Russia and Syria: explaining alignment with a regime in crisis
ROY ALLISON Since spring 2011 2011 the civil cnict an humanitarian h umanitarian emergency in Syria has becme ever mre intense, psing an increasingly stark threat t reginal stability. The erts Presient Bashar al-Assa’s regime t prevail thrugh thrugh the uncnstraine use rce in this brutal struggle r pwer have have epse eeply entrenche plitical ault-lines amng Mile Eastern gvernments an in the glbal cmmunity states. At the reginal level Iran has been the mst steaast supprter Assa an his preminantly Alawite state structure aligne t Shi’i Islam. Hwever, at the glbal level Russia is the pwer which has mst prminently prvie a iplmatic shiel r the Syrian state an blstere it with arms supplies, althugh Mscw talks abut the nee t ‘balance’ between the warring parties in Syria. Its e act alignment with Damascus, rearme at the June 20 20113 G8 summit, has let Russia increasingly islate internatinally. Even China has chsen t keep a relatively lw prfle ver the cnict. This pses a uestin acute imprtance: why has Russia s cnsistently maintaine a cntrary psitin in the Syria crisis nt nly t western but als t mst Arab an Muslim states? Why has it eectively shiele Damascus in the UN Security Cuncil an been s lath t challenge the legitimacy Syrian rule uner Assa, espite the egregius abuses cmmitte by his regime? The Russian psitin can partly be eplaine as ne mre epressin Mscw’s lng-staning aversin t r ear western-le military interventins. This has bth structural an nrmative eatures an has uelle much acerbic criticism western actin by Putin since the early 2000s. 1 Hwever, in the past, when Russia has clashe iplmatically with western states ver ver the use rce, it has generally been able t cunt n the supprt a signifcant number like-mine, svereignty-riente states in the wier internatinal cmmunity. Mrever, Russia has nt always cnemne the launch western-le interventins interventins r enie them a UN manate. Mscw accee t the campaign in Aghanistan in autumn 2001 an chse nt t blck the UN manate r military actin in Libya in March 2011 (Reslutin 1973). In the case Syria, neither NATO nr the Unite States, nr inee ther western states, have been enthusiastic abut impsing a n-y 1
This tpic is analyse etensively in Ry Allisn, Russia, the West and military intervention (Or: Or University Press, 2013). 2013). Fr a shrt assessment this aspect Russian ecisin-making, see Samuel Charap, ‘Russia, Syria an the ctrine interventin’, Survival 55: 1, Feb.–March 2013, pp. 35–41.
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Roy Allison zne r engaging in ther rms signifcant interventin, althugh this began t change ater June 2013. This article argues that the Russian critiue past western-inspire interventins, cast in the language legality an principle, is insucient by itsel t eplain its plicy twars Syria. That sai, the Russian stance v ver er Syria has been in sme respects clearly inuence by the rebellin in Liby Libya, a, alreay uner wa way y as the Syrian crisis was emerging, the utsie military interventin in Libya an the verthrw Gaaf’s regime. Outlining Russian grievances ver the cnict in Libya, we fn at their heart a narrative n the illegitimacy eternally prmte regime change. It is a narrative centre n the principle territrial svereignty, which rejects the ntin that states can be hel subject t stanars plitical legitimacy evise in western capitals. This repuiatin spille rwar int the iplmatic wrangling ver ver the emerging Syrian crisis an was reinrce reinrce an cife as Putin re-emerge as Russian presient. The Russian reign ministry’s reign plicy cncept, publishe in February 2013, scrne ieas ‘that are being implemente … aime at verthrwing legitimate authrities in svereign states uner the pretet prtecting the civilian ppulatin’. It calle erts t ‘manage crises thrugh unilateral sanctins an ther cercive measures’ a risk t wrl peace an stability.2 This article assesses a variety eplanatins r the persistence the Russian stance in the Syria crisis beyn such issues principle an glbal rer, with the intentin uncvering the unerlying eterminants Russian plicy in this particular case. First, cnsieratins ientity an share histrical anity between Mscw an Damascus are analyse. Secn, Russian material interests in bilateral relatins with Syria an its geplitical interests in the reginal pwer play arun Syria are scrutinize. Thir, we eplre implicatins the Syria crisis r Russian state rer in tw ierent respects. One these is the neus between reginal spillver rm Syria, Islamist netwrks an insurgency in the nrthern Caucasus. The ther relates t the perceptin the cntrversy ver regime change in Syria as anther eample the western cmmunity challenging the plitical legitimacy an authritarian state an leaership. What emerges is that Russian behaviur n the internatinal stage relating t the Syrian crisis, as well as its reerence t traitinal legal principles an rules cnuct in this case, t a signifcant egree reect instrumental cncerns abut plitical legitimacy an state chesin within Russia an its near n ear neighburh. It is this, mre than any eep sliarity with the Syrian leaership r cmmitment t the material benefts relatins with the current Syrian state, that has maintaine Mscw’s Mscw’s alignment with Damascus.
2
Cncept the Freign Plicy the Russian Feeratin, apprve by Putin 12 Feb. 2013, at http://www. mi.ru,, accesse 7 June 2013. See als Sergei Lavrv, ‘Russia’s reign plicy philsphy’, 28 March 2013, at mi.ru http://www.mi.ru,, accesse 20 May 2013. http://www.mi.ru
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Russia and Syria
Intervention in Libya and the road to regime change On 17 March 2011 the UN Security Cuncil apte Reslutin 1973, authrizing a n-y zne ver Libya. This ere an unpreceente manate uner Chapter VII the UN Charter r the use military rce r humanitarian purpses against the wishes a unctining state. Russia an ur ther sceptical Security Cuncil members abstaine in the crucial vte. In the ebate bere the aptin Reslutin 1973, Russian statements were in the nrmative mainstream. They i nt seek t privilege Libyan svereignty ver the nee r ptential rceul measures in the intensiying humanitarian crisis.3 Yet within ays Reslutin 1973 being passe, the then prime minister Vlaimir Putin cmpare it t ‘a meieval call t crusae’, apparently playing t Russian natinalist pinin in his traemark ppulist criticism US plicies. 4 Frm late March 2011 Russia’s iplmatic stance was increasingly critical the military implementation the Security Cuncil manate, especially as the calitin mre clearly cuse its campaign n verthrwing the Gaaf regime an as the pssibility a grun peratin became mre likely. Yet prbably neither evelpment came as a surprise t Presient Meveev, r t astute Russian iplmats r military leaers. By late April Meveev was implying that Gaaf shul step wn. A mnth later, ater a G8 summit, he cncee that G8 leaers ha been unanimus that Gaaf’s regime ‘has lst legitimacy an he must leave’.5 Despite this psitin, the ntin regime change tuche a raw nerve at the tp the centralize Russian state, since it epresse nt nly the jugement western states abut the plitical legitimacy a leaership, in an interventin backe by rce, but als clear supprt r ne sie in a civil war, beyn the manate agree in the UN. T call r regime change, Freign Minister Lavrv claime, in a theme which became amiliar in his statements als n Syria, mae the insurgent sie mre intractable an unwilling t cnsier a ceasefre. The real anger, he argue thrugh spring an summer 2011, was that the belie that ‘the reigners will help us’ t verthrw the regime may be ‘cntagius’. It cul ‘appear amng the prtesters in ther cuntries the regin’ hping r assistance rm the internatinal cmmunity. This wul be ‘an invitatin t a whle array civil wars’.6 As the campaign in Libya epane, Mscw accuse calitin rces numerus inringements Reslutin 1973, riven by erts at regime change: the eclaratin Gaaf an his relatives as ‘legitimate targets’ (as well as the fnal bmbing Gaaf’s cnvy as he trie t escape); the ‘isprprtinate use rce’ resulting in the eath civilians; an the targeting Libyan state inra3 4 5 6
See Security Cuncil statement SC/10180, AFR/2120, issue 22 Feb. 2011, http://www.un.rg/News/Press/ cs/2011/sc10180.c.htm, accesse 7 June 2013. Interview with Putin, 21 March 2011, http://archive.premier.gv.ru/eng/events/news/14542, accesse 13 June 2013. News cnerence ater G8 summit, 28 May 2011, at http://www.kremlin.ru, accesse 7 June 2013. Sergei Lavrv at press cnerence in Tskhinvali, 26 April 2011, BBC Summary Wrl Bracasts: Frmer Sviet Unin, http://www.bbc.mnitringnline.cm (hencerth BBC), as available t registere users, Mn FS1 FsuPl sv.
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Roy Allison structure an civilian sites.7 Russia als prepare itsel t resist western challenges t the UN arms embarg r Libya an the pssibility a grun ensive by western states. Russia elt aggrieve that it was unable t use Reslutin 1973 as a tl t cnstrain calitin peratins. When NATO tk cmman thse peratins in Libya in March, Russia argue that the Security Cuncil shul scrutinize the cnsistency the campaign with the manate in Reslutin 1973. Hwever, Mscw aile t establish this principle, which ha the wier gal cnstraining ther ptential NATO epeitinary tasks. Right rm the utset the Libya campaign Russia ha elt marginalize by the rmatin a new multilateral Cntact Grup t prvie plitical guiance n peratins in Libya. Russia uestine the authrity this by an remaine utsie it.
Russia assumes the role of diplomatic shield for the Assad regime As the spring 2011 wre n, Russia sught t avert any cmparisn between the evelping campaign in Libya an ways in which the internatinal cmmunity might respn t the emerging crisis in Syria. Lavrv escribe ‘attempts t repruce the Libyan eperience in ther cuntries an regins’ such as Syria, Yemen r Bahrain as ‘very angerus’.8 Russian cials claime that the Syrian case iere materially rm that Libya in that ppnents the regime in Syria use vilence rm the beginning (a view nt share by western states) an cntinue t s.9 In cntrast t the Libya crisis, in the case Syria Russia trie t cnstrain Security Cuncil invlvement rm the utset. In June 2011 it claime, in language with legal implicatins, that ‘the situatin es nt present a threat t internatinal peace an security’. Rather, ‘uite cnsierable cnseuences r the Mile East regin’ cul result eactly rm intererence in Syrian internal aairs.10 Mscw has remaine aamant that it will blck any pssible track twars a UN Chapter VII interventin an blck even sanctins against Syria that might mve in that irectin. Instea, Mscw presente the apprach taken t the plitical crisis in Yemen as a pssible mel r respnse in the Syrian case. In Yemen, in the Russian interpretatin, ‘all the eternal players wrke etremely patiently an persistently with all the sies, withut ultimatums, encuraging them t cmprmise’.11 Security Cuncil Reslutin 2014 in Octber 2011 cife the ramewrk r a settlement in Yemen. In August 2011, Presient Meveev signalle that there were limits t Russian reainess t shiel the Syrian regime, preicting that Assa wul be ‘in r a grim 7
8 9 10 11
See remarks by Putin n 26 April 2011, http://archive.premier.gv.ru/eng/visits/wrl/14991/events/14996/ , accesse 13 June 2013; Russian reign ministry press release, 1 May 2011,http://www.mi.ru, accesse 20 July 2011; statement by the new Russian reign ministry human rights envy, Knstantin Dlgv, RIA Nvsti news agency, 3 May 2011, BBC Mn FS1 FsuPl stu; interview with Sergei Lavrv, Moskovskiye novosti, 12 May 2011, http://www.mi.ru; statement by Knstantin Dlgv, Intera, 25 May 2011, BBC Mn Alert FS1 MCU ME1 MEPl 250511 ib. Lavrv, Intera, 13 May 2011, BBC Mn Alert FS1 MCU ME1 MEPl 130511 et. Interview Lavrv, Moskovskie novosti , 19 May 2011. Lavrv, 1 June 2011, at http://www.mi.ru, accesse 10 May 2011. Lavrv, 23 Dec. 2011, at http://www.mi.ru, accesse 10 May 2013.
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Russia and Syria ate’ i he were t ail t launch rerms an recncile the regime with the ppsitin.12 But espite the absence rerms by Damascus an its intransigence ver prpsals r a serius prcess meiatin with ppsitin grups, Mscw has aile ever since t issciate itsel rm Assa’s regime r t challenge the legitimacy his rule. The Russian psitin was reinrce ater the re-electin Putin as presient in spring 2012. Sme Russian analysts have claime that Russia lacks leverage ver Assa, that the ntin a Russian–Syrian alliance is a myth.13 But the cntinuatin Russian arms supplies t Syria, an the iplmatic shiel Russia has cnsistently hel r Assa in efance mst the Arab wrl an the UN cmmunity states, makes it icult t efne the relatinship as less than an alignment mutual cnvenience, in which Russia has been simply unwilling t threaten actin which cul urther weaken the Syrian regime an the state structures ver which it presies. When the Arab League ecie t impse sanctins n Syria an harshly criticize Assa’s brutality, Russian leaers reuse t llw mainstream Arab pinin as they ha ne in the Libyan case. They ignre this epressin ‘reginal legitimacy’. Mscw was lath t enrse any measures that might rm a basis r the replacement Assa’s regime, even inirectly thrugh new, strng UN sanctins. Russia wrke with China, an initially als trie t crinate with ther BRICS states, t hea any Security Cuncil reslutin n Syria that i nt epressly rule ut eternal military interventin. In Octber 2011 Mscw an Beijing vete a reslutin rate by western states which calle r a Syrian-le plitical prcess an cnemne ‘grave an systematic human rights vilatins’ in Syria.14 In February 2012 the tw pwers jintly vete a new, strngly wre rat reslutin (althugh this still reraine rm any threat r allusin t pssible rceul UN actin). All 13 ther Security Cuncil members, this time incluing ther BRICS states, were range in supprt the reslutin. Russia was nw uite islate, with supprt nly rm China.15 A respnse t Russian an Chinese blcking actin at the UN early in 2012 was the creatin, utsie the UN ramewrk, a Cntact Grup r Syria, the ‘Grup Friens Syria’. Mscw uickly cmpare this with the Cntact Grup create as part the internatinal respnse t the Libyan uprising, claiming that the rmatin ‘such sel-rganise grups vilates internatinal law an the UN Charter, especially since they are establishe r the purpse … military 12 13
14 15
Interview n 5 Aug. 2011, http://eng.news.kremlin.ru/news/2680/print, accesse 7 June 2013. Dmitri Trenin, ‘The mythical alliance: Russia’s Syria plicy’, Carnegie Papers, Carnegie Mscw Centre, Feb. 2013, p. 19. Hwever, Trenin als cncees that ‘Russia has reuse t use incentives an isincentives with Assa—such as security guarantees r threats cutting ai—t make him amenable t ialgue’, an that ‘Russia has been arming ne the sies in a e act civil war’: pp. 20–21. Fr the Russian eplanatin its vte, see Vitaly Churkin, 5 Oct. 2011, at http://www.mi.ru; S/2011/612, 4 Oct. 2011, http://www.un.rg/ga/search/view_c.asp?symbl=S/PV.6627, accesse 5 May 2013. Fr the weak Russian eence its vte, see Security Cuncil 6711th meeting, 4 Feb. 2011, S/PV.6711,http:// www.un.rg/ga/search/view_c.asp?symbl=S/PV.6711, accesse 5 May 2013. Fr an analysis the Chinese stance in the Syria crisis an Security Cuncil vting, see Yang Fuchan (rmer vice-minister the Chinese ministry reign aairs), ‘Large-scale upheaval in the Mile East an China’s iplmatic relatins’, Journal o Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies 6: 4, Dec. 2012, pp. 1–17.
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Roy Allison interventin’.16 Russia was mre reay t wrk within a UN-supprte ‘Actin Grup’ n Syria, which inclue majr pwers, Arab states an representatives internatinal rganizatins. In June 2012 this grup prpse principles r a ‘Syrian-le transitin’ in the Geneva Cmmuniué. But this imprtant cument reache n agreement n whether Assa’s eparture shul be a precnitin r the creatin a transitinal gvernment.17 Russia ha previusly, in March 2012, accepte a UN presiential statement urging Assa t accept the peace plan put rwar by the UN special envy Kf Annan. This talke an ‘inclusive plitical prcess’, a ceasefre an the withrawal rces by bth sies. But ntably it i nt talk electins r a transer pwer, as the Arab League an western states sught.18 It was llwe by UN Security Cuncil Reslutin 2042 in April, which establishe a shrt-live mnitring missin.19 Hwever, Assa aile t withraw Syrian rces in an arun ppulatin centres as reuire. With the re-electin Putin as Russian presient, there ha been speculatin in May 2012, bere a scheule bilateral meeting between Obama an Putin, abut a eal in the ng, utsie the UN plan, by which Russia wul agree t the remval Assa an his replacement by a less cntrversial gvernment fgure, llwing the eample the transitin in Yemen. The regime wul remain largely intact an s t wul Russia’s Syrian interests, incluing its cmmercial relatinships an its naval acility n the Syrian cast.20 N such eal transpire—an even i it ha, it wul mst likely have been rejecte by the Syrian rebel grups. Since then western cials have vainly trie t enlist Mscw’s help in pressing r the replacement Assa as a precnitin t rming a new transitinal gvernment in Syria. Russia claims that it is nt wee t the current Syrian leaership as such an seems t have hpe that it might gain reginal an perhaps wier internatinal avantage by psitining itsel as an inispensable meiatr ver Syria, n its wn terms. But it has been reluctant t reach ut t the ppsitin. Mscw has been ismissive the rle the Syrian Natinal Cuncil, braning it as merely a grup epatriate pr-western intellectual an rmer pliticians, thugh it has retaine limite cntact with it. Russia has lke mre avurably n secular ppnents the Syrian regime, such as the Natinal Crinatin By r Demcratic Change, which are mre willing t cntemplate ialgue with the regime in Damascus. In cntrast, Russian cials cnemn the Free Syrian Army as a by etremists an Islamists. They have als reuse t accept the Natinal Calitin r Syrian Revlutinary an Oppsitin Frces, 16 17 18 19 20
Russian eputy reign minister Mikhail Bganv, as reprte in http://valaiclub.cm/mile_east/38940/ print_eitin/, accesse 7 June 2013. Actin Grup r Syria fnal cmmuniué, an Lavrv press cnerence, 30 June 2012, at http://www.mi. ru, accesse 30 July 2012. Daily Telegraph, 22 March 2012. Security Cuncil Reslutin 2042, S/RES/2042, 14 April 2012, http://www.un.rg/Dcs/sc/unsc_ reslutins12htm, accesse 10 March 2012. ‘US hpes Assa can be ease ut with Russia’s ai’, New York Times, 27 May 2012; ‘Syria: why Russia change tack’, Guardian, 28 May 2012.
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Russia and Syria an umbrella rganizatin rme in Nvember 2012, as the legitimate representative the Syrian peple. This has set Russia apart rm Gul Arab states, Turkey, Eurpean states, the Unite States an sme hunre ther cuntries.
Identity and solidarity in Russian–Syrian relations Cul sme sense share ientity an sliarity unerpin Russian–Syrian relatins in the current crisis? Fr Russia this cul be an epressin histrical assciatins an anities, carrie rwar t the cntemprary setting in the minset security plicy ecisin-makers attracte t the certainties earlier antagnistic relatins with western pwers. Alternatively, Putin an the cre Assa’s regime may simply bn arun a share internatinal utlk r ientity cuse n territrial svereignty an rejectin the nrmative basis the sliarist, human-cuse agena many western states. Taking int accunt the cgnitive an psychlgical imensin Russian ecisin-making, such cnsieratins cannt be iscunte. It is plausible that the clse assciatin between the USSR an Syria has sme cntinuing resnance in the minset Russia’s current security an reign plicy leaership, generating a sense sliarity. The Ba’ath regime, minate by Hafz al-Assa rm 1970 until his eath 30 years later, ha ater all emerge in the 1970s as the USSR’s nly steaast ally amng the majr states the Mile East.21 Hwever, this Cl War relatinship was base n strategic interepenence rather than ielgy. Each sie haggle r gain.22 While supplying Syria with arms an military avisers, Mscw ha t swallw the Syrian Ba’ath Party’s cntinuing ban n the Syrian Cmmunist Party. Mscw an Damascus were nt psychlgically clse. Mutual suspicins ha t be papere ver. This tensin is reveale in the etaile Sviet espinage material cntaine in the Mitrkhin Archive, which was smuggle t the West an publishe. The KGB achieve signifcant penetratin the Ba’ath regime’s reign service an intelligence cmmunity. Fr eample, a key iplmat recruite by the KGB ha becme the irectr-general the Syrian reign ministry by the early 1970s. Mscw knew the Syrian leaer’s thinking, helpe by the KGB bugging his apartment n his visits t Mscw an by ull penetratin the Syrian embassy in Mscw. In this way Russia knew hw reluctant Hafz al-Assa was t cmmit himsel t a Sviet–Syrian treaty rienship an cperatin.23 Frm time t time there were serius isputes between Mscw an Damascus. One such ccurre in June 1976 ver the Syrian interventin in the Lebanese civil war in avur the Marnite Christians against their PLO an let-wing ppnents. The KGB ha clse cntacts with sme the latter, an the KGB 21
22 23
Fr analysis the Cl War Sviet–Syrian relatinship, see Eraim Karsh, Soviet policy towards Syria since 1970 (Basingstke: Macmillan, 1991); Eraim Karsh, The Soviet Union and Syria: the Assad years (Lnn: Ryal Institute Internatinal Aairs, 1998). Karsh, Soviet Policy towards Syria since 1970 , p. 33. Christpher Anrew an Vasili Mitrkhin, The Mitrokhin Archive II: the KGB and the world (Lnn: Allen Lane, 2005), pp. 195–6, 200–201, 207–208.
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Roy Allison resiency in Damascus secretly prvie uns t supprt the Lebanese Cmmunist Party which ppse Syrian interventin.24 That year Assa epelle hal the Sviet military avisers in Syria (then mre numerus in Syria than anywhere else in the wrl). He instructe the Sviet Navy t remve its submarines an supprt crat rm the prt Tartus. Fences were later mene, but the relatinship remaine a tetchy ne an Mscw reinrce its cvert cnnectins with the Syrian Cmmunist Party.25 Althugh in Octber 1980 Russia an Syria i fnally sign a bilateral treaty rienship an cperatin, the tw parties ten iere ver the interpretatin its bligatins. As a result Mscw was lukewarm r passive when aske r supprt by Syria in a series reginal crises in the 1980s.26 The large number Sviet avisers in Syria i nt reect Syrian interest in the Sviet ielgical utlk; rather, it epresse the value Damascus attache t Russian technicians an arms. This was an instrumental rather than an ientitybase relatinship, an nt ne in which histrical anity as such was likely t cunt r much in later years. Even s, it has been estimate that by 2006 sme 10,000 Syrian cers ha receive training at bth Sviet an Russian military acaemies, an that as late as that year up t 2,000 Russian military avisers were serving in the Syrian military.27 Mscw claims that the nly such avisers nw let are at the Tartus naval acility, thugh accring t western meia reprts in December 2012 Russian military avisers are still manning sme Syria’s mre sphisticate air eences (as they i uring the Cl War)—a cmplicating actr r any eternal military interventin.28 The Syrian military’s etensive earlier interactin with the USSR an Russia, as well as the human ties with Russian military avisers, are likely t have ha sme scializing eect in avur Russia. This must als have let a egree sympathy r Syria amng sme Russian military cers. A Russian eence jurnalist claims that there are hawks in the reign an eence ministries, as well as the intelligence cmmunity, in Mscw with lng-time cnnectins t the present Syrian military-intelligence establishment, wh argue that the Syrian regime may still eeat its enemies an that abanning an l ally is wrng.29 An it es seem that Russia is still prviing intelligence supprt t the Syrian regime 24 25 26
27
28
29
Anrew an Mitrkhin, The Mitrokhin Archive II , p. 206. Anrew an Mitrkhin, The Mitrokhin Archive II , pp. 208–10. Eraim Karsh, ‘Sviet–Syrian relatins: the truble partnership’, in Margt Light, e., Troubled riendships: Moscow’s Third World ventures (Lnn: British Acaemic Press, 1993), pp. 146–7; Ry Allisn, The Soviet Union and the strategy o non-alignment in the Third World (Cambrige: Cambrige University Press, 1988), pp. 232–3. Fr the tet the treaty, see Zaar Imam, Towards a model relationship: a study o Soviet treaties with India and other Third World countries (New Delhi: ABC Publishing Huse, 1983), pp. 157–61. Anrej Kreutz, Syria: Russia’s best asset in the Middle East, Russie.Nei.Visins n. 55, Institut rançais es relatins internatinales, Paris, Nv. 2010, http://www.iri.rg/?page=cntributin-etail&i=6301&i_ prvenance=97, accesse 15 June 2013, p. 18. ‘There are n Russian military specialists in the ranks the Syrian army’, nly at Tartus, accring t the eputy irectr the Russian Feeral Service r Military–Technical Cperatin, Vyacheslav Dzirkaln: Intera-AVN military news agency, Mscw, 11 July 2012, BBC Mn Alert FS1 MCU ME1 MEPl 110712 m. ‘Russian military presence in Syria pses challenge t US-le interventin’, Guardian, 23 Dec. 2012. Pavel Felgenhauer, ‘Mscw reay r a cnrntatin with the West ver Syria’, Eurasia Daily Monitor ( Jamestwn Funatin) 9: 132, 12 July 2012, http://www.eurasia.rg, accesse 7 June 2013.
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Russia and Syria an receiving useul military intelligence abut this vlatile regin. Russia retains a large electrnic eavesrpping pst in the Syrian prt city Latakia. This analysis pints t a Russian reluctance t break with a lng-term ‘plitical base’ in the Mile East maintaine thrugh ties t Assa’s security elite. Writing in spring 2013, the Russian Mile East analyst Aleksei Malashenk claime that ‘the relatinship between Syria an Russia is the last remnant Sviet plitics in the Mile East … This is the fnal pint the pst-Sviet presence in the regin. It is etremely icult r Putin an the Russian elite t accept this.’30 What is at stake here is mre a matter Russian material an strategic interests than ientity r lyalty, even i it is mie up with nstalgia r the past strategic reach the USSR.31 I we cnsier cgnitive respnses, there is n evience that Putin has hel any pr-Arab r pr-Thir Wrl sentiments.32 Such an Arabist stance may have lingere in Russian plicy in the late 1990s uner the inuence Yevgeny Primakv, a leaing specialist n the Mile East in his earlier career wh became Russia’s reign minister an then prime minister. Writing later, Primakv urge Russia t be mre active in reslving Mile East issues, claiming that ‘Russia has traitinally enjye untarnishe relatins with the Arab cuntries an Iran’.33 This kin ptimism, i it still ha any currency in Mscw in the 2000s, is unlikely t have survive the Arab Spring an recent Russian wariness ver Iran, let alne Mscw’s ierences with the Arab League ver the Syria crisis. In tay’s wrl, the Russian leaership uner Putin values states that prject a share utlk with Mscw n the wier internatinal stage. Damascus an Mscw, as I shall argue belw, can bn arun a pluralist emphasis n territrial svereignty an the repuiatin eternally prmte regime change. They jine in ppsing US erts t btain UN Security Cuncil apprval r interventin in Ira in 2002–2003, as well as the actual US-le interventin in Ira. In spring 2003 Putin backe Syria in warning that ‘even i there are peple wh nt like the regime in this cuntry, it shul nt be change uner pressure rm utsie’—a precursr t the current cntrversy. 34 Syria has als earne Russian apprval r supprting sme its key reign plicy psitins. Fr eample, Syria was the secn cuntry ater Belarus t epress public supprt r Russia in 2008 when it intervene militarily in Gergia. A ew ays ater the utbreak this cnict, Assa visite Mscw an rejecte ‘attempts t istrt the acts t prtray Russia as an aggressr cuntry’. He even ere t welcme Russian missile systems n Syrian territry as a strategic respnse t the events in Gergia an t the pssible installatin US missile 30 31 32 33
34
Rai Free Eurpe/Rai Liberty Reprt, 21 March 2012, http://www.rerl.rg/articleprintview/24523022. html, accesse 7 June 2013. Fr Syrian supprt r Russian Mile East plicy since the early 2000s, see Kreutz, Syria, Russia’s best asset in the Middle East, pp. 12–17. Anrej Kreutz, Russia in the Middle East: riend or oe? (Westprt, CT: Praeger, 2007), p. 25. Yevgeny Primakv, Russia and the Arabs: behind the scenes in the Middle East rom the Cold War to the present (New Yrk: Basic Bks, 2009), p. 386. Fr an upate versin, incluing analysis the Arab Spring, see Yevgeny Primakv, Blizhniy vostok na stsene i za kulisami (Mscw: Rssiyskaya gazeta, 2012). Kreutz, Russia in the Middle East, p. 28.
803 International Afairs 89: 4, 2013 Copyright © 2013 The Author(s). International Afairs © 2013 The Royal Institute o International Afairs.
Roy Allison eences in eastern Eurpe.35 Such statements invite reciprcal Russian supprt r Syrian plicies. A key uestin is hw ar Russian sliarity with Syria represents persnal supprt r the beleaguere leaership Bashar al-Assa himsel. Mscw has cme run t arguing that Assa’s ate is nt the cre issue, that ‘Russia’s psitin is nt preetermine by the supprt persnalities; it is ictate by cncern abut the ate the Syrian peple, ur lng-staning rien an partner, an the ate a cuntry which has a very lng histry’.36 This is nt really cnvincing. In the frst place, Assa s clearly persnifes the Syrian Alawite regime an Mscw has been s lath t cuntenance regime change in Syria. Secn, Putin seems t view the Russian image being a steaast ally as imprtant internatinally r the creibility Russia’s ther plitical alignments, such as with the Central Asian states the Cmmnwealth Inepenent States (CIS). The tuchstne such creibility is supprt r Russia-rienly leaers an their enturage, r at least a reusal t accee t western campaigns t unseat them. This is nt t say that the Russian leaership eels n anity with the cmmunities caught up in the blletting in Syria. In Lavrv’s wrs, ‘Assa persnifes the guarantr the security the minrities, incluing Christians, wh live in Syria an have live there r centuries’.37 Sme have claime that Putin is inuence by the Russian Orth Church, which ears that Syrian Christians, amng them a large by Orth, wul be persecute i Islamist actins came t pwer in Syria. In cmparisn Russia seems less cncerne ver the ate the several hunre thusan Syrian Circassians—an ethnic grup that the Russian state ha riven ut the Nrth Caucasus t the Ottman empire in the nineteenth century. Early in 2013 the Russian state uma bluntly rejecte calls by Circassians in the Nrth Caucasus r the Russian gvernment t treat the Syrian Circassians as cmpatrits, which wul allw the repatriatin the latter t Russia.38 Bth the Russian elite an sciety at large are mre cncerne abut Russian citizens living in Syria. In January 2013 Lavrv claime that there were several tens thusans these citizens an that an evacuatin plan ha been rawn up.39 In act, these are mstly Russian wmen marrie t Syrian men, an a Russian eputy reign minister has estimate that abut hal these Russian citizens supprt the ppsitin.40 Only abut 1,000 these Russian passprt hlers have let r Russia since the beginning the cnict in Syria, which suggests that this grup has nt been targete by militants. On the ther han, any Russian unirme persnnel in Syria may be mre vulnerable since the Free Syrian Army 35 36 37 38 39 40
Rlan Dannreuther, ‘Russia an the Mile East: a Cl War paraigm?’, Europe–Asia Studies 64: 3, May 2012, p. 555. Gul news website, Dubai, 3 Jan. 2013, BBC Mn ME1 MEEausc EU1 EurPl 040113/hh. Lavrv, as cite by RIA Nvsti, ‘Mscw cncerne abut Syria, nt Assa—minister’, 25 Feb. 2013, http:// en.ria.ru/Russia/20130225/179674039.html, accesse 15 June 2013. Rossiyskaya gazeta website, Mscw, 12 Oct. 2012, p. 8; BBC Mn FS1 FsuPl ME1 MEPl 261012 ms/sc. Eurasia Daily Monitor ( Jamestwn Funatin) 10: 17, 30 Jan. 2013, at http://www.eurasia.rg, accesse 7 March 2013. ‘Russia evacuates its natinals rm Syria’, RIA Nvsti, 23 Jan. 2013, http://en.ria.ru/russia/20130123/178969 855.html, accesse 7 June 2013. Russian eputy reign minister Mikhail Bganv, Intera news agency, Mscw, 13 Dec. 2012, BBC Mn FS1 FsuPl ME1 MEPl gyl.
804 International Afairs 89: 4, 2013 Copyright © 2013 The Author(s). International Afairs © 2013 The Royal Institute o International Afairs.
Russia and Syria has alreay threatene t interpret Russia as an ‘enemy cuntry’ an t attack its naval vessels.41
Russian material interests and Syria Russia certainly has material interests in its bilateral relatins with Syria, especially a sli arms trae, which wul be jeparize by an verthrw the Assa regime. But such interests are nt substantial enugh t er a creible eplanatin r the Russian stance in the Syrian crisis. Mre imprtant are Russia’s wier strategic interests, which reect assessments the plitical gemetry arun Syria an the impact a cllapse Shi’i Alawite rule in the teeth a rebellin rawing its supprt largely rm Sunni, western an Gul State surces. This geplitical lgic abut changing alignments in the Mile East ceists with unerlying Russian ears a chatic utcme rm the unravelling the Syrian state, iscusse belw. The Russian arms trae with Syria has ten been viewe as inuencing Russian ecisin-making. This is true t the etent that the Russian eence inustry an its supprters have signifcant bureaucratic weight in plicy iscussins in Mscw. Putin, t, ten presents himsel as the cheerleaer-in-chie r the recent rise in Russia’s verall share glbal arms sales an as cncerne abut the image Russia as a ‘reliable’ arms supplier. In this cntet he claims blanly that ‘the avancement civilize an mutually benefcial military–technical partnership is an imprtant instrument prmtin reign plitical interests’.42 Yet r the eence lbby in Mscw Russia’s arms trae with Syria is harly critical. Accring t SIPRI estimates, Russia supplie Syria with 72 per cent its arms imprts uring 2007–2011, but in the last these years, 2011, Syria accunte r nly 5 per cent Russia’s ttal arms eliveries abra.43 The Russian think-tank CAST reprte in June 2012 that Mscw ha cntracts t eliver sme US$500 millin wrth arms that year. Hwever, sme large eals, like a reprte US$550 millin eal signe in January 2012 r 36 Yak-130 trainer/cmbat aircrat, have been put n hl. Unlike ther Arab natins, hwever, Syria lacks huge il revenues t pay r avance weapnry. Reprtely, Damascus has s ar pai r less than hal all the arms it has cntracte rm Russia, an is unlikely t be able t ar t make the payments ue t meet eisting cntracts.44 It has a US$3.6 billin ebt t Russia r previus arms eals. Lking ahea, a weakene pst-civil war Syria, 41 42 43
44
Fr the Russian reactin t such threats, see reign ministry statement, 21 Nv. 2012, at http://www.mi. ru, accesse 5 Feb. 2013. Statement by Putin at meeting the Cmmissin r Military–Technical Cperatin with Freign Cuntries, Rossiyskaya gazeta, 18 Oct. 2012. Estimate by Russian think-tank Centre r Analysis Strategies an Technlgies (CAST), Financial Times, 27 June 2012. Accring t the general irectr Russia’s largest state arms eprter Rsbrneprt, Anatly Isaykin, Syria ranks 12th r 13th in terms Rsbrneprt’s eliveries: Intera-AVN military news agency, Mscw, 13 Feb. 2013, BBC Mn FS1 MCU ME1 MEPl 130213 ym. As claime by Ruslan Pukhv, hea CAST, RIA Nvsti, 10 July 2012, http://en.rian.ru/analysis /20120710/174530767.html, accesse 7 June 2013.
805 International Afairs 89: 4, 2013 Copyright © 2013 The Author(s). International Afairs © 2013 The Royal Institute o International Afairs.
Roy Allison even i Assa remains in pwer, can harly be viewe as a majr military partner r Russia.45 One cmplicating variable, hwever, is whether uning r Syrian arms eals has been an will cntinue t be unerwritten by Iran, which has signe several eence agreements with Syria since 2005. Thrugh the current crisis Mscw has cntinue unashamely t eprt arms t Syria, arguing that such shipments nt cntravene internatinal law. Hwever, the nature these supplies has been smewhat cnstraine by Russia’s insistent claims that such weapns are ‘eensive’. Mscw has been respnsive t sme etent t Israeli cncerns, an perhaps thse the Unite States, in nt selling Damascus all that it seeks—r eample, the man-prtable Igla air eence system.46 Cntracts r MiG-31 avance fghter jets have als been annulle. In calculating its wier interests Mscw has t take accunt its trae relatinships with Israel an Turkey, bth invlving much larger vlumes an value than that with Syria. The main emphasis in Russian arms eliveries, builing n the eample the earlier Sviet supply SAM missile systems t Syria, has been n sphisticate anti-aircrat systems an missiles, such as the Buk M-2 meium-range system (SA-17 in NATO terminlgy) an Pantsyr-S1 shrt-range anti-aircrat artillery system (SA-22 t NATO). In summer 2012 the Kremlin appeare t ecie against shipping t Syria the pwerul lng-range S-300 surace-t-air missile system. In May 2013, hwever, there was a urry reprts that Russia ha inee ecie t ship ur batteries S-300s t Syria, r ha alreay ne this an Russian military avisers were eplying them r actin (unlikely in act), espite American an Israeli erts t cnvince Putin that such systems wul be reginally estabilizing r the Mile East verall.47 Sme reprts suggest that Syria has actually mae payments r these avance missiles. But the ecisin t eliver S-300 missiles epresses Russian plitical calculatins abut Syria as much as cmmercial strategy. The installatin in Syria sphisticate air eences (in the case the S-300 with a repute range 125 miles) wul serve as a eterrent t any western-le interventin in Syria (r urther Israeli unilateral strikes). Their presence wul signifcantly raise the stakes an risks erts t impse even a limite n-y zne ver Syrian airspace. Similarly, reprts that Russia has elivere avance anti-ship cruise missiles t Syria, i cnfrme, wul help eter any uture erts t supply rebel rces by sea r t impse a naval embarg n the Syrian regime.48 On the ther han, the elivery avance Russian weapns t Syria may itsel cntribute t the reginal escalatin the crisis, as we iscuss belw. I Mscw cannt epect great cmmercial bunty rm arms eliveries t the Assa regime, neither can it epect large iviens rm energy relatins with 45 46 47
48
As argue by CAST, RIA Nvsti, 10 July 2012, http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20120710/174530767.html. As reprte in Intera-AVN military news agency, Mscw, 26 June 2012, BBC Mn Alert FA1 FsuPl ME1 MEPl gv. ‘Russian military specialists are alreay in Syria’, Nezavisimaya gazeta , 16 May 2013, citing Russian ‘militaryiplmatic surces’; ‘US balks as Russia prepares t eliver missiles t Syria’, Christian Science Monitor , 10 May 2013. New York Times, 16 May 2013, citing unientife American cials.
806 International Afairs 89: 4, 2013 Copyright © 2013 The Author(s). International Afairs © 2013 The Royal Institute o International Afairs.
Russia and Syria Damascus. Since 2005 the Russian il cmpany Tatnet has ha an agreement t eplre an evelp new il an gas epsits in Syria an in 2009 Strytransgaz launche a prject r a large gas-prcessing plant near Hms. But Syria’s il pructin has been eclining r years an its gas reserves are limite cmpare t thse the regin’s biggest players. It is true that Russia has a cmmitment in Syria r cnstructin wrk n the Arab Gas Pipeline linking Egypt t Turkey, an it may view Syria as strategically signifcant r energy transit. On the ther han, Russian supprt r the Syrian aministratin has been alienating Mscw rm the majr energy-prucing states in the Mile East an the Gul (i nt rm Iran), with ptential wier eleterius eects n Russian hpes t knit tgether energy cartels with these states in the uture. Few accunts Russian cnuct in the Syria crisis avi mentin Russian access t the Tartus naval acility n the Syrian cast. Hwever, this naval supply an maintenance site eists as little mre than three ating piers (nly ne which is in service), a repair vessel n lan rm the Black Sea eet, warehuses, an barracks husing sme 50 persnnel. It is intene nly r temprary mring, repair an replenishment.49 A plan has been mte r a majr reurbishment the Tartus acility t allw Russian naval vessels a better, permanent base in the Meiterranean. But, like ther Russian plans r military utreach (such as ieas r CIS military integratin), this is likely t remain an eercise in imaginatin. Mst analysts view this naval lgistics supprt pint as symblic rather than practical value t the Russian Navy. It symblizes Russian geplitical inuence an gestrategic reach, being the last acility this kin utsie the CIS, set up n the basis an agreement in 1971. It epresses strategic nstalgia, reveale in Russian cmments that lsing the base will lea t the lss Russian inuence in the Meiterranean Sea an even ptins r the cntinuus presence Russian ships in mre istant ceans.50 This kin thinking helps eplain a series visits by Russian warships the Syrian cast since summer 2012 an the cnuct especially large-scale Russian war games, invlving all ur Russian eets, in the Meiterranean Sea in January 2013. Hwever, espite such psturing, Russia has alreay prepare the grun, thrugh negtiatins with Lebann, r shiting prt calls by Russian naval vessels t Beirut, while access t Tartus is wngrae r security reasns.51 By February 2013, as fghting rew clser t Tartus, the chie sta the Free Syrian Army annunce that his rces wul target Russian ships since they were supplying the Syrian regime with weapns an eperts, thugh the Tartus acility itsel wul nt be attacke. The Russian general sta ha previusly threatene that it ha the capabilities r ‘an apprpriate respnse’ t any attack n the Tartus acility. Even i Tartus is nt irectly targete, this raises the pssibility in principle Russia sening elite rces r the ‘legitimate eence Russian installatins’. 49 50 51
Intera-AVN military news agency, Mscw, 1 April 2011, BBC Mn FS1 FsuPl ME1 MEPl sv. Russian military-iplmatic surce, Intera-AVN military news agency, Mscw, 3 Aug. 2012, BBC Mn FS1 FsuPl ME1 MEPl hb. Russian military news agency Intera-AVN military news agency, Mscw, 22 March 2013.
807 International Afairs 89: 4, 2013 Copyright © 2013 The Author(s). International Afairs © 2013 The Royal Institute o International Afairs.
Roy Allison This wul be a prvcative scenari an ne prne t escalatin, since in a civil war (as Russia escribes the Syria crisis) an utsie pwer shul ismantle r abann its military acilities rather than intervene militarily n the gruns prtecting them an s becme eectively a participant in the hstilities.52 Inee, in June 2013 Mscw annunce that it ha replace all its military persnnel at the Tartus acility with civilian wrkers. It has been suggeste that the rle Russian naval vessels the Syrian cast has been t prvie an arme escrt r arms shipments t Syria an ‘t prevent a pssible western-le naval blckae rm impsing an embarg’.53 The Russian general sta may be incline twars this lgic, thugh Russian iplmats cul regar a shw naval rce mre braly as a means t strengthen Russia’s han bere any negtiatins ver Syria’s uture. By spring 2013 the epane Russian naval eplyment in the eastern Meiterranean, patrlling waters near Tartus (10–15 vessels at any ne time), was icult t ignre.54 Mscw talke an ‘peratinal suarn’ being assemble which wul act as ‘a lever r ur leaership r ensuring stability in this regin’.55 While it is tempting t view this as mere muscle-eing, in practice the primary rle these naval crat eventually may turn ut t be, alngsie Russian military transprt aviatin, the evacuatin Russian citizens rm Syria.
Geopolitics and regional order in the Middle East Russian naval cntacts with Syria inicate Mscw’s inclinatin t think in geplitical terms an strategic interests in the Mile East, even in relatin t a crisis which is pre-eminently ne mestic state authrity. This reects years Russian supprt r Syria an Hamas, which has given the Kremlin ptential strategic ptins in the Mile East peace prcess t cunter US r western plicy an s t burnish its creentials as an inispensable Great Pwer in this strategic regin. Since the en the 2000s, hwever, Russia has perceive the cus rivalry arun Syria ierently, as vershawe by the risk western cnict with Iran. Mscw presents western plicy twars Syria as shaw-bing. In Lavrv’s wrs, western accusatins against Assa ‘are a cver r a gran geplitical game … Many have in min nt s much Syria as Iran. They penly say that it is necessary t eprive Iran a very clse ally.’56 Russian leaers suspect that the tppling Assa is just part a braer western strategy r estabilizatin r cnict with Iran, with which Russia has a much mre imprtant relatinship than Syria. 52 53 54
55
56
Russian general sta in Intera-AVN military news agency, Mscw, 27 July 2012, BBC Mn FS1 FsuPl ME1 MEPl k; Aleaner Shumilin, ‘A ship leaing t escalatin in Syria’, Moscow Times, 18 June 2012. Felgenhauer, ‘Mscw reay r a cnrntatin’. ‘Russia raises stakes in Syria’, Wall Street Journal , 17 May 2013. Fr etails the grupings vessels invlve, see reprts by Intera-AVN military news agency, Mscw, 23 April an 8 May 2013, BBC Mn FS1 FsuPl Me1 MEPl gyl an BBC Mn FS1 FsuPl sv. Cl.-Gen. Aleksanr Pstnikv, eputy chie the Russian General Sta, escribing a briefng t NATO n the Russian naval presence in the Meiterranean: Intera-AVN military news agency, Mscw, 20 May 2013, BBC Mn FS1 FsuPl stu. Interview with Lavrv, Rossiyskaya gazeta website, Mscw, 23 Oct. 2012, p. 8, BBC Mn FS1 FsuPl ME1 MEPl 261012 ms/sc.
808 International Afairs 89: 4, 2013 Copyright © 2013 The Author(s). International Afairs © 2013 The Royal Institute o International Afairs.
Russia and Syria Mscw als views this macr strategy as cnsistent with the reginal agena Saui Arabia an Qatar, which sets up Syria as the site a pry war braly efne alng a Sunni–Shi’a ais.57 These interlinke relatins pse the risk an escalating crisis r Russia. Iran has mae unilateral eclaratins suggesting that there eists a e act alliance between Russia an Iran in eence the Assa regime. Mscw has avie such language. But it es argue that Iran shul be part the slutin t the Syrian crisis an at the same time ears that Syria cul catalyse a larger western cnict with Iran, t which Russia cul fn itsel an unintene party. Even i pen cnict with Iran is avie, Russia must be aware that it risks serius amage t its burgening relatins with Israel i it appears as clearly aligne with Iran ver Syria. Russia has been careul t characterize its arms supplies t Syria as ‘eensive’. Yet ‘Mscw has never cmpletely rule ut the pssibility that such restraint cul shit i geplitical circumstances change’.58 This has been implie in Russian respnses t the EU ecisin in May 2013 t lit its embarg n arms supplies t the Syrian ppsitin. Anther uncertainty is hw ar Russian arms r Syria are unerwritten fnancially by Iran, r even in sme cases actually elivere n t Iran, circumventing UN sanctins n the latter state. All this heightens the risks Russian entanglement in any western shwwn with Iran. Overall, r many years Mscw has retaine inuence in Syria in cnseuence bth Syria’s heightene sense insecurity an its islatin rm the West. Putin still hpes t beneft rm keeping the Syrian regime in this psitin an t ensure that Russia remains a strategic actr in Mile Eastern iplmacy by leveraging its access t Syria. Hwever, this is nly pssible i the Assa regime remains intact. Russia nw fns, mrever, that mst Arab League cuntries an the Gul states are arraye against its Syria plicy. Inee, Russia’s cllapsing image amng these states is seriusly weakening its geplitical creit in the wier Mile East, althugh Russian cials seem in enial abut this utcme in their public statements.
Russian state order and the narrative of Islamist threats Russian cials have reuently justife their psitin in the Syria crisis as a bulwark internatinal an reginal rer against the threat state cllapse, chas an the sprea transnatinal Islamist netwrks. Althugh the emphasis has been n uphling the Syrian state (purprtely the state rather than just the regime), this Russian narrative has als been assciate with the stability the Russian state thrugh suggestins that Islamist threats might spill ver t the Russian Nrth Caucasus regin. The Russian leaership presents the cnict within an increasingly arun Syria, especially its Sunni–Shi’a Alawite ivisin, as a micrcsm a wier 57 58
Trenin, ‘The mythical alliance’, pp. 14–15. Dannreuther, ‘Russia an the Mile East’, pp. 554–5.
809 International Afairs 89: 4, 2013 Copyright © 2013 The Author(s). International Afairs © 2013 The Royal Institute o International Afairs.
Roy Allison challenge. Mscw may share Tehran’s wrries abut a serius weakening the ‘Shi’a crescent’ that Iran has hpe t rm with Ira, Syria an Lebann. In cmmn with Iran, which als supprts Assa, Russia certainly is anius abut the prspect a Mile East minate in mestic plitics by the Muslim Brtherh. The Muslim Brtherh has been n Mscw’s list prscribe terrrist rganizatins since 2003 r its suppse rle in the Nrth Caucasus uring the Chechen war. Since the Muslim Brtherh has becme a minant rce in Egyptian plitics, hwever, Lavrv has argue rather trtuusly that while its actins remain prhibite n Russian territry, there are n rmal restrictins n Russian cial cntacts with the Brtherh abra.59 Russia escribes Sunni etremism in Syria as an etensin wier netwrks in the Muslim wrl. In ialgue with western states Mscw insists that the fghting in Syria increasingly invlves mre etreme Sunni grups, which in turn encurages the Syrian ppsitin at large t rely n a military slutin as they have cme t epen mre n these Islamist actins.60 This line argument has graually becme mre persuasive. The insurgent actin Jabhat al-Nusra, which has becme a particularly ealy an eective cmbatant against the Syrian regime, plege its allegiance in April 2013 t the Al-Qaea leaer Ayman al-Zawahiri an has been esignate a terrrist rganizatin by the Unite States.61 The transnatinal links ther raical Islamist structures which hpe t transrm Syria int an Islamic state, such as Ahrar al-Sham, are less clear.62 At the reginal level at least there is evience that Sunni Salafst leaers utsie Syria are trying t raise an supprt militias r cmbat against the Assa regime. The Lebanese Salafst cleric Shaykh Ahma al-Assir, r eample, has been mbilizing an arme militia t jin the uprising in Syria an cunteract the ptential rle Hezbllah.63 The Syrian regime claims that ‘ne al-Qaea’s branches is cnucting the main cmbat actins in Syria an it has brught int Syria militants rm twentyeight cuntries, incluing rm Chechnya’.64 Russia agrees that Al-Qaea an terrrist grups with similar ielgical mtivatins have becme much mre active in Syria. In spring 2013 Lavrv state eplicitly that Jabhat al-Nusra was receiving ‘a lt utsie fnancing, a lt arms’.65 Fleshing ut this cncern, a Russian analyst escribe the situatin in Syria as a Green Internatinal, with sme 300 arme ppsitin grups an actins ‘all cntesting each ther r cntrl ver fnancial ws rm Libya, Saui Arabia, an Qatar, r the reistributin 59 60 61 62 63 64 65
Lavrv in interview with Egyptian newspaper Al Ahram, 5 Nv. 2012, at http://www.mi.ru, accesse 5 Jan. 2013. Lavrv at press cnerence, 16 July 2012, at http://www.mi.ru, accesse 5 Jan. 2013. ‘Inuence Islamists in Syrian rebellin cmplicates plicy’, New York Times International Weekly, 5 May 2013, p. 2. See ‘Ahrar al-Sham: a prfle Nrthern Syria’s al-Qaea surrgate’, Terrorism Monitor (Jamestwn Funatin) 11: 7, 4 April 2013. Chris Zambelis, ‘Lebanese Salafst cleric rganizes militia rays int Syria’, Terrorism Monitor (Jamestwn Funatin) 11: 10, 27 May 2013. Syrian reign minister Wali Muallem, at news cnerence with Sergei Lavrv, RIA Nvsti, 25 Feb. 2013, http://en.ria.ru/russia/20130225/1799674039.html, accesse 20 Feb. 2013. Russian eputy reign minister G. Gatilv, 1 Dec. 2012, an Russian reign ministry representative, 6 Nv. 2012, bth at http://www.mi.ru; Lavrv interview r Foreign Policy, publishe 29 April 2013, at http:// www.mi.ru, accesse 10 May 2013.
810 International Afairs 89: 4, 2013 Copyright © 2013 The Author(s). International Afairs © 2013 The Royal Institute o International Afairs.
Russia and Syria arms supplies, an r plitical minatin’.66 Russian cials represent this phenmenn as part a multiacete mern terrrist threat epresse in events in Libya, Mali an Algeria uring 2012–2013.67 Raical Sunni grups have been clashing with Shi’i Hezbllah fghters eening Assa’s regime. In spring 2013 the Syrian army an Lebanese Hezbllah militants ught tgether in an ensive against the rebel-hel twn Qusayr 5 miles rm Lebann’s nrthern brer, which resulte in the recapture the twn rm rebel rces.68 Such cnstellatins rces cmpun the angers sectarian warare in Syria an the likelih the gegraphic sprea turmil t the wier Mile East, rawing in Lebann an ther states brering Syria. It als threatens t mesh the Israeli–Iranian stan- int the Syrian cnict. Israeli air strikes n Syrian territry have epse the angers Hezbllah acuiring sphisticate arms rm Syrian stckpiles, r rm Iran via Syria. Israeli strikes in January 2013, accring t western meia reprts, were irecte against a cnvy Russian-mae anti-aircrat missiles estine r Hezbllah.69 Further pwerul air strikes against sites near Damascus in May 2013 reprtely targete a suspecte cnsignment Iranian guie missiles.70 Russia has trie t ismiss the cntrversy ver its arms supplies t Damascus an has been reticent abut the Hezbllah presence in Syria. Mscw claims that uner its agreements with Syria it checks that the weapns it supplies are being use r their eclare purpse, in the hans gvernment rces, an that the nature the Russian cntracts with Syria ‘enable[s] us t mnitr an ensure that weapns we supply will nt be rware t any thir parties’.71 The Syrian military, r its part, argues that thse surace-t-air missile systems they amit t pssessing, such as the Buk-M2, remain uner their strict cntrl an that there is n pssibility that Hezbllah might acuire them. This es nt seem t cnvince Israel (r, perhaps, western pwers). But it is a necessary argument t buttress the Russian claim that it is trying t limit the epansin the zne vilence an chas in an arun Syria an t blck the sprea sectarian warare. T the etent that such sectarianism ers scpe r transnatinal terrrist rganizatins, Russia warns that the elivery sphisticate ‘illegal’ arms t the Syrian ppsitin thrugh thir cuntries is particularly angerus. S ‘legal’ arms supplies are stabilizing, r at least ‘balancing’, while ‘illegal’ nes suppsely have the ppsite eect. A specifc ispute, r eample, centres n man-prtable air eence systems. The Russian general sta claims such 66 67
68 69 70 71
Aleaner Aksenynk, ‘Syria as a mirrr the changing wrl rer’, Russia in Global Afairs, n. 1, Jan.– March 2013, p. 2, http://eng.glbalaairs.ru, accesse 7 June 2013. Russian presient’s special representative n internatinal cperatin in cunterterrrism an transnatinal rganise crime, Aleksanr Zmeyevsky, as reprte in Johnson’s Russia List, 4 Feb. 2013, 2013.23, http://archive. cnstantcntact.cm/s053/1102820649387/archive/1102911694293.html, accesse 7 June 2013. ‘Evience munts reigners fghting t help Assa regime’, The Times, 23 Jan. 2013, p. 26; ‘Hezbllah jins rnt line as battle rages r key twn hel by rebels’, The Times, 21 May 2013, p. 26. ‘Russia cncerne by reprts Israeli air strike n Syria’, RIA Nvsti, 31 Jan. 2013, http://en.ria.ru/ russia/20130131/179141261.html, accesse 7 June 2013. ‘Israel carries ut secn air strike in Syria’, Guardian, 5 May 2013. As state by eputy irectr the Feeral Service r Military-Technical Cperatin, Vyacheslav Dzirkaln, Intera-AVN military news agency, Mscw, 14 May 2013, BBC Mn FS1 FsuPl stu.
811 International Afairs 89: 4, 2013 Copyright © 2013 The Author(s). International Afairs © 2013 The Royal Institute o International Afairs.
Roy Allison systems, incluing Stinger missiles, have un their way t Syrian rebel grups an might be use by Free Syrian Army leaers against civilian aircrat.72 A mre serius threat still, which cul catalyse an interventin by majr pwers, is that the prlieratin chemical weapns rm the large arsenal these hel by the Syrian gvernment. Lavrv has rejecte the pssibility chemical weapns being use by the current Syrian regime, which in itsel cul trigger a western interventin, an has claime that Mscw has receive ‘uite serius assurances’ t this eect rm Damascus. Fr him, the threat wul grw ‘nly in ne case—i chemical weapns all int the hans terrrists’ in Syria.73 Ater uncnfrme reprts that a missile cntaining chemical agents ha been fre int a village near Alepp in March 2013 Russia ismisse Syrian rebel claims that the gvernment ha use chemical weapns. Instea, Mscw epresse serius cncern that these weapns ha been acuire by the ‘arme ppsitin’ in Syria.74 By implying that erts by Damascus t saeguar Syrian chemical weapns arsenals are ailing, this line nly reinrces the nee r eternal pwers t plan r ecisive erts t stabilize the situatin. This kin claim uels the cntrversy ver the rle Jabhat al-Nusra an like-mine grups. It als raws attentin t the vulnerability stckpiles Syrian chemical munitins i Assa’s regime were t cllapse in isarray. With this in min, US Vice-Presient Je Bien was reprte in February 2013 t have prpse t Lavrv that Russia an the Unite States wrk jintly t maintain secure cntrl chemical weapns in Syria i Assa were t all. 75 Hwever, Russia turns this lgic arun an presents the prlieratin anger as a reasn t try t avi any urther weakening the Syrian state an its security apparatus. Mscw rejecte as uncnvincing a US intelligence assessment, presente in June 2013, that the Assa regime ha use ealy sarin nerve gas n a small scale n multiple ccasins against rebel fghters. Fr Russia, nt nly the Islamist (rea: terrrist) imensin the Syrian ppsitin but the sectarian nature fghting in Syria is use as an argument against erts t unseat Assa. Russian analysts preict that epsing Assa ‘wul nt lea t the en the civil war, but nly the beginning its net phase’; the Syrian gvernment an the ppsitin will just switch rles an cnict will cntinue.76 The establishment cmmentatr Anranik Migranyan warns that in this case prcesses in Syria ‘cul easily spill ver int Lebann an Ira an cul invlve Iran, Turkey an Israel in the cnict’.77 Lavrv agrees that inter-ethnic an inter-religius strie cul rapily spill ver ‘t embrace the entire regin’.78 72
73 74
75 76 77 78
Statement by Army General Niklai Makarv, Intera-AVN military news agency, Mscw, 24 Oct. 2012, BBC Mn Alert FS1 MCU MW1 MEPl 241012 ym; Russian reign ministry statement, 25 Oct. 2012, at http://www.mi.ru; Lavrv, 6 Nv. 2012, at http://www.mi.ru, accesse 10 March 2013. Questins uring visit t Amman, Jran, 6 Nv. 2012, http://www.mi.ru, accesse 10 March 2013. Russian reign ministry statement, RIA Nvsti, 19 March 2013,http://en.ria.ru/wrl/20130319/180117137. html, accesse 7 June 2013. On pssible military respnses by the US t allege evience chemical weapns use by Damascus, see Guardian, 27 April 2013, p. 20. ‘Invlving Russia in Syria’, Washington Post, 4 Feb. 2013. Trenin, ‘The mythical alliance’, p. 11. Izvestiya, 25 June 2012. Interview r Russia Tay TV, 21 June 2012; Johnson’s Russia List , 22 June 2012, 2012.113, http://archive. cnstantcntact.cm/s053/1102820649387/archive/1102911694293.html, accesse 7 June 2013.
812 International Afairs 89: 4, 2013 Copyright © 2013 The Author(s). International Afairs © 2013 The Royal Institute o International Afairs.
Russia and Syria The veteran Russian Mile East specialist Gergiy Mirskiy has alreay interprete the cnict in reginal terms as essentially an ert by Saui Arabia an Qatar t verthrw an Alawite pr-Iranian regime. Were this t succee, he laments, there wul be a prlnge guerrilla, terrrist war, which wul evelp int an apcalyptic war between religius cmmunities. 79 By 2013 sme Russian analysts were speculating abut the pssible cllapse the Syrian state, suggesting that this wul result in reginal threats t the structures pwer in Ira an Lebann an t the mnarchy in Jran, an the ‘eventual rerawing the entire map the Mile East’. Part the mi wul be greater vlatility in Turkish reign an mestic plicy in respnse t a perceive challenge rm the pssible emergence a sel-gverning Kurish area in Syria an the nee t manage huge numbers crss-brer Syrian reugees.80 Such analyses vetail with a narrative by Russian cials accring t which chas an the breakwn state structures in Muslim lans, cuple with the sprea Islamist netwrks, threaten t ee back t Russia. Even bere the Libyan crisis became acute, Lavrv was arguing that ‘the mre the Mile East gets unstable, the higher is the risk peple with malicius purpses causing us truble’. 81 The Russian Security Cuncil secretary an rmer Feeral Security Service (FSB) hea, Niklay Patrushev, presents the same message: Islamism an the raicalizatin states aecte by the Arab Spring may turn them int a centre terrrism. This wul result in mre terrrism an militants in several Russian regins. Russian specialists reer t yung religius activists in the Nrth Caucasus, with tens thusans llwers, wh supprt the Syrian ppsitin thrugh nline articles, ashmbs an emnstratins, an vehemently criticize the cial Russian psitin n Syria.82 Such assessments cme at a time when, espite Putin’s assertins t the cntrary, the Nrth Caucasus is ar mre unstable an threatening t Mscw’s cntrl than even a year earlier, rm Dagestan in the east t Aygea in the west.83 Nn-Russian specialists r the mst part view this eteriratin as rte in cnitins internal t the Russian Feeratin an nt instigate rm abra. Yet r Putin himsel, sme have argue, Syria is reminiscent Chechnya uring its rmer years struggle with Mscw; Putin perceives Syria as ‘the latest battlegrun in a glbal, multi-ecae struggle between secular states an Sunni Islamism’.84 It seems icult r the Russian security elite t issciate the Syrian cnict rm Russia’s wn eperience Sunni insurgency. This perceptin is reinrce by the Syrian leaership’s perspective n the Nrth Caucasus. Syria has cnsistently supprte Mscw’s plicy in this vlatile regin. It strngly cnemne the Chechen insurgents as terrrists. Razman Kayrv, 79
Argumenty nedeli, 28 June 2012; Johnson’s Russia List, 27 June 2012, 2012.15. Aksenynk, ‘Syria as a mirrr the changing wrl rer’, p. 3. 81 Intera, 2 March 2011, Johnson’s Russia List, 3 March 2011, 2011.39. 82 ‘Syria as a terrrism hub: ptential threats t Russia’, http://valaiclub.cm/mile_east/57782.html, accesse 7 June 2013. 83 Paul Gble, ‘Nrth Caucasus mre unstable an mre threatening t Mscw nw than a year ag’, North Caucasus Weekly ( Jamestwn Funatin) 14: 1, 18 Jan. 2013. 84 Fina Hill, ‘The real reasns Putin supprts Assa: mistaking Syria r Chechnya’, http://www.reignaairs. cm/articles/139079/fna-hill/the-real-reasn-putin-supprts-assa, 25 March 2013, accesse 30 March 2013. 80
813 International Afairs 89: 4, 2013 Copyright © 2013 The Author(s). International Afairs © 2013 The Royal Institute o International Afairs.
Roy Allison the autcratic leaer Chechnya, visite Syria as a welcme guest in March 2010. I Assa were swept away, Russia can epect neither a emcratic nr a Sunni unamentalist regime in Damascus t be s sympathetic twars Mscw ver its apprach t the insurgency in the Nrth Caucasus.85 But this leaves a para. As Katz argues, i Sunnis at large cme t view Russia as respnsible r the ppressin thse sharing their belies in Syria, they cul retaliate by supprting Sunni ppsitin grups in the Nrth Caucasus an elsewhere in Russia. Cnseuently, ‘Russian supprt r the Alawite minrity regime in Syria risks unermining Putin’s mst imprtant reign plicy achievement with respect t the Mile East: keeping the Nrth Caucasus the internatinal Muslim agena causes t supprt’.86 Russia risks a angerus ‘blwback’ rm its Syrian plicy. Sme transnatinal links between the Nrth Caucasus an Syria may be evelping as the killings cntinue in Syria. Chechens i nt fght against Gaaf in Libya, a cnict where bth sies were Sunni. But since ne imensin the fght in Syria is between Sunnis an Alawite Shi’is, this arguably makes it easier r Chechens as Sunnis t take part in the cnict there. Since autumn 2012 there has been evience a number Chechens in several grups fghting in Syria against Assa, althugh Kayrv has enie this. The Chechen rebel leaer Dku Umarv has escribe this venture as a iversin rm the pririty jiha in Chechnya, ne which acts t ragment the mujahideen rces.87 Hwever, Chechens nt seem t have travelle irectly rm Chechnya specifcally t fght in Syria. Mst Chechens wh have jine this cnict ha travelle t the Mile East previusly, claiming they wishe t stuy in Islamic institutins. Mrever, there are fghters rm almst all the ethnic grups the Nrth Caucasus an even ethnic Tatars represente in militant grups in Syria.88 The bmbings in Bstn in April 2013, cnucte by tw yung ethnic i epatriate Chechens, have encurage a new Russian line argument. Sn ater this shcking event n US territry, a Russian cial speculate that the Chechens fghting in Syria n the sie the insurgents, suggeste mst implausibly t number between 600 an 6,000, an escribe as carrying ut terrrist acts in Syria, might in the uture ‘turn their han t cmpletely ierent cuntries’.89 A mnth later the Russian military intelligence chie claime that Syrian ppsitin activists inclue a grwing number supprters an arme jiha rm Eurpe. He preicte that with their eventual return t their cuntries they wul be able t use the cmbat eperience they acuire in Syria n the Eurpean cntinent.90 85 86 87 88
89 90
Mark N. Katz, ‘Putin’s reign plicy twars Syria’, Middle East Review o International Afairs 10: 1, March 2006, p. 8. Mark N. Katz, ‘Mscw an the Mile East: repeat perrmance?’, Russia in Global Afairs, n. 3, July–Sept. 2012, p. 4. ‘Chechens are amng reigners fghting t verthrw Bashar al-Assa’, Eurasia Daily Monitor (Jamestwn Funatin) 9: 219, 30 Nv. 2012, http://www.eurasia.rg. ‘Chechen insurgency leaer Dku Umarv tells Chechens nt t fght in Syria’, Eurasia Daily Monitor (Jamestwn Funatin) 10: 59, 29 March 2013, http://www.eurasia.rg. This reprt surmises that there may be several hunre Chechens fghting in Syria. Vlaimir Ktlyar, member the Russian reign ministry Internatinal Law Cuncil, interviewe in Kommersant-FM , 19 April 2013. Lt-Gen. Igr Sergun, chie the Main Intelligence Directrate the Russian General Sta, Intera, 23 May 2013, Johnson’s Russia List, 24 May 2013.
814 International Afairs 89: 4, 2013 Copyright © 2013 The Author(s). International Afairs © 2013 The Royal Institute o International Afairs.
Russia and Syria The implicatin is that Islamist ppsitin grups in Syria, given sustenance by western states’ plicy twars the Assa regime, might nt nly ee back t Russia’s Nrth Caucasus but als cme t threaten western states, rather n the mel Al-Qaea’s earlier assciatin with the anti-Sviet western supprte mujahideen in Aghanistan.
Russian state order and the narrative of orchestrated regime change There is anther eplanatin Russian cmmitment t the Assa regime in terms Russian state rer. The argument here is that Putin’s eternal plicy in the Syria crisis, the justifcatins he ers r the supprt incumbent i illiberal regimes, his aversin t prjecting eternal stanars (emcratic r therwise) r the legitimacy rulers an his insistence n the illegality plicies prmting regime change all reect his preccupatin with central plitical cntrl in Mscw. All this is epresse in Russian statements privileging ‘cnstitutinal rer’. As the cnict in Syria eepene in the secn hal 2012, Russian cials an punits cntinue t argue that any resignatin by Assa wul lea t chas in Syria, an that Assa still ha the supprt the majrity Syrians. In a tw-hur meeting with Obama in June that year Putin spent a lt time pinting t what the Russians viewe as aile eamples plitical transitin in Egypt an Libya, an t their cncern at the lack any creible plan r what wul happen t Syria’s varius battling actins an ethnic grups i Assa steppe wn rm pwer. Behin this was a eterminatin t preserve the basic structure the Syrian regime an state at the epense any ntin emcratic legitimacy. Putin set the tne sn ater his meeting with Obama, justiying authritarianism an scng at emcracy prmtin in the Mile East. ‘Lk at the map the regin,’ he ehrte, arming inaccurately: ‘there are mnarchies everywhere an this basically crrespns with the mentality the peple, as well as lngstaning practice.’91 With this lgic in min, the Russian analyst Aleaner Glts argues that ‘Putin ientifes with Assa, rmer Libyan presient Mammar Gaaf an rmer Egyptian presient Hsni Mubarek. He is frmly cnvince that emcracy, the rule law an human rights are all little mre than cntrivances that allw the West t cntrl weaker natins.’ 92 Arun Putin thers then eer t this view. This is rather a stark argument. Hwever, it helps t make sense Lavrv’s astnishing praise Gaaf’s regime a year previusly as ‘uite stable, ecnmically sustainable, an scially acceptable t the peple’.93 Ocially, hwever, Russian leaers er an instrumental argument r supprting incumbent regimes: the alternative is t pen a Panra’s b, t unleash chas. Lavrv pse a series rhetrical uestins at the 2013 Munich Security Cnerence: 91 92 93
‘Fr Putin, principle vs practicality n Syria’, New York Times, 5 July 2012. Aleaner Glts, ‘Putin between Assa an Mubarek’, Moscow Times, 7 June 2012. Interview in Rossiyskaya gazeta, 11 July 2011, als at http://www.mi.ru, 11 July 2011, accesse 25 Oct. 2012.
815 International Afairs 89: 4, 2013 Copyright © 2013 The Author(s). International Afairs © 2013 The Royal Institute o International Afairs.
Roy Allison Wh amng the rulers [in the Near East an Nrth Arica] is legitimate, an wh is nt? When is it acceptable t cperate with authritarian regimes … an when is it allwe t supprt their vilent verthrw? In what cases is it neee t acknwlege the rces that came t pwer as a result a emcratic electin, an in what cases t reuse cntacting them? What are the criteria an stanars etermining all this? 94
Mscw insiste that in the absence cmmn rules n such uestins, the ‘verall bjective’ r the regin shul be ‘preventing the cllapse an isappearance secular states an the cming raicals an etremists t pwer’.95 This stance is cnsistent with Russia’s critical view the atermath Gaaf’s verthrw an its nervusness ver the rle the Muslim Brtherh in Egypt. It als helps eplain Mscw’s suen an easily btaine supprt r the French military interventin in Mali in January 2013.96 In this case Russia ha mae clear in April 2012 that it supprte the territrial integrity an stateh Mali an the restratin cnstitutinal rer in the cuntry.97 Russia perceive a ual challenge in Mali: Tuareg separatism, with the risk state cllapse, an the assciatin this with mre raical Islamist grups. Russia prclaime the French peratin as legitimate, while epecting it t be limite an temprary. 98 Fr Mscw it was signifcant that it was the svereign gvernment Mali which reueste an interventin. This gave the appeal a legal staning that bth the Syrian Natinal Cuncil an the Syrian Natinal Calitin have lacke in their erts t attract eternal assistance r their cause.99 The Russian supprt r ‘regime security’ als has a reign plicy imensin at the reginal level the CIS. There is an ech here the sliarity Russia ere t illiberal CIS leaers in the secn hal the 2000s when they were nervus abut the avance ‘clur revlutins’ in Gergia, Ukraine an Kyrgyzstan.100 While western states claim that Assa’s regime, espite its clse links with Russia, has reite its plitical legitimacy, Putin an his enturage seek t reassure Russian partners in ther parts the wrl, such as Central Asia, that the supprt they receive rm Mscw will remain frm. This reassurance applies, r eample, t the lng-serving Kazakh an Uzbek leaers, wh wish t ensure a sae successin t their rule in ue curse that will prtect the interests their amilies an assciates.101 Authritarian CIS leaers, 94
Lavrv’s speech at 49th Munich security cnerence, 2 Feb. 2013, at http://www.mi.ru, accesse 5 May 2013. Lavrv at press cnerence, Mscw, 23 Jan. 2012, at http://www.mi.ru, accesse 5 March 2013. 96 UN Security Cuncil Reslutin 2085, SC/10870, http://www.un.rg?News/Press/cs//2012/sc10870.c. htm, accesse 7 June 2013. 97 Statement by Lavrv, ‘Mscw hails Mali plitical agreement’, RIA Nvsti, 9 April 2012, http://en.rian. ru/wrl/20120409/172709490.html, accesse 7 June 2013; Mikhail Margelv, Russian presiential aviser n Arica, ‘Russia uphls Mali’s territrial integrity’, RIA Nvsti, 6 April 2012, http://en.rian.ru/russia/ 21020406/172654558.html, accesse 10 April 2013. 98 Lavrv n Russia TV, Mscw, 10 Feb. 2013, at http://www.mi.ru, 16 Feb. 2013, accesse 20 Feb. 2013. 99 See Rachel Branenburg, ‘Military interventin in Mali vs. Syria: when is the path rcky r pave?’, Unite States Institute Peace, 6 Feb. 2013, http://www.usip.rg/print/publicatins/military-interventin-in-malivs-syria-when-the-path-rcky-r-pave, accesse 7 June 2013. 100 See Allisn, Russia, the West and military intervention , pp. 133–8. 101 As argue by Niklas K. Gvsev, ‘Why Russia wn’t abann Syria’, The National Interest , 29 June 2012, http://natinalinterest.rg, accesse 7 June 2013. 95
816 International Afairs 89: 4, 2013 Copyright © 2013 The Author(s). International Afairs © 2013 The Royal Institute o International Afairs.
Russia and Syria incluing Aleksaner Lukashenk in Belarus an Ilham Aliyev in Azerbaijan, have been isturbe by the prspects transnatinal spillver rm the Arab Spring t their states, an they have sught t cunteract such threats t ‘cnstitutinal rer’ thrugh crinatin with Russia.102 Russia has ere supprt bilaterally an thrugh reginal structures, hping that this will be translate int greater reign plicy synergy with its CIS partners. At a meeting which iscusse the Arab Spring in August 2011, r eample, the secretary-general the Russia-le Cllective Security Treaty Organizatin (CSTO) praise the ‘great attentin’ nw pai by CSTO leaers ‘t the issues raising sliarity an mutual supprt in the rganisatin’s wrk, particularly in the sphere reign plicy’.103 Finally, there is the uestin the Russian leaership’s perceptin challenges t central plitical cntrl in Mscw an the ptential impacts n this i the verthrw yet anther authritarian regime were t be legitimize internatinally. As early as February 2011 Presient Meveev, aressing the Russian Natinal Cunterterrrism Cmmittee, claime that the scenari unling in the Arab states ha been prepare r Russia t by certain ‘script-writers’. This implie a cnscius cnspiracy r rchestratin actin. But the ‘rganizatin a Mile East scenari in Russia will ail’, he intne.104 The same mnth, Lavrv tl an auience in Lnn n cue that ‘calls r revlutins are cunterpructive … we believe we n’t nee t impse revlutins n thers’. 105 Ater the verthrw Gaaf the chie the Russian general sta, Army General Niklai Makarv, bluntly claime that ‘the leaers sme cuntries’ were cntinuing t use the techniue the ‘clur revlutins’ t avance their strategic interests by remving unesirable plitical regimes (in Libya, Egypt, Tunisia an Yemen). He preicte that the same techniues might later be applie t Russia an its allies.106 This suggests that, since the uster Presient Mubarak an thrughut the Syria crisis, the angers a highly persnalize plitical system, characterize by a strng centralizatin real plitical pwer, have resnate amng the Russian leaership.107 Just as the revlt in Syria began, a Levaa Centre pll un that 38 per cent Russians think the s-calle ‘Egypt scenari’ pssible in Russia, while a Public Opinin Funatin survey un that 49 per cent Russians are prepare t participate in prtest emnstratins.108 Even eputies rm the Kremlin-rienly ‘ppsitin’ in Russia, in the Just Russia party, have pinte t 102
Stephen Blank an Carl R. Saivetz, ‘Playing t lse? Russia an the “Arab Spring”’, Problems o PostCommunism 59: 1, Jan.–Feb. 2012, pp. 8–10. 103 Descriptin by Niklai Bryuzha inrmal CSTO meeting, Kazakh Khabar TV, 12 Aug. 2011, BBC Mn Alert CAU 120811 ak/hsh. 104 Aress t meeting the Russian Natinal Cunterterrrism Cmmittee in Vlaikavkaz, as reprte in Moskovsky komsomolets, 24 Feb. 2011. 105 Statement by Lavrv ater meetings with the British Prime Minister an Freign Secretary, 15 Feb. 2011, Johnson’s Russia List, 16 Feb. 2011, 2011.23. 106 Reprt by Makarv t the Russian Public Chamber, in Kommersant, 18 Nv. 2011, p. 2. 107 Fr a iscussin this issue, see Fina Hill, ‘Hw Russia an China see the Egyptian revlutin’, 15 Feb. 2011, http://www.reignplicy.cm /articles/2011/02/15/hw_russia_an_china_see_the_egyptian_revlutin, accesse 10 March 2013. 108 ‘Authritarian Russia watches as Mile East unravels’, Rai Free Eurpe/Rai Liberty Reprt, 3 March 2011.
817 International Afairs 89: 4, 2013 Copyright © 2013 The Author(s). International Afairs © 2013 The Royal Institute o International Afairs.
Roy Allison a cmmn threat linking Russia t the cuntries where uprisings have ccurre— the lack electral legitimacy.109 A Russian critic presents Putin’s ilemma starkly: ‘Putin views any attempt t verthrw an authritarian regime as a clear vilatin the rules the game. He unerstans that he must fght t the en against the [mestic] prtest mvement because the mment he lets wn his guar, he cul fn himsel in the same psitin as Mubarak.’110 This may cntain a se liberal wishul thinking. Hwever, Putin’s cmmitment t a glbal rer which prizes the svereignty incumbent rulers remains t a large etent an eternal epressin his preccupatin with Russian mestic state rer. It is an utlk rte in the structure plitical pwer in Russia an it is share by thse in the elite wh have been empwere by Putin’s presiencies. It is central t unerstaning why, ater the initial shck the Arab Spring uprisings an ismay ver the rcible verthrw the Libyan regime, Putin has blcke iplmatic erts t legitimize r assist the verthrw Assa.
Conclusion Tp reign plicy ecisin-makers like Putin are unubtely inuence by structural cnsieratins in reginal an glbal plitics an their assessment material cnstraints an pprtunities. Many wul argue that their plicies are als shape by cnsieratins ientity, reecting cnitins within their wn state r jintly cnstructe with ther states. We fn in this analysis that Russia appears t take seriusly a calculus the strategic implicatins in the Mile East, gains an lsses, in respect its apprach t Syria, even i Russia’s irect cmmercial relatins with Syria are secnary imprtance. The Russian leaership eels n eep lyalty t r sliarity with its cunterpart in Damascus. But arguably parts the military–security establishment an natinalist pinin in Mscw view Russia’s relatinship with Syria as an imprtant vestige past graneur that shul be retaine an might still be leverage t reginal geplitical avantage r t uphl Russia’s glbal status as an inispensable pwer. These inuences are nt sucient, hwever, t eplain Putin’s unwillingness t renunce r cnemn the beleaguere Syrian regime uner Assa, t cast asie the iplmatic shiel Russia has prvie r it. T eplain this we nee t take int accunt als the Russian leaership’s aniety abut Russian state rer an perceive challenges t Russia’s mestic plitical structure. This aniety unerlies Mscw’s stark repuiatin mves twars regime change in reign states that are perceive t bear the imprint western states. This was a theme Russian iscurse thrugh the 2000s. It was reinrce by Mscw’s sense grievance ver the utcme military interventin in Libya. It has been ever present in Russian reerences t the legality an legitimacy internatinal respnses t the Syria crisis. 109 110
‘Authritarian Russia watches as Mile East unravels’, RFE/RL. Aleaner Glts, ‘Putin between Assa an Mubarek’, Moscow Times, 7 June 2012.
818 International Afairs 89: 4, 2013 Copyright © 2013 The Author(s). International Afairs © 2013 The Royal Institute o International Afairs.
Russia and Syria On ne level, Russian cials an analysts epress wrries that a chatic verthrw Assa will uel urther sectarianism, threaten state breakwn an epan the scpe r actin Sunni Islamist grupings, sme which might take up cause with the insurgency Russia is trying t suppress in the Nrth Caucasus. As a justifcatin r Russian plicy twars Syria, hwever, such claims abut spillver t the Nrth Caucasus may serve an instrumental purpse. They may reect sme real, i verblwn, perceptins within the Russian security services. But they may als be similar in unctin t the eaggerate Russian claims transnatinal Islamist r Al-Qaea-linke presence in the secn Chechen war, which were use t avert western attentin rm human rights vilatins in that cnict.111 A mre immeiate Russian cncern appears t be the urther empwerment Sunni r even Salafst raicalism in Mile Eastern plitics at the epense traitinal Russian ties t the regin. On anther level, we argue, Putin has been particularly lath t accept that any eternal stanars legitimacy may be applie t states, regarless their regime type, which might justiy erts t change their plitical structure r supprt r rebellins within such states. Only the mst natinalist, anti-western an unreective Russian cmmentatrs claim that the Arab Spring was smehw mente by western states. But the mainstream, cial Russian psitin is that neither the western pwers nr their Saui an Qatari reginal partners shul seek t epeite any mre ‘revlutins’ in states whse regimes they islike. Abve all, this epresses nervusness abut uture eternal pressures which reign states may eert r plitical change in Russia n the basis claims that Putin an his enturage lack plitical legitimacy. Putin’s elite is als unsettle by the eample which the verthrw yet anther authritarian ruler in Syria might er t mestic critics within Russia an ther illiberal CIS states. These cnclusins eplain the steaast, even intransigent, supprt Russia has prvie t the Assa regime since it initially sught t crush mestic plitical ppsitin in spring 2011. They er insight int Russian mtivatins an as such are inicative als the likely uture Russian rle in a crisis which has cme t threaten the wier Mile Eastern reginal rer as well as cnstituting an eceptinal humanitarian emergency. Fr Russia, averting a rcible eternal interventin in Syria has remaine a high pririty. The rapi egeneratin events in Syria int a civil war, in which neither party clearly has the upper han, has acilitate the Russian ert t thwart such an interventin thrugh its vet rights in the UN Security Cuncil. The blcking pwer Russia wiels in the UN is real, since the Obama aministratin appears t believe in the legitimacy ere by a UN manate r any signifcant use rce in the crisis, althugh in June 2013 Washingtn signalle its reainess t iscuss a range ptins with key reign allies, incluing a n-y zne ver Syria. 111
Allisn, Russia, the West and military intervention , pp. 91–4; Jhn Russell, ‘Eplitatin the “Islamic actr” in the Russ-Chechen cnicts bere an ater 11 September 2001’, European Security 11: 4, Winter 2002, pp. 96–109; James Hughes, ‘The Chechnya cnict: reem fghters r terrrists?’, Demokratizatsiya 15: 3, Summer 2007, p. 307; Svante Crnell, ‘Internatinal reactins t massive human rights vilatins: the case Chechnya’, Europe–Asia Studies 51: 1, 1999, pp. 85–100.
819 International Afairs 89: 4, 2013 Copyright © 2013 The Author(s). International Afairs © 2013 The Royal Institute o International Afairs.
Roy Allison Hwever, Russian appeals uring the crisis t the principle nn-interventin rte in the UN Charter have been rather rmulaic. Mscw knws it is n shaky legal grun in cntinuing t arm ne sie in a cnict which it efnes as a civil war. But, with its realpolitik utlk, it regars thse arms, especially sphisticate air eence systems, as anther eterrent t any eternal pwers that at sme stage might be tempte t siestep the UN an attempt rcible regime change in Syria. In this scenari, Russian military avisers assisting with S-300 missiles cul unctin as a tripwire rce. Any western actin which results in casualties amng them cul catalyse a eeper cnrntatin with Russia. Mrever, with the liting the EU embarg n arms supplies t the Syrian rebels at the en May 2013 Russian specialists have claime Russia is n lnger restricte t supplying just ‘eensive’ arms t Syria an all kins ther arms may be prvie t hnur earlier cntracts with the Syrian gvernment.112 Des this belligerent atmsphere leave pen ptins r Russian–western plitical cllabratin ver Syria? Russia speaks the nee r a transitinal gvernment, as reseen by the June 2012 Geneva Cmmuniué, with n precnitins n the rle Bashar al-Assa, while western pwers an the larger part the Syrian ppsitin have regare Assa’s replacement as a sine qua non r any serius negtiatin ver a transitinal gvernment. At the en the June 2013 G8 summit Putin nte that ‘we agree t push the parties t the negtiatins table’.113 But he may well be playing r time, hping r successes by Assa’s rces in reversing rebel military gains. Russia has remaine aamant that it will nt seek t persuae Assa t step wn, viewing this as illegitimate actin r regime change, an is hling ut r eibility n the western sie.114 In talks with Washingtn, Mscw has sught t fn cmmn grun in viliying an warning ‘etremist elements’ in the Syrian ppsitin wh are ‘betting n a military slutin’ an ‘are blcking any initiative leaing t a ialgue’.115 Yet Russia can nly epect that the w western-surce arms t the Syrian ppsitin will increase an becme mre eective. During May–June 2013 nt nly i the EU lit its embarg n supplying arms t the rebel rces in Syria, but Washingtn als prmise the ppsitin sme level military assistance. Mscw als knws that the Arab League has agree that its members have a right t arm these ppsitin grups (at a meeting in March 2013 the Arab League als transerre its Syrian seat t the rebels). A grwing view in Washingtn, Lnn 112
Ruslan Pukhv, irectr the Centre r the Analysis Strategies an Technlgies, Intera-AVN military news agency, 29 May 2013, BBC Mn FS1 FsuPl MW1 MEPl gv. The Russian eence minister, Army General Sergei Shigu, nte that ‘i ne sie lits the restrictins, the ther sie can cnsier itsel t be n lnger bun by its earlier bligatins’, Intera-AVN military news agency, Mscw, 29 May 2013, BBC Mn FS1 FsuPl ME1 MEPl gv. 113 ‘G-8 meeting ens with crial stalemate’, International Herald Tribune, 19 June 2013, p. 4. 114 As argue by Aleksey Pushkv, chairman the State Duma Cmmittee r Internatinal Aairs, ‘ur American riens are starting t shit t ur psitin … they have amitte that a cllapse the gvernance structure in Syria is raught with the mst negative cnseuences … The Americans have realize that i suenly everything cllapses, we will get anther Aghanistan’: RIA Nvsti, 13 Feb. 2013, in Johnson’s Russia List, 14 Feb. 2013, 2013.31. 115 Meeting between Russian Freign Minister Sergei Lavrv an US Secretary State Jhn Kerry, RIA Nvsti, 26 Feb. 2013, http://en.ria.ru/wrl/20130226/179702028.html, accesse 7 June 2013.
820 International Afairs 89: 4, 2013 Copyright © 2013 The Author(s). International Afairs © 2013 The Royal Institute o International Afairs.
Russia and Syria an Paris has been that the risk the arms they may supply ening up in the hans militant grups like Jabhat al-Nusra is utweighe by the nee t empwer (thrugh arms eliveries) mre merate ppsitin grups in Syria wh wul therwise be sieline by the likes Jabhat al-Nusra. Western states have als becme cncerne abut Hezbllah etening its territrial reach in Syria. Therere, Mscw cannt eel assure that Assa’s superir military inrastructure will rce at least a stalemate in the civil cnict. Russian cials must have plans t shit their supprt in Syria i the verthrw Assa lks imminent, in an attempt t retrieve sme Russian inuence in this crucial Mile Eastern state. There was alreay speculatin uring spring an summer 2012 ver the pssibility applying the mel the ‘Yemeni’ transitin t Syria: a negtiate plitical settlement that wul satisy Syrian ppsitin grups but cul leave remnants Assa’s gvernment in place. In Yemen, Presient Ali Abullah Saleh was persuae t step wn an han cntrl t his vice-presient, in an agreement brkere by Yemen’s Arab neighburs.116 In 2012 Russia seeme incline t eplre the relevance this Yemen scenari r Syria, althugh it is uestinable hw ar the utcme in Yemen has brught stability t the cuntry. 117 The prblem this cmparisn all alng has been that in Yemen Saleh presie ver a cmple system patrnage t ierent actins an there eiste an ientifable alternative leaer in the rm the vice-presient. In Syria, by cntrast, Assa’s Alawite minrity has lng minate a Sunni majrity ppulatin, an there has been n bvius replacement leaer t Assa (neither Vice-Presient Faruk al-Sharaa nr Prime Minister Wael al-Hali cul prject authrity). The etent the blshe in Syria, the strng an increasing rle raical grups amng the rebels in the fel, an the absence any creible plan r reining in the multiple battling actins an ethnic grups have als seriusly ere the chances achieving an sustaining such a cmprmise slutin. In the resulting impasse ne may argue that ‘Russia wul surely be better aligning itsel with the Arab wrl against the Assa regime rather than aligning itsel with the Assa regime against the Arab wrl’.118 But such lgic es nt take int accunt Putin’s fatin n nt becming party t a prcess aime at regime change. Mrever, Putin seems t believe that the tenacity the Russian psitin n Syria has earne it greater reginal inuence (i nt sympathy) in the Mile East, as well as enhance glbal status as a central player in this majr internatinal crisis.119 Russia talks cntinuing its traitinal rle as ‘a balancing actr in internatinal aairs’.120 Mscw es nt regar itsel as ging r brke in Syria r risking lng-term islatin rm the regin. Lavrv claims, rather, that 116
‘US hpes Assa can be ease ut with Russia’s ai’, New York Times, 27 May 2012. ‘Due West: is Russia changing track n Syria?’, RIA Nvsti, 21 March 2013, http://en.rian.ru/ clumnists/20120321/172307077.html, accesse 23 March 2013. 118 Katz, ‘Mscw an the Mile East’, p. 4. 119 Fr the argument that Mscw eels that the Syria crisis has recnfrme Russia’s glbal inispensability, see Pavel Baev, ‘Nt everything is wrng with Russia’s Syria strategy’, PONARS Eurasia, 26 April 2013, http:// www.pnarseurasia.rg, accesse 7 June 2013. 120 Sergei Lavrv, ‘Russia’s reign plicy philsphy’, at http://www.mi.ru, 28 March 2013, accesse 20 May 2013. 117
821 International Afairs 89: 4, 2013 Copyright © 2013 The Author(s). International Afairs © 2013 The Royal Institute o International Afairs.
Roy Allison cme what may ‘the verwhelming majrity Syrian ppsitin leaers an all the Arab an ther cuntries with which we are in cntact uneuivcally begin every cnversatin by saying that it is imprtant r them that Russia shul retain its presence in the regin’. He enies ‘mantras that we are “n the wrng sie histry” an that we have “lst the Near East”’.121 Such ptimism is ebatable, but it was prbably bste by the emphasis US Secretary State Jhn Kerry, uring talks he hel with Putin in May 2013, n fning cmmn grun n which t cperate with Russia. This raise hpes r a new cnerence uner the auspices the Unite Natins t revive the stalle erts the June 2012 Geneva Cmmuniué. Russia accepte that the new cnerence shul represent all Syrian ppsitin rces, ecept r ‘terrrists’ such as Jabhat al-Nusra.122 By entrenching itsel in the maneuvring arun Syria, Russia may hpe t versee a settlement in that cuntry, alngsie western an reginal states, in a way that wul enshrine cntinue Russian inuence in the regin as a whle. In this vein Trenin has ate the ntin a pssible peace accr reminiscent the Daytn agreement in 1995 that ene the Bsnian war, but ne resulting rm a mre balance ‘iplmatic alliance’ an crinatin between Mscw an Washingtn than was the case in Daytn. An accr r Syria wul enlist all the reginal states t supprt the peace prcess an wul be acilitate by the Unite Natins.123 Fr such an accr t be at all easible, a substantial peacekeeping peratin might be reuire, an Russia es nt eclue its invlvement in such a scenari. Alreay in summer 2012 a senir Russian parliamentarian arme that ‘Russia may cnsier ptins such as participatin in a peacekeeping peratin in Syria i the UN ecies t launch it’.124 Lavrv has specife, hwever, that any such peratin shul nt nly be authrize by the Security Cuncil but als have the cnsent the Syrian Arab Republic, which hithert has shwn n reainess t cnsier this.125 In the absence a ceasefre in Syria warnings have surace at senir levels in the Unite States an rm Assa himsel abut the risks a partitin Syria, which wul have grave ramifcatins r an beyn the neighburing states Lebann, Ira an Jran.126 The nee t ensure the territrial integrity Syria jins Russian an western interests. The anger a cllapse Syrian state brers an ever greater reugee ws wul bring rwar the peri chas that, Russia 121
Lavrv, interviewe in Rossiyskaya gazeta, 23 Oct. 2012, p. 8, an at BBC Mn FSi FsuPl ME1 MEpl 261012 ms/sc. He repeate the claim later that all the ppsitin members cntacte ‘i nt think the uture their cuntry an the whle regin withut Russia’s active invlvement’ since multiirectinal ties prvie ‘better balance’: Intera news agency, Mscw, 10 Feb. 2013, BBC Mn Alert FS1 FsuPl ME1 MEPl iz. 122 Interview with Lavrv n Lebanese TV channel Al-Mayain, 13 May 2013,http://www.mi.ru, 16 May 2013, accesse 20 May 2013. 123 Trenin, ‘The mythical alliance’, p. 25; Dmitri Trenin, ‘Finally, the US an Russia team up’, New York Times , 8 May 2013. 124 Mikhail Margelv, chairman the Internatinal Aairs Cmmittee the Feeratin Cuncil, Intera news agency, Mscw, 9 July 2012, BBC Mn FS1 FsuPl ME1 MEPl ibg. 125 Speech by Lavrv, 29 Oct. 2012, at http://www.mi.ru, accesse 10 March 2013. 126 Guardian, 20 April 2013, p. 22.
822 International Afairs 89: 4, 2013 Copyright © 2013 The Author(s). International Afairs © 2013 The Royal Institute o International Afairs.
Russia and Syria has argue, threatens t llw any verthrw the Syrian regime. Western alarm abut the pssible ragmentatin Syria was reecte in the cmmuniué issue at the en the June 2013 G8 summit, which seeme t envisage the ptin partial, nt whlesale, regime change. A transitin in Syria shul preserve public services, it nte, an ‘this inclues the military rces an security services’.127 This cul be rea as an implicit appeal r senir cers arun Assa t abann him. But it als seems t be an ert t cunter the Russian view that change at the tp the plitical leaership in Syria wul seriusly threaten the chesin the Syrian state. It remains unclear hw Putin interprets the appeal in the G8 cmmuniué r a new ‘transitinal gverning by with ull eecutive pwers’ in Syria, which shul be set up by ‘mutual cnsent’. What, hwever, i Assa’s rule begins t cllapse chatically thrugh elite eectins r military reverses? In these circumstances Russia might pt t evacuate mre its citizens rm Syria by air an sea. But Mscw is unlikely t intervene mre ecisively in an ert t shre up an impling Syrian state. Mscw has state eplicitly that ‘we will nt fght r ur psitins by sening an epeitinary rce t the regin an creating ur net “Aghanistan”’.128 This leaves the pssibility emergency crinatin by Russia with western states t help secure the stckpiles chemical weapns in Syria an prevent mre etreme grups such as Jabhat al-Nusra gaining access t them.129 Fr Mscw this wul surely be preerable t watching rm the sielines a cmplicate western military peratin t secure r estry chemical munitins sites, which cul mutate int a wier western engagement in the cnict an pssible cnrntatin with Russia. As it is, Russia ears that western claims abut the use chemical arms by Damascus cul prvie nt just the trigger, but the pretet, r varius pssible rms interventin, leaving Russia with serius ilemmas n hw t respn. Mscw may hpe that its assistance in cntrlling these chemical munitins wul earn it a cntinue rle in the uture security Syria an the regin. But this pssibility, as well as the rm western engagement in the crisis, epens n whether the escalating cnict can be cntaine. It als hinges n the nature an sustainability plitical arrangements in Syria i, r as wiely epecte in western states when, Assa is epse.
127
International Herald Tribune, 19 June 2013, p. 4. Statement by Lavrv n Rssiya 2 TV, 10 Feb. 2013; Intera news agency, Mscw, 10 Feb. 2013, BBC Mn Alert FS1 FsuPl ME1 MEPl iz. 129 US Vice-Presient Je Bien, in a private meeting with Lavrv n 2 Feb. 2013, reprtely prpse that Russia an the US wrk jintly t secure cntrl Syria’s chemical weapns i Assa’s gvernment shul all. See ‘Invlving Russia in Syria’, Washington Post, 4 Feb. 2013. 128
823 International Afairs 89: 4, 2013 Copyright © 2013 The Author(s). International Afairs © 2013 The Royal Institute o International Afairs.
