Strategic Options for Iran: Balancing Pressure with Diplomacy
Strategic Optins or Iran: Balancing Pressure with Diplomacy
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Tis document is published by Te Iran Project; the content is the collective view o the signers.
Signed and Endorsed by:
Signed and Endorsed by:
Jessica . Mathews
Zbigniew Brzezinski
Stephen A. Cheney, BrigGen.
Richard . McCormack, Amb.
Joseph Cirincione
Ryan C. Crocker, Amb.
William G. Miller, Amb.
Richard Murphy, Amb.
Suzanne DiMaggio
James Dobbins, Amb.
Joseph Nye
George Perkovich
David Dreier
Leslie H. Gelb
homass R. Pickering, Amb. homa
Paul R. Pillar
Lee H. Hamilton
William Harrop, Amb.
William A. Reinsch
Gary Sick
Michael V. Hayden, Gen.
Stephen B. Heintz
Anne-Marie Sl augh aughter ter
Paul A. Volcker
Carla A. Hills
Frank Kearney, LG.
James Walsh
John C. Whitehead
Daniel C. Kurtzer, Amb.
John Limbert, Amb.
Lawrence B. Wilkerson, Col.
imothy E. Wirth, Sen.
William H. Luers, Amb.
Richard Lugar, Sen.
2 strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy
Frank G. Wisner, Amb.
strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy 3
Signed and Endorsed by:
Signed and Endorsed by:
Jessica . Mathews
Zbigniew Brzezinski
Stephen A. Cheney, BrigGen.
Richard . McCormack, Amb.
Joseph Cirincione
Ryan C. Crocker, Amb.
William G. Miller, Amb.
Richard Murphy, Amb.
Suzanne DiMaggio
James Dobbins, Amb.
Joseph Nye
George Perkovich
David Dreier
Leslie H. Gelb
homass R. Pickering, Amb. homa
Paul R. Pillar
Lee H. Hamilton
William Harrop, Amb.
William A. Reinsch
Gary Sick
Michael V. Hayden, Gen.
Stephen B. Heintz
Anne-Marie Sl augh aughter ter
Paul A. Volcker
Carla A. Hills
Frank Kearney, LG.
James Walsh
John C. Whitehead
Daniel C. Kurtzer, Amb.
John Limbert, Amb.
Lawrence B. Wilkerson, Col.
imothy E. Wirth, Sen.
William H. Luers, Amb.
Richard Lugar, Sen.
2 strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy
Frank G. Wisner, Amb.
strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy 3
C
Letter .......................................................................................................................... 1 ............................................................................................. 7 Executive Summary .............................................................................................
I. Introduction ......................................................................................................... 15
M v “ U S, I . T v . W k .
” President Barack Obama, March 2009
II. Relying on the Pressure Pressure Track: Track: Successes, Shortalls, and Risks .............................................................................................................. 21 1. S U.S. U.S. P....................................................................................... 21 2. S U.S. P D.......................................................................... 23 3. Rk A U.S. U.S. P ....................................................................... 26
III. Negotiating a Nuclear Deal With Iran: Iran: Impact on Other U.S. Ojectives in the Middle East.................................................. 31 1. I’ S M E P P.............................................. 32 2. T G S O ......................................................................................... 33 3. G S ......................................................................................................... 34 4. A, Iq, S ................................................................................. 34 5. A Ak Ak ................................................................................................... 37 6. .............................................................................................................. 38 7. E F F H N R ........................................ 38
IV.. Strenghthening The Diplomatic Track: Practical IV Considerations Consideration s and Strategic Options .................................................... 41 1. G D I ............................................................................ 43 2. B k k I..................................................................................... 48 3. P N D ....................................................................................... 50 4. Mv B R............................................................................. 53 5. Ex O C M M S Cf ... 54
V.. Concluding Observations: Costs V Costs and Benets o o Trying To Work with Iran ................................................................................ 57 C Rk .......................................................................................................... 57 B P B .................................................................................. 58
VI. A Primer on Prior Initiatives to Improve Improve U.S.–Iran Relations ........ 61 Endnotes ............................................................................................................... 75 4 strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy
C
Letter .......................................................................................................................... 1 ............................................................................................. 7 Executive Summary .............................................................................................
I. Introduction ......................................................................................................... 15
M v “ U S, I . T v . W k .
”
President Barack Obama, March 2009
II. Relying on the Pressure Pressure Track: Track: Successes, Shortalls, and Risks .............................................................................................................. 21 1. S U.S. U.S. P....................................................................................... 21 2. S U.S. P D.......................................................................... 23 3. Rk A U.S. U.S. P ....................................................................... 26
III. Negotiating a Nuclear Deal With Iran: Iran: Impact on Other U.S. Ojectives in the Middle East.................................................. 31 1. I’ S M E P P.............................................. 32 2. T G S O ......................................................................................... 33 3. G S ......................................................................................................... 34 4. A, Iq, S ................................................................................. 34 5. A Ak Ak ................................................................................................... 37 6. .............................................................................................................. 38 7. E F F H N R ........................................ 38
IV.. Strenghthening The Diplomatic Track: Practical IV Considerations Consideration s and Strategic Options .................................................... 41 1. G D I ............................................................................ 43 2. B k k I..................................................................................... 48 3. P N D ....................................................................................... 50 4. Mv B R............................................................................. 53 5. Ex O C M M S Cf ... 54
V.. Concluding Observations: Costs V Costs and Benets o o Trying To Work with Iran ................................................................................ 57 C Rk .......................................................................................................... 57 B P B .................................................................................. 58
VI. A Primer on Prior Initiatives to Improve Improve U.S.–Iran Relations ........ 61 Endnotes ............................................................................................................... 75 4 strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy
EXECUIVE SUMMARY
Strategic Options or Iran: Balancing Pressure With Diplomacy A Paper rom The Iran Project
It is time or Washigton to rebalance its dual-track policy toward Iran, strengthening
I’ I’ S S f I “ .
”
the diplomatic track in order to seize the opportunity created by the pressure track. The United United States should now dedicate as much energy energy and creativit creativityy to negotiating negotiating directly with Iran as it has to assembling a broad international coalition to pressure and isolate Iran. Only by taking such a rebalanced approach might the United States achieve its objectives with respect to Iran’s nuclear program. Progress on the nuclear issues could lead to a broader dialogue with Iran that advances other U.S. interests and goals in the Middle East. In this third report rom The Iran Project, we consider the successes, shortalls, and risks o strategies designed to pressure the Iranian government into changing its policies. We explore some o the advantages and disadvantages or U.S. interests in the Middle East that might ow rom bilateral negotiations with Iran to achieve a nuclear deal, and propose steps that the President might take to establish a ramework or direct talks with Iran’s leadership that would build on the latest round o
Ronald Reagan, 1986
multilateral negotiations and proposals. Iran’s actions—particularly with regard to its nuclear program—pose complex and dangerous challenges to U.S. interests and security, as well as to the security o Israel and possibly to stability in the Middle East. This paper sets out a response to these serious challenges. A strengthened U.S. diplomatic initiative would not replace the pressure track; rather, it would build on pressure already applied. Some measure o sanctions relie will have to be oered as part o a negotiated settlement; but pressure should not be eased without frm and verifable Iranian commitments to greater transparency and agreed limits on Iran’s nuclear program. The proposed bilateral discussions between the U.S. and Iran would not replace the multilateral negotiations that are now underway. Bilateral talks would have to proceed on a basis understood and ideally supported by the P5+1 (the fve permanent members o the UN Security Council, plus Germany) Germany) and U.S. allie s.
6 weighing beneits and costs o military action against iran
strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy 7
EXECUIVE SUMMARY
Strategic Options or Iran: Balancing Pressure With Diplomacy A Paper rom The Iran Project
It is time or Washigton to rebalance its dual-track policy toward Iran, strengthening
I’ I’ S S f I “ .
”
the diplomatic track in order to seize the opportunity created by the pressure track. The United United States should now dedicate as much energy energy and creativit creativityy to negotiating negotiating directly with Iran as it has to assembling a broad international coalition to pressure and isolate Iran. Only by taking such a rebalanced approach might the United States achieve its objectives with respect to Iran’s nuclear program. Progress on the nuclear issues could lead to a broader dialogue with Iran that advances other U.S. interests and goals in the Middle East. In this third report rom The Iran Project, we consider the successes, shortalls, and risks o strategies designed to pressure the Iranian government into changing its policies. We explore some o the advantages and disadvantages or U.S. interests in the Middle East that might ow rom bilateral negotiations with Iran to achieve a nuclear deal, and propose steps that the President might take to establish a ramework or direct talks with Iran’s leadership that would build on the latest round o
Ronald Reagan, 1986
multilateral negotiations and proposals. Iran’s actions—particularly with regard to its nuclear program—pose complex and dangerous challenges to U.S. interests and security, as well as to the security o Israel and possibly to stability in the Middle East. This paper sets out a response to these serious challenges. A strengthened U.S. diplomatic initiative would not replace the pressure track; rather, it would build on pressure already applied. Some measure o sanctions relie will have to be oered as part o a negotiated settlement; but pressure should not be eased without frm and verifable Iranian commitments to greater transparency and agreed limits on Iran’s nuclear program. The proposed bilateral discussions between the U.S. and Iran would not replace the multilateral negotiations that are now underway. Bilateral talks would have to proceed on a basis understood and ideally supported by the P5+1 (the fve permanent members o the UN Security Council, plus Germany) Germany) and U.S. allie s.
strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy 7
6 weighing beneits and costs o military action against iran
EXECUIVE SUMMARY
This paper di diers ers rom rom earlier earlier Iran Proje Project ct publica publications tions1 in that it takes policy positions
EXECUIVE SUMMARY
IMPACT OF NEGOTIATING NEGOTIATING A NUCLEAR DEAL WITH IRAN ON OTHER U.S. INTERESTS
and makes recommendations or government action. We have sought to base our
Since Iran’s policies and actions have or could have an impact on virtually every
suggestions on actual, objective, nonpartisan analyses, consulting with nearly 20 ormer
major strategic challenge and interest in the Middle East, we examine how negotiating
government ofcials and experts and seeking advice rom a larger group o signatories.
a nuclear deal that might lead to a broader dialogue could aect other
In extensive endnotes, we cite much o the impressive work on this set o issues that
U.S. interests in the region.
has been done by other colleagues in the United States and elsewhere.
u
Israel’s security. Any change in U.S. policy toward Iran would likely be
seen negatively by Israel, at least initially—although the achievement o a nuclear deal
HIGHLIGHTS FROM THE PAPER SUCCESSES, SHORTFALLS, SHORTFALLS, AND RISKS OF RELYING ON THE PRESSURE TRACK
that held frm over time might eventually be regarded by Israel as a positive step. u
Impact on the Gul states. Saudi Arabia and the other Gul States have
Much has been accomplished through pressure, but the results have allen short o
supported the policy o pressuring and trying to isolate Iran. But anything the United
expectations in several ways, and unintended consequences may pose risks.
States might do to ease tensions with Iran and reduce the possibility o conict
u
Successes. U.S. policies have developed and preserved strong com-
mitments rom riends, allies, and partners; underscored the United States’ commit-
would probably be welcomed. u
Impact on Gul security. A durable nuclear deal with Iran would
ment to non-prolieration o nuclear weapons; blocked Iran’ Iran’s s eorts to modernize its
contribute to improved Gul security and might open the door to the eventual
military; weakened Iran’s economy; possibly slowed the expansion o Iran’ Iran’s s nuclear
creation o a regional security pact that over time might even include Iran.
program; and possibly helped add some momentum within the existing ramework or nuclear negotiations with Iran. u
Shortalls. U.S. policies may have slowed but they have not stopped
u
Impact on management o challenges in Aghanistan, Iraq, and
Syria. Negotiating a nuclear deal could make possible long-delayed bilateral discussions on Iraq and Aghanistan, two nations where the United States and Iran
the advancement o Iran’s nuclear program. They have not led to a breakthrough in
have some common interests. The possibility o f nding common ground with Iran
nuclear talks (sanctions have weakened Iran’ Iran’s s economy but not yet led to changed
on Syria appears remote now, but in a post-Assad period, collaboration might
policies or actions); nor have they improved Iran’s human rights practices (in act,
be possible or even desirable.
they may have empowered anti-reorm actions). Eorts to isolate Iran have not markedly reduced its inuence in the region. u
Risks. U.S. policies may have narrowed the options or dealing with
u
Impact on U.S. strategic responsiveness to Arab Awakening.
America’s America’ s eorts to isolate and pressure Iran have become one o the symbols o perceived U.S. hostility to Islam, at least in the eyes o Muslim publics. Should the
Iran by hardening the regime’s resistance to pressure; contributed to an increase
negotiation o a nuclear deal lead to other discussions and a more constructive
in repression and corruption within Iran; distorted trade patterns and encouraged
relationship with Iran, that indicator o perceived hostility might be removed.
the expansion o illegal markets in the region; and possibly contributed to sectarian
u
Impact on counterterrorism eorts. A nuclear deal with Iran could
tensions in the region by pushing an isolated Iran urther toward dependence on
initiate a long process o identiying and pursuing common security interests that
its Shia allies. Sanctions-related hardships may be sowing the seeds o long-term
eventually (probably ar in the uture) might even enable U.S. and Iranian intelligence
alienation between the Iranian people and the United States.
agencies to exchange inormation about Al Qaeda and other terrorist networks that
Ater 30 years o sanctioning and trying to isolate Iran, it seems doubtul that pressure alone will change the dec isions o Iran’s leaders. Meanwhile, there appear to be risks associated with reliance on this approach. A strengthened diplomatic track that includes the promise o sanctions relie in exchange or verifable cooperation could help to end the stando and produce a nuclear deal.
have targeted both the United States and Iran. u
Impact on the economic health o the Middle East. A nuclear deal
with Iran that leads to the liting o some sanctions could produce a stronger sense o economic stability in the region, in addition to reducing the distortion o regional trade patterns and related problems o corruption. Such shits could contribute to the long-term U.S. objective o strengthening the troubled economies o many Arab nations.
8 strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy
strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy 9
EXECUIVE SUMMARY
This paper di diers ers rom rom earlier earlier Iran Proje Project ct publica publications tions1 in that it takes policy positions
EXECUIVE SUMMARY
IMPACT OF NEGOTIATING NEGOTIATING A NUCLEAR DEAL WITH IRAN ON OTHER U.S. INTERESTS
and makes recommendations or government action. We have sought to base our
Since Iran’s policies and actions have or could have an impact on virtually every
suggestions on actual, objective, nonpartisan analyses, consulting with nearly 20 ormer
major strategic challenge and interest in the Middle East, we examine how negotiating
government ofcials and experts and seeking advice rom a larger group o signatories.
a nuclear deal that might lead to a broader dialogue could aect other
In extensive endnotes, we cite much o the impressive work on this set o issues that
U.S. interests in the region.
has been done by other colleagues in the United States and elsewhere.
u
Israel’s security. Any change in U.S. policy toward Iran would likely be
seen negatively by Israel, at least initially—although the achievement o a nuclear deal
HIGHLIGHTS FROM THE PAPER SUCCESSES, SHORTFALLS, SHORTFALLS, AND RISKS OF RELYING ON THE PRESSURE TRACK
that held frm over time might eventually be regarded by Israel as a positive step. u
Impact on the Gul states. Saudi Arabia and the other Gul States have
Much has been accomplished through pressure, but the results have allen short o
supported the policy o pressuring and trying to isolate Iran. But anything the United
expectations in several ways, and unintended consequences may pose risks.
States might do to ease tensions with Iran and reduce the possibility o conict
u
Successes. U.S. policies have developed and preserved strong com-
mitments rom riends, allies, and partners; underscored the United States’ commit-
would probably be welcomed. u
Impact on Gul security. A durable nuclear deal with Iran would
ment to non-prolieration o nuclear weapons; blocked Iran’ Iran’s s eorts to modernize its
contribute to improved Gul security and might open the door to the eventual
military; weakened Iran’s economy; possibly slowed the expansion o Iran’ Iran’s s nuclear
creation o a regional security pact that over time might even include Iran.
program; and possibly helped add some momentum within the existing ramework or nuclear negotiations with Iran. u
Shortalls. U.S. policies may have slowed but they have not stopped
u
Impact on management o challenges in Aghanistan, Iraq, and
Syria. Negotiating a nuclear deal could make possible long-delayed bilateral discussions on Iraq and Aghanistan, two nations where the United States and Iran
the advancement o Iran’s nuclear program. They have not led to a breakthrough in
have some common interests. The possibility o f nding common ground with Iran
nuclear talks (sanctions have weakened Iran’ Iran’s s economy but not yet led to changed
on Syria appears remote now, but in a post-Assad period, collaboration might
policies or actions); nor have they improved Iran’s human rights practices (in act,
be possible or even desirable.
they may have empowered anti-reorm actions). Eorts to isolate Iran have not markedly reduced its inuence in the region. u
Risks. U.S. policies may have narrowed the options or dealing with
u
Impact on U.S. strategic responsiveness to Arab Awakening.
America’s America’ s eorts to isolate and pressure Iran have become one o the symbols o perceived U.S. hostility to Islam, at least in the eyes o Muslim publics. Should the
Iran by hardening the regime’s resistance to pressure; contributed to an increase
negotiation o a nuclear deal lead to other discussions and a more constructive
in repression and corruption within Iran; distorted trade patterns and encouraged
relationship with Iran, that indicator o perceived hostility might be removed.
the expansion o illegal markets in the region; and possibly contributed to sectarian
u
Impact on counterterrorism eorts. A nuclear deal with Iran could
tensions in the region by pushing an isolated Iran urther toward dependence on
initiate a long process o identiying and pursuing common security interests that
its Shia allies. Sanctions-related hardships may be sowing the seeds o long-term
eventually (probably ar in the uture) might even enable U.S. and Iranian intelligence
alienation between the Iranian people and the United States.
agencies to exchange inormation about Al Qaeda and other terrorist networks that
Ater 30 years o sanctioning and trying to isolate Iran, it seems doubtul that pressure alone will change the dec isions o Iran’s leaders. Meanwhile, there appear to be risks associated with reliance on this approach. A strengthened diplomatic track that includes the promise o sanctions relie in exchange or verifable cooperation could help to end the stando and produce a nuclear deal.
have targeted both the United States and Iran. u
Impact on the economic health o the Middle East. A nuclear deal
with Iran that leads to the liting o some sanctions could produce a stronger sense o economic stability in the region, in addition to reducing the distortion o regional trade patterns and related problems o corruption. Such shits could contribute to the long-term U.S. objective o strengthening the troubled economies o many Arab nations.
strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy 9
8 strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy
EXECUIVE SUMMARY
EXECUIVE SUMMARY
We recognize that making even minor changes in the current policy approach
weapons-grade uranium or a bomb without those activities being detected.
will be politically and psychologically difcult and will entail some (mainly short-
But as Iran continues to develop its enrichment program, the evaluation o Iranian
term) costs or the United States. But an intensifed diplomatic eort could
intentions becomes more urgent and more problematic.
produce long-term collateral benefts or U.S. objectives in the region.
STRENGTHENING THE DIPLOMATIC TRACK: STRATEGIC OPTIONS A more more assertiv assertive e and sustained ned diplomatic plomatic initiative nitiative with Iran would need to ocus ocus frst frst on achieving greater transparency and control over Iran’ Iran’s s nuclear program, thereby inhibiting Iran’s Iran’s ability to make a rapid “breakout” toward the production o a nuclear
u
Weighing the uture value o engagement against Iran’ Iran’s s present
antagonistic behavior. Iran’s continuing support or the Assad regime, to take one example, leads some experts to argue that talking with Iran would be unwise and ruitless. Yet some orm o cooperation with Iran may be essential in post-Assad Syria. Near-term tactical issues will compete with and complicate long-term strategic opportunities on almost every issue in dealing with Iran.
weapon. Excluding other issues o concer n to Iran could prove difcult, however, however, since
Preparations or talking with Iran: The belie o Iran’s Supreme Leader that the
Iran is not likely to agree to a comprehensive—or perhaps even a limited—nuclear
United States’ underlying objective is regime change has become an obstacle to
agreement unless it is assured about the United States’ long-term intentions.
progress in any negotiations. Once the President has made a decision to strengthen
No change in U.S. policy will be possible unless President Obama makes the negotiation o a nuclear deal with Iran one o his top priorities. To reiterate, strengthening the diplomatic track o U.S. policy toward Iran does not mean abandoning the pressure track, including maintaining the option o using military orce should the Iranians move quickly to build a bomb. But i the President decides to try to work with Iran, he will have to take into account the political and strategic challenges o managing those dierent policy tracks and their respective goals, benefts, and costs. u
Retaining credibility in the threat o military action. Whether
Iranian leadership has taken seriously President Obama’s stated willingness to take military action to “prevent” Iran rom getting a nuclear weapon has been called into question by critics. Their doubts would increase i the President dec ided to negotiate directly with Iran and put a serious oer on the table. Yet the more the President threatens the use o orce, the more difcult it will be or Iran’s defant leadership to consider any oer oer,, and the more the President will be under pressure to use military orce. u
Maintaining sanctions while using them as bargaining chips.
During negotiations, the United States will need to use the gradual liting o sanctions as a bargaining chip; Iran will push or more and aster relie. Yet there are limits to what the President can deliver by Executive Order, without Congressional consent—and it will be critical to match the easing o pressure with verifable Iranian cooperation on key nuclear issues. u
Evaluating Iran’s intentions. The latest U.S. intelligence assessments
the diplomatic track o America’s Iran policy, the U.S. government will need to take active steps—rhetorical assurances will not sufce —to convince the Supreme Leader that the United States does not seek to overthrow his regime. Other early challenges or the President and his team, in addition to establishing a bilateral channel or regular talks, might be: u
Understanding what the U.S. wants, what Iran wants, and what
both countries want. Iran likely wants respect, recognition o its role in the region, its ull “rights” under inter national law and the Nuclear Non- prolieration Treaty, Treaty, U.S. orces out o the Middle East, liting o all sanctions, and a single-state solution to the Israel–Palestine conict (some Iranian leaders have said they would support any solution that is acceptable to the Palestinians), among other objectives. The United States likely wants ull transparency o Iran’s nuclear program and constraints on Iran’s Iran’ s enrichment o uranium, cessation o Iranian threats against Israel and support or Hezbollah and Hamas, improved human rights practices, and a two-state solution to the Israel–Palestine conict, among other priorities. Iran and the U.S. both want a want a stable Iraq and Aghanistan, deeat o Al Qaeda and Taliban, no military conict In the region, Gul stability, and cooperation on drug trafcking. u
Understanding problematic language and concepts. Iranians
and Americans attach dierent interpretations to many words and phrases. The dierences are not trivial al and can disrupt and conuse discourse. For example, Iran wants “talks” and the U.S. seeks “negotiations”; Iran wants to begin by ocusing on past complaints, while the United States preers to ocus right away on “practical next steps.”
conclude that Iran could not divert saeguarded materials and produce enough
10 strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy
strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy 11
EXECUIVE SUMMARY
EXECUIVE SUMMARY
We recognize that making even minor changes in the current policy approach
weapons-grade uranium or a bomb without those activities being detected.
will be politically and psychologically difcult and will entail some (mainly short-
But as Iran continues to develop its enrichment program, the evaluation o Iranian
term) costs or the United States. But an intensifed diplomatic eort could
intentions becomes more urgent and more problematic.
produce long-term collateral benefts or U.S. objectives in the region.
STRENGTHENING THE DIPLOMATIC TRACK: STRATEGIC OPTIONS A more more assertiv assertive e and sustained ned diplomatic plomatic initiative nitiative with Iran would need to ocus ocus frst frst on achieving greater transparency and control over Iran’ Iran’s s nuclear program, thereby inhibiting Iran’s Iran’s ability to make a rapid “breakout” toward the production o a nuclear
u
Weighing the uture value o engagement against Iran’ Iran’s s present
antagonistic behavior. Iran’s continuing support or the Assad regime, to take one example, leads some experts to argue that talking with Iran would be unwise and ruitless. Yet some orm o cooperation with Iran may be essential in post-Assad Syria. Near-term tactical issues will compete with and complicate long-term strategic opportunities on almost every issue in dealing with Iran.
weapon. Excluding other issues o concer n to Iran could prove difcult, however, however, since
Preparations or talking with Iran: The belie o Iran’s Supreme Leader that the
Iran is not likely to agree to a comprehensive—or perhaps even a limited—nuclear
United States’ underlying objective is regime change has become an obstacle to
agreement unless it is assured about the United States’ long-term intentions.
progress in any negotiations. Once the President has made a decision to strengthen
No change in U.S. policy will be possible unless President Obama makes the negotiation o a nuclear deal with Iran one o his top priorities. To reiterate, strengthening the diplomatic track o U.S. policy toward Iran does not mean abandoning the pressure track, including maintaining the option o using military orce should the Iranians move quickly to build a bomb. But i the President decides to try to work with Iran, he will have to take into account the political and strategic challenges o managing those dierent policy tracks and their respective goals, benefts, and costs. u
Retaining credibility in the threat o military action. Whether
Iranian leadership has taken seriously President Obama’s stated willingness to take military action to “prevent” Iran rom getting a nuclear weapon has been called into question by critics. Their doubts would increase i the President dec ided to negotiate directly with Iran and put a serious oer on the table. Yet the more the President threatens the use o orce, the more difcult it will be or Iran’s defant leadership to consider any oer oer,, and the more the President will be under pressure to use military orce. u
Maintaining sanctions while using them as bargaining chips.
During negotiations, the United States will need to use the gradual liting o sanctions as a bargaining chip; Iran will push or more and aster relie. Yet there are limits to what the President can deliver by Executive Order, without Congressional consent—and it will be critical to match the easing o pressure with verifable Iranian cooperation on key nuclear issues. u
Evaluating Iran’s intentions. The latest U.S. intelligence assessments
the diplomatic track o America’s Iran policy, the U.S. government will need to take active steps—rhetorical assurances will not sufce —to convince the Supreme Leader that the United States does not seek to overthrow his regime. Other early challenges or the President and his team, in addition to establishing a bilateral channel or regular talks, might be: u
Understanding what the U.S. wants, what Iran wants, and what
both countries want. Iran likely wants respect, recognition o its role in the region, its ull “rights” under inter national law and the Nuclear Non- prolieration Treaty, Treaty, U.S. orces out o the Middle East, liting o all sanctions, and a single-state solution to the Israel–Palestine conict (some Iranian leaders have said they would support any solution that is acceptable to the Palestinians), among other objectives. The United States likely wants ull transparency o Iran’s nuclear program and constraints on Iran’s Iran’ s enrichment o uranium, cessation o Iranian threats against Israel and support or Hezbollah and Hamas, improved human rights practices, and a two-state solution to the Israel–Palestine conict, among other priorities. Iran and the U.S. both want a want a stable Iraq and Aghanistan, deeat o Al Qaeda and Taliban, no military conict In the region, Gul stability, and cooperation on drug trafcking. u
Understanding problematic language and concepts. Iranians
and Americans attach dierent interpretations to many words and phrases. The dierences are not trivial al and can disrupt and conuse discourse. For example, Iran wants “talks” and the U.S. seeks “negotiations”; Iran wants to begin by ocusing on past complaints, while the United States preers to ocus right away on “practical next steps.”
conclude that Iran could not divert saeguarded materials and produce enough
strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy 11
10 strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy
EXECUIVE SUMMARY
Beginning o talks. The frst bilateral meetings are likely to be seen as both momentous and perilous. It will be important to: u
ng an exchange o Set the tone. The tone. The U.S. side should begin by inviting
EXECUIVE SUMMARY
COSTS AND BENEFITS OF TRYING TO WORK WITH IRAN The paper presents a complex picture concerning whether and how the United States might enhance the diplomatic track o its Iran policy, ocusing initially
views on broad strategic and global issues, and seek to establish a climate o
on the resolution o key nuclear issues, and then (assuming progress in that area)
mutual respect at the outset.
on a broader range o concerns.
u
Preview objectives. The idea o a comprehensive solution (“grand
u
Costs and risks. A decision to work with Iran would be disruptive
bargain”) may be too complex and divisive to serve as a starting place, but the
politically at home and internationally. It would risk rebu or ailure, and could tur n
United States—with its preerence or practical, step-by-step negotiations—will
out to be mis-timed, either because o external events or the intransigence o
need to fnd a way to respond to Iran’s preerence or looking at the long-term
the current Iranian leadership.
agenda and big objectives, such as establishing mutual respect, agreeing to
u
Benets and potential benets. By making a substantial oer to Iran
non-intererence in internal aairs, and deciding how to manage bilateral relations.
in the context o more direct and intensive negotiations, the United States could
Pursuing a nuclear deal. The nature o Iran’s nuclear activities, together with its
achieve important limits and more controls on Iran’s nuclear program, improve the
eorts to conceal some aspects o the program, strongly suggest that Iran seeks
prospects or eventual stability in Aghanistan and Iraq, and fnd a more balanced
at least the capacity to build a nuclear weapon—although American and other
ooting in the rapidly changing Middle East.
intelligence services assert that Iran has not made the decision to become a nuclear-armed state. For its part, the Iranian government points to the act that the Supreme Leader has issued a atwa (religious decree) that orbids the building or use o nuclear weapons. Against this backdrop, a minimum nuclear deal with Iran should include: u Agreement
on the exclusively exclusively peaceul scope and nature nature o
Iran’s nuclear program. u Agreement
that Iran Iran would produce only low-enriched uranium
(3.5 to 5 %) and cease production o 20% enriched uranium; reduce its stockpiles o enriched uranium, not produce plutonium, and comply with a rigorous monitoring program designed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). u
In return the United States and its negotiating partners in the
This Executive Summary cannot do justice to the extended debates and months o study that have gone into preparing the paper that ollows, or to the rigor o the research and analysis that that buttress buttress its conclusion conclusions. s. We have have tried to provide provide an accurate assessment o the United States’ dual-track policy toward Iran, which currently relies heavily heavily on the the pressure track relative relative to the the diplomatic diplomatic track. track. We have asked what it would mean to rebalance these two tracks by undertaking a more assertive diplomatic initiative that seizes the opportunities created by the pressure track. Despite the challenges and diculties entailed, we remain persuaded that the time is right or testing ng new diplomati diplomatic approaches, approaches, and that that a strategy strategy that more closely closely
P5+1 would oer some sanctions relie and a commitment to no new
balances pressure with with diplomacy diplomacy is more more likely to help the United ted States States achieve
sanctions or a period o time, and acknowledge Iran's limited enrichment program.
its objectives ectives than than reliance reliance on pressure pressure alone. We believe eve the acts, acts, proessional proessional
The scope and timerame o sanctions relie e could be a critical actor in getting getting agreement rom Iran, although the President’s exibility is limited in this regard.
judgments, judgment s, and recommendati recommendations ons that we have assembled assembled here here will stimulat stimulate e the inormed debate and and refection refection necessary or or successul successul decision decision making.
Moving into bilateral relations. In connection with progress on a limited nuclear deal, the United States and Iran could broaden their talks to explore opportunities or collaboration in areas o common interest, such as Aghanistan
1
Weighing Benets and Costs o Military Action Against Iran, The Iran, The Iran Project,Sept. Project, Sept. 2012; and Weighting Benets and
Costs o International Sanctions Against Iran, The Iran, The Iran Project, Dec. 2012, 2012, For ull copies o o The Iran Project’s earlier reports, visit: www.theiranproject.org/reports.
and Iraq, drug trafcking, and making arrangements to prevent accidental incidents rom becoming armed conicts. Iran’s policy toward Israel and its activities in other arenas, such as Syria, will be harder to deal with. The goal should be building a pragmatic relationship that manages tensions and acilitates collaboration on issues o common concern. 12 strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy
strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy 13
EXECUIVE SUMMARY
EXECUIVE SUMMARY
Beginning o talks. The frst bilateral meetings are likely to be seen as both
COSTS AND BENEFITS OF TRYING TO WORK WITH IRAN
momentous and perilous. It will be important to: u
ng an exchange o Set the tone. The tone. The U.S. side should begin by inviting
The paper presents a complex picture concerning whether and how the United States might enhance the diplomatic track o its Iran policy, ocusing initially
views on broad strategic and global issues, and seek to establish a climate o
on the resolution o key nuclear issues, and then (assuming progress in that area)
mutual respect at the outset.
on a broader range o concerns.
u
Preview objectives. The idea o a comprehensive solution (“grand
u
Costs and risks. A decision to work with Iran would be disruptive
bargain”) may be too complex and divisive to serve as a starting place, but the
politically at home and internationally. It would risk rebu or ailure, and could tur n
United States—with its preerence or practical, step-by-step negotiations—will
out to be mis-timed, either because o external events or the intransigence o
need to fnd a way to respond to Iran’s preerence or looking at the long-term
the current Iranian leadership.
agenda and big objectives, such as establishing mutual respect, agreeing to
u
Benets and potential benets. By making a substantial oer to Iran
non-intererence in internal aairs, and deciding how to manage bilateral relations.
in the context o more direct and intensive negotiations, the United States could
Pursuing a nuclear deal. The nature o Iran’s nuclear activities, together with its
achieve important limits and more controls on Iran’s nuclear program, improve the
eorts to conceal some aspects o the program, strongly suggest that Iran seeks
prospects or eventual stability in Aghanistan and Iraq, and fnd a more balanced
at least the capacity to build a nuclear weapon—although American and other
ooting in the rapidly changing Middle East.
intelligence services assert that Iran has not made the decision to become a nuclear-armed state. For its part, the Iranian government points to the act that the Supreme Leader has issued a atwa (religious decree) that orbids the building or use o nuclear weapons. Against this backdrop, a minimum nuclear deal with Iran should include: u Agreement
on the exclusively exclusively peaceul scope and nature nature o
Iran’s nuclear program. u Agreement
that Iran Iran would produce only low-enriched uranium
(3.5 to 5 %) and cease production o 20% enriched uranium; reduce its stockpiles o enriched uranium, not produce plutonium, and comply with a rigorous monitoring program designed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). u
In return the United States and its negotiating partners in the
This Executive Summary cannot do justice to the extended debates and months o study that have gone into preparing the paper that ollows, or to the rigor o the research and analysis that that buttress buttress its conclusion conclusions. s. We have have tried to provide provide an accurate assessment o the United States’ dual-track policy toward Iran, which currently relies heavily heavily on the the pressure track relative relative to the the diplomatic diplomatic track. track. We have asked what it would mean to rebalance these two tracks by undertaking a more assertive diplomatic initiative that seizes the opportunities created by the pressure track. Despite the challenges and diculties entailed, we remain persuaded that the time is right or testing ng new diplomati diplomatic approaches, approaches, and that that a strategy strategy that more closely closely
P5+1 would oer some sanctions relie and a commitment to no new
balances pressure with with diplomacy diplomacy is more more likely to help the United ted States States achieve
sanctions or a period o time, and acknowledge Iran's limited enrichment program.
its objectives ectives than than reliance reliance on pressure pressure alone. We believe eve the acts, acts, proessional proessional
The scope and timerame o sanctions relie e could be a critical actor in getting getting agreement rom Iran, although the President’s exibility is limited in this regard.
judgments, judgment s, and recommendati recommendations ons that we have assembled assembled here here will stimulat stimulate e the inormed debate and and refection refection necessary or or successul successul decision decision making.
Moving into bilateral relations. In connection with progress on a limited nuclear deal, the United States and Iran could broaden their talks to explore opportunities or collaboration in areas o common interest, such as Aghanistan
1
Weighing Benets and Costs o Military Action Against Iran, The Iran, The Iran Project,Sept. Project, Sept. 2012; and Weighting Benets and
Costs o International Sanctions Against Iran, The Iran, The Iran Project, Dec. 2012, 2012, For ull copies o o The Iran Project’s earlier reports, visit: www.theiranproject.org/reports.
and Iraq, drug trafcking, and making arrangements to prevent accidental incidents rom becoming armed conicts. Iran’s policy toward Israel and its activities in other arenas, such as Syria, will be harder to deal with. The goal should be building a pragmatic relationship that manages tensions and acilitates collaboration on issues o common concern. strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy 13
12 strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy
I.
Introduction F , U S v k k “-k” I . W , U S I . I . W v I
A I, P G H. W. B , “G .
I. O k U.S. v jv I’ . P I v U.S. M E. A k k; , . S v , v I I’ . B U.S. I . B k k v P5+1 ( UN S C G) U.S. .
George H. W. Bush, 1989
I T I Pj, , , k I v . W x v v U.S. M E f I v . T x x , v k I ’ v v . W P k k k I’ . W v f U S’ -k I. Uk ,1 k k v . W v , jv, , 20 v x x , k v .
strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy 15
I.
Introduction F , U S v k k “-k” I . W , U S I . I . W v I
A I, P G H. W. B , “G .
I. O k U.S. v jv I’ . P I v U.S. M E. A k k; , . S v , v I I’ . B U.S. I . B k k v P5+1 ( UN S C G) U.S. .
George H. W. Bush, 1989
I T I Pj, , , k I v . W x v v U.S. M E f I v . T x x , v k I ’ v v . W P k k k I’ . W v f U S’ -k I. Uk ,1 k k v . W v , jv, , 20 v x x , k v .
strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy 15
I. INTRODUCTION
I. INTRODUCTION
I xv , v k U S .
2
W k O U.S. I.
SHARED UNDERSTANDINGS T k v v v. u
W z I’ -
U.S. , I, M E. Ev ’ , I ’ I . S I’ — - v —v xv I’ . I U S , M E. T U.S. I . u
W v, , x
U S’ , v I x Hz, H, A S, v. T - P O, I P 2013, k I’ , v . T k x I. N, v 2013 v . u
W k k k
k I. M , v v v v . O I’ S L K v U S ; x (
16 strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy
) v . 3 A , v, U S I . u
W -
-k I, z k, v I . I k, k . W I’ ; v k v I . B k v, k k k v. W v, , v k k k . u
W k , v q v
x U S I v . U S’ . ’ — I v — q. W k k U.S. I. W , “ I,” I— , , — U.S. U.S.- I . W k P O’ “v” I v . u
W k U S I
, , f A’ v ’ v. D k “” j. F , U S k “” Sv U C ’ — v, , U.S. . B v , U S strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy 17
I. INTRODUCTION
I. INTRODUCTION
I xv , v k
) v . 3 A , -
U S . 2
v, U S
W k O U.S. I.
SHARED UNDERSTANDINGS T k v v v. u
W z I’ -
U.S. , I, M E. Ev ’ , I ’ I . S I’ — - v —v xv I’ . I U S , M E. T U.S. I . u
W v, , x
U S’ , v I x Hz, H, A S, v. T - P O, I P 2013, k I’ , v . T k x I. N, v 2013 v . u
W k k k
k I. M , v v v v . O I’ S L K v U S ; x (
16 strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy
I . u
W -
-k I, z k, v I . I k, k . W I’ ; v k v I . B k v, k k k v. W v, , v k k k . u
W k , v q v
x U S I v . U S’ . ’ — I v — q. W k k U.S. I. W , “ I,” I— , , — U.S. U.S.- I . W k P O’ “v” I v . u
W k U S I
, , f A’ v ’ v. D k “” j. F , U S k “” Sv U C ’ — v, , U.S. . B v , U S strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy 17
I. INTRODUCTION
’ v— , , . A j, v v A jv v v . 4 W v , , .
OVERVIEW I P II , v jv k U.S. ; x; k . B T I Pj v xv ( , , I), ’ j v. R .5 I P III, z f vv jv U.S. M E, x U.S. I v , . I P IV, k U.S. I. I v, I v ( v) I’ v v . A v k v I . A v k I (P V), v ( P VI) P z U.S. I 1979. T P j , , .
18 strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy
strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy 19
I. INTRODUCTION
’ v— , , . A j, v v A jv v v . 4 W v , , .
OVERVIEW I P II , v jv k U.S. ; x; k . B T I Pj v xv ( , , I), ’ j v. R .5 I P III, z f vv jv U.S. M E, x U.S. I v , . I P IV, k U.S. I. I v, I v ( v) I’ v v . A v k v I . A v k I (P V), v ( P VI) P z U.S. I 1979. T P j , , .
strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy 19
18 strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy
II.
Relying on the Pressure Track: Successes, Shortalls, and Risks P , , I f I M E— v , v v v j, v I (U.S. I v
I U.S. I. “
”
I’ v k , ).6 I’ I Hz H v U S. 7 I , v Iq, I A’ IED (v xv v) k A U.S. .8 M , I , , P A S, v vv v U S A . 9 T I v’ v z v U.S. . 10 W k , , jv v v. Mv,
Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres to President Ronald Reagan, September 1986
k k k, k v W’ jv I— I’ .
1. SUCCESSES OF U.S. POLICIES T I ,, , . T x k v, U.S. ( UN S C ), — — v . Cv, Cv, v I’ U S ’ , I.
strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy 21
II.
Relying on the Pressure Track: Successes, Shortalls, and Risks P , , I f I M E— v , v v v j, v I (U.S. I v
I U.S. I. “
”
I’ v k , ).6 I’ I Hz H v U S. 7 I , v Iq, I A’ IED (v xv v) k A U.S. .8 M , I , , P A S, v vv v U S A . 9 T I v’ v z v U.S. . 10 W k , , jv v v. Mv,
Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres to President Ronald Reagan, September 1986
k k k, k v W’ jv I— I’ .
1. SUCCESSES OF U.S. POLICIES T I ,, , . T x k v, U.S. ( UN S C ), — — v . Cv, Cv, v I’ U S ’ , I.
strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy 21
II.
RELYING ON THE PRESSURE TRACK: SUCCESSES, SHORTFALLS, AND RISKS
II.
RELYING ON THE PRESSURE TRACK: SUCCESSES, SHORTFALLS, AND RISKS
A , k U.S. :
I ,
1.1 Underscored the United States’ commitment to the non-prolieratio non-prolieration n o
I’ , .13
nuclear weapons. T O
1.5 Possibly helped to add momentum to negotiations. W
I . T
,
f --
P5+1 I . 14
M E. E I k N-P-
1.6 Preserved strong relations with other countries in the region. A
N W W (NP), U N
U.S.
S C, -
, I G .
v q .
T W’ , , I
( x, v I
v
, ).
v A . T v , v, ( R C) .
1.2 Blocked Iran’ Iran’s s eorts to modernize its military. B
- q I I vv q I’ z v . 11 A , I’ P G q v . A v , I v q v . I v .
2. SHORTFALLS OF U.S. POLICIES TO DATE P I v jv, v v . 2.1 Debatable impact on the expansion o Iran’s nuclear program. U.S.
v v q v x I’ — x, k I . B 2002, I , , 10,000 ; 20% v
1.3 Reduced the importation o dual-purpose materials. A
( v - );
k , I v I’
. T
q - q
v I’
v v - .12
() . E
1.4 Weakened Iran’s economy. A x , Weighing
Benets and Costs o International Sanctions Against Iran, — v 2010— k I’ , v , I I’ ’ x, v, v ’ . T v I’ I’ . H
22 strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy
v x ( I v q 1990 D. A. Q. K Pk, v , ). Ov, k -k v x ; U S v I v , v I . 15 T q .
strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy 23
II.
RELYING ON THE PRESSURE TRACK: SUCCESSES, SHORTFALLS, AND RISKS
II.
RELYING ON THE PRESSURE TRACK: SUCCESSES, SHORTFALLS, AND RISKS
A , k U.S. :
I ,
1.1 Underscored the United States’ commitment to the non-prolieratio non-prolieration n o
I’ , .13
nuclear weapons. T O
1.5 Possibly helped to add momentum to negotiations. W
I . T
,
f --
P5+1 I . 14
M E. E I k N-P-
1.6 Preserved strong relations with other countries in the region. A
N W W (NP), U N
U.S.
S C, -
, I G .
v q .
T W’ , , I
( x, v I
v
, ).
v A . T v , v, ( R C) .
1.2 Blocked Iran’ Iran’s s eorts to modernize its military. B
- q I I vv q I’ z v . 11 A , I’ P G q v . A v , I v q v . I
2. SHORTFALLS OF U.S. POLICIES TO DATE P I v jv, v v . 2.1 Debatable impact on the expansion o Iran’s nuclear program. U.S.
v v q v x I’ — x, k I . B 2002, I , , -
v .
10,000 ; 20% v 1.3 Reduced the importation o dual-purpose materials. A
( v - );
k , I v I’
. T
q - q
v I’
v v - .12
() . E
1.4 Weakened Iran’s economy. A x , Weighing
Benets and Costs o International Sanctions Against Iran, — v 2010— k I’ , v , I I’ ’ x, v, v ’ . T v I’ I’ . H
v x ( I v q 1990 D. A. Q. K Pk, v , ). Ov, k -k v x ; U S v I v , v I . 15 T q .
strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy 23
22 strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy
II.
RELYING ON THE PRESSURE TRACK: SUCCESSES, SHORTFALLS, AND RISKS
II.
RELYING ON THE PRESSURE TRACK: SUCCESSES, SHORTFALLS, AND RISKS
2.2 No breakthrough yet on a nuclear agreement. F , U.S.
2.4 Iran’s regional infuence not waning. N
, , , I v
I v I’ Hz
v . T
H v U.S. Iq A.
I v v . A I , ,
S , ; I v ,
I’ I ’ v k
, L Hz, S Iq, A. I
P5+1 ( v UN S C,
I Rv G C (IRGC) v
G), v
v S B A A
. . A v v, U
v ’ v . I’ f I
S v
j v - ,
I’ . . B I
, , , ,
x. A 30 , ’ v
. I v -
— v
, x J ( ) E 18; v
— I’
OPEC (Oz P Ex C) O-
k , .
16
A , v
U S k v z P5+1 v k I I ( v xv ). T P5+1 j I, . S k P5+1 I A, Kzk, F 2013. T A q k v f , j k. 2.3 No improvement in human rights protections. F
I Rv, P U.S. C v z I ’ ’ . S , I. O , I’ v - I, U S .17 T v v . I , v, v x v f v I’ I’ .
24 strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy
z I S; P N-A Mv. 2.5 Ideological inroads still being made. T I
v I’ I Rv. W (S) A v k I S v, S , S L, v . I Hz S L, I S j Iq x S B, Y, E S A, S v S j S . 19 Gv S M E, I I’ x— U.S. I . 2.6 Iran’s government not changing. F W,
, , I jv I v’ . T jv v U.S. D S. 20 B , x I , v , U.S. I’ S L v U.S. .21 I U.S. , v ,
strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy 25
II.
RELYING ON THE PRESSURE TRACK: SUCCESSES, SHORTFALLS, AND RISKS
II.
RELYING ON THE PRESSURE TRACK: SUCCESSES, SHORTFALLS, AND RISKS
2.2 No breakthrough yet on a nuclear agreement. F , U.S.
2.4 Iran’s regional infuence not waning. N
, , , I v
I v I’ Hz
v . T
H v U.S. Iq A.
I v v . A I , ,
S , ; I v ,
I’ I ’ v k
, L Hz, S Iq, A. I
P5+1 ( v UN S C,
I Rv G C (IRGC) v
G), v
v S B A A
. . A v v, U
v ’ v . I’ f I
S v
j v - ,
I’ . . B I
, , , ,
x. A 30 , ’ v
. I v -
— v
, x J ( ) E 18; v
— I’
OPEC (Oz P Ex C) O-
k , . 16 A , v
z I S; P N-A Mv.
U S k v z P5+1 v k I I ( v xv ). T P5+1 j I, . S k P5+1 I A, Kzk, F 2013. T A q k v f , j k.
2.5 Ideological inroads still being made. T I
v I’ I Rv. W (S) A v k I S v, S , S L, v . I Hz S L, I S j Iq x S B, Y, E S A, S v S j S . 19 Gv S M E, I I’ x—
2.3 No improvement in human rights protections. F
I Rv, P U.S. C v z I ’ ’ . S , I. O , I’ v - I, U S .17 T v v . I , v, v x v f v I’ I’ .
U.S. I . 2.6 Iran’s government not changing. F W,
, , I jv I v’ . T jv v U.S. D S. 20 B , x I , v , U.S. I’ S L v U.S. .21 I U.S. , v ,
strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy 25
24 strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy
II.
RELYING ON THE PRESSURE TRACK: SUCCESSES, SHORTFALLS, AND RISKS
II.
RELYING ON THE PRESSURE TRACK: SUCCESSES, SHORTFALLS, AND RISKS
I’ “v” ( )
v-- I Rv G C, v
I. W v , v ,
U.S.- “ “ .” S
I’ I ’ v .
v k k I
2.7 Opportunities missed to use pressure policies as bargaining chips in negotiations. P I v
I k
. 23 C I’ I’ , IRGC, I I’’ q k k .24
k . I
3.3 Long-term alienation between Iranians and the United States. A
x — .
k I, U S
U , U S P5+1 v
k I’ I’ — -
x . A v,
, A
v F 2013 I A, Kzk,
. 25 S x v
P5+1 , .
I . B ’ f , , q,
3. RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH U.S. POLICIES
W , , I v
A .26 T k
x A , q v
U S’ (
k
U.S. x S H’ Iq, 1990),
U S, .
22
A
k k :
I . P I v v z U.S. I v , v ,
3.1 Narrowed options or dealing with Iran’s nuclear program. S
I ’ ,
v U S v v I .
I k. T v ,
3.4 Distortion o regional trade patterns. T ,
. T I,
,
Benets and Costs o Military Action Against Iran, k I’
U.S., E, E, ,
v , U S . I U.S.
. U.S. v x v
, U
I, k C, V,
S .
B, M, Uk, U.S. .27 I (PPP) (GDP) $1 ,28
3.2 More repression and corruption in Iran. S ’ jv
vv, I v , k v
- k . I’ I’ ,, v I Rv, W; v.
v. I v , U.S. v v -vv ,
26 strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy
strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy 27
II.
RELYING ON THE PRESSURE TRACK: SUCCESSES, SHORTFALLS, AND RISKS
II.
RELYING ON THE PRESSURE TRACK: SUCCESSES, SHORTFALLS, AND RISKS
I’ “v” ( )
v-- I Rv G C, v
I. W v , v ,
U.S.- “ “ .” S
I’ I ’ v .
v k k I
2.7 Opportunities missed to use pressure policies as bargaining chips in negotiations. P I v
I k
. 23 C I’ I’ , IRGC, I I’’ q k k .24
k . I
3.3 Long-term alienation between Iranians and the United States. A
x — .
k I, U S
U , U S P5+1 v
k I’ I’ — -
x . A v,
, A
v F 2013 I A, Kzk,
. 25 S x v
P5+1 , .
I . B ’ f , , q,
3. RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH U.S. POLICIES
W , , I v
A .26 T k
x A , q v
U S’ (
k
U.S. x S H’ Iq, 1990),
U S, .22 A
I . P I
k k :
v v z U.S. I v , v ,
3.1 Narrowed options or dealing with Iran’s nuclear program. S
I ’ ,
v U S v v I .
I k. T v ,
3.4 Distortion o regional trade patterns. T ,
. T I,
,
Benets and Costs o Military Action Against Iran, k I’
U.S., E, E, ,
v , U S . I U.S.
. U.S. v x v
, U
I, k C, V,
S .
B, M, Uk, U.S. .27 I (PPP) (GDP) $1 ,28
3.2 More repression and corruption in Iran. S ’ jv
vv, I v , k v
- k . I’ I’ ,, v I Rv, W; v.
v. I v , U.S. v v -vv ,
26 strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy
II.
strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy 27
RELYING ON THE PRESSURE TRACK: SUCCESSES, SHORTFALLS, AND RISKS
3.5 Exacerbation o the Shia-Sunni divide in the region. A I’
, S . S S v S Iq; v B, K, Y, Y, A, Pk; I S A, k . T S S A S S j B v I S . T U.S. x I S v .29 B , , k, v v U.S. , , I— — k k I’ . A , q k U S. S v I . W v U S v z , v . I , v, W W v , U S P5+1 — x I’ I’ k . I, k A P5+1 I A, Kzk, F 2013. T k P5+1 , , v . B k P5+1 U.S. . T U.S. k .
28 strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy
strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy 29
II.
RELYING ON THE PRESSURE TRACK: SUCCESSES, SHORTFALLS, AND RISKS
3.5 Exacerbation o the Shia-Sunni divide in the region. A I’
, S . S S v S Iq; v B, K, Y, Y, A, Pk; I S A, k . T S S A S S j B v I S . T U.S. x I S v .29 B , , k, v v U.S. , , I— — k k I’ . A , q k U S. S v I . W v U S v z , v . I , v, W W v , U S P5+1 — x I’ I’ k . I, k A P5+1 I A, Kzk, F 2013. T k P5+1 , , v . B k P5+1 U.S. . T U.S. k .
strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy 29
28 strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy
III.
Negotiating a Nuclear Deal With Iran: Impact on Other U.S. Ojectives in the Middle East
I v, v, v v j U S M E. I , k I v U.S. jv — U S I
T q [I US] “ z v v , .
”
Madeline Albright, March 2000
v . O k U.S. jv, A I k U S . F x, I k v,, , U.S I x v k . T G S , U.S.–I U.S.–I U S. A k I’ k . Ov , , I’’ I U S I W k M E v , R, C, I, Pk. T A M E, U.S. jv. T k 9/11 v I x, v , M . 30 T A Q A U.S. ; Iq - A A . T A Ak . k’ k’ , E. E, v , . T I–P ; v S, z , L J Iq k. k. P v strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy 31
III.
Negotiating a Nuclear Deal With Iran: Impact on Other U.S. Ojectives in the Middle East
I v, v, v v j U S M E. I , k I v U.S. jv — U S I
T q [I US] “ z v v , .
”
Madeline Albright, March 2000
v . O k U.S. jv, A I k U S . F x, I k v,, , U.S I x v k . T G S , U.S.–I U.S.–I U S. A k I’ k . Ov , , I’’ I U S I W k M E v , R, C, I, Pk. T A M E, U.S. jv. T k 9/11 v I x, v , M . 30 T A Q A U.S. ; Iq - A A . T A Ak . k’ k’ , E. E, v , . T I–P ; v S, z , L J Iq k. k. P v strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy 31
III.
NEGOTIATING A NUCLEAR DEAL WITH IRAN: IMPACT ON OTHER U.S. OJECTIVES IN THE MIDDLE EAST
III.
NEGOTIATING A NUCLEAR DEAL WITH IRAN: IMPACT ON OTHER U.S. OJECTIVES IN THE MIDDLE EAST
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2. THE GULF STATES AND OIL
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1. ISRAEL’S SECURITY AND THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS
. G S U.S. k U.S. . S G S’ I x, x I’ I Rv, I’
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32 strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy
strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy 33
III.
NEGOTIATING A NUCLEAR DEAL WITH IRAN: IMPACT ON OTHER U.S. OJECTIVES IN THE MIDDLE EAST
III.
NEGOTIATING A NUCLEAR DEAL WITH IRAN: IMPACT ON OTHER U.S. OJECTIVES IN THE MIDDLE EAST
A , j
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2. THE GULF STATES AND OIL
U S
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1. ISRAEL’S SECURITY AND THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS
. G S U.S. k U.S. . S G S’ I x, x I’ I Rv, I’
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k x A’ . G U.S. v k strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy 33
32 strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy
III.
NEGOTIATING A NUCLEAR DEAL WITH IRAN: IMPACT ON OTHER U.S. OJECTIVES IN THE MIDDLE EAST
III.
NEGOTIATING A NUCLEAR DEAL WITH IRAN: IMPACT ON OTHER U.S. OJECTIVES IN THE MIDDLE EAST
I - , v
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k .39 E v f jv U S j . I ’ ’ v v k v I , qk
I k x U S— f x .
4. AFGHANISTAN, AFGHANISTAN, IRAQ, AND SYRIA
S . 40 R
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, v k k,
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, I U S v Iq A k q . I’ I’
3. GULF SECURITY B , I k G . B U.S. I v G. Ev G C C (GCC) 1981, x (S A, K, B, Q, U A E, O) v x ' k
Iq U.S. U.S. v A . Y v k Iq A, I U S v .44 T S, j , , , A .
, 41 x. S G
4.1 In Aghanistan, I U S v
U S. A I v
Kz v; , v v
G v k
Kz , 2014. B v A’
v I. S v
v. B ,
34 strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy
strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy 35
III.
NEGOTIATING A NUCLEAR DEAL WITH IRAN: IMPACT ON OTHER U.S. OJECTIVES IN THE MIDDLE EAST
III.
NEGOTIATING A NUCLEAR DEAL WITH IRAN: IMPACT ON OTHER U.S. OJECTIVES IN THE MIDDLE EAST
I - , v
- I. E
, A Iq. O v , v, U.S.
v - U S. 42 B S A I U S
S–S v A’ M-j
jv v . T I
. A U S v
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k . C U.S.
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I, ,
k .39 E v f jv U S j . I ’ ’ v v k v I , qk
I k x U S— f x .
4. AFGHANISTAN, AFGHANISTAN, IRAQ, AND SYRIA
S . 40 R
A , I R U S
I ’ k.
, v ,
W U.S.–I -
, k — A 2001. 43 T
, v k k,
v I
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, I U S v Iq A k q . I’ I’
3. GULF SECURITY B , I k G . B U.S. I v G. Ev G C C (GCC) 1981, x (S A, K, B, Q, U A E, O) v x ' k
Iq U.S. U.S. v A . Y v k Iq A, I U S v .44 T S, j , , , A .
, 41 x. S G
4.1 In Aghanistan, I U S v
U S. A I v
Kz v; , v v
G v k
Kz , 2014. B v A’
v I. S v
v. B ,
strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy 35
34 strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy
III.
NEGOTIATING A NUCLEAR DEAL WITH IRAN: IMPACT ON OTHER U.S. OJECTIVES IN THE MIDDLE EAST
III.
NEGOTIATING A NUCLEAR DEAL WITH IRAN: IMPACT ON OTHER U.S. OJECTIVES IN THE MIDDLE EAST
A Q, k, k v
f . I’ S k I
A v U.S. . S x
j, . B O
v I’ , A -2014
, I
45
v.
W W v k
q.50 W W ’’ x I k
A, k . W v I’ I’
S f I
k U.S. I . T
A v. B S ,
, k v ,
,, A ( U.S. ), I’
.46
jv k . . S
4.2 Iraq. W U S Iq, A -
I k, v I A jv , xv v k A . 47 Y v , U S I -v Iq. W j (S) Mk v, v v Iq ( , I Iq, U S).48 I U S “A Q M” S Iq. T v v
f S. I I’ ’ Rv Rv G C A (S-) — B A— z . B A’ , A k v . I -A S, I U S v A S ( U.S. U.S. I S k f , v A’ ).
5. ARAB AWAKENING
I R v v ( -
D - A ’
A) v Mq S’ S Iq ,
v k Mk v. N,
x O M E. T
v S v Iq,
A’ f U S
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k v v U.S. .
S -
4.3 Syria. I j A’
S.49 I 36 strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy
v U.S. I, U S v v M . strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy 37
III.
NEGOTIATING A NUCLEAR DEAL WITH IRAN: IMPACT ON OTHER U.S. OJECTIVES IN THE MIDDLE EAST
III.
NEGOTIATING A NUCLEAR DEAL WITH IRAN: IMPACT ON OTHER U.S. OJECTIVES IN THE MIDDLE EAST
A Q, k, k v
f . I’ S k I
A v U.S. . S x
j, . B O
v I’ , A -2014
, I
v.45 W W v k
q.50 W W ’’ x I k
A, k . W v I’ I’
S f I
k U.S. I . T
A v. B S ,
, k v ,
,, A ( U.S. ), I’
.
46
4.2 Iraq. W U S Iq, A -
I k, v I A jv , xv v k A . 47 Y v , U S I -v Iq. W j (S) Mk v, v v Iq ( , I Iq, U S).48 I U S “A Q M” S Iq. T v v
jv k . . S f S. I I’ ’ Rv Rv G C A (S-) — B A— z . B A’ , A k v . I -A S, I U S v A S ( U.S. U.S. I S k f , v A’ ).
5. ARAB AWAKENING
I R v v ( -
D - A ’
A) v Mq S’ S Iq ,
v k Mk v. N,
x O M E. T
v S v Iq,
A’ f U S
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k v v U.S. .
S -
4.3 Syria. I j A’
S.49 I
v U.S. I, U S v v M . strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy 37
36 strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy
III.
NEGOTIATING A NUCLEAR DEAL WITH IRAN: IMPACT ON OTHER U.S. OJECTIVES IN THE MIDDLE EAST
6. TERRORISM S 9/11, A A P U.S. v U.S. U.S. z . M j k U S v k . T x I , v k x. I -S A Q ( ), , z ( S) . C I .52 U.S. v z . P Nx S S H K C M P Z E- Sv C .53 S k k U.S. I -— I — , , x I v A Q v. A , U S I z v . C I Hz H, U U S , v , v U.S. U.S. I. T S U.S. I v S .54 T I k x I. Y I k I’ — x, I x I R I–Iq 1980’ ( P ).
7. ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL HEALTH OF NATIONS
IN THE REGION A A , E , x , , k v ( , A
38 strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy
III.
NEGOTIATING A NUCLEAR DEAL WITH IRAN: IMPACT ON OTHER U.S. OJECTIVES IN THE MIDDLE EAST
Ak). Ak ). L J v k v v ; S’ , , v .55 O q I I, M E. A Weighing Benets and Costs o International Sanctions against Iran, I G C C , j I . 56 A q x , k-k I Iq, Pk, k, G S. T v — I Rv G C, I. 57 A v ( ) I k v U.S. jv, A’ - M E . Mk v - - U S. B - U.S. jv . W k v, v . D , v, v v A’ I. W v k, I k v . T v v ( x v v x I, ), , U S I. I P IV , x v k I k.
strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy 39
III.
NEGOTIATING A NUCLEAR DEAL WITH IRAN: IMPACT ON OTHER U.S. OJECTIVES IN THE MIDDLE EAST
III.
NEGOTIATING A NUCLEAR DEAL WITH IRAN: IMPACT ON OTHER U.S. OJECTIVES IN THE MIDDLE EAST
Ak). Ak ). L J v k v
6. TERRORISM S 9/11, A A P U.S. v U.S. U.S. z . M j k U S v k . T x I , v k x. I -S A Q ( ), , z ( S) . C I .52 U.S. v z . P Nx S S H K C M P Z E- Sv C .53 S k k U.S. I -— I — , , x I v A Q v. A , U S I z v . C I Hz H, U U S , v , v U.S. U.S. I. T S U.S. I v S .54 T I k x I. Y I k I’ — x, I x I R I–Iq 1980’ ( P ).
v ; S’ , , v .55 O q I I, M E. A Weighing Benets and Costs o International Sanctions against Iran, I G C C , j I . 56 A q x , k-k I Iq, Pk, k, G S. T v — I Rv G C, I. 57 A v ( ) I k v U.S. jv, A’ - M E . Mk v - - U S. B - U.S. jv . W k v, v . D , v, v v A’ I. W v k, I k v . T v v ( x v v x I, ),
7. ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL HEALTH OF NATIONS
, U S
IN THE REGION A A , E , x , , k v ( , A
I. I P IV , x v k I k.
strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy 39
38 strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy
IV.
Strenghthening The Diplomatic Track: Practical Considerations and Strategic Options V v A 1979 k I, q. W, , k I I’ ’ — —? O k v , , , I U S , ? H v
P , k, , , “ , q .
”
- k v , , ? A z P VI ( P P Iv Iv U.S.–I U.S.–I R), , v I v. I v k q I k U S. O , U S I j . T U S I f , , f, , v v . T , v v, f I v M E . W k I
John F. Kennedy, 1963
v — — q . T v U S v jv . R , k v . A v , k U.S. I k, I v qk . N v I’ . B P k I, v k k v , , . T : u
Retaining the credibility o threatened military action. W
I k P O ’ ’ k “v” I , strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy 41
IV.
Strenghthening The Diplomatic Track: Practical Considerations and Strategic Options V v A 1979 k I, q. W, , k I I’ ’ — —? O k v , , , I U S , ? H v
P , k, , , “ , q .
”
- k v , , ? A z P VI ( P P Iv Iv U.S.–I U.S.–I R), , v I v. I v k q I k U S. O , U S I j . T U S I f , , f, , v v . T , v v, f I v M E . W k I
John F. Kennedy, 1963
v — — q . T v U S v jv . R , k v . A v , k U.S. I k, I v qk . N v I’ . B P k I, v k k v , , . T : u
Retaining the credibility o threatened military action. W
I k P O ’ ’ k “v” I , strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy 41
IV.
STRENGHTHENING THE DIPLOMATIC TRACK: PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS AN D ST RAT EG IC OP TI ON S
IV.
STRENGHTHENING THE DIPLOMATIC TRACK: PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS AN D ST RAT EG IC OP TI ON S
q . T P
— f S x — U U
I . Y Y P
S k I -A . W
, I’
v U.S.–I –I ,
, P .
k v v I’ S .
u
Keeping up the pressure with sanctions while using them as
I k, A
bargaining chips in negotiations. R I q
v k U.S. I
U S P5+1 v
P5+1 .
q q I. M, I , ,
I , U.S. I
. Gv x —
x k -
jv— P’
k U.S.
( Exv O),
I. W W x k k U S.
,
. W x x-
I. u
59
Evaluating Iranian intentions given continued progress in Iran’s
enrichment program. F U.S. k
I ’ I I’ ’ . D , I v F ( 20% ), , v v Ak , , . A , v, I v k 20% R R, k k v . Ev I’ , W T A U.S. D N I I v - v .60 u
Weighing the uture value o engagement against Iran’ Iran’s s antago-
v I’ . W v U S v v , v k v . W O k . W v, v, .
1. GETTING READY TO DEAL WITH IRAN 1.1 Reaching a presidential decision. U P k
v U S k I, v . A v v q. W ( x ), v x . I , I - U S. T P v k v
nistic behavior in the present. I U S
k
, , I A
v . B
S, v S’ v v
v , (.., I ,
f. I’ S -
“ ”).
U.S. k I. B v 42 strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy
strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy 43
IV.
STRENGHTHENING THE DIPLOMATIC TRACK: PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS AN D ST RAT EG IC OP TI ON S
IV.
STRENGHTHENING THE DIPLOMATIC TRACK: PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS AN D ST RAT EG IC OP TI ON S
q . T P
— f S x — U U
I . Y Y P
S k I -A . W
, I’
v U.S.–I –I ,
, P .
k v v I’ S .
u
I k, A
Keeping up the pressure with sanctions while using them as
bargaining chips in negotiations. R I q
v k U.S. I
U S P5+1 v
P5+1 . I , U.S. I
q q I. M, I , , . Gv x —
x k -
jv— P’
k U.S.
( Exv O),
I. W W x k k U S.
,
. W x x-
I. 59
v I’ . W v
u
Evaluating Iranian intentions given continued progress in Iran’s
enrichment program. F U.S. k
I ’ I I’ ’ . D , I v F ( 20% ), , v v Ak , , . A , v, I v k 20% R R, k k v . Ev I’ , W T A U.S. D N I I v - v .60 u
Weighing the uture value o engagement against Iran’ Iran’s s antago-
U S v v , v k v . W O k . W v, v, .
1. GETTING READY TO DEAL WITH IRAN 1.1 Reaching a presidential decision. U P k
v U S k I, v . A v v q. W ( x ), v x . I , I - U S. T P v k v
nistic behavior in the present. I U S
k
, , I A
v . B
S, v S’ v v
v , (.., I ,
f. I’ S -
“ ”).
U.S. k I. B v strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy 43
42 strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy
IV.
STRENGHTHENING THE DIPLOMATIC TRACK: PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS AN D ST RAT EG IC OP TI ON S
IV.
STRENGHTHENING THE DIPLOMATIC TRACK: PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS AN D ST RAT EG IC OP TI ON S
1.2 Convincing Iran’s Supreme Leader U S k
J 2013 ( v v)
. A , I’ I’ S L, A A K ,
k , x
v jv U.S. I
v U S.63 S k
. T I’ ( q) U.S.
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x— k k
U.S. — P Aj’ ,
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P ,
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f Aj I I’’ .64
I . . V
1.3 Outlining the U.S. end game. I U S k
P k
- I,
. T L ’ ’ , v ’
k U S k
- “” U.S.
( x) v . I v , I v I
I. (O , I ’ ’ U.S.
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, v - U.S. U.S. . U.S.
61
P —— U S’
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k x v I v. P
U S I
k
.
I (v, I v I’ ); v v ( z I) v I’ ; “” , k v, , ; A’ k I q q x q I’
A v v- , x: 1.3.1 Mutual international obligations. T U S I
v v ; z; v ; UN C . 1.3.2 Bilateral agreements. T U S I k
( v
z ; z v
I, ); k
( ); k
S L’ L’ atwa atwa ,
x ;
(S S H C v
; k ,
U S I k k atwa
A A, ; k
)62; A k
j v ; x ,
I , ;
, , z x.
1.4 Establishing a bilateral channel
. I,
. M I
v . T I’ I’
P5+1. I v
44 strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy
strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy 45
IV.
STRENGHTHENING THE DIPLOMATIC TRACK: PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS AN D ST RAT EG IC OP TI ON S
IV.
STRENGHTHENING THE DIPLOMATIC TRACK: PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS AN D ST RAT EG IC OP TI ON S
1.2 Convincing Iran’s Supreme Leader U S k
J 2013 ( v v)
. A , I’ I’ S L, A A K ,
k , x
v jv U.S. I
v U S.63 S k
.61 T I’ ( q) U.S.
S L— k
x— k k
U.S. — P Aj’ ,
I . U, U, U.S. -
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A , , , .
f Aj I I’’ .64
I . . V
1.3 Outlining the U.S. end game. I U S k
P k
- I,
. T L ’ ’ , v ’
k U S k
- “” U.S.
( x) v . I v , I v I
I. (O , I ’ ’ U.S.
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U.S. I’ I’ .)
, v - U.S. U.S. . U.S.
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k
.
I (v, I v I’ ); v v ( z I) v I’ ; “” , k v, , ; A’ k I q q
A v v- , x: 1.3.1 Mutual international obligations. T U S I
v v ; z; v ; UN C . 1.3.2 Bilateral agreements. T U S I k
x q I’ ( v
z ; z v
I, ); k
( ); k
S L’ L’ atwa atwa ,
x ;
(S S H C v
; k ,
U S I k k atwa
A A, ; k
) ; A k
j v ; x ,
I , ;
, , z x.
1.4 Establishing a bilateral channel
. I,
. M I
v . T I’ I’
P5+1. I v
62
strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy 45
44 strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy
IV.
STRENGHTHENING THE DIPLOMATIC TRACK: PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS AN D ST RAT EG IC OP TI ON S
I x , I .
IV.
STRENGHTHENING THE DIPLOMATIC TRACK: PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS AN D ST RAT EG IC OP TI ON S
1.5.2 U.S. wants: F I’ -
W v U S I .
, I “k” z;
I S L v
( k) ( k)
, U S k ’
q ( U S) v ;
I. B
q ;
, I’ k k
I; I Hz H;
v v. 65 B k I
I’ I’ ,
, v v , P-
; ;
v , x
U.S. ; A
v x U.S.-I . .
; P I;
I , U S I ( k , v ). S v S “ ” U.S. I, v.
I . 1.5.3 United States and Iran both want: T v-
Iq A; , v S; f ; G; f , ; k; Q ; S-
1.5 Understanding what the United States wants, I ,
; .
k . T U.S. q
1.6 Developing a ull appreciation o problematic language and concepts.
v U S I — . I .66 N wants needs . D v , , v j k . B . W W , , k k : 1.5.1 Iran wants: R I v ; U.S.
I A zz . F x, I “ “, ,” U S “.” T U S “ k,” I v “” “.” “.” I “,” U S “ “ .” A “I”; “I”; I “T I R I.” T U U S “,” I “v” “.” I vk “ A I,” U S v “ x ..” ..” I U S “G S”; U S “ ” I’ “” . T ,
I’ j ; U.S. I’
, v -
“” ,
. S f v : I
N-P N-P N W67; U.S. M E;
“ ”; U.S. U.S. x
; I ; I/P v
N . . A , , U S “z”
M J Rv A
I v “ . .”” (N
68
j ; I U S
k “ ”; ”; k x U S
I. 69
C .)
46 strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy
strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy 47
IV.
STRENGHTHENING THE DIPLOMATIC TRACK: PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS AN D ST RAT EG IC OP TI ON S
IV.
I x , I .
STRENGHTHENING THE DIPLOMATIC TRACK: PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS AN D ST RAT EG IC OP TI ON S
1.5.2 U.S. wants: F I’ -
W v U S I .
, I “k” z;
I S L v
( k) ( k)
, U S k ’
q ( U S) v ;
I. B
q ;
, I’ k k
I; I Hz H;
v v.
65
B k I
I’ I’ ,
, v v , P-
; ;
v , x
U.S. ; A
v x U.S.-I . .
; P I;
I , U S I
I .
( k , v ). S v S “ ” U.S. I, v.
1.5.3 United States and Iran both want: T v-
Iq A; , v S; f ; G; f , ; k; Q ; S-
1.5 Understanding what the United States wants, I ,
; .
k . T U.S. q
1.6 Developing a ull appreciation o problematic language and concepts.
v U S I — . I .66 N wants needs . D v , , v j k . B . W W , , k k : 1.5.1 Iran wants: R I v ; U.S.
I A zz . F x, I “ “, ,” U S “.” T U S “ k,” I v “” “.” “.” I “,” U S “ “ .” A “I”; “I”; I “T I R I.” T U U S “,” I “v” “.” I vk “ A I,” U S v “ x ..” ..” I U S “G S”; U S “ ” I’ “” . T ,
I’ j ; U.S. I’
, v -
“” ,
. S f v : I
67
N-P N-P N W ; U.S. M E;
“ ”; U.S. U.S. x
; I ; I/P v
N . . A , , U S “z”
M J Rv A
I v “ . .”” (N
j 68; I U S
k “ ”; ”; k x U S
I.
69
C .) strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy 47
46 strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy
IV.
STRENGHTHENING THE DIPLOMATIC TRACK: PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS AN D ST RAT EG IC OP TI ON S
2. BEGINNING TALKS WITH IRAN T k I v. k k qk .
IV.
STRENGHTHENING THE DIPLOMATIC TRACK: PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS AN D ST RAT EG IC OP TI ON S
v. I k U S v z U.S. k I . M I k E A k P (F). I’ A v. Ov z k, k , , . .72
2.1 Setting the tone. T U.S. v x v
I , v , .— U S I . T U S v x I U S I Rv. T x jv. A x I v x v U S, . I v,
2.2.2 An end to decades o distrust and misunderstanding. v
jv, v k , , , , “ “..” Ev , k , v. B v , . 2.2.3 Relations based on non-intererence in internal aairs. A
, . T P
, I’ I’ A , ,
Nx H K k v P Z E L
v I’ . T
C M v k.
jv U.S. . T U S
2.2 Previewing objectives. N v
(“ ”) ”) . B U S , , I ( v) k
v I z I v —j I z U S. 2.2.4 Agreement on an approach to managing the relationship.
A’ - ,
A I U S k k z
, U.S. k
, , v f. T v-
. k k v jv
f,
v . A v jv k :
, v,
2.2.1 Relations based on mutual respect. I’
v v A I , I , P . T v, , U S’ S’ ( B) 1953 ’é é v I I’’ P M, M M Mq, Rz
. F k v ; , k v . A k v . 2.2.5 Agreement on nuclear cooperation. T j U.S. jv
S Pv. T f v I -
v v
U.S. .70 T A’ , I v,
I’ v I k
z , I q
“k” . T v k
(ta’aro ). ). T I A
“z atw atwa, a,”” F M A Ak S’ ,
. T
v
I v v U S, ,
v .
71
48 strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy
strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy 49
IV.
STRENGHTHENING THE DIPLOMATIC TRACK: PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS AN D ST RAT EG IC OP TI ON S
2. BEGINNING TALKS WITH IRAN T k I v. k k qk .
IV.
STRENGHTHENING THE DIPLOMATIC TRACK: PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS AN D ST RAT EG IC OP TI ON S
v. I k U S v z U.S. k I . M I k E A k P (F). I’ A v. Ov z k, k , , . .72
2.1 Setting the tone. T U.S. v x v
I , v , .— U S I . T U S v x I U S I Rv. T x jv. A x I v x v U S,
2.2.2 An end to decades o distrust and misunderstanding. v
jv, v k , , , , “ “..” Ev , k , v. B v , . 2.2.3 Relations based on non-intererence in internal aairs. A
. I v, , . T P
, I’ I’ A , ,
Nx H K k v P Z E L
v I’ . T
C M v k.
jv U.S. . T U S
2.2 Previewing objectives. N v
(“ ”) ”) . B U S -
v I z I v —j I z U S. 2.2.4 Agreement on an approach to managing the relationship.
, , I ( v) k A’ - ,
A I U S k k z
, U.S. k
, , v f. T v-
. k k v jv
f,
v . A v jv k :
, v,
2.2.1 Relations based on mutual respect. I’
v v A I , I , P . T v, , U S’ S’ ( B) 1953 ’é é v I I’’ -
. F k v ; , k v . A k v . 2.2.5 Agreement on nuclear cooperation. T j U.S. jv
P M, M M Mq, Rz S Pv. T f v I -
v v
U.S. . T A’ , I v,
I’ v I k
z , I q
“k” . T v k
(ta’aro ). ). T I A
“z atw atwa, a,”” F M A Ak S’ ,
70
. T
v
I v v U S, ,
v .
71
strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy 49
48 strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy
IV.
STRENGHTHENING THE DIPLOMATIC TRACK: PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS AN D ST RAT EG IC OP TI ON S
IV.
STRENGHTHENING THE DIPLOMATIC TRACK: PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS AN D ST RAT EG IC OP TI ON S
v q v I’
k , , k v
xv , I
. T v 2003, I I’ ’
I k q
v . I , I v
. I I , U S (
N-P N-P ; I A A E A
P5+1) ; z I’
(IAEA) v “P M D” (PMD).
, I
C A v’ v
N-P N-P ; v -
, I . 73
, . T
3.1 Reaching agreement on the scope o Iran’s nuclear program. A -
, ,
U.S. I xv
.
. A , I x
3. PURSUING A NUCLEAR DEAL
A P “ C 3.1 S A” , q , I
N ( , )
v, , v .
k , q-
I P-5 +1 v
. I , I
I v— x,
U S
, x , .—
( ), .
.74 I ,
A , U.S. I
I v NP
P5+1
I . A I v
v ( UN S C I
-
A E A). A I U S “” . I’ A’ ; I, v, U.S.- . F I, x I , v ( I xv ) I j N-P . . U.S. UN S C “z ” I v . I atwa atwa S L , k I . U S , I’ v, I’ I’ , I v . I v , k . I 50 strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy
I P5+1. I z S L ’ ’ atwa U N.75 3.2 Limiting enrichment and acquisition o separated plutonium. I’ -
’ x I’ I’ , .76 A I v I — 3.5% 5%, v q v — q I k. I x 20% ( q I). U 20% v qk , - I v . T I 20% R R ( RR, I
strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy 51
IV.
STRENGHTHENING THE DIPLOMATIC TRACK: PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS AN D ST RAT EG IC OP TI ON S
IV.
STRENGHTHENING THE DIPLOMATIC TRACK: PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS AN D ST RAT EG IC OP TI ON S
v q v I’
k , , k v
xv , I
. T v 2003, I I’ ’
I k q
v . I , I v
. I I , U S (
N-P N-P ; I A A E A
P5+1) ; z I’
(IAEA) v “P M D” (PMD).
, I
C A v’ v
N-P N-P ; v -
, I . 73
, . T
3.1 Reaching agreement on the scope o Iran’s nuclear program. A -
, ,
U.S. I xv
.
. A , I x
3. PURSUING A NUCLEAR DEAL
A P “ C 3.1 S A” , q , I
N ( , )
v, , v .
k , q-
I P-5 +1 v
. I , I
I v— x,
U S
, x , .—
( ), .
.74 I ,
A , U.S. I
I v NP
P5+1
I . A I v
v ( UN S C I
-
A E A).
I P5+1. I z S L ’ ’
A I U S “” . I’ A’ ; I, v, U.S.- . F I, x I , v ( I xv ) I j N-P . . U.S. UN S C “z ” I v . I atwa atwa S L , k I . U S , I’ v, I’ I’ , I v . I v , k . I
atwa U N.75 3.2 Limiting enrichment and acquisition o separated plutonium. I’ -
’ x I’ I’ , .76 A I v I — 3.5% 5%, v q v — q I k. I x 20% ( q I). U 20% v qk , - I v . T I 20% R R ( RR, I
strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy 51
50 strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy
IV.
STRENGHTHENING THE DIPLOMATIC TRACK: PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS AN D ST RAT EG IC OP TI ON S
IV.
STRENGHTHENING THE DIPLOMATIC TRACK: PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS AN D ST RAT EG IC OP TI ON S
U S S’ S’ ),
x I C B k
; U S v 20%
U S. F , v
I v v I’ v v
I Pk
.
I, v v .
I 20% ,
3.5 Longer-term possibilities. Ov , v I’
v ,
k , -z -
F ; v v ;
z , I
Ak . I F ,
v. I .
k I I’’ NP . Pv k I' . A k Ak . T - I k f I’ , v . E v k v IAEA. IAEA. R R ; ; . W I , k k . O U S I,
4. MOVING INTO BILATERAL RELATIONS A , I U S q . 4.1 Establish a ormal bilateral channel. A v
, A- U.S. I S , . I, S xv v, v I I . O , I I I S W W I ( ) v .
P5+1, UN S C k ,
4.2 Encourage diplomatic and ocial contacts. U.S. I
v x S C R— v —
z
. B I U S v v j jv.
. I U N v
3.3 Ensuring transparency transparency.. T IAEA q
I ( IAEA I’ I’ PMD v, v). A
v W , , U.S. . V A I I U S .
v z
4.3 Facilitate exchanges. E v
v q.
x , , , , , z--
3.4 Oering partial sanctions relie. I ,
P,
z x. . D f I U S , - .
k C v . C ,
4.4 Manage hostile rhetoric. W k z ,
U.S. “ ” .
, , P
T E U
S L, v ( v) f , v k.
52 strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy
strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy 53
IV.
STRENGHTHENING THE DIPLOMATIC TRACK: PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS AN D ST RAT EG IC OP TI ON S
IV.
STRENGHTHENING THE DIPLOMATIC TRACK: PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS AN D ST RAT EG IC OP TI ON S
U S S’ S’ ),
x I C B k
; U S v 20%
U S. F , v
I v v I’ v v
I Pk
.
I, v v .
I 20% ,
3.5 Longer-term possibilities. Ov , v I’
v ,
k , -z -
F ; v v ;
z , I
Ak . I F ,
v. I .
k I I’’ NP . Pv k I' . A k Ak . T - I k f I’ , v . E v k v IAEA. IAEA. R R ; ; . W I , k k . O U S I,
4. MOVING INTO BILATERAL RELATIONS A , I U S q . 4.1 Establish a ormal bilateral channel. A v
, A- U.S. I S , . I, S xv v, v I I . O , I I I S W W I ( ) v .
P5+1, UN S C k ,
4.2 Encourage diplomatic and ocial contacts. U.S. I
v x S C R— v —
z
. B I U S v v j jv.
. I U N v
3.3 Ensuring transparency transparency.. T IAEA q
I ( IAEA I’ I’ PMD v, v). A
v W , , U.S. . V A I I U S .
v z
4.3 Facilitate exchanges. E v
v q.
x , , , , , z--
3.4 Oering partial sanctions relie. I ,
P,
z x. . D f I U S , - .
k C v . C ,
4.4 Manage hostile rhetoric. W k z ,
U.S. “ ” .
, , P
T E U
S L, v ( v) f , v k.
strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy 53
52 strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy
IV.
STRENGHTHENING THE DIPLOMATIC TRACK: PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS AN D ST RAT EG IC OP TI ON S
5. EXPLORING OPPORTUNITIES FOR COLLABORATION COLLABORATION AND MANAGING SOURCES OF CONFLICT O k ( 2013),
IV.
STRENGHTHENING THE DIPLOMATIC TRACK: PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS AN D ST RAT EG IC OP TI ON S
, I— k vv U S I, UN S C, E U, .
I U S x
5.5 Arab–Israeli confict. I’ I, Hz
. , x , ,
H, -
v v -v. S
v I. Ov ,
.
. T vx k
5.1 Discussions on Aghanistan and Iraq. A ,
.
A. D
5.6 Cooperation on dealing with al Qaeda, its ranchise elements, and the
Iq’ v
Taliban. T U S v I -
— v
Q A M . Y
U S I v q U.S. .
I v U S S
5.2 Drug tracking. F , A I v k
k, I’ A, k I v k.77 Gv ’ I, k j v.
. I v , I k , U S. I IRGC v S ; v U S I, v x .
5.3 Agreement to avoid accidental conficts, particularly in the Persian Gul. B k v k
I A ’ v v , v f. W v , . B Sv A v 1972 , “I S” . 5.4 A plan to wind down the sanctions and begin trade relations. O
v U.S.–I k I’ . W P Exv O, k v , v v I , , U.S. C I. I I, U S x —
54 strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy
strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy 55
IV.
STRENGHTHENING THE DIPLOMATIC TRACK: PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS AN D ST RAT EG IC OP TI ON S
5. EXPLORING OPPORTUNITIES FOR COLLABORATION COLLABORATION AND MANAGING SOURCES OF CONFLICT O k ( 2013),
IV.
STRENGHTHENING THE DIPLOMATIC TRACK: PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS AN D ST RAT EG IC OP TI ON S
, I— k vv U S I, UN S C, E U, .
I U S x
5.5 Arab–Israeli confict. I’ I, Hz
. , x , ,
H, -
v v -v. S
v I. Ov ,
.
. T vx k
5.1 Discussions on Aghanistan and Iraq. A ,
.
A. D
5.6 Cooperation on dealing with al Qaeda, its ranchise elements, and the
Iq’ v
Taliban. T U S v I -
— v
Q A M . Y
U S I v q U.S. .
I v U S S
5.2 Drug tracking. F , A I v k
k, I’ A, k I v k.77 Gv ’ I, k j v.
. I v , I k , U S. I IRGC v S ; v U S I, v x .
5.3 Agreement to avoid accidental conficts, particularly in the Persian Gul. B k v k
I A ’ v v , v f. W v , . B Sv A v 1972 , “I S” . 5.4 A plan to wind down the sanctions and begin trade relations. O
v U.S.–I k I’ . W P Exv O, k v , v v I , , U.S. C I. I I, U S x —
strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy 55
54 strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy
V.
Concluding Observations: Costs and Benets o Trying To Work with Iran. W v x x U S k I k , v I— v - , ( ) . I , j .
L “ .
”
COSTS AND RISKS u
Negative public reactions. A U.S. P k
I v , k I U.S. . P v I . S v I S A C . u
Risk o rebu or ailure. T k I U.S.
, I’ S L v U.S. “ ” I k I’ k k U S ( I ). I , v
Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1951
U S — U S ( P5+1) v k I, I’ I’ . S U.S. k I, U S k A . T U S v , x z. u
Risk that the timing is wrong. S
k I. T k k “ ” I. S — x— k I. I , v x , I v , v , . strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy 57
V.
Concluding Observations: Costs and Benets o Trying To Work with Iran. W v x x U S k I k , v I— v - , ( ) . I , j .
L “ .
”
COSTS AND RISKS u
Negative public reactions. A U.S. P k
I v , k I U.S. . P v I . S v I S A C . u
Risk o rebu or ailure. T k I U.S.
, I’ S L v U.S. “ ” I k I’ k k U S ( I ). I , v
Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1951
U S — U S ( P5+1) v k I, I’ I’ . S U.S. k I, U S k A . T U S v , x z. u
Risk that the timing is wrong. S
k I. T k k “ ” I. S — x— k I. I , v x , I v , v , . strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy 57
V.
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS: COSTS AND BENEFITS OF TRYING TO WORK WITH IRAN.
BENEFITS AND POTENTIAL BENEFITS u
Limits to Iran’s nuclear activities and reduced prolieration risk.
N k, , v I’ . 78 O k I ’ k . u
Improved ability to manage challenges in Aghanistan and Iraq.
I j j k . T v v I.79 I Iq A, U.S. I jv , . u A
more balanced more balanced and coherent coherent U.S. strategy strategy in in the changing changing
Middle East. I ’ M E, v v -
. S S S, C, J, M, P A, A K . I x, U S v v ; U S v z . B k v U.S.–I , U S .
58 strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy
strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy 59
V.
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS: COSTS AND BENEFITS OF TRYING TO WORK WITH IRAN.
BENEFITS AND POTENTIAL BENEFITS u
Limits to Iran’s nuclear activities and reduced prolieration risk.
N k, , v I’ . 78 O k I ’ k . u
Improved ability to manage challenges in Aghanistan and Iraq.
I j j k . T v v I.79 I Iq A, U.S. I jv , . u A
more balanced more balanced and coherent coherent U.S. strategy strategy in in the changing changing
Middle East. I ’ M E, v v -
. S S S, C, J, M, P A, A K . I x, U S v v ; U S v z . B k v U.S.–I , U S .
strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy 59
58 strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy
VI.
Primer on Prior Initiatives to Improve U.S.–Iran Relations.
T U S I R I z v . I P, v U.S.–I . I , x v v, k ( ) . T . W
I I v , A “ UNSC f . O I . .
”
Henry Kissinger, 2013
v v v , v, v, v .
1. BACKGROUND: STRONG OFFICIAL RELATIONS RELATIONS DURING THE COLD WAR, BREAK DOWN IN 1979 T U S I v C W. U , , U S - I, I v U S v R B f. B 1940, U S v I v , z I’ , v k Sv x. B -1950, U S I . T U S I v 1957 U.S.- A P P, 1965 I . 80 T 1957 v v I j81; I U S. I 1967, U S I N R C, R R (RR). T RR 5 - - - , HEU ( - 19.75%). T , I N N-P N-P (NP), ' v. I -1970, I’ , Rz S Pv, I v 23 1994, U S v . 82 I 1976, P G R. F v I U.S.- q I x , v .83
strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy
strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy 61
VI.
Primer on Prior Initiatives to Improve U.S.–Iran Relations.
T U S I R I z v . I P, v U.S.–I . I , x v v, k ( ) . T . W
I I v , A “ UNSC f . O I . .
”
Henry Kissinger, 2013
v v v , v, v, v .
1. BACKGROUND: STRONG OFFICIAL RELATIONS RELATIONS DURING THE COLD WAR, BREAK DOWN IN 1979 T U S I v C W. U , , U S - I, I v U S v R B f. B 1940, U S v I v , z I’ , v k Sv x. B -1950, U S I . T U S I v 1957 U.S.- A P P, 1965 I . 80 T 1957 v v I j81; I U S. I 1967, U S I N R C, R R (RR). T RR 5 - - - , HEU ( - 19.75%). T , I N N-P N-P (NP), ' v. I -1970, I’ , Rz S Pv, I v 23 1994, U S v . 82 I 1976, P G R. F v I U.S.- q I x , v .83 strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy 61
strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy
VI .
PRIMER ON PRIOR INITIATIVES TO IMPROVE U.S.– IRAN RELATIONS.
VI.
PRIMER ON PRIOR INITIATIVES TO IMPROVE U.S.– IRAN RELATIONS.
D ofcial ofcial U S I ,
' I, I I
I j v U S.
I’ A . W P C j
O A’ ( B) 1953
, R .89 I , I
’é v I’ P M, M M-
v $500 I 1980 1983,
q, z I’ . T U
I I.90 I P M A S
S’ I’ , Rz S Pv. T
, I “ “ v
I Rv 1979 v S.
” v I v Iq
T U S k 1980, v I U.S. k 50 A z 444 . I Rv, U S HEU RR, v v I ’ j. B 1980, I j, A v I (19.75%) RR. T RR v 1987.84 I J, J, 1981, U.S. I k A A, I Rv. S U.S. D S S W C I’ D P M, Bz Nv, A , v . T k v U S I. 85 T - U S -v I’ , , v I U.S. I . 86 S 1979, U.S. I v U.S. I S S E . I I I S Pk E 87 W.
2. 1980 –1989: THE THE IRAN-IRAQ IRAN-IRAQ WAR; IRAN AND AND ISRAEL MAINTAIN TIES; THE IRAN CONTRA AFFAIR
I . 91 u T 1980, I A v
I
v. W W Iq , I I Iq v A M E. I 1985, Hz ( -I L) jk W WA A , K, I, S. H v U S, I . M, R v I Sv U. I R k I -C I — P M S P —“ .” u S
v : T U S
WA L, I k I U S Iq, I .93 W I v , v v v , -v M 1986, vv R , N S Av R MF; I M G A Hk, I ; A H Rj ( P Rj), v S L . T -- (I I x I’
Opportunity for improved relations: u W
I Rv U.S.–I
A ), x v U S x I. I A’
, I' I
I I’
( I v k A ), ' -
v— -C I v v -
I . T v Iq' v I
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S 1980, Iq v I' . O
“ ”
Iq I’ , I F M M D
“v , W.” 94
U S (v I U.S. z ) “ I k ” Iq.88 D C
62 strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy
u D v I v I
I’ vv ,
strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy 63
VI .
PRIMER ON PRIOR INITIATIVES TO IMPROVE U.S.– IRAN RELATIONS.
VI.
PRIMER ON PRIOR INITIATIVES TO IMPROVE U.S.– IRAN RELATIONS.
D ofcial ofcial U S I ,
' I, I I
I j v U S.
I’ A . W P C j
O A’ ( B) 1953
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S’ I’ , Rz S Pv. T
, I “ “ v
I Rv 1979 v S.
” v I v Iq
T U S k 1980, v I
I . 91
U.S. k 50 A z 444 . I Rv, U S HEU RR, v v I ’ j. B 1980, I j, A v I (19.75%) RR. T RR v 1987.84 I J, J, 1981, U.S. I k A A, I Rv. S U.S. D S S W C I’ D P M, Bz Nv, A , v . T k v U S I. 85 T - U S -v I’ , , v I U.S. I . 86 S 1979, U.S. I v U.S. I S S E . I I I S Pk E 87 W.
2. 1980 –1989: THE THE IRAN-IRAQ IRAN-IRAQ WAR; IRAN AND AND ISRAEL MAINTAIN TIES; THE IRAN CONTRA AFFAIR
u T 1980, I A v
I
v. W W Iq , I I Iq v A M E. I 1985, Hz ( -I L) jk W WA A , K, I, S. H v U S, I . M, R v I Sv U. I R k I -C I — P M S P —“ .” u S
v : T U S
WA L, I k I U S Iq, I .93 W I v , v v v , -v M 1986, vv R , N S Av R MF; I M G A Hk, I ; A H Rj ( P Rj), v S L . T -- (I I x I’
Opportunity for improved relations: u W
I Rv U.S.–I
A ), x v U S x I. I A’
, I' I
I I’
( I v k A ), ' -
v— -C I v v -
I . T v Iq' v I
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“ ”
Iq I’ , I F M M D
“v , W.” 94
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u D v I v I
I’ vv ,
strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy 63
62 strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy
VI .
PRIMER ON PRIOR INITIATIVES TO IMPROVE U.S.– IRAN RELATIONS.
v k I.95 W v N C, U S
VI.
PRIMER ON PRIOR INITIATIVES TO IMPROVE U.S.– IRAN RELATIONS.
3. 1989–1992: 1989–199 2: RAFSANJANI’S OUTREACH AND THE FIRST PERSIAN GULF WAR
S N, C W .96 Ev , v A , P R “’ I’ f I .”97 Why the opportunity was missed: u I I’ x I Rv
Opportunity for improved relations: u T
A K, 1989, x
. S I v v f k . L P H Rj, I’ z x , v I A k
, U S I’
. T v
Sv U. T C W f P G
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98), U S’ Iq v v . U.S. Iq I -A, -A, k k U S.99 u I
1988, U S Nv USS Vincennes
I v P G, k j, k 290 . T U.S.–I . u I I’ P G I–Iq W,
u I 1989 , U.S. P G H. W. B—
A L— L— I A v I . A , “ .” W U.S. , I’ x “ A [I].” 100 u Iq'
v K -
W. A I U S S E . I U.S. A F
A , U S A
I ; Iq q ; 1 Iq
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I I’ P G. I’ v v A A v v k j I I C J, " U S A I ... j U S.” u T I–C v
, v.
A.102 Why the opportunity was missed: u B I L, G H. W. B
, v I’ S H . D v fx Iq , I’ U S’ . u T Iq 1991 Sv U. T
U S , I v .
64 strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy
strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy 65
VI .
PRIMER ON PRIOR INITIATIVES TO IMPROVE U.S.– IRAN RELATIONS.
v k I.95 W v N C, U S
VI.
PRIMER ON PRIOR INITIATIVES TO IMPROVE U.S.– IRAN RELATIONS.
3. 1989–1992: 1989–199 2: RAFSANJANI’S OUTREACH AND THE FIRST PERSIAN GULF WAR
S N, C W .96 Ev , v A , P R
Opportunity for improved relations: u T
“’ I’ f I .”97 Why the opportunity was missed:
A K, 1989, x
. S I v v f k . L P H Rj, I’ z x
u I I’ x I Rv
, v I A k
, U S I’
. T v
Sv U. T C W f P G
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98), U S’ Iq v v . U.S. Iq I -A, -A, k k U S.99 u I
u I 1989 , U.S. P G H. W. B—
A L— L— I A v I . A , “ .” W U.S. , I’ x “
1988, U S Nv USS Vincennes
A [I].” 100
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u Iq'
v K -
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A , U S A
I ; Iq q ; 1 Iq
Nv WWII— “P M.” T U.S. k k
.101 T U.S. S S J Bk,
I I’ P G. I’ v v A A v v k j I I C J, "
A.102 Why the opportunity was missed: u B I L, G H. W. B
U S A I ... j
,
U S.” u T I–C v
, v.
v I’ S H . D v fx Iq , I’ U S’ . u T Iq 1991 Sv U. T
U S , I v .
strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy 65
64 strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy
VI .
PRIMER ON PRIOR INITIATIVES TO IMPROVE U.S.– IRAN RELATIONS.
4. 1995: OLIVE BRANCH AND THE CONOCO DEAL
VI.
PRIMER ON PRIOR INITIATIVES TO IMPROVE U.S.– IRAN RELATIONS.
Why the opportunity was missed: u Ev A K’ v, P C
Opportunity for improved relations: u T
P K v . I U S v
v P Rj
I’ Rv G C S
U S 1994. Rz , Rj
A K , , 19 A z k.110 A
, k-
k, W k v, -
. F 1979, I
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— $1 — .
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xv A C. C’
K. T j
k S D P C . 103
k. L, v v S A A Q, I,
Why the opportunity was missed:
v k,111 FBI L F
u T U S v v M E
C v I
I . u P
I vv v
v I P, I’
K C
Hz H. "T [I],
U.S. . S I j A’
k ," -A S S M Ik x. 104 T
“” P K, “” S L.
C v S D, A
H U S
I P A C (AIPAC) v , P
I’ K’ .
C Exv O. 105
5. REFORMIST WINS IRANIAN GENERAL ELECTION: KHA KHATA TAMI MI AND ALBRIG ALBRIGHT HT MAKE MAKE OVERTU OVERTURES RES BUT BUT POLICY POLICY FAILS FAILS TO FOLLOW SUIT
6. COOPERATION IN AFGHANISTAN AND BONN CONFERE CONFERENCE NCE Opportunity for improved relations: u A k S 11, 2001, W I’
v A. A Opportunity for improved relations: u I
x I A ,
1997, M K I — —
U U S j N A 2001,
v (70% ) . A ,
I . 112 D -
v I. 106 S k , J 1998, K
q k Gv, A J D, R
U S v CNN,
Ck, Z Kz, I A UN Jv Z
v . 107
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A , J 1998, K’ ,
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U.S.–I , z ,
I U.S. K A.
I x U S.
108
S x
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U S’ vv v I’ P M
f A - -
M M 1953, “ …
v.
.”
109
u T v I U S v
j j v .. I 2001, P P K K
66 strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy
strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy 67
VI .
PRIMER ON PRIOR INITIATIVES TO IMPROVE U.S.– IRAN RELATIONS.
VI.
PRIMER ON PRIOR INITIATIVES TO IMPROVE U.S.– IRAN RELATIONS.
4. 1995: OLIVE BRANCH AND THE CONOCO DEAL
Why the opportunity was missed:
Opportunity for improved relations:
P K v . I U S v
u Ev A K’ v, P C u T
v P Rj
I’ Rv G C S
U S 1994. Rz , Rj
A K , , 19 A z k.110 A
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. F 1979, I
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— $1 — .
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xv A C. C’
K. T j
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k. L, v v S A A Q, I,
Why the opportunity was missed:
v k,111 FBI L F
u T U S v v M E
I .
C v I
u P
I vv v
v I P, I’
K C
Hz H. "T [I],
U.S. . S I j A’
k ," -A S S M Ik x. 104 T
“” P K, “” S L.
C v S D, A
H U S
I P A C (AIPAC) v , P
I’ K’ .
C Exv O. 105
5. REFORMIST WINS IRANIAN GENERAL ELECTION: KHA KHATA TAMI MI AND ALBRIG ALBRIGHT HT MAKE MAKE OVERTU OVERTURES RES BUT BUT POLICY POLICY FAILS FAILS TO FOLLOW SUIT
6. COOPERATION IN AFGHANISTAN AND BONN CONFERE CONFERENCE NCE Opportunity for improved relations: u A k S 11, 2001, W I’
v A. A Opportunity for improved relations: u I
x I A ,
1997, M K I — —
U U S j N A 2001,
v (70% ) . A ,
I . 112 D -
v I. 106 S k , J 1998, K
q k Gv, A J D, R
U S v CNN,
Ck, Z Kz, I A UN Jv Z
v . 107
N A v Y Q. F K v
u T C
I. S S M-
I, I’ U S. T
A , J 1998, K’ ,
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U.S.–I , z ,
I U.S. K A.
I x U S.
108
S x
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f A - -
M M 1953, “ …
v.
.”
109
u T v I U S v
j j v .. I 2001, P P K K
strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy 67
66 strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy
VI .
PRIMER ON PRIOR INITIATIVES TO IMPROVE U.S.– IRAN RELATIONS.
VI .
PRIMER ON PRIOR INITIATIVES TO IMPROVE U.S.– IRAN RELATIONS.
“D Cvz” UN G A, k 2001 -
A Q); - v Iq ( I
v v . 114 T
A); , B D, S
, .
P 2002, z I’ - I–P f I’ I
How a brief brief period period of colla collaborat boration ion becam became e a miss missed ed opport opportunity unity:: u I’ v v K
k B . I, S U 2002, x k B , P G W. B I “x v,” Iq N K.
115
P B I,
x, k . T k I, vv k. I K’ I , I v U S A .
116
A-
, A D I Gv, I A- A A. A v k W H S D, W v . 117 S I vv A k j, v U S. T S L I v U S I k
I P. u I , I k U S x Mj--
Kq (MEK), I z Iq, -Q v . O v, I k I’ , , . I , I k I’ . T -- . 119 u T “ ”
I v. Why the opportunity was missed: u T U S I’ v. V
P Dk C v v, , “ ’ k v.”120 I , , k U.S. v.
8. 2003–2005: EU3 LEADS THE TALKS TALKS
k v .
Opportunity for improved relations:
7. TERMINA TERMINATION TION OF THE U.S. TRADE BAN
I UN S C (UNSC) R I’ I’
u A Iq
Opportunity for improved relations: u J k B 2003, G, S A
, v W v U S I. I , I U.S. A Iq. P I x B ’ , I U.S.–I . A , S Kz, I’ P, v v S L K. 118
, EU3 (F, G, U K)
. T EU3’ UNSC I U S I. T v jv I’ I’’ . I 2004 20 I A P NP, E ( A) I . Why the opportunity was missed: u T k v I’
B x .
“ ” N N-P
T k U S I,
. A EU3 A 2005 k indenite suspension j
v . I ,
I , v E A
H I J v I; k I’
. 121
(.., A P NP); Hz z; z (v 68 strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy
strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy 69
VI .
PRIMER ON PRIOR INITIATIVES TO IMPROVE U.S.– IRAN RELATIONS.
VI .
“D Cvz” UN G A, k 2001 v v .
114
T
, .
A Q); - v Iq ( I A); , B D, S P 2002, z I’ - I–P f I’ I
How a brief brief period period of colla collaborat boration ion becam became e a miss missed ed opport opportunity unity:: u I’ v v K
k B . I, S U 2002, x k B , P G W. B I “x v,” Iq N K. 115 P B I, x, k . T k I, vv k. I K’
I P. u I , I k U S x Mj--
Kq (MEK), I z Iq, -Q v . O v, I k I’ , , . I , I k I’ . T -- . 119 u T “ ”
I , I v U S A .
PRIMER ON PRIOR INITIATIVES TO IMPROVE U.S.– IRAN RELATIONS.
116
A-
, A D I Gv, I A- A A. A v k W H S D, W v . 117 S I vv A k j, v U S. T S L I v U S I k k v .
I v. Why the opportunity was missed: u T U S I’ v. V
P Dk C v v, , “ ’ k v.”120 I , , k U.S. v.
8. 2003–2005: EU3 LEADS THE TALKS TALKS Opportunity for improved relations: u A Iq
7. TERMINA TERMINATION TION OF THE U.S. TRADE BAN Opportunity for improved relations: u J k B 2003, G, S A
, v W v U S I. I , I U.S. A Iq. P I x B ’ , I U.S.–I . A , S Kz,
, EU3 (F, G, U K)
I UN S C (UNSC) R I’ I’ . T EU3’ UNSC I U S I. T v jv I’ I’’ . I 2004 20 I A P NP, E ( A) I . Why the opportunity was missed:
I’ P, v v S L K. 118
u T k v I’
B x .
“ ” N N-P
T k U S I,
. A EU3 A 2005 k indenite suspension j
v . I ,
I , v E A
H I J v I; k I’
. 121
(.., A P NP); Hz z; z (v strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy 69
68 strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy
VI .
PRIMER ON PRIOR INITIATIVES TO IMPROVE U.S.– IRAN RELATIONS.
VI .
PRIMER ON PRIOR INITIATIVES TO IMPROVE U.S.– IRAN RELATIONS.
u A EU3 k k ,
. S , O
A 2005. I EU3 —
S L K, K . T
j . F ’ v, k
x I U.S. UN, A
EU3, U S ,
M Kz A S R, v.
z I’ “ ” NP.
u I 2009, P O k v U.S.–I
u A , P5+1 I v k,
I v
I suspension o enrichment or an indenite period. I j
I R I ( I’ U.S ),
k z I’ .
P N Y.
u A , I’ P Aj k
u T O ’ jv
I U S, v k I
I' k v v
vv . I
. T U S
2005.
, W v I
u I 2005, . T B ,
M EB, D G I A E A (IAEA), k . -v k
J 2009. D , I v, I . u I O 2009, P5+1 I I’ -
A . T v U
UN S C R, I’
S k UN I,
, U.S. , k I
.
. U S P A B B, S I’ S N S C, S J, v.
9. 2007: OFFICIAL NEGOTIATIONS NEGOTIATIONS ON IRAQ’S SECURITY
I A E A, U S W v I
A modest modest accom accomplis plishmen hment: t: u I 2007, U S v Iq, v
20% , R R, I - , v
v k I. T , U.S. A Iq, R Ck,
IAEA. T v –, - . I
v B I A Iq, H Kz-Q,
P5+1 k, v
Iq. A k
v v -
x , A J D “I v Iq
v I.
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Why the opportunity was missed: u A ,
P Aj’
10. 2009: 2009 : OBAMA’S OBAMA’S OUTREACH
k, , , S L v
Opportunity for improved relations:
( ), ; ,
u S Bk O
-v I I. I v U S . I k
A . I 2007, , “
x x , j U S.
v ” I
D I .
k “ ” I Iq, , . 124
u T U S I j W
k I x . I -
, v x I’ .
, J 20, 2009, O A' I
Ev q I ,
. 125 I , P Aj P O
U.S. v v .
70 strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy
strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy 71
VI .
PRIMER ON PRIOR INITIATIVES TO IMPROVE U.S.– IRAN RELATIONS.
VI .
PRIMER ON PRIOR INITIATIVES TO IMPROVE U.S.– IRAN RELATIONS.
u A EU3 k k ,
. S , O
A 2005. I EU3 —
S L K, K . T
j . F ’ v, k
x I U.S. UN, A
EU3, U S ,
M Kz A S R, v.
z I’ “ ” NP.
u I 2009, P O k v U.S.–I
u A , P5+1 I v k,
I v
I suspension o enrichment or an indenite period. I j
I R I ( I’ U.S ),
k z I’ .
P N Y.
u A , I’ P Aj k
u T O ’ jv
I U S, v k I
I' k v v
vv . I
. T U S
2005.
, W v I
u I 2005, . T B ,
M EB, D G I A E
J 2009. D , I v, I . u I O 2009, P5+1 I I’ -
A (IAEA), k . -v k A . T v U
UN S C R, I’
S k UN I,
, U.S. , k I
.
. U S P A B B, S I’ S N S C, S J, v.
9. 2007: OFFICIAL NEGOTIATIONS NEGOTIATIONS ON IRAQ’S SECURITY
I A E A, U S W v I
A modest modest accom accomplis plishmen hment: t: u I 2007, U S v Iq, v
20% , R R, I - , v
v k I. T , U.S. A Iq, R Ck,
IAEA. T v –, - . I
v B I A Iq, H Kz-Q,
P5+1 k, v
Iq. A k
v v -
x , A J D “I v Iq
v I.
.”122 A B k, I’ x S Iq. 123
Why the opportunity was missed: u A ,
P Aj’
10. 2009: 2009 : OBAMA’S OBAMA’S OUTREACH
k, , , S L v
Opportunity for improved relations:
( ), ; ,
u S Bk O
-v I I. I v U S . I k
A . I 2007, , “
x x , j U S.
v ” I
D I .
k “ ” I Iq, , . 124
u T U S I j W
k I x . I -
, v x I’ .
, J 20, 2009, O A' I
Ev q I ,
. 125 I , P Aj P O
U.S. v v . strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy 71
70 strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy
VI .
PRIMER ON PRIOR INITIATIVES TO IMPROVE U.S.– IRAN RELATIONS.
VI.
PRIMER ON PRIOR INITIATIVES TO IMPROVE U.S.– IRAN RELATIONS.
11. 2010: BRAZIL AND TURKEY TRY TO REVIVE THE TRR DEAL
12. 2011: RUSSIAN STEP-BY-STEP STEP-BY-STEP PLAN
Opportunity for improved relations:
Opportunity for improved relations:
u A ’ 2009, O
u I J 2011, R --, - I
UN S C I. B -
v x
S C, Bz k, vv -
. 127 Ev k I v
.
IAEA . R I, ,
u W U S S C
P Aj R A
v , Bz k
2011.128 W I
I’ v . A 18-
k . I v
, k Bz, v k U.S. v
I. T U S R
( ), I v
v j I.
k v O. W “ D,” U S j v UN S C. T v. Why the opportunity was missed: u T v k Bz k UNSC
Why the opportunity was missed: u T P5+1 j R , k.
U.S. v v ’ k, M . S, I v . 129
k, . Uk k Bz, v , W C R v . u W k Bz D “ j k-
,” U.S. S D “k” v
13. 2012: ISTANBUL, BAGHDAD, AND MOSCOW: P5+1 AND TECHNICAL TALKS Opportunity for improved relations: u I A 2012, P5+1 I I.
“ .” T O j
M (B) J (M). I I, --
Bz k “-” — ,
k
I’ k , v q.
N-P N-P k. T k-
B P P M Bz k k ,
R v I. T I
P O
k v O 2009. T
v k Bz I’ v ,
U S I I , , v v
“ U.S. .” O ,
W H v v .
k —P O’ , 2010 - . T P C I v I. 126 T k UNSC v v
u T I q k. B -
I , v v , -.
v S C.
72 strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy
strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy 73
VI .
PRIMER ON PRIOR INITIATIVES TO IMPROVE U.S.– IRAN RELATIONS.
VI.
PRIMER ON PRIOR INITIATIVES TO IMPROVE U.S.– IRAN RELATIONS.
11. 2010: BRAZIL AND TURKEY TRY TO REVIVE THE TRR DEAL
12. 2011: RUSSIAN STEP-BY-STEP STEP-BY-STEP PLAN
Opportunity for improved relations:
Opportunity for improved relations:
u A ’ 2009, O
u I J 2011, R --, - I
UN S C I. B -
v x
S C, Bz k, vv -
. 127 Ev k I v
.
IAEA . R I, ,
u W U S S C
P Aj R A
v , Bz k
2011.128 W I
I’ v . A 18-
k . I v
, k Bz, v k U.S. v
I. T U S R
( ), I v
v j I.
k v O. W “ D,” U S j v UN S C. T v. Why the opportunity was missed: u T v k Bz k UNSC
Why the opportunity was missed: u T P5+1 j R , k.
U.S. v v ’ k, M . S, I v . 129
k, . Uk k Bz, v , W C R v . u W k Bz D “ j k-
13. 2012: ISTANBUL, BAGHDAD, AND MOSCOW: P5+1 AND TECHNICAL TALKS Opportunity for improved relations:
,” U.S. S D “k” v
u I A 2012, P5+1 I I.
“ .” T O j
M (B) J (M). I I, --
Bz k “-” — ,
k
I’ k , v q.
N-P N-P k. T k-
B P P M Bz k k ,
R v I. T I
P O
k v O 2009. T
v k Bz I’ v ,
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“ U.S. .” O ,
W H v v .
k —P O’ , 2010 - . T P C I v I. 126 T k UNSC v v
u T I q k. B -
I , v v , -.
v S C.
strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy 73
72 strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy
VI .
PRIMER ON PRIOR INITIATIVES TO IMPROVE U.S.– IRAN RELATIONS.
Why the opportunity may yet be missed: u I B M, -.
k U S : . T U S P5+1, , j I NP: 1) A P IAEA, v P ’ v; 2) 3.5%; 3) F, 20%, v x k . 130 u F k
Endnotes
1
Weighing Benets and Costs o Military Action Against Iran, T I Pj, S. 2012; Weighi Weighing ng Benets and Costs o
International Sanctions Against Iran, T I Pj, D. 2012. F T I Pj’ , . j./ 2
S : “ M S I,” T I F T A
C, A 2013; “S I N P,” A C A, F. 2013, ://. ://..// .// ACA_I_B_B_2013.; ACA_I_ B_B_2013.; “S W; T M U I S ,” I C G, M E R N. 138, F. 2013, ://. ://..// .///--- /---/q--/ /q--//138/138-------- -----. --.x; x; Bj Kj, R M, P, “N G N G ,” N I A C, M 2013, ://. ://..//DS/N .//DS/N__ __ ____.?ID=1941 3
F A K’ I, K Sj, “R K: T W V
I’ M P L,” C E I P, 2009, ://..// j__2. 4
F U S C, P R Nx’ -
. T U S EU, ,
. D N K 199 4, U.S.–N K q G W. B N "x " 2001. A x N K, J, U
, v v
S, S K, R, C 2003 2005, x U
. T P5+1 j I’ “ ”
S, , q , N K
.
N K . A x j N V 1966, P x
u W U.S. , W H v
I k. I, , v U.S. v .
. I U S , -
U.S. . A P I , V - U.S. H. F , E G, Constructing the U.S. Rapprochement with China 1961-1974: From Red Menace to acit Ally, C U P: UK, 2005. A, “Fx: H N K,” R, F. 29, 20 12, ://..//2012/02/29/-://..//2012/02/29/----USRE81S1PG20120229. ---USRE81S1PG 20120229. S J G. H, Marigold: S Marigold: Te Lost Lost Chance Chance or Peace in in Vietna Vietnam, m,S U P/W P/W C P, J. 2012.
14. 2013: ALMATY AND ISTANBUL: ISTANBUL: A NEW ROUND OF DISCUSSIONS u O F 26, 2013, v I P5+1 A,
Kzk. T v , v . T
5
F T I Pj’ , : .j./ .j./
6
U.S. D N I J C M 2013 W T A:
“ I - WGU [- ] .” I’ I’ . 7 M 12 , 2013, “U S R W T A A U.S. I C C S S C I,” ://../130312/.. ://../130312/.. I WGU, . T , C . S , J R. C, D N I, I, I
v j I N Y,
, U.S. S C A S, M 10, 2011, ://.-
I. T “” v I M q A
..//2011/03%20M/C%2003-10-11..
A 5-6, v . T k
7
T U S D S I , , H, H, . S S S O, A 30, 2008, .
20% I x .
://../j////2007/103711.
N . n
8
T U.S. D S I , , , Iq C Iq . . . ://../j////2007/103711. 9
I A.R. L N G, “D C W I Ex A A,” B, F.
01, 2013, ://. ://..//2013-01-31/- .//2013-01-31/----- ------- --- 10
“H I , UN x ,” T UN N C, M 11, 2013, ://
..///.?NI ..// /.?NID=44344&C=& D=44344&C=&C1=#.U9W29E__U C1=#.U9W29E__U 11
F I’ , A C, “T C M,” Te
Iran Primer, US I P://..// ://..//- - 12
B I - . P L 111-95,
“C “C I S, A, D A 2010,” J 1, 2010, ://..///D/2194.. //D /2194.. I “ ” - . F , : “U S
74 strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy
strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy 75
VI .
PRIMER ON PRIOR INITIATIVES TO IMPROVE U.S.– IRAN RELATIONS.
Why the opportunity may yet be missed: u I B M, -.
k U S : . T U S P5+1, , j I NP: 1) A P IAEA, v P ’ v; 2) 3.5%; 3) F, 20%, v x k . 130 u F k
Endnotes
1
Weighing Benets and Costs o Military Action Against Iran, T I Pj, S. 2012; Weighi Weighing ng Benets and Costs o
International Sanctions Against Iran, T I Pj, D. 2012. F T I Pj’ , . j./ 2
S : “ M S I,” T I F T A
C, A 2013; “S I N P,” A C A, F. 2013, ://. ://..// .// ACA_I_B_B_2013.; ACA_I_ B_B_2013.; “S W; T M U I S ,” I C G, M E R N. 138, F. 2013, ://. ://..// .///--- /---/q--/ /q--//138/138-------- -----. --.x; x; Bj Kj, R M, P, “N G N G ,” N I A C, M 2013, ://. ://..//DS/N .//DS/N__ __ ____.?ID=1941 3
F A K’ I, K Sj, “R K: T W V
I’ M P L,” C E I P, 2009, ://..// j__2. 4
F U S C, P R Nx’ -
. T U S EU, ,
. D N K 199 4, U.S.–N K q G W. B N "x " 2001. A x N K, J, U
, v v
S, S K, R, C 2003 2005, x U
. T P5+1 j I’ “ ”
S, , q , N K
.
N K . A x j N V 1966, P x
u W U.S. , W H v
I k. I, , v U.S. v .
. I U S , -
U.S. . A P I , V - U.S. H. F , E G, Constructing the U.S. Rapprochement with China 1961-1974: From Red Menace to acit Ally, C U P: UK, 2005. A, “Fx: H N K,” R, F. 29, 20 12, ://..//2012/02/29/-://..//2012/02/29/----USRE81S1PG20120229. ---USRE81S1PG 20120229. S J G. H, Marigold: S Marigold: Te Lost Lost Chance Chance or Peace in in Vietna Vietnam, m,S U P/W P/W C P, J. 2012.
14. 2013: ALMATY AND ISTANBUL: ISTANBUL: A NEW ROUND OF DISCUSSIONS u O F 26, 2013, v I P5+1 A,
Kzk. T v , v . T
5
F T I Pj’ , : .j./ .j./
6
U.S. D N I J C M 2013 W T A:
“ I - WGU [- ] .” I’ I’ . 7 M 12 , 2013, “U S R W T A A U.S. I C C S S C I,” ://../130312/.. ://../130312/.. I WGU, . T , C . S , J R. C, D N I, I, I
v j I N Y,
, U.S. S C A S, M 10, 2011, ://.-
I. T “” v I M q A
..//2011/03%20M/C%2003-10-11..
A 5-6, v . T k
7
T U S D S I , , H, H, . S S S O, A 30, 2008, .
20% I x .
://../j////2007/103711.
N . n
8
T U.S. D S I , , , Iq C Iq . . . ://../j////2007/103711. 9
I A.R. L N G, “D C W I Ex A A,” B, F.
01, 2013, ://. ://..//2013-01-31/- .//2013-01-31/----- ------- --- 10
“H I , UN x ,” T UN N C, M 11, 2013, ://
..///.?NI ..// /.?NID=44344&C=& D=44344&C=&C1=#.U9W29E__U C1=#.U9W29E__U 11
F I’ , A C, “T C M,” Te
Iran Primer, US I P://..// ://..//- - 12
B I - . P L 111-95,
“C “C I S, A, D A 2010,” J 1, 2010, ://..///D/2194.. I “ ” - //D/2194.. . F , : “U S
strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy 75
74 strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy
Endnotes
Endnotes
F I, S L, W , , S C B, H, U A,” O. 6, 2009,
----/. -- --/. A E I, I, O. 22, 2007. O “ ,”
://../- ://. ./-/-/P /-/P/314.x /314.x
I C B, M B, , S -
S , x: 2007, U.S. UAE I’ -
Bj, . ., . 14.
. 40 I . S I, C R S, I’ E
25
C: U.S. P I, A 22, 2010, ://..////RL34525.
L, “I S S A-U S,” Aj, N. 5, 2012, ://.j.//-/-://.j.//-/--
S - I U S N 1979, “O
T I I’ -A . S S
----
OFACR IS AI,”://../-/ ://../-//P/D/ /P/D/
26
.
, , , x
13
I. S T E, “I S Ux M I,” New I,” New York imes, N.2, 2012, ://.. ://../2012/11/03///- /2012/11/03///------ -----..
I , N I A A C (NIAC)
I . NIAC U S / S L’ . H U S I I U.S.
A U S E U x x ,
?=&_=0, ?=&_ =0, E, “I’ “I’ A A F S F U U.S. S,” New S,” New York imes imes,, J. 13, 2012.
. Bj Kj, R M, P, “N G N G ,” N I A C,
27
M 2013, ://. ://..//DS/N_ .//DS/N_____ _____.?ID=1941 _.?ID=1941
I q x U.S. , C I ,
14
x x 20% ’ x. A ,
I , P N I A A C , “ , U S I -
.“ S, P, “T B I’ C,” Diplomat, M 1, 2013, ://. /2013/03/01/-----/?= /2013/03/01/----- /?= S : I N R P P,” CBS N, F. 27, 2013, ://.. ://../8301-202_162-57571507/---/8301-202_162-57571507/------ --/ / 15
W J. B, J M, D S, “I W C C I N D,” New York imes,
J.15, 2011, ://. ://../2011/01/16///16x.? ./2011/01/16///16x.?=&_=0 =&_=0 16
A 2004, P B , “W’ f I," E S,
“T U S E D O S I,” New York imes imes,, J. 25, 2005, ://../2005/01/29/ //29.?= / /29.?=&= &=.. I , I P5+1 2012, U.S.–I U.S. , x G S. “C-M U.S.–I R,” C F R, M 6, 2012, ://..//--- ://..//----/27558. -/27558. 17
F : P, “B S: H S I R,” IME Magazine, ://..////0,9171,1969292,00. 18
19
S R C RS20871, J. 10, 2013, ://..////RS20871. 28
20
D N S A B R R 2012: "I' U S I' , I ." Z C B, “O' I ,” R, J. 201 2, ://..//2012/01/13/://..//2012/01/13/--USRE80C26V20120113 F U.S. I, M S, “: T D-L C W A
E I’ GDP . F $1 , “I C R,”Global R,”Global Finance Magazine, ://
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I "- S ," P’
. I F M M A A S UN–A L L B 19-- f S. I E, S A, , A L S , A . I x . S “U.S. E W I P S,” A J, O. 2012, ://.j.///2012/10/20121014234245373603. 30
T O ’ M ,
f P’ C 2009. F , , “x: O’ O’ S C,” New C,” New York imes, J 4, 2009, ://../2009/06/04///04.x.?= ://../2009/06/04///04.x.?= F I’ f L , A N, A C, N K, “U.S.–I C-
L P I & II,” C S I S, J. 2013, ://./ ://.//- /------ 32
J B, “B G ,” BBC N, D. 13, 2012, ://...//--
--20606069, S B R, “I S Ex G E S A,” A-M, A-M, N. 9, 2012, :// .-.///2012/- .///2012/-/-- /--. .
21
A’ I . K K, “I S A, C R
31
P’ Aj’ Aj’ C E I. S K
F M E S, “A “Aj j V E, S R,” New R,” New York imes imes,, F. 5, 2013, ://.. /2013/02/06///----- /2013/02/06///- ------. --.
A C, J, I, S K, A U.S.
S x I U S I,
, I . 33
I G C C P
G , , A G I G. R , G R: Iran and the World in the Age o Ayatol Ay atollahs lahs,, Ox U U P, 2009, . 133. 34
G G, “F ‘O H H’’ ‘I B: U.S.–S R G,’” ’” Te Te Middle East and the
United States: History, Politics, and Ideologies, D W. L M L. H, W P, 2012, . 355–356.
I,” PBSB, J.15, 2012, ://.. ://..//// /////2012/01/- /2012/01/------
35
f. F U S I Mj--Kq (MEK),
, ; x.
S H, “O M I?” New I?” New Yorker, A2012, ://..////2012/04/. .////2012/04/.
36
22
S K P, T P P (N Y: R H, 2005),
W S-S f , W . D
A W, S W, W, A -J, q
U S , “C ," G D P A 2008,
C B .
U S I q . “’C
23
’ S U.S. I,” R, N. 29, 2010, ://..//2010/11/29/---://..//2010/11/29/---USRE6AS02B20101129
T I x , - I
A, Iq, P, . T O Ex O D “ , ,
37
I .” Ex O 13622, J 30, 2012, ://../ ://..///DCPD-201200607//DCPD//DCPD-201200607//DCPD-
I’ I ’ . A I . S L S,
201200607..
“UAE I ,” G N, D. 2010 ://./////://./////------
24
---1.724970
F IRGC , A A, “H I A R G I’
S A G C C (GCC)
E,” ://.// ://.//-----//--- //----/-- -/-----
76 strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy
strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy 77
Endnotes
Endnotes
F I, S L, W , , S C B, H, U A,” O. 6, 2009,
----/. -- --/. A E I, I, O. 22, 2007. O “ ,”
://../- ://. ./-/-/P /-/P/314.x /314.x
I C B, M B, , S -
S , x: 2007, U.S. UAE I’ -
Bj, . ., . 14.
. 40 I . S I, C R S, I’ E
25
C: U.S. P I, A 22, 2010, ://..////RL34525.
L, “I S S A-U S,” Aj, N. 5, 2012, ://.j.//-/-://.j.//-/--
S - I U S N 1979, “O
T I I’ -A . S S
----
OFACR IS AI,”://../-/ ://../-//P/D/ /P/D/
26
.
, , , x
13
I. S T E, “I S Ux M I,” New I,” New York imes, N.2, 2012, ://.. ://../2012/11/03///- /2012/11/03///------ -----..
I , N I A A C (NIAC)
I . NIAC U S / S L’ . H U S I I U.S. . Bj Kj, R M, P, “N G N G ,” N I A C,
A U S E U x x ,
?=&_=0, ?=&_ =0, E, “I’ “I’ A A F S F U U.S. S,” New S,” New York imes imes,, J. 13, 2012. 27
A C, J, I, S K, A U.S.
M 2013, ://. ://..//DS/N_ .//DS/N_____ _____.?ID=1941 _.?ID=1941
I q x U.S. , C I ,
14
x x 20% ’ x. A ,
I , P N I A A C , “ , U S I -
.“ S, P, “T B I’ C,” Diplomat, M 1, 2013, ://. /2013/03/01/-----/?= /2013/03/01/----- /?= S : I N R P P,” CBS N, F. 27, 2013, ://.. ://../8301-202_162-57571507/---/8301-202_162-57571507/------ --/ / 15
W J. B, J M, D S, “I W C C I N D,” New York imes,
J.15, 2011, ://. ://../2011/01/16///16x.? ./2011/01/16///16x.?=&_=0 =&_=0 16
A 2004, P B , “W’ f I," E S,
“T U S E D O S I,” New York imes imes,, J. 25, 2005, ://../2005/01/29/ //29.?= / /29.?=&= &=.. I , I P5+1 2012, U.S.–I U.S. , x G S. “C-M U.S.–I R,” C F R, M 6, 2012, ://..//--- ://..//----/27558. -/27558. 17
F : P, “B S: H S I R,” IME Magazine, ://..////0,9171,1969292,00. 18
28
20
D N S A B R R 2012: "I' U S I' , I ." Z C B, “O' I ,” R, J. 201 2, ://..//2012/01/13/://..//2012/01/13/--USRE80C26V20120113 F U.S. I, M S, “: T D-L C W A
E I’ GDP . F $1 , “I C R,”Global R,”Global Finance Magazine, ://
../---/253-../--/253----.#x2LA --.#x2LAV5 V5 29
I "- S ," P’
. I F M M A A S UN–A L L B 19-- f S. I E, S A, , A L S , A . I x . S “U.S. E W I P S,” A J, O. 2012, ://.j.///2012/10/20121014234245373603. 30
T O ’ M ,
f P’ C 2009. F , , “x: O’ O’ S C,” New C,” New York imes, J 4, 2009, ://../2009/06/04///04.x.?= ://../2009/06/04///04.x.?= F I’ f L , A N, A C, N K, “U.S.–I C-
L P I & II,” C S I S, J. 2013, ://./ ://.//- /------ 32
J B, “B G ,” BBC N, D. 13, 2012, ://...//--
--20606069, S B R, “I S Ex G E S A,” A-M, A-M, N. 9, 2012, :// .-.///2012/- .///2012/-/-- /--. .
21
S R C RS20871, J. 10, 2013, ://..////RS20871.
31
P’ Aj’ Aj’ C E I. S K
F M E S, “A “Aj j V E, S R,” New R,” New York imes imes,, F. 5, 2013, ://.. /2013/02/06///----- /2013/02/06///- ------. --. 19
A’ I . K K, “I S A, C R
S x I U S I,
, I . 33
I G C C P
G , , A G I G. R , G R: Iran and the World in the Age o Ayatol Ay atollahs lahs,, Ox U U P, 2009, . 133. 34
G G, “F ‘O H H’’ ‘I B: U.S.–S R G,’” ’” Te Te Middle East and the
United States: History, Politics, and Ideologies, D W. L M L. H, W P, 2012, . 355–356.
I,” PBSB, J.15, 2012, ://.. ://..//// /////2012/01/- /2012/01/------
35
f. F U S I Mj--Kq (MEK),
, ; x.
S H, “O M I?” New I?” New Yorker, A2012, ://..////2012/04/. .////2012/04/.
36
22
S K P, T P P (N Y: R H, 2005),
W S-S f , W . D
A W, S W, W, A -J, q
U S , “C ," G D P A 2008,
C B .
U S I q . “’C
23
’ S U.S. I,” R, N. 29, 2010, ://..//2010/11/29/---://..//2010/11/29/---USRE6AS02B20101129
T I x , - I
A, Iq, P, . T O Ex O D “ , ,
37
I .” Ex O 13622, J 30, 2012, ://../ ://..///DCPD-201200607//DCPD//DCPD-201200607//DCPD-
I’ I ’ . A I . S L S,
201200607..
“UAE I ,” G N, D. 2010 ://./////://./////------
24
---1.724970
F IRGC , A A, “H I A R G I’
S A G C C (GCC)
E,” ://.// ://.//-----//--- //----/-- -/-----
strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy 77
76 strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy
Endnotes
Endnotes
I A D 2 010, GCC “[] , P5+1,
“x ” I R, U S A
I’ ,” A D , Mj, “I '' —GCC,” T D S, D. 2010, ://.../
I, . S E L, “E I A,” S C, M 2012.
N/M-E/D/09/I----- N/M-E/D/09/I- --------GCC.x#x2OxXxx. F ,
45
G P, B R, J , “T I N C GCC,” C E, M 2012, :// ://./2012/05/31/- ./2012/05/31/----/ ---/67# 67#
O S, “I “I’ ’ If A A U.S. P,” T I P, J. 17, 2013, ://../ ://../ /2013/j/17/’-f ’-f-- ---- -- 46
38
C. J, “E C G,” MER 235, M E R I Pj, W 2012, ://.
.//264/-- 39
54% ’ G S, , N A 5.3%. G 17%
U.S. 16% E’. S L G. P P,, Te Persian Gul: radition and ransormation, H S: F P A N. 333–334, 2011. 40
T E , ,
T x U S -
2014. W A U.S. , A . 47
T U.S. D S IRGC Q F, H, Iq, , S x ://../j////2011/195547.. ://../j////2011/195547.. F , 2007 A M MC, U.S. D N I: E K, “MC C ‘O E I’ S Iq I,
. L E-K B F, On Oil Embargoes and the Myth o the Iranian Oil Weapon, Ox I
C F R, J 28, 2007, ://..//-://..//----- ----
E S,F. 10, 2012, ://.x ://.x./2012/02/- ./2012/02/----- --------- -----/ /
q-/13692
A U.S. E I A, A, I ’ - ,
48
. I OPEC’ - - x . U.S. E
C "I U.S.–I U.S.–I . I' Iq."
IA,“I:C A,”N. 2011, ://../ ://..//-.? /-.?= =
S “E: U.S.–I W S Iq,” CBS, F. 11, 2009, ://.. ://../2100-500257_162-2823414. /2100-500257_162-2823414.
I 2012, U S S A 20%. T , , U S
F I’ Iq, L B G B, “I “I’ ’ I
I. I , S A . S C K,
Iq,” C F R, M 3, 2008, ://..//-- ://..//--q/12521 q/12521
“U.S. R O F S A I G A,” New York imes, imes,A. A. 16, 2012, ://../2012/08/17/ /-/- /- /------ ------.? -.?= =
49
41
T U S I 2006 2009 Iq. I 2009, U.S. A Iq R
L C, “Ex: W R—I R—I , S, R, S . 19, 2012, ://. ://.. .
//2012/09/19/----q-USBRE88I17B20120919
D f B, E S A , K O.
50
42
I , ://..//?=50140 ://..//?=50140
G . 1) A I
2) I, NAO U.S. C C (CENCOM). T G C C (GCC) I f , . T U S GCC ,
P O’ O’ J 2009 C I
, I I N Y M 2009. B
51
J S. N, “T I D,” Nam Namibia ibian, n, J12, 2012, :// ://... ...//22125/ //22125/--
_ _ . .? ? =%2F =%2F
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52
/ ’ . T U S
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F U.S. I A Q , , K Sj,
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S W B, “T S–S B Cf, 1969: U.S. R D M,” G W U N N S A, B N. 49, J 2001, ://../~/NSAEBB/NSAEBB49/
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T x - S A .
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56
//2013/02/q---.
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strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy 81
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I R. Te Ayatollah Begs to Difer: Te Paradox o Modern Iran (N Y: D , 2008). A K’ : M D, “I '' , K,” A F
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strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy 83
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A P O’ ://.x./11023/--- ://.x./11023/------
---. . P, P, A A Single Single Roll Roll o o the Dice, Dice,. . 10. 126
S H M, “R S N N D W I.” Boston Globe, M 31, 2012, ://100.
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S A P, P, A A Single Single Roll Roll o the Dice, Dice,. . 241–246.
T W L, D T I Pj; I B, T I Pj C; P L, T I Pj. T v T R. Pk, J W MI S Hz Rk B F. M v . B . A v Rx E. O , L, O D, I., Ok N, v k .
T I Pj -v -v z k v U S I v. F 2002 U N A USA Rk B’ F, T I Pj 2009. T T I Pj v v : S Hz, W L, W M, T Pk, J W, Fk W. 84 strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy
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A P O’ ://.x./11023/--- ://.x./11023/------
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S H M, “R S N N D W I.” Boston Globe, M 31, 2012, ://100.
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“S " " " IAEA F A. "T I " " F IAEA q . S J B, “I H P N ,” G,F. 2013, ://. ://...//2013//27/..//2013//27/--- --- - 130
S A P, P, A A Single Single Roll Roll o the Dice, Dice,. . 241–246.
T W L, D T I Pj; I B, T I Pj C; P L, T I Pj. T v T R. Pk, J W MI S Hz Rk B F. M v . B . A v Rx E. O , L, O D, I., Ok N, v k .
T I Pj -v -v z k v U S I v. F 2002 U N A USA Rk B’ F, T I Pj 2009. T T I Pj v v : S Hz, W L, W M, T Pk, J W, Fk W. 84 strategic options or iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy
THE IRAN PROJECT The Iran Project 475 Riverside Drive Suite 900 New York, NY 10115 email:
[email protected] www.theiranproject.org
© 2013 T I Pj
THE IRAN PROJECT The Iran Project 475 Riverside Drive Suite 900 New York, NY 10115 email:
[email protected] www.theiranproject.org
