The Future Actions Series
The Culture of Global Jihad: Character Charac ter,, Future Challeng Challenges es and Recommendations Jeffrey B. Cozzens October 2008
About the Future Actions Series
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he Future Actions Series features informative papers by leading security experts aiming to address some of the key long-term challenges posed by counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation. Borne out of the 2008 International Terrorism Terrorism and Intelligence Conference on 9-10 June in London, the series responds to the need to look beyond day-to-day threat analysis to identify emerging challenges and develop strategies for addressing them. Each paper ocuss on a spcic challng, providing a bri assssmnt o its natur, how it will volv, and how to rspond to it. As w hav larnd, building orward-looing, ctiv ramwors or approaching counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation requires intricate coordination among th diplomatic, militar, intllignc and law norcmnt communitis, communitis, as wll as coopration btwn th public and privat sctors. Our hop is to advanc th stratgic dialogu within and btwn ths aras and to provide a valuable reference for policymakers and practitioners. Future Actions is co-published by Eden Intelligence and the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR). Edit Vanessa Haas King’s College London Editial Assistat Katie Rothman Project Manager, International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR), King’s College London Editial Bad Gavin McNicoll Director, Eden Intelligence, London
Dr. Peter R. Neumann Director, International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR), King’s College London Dr. Magnus Ranstorp Research Director, Centre for Asymmetric Threat Studies, Swdish National Dnc Collg To ordr hardcopis or contact th ditor, plas writ to
[email protected]o. All paprs in th Future Actions Series can b downloadd r o charg at .ics.if and .edeitelligece.cm. 1
About Jeffrey Cozzens
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effrey Cozzens heads Areté Associates’ Terrorism Studies and Analysis Program. Areté supports the U.S. Departments of Defense and Homeland Security, and the Intelligence Community. Also PhD candidate at the University o St Andrws, J’s rsarch xplors th nxus o Wstrn jihadists’ culturs and operational decision-making. decision-making. He has published on jihadist thought and violence in acadmic and prossional journals, and has authord chaptrs in two boos: Mapping Trrorism Rsarch (2007) and Trrorism in th Inormation Ag—Nw Frontiers (2nd edition, forthcoming). Jeff is a Member of the Homeland Security Studis Board at Danil Wbstr Collg (Nw Hampshir). This wor is th author’s alon, and dos not ncssaril rct th opinions of Areté Associates or its clients.
Summary
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he attitudes, values and beliefs central to the Global Jihadi Movement – its ‘cultur’– prsnt a varit o thrats to Wstrn govrnmnts. This cultur’s belief-based narrative, alternative victory metrics and varied structural manifestations, for example, present multiple strategic and operational challenges. Som Wstrn countr-trrorism approachs – including thos o th Unitd Stats – appear particularly vulnerable, as they might inadvertently exacerbate the threat. Lt unaddrssd, ths challngs will incras in complxit, scop, and possibl, severity. Attacking core features of global jihadi culture, taking steps to safeguard the US public’s condnc in th govrnmnt’s countr-trrorism stratg and ctivl lvraging Islamist “dcision-brors” ar svral was to o-st ths challngs.
The Culture of Global Jihad: Character, Character, Future Future Challenges and Recommendations By Jeffrey B. Cozzens
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ignicant utur trrorist thrats to th Wst will manat rom th atomisd “cultur” o global jihad. I dn this cultur as sociall rinorcd attituds, valus and blis shard b most jihadi Salas 1 that motivate and shape its violent activism and constitute a “tool box” 2 or its warar. This is so bcaus th cultur o global jihad is largl asmmtric in comparison to its Wstrn nation-stat rivals: there is an absence of a common basis for comparison in its character— not just tactics—which nabls this trnd to oprat and grminat in th ac o Wstrn countr stratgis. This asmmtr originats largl rom th global jihad’s bli-basd bli-basd narrativ, paralll dnitions o victor and non-linar global prsnc. Ths charactristics o global jihadi cultur will motivat and shap utur thrats to th Wst (spciall th Unitd Stats), including: 1) th dangr that th global jihadi movement’s (GJM)3 complx and insidious charactr could diminish condnc in Wstrn govrnmnts, and 2) th possibilit that Wstrn jihadis will incrasingl dtrmin that ghting in thir Wstrn homlands is as lgitimat as ghting in traditional “zons o jihad”. Waning global jihadi cultur b undrmining its cor attitude, values, and beliefs; developing national consensus on the nature and aspirations o th thrat; and daling pragmaticall with inuntial Islamist voics ar among th bst options or contnding with ths thrats.
Organisation Part on o this papr xplors th natur o global jihadi cultur, and discusss wh it poss an intrinsic challng to th Wst. This discussion cntrs on its stratgic, 1
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I us th trm ‘jihadi Sala’ Sala’ to dscrib thos who ollow th idas and and mthods mthods o al-Qa’idah. al-Qa’idah. It is usd sl-dscriptivl b militants to idnti thos or whom ghting is an obligator mans to ‘defend’ the unity ( tawhid tawhid ) o God’s political and spiritual lordship, which b dault mandats ghting against nominall Muslim rgims, rplling non-Muslim actions rom ‘Islamic’ lands, and defending the global Muslim community ( ummah ( ummah ) through violnc without rspct to political boundaries. S Ann Swidlr, ‘Cultur in Action: Smbols and Stratgis ’, American Sociological Review, Review, Vol. 51 (April 1986). I dn dn th global jihadi jihadi movmnt movmnt as as th iconic individuals, individuals, social social ntwors ntwors and multiactd supportiv structurs that incubat, rn, and promot th cultur o global jihad. 3
structural and idological pculiaritis, which cumulativl ma th GJM altogthr dirnt rom th stats opposing it. Part two posits potntial utur challngs challngs nabld b ths asmmtric charactristics, with a spcic ocus on how ths might impact the US. Part three offers prescriptive measures to tackle these potential threats. This three-tiered approach is necessary because countering future threats effectively cannot be divorced from understanding their essential qualities.
PArT onE A fRAMeWORk fOR UNDeRSTANDING THe ASyMMeTRy Of THe GLOBAL JIHADI THREAT
futur thrats rom th GJM will not aris in a vacuum. Prdicting and countring thm bgins with undrstanding thr ssntials o global jihadi cultur and th was in which ths sparat th movmnt rom its Wstrn rivals. Ths critical dirncs hav and will contribut to an nvironmnt in th US and Uk in which misundrstanding, misundrstanding, misdiagnosis, and oprational surpris ourish. futur jihadi thrats will thriv in this nvironmnt li a laborator incubating pathogns.
The Asymmetry of Belief The primary source of asymmetry separating—and in some sense, inoculating—the cultur o global jihad rom Wstrn countr-trrorism orts is its sociall rinorcd rational beliefs 4. These beliefs center on a divine mandate or contract 5 to ght tawhid (and die) in God’s path in order to establish Islam and protect God’s unity ( tawhid ) in govrnanc and worship in xchang or guidanc and blssings or both th individual mujahid (th on who ‘strivs’ or ghts) and th Muslim communit. 6 They also manifest themselves operationally, impacting the target selection process, for example, and other choices in combat, including suicide tactics. 7 By contrast, th libral dmocratic traditions at th hart o Wstrn countrterrorism efforts emphasise political objectives, military means subordinate to political nds, and slow-moving buraucracis dsignd to rgulat and coordinat countr-trrorism countr-trrorism orts. Wstrn govrnmnts gnrally struggl whn it coms to approaching th bli-basd ramwor that undrpins th GJM.8 A primary reason is bcaus ralism, th long-dominant modl or undrstanding and contnding with the behaviour of nation-states, is poorly suited to understanding and countering non-state threats motivated largely by belief. 9
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S Quintan Quintan Witorowicz Witorowicz and karl kaltnthalr kaltnthalr,, “Th Rationalit o Radical Islam,” Islam,” Political Scinc Quartrl 121:2 (Summr 2006), 295-319. See David Cook, Understanding Jihad (Los Jihad (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2005). S Cathrin Wssingr’s modl modl o Rvolutionar Millnnialism in Jr Cozzns, “Approaching al-Qaida’s al-Qaida’s Warar: function, Cultur, and Grand Stratg,” in Magnus Ranstorp (d.), Mapping Terrorism Terrorism Research (London: Routledge, 2007). Mohammd M. Haz, “Martrdom Mtholog in Iraq: How How Jihadists fram Suicid Trrorism in Videos and Biographies,” Terrorism Terrorism and Political Violence, Violence, 19:1 (April 2007), pp. 95-115. As opposd opposd to th largl largl unid narrativ o o th global jihadis, a cacophon cacophon o voics rom rom within and without th US and Uk or wildl dirnt approachs to undrstanding and contnding with this aspct o th thrat. A cross-sction o ths voics was witnssd during th 2008 London ITI Conrnc, Conrnc, or xampl, which rprsnts on signicant ocal point or th Uk-US discours on countering global jihadism. See J. Peter Pham, “Rapid Reaction: Religion and and Realism Realism After 9/11,” The National Interest online, online, 11 Sptmbr 2007, at: http://www.nationalintrst. http://www.nationalintrst.org/Articl.a org/Articl.aspx?id=15494 spx?id=15494 5
Victory in Jihadi Culture The asymmetric, belief-based character of the GJM poses a different conundrum whn it coms to undrstanding how it masurs victory. victory. Th discours and th bhaviour o global jihadis suggst that thr ar two tracs o victory to which thy aspire: “instrumental” and “expressive.” 10 Th movmnt’s “instrumntal” victory mtrics—whr its stratgic p olitical objctivs ar urthrd by militancy—includ: xplling Wstrn orcs rom th Muslim world, toppling marginally Islamic rgims, and vntually, stablishing regional Islamic emirates that ultimately congeal into a Caliphate stretching from Southast Asia to Spain. Howvr, Howvr, othr vidnc suggsts that altrnativ “xprssiv” mtrics o victory ar also cntral to th movmnt. exprssiv warar (and thus expressive victory) derives f rom a combatant’s identity, belief system and culture rather than primarily than primarily rom rom war’s political objctivs. Both GJM litratur and its militants’ behaviour 11 vidnc th ollowing xprssiv mtrics o victory12: • • • • •
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ensuring th prptuity o ghting13 Obying th individual individual obligation to ght Islam’s nmis rgardlss o th apparent outcome of battle14 Institutionalising Institutionalising a cultur o martyrdom15 Pinpointing Islam’s nmis through th rning rning procss o jihad, jihad, and thus maintaining its identity 16 establishing prid, brothrhood, brothrhood, and and unity in th th ac o thrats thrats to th ummah17
Christoph er Coker, Waging War Without Warriors (London: Lynne Rienner, 2002). See the empirical data data concerning the importance importance of martyrdom martyrdom as a motivating motivating factor in journeying to Iraq and joining al-Qa’idah in Josph fltr and Brian fishman, “Al-Qa’ida’s forign forign fightrs in Iraq: A first Loo at th Sinjar Rcords,” Wst Point CTC (Dcmbr 2007) at: http://www.ctc.usma. http://www.ctc.usma. edu/harmony/pdf/CTCFore edu/harmony/pdf/CTCForeignFighter ignFighter.19.Dec07.pdf .19.Dec07.pdf (accessed 18 June 2008). See Jeffrey Cozzens, “Victory—from the Prism Prism of Jihadi Culture,” Culture,” Joint Joint Force Quarterly , vol. 52 (January 2009). Cozzens, op. cit. (2007). Anwar al-Awlai, “Constants on th Path o Jihad” (n.d., audio lctur sris basd on th wors o yusu al-‘Uar) al-‘Uar) at: http://islambas.co.u/indx http://islambas.co.u/indx.php?option=com .php?option=com_contnt&tas=viw _contnt&tas=viw&id=308&It &id=308&It mid=120 (accssd 18 Jun 2008). Availabl as a transcript (“Mujahid f Sablillah,” transcribr) at: http://www.scribd.com http://www.scribd.com/doc/2407141/Const /doc/2407141/Constants-on-th-Path-o ants-on-th-Path-o-Jihad -Jihad (accssd 18 Jun 2008). Also s Shah yusu Al-Uar (As-Sabl, (As-Sabl, trans.), “Manings o Victor and Loss in Jihaad” (n.d., n.p.), at: http://www.matabah.n http://www.matabah.nt/stor/imag t/stor/imags/35/Manings%20o%20 s/35/Manings%20o%20Victor%20and%20 Victor%20and%20 Loss%20in%20Jihaad.pd Loss%20in%20Jihaad.p d (accssd 18 Jun 2008). Abu Aman al-Hilali, in Majallat al-Ansar (d.), “Th ral stor o th raids on Nw yor and Washington,” in “Boo commmorats Sptmbr 11 ‘raid’,” at: http://www.wh-war http://www.wh-war.com/ls/ .com/ls/ qada_ clbrat_911.txt clbrat_911.txt (downloadd March 2005, in author’s possssion). The essay of Sayf-ad-Din Sayf-ad-Din Al-Ansari (no title) in in Majallat Majallat al-Ansar (ed.), “The real story of the raids raids on Nw yor and Washington,” in “Boo commmorats Sptmbr 11 ‘raid’,” at: http://www.whwar.com/ls/qa war.com/ls/qada_ da_ clbrat_911.txt (downloadd March 2005, in author’s possssion). Abu Ubad al-Qirshi, “Th 11 Sptmbr Raid: Th Impossibl Bcoms Possibl,” in “Boo commmorats Sptmbr 11 ‘raid’,” at: http://www.wh-war.com/ls/qada_clbrat_911.txt (downloadd March 2005, in author’s possssion). 6
• • •
Crating a parity parity o suring with Islam’s nmis—spcially nmis—spcially th Jws Jws and Crusaders18 Victory is sn sn in th maladis maladis aicting God’s nmis, spcially conomic recession and natural disasters 19 Obsrving miracls miracls and drams drams in jihad, which which ortll ortll o divin guidanc and and ultimate victory for the mujahideen20
Whil documnts such as th “National Stratg or Combating Trrorism” are designed to meet the instrumentality of the GJM, they do not contend to a comparabl dgr with th aormntiond bnchmars, which ma b quall, if not more, important to those involved in jihadi activism. This asymmetry in understanding victory sets the stage for multiple potential future challenges.
Structural Asymmetry The faith-based character of the GJM also creates structural asymmetry. Unlike nation-stats, global corporations and many typs o ormal intrnational ntwors, th GJM posssss a cultural cntr o gravity (CoG) that is ound whrvr its adherents reside21. Whil a unid ummah (global Muslim community) is arguably a construct o th Islamist imagination, givn th dirncs within and btwn Muslim communitis, ironically, ironically, thos who adhr to th idas o global jihad shar similar beliefs, operational tendencies and ambitions. Together, these comprise
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S, or xampl, Suliman Abu Gith, “In th Shadow o Lancs,” quotd in MeMRI, “Wh W fight Amrica,” Spcial Dispatch No. 388 (12 Jun 2002). Also s Ruvn Paz, ‘ys to WMD: Th rst Islamist fatwah on th us o Wapons o Mass Dstruction’, PRISM SPeCIAL DISPATCHeS 1:1 (Ma 2003), at: http://www.-prism.org/imags/PRISM%20Spcial%20 dispatch%20no%201.doc Paz found Al-Fahd’s Al-Fahd’s article, Risalah hukm istikhdam aslihat al-damar al-shamel didh al-kuffar , Rabi` Awwal 1424H (Ma 2003) onlin at: http://www.al-hd.com/rsal/doc/r http://www.al-hd.com/rsal/doc/rsal.damar sal.damar.doc (accssd Novmbr Novmbr 2004). Paz nots that th articl was also circulatd on 23 Ma 2003 b th The Global Islamic Media Center, at: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/abubanan2/message/221 Rgarding conomic downturns as orshadowing victor ovr th Muslims’ nmis, s Al-Uar, Al-Uar, op. cit. (n.d., n.p.). This point about natural disastrs was raisd on th al-Qa’idah in Iraq-linked Sout al-Khilafa (‘Voic o th Caliphat’) tlvision broadcast ollowing th U.S. hurricans in autumn 2005 (S “Mov ovr CBS: Al-Qada movs into th Nws Businss,” 27 Sptmbr Sptmbr 2005, at: http://mptjawa.mu.nu/arc http://mptjawa.mu.nu/archivs/122982.php, hivs/122982.php, accssd 20 Jun 2008). For example, example, see the jihadi jihadi literature cited cited in Hafez, op. op. cit. (2007); also see “Special “Special ReportsThrough the eyes of the mujahideen,” Jane’s Islamic Affairs Analyst (1 Analyst (1 December 2004). Th avatars o this CoG com in man orms, rom structurd insurgnt and trrorist ntwors, such as th ‘cor’ al-Qa’idah; to hirarchical administrations, such as thos onc at wor in Anbar Provinc, Iraq; to Wstrn jihadi clls ntirl outsid o AQ’s organizational purviw, such as th Los Angeles-based 2005 Jama’at al-Islam As-Sahee cell. 7
its CoG22, which cannot b bombd away, withrd with a sanctions rgimn, or pt out with bordr ncs. This CoG also transcnds thnic boundaris, as th involvement of converts in the GJM indicates. Basd upon th cntrality o a bli that is inxtricably associatd with on o the three great monotheistic traditions, parallel conceptions of victory, and a cultural, global CoG that emphasises confrontation in order to defend Islam, the GJM is far dirnt rom trrorist thrats that Wstrn govrnmnts hav acd prviously, prviously, and indeed, very different from the governments themselves. These asymmetries will continu to contribut to an nvironmnt charactrisd charactrisd by misundrstanding, misundrstanding, misdiagnosis, and operational subterfuge on the part of the GJM.
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Th global jihad’s cultural CoG includ th ollowing charactristics: 1) crating a ‘parit o suring’ with Islam’s nmis; 2) dnding Islam whrvr on rsids; 3) undrstanding martrdom as both an operational, communal, and personal boon; 4) internalizing one’s obligation to physical jihad to the degree that one supports it logistically or through direct action; 4) believing that the jihadi movement is the apocalyptic ‘saved sect’ ( al-ta’ifa al-ta’ifa al-mansoura ) whos constant ghting will ushr in the end of time; 5) promoting the notion of ‘brotherhood’ to establish clear identity boundaries btwn both nominal Muslims (who ail in thir obligation to support th mujahideen, mujahideen, or whos actions or statements are believed to take them outside of Islam) and kufaar (unbelievers); kufaar (unbelievers); and 6) believing that God’s sovereignty has a direct impact on the success or failure of jihadi operations, and that he intervenes miraculously on behalf of the mujahideen the mujahideen whn th displa th rquisit levels of belief ( iman ). 8
PArT Two POTeNTIAL fUTURe THReATS THReATS
Th ollowing sction outlins two potntial stratgic thrats to th Unitd Stats. Both are linked to the asymmetric character of global jihad. These future threats are not necessarily probable, only plausible.
Undermining condence in the US Government One of the greatest strategic terrorist threats facing the US is the GJM’s potential to undrmin th Amrican public’s condnc in its govrnmnt’s ability to protct it. Undrmining condnc in th US Govrnmnt is vry much ingraind in th GJM’s post-9/11 “strategic studies” literature.23 Th writings o Abu Ubid al-Qurashi (a popular pro-al-Qa’idah onlin commntator on jihadi stratgy) on “ourth gnration warar” ar illustrativ.24 These trumpet the GJM’s asymmetric character as the ultimat mans by which to nabl anothr stri on th continntal US. Al-Qurashi’s Al-Qurashi’s logic gos that th movmnt’s asymmtry allows it to ovrcom US arly warning, prvntativ rst stri and dtrrnc masurs in ordr to attac it, ultimatly sapping American’s trust in its government and eventually bringing about its demise. Unsurprisingly, Unsurprisingly, th ral “ruit” o th attac would b th anticipatd growth o draconian, anti-Muslim post-attac scurity masurs masurs that would, according to th GJM, spar domstic strain whil simultanously bolstring al-Qa’idah’s global narrative.25 The current atmosphere of often-inconsistent US public discourse on the threat and arguably limited institutional understanding of the GJM could contribute to th gravity o this scnario. Th ollowing sction dtails why and how this ominous threat is not entirely out of the question. first, as in othr Wstrn govrnmnts, th US govrnmnt’s domstic public discourse on the nature, objectives and methods of the global jihadi threat generally lacks uniformity, and often, critical nuance. Despite pockets of highl qualid govrnmnt analsts and xprts on th thrat, thir voics and nowldg ar otn stov-pipd, ailing to consistntl rach and impact snior buraucrats and lawmars or guid thir intr ac with th public. Th rsult is otn conicting dnitions o th thrat itsl, inconsistnt public mssaging, and th gnration o somtims-contradictor approachs about how bst to countr it. Examples span from congressional debates and experts s elected for testimony, to public trrorism prpardnss xrciss. Whil this obsrvation warrants mor discussion and vidnc than spac prmits, it is sucint to not that this situation could enable the GJM to maximise the effect of future surprise attacks b omnting public anxit in thir wa.
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Brnjar Lia and Thomas Hgghammr o th Norwgian ffI dsrv crdit or idntiing th jihadi ‘strategic studies’ genre. http://www.mmri.or http://www.mmri.org/bin/articls.c g/bin/articls.cgi?Ara=sd&ID= gi?Ara=sd&ID=SP34402 SP34402 This is also th viw o Sa’ad al-faqih, a Uk rsidnt listd b th Unitd Stats or allgd involvmnt with al-Qa’idah (author’s intrviw, 2005). 9
Second, future attacks on the continental US could grievously exploit inconsistnt ocial mssaging about th thrat by circumvnting circumvnting trumpd, largly technical anti-terrorism anti-terrorism measures. This, in turn, could foster an atmosphere of public constrnation and division. What i th US govrnmnt spnds b illions o dollars scuring its bordr with Mxico and is attacd multipl tims by Canadian or europan militants? What i th Unitd Stats surs a sris o attacs by its own citizns—potntially convrts to militant Islam—who ar uninhibitd by airport scrning procdurs, procdurs, thnic proling, and do not appar on watch-lists? Whil technical anti-terrorism anti-terrorism measures are necessary to deter certain aspects of the thrat, its othr manistations ar abl ovrcom ths with rlativ as. Indd, the data indicates that Canada has a more active community of jihadi sympathisers and activists than Mexico—and also one of the largest, most porous borders in th world. furthr, it is widly rcognisd that th most oprationally advancd US plot sinc th 9/11 attacs was th 2005 “JIS” conspiracy, which targtd targtd Jwish-Amricans Jwish-Amricans and US military prsonnl in Los Angls. This plot was hatchd by African-American converts to militant Islam, not immigrants from the Islamic world. Th thrat is multiactd, multithnic multithnic and transnational owing to its cultural CoG. Whil invsting billions o taxpayr dollars into biomtric scannrs and othr tchnical protctiv masurs masurs may ultimatly prov worthwhil (i it has not alrady), it must be remembered that technology cannot trump culture; the latter uses the former. former. A national security vision and message built upon “Fortress America” ignores the critical asymmetries of the threat, and in the event of attacks like the above, is potntially a catalyst or swing public discord—spcially i combind with inconsistent or ineffective public d iplomacy. iplomacy. Third, public rustration with th govrnmnt in th wa o an attac would lily incras should th govrnmnt hav prviously dtrmind that al-Qa’idah was “datd”. for instanc, wr signicant numbrs o snior al-Qa’idah ladrs illd or capturd, or th cntral al-Qa’idah ntwor cut-o rom its vital rsourcs, it is possibl that an administration would push to dclar “victory”. This happnd in May 2003, whn major combat oprations in Iraq wr pronouncd, “ndd.”26 Such an announcmnt would hav a vry dltrious ct on public condnc in th ac o invitabl post-attac statmnts rom th GJM, in which its o wn victory mtrics would starly contrast ours. W simply do not now what a sris o attacs as dscribd abov— spcially thos prptratd by Amricans—would man in trms o domstic public raction. Howvr, Howvr, it is concivabl that attacs viwd as uttrly dying th logic o US anti-terrorism measures and exposing as premature a declaration of US victory would prompt som sctors o th public to clamor or conrontation with Islam itself—the only meaningful demarcation of the attackers. In such an environment, th voics and staturs o som who ail to distinguish btwn ‘orthodox’ Sunni Muslims and jihadi activists could b amplid. Al-Qa’idah’s Al-Qa’idah’s singl narrativ would
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S http://www.stat.gov/p/na/rls/rm/ http://www.stat.gov/p/na/rls/rm/20203.htm 20203.htm (accssd August 2008). 10
then almost certainly receive a boost, as its claim that Islam is under siege is seemingly validated. ‘Covenant of Security’ Violated A second future threat is that an increasing number of Muslims already sympathetic to jihadi activism might bgin to sns that ghting against thir Wstrn countris o rsidnc is as thologically prmissibl as ghting whr is “Islam” is bing “plainly” thratnd: Aghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, tc. Th mor widsprad th sns that the US government has betrayed its ob ligations to resident Muslims by violating the “Covenant of Security” (“ aqd aman”, aman”, abbreviated CoS), the greater the potential thrat. In this cas, th US can larn rom th Uk’s xprinc with radical Islam. What is th CoS and wh is it at ris? Omar Bari Muhammad (OBM), ormr ladr o th now-dunct Uk-basd al-Muhajiroun (“Th Immigrants”), xplaind th signicanc o th CoS and its rlationship to Islamic militanc in th Wst in a 2005 intrviw. 27 Drawing rom Islamic histor and Just War traditions, h rationalisd that all Muslims living in th Wst who: 1) xplicitl idnti thmslvs as Muslims; 2) maintain ocial Wstrn orms o idntication; 3) ta govrnmnt bnts; or 4) ntr with a wor or stud visa ngag in a “customar covnant” with a Wstrn government.28 According to OBM, this covenant means that they expect to live without ar o arrst, harassmnt, and undu survillanc (tc.) and will b abl to freely practice their religion. 29 In turn, ths Muslims ar not prmittd to ght their unbelieving hosts or plunder their assets unless that government violates the contract.30 I on wishs to wag jihad against th Wstrn countr o his or hr residence, as OBM and his UK-based cadres publicly advocated, then one must ntr rom abroad clandstinl without ntring into a “customar” or assumd contract; concal thir Islamic idntitis; and nsur that thir violnc bnts the global Muslim community. 31 Bari Muhammad argus (somwhat curiousl) that th 9/11 cll ullld ths stipulations. 32 Howvr, this logic dos not suggst that Muslims “under contract” are prohibited from providing rhetorical or logistical assistance to foreign jihadis seeking to enter their homeland to commit acts of terrorism.33 In th ys o many jihadi activists, including OBM and Ayman al-Zawahiri— al-Zawahiri— commonly viwd as al-Qa’idah’s al-Qa’idah’s scond-in-command—th covnant o scurity has been abrogated by both the US and the UK. American and British Muslims must ithr migrat or ght, thy maintain, unlss thir prsnc in ths countris is or 27 28 29 30 31 32 33
S Omar Bari Muhammad’s Muhammad’s intrviw with Anthon McRo, “Thr can b no nd to jihad,” Christianity Today Today , 1 fbruar 2005, at: http://www.christianittoda.com/ http://www.christianittoda.com/ct/2005/105/22.0.html ct/2005/105/22.0.html Ibid. Also see Omar Bakri Muhammad, The World is Divided into Two Camps (London: Ad-D’awah Publications, 2004), pp 67-70. Bakri Muhammad, op. cit. (2004). Ibid. Also s Abu Basr al-Tartousi, al-Tartousi, “Covnants and Scurit in Islam,” at: http://www.n.altartosi. http://www.n.altartosi. com/Covenants.htm com/Covenants.htm (accessed 27 July 2008). S Omar Bari Muhammad’s intrviw with Anthon McRo. Ibid. See David Cohen, “Terror on the Dole,” Evening Standard , 20 April 2004. 11
short-trm or tactical purposs. Othrwis, by virtu o paying taxs, voting, and providing othr orms o tacit support to ths govrnmnts that ar “at war” with Islam, they risk committing “major” sin that takes them outside the fold of the faith.34 In OBM’s cas, this rational is basd upon th viw that th condition o Muslims living in Britain has evolved from one of treaty under Dar al-Amaan (the abode of security) to Dar al-Harb (th abod o war) bcaus o post-9/11 domstic antitrrorism masurs, such as th indnit dtntion o xtrmist prachrs li Abu Hamza al-Masri and other terror-linked suspects, and because of the “persecution” of Muslims’ abroad by British forces and their allies. 35 Mor rcntly, al-Zawahiri cits th dicultis o raising on’s amily in th Wst according to th tnts o the shari’a the shari’a;; th atmosphr o “hostility” that prvails in th Wst towards Islam’s Prophet, Muhammad; and most importantly, the “animosity” demonstrated by the Wst (spcially Amrica) towards Muslims g lobally. lobally. 36 These grievances represent only a w tics on a much longr list that is widly discussd not only by xtrmists but also by many non-activist British and American Muslims. 37 Contrary to th viws o som Sala authors li Abu Basr al-Tartousi, al-Tartousi,38 al-Zawahiri argus that th CoS has bcom an irrlvant concpt altogthr, altogthr, and is wholly unnorcabl now because countries like the US and UK have no intention of honoring agreements with Muslims. 39 Adherence to this “covenant ideology” may explain in explain in part why part why most Wstrn jihadis hav traditionally gon abroad or ghting and/or plotting against US and Uk intrsts. Could it b that th intrprtd abrogation o this traty inuncd th radicalisation o th 2005 London bombrs (som o whom wr apparntly lind to al-Muhajiroun al-Muhajiroun gurs 40 ), for example, to the degree that they opted to strike London rathr than ght in Aghanistan? Convrsly, Convrsly, did bli in an “intact” CoS 34 35
36 37
38 39 40
Aman al-Zawahiri’s al-Zawahiri’s writings on th CoS appar in Ch. 7 o th rcntl rlasd Exoneration (2008) (availabl rom OSC wbsit as GMP20080512342006). See Omar Bakri Muhammad, The World is Divided into Two Camps, Camps, pp. 67-70. Also, Omar Bakri Muhammad’s commnts at th conrnc, “Th rol o Muslims nowadas,” as rportd b Hannah K. Strange, “British Muslims Called to Take Up Jihad,” United Press International , 10 January 2005. furthr, s Aatish Tasr’s intrviw with Islamist activist Hassan Butt, a ormr mmbr o al-Muhajiroun in Aatish Taseer, Taseer, “A British Jihadist,” Prospect , August 2005, pp 18-24. S al-Zawahiri, op. cit. (2008). S, or xampl, Grgg krupa, “Rights groups ar ds’ nw trror prol,” Th Dtroit Nws (4 August 2008), at: http://www.dtnws.com/apps/pb http://www.dtnws.com/apps/pbcs.dll/articl?AID cs.dll/articl?AID=/20080804/ =/20080804/ MeTRO/808040380 Othr rquntl citd grivancs also i nclud: promoting policis viwd as dtrimntal to Muslims around th world, spciall in Aghanistan, Iraq, and th Palstinian Trritoris; Trritoris; dtntion without trial; tortur at vnus li Abu Ghraib, Iraq, and Guantanamo Ba, Cuba; banning the hijab the hijab and niqab and niqab covrings or womn (in th cass o franc and Tur); Tur); inappropriate inappropriate and unnecessary surveillance of Muslim families, community centers, and mosqus; gnral harassmnt b l aw norcmnt; tc. S Abu Basr al-Tartousi, al-Tartousi, “Covnants and Scurit in Islam,” at: http://www.n.altartosi.com/ http://www.n.altartosi.com/ Covenants.htm (accessed (accessed 27 July 2008). Ibid. for xampl, s 25 Octobr 2005 transcript o BBC Radio four intrviws at: http://nws.bbc. co.u/nol/shard/bsp/hi/pds/ co.u/nol/shard/bsp/hi/pds/25_10_05_bombings.pd 25_10_05_bombings.pd ; also s “London Bombrs Hav Tis to Unitd Stats,” ABC nws onlin, 15 Jul 2005. 12
in th vry arly days o th Iraq War impact th dcision-maing o Uk citizns Asif Hanif and Omar Sharif (both linked to al-Muhajiroun al-Muhajiroun 41 ) to strike a bar in Israel rathr than th Undrground? furthr, might th prcivd abrogation o th CoS b on rason why w s mor post-2001 jihadi plots in Amrica and th Uk than w did prior to a mor stringnt post-9/11 law norcmnt rgimn and bor th Iraq War? Whil thr ar clarly no scintic answrs to ths qustions, mpirical vidnc dmonstrats dmonstrats that th CoS is a topic o intrst within Wstrn xtrmist communitis, communitis, much as jihadi Just War thory is to radical Islam writ large. large. Its prcivd abrogation could incras th numbrs o thos willing to participat in violent activism in the US and UK. 42 And sinc thr ar w indications that th grivancs notd by many within Wstrn Muslim communitis hav bn addrssd to thir satisaction—spcially in th viw o jihadi activists—this situation warrants monitoring, as do othr trnds in jihadi idology.
41 42
Chris McGreal McGreal and Jeevan Jeevan Vasagar, “Mystery of the last hours of failed suicide bomber bomber found dead in sea,” The Guardian, Guardian, 20 Ma 2003, at: http://www.guardian.co.u/world/20 http://www.guardian.co.u/world/2003/ma/20/isral 03/ma/20/isral S th wbsits listd in th ootnots o “Islamist Dbat: Ar Muslim Uk Visa Holdrs and Musli m Uk Citizns Prmittd to Carr Out Attacs in Grat Britain?”, MeMRI Spcial Dispatch No. 1821 (23 Januar 2008) at: http://www.mmri.or http://www.mmri.org/bin/articls.cg g/bin/articls.cgi?Pag=archiv i?Pag=archivs&Ara=sd&I s&Ara=sd&ID=SP182108 D=SP182108 13
PArT ThrEE ReCOMMeNDATIONS
Countering the Core of Jihadi Culture Contnding with th asymmtris o th GJM and many o th challngs it prsnts hings in th rst instanc on undrmining th appal o its global cultur within spcic local and rgional contxts. Apart rom jihadi cultur thr is no militant online activism, no social impetus to conduct suicide operations, and no mystical appeal. It is the bo nding agent that holds all components of the movement together. together. How should th Wst attac jihadi cultur? Much has bn writtn rcntl about various countr-radicalisation mthods and stratgis. Whil spac dos not prmit a thorough rviw o ths masurs, th nxt sction will isolat svral integral components of jihadi culture heavily promoted in its propaganda and offer succinct counter-narratives and methods to attack each. Brotherhood and Unity As notd, th GJM strongly mphasiss brothrhood and unity within th movement, both as metrics of victory and the “promise” of joining its ranks. Constructing viable counter-narratives counter-narratives should b egin by developing multi-source mpirical data o instancs whr wonton sl-intrst, sl-intrst, btrayal, racism, tc ar obvious and cannot b asily brushd asid as Wstrn conspiracis. each narrativ of forced participation in suicide bombings should be uncovered and examined for utility; every account of promises broken to former mujahideen should be rsarchd; rsarchd; ach documntd rit btwn Arabs and Pashtuns, or xampl, should b comprhnsivly xplord—spcially xplord—spcially thos involving y al-Qa’idah playrs who hav attaind nar-mythic nar-mythic status—and vry larg-scal larg-scal attac against othr Sunni Muslim civilians nds to b rvisitd. Ntwors o individuals with strt crdibility in Wstrn Muslim nclavs should thn b nlistd to convy ths stories over time, complimented by strategic, periodic online bursts of information convying this actual data. Location dpnding, tribal ntwors could b dployd lswhr. Sinc at its cor, militant Sala thought cntrs on th imprativ o violently protecting the unity of God and believers, and the special “brotherhood” o thos who ta this tas to hart, logic suggsts that this pillar o global jihadi cultur should b targtd. Th problm in th Wst is nding individuals willing to undrta this ort who ar crdibl, “untaintd” by govrnmnt handling, and or whom th riss ar worthwhil. Obligation to Violence The global jihadi movement is also under-girded by a strong narrative of personal obligation to violently confront the ummah’s ummah’s prcivd nmis “whrvr thy ar”. Emphasising orthodox Sunni teachings concerning the duties and responsibilities o sanctiond ladrs to both dclar war and uphold Islamic traditions o jus o jus in bello (accptd conduct in warar) is undoubtdly on important way to countr
14
this aspct o jihadi cultur. Howvr, Howvr, dmonstrating through mpirical vidnc th rluctanc o crtain jihadi icons and idologus to ght, or altrnativly, mphasising thir prsonal inconsistncis at odds with thir articulatd valus could also b usul in undrmining this cultural componnt. Indd, as Quintan Witorowicz argus, it is th “cultural brors” o global jihad—its clrics and idologus—who articulat and rn doctrins ssntial to th maintnanc of its culture.43 Whil oprationalising oprationalising this stratg is bst lt to othrs, rsarchrs rsarchrs should nd vidnc o idologus’ rluctanc to ris halth and walth on bhal o th jihad; reticence to join others at the “front” in the spirit of Abdallah Azzam, the scholar-cum-militant icon of the Afghan jihad; substance abuse (including the consumption of alcohol) or other “taboo” behaviors; evidence of back-stabbing back-stabbing or similar violations o “jihadi” social mors, which would cast doubt on a jihadi ladr’s chrishd rol as mdiator; and so orth. Whr ths ar uncovrd, th cas could b mad that th jihadi ladr is unt to mntor, mdiat, or tach sinc th cannot b assurd o God’s guidanc du to sin. Whil on could ma th countrargumnt that th importanc o prptual ghting is gnrall sn to suprsd the individual’s shortcomings—an argument often used to explain Muslim deaths in al-Qa’idah-lind attacs—thr is no qustion that th individual’s standing would be denigrated and could suffer permanently depending on the nature of intra-group consultation and sub-leadership. Howvr, absnt crdibl purvors o an motional, vidnc-basd countrnarrative, 44 and minus th will to wor with (vn xtrm) Islamists who oppos al-Qa’idah’s mthodolog, attacing th cntral cultural tnant o global jihad will ail. Not onl dos sociological rsarch bolstr this argumnt, but th litratur highlighting highlighting th valu o woring with ormr militants who oppos al-Qa’idah dos as wll. 45 Safeguarding public condence during the “Long War” A topic about which much could b writtn, maintaining th public’s condnc in th wa o a utur attac—particularly attac—particularly a dvastating stri by North Amrican jihadis—ncssitats jihadis—ncssitats a qualitativ boost in th lvl and uniormity o ocial discours on th thrat. An ocial, wll-undd and prmannt US woring group comprising inter-disciplinary inter-disciplinary and multi-agency experts should be established to annually develop a succinct national policy document that articulates precisely the 43
44
45
S Quintan Witorowicz, “Suicid Bombings: Do Blis Mattr?” (Sptmbr 2004) at: http:// www.unc.du/~urzman/ www.unc.du/~urzman/Soc3264/Witorowicz_ Soc3264/Witorowicz_eXPLAINING_SUIC eXPLAINING_SUICIDe_BOMBINGS.d IDe_BOMBINGS.doc oc (accssd Novmbr 2005). On critical componnts o countr-narrativs, countr-narrativs, s William D. Casbr and Jams A. Russll, “Stortlling and Trrorism: Towards a Comprhnsiv ‘Countr-Narrativ Stratg’,” Strategic Insights, Insights, 5:3 (March 2005). For instance, instance, see Peter Peter Bergen Bergen and Paul Cruickshank, Cruickshank, “The Unraveling: Unraveling: the jihadist revolt against bin laden,” The New Republic (11 Jun 2008) at: http://www.tnr.c http://www.tnr.com/politics/stor om/politics/stor.html?id=702b6d5a37a-4e3e-a491-fd72bf6a9da1 a37a-4e3e-a491-fd72bf6a9da1 (accessed July 2008). 15
current nature, scope, and objectives of the global jihadi challenge and establishes public messaging guidelines for the entire federal government. Further, Further, this standing body—perhaps established along the lines of the US Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Wapons o Mass Dstruction46-should also contnd with critical qustions about the threat that bisect the interests of multiple federal agencies and international partnrs. On such qustion might b, “How do s th GJM dn victory, and how can the US coordinate and maximize interagency efforts in 2009 to deprive it of such?” Atr all, sinc military and countr-trrorism countr-trrorism planning ultimatly aims to p advrsaris rom winning whil protcting a stat’s intrsts, intrsts, on must as, how can such planning b ctiv i an advrsary’s prspctiv o victory rmains undnd? Th orts o such an xprt advisory body would cntralis and nhanc public diplomacy orts, bttr prparing th public or potntially dicult tims ahad, and mor tightly ocus th lmnts o US national powr against th GJM. In so doing, it would also lily displ th dangrous myths that tchnology and tightr bordrs will automatically lad to scurity rom global jihadism, and would probably ncourag mor domstic rsarch on th North Amrican dimnsions o th thrat. This would b a vry usul dvlopmnt or US stat and local law enforcement agencies.
references the sacred sources to bolster his case. 48 Th impact o his wor on th discourse of extremists online can be found in seconds using a Google search. 49 Whil th viws o individuals li Abu Basr ar in th main dtstabl and ul th radicalisation narrativ, it is quall vidnt that th srv a dual purpos. W should not throw th provrbial bab out with th bathwatr.
Remedying the Perception of a Covenant Violated? finally, finally, rmdying th prcption o a violatd CoS is xcptionally dicult. This is bcaus most individuals who hold to this doctrin hav alrady progrssd to som xtnt down th radicalisation continuum (th nd o which is militancy) and are looking for loopholes to justify violence. Indeed, domestic counter-terrorism invstigations and military involvmnt ovrsas ar alon sucint or som to “justify” militant activism. Prhaps on o th bst mods to addrss this issu is or law norcmnt and intllignc agncis to adopt a “hands-o” polic whn it coms to inuntial Islamist “cultur brors” brors” who hold to CoS idolog, idolog, but who rjct th ida that “trusts” or “customary covenants” may be broken by Muslims. Abu Baseer at-Tartousi, on o th most inuntial living jihadi authors, according to Wst Point’s 2006 study, is an example. 47 Whil h dos not rjct th ida o ghting non-Muslim non-Muslim orcs abroad, or vn attacing countris “at war” with “Islam”, h vigorously upholds the notion that Muslims should not break covenants under any circumstancs, and in th mannr o a comprhnsiv Sala scholar, copiousl
46 47
S th WMD Commission’s hompag at: http://www.wmd.gov/ind http://www.wmd.gov/indx.html x.html (accssd January 2009). S William McCants (d), The Militant Ideology Atlas (Wst Point, Ny: Th Unitd Stats Militar A cadm, 2006), at: http://www.ctc.usma. http://www.ctc.usma.du/atlas/Atlas-ex du/atlas/Atlas-excutivRport.p cutivRport.pd. d. (accssd September September 2008). 16
48 49
Abu Basr al-Tartousi, “Covnants and Scurit in Islam,” at: http://www.n.altartosi.com/ http://www.n.altartosi.com/ Covenants.htm (accessed (accessed 27 July 2008). S or xampl th 18 August 2006 posts o ‘Abuz Zubair’ at: http://orums.islamicawaning.com/ http://orums.islamicawaning.com/ showthrad.php?t=651&pag=3 showthrad.php?t=651&pag=3 (accssd Sptmbr 2008). 17
Abut ICSr ICSR is a unique partnership of King’s King’ s College London, the University of Pennsylvania, the Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya (Israel), and the Regional Cntr or Conict Prvntion Amman (Jordan). Its aim is to countr th growth of radicalisation and political violence b bringing togthr nowldg and leadership. For more information, see .ics.if
Abut Ede Itelligece Eden Intelligence organises small scale, high impact gatherings on counter-terrorism counter -terrorism and security related issues in a strictly closed environment encourages debate and sharing of insights. Its goal is to facilitate dialogue and develop collaborative projects amongst the security and counterterrorism community’s community’s leading experts. For more information, see .edeitelligece.cm
.ics.if
