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Sociology First published in 1962, this seminal se minal work is an introduction to sociology soci ology in a world world context, and a sophisticated guide to the major themes, problems and controversies in contemporary sociology. The book remains unique in its organisation and presentation of sociological ideas and problems, in its lack of insularity (its wide coverage of diverse types of society and of sociological thought from various cultural traditions), and in its systematic connection of sociology with the broad themes of modern social and political thought. ‘A work of authority and mature scholarship…of a consistently high standard.’ — Times Literary Supplement ‘A book which glows with knowledge, but which is also balanced and literate.’ — Tribune
Sociology A guide to problems and literature T.B.Bottomore
First published in 1962 by George Allen & Unwin Ltd This edition first published in 2010 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2010. To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk. © 1962 George Allen & Unwin All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Publisher’s Note The publisher has gone to great lengths to ensure the quality of this reprint but points out that some imperfections in the original copies may be apparent. Disclaimer The publisher has made every effort to trace copyright holders and welcomes correspondence from those they have been unable to contact.
ISBN 0-203-85134-X Master e-book ISBN
ISBN 13:978-0-415-57893-6 (hbk) ISBN 13:978-0-203-85134-0 (ebk) ISBN 10:0-415-57893-0 (hbk) ISBN 10:0-203-85134-X (ebk)
SOCIOLOGY A Guide to Problems and Literature BY
T.B.BOTTOMORE
LONDON
UNWIN UNIVERSITY BOOKS
FIRST PUBLISHED IN 1962 SECOND IMPRESSION 1963 THIRD IMPRESSION 1964 FOURTH IMPRESSION 1965 This book is copyright under the Berne Convention. Apart from any fair dealing for the purpose of private study, research, criticism or review, as permitted under the Copyright Act, 1956, no portion may be reproduced by any process without written permission. Enquiry should be made to the publisher. This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2010. To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk. © George Allen & Unwin 1962 UNWIN UNIVERSITY BOOKS George Allen and Unwin Ltd 40 Museum Street, London, W.C.1 ISBN 0-203-85134-X Master e-book ISBN
FOR MARY
PREFACE
The occasion for this book was a request to UNESCO from the Indian National Commission for UNESCO, for the preparation of a guide to sociology which would present sociological concepts, theories and methods in relation to the culture and institutions of Indian society. Such a book, it was thought, would provide a better introduction to the subject for Indian students than the existing textbooks, which deal very largely with the Western societies. When the Social Sciences Department of UNESCO invited me to write the book I accepted readily. In the first place, I had already a general interest in the under-developed countries and in the social changes accompanying their industrialization; and I was particularly interested in the economic and social development of India. Moreover, I considered that an attempt to set out the principles and methods of sociology in their bearing upon the study of Indian society might be illuminating not only for Indian students, but for others. It would show how far the accepted sociological concepts and categories are adequate and universally valid, and would reveal some of the major difficulties in classification, comparison and generalization. Finally, I have used this opportunity to ‘introduce’ sociology in a way which seems to me most likely to be useful and stimulating for the student. Throughout the book I have aimed to formulate the difficult theoretical problems with which sociology is concerned, and to show how sociologists have tried to reduce the complexity of the problems and to make them amenable to scientific enquiry. As a prelude to this I have discussed in the first part of the book some general difficulties of sociological theory and method. After the first version of this book had been written I had the opportunity to spend several months in India and to discuss it with Indian scholars. I have benefited greatly from their criticisms and suggestions in re-writing the book. If I do not mention them by name here it is because there are so many who helped me. T.B.B.
CONTENTS
PREFACE PART I. THE SCOPE AND METHODS OF SOCIOLOGY
vii 1
1.
The Study of Society
2
2.
Sociological Theory
11
3.
Sociological Methods
25
4.
The Social Sciences, History and Philosophy
35
PART II. POPULATION AND SOCIAL GROUPINGS
49
5.
Population and Society
50
6.
Types of Social Group
59
PART III. SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS
69
7.
Social Structure, Societies and Civilizations
70
8.
Economic Institutions
85
9.
Political Institutions
98
10.
The Family and Kinship
109
11.
Social Stratifcation
122
PART IV. SOCIAL CONTROL
144
12.
Custom and Public Opinion
147
13.
Religion and Morality
153
14.
Law
163
15.
Education
172
Contents PART V. SOCIAL CHANGE
ix
184
16.
Change, Evolution, Progress
185
17.
Factors in Social Change
195
PART VI. APPLIED SOCIOLOGY
205
18.
Sociology, Social Policy and Social Planning
206
19.
Social Problems
217
INDEX
226
PART ONE THE SCOPE AND METHODS OF SOCIOLOGY
CHAPTER 1 THE STUDY OF SOCIETY
For thousands of years men have observed and reflected upon the societies and groups in which they live. Yet sociology is a modern science, not much more than a century old. Auguste Comte, in his classification of the sciences, made sociology both logically and chronologically posterior to the other sciences, as the least general and most complex of all And one of the greatest of modern anthropologists observed that ‘the science of human society is as yet in its extreme infancy’. 1 It is true that we can find, in the writings of philosophers, religious teachers, and legislators of all civilizations and epochs, observations and ideas which are relevant to modern sociology. Kautilya’s Arthashástra and Aristotle’s Politics analyze political systems in ways which are still of interest to the sociologist. Nevertheless, there is a real sense in which a new science of society, and not merely a new name, 2 was created in the nineteenth century. It is worthwhile to consider the circumstances in which this happened, and to examine the characteristics which distinguish sociology from earlier social thought. 3 The circumstances in which sociology appeared may be distinguished into intellectual and material, and I shall discuss them in turn. Naturally, they were interwoven, and an adequate sociological history of sociology, which has not yet been attempted, would have to take account of these interconnections. In this brief introduction I can only mention some of the more important factors. The chief intellectual antecedents of sociology are not difficult to identify. ‘Broadly it may be said that sociology has had a fourfold origin in political philosophy, the philoso phy of history, biological theories of evolution, and the movements for social and political reform which found it necessary to undertake surveys of social conditions.’ 1 Two of these, the philosophy of history and the social survey, were particularly important at the outset. They were themselves latecomers in the intellectual history of man. 1
A.R.Radcliffe-Brown, Structure and Function in Primitive Society (1952). It was Comte who named the new science Sociology. At one time he ‘regretted the hybrid character’ of the word, derived from the Latin socius and Greek logos, but later suggested that ‘there is a com pensation…for this etymological defect, in the fact that it recalls the two historical sources—the one intellectual, the other social—from which modern civilization has sprung’. System of Positive Polity (trans. J.H.Bridges), Vol. I, p. 326. 3 The histories of social thought emphasise unduly its continuity. It would be helpful and illuminating to have for sociology and the modern social sciences, an account similar to that which H.Butterfield has provided for the natural sciences in The Origins of Modern Science (London 1950), where he gives prominence to a radical change in attitude to the physical world. 1 M.Ginsberg, Reason and Unreason in Society (1947), p. 2. 2
The Study of Society
3
The philosophy of history as a distinct branch of speculation is a creation of the eighteenth century.2 Among its founders were the Abbé de Saint-Pierre, and Giambattista Vico. The general idea of progress which they helped to formulate profoundly influenced men’s conception of history, and is reflected in the writings of Montesquieu and Voltaire in France, of Herder in Germany, and of a group of Scottish philosophers and historians of the latter part of the eighteenth century, Ferguson, Millar, Robertson and others. This new historical attitude is clearly expressed in a passage in Dugald Stewart’s ‘Memoir of Adam Smith’, 3 ‘When, in such a period of society as that in which we live, we compare our intellectual acquirements, our opinions, manners and institutions, with those which prevail among rude tribes, it cannot fail to occur to us as an interesting question, by what gradual steps the transition has been made from the first simple efforts of uncultivated nature, to a state of things so wonderfully artificial and complicated.’ Stewart goes on to say that information is lacking on many stages of this progress, and that its place must be taken by speculation based on the ‘known principles of human nature’. ‘To this species of philosophical investigation, which has no appropriated name in our language, I shall take the liberty of giving the title of Theoretical or Conjectural History, an expression which coincides pretty nearly in its meaning with that of Natural History as employed by Mr. Hume, and with what some French writers have called Histoire Raisonnée.’ In the early part of the nineteenth century the philosophy of history became an important intellectual influence through the writings of Hegel and of Saint-Simon. 1 From these two thinkers stems the work of Marx and Comte, and thus some of the important strands in modern sociology. We may briefly assess the contributions of the philosophy of history to sociology as having been, on the philosophical side, the notions of development and progress, and on the scientific side, the concepts of historical periods and social types. It was the philosophical historians who were largely responsible for the new conception of society as something more than ‘political society’ or the state. They were concerned with the whole range of social institutions, and made a careful distinction between the state and what they called ‘civil society’. Adam Ferguson’s Essay on the History of Civil Society (1767) is perhaps the best example of this approach; in its German translation it seems to have provided Hegel with his terminology and influenced his approach in his early writings on society. Ferguson, in this essay and in later writings, discusses the nature of society, population, family and kinship, the distinctions of rank, property, government, custom, morality and law; that is, he treats society as a system of related institutions. Furthermore, he is concerned to classify societies into types, and to distinguish stages in social development. Similar features are to be found in many of the writings of those whom I have called
2
3 1
We must except the work of the fourteenth century Arab philosopher and historian, Ibn Khaldun. The Prolegomena to his Universal History are remarkable in expounding a theory of histor y which anticipates that of the European eighteenth century writers, and even Marx; but also as the work of an exceptional man who had neither predecessors nor followers. See C.Issawi, An Arab Philosophy of History (2nd ed. 1955). Dugald Stewart, Works, Vol. 10, pp. 33–4. For accounts of the development of the philosophy of history and studies of some of the writers mentioned above, see R.Flint, History of the Philosophy of History (1893) and J.B.Bury, The Idea of Progress (1920).
4
Sociology: A Guide to Problems and Literature
the philosophical historians; they represent a remarkable unanimity and an abrupt change in the direction of men’s interest in the study of human society. These features re-appear in the nineteenth century in the work of the early sociologists, Comte, Marx, and Spencer. A second important element in modern sociology is provided by the social survey, which itself had two sources. One was the growing conviction that the methods of the natural sciences should and could be extended to the study of human affairs; that human phenomena could be classified and measured. The other was the concern with poverty (the ‘social problem’), following the recognition that, in industrial societies, poverty was no longer a natural phenomenon, an affliction of nature or of providence, but was the result of human ignorance or of exploitation. Under these two influences, the prestige of natural science and the movements for social reform, the social survey came to occupy an important place in the new science of society. Its progress can best be traced in the industrial societies of Western Europe, in such pioneer works as Sir John Sinclair’s Statistical Account of Scotland (21 vols. 1791–9), and Sir F.M. Eden’s The State of the Poor (3 vols. 1797), in Condorcet’s attempts to work out a ‘mathématique sociale’, 1 in Quételet’s ‘physique sociale’; 2 and in later studies such as Le Play, Les ouvriers Européens (1855, 2nd enlarged edn. 1877–9), and Booth, Life and Labour of the People in London (1891–1903). The social survey has remained one of the principal methods of sociological enquiry. These intellectual movements, the philosophy of history and the social survey, were not isolated from the social circumstances of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in Western Europe. The new interest in history and in social development was aroused by the rapidity and profundity of social change, and by the contrast of cultures which the voyages of discovery brought to men’s attention. The philosophy of history was not merely a child of thought; it was born also of two revolutions, the industrial revolution in England, and the French revolution. Similarly, the social survey did not emerge only from the ambition of applying the methods of natural science to the human world, but from a new conception of social evils, itself influenced by the material possibilities of an industrial society. A social survey, of poverty or any other social problem, only makes sense if it is believed that something can be done to remove or mitigate such evils. It was, I think, the existence of widespread poverty in the midst of great and growing productive powers, which was responsible for the change of outlook whereby poverty ceased to be a natural problem (or a natural condition) and became a social problem, open to study and amelioration. This was, at the least, an important element in the conviction that exact knowledge might be applied in social reform; and later, that as man had established an ever more complete control over his physical environment so he might come to control his social environment. Thus, the pre-history of sociology can be assigned to a period of about one hundred years, roughly from 1750 to 1850; or, let us say, from the publication of Montesquieu’s Esprit des lois up to the work of Comte and the early writings of Spencer. The formative period of sociology as a distinct science occupies the second half of the nineteenth century. 3 We can see from the brief survey of its origins some of the characteristics which early sociology assumed. 1 2 3
See G.G.Granger, La mathématique sociale du Marquis de Condorcet (Paris, 1956). A.Quételet, Sur l’homme et le développement de ses facultés, ou essai de physique sociale (1835). On the history of sociology see H.Stuart Hughes, Consciousness and Society (London 1959), and Heinz Maus, A Short History of Sociology (London 1962).
The Study of Society
5
In the first place it was encyclopaedic; it was concerned with the whole social life of man, and with the whole of history. Secondly, under the influence of the philosophy of history, reinforced by the biological theory of evolution, it was evolutionary, seeking to identify the principal stages in social evolution. Thirdly, it was conceived as a positive science, identical in character with the natural sciences. In the eighteenth century the social sciences were conceived broadly upon the model of physics; sociology, in the nineteenth century, was modelled upon biology. This is evident in the preoccupation with social evolution, and in the widely accepted conception of society as an organism. The general concern with the scientific character of sociology appears most clearly in the attempts to formulate general laws of social evolution, both in sociology and in anthropology. These wide claims naturally aroused opposition, especially from those who were working in narrower and more specialised fields; among them historians, economists, and political scientists. It is doubtful whether, even at the present day, sociology has altogether succeeded in living down its early pretentiousness. But we should distinguish among the different claims which were made, and also make a distinction between the claims as to the scope of the subject and the claims as to its discoveries. No-one believes any longer that Comte or Spencer discovered the laws of social evolution (though many believe that Marx did). But it does not follow from this that Comte and Spencer (or, for unbelievers, Marx) were entirely mistaken about the scope of sociology, or that they made no important contri butions to its advancement. It seems clear that there is a need for a social science which is concerned with society as a whole, or with total social structure. To say this, however, is to raise the problem of how such a synoptic science can be pursued, and how it is to be related to the other social sciences. The opposition to sociology in its early phase came largely from the feeling that it aimed, not at co-ordinating, but at absorbing, the other social sciences. In the work of later sociologists such ambitions are explicitly disclaimed. Hobhouse, for example, conceived sociology as ‘a science which has the whole social life of man as its sphere’, and not as another specialism, but he viewed its relation with the other social sciences as one of mutual exchange and mutual stimulation. ‘… General Sociology is neither a separate science complete in itself before specialism begins, nor is it a mere synthesis of the social sciences consisting in a mechanical juxtaposition of their results. It is rather a vitalising principle that runs through all social investigation, nourishing and nourished by it in turn, stimulating inquiry, correlating results, exhibiting the life of the whole in the parts and returning from the study of the parts to a fuller comprehension of the whole.’ 1 Similarly Durkheim, although he was especially concerned to emphasise the autonomy of sociology and to specify the particular range of phenomena with which it should deal, did not suppose that sociology could be an encyclopaedic science, or that it could be pursued in isolation from the other social sciences. He envisaged, in much the same way as Hobhouse, a diffusion of the sociological approach, and thus a transformation of the special social sciences from within. Only at a later stage did he think that it might be possible to construct a general sociology, comprising more general laws based upon the laws established in the
1
L.T.Hobhouse, Editorial Introduction. The Sociological Review, (London) I(1), 1908.
6
Sociology: A Guide to Problems and Literature
particular fields of the special sciences.2 In his editorial preface to the first volume of the Année Sociologique, Durkheim explained that ‘our efforts will tend especially to promote studies dealing with very limited subjects, and belonging to special branches of sociology. For since general sociology can only be the synthesis of these special sciences, since it can consist only in a comparison of their most general results, it is only possible to the extent that these sciences are developed’. 3 It can hardly be claimed that even the more modest aims which Hobhouse and Durkheim formulated have been achieved in a manner compelling general recognition. Of the two thinkers Durkheim was more successful in introducing the sociological approach into other social sciences. Many French scholars, in diverse disciplines, were influenced and stimulated by Durkheim’s work; in law (Davy, Lévy-Bruhl), in economics (F.Simiand), in anthropology (Mauss), in history (Marc Bloch, Granet), in linguistics (Cahen, Meillet)—to mention only the most prominent. Durkheim’s ideas were conveyed not only through his own writings but also, and perhaps even more effectively, through the Année Sociologique which he founded in 1898. His conception of sociology was, so to speak, incarnated in the organisation of the Année Sociologique, each issue of which contained one or two original monographs, and a number of surveys from a sociological viewpoint of the year’s writing in several distinct fields of social enquiry. Durkheim justified this arrangement by saying: ‘Sociologists have, we believe, a pressing need to be regularly informed of researches made in the special sciences, the history of law, customs and religion, social statistics, the economic sciences, etc., for it is here that are to be found the materials from which sociology must be constructed.’1 In Germany, as Raymond Aron has noted,2 sociology was at first rejected on account of its encyclopaedic character. Here, as elsewhere, an attempt was made to define and limit the field of sociology, but in this case by the construction of an abstract science of the ‘forms’ of social life, largely under the influence of Simmel. But alongside these endeavours, there was a continuing interest in historical interpretation and the sociology of culture, stimulated by Marxism. These various interests were united in the writings of Max Weber, in whose work, as in that of Durkheim, we see the same concern to promote a sociological approach within existing disciplines; history, law, economics, politics, comparative religion. Thus the classical sociologists, and particularly Durkheim, aimed to establish the scope and methods of the discipline, to show its worth by the investigation of major social phenomena, and to associate it closely with the existing social sciences. Later sociology diverged in certain respects from these aims. In the first place, there was, for a time, a renewal of interest in the construction of general theoretical systems. This pre-occupation is open to several objections. It seems an unwise undertaking to attempt the construction of such systems at a stage where there are still very few well established generalisations at 2
3 1
2
See especially Emile Durkheim, ‘Sociologie et sciences sociales’, Revue Philosophique, LV, 1903, and ‘On the relation of Sociology to the social sciences and to philosophy’, Sociological Papers (London), I, 1904. Année Sociologique, 1, 1898, p. iv. Année Sociologique, I, 1898. The Année Sociologique was restarted (for the second time) after 1945 and is still a valuable interdisciplinary journal. Raymond Aron, German Sociology English translation, London 1957), p. 1.
The Study of Society
7
a lower level. Furthermore, these theoretical endeavours tend once again towards the isolation of sociology from the other social sciences, or its re-emergence as an ‘imperialistic’ discipline aiming at their subjugation. Secondly, in the domain of research, there has been some inclination to concentrate upon ‘residual’ subjects, which are not claimed by any of the other social sciences, and which have a ‘social problem’ character. A recent survey of American sociology 3 shows that in 1953–4 the two major fields of sociological research, in terms of the number of projects, were urban and community studies, and marriage and the family. The trend in some other countries has been similar. But this is not the whole story. There is much evidence that the sociological approach has in fact spread widely in the other social sciences. Political science provides the best example. In recent years the numerous studies of political parties (organisation, bureaucracy, leaders), of pressure groups, of elections and electoral behaviour, and of public administration (bureaucracy, elites), have been conducted or inspired by sociologists. 1 These studies make up a large part of the current research on political institutions, and it has become increasingly difficult to distinguish between political science and political sociology. In the case of economics, which has its own highly developed theoretical system, the influence of sociology is less marked. However, sociological studies of the organisation of work in industrial enterprises, of industrial relations, and, more recently, of the processes of industrialisation, have contributed substantially to economic knowledge. The growth of economic planning has also brought into greater prominence the sociological aspects of economic behaviour. 2 The place of sociology in the study of society can now be more accurately defined, though without any intention of establishing a closed frontier between it and the other sciences. Sociology (with social anthropology) was the first science to be concerned with social life as a whole, with the whole complex system of social institutions and social groups which constitutes a society. The fundamental conception, or directing idea, in sociology is that of social structure. From this follows the sociologist’s interest in aspects of social life which had previously been studied only in an unsystematic way; the family, religion and morals, social stratification, urban life. It was observed above that pre-occupation with some of these ‘residual’ subjects may become excessive, but their investigation is an important part of sociology and properly considered is inseparable from the study of political and economic institutions. Within the fields of the established disciplines, economics, political science, law, etc., the sociological contribution has been to show the connection between the particular institutions being studied and the social structure as a whole, and to insist upon the importance of comparative study. Specialisation is unavoidable in the study of human society, but the sociologist’s view is that it should take place within the framework
3 1
2
H.Zetterberg (ed.), Sociology in the United States of America (UNESCO. 1956) p. 18. The extent of sociological work in this field can be seen from two trend reports published in Current Sociology; III(4) 1954–5, ‘Electoral Behaviour’ by G.Dupeux, and VI(2) 1957, ‘Political Sociology’ by R.Bendix and S.M. Lipset. These instances are referred to only as examples. The relations between sociology and other social sciences will be discussed more fully in Chapter 4.
8
Sociology: A Guide to Problems and Literature
of a general conception of social structure, and should be associated with an awareness of the variability of social institutions and social structure, based upon wide comparative study. This is not to claim that the sociologist carries around a master plan of social structure which he communicates to the specialist. Most sociologists should themselves be specialists, and they are likely to specialise increasingly in the future, although some will continue to be mainly concerned with the general features of social structure. What is needed is a close collaboration between sociologists and other social scientists; and such collaboration implies both that the sociologist should have some competence in one or other of the special social sciences, and that specialists should have some knowledge of general sociology. In these matters social anthropologists have had certain advantages, because of the nature of the societies which they have usually studied. Although they have been chiefly interested in kinship and ritual, they have also been able to study the economic and political institutions of tribal societies without fear of trespassing upon the domain of other scholars. More recently, of course, their situation has become more like that of sociologists; with the industrialisation of many tribal societies (as in Africa) there has been a growth of cooperative research involving economists, political scientists, anthropologists, sociologists and others.1 The systematic study of Indian society began during the period of British r ule, although in India, as in Europe, there is a long tradition of philosophical reflection upon social problems. The first social sciences to develop were economics and social anthropology. The former was connected with the growth of an industrial and commercial economy, and the latter (it has been suggested) 2 with the need for expert advisers in the administration of tribal areas. Sociology has only come to occupy an important place among the social sciences in recent years, and the reasons for its present rapid growth are plain. Since the achievement of independence India has been going through an economic and social revolution, and many of the problems of this revolution can only be solved with the help of sociological enquiry. At the same time the sociologist has a particularly important role in India, because some of the principal elements in the social structure are those with which sociology is especially concerned. Religion and the caste system are crucial factors in Indian social development, and no social scientist can afford to ignore their effects upon economic progress, political organisation and law. This circumstance is favourable not only to sociological research but also to a close co-operation between the social sciences. Dr. Anstey, in a standard work on economic development 1 devotes much attention to the economic effects of caste. Many writers upon Indian politics have observed the influence of religion (the Hindu parties) and especially of caste (the tendency for candidates to be selected from important caste groups, and for castes themselves to develop as pressure groups). Law, and indeed the whole system of social control, is pervaded by religious conceptions and can hardly be studied in isolation from religion. The conditions of Indian society, therefore, dispose the special social sciences towards a sociological approach. 1 2
1
The work of the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute in Rhodesia is a good example. R.N.Saksena. ‘Trends in the teaching of sociology and social research in India’, The Journal of Social Sciences (Agra), I(1), 1958, p. 3. Vera Anstey, The Economic Development of India (4th revised edn. 1952).
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9
There is another aspect of the study of human society which should be considered here. The great nineteenth century sociologists have been criticised for their encyclopaedic conception of the discipline. But this had one great advantage; it called for a wide knowledge of different types of society and historical periods. Even though sociology was formed in Western Europe, and in large measure as a response to the advent of industrial capitalist society, these early scholars did not confine their interest to the European societies. They regarded the whole range of human societies as constituting the subject matter of their science.2 By contrast, recent sociology has been characterised by a much narrower range of interest. The great majority of sociologists have been engaged in studying very small segments of their own societies. There are several reasons for this change; the great accumulation of knowledge (which has made difficult, and perhaps impossible, the kind of scholarship which the work of Hobhouse or Max Weber displays), the decline in favour of the comparative method, and a wrong conception of specialisation. Sociology has perhaps never been so ethnocentric as during the past few decades. Fortunately, there are signs that the situation may be changing again; there is a distinct revival of comparative studies, and sociologists are beginning to emulate social anthropologists in their devotion to field-work in alien societies. These comparative studies differ in important respects from those of the nineteenth century; they deal with a more limited range of phenomena, and they depend increasingly upon international co-operation, rather than upon the solitary work of individual scholars. But they are similar in requiring a broad general knowledge of types of social structure and social institution, and a view of human society which goes beyond the particular features of the sociologist’s local community. These characteristics of Western sociology are relevant to the situation in India. The development of sociology in India is due to much the same factors as at an earlier stage in Europe; the emergence of new social problems resulting from rapid economic and social change, and the desire to control and direct that change. It is natural therefore that the interest of sociologists should be concentrated upon the analysis of Indian social structure. But it would be unfortunate if the study of society came to mean, here also, only the study of one’s own society. There is a great opportunity for the development of comparative studies; first, by taking as a framework for research the problems of social structure and social change in Asian societies, and secondly, since India is going through an industrial revolution similar in many respects to that which occurred earlier in Europe, by undertaking comparative studies of the processes of industrialisation and urbanisation in different structural and cultural contexts. Human society is, as Comte declared, an extremely complex phenomenon. The scientific study of social phenomena is impossible without specialisation. But it seems more difficult than in the study of the natural world to arrive at a satisfactory division of the subject matter. The present division of labour between the social sciences is based upon traditional,
2
It is true they were inclined to attribute a special importance to the Western societies, as having attained a stage of civilization which other societies would eventually reach after going through similar stages of development. In this way Comte justified the limitation of his investigations to ‘the elite or avant garde of humanity’ (i.e. the European nations). The view was not entirely unfounded in as much as Western science and technology have been the principal factors in transforming the modern world.
10
Sociology: A Guide to Problems and Literature
easily perceptible features; e.g. political, economic, religious, family institutions. With the advent of sociology this division was implicitly challenged, but it has nevertheless been reproduced to some extent within sociology itself. In any case, the co-operation between sociology and the special social sciences has required specialisation in sociology along these lines. It may be that this classification, in terms of the ‘elements of social structure’, is the most useful one. But we should bear in mind two other considerations. First, as Gerth and Mills have observed, the autonomy of the separate institutions is limited: ‘In “less developed” societies than the mid-nineteenth century West, as well as in more developed societies any one of the functions we have isolated may not have autonomous institutions serving it. Just what institutional orders exist in a more or less autonomous way is a matter to be investigated in any given society.’ 1 Secondly, it is apparent that the increasing scientific concern with solving theoretical problems, and the interdisciplinary research which this involves, is bringing about a new division of the subject matter, in terms of types of society, of microscopic and macroscopic phenomena, and so on. For purposes of description and exposition it is still convenient to deal with social phenomena under the traditional headings, but we should not assume that the scientific division of labour will always follow these lines.
1
Hans Gerth and C.Wright Mills, Character and Social Structure, (London, 1954), p. 27.
CHAPTER 2 SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY
There is not, at the present time, any general body of sociological theory which has been validated or widely accepted. The early sociologists believed that they had discovered a number of fundamental ‘social laws’, principally laws of social evolution, which constituted a body of theory capable of guiding both thought and action. Modern sociologists have been, on the whole, more modest in their claims. They have been chiefly concerned to elucidate the character of the sociological approach (i.e. with methodology rather than theory), and to work out more precise concepts and more adequate classifications. In the latter activity they have formulated mainly that kind of limited generalisation which is involved by the activity of classification itself. R.B.Braithwaite,1 makes a distinction between sciences at different stages of development, and says: “If a science is in a highly developed stage, as in physics, the laws which have been established will form a hierarchy in which many special laws appear as logical consequences of a small number of highly general laws expressed in a very sophisticated manner; if the science is in an early stage of development—what is sometimes called its ‘natural-history’ stage—the laws may be merely the generalisations involved in classifying things into various classes.’ 2 As to the so-called laws of social evolution, it has become doubtful whether they should be regarded as laws at all. K.R.Popper, in his discussion of ‘historicism’ observes: ‘The evolution of life on earth, or of human society, is a unique historical process. Such a process, we may assume, proceeds in accordance with all kinds of causal laws, for example, the laws of mechanics, of chemistry, of heredity and segregation, of natural selection, etc. Its description, however, is not a law, but only a singular historical statement. Universal laws make assertions concerning some unvarying order …i.e. concerning all processes of a certain kind… But we cannot hope to test a universal hypothesis nor to find a natural law acceptable to science if we are for ever confined to the observation of one unique process.’ 1 1 2
1
Scientifc Explanation (London 1953). Cf. S.F.Nadel, The Theory of Social Structure (London, 1957), p. 1 ‘… only the most advanced sciences have reached this level of explanatory theory-building. But “theory” can also be understood in another, less ambitious, sense, namely as a body of propositions (still interconnected) which serve to map out the problem area…the propositions serve to classify phenomena, to analyse them into relevant units or indicate their interconnections and to define “rules of procedure” and “schemes of interpretation”. “Theory” here equals conceptual scheme or logical framework, and it is in this sense that the present enquiry can be said to aim at a “theory”.’ K.R.Popper, The Poverty of Historicism (London 1957) pp. 108–109. Durkheim, in his criticism of Comte expressed a similar idea; he remarked that Comte’s ‘law of three stages’ was not only not a law, but was not even a reasonable hypothesis (since it could not be tested).
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Sociology: A Guide to Problems and Literature
This does not mean that the evolutionary scheme has no value. In biology it led ultimately to the science of genetics and the formulation of universal laws of heredity. In sociology, the concept of evolution produced a good deal of confusion (between evolution, development and progress),2 and was frequently a basis for philosophical rather than scientific thinking. 3 But it led also to some useful attempts at social classification, and to fruitful analyses of the processes of social change; results which the critics of historicism usually overlook. For the rejection of laws of social evolution does not mean that social change cannot be explained in terms of universal laws. Popper himself makes a distinction between ‘laws’ and ‘trends’, and suggests that universal laws of the type ‘Whenever there are conditions of the kind c there will be a trend of the kind t ’, can be formulated. 4 It would not be difficult to reformulate many propositions of the classical sociologists, including Marx, in such terms. Let us take as an example Max Weber’s statement of the relationship between the Protestant ethic and capitalism, which is already close to this formulation. We could say: Whenever there exist economic circumstances a, b, c (to be specified) and a calvinist-type social ethic (emphasising the value of secular activity and the duty of abstinence), there will be a trend towards rationalised economic production aiming at maximum output with minimum cost. Supposing this to be, in a more precise formulation, a true universal law, we should be able, in any particular instance, to answer the question: how is this trend to be brought about? 5 It has been assumed, so far, that the social sciences are generalising sciences which aim, like the natural sciences, at the establishment of a theoretical system, but which are as yet at a low stage of development. This is the view which has been taken by many, probably most, sociologists and social anthropologists, among the most eminent and explicit being Durkheim and Radcliffe-Brown.1 It has been opposed by those philosophers and social theorists who have tried to make a rigorous distinction between the natural sciences on the one hand, and the historical and cultural sciences on the other, asserting that while the former aim at ‘causal explanation’ the latter aim at the ‘interpretation’ or ‘understanding’ of meaning. A major influence in shaping this second conception of the social sciences is the work of Wilhelm Dilthey, and especially his Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften (1883).2 Dilthey’s influence was particularly strong in German sociology, as can be seen
2
3 4 5
1
2
See M.Ginsberg, Essays in Sociology and Social Philosophy (London 1957) Vol. 1., ‘On the concept of evolution in sociology’. For further discussion see Chapter 17 below. Op cit. p. 129. It is an important question for the economically under-developed countries. There is an attempt to specify the conditions for such a trend, using sociological as well as economic concepts, in W.Arthur Lewis, The Theory of Economic Growth (London 1955). Cf. E.Durkheim, The Rules of Sociological Method, where it is argued that the business of the sociologist is to establish causal connections and causal laws; and A.R.Radcliffe-Brown, A Natural Science of Society, p. 3. The theses to be maintained here are that a theoretical science of human society is possible; that there can only be one such science…’ Dilthey’s works have not been translated into English. There is, however, a good exposition and discussion of his views in two books by H.A.Hodges, Wilhelm Dilthey: An Introduction (London 1944) and The Philosophy of Wilhelm Dilthey (London 1952).
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from Max Weber’s essays on the methods of the social sciences. 3 In England, Collingwood put forward views similar to those of Dilthey but had little direct influence on the social sciences. However, a number of English writers have claimed the social sciences as historical disciplines.4 In Italy, Croce’s historical philosophy was for a long time the dominant influence in social studies. The more Hegelian of Marxist writers have also proposed a philosophical theory of history in opposition to sociology as a generalising science.1 Over the past century this has been one of the fundamental controversies in the social sciences and especially in sociology. It is too large a question to be examined thoroughly here. It will be convenient to examine some aspects of the problem in discussing sociological methods in the next chapter, since a part of the dispute turns upon the question whether the methods of the natural sciences can appropriately be used in studying social phenomena. But there are some general points which may be rapidly reviewed. One powerful argument against the scientific character of the social sciences has been that they have not in fact produced anything resembling a natural law. This might be answered (and often is) by referring to the youthfulness of the social sciences, and implying that they will eventually reach a higher theoretical level. But the answer is not entirely convincing; critics would say that the plea of immaturity has been made for a long time, without much sign of growth. Yet the criticism is exaggerated. In sociology, despite the complexity of the subject matter, causal connections and functional correlations have been established with a reasonable degree of probability. Durkheim’s study of suicide and Max Weber’s analysis of the relations between Protestantism and capitalism establish such connections, and there are other examples which we shall examine later. Moreover, those who dispute the scientific character of sociology are themselves open to criticism. If, as they hold, sociology is concerned with historical interpretation, or with interpreting the social actions of individuals on the basis of introspective knowledge of our own states of mind, the scientific
3
4
1
Max Weber, Methodology of the Social Sciences (English translation, 1949) especially the essays, ‘Critical Studies in the logic of the cultural sciences’. But Weber also believed that causal explanation was possible and necessary in sociology: ‘…it cannot be too strongly emphasized that any understanding of, or insight into, the [human] action in question must be carefully verified by the customary methods of causal inference…’. E.E.Evans-Pritchard in his Social Anthropology (London 1951) says, ‘In my view [social anthropology] is much more like certain branches of historical scholarship—social history and the history of institutions and of ideas as contrasted with narrative and political history—than it is like any of the natural sciences’. Sir A.M.Carr-Saunders, in a recent lecture ( Natural Science and Social Science, Liverpool, 1958) argues that: ‘Social science aims at interpreting social facts, that is the actions of men in relation to things, and to one another. These facts are entangled in a network so intricate that an attempt to discover invariable sequences must meet with failure. Such sequences, however, if discoverable, would not yield an interpretation of social facts in the light of our knowledge of people, and that is the interpretation which social science seeks.’ (p. 11.) He concludes the lecture by asserting a close affinity between social science and history; and ‘since no one doubts that the place of history is among the humanities, the place of social science must be there also’ (p. 15). One of the most influential writings of this tendency is G.Lukács, Geschichte und Klassenbewusst sein (1923). A more recent book which critically examines sociology from this point of view is H.Marcuse, Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory (New York, 1941).
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Sociology: A Guide to Problems and Literature
sociologist may ask, in turn, what generally acceptable results have been produced by these methods, and whether in fact they go beyond the insights of poets and novelists. In any case, those who believe that sociology is a scientific discipline are not obliged to claim that the formulation of laws constitutes its entire value. A part of sociology consists of exact description within an orderly framework of categories which involve only Simple theorising. Descriptive sociology is valuable in two ways. First, in the case of contemporary studies it provides information which is indispensable for the solution of practical problems and for the formulation of, and choice among, rational social policies. Secondly, where historical description, or the description of little known societies, is concerned it makes an important contribution to humane studies. For if a humane education consists in becoming sympathetically acquainted with a wide variety of human situations, strivings, ideals, and types of personality, then sociological studies are an essential element in such an education. Along with history, literary studies and, I would say, the historical aspects of the natural sciences, but in a more striking way than most of these, sociology makes us aware of the wealth and diversity of human life. It is, or should be, the centrepiece of modern humane studies, and a bridge between science and the humanities. Between those who regard sociology as a historical discipline and those who consider it a ‘natural science of society’, there seems to be a third view which, while emphasising the scientific character of sociology, insists that the study of society requires a different theoretical model and different methods from those of the natural sciences. This point is, in certain respects, trivial. Every science must have an appropriate scheme of explanation and appropriate methods, but there may still be a fundamental unity of scientific method. 1 A more important point is that there may be a radical difference between social laws and natural laws. Many writers have drawn attention to the reflexive character of social laws, in discussing the ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’ and the ‘self-destroying prophecy’. 2 The wider issue involved is whether, and in what sense, men can change the laws of social science. Alan Gewirth has examined the problem in a recent essay 3 and concludes that, ‘in their conditional aspect, social laws can be changed by men in a sense in which natural ones cannot’, for men can ‘create new correlations of social variables by making new decisions which function as antecedent conditions from which new consequences follow’. The matter can be briefly (and inadequately) summarised as follows: in the natural sciences it is possible to conceive an ultimate closed theoretical system, while in the social sciences this is inconceivable because in human affairs genuine novelty can result from conscious volition. A similar point has been made by H.Marcuse in his study of the development of social theory. He condemns sociology, especially Comte’s sociology, on account of its search for invariant laws and its conception of a unified science, because this eliminates man’s freedom and rationality.1
1 2 3
1
This is discussed further in Chapter 3. See R.K.Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (op. cit.). Alan Gewirth, ‘Can men change laws of social science?’, Philosophy of Science, XXI(3), July 1954. H.Marcuse, op. cit. pp. 340–359.
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These views might lead to various conceptions of sociology; as historical interpretation, or as a ‘critical philosophy’ (Marcuse), as ultimately reducible to psychology plus historical knowledge, or as a generalizing science whose laws have a very limited range. Some of these points will be considered further in the next chapter. I propose next to examine sociological theory as it has developed up to the present time, under three headings: types of generalization, basic concepts and schemes of classification, and explanatory theories.
Types of generalization It is perhaps surprising, in view of the claims sometimes made for the scientific maturity of sociology, that there have been so few attempts to set out in a systematic way, and to evaluate, the different types of generalization to be found in sociological work. One such attempt is the brief discussion in M.Ginsberg’s essay on The problems and methods of sociology’. 2 Ginsberg finds six types of generalization in social science: 1. 2. 3.
4.
5.
6.
Empirical correlations between concrete social phenomena (e.g. urban life and divorce rates). Generalizations formulating the conditions under which institutions or other social formations arise (e.g. various accounts of the origins of capitalism). Generalizations asserting that changes in given institutions are regularly associated with changes in other institutions (e.g. association between changes in class structure and other social changes, in Marx’s theory). Generalizations asserting rhythmical recurrences or phasesequences of various kinds (e.g. attempts to distinguish the ‘stages’ of economic development, Bücher, Schmoller and others). Generalizations describing the main trends in the evolution of humanity as a whole (e.g. Comte’s law of the three stages, the Marxist theory of development from primitive society to communist society, Hobhouse’s theory of social development). Laws stating the implications of assumptions regarding human behaviour (e.g. some laws in economic theory).
It will be seen that these types of generalization are very different in range and level; and that they differ also in the extent to which they can be regarded as validated. Those of the first type are empirical generalizations; many of them can be considered well established, but they have not been incorporated in a more general system of laws in such a way as to form part of a scientific theory. The generalizations of types (2) and (3) can be regarded as formulations of universal laws relating to trends, of the kind discussed earlier (p. 26). On the other hand, the generalizations of types (4) and (5) are not really theoretical generalizations; they are compounds of descriptive-historical statements and interpretations. Comte’s law of the three stages and Hobhouse’s theory of social development describe the growth of knowledge; the Marxist theory of social development describes the growth of technology and productive powers. All of them also interpret historical changes in terms of the phenomena which they emphasise. Finally, the generalizations of type (6) seem to occur
2
Reason and Unreason in Society (London, 1947).
