The Politics of the Gaze: Between Foucault and Merleau-Ponty Author(s): Nick Crossley Reviewed work(s): Source: Human Studies, Vol. 16, No. 4 (1993), pp. 399-419 Published by: Springer Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20011017 . Accessed: 30/08/2012 02:22 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
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Human Studies ? 1993 Kluwer
16: 399-419, 1993. Academic Publishers.
Printed
in the Netherlands.
The politics of the gaze: Between Foucault and Merleau-Ponty*
NICK CROSSLEY of Sociological
Department Kingdom
Studies, University
of Sheffield, Sheffield S10, United
Introduction of Maurice
The work to find
its way
Merleau-Ponty in social into debates
(and minor)
works
again,
and Smith, 1990; Kruks, common concerns 1989). Two within these texts. On the one hand,
1991; (e.g., Dillon, 1986; and Whiteside,
Johnson
1990; Daunhauer, to a greater or lesser extent, manifest, to dissociate Merleau-Ponty's there is a concern straw from the popular models of phenomenology been
once
This theory/philosophy.1 of a number of of interest is indicated by the recent publication are devoted to a reappraisal of this French existentialist's major
resurgence texts which
have
is beginning,
(1908-1961) and political
existential-phenomeology and existentialism which
and still are attacked
and repeatedly discredited in philosophical was a not circles: of e.g., Merleau-Ponty sociological philosopher was a a he critic of such not he did advocate consciousness, philosophies; notion of the transcendental it; he did not 'centre' the ego, he criticised or in either he decentred terms, it; he was subject philosophical sociological and
not an individualist
or political in either ontological terms; and although he was a political of he critical liberal humanism in humanist, bourgeois terms of both its political-ethical and in terms of its search for implications, or essence a sophisticated the 'inner' nature of humanity. His was
was
humanism
which
humanist
rhetoric
does not disintegrate of the post-structuralists.
* An earlier version of this nars, University of Sheffield, participants for their helpful Maurice Roche and Mich?le
in the face
of
the en vogue
anti
paper was presented at the Theory and Society semi? England, on 7th February 1992. Thanks are due to all comments, especially Nick Stevenson. Thanks also to Davies for their help and comments.
400 The
common
second
in the above-mentioned
theme
work
between
texts
is the com?
and that of the more
Merleau-Ponty's popular of contemporary and (in some theory and philosophy, to surpass and add "new" insight cases at least) the ability of his philosophy to these contemporary themes and thinkers. Amongst the thinkers with
plementarity thinkers and themes
whom
Merleau-Ponty Foucault,2 Habermas
has
been
critically 1989), Derrida
compared
and
are
contrasted
1991; Madison, 1991; (Levin, (Dillon, 1990; and Flynn, 1984), Kristeva (Silverman, 1991), Lacan and Walzer 1991; and O'Neill, 1986), Rawls (Whiteside, 1989). (Levin, are from far Often These analyses comprehensive. they only comparative issues. Nevertheless deal with one or two out of a great many possible they Silverman,
serve
to make
should the point that Merleau-Ponty's philosophy now to but ideas. of defunct" the "interesting history They relegated to the concerns of the contemporary in relationship this work
not
be
situate theory
agenda.
I rejoin the these theoretical this paper stirrings by considering a work for theoretical understand? of and value relevance Merleau-Ponty's the Panoptic mode of the of the of gaze, and more specifically, politics ing In
power described by Foucault (1974, 1979, 1980a) in his Discipline and related papers. Punish, I begin by outlining Foucault's I criticise
Then
power. show how
account
and Panoptic of the Panopticon to I deficiencies. its Finally pointing us overcome to allows these philosophy
this account,
Merleau-Ponty's and how it deepens
deficiencies,
and
our understanding
of the Panopticon
and
in the process.
Panopticism
I will briefly Sartre's consider (1969: 252-302) analysis in terms of an understanding of "the look" and its value are two reasons the for this. In the first instance, There or possible between Sartre's "look" and Foucault's relationship
this
During theorisation
of
Panopticism. relationship
but it has not been discussed; asserted elsewhere Jay stresses similarities be? fundamental the for 190-194), (1986: example, tween the two but only as an aside, whilst Kruks (1990: 187-189), again in as a necessary a brief note, suggests 'look' functions that Sartre's supple? I take up the idea of this possible of Panopticism. to the notion ment "Panopticon"
conceptual damental Panopticon".
has been
I stress the fun? but, contra both Jay and Kruks, relationship "the look" and "the between and incompatibility differences to our to make that Sartre has a minor contribution I conclude
of but that the incommensurability of Panopticism understanding of the with the concept any possibility precludes Panopticon The second or synthesis the concepts. between reinforcement was a both it that "look" is Sartre's starting place and discussing criticism
inMerleau-Ponty's
understanding
of gaze
politics.
his "look" of mutual reason
for
a target of In this respect
401 relevance.
it has contextual
and
Foucault One
the Panopticon
the central
of
reversal
historical
of Foucault's
themes
of what
he calls
and Punish is the Discipline the orders of 'visibility and invisibility'
of penal power. The use of the terms "visible" and the operation texts and other of Foucault's is in this "invisible" 1970, 1973) (e.g., it is these terms which Merleau in terms of this paper because interesting
within
to vision in his later the conditions pertaining issue. of the (1968a) rejects the term Merleau-Ponty analysis philosophical of consciousness, and he replaces because of its connotation "perception" and "the invisible". Given that the terms "the visible" the term with to and that he too was concerned Foucault was a student of Merleau-Ponty Ponty
(1968a)
challenge frequent tion. But
uses
to denote
one might of consciousness, that his the philosophy speculate a deliberate use of these terms constitutes theoretical appropria?
as for it to say that for Foucault, Suffice this is just speculation. or visible' the order of is 'the what is seen, and Merleau-Ponty, visibility is the processes and the practices in the making' involved the invisible of the visible
visible
be clarified
which
are not
a consideration
through and invisibility, of visibility In the ancient regime,
themselves
visible.
of the historical
This
definition
reversal
will
of the orders
to which
I have just referred. functioned its notes, power through a to The of constituted be observed power visibility. operation spectacle by and (individually) the largely anonymous invisible masses. of Ceremonies and torture provide the proof and the illustration of this. public execution Foucault
Foucault notes, effect a power relation ceremonies, their spectacular instil into the observing displays masses. The immediate victims of such ceremonies (i.e., Such
which
through the fear but unobserved the tortured
and
in this process; visible to are, of course, made but, according is only their visibility to the process instrumental of making when visible. Moreover, the power they are not being used to display excesses are (literally) hidden away. A dark and of power, these victims secures their invisibility. secluded dungeon executed)
Foucault,
This ordering of the visible and the invisible, within the power relation, no longer holds in the modern era according to Foucault - or at least not in to penal power. In the modern era it is power which is invisible relationship and anonymous, and it is those who are subjected to it who are visible. Power
in part, by making functions, people of practices which individualise individuals within a field of visibility,
ensemble those
visible.
It involves
a complex constitute
and which persons such that they can be observed
402 and kept under surveillance. The functional value of
such surveillance, within modern power com? means no or is by unified to Foucault's plexes, homogenous according are as however. Surveillance identified analysis techniques having at least in Discipline four functions and Punish. In the first instance, they effect a of capture instrumental
and punishment deviants and are amongst potential we a in what deterrent effect. term, thereby achieving might service the observational effected the Secondly, they exigencies by which "correctional Foucault discusses in Discipline and techniques" certainty
if they are to work, i.e., correctional techniques, require a careful and examination and meticulous observation of subjects, and surveillance in the form of examina? (and particularly techniques provide for this. Thirdly
Punish:
tion techniques) human subjects. effect
they provide a basis for the creation of knowledge to identify an intrinsic Foucault appears Finally,
the surveillance
within
relationship in this paper, is most
concern
the central
itself. This
effect, discussed
which
about power is to be
in Foucault's directly now turn. to It is I this that will of the Panopticon. description description a was is an architectural for which The Panopticon plan prison, produced and prison reformer, Jeremy Bentham. in 1791 by the philosopher Foucault In the first instance he identifies is interested in it for two reasons. the extent
was never actually built but as an The Panopticon it had considerable influence upon the architecture of late
its influence.
of
architectural
plan and early nineteenth (Foucault, 1980a). century public buildings as a historical in "the Panopticon" force then. In the is interested as an ideal or perfect understands the Panopticon instance, Foucault in modern relations involved of of the surveillance technologies
eighteenth Foucault second model
In this sense the Panopticon penal power. the modern for understanding functioning dimension interest with which of Foucault's
is an important heuristic It is this of power.
device second
I am concerned in this paper. a of circular the consists level, arrangement Panopticon From this watchtower of cells, all of which open onto a central v/atchtower. to observe any prisoner, at any time. The lighting arrangement it is possible a prisoner the possibility of blind spots through which in the cells prevents At
the most
basic
render him or herself might side walls of the cell make
invisible
to the watchtower
occupant. And the to each other and
invisible (largely) between them. communication any prevent straightforward certainly use and the of of the watchtower architectural the Furthermore, arrangement ensures on watchtower is that its windows the Venetian blinds occupant invisible he
prisoners
to the prisoner. The prisoner never of information,
is the object
then is, "...seen but he does a subject in communication"
not see; (1979:
200). Power,
in this
sense,
is "visible
but unverifiable"
(ibid.,
p. 201).
The
403 of
visibility
the tower
and
its windows
informs
the prisoner and structure
of
the pos? of the tower
but the blinds that they are being watched or not this actually whether from is the the ascertaining prevent prisoner to Foucault, ex? case. The result of this, according is that the prisoner sibility
a feeling
periences
of constant
surveillance.
And
this
is the very basis of through the realisa?
power is the effect achieved power. Panoptic Panoptic tion that one is subjected to the gaze. It is important to stress at this point that, for Foucault, power in the Panopticon. Human automatically beings are the vehicles do not hold
relations.
it nor constitute
functions
of power the complex Thus, the relays and relations of
its source.
They of bricks, arrangement lights and spaces, and and invisibility which these effect, actually intervene visibility them and them relations, asymmetrical: rendering structuring
into human
seen dyad: in is a machine for dissociating the see/being The Panopticon one ever is the peripheral without seen, totally seeing; in the central ring, ever being seen (Foucault, without 1979: tower, one sees everything
202). And
a situation wherein the surveyed subjects to the power effect, through their very awareness or of the possibility that they could be being watched:
the effect
subjects
of this is to create
him or herself
knowledge
to the field of visibility, is subjected and who knows it, assumes for the constraints of he makes them power; responsibility play spon? he inscribes in himself the power relation in upon himself; taneously which he simultaneously the principle of plays both roles; he becomes his own subjection 1979: 202-203). (Foucault, He who
not matter, in thise sense, who occupies the watchtower. It does not "what motive animates him" (ibid.) Indeed the more numerous and these the greater the prisoner's "anxious anonymous temporary spectators, awareness of being observed" it does not matter if the (ibid.). Moreover, It does
matter
or not. Occupancy is actually being watched of the watchtower and prisoner the apparition of a surveyor which are this effects, to sufficient alone, secure the panoptic effect. A final point which should be noted in this respect is that the watchtower as as well is also subject to it. occupant, being a vehicle of Panoptic power, can be subject to frequent, Prisons and unannounced irregular inspections by an external body (this was Bentham's plan at least) and the field of effected of the Panopticon ensures that through the architecture can be hidden from such Within minutes of her/his any nothing inspector. the whole of the prison and everything arrival, an inspector could observe that is happening within it. Bad or cruel management, like the deviance of visibility
404 has no hiding
the prisoner,
Foucault
place
in the Panopticon.
criticised
is open to many criticisms and objections. His sweeping analysis a powerful and rhetorical whilst communicative aid, style, for example, an inattention to historical often conceals and logical detail. The notion of a in the orders of visibility literal reversal and invisibility within the power
Foucault's
for example, is both historically and logically It insustainable. relationship, in the ancient regime must have utilised could be argued that power the some means of subjects and must have involved of achieving this visibility ever have otherwise been punished because nobody would visibility, they would never be identified for deviance. The Frankpledge system would be a for such
contender
possible
to the modern
ancient it could
surveillance with systems. Moreover, be argued on logical grounds that "the if it is then it has no invisible because
era, respect eye of power" cannot be completely means its effect: people can't be affected of securing own identification aware of its presence. Foucault's of the surveyor presence of this. In this sense, it would
unverifiable" example tedly less
literary and less evocative, relations within power visible-invisible
by it if they are not of the "visible but
in the Panopticon is the historical be more accurate, though undoub? to refer to a shift in the balance of practices,
rather than referring
to a
reversal.
complete
Of more
concern
to me
in this paper however, is Foucault's of analysis his assertion and particularly of the Panopticon, that of his own subjection" "the principle the by making statement in This is problematic, "play upon himself.
the internal working the prisoner becomes effects
of power to Foucault's relationship In the first
Foucault's
aporia.
in two respects. philosophy, there is a problem of inconsistency, and incoherency a as I of the will show in moment, analysis Panopticon,
instance
as to be a subject and posits human subjectivity the prisoner presupposes at to the exercise of when the time for and Foucault, power, necessary prior and Punish, claimed not to presuppose of writing Discipline any substantial could be ex? that subjectivity notion of the subject, and in fact claimed in terms of
plained upon
of power. Foucault and relies presupposes to explain the subject which then. Moreover, is unex? in this analysis remains unelaborated, fundamentally terms In particular, in of Foucault's philosophy. inexplicable
that which
presupposed and plained
the effects
he claims
two stable aspects of subjectivity. presupposes In the first instance he presupposes the subject as sentient This point requires explanation: of visual meaning.
Foucault
and as capable
405 to Foucault's is achieved, in effect, according Panoptical analysis, awareness first instance, the that s/he is through prisoner's being is in turn achieved and this awareness of the watched, through the visibility The
the
In this sense
and its windows.
central watchtower
then it is presupposed that in this context, must amount to a meaning?
is capable of sight. Moreover, subject "sight", amount to more than a mere sense impression. Itmust the
see the watchtower as a watchtower, The prisoner must ful experience. I can be seen'. Foucault 'the point from which presupposes effectively of perception here then, and he constitutes the prisoner phenomenology
as a as
the subject of such a perceptual phenomenology. The issue of the sentient the subject of visual perception, it subject, is not explicitly should be noted, dealt with in any of Foucault's works. Whilst he does analyse the constitution of a new field of visibility and a in The Birth of the Clinic the gaze (Foucault, 1973), this or account the for of sentience analysis possibility meaningful a unitary subject vision. As Deleuze (1988: 13) notes, it simply presupposes of perception. Foucault's of the sentient in the presupposition subject not an of the constitutes in his analysis Panopticon only incoherency structuring
of
does
account unable
not
then, it raises questions to address.
and
issues which
Foucault's
philosophy
is
In the second
and the instance, Foucault presupposes intersubjectivity of this to be needs subject intersubjectivity. Again point explained: In his analysis of Foucault's to French "anti-ocular dis? relationship that Foucault's course", Martin Jay (1986) stresses "gaze" is objectifying I want to suggest that, with respect to the Panop? and not intersubjective. an ticon, the reverse is in fact the case; i.e., that the Panopticon presupposes an rather than has two gaze. This argument intersubjective objectifying it must
be noted that the gaze which the operationalises is not the gaze of the surveyor but is, in fact, the gaze of the The Panopticon does not require that the prisoner is actually surveyed. at looked but only that s/he feels that s/he is, and this feeling, as I being have said above, is secured own the This through prisoner's perception. steps.
Firstly, effect Panoptic
not rule out the possibility that a given prisoner, at a given moment in be in the of the watchtower time, may gaze objectified occupant, but it rules that such objectification is neither necessary nor sufficient for the Panop? ticon to be effective.
does
if we
Now then
are concerned
it is clear
that we
with
cannot
the gaze of the surveyed, of the prisoner, be dealing with an objectifying gaze. The that s/he is being watched, and to be aware of
to reiterate, is aware prisoner, this is to be aware of the presence of
gaze watchtower
the prisoner ocucpant
were
an
of another
subject,
gaze, objectifying as an object, then there could
not of an object. if it constituted be no awareness
If the the of
406 are not
of watching and are not capable are of and of meaning Only subjects capable watching capable as to onself is the and to experience therefore, 'being watched' experience an intersubjective It is to exist within of other subjects. relation? existence
being
watched
because
objects
of meaning.
ship. Moreover, of Foucault's
and this might properly be regarded as a third presupposition this intersubjective involve a clear analysis, relationship must not to between self and other. differentiation It does suffice, experiential non secure the Panoptic that the the of is effect, gaze surveyed subject
as being watched to experience my-self objectifying; a self between and other. distinction of capable
by another
is to be
that my argument concerning intersubjectivity to the practical can be challenged of the through reference invisibility or in not the fact that s/he be and watchtower may watching occupant to be the To this would miss the with argue anyway prisoner. engaging It may
be objected
here
never see the watchtower the prisoner may Although is indicated of this occupant the presence (either truly or falsely) occupant, is an index of The watchtower WATCHtower. watchtower the qua through the maintain that is "an Foucault human presence. Whilst may prisoner it is clear that and never a subject of communication", object of information
point
however.
to the prisoner (if it is to be that s/he is under surveillance, this substructure of intersub? Without
clearly does communicate to the prisoner It communicates
the watchtower effective). that s/he
is an
'object of information'. the feeds off and manipulates, the Panopticon which jective meaning, more a bricks. The collection of than be would power nothing building it is effected within is effected which through the interhuman precisely and communicates. it embodies which meanings As with the issue of the sentient subject, itmust be noted that Foucault's of intersub? cannot provide for an explanation of the possibility philosophy his or of of the then, Again presupposi? subject intersubjectivity. jectivity in terms of his philosophy, tions are not only incoherent they are inex? plicable also. In pointing
I am not subjectivity, or affected of subjectivity that aspects transformed, may denying to this point. Foucault effected through Panoptic power. I have no objection seems to that relations for may effect an Panoptic suggest, example, (1980a) internal policing mechanism (a super ego?): to Foucault's
of
presuppositions
be
Just a constraints. is no need for arms, physical violence, material gaze which each individual under its weight will end gaze. An inspecting eachindividual thus to the point that he is his own overseer, interiorising 1980a: himself and surveillance this over, (Foucault, against exercising 155).
There
407 is no reason,
in terms of my critique, why this should not be the to be recognised case. it would have that in describing But this can the Foucault who presupposes actually subject 'subjectification', it as "inspecting". In an-other gaze, and who can experience experience and there
I have just described. the subject whom to my first central point then, Foucault's of the understanding a it when because is inconsistent Foucault presupposes subject Panopticon a subject and, in fact, to explain the subject as an claims not to presuppose other words, To return
an that this presupposition constitutes of power. It is clear, moreover, a account: it raises the of which his in Foucault's subject question aporia own philosophical cannot account framework for: namely, the subject of effect
but meaningful)
(non-objectifying tivity. I will
perception,
and the subject of intersubjec?
to the question of this subject the second major problem with Foucault's return
however, should be discussed.
I do so shortly. Before account of Panopticism
second major problem with Foucault's analysis of the Panopticon answer the question of why looked that it raises but fails to "being or as Foucault's should be experienced anxiously controlling. analysis The
the Panopticon quite served" or "knowing"
the "anxious
clearly posits that one is subject
is at" of
awareness
to "the field
of being ob? as the of visibility"
It is precisely in this way that the prisoner him/herself and thus become "the principle play upon never And of his own Foucault such yet subjection". explains why or awareness or should have this effect. Why should knowing knowledge very central principle is said to make power
of power.
being aware that one is being looked the effect being described here? How
at have a controlling effect? What is is it achieved? Again Foucault's work raises questions for which it does not, and perhaps cannot, provide answers. to the question of the "weight"of In relationship the gaze, or its controll? Sonia Kruks has that Foucault's effect, (1990: 184-189) ing suggested or could be informed Sartre's analysis (1969: 252-302) supplemented by
detailed
analysis
Sartre's
look
Sartre
describes,
effected Foucault,
of "the look". This
should be considered.
can be the anxiety and tension which quite vividly, awareness one the that at. is looked like Moreover, through being he is clear that one need not be able to see one's surveyor to be
subject to this effect. unobfuscated window secure
point
the effect,
but
cites the breaking of a branch or the sight of an as possible indices of human presence which could it could quite easily be the Panopticon watchtower
He
408 which with
All
he describes. an indication
The
that is important, for Sartre, is being watched.
is that one
is presented
that one
of the look
effect
is described To by Sartre in terms of alienation. as no to is oneself to experience experience longer belonging as an object, oneself but as belonging, in the project of the other. This in our very structure. We are not normally objects of our involves a change "the
own
look"
in Sartre's
awareness,
view. We
"do" and
them as objects of our than having tears us away from this however. Through selves as objects of our own contemplation
rather
control
experience the project possessed Sartre
The
thought. it we come
life and actions, the other
look of
to experience our and awareness. We are divided
we are aware that our actions and experiences Moreover, in the project of the other, which we can and a significance, nor necessarily have access to. We (at least not completely)
and estranged. a meaning
have
neither
live our
our being as not belonging to us therefore. We belong, in part, in of the other, as an object of his/her thought and designs. We are by the other. And we are thereby (again) estranged. a literary
finds
illustration
and elaboration
of
this effect
in the
novels describe and utilise this very (1953, 1957). Kafka's of Joseph K. in The Trial, notion of alienation. The actions and experiences in The Castle, Sartre notes, have meaning and of the Land Surveyor for novels
of Kafka
are also aware that they are objects but the protagonists those protagonists, in the eyes of others, and that their actions have a different meaning and which for these anonymous different surveyors, significance they them? their life and actions, selves do not and cannot know. They experience as not
to them. They feel estranged in belonging completely to not actions and do their because understand experiences they relationship or know the meaning as they exist for the of those actions and experiences therefore,
secures
other. This anonymous the characters. Sartre's gives being would
account
a name
fills
and a more
observed", therefore
which
something detailed Foucault
the alienation of the gap
(which
Kafka
in Foucault's never
awareness
elaborates
ontology sometime
has
been
of
I upon. as a useful
accept and take this name and this description are problems to with There Foucault's analysis. supplement account however. In the first instance
of
It at least
work.
to that "anxious
description refers to but
describes)
Sartre's
This it rests, ultimately, upon a problematic ontology. not much least Sartre's of subject critique, by
the
and colleague, Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1962: pt. 3, ch. 3; 1968a: ch. 2; 1973: ch. 5). I do not have the space to consider these ontologi? is important however, is that Sartre's cal problems here. One point which an anti-social which reduces 'the is look', and interper? ontology ontology more to the basic constitution sonal conflict and objectification of generally, friend
409 the human
condition.
understands
to be an inevitable
What
Sartre
describes
feature
of human
in "the relations
look"
is what
he
and not an effect
of an interactional such as is encounter, through the particularities for in the Panopticon. The specificities of the Panopticon, and provided indeed the machine itself, would be largely irrelevant in Sartre's terms then. There is an incompatibility here between Sartre and Foucault because secured
of being looked at" quite clearly regards the "anxious awareness as being induced by the particularities of the Panoptic mechanism: i.e., "the seen dyad" and consequent of the see/being dissociation situation of the but never a "subject in communica? prisoner as "an object of information"
Foucault
Sartre may provide for a better description of the Panop? tic effect, he does not allow us to understand the Panoptic mechanism. It could of course be that Sartre is right and that the Panopticon is an tion". Thus whilst
because
irrelevance work
on the assumption, is wrong,
that he
him, ensemble
of practices
are estranging
in any case. I will inMerleau-Ponty's various critiques of supported and that "the look" is secured through a specific
all human
and
relations
relations,
of which
the Panopticon
is our ex?
ample.
Merleau-Ponty
and
the gaze
in this paper I have been engaged in a critique of Foucault's of the Panopticon. have criticisms fallen two into In My categories. I have examined the first instance the presuppositions which Foucault's
Hitherto account account
of the Panopticon
involves.
I noted
that he presupposed meaningful perception, and communication, and that he presupposed
a subject of that he presupposed a subject of intersubjectivity a subject with the capability
of self/other distinction of perspectives which goes with (and the reciprocity this - i.e., recognising 'other' as subject). These were presuppositions deemed problematic for two reasons. In the first instance, with the possible of the issues of self, Foucault's exception these presuppositions. It cannot elaborate Foucault
cannot account philosophy upon them. In the second
for in?
uses
this subject qua prisoner, with all that this presup? to account for the operation of power, when, to his poses, according at the time of the of the perspective, power is supposed analysis Panopticon, to constitute and explain Foucault that subjectivity. actually presupposes to explain which he claims a stable subject (of therefore; he presupposes stance,
sorts). Foucault The second
is therefore
logically of Foucault's
incoherent.
account was that it failed to explain problem or controlling being looked at should be anxiety producing, (such as he is criticised here then, for not fulling exploring the says that it is). He
why
410 power. Sartre's theory of "the look" was examined to this problem but whilst his description of "the said to elaborate upon our description of the Panoptic effect in a
of Panoptic mechanics as a possible solution look" was
manner
for a phenomenology of the (one might say that it provided was deemed unsuitable his ontology for an analysis experience),
useful
Panoptic of the Panopticon. In this
section
I will
show
how Maurice
existential Merleau-Ponty's the problems of Foucault's account, our understanding of Panopticism. As a
us to overcome
allows phenomenology and deepen and thus strengthen it should remark here, brief prefatory of the gaze was
not conducted
be
noted that Merleau-Ponty's terms nor do in of the Panopticon, In involve such a notion. sociology
analysis and political his political philosophy of power is extremely weak and his politics fact his understanding seldom a moves am of I not consideration basic relations.3 beyond capital-labour for a new means that Merleau-Ponty of political provides analysis arguing not
then. He
does
strengthen said I will
an account
and
cannot.
that we
I am
already
that his analysis arguing might have: viz. that of Foucault. With this
begin.
can account for meaningful and the That Merleau-Ponty perception and the inter for subjective intersubjectivity subject, and for subject, can an not issue I is which self and of the experience other, fully address and I would themes of his philosophy here. These are principal suggest that sentient
in which but a proper account of the manner them adequately and theorises these issues would understands require much
he deals with Merleau-Ponty more space made
than I have
here. A
few brief
points
on these
issues must
be
however.
is often charged, (1983: 196; 1980a: 117; by Foucault Phenomenology the with notion of a constituting 1980b: 176) amongst others, positing is in and it Foucault consciousness; suggested, by particular (e.g., the practices 1989: 46), that we might do better to examine through which to Merleau-Ponty, In relationship the subject are produced. to amounts and the accompanying corrective is misdirected not how to suck eggs". Merleau-Ponty does your grandmother
and meaning this criticism "teaching
a constituting in any of his analyses consciousness (e.g., of nor a transcen? does he of etc.), presuppose linguistic meaning perception, or a Cartesian In his early work dental ego/subject consciousness/subject. and surpasses of consciousness the philosophy he criticises it, (1962) presuppose
some of its language, and in his later work (1968a) although he maintains the and his project, deepens he radicalises it, very language of the rejects the dates indicate the English of consciousness above (n.b. philosophy touch etc., according There is sentience, i.e., there is vision, publication4). to a substantive to Merleau-Ponty does not amount but such sentience
411 or involve and neither does it presupose consciousness either a a or In any notionof thinking subject. particular, thought mind/body is identified as a property of the body (qua is rejected. Sentience dualism in reversibilities of sensible-sentience; it sees "flesh"5). The body consists can can can be touched, hears and be heard etc. and be seen, touches and notion
of
Moreover,
is keen
Merleau-Ponty habituated body
through
practices.
to
stress
It is a
that perception is effected socio-cultural It is practice.
"done".
The meaning
of perception, for Merleau-Ponty, of the practices is visual The subject of perception and a subject of perception. does not but is effected does through it. This subject's perception perception
result
predate not amount
to thought or "thought about perception", and it however, nor the cogito. Perception is a realisation involves neither objectification of or It is a separation within which the visible. effects (?cart) opening Being,
a seer
a seen.
who is effected subject of perception, through an visual but this is anonymous by perception, meaning meaning a or not It is reflective It is thought-out meaning. 'physiognomic'. only that a subject of thought may be (or practices) through linguistic praxis to this experience and this subject of thought, in turn, must be grafted an from of since the of young self, distinguished experience language and
The
is haunted
children
indicates
(Merleau-Ponty, account This
that
they
do
1979). of perception
not
distinguish
provides
of
Ponty's understanding our encounter with
for
between the first
The most
self
and
other
stage of Merleau fundamental level of
intersubjectivity. for Merleau-Ponty is perceptual. And his others, as objectifying, as thought, or as of the notion of perception rejection the possibility en? that the primordial thought of perception, precludes counter can consist or in its being in some way in alterity being objectified to thought. Perception reducible is an opening and thus myself and the other open onto each other and onto the same world. Each of us is, in relation to the other, (1968a) "carnal This
a visible-seer, audible-listener, tangible-toucher. Merleau-Ponty as "intercorporeal" or (1964: 159-181) refers to this relationship
intersubjectivity". carnal bond, the sensible-sentient affords
access
to the other. When
reversibility one sees
which
holds
as
between
the other, inMerleau subjects, one sees behaviour. And this meaningful terms, Ponty's meaningful access behaviour to the other, it is important to stress here that is, in effect, the carnal bond is not, in Merleau-Ponty's terms, a front behind which
minds (or "true" subjects) might be lurking.He quite explicitly (1962: 352) rejects example: the basis
the notion
to the other is achieved for by analogy i.e., he rejects the notion that I am a mind with a body and that on of seeing bodies which look and act like mine I assume that they that
'access'
412 too must
contain minds.
In the first
instance,
mind,
Two by his does
distance Merleau-Ponty from this view. a of distinction between rejection body and not that behaviour is an outer accept
points
Merleau-Ponty of an inner state. He maintains representation
that behaviour
is what we
are,
it is subjectivity: We must reject the prejudice which makes "inner realities" out of love, to one single witness: hate or anger, leaving them accessible the person who feels them. Anger, facts hidden shame, hate and love are not psychic at the bottom of another's consciousness: or they are types of behaviour are which on of conduct visible from the outside. exist this styles They not hidden behind face or in those gestures, them. Psychology did ot until the day it gave up the distinction between mind begin to develop and body... 1971: 52-53). (Merleau-Ponty, here with such thinkers as Wittgenstein (1953) and Ryle comparison is important is that (1949) is quite apparent. But that is another issue. What access to each other (as subjects) because subjects have immediate subjec?
The
in inner states but rather in perceptible tivity does not consist "styles of conduct". The second point which Merleau-Ponty to make in (1962) wants or to is that this issue the behaviour conduct of the other effects relationship or conduct of the other, for me. The behaviour meaning as im? is experienced maintains, (in the natural attitude) Merleau-Ponty or at least it is insofar as it assumes a commonly mediately meaningful, a (physiognomic)
the behaviour cultural form. One does not first experience of the other to it. The other is not and then, by some secondary action, attribute meaning to (my) thought of him/her. reduced then, ? la Descartes, as a public The existence of language, is crucial for both institution, in and this is an interworld, respect. Language intersubjectivity subjectivity
held
terms. It consists inMerleau-Ponty's in cultural rules and resources which are shared by a community. And it is through participation in this inter? of rules nad utilisation of linguistic world, linguistic through application is that and its that the thinking resources, born, subject thoughts can be is not simply the clothing known both to its self and to the other. Language in Merleau-Ponty's of thought or a tool for thought, (1962) philosophy. force or subject which determines Neither is it an external thought from is the the mode of structured without. very means, very praxis, Language is achieved. And is always therefore, thought thought, through which 'social'
in character.
of 7; (1971: ch. Merleau-Ponty's language analysis was it Merleau Saussure. Indeed the work of is based 1964: 39-97) upon to the French philosophy circuit the work of Saussure Ponty who introduced of later of Unlike the Saussure 1983: Foucault, 198). many (cf. disciples Much
however,
of
Merleau-Ponty
placed
considerable
importance
on
'parole'
or
413 an intersubjective to be a structure, language Speech. He understood so as to of that structure, and objectification avoid reification structure, but, recreated and modified that it is created, he stressed i.e., through praxis, a a not structure for it is is qua thing Merleau-Ponty, speech. Language are and of central The community process. speakers speech regulated then. They create, recreate and modify both for Merleau-Ponty importance as a social as thinking subjects and the structure of language their institution, speech. through with the activity of speech, that It is in connection qua dialogue, his notion of intersubjectivity and inter further develops Merleau-Ponty themselves
of the other, as I have said, can occur to me as well as language is the necessary means of thought. Moreover, the listener are both dependent upon the same source for
The thought to the other because
worlds.
the speaker their access
and
and as to the thought of the speaker (i.e., the spoken utterance), such they may both find out "what the speaker thinks" in the same way and summon the thoughts of the speaker may at the same time. Furthermore, forth thoughts from the listener that s/he has never produced before (or that not
"I did
know
that I knew"
to use
a rather more
mentalistic
turn of
can forge a strong inter subjective In this sense, dialogue bond, an phrase). to participants. And interworld, which has a logic that is strictly irreducible can in absorbed this become process. wholly participants into each other, and we exist through a common Our perspectives merge I am freed from myself, In the present dialogue, world. for the other are are not his: of my making, persons certainly they thoughts though I come or even into do grasp them the moment them. they being, anticipate which my I say And interlocutor raises to what indeed, the objection so that at the I had no idea I possessed, draws from me thought which same time that I lend him thoughts, he reciprocates by making me think too. It is only retrospectively, when I have withdrawn from the dialogue and am recalling it that I am able to reintegrate it into my life and make in my private history... of it an episode (1962: 254). Such
harmonious
social
relations
are not
common
inevitable
and perhaps and the social
not even
however. relations coexistence, Intersubjective can be both conflictual it involves, and alienating. Merleau-Ponty this possibility of conflict and alienation in two ways. In the first explores in his the instance, (1964, 1969, 1971, 1973), he discusses political writings manner are in which concrete the social subjects objectified through which
relations and practices which are constitutive of capitalism and other forms of economic-political domination. In the second instance he considers the effect of "the look" or "the gaze". It is this second point which is of concern in this paper. Merleau-Ponty
generally
adopts
Sartre's
definition
of the look
in terms
414 and "capture" in the perspective of alienation, of the qua self-estrangement of "the look" differs from that of Sartre however, other. His understanding and
it is these differences
the understanding The problem
which
constitute
the basis
of his contribution
to
of Panopticism. 'the look' and
indeed the general problem of others, is for the child, Merleau-Ponty 1968b; argues (1962: 346-365; and more 1979). Drawing upon the work of Piaget, generally specifically of "the mirror that (1989) understanding upon Lacan's stage", he notes for the child because children do not posit a others cannot be a problem of
not a problem
then, the child can from self nor captured by the other because neither feel estranged they do on this In his various writings not experience and alterity. self-hood 'moments' for the birth of the Merleau-Ponty posits different phenomenon, is important but, as I have already of self. Obviously language possibility self and other.
between
distinction
In terms of
language of the child do not distinguish beings, sustained 1979). In his most
the egocentric
noted,
'the look'
that young children, self and other (cf.
suggests between
qua linguistic and detailed consideration of Merleau-Ponty, as the the mirror the issue however, Merleau-Ponty (1968b) posits stage or imaginary me" (ibid., p. 136). point of the birth of the "ideal, fictitious with the specular image of self in the mirror turns the perceiv? Identification a "fictitious me". ing subject back upon itself and gives it an image of self, toMerleau This concept of me, is further relationally according developed, distinction the to self-other But others. this in prepares relationship Ponty, for conflict:
way
... this alienation for the benefit of of the immediate me, its confiscation in the mirror, the me that is visible already outlines what will be the look at him (Merleau of the subject by the others who "confiscation"
Ponty, 1968b: 137). and it point is perhaps the least relevant to the issue of Panopticism, a I made to some extent, to amounts, simple reiteration of the point which or look" the the that alienation earlier: namely, gaze ("the Panop? through between self is dependent ticon effect) upon a subject who distinguishes
This
and
other.
considering formed, through
Merleau-Ponty the operations
can
be
seen
through which these distinctions
and by linking "the look". He makes
visible
to
add
these
to
this
self-other
however, distinctions
to the possibility
the prior
operations
by are
of alienation through which
a feasible possibility. power becomes other processes which after the mirror stage and the various the effect of the look is not of self-hood however, the experience constitute is it necessarily in Merleau-Ponty's inevitable view, and neither likely
Panoptic Even
particularly
if we
are with
those whom
we
know.
The
"moral"
structure
of
415 interhuman
relations
between
in Merleau-Ponty's is view, subjects, between and, as such, involves mutual recognition subjects. address or "hail" (as Althusser, 1976: 47), puts it) each other as i.e., each regards the other as a communicative subject and this
communicative Subjects
subjects: to the other in the form of verbal regard both consists and is made available and non-verbal the gestures ("styles of conduct"). One does not experience other as inaccessible and "capturing" then. The
effect
of
"the
look"
is achieved, for Merleau-Ponty, realised; when we feel that we are
when
this is not individuated recognition in the gaze of the other, when we feel that our actions and and objectified are as if they were "not taken up and understood, but observed expressions an insect's" (1962: 361). The look "takes the place of a possible communica? tion" (ibid.). One party to the encounter as him or herself constitutes
mutual
or as an "inhuman
"inaccessible"
of course,
cate, although, communication"
gaze" (ibid.). They refuse to communi? refusal to communicate is still a form of refusal is a "style of conduct", to it belongs
"The
(ibid.). Such of the carnal-intersubjective, the inner world, and it is only in this way surveyed subject that they are not being as an object. It is only in constituted being the world
not to a mythical intercorporeal, that it can communicate to the
as a subject but are recognised this way, in other words, that the and estrangement objectification, capture.
can experience the refusal to communicate, and the objectification Furthermore, to involves the (surveying) other, according Merleau-Ponty into their their (ibid.): i.e., it involves retreating "thinking being" surveyed
ment culture
subject
in the qua
of an? subject involve?
and more
linguistic intersubjective
that for Merleau-Ponty,
reflective of their specifically practices interworld. The necessary caveat to this point is as for Sartre and Foucault, there is no reason why
look" cannot be secured through an indices of human presence rather than through an actual other. For Merleau-Ponty the fact that it involves the then, the look, despite of objectification, is intersubjectively It is a cultural situated. experience effected in the action of a surveyor and communicated practice, (by virtue of its visible/cultural a to an not It is absence of intersubjec? form) surveyed. the intersubjective fabric. Furthermore, in tivity but a tension or knot within "the
contrast within quence
to Sartre, Merleau-Ponty maintains that "the look" is constituted the particularity of a given situation. It is not an inevitable conse? of a given state of the human condition.
and
Merleau-Ponty In pinning
the
the Panopticon
effect
of
the
look
to
such
specific
interactional
cir
416 for a more suitable understanding of cumstances, Merleau-Ponty provides we what call the human infrastructure of the Panopticon, than Sartre. might illustration
and understanding of "the look", in terms a is far cry from the vastness strangers, admittedly which and individualises houses hundreds machine,
Merleau-Ponty's our encounters
with
the
of of
of Panoptic alienates and controls in a Fordist mass produc? prisoners. The Panopticon of "the look", as Merleau-Ponty tion fashion. But the specificities describes with those described Foucault accord and allows them, by Merleau-Ponty us to understand them. The Panopticon effects and then systematically an intersubjective relation. It places (or knots) subjects within as distance but Foucault then, notes, the (the carnal-intersubjective) seeing seen 1979: 202). (Foucault, by the machine dyad" is dissociated "see/being is effected and stabilised here because the surveyor, qua surveyor, Power is subverts
inMerleau-Ponty's and at the same terms, as an "inaccessible" constituted, the window the time "inhuman" blinded of watchtower gaze; precisely an inaccessible an and communicates and assumes constitutes surveyor, of the possibility form. This effects a permanent6 that negation can be hailed or addressed as a subject of communica? the surveyed-subject of a sustainable the conditions alienation of that tion, and thus secures
"inhuman"
subject. As information,
the (1979: 200) notes, a subject in communication".
Foucault never
surveyed
is "the
object
of
Conclusion describes
Foucault
as a machine. the Panopticon secures in which it its effects
He marvels
(1979, 1981) of human independently In this paper, whilst not denying Foucault's intention or will. claim, I have a to that human the which there is infrastructure Panopticon argued that we examine does not and cannot account for. I have suggested Foucault at
the manner
the human of bricks.
relations And
which
a Panopticon the Panopticon and not a pile to the perceptual I have called attention and character of these relations and this infrastruc?
make
in particular
intersubjective-intercorporeal ture. Such notions are, to some extent at least, inconsistent with Foucault's for an his philosophy does not and cannot provide Certainly philosophy. I that Foucault's have them. of Furthermore, argued understanding account which it awareness" cannot actually for the "anxious philosophy refers that
to and depends the
I have suggested of these problems, a and for rethinking provides I would also add to this that of Panopticism.
upon. In respect of Merleau-Ponty
philosophy recasting of our understanding a deepening and extension in facilitating ticism, Merleau-Ponty's
philosophy
of Panop? of our understanding a and extension for deepening provides
417 of our understanding
of the gaze more
of the politics
generally.
Notes observations are limited to the field of Anglo-American publications. The Belgian philosopher, Rudi Viskar, made similar observations with regard to continental Europe however, at a recent seminar series (on the work of at the held in the department of philosophy Foucault and Merleau-Ponty), of Essex, England. University My own present work concerns a comparative analysis of the work of Foucault on the issue of "politics and subjectivity". Other brief and Merleau-Ponty comparisons can be found in the following publications: Levin (1989, 1991), Kruks (1990), Whiteside (1989), Watson (1984), and Cohen (1984). Humanism and Post-Marxism See my paper Merleau-Ponty, (forthcoming) for a critical analysis of this aspect of Merleau-Ponty's political philosophy. The original date of (French) publication for The Phenomenology of Percep? in France, tion is 1945. The Visible and the Invisible was first published in 1964. posthumously, that a rejction of is concerned, throughout his writings, Merleau-Ponty dualism should not dissolve into an objectivistic reduction of the mind/body human subject qua body. The rejection of mind/body dualism, he notes, not only calls for a rethinking of those phenomena which are conventionally understood to be "mental", it also calls for a rethinking of the body. In his later work (1968), this rethinking takes the form of a theorisation of "the flesh". This concept posits an elemental Being which is neither material or ideal but which includes the dimensions conventionally associated with both sides of this coin. The body, with its reversible aspects of sensible and sentient, is
1. My
2.
3. 4.
5.
as
"flesh",
is
with
language,
its
reversibility
of
meaning,
and
structure,
embodiment. 6.
This
situation
may,
of
course,
be
subverted
if the watchtower
occupant
were
to
break down the blinds on the window and communicate to the prisoner. The effect of the Panopticon is only permanent insofar as the architectural condi? tions
of
the Panopticon
are
sustained.
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