RELIGIOUS REFORMATION DISCOURSE: IRAN'S PATH TO INDIGENOUS SECULARISM Popular Sovereignty vs. Divine Sovereignty Naser Ghobadzadeh Department of Government and I.R City Rd, University of Sydney, NSW 2006, AUSTRALIA
[email protected] INTRODUCTION The religious resurgence that occurred in the last decades of the twentieth century questioned the validity of the global secularisation thesis inspired by the thought of key sociologists such as Herbert Spencer, Karl Marx, Max Weber and Emile Durkheim, all of whom generally adhered to the gradual disengagement of religion from the socio-political sphere. Although not the sole element, the emergence of political Islam took a leading role in presenting this challenge. In many Muslim countries today, there is a bilateral, hostile attitude between religion and secularism, which could be termed ‘Islamism-secularism conflict’. The erosion of religion from the socio-political sphere is assumed as an inevitable element for successful secularisation. Employing a hostile framework, religious forces have succeeded in mobilising those who constitute an absolute majority of population in most of the world’s Muslim countries to defeat the top-down secularisation process which was stimulated by the colonial West and implemented by authoritarian states. But, as Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart suggest, reaching a hurried conclusion may not be the answer; that is, it may be unwise to desert secularisation theory entirely (Norris and Inglehart, 2004, 2007). A review of political Islam’s decades of sociopolitical engagement and close scrutiny of its achievements - specifically its countering of secularism may shed new light on the discussion. Unlike Norris and Inglehart’s approach, this article does not intend to mount an argument against the notion of the failure of secularisation theory. Rather, it scrutinises a specific but key subject, i.e., divine versus popular sovereignty, arguing that a new model of democratic secularism is emerging from the lived experience of political Islam in post-revolutionary Iran. In this model, there is no antithetical relationship between religion and secularism: religious sources stimulate a democratic secularism, according to which separation of religion from the institution of state is promoted but not the separation of religion from politics. Unlike pre-revolutionary, anti-religious secularisation, this conceptualisation incorporates a coexisting relationship between Islam and secularism. Whereas western secularisation was rooted in the Christian-religious reformation, in the Islamic world secularisation was implemented prior to religious reformation (Filali-Ansary, 1996). The current conceptualisation of secularism in Iran is inspired by a religious reformation discourse postulated by religious intellectuals in jurisprudential-theological debate. Throughout this article I will investigate a religious-scholarly argument for popular sovereignty; in support of this argument, secular articulation of religion-state relations is promoted.
To this end, a theoretical framework proposed by Nader Hashemi is employed. For a long time, political scholarship overlooked the theological context of Locke’s work (Gencer, 2010: 324-5). Nader Hashemi, drawing attention to the religious features of the early secularisation process in the West, argues that John Locke employed religious methods and sources to articulate the notion of the separation of church and state. Hashemi maintains that an identical process is taking place in the Islamic world today through religious reformation (Hashemi, 2009). This article reinforces Hashemi’s theoretical argument with an experimental investigation, i.e., a conceptualisation of popular sovereignty within a religious framework. Just as Iranian religious scholars today are contesting the concept of divine sovereignty, the self-same point was debated during the early process of secularisation in 17th century England. There is a vast corpus of literature addressing the political instability that marked the reign of Charles I of England (1600-1649) and ended with his execution in 1649. This episode heralded the elimination of the notion of divine right of kingship in the Western context. Correlation between the rise of popular sovereignty and secularism in the West is not confined to the English case alone. The Glorious Revolution of 1688, followed by the French and American revolutions in the late 18th century, institutionalised the ideal of popular sovereignty in the West (Bukovansky, 2002, Morgan, 1978, Wootton, 1986). During the French Revolution, secularism and popular sovereignty were promoted while the divine right of kings as sovereigns was refuted (Sajo, 2008: 628). This chapter of Western political history mirrors the current situation in Iran. Religious reformation discourse endeavours to represent a democratic reading of religious sources by promoting popular sovereignty not only as compatible with Islamic principles but also as an inevitable form of governance suited to accommodating the core aims of religion. SOVEREIGNTY IN THE SHI’ITE SCHOOL: A CAPSULE HISTORY In Islamic history, the background of the discourse surrounding divine versus popular sovereignty can be traced back to the Prophet Mohammad’s demise in the 7th century. It is, in fact, the very basis of Shi’a/Sunni sectarian division. When the Prophet Mohammad died in 643AD, two proposals emerged regarding his successor. The majority of Muslims, i.e., the Sunnis, believed that governance was not a sacred matter and that it should be decided by Muslims, whose consent (Baya’at) is the source of the ruler’s authority. The minority group - that is, the Shi’a - contended that the Muslims’ ruler should possess divine right. They believed that God had appointed the Prophet’s son-in-law Ali as the righteous ruler. According to the main branch of Shi’ism (Asna Ashari or the 12 Imams), the right to govern was directly given by God to the 12 Imams, all of whom are ancestors of Imam Ali and are believed to be infallible. The twelfth Imam, Mahid, is still alive and will return to form a just government. In terms of factual political history, none of the above twelve Imams - apart from Imam Ali could form a government. Since the disappearance of the Twelfth Imam in 941AD (the Occultation era), de-politicised Shi’ism has been the dominant ideal in the Shi’ite school. However, this was disturbed by the political thought of Ayatollah Ruhollah Mousavi Khomeini (1900-1989), who was the first in Shi’ite history to conceptualise the direct political-leading role for jurists through the doctrine of Velayat-e Faqih (Guardian of Jurists), which was implemented following the 1979 revolution (Kadivar, 1994: 3-4). Khomeini’s doctrine by no means refers to the representation of people. Valy, in the Arabic language, means Guardian or Custodian; in the literal sense, it refers to a parent or to one who is appointed to protect a ward. Khomeini subscribed to the notion that the Prophet Mohammad and all of the twelve Shi’ite Imams possessed the divine right to be the political leaders of the Islamic world (Khomeini and Algar, 1981: 40). Stressing the necessity of establishing an Islamic state in the occultation era, he argues that similar to the infallibles’ political authority, just jurists possess the
divine right to lead Islamic society. He asserts that the political authority of the jurists does not differ from that of the Prophet Mohammad: The idea that the governmental power of the Most Noble Messenger (s) were greater than those of the Commander of the Faithful (‘a), or that those of the Commander of the Faithful (‘a) were greater than those of the faqīh, is false and erroneous. … God has conferred upon government in the present age the same powers and authority that were held by the Most Noble Messenger and the Imāms (Khomeini and Algar, 1981: 62).
Khomeini explicitly questions the argument that Valey-e Faqih is indirectly chosen by people’s vote through the mediation of the Assembly of Experts: ‘Velayat-e Faqih is not something created by the Assembly of Experts, Valey-e Faqih is something created by Almighty God. It is the same guardianship of the Noblest Messenger’ (khomeini, 2006: 95). Thus, the task of the ‘Assembly of Experts is to prove the Velayat-e Faqih ..., they want to ratify something, which is told by Almighty God’ (Khomeini, 2000: 27). In sum, Khomeini’s doctrine fully vindicates the concept of divine sovereignty. POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY: A RECENT SHI’ITE ARTICULATION Khomeini’s political thought has been the dominant discourse within the Shi’ite school since the 1970s. Religious reformation discourse, in line with which a progressive version of religion in politics was promoted, was introduced in Iran in the early 1990s. The issue of sovereignty remains a key theme in the writings of the many scholars who subscribe to this discourse. Questioning the validity of divine sovereignty, they argue that Islam observes subjects as the source of state authority: many scholars argue for a progressive articulation of religion-state relations. The intention of this article is to explore the thought of four scholars - Mohsen Kadivar, Ayatollah Montazeri, Abdolkarim Soroush and Mohammad Mojtahed-Shabestari - who have been chosen not only because of their high scholarly profiles but also due to their significant contribution to the debate surrounding divine versus popular sovereignty. Their influential role in the 2009 presidential election and its aftermath may be considered as of additional importance. The doctrine of Velayat-e Faqih is a jurisprudential articulation of the notion of divine sovereignty. Notwithstanding, disputes regarding this notion are not confined to a jurisprudential framework. Theological/philosophical and even ultra-religious challenges have also been mounted by reformist scholars who argue for popular sovereignty within a religious context. Details of these scholars’ jurisprudential and theological/philosophical approaches are discussed below. Jurisprudential Approach Similar to the ruling clergy, religious sources, that is, the Quran, the Hadith and tradition constitute the foundation of the conceptualization for a group of reformist scholars. While conservatives support an authoritarian interpretation of these sources to justify the concept of divine sovereignty, reformists read these sources more democratically, leading them to provide religious justification for popular sovereignty. Posing a very internal challenge, Mohsen Kadivar, a visiting Professor at Duke University, questions the jurisprudential validity of the notion of divine sovereignty. He argues that only six appointive positions are mentioned in the Quran of which none communicate with the claimed divine political authority for jurists. Like the ruling clergy, he maintains that the socio-political authority of the Prophet and infallible Imams was directly conceded by God (kadivar, 2000a). Kadivar contradicts the doctrine of Velayat-e Faqih by questioning the extension of this socio-political authority to jurists in the occultation era. Based upon his review of the relevant Hadith, Kadivar argues that jurists possess only two appointive positions: judgment and Efta (religious decrees) (Kadivar, 2000b: 9). Thus, jurists do not possess divine political authority to lead Muslims as was the case with the infallibles. Kadivar concludes that ‘Velayat-e Faqih, be it of religious or civil order, appointive or elective, absolute or conditional, lacks credible religious foundation’ (Kadivar, 2002).
Kadivar promotes a state-based popular sovereignty on the grounds that neither the Quran nor the Hadith offer a specific form of state. He states: ‘Islam acknowledges that human faculties are capable of finding appropriate solutions in these fields [forms of political systems]. In other words, politics is a matter of intellect, and the ability to reason is a human trait’ (Kadivar, 2002). Arguing that tens of competing political models can be presented that do not contradict the tenets of the Shari’a, Kadivar maintains that it has been left to the people of different times and different societies to articulate their best political system (Kamrava, 2008: 165). Kadivar argues that democracy is a proper if not a perfect political system for the Islamic world because it is the best product of human reasoning and experience: [D]emocracy is the least erroneous approach to the politics of the world. (Please note that least erroneous does not mean perfect or even error free.) Democracy is a product of reason, and the fact that it has first been put to use in the West does not preclude its utility in other cultures—reason extends beyond the geographical boundaries. One must adopt a correct approach, regardless of who came up with the idea (Kadivar, 2002).
The most high-ranking reformist jurist to conceptualise a quasi-democratic notion of the doctrine of Velayat-e Faqih was the late Ayatollah Montazeri (1922-2009). Montazeri, one of the key rhetoricians of the doctrine of Velayat-e Faqih, suggested its inclusion in the Constitution. Had Montazeri not contested Khomeini’s decision, within 68 days he would have been appointed the second Valey-e Faqih after Khomeini’s death. Persuaded by the empirical experience of the Islamic state, Montazeri made subtle changes to his ideas about the notion of Velayat-e Faqih (Akhavi, 2008: 647). Somewhat understandably due to his religious position and background, Montazeri not only maintained his rigid adherence to political Islam but also to the doctrine of Velayat-e Faqih. He promoted the direct engagement of the clergy in politics (Montazeri, 2000: 99-100). Like the ruling clergy, he did not doubt that the divine source of political authority resided with the Prophet Mohammad and the infallible Imams (Abdo, 2001: 18, Montazeri, 2000: 122-178). In contrast to Kadivar, he reserved his preference for the jurists’ political leadership in the occultation era; however, he distanced himself from the ruling clergy by questioning the notion of Nasb-eUm (generic appointment) according to which although no specific person is appointed as leader of Islamic society, all just jurists simultaneously possess divine right of political authority. Montazeri questioned the practicability of a form of government based on generic appointment. Proposing five possible scenarios1 from which to choose one of the eligible jurists as ruler, he concluded that it was impossible to have a functional form of government based upon the notion of generic appointment (Montazeri, 2000: 188-214). Montazeri concluded: ‘According to the Quranic verses and Hadith, only the qualifications of the sovereign can be extracted, but not more than these qualifications. This is not a basis for the appointment of jurists in the contemporary era’(Montazeri, 2003: 35-6). In contrast to the notion of generic appointment, he outlined the ‘theory of elect (Nazariy-e Nakhb) to provide religious justification for popular sovereignty. He maintained that ‘in contrast to the theory of appointment (Nazariy-e Nasb), according to which the jurists’ right to govern is directly legitimised by appointment by God, in this theory (Nakhb) the source of state legitimacy...is the people’s election not divine appointment’ (Montazeri, 2008: 24). Montazeri argued that from a jurisprudential point of view, the people’s consent was the only legitimising method of the Islamic state in the occultation era (Montazeri, 2000). Montazeri specifically provided a democratic interpretation of certain key Quranic verses and Hadith. According to his reading of the Shura (consultation) verses in the Quran, consultation includes the process of selecting the sovereign. It is not confined to the process of governance (Montazeri, 2000: 288-90). Allegiance (baya’at), which has a strong tradition in Islamic 1
For a detailed discussion of these five scenarios see Akhavi, S. (2008) 'The Thought and Role of Ayatollah Hossein'ali Montazeri in the Politics of Post-1979 Iran', Iranian Studies, 41(5), 645-66.
history and was the means by which the Prophet and Imam Ali assumed political leadership, was frequently cited by Montazeri to justify the need for a voting system (Montazeri, 2000: 305-26). In the ‘elective, conditional doctrine of Velayat-e Faqih’ proposed by Montazeri, the Valey-e Faqih is accountable to people and not to God. He is also chosen for a specific term like other political authorities’ (Kadivar, 2004: 64 & 69). Finally, an extremely important aspect of Montazeri’s political thought was the acceptance of the notion of social contract as the source of state authority. In line with contractarianism, Montazeri saw state authority as stemming from a contract between subjects and the sovereign. In Shi’ite 13 centuries-old history, Montazeri was the first jurist who dared to employ religious articulation in order to set state-people relations based on social contract, similar to the cases of Locke and Rousseau in the West (Soroush, 2004, 2009). Montazeri’s direct quote is worthy of mention in this regard: From a rational and religious point of view, the electing of a sovereign by the people ... is of necessity a social contract, which is indispensible when it is developed and contracted through allegation. When elected, the sovereign is responsible for carrying out delegated tasks due to the contract’s conditions and limitations. People ought to support him and obey his order unless he violates religious principles or the rules of the contract (Montazeri, 2003: 36).
Non-Jurisprudential Challenges Along with the jurisprudential challenges, theological, philosophical and even ultra-religious reasoning have been employed by reformists to question the religious credibility of the concept of divine sovereignty. Scholars subscribing to this approach do not structure their arguments solely upon religious sources such as the Quran and Hadith. These scholars recruit basic human rights principles to argue not only for compatibility but also for the necessity of adopting popular sovereignty in Islamic articulation of politics. Abdolkarim Soroush and Mohammad Mojtahed-Shabestari are two leading scholars in this regard: each has exercised considerable influence over other Iranian scholars. In a general sense, secularism may be described as an effort to remove holiness and divinity from the sociopolitical sphere. Soroush’s intellectual project has secularised different aspects of life. Proposing his magnum opus ‘The theoretical Expansion and Constriction of Shari’a’, Soroush conceptualises the separation of religion from religious knowledge. He states that whereas religion is a sacred, eternal and fixed phenomenon, human knowledge of religion is a worldly, intermittent and temporary phenomenon. He further argues that human understanding of religion is incomplete and imperfect, and, for this reason, no one can claim to possess an ultimate understanding of religion (Kamali, 1995, Soroush, 1994b, Vahdat, 2004). The other area targeted by Soroush is revelation, to which he adds a worldly dimension. Soroush’s theory of the ‘Expansion of Prophetic Experience’ argues that revelation has been effected by the characteristics and personal history of the Prophet Mohammad. As a human being, the experience of the Prophet was accidental; thus, the very experience of revelation in the Arabic culture and language is a factual phenomenon, an historically accidental occurrence rather than an essential attribute of religion (Soroush, 2006). Soroush expands his secularisation theory to the holy text of the Quran, proposing a notion of the substantial and accidental in religion. Firmly maintaining that the Quran reflects Arabic culture and history of the revelation era in its holy text, he categorises jurisprudential principles and the Shari’a as an accidental dimension of the Quran (Soroush, 1998c). Having provided a brief explanation of Soroush’s intellectual project, I will now examine his thought on the divine and popular source of state authority. Soroush emphasises that governance is a non-jurisprudential and ultra-religious issue (Jahanbakhsh, 2001a: 21). Pointing to issues of the prophecy and pontificate (Imamt), which fall within theological study rather than jurisprudential, Soroush maintains that ‘as a theory of state, the doctrine of Velayat-e Faqih ought to be discussed in theological rather than jurisprudential terms’ (Soroush, 1996: 2). This is why there is infrequent
reference to the Quran, Hadith and Islamic tradition in the core of Soroush’s ideas about government (Mottaqi, 2002: 48). In order to question the religious validity of the doctrine of Velayat-e Faqih, he investigates the concept of guardianship (Velayat), in the process outlining two forms of guardianship, i.e., spiritual and political guardianship. Spiritual guardianship incorporates a theosophical notion (Irfan), according to which there is just submission: masters order and devotees obey without question and without seeking any explanation. Soroush further contends that this notion of guardianship can be set exclusively between two persons and can never be extended to the socio-political context. For Soroush, the second notion of guardianship implies political leadership in which there is no such thing as submission. Imam Ali, the only Shi’ite Imam who had the chance to politically lead the Islamic world, possessed political guardianship - not spiritual guardianship. Soroush furnishes a variety of examples showing that the political decision-making of Imam Ali and other Shi’ite infallibles was criticised by their followers. In many cases they changed their minds due to this criticism. For Soroush, the doctrine of ‘Velayat-e Faqih does not resemble anything related to theosophical and spiritual guardianship. It is only the similarity of term that has led some to associate this guardianship (meaning presidency and leadership) with the other notion of guardianship, which is exclusively suited to the friends of God (Uliya-e Allah) and to those who are special before God (Soroush, 1998b: 20). Soroush not only avoids resorting to the Quran, Hadith or Islamic history to argue for popular sovereignty; in fact, he does not base his argument upon any Islamic principle. He contends that in contrast to the modern world in which human beings are rights-carriers, in the religious context human beings are duty-bound subjects. Since jurisprudential regulations are based on this approach towards human beings, they are mostly about the duties of Muslims (Soroush, 2005, Suroush, 2000). Given that not all human rights can be derived from religion, it ought to be seen as a none-jurisprudential and ultra-religious concern. One of these ultra-religious human rights is the right to oversee the ruler, for which Soroush does not attempt to find a religious basis. Soroush depicts people as the source of state authority based on the secular right of subjects to oversee their rulers. Their right to oversee their rulers provides subjects with the right to criticise and, if necessary, to dethrone said rulers: If you have the right to oversee the government, it can easily be proved that you have the right to rule. It is insensate to tell someone that you have the right to dethrone a ruler but not the right to appoint a ruler. The right to appoint is prior to the right to dethrone (Soroush, 1996: 5-6).
From Soroush’s point of view, there are two important questions about government in an Islamic society: a) What values do believers expect from a government? and, b) What methods should they use to achieve these values? The second question refers to techniques: it is a question about management and as such falls into the scientific category. Soroush maintains that scientificexperimental questions are inherently non-religious: If we ask ‘what should be done to have a successful state?’ this question will be translated into questions such as how the education system should be instituted? How the country’s economy should be managed? How the health and housing systems should operate?...Each and every one of these questions is a scientific question…If we refer these questions to religion, we are making a mistake... these aspects of governing have a rational nature. Wise men should get together and formulate arrangements for the managerial aspects of governance (Soroush, 1996: 6).
Thus, in this regard, the issue of government is not a religious issue. Soroush terms the current political system in Iran a ‘jurisprudential state’ (Hukomat-e Feqhi) and argues that jurisprudence too is a science: it is incapable of providing answers to all governing issues. And, similar to the other sciences, jurisprudence is subject to shortcomings: it is bounded by limitations of time and place (Soroush, 1994a: 2-16, 1998a: 2-9). In terms of the second question, Soroush distinguishes values to the two different sets, e.g., generic values - which are ultra-religious, such as justice, truth, humanity
and honesty - and religious values such as outlawing usury, drinking wine or the Hijab issue (Soroush, 1996: 6-7). Soroush argues that appreciation of the basic set of values is related to the nature of governance, not to its religious or non-religious features. For example, he states: ‘If a state intends to succeed, it must be just. Just governance is, of course, confirmed by religion; but, it does not earn its justice from religion’ (Soroush, 1996: 7). However, in terms of religious values, Soroush advocates a minimal role for government. In a religious society, the state may play an indirect role in fulfilling these sets of values. This indirect intervention by the state includes laying out an appropriate situation for free fulfilment of these values by believers. He further argues that human beings have two kinds of needs: primary needs and secondary needs: religious values are among the secondary needs. In a religious society, the state is responsible for fulfilling believers’ primary needs and liberating believers from these concerns, so that ‘an opportunity to think and deliberate upon their secondary needs including spiritual faith – is provided for believers’ (Soroush, 1996: 10). Finally, while the main aim of Montazeri is to politically present a more democratic understanding of religious sources, Soroush sees these efforts as doomed to failure, maintaining that: We have put behind us a period in which some scholars …have sought to extract democracy from Islam ... Abul Ala Maududi and Bazargan were looking for this conceptualisation. For example, they interpret Quran references to consultation (Shura) as parliament; and, when there is talk about allegiance (Baya’at), they understand it as election...We have come to a blest consensus, which proves that this is impossible and doomed to fail (Soroush, 2005).
Soroush argues that democracy is not extractable from Islam, an approach that does not locate him among those who subscribe to the idea of incompatibility between Islam and democracy. He further argues that ‘democracy is a method of governance aiming to “reduce management error” based on the principle of “popular sovereignty”. Now you ask where these principles come from, we say that they are not extractable from principles of religion, although they are not inconsistent with it either’ (Soroush, 2010). From Soroush’s point of view, as the ideal of popular sovereignty is achieved through rational reasoning and is a product of human beings, and because Islam does not recommend any specific form of state, there is no conflict between Islam and popular sovereignty (Jahanbakhsh, 2001b, Soroush, 2010). Mohammad Mojtahed-Shabestari is another key figure who refutes the divinity of politics in Islam from a theological and philosophical standpoint.2 Like Soroush, he argues that governance is not an issue to be outlined within a religious context: ‘Politics should not be based on faith and its scope should not be restricted by religion. In the contemporary world, Muslims may opt to eschew cases of politics and governance mentioned in the holy text and tradition. They may approach politics and governance as philosophical and scientific issues while at the same time not violating the core message of the holy text and tradition’ (Mojtahed-Shabestari, 2004: 77). Similar to Soroush, he also insists that efforts to derive modern political notions such as democracy, freedom, and human rights from the Quran and Hadith are in vain (Mojtahed-Shabestari, 2001). Another commonality between Soroush and Mojtahed-Shabestari, which significantly distances them from Kadivar and Montazeri, is their effort to undermine the role of the Shari’a in religion. Mojtahed-Shabestari, who highlights the importance of individual-God relations without any 2
Mojtahed Shabestari, an influential Shi'a theologian, spent eighteen years in Qum seminary. He was appointed Manager of the Islamic Centre in Hamburg in the 1970s and, after the revolution, served as a member of parliament for four years. He decided to eschew politics after his term in parliament, instead opting to teach at the Faculty of Theology and Religious Studies of the University of Tehran until 2006, when he was retired unwillingly.
intermediary, actually minimises the role of mediators in man-God relations by downplaying the importance of both behavioural mediators (the Shari’a) and human mediators (the jurists). Even revelation does not come first in this relation: ‘The core of Islamic faith...exists in the relationship between a human being and God, with or without revelation’ (Mojtahed-Shabestari, 2008b). MojtahedShabestari proposes the concept of ‘religious experience’ according to which Shari’a is a set of regulations which have been extracted from the holy text and tradition by jurists to express the faith. But, it is not the core premise of religion. Insisting on the priority of faith over the Shari’a, MojtahedShabestari maintains that based on religious experience, every individual interprets and personally experiences the revelation and message of God: this is an individual experience; it cannot be imposed upon others (Mortazavi and Manouchehri, 2009). Thus, attempts to master the interpretation of religion impede the genuine process of understanding religion (Mojtahed-Shabestari, 2000, 2002). For Mojtahed-Shabestari, state intervention in religion ‘stands in direct contradiction to the true essence and spirit of religion’ (Kamrava, 2008: 168). Religious experience is always an incomplete project, which needs freedom to be pursued. To gain genuine religious experience, Muslim’s volition ought to be free of internal sensuality and external barriers (dictatorship). Internal freedom, according to Mojtahed-Shabestari, is subject to external freedom. Religious experience cannot be nurtured by an authoritarian political system: a democratic political system is not only compatible with religion but also crucial to maintaining true religion in the Muslim world (Mojtahed Shabestari, 2000: 34-45, Vahdat, 2004: 215-216). Mojtahed-Shabestari also proposes the idea of a hermeneutic approach to the Quran to inhibit state intervention in religion. According to this notion, each and every person approaches the text possessing pre-knowledge and presuppositions. These presuppositions impact on each individual’s understanding of the text; thus, it is impossible to achieve a neutral reading. The crucial point in Mojtahed-Shabestari’s approach is that the reader’s pre-knowledge is profoundly influenced by consciousness and cognition of the contemporary time. Therefore, like Soroush, Mojtahed-Shabestari concludes that no individual reading of the holy text can ever claim full understanding because human consciousness and knowledge are always evolving (Mojtahed-Shabestari, 1996). Thus, ‘a distinctive aspect of God’s word is its perpetual interpretative feature. No interpretation of God’s word is the ultimate understanding ... there should always be an open path for new interpretations (MojtahedShabestari and Kiderlen, 2007). The political implications of the notion of religious experience and hermeneutic approach to the Quran are to outline the issue of governance as a completely ultrareligious matter. According to Nader Hashemi, the distinction between vertical and horizontal relations is a method to conceptualise the tensions between religion and democracy (Hashemi, 2009: 10-11). Mojtahed-Shabestari articulates an identical distinction: vertical relations communicate with Godhuman relations through individual religious experience; submission and obedience are the main features of such vertical relations. Politics and human rights are matters related to human-human relations. Thus, in terms of the governance, consent, agreement and rational reasoning ought to be employed to regulate the horizontal relations between individuals (Mojtahed-Shabestari, 2007b, Mortazavi and Manouchehri, 2009). Mojtahed-Shabestari also agrees with Soroush when the latter claims that jurisprudence has been the dominant feature of religion in Islamic history. However, the former’s reading of history suggests that this knowledge has always been rational. ‘Reasoning (Ijtihad) and issuing religious decrees (Efta) were always resorted to observing rationality required by the situation of the age’ (Mojtahed-Shabestari, 1999:8). Dividing jurisprudence knowledge into three sections, he argues that jurists have maintained rationality in ‘worshipping’ and ‘trading’ matters but not in ‘governance’ issues. ‘Religious decrees are not congruent with these questions [contemporary political questions]...thus, political jurisprudence has departed from its rational context’ (Mojtahed-Shabestari,
1999: 8). Mojtahed-Shabestari expands this argument vis-a-vis the impossibility of deriving popular sovereignty from a jurisprudential context to the Quran and tradition. Parallel to Soroush’s ‘theory of the expansion of prophetic experience’, he argues that the Quran is a human production of revelation and not The Revelation. The holy text grew out of the Prophet Mohammad’s personal experience of revelation (Mojtahed-Shabestari, 2007a). Actually, this concept is an extension of the notion of religous experience to the Prophet; that is, understanding the holy text as a consequence of the Prophet Mohammad’s religious experience. Mojtahed-Shabestari argues that commands presented in the holy text are responses to the socio-political and cultural conditions of the revelation era, not eternal commands. ‘There are no timeless commands/prohibitions in the revelatory words, because both commands/prohibitions and human beings including the Prophet are ephemerally existent; thus, timeless commands and prohitions are impossible’ (Mojtahed-Shabestari, 2003). Therefore, ‘if there is a Quranic verse about a specific issue, it does not mean that it should always be practiced’ (MojtahedShabestari, 2008a). The political implications of this conceptualisation led him to argue that the political features of the Quran and the Hadith were responses to the socio-political realities of the revelation epoch. Explaining the socio-political context of the various commands alluded to in the Quran, Mojtahed-Shabestari concludes that adopting these commands today is not acceptable because the contemporary socio-political context is completely different. As such, the idea of popular sovereignty cannot be derived from the holy text. Proposing an alternative, Mojtahed-Shabestari invites Muslims to understand the eternal message behind these commands and the essence of the holy text and tradition, which is justice. Mojtahed-Shabestari sees the Prophet Mohammad’s governance in Medina as a factual occurrence and not part of his prophetic mission. He asserts that in the revelation era, the essence of religion (justice) could be captured via the Prophet’s political leadership. But, this factual occurrence does not necessarily mean that religious leaders possess political authority in the contemporary world. In contrast, the essence of religion can be captured in the contemporary world through popular sovereignty. For Mojtahed-Shabestari, popular sovereignty is worthy of support, not because it is decreed by Quran or tradition but because it is the only plausible method of capturing the essence of religion (justice). He concludes that Islam does not include any timeless form of state; hence, it is the responsibility of Muslims to articulate a viable political system, one that can capture the essence of religion. In the contemporary world, human rationality advocates the establishment of a democratic political system as not only appropriate but also an inevitable political choice to fulfil the very basic principle of Islam (Mojtahed-Shabestari, 1999). CONCLUSION The establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979 marked a significant victory for political Islam over secularisation. Three decades after religion became entrenched in Iran’s socio-political sphere, a review of the Islamic state’s efforts to counter secularisation may shed new light on the discussion surrounding Islamism-secularism conflict. Due to the broad nature of the Islamismsecularism conflict, this article does not intend to present a comprehensive picture of the current status of said conflict. Instead, two proxies have been employed to narrow down this wide-ranging topic to a specific but deep analytical framework. The article focuses on investigation of the thought of four leading religious scholars regarding a central theme; that is, divine vs. popular sovereignty. The intention is to provide an experimental case for the emergence of an indigenous conceptualisation of secularism in Iran. Not surprisingly, this situation mirrors the early secularisation process in the West, wherein the issue of popular sovereignty was conceptualised by leading theorists such as Locke and Rousseau to reframe religion-state relations, a change that sparked the secularisation of politics. Throughout the article, I have explored the ideas of four leading Iranian religious scholars, who have
promoted popular sovereignty via presenting democratic readings of religion-state relations. These scholars, all of whom supported the idea of an Islamic state in the 1970s, effectively contributed to the institutionalisation of the Islamic state in the 1980s. However, persuaded by the empirical experience of the Iranian state, they now subscribe to religious reformation discourse to re-consider state-religion relations. Employing religious sources and methods, their conceptualisations propose that consent of the subjects is the source of state authority. This articulation explicitly liberates a very basic element of governance - i.e., source of authority - from religious sanctity, a shift that has led to a more secular articulation of politics. The significant difference between this conceptualisation of secularism and the pre-revolutionary top-down form of secularisation is its conformity to religion. Not only are there no antithetical relations as was the case before the 1979 revolution: this conceptualisation of secularism is rooted in religious reform. Finally, it should be noted that further research into scholarly debate in the political sphere, as well as its correlation with changes at the social level in terms of people’s adherence to religious values, may lead to a more comprehensive understanding of the emergence of secularism in Iran.
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