FEDERICO N. RAMOS VS PATRICIO A. NGASEO FACTS:
Ramos went to Atty. Atty. Ngaseo to engage his se rvices as counsel in a case involving a piece of land. After the Court of Appeals rendered a favorable judgment ordering the land to be returned to Ramos and his siblings (such decision having been final and executor) Atty. Ngaseo Ngaseo sent a demand letter to Ramos as!ing for the delivery of a piece of land which the complainant allegedly promised as payment for respondent"s appearance fee. As a result Ramos Ramos filed before the #$% a complaint charging Atty. Ngaseo of violation of the C%R for demanding the delivery of a parcel of land which was the subject of litigation. &he #$% found Atty. Ngaseo guilty. Atty. Ngaseo argues that he did not violate Article '' CC because when he demanded the delivery of the piece of land the case has been terminated when the appellate court ordered the return of the land to the family of Ramos.
4ince such prohibition applies only if the sale or assignment of the property ta!es place during the pendency of the litigation involving the client"s property. Conse-uently Conse-uently where the property is ac-uired after the termination of the case as in the instant case no violation of paragraph , article '' of Civil Code attatches. #n the instant case there was no actual ac-uisition of the property in litigation since the respondent only made a written demand for its delivery which the complainant refused to comply. 5ere demand for delivery of the litigated property does not cause the transfer of ownership hence not a prohibited transaction within the contemplation of Article ''. Note/ (Rationale for prohibition/ %ublic policy disallows the transactions in view of the fiduciary relationship involved) BERNARDITA R. MACARIOLA vs. HONORABLE ELIAS B. ASUNCION,
ISSUE:
FACTS:
*hether or not Atty. Ngaseo violated Art. '' CC.
Civil Case No. 67'7 of the Court of 8irst #nstance of 9eyte was a complaint for partition filed by 4inforosa R. $ales 9u: R. $a!unawa Anacorita Reyes Ruperto Reyes Adela Reyes and %riscilla Reyes plaintiffs against $ernardita R. 5acariola defendant concerning the properties left by the deceased 8rancisco Reyes the common father of the plaintiff and defendant.
HELD: NO.
+nder %ar. (,) Art. '' of the Civil Code lawyers are prohibited from ac-uiring either by purchase or assignment the property or rights involved which are the object of litigation in which they intervene by virtue of their publicjudicial sales. &he article provides/ Article ''. &he following following persons cannot ac-uire ac-uire by purchase even at a public or judicial action either in person or through the mediation of another/ xxx xxx xxx
;n 0une < '=6 a decision was rendered by respondent 0udge Asuncion in Civil Case 67'7 which became final for lac! of an appeal and on ;ctober '= '=6 a project of partition was submitted to 0udge Asuncion.
;ne of the properties mentioned in the project of partition (,) 0ustices judges prosecuting attorneys cler!s of was 9ot ''< and when the project of partition was superior and inferior courts and other officers and approved by the trial court the adjudicatees caused 9ot employees connected with the administration of justice ''< ''< to be subdivided into five lots denominated as 9ot the property and rights in litigation or levied upon an ''<>A to ''<>2. 9ot ''<>2 was sold on 0uly 6' '= to execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or ?r. Arcadio @alapon. ;n 5arch = '=, ?r. Arcadio territory they exercise their respective functions1 this @alapon and his wife 4old a portion of 9ot ''<>2 to prohibition includes the act of ac-uiring by assignment and 0udge Asuncion and his wife ictoria 4. Asuncion. Asuncion. ;n shall apply to lawyers with respect to the property and August 6' '== spouses Asuncion Asuncion and spouses @alapon @alapon rights which may be the object of any litigation in which conveyed their respective shares and interest in 9ot ''<> they may ta!e part by virtue of their profession. 2 to 3&he &raders &raders 5anufacturing and 8ishing #ndustries #nc.3 with 0udge Asuncion as the %resident and 5rs. &he prohibition in the aforesaid Article applies only to the Asuncion as the secretary. secretary. sale or assignment of the property which is the subject of litigation to the persons dis-ualified therein. *2 have 5acariola filed on August '=< the instant complaint already ruled that 3... for the prohibition to operate the dated August = '=< alleging that respondent 0udge sale or assignment of the property must ta!e place during Asuncion violated violated Article Article '' paragraph paragraph , of the New the pendency of the litigation involving the property.3 Civil Code in ac-uiring by purchase a portion of 9ot No.
''<>2 which was one of those properties involved in Civil Case No. 67'7 decided by him. ISSUE:
*hether or not the actuation of 0udge Asuncion in ac-uiring by purchase a portion of property in a Civil Case previously handled by him violated the prohibition under the Civil CodeB HELD: NO.
&here is no merit in the contention of 5acariola that respondent 0udge 2lias $. Asuncion violated Article '' paragraph , of the New Civil Code in ac-uiring by purchase a portion of 9ot No. ''<>2 which was one of those properties involved in Civil Case No. 67'7. &hat Article provides/ Article ''. &he following persons cannot ac-uire by purchase even at a public or judicial action either in person or through the mediation of another/ xxx xxx xxx (,) 0ustices judges prosecuting attorneys cler!s of superior and inferior courts and other officers and employees connected with the administration of justice the property and rights in litigation or levied upon an execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective functions1 this prohibition includes the act of ac-uiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they may ta!e part by virtue of their profession. &he prohibition in the aforesaid Article applies only to the sale or assignment of the property which is the subject of litigation to the persons dis-ualified therein. *2 have already ruled that 3... for the prohibition to operate the sale or assignment of the property must ta!e place during the pendency of the litigation involving the property.3 #n the case at bar when the respondent 0udge purchased on 5arch = '=, a portion of 9ot ''<>2 the decision in Civil Case No. 67'7 which he rendered on 0une < '=6 was already final because none of the parties therein filed an appeal within the reglementary period1 hence the lot in -uestion was no longer subject of the litigation. 5oreover at the time of the sale on 5arch = '=, respondents order dated ;ctober D6 '=6 and the amended order dated November '' '=6 approving the ;ctober '= '=6 project of partition made pursuant to the 0une < '=6 decision had long become final for there was no appeal from said orders. 8urthermore respondent 0udge did not buy the lot in -uestion on
5arch = '=, directly from the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 67'7 but from ?r. Arcadio @alapon who earlier purchased on 0uly 6' '= 9ot ''<>2 from three of the plaintiffs namely %riscilla Reyes Adela Reyes and 9u: R. $a!unawa after the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 67'7. #t may be recalled that 9ot ''< or more specifically one>half thereof was adjudicated in e-ual shares to %riscilla Reyes Adela Reyes 9u: $a!unawa Ruperto Reyes and Anacorita Reyes in the project of partition and the same was subdivided into five lots denominated as 9ot ''<>A to ''<>2. As aforestated 9ot ''<>2 was sold on 0uly 6' '= to ?r. @alapon for which he was issued &C& No. D66< by the Register of ?eeds of &acloban City and on 5arch = '=, he sold a portion of said lot to respondent 0udge and his wife who declared the same for taxation purposes only. &he subse-uent sale on August 6' '== by spouses Asuncion and spouses @alapon of their respective shares and interest in said 9ot ''<>2 to the &raders 5anufacturing and 8ishing #ndustries #nc. in which respondent was the president and his wife was the secretary too! place long after thefinality of the decision in Civil Case No. 67'7 and of the subse-uent two aforesaid orders therein approving the project of partition. &he fact remains that respondent 0udge purchased on 5arch = '=, a portion of 9ot ''<>2 from ?r. Arcadio @alapon1 hence after the finality of the de cision which he rendered on 0une < '=6 in Civil Case No. 67'7 and his two -uestioned orders dated ;ctober D6 '=6 and November '' '=6. &herefore the property was no longer subject of litigation. Conse-uently the sale of a portion of 9ot ''<>2 to respondent 0udge having ta!en place over one year after the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 67'7 as well as the two orders approving the project of partition and not during the pendency of the litigation there was no violation of paragraph , Article '' of the New Civil Code. 8inally while it is true that respondent 0udge did not violate paragraph , Article '' of the New Civil Code in ac-uiring by purchase a portion of 9ot ''<>2 which was in litigation in his court it was ho wever improper for him to have ac-uired the same. #n conclusion while respondent 0udge Asuncion now Associate 0ustice of the Court of Appeals did not violate any law in ac-uiring by purchase a parcel of land which was in litigation in his court and in engaging in business by joining a private corporation during his incumbency as judge of the Court of 8irst #nstance of 9eyte he should be reminded to be more discreet in his private and business
activities because his conduct as a member of the 0udiciary must not only be characteri:ed with propriety but must always be above suspicion.
GAN TINGCO vs PABINGUIT
#44+2/ *;N Candida Acabo did not cease to be the owner of the properties despite certain irregularities and defects in the said auction. E29?/ &he trial court was impressed by the circumstance that in the public auction the purchaser was the justice of the peace himself. &his in the judges op inion was unauthori:ed because article ', No. , of the Civil Code prohibits judges from ac-uring by purchase even at pub1ic or judicial sale either in person or by an agent any property or rights litigated in the court in the jurisdiction or territory within which they exercise their respective duties1 this prohibition includes ta!ing of property by assignment.
FACTS/ Candida Acabo was the owner of six parcels of land all situated in the municipality of 0imalalud ;riental Negros. &hese lands were sold on 0une 'D ''' by Candida Acabo to one @an &ingco. $ut the purchaser @an &ingco was unable to ta!e possession of the six parcels of land sold him by Acabo for they were in the possession of 4ilvino %abinguit who alleges certain rights therein. Ee claims to have purchased them from 8austino &he appellant alleges that the property purchased by Abad. Abad had become the owner through purchase from justice of the peace @ardner was not the subject of Eenry @ardner. litigation in the justice court1 that the action was to recover a certain sum of money and that he had ordered the %rior to the purchase made by @arnder a judgment has property sold on execution. been rendered against Ancabo as a result of the complaint filed by 4ilvestre $asaltos. $ecause of AncaboFs failure to &his raises therefore a -uestion as to the true meaning of comply her fixtures and other chattels were levied upon paragraph , of article ', of the Civil Code. law library the order of @ardner being the justice of peace. &he 9ey de $ases in accordance with which the Civil %ublic auction sale was executed and @ardner appeared Code was enacted provides as follows in $ase No. D=/ to be the highest bidder and was the purchaser of Candida Acabos lands and carabaos sold at public auction held in &he forms re-uirements and conditions of each particular the barrio of 5artelo 5unicipality of &ayasan on 5arch D7 contract shall be determined and defined subject to the '7G. general list of obligations and their effects with the understanding that the legislation in force and the legal As @ardner subse-uently learned that he was forbidden to principles evolved therefrom by judicial decisions etc. purchase he sold what he had purchased to 8austino etc. shall serve as basis. Abad Candida Acabos son. ;ne of the bodies of law which conastitute the legislation ;n 0une ' '7G 8austino Abad for the sum of %6G, now in force in the Novisima Recopilacion. #n 9aw &itle sold to 4ilvino %abinguit six parcels of land. ' $oo! , of the same is found the following provision/ 3*e order that in public auctions held by direction of our &he Court of 8irst #nstance of ;riental N2gros rendered alcaldes neither the latter nor any person whomsoever in judgment in behalf of the plaintiff @an &ingco declaring their name shall bid in anything sold at such public him the owner of the lands described in the complaint and auctions.3 &he word alcaldes means judges. &he caption ordered the defendant 4ilvino %abinguit to restore the of &itle ' is 3 Alcaldes or %rovincial 0udges3 and the plaintiff to their possession. entire title deals with the exercise of judicial jurisdiction. %rior to the enactment of the Civil Code the %enal Code &he defendant appealed with the right to a review of the was also in force. Article 77 of the latter prohibits under evidence. penalty any judge from ta!ing part either directly or indirectly in any operation of exchange trade or porfit with &he appeal was heard by this court it having been respect to things not the product of his own property brought it by bill of exceptions. within the territory over which he exercises jurisdiction. 0udging from the legal precedents on which the Civil Code &he appellant alleges that the trial court erred in holding is based it would not seem too much to conclude that the that notwithstanding the sale of the lands in -uestion at said article of the Civil Code does not ma!e any distinction public auction Candida Acabo did not cease to be the between property in litigation. #n effect it appears to be as owner of these properties because there were certain delicate a matter for a judge to ta!e part in the sale of irregularities and defects in the said auction. property that had been the subject of ligitgation in his court as to intervene in au ction of property which though not directly litigated in his court is nevertheless levied
upon and sold as the result of a writ of execution issued by him. *hat the law intends to avoid is the improper interference with an interest of a judge in a thing levied upon and sold by his order. #f under the law @ardner was prohibited from ac-uiring the ownership of Acabos lands then he could not have transmitted to 8austino Abad the right of ownership that he did not possess1 nor could Abad to whom this alleged ownership had not been transmitte have conveyed the same to %abinguit. *hat @ardner should have done in view of the fact that the sale as he finally ac!nowledged was void was to claim the price that had been deposited in court and the justice of the peace of @uijulngan should have declared the auction void and haveordered a new sale to be held besides correcting the errors that had been committed in the proceedings. &o the reasons already stated there is to be added the additional one with respect to the sale made by 8austino Abad to 4ilvino %abinguit that Abad was a minor at the time > a circumstance that deprived him of capacity to sell (Civil Codeart. 'D=6). Abad had no ownership to transmit to anyone and besides he had no pe rsonality to enable him to contract by himself on account of his lac! of legal age.&his court finds no reason whatever why it should not affirm the judgment appealed from. LEON SIBAL , plainti!app"llant,vs.EMILIANO #. VALDE$ ET AL., %""n%ants. VS. EMILIANO #. VALDE$, app"ll"".
personal property and was not therefore subject to redemption1 &he defendant 2miliano 0. alde: filed a counter>claim. Iss&"/ *hether or not the sugar cane in -uestion had the nature of personal property. HELD/ &he sugar cane in -uestion had the nature of personal property.
C##9 C;?2 0+R#4%R+?2NC2 &he first -uestion raised by the appeal is whether the sugar cane in -uestion is personal or real property. #t is contended that sugar cane comes under the classification of real property as 3ungathered products3 in paragraph D of article 66 of the Civil Code. 4aid paragraph D of article 66 enumerates as real property the following/ &rees plants and ungathered products while they are annexed to the land or form an integral part of any immovable property.3 &hat article however has received in recent years an interpretation by the &ribunal 4upremo de 2spaHa which holds that under certain conditions growing crops may be considered as personal property. (?ecision of 5arch '< '7 vol. G Civil 0urisprudence of 4pain.) Eowever from the discussion of 5anresa it appears (') that under 4panish authorities pending fruits and ungathered products may be sold and transferred as personal property1 (D) that the 4upreme Court of 4pain in a case of ejectment of a lessee of an a gricultural land held that the lessee was entitled to gather the products corresponding to the agricultural year because said fruits did not go with the land but belonged separately to the lessee1 and (6) that under the 4panish 5ortgage 9aw of '7 as amended the mortgage of a piece of land does not include the fruits and products existing thereon unless the contract expressly provides otherwise.
8acts/ As a first cause of action the plaintiff alleged that the defendant italiano 5amawal deputy sheriff of the %rovince of &arlac by virtue of a writ of execution issued by the Court of 8irst #nstance of %ampanga attached and sold to the defendant 2miliano 0. alde: the sugar cane planted by the plaintiff and his tenants on seven parcels of land described in the complaint in the third paragraph of the first cause of action1 that within one year from the date of the attachment and sale the plaintiff offered to redeem said sugar cane and tendered to the defendant alde: the amount sufficient to cover the price paid by the latter the interest thereon and any assessments or taxes which he An examination of the decisions of the 4upreme Court of may have paid thereon after the purchase and the interest 9ouisiana may give us some light on the -uestion which corresponding thereto and that alde: refused to accept we are discussing. Article =, of the Civil Code of the money and to return the sugar cane to the plaintiff. 9ouisiana which corresponds to paragraph D of article 66 of our Civil Code provides/ %laintiff prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued against the defendant 2miliano 0. alde: his 34tanding crops and the fruits of trees not gathered and attorneys and agents.&he preliminary injunction was trees before they are cut down are li!ewise immovable granted &he defendant 2miliano 0. alde: in his amended and are considered as part of the land to which they are answer denied generally and specifically each and every attached.3 allegation of the complaint and step up the following defenses/ &he 4upreme Court of 9ouisiana having occasion to interpret that provision held that in some cases 3standing (a) &hat the sugar cane in -uestion had the nature of crops3 may be considered
and dealt with as personal property. #n the case of 9umber Co. vs. 4heriff and &ax Collector ('7= 9a. '<) the 4upreme Court said/ 3&rue by article =, of the Civil Code it is provided that standing crops and the fruits of trees not gathered and trees before they are cut down . . . are considered as p art of the land to which they are attached but the immovability provided for is only one in abstracto and without reference to rights on or to the crop ac-uired by others than the owners of the property to which the crop is attached. . . . &he existence of a right on the growing crop is a mobili:ation by anticipation a gathering as it were in advance rendering the crop movable -uoad the right ac-uired therein. ;ur jurisprudence recogni:es the possible mobili:ation of the growing crop.3 8rom an examination of the reports and codes of the 4tate of California and other states we f ind that the settle doctrine followed in said states in connection with the attachment of property and execution of judgment is that growing crops raised by yearly labor and cultivation are considered personal property. 5r. 5echem says that a valid sale may be made of a thing which though not yet actually in existence is reasonably certain to come into existence as the natural increment or usual incident of something already in existence and then belonging to the vendor and then title will vest in the buyer the moment the thing comes into existence. &hings of this nature are said to have a potential existence. A man may sell property of which he is potentially and not actually possessed. Ee may ma!e a valid sale of the wine that a vineyard is expected to produce1 or the gain a field may grow in a given time1 or the mil! a cow may yield during the coming year1 or the wool that shall thereafter grow upon sheep1 or what may be ta!en at the next cast of a fishermans net1 or fruits to grow1 or young animals not yet in existence1 or the good will of a trade and the li!e. &he thing sold however must be specific and identified. &hey must be also owned at the time by the vendor. (Eull vs. Eull < Conn. D,7
4aid section ,7 enumerates the property of a judgment debtor which may be subjected to execution. &he pertinent portion of said section reads as follows/ 3All goods chattels moneys and other property both real and personal K K K shall be liable to execution. 4aid section ,7 and most of the other sections of the Code of Civil %rocedure relating to the execution of judgment were ta!en from the Code of Civil %rocedure of California. &he 4upreme Court of California under section =<< of the Code of Civil %rocedure of that state (%omeroy p. D) has held without variation that growing crops were personal property and subject to execution. CEA&&29 5;R&@A@2 Act No. ',7< the Chattel 5ortgage 9aw fully recogni:ed that growing crops are personal property. 4ection D of said Act provides/ 3All personal property shall be subject to mortgage agreeably to the provisions of this Act and a mortgage executed in pursuance thereof shall be termed a chattel mortgage.3 4ection G in part provides/ 3#f growing crops be mortgaged the mortgage may contain an agreement stipulating that the mortgagor binds himself properly to tend care for and protect the crop while growing. #t is clear from the foregoing provisions that Act No. ',7< was enacted on the assumption that 3growing crops3 are personal property. &his consideration tends to support the conclusion hereinbefore stated that paragraph D of article 66 of the Civil Code has been modified by section ,7 of Act No. '7 and by Act No. ',7< in the sense that 3ungathered products3 as mentioned in said article of the Civil Code have the nature of personal property. #n other words the phrase 3personal property3 should be understood to include 3ungathered products.L
I7 Am. Rep. '=,J.)
*e may therefore conclude that paragraph D of article 66 of the Civil Code has been modified by section ,7 of the Code of Civil %rocedure and by Act No. ',7< in the sense that for the purpose of attachment and execution and for the purposes of the Chattel 5ortgage 9aw 3ungathered products3 have the nature of personal property. &he lower court therefore committed no error in holding that the sugar cane in -uestion was personal property and as such was not subject to redemption.
#t is contended on the part of the appellee that paragraph D of article 66 of the Civil Code has been modified by section ,7 of the Code of Civil %rocedure as well as by Act No. ',7< the Chattel 5ortgage 9aw.
N;&A $2N2/ #n Si'al v. Val%"('7 the Court held that pending crops which have potential existence may be the valid subject matter of saleand may be dealt with separately from the land on which they grow.
