REPUBLIC VS. CA AND NAGUIT G. R. No.144057
January 17, 2005
Tinga, J. FACTS: Corazon Naguit filed a petition for registration of title which seeks judicial confirmation of her imperfect title over a parcel of land in Nabas, Aklan. It was alleged that Naguit and her predecessors-in-interest have occupied the land openly and in the concept of owner without any objection from any private person or even the government until she filed her application for registration. The MCTC rendered a decision confirming the title in the name of Naguit upon failure of Rustico Angeles to appear during trial after filing his formal opposition to the petition. The Solicitor General, representing the Republic of the Philippines, filed a motion for reconsideration on the grounds that the property which is in open, continuous and exclusive possession must first be alienable. Naguit could not have maintained a bona fide claim of ownership since the subject land was declared as alienable and disposable only on October 15, 1980. The alienable and disposable character of the land should have already been established since June 12, 1945 or earlier. ISSUE: Whether or not it is necessary under Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree that the subject land be first classified as alienable and disposable before the applicant’s possession under a bona fide claim of ownership could even start. RULING: Section 14 (1) merely requires that the property sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed.
There are three requirements for registration of title, (1) that the subject property is alienable and disposable; (2) that the applicants and their predecessor-in-interest have been in open, continuous, and exclusive possession and occupation, and; (3) that the possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945. There must be a positive act of the government through a statute or proclamation stating the intention of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property, thus, declaring the land as alienable and disposable. However, if there has been none, it is presumed that the government is still reserving the right to utilize the property and the possession of the land no matter how long would not ripen into ownership through acquisitive prescription. To follow the Solicitor General’s argument in the construction of Section 14 (1) would render the paragraph 1 of the said provision inoperative for it would mean that all lands of public domain which were not declared as alienable and disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to original registration, no matter the length of unchallenged possession by the occupant. In effect, it precludes the government from enforcing the said provision as it decides to reclassify lands as alienable and disposable. The land in question was found to be cocal in nature, it having been planted with coconut trees now over fifty years old. The inherent nature of the land but confirms its certification in 1980 as alienable, hence agricultural. There is no impediment to the application of Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree. Naguit had the right to apply for registration owing to the continuous possession by her and her predecessorsin-interest of the land since 1945.
AYOG VS. CUSI No. L-46729 November 19, 1982 Aquino, J. FACTS: The Director of Lands, after a bidding, awarded to Binan Development Co., Inc. a parcel of land situated in Davao City with an area of 250 hectares on the basis of its 1951 Sales Application. The occupants of the said land were then ordered to vacate the same and remove the improvements constructed thereon. Upon the refusal of the occupants of the land, the corporation filed an ejectment suit against them. The Director found that the occupants entered the land only after it was awarded to the corporation and could not be regarded as bona fide occupants. On July 18, 1961, the corporation fully paid the purchase price for the land. More than thirteen years later, August 14, 1975, the Sales Patent was issued to the corporation with a reduced area of 175.3 hectares. The occupants, herein petitioners, contested that the adoption of the Constitution, which took effect on January 17, 1973, was a supervening fact which render it legally impossible to execute the trial court’s judgment of awarding the land in question to the corporation. The constitutional prohibition only allows lease of alienable lands of public domain by private corporation or organization which should not exceed to 1000 hectares in area. The Director of Lands pointed out that the corporation had complied with the said requirements long before the effectivity of the Constitution and that the applicant had acquired a vested right to its issuance. ISSUE: Whether or not the 1973 Constitution is an obstacle to the implementation of the trial court’s 1964 final and executory judgment ejecting the petitioners.
RULING: The constitutional prohibition has no retroactive application to the sales application of Binan Development Co., Inc. because it had already acquired a vested right to the land applied for at the time the 1973 Constitution took effect. A right is vested when the right to the enjoyment has become the property of some particular person or persons as a present interest, which has become fixed and established and is no longer open to doubt or controversy. A state may not impair vested rights by legislative enactment, by the enactment or by the subsequent repeal of a municipal ordinance, or by a change in the constitution of the State, except in the legitimate exercise of the police power. In Opinion No. 140, series of 1974, where the applicant, before the Constitution took effect, had fully complied with all his obligations under the Public Land Act in order to entitle him to a sales patent, there would seem to be no legal or equitable justification for refusing to issue or release the sales patent. He should be deemed to have acquired by purchase the particular tract of land and to him the area limitation in the new Constitution would not apply. The corporation’s compliance with the requirements of the Public Land Law for the issuance of a patent had the effect of segregating the said land from the public domain. The corporation’s right to obtain a patent is protected by law. It cannot be deprived of that right without the due process.
