Swingedouw Eric 2010

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Globalisation or ‘glocalisation’? Networks, territories and rescaling Erik Swyngedouw

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University of Oxford Published online: 21 Oct 2010.

To cite this article: Erik Swyngedouw (2004): Globalisation or ‘glocalisation’? Networks, territories and rescaling, Cambridge Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 17:1, 25-48 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0955757042000203632

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Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Volume 17, Number 1, April 2004

Globalisation or ‘Glocalisation’? Networks, Territories and Rescaling Erik Swyngedouw University of Oxford

3 1 0 2 e n u J 9 1 8 1 : 1 1 t a ] 4 0 1 . 9 4 . 4 3 . 9 8 1 [ y b d e d a o l n w o D

Abstract This paper argues that the alleged process of globalisation should be recast as a process of ‘glocalisation’. ‘Glocalisation’ refers to the twin process whereby, firstly, institut institutiona ional/re l/regula gulatory tory arrangem arrangements ents shift shift from the national national scale scale both upwards upwards to supra-national or global scales and downwards to the scale of the individual body or to local, urban or regional configurations and, secondly, economic activities and inter-firm networks are becoming simultaneously more localised/regionalised and transnational. In particular, attention will be paid to the political and economic dynamics of this geographical rescaling and its implications. implications. The scales of economic networks and instit instituti utiona onall arrang arrangeme ements nts are are recast recast in ways ways that that alter alter socia sociall power power geome geometri tries es in important ways. This contribution, therefore, argues, first, that an important discursive shift took place over the last decade or so which is an integral part of an intensifying ideological, political, socioeconomic and cultural struggle over the organisation of society and the position of the citizen. Secondly, the pre-eminence of the ‘global’ in much of the literatu literature re and politica politicall rhetoric rhetoric obfuscat obfuscates, es, margina marginalize lizess and silences silences an intense intense and ongoing socio-spatial struggle in which the reconfiguration of spatial scale is a key arena. Third, both the scales of economic flows and networks and those of territorial governance are rescaled through a process of ‘glocalisation’, and, finally, the proliferation of new modes and forms of resistance to the restless process of de-territorialisation/re-territorialisation of capital requires greater attention to engaging a ‘politics of scale’. In the final part, attention will be paid to the potentially potentially empowering possibilities possibilities of a politics that is sensitive to these scale issues. But what I especially wish to make of it, is a machine to launch your brother’s grand grand proje projects cts … We establ establish ish it in order order that that it may assist assist the financi financial al and industrial companies which we shall organise in foreign countries … [Know then] that I hope to double, quadruple, quintuple this capital as fast as our operations extend! That we must have a hail of gold, a dance of millions, if we wish to accomplish over yonder the prodigies we have predicted! Ah! I won’t say there will be no breakage—one can’t move the world, you know, without crushing the feet of a few passers by. (Zola [1891] 1994, 119)

The recent debate over the alleged increasing globalisation of the world economy, however intellectually stimulating it might be, appears to be increasingly like like a discus discussio sion n over over the sex of the angels angels (Rayp (Rayp 1995). 1995). Intern Internati ationa onalis lisati ation, on, mundialisation, delocalisation, international competitiveness, cultural hybridisation and other more or less fashionable concepts are marshalled into a plurality of heavily mediatised discourses. The plurality of ways in which these words ISSN 0955-7571 print/ISSN 1474-449X online/04/010025-24 DOI: 10.1080/095575704200 10.1080/0955757042000203632 0203632

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2004 Centre of International Studies

26 Erik Swyngedouw


and their abstract definitions are used often produces a Babylonian confusion that seems to serve specific interests and power positions (Hout 1996). I shall argue in this article that (1) an important discursive shift has taken place over the last decade or so which is an integral part of an intensifying ideological, political, socioeconomic and cultural struggle over the organisation of society and the position of the citizen therein; (2) the pre-eminence of the ‘global’ in much of the literature and political rhetoric obfuscates, marginalises and silences an inte intens nsee an and d on ongo goin ing g soci socioo-sp spat atia iall stru strugg ggle le in whic which h a key key aren arenaa is the the reconfiguration of spatial scale, or the arenas around which socio-spatial power choreographies are enacted and performed (Swyngedouw 1997a; 1997b; 2000a) (I conceive scalar configurations either as regulatory order(s) or as networks, whereby whereby ‘regulator ‘regulatory y order’ order’ refers refers to geographi geographicalcal-insti instituti tutional onal arrangemen arrangements ts (like states, regional/local forms of governance, or transnational organisations like the European Union), while ‘networks’ refer to the spatial or geographical arrangements of interlinked economic activities); (3) both the scales of economic flows and networks and those of territorial governance are rescaled through a process of ‘glocalisation’ and (4) the proliferation of new modes and forms of resistanc resistancee to the restless restless process process of de-territo de-territoriali rialisatio sation/re-t n/re-territ erritorial orialisati isation on of capital requires greater attention to engaging a ‘politics of scale’. Crucial to this argument is the idea that social life is process based, in a state of perpet perpetual ual change change,, transf transform ormati ation on and reconfi reconfigur gurati ation on (see (see Harvey Harvey 1996) 1996).. Starting analysis from a given geographical scale, such as the local, regional, national or global, seems to me, therefore, to be deeply antagonistic to apprehendin hending g the world world in a dynami dynamic, c, proces process-b s-base ased d manner manner.. This This has profou profound nd implications for the significance of spatial scale. I conceive scalar configurations as the outcome of socio-spatial processes that regulate and organise social power relations, such as the contested making and remaking of the European Union or the the proc proces esss of stat statee devo devolu luti tion on or dece decent ntra rali lisa sati tion on.. The The emer emerge genc ncee of new new territorial scales of governance and the redefinition of existing scales (like the nation nation-st -state ate)) change change the regula regulatio tion n and organi organisat sation ion of social social,, politi political cal and economic power relations. Over the past few years, a plethora of research has been published on the social construction of scale and the deeply contested scalar transformations of the political economy of advanced capitalist societies (Dicken et al. 2001; Herod and Wright 2002; Howitt 1993; Smith and Dennis 1987; Swyngedouw 1992a; 1997a; 1997b; 2000b). Emphasis has been put on the making and remaking of social, political and economic scales of organisation (Brenner 1998; Collinge 1999; Cox 1998; Delaney and Leitner 1997; MacLeod and Goodwin 1999 1999;; Mars Marsto ton n 2000 2000,, Silv Silver ern n 1999 1999), ), of regu regula lati tion on (Boy (Boyle le 2000 2000;; Bern Berndt dt 2000 2000;; Brenne Brennerr 1997; 1997; Leitne Leitnerr 1997; 1997; Swynge Swyngedou douw w 1992a) 1992a),, of social social and union union action action (Her (H erod od 2001 2001;; Sadl Sadler er 2000 2000;; Wals Walsh h 2000 2000;; Wate Waterm rman an an and d Wi Will llss 2001 2001)) an and d of contestation (Castree 2000; Miller 1997; Towers 2000). In addition, attention has been paid to the significance of differential scalar positionings of social groups and classes in the power geometries of capitalism (Kelly 1999; MacLeod 1999; Swynge Swyngedou douw w 2000a) 2000a),, and on scalar scalar strate strategie giess mobili mobilised sed by both both elites elites and subaltern social groups (Brenner 1999; Herod, 1991; Swyngedouw 1996a; Zeller 2000). In other words, it has been suggested that the social power that can be mobi mo bili lise sed d is depe depend nden entt on the the scal scalee or spat spatia iall leve levell at whic which h soci social al acto actors rs operate. Consequently, the success or effectiveness of social and political strategies for empowerment is related to the ways in which geographical scale is

Globalisation or ‘Glocalisation’? 27 actively considered and mobilised in struggles for social, political, or economic resistance or change. Conceiving the current reordering of political and economic life from a scalar perspective permits one to recast the alleged process of globalisation in ways that is more sensitive to the spatiality of the process, the centrality of the political domain, and the shifting relations and geometries of power. The Mythical Reality of the ‘Global’: Globalisation as Ideology and Practice


The bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the world market given a cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country … In place of the old wants, satisfied by the production of the country, we find new wants, requiring for their satisfaction the products of distant lands and climes. In place of the old local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every direction, universal interdependence of nations. And as in material, so also in intellectual production. The intellectual creations of individual nations become common property. National one-sidedness and narrow-mindedness become more and more impossible, and from the numerous national and local literatures, there arises a world literature. (Marx and Engels 1952, 72).

La Penseé é Unique : Globalisation as a Western Discursive Orthodoxy

A rather remarkable discursive shift has taken place over the past decade and a half or so. The 1960s and 1970s were dominated by political-economic theories and political activist movements that were inspired by a strongly internationalist analysis and agenda, based on the view that capitalism has been—from its very beginning—a geographical project of spatial expansion and spatial integration (albeit in highly uneven ways). Internationalisation and globalisation are now presen presented ted as proces processes ses that that are decide decidedly dly new and profou profoundl ndly y alteri altering ng the power geometries in the world economy (Massey 1999; Amin 2002). Although many ma ny of the the earl early y an anal alys yses es were were crud crudee an and d ofte often n regu regurg rgit itat ated ed uncr uncrit itic ical ally ly internationalist literature, dating back to the early days of the century (Lenin, Luxemb Luxemburg urg,, Hilfer Hilferdin ding), g), the litera literatur turee was nevert neverthel heless ess acutel acutely y aware aware of the long-stand long-standing ing internatio internationalis nalism m of capitali capitalism. sm. ‘Globalis ‘Globalisation ation’’ was not the buzzword then; instead there were rather more politically inspired concepts such as imperiali imperialism sm and neo-imperi neo-imperialis alism, m, neocoloni neocolonialism alism,, uneven uneven developmen development, t, the new international division of labour and the like. Many students of the time surely remember reading A.G. Frank, Cardoso and Furtado, Baran and Sweezy, Emmanuel, Samir Amin, Ernest Mandel, Baran and Sweezy, Muller or Braverman, among many others. During the 1980s, a rather dramatic discursive shift took place in much of the literature and political rhetoric (O’Brien 1992; Group of Lisbon 1994; Ohmae 1995). The world economy had moved—or so it seemed—from the Westphalian nation-state order to fundamental and irrevocably new forms of organisation that transcended the traditional state-based and state-dominated world system. ‘Globalisation’ emerged as the rhetorical vehicle and analytical device used to describe this allegedly important shift in the economic and political organisation of the world economy and the concept soon moved into the cultural domain too (Featherstone et al. 1995). 1995). The propag propagati ation on of this this global globalisa isatio tion n ideolo ideology gy has become like an act of faith. Virtually every government, at every conceivable

28 Erik Swyngedouw


scale of governance, has taken measures to align its social and economic policy to the ‘exigencies’ and ‘requirements’ of this new competitive world (dis)order (see Peck and Tickell 1995; 2002) and the forces of a new ‘truly’ free-market based world economy. In light of the real or imagined threat of owners of presumed (hyper)mobile capital relocating their activities, regional and national states states feel feel increa increasin singly gly under under pressu pressure re to assure assure the restor restorati ation on of a fertil fertilee entrepreneurial culture. Fiscal constraint has to be exercised, social expenditures kept kept in check, check, labour labour market marketss made made more more flexibl flexible, e, enviro environme nmenta ntall and social social regulation minimised, etc. This, then, is heralded as the golden path that will lead regional and national economies to the desired heaven of global competitiveness and sustained growth. This is quite an impressive discursive shift from the 1960s/1970s mindset, whose broadly leftist internationalist rhetoric was replaced, in the 1980s/1990s, by a neoliberal discourse of market-led internationalism and globalisation. This discursiv discursivee shift shift deserves deserves close scrutiny in terms of its ideological ideological content and its relationship to the ‘real’ economy. The discourse of neoliberal internationalism has become, as French intellectuals labelled it, a Pense Pens eé é Unique Uniqu e, a hegemonic, incontestable and virtually naturalised and self-evident set of arguments and beliefs. This hermetic field of vision defies critique and dissidence, such that alternative visions or voices are marginalised and silenced, or meet with formidable dable resist resistanc ance. e. This This mon monoli olithi thicc ima imagin ginati ation, on, in turn, turn, flatten flattenss the politi political cal spectrum and renders the political articulation of alternative positions difficult, if not impossible. La Pense Pens eé é Unique Uniqu e has become the hegemonic academic canon and standard political recipe of an international elite of economists and policy analysts. This combines with a cosmopolitan cultural-economic elite of corporate managers, managers, financial financial fund managers, managers, consultanc consultancy y businesses businesses,, service service providers providers and an d the the like like.. A na nati tion onal al poli politi tica call elit elite, e, both both left left an and d righ rightt of the the trad tradit itio iona nall poli politi tica call spec spectr tre, e, finds finds in thes thesee argu argume ment ntss an excu excuse se to expl explai ain n aw away ay thei theirr inadequacy to link political programmes with an increasingly disenfranchised and disempowered civil society, since dissident voices and alternative political projec projects ts do no lon longer ger find expres expressio sion n throug through h the standa standard rd politi political cal arenas arenas.. Globalisation is, in fact, a triadisation that leaves out much of the world and much more so today than was the case in the 19th or, especially, the early parts of the 20th 20th centur century. y. Of course course,, this this ideolo ideology gy of global globalisa isatio tion n is a decide decidedly dly Wester Western n constr construct uct,, with with Japan Japan its reluct reluctant antly ly adopte adopted d stepch stepchild ild.. The ethnic ethnic conflict that has engulfed the Great Lakes region in Central Africa confirms how the image of a global village is but a simulacrum of a reality. While indicating a reduced global interdependency, it also shows the total disintegration of a region that until fairly recently (mid–1970s) was connected to other parts of the world in a myriad of ways. Sub-Saharan Africa would no doubt benefit from some form of greater global integration. To put it in the old language, today, much of Africa does not even have the luxury any more of being exploited by global capital. Globalisation as a Political Strategy In light light of the above, above, invoki invoking ng global globalisa isatio tion n has become become part part of a powerf powerful ul politi political cal-ec -econo onomic mic ideolo ideology gy throug through h which which capita capital–l l–labo abour ur relati relations onship hipss and relative class power positions are shifted in profound ways. While neoliberal-

Globalisation or ‘Glocalisation’? 29


ism’s ascent in the 1980s revolved around strategies of ‘rolling back the state’ and engaging in what Gramsci would call a war of position, the 1990s and beyond have been characterised by a much more pervasive ‘roll-over’ by the state and other forms of governance aimed at politically instituting neoliberalism as an uncontested and incontestable dogma (Peck and Tickell 2002). This war of manoeuvre is today decisively in the camp of capital, usually with strong state supp suppor ort, t, an and d cent centre ress arou around nd soci social al wa wage ge issu issues es such such as dire direct ct an and d indi indire rect ct labour labour cost, cost, labour labour market market rigidi rigiditie ties, s, public public debt debt and public public spendi spending, ng, trade trade liberalisation, privatisation, neoliberal re-regulation, etc. The hegemo hegemony ny of the global globalisa isatio tion n ‘thesi ‘thesis’ s’ extend extendss from from the conser conservat vative ive righ rightt to even even thos thosee who who clai claim m to purs pursue ue a mo more re incl inclus usiv ive, e, demo democr crat atic ic an and d socially progressive agenda (such as, for example, Petrella’s ‘Limits to Competition’ (Group of Lisbon 1994) or Tony Blair’s vision of the New Britain). This ideology becomes a vehicle for suppressing possibilities of resistance and the formul formulati ation on of altern alternati ative ve trajec trajector tories ies.. As any good good histor historica icall geogra geographi phical cal analysis would easily point out, resistance and the construction of alternative visions and strategies have always been profoundly geographical affairs. It is not surp surpri risi sing ng that that the the mo most st radi radica call cont contem empo pora rary ry mo move veme ment ntss that that atte attemp mptt to confront this hegemony of vision often feed off a distinctly geographical ferment in which which the reclam reclamati ation on of territ territori orial al identi identity ty and hom homoge ogenei neity ty finds finds fertil fertilee ground among those who feel deeply and bitterly disempowered by the disabling strategies pursued by those occupying the loci of power. The top score of the National Front in the recent elections in France is a worrying illustration of this.

Globalisation as Practice Capitalism has always been a decidedly geographical project and globalisation has been part of the capitalist enterprise from at least 1492, if not before. In fact, in ma many ny wa ways ys,, the the wo worl rld d econ econom omy y an and d cult cultur uree of the the late late 19th 19th-- an and d earl early y 20th 20th-c -cen entu tury ry wo worl rld d were were as glob global ally ly inte interc rcon onne nect cted ed as, as, an and d in some some wa ways ys more mo re so than than,, the the pres presen entt time time.. Even Even a curs cursor ory y read readin ing g of the the cult cultur ural al,, economic and geographical accounts of those days would make this abundantly clear in the same way as a more sober statistical comparative analysis would illustrate. Of course, many of these accounts have always prioritised time and history over geography. The latter was usually understood as contextual and passive. Spatial or geographical strategies were rarely considered as vital and formative in explaining the dynamics of internationalisation. At best, the feeble attempts to take space seriously really resulted in replacing the process of class exploitation and domination by processes of spatial exploitation and domination in which clas classs alli allian ance cess in on onee terr territ itor ory y expl exploi oite ted d clas classs alli allian ance cess in othe otherr terr territ itor orie iess (Harvey 1995). Despite the proclaimed internationalism of much work on the left, most historical materialist analysis was clearly bound up with the national state and class formation. From Lenin’s account of the class struggle in Russia to more recent and innumerable accounts of the formation of working classes and class relations in an equally large number of different places, all presented the illusi illusion on of a geogra geographi phical cally ly sensit sensitive ive histor historica ical-m l-mate ateria rialis listt analys analysis. is. Yet, Yet,

30 Erik Swyngedouw


much much of this this lite litera ratu ture re fail failed ed to inco incorp rpor orat atee the the fund fundam amen enta tall prem premis isee that that capitalist geographical dynamics are inherently tied up with processes of territorialisation, de-territorialisation and re-territorialisation and have been so for a long time (Harvey 2003). My quotes from the Communist Manifesto and from Zola Zo la’s ’s no nove vell indi indica cate te as much much.. I ha have ve in rece recent nt year yearss rare rarely ly come come acro across ss definitions of globalisation that are significantly better than, let alone differentfrom, the one offered by Marx and Engels, written more than a century and a half ha lf ago. ago. In the the curr curren entt phas phasee of prof profou ound nd shak shakee-up up of thes thesee geog geogra raph phic ical al processes, ‘globalisation’ is invoked as short-hand to summarise these processes of de-territorialisation and re-territorialisation, but in such a way that makes them equally a-spatial or a-geographical and, as such, profoundly disempowering. It is too easily forgotten that while capital expands its geographical reach and breaks through all manner of geographical barriers, new boundaries are created while older ones are broken down or become more porous. As Hirst and Thompson (1996; 1999), among others, have pointed out, the process of globalisation is perhaps not as pervasive and total as many make it out to be. They show how—at least until 1913—international interdependence in terms terms of global global trade trade and foreig foreign n direct direct invest investmen mentt (FDI) (FDI) was signifi significan cantly tly higher compared with the subsequent period of national ‘Fordist’ development (1925–73). It is only in recent years that we have begun to approach again (at least least in relative relative terms) the conditions conditions of integratio integration n that characterise characterised d the world economy at the turn of the 20th century. This is, of course, not to say that nothing nothing new has happened. happened. The essence essence of capitalis capitalism m is, as Schumpeter Schumpeter showed a long time ago, about perpetual creative destruction in which ‘everything that is solid melts into air’, but this always happens through geographical change and geographical restructuring. As Harvey (1995, 5) pointed out, ‘the adoption of the term “globalisation” signals a profound geographical reorganisation of capitalism, making many of the presumptions about the “natural” geographical units units within within which which capita capitalis lism’s m’s histor historica icall trajec trajector tory y develo develops ps less less and less less meaningful (if they ever were)’. We have to begin to see how the dynamics of capitalism are about the perpetual reconfiguration of space and spatial organisation in which space is a constitutive moment. If I am not mistaken, the term ‘globalisation’ was first coined in the financial press, and not surprisingly so. If anything, the de-territorialisation/re-territorialisat isatio ion n of finan financi cial al ma mark rket etss ha hass been been by far far the the mo most st sign signifi ifica cant nt econ econom omic ic-regulatory change. ‘Real’ capital flows (i.e. those associated with international trad tradee an and d FDI) FDI) dwar dwarff in comp compar aris ison on wi with th flows flows of pure purely ly finan financi cial al capi capita tal. l. Wher Wheree tota totall wo worl rld d trad tradee in 1994 1994 am amou ount nted ed to circ circaa US$4 US$4.3 .3 tril trilli lion on (on (on an annualised basis), total average daily turnover in the financial markets in 1996 skyrocketed to a gigantic US$1.4 trillion, 90% of which was broadly moving around the earth in search of speculative gain (Swyngedouw 1996b). In 2003, this has increased to well over US$2 trillion. This profound internationalisation and de-nationalisation of money in the aftermath of the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system and the subsequent monetary disorder has become, as it were, a pars pro toto to stand for the globalisation of the whole economy. Furthermore, the technological and information revolution has increased and intensified cultural globalisation. As mentioned before, while global media flows have become more dense, the actual direct interchange in economic terms with many of the remote places that fill our TV screens on a daily basis has actually



disint disintegr egrate ated. d. The ima image ge of the global global villag villagee may have have become become a standa standard rd cult cultur ural al icon icon of the the time time,, but but ma many ny plac places es ha have ve in fact fact suff suffer ered ed from from a dimini diminishe shed d interd interdepe epende ndence nce.. Of course course,, the speed speed of commod commodity ity flows flows has accelerated and this in itself propelled the process of de-territorialisation and re-territorialisation to new heights. Undoubtedly, this acceleration of the ease by which people and commodities overcome the barrier of space is unprecedented. Arguably the most profound geographical restructuring that has taken place lies in the combined process of acceleration of working class formation in many part partss of the the wo worl rld, d, the the hype hyperu rurb rban anis isat atio ion n proc proces esss that that stil stilll cont contin inue uess at an intens intensify ifying ing pace, pace, and the mass mass moveme movement nt of people people (and (and mai mainly nly worker workers) s) across space. Of course, this brings with it growing cultural, ethnic, gender and other differentiations among the working class (something that much of recent analysis really does not take into account), but also intensifies the geographical processes that are so central to the current restructuring. It is in this this cont contex extt no nott surp surpri risi sing ng,, ther theref efor ore, e, to find find a grea greatt numb number er of geographical tensions, conflicts and struggles arising in many parts of the world, many of which are not even remotely emancipatory, liberating or empowering. Consider, for example, the formidable barriers erected to dissuade migrating labour forces to move freely in search of a livelihood. It is not only events such as the labour unrest in South Korea, the emergence of the first European-wide strike and workers’ action against the closure of the Brussels Renault factory (a closure that had everything to do with overproduction in the sector and little with with global globalisa isatio tion), n), the genoci genocide de in Centra Centrall Africa Africa,, the resist resistanc ancee agains againstt the draconian austerity programme in France, Italy and Germany, and the rise of anti-internationalist and deeply regionalist struggles that bring out the profound spatial tensions and contradictions that arise out of the maelstrom of spatial transf transform ormati ations ons wrough wroughtt from from recent recent change changess in the organi organisat sation ion of capita capitall circulation processes, but also from the recent waves of plant closures, company restructuring and bank collapses. Scale, Governance and the Mediation of Power The The poli politi tica call econ econom omy y of capi capita tali lism sm is, is, as allu allude ded d to abov above, e, a proc proces esss of continuous transformation of its temporal and spatial horizons. The molecular stra strate tegi gies es of capi capita tall as mo mobi bili lise sed d by a myri myriad ad of atom atomis isti ticc acto actors rs prod produc ucee rhizomatic rhizomatic geographical geographical mappings mappings that consist consist of complex complex combinati combinations ons and layers of nodes and linkages, which are interconnected in proliferating networks and flows of money, information, commodities and people. The flows that shape and define these networks are of course local at every moment (Latour 1993). Over the past few years, the networked ordering of the economy has become simultaneously more localised or regionalised, on the one hand, and transnationalised, on the other. Authors as diverse as Krugman (1995), Ohmae (1995) and Scott (2000) have pointed out that economic growth is predicated upon locally and/or regionally networked clusters of companies that are globally organised and active. Whether one considers the archetypical example of Silicon Valley, the geographical clusters of companies in ‘the Third Italy’ or the concentration of financ financia iall serv servic ices es in Manh Manhat atta tan n or the the City City of Lond London on,, each each illu illust stra rate tess this this process of intense territorial concentration combined with a global reach and

32 Erik Swyngedouw


outlook. In other words, a scalar transformation of the networks of economic organisation has taken place. Of course, the tensions, conflicts and socio-spatial power power geomet geometrie riess that that infuse infuse the networ networks ks render render them them inhere inherentl ntly y unstab unstable, le, permeable and prone to conflict. In additi addition, on, these these econom economic ic (and (and partia partially lly cultur cultural al and social social)) networ networks ks cannot operate independently from or outside a parallel political or institutional organisation, i.e. a set of territorially constructed institutional arrangements that simultaneously provide some social coherence while permitting and encouraging the extended rearrangement of these economic networks (Jessop 2002). In othe otherr wo word rds, s, the the econ econom omic ic mo mome ment nt requ requir ires es its its ow own n ‘out ‘outsi side de’’ in orde orderr to function. Without territorially organised political or institutional arrangements (like the state or other forms of governing) that regulate markets, money and ownership, and organise security and parts of service delivery, the economic order would irrevocably break down. It has always always been been the terrain terrain of the politi political cal where these these tensio tensions ns were were fought, mediated and negotiated, resulting in ever-changing forms of territorial or geographical organisation and the emergence of territorially shifting forms of governance. For a long time and still today, the national state has been singled out out as the the prepre-em emin inen entt locu locuss for for the the crys crysta tall llis isat atio ion n an and d reso resolu luti tion on of thes thesee tens tensio ions ns an and d confl conflic icts ts.. This This ha hass been been an and d stil stilll is an im impo port rtan antt scal scalee for for the the regula regulatio tion n and negoti negotiati ation on of social social,, econom economic ic and cultur cultural al life life and for the articulation of the aforementioned processes of de-territorialisation/re-territorialisation. Yet, the historical geography of capitalism and its restless wrestling with the more enduring characteristics of social and political space have always made existing forms of territorial organisation porous, unstable and prone to transgressions and transformations. The production of space through the perpetual reworking of the networks of flows of capital circulation and accumulation discards existing spatial configurations and scales of governance, while new ones are produced. For example, as soon as the Westphalian order was completed by the mid 20th century, it had already begun to transcend itself as nation national al bounda boundarie riess became became more more porous porous and both both subsub- and supersuper-nat nation ional al scales of governance and organisation became more prominent (Brenner et al. 2003). This deconstruction and reconstruction of spatial scales that are often taken for granted as naturalised units for social existence (much of which is perpetuated in some of the geographical and international relations literature, which often unproblematically singles out particular scalar forms—such as the local, the region regional, al, the nation national al or the global global—a —ass the pivota pivotall terrai terrain n for analys analysis) is) reshuffles social power relationships in important ways. During the 20th century, tury, it was undoub undoubted tedly ly the nation national al state state that that became became the emblem emblemati aticc expression of the pre-eminent political form of territorial organisation. In the present context of a significant process of rescaling, in which not only the the scal scalee of the the na nati tion onal al stat statee but but also also othe otherr scal scales es of gove govern rnan ance ce an and d of regulation of social conflict and social reproduction are reshuffled, the ideology of an ungo ungove vern rnab able le an and d larg largel ely y abst abstra ract ct proc proces esss of glob global al reor reorga gani nisa sati tion on take takess ho holld eas easily. ily. As poi pointed nted out out above bove,, thi this ide ideolog ology y ha hass becom ecomee a powerful weapon in the struggle over the content, democratic accountability and forms of power that emerge in the new scalar configurations that are under constr construct uction ion.. It is exactl exactly y this this revamp revamping ing of spatia spatiall scales scales and their their nested nested

Globalisation or ‘Glocalisation’? 33 arti articu cula lati tion on that that I beli believ evee is cent centra rall to the the curr curren entt proc proces esss of geog geogra raph phic ical al reor reorga gani nisa sati tion on an and d ma may y prov provid idee a mo more re fert fertil ilee terr terrai ain n for for comi coming ng to grip gripss with with the politi political cal econom economy y of contem contempor porary ary change change (see (see also also Swynge Swyngedou douw w 1997a). The Reconfiguration of Scale and the Process of ‘Glocalisation’

Defining Scale: The Dialectic of Territorialities and Networks


In the remainder of this paper, the current process of transformation will be consid considere ered d from from the vantag vantagee point point of the reorga reorganis nisati ation on of the geogra geographi phical cal scales scales of econom economic ic and politi political cal life. life. In partic particula ular, r, the tensio tensions ns betwee between n the rhizomatic rescaling of the economic networks and flows on the one hand and the territorial rescaling of scales of governance on the other will be the central leitmo leitmotiv tiv.. Before Before I can embark embark on this, this, I shall shall briefly briefly summaris summarisee the centra centrall themes of a ‘scalar’ perspective: 1. Scalar Scalar configu configurat ration ions, s, concei conceived ved off either either as regula regulator tory y order( order(s) s) or as netnetworks, as well as their discursive and theoretical representation, are always alre alread ady y a resu result lt,, an outc outcom omee of the the perp perpet etua uall mo move veme ment nt of the the flux flux of socio-spatial dynamics. The theoretical and political priority therefore resides never in a particular geographical scale, but rather in the process through which particular particular scales scales become become constitute constituted d and subsequen subsequently tly transform transformed. ed. There is a continuous tension between ‘scales of regulation’ and ‘scales of networks’. As the latter contract and expand through processes of de- and re-territorialisation, the former emerge as institutionalised territorial compromises that mediate processes of cooperation and competition. Consider, for example, how the contested making and remaking of the European Union constitutes exactly such territorial compromise between territorial ‘ordering’ and the competitive reorganisation of economic and social networks. 2. Struggling Struggling to command a particular particular scale scale in a given socio-spatia socio-spatiall conjuncture conjuncture can be of eminent importance. Spatial scales are never fixed, but are perpetually redefined, contested and restructured in terms of their extent, content, relative importance and interrelations. The continuous reshuffling and reorganisation of spatial scales are integral to social strategies and serve as the arena where struggles for control and empowerment are fought. 3. A proces process-b s-base ased d approa approach ch to scale scale focuse focusess attent attention ion on the mechan mechanism ismss of scale transformation through social conflict and political-economic struggle. These These sociosocio-spa spatia tiall proces processes ses change change the import importanc ancee and role role of certai certain n geographical scales, reassert the importance of others and on occasion create entirely new scales. These scale redefinitions in turn alter the geometry of soci social al powe powerr by stre streng ngth then enin ing g the the powe powerr an and d the the cont contro roll of some some whil whilee disempowering others. 4. Smith Smith refers to this process as the ‘jumping of scales’, scales’, a process process that signals signals how ho w poli politi tics cs are are spat spatia iali lise sed d (198 (1984) 4);; in othe otherr wo word rds, s, ho how w scal scalar ar poli politi tica call strategies are actively mobilised as parts of strategies of empowerment and disempowerment. As the scalar ‘gestalt’ changes, the social power geometry within and between scales changes. 5. There is a simultaneous, ‘nested’ (like (like a Russian doll) yet partially partially hierarchical relationship between territorial scales, while networked scales can relationally

34 Erik Swyngedouw


stretch or contract (Jonas 1994, 261; Smith, 1984; 1993). Clearly, social power along gender, class, ethnic or ecological lines refers to the scale capabilities of individuals and social groups. Engels has already suggested how the power of the the labo labour ur mo move veme ment nt,, for for exam exampl ple, e, depe depend ndss on the the scal scalee at whic which h it operat operates, es, and labour labour organi organiser serss have have always always combin combined ed strate strategie giess of concontrolling place(s) with building territorial alliances that extend over a certain space ([1845] 1968). 6. Scale configurations change as power shifts, shifts, both in terms of their nesting and interrelations and in terms of their spatial extent. In the process, significant new social, economic or political scales are constructed, while others disappear or are altered. 7. Scal Scalee also also emer emerge gess as the the site site wher wheree coop cooper erat atio ion n an and d comp compet etit itio ion n find a (fragile) standoff. For example, national unions are formed through alliances and cooperation from lower-scale movements and a fine balance needs to be perpetually maintained between the promise of power yielded by national organisation and the competitive struggle that derives from local loyalties and inter-local struggle. 8. Proces Processes ses of scale scale format formation ion are cut through through by all manner manner of fragme fragmenti nting, ng, divisive and differentiating processes (nationalism, localism, class differentiation, competition and so forth). Scale mediates between cooperation and competition, between homogenisation and differentiation, between empowerment and disempowerment (Smith 1984; 1993). 9. The mobilisation of scalar narratives, narratives, scalar politics and scalar practices, practices, then, becomes an integral part of political power struggles and strategies. This propels considerations of scale to the forefront of emancipatory politics. Scale Transformations In sum, spatial ‘scale’ has to be theorised as something that is ‘produced’; a process that is always deeply heterogeneous and contested. If the capacity to approp appropria riate te place place is predic predicate ated d upon upon contro controlli lling ng space, space, then then the scale scale over over which command lines extend will strongly influence this capacity to appropriate place. More importantly, as the power to appropriate place is always contested and struggle struggled d over, over, then then the all allian iances ces social social groups groups or classe classess forge forge over over a certain spatial scale will shape the conditions of appropriation and control over place and have a decisive influence over relative socio-spatial power positions. All this suggests that the continuous reshuffling and reorganisation of spatial scales scales are an integr integral al part part of social social strategi strategies es and strugg struggles les for contro controll and empowe empowerme rment. nt. In a contex contextt of hetero heterogen geneou eouss social social,, cultur cultural, al, econom economic ic and ecologica ecologicall regulatio regulations, ns, organised organised at the corporeal, corporeal, local, regional, regional, national national or intern internati ationa onall level, level, mobile mobile people people,, goods goods and capita capitall and hyperm hypermobi obile le inforinformation (networked) flows permeate and transgress these scales in ways that can be deeply exclusive and disempowering for those operating at other scale levels (Smith 1988a; 1988b). Geographical configurations as a set of interacting and nested scales (the ‘gestalt of scale’) become produced as temporary stand-offs in a perpetual transformative, and on occasion transgressive, socio-spatial power struggle. These struggles change the importance and role of certain geographical scal scales es,, reas reasse sert rt the the im impo port rtan ance ce of othe others rs,, some someti time mess crea create te enti entire rely ly new new significant significant scales, scales, but—most but—most important importantly—t ly—these hese scale scale redefiniti redefinitions ons alter alter and

Globalisation or ‘Glocalisation’? 35 express changes in the geometry of social power by strengthening the power and contro controll of some some while while disemp disempowe owerin ring g others others (see (see also also Swynge Swyngedou douw, w, 1993; 1993; 1996a). This is exactly the process that Smith refers to as the ‘jumping of scales’, a process that signals how politics are spatialised by mechanisms of stretching and contracting objects across space (1993): This (stretching process) is a process driven by class, ethnic, gender and cultural struggles struggles.. On the one hand, hand, domineer domineering ing organizations organizations attempt attempt to control control the dominated by confining the latter and their organizations to a manageable scale. On the other hand, subordinated groups attempt to liberate themselves from these imposed imposed scale constraints constraints by harnessing harnessing power and instrumen instrumentalit talities ies at other scales. In the process, scale is actively produced. (Jonas 1994, 258)


The histor historica icall geogra geography phy of capita capitalis lism m exempl exemplifie ifiess this this proces processs of territ territori orial al ‘scalar’ construction of space and the contested production of scale. Capitalists have usually been very sensitive to and have skilfully strategised around issues associated with the geographical scale of their operations, while paying careful attent attention ion to the import importanc ancee of contro controlli lling ng greate greaterr spaces spaces in their their contin continuou uouss powe powerr stru strugg ggle le wi with th labo labour ur an and d wi with th othe otherr capi capita tali list sts. s. Simi Simila larl rly, y, effe effect ctiv ivee oppositional strategies have equally been sensitive to issues of scale. Consider, for example, how environmental movements have occasionally been successful in mobilising local issues into performative political strategies at higher scales. Scale emerges as the site for control and domination, but also as the arena where cooperation and competition find a fragile stand-off. For example, national unions are formed through alliances and cooperation from lower-scale moveme movements nts.. A fine balanc balancee needs needs to be perpet perpetual ually ly mai mainta ntaine ined d betwee between n the prom promis isee of powe powerr yiel yielde ded d from from na nati tion onal al orga organi nisa sati tion on an and d the the comp compet etit itiv ivee strugg struggle le that that derive derivess from from local local loyalt loyalties ies and interinter-loc local al strugg struggle. le. Simila Similarly rly,, cooperation and competition among capitals is also deeply scaled (Herod 1991; Smith and Dennis 1987). Of course, the process of de-territorialisation/re-territorialis rialisati ation on shatte shatters rs spatia spatiall scales scales and new-sc new-scale aled d configu configurat ration ionss emerge emerge as boundaries are transgressed and new frontiers erected. During periods of great social, economic, cultural, political and ecological turmoil and disorder, when temporal and spatial routines are questioned, broken down and reconfigured, important processes of geographical rescaling take place that interrogate existing power lines while constructing new ones. Over the past twenty years or so, this is exac exactl tly y what what seem seemss to ha have ve ha happ ppen ened ed.. The The new new poli politi tica call-ec econ onom omic ic an and d culturalcultural-ecolo ecologica gicall conditions conditions have once again shattered shattered existing existing boundaries boundaries,, produced new ones and rearticulated spatial scales in ways that are at times prom promis isin ing g an and d at othe others rs dist distur urbi bing ng.. Thes Thesee new new scal scalee form format atio ions ns are are neve neverr socially neutral. Both scales of regulation/reproduction and of production have changed, but while social regulation tends to have moved to the individual, the private or the bodily, some scales of production and reproduction (but by no means all) have asserted a greater spatial reach and extent. In the next section, some of the central transfigurations of scale and the emerging new ‘gestalt of scale’ will be documented. The ‘Fordist’ Production of Scale and Its Contradictions The pivot of West European ‘Fordist’ regulation centred on the national state. This was the pre-eminent scale at which conflicts were contested and compro-

36 Erik Swyngedouw


mises settled (Swyngedouw 1990; Altvater, 1993; Jessop 1993a; 2002). The foundations of the Fordist state and the social regulation of labour relations resided specifically in the struggle of the labour movement to transcend local shopfloor struggle and to ‘jump scales’ through gaining increasing power at the level of the state. Similarly, the Keynesian view of macro-economic policies constructed a precarious but increasingly important bond between the state and national private capital. An institutionalised tripartite setting was created whose main focus was on treading a fine line between competition/struggle on the one hand and cooperation/compromise on the other, particularly around the production/ consumption nexus. Quite clearly, command over the accumulation process remained firmly in the hands of private capital that took an outspoken agglomerated urban-regional form, while the reproduction process became increasingly centred on the nuclear family and its associated sexual/gender divisions. The regulatory homogenisation across national space of a series of socioeconomic aspects (wages, social policy policy,, state state interv intervent ention ion,, socioe socioecon conomi omicc norms, norms, rules rules and proced procedure ures) s) was arti articu cula late ted d wi with th a high highly ly unev uneven en loca locall an and d regi region onal al deve develo lopm pmen entt proc proces ess. s. Although ‘the local state’ scale lost much of its power, it remained the arena for a whole whole host host of centra centrally lly import important ant ‘commu ‘communit nity y politi politics’ cs’.. Conseq Consequen uently tly,, the national state became, both in theory and in practice, the pre-eminent and almost naturalised scale through which both subnational and international processes were articulated and understood. This state-based regulation altered the form and structure of competition, part partly ly as a resu result lt of the the grea greate terr scal scalee at whic which h indi indivi vidu dual al capi capita tals ls bega began n to operate. The productivity/consumption nexus permitted a steady expansion of the ‘national’ economy. However, the gradual internationalisation of production and accumulation contributed to more intense competition in the international arena (Moulaert and Swyngedouw 1989). This growing internationalisation of produc productio tion—p n—part articu icular larly ly from from the mid–19 mid–1950s 50s onward onwards—a s—amid midst st a mosaic mosaic of nation nationall ally y regula regulated ted consum consumpti ption on spaces spaces would would prove prove to be a fundam fundament ental al dilemma. While the networks of capital ‘jumped scales’ for the organisation of production through both intensification and extension of their flows and networks, consumption and reproduction remained fundamentally nationally regulated. In addition, the regulation of the various functions of money operated at a variet variety y of scales scales.. During During the interinter-war war period period,, mon money ey was predom predomina inantl ntly y nationally regulated, without an international anchoring value. The collapse of the the finan financi cial al syst system em in the the earl early y 1930 1930ss rein reinfo forc rced ed call callss for for some some form form of international cooperation to prevent beggar-thy-neighbour devaluationary policies without, however, sacrificing international competition. The Bretton Woods agreement embodied such compromise; a compromise that remained shaky, contested and subject to change as the economic international tionalisa isatio tion n proces processs accele accelerat rated ed during during the post-w post-war ar period period.. Only Only the hegehegemoni mo nicc powe powerr of the the US coul could d ma main inta tain in some some sort sort of rela relati tive ve cohe cohesi sion on.. This This compromise was anchored on the dollar–gold standard, which stabilised the intern internati ationa onall mon moneta etary ry system system by provid providing ing a relati relativel vely y secure secure contai container ner of value. However, while regulating the value of money was cemented into the rules of the Bretton Woods agreement and policed by the International Monetary Fund (see Swyngedouw 1992a; 1996b; Leyshon and Tickell 1994), credit or the issuing of money, in contrast, remained firmly at the level of the nation-state. In

Globalisation or ‘Glocalisation’? 37 short, different forms and functions of money were regulated at different scales, whic which, h, of cour course se,, wo woul uld d resu result lt in seri seriou ouss tens tensio ions ns an and d fric fricti tion on due due to the the conflicting nesting of these various spatial scales. In short, ‘Fordism’ was not a condition or stable configuration. Rather, it refers to a dynamic, contested and always precarious process of socio-spatial chan change ge duri during ng whic which h a nest nested ed set set of new new or rede redefin fined ed spat spatia iall scal scales es were were produced. During the decades of the making and breaking of Fordism, new scale forms and new tensions between scales have gradually emerged. Out of this maelstrom scales have been redefined, restructured and rearticulated. Rescaling ‘Glocal’ Disorders: The Post-Fordist Conundrum


What is generally referred to as ‘post-Fordism’—a problematic generic term that now seems to cover almost everything and thus nothing in particular (see Amin 1994)—is a series of a highly contested, deeply contradictory and variegated processes and power struggles that often revolve around scale, the control over particular scales, the content of existing scales, the construction of new scales and the articu articulat lation ion betwee between n scales scales.. Indeed Indeed,, the so-cal so-called led ‘crisi ‘crisiss of Fordis Fordism’ m’ implies a significant territorial rescaling of a series of regulatory practices (see Moulaert et al. 2001; Peck and Tickell 1994; Jessop 1994a). In particular, regulatory codes, norms and institutions are spatially shifted from one scale to another. These rescalings rescalings are invariabl invariably y highly highly contested contested and the outcome outcome varies varies considconsiderably from scale to scale, both horizontally and vertically. The nature, substance and configuration of the new scales and their ‘nesting’ attest to changing relative power positions of social social groups groups and classes. classes. Neverthel Nevertheless, ess, the accumulat accumulation ion imperative (which is, of course, always place bound) and the quest to sustain the circulation of capital seems to be of paramount importance, although the specific mechanisms through which this takes places can vary enormously from one scal scalee to an anot othe her. r. The The over overal alll patt patter ern n is on onee that that I ha have ve term termed ed else elsewh wher eree ‘glocalisation’ (Swyngedouw 1992a; 1992b; see also Luke 1994) and refers to (1) the contested contested restructuring restructuring of the institutional institutional level from the national national scale scale both upwards to supra-national or global scales and downwards to the scale of the indi indivi vidu dual al body body or the the loca local, l, urba urban n or regi region onal al confi configu gura rati tion onss an and d (2) (2) the the strategies of global localisation of key forms of industrial, service and financial capital. In what follows, we shall first consider the networked rescaling of the economy and then move on to articulating the territorial rescaling of scales of governance Rescaling Economic Networks/Rescaling Territorialities of Governance

The Rescaling of the Economy The economic success of cities and regions is highly dependent on the local sectoral and institutional configuration and on the framework of governance in which regional or urban economies are embedded. As locational opportunities expand expand and locati locationa onall capabi capabilit lities ies increa increase, se, so does does the import importanc ancee of ‘local ‘local’’ charac character terist istics ics of cities cities and region regionss in mai mainta ntaini ining ng or assert asserting ing their their global global compet competiti itive ve advant advantage ages. s. Indeed Indeed,, the enduri enduring ng econom economic ic succes successs of region regional al confi configu gura rati tion onss such such as Ile Ile de Fran France ce,, Lond London on,, Bava Bavari ria, a, Flan Flande ders rs,, Ra Rand ndst stad ad Holland and others suggests that competitive success is indebted to specific and

38 Erik Swyngedouw


histor historica ically lly create created d forms forms of territ territori orial al and sociosocio-ins instit tituti utiona onall organi organizat zation ion (Swyng (Swyngedo edouw uw 2000a) 2000a).. These These region regional al econom economies ies are charac character terise ised d by often often highly specialised local or regional filli fil liee`res re s that are embedded in local institutional, political or cultural frameworks. They often cooperate locally but compete at a global scale (Salais and Storper 1993; Swyngedouw 2000c). A variety of terms have been associated with such territorial economies, such as ‘learning regions’ regions’ (Maskell (Maskell and Malmberg Malmberg 1995), 1995), ‘intellig ‘intelligent ent regions’ regions’ (Cooke (Cooke and Morgan Morgan 1991), milieux innovateurs (Aydalot 1986), ‘reflexive economies’ and ‘competitive citi cities es’’ (Phi (Philo lo an and d Kear Kearns ns 1994 1994), ), etc. etc. At the the same same time time,, new new orga organi nisa sati tion onal al strate strategie giess have have been been identi identified fied,, such such as the ‘embed ‘embedded ded’’ firm (Grabh (Grabher er 1993) 1993),, vertic vertical al disint disintegr egrati ation on (Scott (Scott 1988), 1988), strate strategic gic all allian iances ces and so forth. forth. Simila Similarr processes can be identified in the service sector (Moulaert and Djellal 1990). Surely Surely,, such such territ territori orial al produc productio tion n system systemss are articu articulat lated ed with with nation national, al, suprasupra-nat nation ional al and global global networ networks. ks. In fact, fact, intens intensif ifyin ying g compet competiti ition on on an expand expanding ing scale scale is parall parallele eled d exactl exactly y by the emerge emergence nce of locall locally/r y/regi egiona onally lly sensit sensitive ive produc productio tion n mil milieu ieux. x. Yet, Yet, these these locali localised sed or region regionali alised sed produc productio tion n complexes are organisationally and, in terms of trade and other networks, highly internationalised and globalised. The insertion of firms in a dense network of part partic icul ular ar regi region onal al prod produc ucti tion on mi mili lieu eux x is part part an and d parc parcel el of a stra strate tegy gy of globalisation and global integration. In fact, the ‘forces of globalisation’ and the ‘demands of global competitiveness’ prove powerful vehicles for the economic elites to shape local conditions in their desired image: high productivity, low dire direct ct an and d indi indire rect ct wa wage gess an and d an abse absent ntee ee stat statee (Gro (Group up of Lisb Lisbon on 1994 1994). ). Companies are simultaneously, intensely local and intensely global. These ‘glocalising’ production processes and inter-firm networks cannot be separated from ‘glocalising’ levels of governance. The rescaling of the regulation of wage wage and workin working g condit condition ionss or the de-nat de-nation ionali alisat sation ion/pr /priva ivatis tisati ation on of import important ant compan companies ies and public public servic services es throug throughou houtt Europe Europe,, for exampl example, e, simultaneo simultaneously usly opens up internati international onal competitio competition n and necessita necessitates tes a greater greater sensitivity to subnational conditions. The bureaucratic regulation of the wage nexus at the scale of the national state (something that the labour movement struggled hard for throughout most of the 20th century) became more problematic atic as a sign signifi ifica cant nt part part of the the prod produc ucti tion on syst system em supe superr-na nati tion onal alis ised ed.. The The globalisation of the firm and of the economy paralleled a decentralisation of the regulation of wage and other working conditions. The lowering of the scales of the regulation of work and of social reproduction coincided with an increasing scale in the organisation of the economy and the forces of production. This is just one of many many possib possible le exampl examples es of the growin growing g separa separatio tion n betwee between n the netnetworked scales of production and the territorial scales of regulating reproduction. This internationalisation process also questioned traditional forms of oligopolistic competition and inter-firm collaboration within states, which was increasingly replaced by global global strong strong competiti competition on between between ‘glocalis ‘glocalising’ ing’ companies companies.. The nesting and articulation of geographical scales becomes internalised in firm and inter-firm networks that reach from the local to the global and back again. Surely, success in these matters is always fleeting and permanent restructuring and reorganisation are central to maintaining a competitive position in a world where where bounda boundarie riess are shatte shattered red (while (while new ones ones are create created). d). This This became became particularly acute as a number of cities, regions and countries became increasingly less competitive and felt the sting of de-industrialisation and crisis, while others prospered relatively.



Differentiation and fragmentation at all levels became the corollary of internationalisation, globalisation and the creeping imposition of a total(ising) commodi mo dity ty cult cultur ure. e. As Debo Debord rd argu argued ed a long long time time ago, ago, the the comm commod odit ity y as a heterogeneous and perpetually changing and expanding spectacle has attained the total occupation of social life (1970). The tensions between a set of decidedly local/regional cultures, the growing inter- and intra-regional disparities and the fragmentation, pulverisation and proliferation of bodily, local, regional or national identities in a homogenising global cultural landscape and consumption norm prompted more intense resistance to the imposed cultural norms, which revolv revolved ed increa increasin singly gly around around the tyrann tyranny y of a spread spreading ing market market-St -Stali alinis nism m (Robertson 1995). Perhap Perhapss the most most pervas pervasive ive proces processs of ‘gloca ‘glocalis lisati ation’ on’ and redefin redefiniti ition on of scales operates through the financial system (Swyngedouw 1996b). When the Bret Bretto ton n Wo Wood odss agre agreem emen entt brok brokee down down in 1972 1972 as a resu result lt of the the tens tensio ions ns associated with differential territorial scalings of regulating money on the one hand and the expanding scale of production and trade on the other, the global financial order was shattered. In the interstices of this mosaic, new global–local arrangements, new money flows and new geographical configurations would emerge. As Jeelof (1989) has already pointed out, the volatility in the money markets made production planning extremely risky and uncertain. The internationalisation of production and world planning of production chains and input/ output flows, which characterised much of the post-war international division of labour, became a high-risk strategy. Different locations of production as well as sites sites of produc productio tion n and sites sites of commer commercia cialis lisati ation on were were locate located d in differ different ent currency zones and subject to often rapid and dramatic relative exchange-rate fluctua fluctuatio tions. ns. This This made made a shamb shambles les of lon long-t g-term erm corpor corporate ate strate strategic gic locati location on planning. A new mosaic of uneven development emerged in which the financial sector itse itself lf,, no now w libe libera rate ted d from from the the coco cocoon on of fixed fixed exch exchan ange ge rate rates, s, wo woul uld d itse itself lf become an key arena for capital accumulation and feverish expansion. The ‘liberalisation’ of the global financial system signalled the end of an integrated moneta mon etary ry world world space space and, and, conseq consequen uently tly,, reaffir reaffirmed med a mosaic mosaic of differ different ent national moneys. Most currencies would fluctuate in relative value visvis-aa` -vis -v is each othe other, r, depe depend ndin ing g on the the comb combin inat atio ion n of na nati tion onal al econ econom omic ic an and d mo mone neta tary ry policies on the one hand and international money flows on the other. Attempts to regula regulate te mon money ey at new suprasupra-nat nation ional, al, subglo subglobal bal (such (such as the succes successiv sivee attempts to stabilise currencies within the European Union) and geographical scale levels proved to be extremely difficult and rife with geostrategic tensions and interinter-sta state te rivalr rivalries ies.. Of course course,, nation national al mon moneta etary ry and econom economic ic polici policies es matter, but in ways that are profoundly different from the mechanisms that operated during the Bretton Woods era. In particular, monetary policy began to figur figuree as a key key vehi vehicl clee in econ econom omic ic grow growth th poli polici cies es as Keyn Keynes esia ian n dome domest stic ic demand demand-ba -based sed expans expansion ion polici policies es began began to give give way to strate strategie giess aim aimed ed at expanding international trade and at achieving an improved competitive position in the global market place (Drache and Gertler 1991). More importantly perhaps, the liberated money markets and the volatility of the international money markets created a new market environment. Buying and selling currencies and speculating on exchange rate fluctuations allowed for the development and rapid growth of a speculative foreign exchange (Forex) and, from the mid-1980s, a burgeoning derivatives market (see Swyngedouw 1996b).

40 Erik Swyngedouw


Interestingly enough, making money by buying and selling money and speculating on future currency values (however near this future may be) became a prime vehicle for accumulation. Money as expressions of value-in-motion and capital as claims claims to future future (la (labou bour) r) time time establ establish ished ed an arena arena for frenzi frenzied ed financi financial al activi activitie ties. s. Specul Speculati ating ng on future future values values and the buying buying-of -of-ti -time me procee proceeded ded through the creation of new spaces and spatial relations. For example, the Forex mark ma rket et grew grew from from a mo mode dest st US$1 US$155 bill billio ion n in 1970 1970,, when when mo most st deal dealss were were directly related to settling trade, to well over US$2 trillion today. The bulk is driven by constant hedging, arbitrage and speculative positiontaking in the international financial markets, which are organised as extensive networks of nodal points and inter-nodal flows. Almost all deals involve spatial tran transf sfer erss of mo mone ney y as well well as chan change gess in the the rela relati tive ve posi positi tion onss of a stat state’ e’ss currency values (which, in turn, influence interest rates, buying capacity, competitive positions, trade flows, monetary and fiscal policy and so forth). This volatility enables speculative gain, while the flows of money further contribute to reaffirming these fluctuations. The bumpy history of the European Monetary Union, for example, illustrates how the confrontation of national demands and global global financi financial al integr integrati ation on and strate strategie giess result result in perpet perpetual ual tensio tensions ns and continuous friction (Gros and Thygesen 1992; Leyshon and Thrift 1992). The hotly contested implementation and adoption of the euro is an example of how a particular politics of scale is inserted in this emerging new scalar gestalt of money. The Rescaling of the State and Other Institutional Forms What seems to be of great importance in this context of a glocalising economy, culture and politics is the changing position of the scale of the state. While this wass alth wa althou ough gh by no mean meanss the the on only ly pivo pivota tall scal scalee for for the the regu regula lati tion on an and d cont contes esta tati tion on of a whol wholee seri series es of soci socioe oeco cono nomi micc an and d clas classs prac practi tice cess in the the post-war period, the relative position and importance of the state are shifting in decisive ways. In a context in which the capital/labour nexus was nationally regulated while the circulation of capital spiralled out to encompass ever larger spatial scales, there was a concerted attempt to make the ‘market imperative’ the ideologica ideologically lly and political politically ly hegemonic hegemonic legitimi legitimisatio sation n of institutio institutional nal reform. reform. This took shape through a variety of processes that combined (1) the ‘hollowing out’ out’ of the the na nati tion onal al stat statee wi with th (2) (2) mo more re auth author orit itar aria ian n an and d ofte often n soft softly ly but but sometimes openly repressive political regimes. Let us consider just a few of these key rescal rescaling ing proces processes ses and identi identify fy the shifti shifting ng power power geomet geometry ry associ associate ated d with this ‘glocalisation’ of the state or other institutional or regulatory forms. First, the regulation of capital/labour relations tended to devolve from some kind of national collective bargaining to highly localised forms of negotiating wages and working conditions. The UK, for example, has moved a long way towards this and continuous pressure is exercised to make unions and workers accept ‘local’ pay deals. Similar movements have been documented elsewhere (see Cox and Mair 1991; Ohmae 1995), but, depending on particular political configu configurat ration ions, s, resist resistanc ancee to these these moveme movements nts toward toward downsc downscali aling ng has been been more successful in some countries, such as Sweden and Germany, than in others. Second, the ‘Schumpeterian Workfare State’ (see Jessop 1993b; 1994b; Peck and Jones 1994) has either abolished a series of institutionalised regulatory procedure duress to leav leavee them them orga organi nise sed d by the the ma mark rket et (C (Chr hris isto toph pher erso son n 1992 1992)) an and, d,



consequently, by the power of money. Alternatively, they are replaced by more local (’local’ (’local’ can take a variety variety of spatial scale forms from local constituenci constituencies es or cities to entire regions [or a combination of them]) institutional and regulatory forms. Needless to say, this ‘jumping of scales’ alters relative power positions as inter-local cooperation is replaced by inter-local competition. This increases the power of those that can ‘jump scales’ vertically or horizontally at the expense of those whose command of scale is more limited. Third, the restructuring of and often outright attack on national welfare regimes equally leads to a downscaling (in size size and space) space) of public public mon money ey transf transfers ers,, while while privat privatisa isatio tion n permit permitss a socially exclusive form of protection, shielding the bodies of the powerful, while leaving the bodies of the poor to their own devices. In short, the hollowing out of the welfare state rescales relations to the level of the individual body through powerful processes of social, cultural, economic or ethnic exclusion. Fourth, the interventionism of the state in the economy is equally rescaled, either downwards to the level of the city or the region, where public public/pr /priva ivate te partne partnersh rships ips shape shape an entrep entrepren reneur eurial ial practi practice ce and ideolo ideology gy needed to successfully engage in an intensified process of inter-urban competition (Harvey 1989) or upwards to supra- or trans-national scales. The latter is manifested in albeit highly contested and still rather limited attempts to create a super-national form of governance (such as, for example, the European Union). In a different sort of way institutions such as NAFTA (North American Free Trade Association), GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) and others provid providee testim testimony ony to simila similarr proces processes ses of upscal upscaling ing the form form of govern governing ing.. Furthermore, a host of informal global or quasi-global political arenas have been formed. The Organisation of Petroleum-Exporting Countries (OPEC) may have been among the first and most publicised quasi-state organisations, but other examples abound: the G–7 meetings, the Group of 77, the Club of Paris and other ‘informal’ gatherings of ‘world’ leaders attempt to regulate (parts of) the global political economy. Of course, the competitive rivalry among these ‘partners’ prevent some form of effective cooperation that could otherwise ultimately lead to some frightening form of a global authoritarian state-form. Fifth, in addition to the socially deeply uneven, socio-spatially polarising and selectively disempowering effects of the ‘jumping of scales’ that exemplifies this ‘gloca ‘glocalis lisati ation’ on’ of the state state or of other other forms forms of govern governanc ance, e, this this rescal rescaling ing of governance often takes place through disturbingly undemocratic procedures by an increasingly authoritarian governing apparatus. The double rearticulation of poli politi tica call scal scales es (dow (downw nwar ard d to the the regi region onal al/l /loc ocal al leve level; l; upwa upward rd to the the EU, EU, NAFTA, GATT, etc.; and outward to private capital) leads to political exclusion, a narrowing of democratic control and, consequently, a redefinition (or rather a limitation) of citizenship. In short, the ‘glocalisation’ or territorial rescaling of instit instituti utiona onall forms forms leads leads to more more autocr autocrati atic, c, undemo undemocra cratic tic and author authorita itaria rian n (quasi-)state apparatuses (Swyngedouw 1996a; 2000a; 2000b). In sum, although the degree of change and the depth of its impact are still contested, it is beyond doubt that the 19th/20th-century political formations of articulating the state/civil-society relationship through different forms of representative democracy, which vests power in hierarchically structured transcendent dental al stat statee-fo form rms, s, is comp comple leme ment nted ed by a prol prolif ifer erat atin ing g numb number er of new new instit instituti utiona onall forms forms of govern governing ing that that exhibi exhibitt rather rather differ different ent charac character terist istics ics (Baiocchi 2001; Curtin 1999; Taylor 1999). The traditional state-form in liberal democracies is theoretically and practically articulated through forms of politics

42 Erik Swyngedouw


that legitimise state power by vesting it within the political gift of citizens. The new forms of governance exhibit a fundamentally different relationship between power and citizenship and, consequently, constitute a new form of governability (Swyngedouw et al. 2002). Contrary to state-based arrangements, which are hierarchical and top-down command-and-control forms of setting rules and exercising power (but recognised as legitimate via socially agreed conventions of representation, delegation, accountability and control), governance systems are presumably based on horizontal, network and interactive relations between independent but interdependent dent acto actors rs that that shar sharee a high high degr degree ee of trus trust, t, desp despit itee inte intern rnal al confl conflic ictt an and d oppositio oppositional nal agendas, agendas, within within inclusive inclusive participa participatory tory institutio institutional nal or organisaorganisational associations (Schmitter 2002). These are systems of negotiation and convenant that operate beyond the state, albeit not independently from the state. The participants in such forms of governance partake (or are allowed to partake) in thes thesee netw networ orke ked d rela relati tion onal al form formss of deci decisi sion on ma maki king ng on the the basi basiss of the the ‘stakes’ they hold with respect to the issues these forms of governance attempt to address (see Schmitter 2002, 62–63). These new forms of governance fundamentally mentally transform transform state/civ state/civil-s il-societ ociety y relations relations (see Swyngedouw Swyngedouw et al. 2002). Mobilising Scale Politics

Engaging, restructuring and occupying places while metabolising physical and social nature takes places through conflicting socio-spatial processes. The transformative formative continuati continuation on of socio-spa socio-spatial tial relations relations that operate operate through through deeply deeply empowering/disempowering mechanisms produces a nested set of related and interpenetrating spatial scales that define the arenas of struggle where conflict is mediated and regulated and compromises are settled. Socio-spatial struggle and political strategising, therefore, often revolve around scale issues, and shifting balances of power are often associated with a profound rearticulation of scales or the the prod produc ucti tion on of an alto altoge geth ther er new new ‘ges ‘gesta talt lt of scal scale’ e’.. The The soci socioo-sp spat atia iall transformations that have characterised the past two decades or so are testimony to such such scale scale restru restructu cturin rings gs throug through h which which older older power power relati relations ons are transtransformed. The disturbing effects of these recent ‘glocalisation’ processes suggest that the spaces spaces of the circulati circulation on of capital capital have been upscaled, upscaled, while regulating regulating the production/consumption nexus has been downscaled, shifting the balance of power in important polarising or often plainly exclusive ways. The rescaling of the state and the production of new articulations between scales of governance, in turn, redefines and reworks the relationship between state/governance and civil society or between state power and the citizen. The social struggle, therefore, that has been waged over the past decades revo revolv lved ed deci decide dedl dly y arou around nd scal scalee issu issues es.. It seem seemss to me deep deeply ly dist distur urbi bing ng,, however, to see the power of money and an homogenising imperialist culture take control of ever larger scales, while very often the ‘politics of resistance’ seem to revel in some sort of ‘militant particularism’ (see Harvey 1996) in which local loyalties, identity politics and celebrating the different Other(s) attest to an impotence to embrace an emancipatory and empowering politics of scale. To be sure, sure, identi identity, ty, differ differenc encee and place place loyalt loyalty y are centra centrall in any emanci emancipat patory ory project, but solidarity, inter-place bonding and collective resistance demand a decidedly decidedly scaled politics. politics. In fact, fact, empowerin empowering g strategies strategies in the face of the global



cont contro roll of mo mone ney y flows flows an and d comp compet etit itiv ivee whir whirlw lwin inds ds of ‘glo ‘gloca cal’ l’ indu indust stri rial al,, financial, cultural and political corporations demand coordinated action, crossspatial alliances and effective solidarity (Harvey 2003). Strategising around the politi politics cs of scale scale necess necessita itates tes negoti negotiati ating ng throug through h differ differenc encee and simila similarit rity y to formulate formulate collectiv collectivee strategies strategies without sacrificin sacrificing g local loyalties loyalties and militant militant particularisms. Opposi Oppositio tion n groups groups,, whethe whetherr organi organised sed around around workin working g class, class, gender gender,, environmental or other politics, are usually much better and empowering in their strategie strategiess to organise organise in place, place, but often disempowered disempowered and fragmente fragmented d when it comes to building alliances and organising collaboration over space (Harvey and Swynge Swyngedou douw w 1993). 1993). In short, short, what what is distur disturbin bing g in contem contempor porary ary politi politics cs of resistance is not that the paramount importance of scale is not recognised, but rather rather that opposition opposition groups have failed failed to transcend transcend the confines confines of a ‘militant ‘militant particularism’ or ‘particular localism’. The angst for negating the voice of the Other has overtaken the resistance to the totalising powers of money of capital. Ironically, the retreat from collaboration and coalition formation out of fear of perverting the Other’s identity and of annihilating difference swings the leverages of power, of marginalisation and exclusion, decidedly in the direction of the totalisin totalising g and homogenis homogenising ing forces forces of global global commodifica commodification tion and repressiv repressivee competition, controlled by ‘glocal’ elites. An inclusionary politics of scale necessitates a vision and strategy in which the current one-sided obsession with a politics of identity in which the body has become a central site is replaced by a rescripting and reconstruction of group affinities. Resisting the totalising and globalising forces of money and capital accumulation demands forging ‘scalar’ alliances that are sensitive to geographical differ differenc encee and unique uniquenes ness. s. The succes successfu sfull strugg struggle le of the South South Korean Korean labour movement in the first months of 1997 to contest the imposition of more flexible labour regulations (necessary—so the autocratic state insisted—to maintain South Korea’s international competitive stance) and their success in producing a national alliance of opposition forces suggest how a politics that is sensitive to issues of scale can bring a substantial leverage to contest socially regressive regula regulator tory y reform reforms. s. The sprawl sprawling ing prolet proletari ariani anisat sation ion in SouthSouth-Eas Eastt Asia Asia and elsewhere that is increasingly resistant to control by the market-Stalinist regimes that often deny even basic citizenship rights in these places begins to produce a set of all allian iances ces that that might might transc transcend end the idiosy idiosyncr ncrasi asies es of local local resist resistanc ances es through a ‘jumping of scales’ that could begin to undermine the power of capital to command space. In Europe, the closure of the Brussels Renault plant saw the first first succes successfu sfull suprasupra-nat nation ional al labour labour mobili mobilisat sation ion.. In the wake wake of the shockshockwaves waves that that the unexpe unexpecte cted d closur closuree of the plant plant sent sent throug through h Europe European an civil civil soci societ ety, y, the the first first Euro Europe pean an-w -wid idee stri strike ke wa wass orga organi nise sed d as well well as the the first first European labour march in Paris to protest Renault’s strategies. The recognition of how scalar strategies can be utilised and how alliances across space can be built will affect the balance of power and prompt a revision of entrepreneurial strategies. The Renault fight may have been lost, but neither Renault nor any other other multimulti-loc locati ation on compan company y will will contem contempla plate te enacti enacting ng the scenar scenario io of the Brussels closure again. These politics of scale can often forge highly unique and often unlikely unlikely alliances alliances.. The German consumer consumer boycott of Shell in the aftermath aftermath of its double socio-ecological disaster (the Brent Spar and the genocide of the Ogoni people in Nigeria) equally suggests how mobilising scale politics proves

44 Erik Swyngedouw to be a potentially successful strategy in efforts to force different social, political or ecological configurations. This is squarely where the challenge in Europe resides as well. The fight for representation in key European decision-making forums, increased power for the European parliament, a more inclusive voting system that defines rights of citizenship even for those without a European legal nationality, the construction of tripar tripartit titee forms forms of negoti negotiati ation on at Europe European an level, level, intern internati ationa onall worker workers’ s’ representation on the board of international companies and a European-wide redistributive fiscal system are, among others, small pointers in the direction of an empowe empowerin ring g politi politics cs of scale scale that that can reshuf reshuffle fle power power relati relations onship hipss and produce a ‘gestalt of scale’ respectful of citizenship rights and one that promotes inclusion and cooperation. References 3 1 0 2 e n u J 9 1 8 1 : 1 1 t a ] 4 0 1 . 9 4 . 4 3 . 9 8 1 [ y b d e d a o l n w o D

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