.. .. .. .. Total Quality Management Security Through ..
Bodyguard International Ltd
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Services
The Bodyguards Bible . . . . . . . The BSI Training Manual
© BSI Ltd All rights reserved 2000 Company Registered Number: 3735523 VAT Number: 724545240
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The Bodyguards Bible
Copyright 1995 – 1996 – 1997 – 1998 – 1999 - 2000 – by BSI and 2001 – 2002 – 2003 by BSI Ltd Published by: Bodyguard Services International Limited, Email:
[email protected] All rights reserved. Our copyright is rigidly enforced. Except for use in a review, no portion of this Program may be reproduced in any form including email and Computer Disk without the express permission of the publisher. PROTECTED BY INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT
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.. .. .. .. This publication is not meant to replace Hands on training, there is no replacement for the . real thing but for today’s Specialist to carry out their role efficiently he/she will have to study constantly to keep up to date with new practices.
TITLES • General Overview / Personal Security • Bodyguard Lifestyle • Bodyguard Protocol • Client Contact • Client Profiling • Client Education • Threat Assessment • Operational Planning • Operational Orders • Security Advance Party • Residential Security Team • Hotel Security • Restaurant & Venue Security • Office Security • Client Travel Security • Vehicle Travel Security • Team Formations • Walking Drills • Vehicle Embus - Debus Drills • Defensive / Offensive Driving – Anti Ambush Techniques • Escort Drills • Secured Meetings • Unarmed Combat Pistol Marksmanship Training • Hostage / Kidnap Briefing • Introduction to Hostage Rescue • Hostage Rescue - Dynamic Entries • Special Response Teams • CQB Tactics • Electronic Counter Measures • IED - Introduction • IED - Building Search • IED - Vehicle Search • Bombs - Introduction • Bombs - Mail & Deliveries • Basic Surveillance Techniques • Vehicle Surveillance - Give Away Signs • Counter Surveillance, Espionage Theory • Tactical Communication • Radio Communication • Escalation & De-escalation of Force • First Aid – Trauma Management • Terrorist Tactics • Use of Force Theory
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General Overview / Personal Security There are three main principles that I personally think apply to most situations. These are: • • •
That the individual is responsible for his or her own security” That the security measures must match the threat level” That constant awareness is the cornerstone of good personal security”
All security is a compromise and in the field of close protection, that compromise is between the requirements of the security and the demands of living a near normal life as possible by the VIP. A security procedure without the correct mental approach is a total waste of time. We are faced with THREAT – this is the basis of our business and we need to look at threat from 3 perspectives: 1. THREAT AWARNESS 2. THREAT EVALUATION 3. THREAT AVOIDANCE The second and third areas are reactive and totally in the hands of the first. Evaluation is a function and is determined by time! One is incapable of evaluating if time is negligible. What will happen is the classic freeze scenario, “do I shoot or do we run”
BODYGUARD Lifestyle I don’t want you to get any opinions of when trying to become a bodyguard you will end up being in a James Bond lifestyle. This is a hard business to get into and harder one to stay in; the primary reason is because most of us within the profession know each other if not personally but professionally buy reputation. We have a saying in this business that you’re only as good as your last job. What we will teach you over the next 30 days are real life practical skills that can be used the moment you start your first contract. What’s expected of a professional Bodyguard: Reliability, Personality, and Confidentiality. But the primary expectation is one of Professionalism. E.g. NO Drink, Drugs, Emotional problems ETC The object of Personal Security is to reduce the risk of Kidnap, assassination or Criminal act by the application of certain principles and procedures to normal daily life.
BODYGUARD Protocol Protocol is one of the most common reasons for BODYGUARD’S being hired or fired, 4
.. .. .. .. such subjects as dress, hygiene, habits and behavior. The subject can be covered but . you will learn as you go on in the industry, clients requirements vary. Dress code may be formal, informal or a cultural requirement.
Protocol should be written into the SOP’s for each contract: Dress Appearance is very important, it is the first impression a potential client will see of you. If you are dress immaculately people will assume you to be able to take care of yourself and also carry out your business in the same manner, feel good with your dress and it will show by your confidence. Your suit is what you will be wearing most of the time when with corporate clients, stay away from 100% polyester & Linen as they crease very easily. Only if a client prefers a single or double suit then either should be fine, try to go for the conservative looking suit, navy blue or grey choose black suits carefully, try to steer away from the MIB look or the stereotypical BG look. Make sure your suit trousers fit you properly and just reach your shoes; short trousers should not be an option. Pastel shirts are all right throughout the working day but try to wear white shirts for the evenings. Always have spare shirts around when traveling and in case for emergencies. Wear long shirtsleeves, if you have any tattoos, make sure they are covered the appearance of the shirt collar and cuffs are important… always make sure they are clean. Ties should be silk and match your choice of suit and shirt, keeping the not smart and in line with your collar. Wear a decent size belt; keep to black with not a fancy shiny buckle. Shoes should be tie-ups and not slip on's, always tie in double knots for safety. Black shoes go with most clothing and should always be kept very clean. Make sure they fit you correctly you will be doing a lot of walking and standing around. Blisters can be painful and will detract you from your primary duty. Socks should be dark in color or match the clothing you are wearing, not white or multi colored. Hygiene Avoid body odor at all costs, shower and wash as much as possible. Teeth should be cleaned and breathe fresh, nails clipped and clean, hair combed and looking well taken care of beards trimmed and stubble free. Try to wear odorless deodorant with hardly any scent. Habits Smoking is not acceptable even if the client smokes try not to smoke on duty. Nose picking should not be done, Try to use a handkerchief and be discrete. No gum chewing at all. Wear comfortable clothing and underwear, the last thing you want is to be fidgeting with your underwear etc? Behavior Always be on your best behavior, you do not know who is watching you at any time, maybe not your client but associates. 5
Never let your client see you having fun and talking and laughing with other team members, drivers or any waitress, could be seen as you not doing your job correctly.
CLIENT Contact Before attending a meeting with a potential client you should endeavor to gather as much information on the individual and company. This will dictate you’re the best course of action for the contract negotiation process. Basic background checks by using credit reference agencies, companies’ house and relevant publications / who’s who etc the Internet is a great tool for looking for and researching people or companies. You will need to establish the following
Who he is and what position he holds? What is the nature of his business? What business partners there may be? Where and how is he financed?
Arrive at the meeting early and carry out counter surveillance before entering. You may even position outside protective surveillance if you feel necessary. During the interview you will need to build up an accurate picture of events, which would warrant your services. Not all clients will be truthful and may hold back on certain information. Experience in interview techniques will be beneficial in allowing this information to be obtained. • • • • • • • •
What are the reasons for using your services? Assess those reasons, is there a real threat or possibly imagined? Are you there it boost an ego, be a companion or deal with a dangerous situation? Has a threat actually been made to the client? What restrictions will the client be putting on you? Is the threat to be treated seriously? Have the authorities been made aware? What action and procedures have been instigated if any?
You will need to discover if any surveillance has been put on the client, this will include physical & electronic. If surveillance is present this could indicate the possible origin of the treat. You will need to ascertain the level of skill involved in the surveillance: • • •
Government Commercial Private
High level Medium level (Private Investigators) Low level (Criminal elements)
Now you should have a reasonably accurate picture of the treat and be in a position to recommend a few solutions on how you are able to help. Make the client aware of the solutions and that they are based on information given, possible further investigations may change the outcomes.
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.. .. .. .. decided to accept the contract a detailed threat assessment should begin If you have . immediately. CLIENT Profiling A client profile will include preferences and restrictions you will have to work with Always keep in mind that you are in the firing line, should the client restrict your suggestions in such a way it would be dangerous for you and your team, turn the contract down. People Places Personality Beliefs History
Lifestyle
Family - Blood/ Marriage Friends/Acquaintances Associations/Clubs/Religious affiliations Places of birth - Blood/Marriage Places of living - Home/Holiday Places of work/Places of leisure Aggressive, abrasive, confrontational, stubborn, easygoing, approachable Religious Prejudices Past affiliations Associations Military Criminal Medical Previous threats Single Married Divorced Gay Mistresses Gambling Drinking Philanderer Deceiving Workaholic Food Drink Theatre Sports
Now you can establish a threat level and the best approach to effectively protect your client.
CLIENT Education The ability to communicate effectively with your client and educate him in matters of his own security is essential. Client education should show the treats/ dangers along with self-protection procedures/ techniques that the client/ family must adopt in their daily lives, without if possible affecting normal everyday tasks. Begin by briefing the client as how the opposition gains intelligence/ information; this should include his patterns/ habits, surveillance techniques and informers. The client should limit access to information about
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• • • • •
Movements, patterns, lifestyle. Travel modes, itineraries, business arrangements. Clients company position, duties, associates/ colleagues. Plans of client’s office/ home. Security arrangements/ procedures.
Feed false information out on your clients, movements and routes? Basic counter surveillance procedures should be installed to the client/ family & staff • • • • • •
Vehicles cursing or passing the area Persons loitering or sitting in vehicles Empty vehicles/ vans parked in the area Work crews appearing to do no work Door salesmen, religion callers, and surveys Phone calls requesting information on client or family
General Security Advice • • • • • • • • • • •
Travel by different routes at different times if possible Avoid the use of pubs, restaurants/ venues at pre-arranged times Never walk alone & avoid walking at night Advise staff not to provide information on the clients/ families activities Avoid meeting unknown persons at scheduled times & unknown locations Try to memorize all office, home, emergency phone numbers Press releasers & memos should not contain travel plans, times, phone numbers Any photos of client/ family should not be recent Carry out a clean desk policy & use shredders/ safes Do not use designated parking Never book restaurants etc in your own name
Traveling Advice • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Always search the vehicle and surrounding area before entering & driving the vehicle Keep the vehicle clean and uncluttered, no news papers on the seats or dashboard etc. If the choice of vehicles is available then change at random Do not have the company logo on the vehicle Avoid personalized number plates Never have less than half a tank of fuel Never use the same petrol station if possible Always use the alarm & keep all doors/ petrol cap, doors locked Never leave more than the ignition key when maintenance is being carried out Instruct the chauffeur on defensive diving techniques Always drive at the safest possible speeds Keep all doors locked when driving Try to use busy roadways Keep the vehicle moving at all times If attacked stay in the car & use as a weapon, fit emergency sirens/ lights to attract attention If you feel you’re under surveillance, drive to the nearest police station Cross bolt the Exhaust. No identifying stickers. 8
.. .. .. .. Home Advice . • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
All telephones situated away from windows/ glass doors If unsure of any caller, take their number and call them back At night keep all curtains closed & and are drawn before turning lights on Fit lights with timers on in different rooms Fit dead locks & security chains Have a good alarm system with panic buttons around the house especially the bedrooms Have mobile phones as back up to landlines Keep any outside lights on after dark use timers at different times on porch lights, so not to have any pattern. When answering the door use a peep hole/ cctv, peep hole situated in the wall rather than the door Only allow visitors that are expected Keep all rubbish bins in a secure area Instruct all staff on door/ telephone procedures Never label property/ vehicle keys Never allow children to answer the door/ phone
THREAT Assessment The threat assessment is an ever growing animal & should be revised and updated regularly Also with all the information of the current threat of your client, you will need to study national and international newspapers/ news broadcasts. Look for crime trends, terrorism groups/ tactics and any political situations your client may be faced with the Internet is a great source of information utilize it. When all the information as been attained you can now categorize the threat level and establish the procedures needed to protect the client effectively. The following principles should apply, your threat assessment should be The assessment must be
CLEAR
(It must be understandable)
LOGICAL
(The report is rational & based on the facts)
ACCURATE
(Not based on rumor, hearsay & up to date)
RELEVANT
(Include info relevant to the clients needs)
BRIEF
(Simple)
Attacker’s selection of target • • •
Threat is directed at client for who he is Threat is directed at client for who he represents Threat is directed at client for what he represents
Attackers motivation 9
• • • • • • •
Political Criminal Religious Vendetta/ Grievance Financial Mentally disturbed Publicity
Attackers method • • • • •
Assassination Kidnap Injury/ Maim Psychological Blackmail/ Extortion
Attacker’s technique/ how the threat will be carried out • • • • •
Bomb Shooting Knife Poisoning Kidnapping
From collating the above information you can categorize the appropriate threat level • • •
Cat 1 - An attack is definite Cat 2 - An attack is probable Cat 3 - An attack is remote but possible
(High risk) (Medium risk) (Low risk)
The client must also be protected from other possible threats and accidents such as • • • • • • •
Illness Fire Theft Harassment Environmental hazards Foreign conflicts/ policy Logistic problems
You will now need to establish the best approach to take to ensure an effective working relationship between your client/ associates and family. A personal profile of the client, work colleagues and family will dictate how this will be best achieved.
OPERATIONAL Planning The only way to succeed is to thoroughly plan any operation, with contingency plans for almost every possible scenario. Remember only a fool would believe they could handle unforeseen circumstances without prior planning. At this stage the opposition as an advantage, even when preparing for a small operation keep the big picture in mind. Remember if the client is ever witness to confrontation, you have failed in your primary responsibility. • • • • •
You must thoroughly brief all operatives concerned? What is the situation? What has been instigated & by whom? What are the team responsibilities? What do they need to know to be successful? 10
.. .. .. .. are to be involved in the planning; will all have different ideas & comments… All operatives . listen to what each as to say. OPERATIONAL Orders Always ensure that the location is secure, use electronic counter measures or even post guards. Remember the most brilliant planned operation is no good if the opposition can listen in. • • • • •
Operation Commence at Advanced recce Lighting up times Team members
(Code name) (Time & Date) (Time, date, weather conditions etc) (First & last light) (Names)
Ground Introduce the team members to the area that they will be operating: • • • • • • •
Photographs Maps Models Road types Rail travel Pick-up points Towns etc
Situation • •
Friendly Forces (Operation support, Police, Military, Security companies, their roles) Unfriendly Forces (Who/ what they are, what they are expected to do, background information)
Mission What is to be achieved: • • • •
Itineraries? Stops Expected timings Weather etc
Break down into stages: • • • •
1 - Preparation/ build up 2 - The client pick-up 3 - The journey 4 - The drop off
Execution A brief outline of how the team will carry out the mission, Include actions on: • • • •
Fire Attack Threat Bomb 11
• •
Breakdown Medical
Detailed Tasks Full details of what and how the team will carry out the mission. Each member is to know his role and each other's. All routes in/ out, actions on attack etc Service & Support •
List all equipment: o o o o o o
•
First aid kits Search kits Vehicles Weapons Radios Flashlights
Give all relevant: o o o o o o
Timings Dress codes Food & rest details Comms Route cards Phone numbers
Signals & Support • • • • •
Nominate 1/Cs and 2/Cs Give all call signs, codes, color coded maps, radio frequencies Lost comms Set watches Any questions and answers
SECURTIY Advance Party Although this is two separate items we can group them both into SAPs. The role of the Security Advance Party is simple, to obtain intelligence to check the routes and search the area that the VIPs will use. This is ok in theory, however very few teams enjoy the luxury of advance intelligence and planning, due to costing. The SAP have varied duties however there main role is to check that the route the party will take, is safe and secure, as is the venue they are visiting. One of the parties may be sent covertly a few hours ahead to do a methodical search of a venue. Locations • • •
Full postal address All relevant telephone numbers Maps/ grid references
Special Events •
All reservations/ bookings (Clients & team) 12
.. .. .. ..• .
purchase of any tickets needed
Route Selection • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Main route Secondary route Exact mileage Exact timings; test runs to be made at different times of the same day, to gain an overall time Locations/ phones (coins/ card etc) Location of phones on route All communication black spots Safe havens/ emergency RV`s (police/ military establishments if accessible) Location/ numbers of all nearest hospitals/ A+E units Are doctors on site/ on call? First aid equipment at locations Vehicle breakdown services/ response times Road works/ any heavy vehicle movements Weather Places of interest
Danger Areas • • • • • • • • •
Traffic lights/ roundabouts Heavy traffic areas Cross roads Tunnels/ bridges/ railway crossings Overlooking buildings/ bankings Narrow roads Unlit areas/ no lights One way streets Areas of high crime
Police Assistance • • • •
Officers in charge Anti-terrorist/ special branch numbers Canine units/ bomb units, reaction times Contact names/ numbers/ pagers/ radio frequencies
Location Arrival/ Departure • • • • • • • • •
Exact drop off/ pick up points Arrival times Alternative times/ entrances Is the client to be met by anyone specific? Plans/ layout Surrounding area/ man holes/ outside buildings Floors/ stairs Elevators, what capacity Roof/ joining buildings
Location Parking • •
Where is the parking area/ is there a VIP area Security in operation 13
• • • • •
Facilities for chauffeurs/ BGs etc Toilets/ phones VIP route Alternatives Areas to be secured
Refreshments • • •
Is the VIP eating at location? How & where the food is prepared Arrangements for protection team
• • •
Any press/ TV present What are the limits of access? ID being used
Media
Liaison with other personnel • • • •
Protection teams Security Guests (obtain guest list) Managers/ fire, medical officers
Fire Drills • • • •
Fire alarms Extinguishers/ types, service details Alarm system in use Nearest fire station/ number
Linear route planning theory Linear - continuous, horizontal, non-stop, not crooked, shortest, straight-ahead, unbroken, true and uninterrupted. This means that we need to plan a direct route from A – B, this is not necessary a straight route because of various other problems. What Problems • • • • •
Road works One way Traffic Public demonstrations No go areas of town Bottlenecks etc
Route planning is one of the jobs that the SAP should undertake. What information will go into route from the VIPs home to a private function? 1. 2. 3. 4.
Firstly two routes need to be planned because of Intelligence reasons. You must know where the nearest Police Station & Hospitals are. Any road works Any possible bottle necks
Think about what else you should include in your route plan? 14
.. .. .. . Security. Through Total Quality Management .. Route Card Linear Venue
Code Blue
Parking areas
3.8 miles Turn right @ lights 3.5 miles
Hospital 3.2 miles
3rd Exit
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Code Red Zulu
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Roadwork’s 2.2 miles Hairpin Bend 2.3 miles Straight run
Police Station 2nd exit / ⅔ mile on the left
Large bushy area 1.8 / 1.3 miles
Leisure Centre
BT box 0.9 miles
Code green Zulu
Code yellow Zulu
10 Storey Apartments
Residence
© BSI Ltd All rights reserved 2000 Company Registered Number: 3735523 VAT Number: 724545240
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.. .. .. .. .. RESIDENTIAL Security What I’ve done here for you is basically give you an idea of the amount of effort it takes to plan residential security. Rural Residence • • • •
It is easier to erect dedicated security measures, fences and sensors, CCTV A client can become a target due to the isolation It is an easy task for mounting surveillance from surrounding areas Countryside will be dark at night making approaches hard to notice
City Residence • • • • •
High population allows your client to blend in There are more choices of routes Excellent communication systems and support Faster response times for police and medical support Surrounding streets well lit at night
Detached • • •
Allows for greater access and perimeter control Client has privacy Counter surveillance can be more easily mounted
Semi – Detached •
You should consider opposition access into residence through adjoining attic space
Apartment Block • •
Access is limited and easily guarded Other apartments can be approached for intelligence, counter surveillance and possible aid
• • • • •
Alarms & security systems Power supplies Floor plans, construction alterations Ground plans Lifts & shafts
Plans
Residence Perimeter Security • • • • • • • •
Vet all neighbors, properties, who are they Ensure all street lighting working Outside wall, fence to be at least 8 feet tall Walls & fences set up to restrict climbing Wall posts in be inserted in concrete No trees or obstacles to view over Use only the main entrance, keep all others locked Main perimeter to manned at all times 2
• • • •
Driveway to be well lit Keep the main parking area away from the residence Outside blind spots to be well lit CCTV
Residential Internal • • • • • • • • • •
Solid doors, strong windows and frames Blast or protective coated glass All bushes, trees to be cut back Full alarm system Well made locks and chains Bars or grills on ground floor windows Back up power generators All skylights, drainage, man holes to be secured Full use of curtains & blinds Spare flashlights & candles around the house
Residence Staff • • • • • • •
Staff to be restricted to the areas of duty Only long serving staff to be allowed to the client’s main areas Regular vetting of all staff No staff in security control rooms Be careful on subjects talked in front of staff Brief client, staff on security measures Utilize a need to know basis
Mail Procedures • • • •
If possible use a post office box, arrange mail to be collected All main deliveries to the main gate Mail & delivery vehicles to be left outside the property Log all incoming & outgoing mail, phone calls
Delivery • • • • •
No unexpected parcels or mail Delivered mail to be left outside residence All delivery personnel to be identified get to know who they are If personnel different, check with the company Laundry to be done outside, and to be picked up by a security member
Telephone • • • • • •
All calls to come through the security office Keep all phone points away from windows Phone checks for bugs done regularly All emergency numbers at hand Never give out client phone numbers; take the callers number and call back Never answer with the client’s name
Key Security • • •
All spare keys kept in control box and labeled Key box locked with no access Maintain key log and do not label individual keys 3
.. .. .. .. ..
•
Know where and who as the keys at all times
Safe Room • •
This is used as a refuge if an attack takes place It must be secure with its own telephone link, toilet, food & water until help arrives
Operations Room • • • •
Used for daily running and admin of security Manned 24 hrs a day, situated not disturb the client and family Ensure it as toilet, food and rest facilities The control room should be unidentifiable from the outside
Actions On • • • • • •
Detailed plans in the event of attack, fire or medical emergency Escape routes and procedures Awareness of false or decoy fire alarms Communications routine ready and operative Bomb threats All hospitals, doctors, plasma, drug centers to be known with addresses and telephone numbers, response times
Leaving Residence • • • •
Always vary times and exit points Recce the street and surrounding areas before leaving Use all available staff for the above Comms check before leaving
Evacuation Process 1. In a state of civil unrest, these are the procedures you should follow. The Evacuation of personnel is the very last step in assuring that their safety is upheld. 2. At the beginning of civil unrest and when there is no alternative, ALL families should be evacuated along with any other items such as pets or personnel belongings 3. When civil unrest starts to increase ALL non – essential personnel shall be evacuated, and the four most senior personnel into the one property nearest the office. 4. All documents that are not taken will be destroyed. 5. Supplies of food and water must be brought in to sustain the staff for up to two weeks. 6. Also a full medical kit and a small supply of petrol. 7. After careful consideration the delegate in charge must make the final decision to evacuate the remaining personnel and close the office. 8. Finally they should leave the countries via the routes indicated in this file.
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“A defensible space is a living residential environment which can be employed by inhabitants for their enhancement of their lives, whilst providing security for their families, neighbours and friends” SECURITY ANALYSIS Location Delegation de la Commission des Communautes Europeennes en Republique Togolaise Introduction Over the past few months there has been a growing state of unrest, though quiet at the moment there appears to be a groundswell of discontent that could manifest itself at any time. Aim The aim of this survey is to suggest recommendations and procedures that can be carried out by the Delegation, its members or any specialist security team that may be assigned to this location. No costing's have been involved, but expenditure has been kept in mind, therefore no electronic devices have been considered. The main theme being enhanced security by use of simple methods. The brief will be in the following phases: Delegation Phase 1 Exterior Phase 2 Perimeters Phase 3 Grounds Phase 4 Outbuildings Phase 5 Cars and car parking P.O.L. machinery Phase 6 Building Phase 7 Fire equipment, drills and ancillary equipment Phase 8 Staff Phase 9 Communications Phase 10 Local guards Residences and personnel Phase
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Residences
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.. .. .. .. .. Phases
12 Personnel and Families
Phase
13
Routes
Phase
14
Misc
Exterior The only buildings that overlook the Delegation are government offices or state run hotels; this virtually precludes them from being used in an offensive manner against the Delegation or its members. Perimeter The existing walls offer no obstacle to a would be intruder, unfortunately considerable expense would be involved to improve the situation, therefore it is likely to remain as it is. All gates should be closed and locked when not in use. It is recommended that the two gates (visitors and vehicles) now in use should be replaced or repaired as they are both in a bad state of repair and cannot be locked, (no locks). The visitor’s gate should have a bell and to be opened by the guard who will enquire about the nature of the caller's visit before he is admitted into the main building. This guard should be positioned inside the Delegation by the inner security door, which allows him to observe the entrance outside, and he is also on call for any internal disturbances, if needed. The telephone operator is in a position to observe the reading room while still carrying out her duties. Phase 3 Grounds The area surrounding the building is not large in extent, however easy access to the sides and rear of the premises should be restricted by placing grills at locations (13) sheet 1. Lights Many of the lights are not working or in a bad state of repair, vandal proof dusk/dawn automatic lights with at least one light per wall having a protective covering should replace these. To the rear of the building an infrared sensor arc light to be positioned so as to illuminate the maximum amount of ground. Both systems to have a manual override. Incinerator A small incinerator could be utilized at the rear of the building to burn (under controlled conditions) the waste paper from the shredder and the used confidential typewriter ribbons. Also any litter that has accumulated in the Delegation. 6
Ladders All ladders and any object that could assist intruders to scale the walls to the upper floor must be either locked in the outbuildings or securely fastened to an outside wall. Phase 4 Outbuildings The outbuildings to the rear of the Delegation should be cleared of all unnecessary articles.
Those, which are unoccupied, should be locked. The rooms that are in daily use must be secured at the end of the working day. Water Supply The water supply meter is situated behind the front wall. This has no covering and needs to be boxed in. There is an old cistern at the same location the cover of which is rusting away, it needs to be replaced and secured by a padlock (sheet 1 -2-) The fresh water cistern to the rear of the building has a strong metal cover but needs a padlock (sheet 1 -5-) Adjacent to this cistern are the water pressurizing tank and water pump; they are partially covered by part of the outbuildings but need a protective grillage for them to be satisfactorily secured. (Sheet 1 -6-) Power Supply The electricity power supply board is located in an open recess (Sheet 1 -7-) at the side of the building; this area can be easily secured by the placement of a strong metal grill door across the opening. Emergency Generator There is no alternative power supply to the Delegation in the event of a prolonged power failure. The above-mentioned recess phase 4/ (3) is an ideal place for the installation of a small emergency generator. The size and power to be determined by the appropriate technician. Phase 5 Cars and car parking areas The drivers of the Delegation's vehicles must ensure that they have a full tank at the start of each working day and it should not be allowed to fall below the half way mark. They should also carry out their daily checks (oil, petrol, water, tyres pressure and tyres conditions). Any abnormalities to be reported to the relevant person. The H.O.P.'s car should be fitted with run flat tyres or have an anti puncture solution (i.e. ultra seal) within the tyres. 7
.. .. .. . On.. up country trips, two spare wheels are to be taken. There are many puncture repair . devices on the commercial market (inflates and seals the tyre at the same time). Each car should carry one; this also applies to privately owned vehicles. Car search mirrors These are extremely useful when the underneath of a vehicle needs to be inspected. They could be constructed locally to reduce costs. Car parking When not in use the H.O.P.'s car should be parked in the drive inside the Delegation and locked. In times of heightened civil unrest as many cars as practical to use the parking area. The remaining cars to be dispersed to the private residences. The car park opposite the Delegation to be vacated until the situation returns to normal. Fuel If any fuel or inflammable products are kept on the premises as emergency reserves or generator requirements, then they must be stored in a separate location, have the necessary fire precautions and the place to be securely locked. Phase 6 Building The building is substantially constructed of concrete blocks with a cement render finish. The first floor is of concrete whilst the roof and the first floor ceiling are constructed of timber. Asbestos sheeting covers the roof. Windows Many of the windows on the upper floor are the louver type and where these have no grill protection, entry into the building is very easy, others are of the old shutter design and offer no barrier to a would be intruder. Several of the windows (ground and first floor) have light mesh grills: stronger units should replace these. The majority of the lower floor windows have adequate protection. If grills are to be fitted to the 1st floor windows then they should be placed on the inside of the building and some of them to have an opening section or the facility to be removed quickly in an emergency, thereby allowing the window to be used as an alternative fire escape. Air conditioners Grills, making sure that the protection does not interfere with any repairs or servicing that these units might require, should secure all unprotected air conditioners.
8
Doors Both the upper and lower fire doors are made of wood; the keys to open them are kept in a glass-fronted box near by. They are warped and ill fitting, they should be replaced by modern metal quick release doors. Inner security door This is of glass and aluminum construction and is controlled by the telephone operator who has her post to the side (sheet 1 - Tel. Op.) The guard is positioned in the Immediate area where he can observe the visitors gate, whilst the telephonist can see directly into the reading room (which is outside the main Delegation offices - see sheet 1 Reading room). The H.O.P. and the representative from Brussels discussed a possible change in the layout of this door. Proposed security door Once a person is admitted on the premises there are no restriction to his or her movements, therefore a second inner security door should be installed at the foot of the stairs. On the stair side of the door a release button will allow free movement for upper floor staff while the telephonist controls the entry for visitors or workmen. Doors H.O.P. Office Entrance to the H.O.P. office is through the double doors in the secretariat, however there is another entrance leading into the waiting room, this door can be retained but there must be no facility to open it from the waiting room side. Porch door An ornamental grill and door to enclose the open porch area, it will be padlocked during the hours of darkness thereby greatly increasing the security of the main entrance. As it is in a prominent position careful thought should be given to its design. Rear door (sheet 1 -8-) There is an office door to the rear of the building and as it has a non-functional purpose this door could be bricked up. Terracotta Grill (Sheet 1 A -2-) This is situated on the stair landing and allows ventilation into the upper floor, however a few blows of a heavy hammer could demolish it quickly and easily. A strong heavy grill fitted on the inside would secure this location. Again because of its prominent position an aesthetic design would be pleasing to the eye. Keys There are no key cupboards in the Delegation there should be one for each floor and one for the confidential area.
9
.. .. .. .. The .. night watchman holds the keys for the majority of the building; this is in order to
allow the cleaners into the building early in the morning. This system should be changed as soon as possible. Possible alternatives 1. 2. 3. 4.
Duty officer holds the keys and opens the Delegation each morning. Re-arrangement of cleaners timetable Extra security to supervise the cleaners If the second inner second inner security door is installed, the cleaners can continue on the ground floor unsupervised. They can proceed to the first floor when members of the staff are present.
Pros and cons This situation can be viewed in two ways. 1. If the night watchman holds the keys, he could be overpowered and his attackers would have free access to the Delegation and plenty of time to carry out their nefarious activities. 2. If he is not in possession of the keys he cannot enter the 'building in the event of a fire and telephone for assistance. A compromise is possible: he holds a key which will allow him access to a telephone, if this is to be the case, then he must know how to operate the exchange and be supplied with a list of emergency numbers. This matter will have to be settled by the Delegation as could involve extra duties or personnel. Phase 7 Fire precautions In the whole of the Delegation there are only two fire extinguishers. Each office should have a small capacity extinguisher whilst the bottom and top of the stairs there should be placed two 91-litre extinguishers. Alarms Smoke alarms should be installed in strategic locations and a simple method of alerting the delegation of any impending dangers ought to be available, perhaps the oldfashioned iron triangle? Fire assembly-point A point outside the grounds of the Delegation should be designated the "fire assembly point". On the outbreak of a fire, all staff will evacuate the building and gather at the F.A.P. They will exit by the nearest and safest door; in large fires the stairwell can cause a chimney effect so caution must be applied if any member decides to use the stairs as a mean of escape. Specific duties should be allocated to members of the Delegation so in the event of an emergency, the evacuation can run smoothly. Telephonist fire duties 10
On the outbreak of fire the telephone operator will call the relevant authority immediately. However it must be ascertained that there is a fire before such action is taken. This also applies to any other emergencies. Fires If a fire breaks out and it is not of a serious nature then an attempt should be made to put it out or control it until assistance arrives (decision of senior person on post at the time of the fire) Logbook: the telephonist to keep a record of all visitors in a logbook. Suggested format
DATE
REF No
GUEST
PERSON / REASON FOR VISIT
IN
OUT
OBSERVATION
1/1/1991
{1}
SMITH.J
JONES T
09:00
11:30
-----------
1/2/1991
{2}
S&W ELECTRICA L
REPAIR FAULTY SWITCH
10:00
12:00
WILL TMW.
CALL
Phase 8 Passes The Delegation has a small number of staff; therefore it is unnecessary to implement a pass system. A second inner security door is installed this should be sufficient to ensure that the confidential areas are restricted to the relevant personnel. Phase 9 Communications The question of radios is being dealt with directly by H.Q.; however it appears it could take considerable time before the necessary documentation could be granted, therefore other methods might have to be considered. Below is an example of a possible radio network that could be used when radios become available. Each location would be given a call sign. 11
.. .. .. .. ..• • • • • • • •
Delegation House SPARE House 2 House 3 Car 1 Spare Car 2
D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8
A duty officer's list would have to be compiled. The duty officer would disregard his own station call sign and take the control call sign for the duty period. Control would keep a listening watch for the complete period of duty. Other stations would keep open in accordance with the situation and battery life. The network would not be used for chatter, is an emergency network and is to be used for exactly that: "An emergency". Code words A list of code words would be necessary to cover the most serious eventualities, i.e. 1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 7) 8) 9) 10)
Place names Personnel Situations Movements Medical Threats - low/high R.V.s Evacuation Assistance Miscellaneous
The senior members to have their own battery chargers and spare batteries so they can keep their station open 24 hours a day. If possible the Delegation network to have a link with one of the other friendly establishments, particularly one that could come to their assistance in a dire emergency. Phase 10 Local guards It has already been emphasized to the local guards that a higher stage of security is necessary due to the changing political situation, local and international. They have adapted to the re-arrangement of their duties knowing it is for the increased protection of all. However they are reluctant men, they must treat all creeds with awareness and courtesy. Phase 11 Residences and Personnel Whenever a rented dwelling comes to the end of its lease consideration should be given to taking another residence in lieu, if it complies with any of the following. 12
1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6)
Is it closer to the Delegation? Does it offer greater security? How does it fit in with the evacuation plans? Will it receive better communications? Is there a good neighborhood? Location away from areas where unrest is likely to occur.
Residences Personnel and families traveling car or by foot These guidelines are to assist the families and dependants of Delegation's members when they leave the security of their dwellings. By: Car 1. Is your journey really necessary? 2. Try and travel with company or in convoy 3. Vary your timings and routes, particularly for your regular visits. This can be difficult for appointments, however you can arrive 15 min early! 4. If you are stopped by a road block (Police or Demonstrators) do not follow taxies or local cars down the side streets, turn around and keep to the main well illuminated routes until you reach your destination. 5. If you have to open your window to talk to anyone, open it only sufficient to carry on a conversation. Two to three minutes should be enough. 6. Make sure your car has plenty of fuel, oil, and water. Regular servicing is a must. 7. Have a spare key secured hidden on the outside of the vehicle (make sure to remove it during servicing) 8. Have an emergency puncture repair canister in the car 9. Small medical pack 10. Correct tyre pressures 11. If radios become available and you find yourself in a dangerous situation call for assistance. 12. Never leave the car unlocked especially with the keys in the ignition
On foot 1. Whilst walking in town, carry a secondary purse or wallet secreted on your person. In it hold your keys, I.D. cards, large monetary notes. Have only the bare essentials in the exposed handbag or wallet. 2. Don't wear excess jewellery, leave it at home, take off your gold Rolex, and wear the imitation model. 3. If an incident occurs, but you are not involved, move away as quickly as possible, without panic! If you become agitated or frightened find a public place, restaurant, bar-cafe, library, etc. enter inside and compose yourself then telephone for assistance if necessary. This is when a good local knowledge of the town becomes very important. 4. Carry all relevant telephone numbers on a small plastic covered card.
Emergency Provisions Hold at least two weeks supply of food and water, you might have to feed people stranded in 13
.. .. .. .. your residence. Have plenty of torches, lamps, batteries, candles and popular medicaments ..
The H.O.P.'s departure should start from point F, as this is the least observable position. (From outside of the residence). The vehicle is not to move off until a member of his household staff or security guard has checked the area outside the main gates. Arrival of H.O.P. Whenever possible the H.O.P. to inform the household his E.T.A. A member of his staff will wait by the gate, and open it immediately the moment his car approaches. If radios are available, a single code word would be sufficient to warn the guard of his imminent arrival. Miscellaneous Rope ladders or knotted ropes are to be kept upstairs for an emergency escape. If young or elderly people are amongst the household, then a makeshift escape slide is advisable. There must be strong fixing points for the rope or slide to be fixed to. The H.O.P. Residence has an internal alarm system but as the family's dog remains inside at night it cannot be activated. Gas attacks It is not envisaged that the Delegation will find itself in such a situation. However because of the close proximity of government buildings it is possible in an extreme state of civil unrest troops would use tear gas to break up any large demonstrations around these government buildings. In such a case tear gas might drift across to the Delegation, staff will obviously retreat from the gas cloud, but they should try and stay within the office complex. If gas is encountered while traveling by car try not to stop, continue to drive away from the area and open the windows to dissipate the gas as quickly as possible. CONCLUSION The above recommendations and procedures have been offered to cater for a case of extreme civil unrest. The political situation will dictate the level of measures that should be implemented. This is not a comprehensive assessment of the Delegation security requirements; no thought has been given to electronic devices (except "smoke alarms), which would increase its security but unfortunately its expenditure also. Local contractors and security guards can carry out most of the recommendations.
.
Security is given little thought by the majority of people; if the Delegation's personnel become security conscious this will go a long way to combat the present dangers.
15
.. .. .. .. .. OPERATIONS Room Setup The team leader is in overall control, but will delegate the day-to-day running of the Ops room and team rosters to his 2I/c. As the nerve centre this room will be in constant communication with all Bodyguards, even those who are off duty. The Ops room should display all maps of the area of operations, duty rosters, location board, so at a glance you can see where your manpower, vehicle and the VIPs are. A comprehensive list of kit is required to stock an Ops room: • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Radio base station Hand held transceivers Mobile repeaters Chargers & extra batteries Adaptors Mobile phones Notebook computer and printer CCTV monitors Landlines and exchange for the main residence Direct telephone lines Fax machine Full first aid kit X-ray machine to screen mail & packages Fire fighting equipment Vehicle search kit Room search kit Bomb blanket Gas masks Mobile alarms, panic buttons All Ops room documents duplicated in a go bag
You should also have a Radio Log, Incident Log, Visitors Log and a Key Log. On the staff change over there should be a briefing on the days events + information given on any incoming personnel or outgoing VIPs. A typical Ops briefing will contain: 1. 2. 3. 4.
Assignments and updates Intelligence Shift to Shift messages Daily events
There will be one other main item within the Ops room. If applicable a Security cabinet should be in the Ops room with the relevant weapons and ammo stored safely in. There should be a log maintained for both weapons and ammo and orders for weapons & ammunition sheet giving relevant weapons procedure.
HOTEL Security • •
Always liaise with hotel security, many hotels have set procedures for their guests Often the hotels reputation is enhanced by high profile clients and will cooperate fully 16
•
Full advance party, recce and search procedures
Points for hotel stay •
Easy logistics and administration
Points against hotel stay • • • • • •
No control over staff or other guests No control of building and access security Advance party waiting to scan the area on arrival and as added protection Vet all guests either side, above and below client’s suite Have the security control room next to the client’s room with joining access Check all floor waiters as to noise levels on the client’s level
Selection of room/ suite • • • • • • • •
Not below the height of thrown objects, 2 floors. Remain between 6th and the 10th floors for easy exit in an emergency Fill adjoining rooms with protection team members No adjoining balconies either side, below and above Lock and remove all keys to adjoining rooms except protection team control room If possible have client suite exit through the security control room Site rooms at the end of hallways for better control Site rooms away from stairwells and lifts
RESTAURANT and Venue Security • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Avoid regular visits to the same restaurants, especially times and dates Do not use client’s name when booking Full security advance party before client arrives, one SAP member to mark and save the table Client’s table sited in a secured position Clients table not to be sited on routes to the kitchen, bathrooms, windows and exits Check for dress codes and consult with client If the team is not joining the client then their table should overlook but not within earshot Counter-surveillance and outside team members try not to attract attention to themselves If a long period elapses during the meal, rotate team members inside and out Protection team to be one course ahead of the client’s meal Protection team has enough money for there and the client’s meals Arrange with the client an early warning signal for his exit For formal or award dinners vet all persons seated around the client also any other threats and other protection teams working at the same venue.
A good counter measure for the client security, is booking false reservations… but ensure the Manager knows of this, as would not put your client in good standing with the Restaurant in the future.
17
.. .. .. .. Theatres .. and Cinemas • • • • • • • •
Full SAP Book seats so that the team members are at each end of the row as well as behind, if possible book the whole row. Do not seat the client in the middle of the row Seat near fire exit Always carry flashlights Leave either early or late to avoid the rush Do not take client through crowds Liaise with the management for emergency drills
Public Appearances • • • • • • • •
Liaise with location security and management Liaise with police Study the guest list for problems with other guests, move seating arrangements if necessary Arrange all arrival and pick up points and times Brief all persons presenting or have contact with your client on security procedures Full comms check for black spots inside the building Arrange for team to rotate, for refreshments and waiting areas Check location security
Rostrum Security • • •
If the client is on stage, seat team members either side of client and backstage looking in also at the venue entrance looking at the rostrum. Keep the front row of seats empty if possible Team must be ready to give body cover at all times
Shopping • • • • • •
Large stores have security; you should liaise with them Extra vigilance at lifts and stairways, not all the team in the lift at once us stairs or send a team member first and secure the area. In smaller stores not all team to go with the client, one team member to check back rooms and exits If the shop gets crowded then more protection team to enter If parking is a problem, vehicles to circle or park away then return when signaled Be aware of all shopping centers layouts, if possible an SAP before the trip
OFFICE Security The office environment should be treated as an extension of the residence. Many of the security implementations will be the same. However it should be realized that there is a lot more personnel, activity and visitors. It is not often that we can choose the office location, however if it is possible, the following guidelines will allow for greater security from a protection standpoint. • •
It should be situated on main street routes with multiple choices of approaches. The building should not to be overlooked by premises and be out to sniper 18
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
range, especially at embus / debus points. The building should give you total control of security, alternatively control of a whole floor, with the preference of occupying penthouse. A choice of entrances and exits that can be controlled by security, CCTV or alarms. Dedicated lifts if possible. Garage for client vehicle with CCTV or security guard. Suitable outside fencing, lighting and main gate control. Avoid buildings with underground parking areas. Avoid buildings outside large car parking areas. If building is shared, attempt to secure clients area with its own dedicated facilities. Control of building access, parking, switchboards. 1.D badges for all personnel with area access control. Grilles and shutters to be fitted on ground floor windows. Roof entry doors, skylights etc. to be locked and monitored. Alarms or night security on building. CCTV for all approaches, entrances, stairs. Silent alarms and panic buttons fitted for receptionist and P.As. Blast proof windows, strengthened outside walls. Back up power supplies. Air conditioning systems and ventilation shafts, alarmed, secured and checked regularly.
Client Office • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Situate office in center of building. If office on outside wall, situate away from parking area and not overlooked by other buildings. Office network to be self-contained with reception, toilet, mailroom, within the suite. Separate bathroom, kitchen and rest area for client. Client office to have restricted staff access with clean desk policy. Secretaries and security control to have direct access to client office. Visitor / waiting area not to have direct access to client office but via reception area. Safe room for client. Silent alarm and panic button installed. Do not site client office near the mailroom. Visitors chairs to be sited at an angle to the client and should be deep and soft to make sudden moves difficult. Unnecessary clutter kept of desk. Especially potential weapons to be used on client. Client desk should be large to prevent attackers getting over or around quickly. Clients chair should be upright and should swivel to enable fast evasive movements and possible hardened. Situate coffee tables between visitors and client's desk. Possible use of two-way mirror with security observation.
Daily Routines Visitors •
Similar to residence security. 19
.. .. .. .. ..• • • • • • • •
Admittance by appointment only. Visitor vehicle security check if brought on property. Electronic visitor screening. ( Metal detectors. X-ray ) Establish visitor-vetting routine with front reception, i.e. airlock systems. Searching of persons and baggage both physically and electronic. Security escort while on the premises. Only vetted workman allowed to carry out maintenance. What comes in with visitor goes out with visitor.
Employee education The education of employees is essential in helping the protection team carry out their duties and should cover the following: • • • •
To be aware of strangers in building, especially at break periods, beginning and end of shifts. Strangers using cameras, tapes, taking notes should be noted and reported. Aware of inquiries where no names are left or visitors who are taking extra care to view security procedures. Challenging of all unknown people in building.
CLIENT Travel Security Collate all previous travel information if the journey has been made before, especially if the destination is the same Organize initial contact booking for Hotels • • • • •
Transport Entertainment Client or VIP waiting areas Vehicle rental Police or security
Prepare all movements details, timings and seating arrangements for • •
Trains, planes, vehicles and taxis Ensure all arrival / departure timings are known as well as alternative times for possible problems
Arrange for • • • • • • •
Currency exchange Language interpreters Vaccinations Visas Emergency rendezvous and safe houses Comms and emergency services procedures in foreign countries Baggage handling
Train Travel •
Full security advance party checks for routes and station
20
• • • • • •
If train has compartments, book the whole compartment for the client Team must command views of the compartment, corridor and platform Seat client appropriately Team members to sit directly behind the client and on the other row If using sleeper compartment, never book in the client’s name and ensure client’s name is not on the compartment door Check all search all waiting staff before allowing them entry
Air Travel • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Full advance party for; Airport layout, rest areas, VIP lounge, bathrooms and restaurants Liaise with airport security Aircraft design and exit points Checking in procedures and passport control Parking and debus points Any firearms procedures Baggage to labeled and secured for team ID and evidence of tampering Team to handle baggage until placed in hold of aircraft, if possible load last and collect first Baggage to be tagged with the business address and not the home address Board plane behind the clients Exit plane in front of the clients Seat client in a window seat near an exit point One team member to carry all passports and documentation Liaise with all airline staff and cabin crew
Counter Hi-Jacking Precautions • • • • • • • • •
Travel on airlines that have few political enemies Avoid Middle Eastern and American airlines as these are prime terrorist targets at present Book tickets on two different airlines and only collect one set Collect tickets at the airport thus minimizing your travel arrangement plans Plan to fly direct to the destination and avoid stopovers If a stop over is unavoidable, exit the aircraft and wait in the VIP lounge at the terminal Avoid first class seats, neutral tourist seats are more anonymous Avoid flashy clothing and jewelry Operate with a clean passport, visa stamps can be placed on a separate piece of paper
VEHICLE Travel Security The client’s journeys will fall into one of the following categories: • • •
Daily Journeys - A daily part of the client’s lifestyle, traveling to work, school, shopping Short Notice - Journeys made with little or notice, attending meetings etc Special Occasions - Journeys made and booked in advance, holidays, theatre, conventions
Travel Vehicles 21
.. .. .. .. ..• • • • • • • •
Utilize the most suitable vehicles for the journey/ ground covered Strengthened front/ rear of vehicle High density lights Individual switches for all lights Pressurized oil dispenser/ petrol tank explosion proof interior Armor plating/ bulletproof panels Bolt in exhaust Run flat tyres
Before Vehicle Entry/ Then Inside • • • • • •
Visual check of all surrounding area, embus/ debus location All doors/ windows are locked when in vehicle All windows opened no more than 1” Driver to have clear all round view Vehicle/ necessary paper work to be carried Check all equipment, tool kit, first aid, flares, search kits, respirators if necessary Embus/ Debus • Access the ground while arriving, anything out of the ordinary • Do not rush • Even team spacing, all round observation • Give the client body cover at all times • Avoid obvious VIP parking places • Stop vehicles as close to the embus/ debus location as possible • Clients door to be nearest to the entrance when stopping • Reverse into parking spaces for easy out • If working armed, do not use weapons hand for opening doors • Location of arrival and departure points are the most dangerous • Counter surveillance if possible • Always park so that the vehicles can move off quickly and easily • At arrival drivers to remain behind the steering wheel, hand brake off, foot brake on, in move off gear, doors locked • When at the destination, have the vehicles secured and alarmed or watched at all times In Vehicle Seating Arrangements • • • • • • • •
Seat belts if worn, can you release quickly, get your weapon or cover the client Client must wear seat belt Client never behind the driver, you can not cover from behind the driver Team leader in each vehicle Runner in each vehicle in case of lost comms Radio procedure to be used at all times All radio transmissions to be treated unsecured Commercial radios off
Vehicle Movements • • • • •
Where possible keep the vehicle moving Never sit in stationary vehicle Vehicle to travel at the safest speeds for the protection of the client Always know your exact location Distance between vehicles, fast, slow, heavy traffic 22
• • • • •
Do not let anyone in between convoy Always be ready for evasive action Lead car to signal and maneuver well in advance Vet all cars before allowing them to pass Never bluff other cars, even if you have the right of way
Counter Ambush • • • • •
Change the client's vehicle without notice Move lead and rear vehicles around the client’s vehicle Convoy leaves without client; client leaves later in low profile car False radio comms in plain talk Switch arrival and departure points at the last minute
Fatal Mistakes • • • • • •
Complacency Slow reaction time, shock to reaction Lack of maneuverability Not knowing location of vehicle Lack of skill training Lack of panic and stress training
If Vehicle comes under attack • • •
Client down on the floor with body cover, head rests removed Counter action with aggressive positive speed and determination Never attack the ambush unless absolutely necessary
Actions On • • • •
Police stop or break downs Partial road block, drive straight through, aiming for the rear half of the blocking vehicle Complete block, if possible, reverse out or PES vehicle engages target while client’s turns away Beware of decoy
TEAM Formations The Protection Team This word can be misleading, as YOU may be the only one on the team. This means your role can be multi-functional from Driver, Mechanic, Medic and Agony Aunt. Having said this it is not uncommon for you to be on a job where, with various members of a Middle Eastern royal family, there will be 30 – 40 people employed over several residences. When starting a job there are two main areas’ that will always arise. 1. THREAT 2. THE CLIENTS WILLINGNESS TO PAY FOR THEIR PROTECTION The close escort section, possibly three, each with three teams of four men, i.e. twelve on duty at any time, three VIP drivers, that is four on duty at any one time, two VIP vehicles and nine escort vehicles. This would give the luxury of three shifts in a 24-hour period. This is a typical military structure, but the basis of this organization is where most civilian commercial planning is derived. In reality most teams are half this number working two 12-hour shifts.
23
.. .. .. . We are..now into the swing of terminologies, abbreviations and acronyms and now need to start to .define these terms. • • • • • •
Boss or TL – Team Leader 2 I/c – Second in Command BG – Bodyguard PES – Personal Escort Section RST – Residence Security Team SAP – Security Advance Party
Before we look at each of the above separately, we need to look at how the levels of resources for an operation are determined. When arranging the protection of a VIP the first considerations will usually be, how many men are needed, and what sort of organization and equipment is required. These answers are determined by the following factors: • • • • •
Level and nature of the threat The importance of the VIP The VIP’s lifestyle and circumstances The political acceptability of a Bodyguard Resources available – manpower, materials and finance
Our job is varied as is the security objectives, so we aim to protect against the following: 1. Unintentional Injury – Vehicle Accidents, Medical Emergencies 2. Embarrassing Situations – Media Control, Private Life 3. Intentional Attacks – Terrorist or Criminal Kidnapping “STRATEGICALLY THOUGHT OUT AND TACTICALLY APPLIED” The following summarizes the operational side of CP work: • • • • • • • • •
Planning Intelligence gathering Advance Security and logistics preparation Operations Room Communications co-ordination Information exchange Manpower co-ordination Logistics management Special equipment service and management
Bodyguards are the circle of protection around the VIP. The easiest way to achieve this is as follows: • • • • • • • • •
Observation – Using their eyes to assess the situation around the VIP Body Cover – By shielding the VIP with their own bodies Systematic Protection – Doing the job carefully – Vigilance Avoidance of Routine – Avoiding the habits of daily routine Reconnaissance and Planning – Planning and clear concise orders Review of Security – Always review your security procedures Relations with the VIP – BG’s must be professional Operational Security – Monitoring any leaks from the Team Administration – Documentation, Personnel Evaluation
Constant Training The team should train “Actions on Drills” continuously.
24
Physical Fitness It is down to the BG to maintain his own physical fitness, through self-discipline and pride. Equipment used in the Protective Effort 1. Operatives Equipment a. Identification b. Communications and Alarms c. Firearms d. Travel and Administration e. Personal Kit – Leather man etc 2. General Operational Equipment a. Transportation – Vehicles, Air Travel b. Communications – Permanent, Mobile c. Operational Kit – Medic, Search etc d. Technical Equipment – Explosive Detection 3. Principal’s Protective Equipment a. Alarm Systems – Permanent, Mobile b. Surveillance – Permanent, Mobile c. Physical Barriers & Lighting d. Armor – Body, Vehicles, Buildings The best way to protect the life of a VIP in the event of an attack is to remove him or her from the scene. However the basic assumption is that the evacuation will proceed without difficulty. 1. The VIP may be killed or injured. The basic plan must continue, but the destination will now be the Hospital. 2. One of the CP is killed or injured. 3. An obstruction makes evacuation from the scene impossible. 4. Traveling by vehicle – the vehicle is immobilized. It is therefore our task to control the following: Accessibility, Vulnerability, Schedules, Routes, Habits, Attitudes and Awareness The primary formation is the V this is a reasonably good formation as it can be closed down easily and is very adaptable.
Fig 1 – Open V ⊗4
3⊗
2⊗
VIP⊗ TL⊗
1⊗
Fig 2 – Closed V 25
.. .. .. .. ..
⊗3 ⊗4
⊗ VIP ⊗ TL ⊗2 ⊗1
Fig 3 – Open Box ⊗3
⊗4
⊗ VIP ⊗ TL
⊗1
⊗2
The box gives poor protection but favors the image. It works on low threat and low density of people.
Fig 1 – Closed Box formation ⊗3
⊗4
⊗ VIP ⊗ TL
⊗1
⊗2
Good security, but bad for the image. This is used in a high-risk area and no person should be allowed in the box.
Fig2 – All round ⊗3
⊗4
26
⊗2
⊗ VIP ⊗ TL
⊗1 This is good where a lot of people are in close proximity to the VIP, it can also be quickly changed from closed box to all round and back again.
In reality it will be more likely that there will be only one or two Bodyguards on the job. Fig3 – One on One
⊗ VIP ⊗ BG
This scenario is dictated because the Bodyguard is right handed to draw his weapon, but still within arms reach of the VIP. The side you chose to stand should be dictated by the potential threat. If he or she is window-shopping and the shops are on the right, you’re going to have to be on the left.
Be adaptive. For two Bodyguards covering the VIP the most commonly used position is this. ⊗ VIP
⊗ BG
⊗ BG
But remember to adapt as your surroundings change. Also pace is very important the VIP will dictate this, if he is with a friend chatting and walking slowly, you should be behind them. If they are moving fast then you will need to be out front. Fig4 – The classic formation
27
.. .. .. .. ..
⊗2
⊗ VIP
⊗ TL
⊗1
Whilst there is an open front, there is the ability to give fast cover, Arcs of Responsibility
P
WALKING Drills Body cover Whatever the profile requested by the client, we should never sacrifice security for appearances. The BG should always be within striking distance of the client. All escort members should have a pre-determined area of responsibility, sequentially overlapping, and these are, jointly, areas of observation and fire. The PES team must act as one, avoid natural hazards {alleys}, and discourage crossing wide busy streets. All members of the PES must know where the VIP is at all times as well as looking around for potential hazards. Fast, Aggressive action Whilst CP work is generally defensive, it is only that because an attacker will more often have the element of surprise. Unless an attack is observed at a very early stage, a PES will always be reacting – however that reaction must be fast and aggressive.
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Priority The first priority is to give continuous body cover. If the situation is being handled by one person the rest of the PES should be providing cover and moving the VIP to safety.
VEHICLE Embus – Debus Drills The client will carry out most his or her journey by vehicle which being very vulnerable, the two main points are the embus and debus procedures. At the point he embuses & debuses he loses the relative protection of the PES and the maneuverability of the vehicle. Therefore this procedure has to be completed quickly and smoothly. There are six fatal mistakes that result in VIPs being ambushed.
1. Becoming complacent – day in day out routine. 2. Not reacting – Attackers rely on what is termed as dead time of shock to gain 3. 4. 5. 6.
advantage. Not allowing an exit point – Remember to maintain distance to maneuver. Vehicle location – A lack of route awareness and safe havens. Skills – No basic skills, remember your training. Panic – If you panic it’s over, if you are well trained that will automatically kick in.
In order to counteract any threat at the embus - debus point we have established a series of drills to help minimize the risk of any attack. Principles • • • • • • • • •
No rushing Maintain distance between team members Correct distance between vehicles no more than 15 inches Vehicles to stop as close as possible to entrance or exit Windows closed and doors locked Correct use of seat belts Driver should know the vehicle capabilities All round observation Body cover
The driver should remain behind the wheel at all times with the engine running, it should be in gear, with the handbrake off and foot on the foot brake. Prior to departure the vehicles should be called forward 6-7 minutes before departure. Moving from the vehicle to the building should be done as speedily as possible without looking panicky. As a rule of thumb if you were a sole BG, I would let the VIP enter the building first and reverse the procedure on the way out. The VIPs door should be in direct line with the building entrance where possible. Doors should be kept locked for as long as possible and the VIP remains in the car until the BG opens the door for him. If we presume that the SAP has done their job correctly and the building is a safe area, then the VIP can lead, followed by the BG. We must also assume that if we are in a right hand drive vehicle, the VIP must sit behind the BG on the left hand side of the vehicle. I do not hold with the theory because a door in a building is on the right hand side that the VIP has to walk around the car, the car can turn so the vehicle door is on the correct side. 29
.. .. .. .. Considerations .. • • • • • •
The threat The clients habits/ know him or her The clients perception and attitude towards the team members Scheduled and unscheduled stops Walking drills Beware of embus - debus drills overseas, driving on the opposite side of the roads
Drills Orthodox - This is when the vehicles are stopped in such away as to allow the client to embus - debus on the same side of the building. Unorthodox - This is when the vehicles are stopped in such away that the client as to walk around the vehicle in order to embus - debus to enter a building. • • • • • • • •
Drills have to be adapted for convoys of more vehicles. Client should always sit in the rear of the vehicle on the opposite side from the driver When entering vehicles always drop down backside first keeping feet on the ground for a stable position, swing legs in when ready. When arriving the second vehicle to be in position and team members on the ground first and in positions giving all round observation. When leaving team not to move until the client is safety in the vehicle, then move in a quick manner but do not run. Keep vehicle distances about 12" apart, rear vehicle to turn wheels outwards in case of a ram or fast maneuvering. Vehicle engines to be left running and driver behind the wheel ready for any action. Vehicles to be ready before time when client is ready to depart.
Remember if the team look alert, professional and confident would be attackers may think twice before attempting any actions.
DEFENSIVE / Offensive Driving – Anti Ambush Techniques Before we look at specific techniques and procedures, we need to review some basic principles.
• • • • •
Protect the VIP. Should an attack occur, the BG must as is his task to provide body cover. Remove the VIP from the danger area. All actions fast and aggressive. Use appropriate drills, do not attack the ambush. Remember double ambush tactics.
REMEMBER THE OBJECT IS TO FLEE, NOT FIGHT 80% of attacks on vehicles result in the driver being killed or injured. Of only 20% of those that escape, the driver remains unhurt. Terrorists will endeavor to stop a vehicle by killing the driver. 30
Attacks on moving vehicles have followed one or two patterns which can be summarized as follows: 1. Stationary Cut – off 2. Moving Cut – off Stationary Cut – offs {Roadblocks} Any roadblock has been planned with the benefit of surveillance, as they must know times and routes. Should the worst happen, your actions depend on variable factors we have mentioned, that is that the block may be Late, Early, Perfectly timed and may also be Partially blocked, Perfectly blocked and also the block may have been Perceived in time or Perceived late. The drills will either be Defensive or Offensive. Defensive are the “Escape to the rear” options, but be aware of being blocked to the rear. Offensive tactics are those where ramming a vehicle will need to take place. Ramming when done properly, will severely stun, injure or even kill the attackers and give you time to make your escape. A 4,000 lb vehicle at approx 10mph develops 160,000 ft/lb of energy. This energy can be transmitted to the attackers via their own vehicle. Even with considerable front-end damage, a vehicle will still run. Moving Cut – off or Moving Attack The drills are aggressive and most often rely on impact. Never “side swipe” a chasing vehicle, as you are likely to lock up both vehicles and create a perfect target for all the firepower to be brought to bear. To foresee such an attack, we are usually over-concentrating on what is happening ahead and it is important always to have someone looking back to detect and anticipate an attack from the rear. Techniques of Ramming Roadblock • • •
• • • •
Slow down using cadence braking Shift into a low gear Brake suddenly, about two car lengths away Pick a point to ram {rear} when your bumper rises after braking – GO Keep on the accelerator Don’t swerve Drive straight through
Remember when ramming a vehicle. • • • • •
Always go for the rear of the vehicle, as the front {engine} is heavier. Hold the gear lever so it doesn’t jump out. Accelerate all the way Thumbs out of the steering wheel. NEVER hit broadside. 31
.. .. .. .. ..•
At night use full beam.
ESCORT Drills Before setting off on a journey and whilst en-route, due attendance must be paid to some standard procedures and the usual list of do's and don'ts. Drivers must be trained BGs who enjoy a high standard of driving skills and should have attended a course in offensive and defensive Evasive driving. General Rules Know your vehicles It is essential that you do your best to insist on accurate timings. Establish the time your boss wants to arrive at a specific location, work backwards from your 'time en-route' from your recce and advise as to the time you will have to leave. Be firm - leaving late could put everyone in a flat spin, cause tensions resulting in poor convoy work and endanger the VIP if speeds become excessive to the point of being unsafe. If asked how long a journey will take and what time to leave - always give yourself a margin and give them a 'soonest and latest'. The soonest is when you would like to leave the latest is that time which could cause being late for an appointment and require an unacceptable speed en-route. Given that information, it is then their decision when they leave, knowing the consequences. Choice of Vehicle Often we, as operatives, cannot influence choice but, ideally, we would like to see the following: • • • • • • • •
Auto box, power steering Central locking doors and boot. Air conditioning. Run flat tyre system. Vehicle suited to normal tasks. Good power to weight ratio. Reliability. Not overly ostentatious ego sober color scheme.
Depending on the threat level and available resources, you should also consider: Engine protection. • • •
Armoring, preferably with lightweight Kevlar or similar. Self-repairing fuel tanks. Full air-filtering system.
Ensure you have the correct and most appropriate vehicle for the journey ego four wheel drive in snow or poor conditions, or one equipped with air conditioning in summer. The driver must have complete familiarity with the vehicle, it's mechanics and handling characteristics and know the driving under all conditions and be familiar with the vehicle's characteristics when braking at speed. He must be a mechanic and a good first-aid 32
technician as well as a driver. Brief all passengers with a driver's introduction, which asks all passengers to report anything suspicious, and on the actions they should take in an emergency. Ensure departure procedures are always followed (vehicles searched and secured if necessary). • • • • • • • • • •
• •
•
•
Engines to be warmed up before departure Check outside the residence immediately prior to departure for any suspicious vehicles or individuals The driver should adjust all equipment to suit his comfort i.e. seat belt, steering, mirrors Lock all doors and boot Windows closed or open no lower than two inches Sunroof closed VIP to sit in the rear, behind the BG on the opposite side to the driver Check Comms are working, but not immediately prior to departure. So as not to 'warn off' the enemy Ensure you have time to carry out all the pre-driving checks ego POL., lights, brakes, indicators, tyres etc. Drivers must be fully competent in radio procedures and equipment and be prepared to use a phone if Comms fail. Communications should be established between all vehicles and arrival and departure points. Any SAP vehicle some three minutes only in front of the VIP vehicle if on a daily journey A first aid kit should be carried inside the car - not in the boot. The vehicle should also carry a crowbar, sledgehammer, a comprehensive toolkit and a search kit. At least two respirators should be carried inside the vehicle, plus fire extinguishers, some tools and spares (bulbs, fan belts, good map book or maps, jump leads). The driver should keep the vehicle clean and tidy at all times and ensure that all the equipment in his vehicle is readily available and accessible at all times. A route recce card must be carried in the vehicle and the driver must be fully conversant with the position of the safe havens, motorway entry and exit points and have good map appreciation. If an attack occurs, it is not the time to start studying a route recce card or map.
Remember - you are vulnerable when in a vehicle. On The Road •
•
•
The driver should also fasten his seatbelt. There is ongoing controversy over the BG and the use of a seatbelt, but he must be aware of the law and not draw undue attention to the vehicle by not wearing one. The VIP should always wear a seatbelt. Drive at the maximum safest speed, taking into account the road and weather conditions and the vehicle's capabilities. Pay attention to driving and traffic conditions. Drivers must be constantly aware of vehicles or obstacles, which may cause his vehicle to be blocked. At a halt, always plan an escape route 33
.. .. .. .. .. • • •
•
• •
•
•
•
• •
• •
such as breaking across fields, crossing traffic lanes, side streets and turnings and fast reversing. 'Safest Position' - is the safest position to drive on the road, given the actual and potential dangers as they may exist. He will be able to maintain a good view, which will be increased by a slight deviation. He can stop the vehicle safely should the vehicle in front of him suddenly brake. c. He can extend his braking distance so that a following driver has more time to react. d. He can move up to an overtaking position when it is safe to do so. Accelerator sense - 'the ability of the driver to vary the speed of the vehicle by accurate use of the accelerator to meet changing road and traffic conditions’. He must maneuver smoothly at all times. When cornering, he should position early either nearside or offside, to see around the bend quickly and maintain stability - endeavor to straighten a winding road. A driver must visually scan the area several hundred yards ahead where possible, or anticipate, by the use of intelligence gathering, where the road will go i.e. use of tree lines or telegraph/lighting poles. He must be alert for hazards such as objects in the road i.e. bricks, timber, potholes, pedestrians, straying vehicles and anything out of the ordinary. His 'commentary driving' training should ensure he maintains a 360 degree awareness at all times. The driver should not stare at dividing lines or at an area immediately in front of the car's bonnet as this can lead to 'road hypnosis' and he will switch off. This may happen on long motorway journeys. The driver must not allow himself to fall into a false sense of security. He must remain alert at all times. Everyone's well being is in the hands of one or two people - the drivers. Drivers should not engage in conversation whilst driving, play the commercial radio or become distracted by activities within the car. Whilst waiting, do not 'bonnet' or 'nosy-park'. Never leave the vehicle unless ordered to do so by the team leader, but equally never sit in the vehicle if parked for a long time, then don't leave the vehicle unattended but find a position of dominance to watch the vehicle if unable to stand close-by. Do not open doors for occupants unless you are the sole BG/Driver and a one-car drill is in operation. Borders - when abroad there should be efficient forward-planning, to ensure the convoy has a speedy progress without undue delays. All paperwork, passports and weapons should be thoroughly checked. Reconnaissance of border procedures is essential.
Always know your exact location, so you can summon assistance accurately, if needed. Convoy Control and Procedures As with single vehicles, there are some general rules, which need to be reasonably closely adhered to and addressed before we can get into convoy drills, or, as we more commonly 34
know it - Tactical Driving or 'Tac Driving'. Should an escort vehicle accompany the VIP car, then other considerations now apply. Additional vehicles could be as high as 5/6 should other family members, corporate colleagues or connected individuals accompany the Principal. However: • • • •
•
• • • •
•
•
The PES 'back-up' vehicle is only concerned with the VIP and with no other vehicles. The driver must be as familiar with the threat assessment and enemy MO as any other team member. He should know what to expect. The vehicles involved, in this case the VIP and PES back-up vehicle should be closely matched in performance. The VIP driver must signal well in advance, turns and stops, so as to assist the back-up driver in being able to secure in advance a lane for the VIP vehicle and allow correct positioning. The PES driver must keep a constant and close watch on the VIPs car anticipate un signaled turns and stops, stay close when traffic is heavy and drop back when traffic is light. The maximum distance must never be more than 50 meters, whatever the conditions, but the closest position would be dictated by the conditions that apply. One needs to drive close enough to prevent any intrusion by another vehicle between the two cars, but always leave enough room to maneuver. Lane procedure dictates that the PES vehicle will always be offset either nearside or offside. All vehicles approaching from the rear must be checked by the PES and monitored before being allowed to pass. There must be efficient communication between vehicles with the suitable use of minimum code words. The VIP driver must be considerate of, and drive at all times, not only for himself, but the follow vehicle. The very safety of men in this vehicle depends on how well the VIP driver operates. He must not lead them into dangerous situations by a selfish act. The VIP driver must not attempt to intimidate or bluff other drivers. He may have the right of way, but it is not worth the risk to contest this, if other traffic refuses to concede. Other cars must not be allowed to get between the VIP car and escort vehicle.
ALL DRIVERS MUST BE AWARE OF CONVOY PROCEDURES AND DRILLS AND THE ACTIONS TO TAKE IN AN AMBUSH. Two Car Drills In civilian CP work, it must be considered a luxury if resources extend to an SAP vehicle and 35
.. .. .. . a QRF ..vehicle, but often you will enjoy the benefit of a PES vehicle as back-up. As outlined . in the general notes about the PES, is a follow-car which provides: • • • • • • •
Create room/provide cover in heavy traffic. Protection to the rear of the convoy and vetting of all overtaking vehicles to the extent they can prevent vehicles from overtaking the convoy. Constant anti-surveillance. Instant reaction to incidents. The PES can block the road to the rear of the convoy if required and also to the front, should a threat materialize from that quarter. Primarily, the PES can place themselves between the VIP and threat from whichever direction that threat may come. They can provide emergency transport in the event of breakdown of the VIP vehicle or its loss in an attack and can supply additional manpower should the worst happen on the journey.
The position for the PES vehicle is always to the rear of the VIP vehicle and it is with this position in mind that the following two car drills have been developed to 'afford the VIP vehicle the most comprehensive protection from the PES vehicle.' The convoy must always allow itself 'Room to Maneuver'. Whilst we are going to look at the 'by the book' convoy procedures, you must always remember that as a civilian, 'non-official' convoy, strictly adhering to procedures is likely to get most people on the road 'pissed-off'. The resultant attention and horn-blowing directed towards your vehicles causes unnecessary attention and embarrassment to the VIP. If, by not using indicators, you run the risk of causing an accident - be sensible. The real world is not the same as Government service.
SECURED Meetings • • • • • • • • •
Clients often need privacy while conducting meetings Schedule the meeting to be held in one room then change at the last minute, ensuring it is placed away from an outside wall/ window Change the meeting venue at the last minute, bussing all parties to the new location together Electronic and physical screening of all meeting participants Physical and electronic search of meeting area Remove all unnecessary furniture of the surrounding area Beware of gifts to client Secure the area once meeting has commenced Full counter surveillance during the meeting with scanners left operating and calls barred. Checks to include vehicles and relevant locations for bug receivers
ELECTRONIC Counter Measures Why do you believe an electronic sweep is necessary? 36
Establish the possible Identification and movements of the opposition: Government Only limited measures can be used against government bugging, sophisticated equipment along with surveillance, mail intercept & hard wiring Commercial Private investigators use mid range equipment & phone taps Private Individuals with no experience using cheap and nasty kit Opposition Tactics • • • • •
Prior knowledge of meetings & schedules - phone Enquirer, bugs, publications Inside information - staff & associates Surveillance of target Opportunism for planting bugs The amount of time opposition has had access to area for planting bugs; hard wiring is time consuming
ECM Search Procedure • • • •
Opposition is clever, take your time & be thorough/ systematic Search to be carried out under secure conditions - No staff Use two person teams Begin outside the building
Exterior Building Search •
Scan area visually - foot prints, disturbances, tampering
Grounds • • •
Driveway & pathways Manholes, flowerbeds, gardens Vehicles or packages
Building • • • •
Drainpipes/ guttering Windows, grills/ vents Entrance ways & doors Electrical boxers, wiring, bells
Interior Search Procedures • • • • • • •
Scan room visually Close eyes and listen to the room taking in all the sounds Divide the room into half and begin to sweep in opposite directions Floor to waste height, waste height to ceiling, the actual ceiling itself Search all electrical equipment, use the function test but also pull apart and check components If possible have a second model for reference Check all screw heads for tampering 37
.. .. .. .. ..• • • • • •
All furniture should be probed, recent repairs Ceiling panels removed Walls checked for recent repairs, wallpaper, plaster Windows, frames, balconies All lifts and service areas Utilize electronic as well as a physical search
UNARMED Combat Hand-to-hand combat is an engagement between two or more persons in an emptyhanded struggle or with handheld weapons such as knives, sticks, and rifles with bayonets. These fighting arts are essential military skills. Projectile weapons may be lost or broken, or they may fail to fire. When friendly and enemy forces become so intermingled that firearms and grenades are not practical, hand-to-hand combat skills become vital assets. PURPOSE OF UNARMED COMBAT TRAINING Today's battlefield scenarios may require silent elimination of the enemy. Unarmed combat and expedient-weapons training should not be limited to forward units. With rapid mechanized/motorized, airborne, and air assault abilities, units throughout the battle area could be faced with close-quarter or unarmed fighting situations. With low-intensity conflict scenarios and guerrilla warfare conditions, any soldier is apt to face an unarmed confrontation with the enemy, and hand-to-hand combative training can save lives. The many practical battlefield benefits of unarmed combat training are not its only advantage. 1. Contribute to individual and unit strength, flexibility, balance, and cardio respiratory fitness. 2. Build courage, confidence, self-discipline, and esprit de corps. We are always surprised by the amount of people who turn up for CP training who have no martial skills whatsoever. When it comes to the bottom line, you have to be able to fight and remember, you’re seldom, if ever, going to be armed, due to the legislation of certain countries. Close protection is all about avoiding the threat. But, as always there will be a time when you will have to fight for your life and that of your honor. But to balance those comments I am equally surprised by the martial artist that believe that because he or she is a Black Belt they will make an excellent BG. You will, in every circumstance have to engage the following: • • • • Aggression
POWER SPEED BODY WEIGHT AGGRESSION is always the primary glue that holds the rest together.
You may take any one part away from the list and you can still win, but aggression must always stay. I have read too many manuals about how to stop an attacker rushing towards you with a couple of blows to vital organs. This is total rubbish; a person who is high on adrenalin and fear with one goal of hurting you or your VIP cannot be stopped in this way. The only way he can be stopped is to deflect the charge and or bring him down. This will never happen cleanly and it will turn into a grappling match. At this point the rest of your team is hopefully doing what they should be and removing the VIP from danger. Once on the floor you must 38
aim for the most venerable part of the body, eyes, ears, throat and testicles to name a few. If however you take the assailant down and manage to stay upright, then in a brief few seconds, you must make the decision as to whether to finish off the threat or re-group to your team. You must always train to achieve as realistic an effect as possible. Skilled opponents know that you can never go far wrong if you engage your opponent aggressively. Backing off from an attack, puts you on the back foot mentally as well as physically. You must close with an attacker; forget the aim of blocking blows. CLOSE AND HIT. You must remember that pain alone will not stop an attacker. This person, possibly being assisted by drugs, will seldom be stopped by Magnum rounds. One way to give him the good news is to gain a response from the Central Nervous System to disable him. The eyes throat and ears are good targets, but when it all goes to pot the stationary targets you practiced on are now bobbing and weaving all over the place. Attack may be broadly the following or a combination of a number: • • • • • •
VERBAL RUSHING GRABBING STRIKING BLUNT INSTRUMENT BLADED ARTICLE
Striking attacks are the easiest to deal with. You do not have to think is my attacker skilled or un-skilled as in the fractions of seconds you have to deal with a situation it would do you little or no good at all. You must make an Instant Response Action to the threat (IRA) In Battle, CHOICE AND DECISION-MAKING, IS DEATH AND INJURY PRODUCING To defeat a skilled kicker you must – • • •
Cover up Close up Sweep or grapple to the ground
At all costs any type of physical engagement should be avoided, a good BG will pre-empt the engagement by being aware of the situation around him or her. You must act fast to take your attacker out of the equation, you do not want a prolonged confrontation. Chokes, grabs, traps, wrist and arm locks First and most important principal you should be the giver rather than the receiver. Chokes and strangles when applied properly will work within seconds, all this rubbish about kicking or head butting backwards is crap, a good attacker will limit all these area’s from your reach. The whole idea is speed aggression and simplicity in dealing with the attacker. Knife Attacks
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.. .. .. .. On confronting a person who is holding a knife, my advice is to give them what they want . (within .reason) or just run away. But we are involved in the field of Close Protection, where free choice often doesn’t enter in to it. If you are armed shoot them! Use any weapons you can get your hands on sticks, chairs, dustbin lids, etc. You are going to have to move in close, it is all a question of Distance / Reaction. You will for sure receive some damage but if you use your forearms no major arteries will be cut. Although the Legislation in a country allows it or not I always carry an ASP telescopic baton to give the offender the good news with. Defense against Hand Gun attacks Unfortunately it has become so easy to obtain firearms on the black market, that the weapon of choice nowadays is a firearm. A person will have 2 main objectives if he attacks with a gun: 1. To Kill 2. To Kidnap Under stressful conditions with people around them, the chances of an assassin hitting a target at anything over 15 feet is unlikely. If you research most attempted assassinations the assassin is usually very close. What do you look for in a person who would attempt such a task. Stress, Tension, Nervousness, over-concentration and Fear. If you can spot this and move towards the offender, you are cutting these persons options down and giving them less time to react. So, you’ve had a handgun pulled on you and you are unarmed, this is not one of those times you close up and rush the target. Proximity Bring him in! – If he is not within reach, he must be induced to come closer to you or for you to move closer to him. An expert assailant will know that a short - barreled weapon held tight against the body is extremely hard to take away from someone. Despite fear and stress, you have to be calm enough to assimilate as much information as pertinent to your safety and survival. Before we start with this we need to first look at what type of firearm is being used, a revolver – either single or double action or a high spec automatic. My preference to be faced with is a revolver, which would require a full pull through to action it in double action mode and similar with a pistol. (No knee jerk reaction with a revolver)
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With an automatic I have heard of stories about training to push back the slide to stop it firing. To do this you have to be extremely skilled and prepared to take a risk. Not for me! We now have the assailant in close pointing a handgun at you. Firstly you probably have about ⅔ of a second to move out of the line of fire. 9 times out of 10 the weapon will be pointed at your head, this actually makes life easier as all you have to move is your head. Note: - To hit a weapon hand when the weapon is pointing in your face means that movement of your arms happens below his line of site, sheltered by his own arm. A split second before you strike, look away. You won’t lose your point of contact and he will feel that he is in control of the situation. You need to strike the weapon hand away from you, but keeping control of the hand so it doesn’t come back on you. You must now finish him off, if both hands are tied up, use your head or knee’s. Dos and Don’ts • • • •
If you are ordered to put your hands up never raise them above head height. Do not show any prior movement towards the weapon, don’t stare; the eyes give the game away. Always keep the weapon in your peripheral vision Try to act natural – Frightened.
BASIC PRINCIPLES There are basic principles that the hand-to-hand fighter must know and apply to successfully defeat an opponent. The principles mentioned are only a few of the basic guidelines that are essential knowledge for hand-to-hand combat. There are many others, which through years of study become intuitive to a highly skilled fighter. Physical Balance. Balance refers to the ability to maintain equilibrium and to remain in a stable, upright position. A hand-to-hand fighter must maintain his balance both to defend himself and to launch an effective attack. Without balance, the fighter has no stability with which to defend himself, nor does he have a base of power for an attack. The fighter must understand two aspects of balance in a struggle: • •
How to move his body to keep or regain his own balance. A fighter develops balance through experience, but usually he keeps his feet about shoulder-width apart and his knees flexed. He lowers his center of gravity to increase stability. How to exploit weaknesses in his opponent's balance. Experience also gives the hand-to-hand fighter a sense of how to move his body in a fight to maintain his balance while exposing the enemy's weak points.
Mental Balance. The successful fighter must also maintain a mental balance. He must not allow fear or anger to overcome his ability to concentrate or to react instinctively in hand-tohand combat.
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.. .. .. .. Position. refers to the location of the fighter (defender) in relation to his opponent. .. Position A vital principle when being attacked is for the defender to move his body to a safe position-that is, where the attack cannot continue unless the enemy moves his whole body. To position for a counterattack, a fighter should move his whole body off the opponent's line of attack. Then, the opponent has to change his position to continue the attack. It is usually safe to move off the line of attack at a 45-degree angle, either toward the opponent or away from him, whichever is appropriate. This position affords the fighter safety and allows him to exploit weaknesses in the enemy's counterattack position. Movement to an advantageous position requires accurate timing and distance perception. Timing. A fighter must be able to perceive the best time to move to an advantageous position in an attack. If he moves too soon, the enemy will anticipate his movement and adjust the attack. If the fighter moves too late, the enemy will strike him. Similarly, the fighter must launch his attack or counterattack at the critical instant when the opponent is the most vulnerable. Distance. Distance is the relative distance between the positions of opponents. A fighter positions himself where distance is to his advantage. The hand-to-hand fighter must adjust his distance by changing position and developing attacks or counterattacks. He does this according to the range at which he and his opponent are engaged Momentum. Momentum is the tendency of a body in motion to continue in the direction of motion unless acted on by another force. Body mass in motion develops momentum. The greater the body mass or speed of movement, the greater the momentum. Therefore, a fighter must understand the effects of this principle and apply it to his advantage. The fighter can use his opponent's momentum to his advantage--that is, he can place the opponent in a vulnerable position by using his momentum against him. • • •
The opponent's balance can be taken away by using his own momentum. The opponent can be forced to extend farther than he expected, causing him to stop and change his direction of motion to continue his attack. An opponent's momentum can be used to add power to a fighter's own attack or counterattack by combining body masses in motion.
The fighter must be aware that the enemy can also take advantage of the principle of momentum. Therefore, the fighter must avoid placing himself in an awkward or vulnerable position, and he must not allow himself to extend too far. Learn how to break your fall If your intention is to run your opponent backwards at 100mph into any object, particularly the floor, self-preservation in your opponent will cause him to release his grip on you. You must train to develop an instinctive reaction to dropping and twisting body weight to break free of bear hugs and hit the ground running. Elbows – Used properly, they are one of the best close quarter weapons available. They are extremely hard to block and are like having a heavy hammer in your personal arsenal. Fists – Give you the range to your target, however some people just cannot punch and usually do more damage to themselves rather than the opponent. Kicks – These are extremely difficult to use effectively in a street fight.
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The main target areas that you should aim for if you have to kick are, the stomach, and anything below the waist knees’ Groin etc. Grappling – learn how! Some 90% of street battles will end up with two people wrestling each other to the ground. Remember what you have been taught so far use everything at your disposal, head butt, bite and elbow. Blunt Instruments – These are like the TKD kickers, give them distance and they will beat you to death. As before you will have to COVER UP AND RUSH IN. Leverage. A fighter uses leverage in hand-to-hand combat by using the natural movement of his body to place his opponent in a position of unnatural movement. The fighter uses his body or parts of his body to create a natural mechanical advantage over parts of the enemy's body. He should never oppose the enemy in a direct test of strength; however, by using leverage, he can defeat a larger or stronger opponent. Close Range Unarmed Combat. In close-range combative, two opponents have closed the gap between them so they can grab one another in hand-to-hand combat. The principles of balance, leverage, timing, and body positioning are applied. Throws and takedown techniques are used to upset the opponent's balance and to gain control of the fight by forcing him to the ground. Chokes can be applied to quickly render an opponent unconscious. The soldier should also know counters to choking techniques to protect himself. Grappling involves skilful fighting against an opponent in close-range combat so that a soldier can win through superior body movement or grappling skills. Pain can be used to disable an opponent. A soldier can use painful eye gouges and strikes to soft, vital areas to gain an advantage over his opponent Mid Range Unarmed Combat In medium-range combative, two opponents are already within touching distance. The arsenal of possible body weapons includes short punches and strikes with elbows, knees, and hands. Head butts are also effective; do not forget them during medium-range combat. A soldier uses his peripheral vision to evaluate the targets presented by the opponent and choose his target. He should be aggressive and concentrate his attack on the opponent's vital points to end the fight as soon as possible. Long Range Unarmed Combat In long-range combative, the distance between opponents is such that the combatants can engage one another with fully extended punches and kicks or with handheld weapons, such as rifles with fixed bayonets and clubs. As in medium-range combative, a fighter must continuously monitor his available body weapons and opportunities for attack, as well as possible defence measures. He must know when to increase the distance from an opponent and when to close the gap. The spheres of influence that surround each fighter come into contact in long-range combative.
PISTOL Marksmanship Training BASIC MARKSMANSHIP FUNDAMENTALS The main use of the pistol or revolver is to engage an enemy at close range with quick, accurate fire. Accurate shooting results from knowing and correctly applying the elements of marksmanship. The elements of combat pistol or revolver marksmanship are: 43
.. .. .. .. ..• • • • • •
Grip. Aiming. Breath control. Trigger squeeze. Target engagement. Positions.
GRIP The weapon must become an extension of the hand and arm. It should replace the finger in pointing at an object. A firm, uniform grip must be applied to the weapon. A proper grip is one of the most important fundamentals of quick fire. One-Hand Grip. Hold the weapon in the nonfiring hand; form a V with the thumb and forefinger of the strong hand (firing hand). Place the weapon in the V with the front and rear sights in line with the firing arm. Wrap the lower three fingers around the pistol grip, putting equal pressure with all three fingers to the rear. Allow the thumb of the firing hand to rest alongside the weapon without pressure. Grip the weapon tightly until the hand begins to tremble; relax until the trembling stops. At this point, the necessary pressure for a proper grip has been applied. Place the trigger finger on the trigger between the tip and second joint so that it can be squeezed to the rear. The trigger finger must work independently of the remaining fingers. Two-Hand Grip. The two-hand grip allows the firer to steady the firing hand and provide maximum support during firing. The nonfiring hand becomes a support mechanism for the firing hand by wrapping the fingers of the nonfiring hand around the firing hand. Two-hand grips are recommended for all pistol and revolver firing. Fist grip. Grip the weapon as described in paragraph a above. Firmly close the fingers of the nonfiring hand over the fingers of the firing hand, ensuring that the index finger from the nonfiring hand is between the middle finger of the firing hand and the trigger guard. Place the nonfiring thumb alongside the firing thumb. Palm-supported grip. This grip is commonly called the cup and saucer grip. Grip the firing hand as hand. Place the nonfiring hand under the firing hand, wrapping the nonfiring fingers around the back of the firing hand. Place the nonfiring thumb over the middle finger of the firing.) Weaver grip. Apply this grip the same as the fist grip. The only exception is that the nonfiring thumb is wrapped over the firing thumb. Isometric Tension. The firer raises his arms to a firing position and applies isometric tension. This is commonly known as the push-pull method for maintaining weapon stability Isometric tension is when the firer applies forward pressure with the firing hand and pulls rearward with the nonfiring hand with equal pressure. This creates an isometric force but never so much to cause the firer to tremble. This steadies the weapon and reduces barrel rise from recoil. The supporting arm is bent with the elbow pulled downward. The firing arm is fully extended with the elbow and wrist locked. The firer must experiment to find the right amount of isometric tension to apply. Natural Point of Aim. The firer should check his grip for use of his natural point of aim. He grips the weapon and sights properly on a distant target. While maintaining his grip and stance, he closes his eyes for three to five seconds. He then opens his eyes and checks for proper sight picture. If the point of aim is disturbed, the firer adjusts his stance to 44
compensate. If the sight alignment is disturbed, the firer adjusts his grip to compensate by removing the weapon from his hand and reapplying the grip. The firer repeats this process until the sight alignment and sight placement remain almost the same when he opens his eyes. This enables the firer to determine and use his natural point of aim once he has sufficiently practiced. This is the most relaxed position for holding and firing the weapon. AIMING Aiming is sight alignment and sight placement sight alignment is the centering of the front blade in the rear sight notch. The top of the front sight is level with the top of the rear sight and is in correct alignment with the eye. For correct sight alignment, the firer must center the front sight in the rear sight. He raises or lowers the top of the front sight so it is level with the top of the rear sight. Sight placement is the positioning of the weapon's sights in relation to the target as seen by the firer when he aims the weapon. A correct sight picture consists of correct sight alignment with the front sight placed center mass of the target. The eye can focus on only one object at a time at different distances. Therefore the last focus of the eye is always on the front sight. When the front sight is seen clearly, the rear sight and target will appear hazy. Correct sight alignment can only be maintained through focusing on the front sight. The firer's bullet will hit the target even if the sight picture is partly off center but still remains on the target. Therefore, sight alignment is more important than sight placement. Since it is impossible to hold the weapon completely still, the firer must apply trigger squeeze and maintain correct sight alignment while the weapon is moving in and around the center of the target. This natural movement of the weapon is referred to as wobble area. The firer must strive to control the limits of the wobble area through proper breath control, trigger squeeze, positioning, and grip. Sight alignment is essential for accuracy because of the short sight radius of the pistols and revolvers. For example, if a 1/10-inch error is made in aligning the front sight in the rear sight, the firer's bullet will miss the point of aim by about 15 inches at a range of 25 meters. The 1/10-inch error in sight alignment magnifies as the range increases--at 25 meters it is magnified 150 times. Focusing on the front sight while applying proper trigger squeeze will help the firer resist the urge to jerk the trigger and anticipate the actual moment the weapon will fire. Mastery of trigger squeeze and sight alignment requires practice. Trainers should use concurrent training stations or have fire ranges to enhance proficiency of marksmanship skills. BREATH CONTROL The firer must learn to hold his breath properly at any time during the breathing cycle if he wishes to attain accuracy that will serve him in combat. This must be done while aiming and squeezing the trigger. While the procedure is simple, it requires explanation, demonstration, and supervised practice. To hold the breath properly the firer takes a breath, lets it out, then inhales normally, lets a little out until comfortable, holds, and then fires. It is difficult to maintain a steady position keeping the front sight at a precise aiming point while breathing. Therefore, the firer should be taught to inhale, then exhale normally, and hold his breath at the moment of the natural respiratory pause ( Breath control, firing at a single target.) The shot must then be fired before he feels any discomfort from not breathing. When multiple targets are presented, the firer must learn to hold his breath at any part of the breathing cycle. Breath control must be practiced during dry-fire exercises until it-becomes a natural part of the firing process. TRIGGER SQUEEZE 45
.. .. .. .. Improper causes more misses than any other step of preparatory .. triggerPoorsqueeze marksmanship. shooting is caused by the aim being disturbed before the bullet leaves the barrel of the weapon This is usually the result of the firer jerking the trigger or flinching. A slight off-center pressure of the trigger finger on the trigger can cause the weapon to move and disturb the firer's sight alignment. Flinching is an automatic human reflex caused by anticipating the recoil of the weapon. Jerking is an effort to fire the weapon at the precise time the sights align with the target. Trigger squeeze is the independent movement of the trigger finger in applying increasing pressure on the trigger straight to the rear, without disturbing the sight alignment until the weapon fires. The trigger slack, or free play, is taken up first, and the squeeze is continued steadily until the hammer falls. If the trigger is squeezed properly, the firer will not know exactly when the hammer will fall; thus, he does not tend to flinch or heel, resulting in a bad shot. Novice firers must be trained to overcome the urge to anticipate recoil. Proper application of the fundamentals will lower this tendency. To apply correct trigger squeeze, the trigger finger should contact the trigger between the tip of the finger to the second joint (without touching the weapon anywhere else). Where contact is made depends on the length of the firer's trigger finger. If pressure from the trigger finger is applied to the right side of the trigger or weapon, the strike of the bullet will be to the left. This is due to the normal hinge action of the fingers. When the fingers on the right hand are closed, as in gripping, they hinge or pivot to the left, thereby applying pressure to the left. (With left-handed firers, this action is to the right.) The firer must not apply pressure left or right but increase finger pressure straight to the rear Only the trigger Linger must perform this action. Dry-fire training improves a firer's ability to move the trigger finger straight to the rear without cramping or increasing pressure on the hand grip. • •
The firer who is a good shot holds the sights of the weapon as nearly on the target center as possible and continues to squeeze the trigger with increasing pressure until the weapon fires. The person who is a bad shot tries to "catch his target" as his sight alignment moves past the target and fires the weapon at that instant. This is called ambushing, which causes trigger jerk.
Follow-through is the continued effort of the firer to maintain sight alignment before, during, and after the round has fired. The firer must continue the rearward movement of the finger even after the round has been fired. Releasing the trigger too soon after the round has been fired results in an uncontrolled shot, causing a missed target. TARGET ENGAGEMENT The closest and most dangerous multiple target in combat is engaged first and should be fired at with two rounds. This is commonly referred to as a double tap. The firer then traverses and acquires the next target, aligns the sights in the center of mass, focuses on the front sight, applies trigger squeeze, and fires. The firer ensures his firing arm elbow and wrist are locked during all engagements. If the firer has missed the first target and has fired upon the second target, he shifts back to the first and engages it. Some problems in target engagement are as follows: Recoil Anticipation. When a soldier first learns to shoot, he may begin to anticipate recoil. This reaction may cause him to tighten his muscles during or just before the hammer falls. He may fight the recoil by pushing the weapon downward in anticipating or reacting to its firing. In either case, the rounds will not hit the point of aim. A good method to show the firer that he is anticipating the recoil is the ball-and-dummy method.
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Trigger Jerk. Trigger jerk occurs when the soldier sees that he has acquired a good sight picture at center mass and "snaps" off a round before the good sight picture is lost. This may become a problem, especially when the soldier is learning to use a flash sight picture. Heeling. Heeling is caused by a firer tightening the large muscle in the heel of the hand to keep from jerking the trigger. A firer who has had problems with jerking the trigger tries to correct the fault by tightening the bottom of the hand, which results in a heeled shot. Heeling causes the strike of the bullet to hit high on the firing hand side of the target. The firer can correct shooting errors by knowing and applying correct trigger squeeze. POSITIONS The qualification course is fired from a standing kneeling, or crouch position. All of the firing positions described below must be practiced so they become natural movements, during qualification and combat firing. Though these positions seem natural, practice sessions must be conducted to ensure the habitual attainment of correct firing positions. Assuming correct firing positions ensures that soldiers can quickly assume these positions without a conscious effort. Pistol marksmanship requires a soldier to rapidly apply all the fundamentals at dangerously close targets while under stress. Assuming a proper position to allow for a steady aim is critical to survival. Pistol-Ready Position. In the pistol-ready position, hold the weapon in the onehand grip. Hold the upper arm close to the body, and the forearm at about a 45ø angle. Point the weapon toward target center as you move forward. Standing Position Without Support. Face the target. Place feet a comfortable distance apart, about shoulder width. Extend the firing arm and attain a two-hand grip. The wrist and elbow of the firing arm are locked and pointed toward target center. Keep the body straight with the shoulders slightly forward of the buttocks. Kneeling Position. In the kneeling position, ground only the firing side knee as the main support. Vertically place the foot, used as the main support, under the buttocks. Rest the body weight on the heel and toes. Rest the nonfiring arm just above the elbow on the knee not used as the main body support. Use the two-handed grip for firing. Extend the firing arm, and lock the firing arm elbow and wrist to ensure solid arm control. Crouch Position. Use the crouch position when surprise targets are engaged at close range. Place the body in a forward crouch (boxer's stance) with the knees bent slightly and trunk bent forward from the hips to give faster recovery from recoil. Place the feet naturally in a position that allows another step toward the target. Extend the weapon straight toward the target, and lock the wrist and elbow of the firing arm. It is important to consistently train with this position, since the body will automatically crouch under conditions of stress such as combat. It is also a faster position from which to change direction of fire. Prone Position. Lie flat on the ground, facing the target. Extend arms in front with the firing arm locked. The arms may have to be slightly unlocked for firing at high targets. Rest the butt of the weapon on the ground for single, well-aimed shots. Wrap the nonfiring hand (fingers) around the fingers of the firing hand. Face forward. Keep the head down between arms as much as possible and behind the weapon. Standing Position With Support. Use available cover for support--for example, a tree or wall to stand behind. Stand behind a barricade with the firing side on line with 47
.. .. .. .. edge of the barricade. Place the knuckles of the nonfiring fist at eye level against ..the the edge of the barricade. Lock the elbow and wrist of the firing arm. Move the foot on the nonfiring side forward until the toe of the boot touches the bottom of the barricade. Kneeling Supported Position. Use available cover for support--for example, use a low wall, rocks, or vehicle. Place the firing-side knee on the ground. Bend the other knee and place the foot (nonfiring side) flat on the ground, pointing toward the target. Extend arms alongside and brace them against available cover. Lock the wrist and elbow of the firing arm. Place the nonfiring hand around the fist to support the firing arm. Rest the nonfiring arm just above the elbow on the nonfiring-side knee. COMBAT MARKSMANSHIP After a soldier becomes proficient in the fundamentals of marksmanship, he progresses to advanced techniques of combat marksmanship. The main use of the pistol or revolver is to engage the enemy at close range with quick, accurate fire. In shooting encounters, it is not the first round fired that wins the engagement, but the first accurately fired round. The soldier should use his sights when engaging the enemy, the only exception being if this would place the weapon within arm's reach of the enemy. TECHNIQUES OF FIRING (Hand-and-Eye Coordination) Hand-and-eye coordination is not a natural, instinctive ability for all soldiers. It is usually a learned skill obtained by practicing the use of a flash sight picture. The more a soldier practices raising the weapon to eye level and obtaining a flash sight picture, the more natural the relationship between soldier, sights, and target becomes. Eventually, proficiency elevates to a point so that the soldier can accurately engage targets in the dark. Each soldier must be aware of this trait and learn how to best use it. Poorly coordinated soldiers can achieve proficiency by being closely supervised. Everyone has the ability to point at an object. Since pointing the forefinger at an object and extending the weapon toward a target are much the same, the combination of the two are natural. Making the soldier aware of this ability and teaching him how to apply it when firing results in success when engaging enemy targets in combat. The eyes focus instinctively on the center of any object observed. After the object is sighted, the firer aligns his sights on the center of mass, focuses on the front sight, and applies proper trigger squeeze. Most crippling or killing hits result from maintaining the focus on the center of mass. The eyes must remain fixed on some part of the target throughout firing. When a person points, he instinctively points at the feature on the object on which his eyes are focused. An impulse from the brain causes the arm and hand to stop when the finger reaches the proper position. When the eyes are shifted to a new object or feature, the finger, hand, and arm also shift to this point. It is this inherent trait that can be used by the soldier to rapidly and accurately engage targets. This instinct is called hand-and-eye coordination. Flash Sight Picture. Usually when engaging an enemy at pistol/revolver ranges, the firer has little time to ensure a correct sight picture. The quick-kill (or natural point of aim) method does not always ensure a first-round hit. A compromise between a correct sight picture and the quick-kill method is known as a flash sight picture. As the soldier raises the weapon to eye level, his point of focus switches from the enemy to the front sight, ensuring that the front and rear sights are in proper alignment left and right, but not necessarily up and down. Pressure is applied to the trigger as the front sight is being acquired, and the hammer falls 48
as the flash sight picture is confirmed. Initially, this method should be practiced slowly, gaining speed as proficiency increases. Quick-Fire Point Shooting. This is for engaging an enemy at less than 5 yards. It is also useful for night firing. The weapon should be held in a two-hand grip. It is brought up close to the body until it reaches chin level and is then thrust forward until both arms are straight. The-arms and body form a triangle, which can be aimed as a unit. In thrusting the weapon forward, the firer can imagine that there is a box between him and the enemy, and he is thrusting the weapon into the box. The trigger is smoothly squeezed to the rear as the elbows straighten out. Quick-Fire Sighting. This is used when engaging an enemy at 5 to 10 yards away. It is used only when there is no time available to get a full picture. The firing position is the same as for quick-fire point shooting. The sights are aligned left and right to save time, but not up and down. The firer must determine in practice what the sight picture will look like and where the front sight must be aimed to hit the enemy in the chest. TARGET ENGAGEMENT In close combat, there is seldom time to precisely apply all of the fundamentals of marksmanship. When a person fires a round at the enemy, many times he will not know if he hit his target. Therefore, two rounds should be fired at the target. This is called a double tap. If the enemy continues to attack, two more shots should be placed in the pelvic area to break the body's support structure, causing the enemy to fall. TRAVERSING Traversing 360ø. In close combat, the enemy may be attacking from all sides. The soldier may not have time to constantly change his position to adapt to new situations. The purpose of the crouching or kneeling traverse 360ø is to fire in any direction without moving the feet. The firer remains in the crouch position with feet almost parallel to each other. The following instructions are for a right-handed firer. The two-hand grip is used at all times except for over the right shoulder. Turning will be natural on the balls of the feet. COMBAT RELOADING TECHNIQUES Reloading was an overlooked problem for many years until it was discovered that soldiers were being killed due to dropping of magazines, shaking hands, placing magazines in backward, and placing empty magazines back into the weapon. The stress state induced by a life-threatening situation causes soldiers to do things they would not otherwise do. Consistent, repeated training is needed to avoid such mistakes. STEP 1: Develop a consistent method for carrying magazines in the ammunition pouches. All magazines should face down with the bullets facing forward and to the center of the body. STEP 2: Know when to reload. When possible, count the number of rounds fired. However, it is possible to lose count in close combat. If this happens, there is a distinct difference in recoil of the pistol when the last round has been fired. Change magazines when two rounds may be left--one in the magazine and one in the chamber. This prevents being caught with an empty weapon at a crucial time. Reloading is faster with a round in the chamber since time is not needed to release the slide.
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.. .. .. .. 3: Obtain a firm grip on the magazine. This precludes the magazine being ..STEP dropped or difficulty in getting the magazine into the weapon. Ensure the knuckles of the hand are toward the body while gripping as much of the magazine as possible. Place the index finger high on the front of the magazine when withdrawing from the pouch. Use the index finger to guide the magazine into the magazine well. STEP 4: Know which reloading procedure to use for the tactical situation. There are three systems of reloading: rapid, tactical, and one-handed. Rapid reloading is used when the soldier's life is in immediate danger, and the reload must be accomplished quickly. Tactical reloading is used when there is more time, and it is desirable to keep the replaced magazine because there are rounds still in it or it will be needed again. One-handed reloading is used when there is an arm injury. Rapid Reloading. • • • • • •
Place your hand on the next magazine in the ammunition pouch to ensure there is another magazine. Withdraw the magazine from the pouch while releasing the other magazine from the weapon. Let the replaced magazine drop to the ground. Insert the replacement magazine, guiding it into the magazine well with the index finger. Release the slide, if necessary. Pick up the dropped magazine if time allows. Place it in your pocket, not back into the ammunition pouch where it may become mixed with full magazines.
Tactical Reloading. • • • • • •
Place your hand on the next magazine in the ammunition pouch to ensure there is a remaining magazine. Withdraw the magazine from the pouch. Drop the used magazine into the palm of the nonfiring hand, which is the same hand holding the replacement magazine. Insert the replacement magazine, guiding it into the magazine well with the index finger. Release the slide, if necessary. Place the used magazine into a pocket. Do not mix it with full magazines.
One-Hand Reloading. • • • • • • •
With the right hand. Push the magazine release button with the thumb. Place the safety ON with the thumb if the slide is forward. Place the weapon backwards into the holster. Insert the replacement magazine. Withdraw the weapon from the holster. Remove the safety with the thumb if the slide is forward, or push the slide release if the slide is back.
With the left hand. • • • •
Push the magazine release button with the middle finger. Place the safety ON with the thumb if the slide is forward. With the .45caliber pistol, the thumb must be switched to the left side of the weapon. Place the weapon backwards into the holster. Insert the replacement magazine. 50
• •
Remove the weapon from the holster. Remove the safety with the thumb if the slide is forward, or push the slide release lever with the middle finger if the slide is back. These are the basic stances used in firing a handgun. As you can see a young teenager is demonstrating the moves. This proves it is not difficult to learn.
Firing from protective cover.
Last round spent One / Change complete magazine action / eject magazine while reaching for a new clip.
Magazine gone / replace & return fire.
POOR VISIBILITY FIRING Poor visibility firing with any weapon is difficult since shadows can be misleading to the person. This is mainly true during EENT and EMNT (a half hour before dark and a half hour before dawn). Even though the weapon is a short-range weapon, the hours of darkness and poor visibility further decrease its effect. To compensate, the operative must use the three principles of night vision. Dark Adaptation. This process conditions the eyes to see during poor visibility conditions. The eyes usually need about 30 minutes to become 98- percent dark adapted in a totally darkened area. Off-Center Vision. When looking at an object in daylight, a person looks directly at it. However, at night he would
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.. .. .. . see the..object only for a few seconds. To see an object in darkness, he must concentrate on it while .looking 6ø to 10ø away from it. Scanning. This is the short, abrupt, irregular movement of the firer's eyes around an object or area every 4 to 10 seconds. When artificial illumination is used, the firer uses night fire techniques to engage targets, since targets seem to shift without moving. Weapon Selection & Handling If Unarmed Combat for the Close Protection operative could realistically take up a book in its own right, then a complete dissertation on this subject could probably fill four, but at the end of it we'd also equally be none the wiser. No other subject matter contains such divergent views on so many aspects and I've tried to give a somewhat different slant on the process. I've concentrated on Handgun selection, although touched on the role of shotguns and full autos. For most operatives, it will be the exception that they will get to carry a weapon in the civiy field and out of that small percentage, even fewer will carry a full auto weapon. Shotguns, particularly where a large estate is involved, can be a standard piece of kit, although no one will own up to carrying one for any more concrete purpose than culling the local rabbit population. The scene we set for the whole of this chapter is one where the operative is abroad. Single BG drills. Fast accurate weapon handling with a VIP slung over your shoulder is somewhat of a challenge. At the same time you will be tracking backwards hence the exaggerated crouch, which gives good control of your Principal with your backside. That being the case, predominantly, the weapon will be a handgun. There may be a wider variety of weapons in the residence and carried in vehicles, but we are going to concern ourselves with the handgun side of things. Broadly, you'll be faced with either a Revolver or Semi-auto Pistol and we'll look at the pros and cons of both, but before that we need to examine the role of the handgun per se, whichever the variety, and dispel some myths. Primarily, the handgun is a defensive weapon. It's accuracy, out past 25ft, under severe stress conditions is poor and, realistically, ranges of 10-15ft, given the situations we envisage the weapon would be used in, is probably more like an effective range. In training scenarios I regularly see people miss man-sized targets from 3ft under stress and time constraints. If artificially induced, pressure can so dramatically effect accuracy, just think what being stabbed, shot at and bombed might do to your aim. We're constantly bombarded with statistics about handgun engagements with regard to the AVERAGE distance of a confrontation; number of rounds fired, hit-rate, reloading characteristics etc, but one needs to carefully analyze the source. We all quote statistics to support our individually preferred manner of tuition but for most of us, the stats we quote are those from the very large body of case history from the North American police and FBI experience. Whilst relevant in a broad way, in some areas the experience doesn't relate to CP work nor, equally, does the British Police firearms thinking which influences their CP firearms approach. No CP body of case history of any size exists to prove any point or theory one way or another. A commonsense approach to 52
application, tinged with some intellectual work on the likely scenarios one can foreseeable perceive, tested against the experience of others in similar situations may get us some way down the road. Before moving off elsewhere, some statistical information may prove thought-provoking and set the scene for what you are about to read. FBI summary of officers killed, together with police gunfight data, has remained consistent 92% of all fire-fights occur within 20 feet, with 6% out beyond 50 yards, resulting from sniping incidents and nearly all officers killed are within 10 feet of their assailant, with half dying at 0-5 feet. In 1988, most NYPD shootings were within 7 feet and the hit ratio was a startlingly low 11 % ('Making a Cop', Ranchlin, 1991). The FBI's 1992 Law Enforcement Officers Killed & Assaulted Report covered a 10-year period in which 650 officers were killed by firearms, 500 by handguns. Distances were 367 killed at 5 feet or less and given that 500 died by handgun, the proximity at which the majority of engagements took place is truly quite frightening. The NYPD's own, very detailed analysis, published each year of 'Firearms Discharge - Assault Report' shows that from 1991 to 1993, with nearly 1,000 shooting incidents as a body of experience, 52% took place in the dark and 50% were at less than 21 feet. The average number of shots fired by officers was only 4 and the average hit rate is only 16%. How relevant? These statistics are for trained police officers that, often, are responding to a call and are preparing to attend a potentially dangerous scene. They may have weapons drawn and be prepared mentally for the worst, even then the hit rate at ranges, measured sometimes at punching range, is between 10-16%. Imagine then how difficult shooting would be if, from nowhere out of a crowd, a gunman faced you with a drawn weapon letting off rounds - a hit rate of 2%?? Maybe, an instinctive desires to cover up and drop? A fumbled draw? - Whatever the result, don't believe that what you calmly practice on the range will be how its actually going to work. The Steyr TMP (Tactical Machine Pistol). One of the best full auto weapons on the market. But if you found yourself in a GP role where you need full - auto weapons_ check the remuneration part of your contract. You don't need it. Always bear in mind that as a CP operative, you're likely to be reacting to a situation not in charge of it from the start. What works for an armed undercover Robbery Squad officer isn't translatable, as he may be able to 'get the drop' so to speak. In CP work, the boot will be on the other foot. I'd first like to go back a few years and look at some Influences on handgun work. In 1929 a major in the US Army Coast Artillery Corps, Wm D Fraser published a book called 'American Pistol Shooting: A Manual of Instruction in Modern Pistol Marksmanship'. It was a 53
.. .. .. .. book, which, .. whilst being primarily a target shooter's guide, contained some advanced theories on combat shooting and his breakdown of the elements of combat shooting are as relevant today as they were sixty years ago. • • • • • •
Suitable Pistol Accessible carrying position Properly made Holster Skillful Pistol manipulation Natural, accurate gun pointing Coolness and self-control in action
If we were to go back as far as 1906 for a synopsis of the thinking on the first point above, i.e. 'Suitable Pistol', we would need to be a 'fly on the wall' at the invitation of the American Ordnance Department, to manufacturers of revolvers and semi-auto to submit their designs for competitive testing. As a result of the trials, subsequently held in 1907, the Cavalry Corp took delivery of 200 .45 pistols, manufactured by Colt. There was a substantial resistance to its adoption and much support for continuing with the preference for revolvers, was assisted by the success the British were having against the Boers armed with semi-auto Mausers. The attractions of the semi-auto were, however, undeniable i.e. (as stated at the time).... • • •
Reduced recoil, improving accuracy and reducing a tendency to flinch Facility of re-charging, especially in cold weather and when on the move Greater capacity of rounds in the magazine than is carried in any revolver cylinder
In 1907, the military thinking about the handgun was as accurate then as it is today. They understood it as a weapon of last resort and that when brought into use it would be in an environment of extreme necessity. They understood the ranges would be short and the length of time of engagement usually brief. They summarized the requirements as follows: • • • • •
Certain Effect (stopping power) Speed of manipulation Ammunition capacity Accuracy Safety
One of the most radical designs of pistol since the Browning. The H & K P7 'squeeze cocker' is, in the author's view, the best pistol for a GP role. The problem is that with the larger capacity M 16, the butt size is large, even for a big hand. It also feels top heavy when in the holster. If you can sacrifice some capacity then the P7 M8 is the ideal choice. They recognized the pistol as, a 'personal weapon of protection' - that in skilled hands it was convenient, accurate, reliable and safe, but that in untrained hands, that there was more danger from accidental discharge than from the revolver.
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The Ordnance Dept. issued a pamphlet in 1912, 'Manual of the Automatic Pistol' and without the date on it you wouldn't know it wasn't written yesterday and it echoed what we readily accept that the handgun is a weapon of last resort, but in that role it is ideal for the job. They referred to its limited range and to the planning required to have it accessible and to hand if needed. The interesting aspect of the manual was its realization that pistol work is essentially 'Grab & Shoot'. They stressed a 'great rate of fire' and 'snap shooting'. However, the proposed underlying training in the Manual was firmly based on the 'Marksmanship' school, emphasizing 'slow fire', target orientated shooting as the 'foundation' of combat shooting. This polarity in combat pistol work has continued since then to the present day, where until only recently it has dominated Police and Military thinking as to how training should accomplish effectiveness. The classic 'off hand' dueling stance became the basis of all marksmanship dominated pistol work. This continued with formal procedures for training in 'Principles of Marksmanship'. Unfortunately, the empirical experience of those who were at the sharp end of pistol confrontations had no forum for the dissemination of knowledge and were voices in the wilderness. The 'modified' weaver stance. Whilst not ideal from a number of aspects, it is still the stance 'of choice'. With practice, it's practical advantages for turns, pivots, fire and movement, all conspire to outweigh the more static isosceles stance. The problem is that the weaver constantly creates a two-handed approach and experience suggests that in a firefight, stress leads to 'instinctive' one hand shooting. Lost was the experience of the gunfighter of the old west and although a lone voice could be occasionally heard, the mould was set. At times however, certain individuals whose experience and strength of purpose were too strong to ignore broke that mould. Such a man was William Ewart Fairburn who, in the early years of this century, as an officer in Shanghai Municipal Police was instrumental in bringing about the most radical changes to the use and training in handguns. The International Settlement in Shanghai was unquestionably, at that time, the single most lawless place in the world, with acts of crime and terrorism running at epidemic levels. Organized gangs of professional kidnappers roamed the streets armed with the latest in full and semi-auto weapons and when caught would use them. Conditions in which the police fought were the filthy, tightly packed, poorly lit, overcrowded maze of Chinese buildings, against Chinese, Korean and Japanese gangsters, skilled in a variety of Martial Arts and the use of weapons. The Queensbury rules and 'principles of marksmanship' proved totally ineffective in combating such violence.
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.. .. .. .. A weapon that if Fairbairn was alive .. would today he have felt completely at ease with, the CZ 85 has to be one of the best 'out of the box' pistols available today. Based on the Browning design, it is a traditional pistol, but for reliability, accuracy and cost, it is one of the best. Fairbairn, with others, developed combat concepts and training systems for pistol, knife, stick and unarmed combat that, due to its success, was to eventually find its way into all Commando training and for training the special operations people in the British SOE, (Special Operations Executive) and the American OSS (Office of Strategic Service) during the Second World War, as well as the American Marine Corp. It was Fairbairn who thought of the first 'Killing House', or 'Mystery House' as it was called then and also the 'Double Tap', but most importantly he realized the one vital aspect of training. From 1910 to 1919, Fairbairn accompanied nearly every patrol that was involved in a shooting or was likely to be involved in one. From that he ascertained what natural instincts came into play when a man was under fire or was faced with a knife or threatening situation. As a consequence, his training in the use of handguns duplicated both the conditions where engagements took place and natural instincts into account. He knew his men would crouch under fire and was quite clear how they would angle their bodies and extend their weapon arm under a variety of conditions. He trained to accommodate the instincts. He knew that his officers would only ever have a fleeting glimpse of a target, light would be poor and they would have unstable footing, with noise and explosions going around them, as well as being on the move. The accepted 'principles of marksmanship' v no basis for training a man to survive in such conditions. I've summarized it as follows: TRAINING TO INSTINCT Over the years, we have been much influenced by target competition work from slow fire to even the more Combat and Practical Pistol competition disciplines. There is much value that has come from the culture dish of 'Practical Pistol', but equally there is so much 'padding' that the core element of effectiveness is lost. Fairbairn developed his method of 'shooting to live' instruction where his men would trained to instinctively fire in two shot bursts (double tap), without ever bringing the weapons to a 'line of sight.' Fairbairn knew that at times of stress, a man would look at I opponent not at the sights of his weapon and that weapon alignment should be taught to instinctive. The beauty of the weaver position is that one can move into other shooting positions with ease and 56
the same grip and relative body position remain unaltered. Kneeling should be a temporary position if in the open, with a brief drop to the knee to take a shot with a lowered profile and then up and off. Don't settle onto your back heel. If you're some distance from the threat or behind hard cover, then you can settle into the 'sniping' kneeling position and settle onto your rear heel. Not shown in the photograph on the left is the elbow position, which should be braced against the inside of the left knee, with both then pressing against each other. Don't rest your elbow on the top - bone to bone - as they simply rock about and provide no stability. The arguments over Stance and Grip for a handgun will rage into the distant future to when man is shooting 'Ray Guns', as will the argument about the choice of Revolver or Pistol. Whilst, ultimately, a matter solely of personal preference - remember in a CP role when abroad, choice of weapons will probably be a 'fait accompli'. You won't have a choice, but get what you're given. As a consequence, you must be familiar with as wide a variety of both pistols and revolvers. You need to know the mechanical differences, shooting characteristics, stripping, carry problems of as many weapons as possible. Resist the temptation to have a personal favorite. All handguns have a different 'natural pointing ability' and will feel different when speed drawing and endeavoring to achieve a natural 'hand/eye coordination. Caliber is again a consequence of the weapon you're given but, predominantly, you are likely to be given a semi-auto in 9mm cal. Despite what you may read, the 9mm is a 'stopper' with the correct load. American Police engagements indicate that the chances of re-loading in a fire fight are negligible and although police work can't entirely influence CP thinking, the inclination would be to have as large a magazine capacity as possible, but don't ignore your speed loading training. If you can carry spare mags. Do so. For many people, the more 'natural' pointing ability of the revolver gives them a be chance of accuracy, but cylinder capacity must eventually militate against their choice. 1 problem with semi-auto pistols is traditionally one of safety. To be brought into I quickly, a pistol needs to be in what has come to be known as 'Condition l' - locked: cocked - a round in the chamber, hammer back and thumb safety on. Ultimately, as safe carry and operate as a revolver on double action, it has always seemed a problem for so authorities to accept that a weapon can safely be carried all day in that condition and drawn and used without cause for concern. Hence the drive for a 'safe' pistol and for n we've simply ended with a situation where 'we've painted legs on a snake". I refer to 1 double action pistols with a de-cocking lever, designed to safely lower a hammer into (double action mode, after chambering a round. Accuracy gained by having a single action pull with a traditional pistol is now lost a much harder double action is required for the first shot, giving a totally different, a slower cadence for the first 'double tap'. Only the 'squeeze cocker' H & K P7 has, for IT been a truly innovative development in pistol design since Browning first sat down at 1 workbench. 57
.. .. .. .. Glock's. with .
their trigger safety, less so, and the majority of DA's you can bin their development has been driven by the American police authority's need to provide safe but regrettably emasculated pistols to police officers who are unable to train with enough rounds through reasons of economy. This has resulted in such weapons as H & K double-action pistol, which is simply that, a pistol that will only operate from double-action mode. If much further development (sic) occurs we'll eventually SI cylinders introduced into semi-autos. The H & K USP in its worst form is solely double-action. In the text I refer to developments, which are so ridiculous as to reach a point where they put a cylinder on a pistol. Well with this they are almost there. The ultimate example of 'painting legs on a snake '. Even Fairbairn recognized the constraints that economics caused in operating safely. As his Chinese officers were restricted to only 32 rounds as a 'qualification' course of fire in training, Fairbairn felt unable, from a safety aspect, to allow his men to carry locked and cocked. He didn't even allow them to load and unload themselves and another officer inserted the magazine into the weapon for them after the weapon had been holstered, before they left the station house. The weapon, carried in Condition 3, was then, on being drawn 'actioned' to chamber a round and cock the hammer. Fairbairn had the safety pinned back so as to be inoperative. After nearly 30 years, 1've never had a safety problem with working from leather, with the pistol having been in Condition 1. Safety is a function of training, correct practices and correct adherence to safety procedures, and, fortunately, as civilians, we are not constrained by any wider economic issues apart from the depth of our own pocket, we should endeavor to put as many rounds down range in training as we can. Prone. If you are going to be somewhere for a time and you've no cover, you're going to have to get down. Be aware that you lose vertical vision when on the ground. The position shown allows the greatest mobility and flexibility of shooting positions than being flat on your belly. The Prone position illustrated above, is the one that allows the greatest flexibility of movement. By pushing the bent leg down and bending the straight leg, you can effectively shoot from 5 o'clock, all the way round to 7 comfortably. You'll also find that you are able to shoot with a higher elevation than if you were in a basic, prone isosceles, where you will find it difficult to shoot high. Lets first of all look at how a weapon is carried. 58
Holsters Holsters are 'Situational' - by that I mean they are not simply a means of carrying a weapon rather that their design, position and use are related to a variety of situations where wearer may find himself requiring access to a weapon under or over a range of clothing again, themselves dictated by 'situation'. One may be stationary, mobile in a vehicle, formally dressed, casually dressed, sedentary all day or very active. One may even be in a pair of swimming trunks on the beach. A person may also be constrained in how he is able to draw a weapon due to the logistics 0 situation and all these 'tactical' factors inhibit and condition holster use design. 1 following aspects essentially dictates the use and design of holsters: •
. The nature of the weapon
•
. Security
•
. Speed
•
. Concealment
•
. Clothes to be worn
•
. Right or left handed
•
. Existing preferences or prejudices
A good GP holster, this pancake type from Gould & Goodrich has 3 slots for a variety of positions, a reinforced paddle thumb break. It can be worn tilted on the shooter's strong side or straight up for a cross draw should the situation demand. A flexible piece of kit. A vital point to bear in mind is that the greatest influence on how a weapon is drawn is not the type of holster, but where it is worn. A police officer, choosing a holster to be worn in an overt role would be wanting security and accessibility. He would have a holster with a top strap, covered trigger guard, steel springs integral in the design to keep the weapon secure and grab free. A CP role asks for another factor to be taken into account 'Concealment'. Concealment unfortunately is an inhibiting factor to accessibility. The need to be covert with handguns has led to the development of holsters, which can be worn •
. Behind the hip
•
. Small of back
•
. Under the arm
•
. Within another carrying device e.g. 'Bumbag'
When casually dressed_ the 'Bumbag' holster is a must. It takes considerable practice to draw a large frame auto from such a holster_ but all the practice is worth the effort. Once you've recovered from the 'Velcro burns' you should have quite a slick draw. This photo illustrates a 'cross draw' position_ but you can move the bag more to your right and thereby facilitate a very short_ fast 59
.. .. .. .. standard .. draw. Hip holsters can either be worn on the belt or inside the pants (ISP). Broadly, they can be holsters designed to be worn 'strong side' (weapon hand side) or used in a 'cross draw' mode. PROs and CONs Ankle Holster Of little use in a CP field and are more the preserve of the undercover policemen. If one was to spend every minute sitting down, then it may have a part to play. Shoulder Holster Its advantages are purely 'situational'. It has to be the ideal carry when a large degree of car work is involved, as sitting down does not hinder its accessibility. Also, in certain formal social engagements, where a jacket with tails is worn, then a hip holster can be untenable and one may have to resort to use of a shoulder holster. In other circumstances, a shoulder holster is not an ideal 'concealed carry'. By definition, a shoulder holster involves a 'cross draw', where the weapon is held either in a vertical position or in a horizontal one - but forward. There is nearly always a 'thumb break' system of closure, but with practice, speed of draw is good. The major disadvantages are in the cross draw. The two ways to carry in a shoulder holster. Left - in the vertical position and right in the horizontal mode. The latter suits a medium size pistol as distinct from a full frame semi. To encourage 'instinctive point and shoot' ability, we need to co-ordinate our natural pointing/eye link. This action is like punching i.e. we don't watch our punch when we strike a target, nor watch the fist on its journey, we watch the target and our co-ordination of hand eye when involved in pistol work, happens the same way. Pointing and punching are naturally co-coordinated for us and we should use them for weapon alignment, without recourse to those traditional principles of marksmanship, where every point of reference is aligned in the first instance with the eye. If we swing a weapon, however, to acquire a target, we lose the co-ordination of hand and eye and so it is with a 'cross draw', where we have to swing the weapon in an arc to the target and then endeavor to stop its swing at the right time. Swinging past and over-compensating all come into play. Such delay, whilst measured in factions of a second, together with suspect accuracy, all count, unlike the hip holster draw, where it is relatively easy to align the weapon onto the target early. With a draw from the shoulder holster, you have to wait for the swing to settle on the point of aim, also creating in nearly every instance, a 'long arm shot' whereas, if 60
occasion demands, one can adopt an instinctive shot from close to the body when drawing from the hip. At very close, even touching range, extending your arm is the last thing you want, as your weapon can be deflected or ripped from your grasp and your shooting hand and arm can be jammed across your chest as you attempt to draw, losing all leverage advantage. Hip Holster These come in a variety of designs, construction and material. They range from 'clip on' to belt slide' with a vertical hold or with an 'FBI tilt'. Awkward to wear for long periods in a vehicle they are, however, the favoured holster of choice. The draw can be effected quickly and the weapon lined to the target and ready to shoot long before it may be in its final ideal position. Its use is complicated far more by clothing than the shoulder holster, where two hands can easily effect a smooth draw, but practice in clearing a jacket with either the strong hand on the way to the draw, or with the weak hand from the back, makes perfect. From the draw, the weapon can be aligned and 'punched' to the target to maximise the hand/eye coordination. I use the word punched advisedly, as the punching action must not end with any impact, which will throw the point of aim down. A more correct terminology would be point. Stability of the holster during the draw is important and holster construction is such that there is usually complete rigidity in the holster, with no play either with the holster or belt combination. A spring, thumb break or tensioning screw will keep the weapon held firm during active movement, yet give smooth, unrestricted extraction on the draw. General If you have to carry a weapon, then don't restrict your ability to use it. If you wear a topcoat, keep it unbuttoned as with a jacket. Ensure nothing, such as a loose shirt will impede the draw. Coming out with nothing but a handful of woolly jumper is not advised. Try methods of weighting a coat pocket to assist the 'sweep' of the jacket to clear for the draw. Personally, I find this creates inertia, particularly if you hook the coat in the middle as your hand moves back for the draw. Don't wear gloves and don't get involved in carrying anything i.e. parcels, suitcases, flowers, presents etc. Reloading Practice speed reloads with both revolvers and pistols and establishes how best to carry what you're going to reload with. A well honed reload with a semi-auto can be as fast as you could fire a round, but whilst revolvers get more complicated, with practice, they can be reloaded quickly. Speed loaders for revolvers are seldom as convenient to carry as a flat magazine with 15 rounds for a pistol. A body of evidence says, however, that reloading in a fire fight is not a common feature, but that shouldn't negate one's thinking on carrying a good supply of ammo and how best to reload quickly. Stance, Grip, Target Acquisition 'TRAIN FOR INSTINCT'
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.. .. .. .. W.E. Fairbairn was the leading exponent, through personal observation of 'behavior under ..
fire' and he categorized such behavior and personal preferences of his men. He was able to conclude that - "Stance was a function of distance". He was primarily interested in people's instinctive reaction in a fire fight and noticed the predominant variations were broadly that the stance was 'open or closed' to the target and that his men would shoot either one or two handed. Again, the predominant factor was the distance between them and their enemy and here we enter a minefield. Stance Over the years, the influence of the so called 'Weaver' stance, with the angled body and pushing/pulling opposing grip has come to dominate in certain quarters of combat pistol shooting. In its defense, it has a lot going for it and allows good 'fire and movement' and ease of getting into 'positional' shooting such as kneeling and prone. It allows 'turning' and 'targeting' more easily than say the FBI or 'Isosceles' stance and as a training stance from which work as a foundation of instruction it is more than suitable. We must remember though, that its so called inventor, Jack Weaver of Lancaster, California, was above everything, a competitive shooter and, its effective use in 'Practical IPSC' competition, popularized by Jeff Cooper has given it a pre-eminence that often doesn't allow room for the more 'instinctive' reactions to a fire fight. Don't believe the bollocks about the stance absorbing recoil, a stance allows you the best platform for engagement and most flexibility of movement. Unfortunately, the instinctive reaction to crouch under fire prohibits instinctive movement and consequently the argument at this point in favor of the Weaver stance can weaken. The Weaver stance in its various guises has a long history, pre-dating we are told, its supposed introduction by Jack Weaver in the South Western Combat League matches of the '50s and later. A book called 'Shooting' written by a then Colt Firearms representative, John Henry Fitzgerald, showed a picture of him in the so-called Weaver stance, back in 1930. The argument of stance is actually a 'red herring' and it is more importantly the choice of shooting one-handed or supported with the other hand, which is the real argument. There will never be a successful conclusion to the argument as there is no correct solution or ideal. What works at the time, works. It's that simple. What's important is that we train people in a way that will provide responses as close to the natural instinctive response as possible. There is little point spending countless hours trying to 'make water run uphill'. Grip One Hand &Two Hand Grip In a CP role, particularly in a 'one to one' role as BG with no back-up PES, it may be necessary with the weak hand to either fend off or hold your Principal, whilst drawing a weapon with the strong hand and immediately you're two handed, training becomes redundant. This scenario as described, tends however, to disguise the main argument and that again is a person's instinctive reaction when returning fire, which, more often, will be to shoot strong hand only. The FBI as far back as prior to WW2 adopted two handed shooting, when they allowed supported shooting from behind barricades at ranges out at 25-50 yards. From the 62
'Isosceles' one can shoot both single and double handed and when single handed, one can shoot with an angled posture. It allows a 'combat crouch' (an instinctive reaction under fire), but disallows mobility, particularly when completely square on and shooting two handed, unlike the modified Weaver which allows far more flexibility for fire and movement. Two handed shooting obviously has its place and is advocated by those people who favor the requirement of a 'flash site picture' as distinct from the 'instinctive' shooter. Personally, I do not feel that the two schools of thinking are in any way contrary as again, the argument is purely dominated by distance. A two handed hold increases stability and therefore accuracy of the weapon, particularly when firing multiple shots ('double taps') and also lessens the chance of a weapon being torn from your grip. Remember - you're coming under fire and will have to react. Speed of draw, target acquisition and trigger release have to be a smooth continuous movement and your training needs to be as close as possible to your natural instinct. The Draw Whether you are at 30 feet or 3 from your target or enemy, one thing remains constant - the speed of the draw. At 20 plus meters, once the weapon is out you may feel relaxed enough to take a two handed grip in a Weaver or Isosceles stance, gain a good 'Index' sight picture and loose off a round. At 3 feet you will probably be squeezing the trigger as your weapon has just cleared the holster and aligned with the targets. It's only distance that dictates the process of target acquisition and stance and grip variables, but the one constant factor must be a fast draw. Of all your various drills and practices, this is the one that you can repeat 10,000 times and it won't cost you a penny. Its a 'dry' training drill that you should practice until you're sick of it. Practice it standing, walking, crouching, falling, sitting and running, but practice it. Practice it with a variety of outer layers of clothing, from loose shirts to jackets and topcoats. The draw from the Weaver stance. From a concealed carry, the jacket must be well clear of the holster. Note the index finger outside the holster and stiff until such time as it can safely acquire the trigger. Irrespective of the range and the speed and cadence of shots, the draw is always the same - fast. You will never be fast and accurate, however, unless you are smooth. Practice to be smooth before you bleed the speed into the draw. If you go too fast too soon you will simply be jerky and robotic. Note the slight drop of the forward shoulder to present the butt of the weapon better to the hand and create some air between the back and the butt for the hand to slip between. Accuracy is affected by two factors when drawing: 1. A poor grip 2. A jerky, robotic action (as if you were still working by numbers) If you acquire a poor grip on a weapon whilst in the holster, it will only get worse once its out and you're firing. If you're not smooth on the draw, the 'jerky' action will negate the body's 63
.. .. .. .. automatic .. sensing system which co-ordinates hand/eye and brain. The draw can be broken down into the following parts: • •
•
• • •
Target acquisition The thumb draws across the top of the abdomen, catching the jacket, the thumb is really to help locate the jacket as it is the little and adjoining finger that actually catch the jacket. The jacket must be flung over the back and anything less than a really vigorous movement will simply allow the jacket to fall back over the butt of the weapon. As the fingers hook the jacket, the lead shoulder can be dropped slightly and the rear hip, behind which the pistol is sitting, can be canted back slightly, which helps present the weapon to the hand and also allows the jacket to stay behind more. This is only really practical in a Weaver position. This also allows the hand to fit between back and butt. The web of the thumb is dropped down over the butt plate with the index finger down and stiff outside the holster. The weapon is drawn vertically up with a high arm lift and then pivoted almost immediately to align with the target. As the weapon is pushed towards the target, at a point appropriate, the safety can come off or the cocking lever squeezed and the shot taken. The point appropriate for the safety to be released is dependent on the situation i.e. training or for real.
The choice of grip and stance all have a part to play in the draw, but its unchangeable characteristics are speed and smoothness. Start off slowly, keep the whole thing one smooth action and then 'bleed' the speed into it as your actions become more automatic. The weak hand, if of the box variety, may pull the jacket, back from behind, but this won't work with a vented one.
Whilst in the learning phase of the short draw, it's essential that someone check your weapon position. As the pistol leaves the holster, it should pivot as if the weapon hand has a screw going through it and into your ribs, around which the hand and weapon rotate. The butt rests on the hipbone. In that fixed position wherever you point the body, the weapon will point. The 'speed rock'. At close ranges you may need the speed of a short draw with the weapon firing as soon as it leaves the holster and is pointing at the target. The only concern is that there is a natural tendency for people to push the weapon towards the threat, even if close. In a way it's part of a natural instinct to want to, in some way, cover your face. Short draws do have their place and should be practiced. Speed and Accuracy
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The two are often seen in conflict and often accuracy can fall in relation to increased speed, but the importance of getting a weapon into action quickly cannot be stressed strongly enough. Waiting in an undercover van, weapon drawn on 'robbery' detail with known 'faces' to identify and the advantage of surprise, the stance and weapon support that a police officer would adopt cannot be cross referenced to a CP situation, but in police training manuals you will see this influence and also that of the basic principles of marksmanship. In a CP role, the first you may know of an engagement is when a round comes through your car window. It’s too easy to be clinical and classroom-like in the preparation of a training package and disregard 'Instinct and Reality'. If you come under fire and your priority, correctly, is to get your VIP away, then you need to keep an assailant's head down. You need to divert his attention from being the attacker to being attacked. He needs to come under fire quickly and whilst it would be ideal if you hit and stopped him in the first instance, in reality the best you can realistically hope for is 'suppressive fire'. Distance also dictates the feasibility of being accurate. If all you have is a handgun, it will probably only buy you time to escape. Put rounds down as quickly as possible, endeavor to be accurate, but above all else, be instinctively quick in getting into action. Target Acquisition This means what it says - not just acquiring a 'site picture', but also establishing your target? Incoming fire has a source. To be on aim before acquiring a target will cause a loss of hand/eye co-ordination. The head turns; eyes acquire the target at the same time as the strong hand goes for the weapon. The grip on the weapon at this stage is critical, as a weak, imperfect grip will only ever get worse, never better. And when rounds are 'loosed off', a poor grip will become exaggerated with recoil. The target is visually acquired and the weapon drawn and 'punched' towards it. A round can be let off the moment the barrel is pointing towards the target. The eye doesn't need to see both the target and the end of the barrel for the body to co-ordinate with the brain. Keep both eyes open. Under stress, we develop tunnel vision and if you've ever been Involved in a fight or highly stressful situation, you'll know the feeling. Narrowing your peripheral vision any further by closing one eye is not recommended. If you need to close an eye to obtain a perfect 'site picture', then I would submit your enemy is too far away to bother shooting. At the distances likely to be involved, I also question the necessity of having a 'flash site picture'. As it means you've waited for a complete posture before you engaged with a view of weapon/target. With tunnel vision, the narrow tunnel within which your site has now to appear, on line with the target means an even longer time before you can let a round off. Your mind can still co-ordinate your barrel to the target, without your eyes having a part in the process. I'm not talking about 'hip shooting' rather that your weapon is out in front, but not necessarily playing a visual part with your eye co-ordination and the target. As we have said previously, in a fight you don't maintain a site picture, which includes your hands, feet, elbows and the target. We instinctively concentrate on the target and are even able to hit a particular target on the body whilst looking elsewhere i.e. we can easily hit a man with body shots while we look at his eyes. The same goes for pistol work. We are close enough to the target to be able to accurately shoot 'center of mass' in an instinctive fashion, 65
.. .. .. .. What I .personally feel suits me, however, should not have application across a wide range .
of individuals own preferences and if we lose sight of a person's own behavior and instinct, we are going against the first tenet of training. Positional Shooting, Turns and Pivots At Combat Shooting's basic level for CP work, you will need to be skilled in the following: Normal Safety Procedures (NSPs). Until you are competent to handle a weapon safe! Under all circumstances, you will be unable to practice any drills on a range. At all time you must treat every weapon as loaded, not point a weapon at anything you do not intend to shoot and during a course of fire, have your weapon pointed down range at all time: When on a firing point you will not handle your weapon or any weapon that may be on table. If your weapon is in your holster it will stay there at all times. Safe handling of a weapon must become instinctive but not so instinctive that you bee on unaware of your actions with a weapon. You must constantly have a conscious awareness: of the weapon's muzzle and remember 'touching triggers - tragedy'. You will need to be skilled at the following basics: • • • • • •
• •
Working from stances The draw Weak hand shooting Positional shooting - standing, kneeling, prone Turns/pivots - right turns, left turns, 180 degrees turns and pivots All the above must be practiced whilst on the move as well as when stationary. Short draw/hip shooting Punch to buy time Body cover/weapon handling - with multidirectional threats
In the early learning stages of giving body cover and returning fire, there is a tendency to shoot low, particularly if you need to get rounds off as the weapon leaves the holster. At close ranges you will always put the rounds in the knees without some effort to correct the aim. As training advances, there must be the inclusion of: • • • • • • • •
Shooting from a moving vehicle and team drills Advanced barricade work Low light shooting and 'torch and pistol' work Stress fire training Basic hostage recovery Advanced team drills - fire and movement Counter attack techniques Use of pyrotechnics
All the above with handguns, shotguns and, if abroad, full auto SMGs. 66
The start of training is the 'punch to buy time' drill. Resist the tendency to want to strike the face. Someone committed to a draw will carry on regardless. Hit the shoulder on the weapon side and hit it hard. If done properly, it will almost spin your opponent round. If he's just acquired a grip on the weapon, it will often fly out of his grip, but at worst he will be completely off line to take a quick shot which buys you time to draw and shoot. You acquire the weapon as you hit and rock back to shoot. Punch to buy time is the only way at close range that you will have a chance against someone who has the drop on you and is already going for his weapon. You won't outdraw him. WEAPONS SAFETY RULES The trigger safety is a mechanical safety, which is incorporated into the trigger in the form of a lever. In the untouched state the trigger safety blocks the trigger from being moved backward. If the weapon is dropped or if the trigger is subjected to an off-centre, lateral pressure, it is still impossible for the gun to fire. The trigger being pulled by the trigger finger can only release this safety. It automatically re-engages after the trigger is released. This situation offers maximum possible firing readiness combined with maximum safety for the user.
In the secured position the firing pin safety mechanically prevents the firing pin from moving forward. A springloaded pin projects into the firing pin cut-out and blocks it. As the trigger is pulled towards the rear, an extension on the trigger bar pushes the firing pin safety up and opens the firing pin channel. The trigger being pulled to the rear can only release this safety. This situation offers maximum possible firing readiness combined with maximum safety for the user
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.. .. .. .. .. position the firing pin In the secured
pushes the trigger bar onto the safety ramp under the influence of the firing pin spring. There is no possibility in this position of the firing pin being released. The trigger being pulled to the rear can only release this drop safety. This situation offers maximum possible firing readiness combined with maximum safety for the user.
Basic Firearm Safety Rules As a firearms owner and user, you must take the responsibility for the safe handling and safe storage of your firearm. You are taking the first step by reading this page, but you can go further by enrolling in any one of the numerous shooting safety courses available in your country. Firearms safety is up to you! 1) Handle all firearms as if they were loaded! Never forget that a gun has the potential to produce serious injury or death in a single instant of carelessness. Make safe gun handling a habit to be followed at all times. After you determine that a gun is unloaded, continue to handle it as though it were loaded. 2) Always keep your firearm pointed in a safe direction! In selecting a safe direction, you must also take into consideration that a bullet can ricochet or glance off any object it strikes, and that bullets can penetrate walls, ceilings, floors and windows. Remember: You should never point a gun (whether loaded or unloaded) at another person or at yourself. 3) Keep your finger out of the gun's trigger guard and off the trigger until you have 68
aligned the guns sights on a safe target and you have made the decision to fire! By keeping your finger completely outside the trigger guard until you are aimed at the target, you guarantee that any shots you fire will go safely in the direction of your intended target. 4) Always be certain that your target and the surrounding area are safe before firing! Remember that a bullet can travel as much as several miles, so you should be certain of what your bullet could strike before you pull the trigger. Never fire at a movement, a noise, a flash of colour or a rustling bush without positively identifying your intended target. 5) Whenever you handle a firearm, the first thing you should do (while keeping it pointed in a safe direction with your finger outside the trigger guard) is to open the action to determine whether or not the firearm is loaded! If you do not know the proper way to open the action of a particular firearm - do not handle it. Instead, consult the owner's manual, your local gun dealer or a more knowledgeable shooter. Do not experiment 6) Thoroughly read the instruction manual supplied with your firearm! Never use any firearm unless you completely understand its operation and safety features. If you do not have an instruction manual, contact either the retail store where you purchased your gun or the manufacturer directly or request that one be furnished to you. 7) Before firing your weapon, you should routinely make sure that your firearm is in good working order and that the barrel is clear of dirt and obstructions! Any obstruction that prevents the bullet from moving easily down the barrel can cause pressure to build up in the weapon. A small bit of mud, gun grease, excess lubricating oil or rust can cause pressure to build up to the point where the barrel bulges or bursts upon firing, resulting in a damaged gun and serious bodily injury to the shooter or those around him. 8) Only use ammunition recommended by the firearm manufacturer, and always be certain that the ammunition matches the calibre of your gun! Most modern firearms have their calibre designation stamped into the barrel (for example, "9x19" or ". 45 Auto") Your box of ammunition should bear the exact same designation. Just because a cartridge fits into your gun does not mean it is safe to fire. Firearms are designed, manufactured and tested to standards based on factory-loaded ammunition. Hand-loaded or reloaded ammunition deviating from factory specifications should not be used. Use only the correct ammunition for your firearm. Attempting to fire even a single improper bullet can destroy your gun and cause serious personal injury or death. 9) Quality ear and eye protection should always be worn when shooting or observing! Exposure to the noise of gunfire can permanently damage your hearing if protection is not worn. Shooting glasses, preferably with side panels, help to guard against eye injuries from ejected cases and the splash back of pebbles and fragments from the backstop. Wearing eye protection when disassembling and cleaning your gun will also prevent eye injuries from loosened springs or other parts, as well as from aerosol solvents and cleaning
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.. .. .. .. agents... 10) Never use firearms while under the influence of drugs or alcohol! Handling and using a firearm requires your full and continuous attention, alertness and unimpaired judgment. Avoid handling firearms while taking prescription medicines, which can make you, draw, drowsy, slow your reflexes and impair your normal senses or judgement. 11) All firearms should be stored unloaded and secure in a safe storage case, inaccessible to children and untrained adults 12) The transportation of firearms is regulated by laws. Always transport your firearm in a safe, unloaded condition and in accordance with applicable laws. Remember - no set of rules can cover all possible situations. The safe and rational use of a firearm depends on the common sense and proper training of the user. Always follow safety rules and think before using any firearm
WEAPONS SAFETY IS YOUR CONCERN
GLOCK 17 / GLOCK 17C1)
Calibre: 9x19mm
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GLOCK 17
GLOCK 17C
Calibre
9x19mm
9x19mm
Action
Safe Action System
Safe Action System
Length (slide)
7.32 in.
186 mm
7.32 in.
186 mm
Height 2)
5.43 in.
138 mm
5.43 in.
138 mm
Width
1.18 in.
30 mm
1.18 in.
30 mm
Length between sights 3)
6.49 in.
165 mm
6.73 in.
171 mm
Barrel length
4.49 in.
114 mm
4.49 in.
114 mm
Barrel rifling
Right, hexagonal
Right, hexagonal
Length of twist
9.84 in.
9.84 in.
250 mm
Magazine capacity 4)
10 / 17 / 19 (31)
250 mm
10 / 17 / 19 (31)
Mass (weight) Empty without magazine
22.04 oz.
625 g
21.87 oz.
620 g
Empty magazine
2.75 oz.
78 g
2.75 oz.
78 g
Full magazine 5)
~9.87 oz.
~280 g
~9.87 oz.
~280 g
Trigger pull (standard)
~5.5 lbs.
~2.5 kg
~5.5 lbs.
~2.5 kg
Trigger travel for discharge 6)
0.5 in.
12.5 mm
Number of safeties
3
0.5 in.
12.5 mm 3
Tactical Scenario Case Two FBI agents were killed and five wounded in Miami during a confrontation with robbery suspects at approximately 9:45 a.m. on April 11. Prior to the shootings, the Agents, along with officers of the MetroDade Police Department, were conducting a mobile surveillance, attempting to locate two males believed to have committed a number of violent bank and armoured car robberies. Observing a vehicle matching the description of one that had been stolen and used in previous robberies, an attempt was made to stop the car. When the Agents in three FBI vehicles subsequently forced the suspects’ vehicle to a halt, two males, aged 32 and 34, emerged firing weapons. They used a 12-gauge shotgun with a 71
.. .. .. .. modified ..pistol grip stock equipped to fire eight rounds; a .223-caliber semiautomatic rifle with 30
round magazine; and two .357-caliber handguns. The resultant gun battle left the two assailants and two Agents dead, as well as five Agents wounded. The victim Agents, both killed by rifle fire, were 53 and 30 years of age with 24 and 3 years of service, respectively. Introduction FBI Agents: Richard Manauzzi
Injured (unspecified injuries).
Gordon McNeill
Seriously injured by .223 gunshot wounds to the right hand and neck
Edmundo Mireles
Seriously injured by a .223 gunshot wound to the left forearm.
Gilbert Orrantia
Injured by shrapnel and debris produced by a . 223 bullet near miss.
John Hanlon
Seriously injured by .223 gunshot wounds to the right hand and groin.
Benjamin Grogan, 53 Killed by a .223 gunshot wound to the chest. Gerald Dove, 30
Killed by two .223 gunshot wounds to the head.
Ron Risner
Uninjured.
Suspects: William Matix, 34
Killed by multiple gunshot wounds.
Michael Platt, 32
Killed by multiple gunshot wounds.
Weapons involved in the gunfight: Suspects: Matix:
S&W M3000 12 gauge shotgun (1 round #6 shot fired).
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Platt:
Ruger Mini-14 .223 Remington carbine (at least 42 rounds fired), S&W M586 .357 Magnum revolver (3 rounds fired), Dan Wesson .357 Magnum revolver (3 rounds fired).
FBI: McNeill:
S&W M19-3 .357 Magnum revolver, 2-inch barrel (6 rounds . 38 Special +P fired).
Mireles:
Remington M870 12 gauge shotgun (5 rounds 2 ¾ inch 00 buckshot fired), .357 Magnum revolver (make & model unknown), (6 rounds .38 Special +P fired).
Grogan:
S&W M459 9mm automatic pistol (9 rounds fired).
Dove:
S&W M459 9mm automatic pistol (20 rounds fired).
Risner:
S&W M459 9mm automatic pistol (13-14 rounds fired?), S&W (model unknown) .38 Special revolver (1 round .38 Special +P fired).
Orrantia:
S&W (model unknown) .357 Magnum revolver, 4 inch barrel (12 rounds .38 Special +P fired).
Hanlon:
S&W (model unknown) .38 Special revolver, 2-inch barrel (5 rounds .38 Special +P fired).
Manauzzi:
Apparently lost possession of his handgun during the vehicle collision and was unable to locate and recover it during the gunfight (0 rounds fired).
From the time in which Grogan and Dove first spotted the Monte Carlo occupied by Platt and Matix to the time in which the last gunshot was fired by Mireles, approximately nine and a half minutes elapsed. The gun battle itself lasted over four minutes. The Injuries of Michael Platt and William Matix The gunshot wounds present on Matix’s body (six wounds, A-F) and Platt’s body (12 wounds, A-L) are identified and detailed in alphabetical sequence in the autopsy reports prepared by Dade County Medical Examiner Jay Barnhart, M.D. These reports have been reproduced in Dr. Anderson’s book. Dr. Anderson refers to each wound using the same identification letter and terminology as documented in the autopsy 73
reports.
.. .. .. .. .. I.
The first encounter: Platt and Matix inside the Monte Carlo (estimated duration: approximately 1 minute)
II.
The initial hits on Platt: Platt exiting (estimated duration: several seconds)
the
Monte
Carlo
III.
Platt’s devastating attack: Platt outside the (estimated duration: approximately 1½ minutes)
Monte
Carlo
IV.
The final fusillade: Platt and Matix in Grogan/Dove’s car (estimated duration of approximately 1½ - 2 minutes).
Tactical Briefs #7, Figure 1. FBI-Miami Shootout Crime Scene
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I. The First Encounter: Platt and Matix Inside the Monte Carlo Matix’s1st gunshot wound (right forearm wound E) – Grogan Matix’s 2nd gunshot wound (right head wound F) - McNeill Matix’s 3rd gunshot wound (right neck/chest wound B) - McNeill Immediately after Matix/Platt’s Monte Carlo was forced off the road by three FBI vehicles (occupied by Special Agents Grogan/Dove, Manauzzi, and Hanlon/Mireles), it sideswiped a Cutlass sedan and collided head-on into a tree. Platt (sitting in the passenger seat) then fired 13 rounds from his Mini-14 through the closed driver’s side window of the Monte Carlo at Manauzzi in the car directly beside them, then at Supervisory Special Agent McNeill’s approaching car, then at McNeill (hitting his shooting hand), and then at Mireles (who fell to the ground after being hit in his left forearm). Dr. Anderson conjectures that Platt might have felt he’d sufficiently suppressed the threats emanating from the left front of the Monte Carlo, and he pulled back from the window. This would have given Matix the opportunity to fire towards the left rear at Grogan and Dove with his 12-gauge shotgun. Because the driver’s side door had been damaged during the collision with Manauzzi’s car (as well as the proximity of Manauzzi’s car immediately beside the Monte Carlo), Matix could only partially open his door. He leaned out from his sitting position and fired one round of #6 shot towards Grogan and Dove, which hit the grill of Grogan’s car. Dr. Anderson feels this is most likely when Matix received his first wound, right forearm wound E, which entered his right forearm just above the wrist. Dr. Anderson believes Grogan fired this shot, which hit Matix from a distance of approximately 25 feet. Grogan’s bullet entered Matix’s forearm on the little finger side, travelled just beneath the ulnar and radius bones, cut the ulnar artery, and exited the forearm on the thumb side. Dr. Anderson speculates that Matix probably withdrew back inside the Monte Carlo to examine the wound. At this point, McNeill (who’d already fired four shots across the hood of Manauzzi’s car and into the cab of the Monte Carlo when he was hit in his gun hand by one of Platt’s .223 bullets) apparently saw Matix’s movement and fired the last two rounds out of his revolver at Matix. The bullet from McNeill’s shot number 5 is believed to have caused Matix’s 2nd wound, head wound F. As Matix pulled back inside after firing at Grogan and Dove, who were positioned behind the Monte Carlo, Matix’s head and upper torso were still rotated to the left when McNeill’s bullet hit him, producing head wound F. The bullet hit Matix just forward of his right ear, below the temple, shattered the cheekbone, hit and fractured the base of the cranium, and entered the right sinus cavity under the eye. This hit bruised the brain (but did not penetrate the cranium or brain) and Dr. Anderson believes it most probably knocked Matix instantly unconscious. McNeill’s sixth shot hit Matix, causing the third wound, right neck/chest wound B, and the bullet entered the right side of his neck after he slumped unconscious momentarily forward against the driver’s side door. It penetrated his neck at a downward angle and severed the blood vessels behind the collarbone, ricocheted off the first rib near the spine and came to rest in the chest cavity. It bruised but did not penetrate the right lung. This wound interrupted the blood supply to his right arm and might have also disrupted the brachial plexus to cause dysfunction of the nerves that supply the arm. Dr. Anderson speculates that Matix’s right arm was probably paralysed by this injury, either immediately by disruption of the nerves or eventually by total loss of blood circulation to the arm. Dr. Anderson feels this wound would have ultimately been fatal, due to the severed blood vessels. Bleeding from this injury during the next 2-3 minutes caused almost a litre of blood to accumulate in the chest cavity. However, for the next minute, it is believed that Matix slumped over onto his back and lay unconscious on the front seat of the Monte Carlo. Dr. Anderson observes that although Platt fired 13 rounds of .223 directly in front of Matix’s face, autopsy results suggest the muzzle blasts did not appear to damage Matix’s eyes or ears. His corneas were intact and there was no blood in his ear canals to indicate that his eardrums had been ruptured.
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.. .. .. .. .. was not found anywhere inside the Monte Carlo, and because of this Dr. Anderson believes Platt’s blood Platt did not receive any bullet wounds while he occupied the passenger compartment. II. The Initial Hits on Platt: Platt Exiting the Monte Carlo Platt’s 1st gunshot wound (right upper arm/chest wound B) – Dove Platt’s 2nd gunshot wound (right thigh wound L) - Dove? Platt’s 3rd gunshot wound (left foot wound I) - Dove? Platt’s 4th gunshot wound (back wound K) - Orrantia? Dr. Anderson theorizes that when Platt saw Matix slump over after being hit by McNeill’s bullets he might have decided that his chances of getting away were better if he exited the Monte Carlo. As Platt crawled through the passenger side window, one of Dove’s 9mm bullets hit his right upper arm, just above the inside crook of the elbow. According to Dr. Anderson, the bullet passed under the bone, through the deltoid, triceps and terse major muscles, and severed the brachial arteries and veins. The bullet exited the inner side of his upper arm near the armpit, penetrated his chest between the fifth and sixth ribs, and passed almost completely through the right lung before stopping. The bullet came to a rest about an inch short of penetrating the wall of the heart. (However, the accompanying autopsy report states that the bullet passed through the biceps muscle, and the autopsy photograph seems to support the medical examiner’s observation. The autopsy photograph shows an entry wound of the upper right arm, just above the inside bend of the elbow, in the location where the biceps muscle begins to show definition. The photograph suggests that the bullet passed through the biceps muscle of the upper arm in front of the bone. We discussed our observation with Dr. Anderson and he agreed with us. He stated that he would correct this error in a future revision to his report.) At autopsy, Platt’s right lung was completely collapsed and his chest cavity contained 1300 ml of blood, suggesting damage to the main blood vessels of the right lung. Dr. Anderson believes that Platt’s first wound (right upper arm/chest wound B) was un-survivable, and was the primary injury responsible for Platt’s death. The Monte Carlo came to a stop with its passenger side wedged against an uninvolved vehicle (Cutlass) that was parked in the driveway of a duplex home where the incident took place. After Platt crawled out the window and was rolling off the front hood of the Cutlass, Dr. Anderson believes he has hit twice more, most probably by Dove, in the right rear thigh and left foot, (right rear thigh wound L and left foot wound I, respectively). The bullet that produced the thigh wound entered the inside back surface of the right thigh and exited the outside surface of the leg, and involved only muscle tissue. The bullet that hit Platt’s left foot entered behind the little toe and passed laterally through the foot from left to right, exiting above the big toe. Dr. Anderson feels Platt’s fourth gunshot wound (back wound K) might have incurred shortly after he exited the Monte Carlo. The wound is a left to right grazing wound to the back, and may have been inflicted by Orrantia, who was in a position across the street and in front of the Monte Carlo. Orrantia’s bullet might have hit Platt after he got back onto his feet in front of the Cutlass and was turning to his left. The bullet abraded the skin just to the right of the spine in the location of the upper shoulder blade. III. Platt’s Devastating Attack: Platt Outside the Monte Carlo 76
Platt’s 5th wound (right forearm wound D) - Risner? /Orrantia? Platt’s 6th wound (right upper arm/chest wound C) – Risner Platt’s 7th, 8th, 9th and 10th wounds (right foot wounds E, F; and left foot wounds G and H) - Mireles After Platt crawled out of the Monte Carlo and rolled off the front hood of the Cutlass, he took a position at the passenger side front fender of the Cutlass. He fired a .357 Magnum revolver at Risner and Orrantia, who were both across the street shooting at him. Dr. Anderson believes that the revolver would have been easier for Platt to manipulate due to the injury incurred to his right upper arm by Dove’s bullet (Platt right upper arm/chest wound B). Dr. Anderson feels Platt received his fifth wound (Platt right forearm wound D) when, after shooting at Risner and Orrantia, he turned to fire at Grogan, Dove and Hanlon (who’d by now joined up with Grogan and Dove after running across the street with Mireles). The bullet, fired by either Risner or Orrantia, hit the outside of Platt’s right forearm (midway between the wrist and the elbow) fractured the radius bone (the bone in the forearm on the thumb side), and exited the forearm. The bullet also affected the muscles that control the thumb’s ability to grip causing Platt to drop his .357 Magnum revolver. The revolver was found at the passenger side front fender of the Cutlass after the shoot-out. Dr. Anderson believes that shortly thereafter, Platt incurred his sixth wound (Platt right upper arm/chest wound C), which was inflicted by Risner. The bullet entered the back of Platt’s right upper arm (mid arm), passed through the triceps muscle and exited below the armpit. It then entered the muscles in the side of his chest and came to a rest in the soft tissues of the right side back, below the shoulder blade. The bullet did not penetrate the rib cage and the resultant wound was not serious. Platt then apparently positioned the Mini-14 against his shoulder using his uninjured left hand and manipulated the trigger with a barely functioning finger on his right hand, and fired three shots. One shot was directed at Orrantia and Risner’s location, which hit the steering wheel of their car. Flying debris from this bullet injured Orrantia. Two shots were fired at McNeill. The first bullet missed McNeill, but the second hit his neck. The second bullet stunned McNeill’s spinal cord causing him to collapse, and he was temporarily paralysed for several hours afterwards. McNeill recounts that Platt was smiling at him as he was shot. Platt left his position at the passenger side front fender of the Cutlass, moving between the Cutlass and Trans Am, and began rapidly closing distance with Grogan, Dove and Hanlon who were behind Grogan/Dove’s car. (A Mini-14 magazine was recovered adjacent to the passenger side front fender of the Cutlass suggesting that Platt reloaded before he began his charge.) At this point in the gunfight, Dove had relocated from behind the passenger side door of his car, around the back of the car and had taken a position near the driver's side door. (Dove’s gun, a S&W model 459 9mm automatic, had been hit by one of Platt’s bullets. Whether or not this occurred before or after he moved to the opposite side of the car is unknown.) Grogan had moved to occupy a position near the driver's side rear fender. Hanlon had fired his gun dry after shooting at Platt from around the passenger side rear fender/bumper and was hit by one of Platt’s bullets in his gun hand while reloading. Hanlon then rolled over onto his back behind the car. Within moments he saw Platt’s feet standing at the passenger side rear of the vehicle. Dr. Anderson states that it was at this time when Platt left large smears of blood as well as arterial blood spurt patterns on the rear of the vehicle. As Hanlon attempted to push himself under the left rear trunk to maximize his cover against Platt, he heard Grogan cry out, "Oh my God!" Platt killed Grogan with a single shot to the chest. Platt then rounded the rear fender, saw Hanlon, and fired one shot into Hanlon’s groin area. Hanlon rolled over onto right side into a foetal position expecting to be shot again and killed. However, Platt immediately shifted his attention to Dove, firing twice directly into Dove’s head. Dove instantly collapsed; his head coming to rest just inches away from Hanlon’s face. According to Dr. 77
.. .. .. .. Anderson,.. Hanlon recalls that Platt fired several more rounds, apparently at Risner and Orrantia. The spent cases from Platt’s Mini-14 fell onto Hanlon’s body.
After firing at Risner and Orrantia, Platt opened the driver’s side door of Grogan/Dove’s Buick. Just as he was stepping to enter the car, Mireles fired the first of five rounds of 00 buckshot from the Remington 870 shotgun he was carrying when he was hit in the forearm at the beginning of the gunfight by one of Platt’s bullets. Dr. Anderson feels this first shot by Mireles caused Platt right foot wounds E and F, and left foot wounds G and H. These wounds did not knock Platt off his feet. Sometime during the gunfight, Matix regained consciousness and apparently crawled, unseen by the FBI agents, out the same window Platt had used to exit the Monte Carlo. Orrantia reported that Matix remained near the passenger side front fender of the Monte Carlo for a while without ever firing a shot. When Platt entered the driver’s side of Grogan/Dove’s car, Matix joined him by entering the passenger side door. According to Dr. Anderson, forensic evidence indicates that Matix never fired a weapon after he received his initial injuries while occupying the driver’s seat of the Monte Carlo. IV. The Final Fusillade: Platt and Matix in Grogan/Dove’s Car Platt’s 11th wound, scalp wound A – Mireles Matix’s 4th wound, face wound D – Mireles Matix’s 5th wound, face/spine wound C – Mireles Matix’s 6th wound, face/neck wound A – Mireles Platt’s 12th wound, chest/spine wound J - Mireles Mireles fired a total of five rounds from his Remington 870 shotgun from a range of about 25 feet. With his first shot it appears he struck Platt in both feet when Platt was about to enter the driver’s seat of Grogan/Dove’s car. Mireles fired the remaining four shots at the windshield and driver’s window, but according to Dr. Anderson there’s no compelling forensic evidence to indicate that any of the pellets from Mireles’ shots 2-5 hit Platt or Matix. Dr. Anderson speculates that Platt might have ducked below the window openings, possibly in Matix’s lap, to have avoided being hit by the buckshot. At about this moment in the gunfight, Metro-Dade police patrol officers Martin Heckman and Leonard Figueroa arrived on the scene. Shortly thereafter, Heckman covered McNeill with his own body to protect McNeill from being hit again. Dr. Anderson does not document the actions of Figueroa. Platt’s specific actions at this stage of the gunfight have been subject to controversy. Civilian witness Sidney Martin described Platt as leaving Grogan/Dove’s car and walking more than 20 feet to Mireles’ position and firing three shots from a revolver at almost point blank range at Mireles and then returning to Grogan/Dove’s car. Mireles does not recall this happening. McNeill recalls seeing what appeared to be bullets striking the pavement. Heckman does not remember Platt being outside the car, but he does recall Platt pointing a gun out the driver’s window at him and their eyes meeting. Risner and Orrantia, who were both across the street, state that they never saw Platt approach Mireles and fire at him. In Cautionary Note #2 (four paragraphs that are published in the Introduction section), Dr. Anderson postulates that Platt exited the driver’s side door of Grogan/Dove’s car, staggered out a few steps, fired three shots from Matix’s .357 Magnum revolver (using his left hand) towards the general direction of Mireles and/or McNeill without hitting anyone, and then immediately got back into the driver’s seat of Grogan/Dove’s car. Dr. Anderson feels that the bones broken in Platt’s feet by Mireles’ first shotgun blast (as well as the large amount lost blood) would have prevented him from walking very far. He goes on to explain that the effects of deep shade, position and angles of the participants/witnesses, obstructed views,
78
etc., probably influenced individual perceptions of Platt’s actions. After Platt got back into Grogan/Dove’s car he attempted to start the engine. Dr. Anderson observes that the injuries to Platt’s right arm probably prevented him from being able to use his right hand to turn the ignition key. This forced Platt to lean away from the driver’s side window to use left hand to turn the key on the steering column. Matix was apparently attempting to help Platt start the car. Mireles then drew his .357 Magnum revolver, got to his feet, moved laterally about 15 feet parallel with the street, clear of McNeill’s car, and then began walking directly towards Platt and Matix, who were sitting in Grogan/Dove’s car. Mireles fired six rounds of .38 Special +P from his revolver. Mireles revolver shots 1 and 2 were fired at Platt, shots 3, 4 and 5 at Matix, and shot 6 at Platt. Five of the six bullets hit Platt or Matix. Mireles first shot at Platt hit the back of the front seat behind Platt’s left shoulder. Dr. Anderson theorizes that the sound of the gunshot would have caused Platt to turn his head to the left to look for the source of the gunfire. Mireles second shot then hit Platt above the outer edge of the right eyebrow (Platt scalp wound A). The weight of the projectile that was recovered from Platt’s scalp was about 19 grains, suggesting that the bullet hit the driver’s side window post and fragmented. After the fragment penetrated the skin it ricocheted off the curvature of the right side of Platt’s forehead, and travelled between the skin and the exterior surface of the skull for a distance of about 2 inches before it stopped above the right temple. The fragment did not penetrate the cranium. Dr. Anderson postulates that Platt then laid back on the front bench seat of Grogan/Dove’s car, placing his head and shoulders (face side up) in Matix’s lap on the passenger side, in attempt to use the driver’s side door as cover against Mireles’ gunfire. Platt’s movement and positioning trapped Matix upright on the seat with his back against the passenger side door. Mireles third shot hit Matix’s face just below the left cheekbone and adjacent to the left nostril (Matix face wound D). The projectile fragmented in two; the largest embedded in the bone beside the nose, a smaller fragment penetrating the left sinus cavity. According to Dr. Anderson, this wound was not significant, and probably was inflicted as Matix was looking at the approaching Mireles. The size and weight of the two fragments suggests the bullet probably hit the driver’s side window frame before it hit Matix. Matix then apparently tried to make himself as small a target as possible. He tucked his chin into his chest and pressed his back against the passenger side door to slide his buttocks on the bench seat in attempt to get as low as he could. Dr. Anderson claims this would have accounted for the wound path caused by Mireles’ fourth bullet (Matix face/spine wound C). The bullet hit Matix’s face just outside the lower right edge of the right eye socket, at about seven o-clock. The bullet travelled downward through the facial bones, through the right side of the lower jaw, into the neck, and entered the spinal column between cervical vertebra number 7 (C7) and thoracic vertebra number 1 (T1) where it severed the spinal cord at the base of T1. Matix’s body would have immediately relaxed, according to Dr. Anderson, causing his head to tilt backwards. His face would have risen upwards by the time Mireles’ fifth bullet hit him in the face (Matix face wound A). The bullet hit Matix’s chin just below the right corner of the mouth, penetrated the jaw bone and into the neck where it came to rest beside the right side of the spinal column at C7. The bullet did not damage the spinal cord. By this time Mireles had reached the driver’s side door of Grogan/Dove’s car when he fired his sixth and final shot. Mireles extended his gun through the driver’s side window and fired at Platt (Platt chest/spine wound J). The bullet penetrated Platt’s chest just below the left collarbone, travelled through the musculature of the shoulder and neck and stopped in the fifth cervical vertebra (C5), where it bruised the spinal cord. Dr. Anderson observes that the wound path of this bullet through Platt’s body could only have occurred if Platt were lying on his back on the front seat. Mireles’ sixth and final shot ended the gunfight. Platt and Matix both lay on the front seat of Grogan/Dove’s 79
.. .. .. .. .. was not already dead, he would be shortly. Arriving paramedics came to the aid of the FBI car. If Matix agents first and then shifted their attention to Platt and Matix. According to Dr. Anderson, paramedics found no signs of life in Grogan, Dove or Matix and no first aid were attempted. Whereas, Platt appears to have still had a heartbeat because paramedics inserted an airway tube and began administering intravenous fluids. Platt died at the scene without regaining consciousness. Conclusions Dr. Anderson concludes his forensic analysis of the gunfight by pointing out the remarkable accuracy of the FBI agents in achieving solids hit on both Platt and Matix, despite the fact that the suspects were obscured by deep shade, dust and gun smoke. He provides specific examples of accurate shooting by five of the eight Agents involved: Grogan, McNeill, Dove, Risner and possibly Orrantia. He also points out the ability of several of the people involved in the shoot-out, both suspects and FBI Agents, to continue to perform both physically and mentally through sheer willpower after having sustained severe gunshot wound trauma, and provides specific examples of determination on both sides. (Note: toxicology tests conducted on the body fluids of Matix and Platt revealed neither was under the influence of chemical intoxicants. Both were alcohol and drug free at the time of the shoot-out.)
HOSTAGE / KIDNAP Briefing Kidnap & Ransom We will not go into K & R in to much detail as it is such a specialized subject, but we will go over a few details. Kidnappings and extortion are on the upswing. The highest risk area in the world is South America and Columbia in particular. Columbia has the record for the most kidnappings and the highest ransom demands. For many criminals kidnapping is a business, and kidnappings in Columbia are often professional, well-planned operations lasting considerable periods of time. The US has a much lower level of kidnappings than overseas high-risk areas, but they do occur. US incidents are rarely publicized by those involved because corporations and individuals want to avoid any repeat attacks or threats. Extortion against corporate assets or products also occurs in the US, and is also on the upswing. Despite the increase in US situations, effective law enforcement, stiff penalties and strong security measures continue to keep the US safer than other countries. The increasing sophistication of corporate security systems may be contributing to an increase in these types of crimes. One theory is that the increased sophistication of corporate security systems is much tougher to crack, and that kidnapping is an effective way to obtain the knowledge to complete the crime. A government handbook for employees residing overseas has the following description of the need for K & R insurance: Unfortunately, kidnapping has become a major security issue in several countries outside of North America. In the last several years, statistics have shown an escalation of incidents in Italy, the Philippines, Columbia, Pakistan, and Brazil. Obviously, no one plans on being victimized by this sort of criminal activity. But when it does occur, the financial fallout can be 80
overwhelming to the families involved. Consider the following scenario: three men suddenly confront an executive in a foreign country leaving his office, each with firearms. He is forced into a vehicle, which quickly flees from the scene. A ransom for his release is set at $1,000,000. The ransom is paid in full and he is released within 30 days. Fortunately for his family, this gentlemen had an insurance policy that specifically covered such an occurrence. As a result, neither he nor his family suffered any significant financial loss as a result of this criminal act. Without diluting the importance of [coverage] factors, the primary consideration for any "Kidnap and Ransom" policy still lies in the expertise that will be utilized for hostage retrieval. The negotiating team is probably more important than the policy. The policy should provide for both an experienced negotiator and the facilities necessary to ensure that the hostage is returned unharmed. A vital role for any close protection officer is to make the client aware of the situation of him/ her being kidnapped and being held hostage for a ransom. For reasons such as financial reward, political statements and even publicity. Lets say that nine times out of ten the client will freeze in these situations, then it will depend upon the bodyguard & protection team to take control and direct any action/ movement. Hopefully the client will obey instructions and escape with out being injured. The briefing should be given to any client who could face an hostage/ kidnap situation; if captured it most likely you will be held in isolation. When left on your own, the human mind goes through many emotions, especially when faced with the danger of death. The client should be made aware of certain points, which could save themselves in the event of kidnap. • • • • • •
Try to maintain your emotions Do not offer resistance once the kidnap has been successful Be prepared to accept isolation Do not antagonize your captors Do not make threats or promises Attempt to create a relationship between you and the captors
If possible try to make a mental picture and note the following • • • • • • • •
Descriptions of captors Descriptions of places Any sounds & smells Direction taken from the place of the initial capture Persons in authority/ how many captors/ male or female Weapon systems used Any conversations between the captors The time
INTRODUCTION To Hostage Rescue The protection team is to counter the attack whilst the client is still free, giving the client safe escape from the danger. Will stress its not the job for the protection team to instigate a rescue attempt, if there client as been successfully kidnapped. 81
.. .. .. .. Hostage teams are normally military or police units that are dedicated to these .. rescue situations but there are times when clients have the need for private units or teams. It is very rare for a client to have the need or resources to employ a full time Hostage Rescue Team. It is very intense and team members need to be rotated on a two-week or four-week turn around. Normally using five guys per team on one shift, on a daily basis having three shifts working eight hours maximum. Obviously this would be the idea scenario and be categorized as very high risk, a definite threat involved. BUILDING RESCUE PROCEDURES • • • • • • • • • •
Composition of team members should be five guys, two pairs and one team leader to control. The team leader and members need as much intelligence as possible, Number of attackers Race of the attackers, language spoken Clothing of the attackers Weapons and equipment used Method of entry and building plans Details on the client, dress, medical Location of client and attackers Location of any other friendly personnel
• • • •
Identify all possible means of entry Enter by covert means where possible Enter by the roof or highest floor possible Secure entry points
Entry
Room clearance • • • • •
Work in pairs Check and clear doors, if locked use means to bust open Entering room, identify targets before engaging with fire Check all hiding places and for other doors Room clear, try to secure and lock if at all possible, door wedges or tape so everyone knows its clear
Movement • • •
Clear rooms and building progressively, room by room and floor by floor All stairways when cleared should be held and secured Work in teams, fire and maneuver, room by room
Control the situation • • • •
Try to avoid being silhouetted or illuminated Use the buildings lighting to your advantage Fast and aggressive movement through the building Use flash bangs or concussion grenades
Building clear • • • •
Ensure all attackers either dead or taken prisoner, all secured Principle is safe Route out of building secure and safe Co-ordinate with medical agencies if needed
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Mobile Rescue Procedures • • • •
Team consisting of four to five guys positioned in one vehicle Their vehicle to follow the clients convoy, in distance for a fast response time, one minute Watch the flow of traffic and adapt accordingly Keep communication up and running
Ambush • • • • • • • • •
Move in fast and very aggressively Use flashing lights and sirens to get attention Cover the client's vehicle Smoke Return fire Well aimed covering fire Give window of escape for the client Remove client from the threat Escort or take to safe house
HOSTAGE Rescue – Dynamic Entries A dynamic entry is just that, dynamic, fluid and as the potential to rapidly change in circumstance and dimension at any moment. The potential for violence and lethal confrontation are extremely high. In general to reduce the potential for a lethal confrontation and the destruction of evidence the entry must be conducted rapidly and forcefully. The team must seize the site quickly dominating every person and areas inside it without delay or hesitation. Tactical Principles Use your eyes and ears. People commonly search with their eyes using vision bands beginning at a particular focal distance. Unfortunately the pressure of searching an armed advisory using bands as a pronounced tendency to fixate visual focus at a specific distance. This can easily cause you to walk into uncomfortably close proximity with an opponent, or fail to locate him at longer rangers. By changing eye focus “in and out” and changing your line of sight to cover the exposed areas, this problem can be avoided. You may find it unnatural to begin with, but with practice it becomes immensely more effective. Never turn your back on anything you have not cleared. Retain the advantage and search systematically. Make sure that all walls and enclosed areas are checked thoroughly before turning your attention to another area. What you miss can kill you, do not chase suspects through a location passing uncleared areas. Stay away from corners and maximize distance to potential threat areas, this will create a reactionary gap between you and your opponent. Allowing time to think and take the correct action, take corners and walls wide. Move correctly. Do not bounce around, apply the proper movement techniques so you have the ability to fire your weapon accurately immediately. You must maintain the ability to return fire and fire when necessary. You must correctly practice and use proper shooting on the move techniques, failure to maintain a weapons platform or gunmount will breakdown your ability to protect yourself with accurate fire. In addition failure to apply these methods will 83
.. .. .. . reduce ..your control of an adversary by presenting a less than dominate appearance and . the likely hood of a confrontation. may increase Watch your front site. Do not panic and point shoot, point shooting is panic shooting. Shooting accurately the first time and placing your rounds exactly where you need them is likely to result in fewer rounds being fired. General effects of stress in operational situations
•
Visual blocking – Tunnel vision, seeing black and white only
•
Respiratory distress – Escalated breathing pattern
•
Audio blocking – Sounds are muffled and faint, unable to hear at times, unable to speak at times, will revert back to your native language
•
Increased heart rate – Your heart rate will escalate as if you where running
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Inability to perform intricate manual tasks – Your ability to complete detailed specific tasks and technical movements is greatly reduced
•
Target fixation – You will stare at the perceived threat and block out all other threats in the area
Team configuration and structure There are a multitude of variable circumstances that will dictate the size, training and configuration of a team. The margins of error and danger are extremely high during these operations so we tend to use personnel of specific training and operational backgrounds. Remember this is a simple and very generic structure that can be modified to meet your specific requirements. A minimum of 8-man entry team should be utilized, the responsibilities with in this team should be organized and designed in the following method. Team leader This person is responsible for the planning, overview of the operation and personnel Pointman or scout The most senior and experienced tactical operator, this is one of the teams greatest assets and strengths. Responsible for planning the direction of flow of the operation inside, personnel and second in command. The team leader and pointman work hand in hand, both pointman and team leader move actively as team members with their respective partners inside the site. Back up man/ second in command This position should be filled with your second most experienced operator, this position is responsible to back up the pointman and follow him where ever he moves, pointmans shadow.
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Operator 4 Responsible to clear rooms and conduct operation, works in conjunction with team leader Operator 5 Responsible to clear rooms and conduct operation, works in conjunction with operator number 6 Operator 6 Responsible to assist the team where directed and fill in as needed, suspect handling Operator 7 Responsible to assist the team where directed, a reinforcement position Operator 8 Responsible for removing all obstacles and barriers preventing the flow of team members inside and outside. As needed inside the site he will be called up from the team to put doors down or breach obstacles. Types of room entry methods There exist many different methods of room clearing techniques, here are four methods Button hook The operators are staged on the door, he steps in the threshold of the doorway and reverses direction into the room and rapidly clears the entry point kill zone. Move continuously to a point of domination in the room. Recommended use of this method is for large doorways, also used to backup and provide coverage for the first operator in the room if he criss crosses. Positive – this allows the operator to enter from a staged position and provides a method of clearing the 90 degree angle to the 1st operators back as he enters. Negative – the operator as a tendency to drop the head and weapon momentarily upon entry into the room, in addition the footwork is a little more difficult and not as smooth as the criss cross to maintain gunpoint. Criss cross The operators are staged on the doorway, they are on gunpoint and move directly across the doorway threshold into the room rapidly clearing the entry point kill zone. They move to their points of domination in the room, basically continuously walking in a straight line into the room and covering the 90-degree angle as they move. A general rule is that the operator on the hinge side of the door is the low man and first in the room. Recommended use of method is for all standard doorways, this may not be used for 85
.. .. .. .. ..large doorways as described in the buttonhook. Positive – this allows the operator to maintain his footing and direction of travel, allowing good gun point control while moving directly to the 90 degree angle with little difficulty. Negative – Must cross completely across the doorway while entering. Combination The first operator button hooks and the second operator leans over the first while moving into the room. The second is covering and moving with the first to cover is back as he penetrates the entry point kill zone. To begin the team is stacked on the doorway, the first operator button hooks and the second is criss crossing. Slicing technique Operator slices the doorway prior to the physical entry, allowing eyes on the objective before entering room. The operator maintains maximum distance from the threat area while slicing, with this technique 75-80 % of a room can be cleared without entering. Control from the exterior of the room is the real advantage of this method prior entering. This is used on open doors to rooms, the operators stack on the doorway, the first slice’s the doorway then himself and team operator can now criss cross through the doorway. When closed doors are presented the operators will stage automatically on both side of the door, the door will be breached or opened and the operators enter in criss cross fashion. Common mistakes •
Silhouetting the muzzle of the weapon into the threat room prior to entry, this is a direct failure to slice properly or moving improperly and evaluating the terrain your operating in.
•
Operators fail enter the room simultaneously, there is a long time between the operators entering the doorway.
•
Failure to cover the 90-degree angles immediately upon entry, operators tend to focus on the center of the room.
•
Failure to communicate with each other, you must communicate your intentions and desires to other team members, rapidly, briefly and coherently.
•
Failure to remain calm, adrenaline overload and lack of emotional control under stress, this is at times the most difficult single thing to over come and fight through.
•
Failure to maintain gunpoint and stance while moving, shooting on the move should be practiced. Everyone of you can discuss the specifics of the entry and type of configuration you use. These are just suggestions and safety rules, the safety rules for clearing operations can not be ignored or forgotten. A number of our fellow operators have lost their lives establishing these rules and guidelines. Please consider them and attempt to make them part of your S.O.P`S. 86
SPECIAL Response Teams Introduction to operational procedures for United States teams, these protocols can be adapted for international teams. There are many different names depending on the part of the country in which they operate. Some of the names are: SWAT EMT SERT EST HRT ETF SOG
Special Weapons and Tactics Emergency Response Team Special Emergency Reaction Team Emergency Services Team Hostage Rescue Team Emergency Task Force Special Operations Group
Although the names may change their mission remains the same - TO SAVE LIVES! Primary and Secondary Missions The Primary Mission: This includes hostage rescue, counter-terrorism, kidnapped children, and fugitive and felony arrest teams. Secondary Missions Include executive or witness protection, protecting vitally important locations, intelligence gathering, and training other operational teams. Special Response Teams Are closely integrated teams that are uniquely equipped to function in high threat environments. Their training lends itself to a wide range of tasks and situations. Their versatility and effectiveness make them an invaluable necessity to any unit responsible for the protection of human lives. Personnel selected for SRT should be • • • • •
Volunteers or placed forward for selection In excellent physical condition Intelligent Extremely motivated Well versed with various weapon systems
Team members must be able to control their emotions and think in a logical, trained, instinctive fashion when under stress. Six Man Team The six-man team formation must be versatile and able to handle whatever situation develops under, at times, stressful conditions. Two such teams can be split into three four-man teams as needed. The organization of the six-man team is as follows: 1. Point man/ scout 2. Team Leader 87
.. .. .. .. ..3.4.
Entry Man Entry Man 5. Equipment Man 6. Rear Guard
Point Man Responsibilities include scouting the objective, and providing forward security during team movement. Team Leader Plans, coordinates and leads the team. Primary responsibility is the safety of his men. Entry Man Two positions on the team. Responsible for the initial entry and probably first contact with the threat. Equipment Man Carries team equipment. If all other factors are equal he should be the physically strongest team member when all other factors are equal. Rear Guard Provides rear security for team during movement. Each member of the team should be cross-trained in the duties of each position and be prepared to flow into another position as requirements dictate or in the event of casualties. Equipment The following is a basic inventory of equipment. The mission will dictate whether additional specialized gear is needed. Uniforms There are three basic uniform groups, which can be described as "high profile," "low profile," and "black clothes." What each individual on the team wears will depend on the particular unit, its objectives and where it is going. High Profile Normally, this is the conventional uniform worn on daily duty. If the team wears a suit and tie then this will be the "high profile" uniform. Low Profile This category defines street clothes that blend with the environment. "Low profile" is utilized covert operations and infiltration. Blacks
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This is the combat uniform. They should also convey maximum psychological impact. Example: black hoods and gloves create a strong image, but black tends to silhouette the wearer at night. The best overall uniform is a two piece tropical military cammie uniform that has been washed in a black dye to create a dark mottled look. This makes it nearly invisible in shadows or darkness. Jump suits are impractical as they restrict movement. The complete uniform should include eye protection, gloves and lightweight boots that support the ankle and have a heavy rubber traction sole to insure silence. Individual Equipment • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Individual lighting -2 flashlights, one secured to the person. Knife, single edged - for cutting away straps, rope, etc. Small mirror, Gas masks Black tape, Plastic flex cuffs, Cammie stick, Load bearing vest, Notebooks and pens, Sidearm holster (thigh or shoulder), Personal rappelling gear, Communications gear, Small canteen (always full), Flash bangs Gloves - non-cloth, poly urethane with ribs on inside. Hood, Foul weather gear, Body armor, Heavy duty watch, First aid dressing, Weapons (long gun and pistol),
Team Equipment • • • • • • • • • • •
Extension mirrors, Lighting - 500,000 to 1,000,000 candle power, Special weapons - scoped rifle, high capacity sidearm Chemical agents and smoke, Team rappelling gear, First aid gear, Battering ram, Climbing gear, Vehicles, Communications gear, Ladder, hard rubber on ends for stealth,
Notes: Individual weapons: no single weapon can serve all missions. The most versatile weapon for close engagements is the submachine gun, of which, the H&K MP5 series is the choice of professionals world wide. Where longer shots may be required a compact assault rifle is a better choice.
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.. .. .. .. Introduction .. To Tactics The sequence of events that may call an SRT into action would generally occur as follows: • • • • • • • • • • • •
Locate and isolate threat if possible. Start notifications - supervisors, teams, etc. Establish tactical communications. Establish command post. Establish outer perimeter. Notify SRT. Notify medical support personnel. Isolate phone and communications to threat if possible. Call in off-duty personnel. Isolate and interview witnesses at Command Post. Commence evacuation plan. Any other support notified.
P.I.P.E. Is an acronym describing the deployment of an SRT unit. There are four phases known as the (1) Pre-confrontation phase, (2) Immediate action phase, (3) Planning phase, and (4) Execution phase. Pre-Confrontation Phase • • • • • • • •
Personnel selection phase, Training, Write S.O.P., Collect intelligence, Contingency planning, Logistical support, Liaisons with other agencies, groups, governments, Security.
Immediate Action Phase •
This is when the situation requiring SRT occurs.
Planning phase • • • • • •
Analyze situation, Strategy planning - look at options, Tactical approach planning, Inventory of all available resources, Evacuate or warn civilians (when possible), Review all available intelligence.
Execution phase • • • •
Control situation, Negotiate with subjects/ threat, Assault the threat/ Evacuate hostages, Debrief.
Command Post
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The Command Post is center of operations where Command Personnel, the Press and the Public come together. SRT operations domestically attract a lot of publicity and media attention. The Command Post provides a place for cooperation with the press. It is very dangerous to have a rouge news team interfering with operations or exposing themselves or the team to danger under the guise of "the people's right to know." The Command Post should be located in a safe place on the interior boundary of the outer perimeter. A chain of command, including the following persons, should be at the Command Post. Commander/ Duty Officer Scribe Recorder SRT/ Support • • • • • • • • •
SRT Officer in Charge Intelligence Officer Command Post Security Personnel Perimeter Control Personnel SRT Teams Equipment Scribe-Recorder Dispatcher Clean-up Crew
Note: There are two Scribe-Recorders responsible for keeping an accurate record of everything pertaining to the operation. This information will later be transcribed to an official record which may be used to justify the actions of the SRT in court. The Command Post will need to have men responsible for maintaining security and order present to prevent operations from being disrupted. Tactical Command Post The Tactical Command Post is for SRT Only. Here, the team plans the final details of the assault. The Tactical Command Post is located at the exterior boundary of the inner perimeter. Resources In A Crisis An SRT unit may be able to call on many resources in an emergency. Law enforcement Teams may have access to all city or county facilities under an Emergency Action Plan. Some of these additional resources are: • • • • • • •
City, County, State, Federal or Military Motor Pools for vehicles of all types. Fire Department/Rescue Service - ladders, waterpower. No one can break into a building or vehicle faster than a fireman. Ambulance/EMS - Medical Support Utility Company - Cut, water, power and telephones off. E.O.D. - Explosives handling. Private Contractors - Build special apparatus or provide details on a building they constructed. 91
.. .. .. .. Scouting .. Scouting can be defined as locating the threat, judging its capabilities and determining how to neutralize or apprehend suspect(s). The Scout is a very important position and is the second in command under the Team Leader. The multifaceted nature of this position makes it very challenging. Before leaving the Command Post the Scout should preplan his observation points. The closest terrain should be scouted first. The acronym COCO is used to assist in scouting and preparing the briefing for the team. Cover/Concealment - Both for the threat and the team. Observation - What the team can see and what the threat can see. Critical Terrain - Fences, high ground, buildings, power lines, etc. Obstacle - Dogs, creeks, walls, things to negotiate. Avenue Of Approach Ingress and egress (how to get into and out of the area). Two ways in and two ways out. The Scout selects the sniper position, four points of entry (two conventional entries, two unconventional), and selects or changes the inner perimeter. Sketching Most effective if augmented with photographs and/or video. Sketches should be made from ground up. Sketches should show yardage to key points, angle of shots for snipers. It is important to indicate compass directions and position of the sun. Wind direction should be included for various times of the day. A rule of thumb for judging distance is to remember that the average telephone pole is 35 feet; the average one story home is twelve feet. Five Point Paragraph Order Prior to the assault a SRT unit should receive written orders clearly outlining the mission. SMEAC: • • • • •
Situation Mission Execution Administration/equipment Communications/command
The an acronym which shows the format of such an order. No mission should be undertaken without such an order. After the operation it may be important to have documentation showing exactly why certain actions were taken. Situation •
Location, type of action, information on threat, level of threat (threat assessment), intelligence, weather, weapons.
Mission •
The objective of the operation. Should be written like a press release.
Execution
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•
Use names, specify duties, tactics and backup plans.
Administration/ Equipment •
List available gear and responsibilities of team members.
Communication/ Command •
A clear statement of the chain of command, radio frequencies, codes, call signs, is important.
Team Movement A team moves from cover to cover along the safest possible route. When moving or clearing an area, firepower, noise and light discipline must be maintained at all times. Know the difference between "cover" and "concealment." • •
Cover fire. Concealment small arms fire.
The enemy can't see you and you are safe from small arms Though the enemy can't see you, he can still kill you with
Movement Over Open Ground Before leaving cover pick the next position to move to and insure all team members know where to go. • • • •
Choose the shortest route and avoid exposure. Do not run in an exaggerated zigzagging movement because it increases your exposure time. Keep weapons pointed in direction of enemy. Always keep a cover man-watching enemy.
Building Search When possible enter building from top and search down. If the suspect(s) choose to flee they will run into the inner perimeter personnel. Avoid fatal funnels The fatal funnel is created by the narrow opening of a doorway or other such barrier. Hallways are one long fatal funnel. An enemy waiting inside a room only needs to sight in on the opening and wait for the target to appear. Stairwells First man in advances with his weapon aimed in direction of travel. He covers the first landing. Second man moves behind first and inches up sidewall taking furtive peaks up as more of the next level appears. Second man stops on stairs before breaking the plane formed by an imaginary line between the level above and the stairs below. Third man crawls up the stairs on his back with weapon facing toward next level. Other team members cover any openings and to the rear. Secure each level as you go
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.. .. .. .. Vehicle .. Assaults Prior to assaulting a vehicle it should be immobilized. Shoot out tires and/or disable engine. Assault vehicles from the front or the rear depending on the location of engine. The engine block will give some protection. Distractions should be used extensively to improve chances of success. Aircraft It is necessary to examine detailed layouts of the particular aircraft involved. Aircraft have a number of possible openings from above, below and side. An aircraft maintenance chief familiar with the aircraft is invaluable. Vehicles and aircraft present their own unique problems due to their design. It will take extensive planning and teamwork to be successful. Distractions • • • • • • • •
Anything that takes the suspects attention off the team is a distraction. The split second gained by the team may make the difference between life and death. An "explosive entry" is both entry and distraction. Automatic weapons fire through walls or windows. Stun grenades tossed inside prior to entry. Smoke and tear gas. Simultaneously breaking windows on the 1-2 corner while team enters on the 3-4 corner. Intense lights shining through the window onto the threat or into his/ her eyes.
CQB Tactics The most feared situation for any military or Special Forces unit is a Close Quarters Battle (CQB). The reason is because there are campers, snipers, and many other hazards that await them in an enclosed facility. It takes a welltrained and practiced team to execute a successful Counter Terrorist (CT) Operation. Some of the most well known military units known for CT Ops are Delta, SEAL Team Six (now DevGroup), Special Air Service, and lately Marine Force Recon. All of these units train harder than any other unit in existence. The reason is obvious, the engage in CT Ops, they need to know how to operate and be successful. No CQB Op is the same; they do however have common characteristics. Usually there are campers, or a person who chooses a place to hide out and wait for you to engage them. Early 94
Warning Systems (EWS) are also common. The major threats are always the same however. If you are approaching a building or facility, which has hostile enemy personnel (Tangos) inside, unless you are very stealthy, you almost have to expect to take fire. Snipers are also a common threat in a CQB situation. All of these threats can be remedied however, with the correct tactics. The hardest obstacle to overcome is stealth. Most of the time, the tangos will know your entry point and will base their defensive formation to defend against that entry point. Which brings up the next formidable obstacle. They have some idea where you are or will be; you only know their general vicinity. That gives the tangos a great advantage over you. You must consider this before formulating a plan of action. The mentality you want to have when facing a CQB is to operate swift, silent, and "deadly." Swift and efficient movement, combined with a level head and stealth is the best offence against a hazardous situation. If you are a commander of a team, you must remember that. Make sure that your team operates under those conditions.
The first thing that a CT unit needs to do before they jump into the shooting and looting is to even the odds. The tangos know that you're out there but you don't know much about them. For those of you aren't familiar with Reconnaissance, it is going "behind enemy lines" to gain information about your enemy. Reconnaissance is a non-violent operation where a shot is fired only if necessary. This proves very useful in a CT situation because if you know where your enemy is, you can exterminate them with much greater ease. The SEALs were the very first to preach and publicize this attitude, but 2 is always better than one. From the first phase of BUD/s (Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL Training), SEALs are assigned a swim buddy. From that your swim buddy accompanies point on anything you do. Reconnaissance should be done in the same manner. So to make a long story short, the first thing you should do when Reconnoitring an area of Operations (AOP) is to divide the team up into smaller teams of two. This is smart because if all goes to hell and a fire fight breaks out two people stand a better chance than one. The next thing to do is to set up a rally point. The rally point is a point in the AOP where the entire team will regroup after reconnaissance. This point needs to be a strategic position in a number of ways. The Rally Point needs to be concealed from enemy view, it's not a huddle in football, and they will shoot you. The Rally Point also has to be a defensive stronghold. If, unfortunately, all goes to hell, the team needs to be together. The team returns to the rally point at that time and defend it. Reconnaissance is the stealthiest part of an entire CT Op. You cannot be detected! The idea is to gain intelligence on the enemy without them detecting you. Movement should be concealed and slow. I'm sure you've seen it mimicked in the movies. Try not to run unless necessary because a fast moving object attracts the eye before a slow moving object does. Running also makes a lot more noise than walking. The enemy will most likely hear you before they see you. This is where Reconnaissance communication is important. A chapter is devoted later on to communication during assault because recon communication is different. 95
.. .. .. .. You must have a set of hand signals. Don't get nervous, you only need a few. The important .. enemy ones are sighted, sniper, danger zone, and a good sniper position. The hand signals should be simple, not elaborate, and very easy to remember. I'm sure you can come up with some logical hand signals. There are a number of things you are looking for when reconnoitring an AOP. These things include but are not limited to good sniper position for your team, enemy personnel, tango snipers, danger areas (Open areas that attract gunfire), good cover and concealment, possible entry points, and enemy escape routes. Once you have found these things, you must record them. The second member of the Recon Team needs to carry approximately 3 by 5" spiral notebook and a pencil (mechanical). Map the area that you have reconnoitred and either write down what you found and where or mark the map with symbols. This is up to the team; there is no real rule for reconnaissance unless you are in the military. Movement is probably the most difficult part of reconnaissance. You must move undetected and still get good intelligence. The two man teams need to move as one. This is accomplished by appointing a point man early on. The point man is the front man in the formation who basically decides where and when to go. The point man needs to be competent and stealthy. Basically, the way movement works is that the point man decides a path to take and leads his team member along that path. Just remember, that you never split up. Move as a team always. After you have completed the recon of the AOP, return to the rally point. The Officer in Charge (OIC) collects the information and sets up a plan. This should be the only time that talking is permitted on a Recon Op. They conveying of accurate information and intelligence is crucial, don't screw it up, The most important things to remember about reconnaissance are you don't fire a shot. It needs to be practiced and the art needs to be perfected. Only the most skilled military units participate in reconnaissance operations in the real world, so you can imagine the difficulty. Follow the above and you should be fine. So far it's worked for my team.
Communication is vital for a team's success. There are a number of forms of communication used by today's Special Forces units. The very first and still favorite in some cases are hand signals. Hand signals are completely quiet and they are effective. The other common method of communication is through tactical radios (TacRadio). Even though a good radio is expensive, if you're a serious team, you will want to shell out the money. NOTE: Some tournaments do not allow radio communication. Refer to the rules in your area before purchasing!! TacRadios offer more flexibility than hand signals and can be more effective. If you do purchase radios, spend the money to get a decent one because if your team relies on TacRadio comm. Units and they go down, you're screwed. Depending on if you have military experience or how serious your team is, you may have preAssigned positions in the team. Common military positions include the Point Man, OIC, Corpsman (medical Officer), Assaulters, Grenadiers, and Rear security. These positions will 96
be referred to for the rest of this document. The acting position of a team member is a good reference for radio communication. While some teams choose to use names, our team quickly chose the position naming reference over names. WE found names to be cumbersome while positions worked out quite nicely. Whether you use TacRadios or hand signals, communication should be short and to the point. You don't want to get caught waiting around in an open area because your comm. isn’t effective enough. That's begging for an ambush to happen. Simple code words are an asset to radio communication. Hand signals are for more developed and serious team and need to be developed by the team itself. Teams are most familiar with signals that they come up with on their own. The same goes with code words. Communication Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) are best developed by the teams themselves. The information above is only there to help you formulate your own ideas. No matter what form of communication you choose, the same principles apply. Restrict communication to only necessary comments that directly affect the mission. For TacRadios, make sure that the ones you choose have a hands-option. Holding your weapon and concentrating on the task at hand can be complicated enough. Shooting is a fundamental skill that won't be covered in detail in this manual. Shooting is a vital part of any Op. After all, you have to shoot the tangos to take them down don't you? Shooting in a CQB situation is actually quite different from that of any other Op. The reason is because in CQB the action is fast. Shooting in CQB is based upon initial volume of fire and instinct. Reaction time is very important in CQB. There are a number of fundamentals that help and apply to CQB though. The first is that you never look away from your gun. Keep your weapon in front of you at all times. The only exception belongs to the Point Man who may need to use his sidearm (if available). Don't look anywhere that your weapon is not pointed. Believe it or not, it's much easier to depress the trigger than to look, have to swing your weapon to your target, and then depress the trigger. If you head moves, your weapon goes with it. This is even truer with a sidearm. The next fundamental skill is a readiness stance. Keep your weapon in front of you a slightly on a low angle when moving in a "clear" area. The reason is because if you're not in a clear area, you actually present less of a target. Movement like that is also important because you are more relaxed. When in CQB, tenseness is a bad thing. Tenseness causes premature firing of the weapon and a lot of missed targets because of poor aiming. You do not however want to move in this manner when you know that you're near tangos. If you're moving through a danger area, keep the weapon in a firing position with a relaxed grip. If you're too tense, you may have a tendency to jerk the weapon when firing which could throw your aim off. By the way, missing is a bad thing! The third and equally important aspect to combat shooting in CQB is reloading. Yes, there is a SOP for reloading. The most efficient reloading technique is used by the U.S. Airborne Rangers. The first thing to do if you need to reload is to check for cover. If there is cover move to it. Once behind cover, drop to a knee and if necessary, draw your sidearm to within easy reach in case of an emergency. Replace magazines quickly and engage in the fire fight again.
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.. .. .. .. The last most important aspect of CQB shooting is a field of fire. Each team member .. and needs to have a pre-assigned field of fire. A team member's field of fire is the area that the team member is going to concentrate on when moving unless moving through an open area at which you engage targets of opportunity. The point man has the front of the team covered with the help of the OIC. The OIC covers the near flanks of the point man. The next man in the line, which is usually a corpsman, covers the left and right of the team. The Assaulters cover targets of opportunity. The rear security team member (last man in formation) covers the rear of the team. This is an important position because the most common guerrilla tactic is to engage a larger force from behind. Another important thing to remember is if you fire in your field of fire let your team know who is firing by calling out "contact!" If you "drop" the tango, let the team know by saying, not yelling, "tango down." The above needs rehearsal and should be trained again and again. My team focuses on target shooting under controlled circumstances working on a "reflex or Instinct shot." Basically, we set up a target, mimic clearing an area, and engage the target of reflexes. That involves bringing the weapon up for the ready position and firing until the target is hit. Most of this chapter involves being in a heavy firefight. In a CQB situation you mostly only use cover temporarily when entering a room that has not been cleared yet. In a firefight however, good cover could mean the difference between your team losing or winning. Concealment applies to every aspect of CQB. You want to take down the tangos swiftly and stealthy. At least that's what our team attempts to do. Good cover is usually very hard to find in CQB. The most common and effective is a door/window opening. They provide full cover of the body and allow for quick movement. When using a door or window opening for cover, keep your weapon ready to fire at all times. Stand close to the opening but not to the point where you are exposed to fire. To fire from that position, lean at the hips to expose the smallest target to the enemy and engage either targets of opportunity or in your field of fire depending on the situation. Concealing yourself is during the entry of the concealment is usually building, these options really the only solution.
very important in CQB. The most important time for concealment is building or facility. Make your approach silent and not obvious. Good found with corners and foliage. Depending on the design of the target may not be present. If that situation comes up, stealthy movement is
The best way to conceal yourself is with good clothing and camouflage selection. Don't choose to wear black "ninja suits" for a daytime Op. Face paint camouflage is also a good addition. Make sure that every part of your body is covered in some manner including your hands and face. If you've chosen good camouflage, you should be able to use most objects as concealment. One important thing to add is if you really don't want to be noticed, don't stare at your enemy. If you're in your car sometime and you're at a red light, stare at the person next to you and they will most likely look back. That's the human man's sixth sense. Focus on your target for short periods of time and then return to watching your target. Five seconds usually works good for us.
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Smart Movement is a vital part of success for a CQB Op. Movement in CQB is swift and silent. There should always be a purpose for movement. Never move unnecessarily because it just puts your team in danger. When moving be sure to stay low and present as little of target as possible to the enemy. Running is usually a last resort. Quick and silent movements are preferred to running which is more noticeable and makes more noise. Of course if your team is compromised (discovered), running is required because you need to get some cover to engage and neutralize the tangos. Covering areas is a crucial aspect of movement. If you approach an open hallway, staircase, intersection or some form of open area, your team's movement needs to be covered. Hall Ways and intersections are the most commonly encountered obstacles. When moving across a "T shaped" hallway, the point man approaches the area and peeks around the corner. If a tango is there, the scout should neutralize the threat. If not, the scout should drop to a knee and cover the corner he just cleared. The next man in line should cross the open hallway and leave enough room for the rest of the team on the other side. Once across the other side, the OIC (second man in formation) is responsible for covering directly ahead of the way he just came. Once the point man gives the word, the next man crosses. He then aids the point man in covering the open area. The team crosses the open area one by one until the point man comes across and assumes the position of point and the "patrol" continues. Clearing and covering corners is another important aspect of movement. If you approach a corner, the point man should tell the rest of the team they've reached a corner. The point man then "slices the Pie" on the corner. Slicing the pie involves maximizing the team members view while limiting the reaction time of the tango. Slicing the pie involves making a 90-degree movement around the corner. In other words, the point man takes a step back from the corner turns his body so his point of view is looking directly past the edge of the corner. He then side steps turning his body slightly as he moves to maximize his field of vision. When encountering opposite corners as in the "T Shaped" hallway, you need to separate the team. The OIC and one other team member goes to the opposite corner as the point man. On a three count, the Point man and the OIC slice the pie at the same time, which prevents the chance of a rear ambush. The man coupled with the OIC covers the OIC's movements remaining approximately three steps behind the OIC in case the OIC goes down. After both corners are clear, the OIC or point man decides which way to proceed and the team regroups and begins the "patrol" again. Clearing rooms can be very difficult. If you approach a room with an open door the team needs to set up on both sides of the opening. When moving across the opening, do not be detected. If you are, you're screwed. The point man should give warning to the team when he first sees the doorway and the team should act appropriately. When the team splits up, an assaulter should accompany the OIC to the opposite side of the door opening as the point man. On the OIC's order, the Point man swings in through the doorway making a 90-degree turn to his nearest side. For example, if the point man is on the left side of the doorway, he'll enter and turn left. Right after the point man enters, the OIC follows and turns to the opposite side of the point man. Be sure to make those turns 90 degrees because room corners are a favourite for tango campers. After the OIC, the next man on the point man's side enters and follows the same path as the point man but makes approximately a 60 degree turn focusing more on the 99
.. .. .. .. centre of room. The next man on the OIC's side enters in the same fashion but follows the .. theinstead OIC's path of the point man. This continues until the entire team is in the room and the room is deemed clear by the OIC. Example of entry: Point man goes left, OIC goes right, Corpsman left, 1st Assaulter right, 2nd Assaulter left, Rear Security, right. A closed door is handled differently however. If a closed door is encountered, the point man and OIC line up on the opposite sides as before. The OIC moves first and positions himself on about a 45-degree angle opposite the door swing. In other words, if the door opens and swings left, the OIC will be on the right side of the doorway. The OIC then kneels and has his weapon trained (aimed) directly ahead into the open space laying beyond the door. The OIC must leave enough room for the door to open! The point man opens the door on the OIC's order. At about .5 seconds after the door is opened, the point man makes his normal entry procedure as above and the operation continues as normal with exceptions to the OIC and the 2nd Assaulter. Instead of the OIC clearing the room, the next man in the line, in the case above, the 1st Assaulter clears in the OIC's place. Everything goes accordingly except for the 2nd Assaulter who positions himself next to the OIC and covers the team's rear. Once the room is clear, the OIC and 2nd Assaulter move in with the rest of the team and the "patrol" continues. An important point to remember is when clearing a room; do not engage targets of opportunity. Engage targets that lie in your path only. If you turn to shoot the tango, you'll hit your own man before you hit the enemy. Strict fields of fire are required in order for this method of room clearing to be efficient. Using snipers is fairly complicated in CQB. Snipers need to have a position that provides both cover and concealment. This information will cover this use of snipers in a close quarters Battle. A sniper's purpose in CQB is to cover the movement of the assault and recon teams and take out difficult targets that the OIC deems puts the Assault team in danger. TacRadios are required if you're going to snipe. A sniper must have excellent determination and concentration. The Sniper may be the most experienced and trained member of the team. Be prepared, being a sniper is hard. A sniper in CQB is responsible for locating targets on the exterior of the building and for taking out threats to the assault team. The sniper needs to have a radio with direct contact to the OIC. He also must have a scope and in some cases Night Vision Goggles (NGVs) or an NVG scope on his rifle depending on if the Op takes place during daylight or night. If a sniper makes contact with a tango, he needs to report this to the OIC before he acts unless the Tango poses direct threat to the Sniper. When reporting the Tango to the OIC, the Sniper must have a location, approximate range, and difficulty rating of the shot. The OIC then decides whether the Sniper takes a shot or if the assault team deals with the threat. The only other time the Sniper has the option to shoot without OIC authorization is if the Assault team is in direct danger and there is no other option. A sniper is a last resort and serves for intelligence purposes more than anything else. If you're going to use a sniper, he must be a crack shot. A sniper must practice shooting and become very accustomed to his weapon. I would recommend practicing firing from a number of positions because no one-sniper position is the same as the next. You never know when you'll need to be prone or be in the sitting position. 100
Conclusion Hopefully this manual has expanded your knowledge on CQB and will help your team to succeed. A lot of the information in this manual comes from real military tactics from units such as the Airborne Rangers, Navy SEALs, Marine Force Reconnaissance Companies, Army Delta, and the British Special Air Service (SAS). My team practices these tactics and so far we've had some great successes. Out of all the combat situations out there, CQB seems to be the most difficult. Hopefully this manual will make it less difficult and reduce the time it takes for you to develop your own SOPs and tactics. Good luck and Happy hunting.
IMPROVISED Explosive Devices (IED) The Improvised Explosive Device {IED} has become the most popular method of attack by terrorists worldwide and is high on the list of criminal extortionists. Explosive or Incendiary material in large or small quantities can be delivered by post or courier with devastating consequences. Explosions within confined spaces will obviously create more damage than devices in the open. IED’s are popular because: • • • •
No need for close contact Chance of high success Publicity Easy to make
Recognition • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Small packets with unusual postmarks, foreign mail from unusual sources and special delivery Unfamiliar handwriting or incorrect spelling or typing, particularly foreign Any small books or catalogues, particularly anything unrequested Titles on address, but no addresses Restrictive markings such as confidential Excessive postage Mis-spelling of common words Oily stains or discolouration No return address Excessive weight Lop sided or uneven envelope Protruding wires or foil and small holes Excessive securing Visual distractions Smells e.g. Almonds or Ammonia Any springiness, but will not bend Hold up to light to see the outline
Actions on finding a suspect device • • • • •
Do not open any suspect packages Don’t over handle the package Never Bend a package Remove the VIP from the area Don’t place the device in water
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Remember where the device is in the building and give a thorough description Don’t use radios within a 50 metre area Remember that a delivery of a suspect device could be a hoax to get the VIP into the open
SEARCH PROCEDURES One of the biggest threats you will face is the bomb, as you search for the 20th time you may start becoming lazy. NEVER ALLOW THIS TO HAPPEN. Know the MO of the terrorist bombs, how they work, what to look for There are many classifications for explosives, but basically they can be regarded in two forms; Low explosive •
Burns very fast and causes a heaving effect, commonly used as propellants
High explosive •
Creates a shock wave due to compressing the explosive and raising its temperature, causing it to ignite with a shattering effect. High explosives are difficult to ignite, normally a series of other explosions are needed to trigger the main high charge.
Application of explosives • • •
People Buildings Vehicles, planes, boats or trains
Bomb types • • • •
Letter, posted or hand delivered Package Vehicle Incendiary
IED components • • • • •
Power/ timing unit Detonator/ igniter Explosive compound Arming trigger Anti-handling device
Victim activation trigger • Trip wire • Application of pressure • Releasing of pressure Tilt or vibration • Light activated • Radio transmission • Electric cable • Manual 102
Initiation or fuse types •
• •
Chemical o These are usually time delay, acid eats through a wire allowing a striker to fire thus detonating the explosive. Chemical fuses are of short duration; an easily made chemical fuse is the durex bomb. Mechanical fuse o Some form of mechanical action is needed, a trip wire – wire wrapped around the drive shaft of the vehicle, mousetrap. Altitude/ barometer fuse o Usually used on aircraft, contains mercury that expands as pressure of altitude drops initiating the explosive.
Types of explosive •
•
Commercial o
Quarex, gelamix, frangex
o
Commercial explosives are slow burning and have less energy than military explosives
Military o
•
Semtex, PE4, C4, plastic (px)
Home made o
Manufactured from mixes such as weed killer, ammonia, sugar, petrol
IED security precautions •
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•
Letter bombs o Packages of up to 22Ibs can be sent through the mail o Mail should never go direct to the client o Arrange for mail to be delivered to security staff direct and not left in the mailbox o If possible use X-ray machines, vapor analyzers, metal detectors o Post office can screen mail before delivery Handling suspect mail o Do not open o Reduce handling o Remove client and unnecessary staff from package o Do not place in water o Place in bomb pouch or outside in the open o Keep away from flammable, gas lines o Do not use radios o Call special branch or bomb squad Types of vehicle bomb o Devices that have been placed in a hurry, packages or bags that are either placed in, leaned on, balanced against or put under the vehicle. o Devices that have been fitted secretly for some period of time o A vehicle that has been made into an explosive device or car bomb for use against buildings 103
.. .. .. . Types ..of triggers . • • • •
Wired to the brake light Wired to a tilt switch and activated upon driving away Wired to the milometer for detonation after a certain distance Wired to doors, bonnet, boot
IED VEHICLE SEARCH Use two team members and one supervisor with a checklist, search in opposite directions until back to the start position. •
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Surrounding area o Garage doors o Windows, gates, drains o Foot and tyre prints o Jack marks o Oil and fluid drops o Broken glass o Wire, string and loose dirt Beneath vehicle o Engine compartment o Seat & foot wells o Fuel/ brake lines o Exhaust system o Transmission o Petrol tank Exterior o Coachwork o Bumpers o Doors o Bonnet/ boot o Petrol cap o Locks/ handles Wheels and arches o Tyres – slashes and valves o Hub caps o Wheel nuts – tampered or loose o Arches Interior from the outside o Look through the widows o Any packages o Wires or tape o Doors to be opened from the rear first o One team member to watch through the opposite window whilst the door is opened very slowly Interior from inside o Around, under and between seats o Head rests o Seat belts o Under floor mats o Foot wells o Door panels & pockets o Switches 104
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o Interior light o Instrument cluster o Cigarette lighter o Heater vents o Radio or cassette Bonnet o Locking spring o Hinges o Framework Engine block o Any tampering or wires o Vents, heater, wiper motors o Air, oil, brake, fuel filters, reservoirs and lines o Manifold o Carb, distributor, coils and plugs o Steering column and linkage o Radiator and fan o Fuse boxes o Clutch, brakes and accelerator linkages o Battery Boot o Any tampering o Locks, hinges and interior light o All panels o Mats o Lights, wiring and petrol tank neck o Spare wheel, jack and tool kit
Start the vehicle and check all switches, lights and brakes. Remember the following • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Firstly you should know the general lay out of the Internal Combustion Engine, as you will have to distinguish between what should be there and what looks out of place. Firstly before you approach the car, use the remote control key fob to open and close the doors quickly. With the car locked approach carefully. Utilizing the search mirror and a torch check underneath the vehicle for any protruding items, remember these could be concealed using axel grease or black paint. Check all four tyres front and behind, check the exhaust and the front grill. Now check around the vehicle for any off cuts of wire or foil. Using the auto-unlock fob, unlock the doors. Firstly look through all of the windows for any disturbances in the car and any protruding items. Open the driver side door checking there are no wires or connection strips, check the door panels and if they come off, take them off to check behind them. Do the same for the remaining three doors. Using the same opening instructions, open the boot of the vehicle. Check behind the light panels, and any removable panels. Remove the boot carpet and carefully take out the spare tyre and check it. Now move into the rear of the car, lift any carpet or rugs, and alter any seating to check behind them. Do the same in the front of the car. Now check to see if any internal lights or seals have been tampered with. 105
.. .. .. .. ..• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
In the front of the car open any fuse boxes and ashtrays, check underneath the stirring wheel and ignition systems. If possible dismantle the glove compartment and check behind it. Check the dash for any movement or unseating. While doing this any open headed screws should be checked for tampering. Now checking the bonnet release switch, open the bonnet. Using the same door-opening principal carefully open the bonnet. Now open the Petrol cap in the same way and check for tampering. Now if you know your engines, check for unusual items, wires, packages etc. Check anything that is detachable, hoses, filters, fluid containers etc. Check headlights and battery source. If you are happy with everything close all but the drivers door. Some modern Mercedes & BMW’s allow the engine to be started from the key fob. Start the engine. If you are still here, put the car into gear and take it out for a spin. Make sure you accelerate & decelerate rapidly. If you are 100% happy return to pick up your VIP. Now remember do not leave the car once you have checked it over.
IED Building Search Procedures If relevant, you will need to start outside. If you were searching a hotel room on the 10 th floor, this would probably be overlooked. In theory there should be 2 X 2 man teams. They will work diagonally around a building, both teams in the same direction. Should a device be encountered, only two people are risk at any one time. They will check the following: • • • • • • • • • •
Shrubbery Flower Beds Driveway Manholes Vents and appliances Down pipes Disturbed soil Suspicious vehicles Windows & grills Entrance
The search will now move inside. With limited resources, you must, in the majority of cases, split you search in to priorities. If you have limited time or manpower, then with the assistance of plans and knowledge of the VIPs location and areas to be visited, color code you prioritized areas. RED – The most important area where a device will definitely kill AMBER – Preferable to search 106
GREEN – All other areas The search should be carried out, accompanied by someone who knows the premises. “Watch where you put your feet” – “How you handle things” and “See, don’t just look. •
•
•
•
Exterior o Scan the area visually for anything out of the ordinary, foot prints, disturbances and tampering o Search order will depend on location layout, but should include; Grounds o Driveways o Manholes o Flower beds o Suspicious vehicles or packages Building o Drainage pipes and guttering if possible o Windows, grills and vents o All entry points o Electrical boxes, telephone connection boxes, wiring and bells Interior o Hallways, corridors, bathrooms and rooms o Scan room visually for anything unusual o Close eyes and listen for any noises o Divide the room in half and begin to sweep in opposite directions until meeting in the middle o Go back over the area covered by your partner meeting at the start point o Floor to waist – waist to ceiling – the actual ceiling o Search all electrical equipment, unscrew and check internally o Be sure to check all screw heads for tampering o All chairs and upholstery to be probed, recent repairs etc o Ceiling panels checked o Walls to be checked for recent repairs to wallpaper and plaster o Include all windows, frames, ledges and balconies
BOMBS - Introduction What they look like Bombs are easily disguised in many ways, but you can be sure the last thing it is likely to look like is a bomb. Very often it is not what a package looks like but where it is seen can give it away. In other words the device can look innocent but put under a vehicle, or against a door, this same object now becomes very suspicious. The terrorist will shape, paint and disguise a bomb to try and make it inconspicuous, even seven tons of explosive in the back of a lorry will be concealed or covered. There is no easy answer to this question, a wellconcealed bomb can go undetected without much effort. There is another type of bomb the incendiary device, it is very small and designed to create a limited explosion which will start a fire. It can be made to fit inside a cigarette packet, or any other container. Terrorists will carry an incendiary bomb on their persons until a good 107
.. .. .. .. place as .. been found to conceal it. Over the past few years it has become apparent that no one type of car is used nor one type of bomb. Indeed to identify a well placed car bomb you first need to know the underneath of the car quite well to spot something out of place. So once again common sense counts for a great deal, as does trying to spot the unfamiliar. Look before and give a full search before even touching the vehicle that causes you concern.
You might consider a good idea, if you or staff take some time out from any distraction's to think: If I were a bomber looking to plant a bomb, where would I plant it? • • • •
To maximize damage? To cause the most injury? To start the worst fire? To give me the best chance of being undetected and making my escape?
Test your security you may be surprised how useful this exercise can be. In your situation consider what type of disguise the bomb could be in, such as a bag, briefcase, parcel or package. Remember that whatever precautions you take against the bomber will also help detect the burglar or any thief. Remember terrorists assess likely targets before they try and leave a bomb at a later date. There is a lot you and all your staff, visitors can do to deter them by replacing fear with vigilance. No criminal will act if your normal behavior will deter him or her, or steps you have taken will increase their risk of being caught.
BOMBS – Mail & Deliveries Postal bombs may be sent in envelopes no thicker than a quarter of an inch or larger packages. In either case they may be of the explosive or incendiary variety. As before check the package for excessive tape and postage, any protruding wires or foil and a smell of almonds or ammonia. Are there any oil stains or smudge marks on the package and does it feel excessively heavy for its size. Remember post bombs may explode on opening, look for • • • • • • • • • •
The postmark -Especially if foreign and the name and address of sender, do you normally get letters or parcels from here? The writing - Which may be foreign style, do you recognize it? The balance - Is it evenly balanced?, if the letter or parcel is lopsided, treat it as suspect. The weight - If it seams to be excessive for the size of letter. Any holes Are they any holes or pin points which could have been made by wires?, any wires sticking out. Stains Are there any stains or grease marks? The smell Some, but certainly not all explosives have an aroma of marzipan or almonds. The feel In the case of letters, it will indicate whether there is only folded paper inside the envelope of if there is stiffening, for example, cardboard or the feel of metal in which case treat it as suspect. The outline - Can you see if there are any unusual outlines if you hold it up to the light? The flap Is the flap of the envelope stuck down completely? there is usually a 108
•
Stamps -
small gap. The terrorist often puts too many stamps on the letter or parcel to ensure it will pass through the post office.
Other points to look for •
Do not accept presents or parcels from Unknown persons, especially parcels that have not been ordered. Do not allow suppliers to enter your grounds or home Discourage the leaving of parcels on window sills or at the door Check all deliveries carefully before accepting them Be suspicious of a change of postman, milkman or regular delivery person Encourage regular correspondents to write their name on the outside of parcels and bulky letters • Give very clear instructions to the members of your staff and household on all above points. BOMB AWARENESS The picture you are now viewing shows the effect of an explosive charge on what, in this instance, was a 2.8 tonne armored Mercedes belonging to Alfred Herrhausen, chairman of Deutsche Bank, who was assassinated on 30th November 1989. Only 22lbs of TNT placed on a child's bike blew the Mercedes some 82 feet across the road. The Improvised Explosive Device (IED) has become the most popular method of attack by terrorists worldwide and is high on the list of criminal extortionists. IEDs are popular because no need for close contact chance of success is high publicity easy to make. It may pay to look at the dynamics of explosive material and the injuries they can cause. Explosives are substances which, when detonated are very rapidly expanded to large volumes of gas. When a bomb, grenade or other casing confines the explosion, such high pressures will rupture the casing, imparting high velocity to the resulting fragments. The remaining energy then produces a blast shock wave and the displaced air creates a blast wind. The shock wave created by the compression of the surrounding air is not dissimilar to a large amplitude sound wave. The rapid rise in pressure can be in the order of hundreds of thousands of pounds per square inch and the blastwave moves away from the source as a sphere of rapidly expanding compressed gas. The velocity of the shockwave in air is over 3,000 meters per second, although it will soon fall to the speed of sound, depending upon the nature and composition of the charge. Like sound waves, blast pressure waves will flow over and around any obstruction like a wall and affect anyone mistakenly sheltering behind it. The pressure level at 90 degrees to the direction of travel of the shock front is called 'Incident Pressure'. There is a suction, or negative pressure, which follows after the blastwave, but although much less than the positive pressure, is ten times longer. A blast wave will travel much faster through a liquid or solid, due to the greater density of the material. Blast injuries in water are more severe at a great distance. Direct contact with Armor plate during an explosion will result in more serious injuries. There are three other physical factors, which need to be understood regarding blast injuries. A condition known as 109
.. .. .. .. 'Spalling' .. results from the shearing forces created on a body where the different densities,
reacting differently to the pressure wave, causes a pressure pulse, which compresses and heats small air bubbles as it passes over. The compressed and heated bubbles expand and implode with an explosive force. As the blastwave passes over the body, it creates specific damage at the surface of the tissue. An eardrum that will rupture at 7lbs per square inch and the lung at 50lbs per square inch, will suffer severe damage. If the blast pressure is high enough, similar damage will be occasioned to the abdomen, causing severe disruption. The lungs can also be crushed between the diaphragms, which rises violently under the ram effect of the pressure-driven abdomen. Blast Wind The rapidly expanding gases displace an equal volume of air. This air travels immediately behind the shock front at very high speed, creating a dynamic pressure. At some distance away it may blow a person over, causing a variety of injuries. Closer to the explosion, there will be a traumatic amputation - the mass movement of air will actually blow limbs off. In the immediate vicinity of the explosion there may be total disintegration of the body. An explosive device is usually constructed in a way that, contained with the blast wind, will be high velocity fragments of metal or flammable material. The PIRA petrol bomb, where one pound of explosive attached to a one gallon can of petrol placed against an outside wall, door or attached to a window grille, sent a fireball some 30 to 40 feet and successfully destroyed whole buildings. General Bomb Management • • • •
Establish! Assess the probability of an actual or threatened bomb incident to your Principal, Residence, or other site. Estimate the consequent damage: Physical, Psychological Plan effective PREVENTATIVE measures to reduce the likelihood of an incident. Develop Control and Containment techniques to reduce the consequent damage if an incident, real or threatened, does occur.
Explosions in confined spaces such as vehicles or buildings are even more devastating than in the open. Devices may come in many guises: 1. Package Bomb May be any type of package, even a carrier bag. They can be left innocuously anywhere in or near a building or vehicle. 2. Incendiary Device Consists of combustible material in something as small as a cigarette packet or cassette box. Pushed down the back of a settee or similar, it can cause severe damage. 3. Car Bomb A small amount of explosive on or in the car, detonated by a variety of means, will demolish a vehicle and its occupants. The devices may be of the explosive or fire bomb type. Cars packed with explosive and left in a strategic position will devastate large buildings, or if timed 110
correctly, kill specific targets whilst in convoy - a popular method of assassination by the Italian Mafia, most recently used against investigative magistrates. 4. Letters or Parcel Bomb Explosive or incendiary material in large or small quantities can be delivered by post or parcel delivery with devastating consequences. 5. Bomb Threats A bomb threat can have a serious effect on the operation of a business and the confidence of its employees. Whilst experience shows most bomb hoaxers make calls, every care must be taken to evaluate the call and act accordingly. The blast from an explosive device in its spherical form travels up as well as along and windows above ground floor level are also liable to shatter and cause casualties. Ordinary window glass subject to blast shatters into sharp-edged pieces including long slivers. At High velocity, these pieces can cause severe injuries or death. Furthermore, blast waves can penetrate into a building and shatter internal glazing such as borrowed lights to corridors. Since corridors are usually circulation and escape routes, borrowed lights and glazed door panels often need protecting as well (see Chapter 5 - Office Security). Shatterproof film or possibly the use of laminated glass which missile-forming properties are very much less than those of ordinary glass. Polycarbonate sheets over glass will also assist, as will approved net curtains or drapes in the residence or VIP office.
The three photographs on this page illustrate the potential for devastation that can be wreaked by a car bomb. The attack was against a coach of Soviet Jews on their way to Ferihegy Airport in Budapest. Perpetrated by Palestinian terrorists, a Fiat Tipo, packed with 20 kilos of plastic explosive in its boot, was detonated by a radio working on the 400-500MHz ranges from some 150 feet away. Due to the ever-present threat of attack, a Police car, followed immediately by another Police car bringing up the rear, preceded the coach. The bomb contained steel balls and more by good luck than anything, the main force was directed away from the road. The lead Police car took most of the blast, with two 111
.. .. .. .. Police officers being seriously injured. Occupants of the coach sustained minor cuts. The . device .was detonated prematurely. On the left are the remains of the billboard that the Fiat was parked behind. Left: Remains of the Fiat. Right: The Police lead vehicle and the bus. Remember - Don't site the VIP suite overlooking a car park area or main road. Don't site your mailroom in the middle of the building. In an office, the damage is already done if a suspect package is not checked until it is in the mailroom, at which point, if it is discovered, it is now in the middle of the building if that is where the mailroom is situated. The effect from a confined blast in a building can be devastating. Its effects will not be restricted to the room in which it detonates. Currently, no company can feel safe from being the recipient of any incendiary device. They are easily constructed from household materials, yet their potential for devastation is out of all proportion to their size. The incendiary or small letter bomb is still a current threat, although at the time of writing, the incidence of reported suspect packages in London has fallen by 80%, given the IRA ceasefire. The incidence however, of incendiaries in retail or meat packers targeted by the extreme elements of the Animal Activists is holding steady. The attraction of the letter or parcel bomb to a terrorist, extortionist or crank, is that he can reach the innermost sanctums of an operation, be it a company, politician or businessman whilst remaining remote. Devices, given the ingenuity of construction, particularly in battery technology and electronic timers, can mean the perpetrators can be thousands of miles away when the explosion takes place. The Brighton bomb was placed some three months prior to being occupied by Conservative Party members for their conference, but also illustrated the folly of having untrained people carry out search procedures. In any Improvised Explosive Device (LED), you will find the following: • • •
Times and Power Unit Detonators or Igniter Explosive or Incendiary mixes
And Optionally • •
An Arming Device An Anti-Handling Device
The old acronym 'HIT' helps in understanding the requirements a terrorist is looking for: H I T
- Hide - Initiate - Target
- The terrorist must have a concealed hiding/firing point - Must have a means of initiation - Must be there at a specific time
Confusion often arises with the terminologies, particularly that relating to the anti-handle] device and 'Booby Traps'. A bomb designed to be operated, say, by 'remote control', IT have an anti-handling device. This is so as to score a hit should the device be discover: prior to the proposed time of detonation and is considered to be 'booby trapped'. Howe, A device designed to explode as a result of being initiated by the intended victim generally 112
referred to as a 'booby trap'. A device may therefore be either booby-trapped a booby trap in its own right. In either case it is VICTIM OPERATED. Also, an arming device can be the initiator for the bomb. In the case of the Pan, bombing, three Barometric switches were used as arming devices and finally to initiate device. The first two armed the device on reaching a prescribed altitude on its journey to Frankfurt and then to Gatwick, the third switch as 12,000 feet completed the circuit initiated the bomb. It will pay to look in slightly more detail at the main elements of a de' and methods of initiation. Time and Power Unit As was illustrated with the Brighton bomb, the ability to control to within a few seconds months later, an explosion, is one of the deadliest attributes of a bomb. This allows perpetrator to be miles away from the event and to precisely target the explosion time" In the event of the Brighton bomb, the terrorists had, however, to guess as to which n Margaret Thatcher would be staying in. The time element can be controlled in a number of ways. 1. Timer Operated 2. Command Operated 3. Victim Operated Timer Operated •
Mechanical i.e. alarm clocks, watches, candle, barometric
etc. - electronic i.e. Video timers etc. • Chemical i.e. a chemical that will eat through to initiate a device. Command Operated •
Command wire
•
Remote Control
Victim Operated (or delay devices) This could be by a variety of means - by say, opening a car door, sitting on a seat, starting the vehicle, moving away, opening a package, turning on a light etc. •
'Anti-Lift' i.e. Trembler device. 'Anti-Tilt' i.e. Mercury switch
•
'Anti-Open' i.e. Micro switch, or simply making contact.
Heat/Light operated • Pressure on/Pressure release - - - Tension on/Tension release •
Electrical i.e. engine, light switches etc. Photoelectric
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.. .. .. . Power ..Unit . In the majority of cases, the power to initiative a device will be by battery. This could be as small as a 1.5-volt watch battery for an incendiary device or a car battery attached to the end of a command wire. Flat batteries such as those contained within modern Polaroid film packs are powerful and concealable. Battery technology is such that the construction of an explosive or incendiary device is made relatively easy. Size of battery is less important if the device is 'command' detonated. A car battery will be perfectly adequate. Other power sources may be mechanical, chemical, light or people. Detonators and Igniters A detonator is needed to supply the initial boost to the main explosive charge. Detonators can be commercially obtained or homemade. They are all essentially the same, with a small explosive charge contained within a metal tube, wired so as to connect to the power source. There are many varieties of detonator, some delay based, either a slow fuse or working through a chemical reaction such as the action of acid on a soft metal spring, eventually activating a plunger onto a detonator. An igniter for an incendiary mix needs to be nothing more complicated than a bulb where the filament is exposed and placed within an incendiary mix. When a current passes through it, the filament glows hot and ignites the mixture. Explosives The lax security at quarries and mining operations has provided a regular supply of commercial explosives such as Gelamix, Quarex and Frangex. Modem Dynamites, are now very stable and most make no use of the classically unstable element, 'Nitro-Glycerine'. Commercial explosives are much 'slower burning' than military types and produce a far lower energy output. Placed and packed carefully, however, it is equally as devastating in the hands of terrorists as military explosive. The support provided to terrorist organizations by many former Eastern bloc countries also gave easy access to such products as the ubiquitous Semtex (a mix of ROX and PETN). Other military explosives such as PE4 have found their way into terrorist hands. TNT is still the classic military demolition explosive, usually foil covered to prevent the ingress of moisture and sometimes coming with an integral detonator. There are many varieties of initiation devices available to terrorists, particularly chemical or simple percussion delay devices. By choice, however, terrorists favor the use of 'plastic' explosives or PX. Safe to handle, totally benign until a detonator is added and malleable. It can be sawn, molded and abused without any problem, plus it is odorless and non-toxic. Plastics come in many forms and most are based on conventional RDX combined with a plastic polymer. Homemade explosives such as ANFO and ANAL and CO-OP mix are all easily constructed and in reasonably large quantities, very effective. They need to be delivered in large quantities of many hundreds of kilogram’s to be equally as effective as a moderate amount of military explosive, but if time and circumstances favor, they can be devastating, as the security forces in Northern Ireland know only too well.
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Incendiary mixes are usually all homemade from simply household items such as weed killer and sugar. The proportions dictate the degree of bum or explosion one wants to achieve. Incendiary devices, as small as one contained in a cigarette packet, can result in the ultimate destruction of whole buildings, with damage running into millions of pounds. Explosive material will either be high explosive (HE) or low explosive (LE). HE is more 'brissant' than LE, in other words, it has a high shattering effect, whereas LE is used to push and shove. Low Explosive (LE) Must be contained won’t work when damp Prone to friction/spark Will not cut steel High Explosive (HE) needs no containment Okay when damp/wet not affected by spark Cuts steel Low Explosive is usually - black powder, smokeless powder, homemade. Such items as Harpic, fertilizer, petrol or diesel oil, soap flakes, sugar, paint thinner, battery acid are all possible ingredients for LE mix. Arming Switch A device may need to be carried some distance before being placed in-situ and in order to facilitate its safe handling; it may need to have an arming device. Such a device would be necessary with any bomb designed to be initiated by 'tilt' or 'trembler'. A letter bomb, Whilst under construction, needs to be safe until sealed, at which point, an arming device such as a pin or wire can be removed, hence the need to look for 'tell-tale' holes in a suspect letter or package. The barometric switch is another version of the arming switch and may also be the initiator. A single switch to complete an electric circuit may be incorporated in a device. Victim Operated Such devices require the compliance of the victim to initiate the explosion. This may be a simple 'pressure on/pressure release' device, using such household items as a mousetrap or clothes peg. In both cases, on release of the pressure e.g. mousetrap, a circuit is formed and the detonator ignited or with a clothes peg under the wheel of a car, which on moving on, pressure is applied to close the circuit. Pressure devices could be simply constructed from the pressure mat, integral to most burglar alarm systems, or it could be made from tin foil and soft foam layers, which could be placed within a car seat or in a room under a mat. Micro switches can be bought for pence and constructed into anything the victim may open, such as a book or box in the post. Light sensitive switches can be used, but the safe construction by a terrorist and its subsequent arming, is often a dangerous complication. Heat sensitive devices can be attached to the exhaust manifold of a victim's vehicle. The mercury tilt switch, bought for a few pence at Tandy electrical stores and used in the assassination of MP Airey Neave, is simplicity itself. The tilting of mercury in a small glass vial will complete a circuit and initiate the charge. 115
.. .. .. . These ..are .
advantages and disadvantages of the choice of initiation and it pays to summaries these. Initiation
Remote
Advantage
Disadvantages
Easy escape
can be jammed, lose line of sight
Time accurate
prematurely detonated alternate
by
Detonated Command Wire
Accurate, can’t be jammed
Easily detected & cut
Timer
Leave and go
often unreliable, the longer left May be found
Booby Traps
Victim Operated
leave & go more difficult dangerous to post or deliver construct. Go off for no reason
NOTE - An explosive letter bomb can be sent through the post in an envelope no thicker than one quarter of an inch. A package up to 22lbs in weight can be sent through the post. A system must be established in both the residence and the office to screen incoming mail. Investment in a variety of technology, from x-ray machines to discriminating metal detectors and vapor analyzers are worthwhile. The outlay, as always, will be determined by 3 factors: • • •
Level of Threat Regional Risk Depth of Pocket
A cheap hand-held, non-linear junction detector can greatly assist in screening incoming mail. Examples of a Cassette Incendiary, showing the time, power unit and incendiary mix, a favorite device of the Animal Liberation Front. On the left of the photograph is a simple device illustrating the use of a springloaded clothes peg and power unit, suitable for a number of purposes.
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Remote Control Device. Remote control unit with the device installed in a cigar box. The range of such a device_ whilst only measured in 10's of metres can still make an effective terrorist weapon. Recognition • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Small packets with unusual postmarks, foreign mail from unusual sources and special delivery. Unfamiliar handwriting or incorrect spelling or typing, particularly foreign. Any small books arriving, particularly anything unrequested. Titles on address, but no names. Restrictive markings such as 'Confidential', 'Personal' etc. Excessive postage. Mis-spelling of common words. Oily stains or discoloration. No return address. Excessive weight for its size. Lop-sided or uneven envelope. Rigid envelope, either card or metal stiffening. Protruding wires or tin foil and small holes or pinpricks. Excessive securing material such as masking tape, string etc. Visual distractions. Unusual smells i.e. almonds or ammonia. Any springiness. Be suspicious if it fees springy, but does not bend - be careful. Hold up to light to see any unusual outline.
Actions On Finding a Suspect Device Remember the effects of a bomb inside a building are far more severe than when out in the open. Some Do's and Don'ts: •
Do not open any suspect package
•
Don't over-handle suspect packages
•
Never bend a suspect package
•
Get the client away whilst your other Immediate Action Drills take place
•
Don't place a device in water 117
.. .. .. .. ..•
If the device was found in a building, try and remember exactly where the device is with a
description.
•
Don't accept delivery of any unexpected package
•
If you have grounds in a residence, select a flat open area away from the main building to place the suspect package. If not, then place on a flat surface in a room close to the door of the building. Remember, whilst the explosive blast in an open space may be reasonably safe, windows will still be blown open up to a long distance.
•
Don't place a device near flammables
•
Don't select a safe area near gas or other service lines
•
Don't use radios within 30 to 50 metres
•
Don't put anything on a device (pressure switch)
•
Don't bring devices into a building
•
Remember, delivery of a suspect device could be a hoax to get the VIP into an open space
Don't simply condition your thinking to believe that 'suspect packages only contain explosive or incendiary material. There is a growing practice of sending 'nastiest' in the post. These can range from pins, to razor blades, broken glass and needles. Don't ignore the dangers of an innocuous envelope - it can still contain a threatening letter or an extortion demand. Always inform the police, don't throwaway and don't ignore them.
BASIC Surveillance Techniques It is always essential to report thoroughly all observations of the targets movements regardless of insignificant they may appear. They may mean something to someone who has the whole picture. In general it is best if operatives do not wear hats as they do tend to stand out, unless it is part of your cover. Women should always try to avoid wearing tight cloths for obvious reasons. Having said that it is important for teams to be mixed in case your target meets a female and enters a cloths shop etc. Likewise teams should also consider mixed dress - some in casual cloths & maybe one in a suit, just in case. If you are all in casual order and the target goes into a hotel/ restaurant you will lose them. Avoid wearing jewelry, rings etc, they are made to attract attention. Even down to your watch, a big, flashy, shiny one that goes bleep every hour does not help. Try to layer your cloths, it is easier to take off cloths to change your general appearance. If convenient you can change cloths with other team members, always try to do this out of sight as it makes you rather obvious. Avoid looking like a surveillance vehicle. Try not to have to males together. Equipment to be kept out of sight. Don’t have coffee cups, cigarettes, food wrappers outside the vehicle etc. Do not sit with your seat belts on, engine running it may alert the target. Use a family car with a child seat in the back.
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When on vehicle surveillance consider your position, i.e. - if parked anywhere near a school/ playground you will be seen and reported by a member of the general public. When in a vehicle or on foot surveillance you should always be looking ahead. What would you do if the target stops, turns etc, plan ahead in your mind. If you suspect your under surveillance it can go two ways you can compromise them letting them know they have been seen or we can use them to feed back false information. SURVEILLANCE DETECTION THEORY What You Need to Know Introduction Various myths and misconceptions have built up about the role of the Bodyguard, and the techniques he, or she uses to achieve results. One area of activity that almost every ‘layman’ immediately associates with BG work is electronic surveillance. It's certainly a very interesting area, which probably explains why many works of fiction, both on TV and in popular literature, concentrate on it. In reality, the vast bulk of the work of a professional BG is carried out without recourse to such methods. Indeed, there are many investigators who have never used electronic surveillance equipment in careers spanning many years! However, to avoid this field altogether, is to ignore one of the most interesting tools available to the investigator today. Modem technology has made a wide range of equipment and techniques available and these offer extensive intelligence-gathering capability to operators who know how to deploy them effectively. Almost every company and individual in the western world relies on some form of telecommunications on a day-to-day basis. However, the telecommunications system in every country is wide-open to infiltration by modem electronic devices. More interestingly still, most People remain completely unaware how insecure there home, office or mobile telephone, tax machine or data link is. The enterprising investigator can, therefore, collect some very useful data using electronic surveillance methods and equipment, in many cases without anyone ever being aware this is taking place. One important restriction to be aware of is that the operation of unlicensed transmitting devices, the connection of unapproved devices to the public telecommunications network and the interception of telecommunications is generally illegal in the UK. However, do note that it is the operation of such equipment, which is illegal. Its sale, purchase, possession or rental is. Collegial and so there are many suppliers who can supply electronic surveillance equipment, ostensibly for export use. The final most important point you should know about electronic surveillance equipment is 119
.. .. .. .. .. almost always open to detection and counter surveillance (i.e. measures which that it is
prevent its effective use). This is both an advantage and a disadvantage to the investigator. On some 9ccasions he or she may be deploying electronic surveillance, but on other occasions may be engaged in detecting and removing it! In this section we will consider the range of equipment available, and some situations in which it may prove useful. In no way is it intended to be an instruction manual on the use of the devices covered. At this stage it is for information only. Some of this equipment will be referred to again in the appropriate section of the main course. Types of Electronic Surveillance The main forms of electronic surveillance, or 'eavesdropping', are LISTENING DEVICES (known As 'bugs') and TELEPHONE MONITORING (known as 'taps') and there is a subtle but important difference between the two. A listening device can be located in any room or area, either operating independently or carried by an individual, to monitor everything that is said in that area. A telephone-monitoring device, on the other hand, is used solely to monitor what is being passed over a telephone line. Listening Devices Listening devices consist of four basic components: a MICROPHONE, a TRANSMITTER, a RECEIVER and a RECORDING DEVICE. The operator can configure these devices in order to provide the most effective monitoring of the individual area in question; what is suitable for one assignment may be inappropriate for another. Microphones The smallest surveillance microphones currently available are typically 5mm X 5mm X 10mm. These may be hidden, for example, under a desk or in a light fitting, but it is more usual to disguise them in an innocent, 'host' device such as a pen, briefcase or plug adaptor. Transmitters The transmitter is a very important part of any surveillance installation. These come in a variety of shapes and sizes, the smallest being approximately 35mm X 18mm X l0mm. As with microphones they can be either hidden in a room or disguised as an innocent item. Receivers If using a transmitter you will also need a receiver. There are various types on the market and performance is usually related to size. Receivers are available which can monitor up to five different signals at the same time. Recorders Every surveillance configuration should employ a recorder if it is to be truly effective. This 120
can be situated either with the microphone (making a transmitter and receiver optional) or at a remote location with the data being relayed over a transmission link. The chief disadvantages to locating the recorder in the area to be monitored are the space requirement and also the need to maintain the device (i.e. replace the tapes and batteries). The great advantage to concealing the recorder in the area to be monitored is that these devices are almost impossible to detect with counter surveillance equipment. (If your recorder is located ala remote location then it is always possible, indeed quite likely, that the transmission signal may be picked up by a debugging device.) Finally remember that no matter what kind of listening device is used their effectiveness always depends on the skill of the operator in choosing and using devices, from the range we discuss in this publication, which are most appropriate for the situation in question. Telephone Monitoring. As we have seen, by no means are all surveillance devices attached to telephone equipment, but a good many items are. Depending on the assignment in question it may be necessary to employ both a listening device and a telephone monitor. It should also be remembered that, with the development of modern communications, it is now possible to monitor any type of information sent down the telephone line. This includes voice transmissions, facsimile (fax) transmissions and computer data transmissions. In each case these may be recorded and, in the latter two cases, deciphered with the use of an encoding machine or even just a compatible fax machine or computer. There are three methods of monitoring 'phone calls: 1. Wire a device to the telephone line. A recording device, or a transmitting device, can be attached at any point on the wiring system to monitor voice, fax and data signals. The most basic devices simply plug into an extension socket on the same line as that being recorded. More advanced devices are available to monitor the operation of microprocessor controlled telephone systems (e.g. PABX systems). 2. Locate a transmitter on or near the telephone equipment. In these situations the telephone handset or base is usually chosen to house the 'bug'. This form of eavesdropping is only suitable for the monitoring of voice communications. The smallest transmitter currently in use is approximately 35mm X 18mm X l0mm and will transmit to a receiver about 400 yards away. (For best results the receiver should usually be located in the same building or a nearby-parked vehicle.) 3. Specialized telephone equipment. It is possible to obtain telephone apparatus, which looks like, and indeed works like, a stan121
.. .. .. .. .. or office telephone but which incorporates a monitoring device. The monitored dard home party uses this apparatus in all innocence.
These devices can transmit, but their great advantage is that they can release the data they collect down the telephone line to a remote monitoring position, either nearby or even on the other side of the’ world. When used in this way they are extremely difficult to detect and virtually maintenance free. Counter surveillance Equipment It is important to remember that every type of electronic surveillance device can be detected in some way. Whether or not this is an advantage or disadvantage depends on which side of the fence you happen to be on at the time! The main factor that complicates detection is the wide range of surveillance equipment available and the many permutations in which the operator may deploy it. The best counter surveillance or debugging device is the operator him or herself! Knowing the devices that are available and how they are used, as covered in this booklet, makes detecting and removing them much easier. For example, knowing how to identify nonstandard telephone or electrical equipment, or knowing what sounds or other telltale signals are emitted by common surveillance devices. Having said this a number of electronic devices are available to aid in the detection of transmitting devices. These work either by: 1. Radio Field Strength Testing In other words, simply detecting that a transmitter is in operation. These can be used to quickly scan a large room but are not always useful in precise location of the transmitter since various external factors can affect radio field strength. 2. Radio Receivers and Spectrum Analysis In simple terms these monitor the transmission emitted by the bugging device itself and by filtering out background radio signals, innocent transmissions and signals onto which the bugging device may have smuggled (or hidden its signal behind) allow precise location of the device. 3. Additional equipment to detect taps placed on telephone lines. These usually work by detecting tiny abnormalities in the operation of the line. They carry out checks such as tone sweep, line voltage and current test, line carrier detection and also allow on-hook listening. Again, it is a case of the more expensive the device the more effective it will be and the cheaper it is the more rudimentary it is likely to be. 4. Jamming Devices
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Devices are available which prevent the use of listening, recording and transmitting devices, particularly when these have been applied to telephone lines. These are generally effective but the disadvantage is that the party who is eavesdropping is immediately alerted to the fact that their intrusion has been detected and may take other steps to monitor your activities. In summary the best piece of advice is to say that all forms of telecommunications are insecure and impossible to protect completely against surveillance. Even codes, ciphers and scrambling devices can be defeated quite easily. For example, governments worldwide do not usually license the use of any telecommunications equipment in their respective country unless they have first discovered how to tap into it for themselves. Having examined the various principles that apply to electronic surveillance we will now look at the various items of equipment that are available today. Different manufacturers may use different names but the principles of each item of equipment are essentially the same: Basic Transmitting Devices Basic transmitters range in size between approximately 35mm X 18mm X 1Omm, up to approximately 85mm X 50mm X 25mm for deployment where space is at less of a premium. Most investigators prefer to use the cheapest possible transmitting devices, which do not need to be recovered after the operation is complete; prices start at £10. Two important points about transmitters are that the larger the transmitter the more powerful it will be. For example, the smallest 35mm X 18mm X 1Omm device may only be capable of transmitting a signal up to 0.25 mile. A 85mm X 50mm X 25mm device, on the other hand, may transmit up to two miles. Many transmitters have their own battery supply; the disadvantage of this is that they need to be replaced periodically or the transmitter eventually 'dies'. Some transmitters connect to the power supply of a host appliance (e.g. a telephone or a plug adaptor). These will operate indefinitely without maintenance; the disadvantage is that they take more time and effort to 'plant' in the first place. Another point to note when deploying a basic transmitter is that it must be disguised in a suitable location, such as a desk, light fitting or telephone. Covert Transmitting Devices A covert transmitter is essentially a basic transmitting device, which is disguised as (or, alternatively, is located in) an ordinary day-to-day item. The host item operates in the normal way but conceals the transmitting device. These items can then be 'planted' in a location to be monitored or even, for example, given as a gift. Again, as with basic devices, the range over which the transmitter can operate is directly related to its size. Covert transmitting devices must either be powered by their own batteries or wired into a power source. Transmitters disguised as wall sockets or plug adaptors are therefore very common since they have direct access to mains electricity. These are some of the items a 123
.. .. .. .. .. covert transmitter is most commonly located within: • • • • • • • • • •
An electrical wall socket. A plug adaptor. A telephone (handset or base). A fountain pen. A desk or handheld calculator. A briefcase. An 'exit' sign. An emergency lighting luminary. A smoke detector. A PIR detector (part of a security alarm system). . A false air vent.
The shrewd operator will also devise and construct his or her own covert transmitters, thus making it extremely difficult for other people, however experienced, to discover where a transmitter mayor may not be located. Covert transmitters (or alternatively a recording device) can also be body-worn, i.e. located on the person of an operator to record meetings and conversations. In this situation they are known as a 'wire'. For best results a body-worn transmitter may be used in conjunction with a pen microphone. Receivers for use With Listening Devices. Any transmitter must be used in conjunction with a suitable receiver. Transmitters and receivers used in electronic surveillance can operate on any radio frequency but most typically operate on narrow band FM over a frequency range of UHF 365-455 MHz. Most good quality counter surveillance scanners search for transmissions anywhere in the 1 MHz - 2 000 MHz range. Some transmitters are designed to 'smuggle' their signals alongside another FM signal (e.g. a commercial radio station) to make detection more difficult. This does not by any means make detection impossible. Receivers are available in various formats including handheld, desktop and briefcase size. A small handheld receiver will be around 85mm X 65mm X 25mm and will allow you to monitor one transmitter. The most advanced receivers are often mounted in a briefcase and will allow the monitoring and recording of four or five transmitters. It is not the quality of the receiver that determines how far from the transmitter can operate, but the quality of the transmitter and its power source. Receivers are rarely used independently and should mostly be used with a compatible recording device. Recording Devices A good recording device forms the heart of any electronic surveillance system. Any professional recording machine or portable household audiocassette recorder will do this job with the proviso that the better the quality of the machine the better the quality of the recording.
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The main drawback with recording devices is that the amount they can record depends on a) the length of the tape and b) the life of the power source, ego the batteries. In longer-term surveillance operations (and also situations where the recording device is to be concealed in the premises being monitored) it is therefore customary to use a compaction device, wired between the receiver and the recorder. These allow up to 8 hours of recording to be made on one side of a standard C120 cassette tape. Some compaction devices allow several recorders to be wired together (known as cascading) so that many weeks of recording may be made without any maintenance being required. Pen Microphone A pen microphone is a very useful adjunct to a recording system. These are available in two types: a simple pen microphone, which is wired to a recording device and a transmitting pen microphone, which transmits its signal to a remote location. Pen microphones (which appear to be a high quality fountain pen and do actually work as pens) are ideal in noisy environments. The pen can then be placed in position in front of the party whose voice is to be recorded and background noise cut to a minimum. JSonic Ear Also known by some operators as a 'bionic ear' this is a very useful surveillance device. It basically consists of a highly sensitive gun microphone, often positioned in a parabolic 'satellite' dish. When carefully aimed this device will pick up normal conversation at a distance of 100 yards plus; coverage of greater distances (up to one mile) is often possible in good conditions and when used in conjunction with an amplifier. The main limitations of the sonic ear are that it is cumbersome and it, and its operator, must be concealed at some distance from the subject, i.e. in undergrowth or under cover of darkness. The sonic ear cannot be used successfully on an unattended basis. Wall Contact Amplifier System A WCAS (or wall listener) can be invaluable on many assignments. It basically comprises a highly sensitive limpet microphone attached to a powerful amplifier. This can be attached to a wall to monitor a conversation on the other side, even from outside buildings. The quality of the reception depends on the quality of the device; the best WCAS can eavesdrop on normal conversation through a 12" brick or concrete wall. Even the most basic models can make conversation audible through standard block or timber partition walls or doors. Telephone Extension Monitor This is one of the simplest and most inexpensive telephone monitoring devices available and always useful to keep as part of your kit. It simply consists of a speaker linked to a standard telephone wall plug (some models are equipped with crocodile clips). When plugged into a telephone extension socket (or clipped into any junction box) any conversation on the line in question can be monitored. 125
.. .. .. .. The great .. advantage of the telephone extension monitor is that, if left connected, no voltage drop or audible interference is experienced making this very simple device extremely difficult to detect. Linesman's Telephone The linesman's telephone consists of a handheld telephone and crocodile clips to enable it to be connected to any telephone wiring, junction box, or overhead line. Calls can then be monitored or even made on the line in question. This is a device, which must be used with great discretion, as it has no legitimate purpose outside the hands of a telephone engineer. Telephone Recorder A telephone recorder is one of the most useful pieces of equipment in electronic surveillance. It can be connected to a telephone line (either into an extension socket or directly into telephone wiring) and simply left to record all activity on the line. You may be wondering why telephone calls should be recorded using a hidden recorder (which has to be maintained and later retrieved) when they could be simply transmitted and recorded. The answer is that it is much more difficult to detect this form of intrusion than in installations where a transmitter is involved. There are two types of telephone recorder: 1. Basic Recorder Simply switches on when the 'phone is picked up and off when the 'phone is hung up. This type of device is most suitable for personal use, i.e. monitoring and recording one's own telephone calls where no attempt is likely to be made to search for bugs or taps. 2. Advanced Recorder This kind of device is almost impossible to detect as it stabilizes voltage on the telephone line (producing no tell-tale voltage drop, the method of detection used by most telephone detapping devices). It is also resistant to most jamming devices. Finally, an advanced recorder will also monitor activity on the line when the telephone is not in use, e.g. calls made but not answered and on-hook scans made by telephone de-tapping devices. Some recorders use an internal recording deck but others can be connected to any external audiocassette recorder. (Note: This will require 'remote' and 'mike' jacks.) Field Telephone Recorder This is an extremely simple but useful piece of equipment to have. It consists of a limpet microphone connected to a cassette recorder jack. When attached to the handset of any telephone this device enables a recording to be made of both sides of your telephone Conversation. Its small size makes it suitable for use out in the field. 126
Monitor Telephone The monitor 'phone is designed to look and work exactly like an ordinary home or office telephone but it can be used to monitor what is being said in the room where the device is located from any other telephone anywhere else in the world. In this respect it is what is known by electronics experts as an 'infinity device', i.e. the listening range is not limited by the range of a transmitter. To use this device it must first be 'planted' in the room to be monitored. Then, simply make a call to the monitor 'phone as normal (if necessary this can be an innocent-sounding 'sorry, wrong number' call). When the called party hangs up, however, the microphone in the monitor 'phone stays live so that the operator can hear exactly what has been said following the call. Watchdog 'Phone As with the monitor 'phone the watchdog 'phone looks like an ordinary telephone but it has a covert use. However, this piece of apparatus simply 'listens' for any activity in the room in question. If the microphone in the 'phone detects any activity (either a 'phone call or any speech) it will instantly and secretly dial any telephone number you have programmed into the device. You may then monitor what is being said in the room. Again the watchdog 'phone works just like an ordinary telephone and its primary function is virtually un-detectable to all but the most experienced operator. Telemonitor The telemonitor is mainly used to listen in to premises owned or used by the individual who wishes to monitor what is being said or done there. Telemonitor (which are approximately 80mm X 60mm X 25mm in size) are placed at strategic locations in the premises to be monitored and plugged into a standard telephone socket (this may be a line provided solely for this purpose or shared with a 'phone or fax line). The eavesdropper can then monitor what is being said in the room simply by calling the number of the 'phone line to which the telemonitor is attached and tapping in a pre-set security code. The great advantages of telemonitor are that they do not require battery power; all power is drawn from the 'phone line. Also, as infinity devices, they are not limited in range; monitoring can be done from any 'phone anywhere in the world. These devices also have a very advanced listening range (up to 40 feet in some cases) and offer greater clarity than is possible with a transmitter-dependent bug. Several may be used in the same building. Their main disadvantage is that they are cumbersome. They cannot be easily planted without unhindered access to the premises and are readily detectable by anyone who suspects they may be in use. Answering Machine Intruder 127
.. .. .. .. .. machines are in very common use today but most people do not realize that Answering these are extremely insecure. This applies not only to the owner of the machine, but to friends and associates who may leave confidential information on the machine unaware of the fact that it can be very easily 'pickpocket Ted' by electronic means. The answering machine intruder simply plugs into any 'phone line, calls the answering machine to be 'cracked' and bombards it with every possible combination of access code (following the same procedure which the owner of the machine uses to retrieve his or her messages from a remote location) until the code is discovered. This can often be accomplished in less than 60 seconds.
Once the access code has been discovered the intruder has the facility to listen to, erase or change messages left by callers, or even erase or change the message that legitimate callers hear when they call the answering machine. In short a very useful piece of equipment for eavesdropping. Answering Machine Guardian The answering machine guardian is essentially an electronic counter surveillance device and the only effective way of defeating the answering machine intruder (above) or other unauthorized tampering. This device is extremely simple in operation and links between your answering machine and your telephone line. The guardian allows the correct access code to access the machine. However, if it senses a tone burst (as caused by an answering machine intruder issuing a rapid succession of combinations in an attempt to crack the access code) it simply disconnects the line. Telephone Tone Decoder The monitoring and recording of telephone conversations can prove an extremely useful surveillance technique. However, it is also sometimes useful to be able to identify the third party telephone line to which calls are made, or from which they are received. The TID device does this by analyzing the line identification signals sent or received over a telephone line (live or recorded) and then showing them on a digital display. Most TID devices work both on telephone exchanges, “which” use DTMF (touch-tone) systems that (most developed countries) and the older-style pulse dialing exchanges. Jamming Devices 1. Audible Jammer This is the simplest way of minimizing eavesdropping either on your own telephone line or in person-to-person conversation. The device works by issuing a random high frequency tone, which desensitizes the microphone of any bug, which is placed in the immediate area (most jammers protect an area of 150 sq. ft. or so). This renders any bug (including a sonic ear type device) ineffective; all the eavesdropper will hear is a loud hiss. 128
The main drawback to this kind of counter surveillance measure is that the tone is audible to the individuals who are legitimately participating in the conversation. It is, however, a worth while precaution when important matters are being discussed. Recorder Jammer This is a device, which prevents eavesdropping by a recording device. It is effective against taps attached to a telephone line and works by jamming the signals which operate the recording device when the 'phone is lifted. The Jammer works on both incoming and outgoing calls and also indicates when it has successfully jammed a recording device. An as added feature most of these devices are also able to indicate the presence of (although not disable) infinity devices such as telemonitor and monitor telephones. Counter surveillance Scanners Wide ranges of scanners are available, from various manufacturers, to detect the use of transmitting bugs, e.g. Body bugs, room bugs, telephone bugs etc. In general terms the price of the scanner in question is directly related to how sophisticated and how successful it is (prices range from £300 to £1 000). In all cases no device can be completely foolproof and, of course, these scanners cannot detect bugs, which are merely recording devices (recording what is being said onto tape for retrieval at a later date) rather than transmitters. The best scanners incorporate radio field strength, receiver and spectrum analysis (discussed earlier) to provide three levels of protection: 1. Signal monitor. Identifies that a transmitter is being used in the area being scanned. 2. Directional detector. Leads the operator to the source of the transmission, usually by means of an audible rising and falling tone or an LED display. 3. Verification. This allows the operator to listen to exactly what is being received and transmitted by the bug, hence allowing him or her to confirm a bug and not some completely innocent piece of equipment, such as a TV set, are giving the signal. Again, much depends on the skill of the operator. No scanning procedure can be considered complete unless a careful physical examination of the room in question has been undertaken. Hold Invader 129
.. .. .. .. This is .a very ingenious device that has a limited use for some very clever electronic eaves. dropping. It simply plugs in between your telephone base and the handset. (A telephone with a detachable handset is required.)
The hold invader works by putting the party you are calling on a 'false hold'. During this period they hear the usual 'dead' sound in the earpiece and are given the impression that you are not listening to whatever they say. However, if they do make any remarks to a third party in the room the hold invader allows you to hear these! The hold invader device includes very powerful amplification electronics; even if the party being called places their hand over the mouthpiece then you may still be able to listen in to their conversation. The hold invader requires a degree of conversational skill to obtain best results. For example, you may call the other party and mention the name of a subject or a third party you wish to discuss. Then put them on the false hold. During this time you will be able to listen in to confidential remarks, which are made on the subject! Voice Changer Finally in our discussion of electronic surveillance we come to a device, which is not strictly surveillance nor a counter-surveillance device but which, nevertheless, has many possible uses. This is the voice changer. The voice changer is a device, which, as the name suggests, changes your voice to make it sound like someone else! It can change the tone and pitch of your voice and even change your accent. It can turn a male voice into a female voice and vice versa! The device simply plugs into your 'phone between the base and the handset. Various different voice changers are available but they all work in the same way. It is preferable to choose a model, which does not incorporate a delay between speaking and the called party hearing your voice (as some cheaper devices do). An additional benefit of some devices is that they allow you to make a local call sound like a long distance/international tall and Vice versa. The most important point to remember when deploying equipment of this nature is to ensure' that the tone, pitch and volume is consistent when making or receiving calls which purport to be the same person. Summary We hope you have found this guide to electronic surveillance equipment both informative and interesting. We cannot stress strongly enough that this is a complex specialist field which should not be entered into without more detailed information than is supplied in this introductory booklet. If you intend to enter into private investigation on a professional level, the vast majority of your work will be done without recourse to this type of equipment. Where such equipment may be deemed helpful, its use is discussed within the main home study course.
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Important Note Some electronic surveillance and counter surveillance equipment presently available is either unapproved for connection to the public telephone system in the UK or consists of unlicensed transmitting devices. Its use (although not its purchase or possession) may be illegal in certain countries. Audio Surveillance Equipment: A Beginner's Guide Audio surveillance equipment falls into two basic types: • •
Equipment designed to monitor conversations in a room Equipment designed to monitor conversations over a telephone line
In either case, the conversation may be recorded on site, or may alternatively be transmitted to a receiver located elsewhere. In the latter case, the conversation may either be listened to 'live' or recorded. There are several situations in which you may want to monitor, listen to, and possibly record a conversation. For example: When you want to record a conversation in which you are participating. This may be for proof of a verbal contract, or for evidence to relay back to a client. When it is necessary to record or listen to a conversation at which you cannot be present. At the heart of every audio surveillance system is a transmitter. As the name suggests, this picks up the sound from a room or telephone conversation and transmits it to a receiver. These transmitters are very small and can often be disguised as phone sockets, pens, calculators, etc. The conversation can then be heard via the receiver, which in turn may be linked up to a recorder, which, yes, records the conversation... simple! Room Conversation Surveillance There are two basic types of room transmitter: 1. Portable systems These are ideal for situations where you have full or partial access. They are frequently used in meetings and negotiation situations. The transmitter is concealed within a briefcase, pen, or calculator, for example. These items can be taken with you into a room without suspicion and very discretely operated to transmit/record a conversation. 2. Fixed/static systems These devices are best used in situations where you will not be present. There are two types: Battery operated. Suitable where there is regular access, or where transmission requirements are fairly short term. Electrical mains driven. Suitable for situations where regular access is not possible, or where the transmission requirements are fairly long term. This type of device is easy to install and can be left to operate indefinitely. Telephone Conversation Surveillance 131
.. .. .. .. There are .. two basic ways in which you can monitor a telephone conversation: 1. Wire Tap This type of device is connected between the telephone line to be monitored, and a tape recorder. The recorder automatically records both sides of a conversation on that line, and switches off when the line is not in use. Alternatively, a tape-recorded can be used to automatically record the conversation directly to tape. 2. Telephone Transmitter This is a small device, which is connected to the telephone line, or concealed inside the telephone socket, double adaptor or telephone receiver itself. Both sides of the conversation will then be transmitted each time the phone is used. The conversation can then be picked up by a receiver located 'off-site' and either listened to or recorded. What do you need? So, an audio surveillance system operates using a combination of: • • •
A transmitter (available in many guises) A receiver (the same type, regardless of transmitter) A recording device
Depending on the job in hand, you will need to employ one, two or all three of these. Our range of equipment has been specially selected to provide the most cost effective and efficient solutions to all your audio surveillance problems.
VEHICLE Surveillance - GIVE AWAY SIGNS • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Vehicles parked in prohibited areas Vehicles parked in the same place for an extended time, with individuals inside Vehicles who stop and start when the clients vehicle moves Vehicles that pass the client and park Vehicles that drive very erratic, slow then fast or stops Vehicles that signal to turn then fail to do so Vehicles that follow the clients vehicle through a red light Vehicles that maintain the same distance all the time when behind the client Vehicles that can be seen going on parallel streets as the client vehicle Vehicles who close at heavy traffic then fall back in slight traffic Persons leaving a building straight after the client leaves Vehicles parking and know one getting out Vehicles with covered or number plates removed Any vehicle seen more than once during your travels Persons standing around street corners or lobbies, just hanging around in general Persons turning away when they are observed Vehicles that move in and out of traffic Vehicles that circle the area when the clients vehicle as stopped Vehicles with tinted windows or blocked rear windows with items Vehicles parked up with persons inside with seat belts on 132
•
Vehicles with added magnetic aerials
COUNTER Surveillance, Electronic Espionage Theory Covet observation of persons or location for the purpose of detecting current surveillance being conducted by hostile adversaries. If you know you are under surveillance
Do not reveal that you suspect • • • • • •
Use communications to notify authorities Do not force confrontation Determine identifying information - vehicles, license numbers etc Use evasive driving techniques if necessary Report all suspected surveillance In a foreign country, surveillance may be conducted by police or military personnel The key to defeating surveillance is, when danger signs are received, do something about it
A wrong decision well executed is better than no action at all Be unpredictable, routine kills !!!!! Counter Surveillance • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Aware targets are persons who are observant and cautious Unaware targets are general public Hostile targets are persons who have been highly trained in surveillance & counter surveillance Try and use the right looking personnel for the given task Equipment needed, can communications be carried or not Always avoid eye to eye contact with persons under surveillance Try to wear non descript clothing and have many layers that can be discarded through the task Use footwear that is suitable and comfortable, no heel tacks that make noise Look out for personnel using body worn communications, microphones and earpieces Never present yourself, what out for windows, reflections and shadows Use all available cover especially other people Always act as normal as possible be natural Remember people that try to start a conversation with you Know the general area you are working in, buses, trains and planes Crossing roads, look both ways it may confuse your intentions Use windows and shop fronts as ways to look around you Walk against the flow of traffic it will stop any vehicles following you, use pedestrian walkways Use counter surveillance, turn about and walk back and forth, go into shops and walk back out 133
.. .. .. .. ..• • • • •
Beware of using isolated cover, you will stand out Use of cover stories, no factual information to be used A true disguise will allow you to blend in with your surroundings, and could be your character Carry a newspaper or items that can be thrown away Beware of large shopping stores, they have there own security systems and staff
Espionage Theory With Industrial Espionage high on the list of current security problem it is imperative that the Bodyguard is well versed in this field. Methodologies 1. General information may be collected by: Stealing rubbish, surveys, phone calls and local gossip 2. Surveillance may be carried out: On foot by one or a multiple of people, different vehicle types or fixed observation posts 3. Resources Transportation, photographic, communications, wardrobe and props 4. Target Vulnerabilities Home – routes to/from Office – routes to/from Times – Patterns Bottleneck areas Family activities Pattern Activity 5. Surveillance teams may make a direct approach Men, women, children and dogs used Prospective job applicants Reporter, service calls, surveys etc 6. What to look for: Repeats – persons, vehicles Channeling, shifting, turning and stops Demeanor Asymmetry – What looks odd, what doesn’t fit in the given environment? Use your area knowledge to best advantage to know what you should see and expect. You will then know the most likely vantage points from which surveillance can operate. Apply your intellect to think how you would go about the task. This should give you a clear insight into your own and your team’s pattern of action. • • •
Think about habits Spot vulnerabilities Make necessary adaptations
Surveillance and Surveillance detection are opposite sides of the same coin. Know the following: Techniques, Purpose, Equipment and Surveillance consequences The more important your VIP the more larger and in depth the surveillance will be, this also means there is more chance of viewing the operatives. 134
Obviously the more difficult it is for the offenders to procure the necessary information, the less attractive the victim becomes.
TACTICAL Communication For Law Enforcement & Protection Personnel Security personnel are increasingly being confronted with more violent and dangerous situations each day. How you deal with each incident can make the difference between going home at the end of your shift or a trip to the hospital. Great emphasis has been placed on better training, but it seems that little has been given in the use of your most powerful weapon you possess; your mouth. What is tactical communication? It consists of principles of communication used by security to accomplish three goals: • • •
To ensure a standard and professional approach to persons To prevent conflicts from escalating To de-escalate situations
There are four components to effective communication; Language •
That is words and their structure, is self evident
Paralanguage Involves how the words are delivered, their tone, volume Kinetics / Body language •
A person’s stance, gestures, or facial expressions can escalate or deescalate a situation faster than any words ever could
Active Listening •
This involves more than just hearing the words spoken, it involves understanding the words, a sense of empathy for what is being said
Security safety begins with the ability to empathize with another person. Your goal is to gain compliance, thereby avoiding the need to escalate along the force continuum, and increasing safety to all persons involved. To maintain empathy, you must develop the skill to deflect verbal assaults. All too often, the attacker will attempt to turn the tables on the security and move the interview in a different direction. You must remain focused on the topic and deflect the attackers comments. Key words which accomplish this task should become part of your language, and be used accordingly. Examples of such key words are; I appreciate that but...... I understand that but..... Maybe so but..... This allows you to re-focus, yet maintain a sense of empathy for the attacker. Basically people fall into three categories; 135
.. .. .. .. Cooperate people .. •
Are the easiest to deal with, and compliance can be gained by mere words alone. A calm, but firm attitude will project a positive image without being intimidating.
Passively resistant people •
Have not made up their minds. The may comply, but need to be convinced it is in their best interests to do so. They may move slowly, ignore securities questions, trying to frustrate your actions. They may be looking for an avenue of escape, and will try to if you do not control the situation. Some level of physical force may be required to deal with this type of person. Firm, clear commands, with bladed body position, are the best way to handle the situation.
Actively resistant people •
This type will pull away from you and progress into the assault stage. These are sure signs the situation is escalating. Your goal is to gain control of this person as quickly as possible. Clear, firm commands, given from a short distance, are required. You must maintain a reactionary gap, and be prepared to move. If you shout initial commands and the attacker begins to comply, you should tone down further commands. If you maintain the same volume, there’s nowhere to go if the attacker does not comply. Always have a little headroom to react to the attacker. If the attacker presents a weapon your first concern should be to find a position of advantage. Then a standardized challenge should be given. This tells the attacker you are aware of his actions and also tells any assisting security there is a serious situation involving an armed attacker. Your directions should be clear, concise, and take into consideration your own safety, and that of fellow persons. Do not let the attacker close the distance at their own discretion.
It is usually easier to stay out of trouble, than it is to get out of it, once you are in it. Most attackers can be influenced by tactical communication, because of one important reason: -Egos. People are concerned bout their egos and how they are perceived by their friends. When you confront someone about something they have done wrong, the person’s ego is threatened. The mere presence of security is enough for someone to get their back up. Couple that with insulting, abusive, or demanding language and the person may feel he has no alternative but to resort to force.
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RADIO Communication
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.. .. .. .. .. Phonetic Alphabets These are not phonetic alphabets as in those used to guide pronunciation; rather they are a selection of alphabets used, particularly by radio operators, to spell out words. Phonetic Alphabets of the World Letter NATO & British British A or NY International Forces RAF 1942-43 Telecom B French International Police Aviation 1952
German
Italian
Spanish
Anton
Ancona
Antonio
Bologna
Barcelona
Como
Carmen
A Alfa
Abel
Apple
Alfred
Amsterdam
Adam
Anatole
Ä Ärger B Bravo
Baker
Beer
Benjamin
Baltimore
Boy
Berthe
Berta
Charles
Casablanca
Charlie Célestin Cäsar
C Charlie
Charlie Charlie
Ch Charlotte
Chocolate
D Delta
Dog
Dog
David
Denmark
David
Désiré
Easy
Edward
Edward
Edison
Edward Eugène
Dora
Domodossola Dolores
Emil
Empoli
E Echo É Émile F
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Enrique
Morse Code Letter Morse
Letter Morse
Digit Morse
A
.-
N
-.
0
-----
B
-...
O
---
1
.----
C
-.-.
P
.--.
2
..---
D
-..
Q
--.-
3
...--
E
.
R
.-.
4
....-
F
..-.
S
...
5
.....
G
--.
T
-
6
-....
H
....
U
..-
7
--...
I
..
V
...-
8
---..
J
.---
W
.--
9
----.
K
-.-
X
-..-
L
.-..
Y
-.--
M
--
Z
--..
Letter Morse
Punctuation Mark
Morse
Ä
.-.-
Full-stop (period)
.-.-.-
Á
.--.-
Comma
--..--
Å
.--.-
Colon
---...
Ch
----
Question mark (query) ..--..
É
..-..
Apostrophe
.----.
Ñ
--.--
Hyphen
-....-
Ö
---.
Fraction bar
-..-.
Ü
..--
Brackets (parentheses) -.--.139
Quotation marks
.-..-.
If the duration of a dot is taken to be one unit then that of a dash is three units. The space between the components of one character is one unit, between characters is three units and between words seven units. To
.. .. .. . indicate.. that a mistake has been made and for the receiver to delete the last word send . . dots). ……. (Eight
140
ESCALATION & De-escalation of Force Confrontation When confronted by an aggressor or singled out for help by a well-meaning person, you must immediately decide a plan of action. Do you tactically disengage or take control?
Tactical Disengagement If your plan is to disengage, do so tactically. Do not back up while directly in front of the aggressor. You cannot back up faster than he can walk forward. It is a better option to get out from in front of him mad to move laterally and then disengage. This forces the aggressor to turn, look, and then attempt closing in on you. Vital moments are spared, leaving you time to create distance and tactically escape. You must remember that security may think that it is acceptable to just turn and run. This method of escape places the aggressor in a position of advantage in that your back is now facing him. Additionally the process of turning and preparing to run allows the aggressor time to initiate forward motion and thereby be in motion before you. It is strongly suggested that should tactical disengagement be what is in order, you get out from of the aggressor, issue loud verbal commands such has stop, get back etc, and then exit initially at an angle. Tactical disengagement is not giving up, at that time it is your only alternative. It gives you space, time, distance and therefore the opportunity to be in a position of advantage, and not injured or killed. Patterns of Movement Should tactical disengagement not be in order and the attack is in progress, then patterns of movement should be employed. Simply stated, patterns of movement means; get out of the way of the attacker and the attack. The untrained person may respond by backing up to avoid attack, but as previously pointed out, the act of backing up still keeps you in front of the attacker. Backing up may imbalance you, shielding you from what is behind you. Backing up is slower than the aggressor can move forward. Therefore backing up should be something that is avoided unless there is nothing else you can do. Moving laterally, or on an oblique angle, gets you out from in front of the aggressor. For example If the attacker is coming straight at you and you step laterally to your strong or reaction side, this will place you outside of the initial attack and give you the space, time, and distance to initiate your plan. When the attacker is striking you, your first priority must be not to get hit. If you can make the attacker miss by moving your body or getting out of the way - do so, and then counter. Consider with what the attacker is attacking you. Hands and feet have to be blocked or the attack deflected as you have been taught. These actions must be smoothly performed and done without conscious thought.
141
.. .. .. .. Blocking the attack must done in conjunction with body movement and loud .. and deflecting verbal commands. Remember you are mentally on balance while physically and mentally unbalancing the attacker. The key to blocking and deflecting is doing what is necessary not to get hit, injured or killed.
Countering The Attack With what is the attacker assaulting you? Can you tactically disengage? Do you have to confront and block and deflect the attack? If so, then you must counter the attack and gain control
FIRST Aid – Trauma Management Trauma Care The management of severe multiple injury requires clear recognition of management priorities and the goal is to determine in the initial assessment those injuries that threaten the patient's life. This first survey, the 'primary' survey, if done correctly should identify such life-threatening injuries such as: • • • •
airway obstruction Chest injuries with breathing difficulties Severe external or internal hemorrhage Abdominal injuries.
If there is more than one injured patient then treat patients in order of priority (Triage). This depends on experience and resources (Discussed in the practical sessions). The ABCDE survey (Airway, Breathing, Circulation, Disability and Exposure) is undertaken. This primary survey must be performed in no more than 2-5 minutes. Simultaneous treatment of injuries can occur when more than one life-threatening state exists. It includes: Airway Assess the airway. Can patient talk and breathe freely? If obstructed, the steps to be considered are: • • • •
Chin lift/jaw thrust (tongue is attached to the jaw) Suction (if available) Guedel airway/nasopharyngeal airway Intubations. NB keep the neck immobilized in neutral position.
Breathing Breathing is assessed, as airway patency and breathing adequacy are re-checked. If inadequate, the steps to be considered are: • • •
Decompression and drainage of tension pneumothorax/haemothorax Closure of open chest injury Artificial ventilation.
Give oxygen if available.
Reassessment of ABC's must be undertaken if patient is unstable
142
Circulation Assess circulation, as oxygen supply, airway patency and breathing adequacy are rechecked. If inadequate, the steps to be considered are: • • •
Stop external hemorrhage Establish 2 large-bore IV lines (14 or 16 G) if possible Administer fluid if available.
Disability Rapid neurological assessment (is patient awake, vocally responsive to pain or unconscious). There is no time to do the Glasgow Coma Scale so a Awake Verbal response Painful response Unresponsive
A V P U
System at this stage is clear and quick. Exposure Undress patient and look for injury. If the patient is suspected of having a neck or spinal injury, in-line immobilization is important. This will be discussed in the practical sessions. The first priority is establishment or maintenance of airway patency. Talk to the patient A patient who can speak clearly must have a clear airway. The unconscious patient may require airway and ventilator assistance. The cervical spine must be protected during endotracheal intubation if a head, neck or chest injury is suspected. Airway obstruction is most commonly due to obstruction by the tongue in the unconscious patient. Give oxygen (if available, via self-inflating bag or mask) Assess airway The signs of airway obstruction may include: • • • • •
Snoring or gurgling Stridor or abnormal breath sounds Agitation (hypoxia) Using the accessory muscles of ventilation/paradoxical chest movements Cyanosis.
Be alert for foreign bodies. The techniques used to establish a patent airway are outlined in Appendix1 and will be reviewed in the practical sessions. Intravenous sedation is absolutely contraindicated in this situation. Consider need for advanced airway management Indications for advanced airway management techniques for securing the airway include: • • • • •
Persisting airway obstruction Penetrating neck trauma with haematoma (expanding) Apnoea Hypoxia Severe head injury 143
.. .. .. .. ..• •
Chest trauma Maxillofacial injury.
The second priority is the establishment of adequate ventilation. •
Inspection (LOOK) of respiratory rate is essential.
Are any of the following present? • • • • •
Cyanosis Penetrating injury Presence of flail chest Sucking chest wounds Use of accessory muscles?
Palpation (FEEL) for • • • •
Tracheal shift Broken ribs Subcutaneous emphysema Percussion is useful for diagnosis of haemothorax and pneumothorax.
Auscultation (LISTEN) for • •
Pneumothorax (decreased breath sounds on site of injury) Detection of abnormal sounds in the chest.
Resuscitation action This is covered in lecture and in practical sessions: see Appendix 5 • •
The chest pleura is drained of air and blood by insertion of an intercostal drainage tube as a matter of priority and before chest X-ray if respiratory distress exists When indications for intubation exist but the trachea cannot be intubated, direct access via a cricothyroidotomy may be achieved. See Appendix 1.
Special notes • •
•
If available, maintain the patient on oxygen until complete stabilization is achieved. If a tension pneumothorax is suspected then one large-bore needle should be introduced into the pleural cavity through the second intercostal space, mid clavicle line to decompress the tension and allow time for the placement of an intercostal tube. If intubation in one or two attempts is not possible a cricothyroidotomy should be considered priority. This depends on experienced medical personnel being available, with appropriate equipment, and may not be possible in many places.
Circulatory Management The third priority is establishment of adequate circulation. 'Shock' is defined as inadequate organ perfusion and tissue oxygenation. In the trauma patient it is most often due to hypovolaemia. The diagnosis of shock is based on clinical findings: hypotension, tachycardia, tachypnoea, as well as hypothermia, pallor, cool extremities, decreased capillary refill, and decreased urine production. See Appendix 3.
144
There are different types of shock including: Haemorrhagic (hypovolaemia) shock: Due to acute loss of blood or fluids. The amount of blood loss after trauma is often poorly assessed and in blunt trauma is usually underestimated. Remember • • •
Large volumes of blood may be hidden in the abdominal and pleural cavity Femoral shaft fracture may lose up to 2 liters of blood Pelvic fractures often lose in excess of 2 liters of blood.
Carcinogenic shock: Due to inadequate heart function. This may be from • • • • •
Myocardial contusion (bruising) Cardiac tamponade Tension pneumothorax (preventing blood returning to heart) Penetrating wound of the heart Myocardial infarction.
Assessment of the jugular venous pressure is essential in these circumstances and an ECG should be recorded if available. Neurogenic shock: Due to the loss of sympathetic tone, usually resulting from spinal cord injury, with the classical presentation of hypotension without reflex tachycardia or skin vasoconstriction. Septic shock: Rare in the early phase of trauma but is a common cause of late death (via multi-organ failure) in the weeks following injury. It is most commonly seen in penetrating abdominal injury and burns patients. Circulatory Resuscitation Measures (See Appendix 5) The goal is to restore oxygen delivery to the tissues. As the usual problem is loss of blood, fluid resuscitation must be a priority. • • • •
Adequate vascular access must be obtained. This requires the insertion of at least two large-bore cannulas (1416 G). Peripheral cut down may be necessary. Infusion fluids (crystalloids e.g. N/Saline as first line) should be warmed to body temperature if possible (e.g. prewarm in bucket of warmed water). Remember hypothermia can lead to abnormal blood clotting. Avoid solutions containing glucose. Take any specimens you need for laboratory and cross matching.
Urine Measure urine output as an indicator of circulation reserve. Output should be more than 0.5 ml/kg/hr. Unconscious patients may need a urinary catheter, if they are persistently shocked. Blood transfusion There may be considerable difficulty in getting blood. Remember possible incompatibility, hepatitis B and HIV risks, even amongst patient's own family. Blood transfusion must be considered when the patient has persistent haemodynamic instability despite fluid (colloid/crystalloid) infusion. If the type-specific or cross-matched blood is not available, type O negative packed red blood cells should be used. Transfusion 145
.. .. .. . should,..however, be seriously considered if the haemoglobin level is less than 7 g/dl and if . is still bleeding. the patient First priority: stop bleeding •
•
•
Injuries to the limbs: Tourniquets do not work. Besides, tourniquets cause reperfusion syndromes and add to the primary injury. The recommended procedure of "pressure dressing" is an ill-defined entity: Severe bleeding from high-energy penetrating injuries and amputation wounds can be controlled by subfascial gauze pack placement plus manual compression on the proximal artery plus a carefully applied compressive dressing of the entire injured limb. Injuries to the chest: The most common source of bleeding is chest wall arteries. Immediate in-field placement of chest tube drain plus intermittent suction plus efficient analgesia (IV ketamine is the drug of choice) expand the lung and seal off the bleeding. Injuries to the abdomen: "Damage control laparotomy" should be done as soon as possible on cases where fluid resuscitation cannot maintain a systolic BP at 8090 mm. The sole objective of DC laparotomy is to gauze pack the bleeding abdominal quadrants, where after the mid-line incision is temporarily closed within 30 minutes with towel clamps. DC laparotomy is not surgery, but a resuscitative procedure that should be done under ketamine anesthesia by any trained doctor or nurse at district level. This technique is something that needs to be observed before doing it, but done properly, can save lives.
Loss of blood is the main cause of shock in trauma patients Second priority: Volume replacement, warming, and ketamine analgesia •
• • •
•
The replacement should be warm: The physiological coagulation works best at 38.5°C; haemostasis is difficult at core temperatures below 35°. Hypothermia in trauma patients is common during protracted improvised out-door evacuations even in the tropics. It is easy to cool a patient but difficult to re-warm, hence prevention of hypothermia is essential. Per oral and IV fluids should have a temperature at 4042°C using IV fluids at "room temperature" means cooling! Hypotensive fluid resuscitation: In cases where the haemostasis is insecure or not definitive, volumes should be controlled to maintain systolic BP at 8090 mm during the evacuation. Colloid solutions out electrolyte solutions in! Recent careful reviews of controlled clinical studies show slight negative effects of colloids compared to electrolytes in resuscitation after blood loss. Per-oral resuscitation is safe and efficient in patients with positive gag reflex without abdominal injury: Oral fluids should be low in sugar and salts; concentrated solutions can cause an osmotic pull over the intestinal mucosa, and the effect will be negative. Diluted cereal porridges based on local foodstuffs are recommended. The analgesic choice: The positive inotropic effects, and the fact that it does not affect the gag reflex, makes us recommend ketamine in repeated IV doses of 0.2 mg/kg during evacuation of all severe trauma cases.
Secondary Survey Secondary survey is only undertaken when the patient's ABC'S are stable. 146
If any deterioration occurs during this phase then another PRIMARY SURVEY must interrupt this. Documentation is required for all procedures undertaken. This will be covered in the Forum. The head-to-toe examination is now undertaken, noting particularly: Head examination • • •
Scalp and ocular abnormalities External ear and tympanic membrane Periorbital soft tissue injuries.
Neck examination • • • •
Penetrating wounds Subcutaneous emphysema Tracheal deviation Neck vein appearance.
Neurological examination • • •
Brain function assessment using the Glasgow Coma Scale (GCS) (see Appendix 4) Spinal cord motor activity Sensation and reflex.
Head injury patients are suspected to have
Cervical spine injury until proven otherwise Chest examination • • •
Clavicles and all ribs Breath sounds and heart tones ECG monitoring (if available).
Abdominal examination • • • •
Penetrating wound of abdomen requiring surgical exploration Blunt trauma a nasogastric tube is inserted (not in the presence of facial trauma) Rectal examination Insert urinary catheter (check for metal blood before insertion).
Pelvis and limbs • • •
Fractures Peripheral pulses Cuts, bruises and other minor injuries.
X-rays (if possible and where indicated) • • • •
Chest X-ray and cervical spine films (important to see all 7 vertebrae) Pelvic and long bone X-rays Skull X-rays may be useful to search for fractures when head injury is present without focal neurological deficit Order others selectively. NB chest and pelvis X-rays may be needed during primary survey.
Chest Trauma 147
.. .. .. .. Approximately . a quarter of deaths due to trauma are attributed to thoracic injury. Immediate deaths .are essentially due to major disruption of the heart or of great vessels. Early deaths due to thoracic trauma include airway obstruction, cardiac tamponade or aspiration. The majority of patients with thoracic trauma can be managed by simple manoeuvres and do not require surgical treatment. Respiratory distress may be caused by: • • • • • • •
Rib fractures/flail chest Pneumothorax Tension pneumothorax Haemothorax Pulmonary contusion (bruising) Open pneumothorax Aspiration.
Haemorrhagic shock due to: • •
Haemothorax Haemomediastinum.
Rib fractures: Fractured ribs may occur at the point of impact and damage to the underlying lung may produce lung bruising or puncture. In the elderly patient fractured ribs may result from simple trauma. The ribs usually become fairly stable within 10 days to two weeks. Firm healing with callus formation is seen after about six weeks. Flail chest: The unstable segment moves separately and in an opposite direction from the rest of the thoracic cage during the respiration cycle. Severe respiratory distress may ensue. Tension pneumothorax: Develops when air enters the pleural space but cannot leave. The consequence is progressively increasing intrathoracic pressure in the affected side resulting in mediastinal shift. The patient will become short of breath and hypoxic. Urgent needle decompression is required prior to the insertion of an intercostal drain. The trachea may be displaced (late sign) and is pushed away from the midline by the air under tension. Haemothorax: More common in penetrating than in non-penetrating injures to the chest. If the haemorrhage is severe hypovolaemic shock will occur and also respiratory distress due to compression of the lung on the involved side.
The extent of internal injuries cannot be judged By the appearance of a skin wound Optimal therapy consists of the placement of a large chest tube. • •
A haemothorax of 5001500 ml that stops bleeding after insertion of an intercostal catheter can generally be treated by closed drainage alone A haemothorax of greater than 15002000 ml or with continued bleeding of more than 200300 ml per hour is an indication for further investigation e.g. thoracotomy.
Pulmonary contusion: is common after chest trauma. It is a potentially life-threatening condition. The onset of symptoms may be slow and progress over 24 hrs post injury. It is likely to occur in cases of high-speed accidents, falls from great heights and injuries by highvelocity bullets. Symptoms and signs include: •
Dyspnoea (short of breath) 148
• • • • •
Hypoxemia Tachycardia Rare or absent breath sounds Rib fractures Cyanosis.
Open or "sucking" chest wounds of the chest wall. In these the lung on the affected side is exposed to atmospheric pressure with lung collapse and a shift of the mediastinum to the uninvolved side. This must be treated rapidly. A seal e.g. a plastic packet is sufficient to stop the sucking, and can be applied until reaching hospital. In compromised patients intercostal drains, intubation and positive pressure ventilation is often required. The injuries listed below are also possible in trauma, but carry a high mortality even in regional centres. They are mentioned for educational purposes. Myocardial contusion is associated, in chest blunt trauma, with fractures of the sternum or ribs. The diagnosis is supported by abnormalities on ECG and elevation of serial cardiac enzymes if these are available. Cardiac contusion can simulate a myocardial infarction. Patient must be submitted to observation with cardiac monitoring if available. This type of injury is more common than we think and may be a cause of sudden death well after the accident. Pericardial tamponade: Penetrating cardiac injuries are a leading cause of death in urban areas. It is rare to have pericardial tamponade with blunt trauma. Pericardiocentesis must be undertaken early if this injury is considered likely. Look for it in patients with: • • • •
Shock Distended neck veins Cool extremities and no pneumothorax Muffled heart sounds.
Beware pulmonary contusion and delay in deterioration of respiratory state Pericardiocentesis is the first therapy and this will be discussed in the practical session. Thoracic great vessel injuries: Injury to the pulmonary veins and arteries is often fatal, and is one of the major causes of on-site death. Rupture of trachea or major bronchi: Rupture of the trachea or major bronchi is a serious injury with an overall estimated mortality of at least 50%. The majority (80%) of the ruptures of bronchi are within 2.5 cm of the carina. The usual signs of tracheobronchial disruption are the followings: • • • •
Haemoptysis Dyspnoea Subcutaneous and mediastinal emphysema Occasionally cyanosis.
Trauma to oesophagus: In patients with blunt trauma this is rare. More frequent is the perforation of the oesophagus by penetrating injury. It is lethal if unrecognised because of mediastinitis. Patients often complain of sudden sharp pain in the epigastrium and chest with radiation to the back. Dyspnoea, cyanosis and shock occur but these may be late symptoms.
149
.. .. .. .. Diaphragmatic Occur more frequently in blunt chest trauma, paralleling the rise in .. of carinjuries: frequency accidents. The diagnosis is often missed. Diaphragmatic injuries should be suspected in any penetrating thoracic wound: • • • •
Below 4th intercostal space anteriorly 6th interspace laterally 8th interspace posteriorly Usually the left side.
Thoracic aorta rupture: Occurs in patients with severe decelerating forces such as highspeed car accidents or a fall from a great height. They have high mortality as the cardiac output is 5 l/min and the total blood volume in an adult is 5 litres.
Beware pericardial tamponade in penetrating chest trauma Abdominal Trauma The abdomen is commonly injured in multiple traumas. The commonest organ injured in penetrating trauma is the liver and in blunt trauma the spleen is often torn and ruptured. The initial evaluation of the abdominal trauma patient must include the A (airway and C-Spine), B (breathing), C (circulation), and D (disability and neurological assessment) and E (exposure). Any patient involved in any serious accident should be considered to have an abdominal injury until proved otherwise. Unrecognised abdominal injury remains a frequent cause of preventable death after trauma. There are two basic categories of abdominal trauma: Penetrating trauma where surgical consultation is important e.g. • •
Gunshot Stabbing.
Non-penetrating trauma e.g. • • • •
Compression Crush Seat belt Acceleration/deceleration injuries.
About 20% of trauma patients with acute haemoperitoneum (blood in abdomen) have no signs of peritoneal irritation at the first examination and the value of REPEATED PRIMARY SURVEY cannot be overstated. Blunt trauma can be very difficult to evaluate, especially in the unconscious patient. These patients may need a peritoneal lavage. (Discussed in session.) An exploratory laparotomy may be the best definitive procedure if abdominal injury needs to be excluded. Complete physical examination of the abdomen includes rectal examination, assessing: • • • •
Sphincter tone Integrity of rectal wall Blood in the rectum Prostate position.
Remember to check for blood at the external urethral meatus. 150
Women should be considered pregnant until proven otherwise. The foetus may be salvageable and the best treatment of the foetus is resuscitation of the mother. A pregnant mother at term, however, can usually only be resuscitated properly after delivery of the baby. This difficult situation must be assessed at the time.
Blood catheterization (with cauthin in pelvic injury) is important The diagnostic peritoneal lavage (DPL) may be helpful in determining the presence of blood or enteric fluid due to intra-abdominal injury. The results can be highly suggestive, but it is overstated as an important diagnostic tool. If there is any doubt a laparotomy is still the gold standard. The indications for lavage include: • • • • • •
Unexplained abdominal pain Trauma of the lower part of the chest Hypotension, hematocrit fall with no obvious explanation Any patient suffering abdominal trauma and who has an altered mental state (drugs alcohol, brain injury) Patient with abdominal trauma and spinal cord injuries Pelvic fractures.
The relative contraindications for the DPL are: • • • •
Pregnancy Previous abdominal surgery Operator inexperience If the result does not change your management.
Other specific issues with abdominal trauma: Pelvic fractures are often complicated by massive haemorrhage and urology injury. • •
Examining the rectum for the position of the prostate and for the presence of blood or rectal or perinea laceration is essential X-ray of the pelvis (if clinical diagnosis difficult).
The management of pelvic fractures includes: • • • •
Resuscitation (ABC) Transfusion Immobilization and assessment for surgery Analgesia.
Pelvic fractures often cause massive blood loss Head Trauma Delay in the early assessment of head-injured patients can have devastating consequence in terms of survival and patient outcome. Hypoxia and hypotension double the mortality of head-injured patients. The following conditions are potentially life threatening but difficult to treat in district hospitals. It is important to treat what you can with your expertise and resources and triage casualties carefully. Immediate recognition and early management must be made of the following conditions: 151
.. .. .. .. Acute extradural classically the signs consist of: ..
• Loss of consciousness following an lucid interval, with rapid deterioration • Middle meningeal artery bleeding with rapid raising of intracranial pressure • The development of hemiparesis on the opposite side with a fixed pupil on the same side as the impact area. • Acute subdural haematoma with clotted blood in the subdural space, accompanied by severe contusion of the underlying brain. It occurs from tearing of bridging vein between the cortex and the dura.
The management of the above is surgical and every effort should be made to do burrhole decompressions. The conditions below should be treated with more conservative medical management, as neurosurgery usually does not improve outcome. • Base-of-skull fractures bruising of the eyelids (Racoon eyes) or over the mastoid process (Battle's sign), cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) leak from ears and/or nose • Cerebral concussion with temporary altered consciousness • Depressed skull fracture an impaction of fragmented skull that may result in penetration of the underlying dura and brain. • Intracerebral haematoma may result from acute injury or progressive damage secondary to contusion.
Alteration of consciousness is the hallmark of brain injury The most common error in head injury evaluation and resuscitation are: • • • •
Failure to perform ABC and prioritise management Failure to look beyond the obvious head injury Failure to assess the baseline neurological examination Failure to re-evaluate patient who deteriorates.
Management of Head Trauma The Airway, Breathing and Circulation are stabilised (and the C-spine immobilised, if possible). Vital signs of important indicators in the patient’s neurological status must be monitored and recorded frequently. Glasgow Coma Score (GCS) evaluation is undertaken: see Appendix 4. Remember: • • •
Severe head injury is when GCS is 8 or less Moderate head injury is when GCS between 9 and 12 Minor head injury is when GCS between 13 and 15.
Deterioration may occur due to bleeding •
Unequal or dilated pupils may indicate an increase in intracranial pressure
•
Head or brain injury is never the cause of hypotension in the adult trauma patient
•
Sedation should be avoided as it not only interferes with the status of consciousness but will promote hypercarbia (slow breathing with retention of CO2) 152
•
The Cushing response is a specific response to a lethal rise in intracranial pressure. This is a late and poor prognostic sign. The hallmarks are: o
Bradycardia
o
Hypertension
o
Decreased respiratory rate.
Basic medical management for severe head injuries includes: •
Intubation and hyperventilation, producing moderate hypocapnia (PCO2 to 4.55 Kpa). This will reduce both intracranial blood volume and intracranial pressure temporarily
•
Sedation with possible paralysis
•
Moderate IV fluid input with dieresis i.e. do not overload
•
Nurse head up 20%
•
Prevent hypothermia.
Never assume that alcohol is the cause of drowsiness in a confused patient Spinal Trauma The incidence of nerve injury in multiple traumas is higher than expected. The most common injuries include damaged nerves to fingers, brachial plexus and central spinal cord. The first priority is to undertake the primary survey with evaluation of ABCDE-scheme: •
A Airway maintenance with care and control of a possible injury to the cervical spine
•
B Breathing control or support
•
C Circulation control and blood pressure monitoring
•
D Disability means the observation of neurological damage and status of consciousness
•
E Exposure of the patient to assess skin injuries and peripheral limb damage.
Examination of spine-injured patients must be carried out with the patient in the neutral position (i.e. without flexion, extension or rotation) and without any movement of his spine. The patient should be: •
Log-rolled (discussed in practical session)
•
Properly immobilized (in-line immobilization, stiff neck cervical collar or sandbags). This will be discussed in the practical sessions
•
Transported in a neutral position. 153
.. .. .. .. With vertebral .. injury (which may overlie spinal cord injury) look for: •
Local tenderness
•
Deformities as well as for a posterior "step-off" injury
•
Oedema (swelling).
Clinical findings indicating injury of the cervical spine include: •
Difficulties in respiration (diaphragmatic breathing check for paradoxical breathing)
•
Flaccid and no reflexes (check rectal sphincter)
•
Hypotension with bradycardia (without hypovolaemia).
C-Spine: (if available) In addition to the initial X-rays, all patients with a suspicion of cervical spine injury should include an AP and a lateral X-ray with a view of the atlas-axis joint. All seven cervical vertebrae must be seen on the AP and lateral.
Caution: Never transport a patient with a suspected injury of cervical spine In the sitting or prone position. Always make sure the patient is stabilised Before transferring Neurological assessment Assessment of the level of injury must be undertaken. If the patient is conscious, ask the patient questions relevant to his/her sensation and try to ask him/her to do minor movements to be able to find motor function of the upper and lower extremities. The following summarizes key reflex assessment to determine level of lesion: Motor response •
Diaphragm intact level C3, C4, C5
•
Shrug shoulders C4
•
Biceps (flex elbows) C5
•
Extension of wrist C6
•
Extension of elbow C7
•
Flexion of wrist C7
•
Abduction of fingers C8
•
Active chest expansion TlT12 154
•
Hip flexion L2
•
Knee extension L3L4
•
Ankle dorsiflexion L5S 1
•
Ankle plantar flexion S1S2
Sensory response •
Anterior thigh L2
•
Anterior knee L3
•
Anterolateral ankle L4
•
Dorsum great and 2nd toe L5
•
Lateral side of foot Sl
•
Posterior calf S2
•
Peri-anal sensation (perineum) S2S5
NB if no sensory or motor function is exhibited with a complete spinal cord Lesion the chance of recovery is small.
Loss of autonomic function with spinal cord injury May occur rapidly and resolve slowly Limb Trauma Examination must include: •
Skin color and temperature
•
Distal pulse assessment
•
Grazes and bleeding sites
•
Limb’s alignment and deformities
•
Active and passive movements
•
Unusual movements and crepitation
•
Level of pain caused injury.
Management of extremity injuries should aim to: 155
•
.. .. .. .. ..Keep blood flowing to peripheral tissues
•
Prevent infection and skin necrosis
•
Prevent damage to peripheral nerves.
Special issues relating to limb trauma •
Stop active bleeding by direct pressure, rather than by tourniquet as it can be left on by mistake, and this can result in ischaemic damage.
•
Open fractures. Any wound situated in the neighborhood of a fracture must be considered as a communicating one. Principles of the treatment include:
•
Stop external bleeding
•
Immobilize and relieve pain.
•
Compartment syndrome is caused by an increase the internal pressure of facial compartments; this pressure results in a compression of vessels and peripheral nerves situated in these regions. Perfusion is limited, peripheral nerves damaged and the final result of this condition is ischaemic or even necrotic muscles with restricted function.
•
Amputated parts of extremities should be covered with sterile gauze towels, which are moistened with saline and put into a sterile plastic bag. A non-cooled amputated part may be used within 6 hours after the injury, a cooled one as late as after 18 to 20 hours. Deep penetrating foreign bodies should remain in situ until theatre Exploration
Limb Support: Early Fasciotomy The problem with compartment syndromes are often underestimated: •
Tissue damage due to hypoxemia: Compartment syndromes with increased intra muscular (IM) pressures and local circulatory collapse are common in injuries with intramuscular haematomas; crush injuries, fractures or amputations. If the perfusion pressure (systolic BP) is low, even a slight rise in IM pressure causes local hypo perfusion. With normal body temperature peripheral limb circulation starts to decrease at a systolic BP around 80 mmHg.
•
The damage on reperfusion is often serious: If there is local hypoxemia (high IM pressure, low BP) for more than 2 hours, the reperfusion can cause extensive vascular damage. That is why decompression should be done early. In particular the forearm and lower leg compartments are at risk.
When the bleeding source is controlled, we recommend in-field Fasciotomy of forearm and lower leg compartments if the evacuation time is 4 hours or more. Fasciotomy should be done by any trained doctor or nurse under ketamine anaesthesia at the district location. Special Trauma Cases 156
Paediatrics Trauma is a leading cause of death for all children, with a higher incidence in boys. The survival of children who sustain major trauma depends on pre-hospital care and early resuscitation. The initial assessment of the paediatric trauma patients is identical to that for the adult. The first priority is the Airway, Breathing, then Circulation, early neurological assessment, and finally exposing the child, without losing heat. Paediatric 'NORMAL' values are included in Appendix 2. Specific resuscitation and intubation issues in the young include: •
The relatively larger head and larger nasal airway and tongue
•
Nose breathing in small babies
•
Angle of the jaw is greater, larynx is higher and epiglottis is proportionally bigger and more "U"-shaped
•
Cricoids are the narrowest part of the larynx, which limits the size of the ETT. By adult life, the larynx has grown and the narrowest part is at the cords
•
Trachea in the full-term new-born is about 4 cm long and will admit a 2.5 or 3.0 mm diameter ETT (the adult trachea is about 12 cm long)
•
Gastric distension is common following resuscitation, and a naso-gastric tube is useful to decompress the stomach.
If tracheal intubation is required, avoid cuffed tubes in children less than 10 yrs so as to minimise subglottic swelling and ulceration. Oral intubation is easier than nasal for infants and young children. Shock in the paediatric patient: (Refer Appendix 2). The femoral artery in the groin and the brachial artery in the antecubital fossa are the best sites to palpate pulses in the child. If the child is pulse less, cardiopulmonary resuscitation should be commenced. Signs of shock in paediatric patients include: •
Tachycardia
•
Weak or absent peripheral pulses
•
Capillary refill > 2 seconds
•
Tachypnoea
•
Agitation
•
Drowsiness
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•
.. .. .. .. ..Poor urine output.
Hypotension may be a late sign, even in the presence of severe shock.
The principles in managing paediatric trauma patients Are the same as for the adult Vascular access should be obtained. Two large bore intravenous cannulae should be inserted. Attempt peripheral veins first and avoid central venous catheters. Good sites are the long saphenous vein at the ankle and the femoral vein in the groin. Intraosseous access is relatively safe and a very effective method of fluid administration. If an Intraosseous needle is unavailable then a spinal needle can be used. The best site is on the anteromedial aspect of the tibia below the tibial tuberosity. The epiphysis growth plate must be avoided. Fluid replacement should be aimed to produce a urine output of 12 ml/kg/hour for the infant, and 0.51 ml/kg/hour in the adolescent. An initial bolus of 20 ml per kilogram of the body weight of Normal Saline should be given. If no response is obtained after a second bolus then 20-ml/kg type specific bloods or O Rh negative packed red blood cells (10 ml/kg) should be administered if available. Hypothermia is a major problem in children. They lose proportionally more heat through the head. All fluids should be warmed. Because of the child's relatively large surface area to volume ratio, hypothermia is a potential problem. Exposure of the child is necessary for assessment but consider covering as soon as possible.
The child should be kept warm and close to family if at all possible Pregnancy The ABCDE priorities of trauma management in pregnant patients are the same as those in non-pregnant patients. Anatomical and physiological changes occur in pregnancy, which are extremely important in the assessment of the pregnant trauma patient. Anatomical changes •
•
Size of the uterus gradually increases and becomes more vulnerable to damage both by blunt and penetrating injury o
at 12 weeks of gestation the fundus is at the symphysis pubis
o
at 20 weeks it is at the umbilicus and
o
At 36 weeks the xiphoid.
The foetus at first is well protected by the thick walled uterus and large amounts of amniotic fluid.
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Physiological changes •
Increased tidal volume and respiratory alkalosis
•
Increased heart rate
•
30% increased cardiac output
•
Blood pressure is usually 15 mmHg lower
•
Aortocaval compression in the third trimester with hypotension.
Special issues in the traumatised pregnant female •
Blunt trauma may lead to o
Uterine irritability and premature labour
o
Partial or complete rupture of the uterus
o
Partial or complete placental separation (up to 48 hours after trauma)
o
With pelvic fracture be aware of severe blood loss potential.
What are the priorities? •
Assessment of the mother according to the ABCDE
•
Resuscitate in left lateral position to avoid aortocaval compression
•
Vaginal examination (speculum) for vaginal bleeding and cervical dilatation
•
Mark fundal height and tenderness and foetal heart rate monitoring as appropriate.
Resuscitation of mother may save the baby. There are times when the mother's life is at risk and the foetus may need to be sacrificed in order to save the mother.
Aortocaval compression must be prevented in resuscitation of the Traumatised pregnant woman. Remember left lateral tilt Burns The burn patient has the same priorities as all other trauma patients. Assessment: Airway, Breathing (beware of inhalation and rapid airway compromise), Circulation (fluid replacement), Disability (compartment syndrome) Exposure (% burn). The source of burn is important e.g. fire, hot water, paraffin, kerosene etc. Electrical burns are often more serious than they appear. Remember damaged skin and muscle can results in acute renal failure.
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.. .. .. .. Essential .. management points: •
Stop the burning
•
ABCDE then determine the percentage area of burn (Rule of 9's)
•
Good IV access and early fluid replacement.
Specific issues for burns patients The following principles can be used as a guide to detect and manage respiratory injury in the burn patient: •
Burns around the mouth
•
Facial burns or singed facial or nasal hair
•
Hoarseness, rasping cough
•
Evidence of glottic oedema
•
Circumferential, full-thickness burns of chest or neck.
Nasotracheal or endotracheal intubation is indicated especially if patient has severe increasing hoarseness, difficulty swallowing secretions, or increased respiratory rate with history of inhalation injury. The burn patient requires at least 24 ml of crystalloid solution per kg body weight per percent body surface burn in the first 24 hours to maintain an adequate circulating blood volume and provide adequate renal output. The estimated fluid volume is then proportioned in the following manner: •
One half of the total estimated fluid is provided in the first 8 hours post burn
•
The remaining one half is administered in the next 24 hours, to maintain an average urinary output of 0.51.0 ml/kg/hr.
Undertake the following (if possible): •
Pain relief
•
Bladder catheterisation if burn > 20%
•
Nasogastric drainage
•
Tetanus prophylaxis.
Clinical manifestations may not appear for the first 24 hours Transport of Critically Ill Patients Transporting patients has risk. It requires good communication, planning and appropriate staffing. Any patient who requires transportation must be effectively stabilised before 160
departure. As a general principle, patients should be transported only if they are going to a facility that can provide a higher level of care. Planning and preparation include consideration of: •
The type of transport (car, land rover, boat etc)
•
The personnel to accompany the patient
•
The equipment and supplies required en route for routine and emergency treatment
•
Potential complications
•
The monitoring and final packaging of the patient.
Effective communication is essential with: •
The receiving centre
•
The transport service
•
Escorting personnel
•
The patient and relatives.
Effective stabilisation necessitates: •
Prompt initial resuscitation
•
Control of haemorrhage and maintenance of the circulation
•
Immobilisation of fractures
•
Analgesia.
Remember: if the patient deteriorates, re-evaluate the patient by using the primary survey, checking and treating life-threatening conditions, then make a careful assessment focussing on the affected system.
Be prepared: If anything can go wrong, it will, and at the worst possible time Appendix 1 Airway Management Techniques Basic techniques Chin lift and jaw thrust Placing two fingers under the mandible and gently lifting upward to bring the chin anterior can perform the chin lift manoeuvre. During this manoeuvre the neck should not be hyper extended. (Demonstrated in the Practical session)
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.. .. .. . The jaw.. thrust is performed by manually elevating the angles of the mandible to obtain the . (Demonstrated in the Practical session) Remember these are not definitive same effect. procedures and obstruction may occur at any time. Or pharyngeal airway The oral airway must be inserted into the mouth behind the tongue and is usually inserted upside down until the palate is encountered and is then rotated 180 degrees. Care should be taken in children because of the possibility of soft tissue damage. Nasopharyngeal airway This is inserted via a nostril (well lubricated) and passed into the posterior oropharynx. It is well tolerated. Advanced techniques Orotracheal intubation If uncontrolled, this procedure may produce cervical hyperextension. It is essential to maintain in line immobilisation (by an assistant). (Demonstrated in the Practical session) Cricoids pressure may be necessary if a full stomach is suspected. The cuff must be inflated and correct placement of the tube checked by verifying normal bilateral breath sounds. Tracheal intubation must be considered when there is a need to •
Establish a patent airway and prevent aspiration
•
Deliver oxygen while not being able to use mask and airway
•
Provide ventilation and prevent hypercarbia.
This should be performed in no more than 30 seconds: if unable to intubate then ventilation of the patient must continue. Remember: patients die from lack of oxygen, not lack of an endo-tracheal tube.
Remember: patients with trauma of the face and neck are at risk for airway obstruction Surgical cricothyroidotomy This is indicated in any patient where intubation has been attempted and failed and the patient cannot be ventilated. The cricothyroid membrane is identified by palpation; a skin incision that extends through the cricothyroid membrane is made. An artery forceps is inserted to dilate the incision. A size 46 endotracheal tube (or small tracheotomy tube) is inserted. Appendix 2: Paediatric Physiological Values
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Variable
Newborn
6 months
12 months
5 years
Adult
Respiratory rate (b/min)
50 ± 10
30 ± 5
24 ± 6
23 ± 5
12 ± 3
Tidal volume (ml)
21
45
78
270
575
Minute ventilation (L/min)
1.05
1.35
1.78
5.5
6.4
Hematocrit
55 ± 7
37 ± 3
35 ± 2.5
40 ± 2
4348
Arterial pH
7.37.4 Age
7.357.45
7.357
Heart rate range
Systolic blood pressure
(Beats per minute)
(MmHg)
01 year
100160
6090
1 year
100170
7090
2 years
90150
80100
6 years
70120
85110
10 years
70110
90110
14 years
60100
90110
Adult
60100
90120
Respiratory Parameters and Endotracheal Tube Size and Placement Age
Weight
Respiratory
ETT
ETT at
ETT at
(Kg)
Rate (b/min)
Size
Lip (cm)
Nose (cm)
Newborn
1.03.0
4050
3.0
5.58.5
710.5
Newborn
3.5
4050
3.5
9
11
3 months
6.0
3050
3.5
10
12
1 year
10
2030
4.0
11
14
2 years
12
2030
4.5
12
15
3 years
14
2030
4.5
13
16
4 years
16
1525
5.0
14
17
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6 years
.. .. .. .. .. 20
1525
5.5
15
19
8 years
24
1020
6.0
16
20
10 years
30
1020
6.5
17
21
12 years
38
1020
7.0
18
22
Appendix 3: Cardiovascular pulmonaries Heart Blood
Capill
Resp
Urine
Mental
Rate
Refill
Rate
Volume
State
Normal
Normal > 30 malls/hr Normal
Blood loss Pressure
Up to 750 ml
< 100 Normal
7501500 ml
> 100
Systolic
Mild Positive 2030
2030
Normal
Concern Anxious/
15002000 ml
> 120 Decreased Positive 3040
515 Confused Confused/
More than 2000 ml
> 140 Decreased Positive > 40
< 10 Coma
Appendix 4: Glasgow Coma Scale Function
Response
Score
Open spontaneously
4
Open to command
3
Open to pain
2
None
1
Normal
5
Confused talk
4
Inappropriate words
3
Inappropriate sounds
2
Eyes (4)
Verbal (5)
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None
1
Obeys command
6
Localises pain
5
Flexes limbs normally to pain
4
Flexes limbs abnormally to pain
3
Extends limbs to pain
2
None
1
Motor (6)
Appendix 5: Cardiac Life Support
Appendix 6: Trauma Response
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.. .. .. .. Long before any trauma patient arrives in your medical care, roles must be identified and .. to each allocated member of the trauma 'team' Team members (depends on availability) Ideally: On-duty emergency doctor or experienced health worker (team leader) Trauma Team roles Team leader (Doctor)
(Nurse)
1. Co-ordinate ABC's
1. Help co-ordinate early resuscitation
2. History patient or family
2. Liase with relatives
3. Request X rays (if possible)
3. Check documentation including:
4. Perform secondary survey
Allergies
5. Consider tetanus prophylaxis and antibiotics
Medications
6. Reassess patient
Past history
7. Prepare patient for transfer
Last meal
8. Complete documentation
Events leading to injury
4. Notify nursing staff in other areas •
On-duty emergency nurse
•
1 or 2 additional helpers
When the patient actually arrives, a rapid overview is necessary. This is known as TRIAGE. This rapid overview prioritises patient management according to: •
Manpower
•
Resources.
This will be discussed at length during the course. Appendix 7: Activation Plan for Trauma Team
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Criteria The following patients should undergo full trauma assessment: History • • • • •
Fall >3 metres MVA: net speed>30 km/hr Thrown from vehicle/trapped in vehicle Death of a person in accident Pedestrian vs. car/cyclist vs. car/ unrestrained occupant.
Examination • • • • •
Airway or respiratory distress BP>100mmHg GCS <13/15 >1 area injured Penetrating injury
Disaster management Disasters do occur and disaster planning is an essential part to any trauma service. A disaster is any event that exceeds the ability of local resources to cope with the situation. A simple disaster plan must include: • •
• •
• • • •
Disaster scenarios practice Disaster management protocols including: o On-scene management o Key personnel identification o Trauma triage Medical team allocations from your hospital Agree in advance who will be involved in the event of a disaster o Ambulance o Police/army o National/international authorities o Aid and relief agencies. Evacuation priorities Evacuation facilities Modes of transport: road/air (helicopter/fixed wing)/sea Work out different communications strategies.
Medical pack (emergency) In any emergency evacuation the medical pack should to the assembly point where immediate assistance can to anyone suffering from burns or wounds. The medical pack (emergency) should contain the following: • • • • •
Blanket Triangular bandages Safety pins Crepe bandages Rolls of Elastoplasts 167
.. .. .. .. ..• • • • • •
Strong scissors Paraffin gauze (Burns) Shell dressings Blow up splints List of Personnel (up to date) - numbers to be verified Any special medicaments
at assembly point
Priorities for first aid
Ask
Look
Listen
Think
Act
One out of five casualties are seriously injured, maybe unconscious and require the following order of priorities. YOU MUST KNOW THEM WELL A. A clear airway to breathe through
- recovery position - Insert plastic airway
B. Breathing to be assisted
- mouth-to-mouth breathing
C. Circulation of the blood to be maintained external
- stop bleeding by - urgent treatment -
- Prevention of shock D. Do not panic
- Prevent and treat shock
E. Evacuation to the nearest medical unit. Any remaining casualties may be injured in the limbs and will require the following order of priorities a) Stop the bleeding b) Prevent shock c) Rest and gentle handling d) Evacuation. If YOU are injured and still conscious, carry out the following SELF HELP DRILL Stop the bleeding • • •
Lie still Direct pressure on or around wound - apply your shell dressing Put a crepe bandage on to maintain pressure firm, even
Treat pain •
Keep injured part still
Think about • • •
Help from others Look for exit wound and cover it You will be more comfortable if you have a chest wound if you sit and lean to injured side, and with a stomach wound sit propped up with the knees 168
drawn up. Assistance to the injured • • • •
Maintain a clear airway Put unconscious casualty in the recovery position, if injuries allow it Keep him still Listen for sounds of breathing - mouth to mouth if necessary
• •
Check that the heart is beating - massage heart if not beating Stop bleeding by any or all of the following:
Direct pressure with fingers or thumbs on or around the wound. If a dressing is available, apply it directly over the wound and press it firmly down. Make sure that it extends well beyond the edges of the wound. Apply a crepe bandage to maintain firm, even pressure. NOT TOO TIGHT If blood comes through dressing put more layers on. Expect and look for an exit wound. Any deep wound should be plugged right to is base with dressings. If bones protrude, then build dressings in layers around wound. Indirect pressure by using the pressure points in arms or legs. A TOURNIQUET SHOULD NEVER BE NECESSARY IF YOU DO YOUR JOB RIGHT. Elevate the limb whenever possible. Rest the part Prevent shock Reassure the casualty - it is worth a pint of blood to him Keep his body flat and raise the legs - worth another pint Loosen tight clothing. Keep him comfortably cool. Treat the cause of shock. Decide if evacuation is urgent to save his life Move good limb to the side of the injured ones and tie or splint them. Tie or pin an injured arm to the chest. Never leave an unconscious casualty - he may stop breathing. Always try to keep out germs. Never give a wounded man drinks - only SIPS - and not ever • •
If unconscious A penetrating wound of the trunk 169
.. .. .. .. ..•
Operation likely within four hours - never give alcohol in any form
Evacuate gently - Your casualty will get more shock every time he KILLS.
is even slightly moved - and SCHOCK
TERRORIST Tactics We tend to believe that a well-run CP/EP operation, which maintains awareness and correct procedures, will act as a deterrent to a terrorist organization. Quite probably in a large number of cases this is the case, but if a terrorist group is deterred from action by what would appear to be professional switched on security, we would never know, as they would simply turn their attentions to a softer option. The use of 'lead and follow' vehicles, hardening of the Principal's vehicle, residence and office should, we believe, all contribute to his improved safety. None of these measures helped, however, in protecting the life of the head of Deutsche Banke, Alfred Herrhausen, who was assassinated by West Germany's 'Red Army Faction' (RAF). Operating spasmodically, but successfully, they have been one of Germany's most dangerous left wing terrorist groups. It will pay us to look at one case study and see what lessons can be drawn. Alfred Herrhausen, Chairman of Germany's largest bank, was an individual larger than his position at the bank. He was a senior Economist and Industrial Strategist and a personal friend and advisor to Chancellor Helmut Kohl. His assassination was not dissimilar in magnitude to that of a Head of State, as indicated by the £2 million reward offered by the West German Government for information leading to the capture of his assassins. As a consequence of his prominence and importance, he was assigned a permanent Close Protection Team, which daily, whilst in transit, comprised of a lead vehicle, a follow vehicle and $200,000 of armored Mercedes, in which Herrhausen was driven. The security provisions of ‘Protected’ targets had never deterred the RAF however. Out of 10 attacks on prominent people, 6 had protection of one form or another, either Bodyguards, Escort Vehicles or Armored Vehicles. Three travelled in fully armored vehicles and three travelled in a three-car convoy. Herrhausen lived in an up-market residential area of Frankfurt and habitually left home around the same time. Choice of routes close from his home was limited and involved driving through a Park area. Close to the site of the attack was a walking path, jogging area and parking area within the Park, giving the terrorists ample cover for surveillance, preplanning and execution of the attack. Vehicles at the point of attack were slowed to approx. 30mph due to a school crossing and bus stop on the road and the road was prohibited to parked vehicles. Shortly after 8.30am on the morning of the attack, Herrhausen's armored Mercedes was blown nearly 80 feet along the road, when some 22lbs of TNT, placed on the carrier of a child's bike, exploded some three feet from the side of the vehicle. The blast blew shrapnel through the right rear door into the back right seat, where Herrhausen habitually sat. He was fatally injured and bled to death shortly after the explosion, although his driver, miraculously, was only slightly injured. The device had been triggered by a photoelectric cell, attached to one of the white posts, which lined the street. The beam was reflected back from a mirror also attached to a post on the other side of the street. The terrorists, calculating the speed and length of the Mercedes, 170
and seating position of their target, had previously calculated the position the bike would need to be in to explode as the front of the armored vehicle cut the beam. On the journey, the lead car which was some 200 metres in advance of the Mercedes, had passed the beam safely as it had been armed by command wire by a terrorist in a jogging who, with a small electric device and battery pack, had armed the bomb having been warned by a colleague by radio that the lead vehicle had passed the beam. The sophistication of the method of detonation and arming the bomb was unique. Some Weeks before, 'workmen' had chiseled a line in the pavement in which to lay command wire and cemented over it. The remainder of the command wire, which posed through the park, had probably been laid only that morning so as to escape Ion. The attack was a meticulously planned and spectacular coup for the RAF. The attack exposed serious flaws in the security measures. The lead car achieved nothing. Had it been advance vehicle tasked to recce the route in detail, then it may well have been suspicious bike parked in a position, which was discouraged on the particular road. For all the reasons we know, the park area was the ideal choice for the terrorist_ equally, security should have identified the locale as one which would give cam concern. • • • • •
Close to home with few alternates Traffic forced to slow Easy surveillance Tree-lined and bushy area Narrow road with • Easy escape following the attack • Ease of concealment that is joggers/walkers/couples etc. during the attack
The incident contains many of the common elements of a terrorist operation, 1 elevated, if we could use the word in such a horrific incident by the planning! Complexity of the method of attack. Many lessons can be learned from the attack, pro the main one being, that under certain circumstances a ‘hardened target’ will not put off a determined, intelligent, resourced terrorist organization, rather see it challenge. Security cannot be complacent as a consequence of the fact they have manpower and material resources. Constant awareness and the belief it will always hi to you, need to be maintained to enable observation, evaluation an avoidance to all into play. From an operational point of view the two lessons learned from this incident area. • •
Surveillance recognition Specific route survey
The surveillance was there to see if anyone had looked hard enough. Weeks of painstaking surveillance had been going on, not to mention the terrorists having to chisel away part of the pavement. The value of a lead vehicle, which is improperly tasked, is also brought into start relief. Whilst they may have been on the lookout for potential ambush situations they missed the bicycle. The routine of the lead car was also so well known that they used it as a timer to arm the device.
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.. .. .. .. Assessing .. the conclusions of just one incident is insufficient for a student to become fully
acquainted with terrorist tactics and from the many Kidnap/Assassination attempts the following have merit in further study. • • • •
Attempted assassination of President Ronald Reagan March 1980, Washington Assassination of Col. Shatter & Col. Turner, Tehran Assassination Aldo Morro, Italy Kidnapping Hans Martin Schleyer, W. Germany
There are, unfortunately, many other incidents to study, some successful and some not so. 1 would be comforting to think that those that were unsuccessful were so as a result of the preventative actions of the Bodyguards. Regrettably this, in the majority of instances, is not the case. Most failures can usually be attributed to 'balls up' by the attackers or a failure of something outside their control. With the element of surprise and undetected surveillance, the odds are stacked in their favor. From 1970 to 1992 there was an increase in terrorist incidents from 298 to 5,400 in 1992 a 1713% increase in the level of terrorist activity. The geographic split of total incidents in 1992 was as follows: •
Latin America - 28 %
•
Middle East - 24 %
•
Asia. 19%
•
Europe. 18 %
•
Africa. 11 %
This gives a very one-sided view of the level of worldwide risk. Domestic bombing incidents in the States from 1975 - 1984 amounted to some 10,100 according to the FBI 'Summary of Bomb Incidents'. The breakdown was 7,100 explosive devices and 3,019 Incendiary devices, which resulted in 279 deaths and 1,600 injuries, yet the figures quoted At the beginning of this section attributed no terrorist incidents as happening in the D.S. Add To this the huge and growing problem of organized crime and acts of extortion, leveraged by The threat of or actual violence and the actual total for what one could consider domestic Terrorism is huge.
USE of Force Theory The use of force in response to Terrorism There is no question that terrorist incidents will continue to plague the international community well into the foreseeable future. One primary reason for this is the inherent difficulty involved in preventing a terrorist attack before it occurs. Another is the oftenfanatical nature of individuals who carry out the often suicidal - assaults. These factors are often the primary reason that the only action that can be taken in response to terrorism is after-the fact. Herein, too, lies a significant and controversial problem which responses are appropriate? Few disagree that economic sanctions against that nation determined to be responsible are acceptable. Nonetheless, while this action may dissuade some nations from hosting terrorist groups or providing refuge to individual perpetrators, it does little to punish those directly responsible. It is for this reason that it is important that nations are perceived
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as willing and able to make appropriate use of their armed forces to conduct retaliatory operations. A brief, illustrative examination of US practice and policy follows. The policy of the United States in the use of the military in responding to terrorist incidents has remained fairly consistent in recent years. Following the bombing of the April 1986 La Belle discotheque in West Berlin (which resulted in the deaths of two US servicemen), President Ronald Reagan ordered an immediate and thorough investigation involving all major US intelligence and law enforcement services. Upon conclusive finding that the perpetrators of this incident had been trained in Libya, he ordered an air strike on a number of targets, including terrorist training facilities. In the period of time following this attack, Libya noticeably reduced its previously active involvement in support of international terrorism. More recently, when Iraqi involvement in the plotted assassination of President Bush was verified in June 1993, President Clinton ordered a Tomahawk missile strike against the facility believed to have facilitated the planning of the operation, the headquarters complex of the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS). This attack (while later determined to be of questionable military effectiveness) provided a significant symbol of US resolve to punish those responsible involved in terrorism directed against its citizens. Following the attack, President Clinton issued this statement: "The Government of Iraq acted unlawfully in attempting to carry out Saddam Hussein's threats against former President Bush because of actions he took as President. The evidence of the Government of Iraq's violence and terrorism demonstrates that Iraq poses a continuing threat to United States nationals and shows utter disregard for the will of the international community as expressed in Security Council Resolutions and the United Nations Charter. Based on the Government of Iraq's pattern of disregard for international law, I concluded that there was no reasonable prospect that new diplomatic initiatives or economic measures could influence the current Government of Iraq to cease planning future attacks against the United States. The only thing more important than shot placement is knowing when to shoot. A lot of time is spent talking about which weapon or ammo will best suit your particular needs for each facet of personal defence. One topic that is rarely discussed though is how these lethal tools should be employed. Just what are the guidelines? Years ago I took my first use of force training while I was at the Maricopa County Detention Academy. At the time I thought that what they were teaching me was just watered down ‘jailer’ training, far different from actual police training. A few years later I found out how wrong I was when I had the opportunity to attend the firearms certification course required for all peace officers in Arizona before they may carry a weapon. As I sat in that class I was shocked to find that it was almost identical to the course I took for unarmed use of force back in the academy. Many people who have taken the instruction required to obtain their concealed weapons permit also have the same belief that I held then. Guess what? When I took the CCW course, it was not only the same material, but also the same two cops taught it! In fact the only difference between lawful force for police and civilians is that peace officers are not given the option of fleeing the scene to avoid confrontation. Lawful use of deadly force has nothing to do with shoot ‘em up, spray & pray tactics. It is a last ditch option when no other course of action is available. Regular police training emphasizes less on SWAT tactics and more on judgmental use of force. So when gun writers lambaste cops by saying that many are less proficient with their sidearm than the average IPSC shooter, they are doing a great disservice to the law enforcement community. Police are trained to know when to use force in a 173
.. .. .. .. discretionary . manner. Anyone who buys into the belief that police should be able to shoot .like the Terminator needs to spend more time as a ride along and less time at Blockbuster video. Lawful use of deadly force has nothing to do with shoot ‘em up, spray & pray tactics. It is a last ditch option when no other course of action is available. Here, two shots have caused the attacker to break off and back pedal away from the victim. Shoot-to-stop is best typified here. Further shots would constitute excessive force and a shoot-to-kill mentality. The governing logic behind all use of force is simple, "You may use only that amount of force necessary to overcome the threat." Police apply this logic best by stair stepping their levels of force. If you have ever wondered why modern police carry more weapons than Batman, here’s an example; Two police go to arrest a transient. First they verbally command him to comply, he resists. Next they grab him and begin to use Aikido holds to administer pain compliance, but he pulls a knife from his belt. One officer pulls his sidearm and covers his partner who responds to the threat with a blast of OC pepper. More verbal commands are given, "Put down the knife and surrender!" The subject still refuses and threatens the two officers who (in some departments) respond by firing two darts from a hand held Tazer. Still resisting, and impervious to the barrage of non-lethal devices used on him, the transient charges one of the officers. Officer number one responds with a single shot that stops the attacker. An extra magazine or speed loader is always nice in a protracted gunfight, but the entire philosophy of civilian defensive shooting is to extricate you from the threat as quickly as possible. The trade-off of an extra magazine in favour of an OC canister makes more sense in terms of bulk/non-lethal alternative. In each of these steps, the officers responded to each threat increase by raising the level of force slightly in response. While most real world police shootings do not have this many steps, this scenario is common and in almost all cases the officers are quickly cleared. Because they took such extensive pains to avoid shooting the perpetrator, it would be very unlikely for them to be convicted of criminal wrongdoing. Also, they could have shut down the situation at any time had the transient yielded. One of the aspects of modern defence is the ‘shoot to stop’ doctrine. It is not uncommon for people to believe that the proper intent in a lethal encounter is to shoot to kill. In our litigious world just uttering that phrase following a shooting is enough to guarantee that you will become the next David Goetz, sued for your entire future. To intentionally kill an attacker actually violates the use of force code, Only that amount of force necessary... Yes, it’s a bizarre world we live in, designed by lawyers and built by judges!
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Use of your handgun as an impact weapon not only raises weapons retention concerns, but also may damage some guns. The author’s father once destroyed an early alloy frame revolver by using it to repeatedly strike an unarmed attacker. Since then he carried a Colt 1911. In modern force methodology, you shoot to stop the bad guy from doing whatever he is doing. Upon compliance you stop firing, his death is a coincidental factor of your response. We don’t care if the offender goes away mad, just so long as he goes away. If this can be done with the mere sight of a .50 cal Desert Eagle with suppresser and Tac light, then all the better for you! Chances are, you will find that [in your state] you are not even legally permitted to use your weapon to stop the commission of a felony unless there exists reasonable fear of death There will be those that argue that deadly force has its own doctrine above and beyond normal levels of force because most state statutes specify that imminent danger to you or another must be present in order to respond with deadly force. But these requirements fall within the bounds of ‘only that amount of force...’ The simplest way to understand deadly force is that it can only be used in response to a life threatening attack. It is similar to a chess game where only a pawn can attack a pawn, bishops can only attack bishops, and You must have a reasonable fear for your life or that of another before you can administer deadly force. The threshold for reasonable fear may vary from person to person. I might lack legal justification for shooting a 6’, 180 lb man who attacks me with fists. Because I’m healthy, have no physical impairments, and have both the professional training and experience to respond to the threat, I would be less likely to be able to convince a grand jury that I had serious fear of death. By contrast, if that same man attacked my 5'3" wife then his death would likely be ruled as justified because she is shorter, weaker, and has no defensive training. In her case it would be prudent to assume that almost any male attacker would overcome her. Because of their lack of upper body strength, women have a higher reasonable fear of harm from a single unarmed attacker than a healthy male would. This could lower their threshold for responding with deadly force. A good example of reasonable fear was a burglary that occurred out in the county several years ago. The homeowner heard several men moving around at the end of his hallway by the living room. When he moved to the other end of the hallway with gun in hand they heard him. In the darkness he heard one of the criminals tell another "Let’s ---- him up!" At this point, against multiple attackers and in total darkness, he had a reasonable fear of imminent danger. They had agreed to harm him.
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.. .. .. . He fired.. into the darkness hitting two of the three. Of the two who had escaped, one was caught .later in the emergency room. His defence was that they had not been armed; hence the homeowner had no right to fire on them. The police disagreed and found the man’s actions reasonable. The use of deadly force to protect property is illegal. A reasonable fear for a human life must exist. In this photo the mere sight of a weapon is used to scare away a car thief. Were there children in the car, and then use of deadly force would likely be justified. So the next time that you hear someone tell you that most cops shoot poorly, try and keep in mind that no one pay them to kill people. The first rule to surviving a gunfight is to avoid it completely. But for those times that you are given no alternative, use of force must be done with the utmost in discretionary judgment. Because when the time comes you will be acting on instinct and adrenaline, it is best to incorporate alternative steps into your training Regime. Practice verbally challenging targets, carry a secondary non-lethal weapon, and work out emergency procedures on the range in advance. Most of all, take the time to learn the use of force statutes for your state by visiting the public law library in your county. Chances are you will find that you are not even legally permitted to use your weapon to stop the commission of a felony unless there exists reasonable fear of death. On the flip side, most states statutorily permit the use of deadly force to stop rape, kidnapping, or arson of an occupied structure. APC
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Protectee Profile 1. Protectee’s Name………………………………………………… Nickname…………………………………………………. 2. Permanent Residence Address………………………………………………………………………. …………………………. ………………………………………………………………………………………………………… ………………………………. Telephone…………………………………………Fax………………………Floor plan available? …………………………… 3. Secondary (vacation) residence address……………………………………………………………………………………….. ………………………………………………………………………………………………………… …………………………….. Telephone………………………………………..Fax………………………..Floor Plan available? ……………………………... 4. Office Address………………………………………………………………………………………………… ………………… ………………………………………………………………………………………………………… …………………………..… Telephone…………………………………………Fax………………………Floor plan available? ………………………….. Secretary’s name………………………………………………..Home phone…………………………………………………….. Other telephones and description (Skypage etc) …………………………………………………………………………………. ………………………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………. 5. Physical: Age…….. Height……………… Weight……………Hair Colour…………Eye Colour…………………………… Glasses?…………. Prescription……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……... Scars/identifying marks…………………………………………………………………………………………………… ………… ………………………………………………………………………………………………………… …………………………….. 177
.. .. .. .. .. data: Sex…..Race……Date of birth……… 6. Personal Birthplace……………………………………………………………… Social Security…………………………Passport………………………Passport expiry date…………………………………… Drivers Lic…………………….State/Country……………………..Int’l driver’s Lic……………………………………………. Major Credit cards & #s ………………………………………………………………………………………………………… … ………………………………………………………………………………………………………… …………………………….. ………………………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………. 7. Medical: Physicians name……………………………………………… Telephone……………………………………………. Address……………………………………………………………………. ………………………………………………………….. Physicians name…………………………………………………………… Telephone…………………………………………….. Address………………………………………………………………………………………………… …………………………… Dentist’s name……………………………………………………………… Telephone………………………………………….. Address………………………………………………………………………………………………… …………………………. Illnesses/operations……………………………………………………………………………………… …………………………. Medication required…………………………………………………….Blood type……………………………………………. Allergies/drug allergies………………………………………………………………………………………………… ………… 1 8. Vehicles: Make………….Model………….Year……………….. Colour…………..Lic/State…….. Make………………………Model………………….Year……………Col…………… Lic/State……… Make………………………Model………………….Year……………Col…………… Lic/State……… 178
9. Plane: Type/description…………………………………………………….I.D……………………… 10. Boat: Type/description…………………………………………………….I.D……………………… 11 Health Ins Carrier………………………………………………………..Policy…………………….. Auto Ins Carrier……………………………………………………………..Policy…………………….. Other Ins Carrier……………………………………………………………Policy…………………….. Kidnap/ransom insurance………. Carrier…………………………………Policy……………………. 12.Attorney’s name………………………………………………………… Telephone………………… Address………………………………………………………………………………………………… …. 13. Protectee’s chief of security………………………………………………Telephone……………… Address………………………………………………………………………………………………… … 14. Bank: Name……………………………………Tel……………………… Contact………………… 15. History of threats against family……………………………………………………………………. ………………………………………………………………………………………………………… ….. 16 Any known enemies? ………………………………………………………………………………….. ………………………………………………………………………………………………………… …….. 17. Club memberships……………………………………………………………………………………… 18.
Spouse Name……………………………………………………………………………………………. Physical: Age……….Height………..Weight……………..Hair Colour……………..Eye colour………… Glasses?……………….. Prescription……………………………………………………………………….. Scars/Identifying marks……………………………………………………………………………………….
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.. .. .. . Personal.. Data: Sex…………. Race…………… . D.O.B……………….Birthplace………………………… Social Security………………………………….Passport………………….Passport exp date……………. Drivers Lic……………………………… State/country………………….Int’l drivers licence……………
Medical: Physician’s name………………………………………….Tel…………………………… Address……………………………………………………………………………………… ……….. Physicians name…………………………………………………… Tel……………………………. Address……………………………………………………………………………………… …………. Dentist’s name…………………………………………………….Tel………………………………… Address……………………………………………………………………………………… …………. Illnesses/operations…………………………………………………………………………… ………… Medication required…………………………………………………Blood type……………………… Allergies/drug allergies………………………………………………………………………………….. Club memberships………………………………………………………………………………… …….. ………………………………………………………………………………………………… …………… 19. pouse name…………………………………………………………..Nickname…………………… Physical: Age……….Height…………….Weight………………Hair colour…………Eye col………. 180
Glasses? Prescription……………………………………………………………………………………. . Scars/Identifying marks………………………………………………………………………………….. Personal data: Sex………………..Race……………..D.O.B. ……………..Birthplace……………….. Social Security……………………….Passport…………………………Passport exp date…………… Drivers Lic…………………………..State/Country…………………..Int’l driver’s lic……………. Parent of children?………….. Terms of custody………………………………………………………. ………………………………………………………………………………………………… ………….. 20. Children or other persons in household: Name (child 1)……………………………………………………………… Nickname…………………. Physical: Age………Height…………….Weight…………..Hair colour………….Eye colour…………………. Glasses?…………… Prescription…………………………………………………………………………….. Scars/identifying marks…………………………………………………………………………………………. ………………………………………………………………………………………………… ………………….. Personal data: Sex……..D.O.B……………….Birthplace…………………….Passport…………………… …… Name of School…………………………………………………….Tel……………………………… ………… School Address……………………………………………….Contact…………………………………..
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.. .. .. . If living..away from home, . tel/address……………………………………………………………………… Medical: Physician’s name………………………………………….Tel…………………………… Address……………………………………………………………………………………… ……….. Dentist’s name…………………………………………………… Tel……………………………. Address……………………………………………………………………………………… …………. Illnesses/operations ……………………………………………………………………………………… Medication required…………………………………………………Blood type……………………… Allergies/drug allergies………………………………………………………………………………….. 21. Name (child 2)………………………………………………………… Nickname…………………. Physical: Age………Height…………….Weight…………..Hair colour………….Eye colour…………………. Glasses?…………… Prescription…………………………………………………………………………….. Scars/identifying marks…………………………………………………………………………………………. Personal data: Sex……..D.O.B……………….Birthplace…………………….Passport…………………… …… Name of School…………………………………………………….Tel……………………………… ………… School Address……………………………………………….Contact………………………………….. If living away from home, tel/address………………………………………………………………………
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Medical: Physician’s name………………………………………….Tel…………………………… Address……………………………………………………………………………………… ……….. Dentist’s name…………………………………………………… Tel……………………………. Address……………………………………………………………………………………… …………. Illnesses/operations ……………………………………………………………………………………… Medication required…………………………………………………Blood type……………………… Allergies/drug allergies………………………………………………………………………………….. 22. Name (child 3)………………………………………………………
Nickname…………………. Physical: Age………Height…………….Weight…………..Hair colour………….Eye colour…………………. Glasses?…………… Prescription…………………………………………………………………………….. Scars/identifying marks…………………………………………………………………………………………. Personal data: Sex……..D.O.B……………….Birthplace…………………….Passport…………………… …… Name of School…………………………………………………….Tel……………………………… ………… School Address……………………………………………….Contact………………………………….. If living away from home, tel/address……………………………………………………………………….
Medical: Physician’s name………………………………………….Tel……………………………
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.. .. .. .. Address……………………………………………………………………………………… .. ………..
Dentist’s name…………………………………………………… Tel……………………………. Address……………………………………………………………………………………… …………. Illnesses/operations ……………………………………………………………………………………… Medication required…………………………………………………Blood type……………………… Allergies/drug allergies………………………………………………………………………………….. 23. Name (child 4)………………………………………………………… Nickname…………………. Physical: Age………Height…………….Weight…………..Hair colour………….Eye colour…………………. Glasses?…………… Prescription…………………………………………………………………………….. Scars/identifying marks…………………………………………………………………………………………. Personal data: Sex……..D.O.B……………….Birthplace…………………….Passport…………………… …… Name of School…………………………………………………….Tel……………………………… ………… School Address……………………………………………….Contact………………………………….. If living away from home, tel/address………………………………………………………………………
Medical: Physician’s name………………………………………….Tel…………………………………………… Address……………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………….
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Dentist’s name…………………………………………………… Tel…………………………………………….. Address……………………………………………………………………………………… …………. …………. Illnesses/operations ………………………………………………………………………………………………. Medication required…………………………………………………Blood type………………………………. Allergies/drug allergies………………………………………………………………………………….. ………. 24. Grandchildren? If yes attach separate sheets with same information as for children 25 Household employees: Name…………………………………….Tel…………………………………………. Address……………………………………………………………………………………… ………………………. Name………………………………………………………………… Tel,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, ………………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………… CLIENTS SHOULD PROVIDE: Fingerprints, photographs, voice tapes and handwriting samples of each family member and blueprints of all residences.
RESIDENCE
What are the crime statistics for the neighbourhood
What is the response time for police
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.. .. .. .. .. What is the quality of the fire, police and ambulance services?
Have you introduced yourself to the local authorities? Have you walked /driven around the neighbourhood? Have you introduced yourself to the neighbours? (is there any neighbourhood interaction on security matters) Have you made a notation of neighbours ’vehicle licence plates And description of vehicles? What is the layout of the grounds and surrounding terrain? Have you produced a map or sketch? Are there security problems caused by the terrain, such as ditches, body of water, trees, high point overlooking the house and grounds What delay/deterrent protection is provided by the perimeter? Is there a fence? Is it in good repair and of sufficient height? Is There ahedge? If there is a fence is the gate sturdily built with a good lock? Is the gate locked at night? Is it locked during the day? Is the gate mounting hardware secured so that it cannot be Unfastened to prevent an intruder to enter? Can the gate be unlocked with a remote control device From within the automobile?
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Have shrubbery and trees close to the fence/house been cut back to deny hiding places ? Are there trees, poles, or structures near the fence which could Enable an intruder to more easily climb the fence or avoid contact if there are electronic sensors Has debris been cleared from both sides of the fence?
Is there sufficient lighting for the grounds and the exterior of the house?
Are light power switches well protected?
Is there back up power for all lighting on the grounds And in the house
How many access points to the house and grounds are there (alley, secondary access, road etc) Does someone regularly check the grounds and perimeter to Make certain that fence, gates, locks, lights etc are in good repair And have not been tampered with? Are light bulbs replaced on a regular basis Is the ground sufficiently level around the perimeter to enable the installation of barrier- type intrusion detectors? Are there trees, poles or other obstacles which would hamper the use of invisible barrier-type sensors? Are there animals on the grounds during the night which would preclude there use of motion detectors? 187
.. .. .. .. .. Are there guard dogs?, and if so, who is responsible for handling and exercising them? If not guard dogs, are there (pet) dogs which bark to warn of intruders? Are they secure from intruders?
Is there sufficent lighting to enable the use of CCTV?
Are there guards and if so who is responsible for supervising them Assigning schedules etc?
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Do the guards vary the patrol schedules so as not to be predictable?
Are the guards armed? And if so what is the firepower and condition of their weapons?
Do the guards supply their own weapons, or are these provided by the client?
Do the guards carry radios? And is there a strict code for there use/
Are the guards proprietary? (hired and supervised by the client or agent or provided by a contract services)
If guards provided by contract services, is the liability issue Clearly defined and does the company carry liability insurance?
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.. .. .. .. Have the .. guards, in your opinion been properly trained, particularly In the use of the maintenance of firearms?
Are firearms secured when not in active duty? Are all firearms regularly checked, repaired, cleaned and maintained?
Are weapons licensed and in compliance with local regulations?
Can entrances to the residence be seen from the street or any Area off premises?
Are entrances well lighted?
Are exterior doors of solid core and/or contain steel facing?
Do exterior doors fit and close snugly without gaps or give?
Are there steel/glass security storm doors? Are door hinges well-secured and, if not located on the inside Protected against the removal of the hinge pins?
Are all locks on exterior doors equipped with auxiliary locks?
Have strike plates been used and securely fastened with deep-set screws? 190
Is there glass in the door which could be broken and the lock reached from outside? If so, is the door fitted with a double cylinder lock and the key out of reach from the outside
If there is no glass in the door is there a peephole? Is there a pet entrance which could permit entry by a small person or can a lock be accessed through the pet door
Are all sliding glass doors hung so that the sliding door is mounted on the inside? Are doors secure from being lifted off the sliding door track? Is the jimmy-proof lock or charley bar on all sliding glass doors?
Are all sliding doors of reinforced bullet proof glass? Is the garage door equipped with a good locking system which can be unlocked and opened electronically from inside the vehicle?
Does the garage door automatically clock itself when closed?
Is the garage kept closed and locked at all times? Are vehicles inside the garage kept locked? Is the door from the garage into the residence of solid core and Does it have not only a deadbolt, but an auxiliary lock Opened from the inside Is the door from the basement into the upper floor of solid core And equipped with a deadbolt plus auxiliary lock? 191
.. .. .. .. .. If there is an outside entrance into the basement, has this entrance Been equipped with the same security specifications as other Exterior doors (solid core door, solid fit, solidly emplaced hinge pins, deadbolt lock? Do all outbuildings (storage sheds pool house etc) have sturdy Locks, hasps, and good security? Have trellises and ladders which could be used to gain access To upper floors been removed? Are external fuse boxes, control panels and power sources well secured from environmental hazards and against intrusion? Is there a swimming pool? If there are small children, is pool well secured with a fence, gate, locks and a floating alarm?
Are unused doors and windows permanently Closed and secured/ Have louvre windows been replaced with solid windows Of tempered, shatter proof glass? Do all windows have locks? Are windows kept locked when closed? If windows are opened, can they be locked from in the Open or half open position? Do all windows have screens or storm windows which can be Locked from the inside? Are all of the windows and doors protected either with iron bars Or an alarm system? If so are they (particularly bedroom windows) Equipped with quick release fire escape devices? Are window air conditioners bolted and secured against removal? Are basement and garage windows fully secured? Do any upper floor windows open onto a porch, balcony, or other 192
Structure. If so have they been fully secured? Do all windows have adequate window coverings,(curtains, drapes Shutters) to prevent someone from seeing inside? Are skylights fully secured against intrusion? Is the roof fully secured against intrusion?
If it is a flat roof, has a pole or something been erected to Deter a helicopter attack? Can the roof be accessed by scaling with grappling hooks? Does the master bedroom have a solid core door with a deadbolt Lock and hinge pins which cannot be removed from the outside? Is there either a telephone line or a cellular phone? Has a safe room been designated? Is the safe room equipped with a separate secure telephone Line or a cell phone? Is the safe room rated fire safe for at least one hour? Is the door to the safe room solid core, steel plated, and secured With a deadbolt, strike plate, reinforced door frame, and non-removable hinge pins?
Has the safe room been equipped and stocked with a battery Operated light, fire extinguisher, first aid kit, two-way radio Weapons, and water
Does the residence have an electronic alarm system? Is it an audible or a silent alarm? Is the alarm system connected to a central station? or is it connected to a residence command post?
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.. .. .. .. . Has the .system been recently (and is it regularly tested) Who is responsible for servicing and maintaining the system? Is the system subject to a higher than normal rare of false alarms? Does the alarm system need updating and/or enhancement Or is it adequate? What is the response to an alarm intrusion? What is the response time? Is the residence equipped with panic switches to signal an emergency ? what is the response? Is there CCTV detection system? Is it adequate, with sufficient Lighting? Who is available to monitor the CCTV what is the planned Response to a detection? Do you have layout and a set of blueprints for the residence And the electronic system? Where are they kept?
Is there a fire detection system?
Are batteries regularly checked for the system? Is there back up power? Are fire extinguishers strategically placed around the residence? Who is responsible for charging and maintaining the extinguishers? Are all occupants of the residence trained in the use of the extinguishers? Is the residence equipped with interior fire sprinklers?
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Is there at least one or more folding ladders on the upper floor To facilitate escape in the event of a fire? Do the occupants regularly practice a fire drill? Do the occupants regularly practice an intrusion drill? With retreat to the safe room?
Is there a command post on the grounds or within the residence? Is the command post manned on a twenty four hour basis? Are schedules made and adhered to for the protection team? Are weapons safely secured within the command post\? What form of communication system is available for the Command post is it secure? Is the command post off limits to employees other Than the protection team? Is the command post stocked with: Radios Medical kit Office supplies, table, chairs and bulletin board Typewriter Flashlight Fire extinguisher Extra keys (vehicles, residence) Layout and plans of house and grounds Updated client itinerary Telephone numbers Agent schedules and post assignments Intelligence reports Polaroid cameras Are procedures in place for screening visitors Is there a locking mailbox or arrangements for delivery of mail to the command post? How are deliveries to the residence handles? 195
.. .. .. . are they.. taken to the command post? . Is garbage/trash in a secure area or is it shredded? Do you have names, addresses, and telephone numbers for all staff?
Have the household employees been screened with background checks Has a personal profile been obtained for the client and his family Have family members and household staff been given “security Awareness” training to alert them to excessive wrong numbers and indications of surveillance?
Does family and staff understand the workings of the alarm System and use it?
Are windows and doors kept locked? Does family and staff understand the use of ( and any codes for ) emergency communication procedures? Have serial numbers been recorded for possessions and Have possessions been marked with an ID number? Have family and staff been alerted to the signs of a possible mail or package bomb and been given procedures for handling?
Is there a strict system for key control? Have the client and family been given a security briefing including how to kep a low profile, varying driving routines, defensive driving And crime prevention measures? Have procedures been established with the children’s school 196
Officials To prevent children being picked up by strangers? Do the children have escorts and secure transportation to take then to and from schools?
Do you have make, model and licence numbers of all client And household staff vehicles?
Has the residence been checked for eavesdropping devices?
Are the telephone lines regularly checked against wiretaps?
Apartment/Condominium
In addition to the above the following apartment-specific security details should be checked. All items on the above checklist should be checked and where necessary, security alterations made to the apartment-for example, with doors, locks, hinges, window locks, sliding glass doors etc. What is the history of crime within the building? Have the neighbours in close proximity (either side, above and below) been checked out? Do you believe them to be secure neighbours? Have you introduced yourself to the (close) neighbours within the building Is there a tenant association, and is mutual security an issue which can be established?
How secure overall is the building?
Is someone on duty in the lobby 24 hours a day to screen visitors delivery men, repair/maintenance people? Does the apartment have a balcony (s) which 197
.. .. .. .. could be .. accessed from the outside? Are the apartment’s grounds patrolled?
Are the apartments grounds well lit? Is there an inside parking garage? How secure is the garage against intrusion? Is the garage well lighted? Is there a telephone and/or panic switch located at strategic points within the garage? Is the garage area patrolled? Are you certain that no keys, or master keys to the client’s apartment are in other hands such as the building management? Have background checks been made on building management staff and employees? Is there back up power for the building? Is there an adequate number of elevators in the building? Are the elevators well lit and equipped with a mirror which reveals all occupants? Is there an adequate intrusion detection system in the building? What is the response time to the alarm?
Have you checked to be certain that the extinguishers have been charged and maintained
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Does the building have a fire detection system? Is it well maintained? Are there fire extinguishers in each half of the building? Have you checked the tags to be certain that the Fire extinguishers have been charged and maintained? Is the building well sprinklered?
Is the client’s apartment located within reach of the fire trucks And ladders Does the apartment have its own intrusion detection system? Has the system been properly maintained? What is the location of the nearest emergency hospital? Have you located the primary and secondary routes To the hospital? Have you checked all hallways and exits to determine the best escape route In the event of a fire? Are hallways, stairs and exits free of obstructions, equipped with handrails and well lit?
Can roof doors and skylights only be opened from the Inside and are they kept locked at all times? Are there bars covering roof doors and skylights? Are recreational areas (swimming pools, gym, library) secure and not available to the public? are there outside doors to these areas and are they kept locked from the public? Have you acquired a set of plans or at least a detailed layout of the building? 199
.. .. .. .. .. Office
Is the building propriety to the client, that is Is the client’s company the only one occupying The building If not have you introduced yourself to the other tenants? Have you performed a background check on any of the other tenants? Do any of the tenants present a security problem for your Client either with their employees or their product/service or their inattentiveness to security? Are there building security programs which encourage Interaction between tenants? Is there director of security for the building? What are the crime stats for the neighbourhood? Is there anything about the building, grounds or location that would make it an unusually attractive target for crime or terrorism
Are there any environmental concerns within or about the facility which should be addressed (poor water, asbestos, flooding, etc.)
What is the response time for police? fire? ambulance? What is the quality of the police, fire, and ambulance service?
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Have you established liaison with the police authorities?
Have you walked/driven around he neighbourhood, noting Anything unusual?
Have prior security surveys of the building and grounds Been made and are they available? What are the results of these surveys?
What is the layout of the grounds and surrounding terrain? Have you produced a sketch or map? Are there security problems caused by the terrain such as Ditches, body of water, trees, high point overlooking the facility and grounds
Is access to the facility open or restricted? If open access, is there visitor parking on the grounds? How is employee parking handled? What delay/deterrent protection is provided by the perimeter? Is there a fence? Is it in good repair and of sufficient height and strength is the entry road/street, straight/angular? If there is a fence how many access gates are there? Is/are the gate(s) locked at night? Is the gate mounting hardware secured so that it cannot be Unfastened to permit an intruder to enter?
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.. .. .. .. .. equivalent in strength and security to the fencing? Is the gate Is the main gate manned by a guard? Have shrubbery and trees close to the fence and/or facility been Cut back to deny hiding places? Are there trees, poles or structures near the fence which would enable an intruder to move easily, climb the fence or avoid contact If there are electronic sensors?
Has debris been cleared from both sides of the fence? Is there sufficient lighting for the perimeter, fencing, gates, grounds And the exterior of the facility?
Are light bulbs replaced on a regular basis
Is the lighting sufficient to enable the use of CCTV Are parking lots adequately lighted? Is the lighting mounted so that it is beamed in the direction Of the fencing(in the eyes of intruders) leaving the guards in a nonHighlighted area? Are light (power) switches well protected? Is the lighting tamper proof? Is there back up power for all grounds and buildings? Who is responsible for controlling the lights? Who is responsible for checking and maintaining the lights? How many access points (alley, secondary access road etc) to the grounds and facility are there?
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Is there an interior perimeter road for the use of the guards? Does someone regularly check the grounds and perimeter To make sure that fences locks etc are in good repair And have not been tampered with?
Is the ground sufficiently level around the perimeter to Enable the installation of barrier type sensors?
Are there trees, poles or other obstacles which would hamper the use of invisible barrier type sensors? Are there animals on the grounds during the night which would preclude the use of motion detectors? Are there guard dogs and if so who is responsible for handling and exercising them Are there guards and if so who is responsible for supervising them assigning schedules etc
Are backgrounds checks performed on guards at hiring? Do the guards vary their patrols schedules so as not to be predictable? Are the guards armed, and if so what is the firepower and Condition of their weapons? Do the guards supply their own weapons, or are these provided by the client? Do the guards carry radios? And is there a strict code for their use? Are the guards proprietary hired (hired and supervised By the client or agent) or provided by a contract agency?
If guards are provided by a contract service, is the liability issue clearly defined, and does the company carry liability insurance? 203
.. .. .. .. .. Have the guards in your opinion been properly trained, Particularly in the use of and maintenance of firearms? Are firearms properly secured when not in active duty? Are all firearms regularly checked, cleaned and maintained? Are weapons licensed and compliance with local regulations? Does the facility have an electronic alarm system? • • • • •
Perimeter intrusion detectors? Fence disturbance/motion sensors? Exterior door alarm sensors? Interior motion detectors, microwave, or other sensors? Window sensors?
Is it an audible or a silent alarm system Who will monitor the alarm sensors? Is the alarm system connected to a central station, or is it connected to a command post? If a central station is used are there dedicated telephone lines to carry the signals? Who will respond to an alarm signal? What is the response time? Are there guidelines for a response to an alarm signal? Will the response team be armed? What are the limitations to the response? If the alarm is transmitted from the facility will the response team be able to enter? How? Will they have keys?
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In the event of an alarm signal who on the company staff Will be notified? Has the system been recently (and is it regularly) checked? Who is responsible for servicing and maintaining the system? Is the system subject to a higher than normal rate of false alarms?
Does the alarm system need updating and/or enhancement or is it adequate?
If there are no proprietary guards, who will respond to an alarm signal? What is the response time? Is he facility equipped with panic switches to signal an emergency what is the response? Is there a CCTV detection system? What is the planned response to a detection. Who is available to monitor the CCTV? What is the planned response to a detection? Are all outdoor switches located in weatherproof, tamper resistant Areas? Do you have a sketched layout? And a set of blueprints For the grounds and the electronic system? Are all entrances to the building well lit? Are secondary doors (fire exits) solidly constructed And equipped with panic bars? And otherwise kept locked? Are unused doors securely locked? Is the exterior of the building itself of sufficient strength and integrity to withstand invasion? 205
.. .. .. .. .. Is there an alarm system which controls access through the exterior doors?
Are exterior doors of solid core and/or contain steel facing? Do exterior doors fit and close snugly without gaps or give? Have strike plates been securely fastened with deep-set screws? Are door hinges well-secured and, if not located on the inside Protected against the removal of the hinge pins? Are all locks on exterior doors either deadbolt (with at least a 1”throw) or double cylinder
Is there glass in the door which could be broken and lock reached from outside? If so is the door fitted with a double cylinder lock and the key hung out of reach from the outside If there is no glass in the door, is there a peephole? Are all sliding doors of reinforced (bullet proof) glass? Are all windows within access from the ground connected to the alarm system. Are all windows within access from the ground connected to the Alarm system? Are ground floor windows protested by shatterproof glass and iron bars?
Is the roof accessible from the ground or from adjoining buildings? Have the roof, skylights, ducts, and other accessible entryways been secured? If it is a flat roof has a pole or something been erected to deter A helicopter attack?
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Can the roof be accessed by scaling with grappling hooks? Do you have a layout and/or blueprints of the building? Is there an inside parking garage?
How secure is the garage from intrusion?
Is the garage well lit? Is there a telephone and/or panic button located at strategic points Within the garage Is the garage area patrolled? Has a safe room/area been designated? Is the safe room equipped with a separate secure telephone or A cell phone?
Is the safe room rated fire safe for at least one hour?
Is the door to the safe room solid core, steel plated, and secured With a deadbolt, strike plate, reinforced door frame, and non-removable hinge pins?
Has the safe room been equipped and stocked with a battery Operated light, fire extinguisher, first aid kit, two-way radio Weapons, and water
Is there a fire detection system? Are batteries regularly checked for this system? 207
.. .. .. .. .. Is there back up power?
Are fire extinguishers strategically placed around the facility Are they charged and maintained? Is the facility equipped with interior fire sprinklers? Does the residence have an electronic alarm system? Do the occupants practice a fire drill, how often? Are there lit exits clearly marked? Are there signs by the elevators directing occupants to use the stairs in the event of a fire?
Are procedures in place to handle bomb threats and evacuation?
Are evacuations practiced on a regular basis?
Has a safe assembly area been designated for use in an evacuation?
Are there an adequate number of elevators in the building? Are the elevators regularly inspected?
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Are the elevators well lit and equipped with a mirror Which reveals all occupants? Are all hallways, stairs, and exits free from obstructions, equipped with handrails and well lit? Is there a crisis management team that meets on a regular basis? Is there in place a crisis management plan? Are CMP scenarios and drills practiced? Does top management participate? Does the company carry kidnap/ransom insurance on its top executives? Does the CMP include procedures for handling a kidnap or hostage taking of a top company executive Is there a command post on he grounds or within the facility Is the command post manned on a 24 hour basis? What form of communication system is available for the command Post? Is it secure? Is the command post off-limits to employees other than the protection Team and guards? Is the command post stocked with : Radios Medical kit Office supplies, table, chairs and bulletin board Typewriter Flashlight Fire extinguisher Extra keys (vehicles, residence) Layout and plans of house and grounds Updated client itinerary Telephone numbers Agent schedules and post assignments Intelligence reports Polaroid cameras Is strict key control maintained within the facility? How is this handles?
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.. .. .. .. Is a record kept of al persons issued with and holding .. keys? company What procedures are in place for handling lost keys? are locks changed? Are mail handling procedures in place to alert mail handlers to possible mail and package bombs? Are all deliveries to the building or company space received at a central place? Do all new employees receive security awareness Training as part of their orientation? Are background checks made, and/or references checked on all employees? Are executive briefings prepared for all executives going overseas? What access controls are in place to handle visitors and trades people: • • • • •
At the gate In the lobby In the anteroom of the company offices In restricted areas? At the loading dock
Is it open access within the building for employees or are they restricted to certain areas? What access controls are in place to handle restricted employee access? Are employees badged? Are visitors issued badges, and are these badges collected upon the end of the visit? Is there a visitor escort service? Are outside repair/maintenance people escorted and supervised during their entire visit? Are packages and or briefcases searched? Are stairwells locked from the inside(self locking) Except at the ground floor and each five floors? 210
Do the receptionist/secretary and top execs have a silent distress panic signal? What is the response to the signal? Are rest rooms kept locked?
Are closets and maintenance rooms kept locked? Is an outside cleaning service used? Have they been checked? Are meeting rooms and exec offices regularly checked for eavesdropping devises Are telephone lines secure? Are they regularly checked for wiretaps What procedures are in place to protect proprietary company information? Is there good company security? Is there good company security?
Is the client’s staff (assistants, secretary) willing to assist in providing information to the protection team about the client’s itinerary and plans? Are they cooperative? Is the client’s staff aware of the need to protect the confidentiality Of the client’s itinerary and personal information?
Is the security director aware of the need to work with the protection Team? Have good relations been established?
OVERSEAS If overseas have all the above security measures been followed and upgraded to provide even more in-depth security? Is client and family fully aware of the need to keep a low profile and 211
.. .. .. .. to be even .. more aware of the need for security in a foreign country? Have household employees and company staff, particularly foreign household staff been fully background checked? Have you obtained the names, addresses and telephone numbers for household employees and company staff? Are household employees trained in security awareness and in the handling of mail deliveries and strangers at the door and on the telephone? Have you established contact with local authorities and with the U.S. department of State? Have you prepared an intelligence report and threat assessment for the host country and location? If you have employed a guard service, did you get recommendations From the US Department of State and did you check on the company? Have you communicated with the security personnel in other American companies in your location and discussed mutual security plans in the event of an evacuation?
Have company logos and other identifying marks been removed from client vehicles and residence? Is client’s vehicle of a low profile make and model common to the vehicles of the host company? Have you prepared an emergency evacuation plan in the event that The client and his family must move quickly/ Have you prepared a stock of emergency supplies to be kept at he residence in the event that an emergency prevents you from leaving the country? Are more stringent security measures taken to avoid having a bomb Placed in or near the residence or offices such as : • • •
Removing any bicycle racks adjacent to the building Not allowing unidentified bicycles or vehicles to be parked adjacent to the building Placing covers or screens over all ducts, vents mail slots etc on the building
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• •
Regularly inspecting the public areas of the building to note any unidentified or suspicious objects left there Securing or locking paper towel dispensers, boxes toilet tank tops etc
Have children’s schools been thoroughly checked to be certain they Are safe and reliable? Have school administrators and teachers been given instructions regarding not allowing children to be picked up by anyone other than family agents and other identified individuals Have children been given a code to identify any unknown person contacting them or attempting to remove them from school? Has a code been established with the client which would be used in the event of a kidnapping? Does the corporate crisis management plan cover the Eventuality of a kidnapping or hostage taking? Are you aware of the host country’s national holidays and are you particularly vigilant during these times?
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.. .. .. .. .. VEHICLE & TRANSPORTATION CHECKLIST Is the client’s vehicle of a size and weight that gives comfort and solid safety features?
Does the vehicle have automatic transmission? Have engine, transmission, radiator. Alternator, battery etc been upgraded for the heaviest duty available Is the vehicle equipped with a high intensity spotlight mounted on a swivel? Is the vehicle air conditioned? Does the vehicle have automatic controls for the windows and door locks? Is the vehicle equipped with an alarm system? Can the alarm system be controlled electronically with a hand held Clicker from outside the car? Are tires fully inflated? And are all four tires kept at exactly The same level of inflation? Is the spare tire regularly inspected and kept fully inflated? Is the vehicle in good condition overall? Is it regularly maintained? Who performs the maintenance is the vehicle taken to the same mechanic each time Do you carry in the trunk in addition to the spare tire extinguisher, flashlight, tire sealers, tool kit, tow chain, jack, lug wrench, jumper cables, extra motor oil and engine coolant plus a fully maintained medical kit Does the trunk have an inside latch release to
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flares, fire
permit escape if locked inside Do the hood and gas cap have locks controlled from inside? Is the car armoured? Should it be? Is the window glass bullet resistant? Have the radiator and gas tank been reinforced? A the tires a “ run flat” type which will continue to roll even if Pierced by a bullet Is the vehicle equipped with a cell phone and is it programmed for speed dialling? Do you have a two-way radio Do you keep the gas tank at least half full? Do you keep all doors and windows closed and locked at all times? If the vehicle is not always under your direct control or well Secured do you always perform a quick inspection of the vehicle and its immediate surroundings before getting in?
If the driver is employed for the client’s vehicle has the driver Been briefed as to logistics, safety and security procedures? If permanently employed has the driver been fully trained in executive protection driving procedures and escape and evasion driving manoeuvres? Is the driver aware that travel routes and times should be varied to avoid predictable behaviour? Is the driver aware that in an emergency, he/she must drive away Immediately, even at the cost of the vehicle. Is the driver armed? Has the driver been trained in defensive shooting? Have all identifying marks logos vanity licence plates etc been removed from the vehicle?
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.. .. .. .. .. Have all identifying marks been removed from the parking space used by the vehicle?
When not is use is the vehicle kept locked and inside a locked garage whenever possible? Is there an escort car does it function as the lead vehicle? If a rental limousine and driver have been hired, has the drive been Informed that the agent (rather than the client) will issue instructions? Has the limo driver been given explicit instructions? Are rental vehicles checked as to spare tire, fluid levels etc?
ADVANCES
Pre-Departure Have you put together a preliminary threat assessment? Have you renewed your files to find any prior reports and advance information which might be useful?
Do you have the client’s itinerary and all pertinent information about the proposed trip. This includes: Dates and locations to be visited • Itinerary • Auto/Limo rental agencies to check reservations • Federal state and local law enforcement or intelligence agencies as appropriate • Airline and/or transportation agency being used by advance agent to location If travel is by private aircraft, have captain and crew been alerted? Have you secured information about: • • •
Type of aircraft, call signs and tail number? Anticipated departure and arrival times? General aviation facility of FBO at the departure and arrival sites with telephone numbers 216
• • • •
Ramp stairs required? Storage location for the aircraft at the FBO? Alternate arrival site? Any special arrangements?
ON SITE AT SITE/CITY Observe general layout of the airport, How good is security? How is luggage handled? Will unloading and processing of client in a special place be required? Airline Service Rep contacted for any special handling requests? • Obtain a good map of the area and orient yourself to important ref points and locals • Obtain rental car, revonfirm reservations, discuss any special requirements • Proceed to hotel observing traffic conditions, road conditions and landmarks • Check into hotel. noting parking areas, lobby configuration, elevator locations, restaurants, emergency exits Telephone home office and inquire about any changes in plans? Notify host, sponsor, or contact of arrival, make appointments if appropriate Make appointment to meet with local law enforcement officers HOTEL Meet with general manager or resident (assistant) manager Request meeting with reservations manager, security director, night manager, food and beverage manager, chief hotel telephone operator head bellman, concierge, and head housekeeper At the meeting obtain telephone numbers for the general manager ,resident manager, and key personnel, and explain any special needs for room arrangement, food, access control, screening visitors, handling incoming calls need for privacy and security etc
Obtain all information about hotel restaurants and room service Locations and hours open Room service hours Name of Maitre’d and/or chef Host/hostess Menus Request that all room service orders, mail and packages go to command post Determine if staff wear identification badges Determine what services (barber, beautician, etc) are within the hotel 217
.. .. .. .. .. for protectee and his/her party and determine Select rooms who is in close proximity rooms either side above and below Examine rooms to be certain they are in good repair, safe free of hazardous objects, comfortable and contain any items of special request by the client Check for bugs and wire taps Obtain duplicate keys for all rooms to be used by client Locate emergency exits fie extinguishers, fire hoses, and smoke alarms Establish primary and secondary exit routes for emergency Check fire extinguishers to see if they have been charged Check hallways and stair wells for any obstructions, hand rails and lighting
Select location of command post check for bugs and wire taps
Arrange with head housekeeper to rearrange furniture and obtain chalk board Bulletin board extra waste baskets and bathroom towels Obtain long cord for telephone in command post
Obtain supplies for command post: Local telephone books Pens Paper Legal pads Paper clips Stapler Expense vouchers Time sheet Tags for labelling keys Other supplies and equipment recommended for command post: Folding stock pump shotgun Extra ammunition for shotguns and handguns 5-cell heavy duty flashlight with extra batteries ABC type fore extinguisher Handcuffs or flex cuffs Electrical appliance extension cord Telephone extension cord 218
Long telephone handset cord Small screwdriver set Key block locks Smoke masks for each member of the team Two-way radios , charger and spare batteries Portable alarm system should include: Smoke detector, door motion sensor, and panic alarm for room Alarm annunciator for remote sensors Paging system with sufficient pages for off-duty personnel Medical Kit for command post should include: Oxygen cylinder, regulator and mask Bulky trauma dressings Bandage material Splints Comfort items Aspirin and Tylenol Di-gel, Pepto Bismol Antihistamine Protectee and protective detail medications
Meet with Security Director and ask for a walk through of the hotel Checking entrances, exits, parking, emergency equipment, banquet and conference rooms, kitchens, maintenance, engineering, employee locker rooms, employee entrances and storage areas Determine from Security Director if there have been in the past Or are currently, any particular security problems What is the history of crime within the hotel and the surrounding areas How many security personnel are on the hotel staff? Can they be Utilised to assist in extending special security to client? Determine from Security Director locations of nearest fire station Ambulance service and emergency hospitals Ask Security Director for floor plans of hotel, or make sketches of hotel layout Make certain that there are sufficient baggage handlers with carts Reaffirm all billing arrangements and charges to master ledger
Residence (not belonging to client) See above checklist for residence
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.. .. .. . If alarm..system is not in place attach portable alarms . Determine if a temporary command post can be set up
Determine if a temporary safe room can be set up Determine if al mail, packages delivered to the residence Can be checked first by agents Household staff should be briefed on procedures for handling telephone enquiries and visitors
Obtain a list of service providers garbage collectors, gardeners, pool service etc and aprox times when they are to be in the residence If appropriate conduct an electronic sweep of the premises to determine if there are any eavesdropping devises or wire taps
Restaurants
Obtain floor plans or make sketches Request most secure private tables for client Request privacy and confidentiality for them Check exits, restrooms and access to telephones Determine where to park protectee vehicle Make arrangements for feeding protective agents Make reservations and arrangements for billing or payment Determine primary and secondary routes to nearest emergency Hospital with trauma unit Determine primary and secondary routes to restaurant from client’s location
Ballrooms, Banquets and Auditoriums Meet with liaison person for host committee, banquet manager facility manager and program manager Obtain telephone numbers for these people What is the purpose of this function What is the program How many attending What is the suggested dress Request that all awards and gifts be mailed to protectee 220
Determine seating arrangements ask to see function sheet Will client be seated at head table, if so what is below and behind table And how is it accessed Is there a buffer in front of the front table Examine podium, raised platform, stage, steps and chairs for loose Carpet, wires, and general stability Are stairs to podium well lit or should tape be fixed Obtain a floor plan of the facility, showing entrance and exit routes Under normal and emergency conditions, fire extinguishers, restrooms Telephones, holding room and parking Select and indicate agent posts on floor plan Determine if protectee can be brought in through special entrance Identify control boxes for heat, air, light and sound. Are they secure? Is there back up power? Where will protectee’s vehicle be parked? Will it be secure under constant supervision Who is handling security for the event? How large is the security Staff/ Have there been any problems associated with either the event, the facility or the neighbourhood?
Do a walk through of the facility Make arrangements for agent meal tickets Determine what will be needed for access control Is entry free and open to the general public Were tickets sold, at what price Is the event invitation only Are invitations numbered and cross referenced by name on a master list May guest who chooses not to attend give his invitation to another How many people are expected Where is the main control point Who will be there to check invitations? Who will handle guests who have forgotten or lost invitations Are handbags and parcels to be searched by whom Will metal detectors be required How will access via service or stage entrance be limited to authorised personnel 221
.. .. .. .. How will personnel be identified .. authorised How will exits to restroom and re-entry to ballroom be dealt with Have arrangements been made and space been provided for the media is the space contained in some way Has a press room been set up is it adequate Will bystanders and hecklers standing outside be contained in a roped off area Establish primary and secondary travel routes to the closest emergency hospital
Outside events Establish liaison with event sponsors and obtain details as listed Above A diagram or sketch should be made A walk through should be conducted of the entire area Is the area fenced Is there high ground overlooking the event area (stage) can it be secured Who is handling security for the event? How large is the security Staff Is it a seated affair Can attendees and spectators be confined behind ropes or barricades Have ”friendlies” been contacted to fill the front sections of the Roped off areas Has space and arrangements been made for the media Is there a “foul weather” plan Do you have a large umbrella for the protectee If it is a night event who is handling the lighting and will they be on hand for the event Is there back up power Determine primary and secondary routes to the event Determine primary and secondary travel routes to the closest emergency hospital
Ground Transportation Are you dealing with a large reputable rental car agency Have reservations and billing arrangements been made and re-conformed Does the car/Limo have an automatic transmission Is it air conditioned Does it have an alarm system and can it be controlled from outside Are tires fully inflated Is the spare tire in good condition Check fluid levels and conduct a general examination of under-the-hood mechanism Test all controls –air conditioning, heat, power locks etc Rental car or limo should have in the trunk, jump leads jack small tool kit an lug wrench Trunk should be equipped with flares flashlight tire sealers tow chain motor oil fully maintained medical kit
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If using a limo has driver been briefed and given a typed list of instructions Report with a clean car and a full gas tank-refill at night Speak only when spoken to Stay with limo at al times unless relieved Driver does not open and close doors If trunk needs to be opened use the interior release Don’t drink alcoholic beverages prior to or during work Don’t eat in the car Don’t smoke in the car Obey all traffic laws Do not turn on radio unless requested In high profile motorcade keep headlights on Keep one car length between vehicles Follow agent recommended travel routes Follow instructions of security agent rather than the client Establish duress code and emergency procedures
Is the car/limo equipped with a cell phone or a two-way radio Obtain duplicate vehicle keys Is an escort car to be rented, if so all of the above should be checked Where will the vehicles be parked Is there a contingency plan for what will be done if the limo or rental car breaks down? Do you have name, home telephone number and address for limo driver Have you picked a primary and secondary route to ach destination to be visited by client Have you tested the routes during rush hour, at night and at times similar to when the event will take place Are the maps clearly marked and easily read
Charter or Corporate Aircraft Have captain and crew been alerted to departure and travel schedules? Filld in flight plan and alternate foul weather plan? Have arrangements been made for ramp steps if needed? Is de-icing equipment available What is the length of the runway and will it accommodate the aircraft Do you know the hours of airport operation Do you have the telephone numbers and names of airport operations people Is there a VIP holding area at the local and site FBOs Where are restrooms and telephones Are there any customs regulations and clearances Are there special requests for food equipment etc Obtain a diagram or ma of airport and ramp areas be sure to brief all drivers on primary and secondary routes into and out of the airport Brief drivers on the primary and secondary routes to the hospital from the airport Will aircraft be guarded when unoccupied Are aircraft crew fully aware of security procedures 223
.. .. .. .. Establish security posts .. anysecurity If additional is needed ask the operations supervisor for recommendations for an outside security company What is the aircraft identifying information After a departure wait several minutes and then notify advance agent at next stop that party is on its way
Emergency Services Where is the nearest hospital with shock/trauma unit and a doctor on 24 hour duty to the hotel or site? Have you established primary and secondary routes to the hospital from the hotel, event etc Do you know the locations of the emergency entrances Is there suitable landing site for a helicopter Is there a VIP room Is ther a room for security and staff What is the response time for the fire department to the various locations. What is the response time and quality of service of the ambulance emergency services
Foreign Advances Do you have a valid passport which will not expire in less than six months Do you have the appropriate visa for the countries to be visited Have you received the appropriate shots Do you have a supply of medicines for colds, allergies, diarrhoea etc Do you have an international drivers licence Do you have valid credit cards Do you have a small amount of local foreign currency Do you have a relevant current guidebook Have you considered prepaying an amount to your credit card companies so as to extend your credit Have you purchased travellers checks Have you given careful consideration to the choice of air carrier Have you booked an “open” return flight Are you carrying a supply of prescribed medicines and do you have a copy of your prescription Have you noted serial numbers of and declared any firearms and packed them away unarmed in the stowed luggage Have you made copies of your passport and visa information credit card numbers Have you committed to memory a few basic phrases of the local languages Will you need an interpreter
Wrap Up Have you collected all expense vouchers and submitted a final expense report Have you written thank-you letters and filed your notes
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Close Protection Driver Brief. The overall rule during all vehicle mounted close protection details is that the CP agent is the vehicle commander, not the client and it is the CP agent who will issue orders in order for him/her to be effective in his/her duties. The following points are some do’s and don’ts for the driver: •
Report with a clean vehicle and a full gas tank.
•
Ensure that he/she has thoroughly checked the vehicle for suspicious activity or objects and that the vehicle is fully serviceable before beginning any programmes.
•
Speak only when spoken to. Unnecessary chatter cannot only be unwanted, but can pose a problem if the agent is concentrating on traffic, route, hazards etc
•
Do not leap out of the vehicle to open the door for the client, the agent will open and close the client’s door.
•
Once the client and the agent are inside the vehicle ensure the central locking is applied and the doors remain locked until the vehicle has arrived at the designated location. The windows must remain closed. If the client wishes a window to be open, ensure it is only open by a maximum of 2.5 inches to prevent opportunist attacks and objects being thrown into the vehicle.
•
Do not leave the vehicle unattended. Stay with the vehicle at all times unless you are relieved. Provisions will be made for the meals, restroom breaks, etc. If you must leave the vehicle, you are to notify the agent, the command post, or other drivers as to where you can be reached, how long you will be gone, and the reason for leaving the vehicle. The agent should carry a spare set of keys for the vehicle and another set kept at the command post. The advance agent should ensure that all drivers know how to and are able to contact the agent and command post.
•
When the vehicle arrives at its destination, the vehicle doors should be unlocked by the driver, the engine is kept running and in drive, and the driver remains behind the wheel helping the agent with observation of possible threats. Do not open and close doors for the client or the agent. The agent riding in the passenger seat of the vehicle will open his door only when he is satisfied that it is safe to do so and then he will open the clients door whilst observing the area for potential threats.
•
If the trunk needs to be opened then it should be released by the driver using the release catch from within the vehicle. Do not remove the keys from the ignition in the event that it is necessary to leave immediately.
• •
Alcoholic beverages must not be drunk within twelve hours prior to reporting for work or during work. Do not drink any beverage whilst driving. Food should not be eaten in the car, nor should the vehicle be used to drive to an eating establishment. The agent will arrange for meals. If it should become necessary to eat in the car, the vehicle must be completely cleaned and aired before the protectee returns.
•
Do not smoke in the vehicle at any time even if you are alone within the vehicle.
•
Drive smoothly, safely, and conservatively, obeying traffic laws and wear your seat belt. Stop, start, and turn gradually and smoothly, signalling turns well in advance. Pace your
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.. .. .. .. so that you do not run yellow lights. This is especially important if there is a follow..driving up vehicle. Do not sound the horn except in an emergency. •
When approaching red lights slow down and cruise slowly up to the traffic lights keeping the vehicle moving, a moving vehicle is safer than a stationary vehicle.
•
When bringing the vehicle to a halt at a stop sign or traffic lights ensure there is enough space between your vehicle and the vehicle ahead for you to drive around and escape if necessary to do so.
•
Do not turn the radio on unless requested to do so by the protectee or agent. Establish if the protectee has any favourite stations and pre-program the radio stations. If not then preprogram the stations to classical, easy listening and a good news station.
•
In a high profile motorcade, keep the headlights on.
•
In a motorcade or convoy, drivers should remain at least one vehicle length from the vehicle ahead of them. The distance should be such that the vehicles do not run into each other, and at the same time do not allow other vehicles to get in-between. If a problem develops with a vehicle then that vehicle should drop out rather than hold up the motorcade unless it is the VIP vehicle at which point a soft vehicle change should be carried out. A hard vehicle change is carried out only when under attack and the VIP vehicle has been immobilised.
•
If the destination is reached during darkness the vehicle lights should be on full beam and should be pointed away from location in an attempt to blind any potential attacker.
•
The driver must ensure he is furnished with maps and route cards to locations and acknowledge that he/she has a full understanding of all routes and locations. If he/she does not, then inform the agent immediately.
Your professionalism and co-operation is appreciated. Written by: Damian Rawcliffe
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CLOSE PROTECTION NOTES Personal Security – 5 Main Principles 1. 2. 3. 4.
Situation Awareness Avoid Routine (SAFER) Follow security procedures Exercise Common Sense and Initiative
Remain Anonymous or show strength
Situation Awareness: Accept threat exists Be vigilant (work and leisure) Be suspicious
Cautious approach Avoid Routine Different routes (find & destroy the routine before Different time the terrorist does it to you) Avoid Patterns 9visiting same places) Follow security procedure Establish procedures for Home/Office/Family/Travel Follow the procedures Make them workable Practice what you preach
Exercise common sense and imitative
(# do not panic # use any means at your disposal to counter the threat:
*religion/knowledge of terrorist group ) Remain anonymous or show strength Remain anonymous:
Low profile 227
.. .. .. .. Reservations in a different name .. phone Ex-directory numbers Dress conservatively Do not display jewellery Do not display cash Nothing to allow people to think you are a person of status Show strength (if anonymity is impossible) Make the attacker believe the attack would: Not succeed Show professionalism Strength in numbers (golden rule don’t show weapons) Attacker must believe in your ability (Alertness)
THE THREAT Persons Posing the threat Mentally unstable Criminals Mobs and dissidents Terrorists
(*special population groups druggies etc) * Protesters *Press *Enthusiastic crowd)
THE TERROIST THREAT The use of force or the threat of force by individuals or organisations to achieve by illegal means their political or ideological aims “Kill one terrify a thousand”
PROFILE OF A TERRORIST Age: 20-40 Middle class Educated Knows his aims Left wing extremist Regular job
TERROIST GROUP STRUCTURE Command Support Supply Active – (no ties)
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TERROIST ATTACKS Bombings Stand off attacks ( Snipers, morters, cyber terrorism –computers) Close quarter attacks Hostage taking
TERRORIST OPERATING PROCEDURES Target group identification Initial reconnaissance of target Target selection Close target reconnaissance Planning Execution Exploitation Lessons learnt
THREAT ASSESSMENT Intelligence sources G1 - Manning G2* G2 – SY (Land/Sea/Air) Request through chain of command G3 – Ops/Trg Low level intelligence(local security forces) G4 - Logistics Other CP teams G5 -PR Media SO3 - Capt SO2 - Maj SO1 – Lt Col
AIM OF THREAT ASSESSMENT Most likely: form of attack Place of attack Time of attack
ASSESSMENT Must be:Clear Current Correct
ANALYSE THE PRINCIPLE Why is he/she going to be a threat Current employment Previous employment Who he/she is
IDENTIFY THE ENEMY Type of people or organisation Reduce lists (No of organisations are reduced through time) ID the groups/individual Capabilities Active areas Capable of activity in area 229
.. .. .. .. ..
STUDY THE ENEMY Individuals making up the group The group: Names Aliases Descriptions Histories
FAVOURITE MODUS OPERANDI (MO) • recent attacks • present capabilities ( it should now be possible to reduce the most likely areas of attack)
RECENT ATTACKS – PRESENT CAPABILITIES
(Study the programme) Identify locations Identify timings Take this into account: Traffic conditions Routines Buildings Terrorist weaponry Weakness in perimeter/building Vehicle security
CONCLUSION Interpretation of all available intelligence Vulnerable elements of operation Allocation of protection resources
SUMMARY Accurate threat assessment trial Update it regularly Use new information as it becomes available
REACTION TO ATTACK PHASES OF RESPONSE IMMEDIATE ACTION STABILISATION PROCEDURE COUNTER ACTION IMMEDIATE ACTION (DRILL) PRINCIPALS: Remove or reduce the threat Place assets between the threat and the VIP Remove the principal from the threat 230
STABILISATION PROCEDURE (find) Containment (fix location/strength) Precise situation (known information) Imprecise situation (N/K information)
COUNTER ACTION Carried out by other agencies
(last resort “strike)
ORGANISATION OF A CP TEAM Composition Team Leader 21/C
RST
PES
SAP
BG
CAT
QM
TEAM LEADER Rank ranges between Sgt – Maj depending on the size of the team and task, usually a SSgt
RESPONSIBILITIES : Command and Tasking of team Obtaining threat assessment Learn about VIP Obtain the VIP’s programme Detail people to carry out recces and liaison where required Make an appreciation Deliver orders/brief team
SECOND IN COMMAND
Rank ranges between Cpl – Capt RESPONSIBILITIES: Prepared to resume command of the team at short notice or in the team leaders absence Involved in the planning from the onset 231
.. .. .. .. ..
RESIDENT SECURITY TEAM (RST) Man power from 1 person up to 3 RESPONSIBILITES: Security of building Running of ops room (24 hrs a day) Searching of residence Securing the location Provides internal security Responsible for VIP family on his return
PERSONAL ESCORT SECTION (PES) 4X PERSONS – Normally used when the threat is extremely high ROLE: Accompany the VIP when mobile or on foot Support BG Overt deterrent First line of defence Obtrusive Recces as directed Accompany and protect VIP whilst out of residence Carry out anti surveillance Provide 360 protection
SECURITY ADVANCE PARTY (SAP) ROLE: Check the routes in advance of the VIP Search and secure locations Manpower due to size of team Remain in location throughout time of visit Check the route and location in advance and remain in situ (friendly face) Security covert (discreet/overt) Ant-surveillance drills Liaise with team De-buss and Em-buss points Check entrance points Check routes Establish comms
BODY GUARD (BG) COUNTER ATTACK TEAM (CAT) ROLE: Back up team
Covert protection Can act as a lazy (PES)
QUARTER MASTER (QM) Usually A Cpl ROLE: 232
Feeding Equipment Vehicles VEHICLE/BUILDING
SEARCH
Vehicle search – 7 stages Surrounding area (systematically Perimeter check (drains, bushes, debris etc) 4 man team = T/L, scribe + 2 searching)
COACH WORK (If vehicle not in use must be: Body work (paint scratched, grease marks #attended, anything odd!) # guarded, # secured )
UNDERNEATH, WHEELS & ARCHES (hands on)
#must be searched if
left unattended
BOOT Don’t forget spare wheel (loose items etc) (#don’t just look for explosives #cut cables #Loose wheel nuts #Draining of fluids #Loose plugs and leads #Bugging devises)
INTERIOR Look inside first then open rear door, search rear first then move forward (”then look into cockpit”)
ENGINE (Visual and then hands on) Washer bottle Heat/cooler ducts Bonnet itself
FINAL TEST Test all controls, move vehicle, brake test
BUILDING SEARCH
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.. .. .. .. the threat triad First assess .. Terrorist aim –(kill or severely maim) Location (routes, (drive ways, entrances etc: recce inquire as to local ???) Type of threat –(what form, surrounding areas/building try to think like a terrorist – plan ahead) VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT Size of device Building structure Red, amber, green (RAG) method of search (3 zone Red = extreme hazard Amber =Suffering injuries Green = Possible injuries )
THE SYSTEMATIC SEARCH All four walls –( Liase with building security – Ask about any building work strange builders) Ceiling -(Roof panels etc) Floor (Fitting of carpets, lumps oddities etc) Furniture - (Look different out of place) Outside areas –( Grounds)
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS CLEAR – escape routes and evacuation areas CLEAR – Ops room/set up plans CONDUCT – search –RAG method SECURE –areas
ACTION UPON DISCOVERING AN IED Don’t touch it Obtain a description – draw a picture Inform TL Mark where the device is physically Wedge doors and windows No radios/flash cameras
ACTION BY TL CONFIRM CLEAR CORDON CONTROL CONTROL POINT CHECK (possible secondary device) Task agencies Inform SUSPICIOUS OBJECT (use staff local to area who may know what it is)
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ROYAL MILITARY POLICE UNIT PROTOCOL The etiquette with regard to people’s rank and status –where the art of acceptable behaviour, speech and dress is required. BEHAVIOUR On duty Off duty ON DUTY Timings Compliments Personal Opinion Confidentiality (keep to yourself) Over familiarity and fraternisation Honesty – (don’t bluff if you don’t know) Remain approachable (don’t be awkward, be friendly, try to get on) DISTURBING AND ANNOYING HABITS Picking your nose Adjusting the crotch Belching Breaking wind Revving the engine Slamming doors Tuttting Chewing gum Muttering OFF DUTY Alcohol Sex DRESS Acceptable to the VIP Conservative Suitable to the task (ask VIP what is suitable for the function) Clean and well pressed PERSONAL HYGIENE Odour (smoke) Appearance
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WALKING FORMATIONS PRINCIPLES OF WALKING FORMATIONS Adaptability Correct spacing - dependant on: Threat level Principals wishing Spacing of the PES Spacing of the BG VIP’s image Observation (360 degrees at all times)
BOX FORMATIONS
SG
SG
VIP
BG
SG
TL
Direction of travel
DIAMOND FORMATIONS
SG
SG
VIP
“V”
FORMATION BG
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TL
SG
Direction of travel
4th member can be used to stay with car FORMATION SPACING
OPEN FORMATIONS Open box Open diamond Open “v” CLOSED FORMATIONS Closed box Closed diamond Closed “v”
REACTION TO ATTACK PRINCIPALS Remove or reduce the attack Place your assets between the threat and the VIP Remove the VIP from the threat
TYPES OF ATTACK Verbal attack Physical attack Knife attack Gun attack Long range sniper Grenade attack
BUILDING SECURITY LOCATIONS Residence Office 237
.. .. .. .. RESIDENCE ..
Can be in two environments Urban Rural
URBAN points of interest Good emergency response time Good communications Ease of access Ease of evacuation Lack of privacy Cover for enemy surveillance Overlooking buildings
RURAL Privacy Difficult for surveillance teams to merge with locals Emergency response times are slow Routes to and from a rural residence are limited Communications are difficult More ground to protect TYPES OF BUILDINGS
Bungalows Terraced house Country House Barracks/Embassy compound Apartment Hotel
CONSTRUCTION External considerations Internal considerations EXTERNAL Location Perimeter Grounds Buildings Doors – steel core door-drop bar Windows/skylights
INTERNAL VIP suite Safe room Staff quarters Guest room Public rooms
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RESIDENCE SECURITY Outer cordon Intermediate cordon Inner cordon
OUTER CORDON Area up to the outside of the perimeter fence Controlled by police &/or security forces Perimeter fence should provide an effective physical barrier
INTERMEDIATE CORDON Area from the perimeter fence to the residence outer wall Controlled by RST Should be a guard to control access who must consult RST prior to admitting anyone into the residence grounds INNER CORDON Area consists of the inner security of the residence including control of access into the building Controlled by RST RST Team leader (TL) should personally introduce all team members to the VIP, Host and all house staff members at the earliest opportunity
CONDUCT OF RST They need to be discreet Tactful Maintain strict residence security No smoking Keep noise and movement to a minimum especially at night Remain smartly dressed Do not fall asleep Do not show off with weapons Keep the Ops room tidy Respect the principals’ privacy and remember you are in his house Do not enter the VIP suite or study
DUTIES OF THE RST] As well as providing a 24 hr manned Ops room, the RST is responsible for the security of the residence as well as the principle when he is at the residence Answering the phone Answering the door Checking the post Regular security checks Handover/takeover – any program changes Locking and opening up procedures Night time routine
EMERGENCY DRILLS Fire procedure Bomb threat/hoax
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.. .. .. .. OFFICE .. SECURITY
Locate VIP office on an upper floor BG office located near to VIP Safe room located next to VIP PA office next to VIP Waiting room for visitor
SITUATION AWARENESS OBSERVATION Attention Perception Conclusion
ATTENTION Involuntary Voluntary Habitual SUNMMARY Aware of what you see – look for signals Vet – is it relevant Discard Recognise – pick up on danger signals
SIGNS OF DANGER Obvious – ambush men with guns Situation signs – things in the environment Behavioural signs – body language AMBUSH PRINCIPLES
All approaches covered Ambush must have depth Ambush must be protected
TERRORIST CAPABILITIES Block escape from both directions – will use vehicles Will have a means of: Defeating armour Forcing the VIP to exit from vehicle Neutralise escort Protect itself and escape
AMBUSH SITTING Natural defile Few target escape routes Target approach observed Good terrorist escape routes
VIP OFFICE Solidly constructed door Windows armoured/laminated Alarm system for VIP –through to BG Curtains/blinds for windows Position VIP desk away from view PROCESSING OF VISITORS 240
Other VIPSs Business callers Social callers OTHER VIPs On arrival reception Inform PA VIP or PA meets visitor & guide to office BG in attendance On departure reverse procedure carried out
BUSINESS CALLERS On arrival reception inform PA Visitor called forward to PA office – BG in attendance – if necessary visitor searched Visitor seen by VIP Visitor will depart in accordance with normal drills – get someone to show them out
SOCIAL CALLERS If family allows unhindered access Visitors other than family treat as per business callers
AMBUSH SIGNS Natural defile No target escape No warning Fire positions Terrorist escape Marker Pedestrian Occupied vehicles Most of the signs are fixed Think like a terrorist Identify areas of risk Look for other signs
BEHAVIOUR SIGNS STRESS Pooling Hair stands on end Sweating White face Adrenaline
DEPLACEMENT ACTIVITY Filling in time – window shopping/reading Mask his true intentions Over emphasised
CLOSED BODY SIGNS Limbs crossed – hiding intentions Frequent touch of face – nervous = DANGER Sudden movement to open posture
MENTAL CONDITION STATES GREEN:-
Unaware of surroundings –2-4 seconds to react
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.. .. .. .. YELLOW:Relaxed alert no specific focus ..General caution, receptive to “triggers” ORANGE:- Specific alert tactical appreciation – legal decision, preparation RED:aggressive
Flight imminent, mental trigger – then you know what to do with: weapon & be
** Never lapse into condition GREEN Where possible remain at YELLOW Move to ORANGE in known danger situation Prepare as much as possible before the flight Lower conditions as soon as possible “Where observation is concerned, chance favours only the prepared mind”
SURVEILLANCE/AWARENESS The systematic observation by covert or overt means of a person
WHO WILL CARRY IT OUT? Terrorists Criminals Press Foreign Intelligence Agencies To ID a CP team Manpower Weapons Vehicles Method of operation Capabilities Alertness
SURVEILLANCE TEAM Trained/not trained Man power –women & men Vehicles Equipment – cameras, radios, wpms
TYPES OF SURVEILLANCE Foot Mobile Static
Ops – Long term/temporary Rural -Urban
Technical
Optics, phone taps, cameras 242
Aerial
very costly
METHODS OF OPERATION Aim: Why are they doing it? Start point: Where the target is? Press, house staff, CP team on the piss Walk pasts & close target recces (CTRs) help to gain info Stake out covering all options Follow The housing, if the target stop the team surrounds the target & coves all options
VEHICLE ANTI-AMBUSH Protect the VIP Remove the VIP from danger Choose the operative drill Don’t attack the ambush Fast & aggressive action Beware of the decoy – secondary attack
TYPES OF ANTI-AMBUSH Drive through Block front Block front and rear Vehicle change over
ONE CAR DRILLS DRIVE THROUGH BG shouts “Get down” Vehicles move away from the main threat, accelerates, lights and horn, nearest safe house BG returns fire BG sends contact report BLOCK FRONT BG shouts “get down” VIP stops if you can’t ram the block BG returns fire Vehicle reverses out of killing zone VIP vehicle turns BG sends contact report
BLOCK FRONT AND REAR BG shouts “get down VIP vehicle stops BG returns fire Vehicle reverses until rear block is there Assess where the main threat/fire power is coming from Vehicle moves away/Adopts/vehicle position putting the vehicle between you and threat Exit vehicle to the protected side Deploy smoke/driver engages enemy BG controls VIP & considers extraction BG/VIP extract goes to nearest safe house Send contact report
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.. .. .. .. TWO CAR .. DRILLS DRIVE THROUGH BG shouts “get down” VIP vehicle moves away from ambush – horn and lights PES moves towards ambush and returns fire – run people down Send contact report Safe house BLOCK FRONT BG shouts “get down” VIP vehicle stops and reverses lights and horn PES moves in front –deploys smoke PES vehicle returns fire PES/VIP reverse back together, PES giving cover to VIP Vehicles turn when able Safe House Contact report
BLOCK FRONT AND REAR BG shouts “get down” VIP vehicle stops and reverses lights and horn PES moves in front returns fire and deploys smoke PES reverses back providing cover for VIP vehicle Rear block goes in is spotted Assessment of main threat/fire power VIP vehicle moves away and adopts “vehicle position” PES vehicle forms a 2T” or a “V” PES deploy return fire and lay smoke PES command decides on extraction BG extract VIP from vehicle BG/VIP & PES aggressively withdraw to cover/safe house Send contact report
VEHICLE CHANGEOVER There must be a change to drive out of ambush (VIP vehicle is u/s) BG shouts “get down” VIP vehicle will stop =vehicle position if possible PES vehicle stops beside VIP vehicle – must be protected side PES driver remains in vehicle/PES deploy BG/VIP change vehicle PES vehicle extracts from area to nearest safe house PES and VIP driver extract by foot Send contact report
CAT TEAM DRILLS Options: a) Stop short – flanking attack b) Stop short – go firm (A) One CAT team member will remain with vehicle – if there is more than two CAT team move into flanking position CAT attack enemy 244
Once VIP is away and extracted they break of attack CAT extract to nearest safe house (B) CAT go firm – 360 degrees cover Inform BG/VIP BG/VIP find/manoeuvre to CAT location BG/VIP drive to nearest safe house Rest of CAT extract themselves
SURVEILLANCE AWARENESS A system of drills used by CPT to detect &/or evade surveillance
TYPES Types Covert Overt
PASSIVE Maintain personal security skills (PSS) Beware - look round check mirrors etc Be suspicious of people/vehicles Avoid routine Be methodical – don’t take short cuts Good communications – telling people information
COVERT The employment of apparently normal acts, which may cause an abnormal reaction
ON FOOT Use a busy shopping centre Use escalators and lifts Identify possible stake out and trigger locations Use quiet open areas such as parks and country walks Use a different drop off and pick up location
MOBILE Variations of speed Not using vehicles immediately Short trips Minor traffic violations Use of indicators
OVERT
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.. .. .. .. Drills carried .. out openly to evade surveillance COUNTER-SURVEILLANCE Use of a 3rd party to identify surveillance on a briefed individual (CP Team) Collect – Speak to a member of the team Sift what’s important and what’s not use a matrix system Assess Brief - tell the higher authority Plan Acting - act out the plan
REACTION TO ATTACK
BUILDING – RTA 3 PHASES 1 Immediate action 2 Stabilisation 3 Counter action 1A Remove/reduce the threat Place assets between the threat & the VIP Remove the principle from the threat
STABILISATION Team must aim to stabilise the situation Avoid aggressive posture unless necessary Prevent the situation from deteriorating CONTAINMENT Surround the incident Fix the enemy’s location, strength and condition 2
SITUATIONS Be precise Imprecise Precise is when we know
Composition of the enemy Strength of the enemy Capabilities of the enemy 246
Location of the enemy All of these are known
(location of VIP)
Imprecise This is a situation when one or more of the previous factors are unknown
FURTHER POINTS If the enemy have VIP: *Prevent escape *Negotiate *Gain time – can be done by negotiating *Gather information *Line of compromised authority – move tactfully so you’re not seen by enemy *Window of opportunity
COUNTER ACTION Will only go into a building to rescue VIP –(fire, bomb, rounds going through safe room door) Only go in as a last resort COMBAT APPRECIATION Ground Situation (surrounding area) Aim – save VIP Enemy – how professional are they? CALCULATED PLAN Keep the plan simple It must be structured around protecting VIP Covert entry/overt entry – distraction SUMMARY Find principle Fix enemy’s location Strike (react)
VEHICLE EM-BUS & DE-BUS DRILLS Principle is extremely vulnerable when moving from/to a vehicle Risk is higher when VIP is being picked up /dropped off
BASIC FORMS Orthodox Unorthodox
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.. .. .. .. ORTHODOX ..
When the vehicle is stationary & the VIP can de-bus on the same side of the vehicle as the entrance
FACTORS - visits Official engagement Private engagement Unscheduled stop
OFFICIAL ENGAGEMENT A pre-planed visit to an event & may be known/anticipated by others who pose a threat May be advertised in media
PRIVATE ENGAGEMENT These include recreational visits normally outside working hours, although pre-planned it will not be advertised and should not be known to others who pose a threat
UNSHEDULED STOP This would include a visit at short notice not pre-planned
BG EM-BUS CONSIDERATIONS Vehicle in position Stop close to pick up point 360 degrees observation by BG and driver 1BG informs Driver when VIP is arriving at vehicle Driver always has gear engaged Driver & 1BG identify escape routes
PLANNING A CP OPERATION
FACTORS The principle’s profile The threat The programme Recces An appreciation An Op order
PRINCIPLE’S PROFILE ADC’s, PA’s, older CP teams Pen picture to include career profile Family and friends 248
Description – height and build Medical info-blood group, conditions Likes and dislikes Attitude to CP Category of VIP THE THREAT -Person(s0 who pose threat –terrorist-criminal-psychopath-crank-demonstrators -Methods of operation:- assassination, kidnap, hostage, instilling of fear, surveillance -Gathering intelligence:- G2 Branch, Int & Sy, embassy Sy Offrs, reliable civilian Sy, police agencies, other CP teams -Levels of protection:- Cat 1 VIP in danger/an attack can be expected Cat 2 VIP is in some danger an attack can not be ruled out Cat 3 VIP is at threat CAT 1 PROTECTION BG, full PES Protection at place of work & places visiting Use of armoured vehicles Counter-attack team Use of electronic fortifications
CAT 2 PROTECTION BG PES – reduced form Some of the measures of CAT 1
CAT 3 PROTECTION May be given a BG and a PES Residence and place of work may be patrolled by Police and other agencies Places frequented by VIP may be given attention
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THE PROGRAMME Obtained early & discussed daily to see if there are any changes Available form :- ADC, PA,MA or the VIP
TYPES OF ENGAGEMENTS Official Private
(*Check programme for errors, seating plans, guest lists car passes, weather arrangements accom, and feeding arrangements programme establish places to get changed /medical facilities, evacuation plan)
OFFICIAL Civilian locations:Formal functions Black tie dinners, banquets, public speeches and cocktail parties Military/Embassy locations:Military tattoos, official calls, remembrance day, ceremonial functions, places at work
PRIVATE Recreational – Golf, tennis, walking etc Sight seeing – museums, art galleries Evening entertainment – cinema, meals, drinks, opera Travel – railway, airports
TIMINGS Accurate Realistic *both to be determines on the recce phase *visit locations and do drives as per the programme
DRESS Should always be practical & and be able to carry out drills Should always compliment the principle –VIP in a suit BG in a suit Never out dress the principle Always choose clothes that blend in with the environment Always have sufficient clothes for the task – possible overnight stays Prior to tasks BG to confirm with VIP reference dress codes
TRANSPORT Flying programme Principle travelling another vehicle 250
The principle driving himself Walking remember back up vehicle
RECONNAISSANCE Map appreciation –routes/roads Identify locations to be visited
ROUTES Known routes Clear the routes – road works Personal security No recce report/route card required
9phone AA – teletex)
Unknown routes Full drive/walk by team Full recce reports Route card Good map appreciation Check programme for accuracy – timings are ok Check comms when out and about Recce main route and alternative route Drive routes the same times and day
LOCATIONS Full recce reports produced Good map appreciation – look for places of interest in the area that the VIP might visit Em-bus/De-bus points (video/photograph? –location) Entry/exit points to the buildings Vulnerable points –(when in open) Safe room inside each location (access at short notice) Emergency RV points Actions on Comms check 360 degrees protection at all times Use the team to the full Car parking & vehicle security vehicles not to be left unattended Existing Sy measures
EQUIPMENT Recce report/route cards Maps Stationary Dictaphone Camera Camcorder Watch
LIAISON With the organisers and planners of the event Military/embassy officials Other Sy agencies 251
.. .. .. .. Other CP .. teams Civil police and SB Airport/Port Sy staff – for VIP flying in RECCE REPORTS
(safe houses and police stations)
COMMUNICATION Codes Red spot system Code words Use of serials
(comms)
All down to good comms
APPRECIATION The aim The factors The courses open to the team – choose the best course The plan – OP orders Operational (OP) order is a method of conveying a commanders plan to those who must execute that plan & to the others who must use it
THE BODYGUARD
QUALITIES OF A BODYGUARD Sense of responsibility Mature, positive and confident Alert and active mind Methodical Reliable Ability to get on/communicate with people Realistic – what you can and can’t do Truthful and honest Patient, tactful and tolerant A single minded devotion to duty and priorities Not easily bored Conscientious Diplomatic ROLE OF A BODY GUARD CP team bodyguard Duties of a CP team BG Prior to the operation Must know routes to each location Carry out a recce of each location to be visited Be aware of the em –bus/d-bus locations Be aware of existing Sy measures Familiarise himself with the VIP’s profile Other tasks allocated by the TL 252
During the operation Brief the VIP on duties and drills Introduction of yourself & driver Previous CP experience of VIP Brief the VI on actions on Mobile Sy –central locking windows Programme changes including dress Passage of information to the team –tell them everything Protection of the VIP Door opening/closing Escorting the VIP RTA drills
POST OPERATION/END OF DUTY Brief oncoming BG on:Programme changes Timings Dress for the day Problem areas –likes/dislikes of VIP Tactical considerations Brief the team leader Prepare information for the Post Ex Report (PXR)
THE INDIVIDUAL BODY GUARD Pre-Operation Gathering information Threat assessment Programme – changes/timings VIP profile Plan the CP operation Recce each route & location Brief Sp staff – driver During the operation Brief the VIP on drills Provide protection during the operation Command and control ** Be prepared for CHANGE/FASTBALL** Post –Operation Clean up & re-supply Post operation report – pass on the information
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.. .. .. .. ..
FIRST AID. AIMS OF FIRST AID. To save life To prevent the casualties condition from getting worse PRINCIPLES OF FIRST AID. To prevent further injury to the casualty and to avoid injury to yourself, e.g., from fire, fumes, flames, collapsing buildings and any other hazards
To assess and treat the casualties in the following order of priority: Airways Breathing Circulation Disability Then to place the casualty in a comfortable position To immobilise injured limbs and broken bones To relieve pain if possible To arrange for evacuation, if necessary, in the correct priority REASONS FOR OBSTRUCTED AIRWAYS. Suffocation Inhalation of blood, vomit or water Foreign material in the mouth or throat, such as false teeth, blood clot, vomit, mud and debris 254
Swelling of the airway Injury to the face and neck RECOGNITION OF OBSTRUCTED AIRWAY. Breathing might be absent or noisy, bubbling, gasping or whistling Face might be blue or pale If conscious he might make violent efforts to breath If unconscious he might be convulsing ACTION TO BE TAKEN. Clear the airway Open airway- jaw thrust manoeuvre Place in ¾ prone position
REASONS FOR STOPPAGE OF BREATHING. Choking Suffocation Swelling of airway The tongue falling back in unconscious casualties Electric shock Drowning in water, blood or vomit Heart attack Poisoning due to nerve agents or an overdose of drugs such as morphine RECOGNITION OF STOPPAGE OF BREATHING. He will be unconscious Face might be blue or pale There will be no obvious chest movement No air being exhaled
255
.. .. .. .. ACTION .. TO BE TAKEN. EXHALED AIR RESUSITATION 2 breaths initially, then 10 breaths per minute- 1 every 6 seconds Check pulse Lay in ¾ prone position REASONS FOR HEART STOPPING. Stoppage of breathing Electrocution Drowning Hypothermia Heart attack Poisoning RECOGNITION OF HEART STOPPING. Check the CAROTID PULSE at the neck after the first two breaths of EAR ACTION TO BE TAKEN. Clear the airway Lay casualty on back on a firm surface Open airway 2 breaths of EAR Check CAROTID pulse for 5 seconds If no pulse begin compressions1 person – 15 compressions to 2 breathes 2 persons- 5 compressions to 1 breath SHOCK SHOCK IS THE BODYS REACTION TO LOSS OF CIRCULATING BODILY FLUID THROUGH INJURY, FOR EXAMLE BLEEDING AND BURNS.
256
RECOGNITION OF SHOCK. Casualty might feel cold and clammy on the skin Might be pale and look anxious There might be a blue tinge to the extremities, such as his nose, ears and fingers Pulse might be weak and fast Breathing might be shallow and rapid Might complain of feeling weak, faint and giddy with blurred vision Might be thirsty Might be semi-conscious or unconscious ACTION TO BE TAKEN. Lay casualty down, flat if possible Clear airway and ensure he is breathing Look for and stop any external bleeding Support and immobilise any injured limbs Keep the casualty warm and protect from the cold, wind and rain Avoid over heating DO NOT give anything to drink- only moisten lips with water DO NOT give morphine if; Has difficulty in breathing Is unconscious Has head injury REASONS FOR UNCONSCIOUSNESS.
Stoppage of blood supply to the brain, ie, fainting and heart attack Head injury Stoppage of breathing Drugs, alcohol, chemicals and poisons Diseases such as diabetes and epilepsy RECOGNITION OF UNCONSCIOUSNESS. Will not respond to normal or loud speech Will not respond to touch or pain such as pinching the ear lobe Will not respond to simple commands Might not be breathing 257
.. .. .. .. .. ACTION TO BE TAKEN. Check and clear airway Place in ¾ prone Never leave unattended because tongue may fall back into the throat and cause blockage Might vomit and drown as fluid runs into lungs FRACTURES. TREAT TO REDUCE PAIN AND PREVENT FURTHER INJURY.
Two types of fractures; CLOSED FRACTURE – no break in the skin OPEN FRACTURE – open wound Dress wound as appropriate and immobilise wound or limb COMPLICATED FRACTURE. There is damage to blood vessels, nerves and other important structures round the fracture
RECOGNITION OF COMPLICATED FRACTURE. The casualty might have felt or heard the bone break Might complain of pain and tenderness at the site of injury Might see bruising, swelling or deformity of the injured part Might be loss of movement or abnormal movement of injured part ACTION TO BE TAKEN. Stop bleeding and cover wounds with a dressing Immobilise the limb CHEST INJURIES. CRUSHED CHEST. 258
Might see abnormal chest movement on injured side Breathing will be painful and difficult Might complain of being short of breath Might be shocked, look anxious and distressed Lips may become blue Might cough up blood
ACTION TO BE TAKEN. Clear airway If conscious put in comfortable sitting position If there is a lot of abnormal movement of chest wall, casualty may be more comfortable lying on injured side If unconscious lie in ¾ prone position, lying on injured side OPEN CHEST WOUNDS. RECOGNITION OF OPEN CHEST WOUNDS. Will see a wound and might hear a sucking when casualty breaths in Breathing will be difficult and shallow Might see blood stained liquid bubbling out when casualty breaths out Might cough up blood Might show signs of shock ACTION TO BE TAKEN. Clear airway Seal hole leaving valve on bottom of seal Place comfortable position or in ¾ prone on injured side INTERNAL CHEST INJURY. DAMAGE TO BLOOD VESSELS, LUNGS OR HEART BY EXPLOSION AND BLAST.
259
.. .. .. .. RECOGNITION OF INTERNAL CHEST INJURY. .. Casualty might cough up blood Breathing will be difficult and painful Might look shocked Might know or suspect that he has been subject to a blast ACTION TO BE TAKEN. Treat for shock Treat sitting up if possible
ABDOMINAL INJURIES. RECOGNITION OF ABDOMINAL INJURIES. Might be wound or bruising of the abdomen, lower chest, lower back, groin or buttock
Might complain of pain and tenderness in his abdomen, abdomen muscles might be tense Will show signs of shock Might be vomiting blood stained fluid ACTION TO BE TAKEN. Cover wound with dressings If any gut is visible dressing should be wet Place casualty in ‘W’ position with knees drawn up and head and shoulders raised Or on side with knees drawn up Treat for shock Request urgent evacuation DO NOT give food or drink 260
BURNS. HEAT
CHEMICAL
RADIATION
RECOGNITION OF BURNS. SUPERFICIAL BURNS- appear red and the area might be swollen and blistered DEEP BURNS- appears dull-white and might be charring Some casualties might have a combination ACTION TO BE TAKEN. Put out flames Cool part with cold water for 10 minutes Cover burn including charred clothing with clean dry dressing Give morphine if necessary DO NOT burst blisters or remove charred clothing or apply lotions etc If casualty is conscious give frequent sips of water Place in comfortable position and immobilise and support burnt limbs PHOSPHEROUS BURNS. Cover burn with WET dressing and keep wet DO NOT remove phosphorous HEAT ILLNESS. HEAT EXHAUSTION HEAT STROKE RECOGNITION OF HEAT EXHAUSTION.
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.. .. .. .. ..
Headache, dizziness and nausea
Cramps in legs or abdomen Pale clammy skin Weak pulse Might become confused and eventually unconscious ACTION TO BE TAKEN. Lay casualty down in cool shaded place Give frequent sips of cool water Keep cool by fanning or by sponging whole body down with cool water Heat stroke may develop RECOGNITION OF HEAT STROKE. All the above Show disturbed or uncharacteristic behaviour Fatigue, headache, and irritability Diminished sweating Nausea Flushed dry skin ACTION TO BE TAKEN. Lay in coolest place Remove all clothing Give sips of water Sponge down and fan or expose to breeze if possible Evacuate
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COLD INJURIES. HYPOTHERMIA NON-FREEZING COLD INJURY (TRENCH FOOT) FREEZING COLD INJURY (FROST BITE) HYPOTHERMIA. RESULT OF PROLONGED EXPOSURE TO COLD, WET AND WINDY WEATHER CONDITONS OR SUDDEN IMERSION IN ICY WATER
RECOGNITON OF HYPOTHERMIA. Uncontrollable shivering Unusual tiredness Disturbed vision Slurred speech Unexpected bursts of energy Unexpected behaviour changes When on the move, might slow down, stumble and repeated fall down Might collapse and become unconscious ACTION TO BE TAKEN. Protect casualty from weather Replace any wet clothes Put in dry sleeping bag with companion Give warm sweet non-alcoholic drinks Evacuate NON-FREEZING COLD INJURY. (TRENCH FOOT) RECOGNITION OF NON-FREEZING COLD INJURY. Feet become white, numb, cold and possibly swollen
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.. .. .. .. ACTION .. TOBE TAKEN. Protect the casualty from weather Gently clean and dry feet Warm feet using direct body heat Evacuate DO NOT RUB or WALK
FREEZING COLD INJURY. (FROST BITE). RECOGNITION OF FREEZING COLD INJURY, Feet appear white, are numb and look like marble Advanced will blister and go black and gangrenous Affected area feels cold and firm to touch ACTION TO BE TAKEN. Put in dry sleeping bag Give hot, sweet non-alcoholic drinks Evacuate Frozen feet can walk MORPHINE. DO NOT GIVE MORPHINE TO:
UNCONSCIOUS
HEAD INJURIES INJURIES AFFECTING BREATHING
Mark casualty with:
‘M’ Date
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Time
Up to 3 syretes
BATTLESHOCK. RECOGNITION OF BATTLESHOCK. Physical symptoms such as weakness or deafness, out of proportion to or absence of injury
Severe apprehension or restlessness Overwhelming guilt or despair Continuing over reaction to sound such as trembling Unexpected changes in behaviour, restlessness or over-reaction Substance abuse Dazed and confused state ACTION TO BE TAKEN. Reassure and evacuate
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