ETHICS SELF
CONCERN
PRACTICE
FREEDOM*
all, I would like to ask what is focus your current thinking. Having followed latest developments your thought, particularly your lectures College France 1981-82 hermeneutics of the subject, would like to know your current philosophical approach is still determined by poles subjectivity Q. First
truth.
actual fact, I have always been interested this problem, even framed somewhat differently. I have tried to find human subject fits into certain games truth, whether they were M.F.
truth games that take model,
form
science
refer
scientific
truth games such as those one may encounter in institutions
control. This is theme book The Order how, scientific scientific discou rses, Things, in which attempted to human subject defines itself as speaking, living, working individual. my courses at College France, I brought this problematic in its generality. practices
Q. Isn't there
"break" between your former problematic and that
subjectivity/truth, particularly starting with the concept
"care
self"?
to that point subject ship between M.F. Up
conceived games
problem of the relation
truth in terms either
coer-
*This interview was conducted by H. Becker, R. Fornet-Betancourt, an A. Gomez Miiller on on Janu ary 1984. appeared in Concordia: Concordia: Revista Revi sta internacional defilosop fil osophia hia translation, by P. Aranov an D. McGrawth, (July-December 1984), pp. g6-u6. has been amended and the footnotes th French text added.
Ethics: Ethics: Subjectivity Subjectivi ty
Truth
cive practices-such as those psychiatry prison s y s t e m - o r theoretical scientific games-such as analysis wealth, lan guage, and of living beings. my lectures College France, I terms of what ma called a practice self; tried to grasp although this phenomenon as not been studied very much, I believe ha been fairly important in societies ever since Greco-Roman period. In Greek Roman civilizations, such practices of the self especially more autonomous than they were much more important were later, after they were taken over to a certain extent by religious, pedagogical, medical, psychiatric institutions. Q. Thus there
been
sort
longer involve a coercive practice,
shift: these games practice
truth
self-formation
subject. right. is what could call ascetic practice, tak ing asceticism a very general s e n s e - i n other words, in sense as exercise self self morality renunciation by which one attempts to develop to attain transform oneself, more gen to a certain mode of being. Here taking asceticism by Weber, for example, eral sense than that attributed to along the same lines. Q. self that work of the self be understood as a cer liberation? tain liberation, as a process M . F . I would be more careful on that score. I have always been some notion liberation, because is what suspicious treated risk falling with precautions and within certain limits, runs back on the idea that there exists a human nature or base that, as a con sequence certain historical, economic, social processes, been concealed, alienated, by mechanisms of repres imprisoned in sion. According to this hypothesis, all that is required is to b r e a ~ these reconciled with himself, redis repressive deadlocks will cover his nature regain contact with his origin, reestablish a full positive relationship with himself. I think this idea should accepted without scrutiny. I trying to say that liberation as such, this liberation, does ot exist: when a colonized peop le that form attempts to liberate itself from its colonizers, this is indeed a practice strict sense. of liberation we know very well, moreover this specific case, that this practice liberation is itself suffi cient to define the practices this freedom that will still needed able to define people, this society, these individuals M.F.
The Ethics
he Concern
Self as a Practice
Freedom
28
acceptable forms existence political society. This emphasize practices of freedom over processes is liberation; they again, latter indeed have their place, seem to to capable by themselves practical forms free defining all dom. This is precisely the problem encountered with regard to sexu ality: does it make any sense to say, "Let's liberate sexuality"? Isn't practices defining freedom by which the problem rather that could define what is sexual pleasure erotic, amorous pas sionate relationships with others? This ethical problem defini practices of freedom, it seems to is much more important tion admissible
than
rather repetitive affirmation that sexuality
desire must
be liberated. Q.
degree
doesn't the exercise
liberation? Yes, absolutely.
practices
freedom require
this is where
must introduce
certain
con analyses I domination. trying to make bear essentially cept power. By this mean something different from states relations M.F.
domination. Power relations are extremely widespread
human
relationships. Now, this means not that political power is everywhere, but that there is human relationships whole range of power rela tions that may come into play among individuals, within families, analysis so on. pedagogical relationships, political life, power relations is extremely complex area; one sometimes encounters what may be called situation states of domination in which the various particpower relations, instead being mobile, allowing ipants to adopt strategies modifying them, remain blocked, frozen. When social group succeeds in blocking field individual preventing any reversibility power relations, immobilizing them military means, is faced with movement by economic, political, is certain domination. such a state, what may be called a state -exist exist only unilaterally freedom that practices extremely constrained limited. Thus, agree with yo that libera political historical condition for a practice tion is sometimes is clear that number freedom. Taking sexuality as example, liberations were required vis-a-vis male power, that liberation necessary from oppressive morality concerning heterosexuality as give rise well as homosexuality. this liberation does happy human being imbued with a sexuality to which the subject could achieve a complete satisfying relationship. Liberation paves
Ethics.' Subjectivity
Truth
power relationships, which must way for controlled by prac freedom. tices form freedom? Q. Can't liberation itself practice mode M . F . Yes, in some cases. ou have situations where liberation free struggle liberation indispensable fo practice dom. With respect to sexuality, for e x a m p l e - a n d am not indulging don't like polemics, think they usually polemics, because Reichian model derived from certain reading of f u t i l e - t h e r e is problem was entirely Freud. Now, Reich's view liberation. somewhat schematically, according to him there is desire, To drive, prohibition, repression, internalization, is by getting of these prohibitions, in other words, by liberating oneself, that problem gets resolved. I t h i n k - a n d know vastly oversimplifying refined positions many a u t h o r s - t h i s much more interesting freedom: How completely misses ethical problem of the practice ca practice freedom? With regard to sexuality, is obvious that desire that is by liberating will learn to conduct ourselves ethi cally pleasure relationships with others. Q. ou say that freedom must be practiced ethically practice freedom, M . F . Yes, for what is ethics, con scious [rijlkhie] practice offreedom? Q. In other words, you understand freedom as a reality that is already ethical itself. M . F . Freedom is ontological condition ethics. ethics is considered form that freedom takes when is informed y reflecti on. Q. Ethics is what is achieved search fo or the care self? Greco-Roman world, M.F. care self was mode which individual f r e e d o m - o r civic liberty, to point-was reflected Ese rijlechie] as ethics. you take whole series texts going from late S t o i c i s m major texts first Platonic dialogues to Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius, that the theme so o n - y o u will care self thoroughly permeated moral reflection. is inter that, esting to societies other hand, at time that is self became somewhat suspect. very difficult to pinpoint, care certain point, being concerned with oneself readily Starting form selfishness self-interest denounced as self-love, a form in contradiction with shown in others self interest to sacrifice required. All this happened during Christianity; however, I simply saying that Christianity is responsible for it. ques-
The Ethics
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28
tion is much more complex, for, with Christianity, achieving one's sal
vation is also a way is attained through
Christianity, salvation renunciation self. There is paradox Christianity-but that is another problem. To come care of the self back to question you were talking about, I believe that among Greeks and Romans-especiall self Greeks-concern with proper prac care of the self were required fo right conduct freedom, tice order to know oneself [se connaitre]-the familiar aspect of the gnothi seauton-as well as to form oneself, to surpass one self, to master appetites that threaten to overwhelm one. Individual Greeks-contrary to freedom wa very important fo common no impor place derived more or less from Hegel that sees it as being tance when placed against imposing totality city. to people around you, another city, slave those governing you, your own
caring for oneself.
fundamental theme.
as
cern with freedom wa
essential
permanent problem or eight
ancient culture. What entire ethics full centuries have here is revolving around the care self; this is what gives ancient ethics it particular form. I am not saying that ethics is synonymous with the care that, self, antiquity, ethics as conscious practice of freedom has revolved around this fundamental imperative: "Take yourself" [soucie-toi de toi-meme]. care Q. assimilation of the logoi, truths. imperative that implies M . F . Certainly. Taking care oneself requires knowing [connaitre] self is, oneself. Care course, knowledge [connaissance] self-this is num Socratic-Platonic aspect-but also knowle dge both truths ber of rules acceptable conduct or of principles that prescriptions. To take care of the sel f is to equip oneself with these truth. truths: this is where ethics is linked to the game Q. ou saying that involves making this truth that is learned, memorized, progressively applied into a quasi subject that reigns this quasi subject? supreme yourself. What is status M.F.
Platonic current
thought,
least at the
Alcibiades, the problem fo subject individual soul is to turn its gaze upon itself, to recognize itself in what is and, recognizing itself truths that issue from that is, to recall what think other hand, the current been able to contemplate; we can broadly call Stoicism, problem is to learn through the teaching number doctrines, some which funtruths
Ethics: Subjectivity
Truth
conduct. Yo must pro each situation and, ceed in such a way that these principles tell yo as were, spontaneously, is here that to conduct yourself. Stoics encounters from from Plu metaphor that comes tarch: "You must learn principles such a constant wa that when fears awake like barking dogs, ever your desires, appetites, logos will speak like voice of the master who silences his dogs with a single cry. Here we have logos functioning, as were, idea logos, your part; you have become without an intervention logos become you. Q. would like to come back to question relationship be reflective tween freedom and ethics. When you say that ethics is part [ta partie rijIechie] freedom, does that mean that freedom ca first always a free aware itself as ethical practice? Is work on oneself to dom that is, so to speak, "moralized," or must freedom? discover ethical dimension ental principles while others
F.
rules
Greeks problematized their freedom, and the freedom
individual, as
ethical problem. ethical sense which Greeks understood it ethos was a way being and of behavior. was a mode subject, along with certain wa act being fo ing, a way visible to others. his cloth person's ethos evident ing, app-earance, gait, in the calm with which every responded event, Greeks, this concrete form so on. For free way they problematized their freedom. pos dom; this as could sessed forward as admired splendid ethos, an example, as someone who practiced freedom in certain way. I don't think that a shift is needed fo freedom to be conceived as ethos; is immediately problematized as ethos. extensive work by self on self is required for this practice freedom to take shape ethos that is good, beautiful, honorable, estimable, memorable, exemplary. Q. Is this where you situate power? analysis think that insofar as freedom or M.F. Greeks signifies non different definition s l a v e r y - w h i c h is quite freedom from is political o w n - t h e problem is already entirely political. that nonslavery to others is condition: a slave as ethics. Freedom is also a political model insofar as thus inherently political. being free means not being a slave to oneself and one's appetites, which means that with respect
oneself one establishes
certain
The Ethics relationship
he Concern
domination,
Self as a Practice
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28
mastery, which was called arkhe,
power, command. As you have stated, care certain sense care fo self is ethothers. In this sense, care of the self is also always ethical, ical itself. M . F . What makes it ethical for is care fo Greeks is that itself; others. care implies complex the self is ethical relationships with others insofar as this ethos freedom is also a way of caring for others. This is wh it important for a free con able to govern his wife, his children, ducts himself as he should to hi household; is also the art governing. Ethos also implies a rela tionship with others, insofar as care of the self enables to occupy his rightful position city, community, interpersonal rela a friend. An tionships, whether as magistrate care self also implies relationship with the other insofar as proper care lessons master. self requires listening to needs guide, counselor, a friend, someone who will be truthful with you. Thus, relationships with others is present throughout the devel problem care self. opment Q. care of the self always aims for well-being others; it aims to manage the space al relationships, to power that exists manage it in a nonauthoritarian manner. What role could a philosopher play this context, as a person is concerned with care for others? example. would greet people M . F . Let's take Socrates as the street or adolescents gymnasium with the question: Are you caring for y o u ~ s e l f ? Fo been entrusted with this mission by go will even when threatened with death. abandon is cares about care of others; this is particular philosopher. case position le simply say that this whole morality was that free man, think postulate same token, took proper care person himself would, by able to conduct himself properly fo others. relation to others A city a city which everybody took proper care himself would this ethical principle it perfound that functioned well don't think can say that the Greek who cares for manence. himself must first care fo others. To mind, this view only came later. Care fo others should not be before care oneself. care self is ethically prior relationship with oneself is that ontologically prior.
Ethics Subjectivity
Truth
self, which possesses a positive ethical mean ing, be understood as sort of conversion power? M . F . A conversion, yes. fact, it is a way control limiting ling power. For is true that slavery is great risk that Greek free resists, there is also another danger that initially appears to be the slavery: abuse of power. abuse of power, opposite exceeds legitimate exercise one's power imposes one's fan tasies, appetites, desires others. Here have the image of the tyrant, simply rich powerful uses his wealth power to abuse others, to impose unwarranted power on them. ca s e e - i n any case, this is what the Greek philosophers s a y - t h a t is slave his appetites. An good ruler is precisely such exercised, that is, exercises his power as ought to simultaneously exercising his power over himself. nd it is over oneself that thus regulates one's power over others. Doesn't care self, when separated from care for oth ers, risk absolute? becoming couldn't this "absoluti zation" of the care of the self become a way exercising power over Q.
this care
others, in the sense of dominating others?
No because exercising a ty risk dominating others rannical power over them arises precisely only when ha taken care of the self ha become slave yo one's desires. take proper care yourself, that is, you know ontologically what you are, you know what you re capable of, you know what it means for you to a citizen a city, to be the master of household in oikos, should you know what things you should fear, yo know reasonably hope fo and, what yo the other hand, what things matter to you, you know, finally, that yo should not be should d e a t h - i f you know all this, you cannot abuse your power over afraid others. Thus, there is danger. That idea will appear much later, when self becomes suspect love perceived as comes to self roots various moral offenses. In this context, renunciation will be the prime form care self. All this is evident Gregory Nyssa's Treatise on Virginity, which defines care self, renunciation all earthly attachments. is epimeleia heautou, as renunciation of all that attachment to love self, earthly self.:; care think that Greek Roman thought self cannot in itself tend toward so exaggerated a form self-love as to neglect others or, worse still, to abuse one's power over them. M.F.
The Ethics Q. Thus
he Concern
is a care
Self as a Practice
self that,
Freedom
28
thinking of itself, thinks of
others?
Yes, absolutely. takes care point of himself to has as master as knowing exactly what duties household enjoys a proper relationship with father will find that husband his wife children. Q. doesn't the human condition, in terms its finitude, playa very important role here? Yo have talked about death: yo afraid death, then you can not abuse your power over others. seems to fear of death, that this problem of finitude is very important; being hurt, is finitude, care self. the heart course. An this is where Christianity, by presenting salvaM.F. a way upsets least disturbs tion as occurring beyond life, balance care of the self. Although, le say again, seek one's salvation definitely means to take care oneself. condi tion required fo attaining salvation is precisely renunciation. Among Greeks Romans, however, given that one takes care of oneself one's life, and that leaves behind is only reputation afterlife expect, care self can be centered entirely what oneself, does, place occupies among oth ers. can be centered totally on the acceptance d e a t h - t h i s will become quite evident late Stoicism-and even, to point, can be, if not become almost desire fo death. At the same time, self which will care for others, least a care beneficial to others. Seneca, fo example, it is interesting to note importance end, so old, le us hasten toward the theme, let us hurry that moment may thereby come back to ourselves. This type before death, when nothing more can happen, is different from expect salvation desire fo death finds among the Christians, is like a movement to rush through life to point through death. where there is no longer anything ahead but the possibility of death. Q. would like to turn to another topic. your lectures College France you spoke about relationship between power knowledge [savoir]. talking about ow yo relationship tween subject truth. Are these pairs concepts-power-knowledge some way? subject-truth-complementary M.F. As I said when we started, I have always been interested in truth. relationship between subject problem mean, how does subject fit into a certain game first problem truth? M.F.
Ethics: Subjectivit examined wa
Truth
as problematized, starting certain time and following certain processes, as illness falling under cer this game tain model of medicine. How was subject placed truth defined by a medical model or a knowledge? An it was while working this analysis that I realized that, contrary to what wa rather common practice at that time (around the early sixties), this phenom enon could not be properly accounted for simply by talking about ide ology. fact, there were practices-essentially widespread use of wh
madness
been developed starting at the beginning of
incarceration which
seventeenth century, and had been
subject problem
this type
institutions
condition fo
truth g a m e - t h a t sent
insertion
back to
power much more than to the problem
ideology. This is what to pose problem of knowledge power, which fo is instru fundamental problem ment that makes possible to analyze the prob lem of the relationship truth what seems to me the most precise way. between subject Q. you have always "forbidden" people to talk to you about general? subject explain M . F . No, I have "forbidden" them. Perhaps with myself adequately. What rejected wa starting idea theory of the subject-as is done, fo example, phenomenology this theory, asking how a given existentialism-and, basis form knowledge [connaissance] wa possible. What wanted to try to show wa ho subject constituted itself, in one specific form another, as a a healthy subject, as a delinquent nondelinquent subject, through certain practices that were also games truth, practices power, so on. I to reject a priori theories subject order to analyze relationships that ma exist between the subject different forms subject and games constitution power, so on. truth, practices Q. That means that a substance. subject is this form is not prima M.F. is a substance. is a form, rela rily always identical to itself. Yo have the same type tionship to yourself when yo constitute yourself as a political subject goes to vote speaks seeking to meeting and when you fulfill your desires a sexual relationship. Undoub tedly there relainterferences between these different forms subtionships ject; dealing with the same type subject. we are each case, plays, establishes different type of. relationship to oneself.
The Ethics
he Concern
Self as a Practice
Freedom
is precisely historical constitution these various forms truth which interests subject relation to games Q. the mad, the ill, the delinquent subject-and perhaps even sexual subject-was subject that wa object theoretical discourse, let us say a "passive" subject, while subject you have been speaking about over the past two years your lectures at the College France is "active," a politically active subject. care self concern s al political practice so problems government, on. would seem, then, that there ha been a change for you, a change perspective problematic. M.F. it is indeed true that constitution subject considered consequence a system pas coercion-this is sive subject-you know very well that the subject not an unfree subject, mentally sub person is constituted as that ject preCisely relation to over against declares history psychiatry mad. Hysteria, which was so important in in to very asylums of the nineteenth century, seems to picture subject is constituted as subject. nd is cer ho tainly accident that the major phenomena of hysteria were observed those situations where there was a maximum precisely coercion to force individuals to constitute themselves as mad. On the other hand, now interested in ow subject constitutes would say that active fashion through practices self, these practices itself in something invented by the individual himself. They re nevertheless finds hi culture models that ar proposed, suggested, by his culture, his society, his social group. imposed upon Q. deficiency in your would seem that there is something problematic, namely, in the notion of resistance against power. Which itself care presupposes a very active subject, very concerned with philosophically. and of others and, therefore, competent politically M.F. This brings us back t what mean by power. I problem scarcely use I use word power, occasion it is simply as ower. expression generally use: relations shorthand fo speaks there are readymade models: when power, people imme diately think a political structure, government, dominant social class, slave, so on. I this master thinking human rela all when speak relations power. mean that tionships, whether they involve verbal communication such as we are engaged in this moment, amorous, institutional, economic rela An
Ethics: Subjectivity
Truth
tionships, power is always present: mean a relationship which other. So I conduct of speaking person tries to control different forms; these power relations that exist at different levels, relations ar mobile, they modified, they are not fixed once for all. Fo example, fact that may be older than you, and that yo initially have been intimidated turned around during ay course conversation, up being intimidated before is younger than someone precisely because m. These power relations are thus mobile, reversible, unstable. should also noted that power relations ar possible only insofar as subjects free. other's disposal them were completely became hi could wreak boundless thing, object limitless viowhich lence, there wouldn't any relations power. Thus, order fo power relations to come into play, there must be least certain degree of both sides. Even when freedom power relation is completely balance, when can truly claimed that side has "total power" other only insofar as over other, a power ca exercised over killing himself, option leaping out the other still as win power relations dow, killing the other person. This means that possibility resistance because there is necessarily there were no possibility resistance (of violent resistance, flight, deception, strategies capable reversing situation), there would be no power relageneral form, I refuse to reply to tions all. This being question power is everywhere, there is freesometimes asked: "But power every social field, dom." answer that if there are relations dom this is because there is freedom everywhere. course, states ination do indeed exist. In great many cases, power relations fixed perpetually asymmetrical allow such a way that they extremely limited margin of freedom. To take what is undoubtedly very simplified example, one cannot sa that only conventional marital structure of the eighteenth wielded power in quite a few options: they could and nineteenth centuries; women deceive their husbands, pilfer money from them, refuse them sex. Yet they were still (!. state of domination insofar as these options were reversing situultimately only stratagems that never succeeded they economic, social, institu ation. In such cases of domination, tional, sexual, th problem is knowing where resistance will develop. Fo example, a working class that will resist domination, will this political parties; and what form will t a k e - a strike, be in unions
The Ethics
he Concern
general strike, revolution, uation
domination, all
Self as a Practice
0/ Freedom
parliamentary opposition? In such a sit-
these questions demand specific answers
that take account of the kind.and precise form of domination
tion.
9
ques-
power everywhere, thus there is claim that "you absolutely inadequate. room fo freedom" seems to idea that domination that controls everything leaves power is a system room or freedom cannot attributed to Q. Yo were talking before about free the philosopher as two different modes· care of the self. care self of the philosopher would have a specificity that cannot be confused with that of the free man. M.F. would say that these figures represent tw different places care self, rather than two forms self. I believe care intensity, such care remains the same, but in terms that the form in zeal for self, and, consequently, also for others, degree just any free man. that place of the philosopher is Q. Is there ca make this point between fundamental link philosophy politics? relationship between philosophy M . F . Yes, certainly. I believe that is certain that takes an politics is permanent and fundamental. history care relationship the self in Greek philosophy, with politics is obvious. And it takes a very complex form: hand, you have, for example, Socrates as well as Plato in Alcibiades4' Memorabilia - g r e e t i n g young men, saying to and Xenophon them: "You want to become a politician, to govern a city, to care fo others, yo haven't even taken care yourself. you care for yourself you will make poor ruler." From this perspective, care also ontological condition of the self appears a pedagogical, ethical fo development good ruler. To constitute oneself as a governsubject implies that ha constituted oneself as a subject cares for oneself. Yet, on have Socrates saying in other hand, Apology that he approaches everyone because everyone has to take care performing highest himself;6 doing so, I he also adds, service for city, and instead of punishing you should reward even more than yo reward winner Olympic Games."7 a very stron g connection between philosophy politics, Thus we which was to develop further when philosop her would care only fo soul citizen fo that of the prince. philosopher becomes spiritu al adviser prince's counselor, teacher,
294
Ethics: Subjectivity
Q. Could
wa what
problematic thinking about politics,
Truth
care of the self be at the heart form
politics different from
know today?
got very far in this direction, I would very much like to come back to more contemporary questions to try to be made all this in the context of the current political what I have political thought of problematic. impression that in nineteenth century-and perhaps one should go back even farther, Hobbes-the political subject to Rousseau conceived essentially as a subject law, whether natural positive. On the other hand, seems to that contemporary political thought allows very little room fo ethical subject. I don't like to reply question to questions haven't studied. However, I would very much like to questions I examined through ancient culture. come back to Q. What is philosophy, which relationship between the path leads to knowledge of the self, a n ~ the path spirituality? spirituality I m e a n - b u t sure this definition can hold M.F. for very l o n g - t h e subject's attainment of certain mode being transformations that subject must carry itself to attain this mode being. I believe that spirituality philosophy were iden tical nearly identical in ancient spirituality. any case, philosophy's self, with knowlmost important preoccupation centered around edge [connai5sance] serving, most often, world coming after to support self.· Reading Descartes, is remarkable care find Meditations this same spiritual concern with attainment being where doubt was no longer possible, and where mode could finally know [connai't].B by thus defining mode of being to which philosophy gives access, realizes that this mode being terms of knowledge, and that philosophy turn is defined entirely is defined development knowing [connaissant] terms of of what qualifies subject, subject as such. From this perspective, it seems to functions ofspiritu that philosophy superimposes ality upon the ideal grounding for scientificity. Q. Should care of the self in the classical sense concept be updated to confron t this modern thought? so just to say, We have M . F . Absolutely, would certainly self; so here, here is, unfortunately forgotten about care key to everything." Nothing is more foreign to than the idea that, at a certain moment, philosophy went astray forgot something, M.F.
admit that I have
The Ethics
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its history there is principle, foundation that must be rediscovered. I feel that all such forms analysis, whether they take a radical form claim that philosophy has from outset whether they take much more historical view been a forgetting, philosopher forgot s o m e t h i n g " say, "Such point such useful. Which neither of these approach es is particularly interesting does mean that contact with such such philosopher some would produce something, emphasized that must thing new. Q. This leads truth to ask: should one have access to sense other words, in today, to truth in the political sense, political strateg directed against various "blockages" of power in system relations? M . F . This is indeed a problem. After all, why truth? Why are we con care of the self? And why cerned with truth, and more so than with must care of the self occur only through concern fo truth? that somewhere
think
touching on
fundamental question here, what
would
call th question fo West: How did it come about that all West culture began to revolve around this obligation of truth which different forms? Things being as they are, nothing so far taken a lot ha shown that is possible to define a strategy outside this con cern. is within field obligation to truth that it is possible to move about ay another, sometimes against effects truth be linked to structures institutions domination which entrusted with truth. To greatly simplify matters, there are num erous examples: there been whole so-called ecological m o v e m e n t - a very ancient one, by way, that did not just start in the twentieth opposition, as century-that often were, to a science or, least, to a technology underwritten by claims to truth. this same ecology articulated its own discourse truth: criticism was authorized balance name of knowledge [connaissance] nature, life processes, so on. Thus, escaped from domination of truth by playing a game that was totally different from truth game by playing playing another game, same game differently, another hand, with other trump cards. I believe that the same holds politics; here one can criticize on the basis, for true in order domination caused by state example, of the consequences so by playing a unjustified political situation, one can only certain game truth, by showing it consequences, by pointing
Ethics: Subjectivity that there
Truth
other reasonable options, by teaching people what they
don't know about their
situation, their working conditions,
their exploitation. Q. With regard to
question
games truth and games don't yo think that there can be found history evidence ular kind of these games of truth,
that
as
relation to all other possible games of truth
by its essential openness, it
power, partic
particular status
power, opposition to all blockages
is marked power
power here meaning domination/subjugation? games Yes, absolutely. when I talk about power relations absolutely saying that games truth are just contruth, cealed power r e l a t i o n s - t h a t would be horrible exaggeration. problem, as I have already said, is in understanding truth games they relations. connected with ca show, for example, that the medicalization of madness, in other words, medical knowledge [savoir] around individuals organization as connected with whole series social designated as mad, economic processes a given time, also with institutions practices power. This fact wa impugns the scientific validity psychiatry: does endorse psychitherapeutic effectiveness atry, but neither does it invalidate it. is also true that mathematics, for example, is linked, albeit a completely differen manner than psychiatry, to power structures, only in way is taught, way which consensus among mathematicians is organized, functions closed circuit, its values, determines what is good (true) (false) wa means that mathematics is only mathematics. This in power, truth mathematics is linked that the game game an w a y - t o certain w a y - w i t h o u t thereby being invalidated games some cases these power. is clear that institutions connections could write mathe such that entire history matics without taking them into account, although this problematic is always interesting even historians begin mathematics re history ning to study their institutions. Finally, it is clear that games truth exist between power relations connection that is psychiatry; an in mathematics is totally different from what case, nothing games truth simply cannot say that games power. Q. This question takes us back to subject because, problem is question with games knowing ho is speaking truth, M.F.
The Ethic
truth, how
0/
he Concern
speaks it,
can play speaking truth is game. M.F.
word "game" ca
Self as a Practice
speaks it. For, truth: there is game,
Freedom
games
plays
'2
9
truth,
truth
lead you astray: when I say "game,"
rules by which truth is produced. is game sense procedures that lead to certain amusement; it is a result, which, basis its principles rules of procedure, may invalid, winning losing. be considered valid Q. There remains the problem of "who": Is a group, a body? group M.F. individual. Indeed, there is problem can see that here. With regard to these multiple games of truth, ever since ag society Greeks been marked by imperative definition lack a precise games truth which exclusion ali others. a given game re permitted to truth, it is always possible to discover something different an to more less modify this entire game of truth. that rule, and sometimes even This ha undoubtedly given West possibilities for development found speaks truth? Free individuals other societies. establish a certain consensus, find themselves within cer tain network practices constraining institutions. power Q. So truth is construction? games of truth which truth is a conM . F . That depends. There struction others which it is not. One can have, for example, describing things such such a way: game truth that consists anthropological descrip tion a society supplies person giving construction description, which itself certain number historically changing rules, so that sa that is to a certain extent a construction with respect to another description. This does the imag mean that there's just a void, that everything is a figment ination. On the basis said, for example, about this transwhat ca formation games truth, some people conclude that I have said that nothing e x i s t s - I have been seen as saying that madness does exist, whereas converse: was a question problem is absolutely knowing how madness, under various definitions that have been given, was at particular time integrated into institutional field that constituted it as mental illness occupying a specific place alongside other illnesses. At prob heart of the problem truth there is ultimately communication, transparency words a discourse. mean
Ethics: Subjectivity person who ha
Truth
capacity to formulate truths also has a power, in the wa to express the power of being able to speak truth wants. M.F. Yes, mean that what the person says is yet this does true, which is what most people believe. When you tell people that power, they say: "So it relationship between truth there isn't truth after all!" Q. This is tied up with problem of communication because, society where communication transparency, reached high level power. games structures truth ar perhaps more independent think important problem; imagine yo M.F. This is indeed a little about Habermas when you say that. I quite interested his work, although know completely disagrees with my views. a little more in agreement with what While I, for my part, tend to says, I have always gives communica problem insofar as tive relations this place which is so important and, above all, a function that would call "utopian." idea that there could exist a state truth to circulate freely, communication that would allow games coercive effects, seems utopian to me. This without any constraints that power relations are not something that is precisely a failure to is itself, that have to break free of. I think that a sociby that one means the strate et an exist without power relations, gies by which individuals try to direct control conduct others. to try to dissolve them utopia com problem, then, is pletely transparent communication to acquire rules law, also morality, practice management techniques, ethos, power with as little self, that will allow us to play these games domination as possible. told us power is evil. Q. Yo ar very far fr om Sartre, M.F. Yes, that idea, which is very far from my way of thinking, has often been attributed to evil. Power is games Power is strategy. all know that power is evil! For example, let us take amorous relationships: to wield power over the other in a sort sexual situation may of open-ended strategic game where reversed is evil; it's a part of love, passion sexual pleasure. And take, as another example, something that has often been rightly critipractice c i z e d - t h e pedagogical institution. I see nothing wrong in truth, a specific game person who, knowing more than others tells those others what to do, teaches them, transmits knowledge
The Ethics
he Concern
Self as a Practice
Freedom
techniques to them. problem in such practices where p o w e r itself b a d ' t h i n g - m u s t inevitably come into play is which is kind to avoid knowing ki is domination effects where subjected arbitrary a teacher, unnecessary authority thumb under a professor abuses his authority. student I believe that this problem must law, rules framed in terms rational techniques of government and ethos, practices of the self freedom, Q. Ar
to take what you have just said as fundamental criteria what you have called a ethics? is question playing with as little domination as possible fact, hinge point ethical concerns M . F . I believe that this is, political struggle for r espect rights, critical thought against abusive techniques research ethics that seeks to government ground individual freedom. Q. When Sartre speaks of power as
be alluding to
reality
supreme evil, he seems to
power as domination.
this point yo
probably in agreement with Sartre. defined, so M . F . Yes, I believe that al these concepts have been is talking about. even sure that one hardly knows what used the right words, when I first became intermade myself clear, power. I have a clearer sense of probested in the problem lem. that must distinguish between power relations seems to understood as strategic games between liberties-in which some try to conduct others, turn try to avoid allowing their control controlled try to control conduct to conduct of the o t h e r s and the states domination that people ordinarily call "power." two, between games of power states of domination, between you have technologies course, in a very government-understood, only wa institutions broad sense that includes governed also wa governs one's wife analysis children. these techniq ues is necessary because it is very often through such techniques that states of domination are established maintained. There power: strategic relations, techniques re three levels to my analysis states government, domination. Q. In your lectures on hermeneutics of subject there is a passage first only useful point resistance which you say that relationship of self to to political power is in self. believe that the only possible p o i n t o f resistance to M.F.
Ethics: Subjectivity
Truth
political power-understood, course, as a state domination-lies relationship of the self to self. I saying that "governmen tality" implies relationship self to itself, intend this concept of "governmentality" to cover whole range of practices that constitute, define, organize,
instrumentalize
strategies that
individuals dealing with each other. Those their freedom ca others are tr to control, determine, limit freedom themselves free individuals their disposal certain instru have use to govern others. Thus, basis for all this is freements they relationship to self to itself dom, relationship other. Whereas, you try to analyze power not on basis freegovernmentality, basis of the political dom, strategies, institution, you can only conceive the subject as a subject law. as as had these does then a subject have rights, rights either granted political society; removed by institution subject. an all this brings us back to a legal concept other governmentality makes possible hand, I believe that the concept to bring subject it relationship to o t h e r s freedom very stuff [matiere] ethics. which constitutes Q. you think that philosophy has anything to say about wh there others? is this tendency to try to control conduct way conduct M.F. o t ~ e r s is controlled takes very different forms intensity arouses desires appetites that vary greatly society. I don't know anything about anthropology, depending control an well imagine societies which conduct advance that, game is others is so well regulated sense, already over. a society like own, games the other hand, very numerous, and the desire to control conduct others is g r e a t e r - a s we see al family relationships, fo example, freer people with sexual relationships. However, emotional respect to each other, more they want to control each other's 'conmore appealing duct. fascinating more open the game, becomes. Q. yo think role philosophy is warn of the dangers power? M.F.
This
as always been an important function
philosophy.
its critical a s p e c t - a n d mean critical in a broad sense-philosophy is that which calls into question domination at every level every form which it exists, whether political, economic, sexual, institu-
The Ethic
he Concern
Self as a Practice
Freedom
what have you. To a certain extent, this critical function tional, philosophy derives from Socratic injunction "Take care yourself," other words, "Make freedom your foundation, through the mastery yourself." NOTES Plato, Alcibiade, trans. M. Croiset (Paris: Belles Lettres, 1925), pp. 109-110 [Alcibiades, trans. W. R. M. Lamb, in Plato (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, 1967), vol. 12, pp. 210-13]. 2
Plutarch, De la tranquillite de ['arne, trans. J. Dumortier an J. Defradas, in Oeuvres Morales (Paris: Belles Lettres, 1975), vol. 3, pt. 465c, p. 99 [Tranquillity Mind, in The Complete Plutarch: Essays an Miscellanies, ed W. L. Bevan (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, Works 1909), vol. 2, pp. 28)-84]. Th citation is an inexact paraphrase
.,
Gregory of Nyssa, Traite de la virginite, trans. M. Aubineau (Paris: Cerf, 1966), ch. 13, 303c-305c, pp. 411-17 [Treatise on Virginity, in Saint Gregory Nyssa: Ascetical Works, trans. V. W. Cal lahan (Washington, D.C. : Catholic Universities of America Press, 1966), pp. 46-48].
4
Plato, Alcibiade, 124b, p. 92; 127d-e, p. 99 [Alcibiades, pp. 173-75; p. 189].
5
Xenophon, Mimorables, trans. E. Chambry (Paris: Garnier, 1935), bk. 3, ch. 7, §9, p. 412 [Memorabilia, trans. A. L. Bonnette (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1994), bk. 3, ch. 7, §9, p. 91].
6
Plato, Apologie de Socrate, trans. M. Croiset (Paris: Belles Lettres, 1925), 30b, p. 157 [Socrates' Dqense (Apology), trans. H. Tredennick, in Plato: The Collected Dialogues, eds. E. Hamilton an H. Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), 30b, p. 16].
7
Plato, Apologie de Socrate, 36c-d, p. 166 [Socrates' Dqense (Apology), 36c-d, pp. 21-22]. R. Descartes, Miditations su la philosophie premiere in Oeuvres (Paris: Gallimard, 1952), PP.253-334 [Meditations on First Philosophy, trans. an cd J. Cottingham (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996)].
