The background and formation of the Four Schools of Islamic Law By Eirini Kakoulidou
Islam’s Early Period & Pre -‐ Islamic Background In Islamic faith, law and religion have developed a unique and very elementary association between them. In the Western world, law and religious studies are known to research the role of religion in relation to the State and its legal system. There is a vast contrast between the above and the focus of said studies in Islam, where law and religion are very closely affiliated, and as a result one cannot follow or study one domain in separation from the other1. There are two main concepts that express the notion of divine law in Islam: those are fiqh and Shari’ah. In its original sense, fiqh signifies a broad sense of understanding. It is also used in a more specific manner, in order to express understanding towards the law. This meaning came up around the same time with the first Islamic law texts, during the late 8th and early 9th centuries AD. Fiqh can be expressed through all of the following examples: explaining the law in details; creating and institutionalising social norms; justifying social norms in relation to holy texts; producing written texts, essays and books on the law. In contrast to the above, Shari’ah is referred to the law of God and its divine quality. It indicates the practical application of God’s or the Prophet’s will in relation to law, or the application of law that can be justified by holy texts. Therefore, one of the main concepts to grasp is that practitioners of fiqh seek to find ways to express and apply the principles the holy of law of Shari’ah2. It is thought that the first three generations after Prophet Muhammad’s death (632 AD) are the most important in relation to Islam’s cultural and religious development. This epoch is referred to as the First Century of Islam, but it is also a time shrouded in obscurity due to the lack of historical evidence. During that period, many important and distinguishing characteristics of Islamic law were founded, while the newfound Islamic society established its own legal institutions. During most of the first century of Islam, Islamic law did not exist by definition. As it were in the times of Prophet Muhammad, legislation and law
1
Schacht J. & Bosworth C.E The Legacy of Islam Oxford University Press 1979 p.392-393
2
The Oxford Encyclpaedia of the Modern Islamic World: Legal though and Jurisprudence (p.450).
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were not inside the focus of religion, and therefore jurisprudence did not draw specific attention in the Muslim world, as long as law technicalities and practices did not impose any religious or moral deviations3. Islamic Jurisprudence did not start out with scientific intentions, i.e. to study the practice of courts within the power of the established order. On the contrary, it served as an institution to protect the functioning legal system’s practices from being attacked and analysed. The first Islamic law scholars were first and foremost Muslim devotees and did not regard themselves as men of law. Their main -‐ and perhaps only -‐ interest was to explain and document the system of ritual law practice. Their interest in legislature and its various relationships was a development that came later, taking most of its inspiration from the Abbasids and their political agenda, as well as their approach to law in general. Therefore, one could argue that those first scholars’ interest was mostly focused on religious ideals. Two main tendencies were formed during the creation of jurisprudential processes in the late Umayyad and early Abbasid period4. Firstly, in order to keep the Islamic doctrine consistent and coherent, lawful procedures became more methodical; moreover, personal or arbitrary opinions (known as ra’y5) subsided in order for a more analogical deduction (known as qiyas6) to arise. The second tendency was an increasing importance of the practice of Sunnah or established doctrine7.
3
Schacht, J. An Introduction to Islamic Law. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982)
4
Coulson, N, A History of Islamic Law. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1994) p. 36
5
Αl-ra’y -“Personal opinion”. Used by certain jurists opposed to the Traditionalists when interpreting religious law (fiqh). Among the schools of law the Hanafites predominantly used it. (A Glossary of Islam, Dominique Sourdel & Janine Sourdel-Thomine, Edinburg University Press, 2007). 6
Qivas - “Reasoning by analogy”. Used by jurists to resolve problems of religious law (fiqh) not clarified in the texts. It was first developed by Al Shafi’i on the basis of his study of the effective cause (illa) of a decision that might lead to other unforeseen decisions and used subsequently in the Shafi’i school of law. Later Al Ghazali (died 1111) sought to justify the logical nature of such reasoning. (A Glossary of Islam by Dominique Sourdel & Janine Sourdel-Thomine, Edinburg University Press, 2007). 7
Sunna or Sunnah- Established custom normative preceded, conduct and cumulative tradition, typically based on Muhammad’s example. The actions and sayings of Muhammad are believed to complement the divinely revealed message of Qur’an. J.P. Esposito, The Oxford Dictionary of Islam, 2003.
2
More specifically, during the early Abbasid period, those ancient schools of law were established mainly because of their geographic position and importance. Those schools later transformed into a new type of institution, which pledged allegiance to an individual person, a master in the form of a learned scholar. The geographically based schools of law were situated in various central positions of the Islamic world and each had its own religious scholar, who had formed a certain minimum agreement on their doctrines. Towards the half of the 2nd hijra century, many people had taken to following the teachings of a recognised spiritual leader and the main principles of his doctrine, while maintaining the right to diverge from any specific point they did not agree with. This is what essentially led to the formation of groups of people within the ancient schools of law. In the Kufa school of Iraq, there were followers of Abu Hanifa, and in the Medina8 school there were followers of Malik9. Around the middle of the third hijra century, the conversion of ancient law schools into “personal” schools (schools based on certain scholars) took greater effect. These law schools did not continue the long standing tradition of geographically-‐based schools, but rather focused on the doctrine of a certain religious figure along with his followers. This transformation was a subsequent outcome that was long ago cradled in the ancient Islamic schools of law, but was surely accelerated by the influence of the Shafi’i school10. The aforementioned development, which was for the most part carried out by al Shafi’i, influenced and shaped Islamic law’s future as a whole. But as law focused on the teachings of religious dogma, the application of law became more rigid and based on doctrine. Independent research and analysis was increasingly prohibited, while law with its various facets was dependent on traditions and the strict adherence to God’s command.
8
Of the many schools of law, which flourished in the different provinces of Islam at the early times, those of Medina and Kufa were the most important. The Oxford Encyclpaedia of the Modern Islamic World: Legal though and Jurisprudence (p.450). 9
Abu Hanifa and Malik were the founders of two out of four law schools of orthodox Sunni Islam.
10
Schacht, J. An Introduction to Islamic Law. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982) p.58
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The Evolution Period According to professor Joseph Schacht in his work An Introduction to Islamic Law, there are two main schools of Islamic law, which prevailed during the 8th and early 9th century: Ashab al-‐ra’y, considered as the rationalistic jurisprudents, and Ashab al-‐hadith, which was an adversary school known as the Traditionists11. Al Shafi’i, Joseph Schacht says, tried to steer a middle course between them, accepting the Traditionists’ stress on hadith but rejecting the crudeness of their legal thought 12. Schacht13 indicates that ultimately Shafi’i did not succeed in replacing the established schools of law with his new type of doctrine, which was based on concepts held by the “Traditionists”. However, Shafi’i succeeded in creating a new thesis on Islamic law, which was indeed the outcome of his efforts in searching to find a logical and indisputable expression of Shari’ah, as well as its function in legal theory. Well-‐known jurisprudents like the Hanafis and the Malikis continued the aforementioned ancient law schools of Kufa and Medina, without changing their established legal doctrine according to Shafi’i ideologies. However, they did in the end adopt a type of legal theory that was extensively based on the Traditionist inspiration, much like the Shafi’i did. As J. Schacht indicates: This 'classical' theory of Islamic law, or doctrine of the usul al-‐fiqh, which was established during the third century of the hijra (ninth century A.D.), was in many respects more elaborate than Shafi’i s own theory, and differed from it in one essential aspect. Shafi’i, in order to be able to follow the traditions from the Prophet without reservation, rejected the principle of the consensus of the scholars, which embodied the living tradition of the ancient schools, and restricted his own idea of consensus to the unanimous doctrine of the community at large. The 11
The Traditionst jurisprudents of the earlier ninth century, proposed that Islamic law be inferred from hadith, reports of that the Prophet, his leading Companions, and the Follower had said or done, without significant resort to reason. Contradictions among hadith reports they either resolved by means of isnad comparison or simply let stand, refusing to define the law by their won preferences. Their adversaries the rationalistic jurisprudents (ashab al-ra’y) also used hadith, but far less extensively and without significant use of the isnad comparison to sort out the sound from the unsound. In the later ninth century, rationalistic jurisprudents, took up many of the forms formely peculiar to the traditionist jurisprudents, especially formal dependence on hadith and isnad comparison to sort the sound from the unsound. Traditionist jurisprudents in turn accepted the need for separate expertise in legal reasoning besides hadith criticism. Christopher Melchert, Islamic Law and Society Vol. 8, No. 3, Hadith and Fiqh (2001), p. 383-406, BRILL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3399450. 12
Schacht Joseph, The Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1950 p.56-57.
13
Schacht Joseph, An Introduction to Islamic Law Oxford University Press, 1982 p. 59.
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classical theory returned to the concept of the consensus of the scholars, which it considered infallible in the same way as the general consensus of the Muslims. But it had to take into account the status, which Shafi’i had meanwhile won for the traditions from the Prophet, and it extended the sanction of the consensus of the scholars to Shafi’i’s identification of the Sunna with the contents of traditions from the Prophet 14. In his book A History of Islamic Legal Theories, professor Wael B. Hallaq notes that Al Shafi’i was one of the first few individuals to bring a new kind of analogical reasoning in order to approach the Qur’an and hadith. This new understanding was different compared to the consensus (ijma) that fiqh scholars had established; a consensus which had been the main way of interpreting the holy texts up until Shafi’i’s work. This kind of legal reasoning became a core factor in the development of usul-‐as-‐fiqh and has been widely referred to as “analogy” or qiyas. The latter provided the basis for laws to be established through the process of analogical deduction, when the matters that needed legal consideration were not discussed neither in the Qur’an or Prophet Muhammad’s Sunnah. Apart from the aforementioned quiyas, other processes of legal decision making (or ijtihad) can be found in Islamic law, such as: istihsan, or juristic “preference” and istislah, which is a method of reasoning based on public welfare when a problem is not addressed in the sacred texts15. Towards the end of the 9th century, the ideological clashes that Al Shafi’i’s presence brought in Islamic legislature had subsided for the most part. The tradition of Sunnah, in other words the practice of the Prophet Muhammad’s teachings in Islamic jurisprudence, had been introduced and solidified16. As a result of the above, the classical theory has come to instruct that Islamic law as a whole is based on four basic principles (“roots”), which are the following: The Qur’an, the Sunnah of Prophet Muhammad which is inherited by the applicable traditions in law-‐making decision, the consensus (or ijma) made up by
14
Ibid p. 60.
15
Hallaq Wael B., A History of Islamic Legal Theories: An Introduction to Sunni Usul al-fiqh , Cambridge University Press, 1997 16
Goulson N.J, The History of Islamic Law, Edinburg University Press, 2003 p.72 (chapter “Jurisprudence in Embryo, the Early Schools of Law”)
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scholars belonging in the orthodox Islamic community, and the method of analogical reasoning known as quiyas17.
The Four Sunni Schools of Law: Madhabs The foundations of Islamic law schools go way back to the end of the Umayyad period, or the beginning of the second Islamic century. At that point in history, Islamic law had started to venture outside the borders of institutional and popular law practice, the latter being shaped by religious concepts taken from the sacred texts of the Qur’an and the hadith. The change in the political scenery that came with the Umayyads’ fall from power and the emergence of the ‘Abbasids in 132 of the hijra (750 AD) also influenced Islamic law as a whole. By that time, Islamic law had already developed its basic characteristics, while the call of the Arab Muslim society for a suiting legal system had been met. At that stage, the early ‘Abbasids did not only continue but also emphasised on the “Islamicising” trend in law, which had prevailed towards the end of the later Umayyad period18.
The Hanafi School of Law19 Abu Hanifah (699-‐767) is the alias of Nu’man ibn Thabit, a scholar of Persian descent and a Kufa native. Hanifah studied scholastics while later he focused on deeply studying the jurisprudence of the Kufa School of law. He earned his living by operating a business as a textile merchant. Hanifah is said to have always used common sense and logic in the process of practical problem solving and philosophical ethics. He also broadened his reasoning with the use of analogy (the aforementioned qiyas) and preference (known as istihsan). Hanifah widely used the instrument of opinion in the process of legal thought analysis, together with analogy and preference. This led to the characterisation of his school as “the people of opinion” (or rationalists, ra’y), thus distinguishing his school from “the people of traditions”, the aforementioned Traditionists. However, that does not imply that the Hanafi School was less meticulous concerning Islamic traditions. Hanifah is also credited with the following words: “This knowledge of ours is opinion; it is the best we have been able to achieve. He who is able to arrive at different conclusions is entitled to his 17
Although the later schools of law shared the essentials of this classical theory, traces of the different doctrines of the ancient schools have survived in some of them. (Joseph Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law, p.60) 18
The Oxford Encyclopaedia of the Modern Islamic World, Chapter “Legal Thought and Jurisprudence”, p.450
19
Ibid p.457
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opinions as we are entitled to our own.” Although Abu Hanifa does not have a book on fiqh, scholars mention a musnad of hadiths and traditions ascribed to him20 Abu Hanifah’s lifework as expressed in his legal thought displayed a deep belief in liberality and showed reverence for personal freedom. This is something that cannot easily be found among other Islamic jurists of his time. He was the first to establish laws in order to secure contracts, the latter being evidence of his belief in the principle of protecting freedom, a fact demonstrated in contracts of salam and murabahah. Salam, the first contract, secures the immediate payment of the goods which are to be delivered in the future, even though sales contracts usually dictate the immediate payment of money in exchange for the goods. Murabahah, the second type of contract, allows a trader to sell goods for their original agreed price plus an extra predetermined profit as long as usury is not involved in the exchange process. As for laws on personal freedom, Hanafi allowed unmarried women who had reached their adulthood to be able to marry without the intervention of a marriage guardian. Nevertheless, later Hanafi doctrine restricted that right to a woman who had previously been married. Despite the beliefs of the Kufa School (at which he belonged) and the general legal ethos of his time, Hanafi did not sentence compulsive shoppers and spendthrifts, and justified his action by stating that a person who has reached adulthood is free to spend their possessions and/or property in any way that they wish21. Abu Ηanafi’s doctrine was carried on by his students, four of which went on to become quite famous: Abu Yusuf, Zufar ibn al Hudhayl, Muhammad ibn al Hasan al Shaybani and al Hasan ibn Ziyad. Hanafi became the most prevailing Islamic school of law during the Abbasid Caliphate period, largely to due to Abu Yusuf’s and other early Hanafis’ efforts, which gave Kufa an advantage compared to other schools of law of the time. Hanafi was also the official law school of the Ottoman Empire. To this day, Hanafi is the official school for the issuing of fatwas22 as well as for the application of “personal status” matters of Sunni Muslims in countries that ensued the demise of the Ottoman Empire, i.e. Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan, Israel and Palestine. In Turkey, which is an officially secular state, it is the Hanafi law
20
Abu Zahra Muhammad, The four Imams- Their Lives, Works and Schools of Jurisprudence, Dar Al Takwa 2010 p.229
21
The Oxford Encyclopaedia of the Modern Islamic World p.457.
22
Fatwa: Authoritative legal opinion given by a mufti (legal scholar) in response to a question posed by an individual of a court of law. J.P. Esposito, The Oxford Dictionary of Islam, 2003.
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which determines religious holidays. Furthermore, it is still the most established school in regard to the application of personal status matters and the religious holidays of Muslims living in the Balkan area, as well as Caucasus, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, the Republics of Central Asia and China. It is reported that its followers make up more than an impressive 1/3 of the world’s Muslim population23.
The Maliki School of Law24
The Maliki School arose in the Arabian Peninsula, the original home of all Islamic thought. It was initially named the School of Hejaz25 or alternately the School of Medina. The doctrines developed by the Maliki School are historically related to prime Muslim thinkers like Umar ibn al Khattab, Abbas (Prophet Muhammad’s uncle) and A’ishah (Prophet Muhammed’s wife). Later on in the school’s history, some of the most learned jurists were the teachers of Malik, whose name became the eponym of the school. Malik ibn Anas al Asbahi was a Yemen descendant, born in Medina in 713 AD. He lived there until his death in 795, the only times he left the city being those that he went to Mecca as a pilgrim. Therefore, Malik epitomised the learning of the people of Medina. The Al Muwatta is a book written by Malik on Muslim law, which contains a compilation of traditions handed down from Prophet Muhammed, his companions and followers arranged according to the subjects of jurisprudence. In this book, Malik mentions the general foundations of fiqh, which are the Qur’an, its texts, its outward meanings and understood meanings, the Sunnah, the consensus and then analogy26. Malik ibn Anas was a man profoundly committed to tradition throughout the development of his legal doctrine. He often stressed the fact that he would not stray from the path that his teachers and the consensus of the great thinkers of Medina had handed down to him. Nevertheless, Malik studied and put to use a form of deductive thought process which was similar to analogy. In his own words, “as for those matters that I did not receive from (my predecessors) I exercised 23
The Oxford Encyclopaedia of the Modern Islamic World p. 450 Law: Legal Thought and Jurispudence / Juristic Schools and Hermeneutical Traditions, p. 456: Sunni Schools of Law. 24
The Oxford Encyclopaedia of the Modern Islamic World. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p..459.
25
Western coastal province of Saudi Arabia, home to the pilgrimage cities of Mekka and Medina. It was the first region to become part of the Islamic world under Muhammad’s leadership. J.P. Esposito, The Oxford Dictionary of Islam. 26
Abu Zahra Muhammad, The four Imams- Their Lives, Works and Schools of Jurisprudence, Dar Al Takwa 2010 p.89
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my reasoning and reflection according to the course of those I have met… so that I would not deviate from the course of the people of Medina and their opinions. If I did not hear anything specifically about a matter I attributed the opinion (ra’y) to me.”27 Compared to the Hanafi School, the Maliki School is considered to be somewhat more conservative in its approach to law, and especially in relation to issues concerning the female gender. This is perhaps something linked with the fact that at the time, Medina’s scholars had traditionally followed more conservative views. According to Malik’s doctrine, women can only get married with the approval and involvement of a marriage guardian. Moreover, Maliki law grants fathers and parental grandfathers the right to approve a marriage of their daughters and granddaughters without their consent, and in some cases, even against their will. Hanafi law, on the other hand, limits this coercion (known as jabr) in relation to marriage to the age of puberty. Among Malik ibn Anas’s students was Muhammad ibn Idris al-‐Shafi’i., who was the founder of the school going under his name.
The Shafi’i School of Law28 As discussed above, the Shafi’i school was not exactly a school based on the geographic tradition of a certain area or city; it was an outcome of a single jurist’s efforts, who was very much knowledgeable in the doctrines of the other two schools and was able to synthesise new doctrine out of both. Muhammad ibn Idris ibn al-‐Abas ibn Uthman ibn Shafi’i was born in Gaza, Palestine in 767 AD and died in Egypt in 820 AD. He utilised the opportunity to merge the knowledge of the Iraqi as well as the Hejaz fiqh, which, along with his extensive traveling in the Islamic world, gave him a profound and deep understanding of Islamic law. As a result of the above, Shafi’i gained the opportunity to formulate a new theoretical basis for law, which is expressed in his famous work, Al-‐risalah. This book was written in Bagdad during Shafi’i’s second stay and was revised when the scholar moved to Egypt during the years 814-‐815.
27
Professor Amin al-Khuli, a reformist scholar, explains that the word ra’y at that time did not bear its later technical meaning of opinion vis-à-vis analogy, but meant rather “understanding” and “good judgment”. The Oxford Encyclopaedia of the Modern Islamic World, p. 459 28
Oxford Encyclopaedia of the Modern Islamic World. p. 460
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Shafi’i regarded himself as a representative of the law school of Medina, even though he had openly accepted the Traditionists’ central views. (The Traditionist approach propagated that that Islamic tradition was more important for the formulation of law compared to the doctrines developed by the various schools, which emerged across the Islamic world). Shafi’i first developed his doctrine in Iraq, but when he moved to Egypt he retreated back to some of his early views on law. Thus, this resulting doctrine came to be known as the Egyptian doctrine, or new version of Shafi’i’s school. Shafi’i dictated Al-‐umm to al-‐Rabi ibn Sulayman, a close student of his. It is a highly influential piece of work that did not only define Shafi’i’s own doctrine, but also many of the elements and differences among other Islamic schools of law. This seven-‐ volume book deals with many law topics, some of them being: transactions, religious holidays, penal/criminal matters and personal status manners. The book also makes references to the differences in Islamic thought on law, such as those between Ali and Ibn Masud, and those between Shafi’i and Malik. In Al-‐umm, Shafi’i delves into his most loved topic, which is attacking those who do not regard the traditions of Islam as necessary in the formulation of jurisprudence. He also nullifies the importance of juristic preference (known as istihsan29) as a valid form of law. Among Shafi’i’s students was Ahmad ibn Hanbal, whose name was given to the school he founded. Since Egypt was home of Shafi’i’s doctrine, the Shafi’i School has deep roots in this particular country. It was the official school in the times of the Ayyubid dynasty (1169-‐1252 AD) and maintained a prestigious rank during the Mamluks, who succeeded the Ayyubids. The Shafi’i School was replaced by the Hanafi School much later, when the Ottoman Empire conquered Egypt in 1517 AD. Nowadays, the Hanafi School constitutes the official law practiced in courts as far as personal status matters go. However, many Egyptians (especially of the rural areas of the country) follow the doctrine of the Shafi’i school for their religious observances. The same happens in many other areas of the Muslim world, i.e. in the greater parts of Palestine and Jordan, and has many followers in Syria, Iraq, the Hejaz, India, Pakistan, Indonesia, and the Sunni parts of Iran and Yemen30. 29
Istihsan –“Search for the best solution.” - Refers particularly to the methods used by scholars of school of law of Hanafi to resolve practical problems posed by the application of the law (Shari’ah). A Glossary of Islam by Dominique Sourdel & Janine Sourdel-Thomine, Edinburg University Press, 2007). 30
The Oxford Encyclopaedia of the Modern Islamic World. p. 460
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The Hanbali School of Law31 Hanbali is another school based on the heritage of a scholar, since it embodied the doctrine, opinions and fatwas of another important Islamic lawmaker: Ahmad ibn Hanbal. Hanbal was born in Baghdad in 780 AD and died in the same city in 855. He traveled extensively the Islamic world, in countries like Syria, Yemen and the Hejaz, as well as Kufa and Basra cities in Iraq. He did so in order to gather as many Islamic traditions concerning all aspects of law and produce his seminal work, Musnad al-‐Imam Ahmad. It is a colossal piece of work, which extends over six volumes and contains more than forty thousand items. The Musnad al-‐Imam Ahmad, together with the fact that Hanbali did not write any books on fiqh like many other of the scholars of his time, leads many Muslim historians to think that he should be regarded a traditionalist rather than a jurist. Nevertheless, his students assembled his opinions on legal matters as well as fatwas (juristic rulings) he produced, which led to a set of principles and laws important enough to create a school out of this great thinker’s work on law. The dedication of the Hanbali School to the traditions of Islam can also be found in its separation from the views of other schools regarding the sources of law. According to Ibn Qayyim al-‐Jawziyah (d. 1350), a late Hanbali legist, there are five main sources of law32: the holy texts of the Qur’an and Sunnah, the fatwas of scholars as long as they do not contradict the scriptures, the sayings and opinions of jurists that fall in line with the holy texts, traditions without a specific lineage of transmission and ownership, and finally the reasoning which is based on analogy if there are no other means available. Ibn Hanbal is famous throughout the annals of Islamic history for being a steadfast believer in all things Muslim in his personal life. He maintained a solid stance, which passionately defended the idea of an uncreated and eternal Qur’an. His denial towards the doctrine of the “createdness” of the Qur’an led to his imprisonment during the Inquisition in Baghdad, involving hard conditions and beatings. Hanbal’s strict adherence to doctrine is mirrored in the voices of two followers who brought his school back to life: one is Ibn Qayyim (another great Sunni Islamic jurist) and the great Hanbali school teacher, Tawi al-‐Din ibn Taymiyah (d. 1327). Echoes of Hanbali’s personal views can also be found in the career of Muhammad ibn Abd al-‐Wahhab (d. 1792), who was a famous Hanbali reformer of Nejd.
31
Ibid. p. 461
32
Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, Ibn Taymiyya, and Islamic Theology, J. E. Lowry and D. Stewart. p.201-222
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Hanbal’s school includes many followers, an important one being Muwaffaq al-‐Din ibn Qudamah (d. 1223), the author of the twelve-‐volume masterpiece Al-‐Mughni, as well as author of the Al-‐umdah. The revived Hanbali School, which lacked popularity among Muslim followers before the abovementioned Ibn Tayamiyah, gained even more strength during the 18th century AD. Ibn Abd al-‐Wahhab was head of a reformist movement in Arabia, which sought to drive Islam back to its original, pristine foundations. Those foundations were impeccably loyal to the Qur’an and the Sunnah, instead of the thought of later Islamic law scholars. The success of the Wahhabis33 and the return of the famous Saudi Arabian family in the early 20th century established the Hanbali School as the official law school of Saudi Arabia. Hanbali is also the official law school of Qatar, and has many followers in Syria, Iraq, Palestine and other places of the Muslim world.
The two approaches of studying usul al fiqh Ensuing the establishment of the madhabs (schools of Muslim law), the ulema (the educated class of Muslim legal scholars) of various schools assumed two separate stances to the study of usul al-‐fiqh. One is theoretical, while the other one is based on deductive methods. The main differences of the two approaches have to do for the most part with their basic orientation: the first one is ultimately based on the strict adherence to theoretical doctrines and traditions, while the second is more pragmatic because it sees theory as something formulated according to the legal issues at hand and the way they need to be tackled. The gap between those two approaches is more akin to their whole design and approach and has less to do with legal thought in its entirety. The first approach remains loyal to the principles and their application in law, while the second approach aims to combine traditions and principles in order to meet a specific case’s needs. The theoretical approach to studying usul al fiqh is followed by the Shafi’i School. On the other hand, the deductive approach is connected with the Hanafi School. The theoretical approach is
33
Wahhabis - Eighteenth century reformist/revivalist movement for socio-moral reconstruction of society. Founded by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, a Hanbali scholar in Arabia. Proclaimed tawhid (uniqueness and unity of God) as its primary doctrine. Wahhabism began in response to the perceived moral decline and political weakness of the Muslim community in Arabia. It proposed a return to an idealized Islamic pas through reassertion or monotheism and reliance on Qur’an and hadith, rejection medieval interpretations of Islam and jurisprudence. Emphasized education and knowledge as weapons in dealing with nonbelievers. Known for its sometimes violent opposition to the popular cult of saints, idolatry, and shrine and tromp visitation, as well as the sacking of Shii shrines in Najaf and Karbala in 1802. Formed an alliance with Muhammad ibn Saud in 1747, which served at the basis for the consolidation of the present-day kingdom of Saudi Arabia. (Esposito John, The Oxford Dictionary of Islam).
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known as usul al-‐Shafi'iyyah or tariqah al-‐Mutakallimin; the deductive approach is known as usul al-‐ Hanafiyyah, or tariqah al-‐fuqaha'34.
Relationship between the Four Schools of Law The traditional schools of law discussed throughout this essay have generally shared relationships of mutual toleration and respect, despite acts of religious fanaticism of the past. These acts mainly took place in the high Middle Ages and were carried out by rulers and members of the public alike. However, the attitude of mutual tolerance dates back to the time of the ancient schools of law reviewed above. These schools had managed to accept their geographical differences of doctrine as natural. As early as the second century of the hijra, there was a saying that scholarly religious disagreement between Muslim communities (known as ikhtilaf) was a sign of spiritual expression. However, this saying came to be known as a saying of Prophet Muhammad much later. This mutual tolerance between the Islamic schools of law did by no means come easy, and went through many trials and tribulations, as each school aimed to maintain its own doctrine unchanged and loyal to its geographical tradition. Shafi’i’s innovative input is what enabled the opportunity for debate on matters of principle between the schools of law and as a result, the various schools managed to reach some common ground. Moreover, the consensus, which is generally considered as the unifying principle of Islam, has proved to be very successful in smoothing out the differences of doctrine and opinion that different law schools have had, without needing to eliminate those said differences. The four schools discussed throughout this essay have proved to be equally respectful to ijma (the consensus of the Muslim community). All of the schools have the objective to apply and instill the will of Allah in all of their legal work, by staying close to the holy texts of the Qur’an and Prophet Muhammad’s Sunnah. Their individual interpretations of the holy texts and principles can all be considered equally valid and important, and their methods of reasoning can be seen in the same light. Ultimately, all of those schools belong in the orthodox Islamic thought. Any follower of Islam has the right to choose and join the school of their choice, and also change their adherence to a specific school according to their wish and without hindrances. With a simple transaction and for any reason be it personal convenience or any other motive, Muslim followers have the right to depart from the one they follow normally, i.e. because of their 34
M. H. Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence International Islamic University, Malaysia, March, 1991 p. 17-19 (Chapter: Two approaches to the study of Usul al-fiqh)
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geographical status and place of residence. This procedure is known as taklid. Nevertheless, is an individual wishes to carry out the above procedure; they are to follow the principle of their school of choice in every way until the procedure is complete. Muslim individuals are not supposed to combine different doctrines from various schools, because this would be considered as talfik, the act of religious unlawfulness. Finally, it should be noted that Modernists within Islamic culture have disregarded this last rule. GEOGRAPHICAL UNITS
REFERENCES & BIBLIOGRAPHY The Oxford Encyclopaedia of the Modern Islamic World. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). Coulson, N. A History of Islamic Law. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1994) 14
Schacht, J. An Introduction to Islamic Law. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982) Schacht, J. The Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1950) published in paperback in 1979. Wael B. Hallaq, An Introduction to Islamic Law, Cambridge University Press 2009. Wael B. Hallaq, The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law. Cambridge University Press, third printing, 2007. Wael B. Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal Theories: An Introduction to Sunni Usul al-‐fiqh , Cambridge University Press, 1997. Mawil Izzi Dien, Islamic Law: From Historical Foundations to Contemporary Practice. The New Edinburgh Islamic Surveys, Edinburgh University Press 2004. M. H. Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence (International Islamic University, Malaysia, 1991) Muhammad Abu Zahra, The four Imams-‐ Their Lives, Works and Schools of Jurisprudence, (Dar Al Takwa 2010) Hossein Esmaeili, The Nature and development of Law in Islam and the rule of Law challenge in the Middle East and the Muslim World (Connecticut Journal of International Law Vol. 26:329) Joseph Schacht and C.E Boswsorth, The Legacy of Islam, Oxford University Press 1979 (second edition). Dominique Sourdel & Janine Sourdel-‐Thomine, A Glossary of Islam, (Edinburg University Press, 2007) John Esposito, The Oxford Dictionary of Islam (Oxford University Press, 2003 Seyyed Hossein Nasr Islam: Religion, History and Civilization, Harper Collins e-‐books, 2003 Malise Ruthven with Azim Nanji, Historical Atlas of the Islamic World, Oxford University Press 2004. John L. Esposito, What everyone needs to know about Islam, Oxford University Press 2002.
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