Strange Fruit: Fruit: Susan Strange's Theory of Structural Power in the International Political Economy by Christopher May Susan Strange has argued that structural power within the international political economy (IPE) has four dimensions; security, production, nance, and knowledge. he following article o!ers a discussion of this theory of power that is "oth sensiti#e to the de#elopment of Strange$s ideas, and to a num"er of criticisms that might "e le#elled at them. It will "rie%y point to the epistemological grounds for accepting Strange$s eclectic approach as a #alid social science methodology. It will then argue that an understanding of stru struct ctur ural al powe powerr is cruc crucia iall for for any any soci social al sc scie ienc nce e "efor "efore e disc discus ussi sing ng Strange$s work on power in the international political economy. &inally, it will e'amine some possi"le shortcomings of Strange$s work and "rie%y note the conclusions to which her theory more recently has led her. her. o"ert o' has argued* +heory is always for someone someone and for some some purp purpos ose. e. ll ll theo theori ries es ha#e ha#e a per persp spec ecti ti#e #e+. +. Stranges Stranges perspecti#e perspecti#e de#eloped o#er a num"er of years, starting with her work for hatham /ouse /ouse on 0riti 0ritish sh nanc nancial ial policy policys s inter internati nationa onall dimens dimension ion,, and slowly slowly "ecoming more focused on notions of economic power and how such power struct structur ured ed inter internati nationa onall moneta monetary ry relati relations ons.. s these these relat relation ions s "ecame "ecame mor more dist distur ur"ed "ed duri during ng the the late late -1 -123 23s s and and early early -1 -143 43s, s, sh she e "eca "ecame me increasingly concerned with the international political economic dimension of such issues, and started to 5uestion how power was "eing conceptualised in e'planations of international nancial disruptions. hus there there can "e little dou"t that Strange$s Strange$s theories theories ser#e a purp purpos ose. e. /er /er theo theory ry of powe powerr was was for formulat mulated ed to o!er o!er su supp ppor ortt for for her her argument that the 6nited States need not fail to lead, "ut can choose to e'ercise its economic power not only for its own interests, "ut for those of the international system as a whole. his argument was formulated as a direct response to the declinist school of merican hegemony. hegemony.7 &or this argument to "e accepta"le Strange needed a theory of that e'plained how economic power could "e e'ercised without o#ert coercion; and why it was possi"le that, despite the widely held perception of the eros erosio ion n of capa capa"i "ili liti ties es in some some area areas, s, the the 6nit 6nited ed Stat States es was was stil stilll the the predominant economic power in the glo"al economy. 8hat emerged was a more general theory of structural power, which is an informati#e method for analysing the international political economy and its pro"lems.
Three strands in Susan Strange’s work here here are three three main strands to Susan Stranges Stranges work, of which this article article is main mainly ly conc concer erne ned d with with one one 9 the the analy analysi sis s of stru struct ctur ural al powe powerr in the the inter internati national onal politi political cal econom economy y. In additi addition, on, she has "een "een concer concerned ned to e'ami e'amine ne and critic criticise ise the direct direction ion that that the dis discip cipline line of Intern Internatio ational nal elations has sometimes taken, and has also produced a considera"le "ody of writin writing g on what what she has termed termed the nanc nance e struct structur ure, e, inter internati national onal 1
nanc nancial ial econom economics ics and politi politics. cs. 8e will will "rie% "rie%y y dis discus cuss s these these other other two strands "efore e'ploring Stranges work on power, and should also note that that all all thr three stra strand nds s feed feed into into each each othe otherr. his his typo typolog logy y is mor more for for con#enience than a 'ed di#ision in her work. Strange has made a num"er of criticisms of "oth the preoccupations and the methodology of International International elations. She has argued argued that much theoretical work is not really theory at all if theory should o!er e'planation "ased "ased on +princ +principle iples s indepe independe ndent nt of the phenom phenomena ena to "e e'pla e'plained ined+. +.: erely putting one e#ent after another in a descripti#e manner, without e'plicitly linking them causally, cannot count as e'planation.
rucially for Strange, theory +must seek to e'plain some aspect of the international system that is not easily e'plained "y common9sense+.2 Parado'ically, in part Stranges e'planation of structural power is "uilt on what she herself calls +no more than a statement of common sense+.4 It may "e su?cient for us to draw a distinction "etween assumptions that are common9sense and e'planations that are common9sense, to o#ercome this appar apparent ent contra contradict diction ion.. Strang Strange e has o!er o!ered ed her assum assumpti ptions ons "ased "ased on common9sense as an entry point into her more comple' structural theory, rather than as a theory in themsel#es.@ &or Strange, the greatest misperception in International elations is that the international system has not changed, and ne#er will. any of the failings of present theories stem from their attempts to make theoretical statements that are insensiti#e to historical de#elopments.1 She argues argues that social scientists need to "e much more cautious in the claimed scope of their theoretical statements, and to "e aware of the limits and dangers of stretching theory too far. Ance it is understood that history and institutions (and their histor history) y) matter matter,, then then ahisto ahistoric rical al genera generalisa lisatio tions ns "ecome "ecome an e'tension of historically specic cases to the le#el of law. here is a need, to whic which h Stra Strang nge e respo espond nds, s, to de#e de#elo lop p theo theorretica eticall stat statem emen ents ts whic which h incorporate historical time. In her seminal article +a#eB /ic Cragones+,-3 Strange was concerned that regime analy alysis, is, "y concentrating on inter9go 9go#ern ernmenta ntal organisations, has too easily taken on the agenda of the more powerful states in the international system. 0y focusing on areas of international agre agreem ement ent,, this this anal analys ysis is lea#e lea#es s asid aside e #ast #ast area areas s of the the inte intern rnati ation onal al political economy that are not on the agenda of the maDor state actors.-Cespit Cespite e their their prote protesta station tions, s, studie studies s of inter interdep depende endence nce are are most most often often concern erned with intergo#ernmental "odies while ign ignoring other -7 transnational actors of e5ual importance. 2
nd Dust as importantly, she notes, regime theory does not re5uire the scholar to ask whose power a regime$s principles, norms, rules and decision9making processes most re%ect. and articles-2 on the international politics of money and credit, which ha#e informed her analysis of the international political economy in general. 8hile this work has fed into the theory of structural power 9 nance is one of the four structures 9 it represents a su"stantial "ody of work in itself. /owe#er, "elow we will limit oursel#es to the discussion of its part in her o#erall theory of power. 8e should note that "y mo#ing from a sectoral specialisation to a more o#erarching concern with structural power and transnational relations, Strange pro#ided a model for her #iews on the direction that study should take. &or Strange, analysis of international political economy should always "e rooted in the sectoral le#el, which should inform the more general analysis.-4 0ut "efore we turn to her analysis, we need to rst e'amine some of the epistemological issues raised "y her work.
Epistemology and the Eclectic Method o help us understand Strange$s methodology, it is useful to e'plore &eyera"end$s +methodological anarchism+.-@ &eyera"end$s argument for epistemological openness is a position that sits well with Strange$s more intuiti#e Dustication of her eclectic theory9"uilding. /owe#er, Strange herself has not e'plicitly made this argument, ha#ing only +Dust a"out heard of &eyera"end+.-1 &eyera"end has argued that theories of logical empiricism and critical rationalism +gi#e an inade5uate account of science "ecause science is much more $sloppy$ and $irrational$ than its methodological image+.73 he imposition of methodologies "uilt around falsication, the a#oidance of ad hoc hypotheses or ideas, and the priority gi#en to measura"le phenomena, constrict scientic ad#ance. Science has always ad#anced through a process of error and de#iation. heory (and science) de#elop "y comparing current ideas with others, not "y Dust comparing current theory with e'perience. s no theory 3
is consistent with all the facts within its domain, for &eyera"end, to discard ideas that do not t the facts is pointless. ather those ideas that fail in some way in the competition with others are impro#ed until it is they that win. hen the impro#ement process can mo#e to the new loser.7- It is this proliferation of theories that impels science forward, while uniformity (uhn$s normal science) impairs any discipline$s critical power. he e#idence that we can use to falsify one theory may only "e a#aila"le through the application of another. /ere &eyera"end re#erses the process that uhn descri"es* it is not the emergence of anomalies (e#idence that does not t the current theory) that "ring forward new theories, "ut the new ideas which "ring forward new e#idence. &or uhn, anomaly only appears against the "ackdrop of the dominant theory, and only when there are too many anomalies to sustain the theory will a new one emerge.77 uhn$s seems to "e a linear process, whereas &eyera"end sees a constant mediation "etween facts and theory.7: his is not to say that theories should eschew rationality . 8e can Dustia"ly demand that a theory should gi#e us a coherent account of its world 9 +of the totality of facts as constituted by its own basic concepts+, "ut that is all we can demand.7= hus while we may still "e a"le to refute specic theories, there can "e no Dustication for competing theories to criticise how other theories ha#e constituted their facts. ost importantly, if we accept the argument that the thing and the idea of the thing cannot "e separated, then there can "e no o"Decti#e existing thing, only a known thing as e#en its recognition in#ol#es mo"ilising one theory or another. &eyera"end is then a"le to argue that +e#ery methodological rule is associated with cosmological assumptions, so that using the rule we take it for granted that the assumptions are correct+.7> ethodologies are only inherently superior after we ha#e adopted a certain ideology, and we may ha#e done so without e#er ha#ing e'amined its limits, as well as its ad#antages. he acceptance or reDection of ideology is a matter for the indi#idual, "earing in mind its limitations and what needs to "e done. &eyera"end argues that as all +methodologies ha#e their limitations...the only rule that sur#i#es is $anything goes$+.72 hus he seeks not to replace one set of rules with another "ut to point out that the appeal to any set of rules as a Dustication may not "e su?cient to esta"lish that one theory is necessarily more scientic than another. It is this #ery clash "etween facts and theory that constitutes progress in science.
one theoretical construct with another may "e less than helpful.
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Authority, Markets, Values and Risk &or Strange, the central 5uestion for IPE is 8ho "enetsJ (or as she phrases it $ui "onoJ$).:= o look at who "enets one needs to know where power lies and how this in%uences outcomes. Strange has stressed that* ... it is impossi"le to arri#e at the end result, the ultimate goal of study and analysis of the international political economy without gi#ing e'plicit or implicit answers to these fundamental 5uestions a"out how power has "een used to shape the political economy and the way in which it distri"utes costs and "enets, risks and opportunities to social groups, enterprises and organisations within the system.:> 0roadly, there are three interconnected aspects of the international political economy that Strange sees as "eing conditioned "y structural power 9 the continual "argains "eing struck "etween authority and market; the ordering (or prioritising) of #alues in any outcome; and the allocation of risk (which for Strange is the o"#erse of the allocation of "enet). &or these outcomes to "e e'plained, an appreciation of structural power is re5uired. /owe#er, "efore we discuss structural power we need to understand why these particular "argains and outcomes are important for Strange.
Authority/market bargains Strange argues that politics and economics can "e "rought together "y a structural analysis of the e!ect of political authority (e'plicitly not only states) on markets and con#ersely, of markets on those authorities. If economics concerns the allocation of scarce resources, and politics concerns pro#iding pu"lic order andKor pu"lic goods, then any theory "ringing them together must take these di!erent foci into account. /owe#er, often each takes the other as gi#en; studies of international economic relations assume political order and #ice #ersa.:2 Strange$s approach concentrates on +the authority9market and the market9authority ne'us+ to ensure that the e!ects of structural power o#er the agenda of such de"ates is recognised, as well as more standard analyses regarding relational power.:4 It is structural power that determines the relationship, or "argain, "etween authority and market. arket solutions cannot play a maDor role in the way in which a political economy functions unless they are allowed to do so "y the actor that wields economic power and possesses authority. Strange stresses that it is not only the direct power of authority o#er markets that matters, "ut also the indirect e!ect of authority on the conte't or surrounding conditions within which the market functions.:@ It is important to note the history of particular authority9market "argains; to disco#er when and why key decisions were taken as well as who took them. 6
8hile these decisions may ha#e "ecome facts, in the past they were (and implicitly still are) su"Dect to structural power.:@ his "argaining process not only in#ol#es states, "ut other national and international actors as well; "argains may "e "etween non9state actors themsel#es or "etween these actors and states. uthority o#er a particular relationship where a "argain is struck is not dependent on an actor "eing a state. he outcome of the "argain will, howe#er, re%ect where structural power lies in that relationship.:1
Ordering values If we are to analyse "argains "etween authority and market, and the in%uence of power on these "argains, we should also consider which #alues are "eing prioritised. 8hen Strange discusses #alues she is concerned with the +"asic #alues which human "eings seek to pro#ide through social organisation, i.e. wealth, security, freedom and Dustice+. &or Strange, the simple "ut important point is that di!erent societies di!er in the proportions in which they com"ine these "asic #alues.:1 hese arrangements or com"inations are not di#inely ordained, necessarily settled or the outcome of chance or fortune. hey are the end result of decisions taken in the conte't of man9made institutions and self9 set rules and customs 9 they are historically conditioned.=3 Strange$s aim is to make IPE #alue9sensiti#e; recognising where #alues are "eing ordered and traded o!, and the history of such decisions and "argains. It is also necessary to understand how and when ordering of #alues informs analyses.=If power is dened primarily in terms of the a"ility to create or disrupt order in the international system, as it is in ealism, then security is promoted a"o#e the other four #alues. nd since international order is often, though not always, disrupted "y states, it is unsurprising that ealism$s prime concern has "een with the relations "etween states. /owe#er if power is dened in terms of the a"ility to create or destroy wealth rather than order, and to in%uence the elements of Dustice and freedom, then the analysis will need to take into account, and may e#en prioritise, other actors and relationships.=7 Strange argues that there is a need in IPE for a greater openness a"out #alues. t present, +economics tacitly prefers e?ciency and international relations tacitly prefers peace+ making it di?cult to discuss what other #alues are sacriced for the sake of e?ciency or peace, and what other changes are o"structed.=: 8here power is used to promote a particular outcome o#er another, #alues themsel#es are "eing ordered. here can "e no neutral cost9"enet trade9o!.==
Allocation of Risk
7
Strange$s e'plicit discussion of the allocation of risk has "een limited to one pu"lished article, though it is implicit throughout her writings on power. 8hen considering The olitics of !nternational "urplus Capacity , or analysing Casino Capitalism, one of Stranges concerns has always "een how the risk of uphea#al stemming from certain L"argains has "een allocated. In the one article e'plicitly concerned with risk she %eetingly proposed a fth structure 9 the structure of welfare 9 consisting of the +politically determined arrangements which decide how and for whom, the main threats to human life and contentment are a#oided, alle#iated or compensated.+=> She maintains that political power in any system is used "oth to a#oid risk (or threats), or at least to shift the risk elsewhere, and to e'tend the opportunities for those holding power.=2 hus 5uestions a"out the perceptions of risk, and the mitigation, allocation and management of risk, are an important part of any analysis. isk is a concept which is +essentially unifying when it comes to looking at political and economic issues and outcomes+. n analysis can usefully ask* 8hat is the nature, incidence and origin of the riskJ Perhaps most importantly* /ow ha#e markets and states created risks, and how ha#e they attempted to mitigate them, or to con#ert them into costsJ=4 &or Strange, risk is the o"#erse of opportunity. o discuss opportunities is to discuss risks. Studies of international relations can "e di#ided "y the sorts of risks and opportunities regarded as central. In ealist analyses the risk of war is often cited, while li"eralism is concerned with opportunities for the creation and enDoyment of wealth. It is also illuminating to ask how societies percei#e and manage risk, as this will re%ect their ordering of #alues. Identifying risks helps re#eal the "alance "etween authority and market. /owe#er, in her more de#eloped #ersion of structural power the discussion of risk remains on the relational le#el 9 particular political risks 9 rather than as part of the structural analysis. his is not to say that the allocation of risk disappears from Strange$s analysis, merely that after this "rief appearance it su"merges again into an implicit part of her schema.
Power in the social sciences he concept of power needs to "e understood in two ways; in an instrumental sense (what does it doJ) and in a procedural sense (how does it do itJ). s power is +the fundamental concept in social sciences+,=@ we shall rst "rie%y e'amine one way structural power has "een de#eloped in social science, "efore looking at Strange$s theory. 8hile recognising that this "rief e'ploration must "e partial and pull out certain aspects of the discussion of structural power while remaining silent on others, it will "e useful to locate the idea of the possibility of structural power in a discourse outside Stranges own. his is not to suggest that there is a necessary link "etween the literature discussed "elow and Stranges own work, "ut it is to suggest that Strange should not "e seen as de#eloping an idiosyncratic approach with no precedents. 8
ussell$s concept is a good point of departure. Hooking at power throughout societal relations, he produced a parsimonious denition 9 +Power may "e dened as the production of intended e!ects+.=1 /e e'pected that where +no social institution... e'ists to limit the num"er of MthoseN to whom power is possi"le, those who most desire power are, "roadly speaking, those most likely to ac5uire it+.>3 Power here is an attri"ute which e'ists for the taking. /owe#er more recent writers ha#e tended to emphasise the relational 5uality of power 9 that is, how it can "e understood as a product of relations between actors. 0lau, tacitly accepting ussell$s denition, e'panded the discussion along "eha#ioural lines; power +is the a"ility of persons or groups to impose their will on others+,>- where their will is +the desire for an intended e!ect+. 0ut he then went on to identify three more elements to his understanding of power. &irst, power was seen as "eing a continuing factor. he single incidence of in%uencing a decision outside an enduring relationship is seen as separate. Second, to distinguish power from force it is essential to recognise that there is +an element of #olunteerism in power 9 the punishment could "e chosen in preference to compliance, and it sometimes is 9 which distinguishes the limiting case from coercion+ or force. he sanction might "e chosen if the percei#ed cost of compliance was too high. &inally power is a product of asymmetrical relations. 8here each party has e5ual in%uence o#er the other, power does not play a maDor role in decision making. 0lau argued that power within a relationship can "e dened "y four "asic alternati#es to its operation. 8here will is imposed there may "e a possi"ility of e'acting a cost, making the relationship one of e'change rather than imposition. Secondly, "enets>7 may "e o"tained from elsewhere. hirdly, force may "e used to o"tain the re5uired "enets, or to resist their remo#al. &inally, the relational "enets may "e renounced, sidelining the power relation in that particular sector. /owe#er, if actors ha#e insu?cient resources, or no satisfactory alternati#e strategies, if they are una"le to utilise force or their needs are pressing, those a"le to supply the rele#ant "enets will attain power o#er them. 6nder these conditions, +their su"ordination to his power is inescapa"le, since he can make the fullment of essential needs contingent on their compliance....Mand thusN di!erentiation of power arises in the course of competition for scarce goods+.>: &or 0lau, power and force are separate (though part of the same continuum), and power is an e'change relationship which if necessary can "e resisted or challenged. 0ut for Hukes, e#en this e'pansion of the discussion is insu?cient to capture all aspects of power. Hukes identied three analyses of power, each more powerful than the pre#ious. &irst, there is a one9dimensional #iew of power which focuses on "eha#iour when decisions are made on issues o#er which there is some con%ict of interest. Power is the element that re#eals why one party$s interests take precedence o#er the other$s.>= he two9dimensional #iew represents a 5ualied criti5ue of the focus on "eha#iour of the rst #iew. his second dimension in addition considers ways in which +decisions are pre#ented from "eing taken on potential 9
issues o#er which there is an o"ser#a"le con%ict+.>> he actor enDoying power within a relationship may delay decisions (almost indenitely) or o"struct the decision9making process for a particular issue altogether. Hukes$ third #iew of power considers how potential issues are kept out of politics altogether. Power here controls the agenda to o"scure and hide con%ict, though potential con%icts will still e'ist, they may ne#er "e actualised. here may "e a +latent con%ict, which consists of a contradiction "etween the interests of those e'ercising power and the real interests of those they e'clude+.>2 he pre#ailing actor, through the operation of social forces and institutional practices, will dene pro"lems and thus the choices of solution. 0y controlling the agenda, the decision9 making process may "e presented as fair and e5uita"le "ecause unpalata"le or unaccepta"le solutions for the dominant actor ne#er reach the agenda for consideration "y other actors. E#en where power is not a"solute, the agenda may "e su"Dect to modication "y the more powerful actor in a relationship. Such a conception of power is important for any social science that looks at relations within a society, howe#er constructed. If power not only settles outcomes within relationships "ut can, in e!ect, dene those relationships through control of (or at least in%uence o#er) the relational agenda, it is, as ussell asserted, the fundamental concept in social science. 8ithout understanding power we cannot understand how relational con%icts are resol#ed and how the actors$ agenda are set, or change and, for Strange, we cannot understand the history of sectoral "argains "etween authority and market which shape the international political economy.>4 he "argain "etween authority and market identied a"o#e is determined "y power, "oth relational and structural.>@ s in Hukes$ analysis, Strange sees this structural power as "eing crucial to an understanding of power in general. 8hile ealist writers ha#e "een concerned only with relational power (or Hukes$ two9dimensional understanding), Strange argues that it is the less #isi"le structural power, informing the agenda, that needs to "e e'amined for a meaningful analysis of the international political economy.>1
Structural power in the international political economy Stranges theory of structural power did not spring fully formed into e'istence in the mid9-1@3s. ather, it de#eloped slowly, partly as a response to the lack of power analysis in international economics, and partly as a way of disputing the merica9in9decline thesis of /egemonic Sta"ility heory. his was then formalised in "tates and Markets as four structures of power in the international political economy. hese four structures 9 security, nance, production and knowledge 9 at any one time all contri"ute in di!ering weights to the structural power attri"uta"le to the particular actor "eing analysed, "e it a state, transnational corporation (<), or international organisation.23 Cepending on the structural 10
interaction within a particular sector of the international political economy, an actor$s power o#er decision9making and outcomes may #ary. rucially for Strange, there can "e no 'ed ordering of these four structures, none is always more important than the others. hus while she may draw on ar'ist analysis of the production structure, she is unprepared to accord this structure a prior determining role.2-
The "ecurity "tructure Power in the security structure %ows from the pro#ision of security "y one group for another. hey may in the process ac5uire ad#antages in the production or consumption of wealth and special rights or pri#ileges in that society. +hus the security structure ine#ita"ly has an impact on the who9 gets9what of the economy+ "oth national and international.27 Strange$s inclusion of the security structure in her analysis is rooted in an historical understanding of the discipline$s de#elopment. 8hen political economy was rst ela"orated in the eighteenth century, the two 5uestions it was concerned with were security 9 +safety of the realm+ 9 and nance 9 +the #alue of the currency+.2: Structural power continues to lie with those in a position to e'ercise control o#er ("oth to threaten and preser#e) people$s or society$s security, especially through #iolence.2= Strange does not wish to dispense with a ealist analysis of the security relations "etween states.2> She o!ers an analysis of the security structure that is "ased on the "alance of power, and for instance, di!ers little from orgenthau$s discussion of the international system and how it responds to the lack of authority.22 0ut the key di!erence "etween a ealist analysis and that o!ered in Strange$s work is that the security structure does not take automatic precedence. s a #ery few of the con%icts "etween actors in the international political economy are pushed as far as the utilisation of force, power in the security structure is not the conditioning structure of international political economy, "ut instead is only a special case, su"Dect to pressures from the other three structures.24
The roduction "tructure 0roadly, Strange understands the production structure as "eing a society$s arrangements to determine what is produced, "y whom and for whom, "y what method and on what terms. +he production structure is what creates the wealth in a political economy.+ he interaction "etween the production structure and the social groups in#ol#ed in it in%uences outcomes and the allocation of "enets. 8hen a particular social group loses relati#e power, changes are likely to follow in who produces what and how they are organised, and thus who "enets from producti#e enterprise. nd e5ually, 11
when methods of production change there will likely follow a shift in the distri"ution of social and political power. In addition the nature of the state and the use of authority o#er the market may "e modied. +hange in the production structure changes the #ery nature of the state. Its capa"ilities are changed and so are its responsi"ilities.+2@ Strange agrees with the "road structural "asis of a ar'ian economic analysis without accepting that it is the structure, it is "ut one of a num"er.21 he struggle "etween classes in%uences change in the structures of power, "ut does not determine such change, though at least one writer has attempted to integrate Strange$s structures "ack into a ar'ist9social relations approach.43 he analysis of the production structure has "een taken furthest in Rival "tates# Rival $irms, where it is suggested that states are now in competition o#er the means to create wealth within their territory rather than for domination o#er more territory. 8here, in the past, states competed for power as a means to wealth, now they compete more for wealth as a means to power.
The $inancial "tructure he third structure that Strange considers as a location of economic power is the one a"out which she has written most.4: She has argued that the nancial structure has risen in importance in the last thirty years and is now decisi#ely important in international economic relations. Strange has emphasised that what is in#ested in modern economies is not money "ut credit, and credit can "e created 9 it does not ha#e to "e accumulated. herefore, whoe#er can gain the con%dence of others in their a"ility to create credit will control the economy.4= Political authority dictates what money may "e used, enforces if need "e agreed monetary transactions, and licenses and, if necessary, supports maDor credit9creating operators in the system.4> 12
In any economy, national, international or transnational, the power to create credit implies in%uence o#er purchasing power (at least that "ased on proDected rather than realised earnings) and thus the a"ility to in%uence markets for production. In addition, this power implies the a"ility to +manage or mismanage the currency in which credit is denominated, thus a!ecting rates of e'change with credit denominated in other currencies+. he nancial structure, therefore, has two insepara"le aspects* the structures through which credit is created, and the monetary system(s) which determine(s) the relati#e #alues, or e'change rates of the currencies in which credit is denominated.42 he power to create credit is shared "y go#ernments and "anks (and much will depend on the political, and regulatory relations "etween them). E'change rates "etween the di!erent currencies are determined "y the policies of go#ernments and "y markets ("ut this will depend on how much freedom go#ernments allow to markets). 0oth aspects of the nancial structure in#ol#e a "argain "etween authority and market, which will re%ect the power within the structure itself.44 8hile the "alance may ha#e shifted e'plicitly away from authority, and towards markets, this does not necessarily represent a replacement of the power of authority o#er markets, authority still counts.
The &nowledge "tructure he nal, and possi"ly most suggesti#e (and pro"lematic) of Stranges four structures is the knowledge structure. s Strange notes, power deri#ed from knowledge has "een the most o#erlooked and underrated source of power in studies of the international political economy. his is at least partly "ecause it concerns what is "elie#ed, what is known (and percei#ed as understood or gi#en) and the channels "y which these "eliefs, ideas and knowledge are communicated, or conned, making its in%uence and role hard to assess. Power in the knowledge structure lies as much in the capacity to deny knowledge, to e'clude others, as in the power to con#ey knowledge.@: he power deri#ed from knowledge most often stems from consent, rather than coercion, authority "eing recognised on the "asis of a socialised "elief system or the status conferred "y possessing the knowledge, and with it access or control o#er the means "y which it is stored and communicated. here is a clear parallel here to /aas$ and others$ work on epistemic communities, regarding the power of intellectual elites o#er agenda formation in international organisations.@= Strange has suggested a possi"le analytical framework, "ased on three central changes within the knowledge structure itself. nalysis needs to "e concerned with* changes in the pro#ision and control of information and communication systems; changes in the use of language and non9 #er"al channels of communication; and changes in +the fundamental perceptions of and "eliefs a"out the human condition which in%uence #alue Dudgements, and through them, political and economic decisions and policies+.@> ore recently, she has admitted that in the knowledge structure she is seeking to com"ine two rather di!erent structural phenomena. An one le#el there are +"elief systems and their associated #alue preferences that inha"it or #alidate some kinds of actions rather than others+. An the other change is apt to ha#e +a direct and sometimes 5uite a su"stantial e!ect on the "argaining power of actors as well as on the prioritised #alues of the system+.@2 he distinction here is "etween action informed "y "elief, and action informed "y information. /owe#er, the knowledge structure still re5uires more de#elopment to transcend the suggesti#e.@4
"econdary "tructures &or Strange, once the four structures a"o#e ha#e "een appreciated, then other aspects of the international political economy can "e considered as a secondary le#el conditioned "y the interaction of these primary structures. @@ Strange has identied the most important as* transport systems; trade; energy; and welfare (where, unlike the welfare structure 14
she has proposed in an earlier work@1, this is more operational and less concerned with the ordering of #alues).13 8hile these secondary structures "ear a passing resem"lance to the issue areas in theories of interdependence,1- for Strange this secondary le#el can only "e understood as a product of the four primary structures and the power considerations therein.17 In these secondary structures economic or political de#elopments, and "argains o#er outcomes, are conditioned "y primary structural power. &or any particular issue the scholar needs to look "eyond the supercial relational manifestations of power to identify which actors are shaping the agenda of decision9making and ruling out certain solutions or outcomes, without other actors necessarily "eing aware of the way parameters are "eing set. &or Strange, part of the pro"lem in International elations and International Political Economy has "een the concentration on secondary structures, not recognising the importance of the power relations within the underlying primary structures. he implications of primary structural change on this secondary le#el, and most importantly the growing in%uence of the knowledge structure has informed much of Strange$s recent work.
Some Criticisms 6nlike some other theorists, Susan Strange has not attracted a wealth of literature engaging with her assumptions, or o!ering criti5ues of her work. his may "e "ecause as one of the originators of modern non9merican International Political Economy, other authors while not necessarily in awe of Strange, are wary of trying to criticise what has "een such a wide9 ranging "ody of work. In addition until the appearance of "tates and Markets, Stranges general theoretical position had always em"edded within sectoral su"Dect matter (in her analysis of international nance in Casino Capitalism or international trade in a num"er of articles for !nternational A'airs, for instance). It might also "e possi"le that the appearance of the word Lintroduction in the su"9title to "tates and Markets may sometimes lead to a premature dismissal of its theoretical content. /owe#er, this is not to say that her work is "eyond criticism, and indeed there are three serious potential pro"lems with her theory of structural power. Perhaps of most immediate and widespread concern is her eclectic method. s noted a"o#e, using &eyera"end$s methodological anarchism might not "e the way Strange herself would defend her methodology, "ut the parallels and resonances "etween the two are strong enough to gi#e such a position a certain salience. hese epistemological issues suggest a greater pro"lem with Strange$s theory. 8hile the inclusion of the fourth structure 9 knowledge 9 is what makes the general theory so alluring, it also opens up a maDor pro"lem area inasmuch as it forces the theory to deal with issues that in its current state of theoretical de#elopment it has di?culty understanding. Strange attempts to use $knowledge$ and $information$ as interchangea"le 15
terms, and "y doing so suggest that the stu! of the knowledge structure is somehow the same as money might "e in the nancial structure, a resource that can "e used.1: She defends this instrumentalist #iew of knowledge9information "y suggesting that what +the student of international political economy is more immediately concerned with is the nature of power e'ercised through a knowledge structure+ rather than the unresol#ed de"ates o#er the #ery nature of knowledge itself.1= /owe#er, this "egs the most important 5uestion on which her conception of the knowledge structure is "ased. (ow does knowledge a'ect the other structures) &or Strange, donning her instrumentalist guise, it is the control of information and know9how, that ena"les structural power to set the agendas in the other dimensions 9 security, nance and production. 0ut to carry this to its logical conclusion (as EllehOD does1>) is to place the knowledge structure in a foundational role. If the control of knowledge is the way agendas are set, and agenda9setting is a central role of structural power, then knowledge issues must "e prior. his is not the direction in which Strange wishes to mo#e. /er argument has always "een that the four structures interact, with none "eing necessarily prior in any particular situation. he proposition that the knowledge structure could condition all other structures would seem to go against the e'plicit theory she has "een "uilding. /a#ing introduced knowledge in a structural form, Strange immediately attempts to close the Pandora$s "o' that she has opened. She can only do this "y re5uiring us to accept that knowledge is a resource. 8hile the discussion of "elief systems teeters on the edge of opening up issues of power and knowledge foregrounded "y &oucault and others, Strange constantly pulls "ack. hus the knowledge structure in its current state is one sided, and under9theorised. his is to say that while we can accept that knowledge9information can "e an instrumental in%uence on action, there is another side to its in%uence. s 0ourdieu has noted* +he theory of knowledge is a dimension of political theory "ecause the specically sym"olic power to impose the principles of the construction of reality 9 in particular, social reality 9 is a maDor dimension of political power.+12 hus, e#en to claim that the knowledge issue is not pro"lematic is to make what &eyera"end might call an +ideological choice+. If claims a"out the nature of knowledge are political, then we need to account for their interaction with the other structures Strange identies, rather than accept the use of knowledge9information as "eing a su?cient analysis of its role. uriously, Strange sees the importance of knowledge ("roadly concei#ed) in the international political economy, yet closes her conception of knowledge when suggesting its structural potential. If we are to use the space opened up "y the conception of a Lknowledge structure we need to ensure that we include all those forms of knowledge that can "e seen to play a role in the authorityKmarket "argains Strange sees as central to understanding the international political economy. his must include more than a notion of knowledge as information, not least of all "ecause "elief always plays a role in the way choice, decisions and L"argains are 16
concei#ed and recognised. It is the #ery a"ility to open up such areas to analysis within a study of international political economy that is one of the strengths of Stranges approach. /a#ing noted this pro"lem within the knowledge structure, the ne't step would "e to re9theorise this structure to de#elop the theory$s full potential. /ere we would need to engage with the notion of knowledge and e'pand it to encompass not only resourceKinformation "ased conceptions of its role, "ut also the structure of "elief, opinion and socialised thought systems. In other words, we may need to understand the Lknowledge structure as a concept coterminous with anthropological ideas of culture. 8e need to include not only 5uestions regarding what is known "y whom, "ut as importantly why certain *truths+ are accepted as known# while others are not , and how this agenda of *truth+ is set and contested within the knowledge structure, 8hen we start to address these sorts of issues we can start to fully recognise the interaction "etween the knowledge structure and the security, production and nance structures. 0ut, there is another pro"lem we also need to e'amine. Strange$s work seems to lack an e'plicit theory of change. his is not to say that Strange is insensiti#e to change 9 5uite the opposite, she has continually argued that IPE must "e "uilt on an historical appreciation of changes within the system. /owe#er, there is a tendency in her writings to assume change and then e'plain it, rather than to understand the dynamics she identies. hat is, while change appears in her work as a central historical issue, there is little to suggest why change might happen, accept as a reaction to change in other areas of the relations she is discussing. 8hile in her more recent work she has identied three main areas determining structural change 9 technology, states and markets 9 she o!ers little direct analysis of the dynamics of these determinates.1@ It may #ery well "e that the interaction of technological, market and authoritati#e shifts determine changes in the primary structures, "ut this Dust mo#es the e'planation "ack a stage without an analysing what fundamentally causes change 9 we still lack a way of understanding what dri#es this change.11 Strange has always argued against mono9causal e'planations, and decried determinism where change is theorised as the result of historical processes (long wa#es, the decline of capitalism, class competition). She stressed instead that change is the result of many factors.-33 /owe#er, if we are to go "eyond e'plaining and o!er a theory of understanding, (from how to why) we need to ha#e a theory of what dri#es change at its most "asic le#el. In other words, Strange$s theory of structural power seems to assume a sort of social perpetual motion, with no dri#ing force identied to push the o"ser#ed dynamic onwards. 8e might suggest that Strange implicitly argues that competition within the structures dri#es change 9 "etween states in the security structure, "etween rms in the production structure, "etween credit9 controlling actors in the nancial structure and "etween those who utilise ideas in the knowledge structure. his seems to take the idea of competition as natural, without o!ering a rationale for this "elief. /owe#er, Strange has suggested that a way round this pro"lem may "e to introduce 17
a socio9"iological conception of competition at the root of change. his might then "e de#eloped into a fth structure, of competition, where $natural competition$s form andKor suppression might "e decided. /owe#er, as Strange recognises, this signicant 5uestion is as yet unde#eloped within her work.-3nother way of approaching this pro"lem, which relie#es us of ha#ing to grapple with the literature around socio9"iology (which has its own pro"lems) might "e to utilise o"ert o's notion of contradiction and con%ict. o' suggests that the confrontation "etween historical realities and their conceptual representations (in Stranges terms "etween the knowledge structure and its three co9structures) is a dialectal process which can "e seen as the root of changes in the international political economy. his is attracti#e as it pro#ides a motor which ts in with the structures Strange proposes, and is drawn from a "ody of ideas that recognises structures as crucial to its analysis. /owe#er, this use of what is essentially historical materialism may attempt to make Strange a (neo) ar'ist, where she (at least as she understands herself) is not.-37 8hile the pro"lems discussed a"o#e are serious and to some e'tent might "e seen to compromise Strange$s theory of structural power in the international political economy, it is certainly not the aim here to dismiss Strange$s work. An the contrary, it is the #ery potential and suggesti#eness of this work that makes it essential that these pro"lems are addressed in our continuing engagement with her theory. he identication of these pro"lems represents a signpost for one particular research proDect, my own, "ut should not "e taken as the only way an engagement with Stranges work could de#elop. he signicance of Stranges work is the space it opens up for new approaches to the study of the international political economy, and as such the pro"lems I ha#e with her theory are indicati#e of my concerns and interests.
Conclusion Strange$s own use of her theory of structural power has led her to argue that changes in the four structures of power are altering the way in which the international political economy is organised, and that the knowledge structure is emerging as central to power considerations. /er analysis leads her to conclude that power is increasingly non9territorial in nature, and transnational rms or enterprises are increasingly important in the international political economy. Strange has argued that +the close coincidence of three things 9 political authority; economic acti#ity and e'change; and geographical territory 9 no longer holds+.-3: 8hile this is similar to osenau$s work on tur"ulence in international relations where he proposes the emergence of two $worlds$ 9 one state9centred, one knowledge9centred 9 Strange e'plicitly reDects this di#ision, and insists that there is still only one world where the four structures interact.-3=
18
It is +the information9rich occupations, whether associated with manufacturing or not, that confer power, much more now than the physical capacity to roll goods o! an assem"ly line+. his leads Strange to conclude that the location of production is much less crucial than where key decisions are made on what is to "e produced, where and how it is designed, and who directs sales successfully on the world market. hus all the statistics +so commonly trotted out a"out the 6S share of manufacturing capacity, or the declining 6S share of world e'ports of manufactures are so misleading 9 because they are territorially based+. 8hat is essential for the location of power in the international political economy is the share of world output that is under the direction of e'ecuti#es of particular companies, not where it takes place.-3> s the power relations "etween rms and states shift, an appreciation of the rm in international political economy "ecomes more important 9 after all it is the rms which are shaping the increasingly deregulated international economy. his leads her to the conclusion that the relations "etween states are only one aspect of the international political economy, and that the producers of wealth 9 the transnational rms 9 play a key role.-32 here is a new diplomacy with three critical and intertwined elements* +the "argaining among states for power and in%uence, the competition among rms contesting the world market and the specic "argaining "etween states and rms for the use of wealth9producing resources+.-34 his three9way diplomacy; state9state, rm9rm and state9 rm, is increasingly the way that "argains are struck within the international production structure and "enets allocated. Strange also argues that a $glo"al "usiness ci#ilisation$ has emerged, where authority, though still present, is far more dispersed and less precisely dened. ransnational social networks com"ined with aspirational elements within the international "usiness class, has engendered a desire to Doin this communityKci#ilisation, which has led to the spread of merican li"eral "usinessKcultural mores.-3@ his analysis has some similarities, and draws on some similar sources, as recent de#elopments in ramscian analysis. Strange has "een open to these ideas while seeing them as part of the e'planation, not the singular "asis for change.-31 Strange argues that the di!usion of this glo"al "usiness ci#ilisation from its original core in merica to the rest of the world has led to a loss of relational power and increased the asymmetry of power "etween states. few states, and for Strange most importantly the 6S, ha#e e'panded their e'tra9territorial authority. ost of the other states in the international system ha#e seen their authority domestically and internationally eroded in the face of structural change.--3 s other states and their economies ha#e "ecome integrated into this new arrangement, +their range of choice in policy9making has "een constrained much more than that of the 6nited States+.--- In fact Strange has gone so far as to suggest that what has emerged from these changes is an merican empire "ased on its control through this glo"al "usiness ci#ilisation. If this is so, she suggests that a new theory is needed to account for the way this empire has and continues to de#elop.--7 19
&inally we should note that Strange herself clearly sees her work, especially in "tates and Markets as suggesti#e rather than o!ering nal answers.--: his leads to the 5uestion of whether Strange really is o!ering a fully de#eloped theory at all. his 5uestion is important, not least of all "ecause it conditions our engagement with her work. If she is o!ering a fully de#eloped theory then our criti5ue needs to "e primarily concerned with the pro"lems within her analysis. 0ut if she is o!ering a research programme, then we can de#elop the theory in ways that engage with her work (and our perception of its possi"le shortcomings), "ut also e'plicitly re%ects our own positions, particular interests and perspecti#es. s noted a"o#e Strange accepts that on the 5uestion of change considera"le theoretical work is still needed if we are to understand the underlying dynamics within the four structures. o limit our claims for Strange$s work and suggest that it does indeed represent something more approaching a research programme than a theory is not to de#alue its signicance in any sense. ather it is to reinforce the need for theoretical work that remains open to new insights.--= It is fairly easy to identify within Strange$s work "oth the negati#e and positi#e heuristics that Hakatos proposes for research programmes.--> he negati#e heuristic would re5uire us to a#oid dealing only with secondary structures, a#oid e'amining only the national or the international, and a#oid di#iding o! the political from the economic. he positi#e heuristic would encourage us to pursue considerations of structural power, the ordering of #alues and the importance of non9state actors. his is not to say that the t "etween Strange$s approach and a Hakatosian research programme is perfect, "ut it may "e a useful way of looking at Stranges social scientic proDect. Susan Strange$s work may "e $Strange fruit$ indeed, not to e#ery"ody$s taste, "ut as a recent festschrift --2 has indicated she is not without a su"stantial "ody of admirers. 8hat is interesting is that most of the contri"utors point to Strange as a mentor and remark on her encouragement of their own work, rather than o!ering reheated #ersions of her work. Perhaps the most powerful and in%uential aspect of Strange$s work will "e to ha#e produced in her wake a group of followers, not repeating and rening her e#ery thought, "ut a group of International Political Economy scholars prepared to engage with #alues and structural power considerations, who do not accept agendas as gi#en and who recognise the usefulness of sectoral e'pertise.
20
-. .8. o', +Social &orces, States and 8orld Arders* 0eyond International elations heory+, in .A. eohane (ed.), -eorealism and !ts Critics (. 0. 0uFan, +States and arkets+ :;ook review< !nternational A'airs Rol.2>, -1@1, p.::-. 2. Strange, "tates and Markets, op,cit,, p.-- and similarly Strange, +owards a heory of ransnational Empire+, op,cit,# p.-2:. 4.
Strange, "tates and Markets, op,cit,, p.71.
@. his point is usefully ela"orated in G.H. ichards, +States and arkets+ :;ook Review< The 0conomic Record Rol.2>,
Strange, +a#eB /ic Cragones...+ op,cit,, pp.=179:.
-7. &or instance .<. ooper, The 0conomics of !nterdependence 0conomic olicy in the Atlantic Community (
21
6ni#ersity of
Strange, "tates and Markets, op,cit,, pp.7-97.
-=. &or Strange$s own auto"iographical re%ections on her pre9academic life see +I . S. Strange, The "terling roblem and the "ix (Hondon* hatham /ouseKPEP, -124); S. Strange "terling and ;ritish olicy (Hondon* A'ford 6ni#ersity Press, -14-); S. Strange !nternational Monetary Relations M(Rolume 7 of . Shoneld (ed.), !nternational 0conomic Relations in the 8estern 8orld 2939 6 >2 (Hondon* A'ford 6ni#ersity Press, -142) and Strange, asino apitalism, op,cit, -2. S. Strange, +I&* onetary anagers+, in .8. o' and /.. Gaco"son et al, The Anatomy of !n1uence 7ecision Making in !nternational Organisation () p7=. -@.
P. &eyera"end, Against Method (Hondon* ).
-1.
Strange, personal correspondence with author.
73.
&eyera"end op,cit,, p.-41.
7-.
&eyera"end op,cit,, p.719:-.
77. .S. uhn, The "tructure of "cienti%c Revolutions "econd 0dition# 0nlarged (hicago* 6ni#ersity of hicago Press -143) p.2> !. 7:.
&eyera"end op,cit,, p.:-.
22
7=.
!bid,# pp.7@=9>.
7>.
!bid,# p.71>.
72.
!bid,# p.712.
74. &or an e'tended and e'pansi#e discussion of Singer$s classic pro"lem see /ollis and Smith E'plaining and 6nderstanding International elations, op,cit, and 0. 0uFan +he He#el of nalysis Pro"lem in International elations econsidered+, in . 0ooth and S. Smith (eds.), !nternational Relations Theory Today (am"ridge* Polity Press, -11>) pp.-1@97-2. 7@. 0. 0uFan, . Gones and . Hittle, The ?ogic of Anarchy -eorealism to "tructural Realism (
Strange, +owards a heory of ransnational Empire+, op,cit,# p.-2:.
:7.
Strange, +IPE* he story so far...+, op,cit,# p.7:.
::.
Strange, "tates and Markets, op,cit,, p.7=.
:=. Strange, +he Study of ransnational elations+, !nternational A'airs, Rol.>7 (-142) p.::1 and Strange, "tates and Markets, op,cit,, pp.-:9=. :>.
!bid,, p.77.
:2. Strange, +he Study of ransnational elations+, op,cit,, p.:==9> and Strange, "tates and Markets, op,cit,, p.7:. :4. Strange, +8hat is Economic Power, and 8ho has itJ+, !nternational =ournal# Rol.:3, ), pp.7-497- and Strange, Casino Capitalism, op,cit,, pp.719:3. :@. Strange and ooFe, olitics of !nternational "urplus Capacity , op,cit,, p.773. &or state9stateKstate9rmKrm9rm triangular "argaining diplomacy, see Strange, G.. Stopford and G. /enley, Rival "tates# Rival $irms Competition for 8orld Market "hares (am"ridge* am"ridge 6ni#ersity Press, -11-).
23
:1. Strange, +Protectionism and 8orld Politics+, !nternational Organisation, Rol.:1, ) p.7:4; Strange, "tates and Markets, op,cit,, p.-4. =3.
Strange, "tates and Markets, op,cit,, p.-@
=-. Strange, +Structures, Ralues and isk in the Study of the International Political Economy+, in .G.0. Gones (ed.), erspectives on olitical 0conomy (Hondon* &rancis Pinter Pu"lishers, -1@:) pp.7-39-. =7. Strange, +0ig 0usiness and the State+, Millennium =ournal of !nternational "tudies Rol.73, . =:.
Strange, +IPE* he story so far...+, op,cit,, p.7=.
==.
Strange, aths to !nternational olitical 0conomy , op,cit,, p.'.
=>.
Strange, +Structures, Ralues and isk...+, op,cit,, p.7-@.
=2.
Strange, +Still an E'traordinary Power...+, op,cit,, p.4@.
=4.
Strange, +Structures, Ralues and isk...+, op,cit,, p773.
=@. 0. ussell, ower, A -ew "ocial Analysis (Hondon* eorge llen and 6nwin, -1:@) p.-3. =1.
!bid. p:>.
>3.
!bid. p-7.
>-. P.. 0lau, 0xchange and ower in "ocial ?ife (7. &or 0lau $"enets$ are what the lesser actor needs from the dominant actor who is e'ercising power. &or instance, 0 may do $s "idding "ecause if 0 does, will continue to protect 0 from the in%uence of . he "enet enDoyed is that of protection. >:.
!bid. p.-=3.
>=. S. Hukes, ower A Radical Biew (0asingstoke* acmillan Education Htd, -14=) p.->. >>.
!bid. p.73.
>2.
!bid. p.7=.
>4.
Strange, +8hat is Economic Power...+, op,cit,, pp.7-497-. 24
>@.
!bid., pp.7-49@; Strange, "tates and Markets, op,cit,, p.7:.
>1. Strange, aths to !nternational olitical 0conomy , op,cit,, p.-1-; Strange, asino apitalism, op,cit,, pp.719:3; Strange, "tates and Markets, op,cit,, pp.7=9>, :-. 23.
Strange, "tates and Markets, op,cit,, p.72, :-.
2-. Strange, +Structures, Ralues and isk...+, op,cit,, p.7-2 and Strange, "tates and Markets, op,cit,, p.72. 27.
Strange, "tates and Markets, op,cit,, p=>.
2:. S. Strange, +8ho uns 8orld ShippingJ+, !nternational A'airs Rol.>7 (-142) p.:=2. 2=.
Strange, "tates and Markets, op,cit,, p.72.
2>. Strange and ooFe, olitics of !nternational "urplus Capacity , op,cit,, p.-7; Strange, +he lo"al Political Economy, -1>19-1@=+, !nternational =ournal, Rol.:1, 3 !; /.G. organthau, olitics Among -ations, The "truggle for ower and eace (
Strange, "tates and Markets, op,cit,, p.:-.
2@.
!bid., p.@4.
21. Strange, +Structures, Ralues and isk...+, op,cit,, pp.7-294; and Strange and ooFe, olitics of !nternational "urplus Capacity , op,cit,, p.7-2. 43. See .8. o', +States and arkets+ :;ook review< Millennium =ournal of !nternational "tudies Rol.-@,
!bid., pp.7->9>.
4:. /er early research work at hatham /ouse (where she was esearch Cirector) and later work "oth on the &ord &oundation$s ransnational elations proDect and at the HSE, focused on international monetary
25
relations. See Strange, +I .
Strange, Casino Capitalism, op,cit,, pp.7>92.
42. Strange, +Still an E'traordinary Power...+, op,cit,, pp.@-97 and Strange, "tates and Markets, op,cit,, p.@@. 44.
Strange, "tates and Markets, op,cit,, p.@@ !.
4@. Strange, Casino Capitalism, op,cit,, p.11; and Strange, +n Eclectic pproach+, op,cit,, p.:>. 41.
Strange, "tates and Markets, op,cit,, p.12.
@3.
Strange, +Still an E'traordinary Power...+, op,cit,, p.17.
@-.
Strange, Casino Capitalism, op,cit,, p.--1.
@7.
Strange, +Still an E'traordinary Power...+, op,cit,, p.@7 !.
@:.
Strange, "tates and Markets, op,cit ., p.-->.
@=. See, for instance, /aas +A"taining International En#ironmental Protection through Epistemic onsensus+, Millennium =ournal of !nternational "tudies# Rol.-1, . @>.
Strange, "tates and Markets, op,cit,, p.-2.
@2.
Strange, An 0clectic Approach, op,cit,, p.4.
@4. &or one direction such de#elopment might take see P. EllehOD, +Ceu' e' machina* he Process of International Economic o9operation+, . organ, G. HorentFen, . Heander and S. uFFini (eds.), -ew 7iplomacy in the ost6Cold 8ar 8orld 0ssays for "usan "trange (0asingstoke* acmillan Press Htd, -11:), where the +knowledge structure+ "ecomes the foundation for the other three. @@.
Strange, "tates and Markets, op,cit,, pp.-:>92.
@1.
Strange, +Structures, Ralues and isk...+, op,cit,. 26
13.
Strange, "tates and Markets, op,cit ., p.-:> ! and chapters 49-3.
1-. See for instance eohane and , . 1:.
Strange, "tates and Markets, op,cit,, p.--@.
1=. !bid., p-:7, though in all fairness she does pro#ide in a footnote a useful starting "i"liography for an in#estigation of these issues including works "y 0arthes, &oucault, /a"ermas and others. 1>. EllehOD, op,cit,, an article that take the rst steps towards re9theorising the knowledge structure. 12. P. 0ourdieu, Outline of a Theory of ractice (am"ridge* am"ridge 6ni#ersity Press, -144) p.-2>. 14. . &oucault, The (istory of "exuality, An !ntroduction (Hondon* Penguin 0ooks, -113) p.@> !. 1@. Strange, "tates and Markets, op,cit,, p.733; S. Strange, +he !; Strange, Stopford and /enley, i#al States i#al &irms, op,cit,, pp.77, :=; and Strange, +n Eclectic pproach+, op,cit,, p.:@. 11. .G. /olsti, The 7ividing 7iscipline (egemony and 7iversity in !nternational Theory (8inchester,ass.* llen and 6nwin, -1@>) pp.=294 makes a similar criticism of +glo"al society+ theories. -33. Strange, Casino Capitalism, op,cit,, pp.149@, -=2; and Strange, Stopford and /enley, Rival "tates Rival $irms, op,cit,, p.774 !. -3-. Strange, personal correspondence with author in response to a note raising this issue "ut also see Strange, +erritory, State, uthority and Economy*
27
-3>. Strange, +he &uture of the merican Empire+, =ournal of !nternational A'airs, Rol.=7, . &or an earlier appreciation of merica$s position in this regard see . Rernon, +ogue Elephant in the &orest* n ppraisal of ransatlantic elations+, $oreign A'airs, Rol.>-, 4:9@4. -32. Strange, +0ig 0usiness and the State+, op,cit,, pp.7=>92 and Strange, +he ransformation of the 8orld Economy+, in H. 0a"ic and 0. /uldt (eds.) Mapping the Enknown Towards a -ew 8orld Order, @earbook of the "wedish !nstitute for !nternational A'airs 29956299 (Hondon* /urst and o. Mfor the SIIN, -11:) pp.=>92. -34.
Strange, Stopford and /enley, Rival "tates Rival $irms, op,cit,, p.:7.
-3@. Strange, +he 92; and Strange, +8ake up, rasnerB he world has changed+, Review of !nternational olitical 0conomy , Rol.-, 92. &or ramscian approaches see for instance S. ill (ed.) .ramsci# (istorical Materialism and !nternational Relations (am"ridge* am"ridge 6ni#ersity Press, -11:). --3. Strange, +owards a heory of ransnational Empire+, op,cit,# p.-24; and Strange, +erritory, State, uthority and Economy...+, op,cit,, p.-=. ---.
Strange, +he .
--7. Strange, +he &uture of the merican Empire+, op,cit .; and Strange, +owards a heory of ransnational Empire+, op,cit, See the analysis of the power of merican international credit rating agencies which "uilds on an appreciation of Strange$s knowledge structure see .G. Sinclair, +Passing Gudgement* redit ating Processes as egulatory echanisms of o#ernance in the Emerging 8orld Arder+, Review of !nternational olitical 0conomy , Rol.-, 1. --:.
Strange, "tates and Markets, op,cit,, p.7:3.
--=. See I. Hakatos, +&alsication and the ethodology of Scientic esearch Programmes+, I. Hakatos and . usgra#e (eds.), Criticism and the .rowth of &nowledge (am"ridge* am"ridge 6ni#ersity Press, -143) pp.1-9-12; G.E. Gosling, +States and arkets+ (0ook re#iew) The 8orld 0conomy Rol.--, .
Hakatos op,cit, p.-:7 !.
--2.
organ, HorentFen, Heander and uFFini, op,cit,
28
