Protective Services (FM 3-19.12 - 2004).pdf

FM 3-19.12 Page

Section II – Organizational Structure................................................................... 2-2 Candidate Selection ................................................................................................ 2-3 Prerequisites............................................................................................................ 2-3 Selection Criteria ..................................................................................................... 2-4 Section III – Makeup of a Protective-Services Team .......................................... 2-7 Participants .............................................................................................................. 2-7 Principal ................................................................................................................. 2-17 Training Requirements .......................................................................................... 2-18 Team Training ....................................................................................................... 2-18 Section IV – Training ........................................................................................... 2-18 Hostile Fire Zones ................................................................................................. 2-19 Chapter 3

PROTOCOL ............................................................................................................ 3-1 Points of Contact ..................................................................................................... Introductions ............................................................................................................ Receiving Lines ....................................................................................................... Military Protocol ....................................................................................................... Dining Protocol ........................................................................................................ Vehicular Protocol ................................................................................................... Attire ........................................................................................................................ Personal Hygiene .................................................................................................... Gifts ......................................................................................................................... Personal Relationships ............................................................................................ Off-Duty Conduct ..................................................................................................... .0015 Funds.............................................................................................................

Chapter 4

3-1 3-1 3-1 3-2 3-2 3-2 3-3 3-4 3-4 3-5 3-6 3-6

THREAT ANALYSIS ............................................................................................... 4-1 Section I – Threat Assessment ............................................................................ 4-1 Conduct a Threat Assessment ................................................................................ 4-1 Create a Threat Assessment ................................................................................... 4-1 Identify the Sources of Information .......................................................................... 4-4 Section II – Personal Security Vulnerability Assessment.................................. 4-5 Purpose ................................................................................................................... Responsibilities........................................................................................................ Phases..................................................................................................................... Questionnaires, Checklists, and Surveys ................................................................

Chapter 5

4-6 4-6 4-6 4-9

ADVANCES ............................................................................................................ 5-1 Personnel Selection................................................................................................. 5-1 Security Plans.......................................................................................................... 5-1 Standard Considerations ......................................................................................... 5-2 Special Considerations ............................................................................................ 5-5 Itineraries ................................................................................................................. 5-5 Site Surveys ............................................................................................................ 5-6 Security Control Room Site Selection.................................................................... 5-11 Mission Day Considerations .................................................................................. 5-12

ii

FM 3-19.12 Page

Chapter 6

SECURITY CONTROL ROOM OPERATIONS ....................................................... 6-1 Security Control Room ............................................................................................. 6-1 Access Control ......................................................................................................... 6-3 Security Posts .......................................................................................................... 6-6 Information Requirements........................................................................................ 6-7 Equipment and Supplies .......................................................................................... 6-8

Chapter 7

FORMATIONS AND MOTORCADE ARRIVALS AND DEPARTURES.................. 7-1 Section I – Formations........................................................................................... 7-1 Escort Formations .................................................................................................... 7-1 Formation Control .................................................................................................. 7-11 Defensive Formations ............................................................................................ 7-12 Nonstandard Formations........................................................................................ 7-13 Medical Evacuations .............................................................................................. 7-16 Section II – Arm's Reach and Extended Arm's Reach Principles.................... 7-16 Arm's Reach Principle ............................................................................................ Extended Arm's Reach Principle............................................................................ Threat Response.................................................................................................... Firearm Use ...........................................................................................................

7-17 7-18 7-18 7-20

Section III – Arrival and Departure Formations................................................. 7-20 Three-Car Motorcade............................................................................................. 7-20 Two-Car Motorcade ............................................................................................... 7-22 Chapter 8

UNARMED DEFENSE AGAINST AN ATTACK...................................................... 8-1 Unarmed Defense Principles ................................................................................... 8-1 Defense and Disarming Techniques ........................................................................ 8-1

Chapter 9

MOTORCADE OPERATIONS AND TECHNICAL DRIVING .................................. 9-1 Section I – Vehicles and Equipment..................................................................... 9-1 Standard Vehicles .................................................................................................... 9-1 Hardened Vehicles................................................................................................... 9-1 Standard Vehicle Equipment.................................................................................... 9-3 Recommended Vehicle Equipment.......................................................................... 9-4 Vehicle Safety .......................................................................................................... 9-4 Motorcade Vehicles.................................................................................................. 9-5 Section II – Motorcade Operations ....................................................................... 9-5 Drivers...................................................................................................................... 9-6 Seat Assignments .................................................................................................... 9-8 Motorcade Movement .............................................................................................. 9-9 Vehicle Formations ................................................................................................ 9-12 Screening ............................................................................................................... 9-14 Technical Driving.................................................................................................... 9-16 Evasive Driving ...................................................................................................... 9-17

iii

FM 3-19.12 Page

Chapter 10

IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE DETECTION............................................... 10-1 Improvised Explosive Devices ............................................................................... Patrol Explosive Detector Dogs (PEDD)................................................................ Coordination of Searches ...................................................................................... Vehicle Searches................................................................................................... Building Searches.................................................................................................. Bomb Threats ........................................................................................................

Chapter 11

SURVEILLANCE DETECTION ............................................................................. 11-1 Surveillance Objectives ......................................................................................... Surveillance Detection Team................................................................................. Surveillance Techniques ....................................................................................... Two-Phased Operations ........................................................................................ Surveillance Detection Identification...................................................................... Surveillance Confrontation ....................................................................................

Chapter 12

12-1 12-1 12-2 12-3 12-4 12-5

PROTECTION IN A HOSTILE FIRE ZONE .......................................................... 13-1 Preparation ............................................................................................................ Threat Information ................................................................................................. Transportation ....................................................................................................... Weapons and Equipment ...................................................................................... Communication...................................................................................................... Communications Security ...................................................................................... Attire ......................................................................................................................

Chapter 14

11-1 11-2 11-2 11-5 11-5 11-7

TERRORISM COUNTERMEASURES FOR PROTECTIVE-SERVICES DETAILS ............................................................................................................... 12-1 Terrorism ............................................................................................................... Terrorist Profile ...................................................................................................... Modus Operandi for Target Selection.................................................................... Terrorists Advantages and Disadvantages............................................................ Proactive Countermeasures .................................................................................. Reactive Countermeasures ...................................................................................

Chapter 13

10-1 10-1 10-2 10-2 10-6 10-9

13-1 13-1 13-2 13-4 13-5 13-6 13-6

COORDINATION OF A PROTECTIVE-SERVICES MISSION ............................. 14-1 Operations ............................................................................................................. Notification of the Mission...................................................................................... Planning and Coordination .................................................................................... Execution ............................................................................................................... Mission Review......................................................................................................

14-1 14-1 14-2 14-7 14-8

Appendix A

METRIC CONVERSION CHART ............................................................................ A-1

Appendix B

SITE SURVEYS AND MISSION CHECKLISTS...................................................... B-1

Appendix C

QUALIFICATION TABLES ..................................................................................... C-1 Section I – Tips for Trainers ................................................................................. C-1 Training Area ........................................................................................................... C-1 Night-Firing Training Tips for Trainers .................................................................... C-3

iv

FM 3-19.12 Page

Section II – Weapon Qualifications Standards................................................... C-3 M4 Rifle ................................................................................................................... C-3 M11 SIG Sauer Pistol.............................................................................................. C-3 MP5 Submachine Gun ........................................................................................... C-8 Advanced Marksmanship Qualification ................................................................. C-14 Slow-Aimed Fire.................................................................................................... C-14 Controlled Pairs..................................................................................................... C-15 Traversing Drill ...................................................................................................... C-15 M11 SIG Sauer Pistol Malfunction and Immediate-Action Drill ............................. C-16 M4 Rifle and MP5 Submachine Gun Malfunction and Immediate-Action Drill ...... C-17 Appendix D

ORDER OF PRECEDENCE LISTS ........................................................................ D-1

Appendix E

WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT .............................................................................. E-1 Section I – Weapons ............................................................................................. E-1 Procurement............................................................................................................ E-1 Standard Weapons ................................................................................................. E-1 Weapons Management ........................................................................................... E-2 Section II – Equipment.......................................................................................... E-5 Communication Equipment ..................................................................................... Ballistic Apparel....................................................................................................... Medical Equipment.................................................................................................. Mission Equipment.................................................................................................. Miscellaneous Equipment .......................................................................................

E-5 E-5 E-5 E-6 E-9

GLOSSARY .......................................................................................................................... Glossary-1 BIBLIOGRAPHY.............................................................................................................Bibliography-1 INDEX ......................................................................................................................................... Index-1

v

Preface Field Manual (FM) 3-19.12 is a new FM developed to provide guidance for protective-services (PS) operations and presents emerging doctrine in the field of PS. This FM was created as a guide for special agents of the United States Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC) and for military police (MP) assigned to PS duties. FM 3-19.12 describes tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) critical to successful PS operations. Operational situations, however, may dictate adaptation or modification to the TTP. This FM applies to all USACIDC and MP personnel performing PS missions, including active duty special agents, civilian special agents, and reserve and national guard special agents. Appendix A complies with current Army directives which state that the metric system will be incorporated into all new publications. The proponent of this publication is HQ, TRADOC. Send comments and recommendations on Department of the Army (DA) Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) directly to Commandant, United States Army Military Police School (USAMPS), ATTN: ATSJ-MP-TD, 401 MANSCEN Loop, Suite 2060, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri 65473-8926. Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns or pronouns do not refer exclusively to men.

vi

This page is intentionally left blank.

Chapter 1

Introduction to Protective Services This FM provides the foundation for training, organizing, equipping, and deploying protective-services details (PSDs). This FM is a planning guide for commanders, team leaders, unit trainers, supervisors, and members charged with deploying PSDs for high-risk persons and visiting dignitaries.

SECTION I – BACKGROUND 1-1. This handbook prescribes TTP to be used in the performance of PS missions.

AUTHORITY 1-2. The authority basis for PS missions derives from Army Regulation (AR) 190-58. This regulation assigns the Commanding General (CG), USACIDC the function of planning and conducting PS operations involving senior executives designated for PS by higher authority. AR 190-58 identifies the installation or area commander as the individual responsible for PS for personnel not designated by higher authority.

POLICY 1-3. Criminal Investigation Division (CID) Regulation 195-1 also establishes the policy of adherence to this publication, identifies procedures for authorized government agencies to obtain PS, and details the selection criteria for personnel assigned to PS units.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 1-4. Figure 1-1 outlines significant dates in the PS history. 1772

Dragoons protect General Washington.

1861

Military units protect President Lincoln.

1865

President Lincoln enacts the United States Secret Service (USSS) as his last official act.

1901

President McKinley assassinated, USSS tasked with protecting the President.

1902

President Roosevelt first to have a full-time USSS detail.

Figure 1-1. Significant Dates in PS History

Introduction to Protective Services 1-1

FM 3-19.12

1967

Office of the Army Provost Marshal General tasked CID to provide personal security for the Secretary and Chief of Staff, Army.

1968

Secretary of Defense tasked the DA to provide personal protection for him and his family.

1971

CID tasked to protect Secretary of Defense on travels abroad.

1975

The Department of Defense (DOD) and the DA began tasking USACIDC for the personal protection of visiting high-level foreign dignitaries.

1976

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Administration), Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments, Subject: PS for the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, 19 August 1976, authorized the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Personal Security) to task the military departments to provide the necessary PS. The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Personal Security) was a retired CID officer. The memorandum recognized that "In most instances, the USACIDC has provided the majority of that support."

1985

Before 1985, PS for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), were provided by the military service criminal investigative organization of the Chairman's service. In 1985, CJCS requested that USACIDC provide personal protection for the CJCS regardless of which service the CJCS belongs.

1986

The Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS) position is established. USACIDC is requested to be the primary agency providing personal protection for the VCJCS.

1996

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Memorandum for the Director of the Army Staff, Subject: Security of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, 16 January 1996, directed that "the DA assume responsibility for the security of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense during scheduled public appearances in the metropolitan Washington, DC area and travels throughout the continental United States (CONUS) and overseas during calendar year (CY) 1996."

1999

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments, Subject: PS for the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, 25 February 1999, again authorized the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Personal Security) to task the military departments to provide the necessary PS. The memorandum again recognized that "In most instances, the USACIDC has provided the majority of that support.

Figure 1-1. Significant Dates in PS History (Continued)

SECTION II – FUNDAMENTALS 1-5. Determining who is, and who is not, a potential target is a difficult prediction. Most general officers are potentially high-risk personnel, yet not all will require the personal protection provided by a full-time PSD.

1-2 Introduction to Protective Services

FM 3-19.12

ASSIGNMENT OF SECURITY DETAILS 1-6. Some military personnel other than general officers may require the additional protection provided by a PSD. For instance, a general officer assigned to an installation in the CONUS probably does not fall into the highrisk category based on general threat conditions. However, a lieutenant colonel (LTC) assigned as a military group commander in an area of lowintensity conflict may have enough specific threats to warrant assignment of a PSD. As such, the decision to assign a PSD to an individual must take into account many factors. These factors include— The rank and grade of the individual. The position the individual holds. The location where the individual is stationed. The general threat level. The specific threat to the individual. The vulnerability of the individual. 1-7. Failure to consider the rank, position, location, threat, and vulnerability collectively may lead to an inaccurate picture of the need for PS. In addition, the commander must make the final decision on whether to insist a PSD be assigned to an individual or to yield to the desires of an individual and not assign one, regardless of the necessity for it.

HIGH-RISK PERSONNEL 1-8. Major Army Commands (MACOMs) have the responsibility of designating Level I and II high-risk personnel (HRP) according to AR 190-58. Once designated, that command has the responsibility to provide qualified personnel and equipment to perform full-time protection for Level I designees. Level II designees are not assigned a full-time PSD but require additional security measures based on local threat levels. 1-9. Several factors determine who receives a PSD. HRP are those personnel who (by their grade, assignment, symbolic value, or relative isolation) are likely to be attractive or accessible terrorist targets (AR 525-13; Department of Defense Directive [DODD] 2000.12). The two designations for HRP include— HRP Level I: Level I HRP have such a significantly high potential as terrorist or criminal targets as to warrant assignment of full-time PS. This would include long-term PS based on assignment location, or short-term PS based on a specific threat. HRP Level II: Level II HRP do not warrant assignment of full-time PS but do require additional office, residential, and travel security measures as deemed appropriate based on local conditions and the threat potential. 1-10. In addition to HRP designation, other factors may be taken into consideration to determine if an individual may require PS. Factors include— High-risk billet. Authorized personnel billet (identified and recommended by the appropriate authority) that because of grade, assignment, travel itinerary, or symbolic value may make a person filling it an especially attractive or accessible terrorist target.


FM 3-19.12

High-risk target. Resources or facilities considered to be at risk as potential terrorist targets because of mission sensitivity, the ease of access, isolation, the symbolic value, and/or the potential for mass casualty.

PRIMARY OBJECTIVES 1-11. The primary objective of the PSD is to operate in a manner to detect, deter, defend, and evacuate against attacks on the principal. Thus, the PSD must operate in a manner that minimizes the possibility of an attack and the attacks probability of success. The most common threats toward the principal include— Assassination. Kidnapping. Injury. Embarrassment. 1-12. To successfully fulfill these objectives, the PSD must train and develop positive measures to avoid, detect, and counterattack. The PSD avoids attacks by never taking the same routes, at the same times, on the same days. It detects a possible attack before it happens by always being alert to the current situation. It should train regularly so that in the event an attack was to occur, it could counter the attack successfully.

ESSENTIAL FUNDAMENTALS 1-13. The goal of a PSD mission is to protect the principal from all hazards, whether caused by personal design, accident, or negligence. Although absolute protection is never possible, following certain well-established PSD basic principles will increase the probability of a successful PSD mission. 1-14. There are five essential fundamentals necessary to the success of PSD missions. They include— Planning and coordination. Ensuring the availability of resources. Assigning responsibilities. Controlling information. Being flexible. PLANNING AND COORDINATION 1-15. Planning is critical to a successful mission. Every element of protection must be thoroughly planned and every act or movement of the principal and the PSD must be scrutinized to ensure maximum security. All personnel must be well briefed on emergency procedures so that they instinctively react instantly and correctly. 1-16. Every mission should have at least, but not limited to, two plans. Each of the plans should account for both good weather and bad weather. Contingencies for each event on the itinerary should be developed based on


FM 3-19.12

countering the various threat scenarios that may exist (see Chapter 14 for mission coordination). ENSURING THE AVAILABILITY OF RESOURCES 1-17. The number of personnel assigned (as well as equipment used) to a protection detail may be based on numerous factors, with none being more important than the availability of resources. Special consideration should be paid to the principal's position, the threat level at the location he is visiting, and the complexity of the mission. All of these factors should be considered when requesting for and making available resources for a mission. ASSIGNING RESPONSIBILITIES 1-18. Responsibilities are assigned to ensure that all facets of the mission are completed properly. If specific personnel are not appointed to complete a specific part of the mission, then it is a guarantee that someone will presume that another agent on the PSD is handling that part of the mission and, in actuality, no one is. 1-19. When two or more agencies are jointly protecting distinguished persons at events, such as ceremonies, summits, or conferences, regardless of the government agency providing the PSD, the agency protecting the senior official should have overall responsibility for security measures. 1-20. Upon assuming a new principal and/or PSD, the operations officer or commander in charge will coordinate a meeting to review security measures, requirements, and the principal's desires. During the initial contact with the principal, the commander or mission special agent in charge (MSAC) briefs the principal and his staff concerning the security arrangements and is prepared to discuss any areas of particular concern to the principal. If the mission involves a new principal, the personal security officer (PSO) should also gather all relevant information about that principal, such as— Preferences. Family member considerations. Physical fitness training programs. Religious preferences. Medical issues. Hobbies. Language capabilities, or lack of them. Physical impairments that may affect travel or lodging. Food and beverage lists. Other unusual traits that could affect the mission. CONTROLLING INFORMATION 1-21. Release of personal information pertaining to the principal and other members of his party, details of the itinerary, and the security procedures to be employed is closely controlled. Security personnel are prohibited from discussing or releasing any of this information with anyone other than


FM 3-19.12

authorized personnel. Security personnel will refer all press personnel to the Public Affairs Office (PAO). 1-22. Release of any information to other than authorized persons can adversely affect the integrity of the security mission. According to AR 525-13, the itinerary of an HRP (to include general officers or civilian equivalents) will be marked, at a minimum, "FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY." Such itineraries may be upgraded when warranted by the threat and authorized by the appropriate classification authority guidelines. Security classifications should be assigned to extremely detailed itineraries (those that include exact dates, times, and locations), which would be of substantial value to threat entities planning an attack (see AR 525-13). BEING FLEXIBLE 1-23. The fact that there may be unexpected changes to the itinerary requires that flexibility be the keynote factor in planning PSD missions. Alternate and contingency plans should be prepared to cover such circumstances as inclement weather, possible threats, or any other actions that may affect the security of the principal. Good preventative measures and thorough backup plans can save the life of the principal as well as the PSD agents.

ALERTNESS LEVELS 1-24. The alertness level employed by PSD agents will be determined by such factors as the threat level, the location, and the current situation. There are five alertness levels for the PSD agents— White: relaxed. Yellow: a relaxed, but aware state. Orange: completely alert (probably in a choke point). Red: suspect danger (ready to implement countermeasures). Black: countermeasures are in motion. 1-25. The PSD alertness level while performing a mission plays a major role in how the PSD agents react when an attack takes place. The PSD must never be in a White Level (relaxed) of alertness while actually performing the mission. In this state, the PSD is not prepared or ready to counter the unexpected, and in most cases, it will not react at all because of being surprised. 1-26. The PSD must remain in a Yellow Level (a relaxed, but aware state) while performing the mission. PSD agents should be aware of their surroundings, looking for potential choke points, and be ready for something to happen. When entering a choke point or an other high-threat area, they should increase their alertness level to Orange or Red depending on whether or not they suspect danger. At these levels, the PSD is completely alert, prepared, and ready for something to happen and is looking for avenues of escape. 1-27. If an attack should take place, the alertness level elevates to Black. The PSD must immediately execute countermeasures to defend an/or evacuate the principal.


FM 3-19.12

DEFENSE IN DEPTH 1-28. The term "defense in depth" refers to the series of protective cordons surrounding the principal in order to provide multiple levels of protection. Each cordon is designed to detect, deter, and defend against an attack. The cordon will either prevent an attack or absorb its shock to such an extent that the results will not be tragic. Control of movement within these cordons is normally established by an identification system of personal recognition, passes, badges, or conservative security. 1-29. The key to the "defense-in-depth" structure is to provide multiple levels of 360° protection. This 360° protection is spherical in nature and is not limited to ground level only. This protection should include security on higher ground (such as building rooftops, windows, or bridges) as asset requirements permit. 1-30. There are no defined areas or shapes for these cordons with regards to either the distance from one to the other or being concentric in shape. These cordons are fluid in nature and must be flexible to adjust to the situation at hand. The proximity of PSD agents to the principal is established on a caseby-case basis and is determined by the threat level, location, crowd, and personality of the principal. The MSAC, PSO, or shift leader (SL) will adjust the cordons to fit the situation. There are three protective cordons (Figure 1-2, page 1-8). They are the— Inner cordon. Middle cordon. Outer cordon. INNER CORDON 1-31. The inner cordon provides close-in protection to the principal. The PSO and PSD agents, including the SL on larger PSDs, should man this cordon. These people have successfully completed the three-week protective services training course (PSTC) provided by the USAMPS and have enough experience to occupy the positions of the close-in PSD or are currently participating in on-the-job training (OJT) on official orders awaiting attendance to the PSTC. 1-32. In some instances, particularly in foreign countries where there is shared responsibility agreed on by the MSAC or other authority and the host government, some changes to the positions in these cordons may be made. For example, during a PSD mission, the host nation (HN) law enforcement officials may wish to have one or more of their trained personnel sharing the inner cordon with the PSD agents. This is usually an acceptable procedure based on the HNs inherent responsibility and authority to protect persons traveling through their sovereign territory. These individuals are additions to the PSD security team, not substitutes for any PSD agent(s). MIDDLE CORDON 1-33. Typically, plain-clothed personnel use the middle cordon for conducting surveillance. CID agents or MP personnel who have successfully completed the PSTC should man the middle cordon. Local law enforcement may also be


FM 3-19.12

Inner cordon Principal

Middle cordon

Outer cordon

Figure 1-2. Protective Cordons incorporated into this cordon. Additional courses in surveillance detection are recommended for agents manning this cordon. OUTER CORDON 1-34. The outer cordon includes surveillance posts, such as access control points, observation posts, listening posts, sniper positions, and static posts and response teams. These posts may be either fixed, mobile, or a combination of both. MP and local law enforcement personnel should man this cordon.

MANNING REQUIREMENTS 1-35. The number of security personnel assigned to a PSD depends on several factors and must be tailored to the situation. In addition to the general considerations of grade and position of the principal, the location of the mission, the current threat, vulnerability assessments, and the manpower resources required to protect a principal must also be considered. Consider the following when determining manning requirements: HRP level. Threat assessment. Analysis of inherent threats obtained during initial and ongoing threat information collection.


FM 3-19.12

Personal security vulnerability assessment (PSVA). Duration of the principal's travels. Nature of public exposure desired by the principal or required by circumstances. Modes of transportation used. Geographical locations to be visited. Ideologies of the population with which the principal will have contact. Scheduled versus nonscheduled events. Availability of local police. Their support is important, not only because they may be integrated into the defense in depth, but because they can also provide valuable threat information and direct support. Travel to areas outside the principals normal daily area of responsibility (AOR), requiring security to be pre-positioned. 1-36. Tables 1-1 and 1-2, page 1-10 reflect a daily optimum and minimum PSD manpower requirements. These tables do not factor in the personnel required to send agents outside the AOR to establish security for a principal that travels. Table 1-1. Optimum Manpower Requirements Task

Teams

Personnel Requirements

SCR

Residence security (5)

Two agents for a 12-hour day shift and three agents for a 12-hour night shift.

Advance teams

Advance security (4)

Two, two-agent teams. Agents will be positioned at each site visited before the arrival of the principal. The four agents may also be used to support force protection requirements (for example, a twovehicle minimum).

Lead vehicle

Lead vehicle (2)

One driver and one member of the protective team. During periods of increased threat, two additional personnel may be placed in the rear seat and would be employed as gunners in an overwatch position for the protective team (not included in total).

Principal vehicle

*Limo vehicle (2)

One driver and the PSO.

Follow/back-up vehicle

Follow vehicle (4)

One driver, one SL, and two members of the protective team.

Relief personnel

Relief personnel (2)

Two agents.

Total MP/CID personnel

19

*NOTE: One agent may be eliminated if the VIP has his own driver (another MOS). The driver provides security for the vehicle, does not dismount, and remains ready in case an evacuation is necessary.


FM 3-19.12

Table 1-2. Minimum Manpower Requirements Task

Teams

Personnel Requirements

SCR

Residence security (2)

Two, agents, one for a 12-hour day shift and one agent for a 12-hour night shift.

Advance teams

Advance security (4)

Two, two-agent teams. Agents will be positioned at each site visited before the arrival of the principal. The four agents may also be used to support force protection requirements (for example, a two-vehicle minimum).

Lead vehicle

Lead vehicle (2)

One driver and one member of the protective team. During periods of increased threat, two additional personnel may be placed in the rear seat and would be employed as gunners in an overwatch position for the protective team (not included in total).

Principal vehicle

*Limo vehicle (2)

One driver and the PSO.

Follow/back-up vehicle

Follow vehicle (3)

One driver, one SL, and one member of the protective team.

Relief personnel

Relief personnel (2)

Two agents.

Total MP/CID personnel

15

*NOTE: One agent may be eliminated if the VIP has his own driver (another MOS). The driver provides security for the vehicle, does not dismount, and remains ready in case an evacuation is necessary.

1-37. There is no fixed upper limit to the number of PSD agents assigned to a mission. However, the minimum number of PSD agents required on the mission will depend on the complexity of the mission. No specific formula is used for determining the number of people to secure a principal due to the numerous variables that must be taken into consideration for each specific set of circumstances. If there is a direct or specific threat to a principal, then a large full-scale PSD must be assigned. If this is not possible, the number of agents required will be determined by the MSAC of the mission. This decision is based on all current information available regarding the threat, location, and resources available. 1-38. The minimum number of PSD agents to escort the principal for any mission is five (see Table 1-2). Any remaining tasks listed in Table 1-2 that are not filled by PSD agents will need to be resourced by the local provost marshal (PM). PSDs consisting of less than five escorting agents compromise the effectiveness of the PSD in attack situations, as it is impossible for less than five agents to perform the collective duties required to provide adequate protection. For example, a PSD escorting a principal with less than five agents would be unable to simultaneously provide close-in protection to the principal, confront a threat, cover and evacuate the principal, remain in the vehicle to ensure vehicle security, and stage the vehicle for immediate evacuation from the threat area. Thus, a minimum of five agents is required in order to effectively perform the following required functions: A PSO to provide immediate close-in protection for the principal, remaining with the principal at all times. One agent to address the threat, diverting the attention of the attacker from the principal.


FM 3-19.12

Two agents to assist the PSO in covering and/or evacuating the principal. A driver. 1-39. In locations and/or events requiring security control room (SCR) operations, additional agents must be added to the five agents used for escorting the principal. For SCR operations, a minimum of two additional agents per shift to the PSD is required. This allows one agent to be available to respond to alarms, video surveillance, persons attempting to gain access to the premises, and so forth. The second SCR agent remains in the SCR to monitor the immediate area, provide surveillance, and safeguard the principal's room. The SCR room should always be manned by at least one PSD agent, and another agent is required for relief duty. 1-40. The MSAC will determine the total number of additional agents required on a mission-by-mission basis as the threat and vulnerability levels necessitate. The total number of PSD agents may fluctuate based on new threat information and mission requirements received by the MSAC. 1-41. The required duties of the PSD remain the same regardless of the size of the PSD operation. The fewer the agents on the PSD, the more each agent must compensate for the lessened "defense in depth" by expanding their security sectors and placing more emphasis on advance work, planning, and good communications. Advance work is the most effective method for identifying and eliminating potential problems. It should never be sacrificed even when there is a minimum number of agents on the PSD. Additional emphasis should be placed on setting up additional assistance from local law enforcement as they can augment a small PSD by providing security support for middle and outer cordons. These additions are supplemental to the PSD, not replacements for any of the PSD agents.

LOW-PROFILE OPERATIONS 1-42. Sometimes it may be advantageous to modify PSD operations to reduce the notice paid to the principal and his need for protection. At these times, a PSD undertakes a "low-profile" operation. A low-profile operation employs only the protective measures that do not draw unnecessary attention to the principal. Such operations do not lessen manpower commitments, nor are they less costly. The protective coverage for low-profile operations becomes more discreet, involves considerable planning and ingenuity, and generally is more difficult to conduct than for high-profile operations. Often the middle and outer cordons of protection are strengthened, allowing the inner cordon to be less obtrusive. 1-43. Low-profile operations do not provide much visible protection close to the principal. This differs from a high-profile operation. Keeping a low profile may be the best course of action (COA), especially in cases where the political situation requires discretion or when the principal desires a low-key security operation.


FM 3-19.12

LEGAL AUTHORITY 1-44. According to AR 190-14, when detaining a subject, only use the amount of force necessary to restrain the subject for delivery to civil authorities. Immediately report all incidents to MSAC and the appropriate federal, state, local, or foreign authorities. The subject should be remanded to the authorities custody. 1-45. PS personnel should familiarize themselves with all the rules of engagement (ROE) and with AR 190-14 in regards to the use of force and the use of deadly force. USING FORCE 1-46. Any defensive actions taken by PSD agents are undertaken for protective reasons or in self-defense, rather than for law enforcement. In making this determination, one should consider if the subject constitutes a present or a continuing threat to the principal or if circumstances indicate the subject might repeat an unlawful act that is considered a threat to the principal. If it is determined that sufficient threat exists (requiring action by PSD agents), the PSD must show that the action by the PSD agents was necessary under an emergency situation. It must also show that the restraint used was minimal and only to the extent necessary to deliver the subject to the civil authorities. CARRYING AND CONCEALING WEAPONS 1-47. CID agents are authorized to carry concealed weapons in the performance of their official PSD and investigative duties according to AR 190-14. MP assigned to a PSD carry their assigned firearm during the performance of their official duties by authorization under AR 190-14. MP must have DA Form 2818 (Firearms Authorization) in their possession. 1-48. PSD personnel may be authorized to carry concealed firearms outside the United States (US) with prior approval from the country to be visited; however, the host country may revoke this approval at any time. Obtain approval through the US embassy or through the official agencies of the host country. After permission has been obtained from local authorities, PSD agents may have to arrange to obtain their weapons from local US agencies in the host country or have the weapons delivered to them aboard the principal's official aircraft. If permission to carry weapons into the country is not granted, coordination will have to be made to obtain weapons authorized in the host country. However, there may be instances in which the country will not grant a weapons clearance at all. In these cases, the PSD must plan protection measures accordingly to compensate for the lack of weapons. 1-49. Army law enforcement personnel authorized to carry firearms aboard commercial and/or military aircraft, or other forms of commercial transportation, will do so according to AR 190-14 and 49 Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) 1544.219. All law enforcement officers must complete the Federal Aviation Administrations (FAAs) required training program entitled "Law Enforcement Officers Flying Armed" per 49 CFR 1544.219. Personnel carrying a concealed weapon aboard an aircraft must notify the appropriate airline officials of the presence of the weapon before boarding.


FM 3-19.12

1-50. When escorting a principal aboard an aircraft, the weapon is not usually surrendered; however, exceptions to such policies are governed by the circumstances of the mission. An unloaded weapon may be transported in locked luggage stowed in the baggage compartment of the aircraft according to AR 190-14. Per 49 CFR 1544.219 weapons may not be stored in an overhead storage bin of an aircraft. 1-51. Federal law enforcement officers are exempt under 49 CFR 1544.219 from surrendering their weapon to the airline representative; however, final authority rests with the commander (pilot) of the commercial or military aircraft. On request, personnel must give up control of the weapon to the commander of the aircraft. NOTE: Security personnel are required to comply with all applicable laws and regulations governing Army law enforcement personnel, including, but not limited to, the following: DOD and DA directives and regulations. Posse Comitatus (18 USC 1385). International law.

CONTINGENCY FUNDS USE (.0015 FUNDS) 1-52. The Joint Travel Regulation (JTR) provides funds for personnel engaged in performing PS in a temporary duty status. AR 195-4 allows MP personnel and CID special agents providing PS to recover funds expended during the mission (see AR 195-4). CID contingency funds are available for use for certain unusual expenditures. MP personnel must coordinate with the local CID element via written request before the obligation or expenditure of .0015 funds can occur (see AR 195-4).



Chapter 2

Organization, Structure, and Responsibilities The requirement for PS today is far-reaching. PS missions may be conducted by a variety of federal law enforcement agencies, DOD law enforcement agencies, major command, and installation MP units, as well as USACIDC teams and units. Governors also may require PS, usually supported by their state police agencies. In some narco-terrorism environments, judges, prosecutors, and witnesses may also require protection.

SECTION I – PROTECTIVE-SERVICES AGENCIES 2-1. Throughout the DOD, there are various units tasked with providing fulltime or part-time PSDs. Headquarters (HQ), USACIDC, when tasked according to the provisions of AR 1-4 and AR 190-40, provides security for individuals designated by higher authority. Protection may also extend to the families of such senior officers or civilian equivalents when it is determined that circumstances warrant it and written approval is obtained from the US Army and the DOD general counsel (legal advisors).

INSTALLATION PROTECTIVE-SERVICES RESPONSIBILITIES 2-2. US Army commanders are responsible for protecting dignitaries and other HRP in the commanders AOR. Commanders must be prepared to meet the requirements of providing professional personal protection equal to the threat and vulnerability assessments on any visiting dignitaries, any designated HRP or their families, or any other persons determined to need personal protection. When it is determined a threat condition exists that requires PS, resources must be committed in a graduated response to provide enough personal protection to counter potential adverse action. 2-3. PS operations in the Army are divided into two categories—those conducted by the USACIDC and those conducted by the MP assigned to a local PM. Regardless of the entity conducting the PS mission, the operation of the detail remains the same. 2-4. The chain of command for most CID agents conducting PS remains within the USACIDC. The USACIDC field elements conduct PS operations only with the permission of the CG, USACIDC, or, if this permission is so delegated, to the commander of the PS unit of that organization. Field elements may be called on for advise or planning assistance if commitments and availability of resources permit.

Organization, Structure, and Responsibilities 2-1

FM 3-19.12

2-5. PS missions, other than those required by the USACIDC, remain the responsibility of the installation or area commander in whose area a dignitary resides or is visiting. As delineated in AR 190-58, the commander of a geographical area is responsible for the safety and security of all dignitaries and HRP traveling through his area. Traditionally, the installation commander tasks the PM to provide security for the dignitary. The PM normally tasks the military police investigators (MPI) to provide the necessary personal security for the designated individuals. Other MP usually augment the MPI.

OPERATIONAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL PLAN 2-6. According to the Installation Force Protection Operational and Organizational (O&O) Plan, US Army installations should have identified and trained available personnel to perform PSD duties when needed. The individuals selected to perform PS duties for the installation must remain available to do so on an on-call basis. In order to ensure their availability, these individuals must not serve in any other incident response function (such as a special reaction team [SRT], counterassault team [CAT], or hostage negotiations) as a potential conflict in duties may arise if a crisis were to occur or if threat levels were to increase, requiring implementation of a PSD. 2-7. Some installations may require a PSD on a full-time basis, but a permanent PSD is likely to be the exception rather than the rule. Most installations only require PSDs on a part-time, as needed basis. In some instances, such as when a high-level dignitary like the Secretary of Defense visits an area of military responsibility, a local commander may only be requested to support the full-time PSD accompanying the visiting dignitary. Usually, the PM is responsible for organizing, training, equipping, and maintaining the PSD. 2-8. The area commander is responsible for the command and control of the resources used for the PSD within the areas of his military jurisdiction. Funding for PS is the responsibility of the commander who directs his personnel and commits his assets to such a mission.

SECTION II – ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 2-9. PS missions require specific organizational structure to best meet the responsibilities necessary for mission success. Individual responsibilities must be clearly defined for each phase of the mission. Project officers, protocol officers, and the host of the principal should be identified and their responsibility established in conjunction with the PS mission requirements. When two or more agencies are jointly protecting distinguished persons, generally, the agency protecting the senior official has overall responsibility for security measures.

2-2 Organization, Structure, and Responsibilities

FM 3-19.12

CANDIDATE SELECTION 2-10. PS is a demanding and highly stressful line of work. Before joining a PSD unit, a soldier must carefully evaluate the nature of the work with special consideration surrounding personal sacrifices and his family situation. 2-11. Any person considering PSD duties must be aware of all aspects of the job requirements before making the final decision to join the detail. The assignment to a full-time PSD is dynamic and exciting due to the requirements of the position. Positive aspects of a PSD assignment are the opportunity to travel to different countries throughout the world and to work with some of the world's leading law enforcement and security agencies on operations that are both critical and fast-paced. The following are some negative aspects that must be carefully considered: Irregular and long hours (18 to 20 hours per day). Often away from home. Intense stress level. Constant adherence to rigid personal and physical standards. Risk of serious personal injury or death to protect the principal. NOTE: Not everyone is suited to the nature of PSD work because of high mental or physical stress levels. 2-12. Shifts of 18 to 20 hours per day are not unusual for PS missions. As a result of these long hours, time off from PSD duties is critical to controlling stress in PSD agents. Many PSD agents will not, or cannot, let go of the mission. Supervisors must insist that time off be taken to tend to the personal needs of the agent and his family, as well as his military needs. Soldiers receiving these assignments must not be permitted to ignore military requirements (such as official photographs, record review, civilian and military schooling) during a PSD assignment.

PREREQUISITES 2-13. The inherent danger and diverse demands of PS dictate the need to ensure that personnel meet the highest standards and proficiency of technical skills. In order for a candidate to be selected for PS, the candidate must meet the following prerequisites (see AR 190-58): Be fully qualified in the MP military occupational specialty (MOS) series. Have a rank of sergeant (E5) through sergeant first class (E7), or specialist (E4) with one year of police experience. Possess a minimum of a secret clearance. Must have the ability to obtain a top secret clearance. Have no criminal record and have a clear Crime Records Center (CRC) check. Be in excellent physical condition and within Army height and weight standards (see AR 600-9). Pass the Army physical fitness test (APFT) according to FM 21-20. Graduate from the three-week PS and antiterrorism evasive driving course (PSTC), USAMPS.


FM 3-19.12

SELECTION CRITERIA 2-14. Personnel being considered for PSD assignments must be screened for the qualities, skills, and abilities necessary to satisfy all the diverse demands of a PSD agent and the projection of an appropriate image representative of the US government. The candidate should have— An exemplary service record. No pending Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) action. No financial problems. A demonstrated high degree of maturity, reliability, and sound judgment. The ability to make instinctively correct decisions in an emergency situation. A demonstrated ability to communicate well, both verbally and in writing. The proven ability to qualify as an expert on assigned weapons. A working knowledge of unarmed defense tactics and police defensive tactics. Training in evasive driving techniques. A working knowledge of the principal's language. (This is a desired trait, but not essential as the host usually provides interpreters or translators.) A thorough awareness of the inherent dangers and adversities of the assignment, and a willingness to sacrifice personal safety to protect a principal at the risk of serious personal injury or death. No temporary or permanent profiles or any other limiting physical characteristics, which would limit the individual in performing any PSD functions or limit him to performing only certain functions (for example, control room agent). NOTE: Spouses may not serve on a PSD together. 2-15. In addition, the following desirable traits should be taken into account when considering an agent for assignment to a PSD (see CID Regulation 195-1): Judgment. Foremost among the desirable traits for a PSD agent is the ability to consistently exercise sound judgment even under stressful and rapidly changing situations. The well being of the principal may unnecessarily be placed in jeopardy or his image discredited by an error in judgment by the assigned PSD agent at a critical moment. Any history of poor judgment must be examined closely when considering an agent for an assignment to PSD. PS is a stressful assignment and will place demands on an agent that are not encountered in other assignments. If the judgment of the agent has been in question in less stressful and demanding situations, it is unwise and unfair to the agent, the command, and the principals he may be assigned to protect to place the agent in a position where an error in judgment might well be fatal. Experience. Agents selected for a PSD assignment should have a wide range of experience, including supervisory roles and experience


FM 3-19.12

in working with senior officials. By the nature of the mission, PSD agents are in continuous direct contact with senior DOD and Army officials and their foreign counterparts. The PSD agent must work directly with aides-de-camps, senior military aides, and other highranking staff members supporting the principal. Maturity. Agents selected for assignment to a PSD should have demonstrated the professional maturity to work without supervision, praise, or reward. The PSD agent may work 18 to 20 hours a day for a principal who may give the agent little or no recognition. An agent who is easily offended or prone to feeling slighted by a lack of praise or even personal consideration is not suited for the psychological stress of PSD duties. Demeanor. The PSD agent must possess the demeanor to establish a cordial, yet professional working relationship with personnel of all grades and positions. The agent cannot be intimidated by flag officers or overbearing toward MP personnel or drivers assigned to support the principal. The PSD agent must be able to function properly dressed in battle dress uniforms (BDUs) at a field-training site or in black tie at a formal dinner given by a head of state. The agent must maintain a cordial, yet detached professional relationship with the principal, his family, and staff in the face of friendly overtures or hostilities. PSD agents must be knowledgeable of protocol procedures and possess the flexibility to accept the customs of the many countries in which they may work. Mental fitness. The PSD agent must be mentally sharp. He must be able to block out all personal considerations from his mind and concentrate on the mission for long tedious hours. Agents who do not possess the inclination or stamina to work 18 to 20 hours a day for extended periods will find PS missions excessively taxing, both mentally and physically. The combination of vast responsibilities and a rapidly changing environment creates an extremely stressful situation for the PSD agent. This stress will continue indefinitely for the duration of the mission. Only agents who have demonstrated that they can effectively deal with great stress should be considered for a PSD assignment. Physical fitness. During a PS mission, many hours of travel by assorted modes of transportation and prolonged walking and standing will draw heavily on the stamina of the agent. The ability to achieve a certain score, even the maximum score, on the APFT will not ensure that an agent can endure the prolonged stress of a PS mission. Constant travel throughout the world will disturb sleep patterns, dietary norms, and exercise routines; yet after many 18- to 20-hour days, the PSD agent must remain capable of swift reaction to a threat to the principal. Tact. There is a host at each location visited by a principal. The host may be an installation commander, a senior state department official, a host country officer or official, or any combination thereof. Often, the host will have spent months planning for the principal's visit. The host may not have considered security at all in the planning or he may have tried to orchestrate the visit from both a security and protocol


FM 3-19.12

standpoint. Either way, the PSD agent must coordinate security arrangements with the host and many times is placed in the position of having to recommend or direct changes. It is imperative that the PSD agent exercise great tact in making the recommendations for change as his handling of the situation will reflect on the principal. Tactfulness should not be confused with weakness. Since the PSD agent is ultimately responsible for the security of the principal, the agent must be decisive while at the same time demonstrate great tact in coordinating the change with the host. Decisiveness. The PSD agent is called on to make a number of decisions during the course of each PS mission. Decisions required before the arrival of the principal at the location need not be made instantaneously, as there is enough time for deliberation. However, many of the decisions required during the actual period of the principal's visit must be instantaneous and made with little or no deliberation. Indecision on the part of the PSD agent may result in embarrassment or actual harm to the principal. Furthermore, once the agent has made a decision, he must be prepared to follow through with that decision. Assertiveness. The PSD agent is ultimately responsible for the security of the principal he is tasked to protect. He must make and implement decisions that may be opposed by officials far senior to the agent. In making a decision, the agent must draw on his judgment, experience, maturity, and decisiveness. When certain of his decision, the agent must make maximum use of his demeanor and tact in articulating the reasoning, which supports the decision to overcome opposition. However, because of the responsibility of the PSD agent to the principal, the agent must be prepared to assert himself when diplomacy, compromise, and reason fail. Communication skills. The PSD agent must be an effective communicator. PSD agents will be required to communicate with personnel at all levels of the military and diplomatic corps, both foreign and domestic. The PSD agent must be able to articulate security requirements with professional confidence without appearing to be overbearing. The success of a PS mission is dependent on the support and cooperation of many individuals and agencies. That support and cooperation is more effective when freely given based on a cordial, professional relationship with the PSD agent rather than begrudgingly given because of the principal's position. Effective communications also require that the PSD agent be skilled in listening as well as speaking. Flexibility. The itinerary will undergo change during each phase of preparation for the visit and each change will affect security. The agent must plan beyond the scope of the itinerary. Contingencies for each aspect of the visit must be considered before the principal's arrival, and a plan must be devised for each contingency. In spite of exhaustive planning and preparation, unforeseen changes will occur during the principal's visit and the agent must be flexible enough to immediately adjust the entire security posture.


FM 3-19.12

Adaptability. The PSD agent must be capable of adapting to radical changes in culture and procedures. The principals whom the agent will be tasked to protect travel extensively, and the agent may be working in the Middle East, the Orient, and Europe in the same week. Each country and region will have different customs, languages, and security methods. The agent must be adaptable to provide the principal with effective protection without offending the host country agencies with whom he must work. Even when conducting PS missions in the US, officials with different perceptions of security requirements will confront the agent. Whenever consistent with acceptable security practice, the agent must be prepared to compromise and adapt the method of security operation to accommodate the desires of the principal and/or the host. Judgment must be used to balance between assertiveness and adaptability. Dedication. The PSD agent may be tasked to protect an individual who represents a political orientation with which the agent does not agree or possibly a government hostile to the US. The PSD agent must be prepared to give every principal he is tasked to protect the same quality service and, if necessary, give his life to protect the principal. The PSD requires the ultimate dedication.

SECTION III – MAKEUP OF A PROTECTIVE-SERVICES TEAM 2-16. On a PS mission, the main participants are the individual being protected, known as the principal, and the agents of the PSD. PSD agents interact closely with the principal on a daily basis and are responsible for the principal's safety at all times.

PARTICIPANTS 2-17. The PSD may consist of any combination of the following members: MSAC. PSO. SL. Advance team. SCR team. Close-in protection team. Baggage team. Drivers. Support personnel (military working dogs [MWDs], interpreters, civilian police, and so forth). 2-18. Before any person is allowed to approach the principal or his personal property, he should be checked to establish his identity and the authority for his presence. This is especially true at the principal's residence, at public events, and near the principal's means of transportation. The PSD should obtain advance lists of expected guests, visitors, press representatives, and people performing services for the principal. The PSD should quickly learn to recognize all employees, regular visitors, members of the official party, and


FM 3-19.12

any public figures that are expected to call on the principal. No stranger should be admitted without the permission of the principal or a member of his staff. 2-19. Effective security often depends on the voluntary cooperation of the public. Friendly consideration for the public, especially the press, and a clear portrayal of the need for security stimulates the cooperation of the public and the press. Inquiries or requests not related to security matters should be referred to the proper member of the official party. Security personnel must refrain from unnecessary conversation with the public and the press to avoid compromising operational security (OPSEC) and potential embarrassment to the principal. MISSION SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE 2-20. The person assigned as the MSAC of a PS mission is responsible for all aspects of the mission. The MSAC— Establishes a close working relationship with the principal's staff, any project and/or protocol officer, and members of any host agency. Obtains detailed itineraries, biographical sketches, protocol information, and other information necessary for mission planning. Collects, evaluates, and disseminates threat information. Coordinates the use of available manpower and equipment resources. Reviews the security plan formulated by the advance team and disseminates copies to the right agencies. Supervises and provides guidance and leadership to participating subordinates during the execution phase of the mission. Conducts a postmission critique, and supervises the preparation of the after-action review (AAR) in the final review. Discusses with host agency officials such items as— Press policies. The amount of public exposure desired by the principal. Funding considerations. Matters of mutual concern. Establishes appropriate liaisons with— The staff of the officials involved. Transportation agencies. The civil and military police. NOTE: On assuming a new principal and/or PSD, the MSAC will coordinate a meeting to review security measures, requirements, and the principal's desires. 2-21. The MSAC has a special supervisory responsibility to help the PSD agents maintain peak performance. Day after day, the long hours of a PSD mission, the requirement for prolonged absences from home, and the constant need to be mentally and physically fit, places tremendous stress on PSD agents. PS operations are jeopardized if an agent suffers burnout from being


FM 3-19.12

overstressed. Supervisors must understand and help control the stress in which the PSD operates. PERSONAL SECURITY OFFICER 2-22. The PSO is responsible for the close-in security of the principal. The PSO on a permanent PSD usually accompanies the principal during both CONUS and overseas travel. To ensure continuity, unity of effort, and control, the PSO is usually the single point of contact (POC) between the principal and agents on the PSD team. It is essential that the PSO obtain the confidence, respect, and cooperation of the principal as soon as possible. 2-23. Even when operating smaller PSD operations, the PSO and MSAC responsibilities must be separately assigned to two different individuals as the PSO has critical responsibilities to the principal that may prevent proper supervision of other PSD agents. It is imperative that a close working relationship be maintained between the PSO and the MSAC. This is done through daily communication between the two. While overall control of the mission remains the responsibility of the MSAC, it is imperative that the PSO be afforded adequate authority and enough freedom of action to accomplish his assignment. SHIFT LEADER 2-24. The SL is the supervisor that maintains maximum command and control of the PSD team. The responsibilities of the SL include— Moving the close-in agents. Communicating with and notifying the PSD. Keeping the PSO informed on all aspects of the mission. Controlling the motorcade and PSD team. 2-25. On certain missions, multiple shifts of PSD agents may be required. SLs may then be designated to take care of a given group of PSD agents, similar to the squad leader in a typical Army platoon. 2-26. In cases where there are limited resources, the MSAC may also function as the SL. ADVANCE TEAM 2-27. The mission of the advance team is twofold—to establish an advance team before the principal's arrival in CONUS and outside the continental United States (OCONUS) locations; and, once on location, to precede the principal by one to two hours to set up security measures. 2-28. After receiving an assignment for a PSD travel mission, the MSAC designates an advance team. The size of the advance team is driven by the scope of the mission. Advance teams are a minimum of two agents, one to maintain a secure area inside the building, and one to meet the motorcade on arrival with the principal. However, based on the complexity of the mission, the size of the advance team could be anywhere from the minimum of two agents to conduct advances for well-known locations, to many agents for missions involving multiple principals, major events, or multiple event locations. When the itinerary holds back-to-back events or when there are last


FM 3-19.12

minute itinerary changes, the advance team may be required to overlap security at two locations in order to maintain security ahead of the principal. The two-agent minimum provides the flexibility for one agent of the advance team to "leapfrog" ahead to the next location while the remaining agent maintains area security until the arrival of the principal. In these cases, detailed upfront coordination and contingency planning will maximize the effectiveness of the advance team. 2-29. The mission of the advance team is to precede the principal and coordinate and execute on-site security surveys and primary and alternate route surveys, as well as all associated security arrangements. When the PSO arrives at each location with the principal, an advance team agent meets him and provides information concerning local security arrangements. When appropriate, the advance team provides the PSO with details of the visit to include, but not limited to, maps, floor plans, sketches, POCs, names of the people involved, telephone numbers, emergency evacuation routes, hold rooms, and safe rooms. 2-30. Advance work begins immediately on the MSAC receiving the basic information on the mission. The lead advance team initiates a mission file that records all coordination, advance team activities, intelligence collection, and site surveys. 2-31. Once the advance team has gathered all available intelligence information, the team travels to the locations to be visited by the principal before the scheduled itinerary of the mission. Sometimes advance work is conducted well before the actual mission depending on the duration of travel by the principal and the threat level in the location to be visited. 2-32. The advance team, using the advance checklist as a guide, begins its advance work. Various advance site surveys are included in Appendix B for reference; however, every mission is unique and may require actions not listed on these surveys. 2-33. Advance work includes, but is not limited to— Being familiar with all phases of a PS operation in order to plan a PSD mission. To fulfill this mission, the advance team must have access to the principal's personal and security information and have a copy of the overall itinerary. This information usually is given to the advance team by the MSAC or the host agency or is developed by the advance team as they participate in the planning phase. The inherent threats in, and the details of, the itinerary determine both the composition of the advance team and how far in advance of the scheduled itinerary it must arrive to thoroughly complete advance work. Maintaining daily contact with the MSAC. The MSAC will provide the advance team with an update on threat situations or the status of the mission. The advance team must immediately notify the MSAC of any incidents that could adversely affect the principal or personnel assigned to the mission. Maintaining daily contact with the PSO. The advance team must have daily communications with the PSO traveling with the principal.


FM 3-19.12

The advance team and the PSO should exchange information pertaining to— Changes in the itinerary. Threat information. Personal information on the principal. Personality information on persons the principal will visit. Details of the local itinerary, including requirements for dress uniform or special clothing. Weather information that includes not only hazardous weather, but also temperature changes and the possibility of rain or snow so that the official party can bring an appropriate wardrobe. Obtaining a detailed copy of the local itinerary and local threat information. The advance team should obtain the most recent, detailed copy of the local itinerary, local threat information, and other information needed to arrange the proper security. Advance team agents should conduct their business through local security representatives. While doing so, it is imperative that they avoid preempting local host agency prerogatives or protocol. 2-34. The advance team conducts a variety of actions and responsibilities at each location to include the following: Establishes effective working relations with the host agency. Establishes effective liaison with the appropriate civil police, the MP, and any other intelligence-gathering agencies. The regional offices of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), US Department of States Diplomatic Security Service (DSS), the US Secret Service, and HN law enforcement agencies can be of particular assistance in PSD missions. Conducts a reconnaissance of all local travel routes to establish necessary security and traffic control posts. In order to approximate the actual time of the principal's movement, the reconnaissance of a particular route is performed at the same travel time of day and under the same traffic conditions as those the motorcade will experience. Alternate routes of travel and safe havens must be identified. Establishes the composition, speed, and order of all motorcades, and ensures that adequate, secure parking areas are available. Establishes effective working relations with management and security personnel at the principal's lodging. Implements a residence watch by the SCR team. Examines the principal's lodging, arranges security coverage, and establishes a system for the control of movement in and around the lodging. Establishes the reliability of all people who will prepare food or provide personal service for the principal. Conducts an examination of the buildings and grounds that will be sites of functions involving the principal. Implements appropriate security arrangements with host security units. Conducts a security examination of the principal's vehicle or other transportation and briefs drivers or crew members as appropriate.


FM 3-19.12

Arranges security for vehicles and other transportation during periods of nonuse. Coordinates transportation and security of the principal's personal effects. Arranges for the briefing of security personnel who will handle personal effects and equipment. Checks arrival and departure times and examines locations at air or train terminals (if used) and coordinates the appropriate security arrangements. Often, PSD missions begin and end with the arrival and departure of a principal and his party at an air terminal. When arranging for these arrivals and departures, the advance team should confer with the airport police, control tower officials, the ground service manager, the airport manager, and other officials as appropriate (see Appendix B for an airport site survey). 2-35. At military reservations and facilities, the advance team coordinates with the commanding officer, the PM, the PAO, and any local intelligence units. Advance teams also should— Obtain a map or plan of the reservation or base. Obtain a floor plan or layout of the buildings showing the entrances, exits, or docking area to be used by the official party. Examine arrival and departure at air or train terminals (if used) and coordinate appropriate security arrangements. Examine quarters for the party (if applicable). Review the availability of amenities, such as food, refreshments, and recreation facilities. Review the security aspects of the activities that the principal will observe or in which he will participate, such as reviewing troops, witnessing demonstrations, and inspecting or examining devices and equipment. Find out the availability of communications, such as radios and their available frequencies, telephones, cellular telephones, and the availability of secure voice capability. 2-36. In addition to the standard requirements that must be accomplished by the advance team, other intangible considerations must be evaluated and discussed before and during the conduct of an advance, such as— Personality of the principal. Principal's family members. Personal information. This information is more detailed than what is available in a biographical sketch. Such information is obtained from the principal, his aide-de-camp, or his staff. This information includes— Physical fitness training programs. Religious preferences. Medical problems. Hobbies and interests. Language capabilities or lack thereof. Physical impairments that may affect travel or lodging. Other unusual traits that could affect the mission.


FM 3-19.12

2-37. On mission arrival at these locations, the advance team contacts identified POCs, commanders, protocol officers, and other people designated to assist with the advance work. The advance team leader should maintain daily contact with the MSAC and the PSO in order to provide an update on the threat situations or the status of the mission. Residence Examinations 2-38. On mission day, the advance team or SCR personnel perform residence examinations. All residence examinations, whether at the principal's residence or at the lodging used when traveling, should be conducted with explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) personnel, military intelligence (MI) personnel technical assistance, and MWD, when available. The physical examination of the residence should activate all items that might be pulled, pushed, or pressed during the principal's occupancy. During the examination, the residence watch should— Open and shut all windows and doors. Open and close drapes and blinds. Push all buttons. Pull all chains. Place pressure on all items of furniture. Inspect the underside of the bed and all the furniture. Inspect behind all wall hangings. Inspect sprinkler systems. Move all items in the room. Lock and unlock all locking mechanisms, including safes in rooms. Follow all exposed wires to their source. Empty and refill the ice cube trays. Verify that all food and beverages in the room come from a reliable source. If not, dispose of them accordingly. Conduct a technical sweep for concealed listening devices, where applicable. 2-39. Whenever possible, the SCR team works with the advance team for the selection of quarters for the official party. Considerations in this selection include— Multiple locations. Adjacent buildings and apartments. Area control. Privacy. Convenience of locations. Availability of fire, police, and medical aid. 2-40. When arranging for the security of a current or proposed residence for the principal, the SCR team— Obtains floor plans of buildings being considered. Determines residence watch requirements and, if necessary, establishes a 24-hour system using at least one police officer from the local jurisdiction.


FM 3-19.12

Designates posts for PSD agents and local police. Establishes a visitor control system with a visitor log and a daily journal. Obtains an access list of those individuals authorized for admittance and implements an identification system. Surveys the building and grounds with management to determine vulnerable areas needing heightened security. Considers routes of entrance and exit, motorcade entrances, parking facilities, layout of lobbies, locations of elevators (and their mechanical rooms and control banks), staircases, corridors, heating and ventilating ducts, and electrical systems. Locates civilian defense shelters, fire escapes, and fire control posts. Determines the reliability of all employees who will be in close proximity to the principal by appropriate background checks. Conducts a background check through the local police and/or the FBI, the Secret Service, the National Criminal Information Center (NCIC), and the USACIDC CRC on all employees who will be in close proximity to the principal. Arranges for communications including a police telephone and radio. Arranges for the screening of all calls to the principal according to the mission plan. Arranges for the examination of packages sent to the official party and the delivery of approved packages to the designated member of the official party. Ensures that the principal's vehicle, the follow vehicle, and the drivers are available to the PSO at the residence during nonduty hours for unplanned or emergency movements. Ensures that rooms over, under, and adjacent to the apartment or room of the principal are occupied by responsible persons. Conducts name checks if deemed necessary. Establishes exclusion and limited-access areas and posts security personnel, as required. Arranges for bomb disposal services through the local EOD. Conducts a fire inspection and arranges for additional fire protection, if required. Residence Watch While Traveling 2-41. The advance and SCR teams perform essentially the same actions at hotels and motels as the residence watch at the principal's home. They— Obtain floor plans. Select quarters for the official party, taking into account adjacent buildings and rooms, area control, and privacy. Survey the building with a person knowledgeable of the layout. Consider entrances and exits, motorcade entrances, lobbies, elevators, staircases, corridors, the heating and ventilating systems, fire control, electrical systems, and other systems.


FM 3-19.12

Survey the banquet and reception rooms, kitchen, and supply rooms for security aspects. Arrange for the security aspects of service, food, the cleaning force, and maids by securing a list of hotel employees to be involved in providing service to the principal. These employees must be cleared as safe by a responsible official or have a name check instituted. Arrange for a secure telephone line, preferably one that can be dialed directly without using the hotel switchboard. Obtain a guest registration list to check for questionable persons. Incorporate the required protective measures into the overall plan and establish checkpoints and barricades for restricted areas. Arrange for the examination of packages sent to the official party and for the screening of telephone calls and visitors. Conduct a joint fire inspection in concert with fire department personnel. Establish the SCR and holding room locations. 2-42. When traveling overseas, it is always assumed that rooms used for the principal's lodging are under technical surveillance. The advance team may opt to coordinate with MI to conduct a technical sweep for concealed listening devices; however, appropriate precautions should be taken by the official party even if the formal technical sweep did not indicate technical surveillance. SECURITY CONTROL ROOM TEAM 2-43. The SCR team is responsible for the security of the residence and the establishment of the SCR. When traveling with a principal, the SCR team and baggage team are usually part of the advance team. However, an SCR team maintains residence watch functions at all times for a permanently located PSD. For more information regarding the residence examinations and residence watches while traveling, see paragraphs 2-38 through 2-42. 2-44. The most sensitive area for a PSD to provide security is in the residence. The residence is the personal space of the principal and is where he expects his privacy and the privacy of his family members not to be violated. It is imperative that the SCR team agents working on residence security remain aware and not create an environment where the principal or his family members feel like prisoners in the home. 2-45. The SCR team sets up the SCR at locations where the principal will remain overnight (RON). These teams are not normally set up for travel missions where the principal will arrive and depart on the same day. CLOSE-IN PROTECTION TEAM 2-46. The close-in protection team is normally composed of the PSO and other PSD agents the closest to the principal. The close-in protection team should remain close to the principal at all times, changing their relative position frequently. Security personnel must ensure that an assailant is unable to get between the PSD and the principal.


FM 3-19.12

BAGGAGE TEAM 2-47. The primary purpose of the baggage team is to maintain total accountability of all personal and official property belonging to the principal and members of the official party traveling with, or closely associated with, the principal. Their primary function is to protect all property from loss or theft and to prevent the introduction of foreign objects or improvised explosive devices (IEDs) into the principal's aircraft, vehicle, or residence. 2-48. When departing from a residence, the agent in charge of the baggage team obtains a list of all persons in the official party from the PSO. All baggage is then tagged with color-coded tags of a unique shape or an unusual design with each member of the official party being assigned a separate, colorcoded identification tag. The baggage and equipment of each member is appropriately tagged and numbered, and a written inventory of the baggage is maintained. 2-49. The baggage handling detail— Collects the baggage of the official party under the supervision of an agent of the baggage team. Counts all property at that time. Inventories all baggage on arrival and departure at each location throughout the trip. Escorts the baggage from the residence to the mode of transportation where a second count is made as it is loaded. Takes additional security measures when regaining control of the baggage that was loaded onto commercial transportation and was temporarily out of its control. In addition to verifying the baggage count, the bags may be x-rayed or searched. 2-50. When the principal and his party arrive at a location, there will be a baggage team assigned to gather all the baggage and deliver it to a predetermined residence. Special care should be given to handling the principal's personal baggage. The principal's baggage is kept with the motorcade, preferably in the principal's vehicle, for his convenience. If the principal's baggage is transported by other means and with other baggage, ensure that it is loaded last so it may be unloaded first. This can be particularly important if the principal is a military officer who needs to change into or out of a uniform or perhaps would like to take a lunch hour for physical training (PT). DRIVERS 2-51. Drivers take all directions from the PSD. The responsibilities of a driver include— Having knowledge of all primary and alternate motorcade routes. Preparing the vehicle for motorcade movement. Setting up the backseat for the principal. Washing and fueling the vehicle. Inspecting and searching the vehicle (such as an IED search).


FM 3-19.12

Providing vehicle security while the motorcade is not in movement. Maintaining the motorcade integrity (does not leave the follow car behind). SUPPORT PERSONNEL 2-52. There are many other individuals and agencies that may be called on to support a PSD mission. A typical PSD mission will include support from— EOD units. MWD units. MI offices. Civilian intelligence agencies. Law enforcement personnel from other branches of the armed services. Local civilian law enforcement personnel. Fire department personnel. Medical personnel. Pilots and aircraft crews. Ground support personnel. Translators and interpreters. Organic details. 2-53. This support is routinely requested by the organization responsible for the PSD mission. Most military and civilian law enforcement and intelligence agencies have supported PSD missions in some capacity and are very responsive to requested support. The best way to acquire this support is through continued liaison and coordination with all agencies concerned.

PRINCIPAL 2-54. PSD agents should adapt themselves and the protection they provide to the convenience of the principal as much as possible. They should make every effort to avoid interference with his official or private functions. The protection must not unnecessarily interfere with the freedom of action expected by a principal in a democracy. His privacy must always be respected and every effort must be made not to embarrass him, call undue attention to him, or interfere with his activities. Protective facilities and personnel should be as unobtrusive as possible given the current threat level. 2-55. The principal contributes to the success of the mission by respecting the purpose of the mission and the responsibility of the PSD assigned to carry it out. The principal’s knowledge of the responsibility of the PSD is critical to the overall success of any PSD mission. Many designated principals feel that being combat leaders serving in command positions exempts them from a real need for a PSD. Persons in the chain of command that are responsible for establishing the PSD must ensure that the principal, as well as his staff and family, are fully briefed on both the responsibilities of the PSD and how the close working relationship between all participants significantly contributes to the overall smooth execution of a PSD mission.


FM 3-19.12

SECTION IV – TRAINING 2-56. When adverse action is directed against a principal, it is the professional and organized actions of the PSD that will be most effective in taking the appropriate action to counter the threat. Security personnel must be trained so well that, in an emergency, despite the excitement and emotion involved, they will react immediately and correctly. They must be familiar with all phases of PS operations and proficient in techniques that will protect the principal in any given situation.

TRAINING REQUIREMENTS 2-57. AR 190-58 formalizes the training and prerequisites for personnel assigned to a full-time PSD. All newly selected PS personnel are required to have successfully completed the PSTC. This course will provide the basic skills and knowledge base required for individuals selected for a PSD assignment to a PSD. All security personnel should receive extensive inservice and continuing on-the-job training to enhance and maintain their skills. PSD agents performing such functions should obtain advanced training in surveillance detection. Major areas for in-service training include weapons familiarization firing, weapons qualifications, unarmed defense against attack (UDAA) techniques, emergency first aid, and the use of specialty equipment used during PSD operations.

TEAM TRAINING 2-58. Protection demands teamwork. Although difficult, and in some cases impossible, PSDs should ideally train together, much as a SRT and other small Army units do. A PSD functions as a unit. Each person on the PSD must be fully aware of his responsibilities and reactions as well as what he can expect from the other PSD agents. Currently, most PS training is not geared to team training due to the difficulty of each Army agency to release five to seven people at a time and because there are so many other commitments that are being fulfilled by these individuals. Once personnel are identified as either part-time or full-time PS personnel, it is recommended that their sustainment training be conducted as a team in order to refine their individual skills and coordinate teamwork. 2-59. Major areas for in-service training include— Firearms. Personnel must be qualified with each type of weapon they might be called on to use during a PSD mission, to include chemical munitions and protective equipment. Personnel assigned to a permanent PSD must fire their assigned weapon for qualification on a quarterly basis and for familiarization on a monthly basis. Personnel failing to qualify as "expert" (see Appendix C for PSD qualification tables) during each quarterly firing should be suspended from PSD duties until their proficiency can be brought back up to the "expert" level. Nonpermanent personnel, who only augment a PSD occasionally, are only required to qualify under their unit standard qualification table.


FM 3-19.12

Attack- on- principal (AOP) drills. AOP drills are an integral step in training the PSD agents to respond instinctively and correctly based on the threat scenario presented. The PSD's response should be immediate; it should be executed instinctively when there is an attack on the principal. The more the PSD agents practice these drills, the more proficient they will become with the execution of the reactionary measures required. AOP drills should be part of a regular training schedule as dictated by the unit standing operating procedure (SOP). Drills should be tailored for the current mission or aspects of the mission, which are considered a potential weakness of the PSD team. Physical fitness. Personnel must meet, as a minimum requirement, physical fitness standards prescribed in AR 600-9. Personnel must abstain from any conduct during the mission, which might reduce their mental and physical capabilities. Any physical or emotional limitations that may affect the performance of the PSD agent should be reported to the MSAC. Technical driving. Personnel must be trained in all aspects of offensive and defensive driving as well as basic driving procedures and vehicle maintenance. Technical driving is a perishable skill. Refresher courses in evasive driving may be required to maintain proficiency. Unarmed defense against attack. Personnel must be trained to protect the principal and themselves in threat situations where they are unarmed in an attack situation. Special equipment. Personnel must be trained in the operation of all special weapons and protective equipment used by the PSD on a permanent basis or upon entering high-threat or hostile areas. Emergency first aid. Personnel must be certified in cardiac pulmonary resuscitation (CPR) for adults and children. For a permanent detail, this should include any special emergency medical requirements of the principal. Specialized equipment maintained by the detail, or required by the principal's health condition, should be included in the training so each member of the team is proficient.

HOSTILE FIRE ZONES 2-60. PSD missions are normally conducted in urban environments. If the principal travels to a hostile fire zone (HFZ), the PSD will have to adjust its tactics from the urban environment to that of an overt hostile environment. Additional, or refresher, tactical training may be required to prepare the team for this environment. Such training should include— Land navigational skills. Tactical radio communications, such as call for fire. Evacuation of the principal from an HFZ. Motorcade operations in tactical armored vehicles. Training with special or nonstandard weapon systems.



Chapter 3

Protocol PSD agents must deal with protocol issues that could possibly bring embarrassment to the principal. A PSD agent may be familiar with basic domestic social customs, but he may not be familiar with the customs and courtesies of another country. Even when there is a protocol officer available to the PSD, it is critical that each PSD agent familiarize himself with the protocol standards of each location or event the principal will be attending. It is imperative that all PSD agents (including the advance team, residence watch team, SCR team, and all drivers) present themselves in a professional manner at all times, as each is a reflection of the principal.

POINTS OF CONTACT 3-1. During advance work, the PSD will deal with many people. Appointments should always be made according to the POCs' schedule, not the PSDs' schedule. The PSD agent should be punctual and early if possible, arriving at least 10 to 15 minutes in advance of the scheduled time. If the PSD agent is going to be delayed, the POC should be contacted. When meeting with a POC, the PSD agent should establish a rapport and be careful not to seem demanding. The PSD agent should prepare questions for the POC in advance so as not to appear to use a checklist during the meeting. 3-2. In case the POC has a need to contact the PSD before or during the mission, the PSD should leave a 24-hour contact number with him. The POC should always be contacted before beginning the mission in case information has changed.

INTRODUCTIONS 3-3. As a PSD agent, it is essential to know who the senior person at a function is based on the order of precedence (see Appendix D), as introductions are made from the senior-ranking official to the lower-ranking official (for example, "General Jones, this is Lieutenant Smith"). 3-4. During official functions, such as a ceremonial pass and review, the PSO should not walk alongside or ride in the principal's vehicle unless a specific or direct threat exists against the principal. A PSD agent should be assigned as the driver, or agents should be placed within the formations.

RECEIVING LINES 3-5. Security personnel are not normally involved in a receiving line. If the principal is walking through a receiving line, the PSD agents should follow at

Protocol 3-1

FM 3-19.12

a reasonable distance behind and to the side of the principal. The PSD agents should stay far enough away so as not to cause embarrassment.

MILITARY PROTOCOL 3-6. Military protocol requires specific responses; for example, when walking, the senior person walks on the right of all others present. The protocol officer or advance team should provide all relevant military protocol information to the PSD. 3-7. PSD agents are not participants in military ceremonies; they are present in order to provide security for the principal. As such, agents should not participate in ceremonies, prayers, national colors, saluting, and so forth, as it diverts the attention of the agent, thereby, reducing the security posture.

DINING PROTOCOL 3-8. PSD agents should never sit with the principal during dinner, or any other occasion, unless directed or invited by the principal. The PSO and at least one PSD agent should sit in strategic locations allowing for them to watch the principal at all times, and to respond to a threat if necessary. 3-9. During dinner engagements, the principal should be seated facing the guest speaker and dance floor. This is for the convenience of the principal. Seating for the PSD will depend on the configuration of the room and tables. Adjacent tables are preferable in order to maintain maximum security, but not so close as to invade the privacy of the principal. 3-10. In the event that a toast is scheduled during the dinner, the PSD agent may request the server to provide a nonalcoholic beverage in order to participate in the toast, or he may raise his glass, but not participate in the toast. If the PSD agent does not participate in the toast, this could call undue attention to the principal causing him embarrassment.

VEHICULAR PROTOCOL 3-11. When traveling with the principal, PSD agents should only answer questions that are directed to them personally and respond with direct, concise answers. Do not overtly listen to conversations. All conversations within the vehicle should remain confidential. The content of conversations should not be given to anyone unless it is critical to the security of the principal. 3-12. The senior person in the vehicle, usually the principal, should ride in the right rear seat. If someone senior to the principal rides in the vehicle, this seat is given to him. The principal may also ride in other seats in the vehicle depending on increased risk factors. Everyone in the vehicle should wear seat belts. Do not insist that the principal or his guests wear one, but suggest it for their safety. 3-13. Motorcades involving more than one dignitary may require the placement of vehicles in order by rank. The vehicle transporting the senior

3-2 Protocol

FM 3-19.12

dignitary normally travels in front of the vehicle transporting the junior dignitary. The threat situation, the locations (HFZ), or other factors may dictate adapting the vehicle order to avoid being predictable. If the principal is the only one with a PSD, the PSD should dictate the order of vehicles for security reasons or maintain a separate motorcade. 3-14. The principal's briefcase should always be placed in the rear seat with the principal unless otherwise directed. The principal's luggage should be loaded in the trunk of his vehicle so that it remains available for immediate access. 3-15. All agents should know how to use the car or cellular telephone and/or radio communications and keep a checklist of all essential telephone numbers. When answering incoming calls, the agent should never disclose the principal's name or the location of the motorcade. Conversations should be short and concise and in a low tone of voice so as not to disturb the principal. Radio communications should be through earpieces and microphones so as to limit the amount of the communication out loud in the vehicle. PSD agents' use of cellular telephones is restricted to official use only.

ATTIRE 3-16. The attire of a PSD agent should be professional, conservative, and parallel to that of the principal. If the principal is wearing class As or Bs, then the PSD agents should be in business attire. If the principal is wearing a sports jacket with an open collar, the agents should be dressed in a similar fashion. The PSD agents, as well as the principal, should dress to blend in with the local environment, especially in hostile areas so as not to bring undue attention to themselves. (For further details, see Chapter 13.) 3-17. All PSD agents will wear a properly fitted protective vest while performing his official duties. AR 670-1 does not allow weapons or special equipment essential to PSD operations to be worn or carried while in military duty uniform. This being the case, it is highly recommended that personnel performing such duties wear appropriate civilian attire. Civilian clothing should be tasteful and present a neat professional appearance. However, if a military duty uniform is required, then weapons and equipment should be worn and carried overtly and according to regulations and local guidance. Exceptions to policy should be granted based on the complexity of the PSD mission requirements. 3-18. When conducting a mission in combat areas, the MSAC will make the final determination on the attire to be worn by the PSD. ATTIRE FOR MEN 3-19. Jackets should be two- or three-button conservative business suits and worn unbuttoned to allow access to law enforcement equipment. The jacket should be tailored in order to fit around concealed equipment that the agent may be wearing or carrying. Shirts should fit properly and be a light color. Ties should be conservative and dark in color. 3-20. Belts are a very important purchase. Belts should be strong enough to hold a gun, radio, and any other equipment that may be needed. Durability

Protocol 3-3

FM 3-19.12

should be the deciding factor on the belt, as it must be able to withstand all the required equipment. Belts should always match the color of the shoes of the agent. Shoes should be comfortable. The best soles are rubber, which decreases sound and improves traction. Socks should match the color of the suit. 3-21. Male agents should wear tuxedos with a flat or satin accent (not velvet) during black-tie affairs. Cummerbunds, vests, and ties should be conservative (black) and match one another. Suspenders may be worn as long as they do not interfere with equipment. ATTIRE FOR WOMEN 3-22. Women are to wear pantsuits for day-to-day wear. As with suits for men, the suits should be dark in color and may need alterations to allow for a holster or other equipment (such as adding belt loops to pants). Suit jackets should be single-breasted and worn unbuttoned to allow access to law enforcement equipment. The jacket must be long sleeved and be tailored in order to fit around concealed equipment that the agent may be wearing or carrying. Blouses are buttoned up to the neck under suit jackets. 3-23. Shoes should be comfortable, preferably flat-soled, and dark-colored. High-heeled, sandal type shoes should always be avoided, as movement is too restrictive for evacuation situations. Stockings should match the color of skin or the outfit. Handbags should be avoided, as the agent must have her hands free. If needed, the handbag must match the clothing and have a strap to put across the body. Female agents should wear tuxedos or wear formal pantsuits to formal events. Money and credentials can be carried in suit pockets.

PERSONAL HYGIENE 3-24. Issues of personal hygiene should be considered for the comfort of the principal. The use of colognes should be avoided, as they may not be pleasing to the principal. Be aware of the scent of body odor on clothes or after a workout with the principal. There is no smoking, chewing of gum, or chewing of tobacco while on duty. Smokers must ensure that the smell of smoke is not on their clothes. Breath mints are recommended. Hairstyles, facial hair, jewelry, and so forth should be conservative and worn according to AR 670-1.

GIFTS 3-25. Security personnel should not accept gifts even though they are presented in gratitude by the principal. Good judgment and diplomacy must be used in evaluating these situations. If gifts cannot be refused without embarrassing or offending the principal, they should be accepted and the MSAC notified immediately. Under no circumstances should the principal be offended. 3-26. Supervisors must ensure that a brief written statement is prepared that gives the circumstances of acceptance, a description of the gift, and an

3-4 Protocol

FM 3-19.12

estimate of its value. Many times the principal or a member of his official party will give each PSD agent a souvenir or memento of his visit. Caution must be exercised to ensure that these items are not of high value nor place a financial burden on the giver.

PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS 3-27. The nature of PS inherently lends itself to close personal relationships. Often, PSD agents endear themselves to their principals through mutual respect and admiration and a meshing of personalities. Such relationships can greatly enhance the relationship between the principal and the entire PSD. As long as this relationship remains within professional parameters, the overall success of the PSD mission is virtually assured. 3-28. It is a difficult task for all concerned to keep a relationship from changing from professional to personal due to the close proximity of the PSD agents to the principal at all times. Supervisors must be particularly watchful to ensure that relationships do not develop beyond the point of cordiality. Restricting the PSO position to a nonpermanent assignment for agents, and thereby regularly rotating the agent in the PSO position, helps to ensure that relationships remain professional. There are, however, cases in which a principal requests the presence of a particular agent for his PSO. It is prudent that supervisors recognize these situations early and manage them closely. 3-29. Just as close personal relationships with the principal must be avoided, close relationships to the principal's family members and staff are also avoided. Supervisors must be alert to PSD agents being invited to attend official or private functions as guests or to take part in activities like golf, tennis, or racquetball with principals, their families, or their staff. Such invitations encourage a personal involvement that can lead to agents circumventing the chain of command or can end up compromising the PSD both professionally and personally. Just as gifts offered to PSD agents must be politely refused, so to must invitations to participate as invited guests. All situations in which PSD agents interact socially with their principals must be avoided. 3-30. It is imperative that the principal and the PSD maintain a very professional and definitive relationship. Principals should be encouraged to recognize and respect the professional distance kept by the PSD. To this end, PSD agents must— Keep all contacts with the principal formal. PSD agents should not attempt to develop close relationships with the official party. Only make contact with the principal through the PSO. Except in cases of emergency, the PSO should be the sole POC between the PSD and the principal. Avoid presuming on protocol or escort prerogatives. The advance team should confirm all protocol and escort prerogatives with the protocol officers and official parties for the events and give this information to the MSAC and PSO. The PSO should confirm the principal's preferences before the start of the mission.

Protocol 3-5

FM 3-19.12

Avoid attracting notice, calling attention to the PSD, or trying to impress people. PSDs are constantly in the public eye and are frequently the principal's POC with the general public. The actions of PSD agents can reflect credit or discredit on the principal as well as cause embarrassment. Respect the principal's privacy. Whenever possible, PSD agents should adapt themselves and the protection they provide to the convenience of the principal, making every effort to avoid interference with the principal's personal freedom. Refrain from any activity that could reduce their mental or physical capabilities. Alcoholic beverages should not be consumed during or for a minimum of eight hours before the execution phase of the mission.

OFF-DUTY CONDUCT 3-31. The behavior of a PSD agent should remain beyond reproach at all times. The PSD is an extension of the principal. Actions taken by PSD agents will reflect directly on the principal, even if performed during advance work or off-duty hours. Adverse actions have great potential to cause embarrassment to the principal. As such, agents working PSD missions must be extremely careful of their off-duty conduct to ensure that their personal life does not negatively reflect on the principal (such as the consumption of alcohol or gambling). During travel missions, PSD agents are on-call 24 hours a day; therefore, they are not considered to have off-duty status during such missions.

.0015 FUNDS 3-32. The use of .0015 funds is authorized for PSD agents when conducting PSD missions. Refer to AR 195-4 for authorized use of .0015 funds for PS expenses.

3-6 Protocol


Chapter 4

Threat Analysis Threat analysis is the continual process of compiling and examining all available information concerning potential activities by threat groups or individuals, which could target Army personnel, information, or critical resources. A threat analysis will review the factors of existence, capability, intentions, history, and targeting of a threat group as well as the security environment within which friendly forces operate. Threat analysis is an essential step in identifying the probability of threat attacks (AR 525-13).

SECTION I – THREAT ASSESSMENT 4-1. Each year federal, state, and local law enforcement officials and private security officers intercede with thousands of individuals who show inappropriate or unusual interest in a public official or figure. Some of these individuals were intercepted within lethal range of a target just before they attempted to mount an attack.

CONDUCT A THREAT ASSESSMENT 4-2. No existing agency has the mission of conducting threat assessments for specific PS missions; therefore, the PSD agents assigned to the mission must conduct the assessments. 4-3. Threat is the ever-changing variable in the PS equation. It is the one thing that does change. The likes and dislikes of the principal remain constant. The number of personnel and the amount of equipment required will be dictated by the threat. The threat will determine how much security is required, depending on the principal's itinerary. Therefore, the threat assessment process must be an ongoing, ever-present activity. 4-4. The threat assessment, performed by the PSD, is aimed at identifying and preventing persons with the means and interest to attack a principal from getting close enough to mount an attack; therefore, reducing the likelihood that they would decide to mount an attack. The PSD uses the threat assessment as a tool to decrease the risk of violence by identifying persons with the interest, capacity, and willingness to mount an attack and rendering them harmless before they approach a protected person.

CREATE A THREAT ASSESSMENT 4-5. Creating an accurate threat assessment is fundamental to the planning, directing, and targeting of countermeasures. In order for the PSD to effectively counter threats, it must be able to identify the threat, the potential

Threat Analysis 4-1

FM 3-19.12

threat level, and the probable activity. To achieve this, the assessment must compare and contrast the threat activity and possible intentions against the principal's vulnerabilities. As such, the threat assessment process is an essential step in developing mission plans that identify the identity, tactics, and probability of an attack. The threat assessment process contains the following phases: Collecting threat information. Analyzing the threat. Determining the type of threat. Integrating the threat assessment. Reevaluating the threat assessment. Identifying the sources of information. 4-6. Because mission requirements and threat levels are dynamic, the threat assessment is an ongoing process. Plans must be made in order to be flexible enough to meet the situation as it develops. COLLECTING THREAT INFORMATION 4-7. A complete working knowledge of the threat, or the potential threat, is a prerequisite to mission success. PSDs must have timely and accurate threat assessments in order to effectively vary the type and level of protection given to the principal based on the type and degree of danger. A proper threat assessment provides the basis to identify resource requirements to conduct a mission and justifies the protection operation to the principal. 4-8. In order to make security plans that will provide the principal with the right level of security to effectively counter threats, the threat collection effort must be thorough. Once collected, this information is compiled into a comprehensive threat management system that is used to plan the security requirements of a mission. 4-9. The critical factor in deterring an attack on the principal is to identify the threat as far in advance as possible. The PSD team must seek specific information pertaining to the capability of the adversary group. Only then can plans be developed to counter the effects of the types of attacks expected. 4-10. The quality of the threat assessment is related to both the relevance and the range of threat information collected. As such, the PSD should make use of all the sources of information available about individuals that may pose a threat to the principal (see paragraph 4-19). ANALYZING THE THREAT 4-11. The PSD will analyze all information as it is collected to determine whether the information shows a threat to the principal. If the PSD determines the individual or group to be a threat, a security plan to manage the individual or group and possible risks is developed and implemented. 4-12. Once the threat information collection effort is complete, it must be analyzed. This is done in two phases. First, information should be examined for evidence of behavior and conditions that would be consistent with the likelihood of a violent attack on the principal. Second, the PSD must

4-2 Threat Analysis

FM 3-19.12

determine whether a subject appears to be preparing for an attack and, if so, when. 4-13. The threat assessment must determine the degree or level of security required for the mission based on the analysis of the following factors (see CID Regulation 195-1): Threat level and general area, and should be specific to the principal. Location (whether CONUS or OCONUS), military installation versus civilian community, and so forth. Identity of the principal and his rank or grade. Duration of the mission. Type of quarters to be used when the principal is to RON. Nature and duration of public exposure, as required by circumstances or as desired by the principal. Local or host government law enforcement support (level and type of support available). Ideologies of the population visited and the local holidays during the principal's visit. Modes of transportation to be used. Quantity and type of threats identified. Medical condition of the principal. DETERMINING THE TYPE OF THREAT 4-14. There are various types of threats faced by a principal and his PSD. These include— Terrorists. Terrorists are individuals who achieve an end through the systematic use of violence, terror, and intimidation. Terrorists may target the principal to make a political statement or obtain media attention on issues that counter the view of the terrorists. It is important to realize that groups considered to be terrorists will differ depending on ones own belief; one may consider them to be terrorists while others consider them to be freedom fighters. (see Chapter 12). Mobs and dissidents. These are individuals or groups who disagree with the opinions and/or beliefs of the principal or the organization the principal represents. This was seen during the debates regarding homosexuals in the military. Large groups of protesters traveled to areas where military leaders were speaking and threatened to throw bags of contaminated blood and urine. Criminals. These people have committed, or have been convicted of, a crime. This applies to any crime in which acts of violence or threats of violence are directed toward officials. Hostile intelligence agents. These people are working for either foreign countries or groups within the US to get information regarding sensitive materials. Mentally ill persons. Mentally ill persons may target the principal for any number of real or imagined grievances. The mentally ill can be

Threat Analysis 4-3

FM 3-19.12

extremely difficult to predict and can be very dangerous. The murder or attempted murder of public officials, famous personalities, or the wealthy has become more and more common. INTEGRATING THREAT ASSESSMENT 4-15. Although the basic techniques and methods of performing PSD missions are standardized, operations are modified to meet the threat conditions under which protection is provided. The degree of protection required and the scale of operations to be undertaken in PSD assignments will differ with the type of threat, the state of international relations at the time, the publicity given to the visit, and other threat assessment considerations that may affect the degree of danger. 4-16. The dissemination and integration stage delivers the threat assessment to the field in order to integrate the threat information into the appropriate planning and countermeasures. Accuracy and timely dissemination are essential to achieving effective integration of the threat assessment into the PSD operation. REEVALUATING THE THREAT ASSESSMENT 4-17. The threat environment is ever-changing. The threat assessment must be revised to reflect the current threat situation. As new threat information is received, the threat assessment should be revised to reflect the current threat conditions and should include recommendations on countermeasures when applicable. Evaluation is essential to determine if mission plans need to be revised to meet the changing threat environment. 4-18. All threat assessments should remain in the mission file until the information is deemed to be no longer applicable. In doing so, it is critical that threat information be managed correctly and according to the applicable laws and regulations governing the collection and retention of such data. Throughout the threat assessment process and subsequent missions, PSD agents should comply fully with all applicable laws and regulations governing the management of intelligence, including, but not limited to, the following: Posse comitatus. DOD and DA directives and regulations. Federal statutes. International laws.

IDENTIFY THE SOURCES OF INFORMATION 4-19. To be effective, collection should be planned, focused, and directed based on the mission requirements. The PSD agents must identify the resources needed to fulfill information requirements, as well as know the capabilities and limitations of available collection resources. To facilitate the collection effort, the PSD must coordinate with various other law enforcement and intelligence resources. This ranges from national intelligence agencies to the organic resources of the unit and the local community within the AOR.

4-4 Threat Analysis

FM 3-19.12

Agencies which may provide threat information to the PSD include, but are not limited to, the following: USACIDC. MI. PM. State and local police. FBI. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA). Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF). US Secret Service. US Embassy when overseas. HN agencies when overseas. Regional security officer (RSO) for the host country law enforcement liaison. Army Counterintelligence Center (ACIC). Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). 4-20. When coordinating with the above agencies, the following information should be solicited: The type of threat. The size of the organization (whether they are a small, disorganized group or a large, well-organized group with cell divisions). An evaluation of the threat's past actions to determine a modus operandi. An evaluation of the threat's capability (amount of funding, equipment, and training received). An assessment of the threat's equipment (access to explosives, submachine guns, night vision devices, or other equipment or weapons). A determination of the threat's intent (goals and objectives). 4-21. Information gathered from the agencies above may differ from location to location. For instance, the local CID office on the installation tends to only deal in criminal information; whereas, the forward-deployed CID offices may also deal in intelligence matters.

SECTION II – PERSONAL SECURITY VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT 4-22. The USACIDC and its field elements are responsible for conducting a PSVA. A PSVA is a comprehensive analysis of all aspects of the principal's official and unofficial lifestyle to determine where he would be most vulnerable to attack. The PSVA scrutinizes all aspects of the physical security of the principal's office, residence, and mode of travel. A review and analysis of the principal's routine habits and his social and personal commitments is conducted. These activities are performed to determine where the principal would be most vulnerable and to reduce the likelihood of him becoming a target of an individual or group.

Threat Analysis 4-5

FM 3-19.12

PURPOSE 4-23. The planning of a PSD mission is complex. The PSVA can prove to be a useful tool for determining the need for a PSD, the level of security the PSD needs to provide, and the specific areas of vulnerability. 4-24. The PSVA is designed for Army law enforcement personnel to conduct an in-depth analysis of the daily routines of senior military personnel or other designated HRP. The assessment may include families of the person surveyed. The PSVA provides information to senior personnel concerning the likelihood of having adverse or terrorist actions directed at the principal. It also identifies measures for the principal to take to enhance his personal safety. 4-25. The purpose of the PSVA is to identify weaknesses in security for HRP in the following areas: Living environment. Working environment. Travel between residence and office locations. Official travel. Personal activities. 4-26. Recommendations will be developed based on the findings of the completed PSVA. These recommendations will be used to establish, and/or enhance, security appropriate to the threat. Assets will be prioritized to maximize security resources.

RESPONSIBILITIES 4-27. According to AR 190-58, MACOMs have the responsibility of identifying and designating HRP within an AOR. MACOMs provide security for HRP as appropriate. PSVAs are conducted on all personnel designated by MACOM commanders and other HRP as directed by HQ, DA according to CID Regulation 195-1 and CID Pamphlet 195-7. USACIDC and CID field elements are responsible for conducting PSVAs and making recommendations based on them.

PHASES 4-28. The PSVA consists of the following five phases and are performed in sequential order: PHASE 1—IN BRIEF 4-29. The in-brief phase is the first phase of the PSVA and is scheduled with HRP who receive the PSVA. Preparations are made to explain the purpose, duration, and procedures of the PSVA. All actions to take place will be fully briefed to avoid any surprises to the principal of the PSVA. 4-30. The initial meeting for the in brief should include the CID commander, operations officer, case agent, HRP, and PM. The Chief of Staff for the HRP and key staff members may be invited to attend if deemed appropriate.

4-6 Threat Analysis

FM 3-19.12

4-31. During the in brief, the following information will be provided: The basis for conducting the PSVA. An explanation of the purpose of the PSVA, and its application to the principal. The intended scope and approximate duration of the assessment. The personnel who will conduct the assessment. Names of other agencies having an interest in the assessment effort. Requests for administrative assistance or support required. The options of a full-scope PSVA versus a limited-scope PSVA. NOTE: An exit briefing will be conducted at the conclusion of the survey that will reflect observations and recommendations. 4-32. Attitude is important during the initial briefing. The security agent giving the in brief must present the PSVA in such a way as to blend the security needs with the desires of the principal. Presented correctly, the security agents performing the PSVA will obtain the principal's approval based on both convenience and security. 4-33. In the event that HRP decline the PSVA, the CID should document the declination and keep a file with basic information on them and their family in case of an emergency situation. PHASE 2—RESEARCH 4-34. During the research phase, review past documentation and problems, previous PSVAs, physical security surveys, and installation vulnerability determinations for reoccurring deficiencies. All of these documents will assist in determining vulnerability factors to review for the new PSVA. As previous surveys are reviewed, the agent should pay special attention to the information that the PSVA provided as well as actions, if any, that were taken as a result of the other documents. 4-35. The research phase will develop a threat assessment specific to the HRP. This threat assessment includes the following: Current threat level. Probability of an attack or compromise. Specific areas of vulnerability. Blueprints of office complex and quarters. Blueprints or schematics of utility lines (electric, gas, water, sewage, and so forth). Names and contact information of neighbors. Name checks of staff, neighbors, and so forth. Location of police and fire departments and the distance and response times for each. Hospital surveys including distances and routes. Airport surveys including distances and routes. 4-36. In addition to the above, special attention should be given to the following: Security recommendations from previous PSVAs.

Threat Analysis 4-7

FM 3-19.12

Actions taken, if any, regarding security recommendations. Reasons given if recommendations were not followed. Any changes that have been made since the blueprints or schematics were drawn which may require updates in security. 4-37. Former PSVAs and other surveys are only to be used as general guidelines when conducting a current PSVA as there is a risk of the information contained in previous PSVAs being outdated. Previous PSVAs should never be used in lieu of performing an updated PSVA, but rather as a starting point for the current assessment. 4-38. The commander will be informed immediately if any criminal evidence is discovered during the PSVA. Subsequent actions are required to ensure the prompt reporting and investigation of serious irregularities. If this notification will compromise an ongoing investigation, the provisions of AR 195-2 will be followed. PHASE 3—OVERT 4-39. The overt phase involves conducting interviews with HRP, their office staff, and their family members. The interview with HRP should include the following: Biographical or personal information. Medical history and current medical conditions. Current photographs. Fingerprints. Voice prints. Handwriting samples. 4-40. Interviews with the HRP staff (drivers, pilots, house aids, and so forth), family members, and security personnel should provide personal information on the individual being interviewed as well as additional information regarding HRP. These interviews should provide the same information as the HRP, to include the personal habits, health, and current security procedures of the HRP. 4-41. This phase also involves inspecting the residence and office facilities. These inspections should include— A check of the duress system and a comparison of the new test results against the last time tested. An inspection of all privately owned vehicles (POVs). PHASE 4—COVERT 4-42. During the covert phase, surveillance is used to determine how HRP conduct daily activities. Covert surveillance is designed to identify routines and patterns in activities, such as— Arrival and departure times. Routes to and from work and potential choke points on routes.

4-8 Threat Analysis

FM 3-19.12

Activities and work schedule while at work. Off-duty and leisure time. Vehicles common to the neighborhood, where vehicles park, when vehicles arrive or depart, and so forth. Locations of mailboxes, manhole covers, pay telephones, and so forth. 4-43. While observing HRP, covert personnel must remain undetected. The covert phase will continue until a pattern has been observed and recorded. PHASE 5—EXIT BRIEF 4-44. Once all prior phases are completed, all information is compiled into a final report and the exit briefing is planned and coordinated with HRP. The exit brief phase will present the recommendations of the final report resulting from the PSVA. 4-45. At the conclusion of the exit brief, HRP should have a good understanding as to the times and places when their most vulnerable to possible threats. HRP should also have gained an increased awareness of being a potential target and know what measures they can take to lessen his vulnerability. 4-46. The amount of the information contained in the exit brief to be presented to the principal's family or members of the official party is at the discretion of HRP. The security agents may advise HRP of the amount of information and the level of detail that would be appropriate. 4-47. The PSVA is a final report. It is conducted to enhance the personal security posture of HRP. No report of corrective action is required. The PSVA final report will include— The date the briefing was held. The list of persons who received the exit briefing. The reactions by HRP receiving the briefing. A list of problem areas noted and solutions. Security recommendations. 4-48. All supporting documentation, such as blueprints, schematic drawings, still photographs, video, and written documents will be available for review or as attachments to the final report. The final report, or portions thereof (if not classified), is made available to the HRP for review. A copy of the final report will be kept in the file, and a copy will be provided to the USACIDC Crime Records Center, Fort Belvoir, Virginia.

QUESTIONNAIRES, CHECKLISTS, AND SURVEYS 4-49. The use of checklists is encouraged only to the extent that they serve as a reminder to the agent to inspect, observe, or comment on specific aspects of a facility or operation. While some special agents and supervisors find the use of a checklist beneficial in the conduct and review of an assessment, caution should be exercised to ensure that agents performing assessments do not become over reliant on them. If assessments are based only on the items on a checklist, PSDs risk artificially limiting the scope of the assessment.

Threat Analysis 4-9

FM 3-19.12

Checklists are prohibited from being used in lieu of, or as a substitute for, training, planning, or advance work. 4-50. Sample questionnaires and checklists are provided in Appendix B to assist PSDs in planning and conducting a PSVA. Checklists are a guide, limited only to the imagination of the agent and the limits imposed by the principal. The questionnaire is maintained as part of the official record of the PSVA but is not included in the final report.

4-10 Threat Analysis


Chapter 5

Advances Advance work is the key to success in the performance of a PSD mission. Advance work involves the coordination of all necessary security arrangements before the arrival of the principal at each location being visited. For some missions, advance work is extensive and complex, while other missions may require less, depending on the threat, the availability of resources and manpower, and the personal desires of the principal or the local commander.

PERSONNEL SELECTION 5-1. Conscientious and comprehensive advance work is imperative to the effective planning of a PSD mission. As such, the selection of personnel for the advance team is critical. In addition to training prerequisites, the following individual characteristics should be considered: Is the person trained in protection? Is the person tactful and diplomatic? Does the person have specialty training (SRT/special weapons and tactics [SWAT] team, CAT, special teams)? Is the person experienced and independent? Does the person have a presentable appearance (professional and conservative)? Is the person an expert of the geographical area? Does the person have the special skills needed for the mission? Special skills can include anything from special weapons training for missions in hostile areas, to experience in skiing, golf, and so forth, as required by the principal. Does the person have any language qualifications (considered an asset, not a requirement)?

SECURITY PLANS 5-2. Every movement of the principal and the PSD must be planned and scrutinized to ensure maximum security. All PSD agents must be well briefed on the security plan and emergency procedures to enable them to react instantly and correctly. The security plans must— Describe specific responsibilities for all actions required to protect the principal at each location. Consider the need for personnel, materiel, and vehicle control as well as the use of protective alarms and devices.

Advances 5-1

FM 3-19.12

Take into consideration what assistance is available from military units in the area, as well as civilian sources. Designate priorities of protection based on the results of criticality and vulnerability analyses of available threat information.

STANDARD CONSIDERATIONS 5-3. As no two sites are exactly alike, it is impossible to establish a specific guideline that will universally apply to all sites. There are, however, standard considerations that apply which will ensure that minimum acceptable standards are applied in each situation. 5-4. Standard considerations include all baseline data required for every mission. Although general in nature, the result of each consideration will be unique based on the principal's requirements, the persons traveling, and the location of each mission. The intricacy of the plan ultimately depends on the site configuration and the mission. GENERAL INFORMATION 5-5. The following general information is specific to each situation: Identity of the principal. Time constraints. Persons accompanying the principal to include family, friends, and associates. These individuals are collectively referred to as the principal's "official party." Principal's travel to locations. PSD travel to locations. Locations visited while traveling. Physical design of the premises, including lodging, meeting rooms, offices, and communications facilities. Press and public areas. Proximity of adjacent buildings. Determination of the threat level. Mission execution date. Mission security personnel (MSAC, PSO, agents, drivers). Coordination with the RSO. Complexity of the mission. Local political climate. Support agents (names, home office location, availability dates, visa, and passport status). Availability of support elements (civilian and military). Area medical and emergency services information. PRINCIPAL 5-6. The principal is the person who the agent is to protect. The agent must know the following about the principal: Gender.

5-2 Advances

FM 3-19.12

Status, position, or rank (military or civilian). Security opinion. Health problems. Personal convenience items that are needed. LOCATION 5-7. A strip map should be prepared and marked with all sites and locations to be visited. Each location to be visited during the mission must be assessed independently for the following factors: Lodging, rental cars, and special equipment. Support elements availability. Weapons availability and/or restrictions at the location, particularly in foreign countries. Event area location in relation to the motorcade arrival area. Primary and secondary entrances and exits and emergency evacuation routes. Rest room and telephone locations, preferably private facilities. Fire suppression system and/or nearest fire extinguisher. Parking requirements or restrictions during the visit. Safe haven and holding room locations. ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION 5-8. Administrative information should be initiated before departure of the mission. Information should include— A copy of the itinerary. The POC. The visa and passport requirements for the principal, official party, advance team, and PSD. A weapons clearance. The immunization requirements. The availability of and the need for voice communications (radio, telephones, cellular telephones, pagers, and so forth). The radio frequency clearance. The type of apparel needed for the mission. The local or host country holiday schedule during the mission dates. A code system developed for communications, to include nonverbal communications. The number of days needed to complete advance work for the mission. SUPPORT ELEMENTS 5-9. Support elements are personnel who support the mission. Support elements should provide the following information: The names of POCs. The location of their elements. The equipment and supplies available.

Advances 5-3

FM 3-19.12

The services available. The limitations of authority. The PS experience level of personnel. THREAT LEVEL 5-10. An on-going determination of the threat level is required. Include the following: The source of threat information. The DOD, DIA, and ACIC threat levels. The type of threat. The determination of whether the threat is general or is specific to the principal. The number of security personnel required based on the given threat level, the complexity of the mission, and so forth (see Table 1-1, pages 1-9 and 1-10, for manpower requirements). The threat of IEDs and the need for technical sweeps and cordons. OFFICIAL PARTY 5-11. The official party is the key factor that should be considered during mission planning. Consider the following: The identity of the persons (include name, rank or position, and contact numbers). The locations and events the persons will be attending with the principal. The determination of whether the persons are traveling with or meeting up with the principal. The mode of travel. The lodging and accommodations. Any special needs or requirements. TRAVEL INFORMATION 5-12. Travel information is required for all persons traveling on the mission (the principal, the PSO, the security agents, and the official party). The following items may be the same for all or different for each person: Number of persons traveling. Number of vehicles traveling. Mode of transportation. Rental vehicles on arrival or during the mission. Lodging and accommodations. Type of aircraft (commercial or military, fixed or rotor wing). Type of airport (government, civilian, or military). Arrival and departure times.

5-4 Advances

FM 3-19.12

SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS 5-13. Special consideration for the following may be necessary based on the needs requirements of the principal, individuals traveling with the principal, the location of the mission, and so on: Rental vehicles. Rental vehicles should parallel the vehicles used by the full-time PSD on a regular basis. They should be either premium or luxury sedans or sport utility vehicles (SUVs), in a conservative color. Determine the type and number of vehicles needed for the mission. Determine if specialty vehicles, such as vans, buses, fourwheel drive vehicles, and/or armored vehicles are required. Communications. Determine the need for cellular telephones, pagers, and Global Positioning Systems (GPSs) and their availability from unit supply or an alternate supplier. Due to variations in telecommunications systems overseas, compatibility of equipment must be verified. If the standard equipment used domestically is incompatible, local equipment will need to be secured by the advance team. Ensure that communications have international dialing capapbilites. Accommodations. Determine where the principal will RON and whether or not security will stay at the same location. Determine the number of rooms required and their availability. Rooms should be secured in blocks to centralize the entire official party and the PSD in the same area of the hotel. When securing rooms, the advance team should secure the room directly above and directly below the room of the principal in order to place a person of known reliability in those locations, as budget permits. Host-specific information. Identify seasonal weather conditions and advise all parties of the need for any special attire or equipment as appropriate. Secure the right vehicles and equipment as necessary. Determine immunization recommendations or requirements (particularly important in some foreign areas). Points of contact. Identify a protocol POC to assist with clothing requirements and local customs and courtesies. Identify a security POC to assist as a local law enforcement liaison with hotel and corporate security. Identify a support POC to provide vehicles, maintenance, and specialty items (boats, life jackets, and so forth). Host nation holidays. The advance team should identify any holidays, religious observances, and so forth that will occur during the principal's visit. Travel arrangements are to be made to accommodate such observances.

ITINERARIES 5-14. Obtain a current or proposed itinerary upon notification of the mission. Advance work and meetings should be scheduled with enough time to avoid conflicts with late arrivals. All support elements and the chain of command should be briefed before departure.

Advances 5-5

FM 3-19.12

5-15. Itineraries change often. Ensure that all agents have the current itinerary at all times. Always keep spare, clean copies of the itinerary for the principal and/or individuals traveling with the principal.

SITE SURVEYS 5-16. Site surveys and inspections should be made of all areas to be occupied or visited by a principal. Surveys are made in advance to determine the physical layout, the hazards that may be encountered, and the amount, type, and duration of PSD resources needed. 5-17. The amount of time required to perform advances and site surveys depends on the advance team's familiarity with the location and the complexity of the mission. Thy usually require three working days for every day of the mission to complete the site surveys. However, they may require more time as the duration of the event and the complexity of the location will ultimately determine the level of involvement required in the site survey. Appendix B includes copies of site surveys that can be used as a guideline based on the specific type of location visited. 5-18. Each time the principal visits a location, site surveys must be conducted on that location. If a location has been previously visited, there should be a site survey on file. Prior surveys should never be used as a substitute for conducting a new survey. New surveys are required for each visit, because many factors may have changed since the prior survey was conducted, such as POCs, contact numbers, or floor plan changes due to remodeling. A survey done for certain locations may be used as a starting point. 5-19. All advance site surveys should include the following general information: Specific location(s) of the principal's visit. Estimated duration of the event or function. Motorcade arrival, staging, and parking areas. Safe havens. Holding room location. Emergency facilities, capabilities, and telephone numbers (fire, police, hospitals, emergency medical services [EMS]). Emergency signals (verbal or visual). Timing and conditions under which to brief the principal on threat level changes or emergency measures. ROUTES 5-20. The advance team will perform travel route reconnaissance and make the determination of primary and secondary routes. On unpublicized trips, protection is greatly facilitated by keeping personnel and equipment inconspicuous and by varying schedules and routes. Advance site surveys on routes should include— Primary and alternate routes (minimum of one each). Primary and alternate evacuation routes. Estimated travel times on all routes.

5-6 Advances

FM 3-19.12

The route the principal will use once at the location or event. Rush hour and traffic levels on the routes. Construction schedules. Choke points and danger areas (such as bridges, tunnels, culverts, shoulders, narrow winding streets, long traffic lights, sewer covers, construction sites, and detours). Codes for checkpoints, choke points, and danger areas. Safe haven locations and distances from sites, danger areas, and choke points. Medical facility locations and routes. 5-21. Routes where buildings dominate points along the motorcade route should be surveyed and additional attention given to potential security risks. Advance security arrangements may include investigation of the occupants of the buildings to establish reliability, control of entry and exit at the building, or surveillance of the building by security personnel who are equipped to take effective action in the event of an attack. 5-22. The advance team should drive all routes to identify potential choke points. Routes should be traveled during the time of day that the principal will be traveling in order to determine traffic levels and delays. The routes should be driven again on the mission day by the advance team to ensure their continued feasibility and that no trouble areas exist, such as road construction. HOTELS 5-23. The advance team completes a site survey on the hotels the principal will occupy. Advance site surveys on hotels should include— Security availability. Floor plans. Room setup and layout. Rooms of the principal, security agents, and staff and the SCR rooms. Room assignments. Maid service or food service availability and scheduling. Motorcade parking and staging. 5-24. Background checks should be performed on personnel that will have either direct access to the principal or to the principal's suite. This information, unless of a derogatory nature, does not need to be documented in the hotel survey. The only information that needs to be documented on the hotel survey is that checks have been completed and the names of personnel who are excluded due to derogatory information. AIRPORTS 5-25. The advance team completes a site survey on the airport that the principal will use. Advance site surveys on airports should include— Coordination with airport police or the law enforcement agency responsible for the security and access to airport property. Access to the tarmac.

Advances 5-7

FM 3-19.12

Navigating through terminals and getting on and off the aircraft. Customs and immigration. A list of aircrew personnel who will be involved in the trip. Certify reliability with responsible officials and conduct a name search through the USACIDC Crime Records Center. Secure parking for the aircraft. Baggage handling procedures. The time required to get airborne. Layover locations and the duration at each location. The aircraft tail number, mission number, flight number, and type. Very important person (VIP) lounges in case of delays. Press and crowd control. Seating arrangements. Special equipment required for the aircraft. RAILROADS 5-26. When traveling by rail, the advance team must contact the station master and railroad police to obtain the following information: The operating schedule. A list of operating personnel who will be involved in the trip. Certify reliability with responsible officials and conduct a name search through the USACIDC Crime Records Center. Any scheduled stops and the duration of each stop. The detraining points and the availability of communications at and the accessibility, convenience, security, and servicing of each one. Any choke points and vulnerable areas created by station stops, siding stops, yard stops, pilot engine switches, viaducts, bridges, overpasses, and so forth. 5-27. The advance team should arrange for a joint security survey with railroad police to determine the need for designating posts for PSD agents to set up barricades, establish restricted areas, and inspect for concealed IEDs and hazards and suspicious-looking spectators. SEA TRAVEL 5-28. When traveling by sea, the advance team must coordinate with the harbor master, Coast Guard, harbor patrol, and dock superintendent. The advance team— Selects docking berths for accessibility, convenience, security, and availability of communications. Arranges with the Coast Guard and harbor patrol for a small craft security patrol of the harbor. Selects a smaller craft with the right speed and appearance to be used by the PSD as a follow boat. Lists the crew who will be involved in the trip. Certifies reliability with responsible officials and conducts a name search through the USACIDC Crime Records Center.

5-8 Advances

FM 3-19.12

Provides for ship-to-shore communications (radio and telephone). Arranges for docking facilities and equipment. Schedules a joint survey with harbor control to determine the need for a restriction of the docking area and the imposition of security measures. Considers the use of helicopter observation and rescue operations. Arranges for searchlight coverage by helicopter if travel will be in the evening. RELIGIOUS SERVICES 5-29. Low-profile operations are typically used for the principal's participation in religious services. Prior coordination with church officials and the establishment of a standard procedure for the principal's regularly attended service will suffice under normal conditions. Security measures instituted during periods of increased turbulence are handled on a case-bycase basis. 5-30. Security arrangements for special occasions associated with churches, such as weddings and funerals, should include— Obtaining a diagram of the building. Ascertaining the time and duration of the service. Determining the involvement of protocol, publicity, and photographic support. Conducting a security inspection of the building, including the basement, main floor, balconies, sanctuary, belfry, roof, grounds, heating and ventilation systems, and lighting systems. Arranging for police details to control traffic. PARADES 5-31. For parades, the advance work must include close coordination with the public safety director, local police, and the appropriate parade officials to establish the proper security requirements. Sewers and other passages under the streets should be inspected and sealed before the parade. Windows facing the parade route should be closed. Occupants of buildings facing parade routes should be checked, and a person of known reliability in each location should be given the responsibility of ensuring that no suspicious persons are allowed at windows or on rooftops in the immediate area. For parades or processions in which large crowds are expected, efforts should be made to have barricades placed along the curbs and uniformed police stationed in the street facing the crowd. 5-32. Alternate and emergency exits from the parade route should be selected during preliminary planning phases of the mission. Advance agents must obtain a parade route map, which will indicate streets closed for the parade, barricades, and detours. 5-33. The principal may be involved in a parade as either a participant or a spectator. If the principal is a participant in the parade, the PSD agents in the follow vehicle will be used to escort the principal in the parade and/or walk

Advances 5-9

FM 3-19.12

adjacent to the principal's vehicle. When the principal is a participant, the advance team must— Review the parade route and streets closed off for the parade route. Consideration should be given to the width of streets, the section of the city (industrial, business, or residential), the buildings lining the route, traffic control, and emergency exits. Determine the timing en route, the units involved, the location, and accessibility. Determine the positions of barricades and ropes. Determine the need for inspections of buildings, streets, sewers, and all potential physical hazards along the parade route. Determine the type and level of traffic control, detoured traffic, controlled parking, and blocked intersections. Determine the security posts needed on the route, on rooftops, and within buildings for uniformed officers, nonuniformed officers, and PSD agents. Determine motorcade parking and staging areas for arrival, departure, and emergency evacuations. Know the location of first aid stations or medical facilities. 5-34. When the principal is only a spectator in the parade, the advance team will— Obtain a list of guests who will occupy the reviewing stands with the principal. Obtain specimens of the admission cards or the invitations to verify authorized personnel. Reserve a section of the reviewing stand for the official party. Designate security posts for agents of the PSD in the reviewing stand, around the immediate area, and in the crowd. Determine motorcade parking and staging areas for arrival, departure, and emergency evacuations. Survey buildings in the area to ensure that all windows are closed, or that the buildings are occupied by responsible people while the principal is on or in the vicinity of the reviewing stands. PUBLIC BUILDINGS AND EVENTS 5-35. The principal's participation in a social or sporting event where large crowds will be in attendance presents unique problems when maintaining security. These locations, by their very purpose and design, are built to accommodate large crowds and maximize access and visibility to onlookers. This greatly increases the security considerations. Fortunately, these locations typically have some degree of internal security in place. By enlisting the assistance of the internal security teams along with the local police, the PSD can provide the additional security required in the middle and outer cordons. The internal security teams will prove to be a tremendous asset in identifying areas of vulnerability for the principal, securing restricted areas, and maintaining access control.

5-10 Advances

FM 3-19.12

5-36. Coordination must be made with building officials, event coordinators, and event security to procure the following information: The time and duration of the function. The type of facility along with a diagram and floor plan. The locations of restrooms, amenities, VIP lounges, and so forth. 5-37. The PSD, in conjunction with building officials, event coordinators, and event security should— Select seats for the principal, or a box for the official party, and seats for the PSD agents. Determine whether firearms or other weapons are to be used in the performance. Inspect all firearms or weapons to be used by the performers. Select primary and alternate entrance and exit routes. Determine motorcade parking and staging areas for arrival, departure, and emergency evacuations. Secure a list of all employees, members of the cast, or team players who will be at the event. All individuals must be vouched for by responsible officials or a name check must be run through the USACIDC Crime Records Center. Obtain a list of people who purchased seats close to the principal, and if possible, conduct a cursory check of their background. Inspect the props and other stage equipment. Establish security contingency plans for the extraction of unauthorized persons and those attempting to disrupt the event. Designate posts for uniformed officers, detectives, and PSD agents. Establish checkpoints and barricades for restricted areas. Search the building for IEDs and other physical hazards using MWD when available. Conduct a joint security survey with local police, to include— Completing an inspection of the basement, main floor, boxes, balconies, upper floors, foyer, restrooms, dressing rooms, stage, orchestra pit, roof, alleys, and wings of the building, and of adjacent buildings if appropriate. Examining the following in case of a fire: sprinkler systems, extinguishers, fire stations, fire escapes, stage equipment, and curtains. Inspecting the lighting system and the electrical switchboard and setting up security posts at the switchboard and lighting controls.

SECURITY CONTROL ROOM SITE SELECTION 5-38. The advance team is responsible for selecting, performing a site survey of, and securing a SCR site at each location visited. The advance team will set up the SCR with the following: A local telephone book. An area map of the surrounding locations, including restaurants, theaters, shopping areas, and so forth.

Advances 5-11

FM 3-19.12

A list of the POCs and their telephone numbers for all locations.

MISSION DAY CONSIDERATIONS 5-39. The advance team precedes the principal by a minimum of one hour before his arrival to implement all security measures previously established. Upon their arrival, the advance team meets with the POC to see if there are any last minute changes. The advance team will brief the SL, command post, and SCR on updated information and secure the location until the principal's arrival. One advance agent will maintain security of the location while the other will proceed to the arrival location to await the arrival of the principal. 5-40. Security inspections are completed at the time the protective control of the area is assumed. Areas that will not be used, such as roofs and basements, should be checked and closed off so persons who may constitute a threat cannot access them. After an inspection is completed, the room or area must be guarded until the conclusion of the event and the principal has departed the area. All building employees who could be present in an area where the principal visits must be screened and given an identification badge. 5-41. An advance agent will be standing by outside to prepare for the arrival of the motorcade. Upon arrival, the advance agent will conduct introductions if necessary, then lead the principal and PSD to the designated locations as appropriate. The agent will brief the SL and PSO as soon as possible on escape routes, rest room facilities, amenities available to the principal, and any other items deemed appropriate. The advance agents and PSD then assume previously arranged security posts. 5-42. The advance team will stay on site until the designated "drop-dead" time to leave for the next location. At that time, the advance team will depart to arrive at least one hour before the principal's arrival at the next location. If time constraints allow, the SL may release the advance team early from the current location in order to have additional time to reconfirm the advance of the following location. In cases where time constraints do not allow enough time for the advance team to precede the principal to the next location, the SL may direct the advance agents to stagger their departure times in order to "leapfrog" from one location to the next, thereby ensuring security measures are in place at each location. 5-43. The flow of information will be one of the biggest challenges faced throughout any mission. The advance team must obtain changes to the itinerary as they are made and immediately brief the personnel concerned. All changes need to be prepared at least one hour before the principal's initial arrival at the location.

5-12 Advances


Chapter 6

Security Control Room Operations SCRs and security posts are tools used to enhance the security posture of the mission by providing 24-hour security in the middle and outer cordons. Each has a specific function in direct support of the PSD and is essential to the safety of the principal. It is similar to a tactical operation center in an urban area.

SECURITY CONTROL ROOM 6-1. A SCR will be established as the base of operations for all matters involving security for a PSD mission and will track the principal's movement while he is away from the temporary residence. The SCR should be the terminal or monitoring point for alarm and communications systems and is manned 24 hours a day. Communications, security, and logistics will all be centrally located within this SCR. At a minimum, a SCR is established when the principal will RON or be at a location longer than 24 hours. However, an SCR will also be established on shorter missions as the security or threat level requires. On travel missions, the advance team selects the location for the SCR during the area site surveys; however, the SCR team mans the SCR during the mission. The SCR must be operational at least 2 hours before the principal's arrival on-site and is manned on an around-the-clock basis during the mission. 6-2. The location of the SCR is instrumental in providing security for the principal's suite and a degree of controlled access into a designated area. The location selected is as close as possible to the principal, keeping in mind access control to both the principal's quarters and the SCR. The SCR should be established across the hall and between the principal's room and the primary direction of approach. Anyone approaching the principal's room must pass the SCR first. If SCR personnel cannot observe the principal's room entrance from inside the SCR, a camera monitor must be used. 6-3. On larger details, a SCR and a communications room will be established. These should be separate rooms, but positioned in close proximity to each other for security. On smaller details, or on missions where deemed appropriate, there may be no physical SCR. In lieu of the SCR, there may be a guard posted in the hallway outside the principal's room. 6-4. In addition to the SCR itself, special consideration should be given to reserving additional rooms for other members of the official party, such as the PSO, aide-de-camp, executive officer (XO) of the principal, principal's doctor, other key staff members, a host or guest of the principal, and additional security agents. Due to cost or availability, PSD agents may stay at an alternate location. However, the SCR and the PSO must remain in the same hotel or location for security response purposes.

Security Control Room Operations 6-1

FM 3-19.12

6-5. When selecting hotel rooms, choose a block of rooms between the second and seventh floors aboveground level. The first floor is vulnerable to breaking and entering, while most fire department ladder trucks are unable to reach above the seventh floor. The total number of rooms required must be determined to ensure proper distribution of rooms and that proper security measures are implemented. Based on the number of rooms being used by the official party and security, room assignments can be made to optimize security of the principal. 6-6. Ideally, the principal's room should be an interior room (noncorner) so that known parties, either official or security, can be placed in the adjacent rooms to each side, above, and below the principal's room. See Figure 6-1 for an example of hotel room assignments. Room assignments were determined as follows: VIP (room 503). Room 501 seems to be a good choice as it is a larger suite and is far away from the elevator, vending machines (which are noisy), and high-traffic areas. However, this suite has two exterior walls and possibly more windows, so it is more difficult to secure. Room 503 is an interior room with only one wall of windows. Adjacent rooms are available on each side in which known parties can be placed for additional security. NOTE: Be able to explain the recommendations of room assignments based on security measures and to brief this to the principal and/or his aide(s). This may change due to personal likes and dislikes of the principal. PSO (room 501). The PSO should have a room immediately adjacent to the principal. Aide-de-camp (room 504). The aide will need to be near the principal and will most likely have an adjoining room. Communications (room 502). Communications often need a specific direction for a satellite link. SCR (room 506). The SCR team can monitor traffic in the hallway and observe the principal's room from this location. Security agent (room 505). Attempt to house security in all adjacent rooms to include adjacent rooms directly above (room 603, not shown) and below (room 403, not shown) the principal. 6-7. If it is not possible to place known parties in the rooms on adjacent floors, security can request that the hotel leave those rooms vacant if possible. Sometimes, host security forces may desire a room near the principal. If this is the case, they can also be placed in adjacent rooms for additional security. It is not recommended that agents be housed in rooms connecting to the principal's room via an internal door, unless specifically requested by the principal. 6-8. Typically, the principal will be provided a suite by the hosting government or military installation being visited. In this case, security must adapt and reposition security elements accordingly. If a suite is provided by the host government, the principal will remain in the suite unless a credible threat exists.

6-2 Security Control Room Operations

FM 3-19.12

Room 503

Room 505

PSO-1 VIP-2

VIP-1 PSO-2

Security agent

Room 507

Elevator

Outer wall

Room 501

Communications Room 502

Vending

Aide-decamp

SCR

Room 504

Room 506

Room 508

Room 510

Figure 6-1. Hotel Room Assignments 6-9. The SCR team is responsible for conducting the physical examination of the room with EOD, MWD, and MI technical assistance when available. This physical examination should include the same elements as described in Paragraph 2-43, page 2-15. 6-10. The SCR team is responsible for conducting name checks on all hotel employees who will be in close proximity to the principal. Name checks should be done through the local police, FBI, or Secret Service and through the USACIDC Crime Records Center.

ACCESS CONTROL 6-11. Access rosters and badge and pass systems are invaluable aids for maintaining access control. A well-established and maintained access control system will support the required compartmentalization, prevent the introduction of harmful devices and material, and preclude unauthorized entry at personnel control points. 6-12. Access rosters, personal recognition, identification badges, badge verification procedures, escorts, and duress codes are elements that contribute to the effectiveness of access control systems. Access rosters should be prepared after coordination with the principal's staff and/or host committee personnel to ensure that all personnel with a need for access are identified. These rosters should be updated immediately on notification of revisions of authorized personnel in order to decrease problems and the potential for embarrassment for the principal and his party. 6-13. Identification badge systems should be implemented and maintained by security personnel and can be simple or very elaborate based on the complexity of the mission. A single type of identification badge may be used


FM 3-19.12

for all PSD agents throughout an entire mission. These badges provide the least amount of control, as they do not differentiate the status of authorized personnel. If the same identification badge is regularly used, it becomes very predictable, increasing the ease at which it could be copied and used for unauthorized access. 6-14. Dual identification badges help to assist in differentiating personnel for access control. In a dual identification system, two badges containing an identical photograph of the individual are created using different backgrounds. Use of a dual badge system— Allows one badge to be presented at the main entrance and then swapped with another bade upon entry. Identifies the access authorization level of the individual. Identifies the status of the individual (security or official party member). Allows badges to be alternated randomly to decrease predictability. 6-15. Multiple identification badges are the most secure and effective method of access control. This system is a refinement of the dual badge system; whereby, multiple badges are created with identical photographs, but different backgrounds. Using multiple badges provides the PSD with additional flexibility by randomly changing badge combination; thereby, reducing predictability. 6-16. Regardless of the system used, the foremost concern is the control of the system. To ensure this control, the identification system must include— The designations of the various areas where identification badges are required. A description of the various identification media in use and the authorization and limitations placed on the holder. The mechanics of identification at the time of entering and leaving each area, including nonoperational hours. The details of where, when, and how identification badges must be worn. The controlled issuance of identification badges from a central point with only those persons having a valid need being issued a badge. 6-17. With the availability of high-resolution color printers, not only is the creation of the badges simple, but also easily duplicated by others. When manufacturing badges, the security team should be aware of this possibility and incorporate security measures to complicate unauthorized copying. Such measures may be the inclusion of a dense pattern into the background, which appears as a single color from a distance and cannot be detected except by close-up inspection. Badges may also be laminated into a plastic cover containing an embossed or holographic official seal. 6-18. In conjunction with identification badges, SCR teams may implement the use of security pins to identify security agents for the mission (Figure 6-2). Like badges, the pins may be the same for all PSD agents or may be different for each part of the PSD team or mission and can be alternated randomly.


FM 3-19.12

W

Armed personnel

P

Peripheral support (site, event, and control officer)

C

Hotel or housekeeping

A

Staff

Figure 6-2. Security Pin Examples KEY CONTROL 6-19. A good lock and key issuance and control system is essential for safeguarding sites. For effective control, accurate records must be maintained and periodic physical inspections and inventories must be made. Combinations and keys must be restricted to only personnel whose duties require them. Combinations and padlocks must be changed when keys are lost or when a person who knows a combination is discharged or suspended. 6-20. Key control systems will vary by site, as each site will have conditions and requirements peculiar to its activity. When establishing a key control system, the SCR team must determine— All locations that require key control. The number of keys required at each location for authorized individuals. A method of tagging or marking keys for ready identification. A method of control for issue and receipt of keys including maintenance of a register and identification of authorized personnel in possession of keys. The actions required when keys are lost, stolen, or misplaced. The location of emergency or master keys, which must be readily available to the security supervisor. 6-21. Once the key control system is developed and implemented, a key control record must be maintained for each key system. This key control record should include— All locking systems (by number)) and show the location of each lock and key number or combination. The total number of keys for each key system. The number of keys issued, on what date, and to whom. The number of lock combinations issued, on what date, and to whom.


FM 3-19.12

6-22. A copy of the principal's room key should be provided to the PSO and MSAC, with the SCR maintaining two copies. PACKAGE CONTROL 6-23. A package control system is invaluable in aiding, detecting, and preventing assaults, sabotage, and espionage. This system is set up to control the movement of packages, materiel, and property into and out of each site. No packages are permitted into restricted areas until they are inspected and have received proper authorization. 6-24. The types of property authorized, persons allowed to move authorized property, and approved package controls may not be limited to packages that are carried openly. Depending on the threat level, package and property controls may be required, to include controls on articles of clothing, handbags, briefcases, umbrellas, lunch boxes, and anything of a similar nature that could be used for concealment. VEHICLE CONTROL 6-25. All motor vehicles privately owned and operated on the site by people who live at, work at, or visit the site should be registered with the SCR team. Prerequisites for registration should include evidence of ownership, a certificate of registration, a valid drivers license or permit, and proof of insurance. Government-owned vehicles (GOVs) should be checked for proper dispatches. The operator of the GOV should present proper authorization. 6-26. The SCR team must coordinate with all the proper authorities to assist in planning for and determining the restrictions of motorcade parking. Parking and staging areas for motorcade vehicles should be located inside, or immediately outside, the perimeter of the protected area. Whenever possible, entrances and exits to parking and staging areas should be separate from public areas and have restricted access. 6-27. Public parking areas should be located outside the restricted area, separate from the parking area of motorcade vehicles. If it is impractical for all public vehicles to be parked outside the restricted area, such as when using a parking lot in a major city, then a restricted parking area should be partitioned off for the motorcade. The partitioned area will include all perimeter areas closest to the motorcade vehicles. Only employees should be authorized to park in the immediate area surrounding the partition. When interior (garage) parking is used, the parking area should be located away from important facilities and/or partitioned off in such a manner that occupants of vehicles must pass through a pedestrian security gate before entering the site.

SECURITY POSTS 6-28. Depending on the needs of the principal and the event, various forms of security posts may be used for the outer cordon. Checkpoints and surveillance are the two types of security posts.


FM 3-19.12

CHECKPOINT 6-29. A checkpoint is a post set up to control access to a specific area. Access is limited to only authorized personnel by requiring all personnel to pass through the checkpoint when entering a restricted area. The host may provide the security element for the checkpoint and include civilian police or PSD agents. Checkpoint security personnel are responsible for checking the identification of all individuals passing through the checkpoint and crossreferencing each individual against the access roster to ensure authorization. 6-30. A checkpoint is the most visible of all security posts; therefore, the potential for embarrassment is great. As such, all security elements should be highly aware of this when dealing with potential breaches of the checkpoint. 6-31. In the event an unauthorized individual attempts to breach the checkpoint, security should detain the individual with the least amount of attention being drawn to the situation as possible. The SCR team should then be notified to send additional agents, and/or a member of the host committee, to the scene to escort the individual away. Whenever possible, allow the host committee to handle the problem as this will further reduce the potential for embarrassment to the principal. Prior arrangements should be made in cooperation with the host committee for a holding room where host security and/or PSD agents can be standing by in case of problems. SURVEILLANCE POST 6-32. A surveillance post is established for a specific area to detect intruders or to determine if surveillance is being conducted against the principal. These posts may be fixed or mobile. See Chapter 11 for more information on surveillance detection.

INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS 6-33. When posting PSD agents at the SCR, they must be provided with the necessary equipment and supplies, specific instructions, and the following information: Duration of duty. This is how long the agent will man the post before a relief agent comes. Relief duty information. This is how the relief of duty will be accomplished and what instructions or equipment the agent on duty will need to pass on to the relief agent. This includes— The time when the next relief agent is expected and his identity. The person to contact if the relief agent fails to report. A duty roster. Access roster. An access roster lists authorized personnel. This roster should be updated with the SCR team in order to reduce the possibility of embarrassment to the principal. Use of force briefing. A use of force briefing must be given to identify the actions that the SCR team is authorized to use. Areas of responsibility. The AOR must be identified and the limits of the post must be designated.


FM 3-19.12

Mission information. The SCR team should have access to the following information: Current itinerary. Duty roster. Location of other VIPs. Location of other PSDs. Room assignment sheet for the staff and PSD. Vehicle status sheet, with fuel levels and team assignments. Names of POCs, the local police, and the escort officer. This is used to confirm support and prior coordination. Name of the RSO. Name of the defense attaché officer. Host contact information. Location of safe havens. Airport information. Transportation plans. Plans for downtime (restaurants, theaters, shopping area lists). Area medical and emergency services information. The information pass-on book (the jog or journal maintained by the SCR).

EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES 6-34. The advance team should coordinate with hotel personnel to remove the furniture from the room, along with prestocked bars and so forth. This will enable the SCR team to bring in tables to set up the SCR equipment and allow for a full range of movement around the room. Standard equipment for an SCR includes— Computers. Computers are necessary for the daily journal to prepare maps and schedules and to make changes to the itinerary. Portable closed-circuit television (CCTV). A CCTV may be necessary to monitor the principal's room and activity in stairwells, hallways, and other areas the SCR agents cannot see directly. The CCTV may have to be temporarily installed by the SCR team for the mission. Some new hotels have security cameras installed. If this is the case, an agent from the PSD should monitor the house cameras. Two-way, multichannel radios. Radios are needed for communication between the PSD agents and the SCR. Portable base stations, repeaters, and mobile radios. This equipment is used when an increase in the range and effectiveness of standard communications gear is required due to the area. Cellular telephones and pagers. These should be available for all PSD agents with international direct dial (IDD) capabilities if overseas access is required. Radio and telephone logs or journals. All radio and telephone communications should be monitored. Logs and journals for communications must be maintained for records.


FM 3-19.12

Comprehensive area maps. These maps pertain to all activities and functions. Maps should include all routes, scheduled visit sites, safe haven locations, emergency services, public transportation, restaurants, theaters, shopping areas, tourist attractions, and so forth. General office supplies. Supply items include pens, paper, tape, note pads, scissors, rulers, staplers, and so forth. Portable security sensor kit. This kit is a portable home alarm system in a briefcase or travel case. Alarms are placed on doors, windows, motion sensors, and so forth.



Chapter 7

Formations and Motorcade Arrivals and Departures During movement from one location to another, the principal must enter and exit vehicles and buildings and move through open areas that expose him to the public. In these instances, physical barriers are impractical or not available. The close-in PSD and other cordons of security are the only defense against an attack. The use of protective formations ensures the safety and security of the principal.

SECTION I – FORMATIONS 7-1. Escorting a principal requires being highly alert to surrounding areas. Particular emphasis is placed on people in crowds who are either participating in the event or are drawn to the area out of curiosity. Close-in security establishes a formation around the principal with additional cordons added as necessary, based on the immediate threat level. 7-2. The safety of the principal is most critical when he is among the public and walking through crowds, into buildings, and to public events in which he will participate. PSD agents are positioned in formations so they can cover all avenues of access to the principal. The proximity of the agents to the principal will depend on a combination of the threat level and the principal's preferences for security. Agents must continually adjust their relative positions to ensure that no threat is able to get between the PSD agents and the principal. 7-3. During outdoor walks, the principal's motorcade will act as the middle cordon by cruising in the immediate vicinity of the principal. The motorcade vehicles can block any vehicle that may threaten the principal's safety. They can also be used to transport emergency equipment or the principal in case an emergency develops or when it is necessary to seek a safer location. 7-4. At indoor events, close-in agents should form the inner cordon immediately around the principal. Additional agents and/or law enforcement personnel will form the middle and outer cordons around the room and the grounds of the building the principal occupies.

ESCORT FORMATIONS 7-5. One of the most dangerous times during a PSD mission is when the principal walks into an unscreened and uncontrolled crowd. To counter these potential threats, the PSD team uses escort formations to protect the principal when walking. As a standard, these formations have names and applications. However, the formations are used as a guide to establish what formation or

Formations and Motorcade Arrivals and Departures 7-1

FM 3-19.12

variation will work best for the situation or circumstances of the mission. The formations are fluid in order to easily adapt to surroundings, threats, or the desires of the principal. The following are the four escort formations: Diamond. Wedge. Triangle. Fence line. DIAMOND FORMATION 7-6. The diamond formation (Figure 7-1) is the most preferred security posture for complete 360° protection around the principal. This formation is used when five agents comprise a close-in PSD team—four close-in agents and one PSO. Each of the five agents holds a key position in the formation and assumes a portion of the 360° sector as his corresponding AOR. Each sector intersects and slightly overlaps adjacent sectors.

P F

F

Direction of movement

L

PSO

R

P = Principal PSO = Personal security officer L = Lead agent R = Rear agent F = Flank agents

Figure 7-1. Diamond Formation and Security Sectors 7-7. The diamond formation positions, sectors, and responsibilities are as follows: Personal security officer. Position. The PSO is positioned slightly to the rear and on either side of the principal. This position is not absolute. The PSO will shift from side to side as he sees fit to help screen the principal from potential hazards.

7-2 Formations and Motorcade Arrivals and Departures

FM 3-19.12

Sector. The PSO covers the area immediately around the principal, in the center of the formation. Responsibility. The PSO is primarily responsible for shielding the principal from harm and evacuating him, if necessary. Flank agents (2). Position. The two flank agents are positioned to the left and right of the principal. Sector. The flank agents cover the areas to the left and right of the principal. Their sectors are to the front (just behind the lead agent's sector), around the sides, and to the rear (just in front of the rear agent's sector). The flank agents' sectors intersect and overlap with the lead and rear agent's sectors. Responsibility. Although the principal controls the pace of the formation, the right flank agent controls the operation and stability of the formation. Lead agent. Position. The lead agent is positioned directly in front of the principal. Sector. The lead agent covers the area to the front of the formation and to the sides, as far as natural peripheral vision allows. The lead agent's sector intersects and overlaps with the flank agents' sector. Responsibility. The lead agent checks the area to the front of the formation and may act as a lead agent for the principal to follow. Rear agent. Position. The rear agent is positioned directly behind the principal. Sector. The rear agent is responsible for the area to the rear of the formation and to the sides (just behind the flank agents' sectors), as far as natural peripheral vision allows. The rear agent's sector intersects and overlaps with the flank agents' sectors. Responsibility. As the principal moves forward, the rear agent checks the respective area. The agent primarily moves forward and looks over his shoulder to check his respective area. But at times, this may require walking backwards to ensure the security of the principal. Walking backwards over rough terrain or walking up and down stairs can be difficult for prolonged periods. Adaptability will be important in these situations. 7-8. Typically the SL takes the right flank position. There may be circumstances where the position of the SLs may change within the formation due to a change in the direction of movement. In such cases, the agent becoming the right flank will assume control over the direction of the movement. However, the SL does not relinquish tactical control of the formation.


FM 3-19.12

WEDGE FORMATION 7-9. The wedge formation (Figure 7-2) is the most commonly used security package for protection around the principal. It uses four agents for close-in protection. The team consists of a PSO and three PSD agents—a lead agent and two flank agents. The sectors generally remain the same; however, the two flank agents now pick up a larger sector, which includes the rear sector.

P

PSO F

F


L

P = Principal PSO = Personal security officer L = Lead agent F = Flank agents

Figure 7-2. Wedge Formation 7-10. The wedge formation positions, sectors, and responsibilities are as follows: Personal security officer. Position. The PSO is positioned slightly to the rear and on either side of the principal. This position is not absolute. The PSO will shift from side to side as he sees fit to help screen the principal from potential hazards. Sector. The PSO covers the area immediately around the principal, in the center of the formation. Responsibility. The PSO is primarily responsible for shielding the principal from harm and evacuating him, if necessary. However, in this formation, additional emphasis is placed on the rear to compensate for the loss of the rear security agent. Flank agents (2). Position. The two flank agents are positioned to the left and right and slightly to the rear of the principal.


FM 3-19.12

Sector. The flank agents cover the areas to the left and right of the principal. Their sectors are to the front (just behind the lead agent's sector) and around the sides all the way to the rear. The flank agent's sectors overlap with one another and with the of the lead agent's sector. Responsibility. The flank agents have expanded areas of responsibility that now include rear security to compensate for the loss of the rear agent. The right flank agent controls the operation and stability of the formation. Lead agent. Position. The lead agent is positioned directly in front of the principal. Sector. The lead agent covers the area to the front of the formation and to the sides, as far as natural peripheral vision allows. The lead agent's sector intersects and overlaps with the flank agents' sector. Responsibility. The lead agent checks the area to the front of the formation and may act as a lead agent for the principal to follow. However, in this formation, additional emphasis is placed on the sides to compensate for the reduction in the number of security agents. TRIANGLE FORMATION 7-11. The triangle formation is the smallest formation that still maintains 360° protection. It is required when only three PSD agents are available for the close-in protection team—the PSO (who has a greatly expanded area), the lead agent, and one flank agent (Figure 7-3, page 7-6). Unlike the other formations, the PSO has a sector to cover in this formation. The PSO still has the responsibility of the principal; however, he is also responsible for the right flank sector. 7-12. The triangle formation positions, sectors, and responsibilities are as follows: Personal security officer. Position. The PSO is positioned to the side and slightly to the rear of the principal. Sector. The PSO still has the responsibility of the principal; however, he is also responsible for the right flank sector. Responsibility. The PSO is primarily responsible for shielding the principal from harm and evacuating him, if necessary. However, in this formation, additional emphasis is placed on the right side and rear to compensate for the loss of the flank agent and rear agent. The agent on the right will control the operation of the formation. When the PSO is on the right, he will control the formation. Flank agents (left flank and PSO as right flank). Position. The left flank agent and the PSO, acting as the right flank agent, are positioned to the left and right and slightly to the rear of the principal.


FM 3-19.12


L

P PSO F

P = Principal PSO = Personal security officer L = Lead agent F = Flank agent

Figure 7-3. Triangle Formation Sector. The flank agent and PSO cover the areas to the left and right of the principal. Their sectors are to the front (just behind the lead agent's sector) and around the sides all the way to the rear. The flank agent's and the expanded PSO's sectors intersect and overlap with each others and the sector of the lead agent. Responsibility. The PSO has an extended AOR to compensate for the loss of the right flank agent and the rear security agent. The right flank (PSO) agent controls the operation of the formation. Lead agent. Position. The lead agent is positioned directly in front of the principal. Sector. The lead agent covers the area to the front of the formation and to the sides, as far as natural peripheral vision allows. The lead agent's sector intersects and overlaps with the flank agents' sector. Responsibility. The lead agent checks the area to the front of the formation and may act as a lead agent for the principal to follow. However, in this formation, additional emphasis is placed on the sides to compensate for the reduction in the number of security agents. 7-13. With the enlargement of the sectors of responsibility, security is weakened, especially to the rear of the formation. If so desired, the lead agent


FM 3-19.12

can move back to a flank position while the flank agent moves to a rear position. Some principals may desire this because it gives the public an unobscured view. From a security standpoint, screening cannot be done; the principal is an open target. NOTE: The triangle formation is the smallest formation which still maintains 360° protection. This formation uses the PSO, who has a greatly expanded sector, and two PSD agents. FENCE LINE FORMATION 7-14. A fence line formation occurs when a crowd is gathered behind a fixed barrier to meet the principal. Such crowds are usually unscreened and have the potential to contain individuals posing a threat to the principal. This presents an inherent vulnerability to the PSD when moving through crowds, as agents cannot focus on any one individual too long and must check on individuals beyond the first layer. Each agent continuously scans the crowd and the hands of the people on the line as the formation passes by. To effectively screen the principal from the crowd, the PSD will transition into the fence line formation from the standard walking formation (Figure 7-4). This formation can only be used when a barrier is in place (such as a rope, a barricade, or a fence) to keep the crowd contained.

LF TF

SA


SA

L P

PSO

SA

R

P = Principal PSO = Personal security officer L = Lead agent R = Rear agent TF = Trail flank agent LF = Lead flank agent SA = Security agent

Figure 7-4. Fence Line Formation


FM 3-19.12

7-15. During events where fence line formations will be encountered, there must be additional security available for placement in the crowd. Additional agents will be located in the second row of the crowd to conduct surveillance (Figure 7-4, page 7-7). They dress commensurate with the crowd and blends in between the first and second row of people against the fence line. The agents are staggered at intervals throughout the length of the crowd, conducting surveillance as the principal works his way down the fence line. If an agent detects a threat in the crowd, he must sound off to advise the PSD of the situation. All PSD agents in the formation will then cover and/or evacuate the principal as the agent in the crowd addresses the threat. 7-16. Agents in the fence line formation report any unusual actions or suspicious activity to the other PSD agents. This alerts the PSD and PSO of potential hazards or threats. 7-17. The fence line formation positions (Figure 7-5), sectors, and responsibilities are as follows:

SA

LF


L P

SA

TF

PSO

SA

R

P = Principal PSO = Personal security agent L = Lead agent R = Rear agent TF = Trail flank agent LF = Lead flank agent SA = Security agent

Figure 7-5. Fence Line Formation Sectors Personal security officer. Position. The PSO will position himself on the handshaking side of the principal, just behind the principal.


FM 3-19.12

Sector. The PSO covers the area immediately around the principal, in the center of the formation. The PSO will also scan the area directly in front of the principal. Responsibility. The PSO is primarily responsible for shielding the principal from harm and for evacuating him, if necessary. Lead agent. Position. The lead agent is the foremost agent in the formation based on the direction of movement. The lead agent faces the crowd, maintaining a distance of 5 to 6 feet (two arm lengths) from the barrier. His shoulders are in contact with those of the lead flank agent. Sector. The lead agent scans (as far as natural peripheral vision allows) the area to the front of the formation and slightly to the right and rear. The lead agent will assist in scanning the area to the rear of the PSO. Lead flank agent. Position. The lead flank agent is immediately to the front of the principal in the formation based on the direction of movement. The lead flank agent faces the crowd, maintaining a distance of 5 to 6 feet (two arm lengths) from the barrier. The lead flank agent is adjacent to the lead agent and trail flank agent. The lead flank agent will have a small gap between his shoulders and the trail flank agent's shoulders. His shoulders are in contact with those of the lead agent. Sector. The lead flank agent covers the areas to the front (slightly to the left and right) and all the way to the end of the fence line formation, in the direction of travel. Trail flank agent. Position. The trail flank agent is immediately to the right of the principal in the formation based on the direction of movement. He faces the crowd and maintains a distance of 5 to 6 feet (two arm lengths) from the barrier. The trail flank agent is adjacent to the lead flank agent and rear agent. The trail flank agent will have a small gap between his shoulders and the lead flank agent's shoulders. His shoulders are in contact with those of the rear agent. Sector. The trail flank agent covers the area in front and slightly to the right and left and the entire area already passed through until the end of the crowd or fence line formation is reached. Rear agent. Position. The rear agent is the last agent in the formation based on the direction of movement. The rear agent faces the crowd, maintaining a distance of 5 to 6 feet (two arm lengths) from the barrier. His shoulders are in contact with those of the trail flank agent. Sector. The rear agent scans (as far as natural peripheral vision allows) the area in front of him slightly to the left and the area the formation has passed. The rear agent will also scan to the rear of the PSO.


FM 3-19.12

7-18. It is important that the PSD approach the crowd from the side and not directly from the front (Figure 7-6). In this formation, the PSD will proceed in a diamond or wedge formation moving toward the crowd. The PSD should position the formation about 5 to 6 feet (two arm lengths) away from the barrier. This will allow the principal to shake hands and greet people while still leaving enough distance for the PSD to react to an attack.

L

P = Principal PSO = Personal security officer L = Lead agent R = Rear agent TF = Trail flank agent LF = Lead flank agent SA = Security agent

TF R


P

LF

SA

LF PSO

L

P

PSO

TF

R

Figure 7-6. Transitioning From a Diamond Formation to a Fence Line Formation 7-19. For paragraphs 7-20 through 7-24, refer to Figure 7-6. As the team arrives at the crowd, the lead agent will turn and face the crowd. The next agents to form will be the flank agents; one taking the position as the lead flank agent and the other as the trail flank agent. The flank agents will move forward into position, temporarily screening the principal from the crowd. The lead flank agent will stand shoulder to shoulder with the lead agent and will turn and face the crowd. The lead agent and lead flank agent stay in contact with each other by keeping their shoulders, arms, or elbows in contact. The trail flank agent will stand next to the lead flank agent, leaving a small gap between him and the lead flank agent where the principal can reach through to shake hands with individuals. 7-20. Once the lead agent and flank agents are in position, the PSO guides the principal into position behind the two flank agents, centering the principal between them. The principal will stand as the PSO desires, but it is


FM 3-19.12

recommended that he face the direction of movement. This reduces exposure and makes for a smaller target. Before the event, the PSO should brief the principal about using the fence line formation so the principal does not move in front of the flank agents. The PSO moves into position behind the principal. If the PSO is taller than the principal, he will stay directly behind the principal. If the PSO is shorter, he will move slightly to the right and to the side in order to see what is happening in front of the principal. 7-21. Finally, the rear agent will move forward, face the crowd, and keep contact with the trail flank agent in the same manner as the lead agent and lead flank agent. If security is needed to the rear of the formation, behind the principal and PSO, the trail flank agent or the rear agent will move to the back of the formation. That agent will face the crowd with his elbow or arm in contact with the PSO's arm or back. This will ensure that the rear agent does not have to look back to see where the team is while he scans his sector. 7-22. Once positioned into the fence line formation, the agents will side step as they move along the fence line with the principal, controlling the rate of travel. During movement, the lead agent and the trail flank agent must use caution not to come in contact with the principal as the formation moves. 7-23. To transition from the fence line formation back into a normal walking formation, the lead agent will turn and face in the desired direction of travel and resume his lead position as he passes the end of the crowd or fence line formation. As the lead flank agent passes the end of the crowd or fence line formation, he assumes a position on the left flank. As the principal passes the end of the crowd, the lead agent and trail flank agent resume their positions in the formation. The PSO should guide the principal in the correct direction, and then take up a position to the rear and on either side of the principal, depending on the situation. 7-24. Reaction to a threat is the same in the fence line formation as it is for any other formation. The PSO will turn the principal away from the threat while the rest of the PSD covers and evacuates him. The agent observing the threat will implement the arm's reach principle and advance on the threat. When the PSD comes to the end of the barrier and crowd, it will form back into the original diamond or wedge formation.

FORMATION CONTROL 7-25. When conducting executive protection, the principal dictates the speed and movement of the PSD. Whereas, when conducting witness protection the speed and movement of the formation is determined by the PSO. In both cases, the right flank agent is responsible for the control of movement of the formation. As the formation turns, the agent assuming the right flank position will run the formation. 7-26. Turning and shifting are important elements for the PSD agents to master while in formations. Instructions for turning and shifting usually come from the PSO, but may be called by any one of the agents observing an obstacle that needs to be avoided. 7-27. A turn in the formation is done when there is a change in the direction of movement (more than 90°). When an agent calls for a turn of the formation,


FM 3-19.12

he will sound off with the direction of the turn (for example, "Right turn"). The formation turns to the right and the positions of the agents change. The right flank agent becomes the lead agent, the rear agent becomes the right flank agent, and so on. 7-28. A shift in the formation is done when the movement is not a full 90° turn, but a minor directional change. A shift simply moves the formation in the direction of the shift while maintaining the same direction of movement. When an agent calls for the formation to shift directions, he will sound off the direction of the shift (for example, "Shift right"). All agents will maintain their current positions in the formation and will adjust to the principal's minor directional change. 7-29. A reverse in the formation is required when the principal makes a full 180° directional change. All positions, with the exception of the PSO, will change by virtue of the directional change. When a "Reverse" is called and the formation reverses direction, the lead agent becomes the rear agent and the flank agents reverse sectors. 7-30. Since the p rin cipal's movements can be un predi cta ble, it is recommended not to try and set a rigid pattern for turns and positions. The smooth transition from one position to the next is important and lessens confusion within the PSD.

DEFENSIVE FORMATIONS 7-31. In the event of an attack on the formation, the agent closest to the threat responds while the other agents adjust their positions to fill the void created by the responding agent. Under no circumstances is the principal left unguarded when an agent responds to a threat, even to assist another agent. Uniformed police and other security agents who make up the middle cordon of security or who have been posted along the route may assist the responding agent. The agents who remain with the principal must ensure that he is removed immediately from the threat area. In a threat situation, evacuation of the principal is of primary importance. The principal cannot be allowed to remain at the scene of the threat. 7-32. When an attack is made on a principal, the PSD goes immediately into a defensive formation. The PSD will transition from the current formation into a defensive formation to protect, cover, and/or evacuate the principal, as the situation requires. The two defensive formations are the— Cave-in. Circle. CAVE-IN FORMATION 7-33. The cave-in formation is a nonmovement formation used to cover the principal from multiple objects coming into the formation. If multiple objects are thrown at the principal, too numerous to knock down individually, all close-in agents collapse in around the principal to provide cover from above (Figure 7-7).


FM 3-19.12

L F F P R


P = Principal PSO = Personal security agent L = Lead agent R = Rear agent F = Flank agents

PSO

Figure 7-7. Cave-In Formation 7-34. In this technique, the principal is crouched down in the center of the formation. The agents face inward with their arms interlocked and their heads turned to the right to provide 360° protection. The agents lean inward to allow for their heads to be close together, thus providing some overhead cover. 7-35. This formation is held for a limited amount of time or until objects stop falling from the air or the principal can be evacuated to a safe haven (mobile or fixed). CIRCLE FORMATION 7-36. The circle formation is used when a hostile crowd is around the principal and there are no other alternatives to protecting the him until transportation arrives (Figure 7-8, page 7-14). The principal is positioned in the center of the formation, while all close-in PSD agents form a defensive circle around him facing outward. Each agent grabs the belt or waistband of the agent to his left with his left hand, thereby allowing the agent to use his right hand to fend off individuals or objects while moving to a designated safe haven or area. 7-37. This formation is not designed to move fast, but will afford 360° security in a heavy crowd. It is held for a limited amount of time since it is hard to coordinate movement while the agents' arms are interlocked.

NONSTANDARD FORMATIONS 7-38. Several events that the principal will participate in will require flexibility of the standard walking formation. There will be circumstances when modification of the formation is required due to the physical layout of the area the principal will move through. During such situations, security is maintained by modifying the standard diamond formation to fit the situation. The PSD agents will transition from the walking formation into


FM 3-19.12

L F

R

P

F

PSO


P = Principal PSO = Personal security officer L = Lead agent R = Rear agent F = Flank agents

Figure 7-8. Circle Formation predetermined positions based on the situation and/or physical restrictions in order to maintain 360° security. EXERCISE 7-39. Providing security formations for the principal during exercise may require either a moving or a fixed-site formation. Formation modifications are required during PT runs, running or jogging, bicycling, racquetball, tennis, horseback riding, and so on. 7-40. Running in formation presents unique problems that have to be planned for in advance. When running with a principal, safety and security are the primary concerns; however, the desires of the principal will affect the way the PSD team operates and sets up the mission. Knowing the principal's abilities and the planned route will help the unit in providing security to the principal while running. 7-41. The advance team should plan a route that meets the distance and terrain requirements of the principal. It should provide safe havens and covered areas to lesson the extent of exposure. An indoor running track is always preferable, but these are not always available and the principal may prefer outdoor runs. 7-42. PSD agents accompanying the principal on the run can use bicycles in order to reduce the level of physical fatigue experienced. Even the fittest PSD agents who exercise with the principal for an extended period will become fatigued and be less effective, lessening their ability to implement protective measures if necessary. When the route allows, remaining agents should follow in the follow vehicles to shadow the principal. If the terrain is too rough for vehicles, then bicycles should be used. 7-43. Knowing the principal's physical abilities will be important for the planning for any type of physical exercise for him. His medical conditions


FM 3-19.12

should be considered. The PSD should also plan and coordinate for medical attention in case of an emergency. 7-44. The use of a vehicle within close proximity to the principal's run or walk route is beneficial as it allows for a safe haven along the route. Medical equipment, additional security agents, weapons, water, and communications gear will be readily available in the vehicle. DOORWAYS, HALLWAYS, AND STAIRWAYS 7-45. When walking through doorways, hallways, and stairways, the square formation is better suited to check doorways and hallways as the PSD team and principal pass. The box formation is a modification of the diamond formation. The lead agent and right flank agent shift into right and left front positions while the rear agent and left flank agent shift into right and left rear positions. Screening is accomplished by adjusting the speed to move up to an area, pausing as the principal approaches and passes, and then passing the sector off to the rear agent and moving forward to the next area. 7-46. Revolving doors should be avoided whenever possible, as they prevent the PSD from remaining with the principal. The restricted openings and oneway rotation of revolving doors can create an entrapment for the principal and PSD. If revolving doors cannot be avoided, the PSD may request the facility manager to collapse the doors to provide unrestricted movement. HANDSHAKES 7-47. When individuals request handshakes with the principal, they are not allowed to approach the principal without being challenged. If the principal wants to shake hands, then two members of the security team will form a barrier. The two agents who form this barrier will determine on what side the individual approaches. Once the barrier is formed, the individual is allowed to shake hands with the principal. The principal should not extend his hand past the two PSD agents for safety reasons. Once the handshake occurs, the PSD team moves back into the diamond or wedge formation while one PSD agent continues to screen the individual from the principal. 7-48. The principal may shake hands and greet people often. If so, it is helpful for the PSD team to brief the principal on the proper handshake technique that will allow him to remain in control of the handshake. The proper handshake form involves extending the index finger out when grasping the hand for the handshake. The index finger will extend beyond the wrist of the individual receiving the handshake. This form gives the principal control of the handshake and prevents the individual from manipulating the grip to his advantage. 7-49. While shaking hands, the principal may encounter a person who does not want to let go. In the event the individual maintains the handshake too long or appears too aggressive, the detail must intervene to break up the handshake and continue the principal's movement. Normally, the agent in the right flank position will notice this and break the handshake. 7-50. Once identified, the agent will notify the PSO of the situation. The PSO will shift his position from the right rear of the principal, to a position directly


FM 3-19.12

in front of the principal, providing a barrier between the aggressor and the principal. The agent then proceeds to break the handshake of the aggressive person. The PSO should place his left arm over the principal's arm creating contact between his inner forearm and elbow with the inner forearm and elbow of the principal. At the same time, the agent is grasping the principal's wrist to support it. The agent then presses the aggressor's thumb back into the aggressor's hand or peels the aggressor's thumb back towards the aggressor's wrist. 7-51. In friendly crowds where the threat appears to be isolated, a complete evacuation may not be necessary. This determination will be made by the PSO.

MEDICAL EVACUATIONS 7-52. In a medical emergency, the principal may fall or collapse. The PSO immediately asks the principal if he is okay. If the principal responds, the PSO will assist the principal to sit or stand. It is not recommended that the principal remain in the same location where the incident occurred due to embarrassment or a crowd forming. The PSO may decide to evacuate the principal or the principal may request to be evacuated. 7-53. If the principal can stand, he will be checked, his clothing will be straightened, and he will continue walking if that is the decision of the PSO or the desire of the principal. If the principal needs to sit and recover, the PSO may direct the team to move him to a suitable area. If the principal does not respond to the PSO, the PSO immediately sounds off with "Medical emergency." This alerts the PSD agents of the situation. 7-54. If the principal is unresponsive and medical circumstances permit, the principal can be moved to a private location away from onlookers. If the principal is lying on his back, the PSO will turn the principal over on his stomach. The PSO will place his right or left arm (depending on what side he is on) under the arm of the principal. A protective agent will move to the side opposite the PSO and place his arm under the arm of the principal. Two other agents will move to the legs of the principal. Each agent will place his arm under the thigh of the principal between the groin and the knee. One agent will remain in an overwatch position. The PSO will direct the lifting and movement of the principal to a designated location or safe haven. Each agent will scan his sector while moving. The agent providing watch will lead the PSD, ward off the public, open doors, and clear the way. Once at a secure location, the team will request a medical support response and begin first aid measures as necessary. 7-55. If a medical emergency occurs in an area that can be secured, there is no need to evacuate the principal. In an open area, a crowd could form and block emergency medical teams from getting to the principal.

SECTION II – ARM'S REACH AND EXTENDED ARM'S REACH PRINCIPLES 7-56. The arm's reach principles are effective when a threat is perceived at a distance of less than 21 feet from the formation. At such a distance, there is


FM 3-19.12

not enough time for the PSD to correctly deploy a weapon while simultaneously screening and protecting the principal.

ARM'S REACH PRINCIPLE 7-57. It takes a suspect 0.5 seconds to shoot a gun that is already aimed. It takes a trained officer 1.2 seconds to draw, point, and shoot and 2.8 seconds to draw, sight, and shoot. This is over five times longer than for an attacker to fire. This unavoidable reaction time delay shows why the arm's reach principle is employed if the threat is perceived to be within 0 to 7 feet of the principal or PSD. The arm's reach principle consists of the following four parts: Identify the threat. Sound off with the threat and direction. Cover the principal. Evacuate the principal. IDENTIFY THE THREAT 7-58. The first part of the principle is the awareness by a PSD agent in closein protection that a potential threat has been presented against the principal. The agent must be aware of the situation around him at all times in order to properly identify potential threats to the principal. Each PSD agent has a sector of responsibility based on the security formation currently employed. The agent identifying a threat in his sector will initiate the arm's reach principle. Five simple terms are used to identify the threat to the principal and other PSD agents. These terms are as follows: Suspicious person (SP). Any potential attacker. Object. Any airborne item coming into the formation. Weapon. Any handheld nonprojectile firing device. Gun. Any handheld projectile firing device Grenade. Any explosive device on the ground. SOUND OFF WITH THE THREAT AND DIRECTION 7-59. The agent identifying the threat will immediately sound off with the type of threat and the direction the threat appears. The direction is determined by the orientation of the threat to the direction in which the principal is moving or facing. Examples include "Gun right," "Weapons left," "Object front," and so on. 7-60. Only primary directions (front, rear, left, or right) are used when sounding off the direction of the threat. All directions are called in relation to the principal's direction of travel. COVER THE PRINCIPAL 7-61. When the agent sounds off, the remaining agents on hearing the warning immediately cover the principal and transition to the cave-in formation to present a smaller target. When covering the principal, the PSO turns the principal away from the threat and ensures that his body is between


FM 3-19.12

the principal and the threat. In this phase, the PSO reduces the visible silhouette of the principal by bending him forward at the waist. The other PSD agents cover the principal by huddling close to him. Each agent places one arm around the shoulder of the agent next to him, thus transitioning to the cave-in formation. The flank agents will place a hand on the shoulder of the lead agent in order to prepare for an evacuation. 7-62. During the cover phase, the agent who identified the threat may be confronting the attacker. In this case, the identifying agent places his body between the threat and the principal to distract the attention of the threat from the principal. EVACUATE THE PRINCIPAL 7-63. After the agents cover the principal, they prepare to evacuate him using the defensive circle formation. The agents, as a group, move the principal to the nearest safe haven or prearranged location. The safe haven may be used as a temporary stronghold until further actions can be accomplished. The safe haven can also be a waiting vehicle, which removes the principal from the area. 7-64. During an evacuation, the only PSD agent to have any physical contact with the principal is the PSO, unless the PSO has been rendered immobile and unable to assist in the evacuation. If this occurs, the agent closest to the principal will assume the PSO's duties in the evacuation. 7-65. If the attack is from a nonexploding object thrown at a principal (such as a brick or food item), the arm's reach principle is limited to only the sound off and cover the principal. Generally, no evacuation is required when objects are thrown. However, if the crowd becomes hostile and/or numerous items are thrown and continue to be thrown, evacuation must be considered for the maximum safety and security of the principal.

EXTENDED ARM'S REACH PRINCIPLE 7-66. The extended arm's reach principle pertains to a threat perceived to be from 7 to 21 feet from the formation. At these distances, it is more advantageous for the agent to "attack the attacker" than to employ a weapon. PSD agents may be forced to traverse obstacles, move past people, or run in an attempt to divert the attention of the attacker. If the security agent is able to reach the attacker, he attempts to disarm him. During this time, the remaining PSD agents cover and evacuate the principal.

THREAT RESPONSE 7-67. All close-in agents must be aware of the safe havens at all times. Effective communication and quick response to a presented threat are the keys to ensuring that the principal survives an attack. 7-68. For threats involving SPs, objects, or grenades, the identifying agent employs the arm's reach principle. In these situations, the remaining agents screen the threat and cover and/or evacuate the principal the situation necessitates.


FM 3-19.12

RESPOND TO A SUSPICIOUS PERSON 7-69. An SP is considered to be any potential attacker. If an SP is identified, the agent closest to the threat will screen the threat by placing himself between the SP and the principal. He maintains that screen position until the next closest agent in the formation approaches that point. The original agent who screened the SP is then relieved by the second agent, who maintains the screening position until the principal is a safe distance from the SP and is no longer in danger. 7-70. An SP is screened until either the principal has traveled a safe distance away or the SP presents an actual threat of a gun, weapon, object, or grenade. Once an actual threat is presented, the arm's reach or extended arm's reach principle is employed. RESPOND TO AN OBJECT 7-71. An object may be any airborne item coming into the formation. In this situation, the identifying agent employs the arm's reach or extended arm's reach principle by guiding the object to the ground. That same agent must remain vigilant for follow-on objects and secondary attacks. Once an agent has committed to address the threat, he must remain with the threat until the principal is evacuated. 7-72. At the same time as the identifying agent employs the arm's reach or extended arm's reach principle, the PSO will bend the principal over at the waist while turning him away from the threat. The agent will shield the principal with his own body, cover him, and evacuate him to a safe location. The remaining agents also transition to the cave-in formation around the PSO and principal, providing additional protection during the evacuation process. 7-73. If only one object is thrown into the formation, the PSO should initiate escort procedures and guide the principal away from the threat. However, if additional objects are thrown toward the principal, cover and evacuation may be necessary. RESPOND TO A GRENADE 7-74. A grenade is any explosive device on the ground. While the device is in the air it is considered an object. Like the response with an object, the identifying agent will guide it to the ground. Once on the ground, it is considered a grenade. At this point, the identifying agent employs the arm's reach or extended arm's reach principle by assuming a supine position, drawing his weapon, and scanning for the attacker or a secondary attack. 7-75. At the same time the identifying agent draws his weapon, the PSO's responsibility is to turn the principal away from the threat, throw him to the ground, and shield him completely with his body. All remaining PSD agents will assume a supine position and attempt to maintain 360° security around the principal. All agents, except the PSO, will lay on their backs with weapons drawn, maintaining a low profile. Agents must maintain a visual on their respective sectors to ensure 360° security. The PSD will remain on the ground until the device explodes or for a count of 7 seconds. If the device explodes, or after 7 seconds with no explosion, then the entire PSD will stand, transition


FM 3-19.12

into the cave-in formation around the principal, and evacuate him to a safe haven (fixed or mobile). RESPOND TO A GUN OR WEAPON 7-76. If the threat presented is either a gun or a weapon, the identifying agent employs the arm's reach principle and confronts the threat using unarmed defense techniques as described in Chapter 8. The remaining agents will cover and evacuate the principal.

FIREARM USE 7-77. The primary focus of all PS personnel is to present and maintain a defensive posture and evacuate the principal from the kill zone. As such, there are only limited situations when the immediate use of firearms, including automatic weapons, is the proper response by PSD agents. 7-78. Situations in which the return of fire would be deemed an appropriate response by the PSD include the principal's vehicle being disabled in the kill zone of an ambush or an organized attack during outdoor walks by multiple assailants, such as a terrorist hit team. During outdoor walks, especially in high threat or hostile areas, a PSD agent armed with an automatic weapon may follow the formation and provide controlled fire support while the PSD is covering and evacuating the principal, if such support is needed.

SECTION III – ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE FORMATIONS 7-79. Moving the principal from one location to another safely and smoothly is a major element of PS. Knowing how to transition from a vehicle to a walking formation is critical. The principal is most vulnerable during the transition from a vehicle to a building or event site. The primary objective of the PSD is to minimize the duration and extent of exposure, as each location requires. There are five basic steps on arrival at a location. Step 1. The security team exits vehicles to the predetermined static positions. Step 2. A security perimeter is established. Step 3. Area security is verified. Step 4. The principal exits the vehicle. Step 5. The PSDs transition from a static position to a walking formation.

THREE-CAR MOTORCADE 7-80. A three-car motorcade (Figure 7-9) consists of a lead car, the principal's vehicle, and the follow vehicle. In a three-car motorcade, each agent has an assigned seat and with specific responsibility. The lead agent will travel in the right front seat of the lead car. On arrival (Figure 7-10), he will exit the car and move to a lead position to meet with an advance agent. The SL, in the right front seat of the follow car, will exit and move to the right front bumper of the principal's vehicle. The rear agent will move from the left rear seat of the follow car to the left side of the principal's vehicle and stand directly in


FM 3-19.12

front of the principal's window to block any view of the principal by onlookers. The flank agent will move from the right rear seat of the follow car to the right rear bumper of the principal's vehicle. Each agent will scan a sector similar to that of a diamond formation.

R = Rear agent F = Flank agent D = Driver SL = Shift leader P = Principal PSO = Personal security officer L = Lead agent

R

D

F

SL

D L D P

PSO

Figure 7-9. Three-Car Motorcade

R

D

D D P

PSO

F SL R = Rear agent F = Flank agent D = Driver SL = Shift leader P = Principal PSO = Personal security officer L = Lead agent A = Advance agent

L

A

Figure 7-10. Dismount on Arrival


FM 3-19.12

7-81. The lead agent will get the "All clear" signal from the advance person. The SL will tap on the quarter panel of the principal's vehicle with the "All clear" signal for the PSO to exit the vehicle. The PSO should not dismount until the SL gives the "All clear." The PSO will dismount the vehicle and open the principal's vehicle door, ensuring to place the door between himself and the principal. The agent must maintain positive control of the armored door, which may weigh as much as 500 pounds. If there is a sharp edge or crease, the PSO should cover this area with his hand to reduce the risk of injury or snagging of clothing. 7-82. Once the principal exits, the PSO moves into position behind and to the right of the principal. As the SL sees the principal move forward, he will notify the team. The agents will assume their positions and sectors as described in a diamond formation. 7-83. This procedure is reversed when returning to the vehicle. Once the PSO closes the principal's door, he opens his door and enters the vehicle. Once the PSO's door is closed, the SL directs the team to mount up in their respective vehicles. Each agent, while maintaining his sector, moves to his respective seat.

TWO-CAR MOTORCADE 7-84. A two-car motorcade (Figure 7-11) is absent of a lead car and a security agent. In a two-car motorcade (with four agents), the PSO, SL, rear agent, and flank agent have the same seating assignments as in the three-car motorcade. The advance agent is incorporated into the formation on dismount to form a diamond formation (Figure 7-12).

R = Rear agent F = Flank agent D = Driver SL = Shift leader P = Principal PSO = Personal security officer

R

D

F

SL

D P

PSO

Figure 7-11. Two-Car Motorcade


FM 3-19.12

R D D P

PSO SL

F

R = Rear agent F = Flank agent D = Driver SL = Shift leader P = Principal PSO = Personal security officer A = Advance agent

A

Figure 7-12. Diamond Formation on Dismount 7-85. The SL exits the follow vehicle and gets the "All clear" from the advance agent, then moves to the right front bumper of the principal's vehicle. The advance agent then turns around assuming the lead position within the formation. The rear agent and flank agent exit the follow vehicle and assume the same positions as described in the three-car motorcade. Once security is established around the principal's vehicle, the PSO and PSD agents follow the same procedures as described in the three-car motorcade. When returning to the vehicle, the PSD is in a wedge formation without the advance agent. Procedures for mounting are the same as with the three-car motorcade.



Chapter 8

Unarmed Defense Against an Attack Personnel involved with a PSD mission may be called on at any moment to protect either the principal or themselves. They must be prepared, alert, and able to employ PS unarmed defense against an attack (UDAA) techniques according to the arm's reach principles at any time. By practicing and applying the UDAA techniques the PSD agent performing a mission can successfully accomplish the objective of lessening the effectiveness of any attack that his assigned principal may face while on foot, when necessary.

UNARMED DEFENSE PRINCIPLES 8-1. UDAA techniques are dramatically different than any other type of law enforcement training. Instead of drawing a weapon and engaging a target, the PSD agent makes his body a target in an attempt to distract and disarm the attacker at distances ranging from 0 to 21 feet. The goal of the identifying agent is to distract the attention of the attacker and disarm or contain the subject until the principal is evacuated. Once disarmed, the PSD agent remains with the attacker while the remaining agents complete the evacuation of the principal. The attacker should be turned over to the local authorities immediately. NOTE: PSD agents must perform the protective mission according to AR 190-14, which governs the use of force. When detaining a subject, the PSD agent must only use the minimum amount of force necessary to accomplish the restraint needed to deliver the subject to the custody of the civil authorities. All incidents should be immediately reported to the appropriate federal, state, local, or foreign authorities, and the subject should be remanded to their custody. 8-2. The PSD agent identifying the attacker will respond to the attacker by sounding off with the threat and the direction of the threat and moving toward the attacker. The objective is for the identifying agent to divert the attention of the attacker from the principal. As the agent closes the distance between himself and the attacker, the focus of the attacker should be presumably shift from the principal to the approaching agent.

DEFENSE AND DISARMING TECHNIQUES 8-3. In the event of an attack on the formation, the PSD agent closest to the threat responds and the other agents adjust their positions to fill the void created by the responding agent. Under no circumstances is the principal left unguarded when an agent responds to a threat, even to assist another agent or the PSO. Uniformed police and other security agents who make up the

Unarmed Defense Against an Attack 8-1

FM 3-19.12

middle cordon of security or who have been posted along the route may assist the responding agent. The agents who remain with the principal must ensure that he is removed immediately from the threat area. When an attack is made on the principal, the PSD goes immediately into a defensive cave-in formation (Chapter 7). In a threat situation, evacuation of the principal is of primary importance. The principal cannot be allowed to remain at the scene of the threat. GUN DEFENSE AND DISARMING 8-4. At distances less than 7 feet, the focus of the identifying agent is to create a buffer between the gun and the principal as quickly as possible to decrease the likelihood that the attacker can establish a direct line of sight to the principal. 8-5. If the distance is between 0 and 21 feet, the identifying agent will proceed toward the attacker. The agent advances toward the attacker yelling and waving his hands and arms to distract the attention of the attacker and to disarm him as the principal is covered and evacuated. Once within arm's reach of the attacker, the agent will employ the figure four clamp technique. 8-6. The agent will sound off with the type of threat and the direction of the threat. When identifying a threat, all handheld projectile-firing devices (such as pistols, bows and arrows, and slingshots) will be identified as a "gun." The direction of the threat is always based on the direction of travel of the principal and will be identified as "front," "rear," "right," and "left." 8-7. The technique used to disarm an attacker with any type of handheld projectile firing device is the figure four clamp technique. This technique is performed as follows: Step 1. The PSD agent makes his body the largest target possible by turning and facing the presented attacker and then extends his hands and arms above his head. The agent will then close the distance between himself and the attacker, thus causing the attacker to shift his focus from the principal (Figure 8-1). Step 2. The agent grabs the top of the gun and pushes the muzzle down (Figure 8-2). Step 3. The agent uses his opposite arm to pass on the outside shoulder of the attacker's weapon hand and encircle the attacker's weapon arm, with the agent grabbing his own forearm (Figure 8-3, page 8-4). Step 4. The agent elevates the gun into the attacker's rib cage to cause him to release it (Figure 8-4, page 8-4). 8-8. The combination of these actions executed at the same time should cause the attacker to release his grasp of the gun and allow the PSD agent to disarm him. The agent should ensure that he maintains control of the gun and the attacker. When a gun is presented at a distance perceived to be greater than 21 feet, the agent identifying the threat will cover and evacuate the principal with the team.

8-2 Unarmed Defense Against an Attack

FM 3-19.12

Figure 8-1. Figure Four Clamp Technique (Graphic 1)

Figure 8-2. Figure Four Clamp Technique (Graphic 2) WEAPON DEFENSE AND DISARMING 8-9. All handheld non-projectile-firing devices (such as knives and clubs) will be identified as a "weapon." The identification of the direction of the threat is the same. Agents addressing a knife-wielding attacker need to realize they will probably be cut at some point during the attack. Agents should be


FM 3-19.12

Figure 8-3. Figure Four Clamp Technique (Graphic 3)

Figure 8-4. Figure Four Clamp Technique (Graphic 4) mentally prepared for this probability and realize that they can continue to fight even if cut. Lunge or Slash Defense 8-10. The technique used to disarm an attacker who lunges or slashes at the principal or PSD with a weapon is a modified version of the figure four clamp technique. The technique is executed as follows:


FM 3-19.12

Step 1. The agent approaches the attacker with one arm up, protecting the face and neck, while the other arm is down, protecting the mid-section and groin. The agent's elbows should be as close together as possible to prevent a slash (Figure 8-5).

Figure 8-5. Lunge or Slash Defense (Graphic 1) Step 2. The agent grabs the wrist of the hand holding the weapon and pushes it downward (Figure 8-6).

Figure 8-6. Lunge or Slash Defense (Graphic 2)


FM 3-19.12

Step 3. The agent uses his opposite arm to pass on the outside shoulder of the attacker's weapon hand and encircles the attacker's weapon arm, with the agent grabbing his own forearm (Figure 8-7).

Figure 8-7. Lunge or Slash Defense (Graphic 3) Step 4. The agent elevates the attacker's weapon arm behind his back to secure the weapon (Figure 8-8).

Figure 8-8. Lunge or Slash Defense (Graphic 4)


FM 3-19.12

Overhead Strike Defense 8-11. This technique is used to defend against an overhead knife strike. The following steps are used to disarm an attacker: Step 1. The agent blocks the overhead strike with the same arm the attacker is using (Figure 8-9).

Figure 8-9. Overhead Strike Defense (Graphic 1) Step 2. The agent places the forearm of his free arm in the bend of the attacker's elbow. The agent encircles the attacker's arm, while grabbing his own forearm (Figure 8-10).

Figure 8-10. Overhead Strike Defense (Graphic 2)


FM 3-19.12

Step 3. The agent pushes down on the attacker's wrist, driving the attacker’s arm away from the agent (Figure 8-11).

Figure 8-11. Overhead Strike Defense (Graphic 3)



Chapter 9

Motorcade Operations and Technical Driving The greatest advantage a PSD has is ensuring that it is neither time nor place predictable. Varying departure, arrival, and travel times can dramatically reduce the potential of a premeditated attack from occurring. Most principals have a 60/40 percent split between their office and residence respectively. The most predictable movement is in the morning. During afternoon and evening hours, the principal is less predictable because there is not a set time to depart the office.

SECTION I – VEHICLES AND EQUIPMENT 9-1. Automotive resources must be available in enough quantity to meet all protective needs. There should be enough vehicles to transport all members of the official party, the PSD, and the baggage team.

STANDARD VEHICLES 9-2. The principal's limousine (limo) will be an SUV, a van, or a premium or luxury four-door sedan. The follow vehicle will be a vehicle of equal stature as it is used as the principal's backup limo in cases of emergency. All vehicles should be conservative in color and capable of maintaining high speeds. Select vehicles that have ample power to cruise easily on all kinds of roads, will be able to travel at slow speeds in parades without overheating, will be free of mechanical troubles, and respond readily to the driver's touch. Special care must be taken to ensure that the brakes and tires of all vehicles are always in excellent condition. 9-3. Choose vehicles that have ample room to accommodate all anticipated passengers without crowding and are easy to enter and exit. Generally, only four people should be assigned to ride in each vehicle. However, the number of PSD agents and the number of vehicles available will determine final seating assignments.

HARDENED VEHICLES 9-4. Hardened vehicles can and do play a vital role in saving lives. DOD recognizes hardened vehicles as heavy-armored vehicles (HAVs) or lightarmored vehicles (LAVs) according to AR 58-1. Hardened vehicles, however, are not the final solution. Contrary to popular belief, they are not bulletproof. In fact, there are no bulletproof hardened vehicles; there are only bulletresistant vehicles.

Motorcade Operations and Technical Driving 9-1

FM 3-19.12

9-5. Hardened vehicles are not invulnerable nor are they intended to be. They are intended to provide an additional layer of protection to the occupants. Armor is a vital feature, but it must not significantly reduce agility and mobility. It is imperative that the appropriate balance between ballistic protection and vehicle performance and handling is achieved. The ability to successfully escape the scene of an attack is the best assurance of survival. The performance and handling of a vehicle are as essential to survival as ballistic protection. 9-6. Excessive weight, resulting from the materials used or unrealistically high standards of ballistic protection, can have tremendous negative impact, causing structural problems and affecting vehicle stability and performance. Excessive weight causes slow acceleration, difficulty in handling on steep grades, and the need for extended braking distances and may create structural problems with door hinges, latches, and window frames. 9-7. Transparent armor that replaces windows and windshields is quite heavy and tends to significantly raise the center of gravity of the vehicle. If not properly matched to vehicle specifications, the effects may to be unstable. It can cause disproportionate weight on the rear axle, the front wheels to break free on acceleration, and the vehicle to nosedive when braking hard, resulting in a skid. When turning sharply, it can cause the vehicle to skid or flip and to roll or pitch farther than the springs can stretch, which can cause a loss of control and the vehicle to overturn. Auxiliary systems may be ordered from the vehicle manufacturer that will assist in reducing many of these negative impacts. The use of composite ballistic materials, which are up to 40-percent lighter than their steel predecessors, provides nearly the same protection, without hindering performance or handling due to excessive weight. 9-8. The protection level required for a hardened vehicle is determined by the criticality and vulnerability as they relate to the threat. Based on the threat assessment, the determination will be made as to what materials will be used and where they will be placed. Areas of vulnerability that may require armor plating or additional hardening features include the following: Between the outside body sheet metal and the interior trim. Inside doors and quarter panels. Inside body pillars. Inside the arch of the roof. Under the seats. Over the floor pans. Over the drive-shaft tunnel and transmission hump. Over the firewall and trunk bulkhead. Behind the dash panel. Around the battery. Around the radiator. Around the fuel tank (can be replaced with an explosion-proof tank). Inside the tires (equip with run-flat tires). 9-9. Unless the goal is psychological deterrence, a hardened vehicle should not be noticeably different from a standard vehicle. Any indication that the

9-2 Motorcade Operations and Technical Driving

FM 3-19.12

vehicle has been converted or hardened will simply prompt the attackers to upgrade their weapons and increase the violence of the attack. Deception and concealment of armor will substantially increase overall protection. 9-10. Whether or not lead and follow vehicles should be hardened has been a matter of considerable debate. By the nature of their mission, they require much greater agility and mobility than the limo, yet a degree of personal protection is necessary in order to complete the mission successfully should an attack occur. As such, the follow vehicle should be hardened identically to the limo so that it can function as the backup limo in an emergency. The lead vehicle may be only partially hardened to allow for the greatest amount of mobility yet provide limited protection to the occupants.

STANDARD VEHICLE EQUIPMENT 9-11. All motorcade vehicles should be outfitted with the following standard equipment: Communications. The PSD must have enough communication equipment to communicate with the SCR and the advance team. The higher the threat level, the more elaborate and se cure the communications need to be. Special arrangements may be required for OCONUS travel as the equipment used domestically may not function in some overseas areas. Mirrors. Flat rearview and side view mirrors should be installed on the car so the driver does not need to move his head to look to the rear. An additional rearview mirror may be installed for the front passenger seat. The agent in this seat can then monitor the rear sector so the driver may concentrate on the sector in front of the vehicle. Tires. All vehicles should have all-weather run-flat tires. Windows. Be sure that there is little or no distortion through the windshield, especially in vehicles with ballistic glass. Rear windows should be tinted to the extent allowed by local or state ordinance. Ballistic curtains may be installed to add additional protection and to provide privacy for the principal. Tool kit. There should be a tool kit in the trunk of the car. Not only will the tool kit be available in case of an emergency, but it can also be used to gain freedom from the inside of the trunk in the event that an abductor locks someone in it. Heavy-duty steering pump. If quick steering maneuvers are needed, the steering fluid can foam and cause loss of steering. Therefore, it is necessary to have a heavy-duty steering pump installed on the vehicle. 9-12. Vehicles should have the following emergency equipment: Law enforcement emergency equipment. Flashing lights and sound equipment. Grill and visor lights. Smoke grenades. The follow vehicle should have smoke grenades for cover and evacuation situations.


FM 3-19.12

9-13. All hardened vehicles used by the motorcade should be outfitted with the following equipment: Modified chassis. If the car is sufficiently hardened there should be some modifications made to the chassis. If the gas tank is protected by armor, the rear frame definitely needs modification. Heavy-duty cooling systems. Heavy-duty suspensions. High-output alternators. Heavy-duty brakes.

RECOMMENDED VEHICLE EQUIPMENT 9-14. Some of the following equipment may not be pertinent to all missions, but all may be relevant to specific situations: Covert antennas. These are specially designed antennas that fit into the skin of the car and cannot be detected; therefore, hiding the fact that the vehicle has a communications system. Horn. The vehicle should have a loud horn or speaker system. Public address system. This allows the driver and occupants to talk to someone outside the car without opening the doors. Also the driver does not have to drive up to someone to talk to him, they can stay a safe distance away and communicate. It can also be used to hear what the people outside the car are talking about.

VEHICLE SAFETY 9-15. Upon procurement, equipment and vehicles must be thoroughly inspected for safety and mechanical condition by a reliable source, such as police or military mechanics. They will ensure that the vehicles used are in good mechanical condition, have all the required safety and communications equipment, and are free from sabotage devices. All vehicles must be carefully inspected before each trip to verify that they have not been tampered with, that no lethal devices have been attached, and that they are in good mechanical condition. 9-16. Once the vehicles are inspected and found safe, the integrity of the vehicle must be maintained. The drivers must ensure that they guard the vehicles at all times during the mission and that security is provided for the vehicles during periods of nonuse until the completion of the mission. When the vehicles are not being used, special arrangements must be made for their maintenance, cleaning, storage, and security. 9-17. Drivers must familiarize themselves with each vehicle they operate, especially when operating hardened vehicles. Particular attention should be given to determining the acceleration rate, uphill acceleration ability, downhill braking ability, and stopping distances of the vehicle.


FM 3-19.12

SECTION II – MOTORCADE OPERATIONS 9-18. Motorcade operations are used to move the principal and the security team from one location to the next.

MOTORCADE VEHICLES 9-19. Most motorcades consist of a lead vehicle, limo, and follow car. LIMOUSINE 9-20. The principal's vehicle is referred to as the limo. This vehicle serves as the primary transportation for the principal. LEAD VEHICLE 9-21. The vehicle directly in front of the limo is called the lead vehicle. This vehicle precedes the limo in order to serve as a lookout. This vehicle is always referred to as the lead vehicle, regardless of its position in the motorcade or its distance ahead of the limo. FOLLOW OR BACKUP LIMOUSINE 9-22. The vehicle directly behind the limo is called the follow vehicle and is used as the backup limo. The follow vehicle— Serves as a backup limo if the principal's limo becomes disabled. Can be used as a shield for the limo during an attack. Serves as a deterrent to potential threats. Transports additional equipment (medical supplies, protective gear). Blocks rear-end collisions with the limo. Blocks collisions at intersections with the limo. Blocks most of the rear traffic from passing. Block other vehicles from separating the limo and the follow vehicles. Serves as an attack vehicle when no lead vehicle is present. Transports agents on the PSD. 9-23. The positioning of the follow vehicle is instrumental to the function of the motorcade. The speed of the vehicles, the type of roadway, the density of traffic and pedestrians, and the threat to the principal determine the distance between the limo and follow vehicle. The follow vehicle must be careful not to trail too far back from the limo, as it will then be incapable of providing adequate security in a timely manner. 9-24. There may be times when the principal feels that the follow vehicle provides too much overt security and is generally too conspicuous. In these cases, he may request that the follow vehicle either travel ahead of his vehicle or behind his vehicle, maintaining an increased distance from the limo. If the follow vehicle is required to maintain a distance of more than 3 to 5 car lengths, then it has lost its security capability. The farther away the follow vehicle is from the limo, the more ineffective it becomes. Even so, the follow vehicle is an essential element in providing protection while the principal is in


FM 3-19.12

movement. It should not be eliminated from a motorcade as it provides numerous benefits in reducing the potential risks to the principal. EXTENDED LEAD VEHICLE 9-25. The extended lead vehicle will precede the motorcade along the designated route. The purpose of this extended lead vehicle is to allow the PSD agents operating it to recognize a potential threat before the motorcade arrives in order to eliminate it or direct the motorcade to an alternate route. The extended lead vehicle will be far enough ahead of the motorcade to discover and warn it of obstructions, attacks, disorderly crowds, or other hazards. On receipt of a warning from the extended lead vehicle, the motorcade will be diverted by the PSO to an alternate route. 9-26. There is a risk in having a large distance between the extended lead vehicle and the motorcade. If the distance is too great, the motorcade must operate independently and will have to fend for itself if attacked. TACTICAL VEHICLES 9-27. When tactical vehicles are employed in a PSD mission, the same considerations are given to their use as those for nontactical vehicles. Some additional considerations must be made. For example, it is unlikely that PSD agents will be qualified to operate all the various tactical vehicles and very unlikely that they will be familiar with the terrain. In these instances, consideration should be given to using US military security personnel. Additional briefing and training may be required to ensure uniformity in response to problems. 9-28. As with hardened vehicles, the drivers must familiarize themselves with the handling of the vehicles in order to ensure that the vehicles are able to perform the mission. AUXILIARY VEHICLES 9-29. When warranted by threatening situations or traffic conditions, marked police vehicles should be incorporated into the motorcade to the front of the lead vehicle and to the rear of the follow vehicle. If the motorcade is long (more than three vehicles), consider using traffic officers at intersections and motorcycle escorts to assist in keeping the motorcade in formation. 9-30. If the motorcade is traveling through more than one police jurisdiction, coordination with multiple jurisdictions is required. An additional marked vehicle from the appropriate police jurisdiction may precede the motorcade.

DRIVERS 9-31. Drivers of all motorcade vehicles must be trained operators. PSD agents should always be in close contact with the limo. For added security and continuity, armed local military or civilian police agents in civilian clothing who have been trained in PSD driving may be used as drivers for the limo and follow vehicles, when possible.


FM 3-19.12

9-32. Drivers should conduct the following to successfully accomplish the driving task and provide accident-free protection to the principal while he is being transported. Drivers should— Become familiar with the operation of each vehicle being used in the mission. Adjust all equipment (such as seat belts, seat, and mirrors) to a comfortable position. Fasten seat belts. Do not insist that the principal or his guests wear a seat belt, but suggest it for safety reasons. Ensure that radios, or other types of communications, are functional and that the vehicle has all the emergency equipment required for the mission. Learn the conditions of the primary and alternate routes, such as narrow bridges, construction, narrow roadways, and anything that might create a danger area or hazard to the principal. Visually scan the area far ahead of the vehicle while driving, keeping alert for hazards, such as debris an d potholes on the road, pedestrians, weaving vehicles, and anything appearing out of the ordinary. Visually scan the same area as the limo driver when driving the follow vehicle so that they can react at the same time as the limo driver. Remain aware that the limo and follow vehicles are moving as one unit. However, it is the responsibility of the follow driver to ensure that the follow vehicle maintains position. Anticipate unsignaled turns and sudden stops when driving the follow vehicle. Drivers should stay close in heavy traffic, drop back slightly in light traffic, and keep alternate plans of action in mind. 9-33. Drivers must ensure that they do not become so transfixed with the motorcade procedures that they disregard their surroundings or become defensive toward innocent, nonthreatening vehicles and pedestrians. Drivers should not— Exit the vehicle, leave the vehicle unattended, or leave the doors unlocked. Engage in conversations, play commercial radios, smoke, eat, or perform other actions that may be disruptive to the principal and divert the attention of the driver. Exit the vehicles to open doors for either the principal or the spouse. The driver will always remain in the vehicle. Allow other vehicles to come between the vehicle being driven and the limo. However, this decision must be weighted against the probability of a threat or an accident. Use a weapon while driving. The driver should concentrate fully on keeping the vehicle under control. However, the driver should be armed so that he will be able to defend in the event the vehicle becomes disabled. Accept packages belonging to the official party.


FM 3-19.12

9-34. Drivers must be briefed on routes, motorcade speeds, and emergency procedures. Drivers, other than PSD agents, having access to the principal will be screened for reliability before assignment to the mission.

SEAT ASSIGNMENTS 9-35. Seating assignments are coordinated by the SL with the principal's staff and the host agency. Regardless of the number of vehicles in a given motorcade, there are basic seating assignments, which are used for the occupants in each of the vehicles. 9-36. The PSO normally rides in the right front seat of the limo with the principal seated behind him. When other considerations make this impractical, the PSO assumes the same position in the follow vehicle. 9-37. In the limo (Figure 9-1), the seating assignments are as follows: Right front: PSO. Right rear: Principal. Left rear: At the principal's discretion.

P S O

P

D

P = Principal

PSO = Personal security officer

D = Driver

Figure 9-1. Limo Vehicle Seating Assignments 9-38. In the follow vehicle (Figure 9-2), the seating assignments are as follows: Right front: SL. Right rear: Security agent 1. Left rear: Security agent 2. 9-39. In the lead vehicle (Figure 9-3), the seating assignments are as follows: Right front: Security agent 3. Right rear: Security agent 4. Left rear: Security agent 5.


FM 3-19.12

SA 1

SL

D

SA 2

SL = Shift leader

D = Driver

SA = Security agents

Figure 9-2. Follow Vehicle Seating Assignments

D = Driver

SA 3

SA 4

D

SA 5

SA = Security agents

Figure 9-3. Lead Vehicle Seating Assignments

MOTORCADE MOVEMENT 9-40. Motorcade movements are the actions, intervals, and offsets used by vehicle operators during motorcade operations. VEHICLE INTERVALS 9-41. The limo sets the pace of movement. The lead vehicle in the motorcade is responsible for maintaining the distance interval ahead of the limo. The interval between motorcade vehicles will depend on the speed. Special care must be taken to ensure that the motorcade can pass through traffic lights


FM 3-19.12

without stopping or running red lights. In city traffic, the interval should be about one-half a car length, or far enough back to see the rear tires. As speed increases, the interval must increase to avoid a collision between the motorcade vehicles. VEHICLE OFFSET 9-42. The recommended offset (Figure 9-4) of the vehicles in a motorcade alignment is one-half a car length and one-half a car width. The limo is offset toward the curbside of the traffic lane; the lead and follow vehicles offset toward the traffic side of the lane. The resulting offset is about one-half a car width based on the size of the lane. The offset will be reversed when the limo is in the passing (interior) lane on a multilane highway. The offset can increase or decrease based on the threat, traffic, and so forth.

Follow vehicle Limo

Direction of traffic

Figure 9-4. Vehicle Offsets 9-43. The threat level, speed, and environmental conditions may dictate changes to the recommended offset. For instance, in hostile areas, particularly those with unexploded ordnance (UXO) or land mines, the limo and follow vehicle will lose the offset and travel in the tracks of the lead vehicle.


FM 3-19.12

LANE CHANGES 9-44. When conducting a motorcade in multilane traffic, integrity of the motorcade is maintained during lane changes. During lane changes, each lane is cleared one at a time regardless of the total number of lane changes. The PSO will request the number of lanes and direction for the lane change. For example, "One right" or "Two left." From the follow vehicle, the SL immediately responds with the command of "Stand by" if traffic prohibits the lane change and "Clear" when the lane request can be executed. Once the "Clear" command is received from the follow vehicle, the lane change can be executed. The follow vehicle blocks the desired lane and the limo executes the lane change. Once the lane change is complete, the follow vehicle will resume the appropriate offset. This is repeated one lane at a time until the total number of desired lane changes is complete. VEHICLE MOVEMENTS 9-45. Starts and stops must be made gradually. As the motorcade is preparing for movement, the follow vehicle will give the command "Ready." This allows the limo and follow vehicle to depart in tandem, maintaining the integrity of the motorcade. Typically, the limo is ready for departure before the follow vehicle. In order to keep the motorcade together, the limo driver can begin to depart very slowly to allow the PSD agents in the follow vehicle the time to mount and depart. This ensures a smooth, gradual acceleration and will give the principal the sensation of the vehicle moving. 9-46. Motorcade speed and intervals must be maintained to minimize the danger of collisions when stopping. As the vehicle comes to a stop, the driver must ensure that there is enough room in front and to the rear of the vehicle so that the vehicle can depart quickly if required. 9-47. The limo should never be stopped with the principal's door or window directly opposite an adjacent vehicle. When the motorcade comes to a stop in traffic, the limo should stop with at least a one-half car length offset from adjacent vehicles. This prevents onlookers in other vehicles from having a direct line of sight to the principal. MOTORCADE PARKING 9-48. Motorcade parking can prove to be the most tedious aspect of a mission. Based on the location of the mission, event, or facility, convenient or close parking may not be available. The advance team should work with hotels and host security to arrange for an arrival and departure location and a staging area for the motorcade. The staging area should be one that will not create a large signature or bring undue attention to the motorcade. 9-49. While parked, the drivers will always remain inside the vehicles with the doors locked. Relief of duty should be scheduled in advance if the length of the event requires it. Vehicles parked overnight should be garaged or inside a secured and monitored area. 9-50. During departure and arrival, the lead and follow vehicles should not interfere with the traffic flow or the mounting and dismounting of other HRP. The advance team should notify the motorcade of any other HRP and PSDs at


FM 3-19.12

the event or facility and coordinate arrivals, departures, and motorcade staging with the other PSDs. This will ensure the smooth arrival and departure of all dignitaries and that motorcade parking is available for all of them.

VEHICLE FORMATIONS 9-51. Vehicle formations will be determined by the size of the PSD, the number of vehicles available, and the type of mission or event. The four types of motorcade formations are— Formal. Three car. Three car using an extended lead. Two car. 9-52. The formal motorcade (Figure 9-5) is usually four or more vehicles. This can be a parade or ceremonial motorcade. As such, the time and location of the motorcade are published. 9-53. In a three-car motorcade, the vehicles maintain a specific offset and interval usually determined by environmental conditions and a threat assessment. 9-54. In a three-car motorcade with an extended lead, the lead car is ahead of the principal and the follow vehicles are at a distance deemed appropriate for the threat level, typically 2 to 5 minutes. Motorcades traveling in this formation regularly will vary the lead times to reduce the predictability of the limo. 9-55. If the interval between the vehicles is increased, the motorcade becomes an extended motorcade, yet the responsibilities of the vehicles remain the same. An extended motorcade offers an extremely low profile but minimum security. Due to the large gaps between the vehicles, it appears that the vehicles are functioning separately, making identification of the principal's vehicle difficult. 9-56. Two-car motorcades contain only the limo and follow vehicle. The absence of the lead vehicle lessons the security offered to the principal. In the event of an attack on the motorcade, the follow vehicle must provide cover for the limo. MOTORCYCLE ESCORTS 9-57. When used for ceremonial purposes, motorcycles should be located to the front and/or rear of the limo. During a high threat, motorcycles will screen the principal's doors. In low threat areas, motorcycles will be positioned by the front fenders of the limo. The motorcycles will leapfrog to intersections, choke points, and danger areas. Coordination between the drivers and the motorcycles is required to determine how they will leapfrog and on which side they will pass and to discuss other concerns that could or may minimize the potential for accidents. 9-58. Motorcycles should not regularly flank the limo except in emergencies and high-threat areas. The noise becomes excessive inside the vehicle and the


FM 3-19.12

Pilot car (marked local police) Motorcycle escort (local police) Lead car Limo

Follow vehicle

Security escort

Staff

Press

Motorcycle escort (local police) Guests

Spare vehicle Tail car (marked local police)

Figure 9-5. Formal Motorcade presence of the motorcycle infringes on the principal's privacy and obscures his view.


FM 3-19.12

9-59. If it is seen that a vehicle intends to pass the principal's motorcade, motorcycle escorts should flank the limo so that the passing driver is forced to delay his advance or swing out of his normal lane, increasing the possibility that they will pass quickly rather than linger alongside the motorcade. MULTIPLE MOTORCADES 9-60. When one or more dignitaries are traveling in unison, the motorcades may merge and travel in tandem. The setup of multiple motorcades can vary. The motorcades may be combined so the principals can ride together. In this case, the senior principal's vehicle is normally used. The senior principal maintains the right rear seat and the junior principal is placed in the left rear seat. In this type of motorcade formation, the junior follow vehicle becomes the lead vehicle, followed by the senior limo, senior follow vehicle, and junior limo, respectively. 9-61. If the principals opt to travel separately, the senior principal's motorcade will travel ahead of the junior principal's motorcade. The resulting order begins with the senior limo, followed by the senior follow vehicle, junior limo, and junior follow vehicle, respectively.

SCREENING 9-62. Skillful and alert driving facilitates the protection of the limo through screening (Figure 9-6). For instance, the follow vehicle can block rear-end collisions and collisions at intersections and if the motorcade maintains a reasonable speed, the follow vehicle can block most of the rear traffic from passing the limo or, at a minimum, block other vehicles from separating the limo and the follow vehicle. SCREENING TURNS 9-63. When making a left or right turn, the limo must ensure that there is enough room for the follow vehicle to remain in position when pulling into traffic. The follow vehicle should swing wide during the turn to screen the rear of the limo from approaching or oncoming traffic into which the motorcade is merging (Figure 9-7). SCREENING POSSIBLE THREATS 9-64. If a threat is perceived and is unavoidable, the motorcade vehicles should be maneuvered into positions to screen the limo. The limo should never slow down during a threat situation in order to receive screening. Rather, the driver of the limo should focus on getting out of the threat area as quickly as possible regardless of whether or not the limo is screened by the follow vehicle (Figure 9-8, page 9-16). 9-65. If an attack occurs while traveling in a three-car motorcade, the lead vehicle will go to the point of attack to "Attack the attacker." The principal and follow vehicles work in unison to escape and evade the attack. If an attack were to occur while traveling in a two-car motorcade, the limo and follow vehicle would immediately proceed to escape and evade the attack.


FM 3-19.12

Limo

Follow vehicle

Figure 9-6. Screening Merging Traffic

Oncoming traffic blocked

Approaching traffic blocked

Figure 9-7. Screening Turns


FM 3-19.12

Limo

Follow vehicle

Figure 9-8. Screening Possible Threats

TECHNICAL DRIVING 9-66. In any motorcade, safety is paramount. All drivers and supervisors must ensure that precautions have been taken to effectively counter would-be attackers and to guard against accidents with other vehicles and pedestrians. Drivers must ensure that any offensive or defensive action is warranted and consistent with the accepted principles of motorcade operations and can be justified when contradictory to traffic rules and regulations. NOTE: Technical and evasive driving maneuvers should only be performed by drivers who have successfully completed the PS training course and the Antiterrorism Evasive Driving Course. 9-67. PSD drivers must adhere to all traffic laws. All PSD agents must be fully trained in what reactive measures to take during an attack. When the attack occurs during motorcade operations, only the lead vehicle, limo, and follow vehicle will be involved in actual defensive maneuvers. Any other vehicles traveling in the motorcade will immediately move off the street to allow room for these vehicles to evacuate the area. 9-68. Driving methods employed during PSD missions require the adoption of an attitude known as defensive driving. Drivers must drive their vehicles with the goal of preventing accidents in spite of the actions of others or the presence of adverse driving conditions. This requires them to tailor their driving habits to the unexpected actions of other drivers and pedestrians; to the unpredictable and ever-changing factors of weather, road, and traffic conditions; and to the mechanical conditions of the vehicle. To accomplish this,


FM 3-19.12

drivers need to know and apply the standard accident prevention tactics, which involve the following three interrelated steps: See the hazard. Drivers must look as far ahead as is practical and think critically about the hazards they might reasonably be expected to encounter. Understand the defense. There are ways of handling situations. Drivers must learn them well, so they can apply them when the need arises. Act in time. Once a driver has seen the hazard and understands the defense against it, he must act. Drivers should never take a "wait and see" attitude. Reaction time diminishes in direct proportion to speed and elapsed time.

EVASIVE DRIVING 9-69. Drivers must be trained and remain proficient in high-speed and evasive driving maneuvers. At the minimum, all drivers should have a knowledge of how to perform the following evasive driving maneuvers: Three-point turn. A three-point turn is an orderly way to turn a motorcade around on a roadway and head in the opposite direction. Threshold braking. Threshold braking allows the driver to stop the vehicle in shorter distances than can be done by locking the brakes, pumping the brakes, or by progressive braking. Speed. Speed as an evasive tactic is functional only for gaining time and allowing the driver to take other evasive actions and put distance between the vehicle and the pursuers. Excessive speed, however, reduces the ability to take evasive action and increases the chance of an accident or a fatal crash. J-turn. Commonly called a "reverse 180°," the J-turn is a high-speed turnaround maneuver used to rapidly turn the vehicle around 180°. This technique uses controlled backing techniques. Drive through. During a drive through, both the limo driver and the follow driver immediately go to full throttle. If the situation allows, the limo driver will move the vehicle away from the threat, allowing more room for the follow vehicle to maneuver to a position between the threat and the limo to provide a screen. The moment the vehicles have passed the ambush zone, the follow vehicle driver must allow the limo to move ahead. The follow vehicle will then move into position behind the limo, providing a rear screen as they drive away from the ambush zone. Reverse out. A reverse out is performed when the motorcade encounters stationary vehicle roadblocks and the motorcade opts that the safest exit is to the rear. During a reverse out, the follow car will come around to the front of the limo and screen the threat. The limo and the follow vehicles execute J-turns, in tandem, to escape. To avoid collision, the follow vehicle must initiate the J-turn first. Police intercept tactic (PIT). The PIT, commonly referred to as the PIT maneuver, is a controlled immobilization technique used when


FM 3-19.12

vehicles are in motion. The use of the PIT maneuver is considered deadly force. Ramming. When encountering stationary vehicle roadblocks and no escape route is available, the ramming procedure may be used to break through the stationary blockade, allowing the motorcade to continue its direction of travel. Extreme caution should be taken regarding the speed and distance at which the ram maneuver is deployed to minimize the risk of disabling the ramming vehicle or causing the air bags to deploy. In a two-car motorcade, the limo would normally be the one to execute the ram. Push out. If the limo becomes disabled during an attack, the PSO gives the command, "Push out." The follow vehicle then pushes the limo to a safe distance from the attack. If the limo is unable to continue, the principal will be evacuated to the follow vehicle, which acts as the backup limo.



Chapter 10

Improvised Explosive Device Detection Bombing is the tactic most commonly employed by terrorist groups. The increase i n bombing activity, coupled wi th the increase in the sophistication of the devices, has caused the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) EOD Standardization Committee to classify all terrorist bombs as IEDs in order to distinguish them from all others. An IED is a popular choice of attack for many reasons. It has become the preferred weapon as it is easy to make and has a low cost of production. With its variable uses and ability to create large areas of destruction, it does not require precision or expertise to deploy it. Once the device explodes, it is almost completely destroyed, leaving little evidence for forensic investigation and protecting the anonymity of the responsible party. The detonation or discovery of an IED can create escalated fear and confusion. Of particular concern is that the information and materials to construct IEDs are readily available in books and on the Internet.

IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES 10-1. An IED is broadly defined as any explosive device made from materials fuzed to detonate under specified conditions. However, an IED can vary in overall makeup and destructive capability. They can range from simple fireworks to sophisticated high-powered explosives. The makeup and form of an IED is only limited by the creator's imagination. 10-2. It is imperative that personnel involved in a search be instructed that their only mission is to search for and report suspicious objects. Under no circumstances should anyone move, jar, or touch a suspicious object or anything attached to it. The removal or disarming of an IED must be left to the professionals in EOD.

PATROL EXPLOSIVE DETECTOR DOGS (PEDD) 10-3. PEDD teams can be used to search for IEDs. PEDD teams are trained to locate explosives where the location is not known. If the area is large, the use of PEDD to search the area will save time. 10-4. PEDD teams can search an area faster, and in many cases, more accurately than many types of machines and/or personnel. PEDD teams should be used, when available, as an added asset of the PSD to search for explosives. Whenever possible, PEDD teams should be used to search areas before a thorough search by other search personnel. If the odor of an explosive is present, the dog will respond and alert the handler to the exact location of

Improvised Explosive Device Detection 10-1

FM 3-19.12

the device that might otherwise require search personnel to open or move a particular object in order to find the same device, thus risking setting it off. 10-5. PEDD teams are not trained to remove or disarm IEDs. If a suspicious item is detected by the dog, EOD should be called in immediately. Items designated as suspicious will only be disposed of, or disarmed, by EOD personnel.

COORDINATION OF SEARCHES 10-6. PSDs will need to coordinate with possible support elements before beginning the mission. When coordinating with the EOD team, PSDs must ensure that search support is available at a given location and not assume that an EOD team is available because they are assigned to that area. The team may be training or supporting another area or mission and may not be within driving distance of the particular location. PSDs must stay informed regarding the equipment and personnel available and the capabilities of those assigned. 10-7. PSDs must coordinate with the local police to determine if any SOPs exist regarding the security of the area. This will also determine the role of the local police agency in assisting with evacuation procedures and established authorized entry and access control measures. 10-8. When coordinating for the use of explosive detection dogs, the PSD will need to know the experience level and training of the handler as well as how long the handler and dog have been working together. The PSD will also need to determine the capabilities of the dog regarding what he is trained to search for and how long he can work at maximum effort and effectiveness.

VEHICLE SEARCHES 10-9. Vehicle searches for explosives are one of the most overlooked areas of responsibility in performing PSD missions. Personnel involved in vehicle searches tend to take short cuts by using improper techniques and by not using a systematic search. When an individual is looking for a weak spot in defense, he can easily spot a relaxed attitude toward vehicle searches. PSD agents must be 100 percent prepared mentally and physically for this task. A simple mistake on anyone's part opens an avenue of opportunity for a wouldbe assassin. 10-10. Vehicle searches for explosive devices should be an integral part of mission preparation. Security personnel must conduct a vehicle search before each movement of the principal. The search should be conducted in an area where it cannot be observed to prevent the search technique from being used against the PSD. Once a vehicle has been searched, it should remain under visual surveillance during all times when the motorcade is not in movement. 10-11. Search personnel should consist of a team of at least two individuals the driver and a security agent. The team uses a planned systematic search, paying strict attention to detail and communicating with each other throughout. The team must be identified in advance to ensure that they have

10-2 Improvised Explosive Device Detection

FM 3-19.12

the proper clothing and equipment. Exercise caution to prevent disturbing the immediate area around the vehicle. 10-12. The proper vehicle search technique uses a systematic search of all the areas around and inside the vehicle. Each of the following areas of the vehicle should be searched in the order presented: Perimeter. Sides. Front. Rear. Undercarriage. Passenger compartment. Engine compartment. Trunk. Operation area. PERIMETER 10-13. The search is initiated by establishing a perimeter around the vehicle. The perimeter is searched for fresh footprints (such as ones in the dirt or mud surrounding the vehicle), wires or other explosive device materials, or even cigarette packs. The search team then divides the vehicle in half and conducts a systematic walk around it with one person walking clockwise and one walking counterclockwise. This search may reveal handprints, wires, or other suspicious objects on the inside and outside of the vehicle. 10-14. For the most part, a would-be assassin's decision on where and how to place an explosive device on a vehicle involves quick and easy access and requires no tools. If possible, search teams should request the assistance of an EOD team or an explosives detection dog team for the initial search. SIDE 10-15. Once the perimeter is found to be clear, the team proceeds to inspect the sides of the vehicles. The team begins with the tires, wheel wells, and hubcaps. Ensure that the tires are in good condition with the appropriate air pressure and are free of unusual abrasions. Wheel wells and hubcaps should be thoroughly examined for devices that may have been attached to the interior. 10-16. The team then moves to inspect the doors, including all windows, weather stripping, and door handles and latches. Ensure that no wires appear to be attached to any area of the window opening and door opening or cross the openings where they sit against the body of the vehicle. The window and door inspections should begin with the external inspection, then a visual search of the interior passenger compartment to the extent that it is visible through the window. Tinted side windows will make the interior inspection extremely difficult. Door handles and latches should be inspected for wires (an abnormal feel on the underside of the handle and/or any type of residue on the handle).


FM 3-19.12

10-17. If the gas cap is located on the side, it should be inspected to ensure it is the original. Inspect for any evidence of wires, or other materials, inserted into the gas tank through the gas cap opening and/or abnormal residue on the gas cap itself, the door to the gas cap, or the area surrounding the gas cap. FRONT 10-18. The front area of the vehicle has two major components to inspect—the grill or hood and the bumper. REAR 10-19. The inspection of the rear of the vehicle should include the outline of the trunk, inside the exhaust pipe, rear bumper area, and visible portions of the gas tank. UNDERCARRIAGE 10-20. Inspections of the undercarriage should include the full length of the chassis and drive train, entire exhaust system including the muffler, and underneath the engine compartment. Pay particular attention to the gas tank, as this is a common area for explosive devices. 10-21. The use of search mirrors for the undercarriage can enhance the detection of possible explosive devices, especially in central undercarriage areas that are difficult to inspect visually from the perimeter of the vehicle. However, great care should be used when using mirrors as the reflection of light may initiate light-sensitive devices. PASSENGER COMPARTMENT 10-22. Before the inspection of the passenger compartment, all doors need to be inspected and cleared. The first door to be cleared is the right front door. Begin with a visual inspection of the outline of the door for any wires, residue, unusual handprints, or other anomalies. Visually check the following areas through the window: seat belts and headrests, floorboards, dashboard, glove compartment, steering wheel, and door panels. Confirm that these areas remain in the condition as they were when the vehicle was last exited (headrests in the same position and the ashtray and glove box open or closed). 10-23. Once the window inspection is complete, the doors can be further inspected for wires. One agent opens the door about 1/2 inch while the second agent inspects with a small red or blue lens flashlight to ensure that the door is not booby trapped. As the door opens further, the ambient light from outside will better assist the agent to see the edges of the door and help clear it.The agent observes the interior of the door opening and the interior components again. This step should be repeated until the door is completely opened. 10-24. Probe and clear all remaining doors before accessing the passenger compartment. The doors should be cleared in the following order: driver's door, followed by the left rear passenger door, and finally the right rear passenger door (principal's door). This order is important as the largest threat exists for the principal's location in the car. Opening and inspecting all other


FM 3-19.12

doors first allows greater opportunity to uncover a potential threat at the principal's door as it has been inspected visually from all possible angles. 10-25. Once the doors have been cleared, leave the doors open and inspect all the remaining areas closely (the steering column, gear shift, emergency brake, headrests, dome lights and door lights and under floor mats, under the dashboard, in the glove compartment, in and around the console, in and around the ashtray, around the visors, visor mirrors, and under the seats). ENGINE COMPARTMENT 10-26. The inspection of the engine compartment begins with a visual inspection of the outline of the hood, followed by the outline of the hood being probed with a business card. 10-27. When opening the hood, one person operates the hood release while the other applies direct pressure to the top of the hood to prevent it from opening too fast. Open the hood in a similar fashion as the doors by allowing it to be raised two to four inches at a time with visual inspections of the inside compartment between each increase. Once opened, the engine compartment should be inspected for fingerprints or smudges on any components. Inspect for tampering of the air filter, battery, exhaust manifold, spark plugs, wires, motor units, belts, fan, and so forth. Conclude with a close inspection of the entire fire wall, as this is a common area for the placement of explosives. TRUNK 10-28. Open and clear the trunk in the same manner as the doors and the hood. Inspect the wheel wells and the back of the passenger seat from inside the trunk. Check the area around the spare tire and remove it and the jack from the vehicle. OPERATION 10-29. Once the interior and exterior portions of the vehicle have been cleared, the vehicle is started and brought up to normal operating temperatures. All the controls within the vehicle are operated, to include the seats, headrests, visors, glove box, console, wipers, radio, horn, turn signals, headlights, emergency flashers, power windows, power locks, and all other electrical and nonelectrical controls in the vehicle. 10-30. The search team then moves the vehicle 10 to 15 feet forward and backward applying the brakes hard enough to cause the vehicle to rock. The underneath of the vehicle is then inspected for any suspicious objects that may have fallen to the ground. The vehicle can now be declared "Clear." Once the vehicle is cleared, the PSD secures the vehicle for the duration of the mission. 10-31. During the inspection process, PSDs must remember to discontinue all forms of communication, to include radio and cellular telephones. If a suspected device is discovered, the EOD team should be contacted immediately. The PSD should never attempt to move, disarm, or render safe any suspected explosive device.


FM 3-19.12

BUILDING SEARCHES 10-32. Explosives and other devices that can breech security checkpoints may be packaged in almost any conceivable form. Therefore, a complete search of the room or building is critical to determine the presence of a potential threat. The search should encompass everything (from floor to ceiling) that could potentially conceal a threat, externally and internally. EXTERIOR SEARCHES 10-33. Most often a bomb device is thought to be hidden somewhere inside a building, but a device may be planted against the structure or in close proximity to the structure. Depending on the nature of the device, an enormous amount of damage can be caused by a device planted outside a structure. Therefore, both the exterior and interior of the building and surrounding area must be searched. 10-34. Conduct a search of the predetermined evacuation assembly area and secure the area before searching the exterior of the building. A search of the evacuation assembly area in the initial search phase allows a safe area for all personnel in the event an evacuation of the building is needed. These designated areas are found in the buildings fire and bomb threat evacuation plan. 10-35. The exterior search of the structure begins after the evacuation areas are secured. The search must cover all feasible areas where a device may be concealed. Any item usually not found in the area or any item noted as being out of place should be viewed with suspicion. The search must be done systematically with special consideration given to window ledges, bushes, garbage can arrangements, and air conditioner units. INTERIOR ROOM SEARCHES 10-36. The interior search of the facility begins after the exterior search is completed. Interior searches are conducted from the lowest level of the facility to the highest and from common access areas to more restricted access areas. First, all public access areas are searched, then offices with public access are searched. Finally, offices, storage areas, and areas with restricted public access are searched. 10-37. The advance team should obtain a blueprint of the building. They should measure the outside dimensions and compare these with inside measurements to determine the thickness of walls and barriers to ensure that no passageways, concealed closets, or hidden compartments border on, or connect with, the room or area being inspected. 10-38. The searchers enter a room, stop, remain still, and listen for any unusual sounds. The room should then be divided into two virtually equal halves (Figure 10-1). This equal division should be based on the number and type of objects in the room to be searched and not on the size of the room. An imaginary line is then drawn between two objects in the room to split the search area. 10-39. When the two-person search team enters the room that is to be searched, they should first stand in the entrance to the room and stand


FM 3-19.12

Figure 10-1. Visual Scan of the Entire Room quietly with their eyes closed and listen for a timed device. Frequently, a timed mechanism can be quickly detected without use of special equipment. Even if no timed mechanism is detected, the team is now aware of the background noise level within the room itself. Background noise or transferred sound is always distracting during a building search. If a ticking or beeping sound is heard but cannot be located, one might become unnerved. The ticking sound may come from an unbalanced air conditioner fan several floors away or from a dripping sink down the hall. Sound will transfer through air-conditioning ducts, along water pipes, and through walls. One of the most difficult buildings to search is one that has steam or hot water heat. This type of building will constantly thump, crack, chatter, and tick due to the movement of the steam or hot water through the pipes and the expansion and contraction of the pipes. Background noise may also include outside traffic sounds, rain, and wind. 10-40. Searchers will make a quick visual scan of the room for obvious, unusual items. The individual in charge of the search team should look around the room and determine how the room is to be divided for searching and to what height the searching sweeps should extend. 10-41. The searchers then divide the room into four levels for inspection. These levels include floor to chin, hip to chin, chin to ceiling, and beyond the ceiling (Figure 10-2, page 10-8). First sweep—floor to chin. The first searching sweep will cover all items resting on the floor up to the selected height. The first search includes items (such as desks, chairs, and garbage cans) that lie within the area from the floor to the chin as shown in Figure 10-2. After the room has been divided and searching heights have been selected, both individuals go to one end of the room division line and start from a back-to-back position. This is the starting point, and the same point will be used on each successive search level. Each person now starts searching his way around the room, working toward the other person, checking all items resting on the floor around the wall area of the room. When the two individuals meet, they will have


FM 3-19.12

4th sweep hollow or suspended ceiling

Ceiling light

Clock 3d sweep chin to ceiling

Bookcase File 2d sweep hip to chin

Desk

1st sweep floor to chin

Figure 10-2. Room Search Sweeps completed a "wall sweep." They should then work together and check all items in the middle of the room up to the selected hip height, including the floor under the rugs. This first searching sweep should also include those items which may be mounted on or in the walls (such as air-conditioning ducts, baseboard heaters, and built-in wall cupboards) they are below chin height. Second sweep—hip to chin. The individual in charge looks again at the furniture or objects in the room and determines the height of the second searching sweep (Figure 10-2). This height is usually from the hip to the chin. The two individuals return to the starting point and repeat the searching technique at the second selected searching height. This sweep usually covers pictures hanging on the walls, builtin bookcases, tall table lamps, and lower shelves that lie within the area from the hip to the chin. Third sweep—chin to ceiling. The third sweep (Figure 10-2) includes items (such as picture frames, shelves, cupboards, windows, high wall-mounted air-conditioning ducts, hanging light fixtures, and vents) that lie within the area from the chin to the ceiling.


FM 3-19.12

Fourth sweep—beyond the ceiling. The fourth sweep (Figure 10-2, page 10-8) includes checking all vents, pipes, and ceiling supports beyond the ceiling. If the room has a false or suspended ceiling, the fourth sweep involves investigation of this area. Check flush or ceiling-mounted light fixtures, air-conditioning or ventilation ducts, sound or speaker systems, electrical wiring, and structural frame members. 10-42. The inspection should begin at a definite location in the room and systematically move in a clockwise manner around the room, checking everything in the order it is encountered. Mentally divide each section into 3-foot squares and closely examine each square with a flashlight for small pinholes, cracks, or openings suitable for concealing explosives. Check for evidence of tampering by carefully examining and tapping all paneling, door frames, window frames, molding, and trim for loose sections and for cracks or openings suitable for concealing explosives. Roll back and examine all rugs to the extent possible. Then, go over the entire surface of the rugs, pressing down firmly with fingertips to locate any small objects that might be concealed inside. 10-43. When inspecting furniture, open upholstery covers on overstuffed furniture and inspect the bottom and back to the greatest extent possible. Carefully go over all pliable surfaces on overstuffed furniture with fingertips and feel for unusual or out-of-place concealed objects. Carefully examine all furniture, open all doors, remove drawers, and check concealed compartments or obscured sections. Also carefully check under the principal's table and chairs, as well as adjoining tables, for foreign objects. Carefully examine all pictures by tapping on the frames to find hollow spaces. 10-44. While inspecting the rooms, the team should inspect all ventilation ducts, utility service passageways, and similar channels for a number of feet beyond the dimensions of the rooms in both directions. To the greatest extent possible, use the same set of checks on the opposite side of the walls, ceiling, and floor of the inspected room. Carefully inspect all locks and locking mechanisms in the room and in the adjacent areas. In some instances, it may be necessary to change locks and establish key control procedures. 10-45. During the inspection, the team must give careful consideration to the existence of safety hazards and the presence and condition of emergency equipment or facilities. Sound devices or explosives, which are very small and self-contained, can be dropped in a wastebasket, quickly concealed under furniture, or superficially planted in a room. This can be done without attracting attention or using much time. 10-46. Rooms that have been searched should be marked to ensure efficiency and speed up the process. Post a sign or marker indicating "search completed" in the area. Place a piece of colored tape across the door and doorjamb about 2 feet above floor level if the use of signs is not practical.

BOMB THREATS 10-47. The initial moments of a bomb threat are crucial to the evaluation of an incident. To ensure the successful resolution of a threat, bomb threat


FM 3-19.12

contingency plans provide prior planning and training in procedures to take on receipt of a bomb threat. 10-48. Bomb threats are usually received by telephone or mail, or they may be discovered by noticing a suspicious item. Each method requires special procedures to effectively obtain the maximum amount of information from the threat source. TELEPHONE BOMB THREATS 10-49. When a telephone bomb threat is received, someone has actual knowledge that a device has been planted or a prankster wishes to disrupt an operation. Noting what is said and how it is said during a bomb threat call can help determine which of these situations is true. The person receiving the call may be the only person to ever have contact with the potential bomber. This is why bomb threat contingency plans must address the need for training persons most likely to receive a bomb threat call. When a bomb threat is received, the receiver must know what to do and how to do it or valuable information will be lost. Proper training provides the person with the skills to pick out important facts. 10-50. The receiver of the call concentrates on the exact words of the caller. He must try to keep the caller on the phone as long as possible to allow time to recognize background noises and gain additional information. Recording the exact date and time of the telephone call is important. By determining the time of the bomb threat, identification of the bomb site by background sounds may be possible. 10-51. As part of the bomb threat plan, a bomb threat checklist is maintained in the SCR and is to be placed near telephones. FBI Form 6-136 is a good example and can be placed beneath a telephone for easy access. If this form is not available, then a copy of the form should be used to develop a locally produced form. The receiver asks the caller for specific information from the checklist. 10-52. If the caller describes what the bomb looks like, how it operates, and its general characteristics, the threat is a descriptive bomb threat. A descriptive bomb threat is probably real. The receiver documents the exact wording of the threat. For example, if the caller says, "There is a bomb planted on your floor. You and your six agents have 20 minutes to clear out." The receiver must note all of that information. If the person receiving the call only indicates that a bomb threat was received, an important investigative tool and important information is lost. 10-53. The person receiving the bomb threat immediately contacts or reports to the SL, MSAC, PSO, or any PSD member available of the bomb threat. If the person is unable to establish contact with the detail, he has to notify the appropriate law enforcement authorities (military or civilian) for guidance and the senior military or civilian assistance to the HRP, or as a last resort in the absence of staff members, the HRP. Time is of the essence. The SL is responsible for notifying the local police and the FBI of the threat. This action will facilitate proper emergency notifications and help lessen the possibility of panic. The receiver does not communicate the bomb threat to anyone until after he has notified the SL or senior PSD agent, who then notifies the MSAC


FM 3-19.12

and PSO. The only person who may authorize release of bomb threat information from the scene is the bomb scene officer. The only person who can release the information to the public is the public affairs officer. Keeping tight control of information can prevent a wave of bomb threats. It is the responsibility of the SL to determine the appropriate evacuation measures, based on the information received regarding the threat. MAIL BOMBS 10-54. A small number of explosive devices have been mailed over the years resulting in death, injury, and destruction of property. Contingency planning is required to help prevent mail bomb disasters. Contingency planners must first consider which organizations are possible targets. A bomb can be enclosed in either a parcel or an envelope; its outward appearance is limited only by the imagination of the sender. However, past mail bombs have exhibited some unique characteristics that can assist in identifying a suspect mailing. To apply these factors, it is important for planners to know the type of mail received by an organization. 10-55. The information contained in the postal Notice 71 should be available to all mail handlers. A copy of this notice should be in each unit mail room. A mail handler or a recipient of mail, who is suspicious of a letter or parcel and cannot verify the contents with the addressee or sender, must not open the article or put it in water or a confined space like a desk drawer or a filing cabinet. Mail handlers and recipients must isolate the suspected mail and evacuate the immediate area. If possible, windows are opened in the immediate area to help vent potential explosive gases. The MP or postal inspector is immediately contacted to report the suspected mail bomb. 10-56. Common characteristics of mail bombs may include— Restricted endorsements, such as "personal" or "private" when the addressee does not normally receive personal mail at the office. An inaccurate addressee's name and/or title. Distorted handwriting. Homemade labels or cut-and-paste lettering for the name and address. Protruding wires, aluminum foil, visible oil stains, and/or a peculiar odor. An excessive amount of postage stamps affixed. A rigid feel or an uneven or lopsided appearance. Unprofessional wrapping with several combinations of tape to secure the package; possible markings of "Fragile—Handle With Care" or "Rush—Do Not Delay." An irregular shape or soft spots or bulges. A buzzing or ticking noise or a sloshing sound. Pressure or resistance when removing the contents from an envelope or parcel. SUSPICIOUS ITEMS 10-57. PSDs must be alert to determine if a suspicious item belongs in the area. A PSD agent should know if a certain briefcase belongs where it is, a


FM 3-19.12

flower arrangement is new, a recently delivered package is expected, or a package in the corner is someone's lunch. The only way to do this is to keep clutter to a minimum. 10-58. When a bomb threat occurs, all PSD agents must quickly scan their sectors and immediate areas and identify anything out of the ordinary. This may be the only way to discover if a bomb device has been introduced to an area. 10-59. If a suspected bomb device is discovered (Figure 10-3), PSD agents do not touch the device. Instead, they ensure that the device does not belong, that no one touches it, that is reported to the SL immediately. If a suspected bomb device is found, the SL must consider an immediate, total evacuation of the building and await the arrival of EOD personnel. No one is to attempt to reenter the building until it has been fully swept by EOD personnel and it has been determined to be clean and safe. Even if the building is safe, the SL may instruct the PSD to move the principal to an alternate location.

Figure 10-3. IED Concealed in a Briefcase EVACUATION 10-60. Evacuation may not be necessary for all bomb threats. The SL determines to evacuate only after a thorough evaluation of all available information and coordination with other security personnel responsible for that location and either the HRP or his senior staff member, if time permits. The results of the bomb threat checklist, information from the SCR, and the criticality of the mission of the targeted facility are considered. The SL must also consider that simply causing a disruption in operations serves the purpose of the bomber. If the bomber describes in detail the type of device, its location, and/or the placing of the device, then the SL may have more reason to believe that the device has indeed been planted. 10-61. In the event a bomb threat is received, the following bomb threat procedures should be taken: All PSD agents will make a preliminary search around their immediate areas for suspicious items.


FM 3-19.12

All persons, as they leave, will remove those items that they brought in (briefcases, thermos bottles, lunch bags), turn off radios, and unplug office machines. All persons will leave windows and doors open to help dissipate any explosive force. All persons will leave cabinets and drawers unlocked (classified cabinets may be an exception) to help make the search easier. Only authorized personnel are permitted entry until the threat is resolved when evacuation of a building is accomplished. 10-62. If a device is actually discovered, either as a result of a bomb threat or during routine operations, evacuation procedures should be carried out quickly. All persons will evacuate to a predetermined assembly area. This area must be at least 100 meters from the structure. This distance takes into account items like propane bottles, natural gas lines, or welding equipment that could contribute to the explosive force of a bomb within a facility. All personnel at the assembly area must be accounted for to determine if anyone is still in the building.

WARNING In some cases, an initial explosion is used to attract attention into an area where a secondary explosive of greater magnitude then detonates, causing causalities among the responding authorities and curiosity seekers. If a detonation has occurred, evacuate the area immediately and do not reenter for any reason. HOAXES 10-63. Some bomb threats are merely hoaxes designed for the perpetrator to establish credibility. Once his credibility as a bomber has been established, he can continue to disrupt by using well-made and well-placed hoax bombs. The right proportions of hoaxes with live IEDs keep security forces busy for a long time.



Chapter 11

Surveillance Detection Surveillance is the continuous or periodic act of observing (by an inconspicuous means) a person, a place, or an object for obtaining information otherwise unavailable or impractical to obtain. Surveillance detection is the act of attempting to identify the individual and/or groups that are conducting surveillance and gathering intelligence about the operation of a PSD.

SURVEILLANCE OBJECTIVES 11-1. The objective of terrorist surveillance is to gather all the information possible on a particular principal so that the data can be assimilated into a precise plan of action, which greatly enhances the likelihood of a successful operation. 11-2. In order for terrorists to execute an attack against a principal, the group must obtain key information regarding the principal's daily routines. Information concerning the principal's residence, office, movement between locations, and security measures is imperative to formulating an attack plan. 11-3. Terrorist actions rely on the predictability of the principal's routine behaviors. The principal's everyday routine will have the strongest impact on whether or not the principal will become a target. The more predictable the principal is, the easier it will be for terrorists to implement their attack plan. 11-4. Statistics confirm that most terrorist operations occur near the residence or the work site, as it is difficult for the principal to remain unpredictable near these locations. Terrorists must be intimately familiar with the area surrounding these locations. Their specific tactical operations planning will be quite different if the principal resides in a rural area rather than an urban area. An unlimited number of variables come into play when the terrorists look at the surrounding area from the perspectives of cover and concealment, avenues of approach, and possible choke points. 11-5. An in-depth knowledge of the routes the principal uses to travel to and from work, or other static locations the principal frequents on a recurring basis, is typically at the core of the terrorist planning. The operational planning of the terrorist will be quite different if the principal travels on rural or isolated routes rather than on major thoroughfares in urban areas. Oneway streets, traffic circles, and narrow bridges will affect their tactical planning. This information will determine the surveillance method that will be employed and the type of ruse or disguise required. 11-6. Since the majority of terrorist attacks directed against Americans involve automobiles, it is essential that the surveillance of the terrorist get as

Surveillance Detection 11-1

FM 3-19.12

much information about a principal's mode of transportation. Use of POVs, car pools, chauffeured vehicles, or public transportation will influence the tactical planning of the terrorist more than any other factor. 11-7. Information on the types of protective security measures the principal employs is critical for terrorist planning. Required information includes knowledge of the security systems employed at the principal's residence and office, such as guards, roving patrols, CCTV, and guard dogs. The location, reaction time, and type of police or security forces that could respond to an attack is of vital importance to the operational planning. Terrorist planning will be greatly simplified if the principal is either without security or has little security, is unaware of the threat, or denies the threat exists.

SURVEILLANCE DETECTION TEAM 11-8. The use of a surveillance detection team should be employed whenever resources permit. It is the responsibility of the detection team to prevent effective surveillance. The team must maintain contact with the middle and outer cordon; however, it is imperative that the team have no overt communication directly with the PSD. 11-9. While performing surveillance detection, the team must— Not create a signature. Have a reason to be in the area. Be dressed and equipped appropriately for the surroundings. Keep communications equipment concealed. NOTE: Surveillance detection teams are used to detect, record, and report possible surveillance. They do not conduct, nor are they authorized to conduct, countersurveillance.

SURVEILLANCE TECHNIQUES 11-10. Terrorists initiate the planning stage through observing, following, and recording the movement and habits of an individual. The activities of terrorist surveillance often begin close to the home of an unsuspecting person. 11-11. Most terrorist attacks take place near the residence because that part of the route or daily routine is the least easily varied. People are more predictable and, therefore, more vulnerable in the morning when departing for work than in the evening when leaving work, as the latter is more likely to be varied. 11-12. Terrorists employ varying degrees of surveillance using as many different techniques as they can to keep from being detected. These techniques include— Stationary or fixed surveillance. In-route or moving surveillance. Electronic surveillance.

11-2 Surveillance Detection

FM 3-19.12

STATIONARY (FIXED) SURVEILLANCE 11-13. Stationary or fixed surveillance is the most common technique employed by terrorist organizations. The surveillants seek a location that permits them to observe the residence more clearly without being observed or suspected. Locations they could use include hotel and motel rooms, apartments, houses, offices, businesses, vans, utility vehicles, and automobiles. 11-14. When using a stationary location in a building, the location chosen must provide an adequate view of the area to be surveyed. Although seldom easy to acquire, stationary locations provide the surveillants the best defense against detection. However, acquisition of a stationary location in a building invariably leaves a paper trail to the terrorist organization. 11-15. To avoid the paper trail that acquiring a location in a building creates, most terrorist organizations will use stationary vehicles to conduct their surveillance. Vans with windows that allow outside observation make good surveillance platforms. Vans are usually outfitted with some type of business logo attached to provide a reason for being in the area. Automobiles are usually parked facing away from the target and rearview mirrors used for observation. 11-16. When conducting surveillance from a stationary position, surveillants must have a plausible reason for being in the area. This ruse or cover is limited only to the imagination of the terrorists and includes— Having automobile problems. Conducting utility, maintenance, or construction work. Walking a dog. Running in the park. Using women and children to give the greater appearance of innocence. Posing as a salesperson, pollster, priest, police officer, maintenance worker, woman pushing a baby carriage, and/or as any other type of ordinary person in order to camouflage themselves into the normal population. IN-ROUTE (MOVING) SURVEILLANCE 11-17. This technique of surveillance is the most difficult type to both conduct and detect due to its required variability. To accomplish this type of surveillance, the terrorist must place individuals or vehicles close to the principal while he is moving. This technique includes on-foot or vehicle surveillance. On-Foot Surveillance 11-18. On-foot surveillance teams require at least three operators, but no more than eight, with five or six being optimal. The surveillants must remain relatively close to the principal. This makes one-person or even two-person surveillance easy to detect. Surveillance by three or more people is more complicated to accomplish and requires more training but provides greater flexibility and is more difficult to detect.


FM 3-19.12

11-19. Americans are more likely to travel by vehicle than on foot. As a result, vehicle surveillance is more commonly used against Americans than on-foot surveillance. One or more vehicles may perform vehicle surveillance. Five or six vehicles are normally used, with two or more operators for each vehicle. The vehicles used are generally common to the area and have local license plates, no distinguishing marks or paint, and four doors. Vehicle Surveillance 11-20. Vehicle surveillance requires a high degree of sophistication and training. At a minimum, the surveillant in the vehicle needs a tape recorder to record events. If that is not available, then two surveillants are required in each vehicle—one to drive and the other to act as an observer and recorder. Additionally, if more than one vehicle is employed, radio communications among the vehicles is mandatory. Two types of surveillance techniques are employed with vehicle surveillance: leading and progressive surveillance. 11-21. Leading Surveillance. In the leading surveillance technique, the surveillant travels in front of the principal while the observer watches for turns. When the principal's vehicle turns, the observer records the intersection and direction of the turn. The next time the principal is surveyed, the surveillant anticipates the recorded turn and verifies the route. Over a period of time, the surveillant will discover the entire route. 11-22. Progressive Surveillance. It is performed by having the surveillants follow the principal in a vehicle. When the principal's vehicle turns, it is recorded. On the next occasion of surveillance, the surveillant continues to follow the principal from where the turn previously occurred. Like leading surveillance, this method eventually uncovers the entire route with minimal chance of compromise. This method is the more commonly used of the two progressive surveillance techniques. Progressive surveillance can also be performed by placing surveillants at key intersections along the probable route of the principal. When the principal's vehicle turns, it is recorded, and the positions of the surveillants are adjusted on subsequent occasions. Eventually the surveillant will discover the entire route of the principal. This method is considered more reliable by surveillants, but is time consuming and manpower intensive. TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE 11-23. Advances in electronics technology have provided terrorists with numerous devices to assist their surveillance efforts. Devices now readily available include cameras, video cameras, hidden cameras, infrared cameras, vehicle tracking devices (such as GPSs), listening and recording devices, and computers. 11-24. These devices can be used to assist in identifying a prospective target and recording his movements. They also may be used to record the security procedures employed by the principal.


FM 3-19.12

TWO-PHASED OPERATIONS 11-25. Terrorists conduct the surveillance operation in two phases—target selection and execution. The target selection phase is the assessment phase. During this phase, the terrorist group compiles a list of potential targets based on the objectives and capabilities of the group. The group then determines who is the most vulnerable to attack. To make this determination, the group conducts surveillance of everyone on their list. This could involve a large number of surveillances. 11-26. As most terrorist groups are comprised of a relatively small, hard-core cadre, the group, by necessity, must resort to outside assistance to obtain the information needed to make their final target selection. This phase of surveillance for terrorist is the most tedious in operational planning. The amount of information needed to make proper assessment of the potential targets requires that the surveillance continue for a substantial time. The lengthy surveillance process, coupled with the fact that by going outside their cadre for assistance of less experienced personnel to conduct surveillance, increases the possibility of detection during this phase. 11-27. The second phase is the execution or attack phase. This phase begins after the selection of the most likely target. Surveillance is now reduced and is conducted by the more experienced members of the terrorist organization. It is no longer necessary to maintain constant surveillance on the principal, as routines and patterns have already been established. Detection of the surveillance now becomes very difficult. At this point, even detection may provide no deterrence factor on the operation.

SURVEILLANCE DETECTION IDENTIFICATION 11-28. Surveillance detection from a stationary location is difficult as the primary objective of the terrorist is to blend in to the everyday surroundings in order to protect their anonymity. Surveillance detection requires that one be intimately familiar with the normal activities of the area in order to recognize activities out of the ordinary. 11-29. In order to detect terrorist surveillance from a stationary location, PSDs should conduct and maintain route surveys and neighborhood pattern analyses to increase their familiarity with the area. These begin with a sketch map of the neighborhood with the following information on it: Route descriptions, including the starting point, finishing point, general direction, and the total distance in miles and kilometers. Traffic patterns and the driving time from start to finish during the time of day the routes will be driven. Road surface conditions (whether asphalt, concrete, gravel, dirt, and so forth). Temporary or new road construction, detour routes, the duration of each, and the location and distance from the starting and finishing points of the route(s). Locations of manhole covers and telephone and power mains.


FM 3-19.12

Choke points and critical navigational areas, such as traffic control points, toll booths, peak traffic times, one-way streets, traffic circles, bridges, narrow streets, and entrance and exit ramps. Potential danger areas, such as public gathering areas, universities and technical schools, political party HQ, and poverty areas. Safe havens for evacuations. Recommended locations include US or other allied diplomatic facilities, police and fire stations, hospitals, and military facilities. Climate changes which will affect or alter driving conditions or driving time. Types of vehicles used by the neighbors, where they park, and the usual times those vehicles are present. Vehicle license plates indigenous to the area (state, province, country, cities, or counties). Service vehicles and personnel normally in the neighborhood and the exact time of day they are usually present. Regular presence, times, and locations of vendors. 11-30. To detect moving surveillance, PSDs must increase their awareness and make attention to detail an integral part of their daily activity. It should never be assumed that surveillance is being conducted by a man. Terrorism is not a phenomenon of only men; a woman or child could easily conduct it. Do not assume that surveillance can only be conducted from behind the principal. It can be conducted in front of or across from the principal. More sophisticated surveillance may even be conducted from above using windows and rooftops. 11-31. Indicators of possible surveillance operations include— Vehicles remaining parked in the same spot for an extended time. Vehicles starting and stopping at the same time as the motorcade vehicles. Vehicles that are passing and parking. Vehicles driving too fast or too slow for traffic conditions. Vehicles traveling at the same speed and maintaining the same distance from the motorcade. Vehicles pausing in a traffic circle until the motorcade passes or exits. Vehicles appearing broken down. Vehicles that have altered or obstructed license plates. People inappropriately dressed for the area or the season. Work crews or vehicles in or near any choke point or potential danger area. 11-32. Route surveys should be done for each route traveled. Anything that seems out of the ordinary or suspicious along the route is recorded. This daily record is then transcribed onto a route pattern analysis sheet to determine if there are any reoccurring people, vehicles, or situations along the different routes that necessitates further investigation. While conducting route surveys the mission, the use of surveillance detection by the PSD may help to identify potential threats and incorporate actions to counter possible attack plans.


FM 3-19.12

SURVEILLANCE CONFRONTATION 11-33. Confronting suspected surveillance must be done passively. Passive maneuvers are techniques intended to not draw attention to the PSD. Subtlety is imperative to prevent alerting the surveillance of their detection. Most surveillants have an acute fear of being detected. This is a natural fear the PSD may exploit. The PSD may perform the following actions on foot or while driving to confirm or deny that someone is watching the principal: Retrace the route often to determine if there is a recurrence of the same individuals along the route. Use mirror reflections for observance (the rearview mirror in a car or mirrors throughout a shopping area). Change the pace of movement, while walking or driving, to observe others changing their pace accordingly. Since this is not the normal course of movement, those altering their pace will be easily detected. Signal for turns while driving but continue straight ahead, perform U-turns, and run yellow lights where it is safe to do so; or circle the block using a series of right-hand turns. This causes the surveillants to do the same or abort the surveillance to prevent detection. 11-34. Whether direct or indirect, confrontation of surveillants should be performed with extreme caution. An overtly compromised surveillance may result in a hostile act against the principal or the PSD.



FM 3-19.12

SURVEILLANCE CONFRONTATION 11-33. Confronting suspected surveillance must be done passively. Passive maneuvers are techniques intended to not draw attention to the PSD. Subtlety is imperative to prevent alerting the surveillance of their detection. Most surveillants have an acute fear of being detected. This is a natural fear the PSD may exploit. The PSD may perform the following actions on foot or while driving to confirm or deny that someone is watching the principal: Retrace the route often to determine if there is a recurrence of the same individuals along the route. Use mirror reflections for observance (the rearview mirror in a car or mirrors throughout a shopping area). Change the pace of movement, while walking or driving, to observe others changing their pace accordingly. Since this is not the normal course of movement, those altering their pace will be easily detected. Signal for turns while driving but continue straight ahead, perform U-turns, and run yellow lights where it is safe to do so; or circle the block using a series of right-hand turns. This causes the surveillants to do the same or abort the surveillance to prevent detection. 11-34. Whether direct or indirect, confrontation of surveillants should be performed with extreme caution. An overtly compromised surveillance may result in a hostile act against the principal or the PSD.


Chapter 12

Terrorism Countermeasures for Protective-Services Details Terrorism is a cancer that has plagued the Middle East for decades. It is now evolving into new and more deadly forms that pose tremendous challenges for the safety and security of Americans both here and abroad. Terrorists are now striking outside their home regions, boldly attacking high-profile targets and killing in a more indiscriminate manner. PSDs are instrumental in countering these threats toward Army leaders.

TERRORISM 12-1. Terrorist groups use strategic tactics to carry out their objectives in an attempt to put the government in a no-win situation. Terrorist acts are dynamic and are designed for impact. Terrorists want to gain the attention of the media, so the attack must be spectacular in some sense. The objectives of the terrorists are usually achieved by one of four tactics. These tactics include bombing, assassination, skyjacking, or kidnapping. It is the mission of the PSD to detect, deter, and defend against these threats toward the principal.

TERRORIST PROFILE 12-2. Often a terrorist is a dedicated person who feels that he is participating in a dynamic political or religious process and who does not differentiate between actions and principles. In his mind, the objectives justify the tactics. Terrorists are dedicated individuals who are prepared to lose their lives for the cause they consider to be above mere common goals. In the past, it was believed that most terrorists wanted to live to see their goals accomplished. As such, these terrorist organizations would exploit mentally deranged individuals or common criminals to carry out their specific high-risk missions (such as assassinations). However, suicide missions are becoming more and more prevalent by terrorist organizations, and they are not necessarily using the mentally ill or criminals to conduct them. As such, PSDs must increase vigilance in regards to IED searches, access control, the protection of the principal moving through unscreened crowds. 12-3. The organization of most terrorist groups is operational and functional. Typical smaller terrorist groups are about 40 to 50 people; a medium-size terrorist group is more than 100, but less than 500. Regardless of the size of the organization, they will fall into one of three interconnecting bands of affiliation: Nonstate directed. Nonstate-directed groups operate independently. No support or directives are given from the national government. White supremacists, animal rights activists, and environmental groups fall under this affiliation in the US.

Terrorism Countermeasures for Protective-Services Details 12-1

FM 3-19.12

State supported. State-supported groups act independently, receive financial and logistical support from a national government, and operationally direct their own terror campaigning. Such groups would include the Provisional Irish Republican Army, the Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna, and the Al Qaeda. State directed. State-directed groups act as an arm of the government. These groups not only receive financial, intelligence, and logistical support from the government, but they also receive operational directives. The governments that use these terror groups include Libya, Iran, Cuba, Syria, and North Korea. In fact, some countries see the use of terror as a tool of government they can most effectively employ against a major power. 12-4. Assistance from local and federal law enforcement agencies should be requested by the PSD in order to obtain lists of active organizations in the mission location, as well as individuals who will pose a threat to the principal.

MODUS OPERANDI FOR TARGET SELECTION 12-5. Terrorist targets generally consist of two types—symbolic or pragmatic. If available, targets that can serve both purposes are selected. When the terrorist group is weak, targets tend to be more symbolic. As the movement gains strength, the targets tend to be more pragmatic. The ideal target is one that is symbolic and pragmatic. Symbolic targets. These targets tend to be prominent members of the government or an institution. The acts are committed in highly visible areas to attract maximum attention and to serve as a primary tool for later psychological exploitation by the movement by undermining confidence in the government and provoking repression. Pragmatic targets. These may include the kidnapping and/or assassination of a high-profile individual in order to serve as a means to either coerce sympathy from the target group or generate needed resources, such as money, materials, or weapons. 12-6. The likelihood of terrorist incidents varies from country to country and depends on the stability of the local government, the degree of frustration among terrorists, the level of security of potential targets, and other factors. 12-7. Historically, most terrorist attacks have been precipitated by detailed preplanning (premeditation), a thorough knowledge of the area, the daily routine of the target, the travel route, and the itinerary. The terrorist's greatest advantage for the attack is surprise. The principal is vulnerable when on the move and probably most vulnerable when entering or departing his home, his place of employment, or areas he regularly frequents. Terrorists have attacked victims while they have been driving; walking; preparing to park; shopping; leaving and arriving at their homes, offices, or churches; regularly scheduled meetings; and en route in boats, airplanes, and trains. 12-8. The vast majority of terrorist attacks on motorcades have been preceded by a vehicle or roadblock that impeded the forward movement of the targeted vehicles. After the vehicle stops at the roadblock, the attack begins with the assailants approaching the targeted vehicle from the front or side and

12-2 Terrorism Countermeasures for Protective-Services Details

FM 3-19.12

concealing their weapons until within about arm's length of the targeted vehicle. The locations of these types of attacks are in areas geographically helpful to the assailants, such as narrow streets, poorly constructed roads with poor lighting, or an area unoccupied at the time of attack. 12-9. Attacks on persons on foot, either jogging or walking, have been preceded by terrorists using various ruses prior to the attack. Some joggers have been assaulted due to their vulnerability of jogging in the early morning when there is little or no traffic or other activity in the neighborhood. Terrorists will use the right ruses to conform to the local population, such as wearing jogging or athletic attire or wearing local military or police uniforms to approach their victims. 12-10. The target selection process of the terrorists involves many steps executed over a period of time. During the initial target selection phase, the terrorist group will pick several possible targets. Once the group of targets has been selected, the terrorist group will initiate surveillance. They will assess which of these targets would be the easiest for them to attack and/or of the highest profile in order to draw attention to their cause. 12-11. Once the terrorists have completed their surveillance, they select the target that best fits their goals and/or is the softest and easiest target. The terrorists then plan their attack. Their operational planning includes analyzing various tactical options and establishing the method by which they will assassinate or kidnap the target. During this phase, they select the attack site and perform attack execution practice drills. 12-12. As part of the attack phase, the commander deploys the terrorists to the attack site to prepare for the attack. Once the target (principal) arrives on the scene of the planned attack, everything must transpire according to the established plan. Terrorists usually set up a simple attack plan and if the principal is late, early, or in a different motorcade formation, the attack is aborted. If this happens, the terrorists will either go back to the surveillance phase or choose another target. 12-13. If the attack is executed as planned, the terrorists will usually have an escape route. The escape route must be close by and easily accessible, because the terrorists want to assassinate or kidnap the principal and get out of the area. The only time an attack will be executed and the terrorists will not have an escape plan is on a suicide mission.

TERRORISTS ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES 12-14. While terrorists have the advantage as far as time and location of an attack, the PSD can influence the terrorists ability to plan and conduct an attack once it has occurred. The most effective defense of an attack is the detection of terrorist surveillance, which precedes the terrorist action. ADVANTAGES 12-15. There are a number of advantages terrorists have in the execution part of any attack. The terrorists will always have the following to use to their advantage: Identity of the target.


FM 3-19.12

Time of the planned attack. Location of the attack. 12-16. The terrorists will conduct surveillance for the attack in order to ascertain the tactics they will use. Based on their surveillance observations, they will plan to have both numerical and firepower superiority over the selected target before initiating an attack. Effective surveillance detection by the PSD may detect terrorist surveillance and interrupt the planning of an attack. DISADVANTAGES 12-17. Most terrorists' attacks are a simple, well thought thorough plan. Terrorists are usually inflexible regarding this established plan and only have one opportunity to execute the attack. As such, the terrorists have several disadvantages in regards to operational planning. In every attack, the terrorist group has to identify the target before the attack. The group has someone make a positive identification of the principal before the attack by initiating a signal to the rest of the team. If identification cannot be made or if the signal is detected by the PSD, there is a good probability of deterring the attack. Most terrorists have to wear a disguise while they are setting up the attack and while they are making the target identification. If the disguise is not good enough or does not fit into the area, a PSD could recognize the threat before the attack occurs. The terrorists have to use some sort of communication to let the group know that the mission is a go or to abort the mission. This communication is done nonverbally by a hand signal or other means. Detection of these signals will alert the PSD to begin countermeasures. The terrorists have to transition from their disguise into the attack mode. This must be done both discreetly and expeditiously as the attack can be countered, or even avoided, if the PSD notices the transition early enough. Terrorists are extremely inflexible in their plans. Each member executes his part without knowledge of the entire plan (this prevents them from revealing any information beyond their own involvement if they were to be apprehended). If the attacker can predict the principal's movements, he has a better chance of success. Reducing predictability of the principal's movements reduces the probability of a successful attack. 12-18. If the PSD is able to exploit any one of these disadvantages, it will assist in preventing the attack from being executed as planned.

PROACTIVE COUNTERMEASURES 12-19. There are proactive measures that can be employed to help avoid a terrorist attack. Proactive measures that should be employed by the PSD include thorough advance work, route surveys, current threat assessments, surveillance detection, varying routes, avoiding choke points, attack

12-4 Terrorism Countermeasures for Protective-Services Details

FM 3-19.12

recognition, countersurprise, and/or any action that ultimately lessens the predictability of the principal and the PSD. 12-20. Self-applied protection measures (such as keeping a low profile and remaining constantly alert to the surroundings) are imperative on missions where the threat assessments indicate a high-threat level to the principal. The principal and members of the official party should be briefed on these measures (Graphic Training Aid [GTA] 19-04-003).

REACTIVE COUNTERMEASURES 12-21. Practicing immediate-action drills is imperative in preparing the PSD to react faster and better to counter the attack. The reactive measure of a quick and unexpected response to an attack situation puts the element of countersurprise to the PSDs advantage. For instance, the terrorists expect the PSD to stop for a vehicle or roadblock. However, if the PSD reacts immediately as trained and rams through the vehicle, they have lessened the predictability factor and increased the chances of the attack being aborted. 12-22. The distance that the attack is initiated from the motorcade or target will determine the response of the PSD. When an attack occurs at close range, the immediate reaction of the PSD should be to evacuate the area. If it appears as though there is the possibility of an attack occurring from a distance, the PSD may have the opportunity to maneuver to better positions, allowing it to further evaluate the situation and avoid the threat.



Chapter 13

Protection in a Hostile Fire Zone The fundamentals of PSD missions do not change, regardless of the location or type of environment. This is true even in an HFZ. However, additional requirements and tactical considerations must be taken into account and may require that some aspects of the mission be modified to meet the required security level. Special considerations for an HFZ include, but are not limited to, uniforms, weapons, equipment, the general threat level, the method and mode of travel, vehicles, and communication.

PREPARATION 13-1. US military personnel are being called on to conduct PSD missions in areas in which circumstances approach combat conditions. Such situations call for additional requirements and considerations that change the appearance of PSD operations. The effect of these changes range from making decisions on the types of weapons systems that should be used for that area to understanding the ROE. If operating in a multination theater of operation, intricate planning must be established with the other services and the HN if applicable. 13-2. PSD missions in HFZs fall into one of the following two protective situations: Protected principal visiting an HFZ. In this situation, the principal normally has a permanent PSD. The principal enters the HFZ for a meeting or visit and leaves the HFZ on its completion. These meetings or visits are normally not regularly scheduled, reoccurring events. In this situation the PSD uses assets from the visited location to accomplish the mission. Protected principal deployed to an HFZ. In this situation, the principal is deployed to an HFZ. Many times, the principal does not have a PSD before deployment. The PSD is primarily made up of MP from the principal's command. They use modification table of organization and equipment (MTOE) from the home station and sometimes lack standard protection-related equipment (mobile cameras or special weapons). The principal normally has many regularly scheduled meetings or visits within the HFZ. The PSD will normally provide support to visiting VIPs in the HFZ.

THREAT INFORMATION 13-3. Threat information is the foundation on which a PSD determines the current threat level and develops proactive protective measures. Updated threat information requires immediate attention to update the threat

Protection in a Hostile Fire Zone 13-1

FM 3-19.12

assessment accordingly. Likewise, intelligence information needs to be reported as quickly as possible to the proper agency. 13-4. Many HFZs are battlegrounds and battle hazards are present, including direct fire and indirect fire. Others are former battlegrounds and contain the dangerous remnants of the conflict, such as UXO and land mines. As such, the PSD must be especially aware of the surroundings. The local populace may not like or may even resent the presence of US forces. This may make selecting safe havens very difficult. 13-5. A PSD must consider all resources available (such as special operations forces [SOF], the police, the international police task force [IPTF], and United Nations [UN]). Current intelligence is obtained by continuously incorporating information gathered by observers, informants, and news reports, and it is obtained from other agencies to confirm or revise the basic intelligence data on the area. Intelligence gathering for an HFZ should include— Past problems and/or attacks in the area. The opposition threat and its capabilities. The public’s attitude toward the principal. The physical setting, and the challenges this setting may present. 13-6. If the PSD operates near the forward edge of the battlefield area (FEBA), it should obtain all information related to enemy positions, the movement of troops, engagement with friendly forces, the frequency and type of enemy fire in that area, and aerial interdiction. 13-7. OPSEC is used to preserve surprise, control information and activities, and keep an adversary from preparing actions. Always protect information by restricting its release and by limiting the access to facilities, equipment, material, and personnel. Information should only be disclosed on a need to know basis.

TRANSPORTATION 13-8. The PSD may not have full freedom of movement in HFZ environments. For the safety of the principal, each movement must be approved. This approval will be obtained from the movement control officer (MCO) in conjunction with the following considerations: How will the motorcade be organized? What type of communications is required? What weapons systems will be used? Are there qualified personnel available to employ the weapons? 13-9. Helicopters are the preferred mode of travel. They are faster and more secure in flight and can infinitely vary routes. However, a helicopter requires a cleared and secured landing zone, and weather frequently prohibits helicopter movement. As such, it is sometimes impossible to land at the desired location. For these reasons, most HFZ movements use both helicopters and vehicles.

13-2 Protection in a Hostile Fire Zone

FM 3-19.12

MOTOR VEHICLES 13-10. In HFZs, vehicle choice may be very limited. Preferably, motorcade vehicles should be nontactical. heavy-armored SUVs in the form of nontactical vehicles (NTV) are recommended for use as the primary limo and lead and follow vehicles. Civilian-type HAVs can blend with local traffic, are generally better powered, offer better vision, are more comfortable, and usually have better range. Tactical vehicles are often too large for some urban environments, do not allow good observation, and are underpowered. 13-11. However, there may be instances when force protection measures dictate the use of tactical vehicles that have mounted crew-served weapons for the lead and follow vehicles. In such cases, all motorcade vehicles, including the principal's vehicle, are switched to tactical vehicles. Tactical and nontactical vehicles should not be mixed within the motorcade. All the vehicles used should look the same so as not to disclose the location of the principal in the motorcade. For instance, if the lead and follow vehicles were high-mobility, multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) due to their ability to carry additional firepower and weaponry, a principal traveling between these two vehicles in a civilian SUV would create a large signature regarding his location. 13-12. Force protection rules may also dictate the size and composition of a motorcade (such as the minimum number of vehicles). This may make it difficult to move advance agents into location ahead of the principal. With careful planning, these requirements can be met. 13-13. When available, support should be coordinated with aviation and artillery units. The supporting units need to be advised of the following: Start point. Schedule. Checkpoints. Size of the detail. Release point. Call signs and frequencies. 13-14. Patterns of local traffic and pedestrians should be closely observed in order to determine normal conditions and to detect situations that appear out of the ordinary. When identifying routes to use, consider possible ambush sites along the route and the terrain that the enemy could use for indirect fire to halt the motorcade. Particular attention should be given to areas (such as bridges, tunnels, fences, tree lines, hillsides, hillcrests and the reverse slope of hills, shell holes or other depressions in the ground, haystacks, buildings, and parked cars) that may provide for concealment of enemy forces. 13-15. Many HFZs are littered with land mines. In many places, land mines were indiscriminately employed without documentation. For this reason, the location of land mines is impossible to predict. Motorcade doctrine specifies that the vehicles are driven offset; however, this creates a dangerous situation in areas where land mines may be present. In an HFZ, on paved roads, it is still desirable to travel with vehicles offset. But in areas where the road is not paved, a more traditional convoy approach (vehicles traveling in line) is warranted. Technical driving maneuvers, such as three-point turns may be


FM 3-19.12

impractical in an HFZ due to road width and land mine threat. This problem is made worse when using tactical vehicles, which normally have an increased turning radius. 13-16. In the event of an attack on the principal, the evacuation direction chosen can be directly influenced by the land mine threat. Areas that can be inspected by the advance team may be limited by the land mine threat as well. A mine detector may be essential equipment during PSD missions in HFZs. HELICOPTER OPERATIONS 13-17. The preferred mode of travel in a combat zone is by helicopter. Many principals have identifying placards on their helicopters or vehicles. Such identification markings should be removed from helicopters or vehicles as it creates a recognizable target for terrorists. Even a single unmarked helicopter can provide an identifiable target. Conversely, multiple helicopters are an effective means of deception as they are unrecognizable as a principal's mode of transportation. The more the principal blends in with his security escort and his surroundings, the safer he will be. 13-18. When traveling in a multiple helicopter formation, the principal's helicopter will depart first, followed next by the security helicopter (a backup HRP helicopter) and remaining helicopter. This also allows for security to remain available to react to a situation on the ground if needed. When landing, the security helicopter arrives first, and a perimeter security cordon is established. Only then will the principal's helicopter land. The time variance between the security helicopter and the principal's helicopter is typically no longer than 30 to 60 seconds. The MSAC and SL are responsible for coordinating, briefing, and ensuring that the pilots understand the security protocol when flying with an HRP and reserving specific seats for security on the helicopter. 13-19. Extensive communication centers can take up significant room on an helicopter. Also, the principal may prefer to have face-to-face contact with communications personnel. As such, it is important that the PSD coordinate directly with the crew in order to examine load plans and to be aware of the seating capabilities and maximum personnel capacity of the helicopter used. 13-20. Typically, the principal sits in the right rear seat as normal. However, the principal should be seated away from the outer seat, when possible, for security reasons. The PSO and SL sit near the exits on the principal helicopter in order to disembark first and establish security. If other armed personnel are available, place them at the windows of the helicopter. Staff personnel, such as the aide, executive officers, medics, and interpreters usually sit with the principal.

WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT 13-21. Standard weapons and equipment issued to PSDs may be insufficient to counter the threat in certain environments. The MSAC will need to determine if appropriate nonstandard weapons systems and ammunition are available. If the embassy cannot provide the weapons requested, the MSAC must determine if there is an available military unit that could offer support


FM 3-19.12

to the PSD with the appropriate weapons systems. Refer to Appendix E for more information. STANDARD AND NONSTANDARD WEAPONS 13-22. The PSD may or may not have the option of using nonstandard weapons. Deployed MP PSD teams normally use standard MTOE weapons. If the option is there, consideration must be given to select the best weapon for the mission. For example, the MP5K (carried for concealable firepower) may be inadequate for large open areas, while the M4 is too large for concealment. Force protection policies may dictate the use of crew-served weapons. In any case, the PSD must be fully qualified with the weapons it uses. 13-23. All weapons should be loaded when conducting a PSD. Some local policies require that weapons be unloaded when entering a building or base of operation. An exception to the policy needs to be obtained by the PSD from the principal or CG, allowing the PSD to retain weapons. The PSD should provide examples to the approving authority to convey the necessity (such as local national workers on bases, the presence of mentally ill and disgruntled service members, and past fatality assaults by US soldiers on US bases). The team is on duty 24 hours a day and needs to be able to react to threats instantly regardless of the location. EQUIPMENT 13-24. In some HFZ situations, the PSD must be equipped to be self-sufficient in the event the PSD cannot immediately evacuate to a safe haven. Additional equipment is required to accomplish this. GPS; military maps; chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) equipment; H-harnesses; water; and rations are a few needed items. A comprehensive mission logistical needs analysis should be conducted for the PSD and the principal.

COMMUNICATION 13-25. PSD agents should be familiar with a wide variety of communications equipment (secure tactical frequency-modulated [FM] radios, satellite equipment, and worldwide cellular telephones), as some communications equipment cannot be supported in some areas. PSD personnel should have communications that can interface with the US and the HN military units. When in an HFZ, it is important to verify that the communications equipment used by the PSD is compatible with the local supporting units. Some cellular systems used in the US will not work in other countries. In these areas, the PSD must plan to have an alternative to cellular telephones, such as iridium satellite telephones. These telephones use satellite networks instead of cellular networks and can be used anywhere in the world. Clearance may be required for the communications equipment and frequencies to be used on the mission.


FM 3-19.12

COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY 13-26. It should always be assumed that surveillants are monitoring communications. OPSEC measures and signal security (SIGSEC) should be used to maintain secure operations. Additional security measures include but are not limited to the following: Communications security (COMSEC). Electronic security (ELSEC). Verbal and nonverbal codes. Signals. Secure voice equipment. Radio silence. Proper positioning of the antenna.

ATTIRE 13-27. Wearing the proper clothing can be critical to the success of the mission in HFZs. While these missions are usually more overt than missions in lower threat environments, take care not to create a large signature. A senior officer in uniform can attract undesirable attention. Consideration must be given to replacing the formality of military uniforms and business suits with more subdued and sometimes casual attire. 13-28. When the principal wears a military uniform, the team wears a military uniform. However, when the covert carrying of weapons is required, military uniforms do not provide adequate concealment and offer poor access to weapons. PSD agents should avoid restrictive items such as Kevlar® helmets and pistol lanyards. These items limit vision, hearing, and reaction critical for the protection of the principal. Use the following rules of thumb: If the PSD has a civilian or military principal in a combat area or HFZ (whose duty uniform is civilian attire), then the PSD should also wear civilian attire. This will possibly include and be dependent on the theater of operations, intelligence, and ROE for displaying exposed weapons. More personnel in civilian attire surrounding the principal make the selection of the target harder even though the security element has exposed weapons. If the PSD has a civilian or military principal (such as an ambassador, CG, division commander, or chief of staff) in a combat area or an HFZ (whose duty uniform is either a BDU or desert camouflage uniform ([CU]), then the PSD should wear a BDU or DCU with exposed weapons. Headgear may or may not be an option for the PSD. Some principals, even in an HFZ or combat area, have been observed wearing a soft cap, while other principals choose to wear a Kevlar helmet. A soft cap or desert cap is more conducive for the PSD but also has limitations in protecting the individual security team members. Within the HFZ and combat area environment, weapons should be exposed to provide a show of force. Local force protection policies should be considered. 13-29. PSD agents must be seated in vehicles for long periods and must get in and out of vehicles many times in the course of a mission. Items worn around


FM 3-19.12

the waist become uncomfortable and may slow exits from vehicles. For this reason, load-bearing vests (LBV) are preferable over load-carrying equipment (LCE) when BDUs are worn. When using LBVs, items can be worn higher on the body where they are more comfortable and less restrictive while entering and exiting vehicles. 13-30. Careful consideration must be given to the psychological effect of the uniform and battle equipment. For example, when visiting a refugee camp or the office of the town mayor, battle equipment may send the wrong message. Many US Embassies have strict policies concerning the wearing of military uniforms, and coordination must be made well in advance of the PSD mission into one of these areas. The wearing of any type of military uniform in these areas must be coordinated not only with the US Embassy, but with host country personnel as well.



Chapter 14

Coordination of a Protective-Services Mission Comprehensive up-front planning and coordination is the genesis of all PS missions. Every phase of a mission must be carefully coordinated with the appropriate military, federal, state, local, and host country agencies. Questions regarding the interpretation of statutes or international agreements will be referred to the Staff Judge Advocate (SJA). PSD personnel accompanying HRP will ensure the coordination of their PSD mission and operations with the MACOM over the geographical AOR. Administrative, logistical, and personnel support will be provided as required by the MACOM (see AR 190-14).

OPERATIONS 14-1. Coordinating a mission is not only limited to identifying evacuation routes, conducting site surveys, and scheduling arrivals and departures, but also includes identifying potential protocol issues, resources and personnel requirements, AARs, and final critiques. All PSD operations follow a standard sequence of events from notification to the termination of the operation. This includes— Notification of the mission. Planning and coordination. Execution. Mission review.

NOTIFICATION OF THE MISSION 14-2. During the initial notification phase of the mission, the goal is to identify the who, when, and where of the mission. This includes the— Identity of the principal. Dates of the mission. Location of the mission. 14-3. If possible, obtain a copy of the principal's itinerary. This assists in identifying the resources required to successfully conduct the mission. Throughout any phase of a PS mission, documentation is the key to the success of the mission. The checklists and surveys depicted in Appendix B should be used a guide. 14-4. On notification of an impending mission, a chronological events journal is started. It is used to record all information pertaining to the mission and to retain all information produced as a result of the mission. The journal is considered to be an official document; it serves as a record of all the actions taken by the PSD, it facilitates preparation of the AAR, and it may be

Coordination of a Protective-Services Mission 14-1

FM 3-19.12

acceptable for presentation to a board of inquiry if an incident adversely affecting the security of the principal occurs.

PLANNING AND COORDINATION 14-5. Careful planning and coordination is required to ensure that logistical and administrative support and personnel are in place. Each time a POC or coordination is made with an agency, an entry should be made into the mission file to accurately document the activity. Man-hours, funds expenditures, and travel costs should all be annotated in the file. Classified documentation should be handled according to the appropriate regulations and unit SOP. Failure to properly document coordination in the mission file could mean the difference between success and failure. SUPPORT PERSONNEL TASKING 14-6. The information gathered during the initial notification phase of the mission should identify the requirement of support personnel. These requirements include— The number of personnel required to support the mission. The duration of the mission. The driver requirements (whether the host or the PSD will provide drivers). The SCR requirement. 14-7. Other considerations when tasking for support agent personnel are the threat level at the mission location, the principal's idiosyncrasies, funding constraints, and the mission location. A support agent requirement form (see example in Appendix B, Figure B-3) allows annotation of the positions that need to be filled, as well as the source of support agent personnel. This form is specific to each PSD and is completed based on the individual PSDs requirements. 14-8. Contact with support agent personnel should be made as soon as they have been identified and fund cite information provided to the them to facilitate their travel. The PSD should obtain a copy of the support agent personnel travel itineraries along with travel costs. 14-9. The PSD should brief support agent personnel on motorcade operations, protocol issues concerning the principal and his staff, and any other pertinent mission-related issues. Support agent personnel should continue to be briefed and updated on the mission as it develops. Failing to update support personnel on weather conditions, travel restrictions, lodging information, and weapons procedures may severely hamper the mission. Once support agent personnel have arrived at the mission location, they should be provided with as much information concerning the mission as possible. ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITIES 14-10. Responsibilities must be clearly defined and each agent should be assigned a specified responsibility for each phase of the mission. Project officers, protocol officers, and hosts of the activity that the principal will visit should be identified and their responsibility established in conjunction with

14-2 Coordination of a Protective-Services Mission

FM 3-19.12

the mission requirements. Coordination between all these individuals must be established to ensure the complete protection of the principal. OPERATIONAL PLAN 14-11. An operation plan (OPLAN) should be completed to document the intent for conducting the mission. The OPLAN should identify the principal, mission dates and locations, as well as the responsibilities of each PSD agent. The OPLAN should also document roles of administrative and logistical support the PSD may receive and provide during the execution of the mission. INITIATION OF THE THREAT COLLECTION EFFORT 14-12. The DOD has two designated agencies (DIA and ACIC) tasked with developing threat assessments for force protection and PSD operations. Therefore, the PSD has the responsibility of developing a threat assessment for the principal's visit to a particular location based on information gathered from numerous sources (see Chapter 4). 14-13. As soon as possible after receiving the itinerary, a threat collection effort should be initiated. This is normally accomplished by coordinating with the USSS, FBI, DSS, CID, MI, and other local, state, federal, and foreign law enforcement or intelligence-gathering agencies. When information considered prejudicial to the safety of the principal is discovered, the developing agency will notify the MSAC. Frequent contact with intelligence-gathering agencies should be maintained throughout the duration of the mission to ensure a current threat level assessment. MISSION FILE REVIEW 14-14. Being armed with the knowledge of the past can greatly enhance mission capabilities. Reviewing previous mission files will assist in identifying potentially valuable information for the mission, such as identifying local holidays, general host-specific information, potential health or medical information, and local currency information. Furthermore, issues that affect the current mission, either positively or negatively, should be reflected in the report. 14-15. Previous mission file reviews are not a substitute for planning and advance work, but can be a good starting point when planning a mission. INTELLIGENCE FILE REVIEW 14-16. As with reviewing previous mission files, a review of intelligence files will help to identify updated threat information specific to the mission location. Information contained in intelligence files from previous intelligence missions can assist in identifying general and specific threat information and may provide information on determining the threat level of the mission location. COORDINATION WITH UNITED STATES EMBASSY OFFICES AND PERSONNEL 14-17. Conducting PSD missions abroad will require coordination with officials from US Embassies in the OCONUS location. To contact the specific


FM 3-19.12

US Embassy, go to , then click on US Embassies and Consulates for the desired office, personnel, and phone numbers. Based on the mission location, coordination will need to be made with some, or all, of the following: The RSO. The defense attaché officer (DAO). Other embassy offices. Coordination With the Regional Security Officer 14-18. The RSO acts as a liaison between visiting US and HN law enforcement agencies. He is the person responsible for the security of US Embassies, embassy personnel, and supporting facilities. Coordination with the RSO should include basic information concerning the mission, itinerary, available threat information, weapons and communications clearances, current travel restrictions, and any other support that the RSOs office can provide in support of the mission. As with any coordination, the RSO should be contacted immediately on notification of the mission. This will allow him enough time to perform mission-related tasks. Coordination should continue throughout the planning phase and while the mission is underway. Coordination With the Defense Attaché Officer 14-19. The DAO is responsible for observing current military conditions and developments and represents the DOD at US Embassies abroad. Most of the time, the principal will be visiting a foreign country on advise from the DAO. This being the case, the DAO will be vital in the planning of events attended by the principal. 14-20. The DAO normally has a direct line of communication with liaisons in the HN military. As such, the DAO may be able to coordinate support for the mission. Coordination with the DAO should include, but is not limited to, basic mission information, itineraries, weapons and communications clearance procedures, facilities being used by the principal and his staff, and applicable restrictions. Coordination With Other Embassy Offices 14-21. In addition to the offices of the RSO and DAO, there are other offices within the embassy that can assist when conducting a PSD mission. The general support officer (GSO) can assist in logistical matters, such as in obtaining cellular telephones and vehicle support. The official travel office can assist in adjusting travel arrangements. The Office of Military Cooperation (OMC) and Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC) are other offices that represent the DOD and may act as liaisons with HN agencies. TRAVEL REQUIREMENTS FOR SECURITY PERSONNEL 14-22. Depending on the PSD and its AOR, coordination of travel arrangements for security personnel to mission locations may be required. Considerations include current and future travel restrictions to the location, passport and visa requirements for entry into the location, medical documents required by HN officials for entry, the procedures for transporting weapons


FM 3-19.12

and special equipment to the mission location; or any other travel restrictions in place. All travel should be conducted according to the command policy for travel. COORDINATION FOR FLYING ARMED 14-23. According to AR 190-14, 14 CFR 1544.219, and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), Army law enforcement personnel may fly while armed. Personnel must have a valid requirement to be armed in flight. AR 190-14 requires personnel to coordinate with the servicing airline before travel, at check-in, and at boarding. Personnel flying armed must present proper identification and proof of training by their agencies at those times. Unless escorting a principal, security personnel will check in their weapons and ammunition at the baggage check-in counter. The weapons and ammunition have to be placed in two separate containers. The PSD will coordinate for the most updated guidance pertaining to weapons shipment and transport within the TSA and the airline. COUNTRY MESSAGE 14-24. PSDs traveling outside of their AOR need to coordinate their travel with all applicable US Embassies. This includes coordinating with the US Embassy in each country that security personnel will travel through. The embassy can alert HN law enforcement of the presence of the PSD and assist in meeting requirements for traveling with weapons and special equipment. 14-25. The country message is an official notification of the PSD mission to any embassy or official office in the HN that may be in a position to assist the PSD. It addresses issues relevant to the PSD agent's arrival, means of travel, equipment required at the location, and any logistical, security, or intelligence resources required. 14-26. The PSD issues a country message to alert US Embassies in foreign countries of their mission. It is normally published in message format and sent via secure means. Information in the message should include very basic mission information, travel arrangements of security personnel, and weapons and communication equipment information. The PSD message should be drafted and released after the principal's message has been released. This will avoid confusing recipients and is a good OPSEC practice. Delivery of the messages should be confirmed and verified with each recipient. Each message should be maintained in the mission file according to the PSD SOP. When possible, the MSAC should obtain a copy of the country message before departing the home station. WEAPONS AND COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT CLEARANCE 14-27. Each mission is unique and therefore may require special equipment. Before traveling with this equipment, coordination with the appropriate personnel and agencies is required. Information concerning special equipment should be addressed in the country message. Serial numbers, model numbers, the number of rounds, and carrying configurations should be included in the country message transmission. This coordination will continue from the initial notification phase throughout the completion of the mission and should be


FM 3-19.12

documented thoroughly in the mission file. Coordination should be conducted with the RSO. COORDINATION FOR EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DEPOSAL AND TECHNICAL COUNTERSURVEILLANCE MEASURES 14-28. Coordination for EOD and technical countersurveillance measures (TCSM) support should be coordinated well in advance of departing for the mission location. The PSD should coordinate with the appropriate POCs to determine what assets are available at no cost. If the mission requires more assets than what is available through local support channels, then the PSD may need to request support via formal channels. Coordination should be conducted with the RSO. 14-29. In some cases, prior approval to have MWDs support the mission may be required. To request a MWD team to support an OCONUS mission, a formal request must be processed from the PSD command, through forces command (FORSCOM) and Lackland Air Force Base, to the supporting activity. This process may differ between services. Once a request is approved, the PSD command must furnish a fund cite to support the action. EQUIPMENT AND WEAPONS REQUESTS 14-30. Equipment and weapons requests are based on the mission size and complexity, threat level, location, and availability of resources. Requesting equipment should be done in a timely manner, well in advance of the mission departure. The PSD must determine what support can be obtained from the HN and/or local law enforcement and other agencies. These requests should be posted in the mission file to document procurement efforts. All equipment should be checked for serviceability before departure for the mission. INTERPRETER CONSIDERATIONS 14-31. English may not be a language commonly spoken at some mission locations. Prior coordination with POCs may reveal the need for an interpreter. Consideration should be given to the number of interpreters required to complete the mission, what agency or command will provide these personnel, the level of security clearance they require, their capabilities and responsibilities, and their place within motorcades and formations. A good working relationship should be built and maintained with these personnel as they could dramatically affect the mission. SPECIAL EVENTS 14-32. Special consideration must be given to special events the PSD may be required to coordinate. Larger events, such as inaugurations, military conferences, or large ceremonies, may require coordination with federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. In most cases, the success or failure of the event will result from timely and effective coordination and planning.


FM 3-19.12

EXECUTION 14-33. The execution stage of the mission begins with the deployment of the advance security team for the on-site surveys of all areas to be visited by the principal. The itinerary for the proposed visit should be obtained from the principal's office or the host agency as soon as it is prepared. It should be reviewed to determine if enough information has been furnished to permit advance security arrangements to be made. In determining whether enough information has been furnished, consider, as a minimum, the following points: The date and time of departure and the points of departure and arrival. The number of persons in the official party, to include names and titles. Biographical information pertaining to the principal. Protocol information. Geographic locations to be visited. Names and locations of hotels or other accommodations where the official party will stay. Modes of transportation to be used (government or commercial). A complete list of all functions and activities to the attended by the principal and the extent to which he will participate. The name, address, and telephone numbers of all protocol officers or officials entertaining the principal. Press coverage incidental to the visit. Arrangements for funding to adequately provide for travel, temporary duty (TDY), and other expenses associated with the mission. The name, rank, and position of other dignitaries (principals) and the POCs for their PSDs. Any other local requirements that could affect the mission. 14-34. After obtaining and discussing details of the itinerary, initiate coordination and liaison with other participating agencies. Points of discussion with these agencies should include— Schedules of events and their timing for both fair and inclement weather. Locations of all events. Lists of guests, committees, and officials participating in the events. The nature and extent of the principal's participation in the events. The facilities for the personal comfort and convenience of the principal and his party, such as food, refreshments, rest rooms, dressing rooms, and telephone access. The location, names, and telephone numbers of the individuals furnishing the principal's accommodations, to include transportation and the handling of baggage. Any presentation made by or to the principal and the circumstances. Press involvement, control, and accreditation.


FM 3-19.12

14-35. Once the advance work is completed, the final security plan will be prepared. The mission will commence following the security plan and conclude on the completion of the visit, event, or trip.

MISSION REVIEW 14-36. The final stage of the mission includes a critique of the mission as well as a formal AAR. CRITIQUE 14-37. To improve PSD operations, intelligent, tactful, and constructive criticism is necessary. The purpose of the critique is to discuss the success or failure of the mission. It is conducted so that all participants will have a clear, orderly idea of what was done correctly and incorrectly. The critique is so important that it must be considered a phase of the mission itself. To maximize the effectiveness of the critique, it should be conducted as soon as possible after the mission is completed. 14-38. When conducting the critique, the MSAC presents criticisms and comments in a straightforward, impersonal manner. The critique should include the following essential elements: Restate the objectives of the mission. This enables the participants to start on a common ground. Review of procedures and techniques employed. Briefly summarize the methods used to attain the objectives. Evaluation of protective service detail performance. This is the most important part of the critique. Using notes taken during the mission, the MSAC points out and discusses the strong points, the weaker points, types of errors, and ways to correct the errors and makes suggestions for improvement. All remarks must be specific and impersonal. Summary. The critique is concluded with a brief but comprehensive summation of the points. 14-39. PSD agents should be encouraged to participate in the discussion to ensure the critique is a learning experience and not an "admonishment." The effectiveness of a critique depends on the flexibility with which the MSAC employs it. Participants should leave the critique with a favorable attitude toward the PSD operation and a desire to improve the next one. PREPARATION OF AFTER-ACTION REVIEW 14-40. The critique culminates in an AAR. Written in narrative form, this report relates the highlights of the PSD mission. It is written by the MSAC as soon as possible after the mission. The notes of PSD agents, journals, and comments of the principal, his staff, the PSO, the SL, and the residence watch can be used to complete the AAR. The AAR can be initiated throughout the mission as points of interest are developed or identified. 14-41. Personnel (other than the PSD agents) who were instrumental in the execution of the mission should be fully identified, and a file should be maintained with this information for future reference. Emphasis is placed on


FM 3-19.12

problem areas encountered and on the procedures necessary to eliminate them. Recommendations for improvements, especially in planning, coordination, personnel, and equipment, are written in detail. A file copy is retained for reference and used in improving future operations.



Appendix A

Metric Conversion Chart This appendix complies with current Army directives, which states that the metric system will be incorporated into all new publications. Table A-1 provides a metric conversion chart. Table A-1. Metric Conversion Chart US Units

Multiplied By

Equals Metric Units

Length Feet

0.30480

Meters

Inches

2.54000

Centimeters

Inches

0.02540

Meters

Inches

25.40010

Millimeters

Miles (statute)

1.60930

Kilometers

Miles (nautical)

1.85320

Kilometers

Area Square inches

6.45160

Square centimeters

Square feet

0.09290

Square meters

Cubic feet

0.02830

Cubic meters

Fluid ounces

29.57300

Milliliters

Volume

Temperature Degrees Fahrenheit

Subtract 32, multiply by 5/9

Degrees Celsius

Weight Ounces

28.34900

Grams

Pounds

0.45359

Kilograms

Metric Units

Multiplied By

Equals US Units

Length Centimeters

0.39370

Inches

Millimeters

0.03937

Inches

Kilometers

0.62137

Miles (statute)

Kilometers

0.53960

Miles (nautical)

Meters

3.28080

Feet

Meters

39.37000

Inches

Square centimeters

0.15500

Square inches

Square meters

10.76400

Square feet

Area

Metric Conversion Chart A-1

FM 3-19.12

Table A-1. Metric Conversion Chart (Continued) Metric Units

Multiplied By

Equals US Units

Volume Cubic meters

35.31440

Cubic feet

Milliliters

0.03380

Fluid ounces

Temperature Degrees Celsius

Multiply by 9/5, add 32

Degrees Fahrenheit

Weight Grams

0.03527

Ounces

Kilograms

2.20460

Pounds

A-2 Metric Conversion Chart


Appendix B

Site Surveys and Mission Checklists Site surveys and mission checklists (Figures B-1 through B-24, pages B-2 through B-38) provide PSD agents with a means of rapidly gathering the information needed for the planning of missions. The examples of site surveys and checklists provided in this appendix are representative of the information required when planning, coordinating, and executing a mission. Each PSD must modify the information shown in these examples in order to customize it to their individual mission requirements. NOTE: It is important to note that overreliance on any type of checklist has an inherent risk of artificially limiting the scope of planning and advance work. It is imperative that PSD agents use these site surveys and checklists as a guideline and starting point, and then modify them to the given mission as necessary.

Site Surveys and Mission Checklists B-1

FM 3-19.12

MISSION FILE DOCUMENTS

SEQ: _____________________

Highlight Documents Contained in This Mission File.

LEFT

RIGHT

Mission File Documents Mission Checklist Support Agent Requirements Preparation Plan Monthly Tasking Message Support Agent Information Sheet(s) Embassy Support Fund Cite Request Fund Cite Message Country Message Principal’s Country Message (purge prior to closure) Briefing Check list Equipment Sign Out Sheet Supply Request (Copy) Support Agent Evaluations

PSU Action Record After-Action Report OPLA Security Support Profile Threat Analysis Report Airport Survey Hospital Survey RON Site Survey Room Assignments Telephone Contact Sheet Site Survey(s) SOP/Briefing Certification Sheet Motorcade Assignments Helicopter Assignments Itinerary Control Room Journals Duty Roster

SAC REVIEW:

OPNS REVIEW:

ADMIN REVIEW/CLOSURE:

OFFICIAL USE ONLY Page 1 of 1

Figure B-1. Sample Documents in a Mission File

B-2 Site Surveys and Mission Checklists

FM 3-19.12

PREPARATION PLAN

SEQ: __________________________ SEQ: _____________________

NOTIFICATION OF MISSION NOTIFIED BY:

DATE:

TIME:

PRINCIPAL:

MISSION LOCATION:

MISSION EXECUTION DATES:

MISSION SAC:

MISSION ASAC:

PERSONAL SECURITY OFFICER:

MISSION PROJECT OFFICER NAME OF PROJECT OFFICER:

OFFICE TELEPHONE:

FAX:

E-MAIL ADDRESS:

CELLULAR TELEPHONE:

PAGER NUMBER: COUNTRY/STATE INTEL FILE REVIEW

AGENT:

Coordinate With PSU Intel Officer to Review Country or State Intel File, Obtain Current Threat Level, and Copy Pertinent Documents for Dummy. Fil DATE: TIME:

HISTORICAL MISSION REVIEW Review the Two Most Recent Files to This Location for Pertinent Information.

SEQ NUMBER: SEQ NUMBER:

MISSION DATES:

MSAC:

MISSION DATES:

MSAC:

COUNTRY CLEARANCE MESSAGE

DATE PRINCIPAL'S MESSAG E DISPATCHED:

If Mission is OCONUS, Complete the Following Information:

DATE PRINCIPAL'S MESSAGE RECEIVED AT PSU:

DATE PSU MESSAGE DISPATCHED:

PSU MESSAGE PREPARED BY:

HOW WILL AGENTS BRING WEAPONS INTO COUNTRY? Hand carried/personal luggage (weapons clearance approved). Weapons package. Weapons are only authorized to enter/leave country on principal's aircraft. PSU agents will borrow weapons from RSO or other local office. N/A. Weapons are not authorized in this country.

CLEARANCE GRANTED FOR PRESET RADIO FREQUENCIES? Yes No, preset frequencies had to be changed to:_______________ Other:_________________________________________________


Figure B-2. Sample Premission Planning Form


FM 3-19.12

PREPARATION PLAN

SEQ: __________________________

K-9/EOD AND TCSM SUPPORT IS K-9 SUPPORT AVAILABLE : Yes No

POINT OF CONTACT:

DATE REQUESTED:

DATE FUND CITE ISSUED:

IS TCSM SUPPORT AVAILABLE Yes No

POINT OF CONTACT:

DATE REQUESTED:

DATE FUND CITE ISSUED:

HOTEL RESERVATIONS FOR PSU AGENTS NAME OF HOTEL:

TELEPHONE NUMBER:

NAME OF AGENT:

DURATION OF STAY:

CONFIRMATION NUMBER:

NAME OF AGENT:

DURATION OF STAY:


NAME OF AGENT:

DURATION OF STAY:


NAME OF AGENT:

DURATION OF STAY:


DESCRIBE ANY CANCELLATION FEES/CHARGES ASSOCIATED WITH THIS RESERVATION: HOTEL RESERVATIONS FOR SUPPORT AGENTS NAME OF HOTEL:

TELEPHONE NUMBER:

NAME OF AGENT:

DURATION OF STAY:


NAME OF AGENT:

DURATION OF STAY:


NAME OF AGENT:

DURATION OF STAY:


NAME OF AGENT:

DURATION OF STAY:


NAME OF AGENT:

DURATION OF STAY:


NAME OF AGENT:

DURATION OF STAY:


DESCRIBE ANY CANCELLATION FEES/CHARGES ASSOCIATED WITH THIS RESERVATION:

NOTES:


Figure B-2. Sample Premission Planning Form (Continued)


FM 3-19.12

PREPARATION PLAN

SEQ: __________________________

AIRLINE RESERVATIONS NAME OF AGENT:

DATE RESERVATION MADE:

DATE ITINERARY POSTED TO FILE:

NAME OF AGENT:



NAME OF AGENT:



NAME OF AGENT:



NAME OF AGENT:



NAME OF AGENT:



NAME OF AGENT:



NAME OF AGENT:



CAR RENTAL RESERVATIONS AGENT:

RENTAL AGENCY:

CATEGORY/SIZE OF CAR:


AGENT:

RENTAL AGENCY:



AGENT:

RENTAL AGENCY:



AGENT:

RENTAL AGENCY:



DESCRIBE ANY CANCELLATION FEES/CHARGES ASSOCIATED WITH THIS RESERVATION: LOCAL OR HOST COUNTRY HOLIDAYS DURING MISSION DATES NAME OF HOLIDAY:

DATE(S):

NAME OF HOLIDAY:

DATE(S):

NAME OF HOLIDAY:

DATE(S):

NAME OF HOLIDAY:

DATE(S):

NOTES :


Figure B-2. Sample Premission Planning Form (Continued)


FM 3-19.12

SUPPORT AGENT REQUIREMENTS SEQ: ______________________ PRINCIPAL NUMBER:

CITY:

STATE/COUNTRY:

MISSION SAC:

MISSION ASAC:

MISSION EXECUTION DATE(S):

SUPPORT AGENT DATES:

VISA REQUIRED: Yes No

SECURITY AGENT REQUIREMENTS

POSITION Shift Leader PSO Spouse PSO Limo Driver Chase Driver Advance Agent 1 Advance Agent 2 Control Room Agent 1 Control Room Agent 2 Control Room Agent 3 Lead Vehicle

PSU AGENT

TOTAL PSU AGENTS: _______

SUPPORT AGENT

N/A

TOTAL SUPPORT AGENTS: _______

SOURCE OF SUPPORT AGENTS _____ AFOSI

_____ NCIS

_____ 202 MP Grp

_____ 3 MP Grp

_____6 MP Grp

_____ 375 Reserve

_____ 366 Reserve

_____ 701 MP Grp

_____ IMA

_____Other:

DATE SUPPORT AGENTS TASKED:

DATE ALL SUPPORT AGENTS IDENTIFIED:

HOW WERE SUPPORT AGENTS TASKED? Monthly Tasking Message E-mail Fax Telephonic

SUPPORT AGENTS WERE IDENTIFIED VIA: E-mail Fax Telephonic


Figure B-3. Sample Support Agent Request Form


FM 3-19.12

SUPPORT AGENT INFORMATION SEQ: _____________________ PRINCIPAL #

CITY:

MISSION EXECUTION DATE(S):

STATE/COUNTRY:

VISA REQUIRED: Yes No

SUPPORT AGENT DATES:

SUPPORT AGENT NUMBER _____ NAME:

UNIT/ORGANIZATION:

MAILING ADDRESS:

OFFICE TELEPHONE:

HOME TELEPHONE:

CELLULAR TELEPHONE:

E-MAIL ADDRESS:

PAGER:

SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER:

If m ission is OCONUS, obtain the following information for Country Clearance Message: DATE OF BIRTH:

PLACE OF BIRTH:

PASSPORT NUMBER:

PLACE OF ISSUE:

DATE OF ISSUE:

EXPIRATION DATE:

WEAPON TYPE/SERIAL NUMBER:

RECEIVED COPY OF THIS AGENT'S FLIGHT ITINERARY AND TICKET COST: Yes No TICKET COST: $

TELEPHONIC SUPPORT AGENT BRIEFING: Special Clothing Requirements Weapons Clearance/Special Restrictions Visa Requirements Itinerary Overview/Threat Level Fund Cites/Hotel/Transportation

IF THREAT LEVEL IS "HIGH," INSTRUCTED AGENT TO BRING PROTECTIVE VEST: Yes No N/A

SUPPORT AGENT NUMBER _____ NAME:

UNIT/ORGANIZATION:

MAILING ADDRESS:

OFFICE TELEPHONE:

HOME TELEPHONE:

CELLULAR TELEPHONE:

E-MAIL ADDRESS:

PAGER:

SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER:

If Mission is OCONUS, Obtain the Following Information for Country Clearance Message: DATE OF BIRTH:

PLACE OF BIRTH:

PASSPORT NUMBER:

PLACE OF ISSUE:

DATE OF ISSUE:

EXPIRATION DATE:

WEAPON TYPE/SERIAL NUMBER:

RECEIVED COPY OF THIS AGENT'S FLIGHT ITINERARY AND TICKET COST: Yes No TICKET COST: $

TELEPHONIC SUPPORT AGENT BRIEFING: Special Clothing Requirements Weapons Clearance/Special Restrictions Visa Requirements Itinerary Overview/Threat Level Fund cites/Hotel/Transportation

IF THREAT LEVEL IS "HIGH," INSTRUCTED AGENT TO BRING PROTECTIVE VEST: Yes No N/A


Figure B-4. Sample Support Agent Identification Form


FM 3-19.12

BRIEFINGS CHECKLIST

SEQ: ________________________

PRINCIPAL NUMBER:

MISSION LOCATION:

TIME OF BRIEFING:

DATE OF BRIEFING:

MISSION DATE(S):

MOTORCADE DRIVERS

Safety Route Recon Chase Vehicle Blocking Appearance/Demeanor

BRIEFER:

Stop 3 ft From Curbs Communications Principal Enters/Exits From the Right Command and Control

Speed of Travel Use of Turn Signals Stay With Vehicles Contact With the Principal

MISSION AGENTS TIME OF BRIEFING:

DATE OF BRIEFING:

Accountability of Equipment Control Room Journal Control Room Operations/SOP Mission Overview Room Service for Control Room Room Service for Principal Special Per Diem Letter Vacating Control Room

BRIEFER:

Access to Principal's Room Alcohol Communications Contact With Principal/Staff Key Control Porter Fees Telephone Procedures/IDD Lines Use of Force

Contact Numbers Deliveries to Control Room (Gifts/Packages/Mail) Duties and Assignments Equipment (Security Pins/Radios/Weapons) Handling of Classified Materials Overall Conduct/Appearance Who's Who on the Staff

BRIEFING FOR STAFF POC/AIDE/PSO TRAVELING WITH PRINCIPAL TIME OF BRIEFING:

DATE OF BRIEFING:

BRIEFER:

(GENERAL) Inclement Weather Itinerary Itinerary Changes PT/Exercise Facilities Security Pin System Security Profile/Motorcade Security Telephone Contact Numbers Threat Information/Assessment Throwaway Vehicle Load Plans Walking/Running Route Weather Forecast

(HOTEL) Bag Drag Notices Burn Bag/Classified Disposal Communications Equipment Credit Cards Accepted Elevator Capacity Embassy Control Room Services Foreign Currency Exchange Rate Hotel Costs Hotel Greeters Hotel Security IDD Line Test With Pentagon Location of Room Keys Upon Arrival Names on Doors Porters (Fees and Availability) Principals Suite Room Assignments/Floor Plan Telephone Dialing Instructions Ti me/Date Control Room Will Be Oper Video Surveillance Equipment

(AIRPORT) Baggage Unload Procedure/Tarmac Access Conveyor Belts for Aircraft (Number) Greeters at the Airport Honor Ceremony at the Airport Initial Helicopter Assignments Initial Helicopter Flight Time Initial Movement Drive Time Motorcade Assignments From Airport Numbering of Vehicles/Helicopters Passport/Customs Procedures Personnel That Will Assist With Principal's Bags Persons Required to Board the Aircraft POC on Aircraft for Principals Bags Press on Arrival Staircases for Aircraft (Number)

DATE:

MSAC:

SIGNATURE:


Figure B-5. Sample Checklist for Mission Briefings


FM 3-19.12

SOP/BRIEFING SIGNATURE SEQ: _____________________ CITY:

STATE/COUNTRY:

PRINCIPAL NUMBER:

MISSION DATES:

MISSION SAC:

MISSION ASAC:

I certify that I have read and understand the security control room SOP. The MSAC and/or ASAC answered any questions I had regarding the SOP. I further certify that I have been fully briefed regarding all aspects of this protective services mission, the use of force, contact with the official party, and the consumption of alcohol during the execution phase of the mission.

NAME

SIGNATURE

DATE

________________________________ Signature ________________________________ Mission Special Agent in Charge


Encl #

Figure B-6. Sample Signature Sheet for SOPs and Briefings


FM 3-19.12

SECURITY SUPPORT

SEQ: ____________________

PRINCIPAL NUMBER:

CITY:

STATE/COUNTRY:

MISSION SAC:

MISSION ASAC:

MISSION EXECUTION DATES:

LIMO PROVIDED BY: US Embassy (RSO/DAO/GSO) PSU (Rental) Host Nation/Local Protocol N/A Other: LIMO DRIVER PROVIDED BY: US Embassy (RSO/DAO/GSO) PSU or Support Agent Host Nation/Local Protocol N/A Other:

CHASE VEHICLE PROVIDED BY: US Embassy (RSO/DAO/GSO) PSU (Rental) Host Nation/Local Protocol N/A Other: CHASE DRIVER PROVIDED BY: US Embassy (RSO/DAO/GSO) PSU or Support Agent Host Nation/Local Protocol N/A Other:

ADVANCE VEHICLE PROVIDED BY: US Embassy (RSO/DAO/GSO) PSU (Rental) Host Nation/Local Protocol N/A Other: ADVANCE VEHICLE DRIVER PROVIDED BY: US Embassy (RSO/DAO/GSO) PSU Host Nation/Local Protocol N/A Other:

LIMO RIGHT FRONT SEAT: PSU PSO CINC or Host Cdr PSO (SAC Approval) Host Nation PSO Host Nation Protocol Officer Other:

HOST COUNTRY CHASE VEHICLE: Yes, One Chase Vehicle Yes, Two Chase Vehicles (box formation) No N/A

ADDITIONAL ADVANCE AGENTS? Yes, RSO or Assistant RSO Yes, Host Nation Security Yes, Host Nation and RSO No N/A

WAS LIMO ARMORED? Yes No N/A

WERE MOTORCYCLE ESCORTS PROVIDED? Yes No N/A

IF ADDITIONAL ADVANCE AGENT'S WERE PROVIDED, WAS IT A "TEAM EFFORT" Yes No Somewhat N/A

WAS A LEAD VEHIC LE USED? Yes, One Lead Vehicle Yes, Two Lead Vehicles (Box Formation) No N/A Source:____________________ DID PSU HAVE A SEAT IN THE LEAD VEHICLE? Yes No N/A WAS CLEARANCE GRANTED FOR WEAPONS? Yes No N/A IF NO, WHAT DID YOU DO? Weapons Package Borrowed From Local Unit No Weapons Were Authorized

SPOUSE’S LIMO PROVIDED BY: US Embassy (RSO/DAO/GSO) PSU (Rental) Host Nation/Local Protocol N/A Other: DID THE HOST COUNTRY PROVIDE SECURITY FOR THE SPOUSE? Yes No N/A WAS CLEARANCE GRANTED FOR PRESET RADIO FREQUENCIES? Yes No, Preset Frequencies Had to Be Changed to:________________________ N/A

WAS A PSO FOR THE SPOUSE REQUIRED? Yes No N/A

DID THE HOST COUNTRY PROVIDE SECURITY AT OR IN THE HOTEL? Yes No N/A OVERALL EMBASSY SUPPORT: Excellent Average Poor OVERALL HOST COUNTRY SUPPORT: Excellent Average Poor


Figure B-7. Sample Profile for Security Support


Encl #

FM 3-19.12

THREAT ANALYSIS SEQ: ______________________ The agencies identified below were each asked to provide the undersigned with any information that may adversely impact this mission. Yes (Critical/High/Medium/Low/Negligible) PSU Intel Officer

(circle one)

No

N/A

No

N/A

Defense Intelligence Agency

Yes

During Duty Hours: (XXX) XXX-XXXX After Duty Hours: (XXX) XXX-XXXX

FBI

Yes

(See Telephone Contact Sheet)

No

N/A

Secret Service

Yes


No

N/A

State Police

Yes


No

N/A

County Police/Sheriff's Office

Yes


No

N/A

City Police

Yes


No

N/A

RSO

Yes


No

N/A

MP Provost Marshal

Yes


No

N/A

L ocal CID Office

Yes


No

N/A

Local NCIS Office

Yes


No

N/A

Local AFOSI Office

Yes


No

N/A

No, there was no adverse or threat information developed or identified. Yes, threat information was developed (see attached after action report).

______________________ Mission End Date

_____________________________________ Signature ________________________________ _____ Mission Special Agent in Charge


Encl #

Figure B-8. Sample Report for Threat Analysis


FM 3-19.12

EMBASSY SUPPORT

SEQ: _______________________

CITY:

COUNTRY:

POST ONE TELEPHONE:

STAFF DUTY OFFICER TELEPHONE:

REGIONAL SECURITY OFFICER (RSO)

NAME OF RSO:

OFFICE TELEPHONE:

STU-III TELEPHONE:

UNSECURE FAX:

E-MAIL ADDRESS:

CELLULAR TELEPHONE OR HOME TELEPHONE: ASSISTANT RSO

ASSISTANT RSO:

OFFICE TELEPHONE:

STU-III TELEPHONE:

UNSECURE FAX:

E-MAIL ADDRESS:

CELLULAR TELEPHONE OR HOME TELEPHONE:

COUNTRY MESSAGE ADDRESS:

SIPERNET ADDRESS:

DATE PSU COUNTRY MESSAGE DISPATCHED:

DATE CONFIRMED RSO RECEIVED MESSAGE:

TIME/DATE INITIAL CONTACT:

SUBSEQUENT:

SUBSEQUENT:

RSO SUPPORT DURING THIS MISSION

(Check all that apply) Additional Advance Agent Advance Vehicle Advance Vehicle Driver Airport Liaison (Access to Tarmac/DV Lounge) Car Reservations (Rental) Cellular Telephones Chase Vehicle Chase Vehicle Driver Communications Equipment (Radio) Clearance Customs Clearance (PSU Agents) Customs Clearance (Official Party) Driver for Spouse Embassy Control Room Expeditor for Agents Arriving at Airport Fund Cites (Cellulars/Vehicles/Overtime/etc) Hospital Liaison

Host Nation Police Liaison Hotel Liaison Hotel Reservations for PSU Agents IDD Lines Intelligence Briefing Interpreter/Translator Itinerary Project Officer Lead Vehicle Lead Vehicle Driver Liaison With Ambassador's Security Detail Limo (Armored) Limo (Nonarmored) Limo Driver Motorcade Assignments (POC) Motorcade Security

Passport/Visa Clearance (PSU Agents) Passport/Visa Clearance (Official Party) Spouse: Provided a PSO Spouse: Provided Limousine/Transportation Spouse: Provided Chase Vehicle Spouse: Provided Chase Vehicle Driver Liaison/Arranged Meetings With Local Security Threat Assessment/Intel Brief Transportation for Agents Transportation for Official Party Weapons/Ammunition Weapons Clearance/Weapons Permits Other:


Figure B-9. Sample Form for Support Provided by the Embassy


FM 3-19.12

EMBASSY SUPPORT

SEQ: _______________________

USE THE BELOW SPACE TO DOCUMENT COORDINATIONS WITH THE RSO:

IS WEAPONS CLEARANCE REQUIRED FOR THIS LOCATION? Yes No N/A Weapons Are NOT Authorized HOW MANY WORKING DAYS DOES THE RSO REQUIRE IN ORDER TO OBTAIN WEAPONS CLEARANCE? 1 to 3 4 to 7 8 to 14 More Than 2 Weeks ARE HOLLOW-POINT ROUNDS AUTHORIZED AT THIS LOCATION? Yes No N/A HOW WILL WEAPONS BE TRANSPORTED? In Checked Baggage Weapons Package Onboard Principals Aircraft Weapons Will Be Borrowed From RSO or Local Unit N/A Weapons Are NOT Authorized


Figure B-9. Sample Form for Support Provided by the Embassy (Continued)


FM 3-19.12

EMBASSY SUPPORT

SEQ: _______________________

DEFENSE ATTACHÉ OFFICE

PRIMARY POC:

OFFICE TELEPHONE:

STU-III TELEPHONE:

UNSECURE FAX:

E-MAIL ADDRESS:

CELLULAR TELEPHONE OR HOME TELEPHONE: ASSISTANT ATTACHÉ

ALTERNATE POC:

OFFICE TELEPHONE:

STU-III TELEPHONE:

UNSECURE FAX:

E-MAIL ADDRESS:


COUNTRY MESSAGE ADDRESS:

SIPERNET ADDRESS:

DATE PSU COUNTRY MESSAGE DISPATCHED:

DATE CONFIRMED ATTACHÉ RECEIVED MESSAGE: DAO SUPPORT DURING THIS MISSION

(Check all that apply) Additional Advance Agent Advance Vehicle Advance Vehicle Driver Airport Liaison (Access to Tarmac/DV Lounge) Car Reservations (Rental) Cellular Telephones Chase Vehicle Chase Vehicle Driver Communications Equipment (Radio) Clearance Customs Clearance (PSU Agents) Customs Clearance (Official Party Driver for Spouse Embassy Control Room Expeditor for Agents Arriving at Airport Fund Cites (Cellulars/Vehicles/Overtime/etc.) Hospital Liaison

Host Nation Police Liaison Hotel Liaison Hotel Reservations for PSU Agents IDD Lines Intelligence Briefing Interpreter/Translator Itinerary Project Officer Lead Vehicle Lead Vehicle Driver Liaison with Ambassador's Security Detail Limo (Armored) Limo (Nonarmored) Limo Driver Motorcade Assignments (POC) Motorcade Security

Passport/Visa Clearance (PSU Agents) Passport/Visa Clearance (Official Party) Spouse: Provided a PSO Spouse: Provided Limo/Transportation Spouse: Provided Chase Vehicle Spouse: Provided Chase Vehicle Driver Liaison/Arranged Meetings With Local Security Threat Assessment/Intel Brief Transportation for Agents Transportation for Official Party Weapons/Ammunition Weapons Clearance/Weapons Permits Other:

USE THE BELOW SPACE TO DOCUMENT COORDINATIONS WITH THE DAO:




FM 3-19.12

EMBASSY SUPPORT

SEQ: _______________________

GENERAL SUPPORT OFFICER (GSO)

PRIMARY POC:

OFFICE TELEPHONE:

E-MAIL ADDRESS:


ALTERNATE POC:

OFFICE TELEPHONE:

E-MAIL ADDRESS:

CELLULAR TELEPHONE OR HOME TELEPHONE: GSO SUPPORT DURING THIS MISSION

(Check all that apply) Additional Advance Agent Advance Vehicle Advance Vehicle Driver Airport Liaison (Access to Tarmac/DV Lounge) Car Reservations (Rental) Cellular Telephones Chase Vehicle Chase Vehicle Driver Communications Equipment (Radio) Clearance Customs Clearance (PSU Agents) Customs Clearance (Official Party) Driver for Spouse Embassy Control Room Expeditor for Agents Arriving at Airport Fund Cites (Cellulars/Vehicles/Overtime/etc) Hospital Liaison

Host Nation Police Liaison Hotel Liaison Hotel Reservations for PSU Agents IDD Lines Intelligence Briefing Interpreter/Translator Itinerary Project Officer Lead Vehicle Lead Vehicle Driver Liaison With Ambassador's Security Detail

Passport/Visa Clearance (PSU Agents) Passport/Visa Clearance (Official Party) Spouse: Provided a PSO Spouse: Provided Limo/Transportation Spouse: Provided Chase Vehicle Spouse: Provided Chase Vehicle Driver Liaison/Arranged Meetings With Local Security Threat Assessment/Intel Brief Transportation for Agents Transportation for Official Party

Limo (Armored) Limo (Nonarmored)

Weapons/Ammunition Weapons Clearance/Weapons Permits Other:

Limo Driver Motorcade Assignments (POC) Motorcade Security

USE THE BELOW SPACE TO DOCUMENT COORDINATIONS WITH THE GSO:




FM 3-19.12

SITE SURVEY SEQ: ____________________ NAME OF AGENT:

SURVEY DATE:

PRINCIPAL NUMBER:

MISSION DATE: GENERAL INFORMATION

NAME OF LOCATION/SITE: NAME OF HOST:

TELEPHONE:

STREET ADDRESS: PRIMARY POC:

TELEPHONE:

SITE SECURITY POC:

TELEPHONE:

NAME OF HOSPITAL DURING VISIT TO THIS SITE:

TELEPHONE:

NAME OF LOCAL POLICE DEPARTMENT DURING VISIT TO THIS SITE:

TELEPHONE:

LOCATION WHERE HOST WILL GREET PRINCIPAL: Curbside, in front of main entrance Inside main entrance N/A (No Host) Other: ARRIVAL TIME:

COPY OF FLOOR PLAN ATTACHED: Yes No N/A DEPARTURE TIME:

ARRIVAL/DEPARTURE AREA OF MOTORCADE: Curbside, in front of main entrance N/A (Walking) Other:_______________________________________

PARKING AREA FOR MOTORCADE/PARTY VEHICLES: Vehicles will remain curbside Parking lot adjacent to function site Par king garage adjacent to function site N/A (Walking) Other: IS THERE A RECEIVING LINE? WILL A GIFT BE PRESENTED TO THE PRINCIPAL? No No Yes Location: Yes Presenter: OBTAINED COPY OF SEATING ASSIGNMENTS FOR PRINCIPAL AND SPOUSE: Yes No N/A SECURITY OR PROTOCOL CHECKPOINTS: ARRANGED FOR PRINCIPAL/STAFF TO BYPASS CHECKPOINTS? Xray of handbags Yes Magnetometer No Check of invitation or tickets N/A Other: DESCRIBE THE WALKING ROUTE FROM THE DROP OFF POINT TO THE FUNCTION:


Figure B-10. Sample Form for a Site Advance


Encl #

FM 3-19.12

SITE SURVEY

SEQ: ____________________

WILL ELEVATOR(S) BE USED AT THIS SITE? Yes No N/A

WHAT IS THE CAPACITY OF THE ELEVATOR(S)?

WILL ELEVATOR(S) BE LOCKED -DOWN? No Yes POC for keys: IF PRINCIPAL WILL USE STAIRS, HOW MANY FLIGHTS?

WHAT FLOOR IS THE FUNCTION ON?

Weight:_______ Max occupants:_______

LOCATION OF SAFE HAVEN:

DESCRIBE THE WALKING ROUTE FROM FUNCTION TO SAFE HAVEN:

DESCRIBE THE EVACUATION ROUTE FROM THE FUNCTION TO THE MOTORCADE:

LOCATION OF NEAREST RESTROOM TO FUNCTION SITE:

WERE BACKGROUND OR LOCAL POLICE NAME CHECKS CONDUCTED OF EMPLOYEES THAT WILL BE CLOSE TO THE PRINCIPAL? Yes No N/A

HOLDING ROOM WHERE PRINCIPAL CAN HAVE A PRIVATE CONVERSATION:____________________________________________________ ___________________________________________________________________ LOCATION OF HOLDING ROOM FOR STAFF IF SEPARATED FROM PRINCIPAL:___________________________________________ ______________ ___________________________________________________________________

OBTAINED KEYS TO PRINCIPAL'S HOLDING ROOM: POC:________________________ Yes No

TELEPHONE NUMBER_____________

N/A OBTAINED KEYS TO STAFF HOLDING ROOM: Yes No N/A

NEAREST TELEPHONE WHERE PRINCIPAL CAN PLACE A CALL: TO OBTAIN AN OUTSIDE LINE, DIAL:

TELEPHONE NUMBER: PRESS

WILL THERE BE PRESS COVERAGE AT THIS SITE? No Yes How many?_____ POC FOR PRESS: WERE PRESS CREDENTIALS VERIFIED BY HOST OR POC? Yes No N/A

WHERE WILL THE PRESS BE LOCATED: Throughout function site Upon arrival (curbside) Upon departure (curbside) Organized, indoor press conference Other: TYPE OF PRESS COVERAGE: National news/TV/video Magazine/newspaper/photographers Still pictures or video only (no questions) Armed Forces radio/TV (US or host)


Encl #

Figure B-10. Sample Form for a Site Advance (Continued)


FM 3-19.12

AIRPORT SURVEY CITY:

STATE/COUNTRY:

NAME OF AGENT:

SURVEY DATE:

PRINCIPAL NUMBER:

MISSION DATE(S):

SEQ: ________________________

GENERAL INFORMATION NAME OF AIRPORT AND SERVICE: STREET ADDRESS: PRIMARY POC:

TELEPHONE:

BASE OPNS/FLIGHT OPNS POC:

TELEPHONE:

AIRPORT SECURITY POC:

TELEPHONE:

FIRE DEPT POC:

TELEPHONE:

DV LOUNGE/HOLDING ROOM POC:

TELEPHONE:

TYPE OF AIRPORT: US Military Base US Civilian Foreign Military Base Foreign Civilian

AIRPORT HOURS OF OPERATION: 24 Hours Other: ____________________

TARMAC IS ACCESSIBLE: 24 Hours Other: ____________________

ARRIVAL INFORMATION TYPE OF AIRCRAFT:

CIVILIAN AIRCRAFT EQUIVALENT:

TAIL NUMBER:

CALL SIGN:

MOTORCADE STAGING AREA:

WILL THERE BE AN HONOR CEREMONY? No Yes How Many?

Adjacent to aircraft, on tarmac Adjacent to DV Lounge; principal will enter DV Lounge before motorcade movement Other

WHO WILL GREET THE PRINCIPAL?

WILL THE AIRCRAFT REQUIRE A STAIRCASE? POC: No, stairs are self-contained Yes How Many? CONVEYOR BELT FOR BAGGAGE? POC: No Yes How Many? LUGGAGE / BAGGAGE UNLOADING PROCEDURE: Planeside; baggage truck will go directly to rear of aircraft after plane stops Other:

TELEPHONE:

TELEPHONE:

DOES THE AIRPORT ASSIST/PROVIDE BAGGAGE HANDLERS? Yes No


Figure B-11. Sample Form for an Airport Advance


Encl #

FM 3-19.12

AIRPORT SURVEY CUSTOMS CLEARANCE POC:

TELEPHONE:

CUSTOMS CLEARANCE PROCEDURE FOR OFFICIAL PARTY: None Customs official must board aircraft for inspection (party briefed) Other: PASSPORT/VISA CLEARANCE POC:

TELEPHONE:

SEQ: ________________________

PASSPORT/VISA CLEARANCE PROCEDURE FOR OFFICIAL PARTY: None All passports collected and given to POC for stamp/processing and later returned to party Other: WILL THERE BE PRESS COVERAGE? No Yes How many?_____

LOCATION OF PRESS:

TYPE OF PRESS COVERAGE:

Throughout function site Upon arrival (curbside) Upon departure (curbside) Organized, indoor press conference Other:

POC FOR PRESS:

National news/TV/video Magazine/newspaper/photographers Still pictures or video only (no questions) Armed Forces radio/TV (US or host) Other:

DEPARTURE INFORMATION MOTORCADE ARRIVAL AREA: Adjacent to aircraft, on tarmac Adjacent to DV/departure lounge Other: WHO WILL FAREWELL THE PRINCIPAL?

HONOR CORDON/DEPARTURE CEREMONY? No Yes How many? _____

WILL THE AIRCRAFT REQUIRE A STAIRCASE? No, stairs are self-contained Yes How many? CONVEYOR BELT FOR BAGGAGE? No Yes How many? LUGGAGE/BAGGAGE LOADING PROCEDURE:

POC:

TELEPHONE:

POC:

TELEPHONE:

DOES THE AIRPORT ASSIST/PROVIDE BAGGAGE HANDLERS?

Planeside; baggage truck will go directly to rear of aircraft Other:

Yes No

WHERE WILL BAGGAGE SWEEP TAKE PLACE? Airport; planeside Other – Explain: TYPE OF BAGGAGE SWEEP: K -9

POC:

TELEPHONE:

POC:

TELEPHONE:

POC:

TELEPHONE:

Xray of handbags Magnetometer WILL THERE BE PRESS COVERAGE? No Yes How many?_____

POC FOR PRESS:

LOCATION OF PRESS:

TYPE OF PRESS COVERAGE:

Throughout function site Upon arrival (curbside) Upon departure (curbside) Organized, indoor press conference Other:

National news/TV/video Magazine/newspaper/photographers Still pictures or video only (no questions) Armed Forces radio/TV (US or host) Other:


Encl #

Figure B-11. Sample Form for an Airport Advance (Continued)


FM 3-19.12

RON SITE SURVEY

SEQ: __________________________

CITY:

STATE/COUNTRY:

AGENT:

GENERAL INFORMATION NAME OF HOTEL:

TELEPHONE:

STREET ADDRESS: PRIMARY POC:

TELEPHONE:

GENERAL MANAGER:

TELEPHONE:

SECURITY MANAGER:

TELEPHONE:

DOES THE FACILITY HAVE A FIRE ALARM/SPRINKLER SYSTEM? Yes No DOES THE FACILITY PROVIDE INTERNET ACCESS: Yes, In Room Yes, Business Center No FOREIGN CURRENCY EXCHANGE RATE: N/A $1.00 = CREDIT CARDS ACCEPTED: Visa MasterCard American Express Diners Club Other: ROOM RATE SUITE: $ ROOM RATE SINGLE: $

CLOSED CIRCUIT CAMERAS/TV? No Yes Monitor Location: DOES FACILITY ACCEPT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TAX EXEMPT LETTER? Yes No ELECTRIC CURRENT WITHIN THE ROOMS: 110V 220V TYPE OF RON SITE: Public Hotel US Military DVQ Foreign Military DVQ Private Residence Other: IS BREAKFAST INCLUDED WITH ROOM RATE? Yes No

HOTEL SERVICES Porters/Luggage Carts Room Service

Dry Cleaning/ Laundry Late Checkout

Currency Exchange

Fitness Center

Restaurant

Early Check-in

Business Center

Other:

WILL THE HOTEL REMOVE/EXCHANGE FURNITURE IN SECURI TY CONTROL AND COMMO ROOMS? N/A No Yes Specify if there is an added charge: HAS THE MINIBAR IN THE SECURITY CONTROL ROOM BEEN SEALED OR REMOVED? Yes No N/A


Figure B-12. Sample Survey Form for a RON Advance


Encl #

FM 3-19.12

RON SITE SURVEY

SEQ: __________________________

ARRIVAL PRINCIPAL'S INITIAL ARRIVAL TIME/DATE: WILL A HOTEL REPRESENTATIVE GREET THE PRINCIPAL UPON ARRIVAL? No Yes

WHERE WILL THE LIMO AND CHASE VEHICLES PARK? Parking lot adjacent to the main entrance Hotel parking garage Vehicles will return to Embassy Motor Pool NAME/TITLE: Other - Explain: WHERE WILL THE PRINCIPAL AND MOTORCADE ARRIVE/DEPART THE HOTEL? IF PRINCIPAL WILL USE STAIRS, HOW MANY FLIGHTS? The hotel's main entrance, located on the ground floor Other - Explain: DESCRIBE THE WALKING ROUTE FROM THE HOTEL ENTRANCE TO THE PRINCIPAL'S ROOM: DESCRIBE THE EMERGENCY EVACUATION ROUTE FROM THE PRINCIPAL'S ROOM: CAPACITY OF HOTEL ELEVATORS?

WHAT FLOOR IS THE PRINCIPAL'S ROOM ON?

Weight: _______ Max Occupants:_______ HOW WILL PORTER FEES FOR THE OFFICIAL PARTY BE PAID? By a member of the official party, ID:____________________________

WILL ELEVATOR (S) BE LOCKED -DOWN? No Yes POC for keys: HOW MANY PIECES OF LUGGAGE WILL BE ACCOMPANYING THE OFFICIAL PARTY?

Billed to security control room - - Cost per bag: $________________ WHICH ELEVATOR WILL BE USED FOR BAGGAGE? WHERE WILL THE BAGGAGE TRUCK UNLOAD AND LOAD? The main elevator(s), located in hotel lobby The hotel's main entrance, located on the ground floor The hotel service elevator Other - Explain: WHAT ROLE WILL THE HOTEL SECURITY OR HOST NATION SECURITY ASSUME DURING THE PRINCIPAL’S STAY? None or N/A Elevator lockdown Roving guard/increased visibility Security checkpoints Location of checkpoints: WILL THE FACILITY PROVIDE THE NAMES OF PERSONS STAYING IN ROOMS NEXT TO, ABOVE, AND BELOW THE PRINCIPAL? Yes (see attached hotel roster) No N/A WILL THE FACILITY PROVIDE A LIST OF HOTEL EMPLOYEES THAT WILL PROVIDE SERVICE TO THE PRINCIPAL AND STAFF? Yes (see attached roster) No - Explain: A LOCAL POLICE NAME CHECK WAS COMPLETED OF HOTEL PERSONNEL WHO WILL BE CLOSE TO THE PRINCIPAL: Yes No - Explain: TYPE OF SWEEP IN PRINCIPAL'S ROOM: K -9

POC:

TELEPHONE:

POC:

TELEPHONE:

POC:

TELEPHONE:

TCSM Other:

HOTEL/ROOM ASSIGNMENT FLOOR PLAN IS ATTACHED: HOTEL/ROOM ASSIGNMENT FLOOR PLAN FORWARD TO STAFF/PSO: Yes Yes No No N/A N/A TIME/DATE ALL ROOM KEYS WILL BE AVAILABLE FOR PICKUP AT FRONT DESK:


Encl #

Figure B-12. Sample Survey Form for a RON Advance (Continued) Site Surveys and Mission Checklists B-21

FM 3-19.12

RON SITE SURVEY

SEQ: __________________________

LOCATION OF ROOM KEYS UPON ARRIVAL OF THE OFFICIAL PARTY: PSU Security Control Room. Embassy Control Room In Room Doors Officia L Party Will Be Required to Register at Front Desk and Obtain Key From Reception. Other - Explain:

DEPARTURE PRINCIPAL’S FINAL DEPARTURE TIME/DATE:

TIME/DATE OF "BAG DRAG" WILL BEGIN:

PRIOR TO DEPARTURE, OFFICIAL PARTY BAGGAGE WILL BE:

WHERE WILL BAGGAGE SWEEP TAKE PLACE?

Placed Outside Rooms Delivered to Security Control Room Delivered to Communications Control Room Other - Explain: TYPE OF LUGGAGE SWEEP: POC: K-9 POC: Xray POC: Magnetometer POC: Other:

Hotel Airport Other – Explain:

TELEPHONE:

TIME/DATE OF SWEEP:

TELEPHONE:

TIME/DATE OF SWEEP:

TELEPHONE:

TIME/DATE OF SWEEP:

TELEPHONE:

TIME/DATE OF SWEEP:

BAGGAGE DEPARTURE TIME/DATE:

COMMUNICATIONS NAME/ORGANIZATION OF PERSON INSTALLING IDD LINES:

TIME/DATE IDD LINES WILL BE INSTALLED:

DIRECTION NEEDED FOR SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS:

TIME/DATE IDD LINES WILL BE OPERATIONAL:

IF NECESSARY, WILL FACILITY ALLOW ACCESS TO ROOF OF BUILDING FOR SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS? Yes No Other: MEDICAL INFORMATION NAME OF HOSPITAL DU RING VISIT TO THIS SITE:

TELEPHONE:

STRIP MAP SHOWING ROUTE FROM RON SITE TO HOSPITAL IS ATTACHED: Yes No

NOTES:


Encl #

Figure B-12. Sample Survey Form for a RON Advance (Continued) B-22 Site Surveys and Mission Checklists

FM 3-19.12

HOSPITAL SURVEY

SEQ: _________________________

CITY:

STATE/COUNTRY:

AGENT:

NAME OF FACILITY: STREET ADDRESS: TYPE OF FACILITY CIVILIAN MILITARY

INPATIENT WITH EMERGENCY ROOM

INPATIENT WITHOUT EMERGENCY ROOM

OUTPATIENT WITH EMERGENCY ROOM

OUTPATIENT WITHOUT EMERGENCY ROOM

EMERGENCY ROOM INFORMATION TELEPHONE: (Direct Line)

EMERGENCY ROOM PRIMARY POC: EMERGENCY ROOM ALTERNATE POC:

TELEPHONE:

HOSPITAL SECURITY MANAGER:

TELEPHONE:

AMBULANCE SERVICE:

TELEPHONE:

MEDEVAC POC:

TELEPHONE:

DESCRIBE FACILITY MEDEVAC PROCEDURE: DURING MEDEVAC, WOULD PSO BE ABLE TO STAY WITH PRINCIPAL? Yes No Explain: IS THIS FACILITY CAPABLE OF STABILIZING AND EVACUATING ANY INJURY OR MEDICAL CONDITION? Yes No Explain: IS THE EMERGENCY ROOM EASY TO LOCATE BY VEHICLE? Yes No Explain: IS THE EMERGENCY ROOM OPEN 24 HOURS? Yes No Explain: IS AN ENGLISH-SPEAKING INTERPRETER ON DUTY 24 HOURS A DAY? Yes No N/A INJURY REFERRED TO ANOTHER HOSPITAL:

NAME OF HOSPITAL:

TELEPHONE:

INJURY REFERRED TO ANOTHER HOSPITAL:

NAME OF HOSPITAL:

TELEPHONE:

EMERGENCY ROOM INFORMATION Emergency Room

XRay

Cardiologist

Neurosurgeon

Whole Blood

Trauma Unit

Burn Unit

Operating Team

Heliport

MEDEVAC


Encl #

Figure B-13. Sample Survey Form for a Hospital Advance Site Surveys and Mission Checklists B-23

FM 3-19.12

TELEPHONE CONTACT SEQ: __________________ Location:

Mission Dates:

Country Code:

City Code:

Dialing Instructions Example:

To dial the hotel from CONUS, telephone 011_____________________________

Name/Organization

Office

Home

Cellular

ADVANCE SITES HOTEL AIRPORT SITE 1 SITE 2 SITE 3 SITE 4 SITE 5 SITE 6 SITE 7 SITE 8

OFFICIAL USE Page 1 of 2

Figure B-14. Sample POC Listing B-24 Site Surveys and Mission Checklists

Encl #

FM 3-19.12

TELEPHONE CONTACT SHEET SEQ: __________________ US EMBASSY

Name/Organization

Office

Home

Cellular

REGIONAL SECURITY OFFICER (RSO) DEFENSE ATTACHÉ OFFICE (DAO) GENERAL SUPPORT OFFICER (GSO) IDD TELEPHONE/COMMO OFFICER VEHICLES/MOTOR POOL MARINE GUARD/POST ONE EMBASSY SWITCHBOARD POLICE/SECURITY/INTEL FBI SECRET SERVICE POLICE DEPARTMENT MP/SP HOST NATION SECURITY LOCAL CID/NCIS/OSI

SECURITY CONTROL ROOM (PREVIOUS STOP) SECURITY CONTROL ROOM (NEXT STOP) EMERGENCY/MEDICAL ON CALL DENTIST PRIMARY HOSPITAL ALTERNATE HOSPITAL FIRE DEPARTMENT


Encl #

Figure B-14. Sample POC Listing (Continued)


FM 3-19.12

MISSION CHECKLIST CITY:

STATE/COUNTRY:

SEQ: _____ - 00 – CID011 MSAC:

PREMISSION Yes Agent: Opened File in ACIRS (Team SAC Only) Yes Agent: Obtained Principal's Itinerary, Posted to File Yes Agent: Support Agents Tasked Yes Agent: Prepared OPLAN Yes Agent: Reviewed Intel/Country Files Yes Agent: Reviewed Previous Mission Files Yes Agent: Identified Local (Host Country) Holidays During Yes Mission Dates Agent: Initial Contact Made With RSO Representative Yes Agent: Initial Contact Made With DAO Representative Yes Agent: Initial Contact Made With Project/Protocol Officer Yes Agent: Made Car Rental Reservations Yes Agent: Made Hotel Reservations Yes Agent: Is a Visa Required? Yes Agent: Visa Processing for all PSU and Support Agents Yes Completed Agent: Country Clearance Message Drafted Yes Agent: Received/Posted Principal's Country Message Yes Agent: Dispatched/Confirmed Receipt of PSU Country Yes Message Posted to File Agent: Confirmed with/RSO/DAO Weapons Clearance Yes Granted Agent: Confirmed with/RSO/DAO Commo Clearance Granted Yes Agent: Opened File in Log Book

Date:

No

N/A

Date:

No

N/A

Date:

No

N/A

Date:

No

N/A

Date:

No

N/A

Date:

No

N/A

Date:

No

N/A

Date:

No

N/A

Date:

No

N/A

Date:

No

N/A

Date:

No

N/A

Date:

No

N/A

Date:

No

N/A

Date:

No

N/A

Date:

No

N/A

Date:

No

N/A

Date:

No

N/A

Date:

No

N/A

Date:

No

N/A

Date:

No

N/A


Figure B-15. Sample Mission Requirement Checklist


FM 3-19.12

MISSION CHECKLIST Tasked/Determined Availability of EOD Support Tasked/Determined Availability of TCSM Support Ensured Support Agent Fund Cites Provided to Group Coordinators Completed Contacting all Support Agents and Confirmed Their Personal Information Flight Itineraries, Including Support Agents, Placed in File Submitted Supply Request

SEQ: _____ 00- CID011

Yes Agent: Yes Agent: Yes Agent: Yes Agent:

Date:

No

N/A

Date:

No

N/A

Date:

No

N/A

Date:

No

N/A

Yes Agent: Yes Agent:

Date:

No

N/A

Date:

No

N/A

Date:

No

N/A

Date:

No

N/A

Yes Agent: Yes Agent: Yes Agent: Yes Agent: Yes Agent:

Date:

No

N/A

Date:

No

N/A

Date:

No

N/A

Date:

No

N/A

Date:

No

N/A

Yes Agent: Yes Agent: Yes Agent: Yes Agent: Yes Agent:

Date:

No

N/A

Date:

No

N/A

Date:

No

N/A

Date:

No

N/A

Date:

No

N/A

EXECUTION PHASE Completed Support Agent Evaluations Obtained Support Agent Flight Cost Data

Yes Agent: Yes Agent:

POSTMISSION Completed Support Agent Evaluations and Posted to File Annotated Airline Travel Cost and .0015 Funds on PSU Form 1 Total Man-Hours Annotated on PSU Form 1 Completed Threat Analysis Report Updated Intel File With Telephone Contact Sheet, AAR, RON, Airport, and Hospital Surveys Completed AAR and Uploaded Into ACIRS Completed/Submitted Travel Voucher Purged Non-PSU Classified Documents From File File Declassified Submitted File to SAC for Review


Figure B-15. Sample Mission Requirement Checklist (Continued) Site Surveys and Mission Checklists B-27

FM 3-19.12

AGENT DUTY ROSTER

SEQ: _____________________

CITY:

STATE/COUNTRY:

PRINCIPAL NUMBER:

MISSION DATES:

MISSION SAC:

MISSION ASAC:

PSO:

SPOUSE PSO:

CHASE DRIVER:

CHASE SHIFT LEADER:

ADVANCE:

BAGGAGE IN:

ADVANCE:

BAGGAGE OUT:

LIMO DRIVER:

OTHER: SECURITY CONTROL ROOM

AGENT

DATE

FROM

TO

Changes to this duty roster will only be made by the mission SAC.

________________________________________ Signature ________________________________________ Mission Special Agent in Charge


Figure B-16. Sample Duty Roster for the Mission B-28 Site Surveys and Mission Checklists

Encl #

FM 3-19.12

SUPPLY/EQUIPMENT REQUEST SEQ: ____________________ DATE REQUEST SUBMITTED:

DATE EQUIPMENT REQUIRED:

REQUESTING AGENT:

MISSION LOCATION:

DURATION OF TDY:

THREAT LEVEL:

QTY

ITEM QTY AMMUNITION POUCH, 9 MM MAGAZINES ANTENNA(S), RADIO CALLING CARD BASE STATION, PORTABLE BINOCULARS CAMERA, DIGITAL, WITH COMPONENTS CARRYING CASE, HARD-SIDED, GRAY (SMALL) CARRYING CASE, HARD-SIDED, WHITE (SMALL) CARRYING CASE, MP-5, HARD SIDED CARRYING CASE, MP-5, SOFT SIDED CARRYING CASE, RADIOS, SABER CARRYING CASE, RADIOS, XTS 3000, LARGE CARRYING CASE, RADIOS, XTS 3000, SMALL CELLULAR TELEPHONE WITH CHARGER AND BATTERY CHARGER, MULTI-BATTERY, SABER CHARGER, MULTI-BATTERY, XTS 3000 CHARGER, SINGLE BATTERY, SABER, 110V CHARGER, SINGLE BATTERY, SABER, 220V CHARGER, SINGLE BATTERY, XTS 3000 DES ENCODER DURESS ALARM, BRIEF CASE HOLSTER, 9 MM PISTOL LAPTOP COMPUTER WITH/COMPONENTS LIGHT, SAFETY (DASH) (BLUE) LIGHT, SAFETY (DASH) (RED) LIGHT, SAFETY (VISOR) (BLUE) LIGHT, SAFETY (VISOR) (RED) MAGAZINES (9 MM) (MP5) MAGAZINES (9 MM) (SIG SAUER)

ITEM METAL DETECTOR (LARGE) METAL DETECTOR (SMALL) MP-5 ASSAULT RIFLE NIGHT VISION GOGGLES (AN/PVS-5B) PADLOCKS PISTOL, 9 MM, SIG SAUER PRINTER, PORTABLE PROTECTIVE VEST (SAFARI (MEDIUM) PROTECTIVE VEST (SAFARI) (LARGE) PROTECTIVE VEST (SAFARI) (X-LARGE) PROTECTIVE VEST (WHITE) (LARGE) PROTECTIVE VEST (WHITE) (MEDIUM) PROTECTIVE VEST (WHITE) (SMALL) PROTECTIVE VEST, TACTICAL, BLACK RADIO(S), SABER II (FM BAND) RADIO(S), SABER III RADIO(S), XTS 3000 RECORDING KIT (FOR USE WITH/ITT VIDEO KIT) REPEATER, PORTABLE ROUNDS, 9 MM, (BALL) ROUNDS, 9 MM, (HOLLOW -TIP) SECURITY PINS (BLUE) SECURITY PINS (GREEN) (METRO TEAM ONLY) SECURITY PINS (LIGHT BLUE) SECURITY PINS (RED) SENSOR KIT, ULTRA GUARD SYSTEM SENSORS, RECEIVER, & TRANSMITTER SURVEILLANCE KIT(S) VIDEO KIT: ITT KAMEN

I understand it is my responsibility to ensure all equipment is accounted for and in operable condition before departure from the supply room. I will immediately notify the PSU Supply Section of any lost or damaged equipment. DATE:

PRINTED NAME:

SIGNATURE:

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Figure B-17. Sample Request for Supplies and Equipment


FM 3-19.12

EQUIPMENT SIGN-OUT SHEET

SEQ: ______________________

CITY:

COUNTRY:

MISSION SAC:

MISSION ASAC: AGENT 1

SECURITY PIN

RADIO NUMBER

WEAPON SERIAL NUMBER _________ ROUNDS

DATE RECEIVED:

SURVEILLANCE KIT AND EAR PIECE

OTHER:

Yes No

I accept receipt and responsibility for the safekeeping of the above equipment. DATE RETURNED:

NAME:

SIGNATURE: AGENT 2 SECURITY PIN

RADIO NUMBER


DATE RECEIVED:

SURVEILLANCE KIT AND EAR PIECE Yes No

OTHER:


NAME:


RADIO NUMBER

WEAPON SERIAL # _________ ROUNDS

DATE RECEIVED:


OTHER:


NAME:


RADIO NUMBER


DATE RECEIVED:


OTHER:


NAME:


RADIO NUMBER


DATE RECEIVED:



NAME:

SIGNATURE:


Figure B-18. Sample Sign-Out Sheet for Equipment


OTHER:

FM 3-19.12

MOTORCADE ASSIGNMENTS

SEQ: _____________________

MOVEMENT NUMBER:

SCHEDULED DEPARTURE TIME/DATE:

FROM:

TO:

DISTANCE (MILES/KILOMETERS):

TRAVEL TIME (MINUTES):

SAFE HAVEN DURING MOVEMENT:

TELEPHONE NUMBER:

HOSPITAL DURING MOVEMENT:

TELEPHONE NUMBER:

PRIMARY ROUTE MAP ATTACHED:

ALTERNATE ROUTE MAP ATTACHED:

Yes No Comments:

Yes No

Reason:

Lead Vehicle

License Number/Model

Limo


Reason:

Staff 1


Staff 2


Staff 3


Dvr:

Dvr:

Dvr: Dvr:

PSU Chase


Dvr:

Dvr:

Host Chase


Baggage


Dvr:

Dvr:


Encl #

Figure B-19. Sample Form for Motorcade Assignments


FM 3-19.12

HELICOPTER ASSIGNMENTS

SEQ: ____________________

MOVEMENT NUMBER:

SCHEDULED DEPARTURE TIME/DATE:

FROM:

TO:

DISTANCE (MILES/KILOMETERS):

TRAVEL TIME (MINUTES):

ESTIMATED DRIVE TIME BY VEHICLE:

NUMBER OF HELICOPTERS:

IS THERE AN ALTERNATE TRANSPORTATION PLAN? Yes No

ALTERNATE MOTORCADE LOAD PLAN AND ROUTE IS ATTACHED: Yes No

PRINCIPAL'S HELICOPTER

TYPE:

Security/Staff Helicopter 1

TYPE:


TYPE:


TYPE:


TYPE:


TYPE:

NOTE: Pilots should be briefed that ALL security and staff helicopter(s) land before the principal's helicopter.


Figure B-20. Sample Form for Helicopter Assignments


Encl #

FM 3-19.12

ROOM ASSIGNMENTS

SEQ: _______________________

RADISSON

59-A Hyde Park Avenue London, United Kingdom Phone: XXX -XX-XX-XXX-XXX Fax: XXX -XX-XX-XXX-XXX To Dial Room to Room Dial 9-XXXX 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27.

NAME Mr. Bacon CPT Benkert CPT Bosch CDR Breckenridge Mr. Bronson Ms. Burke LTC Carter Mrs. Floyd SGT Gamble LTC Green MSGT Harris LTC Hilley RADM Johnson Mr. Kisling CPT Kleman Mr. Kramer SSGT Morales MSGT Pagan Mr. Ruble Mr. Rydell Embassy Control Room Security Control Room Mr. Tyrer Security Control Room Communications Control Room Embassy Control Room Embassy Control Room

ROOM NUMBER 2002 2106 2013 2016 2107 1918 2003 2108 2014 2004 1915 2005 2024 2022 2014 1912 2003 2118 1913 1924 4000 4001 1901 4001 4001 4000 4000

IDD LINE/DIRECT LINE

806-0251

806-0252

806-0256 (Fax) 806-0257 (Voice) 806-0253 806-0258 (Voice/VIP Extension) * 806-0259 (Primary) 806-0254 (Voice) 806-0255 (Voice)

*Dedicated line with extension to principal's room.


Encl #

Figure B-21. Sample Form for Hotel Room Assignments Site Surveys and Mission Checklists B-33

FM 3-19.12

ASAC EVALUATION REPORT SEQ: ____________________ GENERAL INFORMATION NAME OF AGENT:

RANK:

TRAVEL TEAM:

NUMBER OF PREVIOUS MISSIONS AS AN ASAC:

PRINCIPAL NUMBER:

MISSION LOCATION:

MSAC (EVALUATOR):

SSN:

PERIOD COVERED: TEAM SAC (SUPERVISOR):

Evaluation Instructions: This form is designed t o allow the MSAC to evaluate a newly assigned agent's performance during mission preparation, execution, and postmission. Each of these areas should be discussed and the newly assigned agent given suggestions for improving his performance. The following categories are used to rank an agent's performance: 5 4 3 2 1

= = = = =

Excellent Very Good Satisfactory Conditional Warning

Agent's performance consistently exceeded expectations of his position. Agent's performance met and occasionally exceeded expectations of his position. Agent's performance met expectations of his position. Agent's performance is below the expectations of his position. Agent's performance did not meet the minimum acceptable level for his position.

: Degree to which the agent understands the essential functions of protective services 1. Position Knowledge: operations. Also the degree to which the agent used other resources effectively to gain knowledge needed for the mission. Ranking:

1

2

3

4

5

Comments: 2. Work Quality: Accuracy, neatness, effective completion of assignments, and attention to detail. Ranking:

1

2

3

4

5

Comments: 3. Productivity: Amount of work completed and effective use of resources to make the best use of time. Ranking:

1

2

3

4

5

Comments: 4. Teamwork: Willingness to work with others and consider fellow agent's ideas. Ability to get along with others and treat them with dignity and respect. Ranking:

1

2

3

4

5

Comments:


Figure B-22. Sample Evaluation Report for an Assistant Special Agent in Charge (ASAC) B-34 Site Surveys and Mission Checklists

FM 3-19.12

ASAC EVALUATION REPORT SEQ: ____________________ 5. Dependability: Degree to which the agent can be relied upon to follow instructions, complete assigned tasks, and attend meetings. Ranking:

1

2

3

4

5

Comments: 6. Judgment: Degree to which the agent uses sound reasoning to make decisions. Ranking:

1

2

3

4

5

Comments: 7. Initiative: Willingness to accept responsibility independently. Eagerness to learn and use new methods to accomplish tasks. Ranking:

1

2

3

4

5

Comments: 8. Adaptability: Ability to work under changed or new situations or working conditions. Ranking:

1

2

3

4

5

Comments: 9. Mission Planning: Ability to organize work to accomplish the tasks assigned. Ensures that the plan is consistent with PSU doctrine and training. Ranking:

1

2

3

4

5

Comments: 10. Overall Evaluation: Overall ranking for agent, considering all the factors above and any other relevant information. Ranking:

1

2

3

4

5

Comments:


Figure B-22. Sample Evaluation Report for an ASAC (Continued) Site Surveys and Mission Checklists B-35

FM 3-19.12

ASAC EVALUATION REPORT SEQ: ____________________ Agent's Strengths 1._____________________________________________________________________________________________ 2._____________________________________________________________________________________ ________ 3._____________________________________________________________________________________________

Areas This Agent Needs Improvement 1._____________________________________________________________________________________________ 2._____________ ________________________________________________________________________________ 3._____________________________________________________________________________________________

Evaluated Agent's Comments ________________________________________________ _______________________________________________ _______________________________________________________________________________________________ _______________________________________________________________________________________________ _____________ __________________________________________________________________________________ SIGNATURES:

__________________________________________ Evaluated Agent's Signature

______________________________ Date

_________________________________________ _ Evaluator's Signature

______________________________ Date

__________________________________________ Team SAC's Signature

______________________________ Date


Figure B-22. Sample Evaluation Report for an ASAC (Continued) B-36 Site Surveys and Mission Checklists

FM 3-19.12

SUPPORT AGENT EVALUATION SEQ: _______________________ PRINCIPAL NUMBER:

MISSION LOCATION:

MISSION DATE(S):

GENERAL INFORMATION NAME OF AGENT:

RANK/TITLE:

UNIT/ORGANIZATION:

TELEPHONE:

DOB:

SSN:

HEIGHT:

WEIGHT:

EXPERIENCE/PERFORMANCE IF ACTIVE DUTY CID, IS THIS AGENT INTERESTED IN BEING ASSIGNED PSU? N/A No Yes Anticipated PCS/DEROS Date:

NUMBER OF PREVIOUS SUPPORT AGENT MISSIONS: 0 to 5 5 to 10 10 or More Previously Assigned to PSU or a PSD DURING THIS MISSION, AGENT SERVED AS: DURING FUTURE MISSIONS, AGENT SHOULD SERVE AS— Advance Advance Chase Driver Chase Driver Limo Driver Limo Driver Control Room (Day) Control Room (Day) Control Room (Night) Control Room (Night) Spouse PSO Spouse PSO Other: Other: SHOULD THIS INDIVIDUAL CONTINUE TO SERVE AS A SUPPORT AGENT IN THE FUTURE? Yes No See Attached: TECHNICAL PROFICIENCY: SOUND JUDGMENT: MATURITY: Superior Superior Superior Average Average Average Needs Improvement Needs Improvement Needs Improvement OVERALL APPEARANCE: Superior Average Needs Improvement

TO

ADAPTABILITY/FLEXIBILITY: Superior Average Needs Improvement

COMMUNICATION SKILLS: Superior Average Needs Improvement

SCHOOLS ATTENDED PROTECTIVE SERVICES TRAINING:

HOSTAGE NEGOTIATIONS COURSE:

Yes No COUNTER TERRORISM ON MILITARY INSTALLATIONS (CTMI):

Yes No ANTITERRORISM/DEFENSIVE DRIVING COURSE(S):

Yes No

Yes No

THIS AGENT’S AIRLINE TICKET COST: $ MSAC:

SIGNATURE:

DATE:


Figure B-23. Sample Evaluation for a Support Agent


FM 3-19.12

BOMB THREAT CHECKLIST SEQ: ________________________

Instructions: If you receive a bomb threat, remain calm and courteous; do not interrupt the caller or become confrontational. Name of agent:

Exact time of call:

Date call was received:

What phone was the call received on? (Location/Number) Exact words of caller:

QUESTIONS TO ASK

DESCRIBE CALLER'S VOICE

What time will the bomb explode?

Stutter Giggling Stressed Disguised Slow Normal

Where is the bomb located? What does the bomb look like? What kind of bomb is it?

Deep Accent Nasal Broken Rapid Excited

ABOUT THE CALLER

What will cause the bomb to explode? Male Female Approximate Age:

Did you pl ace the bomb? Why was the bomb placed?

Accent (English, French, Italian, German, etc.):

Where are you calling from now?

Was the caller’s voice familiar? Specify:

What is your address?

Was the caller familiar with the area? Specify:

What is your name?

BACKGROUND NOISES

MANNER Calm Rational Coherent Sincere Righteous

Crying Loud Lisp Squeaky Slurred

Factory machines Office machines Party a tmosphere Street traffic Airplanes Trains

Angry Irrational Incoherent Emotional Laughing Other:

Animals Voices Bedlam Music Silence Other:


Figure B-24. Sample Checklist for a Bomb Threat B-38 Site Surveys and Mission Checklists

Encl #


Appendix C

Qualification Tables This appendix focuses on the weapons qualification aspect of participation on a PSD. PSD agents must be proficient with those weapons they are expected to use during a threat situation. This appendix also includes tips and weapon qualification standards.

SECTION I – TIPS FOR TRAINERS C-1. Trainers must always be alert to ways to improve team training, readiness, and safety. Training must be stressful; yet trainers must ensure that strict safety parameters are in place to protect the team members from injury. During training, agents should— Never cover anything with the muzzle of their weapon that they are not willing to shoot. Assume that all weapons are loaded. Keep their finger off the trigger until they are ready to fire. Be sure of the target, backstop, and beyond.

TRAINING AREA C-2. The training area should be geared toward the training situation. The area should be sufficient for the type of training being held. RANGE BOX C-3. A range box should be maintained at each PSD training site. The contents of the box should include, but not be limited to, hammers, varioussize nails, staples, tape, and pastes or a target. TARGETS C-4. Use three-dimensional or realistic targets when possible. Anything that increases realism will benefit the team while training. Examples include— Realistic targets. Realistic targets are any targets having lifelike features (photo or painted) and require threat evaluation. Three-dimensional targets. Three-dimensional targets are dressed with clothing. Cardboard targets. Cardboard targets are cardboard cutouts of weapons draped over the targets with 550 cord. These targets— Simulate armed threat. Move easily to change the situation.

Qualification Tables C-1

FM 3-19.12

Help develop target identification skills (shoot and do not shoot scenarios). Three-inch dots. Shooting 3-inch dots requires more concentration then shooting 25-yard bull's-eyes at short distances. A larger target causes the shooter to fire in a wider dispersion pattern. To increase proficiency, use smaller targets and increase the distance. Multiple targets. Most shooters will not remove the weapon from their face when engaging multiple targets. This causes the shooter to— Get target fixation. Move directly toward the target. Be unaware of their surroundings (secondary targets). NOTE: A weapon in the face obscures low targets, furniture, and other items on the floor. This is a dangerous habit that must be corrected. Stress the importance of dropping the barrel of the weapon 3 to 4 inches after the target has been engaged. This will allow the shooter to scan his surroundings. WEAPONS CLEANING C-5. Weapons cleaning should also incorporate weapons inspection. For example, areas on the M11 to check are the slide, the lower receiver, locking block, and the trigger spring. Weekly preventive-maintenance checks and services (PMCS) should be conducted on all weapon systems (M9, M11, MP5, and M4) and annotated according to the appropriate technical manuals (TMs). COMPETITION C-6. One way to accelerate shooter development is to incorporate some competitive shooting within the team. All agents must participate in the match, as this will induce the shooters to push their abilities. Shooters will see how others have developed. WHISTLE DRILLS C-7. With most shooting drills, the shooter fires when he is ready. Use a whistle as the stimulus for the shooters, causing them to react more quickly. This will enhance the shooters development. SHOOTING AND MOVING DRILLS C-8. Anytime shooting and moving drills are conducted, the individuals should wear all their individual equipment, including body armor. Conducting shooting and moving drills in all types of weather conditions is recommended. Not all shoot situations will be under perfect conditions. Ensure that all appropriate safety precautions are taken.

C-2 Qualification Tables

FM 3-19.12

NIGHT-FIRING TRAINING TIPS FOR TRAINERS C-9. As a trainer, you will find that some individuals shoot better at night than during the day. The reason for this is that they pay more attention to the front sight due to limited visibility. C-10. Schedule night firing during the darkest part of the month. Mark range limitations with chemical lights. This may prevent someone from shooting out of the range fan. If possible, arrange for indoor shooting ranges to simulate the hours of darkness.

SECTION II – WEAPON QUALIFICATIONS STANDARDS C-11. Drawing from the holster and combat reloading should be practiced at every opportunity and integrated into weapon standards exercises. Qualification standards should be met for the M4 rifle, M11 SIG Sauer pistol, and MP5 submachine gun.

M4 RIFLE C-12. Qualification standards for the M4 rifle are outlined in FM 3-22.9.

M11 SIG SAUER PISTOL C-13. The M11 SIG Sauer pistol is a subcompact 9-millimeter handgun that is used by the agent. To qualify for the M11 SIG Sauer pistol, the shooter must meet the standards referenced in Table C-1. Table C-1. M11 SIG Sauer Pistol Qualification Table Range (in meters)

Number of Rounds

Firing Position

2

Standing (overhead knife block)

Semiautomatic

3 5

12

Standing (point shoulder)

Semiautomatic

7

2

Standing (high cover)

Semiautomatic Semiautomatic

15

18

Kneeling and squatting barricade (strong and weak hand)

25

6

Standing barricade

Semiautomatic

Firing Mode

Repetitions

Total Rounds

Time (in seconds)

6

12

3

1

12

15

6

12

3

1

18

90

1

6

25

Total Rounds

60


FM 3-19.12

M11 SIG SAUER PISTOL NOMENCLATURE C-14. The M11 SIG Sauer pistol has the following specifications: Weight. 29.3 ounces with an empty magazine. Length. 7.08 inches. Barrel. Length 3.86 inches. Rifling. Right twist, six grooves, and one turn in 9.84 inches. Sights. Semipartridge, drift adjustable for windage only. Tritium sights for enhanced low-light visibility. Magazine. Staggered column, 13 round capacity (optional: 15- and 20-round capacity). Trigger pull. Double action: 12.12 pounds; single action: 4.4 pounds. C-15. M11 SIG Sauer pistols are designed to be carried and fired without the need for manual safeties. However, there are four passive safeties working internally at all times. They are the— Decocking lever. Pushing down on the decocking lever takes the sear out of register with the full-cock notch of the hammer. The hammer drops forward and is arrested by the sear engaging the safety intercept notch. The firing pin remains locked by the firing pin safety lock. Safety intercept notch. The safety intercept notch is the rest position of the hammer in the forward position. It also becomes effective in case of an accidental hammer release when the thumb is cocking the weapon. Disconnector. The disconnector prevents the pistol from firing unless the slide is forward and locked in battery. It also prevents the weapon from firing more than one shot with each pull of the trigger. Firing pin lock. The firing pin lock prevents the firing pin from moving until the trigger is pulled. M11 SIG SAUER PISTOL BASIC SHOOTING FUNDAMENTALS C-16. Principles of marksmanship are very important. The grip on the weapon, hand placement, breathing, and sight picture can all have an impact on shooting. Ready Stance C-17. Achieve the ready stance as follows: Feet, hips, and shoulders should be squared toward the target. Right-handed shooters will have their feet more than shoulder width apart with their right leg slightly to the rear. Left-handed shooters will have their feet more than shoulder width apart, with their left leg slightly to the rear. Shooters legs will be slightly bent with a slight lean forward toward the target from the hips.


FM 3-19.12

Grip C-18. When gripping the weapon for firing— Place the firing hand as high on the grip as allowed by the hammer spur. When positioning the weapon, form a V with the thumb and forefinger of the firing hand. Ensure that the heel of the hand is solidly behind the butt of the weapon so that it will recoil straight back when fired. Ensure that the support hand helps control the weapon recoil by placing the thumb of your support hand in front of your firing thumb into a "thumbs up" position. Ensure that the fingers of your support hand covers the fingers of the firing hand. Ensure that the weapon forms a straight line with the wrist and forearm. Both of your arms should be fully extended and locked to allow the upper body to act as a shock absorber in order to control the recoil. Slide Action C-19. Perform the trigger squeeze as follows: Place up to, but not more than, the first joint of the trigger finger on the trigger. Applying anymore of the trigger finger can cause an incorrect trigger pull. Apply pressure firmly and evenly straight to the rear for a correct trigger squeeze. Do not jerk the trigger or anticipate the discharge of the weapon. Anticipation, along with milking and relaxing the grip, are major causes of inaccurate hits on the target. Perfect Shot C-20. For sight alignment— Keep both eyes open on the 3-, 5-, and 7-meter line. This is known as point shooting. The idea is to shoot the pointed weapon at the intended target without looking through both of the sights. Close one eye when firing from the 15- and 25-meter line. From greater distances a more accurate shot is required. Silhouette the center of the front sight blade in the rear sight groove and level the top of the rear sight groove. Drawing C-21. Use the following four steps for proper drawing of the weapon: Step 1. Sweep your jacket back with your firing hand from the center of your body. Correctly grip the weapon, releasing any weapon retention device at the same time (normally with your thumb). Step 2. Pull the weapon from the holster just far enough to clear the holster, and lock your wrist forward. The muzzle should now be parallel to the ground.


FM 3-19.12

Step 3. Bring the weapon forward in a punching action directly at your target. As your firing hand is bringing your weapon forward, your support hand raises up into the correct grip or thumbs-up position. Step 4. Lock your wrists and elbows out straight onto your target, and move your trigger finger down from the slide onto the trigger. Holstering C-22. Perform holstering in the reverse order of the draw as follows: Step 1. Whether you had to fire or not, quickly scan (to the left and to the right) for additional targets and breathe with your finger off of the trigger. Step 2. Bring the weapon straight back into your chest decocking with your support hand and again scanning to your left and right and breathing with your finger off of the trigger. Step 3. Release the weapon with your support hand, and sweep your jacket back with the butt of the weapon and your firing hand. Step 4. Rotate the weapon downward and holster the weapon, and secure any retention devices. Students should be encouraged to not look at their holster during drawing and holstering. C-23. Proper drawing and holstering procedures need to be practiced throughout the course of fire. M11 SIG SAUER PISTOL LOADING C-24. Initial loading, rapid reloading, and tactical reloading are the three types of loading procedures used for an M11 SIG Sauer pistol. M11 SIG Sauer pistol loading is a critical task that should be practiced often. Initial Loading C-25. Hold the weapon in the strong hand with the muzzle pointing down range. Keep the fingers out of the trigger guard. With the slide forward, insert a fully loaded magazine into the weapon and tug on the floor plate to ensure that the magazine is fully seated. To chamber the first round, grasp the gripping grooves of the slide and pull the slide back, allowing the slide to sling-shot forward. Then bring the weapon back to its original position; decock the weapon, allowing the hammer to fall safely forward; and holster the weapon. Rapid Reloading C-26. Rapid reloading is the term used when you have fired all the rounds in the weapon and the slide is locked to the rear. In a lethal-force confrontation, this constitutes an emergency. Perform the following steps to perform a rapid reload: Step 1. Remove the trigger finger from the trigger. Step 2. Depress the magazine release while bringing the weapon in to your mid torso and tilt the weapon slightly sideways (grip inboard) to receive a new magazine. The trigger finger or thumb of the firing hand may be used to release the magazine, depending on the side of the weapon chosen for mounting the magazine catch.


FM 3-19.12

Step 3. With the support hand, strip the magazine down and away from the weapon as you reach for the new magazine. Step 4. With the index finger along the front of the magazine, insert the new magazine into the magazine well with enough pressure to fully seat the magazine. Step 5. While bringing the weapon back up on target, allow the slide to go forward by depressing the slide catch lever with the thumb or use the slingshot method. Fire if appropriate (FM 3-23.35). Tactical Reloading C-27. This is the process of exchanging magazines in the weapon to allow you to top off the weapon while saving a partially loaded magazine for further use. The agent retains the ability to fire once at a target should it appear, after the magazine is removed, and has the advantage of keeping all rounds on their person for further use. Use cover, if available. Perform the following steps for a tactical reload: Step 1. Remove the finger from the trigger. Step 2. Bring the weapon to mid-torso and tilt it slightly inboard to receive the fresh magazine. Step 3. Bring the fresh magazine to the base of the grip and remove the magazine from the weapon by pressing the magazine release. Catch the magazine in your hand, preferably between the fingers of the support hand. Step 4. Insert the fresh magazine into the magazine well and place the old magazine in your waistband or pocket to separate it from the fully loaded magazines in your ammunition pouch (FM 3-23.35). M11 SIG SAUER PISTOL RANGE INSTRUCTIONS C-28. Range instructions are those vocal instructions (for example, "Shooters draw your weapons from the holster and assume a high cover position.") that are given by the range personnel. The paragraphs below reflect these instructions. Three-Meter Line C-29. The first phase of fire is the 3-meter overhead knife block controlled pairs drill. When your target presents itself, raise your support arm in front of your head to simulate the blocking of an overhead knife strike, draw your weapon (once it comes clear of the holster, rotate the barrel towards the target, and lock your wrist) and fire two rounds at your target within 3 seconds. You will then scan and breath, decock, reholster, secure, and stand by. You will repeat this drill until you have fired two 6-round magazines for 12 rounds, reloading on your own between magazines. On completion of this phase of fire, you will reload, scan and breath, decock, reholster, and secure your weapon. Five-Meter Line C-30. The next phase of fire is the 5-meter point shoulder-firing position. When your target presents itself, draw your weapon, lock both arms straight


FM 3-19.12

out, and engage your target with 6 rounds, reload on your own, and fire another 6 rounds, firing 12 rounds within 15 seconds. On completion of this phase of fire, you will reload, scan and breath, decock, reholster, and secure your weapon. Seven-Meter Line C-31. The next phase of fire is the 7-meter high-cover controlled pairs drill. When your target presents itself, bring your weapon from a high-cover position (weapon drawn; arms extended out straight and locked; weapon pointed at about waist level of the threat; both eyes open, scanning and breathing over the top of the weapon sights) to a firing position and engage your target with 2 rounds within 3 seconds. You will decock and return to the high-cover position while scanning and breathing. You will repeat this drill until you have fired two 6-round magazines for 12 rounds, reloading on your own between magazines. On completion of this phase of fire, you will reload, scan and breath, decock, reholster, and secure your weapon. Fifteen-Meter Line C-32. The next phase of fire will be the 15-meter barricade position. When your target presents itself, you will draw your weapon and assume a dominant-hand kneeling barricade covered position and engage your target with 6 rounds. At your own speed, you will reload and move to an over barricade, covered position and fire another 6 rounds. Again at your own speed, you will reload and move to a nondominant-hand, kneeling barricade, covered position and fire another 6 rounds, firing 18 rounds within 90 seconds. On completion of this phase of fire, you will reload, scan and breath, decock, reholster, and secure your weapon. Twenty-Five Meter Line C-33. The next phase of fire will be the 25-meter barricade, covered position. When your target presents itself, you will draw your weapon, assume a dominant-hand, standing barricade, covered position, and engage your target with 6 rounds within 25 seconds. On completion of this phase of fire you will drop your magazine, physically and visually inspect your weapon, let the slide go forward, decock, reholster, and secure your weapon.

MP5 SUBMACHINE GUN C-34. At a minimum, each PSD agent will fire 100 rounds of ammunition from the MP5 submachine gun monthly during marksmanship training. PSD agents qualify quarterly. C-35. Every three months, weapons qualification and functions training must be conducted. It includes disassembly and assembly, a functions check, safety procedures, stoppages, and immediate-action drills.


FM 3-19.12

MP5 SUBMACHINE GUN BASIC SHOOTING FUNDAMENTALS C-36. When using the MP5 submachine gun basic shooting fundamentals, ensure that your body is square to the target. The following factors can all have an impact on shooting. Ready Stance C-37. The ready stance is as follows: The feet are a comfortable distance apart with the knees slightly bent. The hips and shoulders are square to the threat. The shoulders are rolled forward slightly with a slight curve forward of the upper body for balance and to dissipate the recoil. The head stays steady. The firers who are right-handed will have their left leg slightly forward with their toes pointed at the target. Left-handed firers will have their right leg forward with their toes pointed at the target. This is a fighting stance. It achieves to the fullest degree the reduction of motion and in a variety of situations allows the shooter to stay (consistent) in the platform. It is a consistent, locked-in, and stable upper body platform that relies on muscle memory gained through repetition. Grip C-38. The shooter should obtain what is called a master grip on the submachine gun. This is done by— Gripping with the firing hand and exerting rearward pressure into the shoulder. Keeping the elbow down. Placing the support hand on the front grip. Rearward pressure should be applied with the support hand as well, with the elbow pointed down. Much of the manipulation of the firearm (such as reloads, the safety select lever, cocking lever, and stoppages removal) should be performed with the support hand in order to maintain the master grip and keep the gun on the shoulder. Sight Alignment C-39. Aimed shooting must be used when pinpoint accuracy is required and when firing longer distances (outside of 5 feet), depending on the shooters abilities. While aiming— The sights must stay aligned throughout the trigger pull and afterwards. The shooter must look through the rear sight, like looking through a window, and focus the eyes fully on the front sight. NOTE: The shooters eyes can only focus on one thing at a time. The top edge of the front sight post is placed on the target to strike the intended point of impact.


FM 3-19.12

Sights and Trajectory C-40. The sights on the HK submachine guns are called "diopter," meaning "as seen through." They take advantage of the natural ability of the eye and brain to easily align concentric circles. MP5 submachine guns have a rotating rear sight drum that provides four various width apertures. Rotating this drum does not change the impact of the rounds downrange. They are for eye relief only. The selection of the appropriate size aperture is usually done according to shooter preference. However, for precise shooting, the shooter should select the smallest aperture that still allows a circle of light (halo) between the rear sight aperture and the outside of the front sight holder. Trigger Control C-41. Trigger control is the firm, constant, even pressure placed on the trigger along the axis of the arm as if the shooter were going to touch the point of his shoulder with the tip of his finger. Firm, even, constant pressure is crucial. What is not fully understood is that proper sight alignment and proper trigger control must be performed together as stated above in the sight alignment section. Thinking about the trigger action is what causes flinching, anticipation, and a number of other fundamental mistakes (creation of motion). Follow Through C-42. Follow through is extremely important. Follow through is simply bringing the gun out of recoil and back on target immediately after recoil. This not only aids in reducing the motion of the gun when firing, but also keeps the shooter in the engagement and ready to take another shot if needed. A common mistake shooters often make is bringing the gun to a ready position immediately after shooting. This may mean that the gun never did stop moving. Doing this does not prepare the shooter, to the fullest degree possible, to fire again if needed. Often times, what the shooter does is change their focus from the front sight to the target immediately on firing to see if they hit the target. The gun is lowered out of their range of vision so they can see the strike of the round. This is not correct. Scanning and Breathing Control C-43. Breathing or breath control as a fundamental of tactical shooting is as simple as this, you have to breathe. This is not the natural respiratory pause that is associated with a fundamental of marksmanship or precision-type shooting. For most, the stress one is placed under at the onset of a shooting engagement may cause the shooter to take a gasp of air. The resulting lack of oxygen intake may cause the shooters' vision and thought processes to be impaired. One must remember to scan and breathe to remain functional. Kneeling (Supported) C-44. This position would normally be used when firing from a distance when no support platform is available. When no support platform available, the shooters will— Kneel with their dominant knee touching the ground.


FM 3-19.12

Place their nondominant foot flat on the ground and forward of the body facing the target. Rest the support arm on the nondominant support knee, avoiding bone-to-bone contact. Kneeling (Unsupported) C-45. This position would normally be used when firing around a vehicle or a structure. When firing, the shooters will— Kneel with their dominant knee touching the ground. Place their nondominant foot flat on the ground and forward of the body facing the target. Keep their back straight. Ensure that their support arm is not in contact with the nondominant knee. Squatting C-46. This stance is the same as the standing stance, but with the shooter bending his legs to a greater extent to create a lower silhouette. This position would normally be used when firing over a vehicle or low barricade. WEAPON POSITIONS C-47. There are four weapon positions used by the PSD. They are concealed; low ready; firing; and a hanging position held vertically close to the body, with both hands on the weapon ready to bring the weapon to a ready or firing position (would be used in a HFZ situation). C-48. The low-ready position is used when contact is imminent and immediately after engaging a target to scan for other threats. It can also be used when the exact threat position is unknown and an unobstructed view of the threat area is required. C-49. Perform the following steps to achieve the low-ready position: Step 1. Point the weapon toward the threat area. Keep the muzzle down 1 or 2 inches lower than the hands of the threat or at a 45-degree angle when the threat is not visible. Ensure that you have a clear view of the area. NOTE: Hold the weapon with meaning, glance through the sights, and keep the sights aligned. Condition yourself to align the sights so that all you have to do is quickly confirm the sights and release well-placed shots in a short amount of time. Step 2. Ensure that the weapon is off safe, and the trigger finger is outside the trigger guard. Step 3. Focus your eyes on the threat area or scan the area to assess the situation and the threat. Step 4. Keep the muzzle aligned with your eyes when you are scanning the area.


FM 3-19.12

WEAPON LOADING AND RELOADING C-50. For loading and reloading, the shooter must— Maintain a secure grip on the weapon with his firing hand. Ensure that the bolt is locked to the rear. Grip the loaded magazine with his support hand. Insert the new magazine into the weapon, and guide it into place with his index finger. Push the magazine up, pull back, and give a tug down to ensure that the magazine is seated. MP5 SUBMACHINE GUN QUALIFICATION COURSE C-51. To qualify for the MP5 submachine gun, the shooter must meet the standards referenced in Table C-2. For example, the shooter is given an MP5 submachine gun, 10 magazines, 60 rounds of ammunition, an type-E silhouette target, a 50-meter range, and is firing from the low-ready position. The shooter must— Place 4 rounds within the head. Place 56 rounds within the torso. Score 70 percent to qualify. Table C-2. MP5 Submachine Gun Qualification Table Range (in meters)

Number of Rounds

7

12

7

Firing Position

Firing Mode

Standing

Full-automatic

2

Standing (controlled pairs)

Semiautomatic

2-1

Standing (failure drill) (2 body-1 head)

Semiautomatic

10

6

Squatting barricade (unsupported)

Semiautomatic

15

Semiautomatic

15

6

Seated barricade (left handed over the barricade)

6

Kneeling barricade (unsupported)

Semiautomatic

25 35

6

Kneeling (supported)

Semiautomatic


Repetitions

Total Rounds

Time (in seconds)

1

12

15 (with reload)

6

12

3 (with reload)

4-4

12

3 to 2 (with reload)

1

6

10

1

6

10

1

6

15

1

6

15

Total Rounds

60

FM 3-19.12

MP5 SUBMACHINE GUN RANGE INSTRUCTIONS C-52. MP5 submachine gun range instructions are the vocal commands given from range personnel. The paragraphs below reflect these instructions. Seven-Meter Line, Standing C-53. The first phase of fire will be 2- to 3-round controlled bursts. When your target presents itself, bring your weapon from a ready position to a firing position and engage your target with two 6-round magazines, firing 12 rounds within 15 seconds, reloading on your own. On completion of this phase of fire, you will reload, scan and breath, place your weapon on safe, and let the weapon hang. Seven-Meter Line, Controlled Pairs C-54. The next phase of fire will be controlled pairs. When your target presents itself, bring your weapon from a ready position to a firing position and engage your target with 2 rounds within 3 seconds. You will then scan and breathe, and return to the ready position. You will repeat this drill until you have fired two 6-round magazines, firing 12 rounds, reloading on your own. On completion of this phase of fire, you will reload, scan and breath, place your weapon on safe, and let the weapon hang. Ten-Meter Line C-55. The next phase of fire will be failure drills. When your target presents itself, bring your weapon from a ready position to a firing position and engage your target with 2 rounds to the chest area within 3 seconds. You will then scan and breath until your target represents itself. You will then engage your target with 1 round to the head area within 2 seconds. You will repeat this drill until you have fired two 6-round magazines, for 12 rounds, reloading on your own. On completion of this phase of fire, you will reload, scan and breath, place your weapon on safe, and let the weapon hang. Fifteen-Meter Line, Barricade Firing Position C-56. The next phase of fire will be the barricade firing position. When your target presents itself you will move to an over barricade, unsupported squatting position. You will bring your weapon from a ready position to a firing position and engage your target with 6 rounds within 10 seconds. On completion of this phase of fire, you will reload, scan and breath, place your weapon on safe, and let the weapon hang. Fifteen-Meter Line, Seated Position C-57. The next phase of fire will be the seated firing position. Unsling your weapon and place the weapon in your left hand. Take a seat in the chair facing to the left of the your target. Ensure that your weapon is placed on your lap. When your target presents itself you will move to an over barricade, unsupported position. You will bring your weapon from your lap to a lefthanded firing position and engage your target with 6 rounds within 10 seconds. On completion of this phase of fire, you will reload, scan and


FM 3-19.12

breath, place your weapon on safe, stand up, resling your weapon, and let the weapon hang. Twenty-Five Meter Line, Kneeling C-58. The next phase of fire will be the 25-meter kneeling, unsupported barricade, cover position. When your target presents itself, you will move to a kneeling, unsupported barricade, cover position. You will then bring your weapon from a ready position to a firing position and engage your target with 6 rounds within 15 seconds. On completion of this phase of fire, you will reload, scan and breath, place your weapon on safe, and let the weapon hang. Thirty-Five Meter Line C-59. The next phase of fire will be the 35-meter kneeling, supported position. When your target presents itself, you will move to a kneeling, supported position. You will bring your weapon from a ready position to a firing position and engage your target with 6 rounds within 15 seconds. On completion of this phase of fire, you will place the weapon on safe, remove the magazine, lock the bolt to the rear, and visually and physically inspect the magazine well and the chamber to ensure that it is clear. You will then stand up and let the weapon hang.

ADVANCED MARKSMANSHIP QUALIFICATION C-60. PSD agents must qualify with their assigned weapons every 90 days (quarterly) and conduct advanced marksmanship training during the remaining months. The PSD agents must qualify and participate in advanced combat marksmanship with all of the following weapons unless indicated otherwise: M9 and M11 SIG Sauer pistol, M4 rifle, and MP5 submachine gun.

SLOW-AIMED FIRE C-61. When first learning to shoot any weapon, the shooter must concentrate on the fundamentals. These fundamentals should be thought about individually and applied slowly in order to ensure that they are done correctly. C-62. The following conditions and standards, for the various weapons used by the PSD, are provided to aid the team trainers in conducting the monthly slow-aimed fire exercise. M11 SIG SAUER PISTOL C-63. The M11 SIG Sauer pistol is the preferred handgun for PSD agents. Agents must meet the qualifications standards when firing this pistol. For example, a shooter is given an M11 SIG Sauer pistol and magazine, 10 rounds of ammunition, a type-E silhouette target with an 8-inch circle overlay, a 7-meter range, and a requirement to fire from the standing unsupported position. The shooter must— Use the proper stance and grip. Acquire the proper sight picture and sight alignment. Place 10 rounds within the 8-inch circle.


FM 3-19.12

M4 RIFLE AND MP5 SUBMACHINE GUN C-64. Shooters must also meet qualifications standards for the M4 rifle and the MP5 submachine gun. For example, the shooter is given an M4 rifle, an MP5 submachine gun, magazines, 10 rounds of ammunition, a type-E silhouette target with a 6-inch circle overlay, a 7-meter range, and a requirement to fire from the standing unsupported position. The shooter must— Use the proper stance and grip. Acquire the proper sight picture and sight alignment. Place 10 rounds within the 6-inch circle.

CONTROLLED PAIRS C-65. Controlled pairs are two rapidly fired rounds discharged from a weapon with speed and accuracy. The distance to the target and the danger that the target represents to the shooter determines the speed. The shooter must master slow-aimed fire, single-shot, and double-action shooting before moving to controlled pairs. C-66. The trigger pull is accelerated, but not to the point where it becomes jerky. The trigger finger never loses contact with the trigger. M11 SIG SAUER PISTOL C-67. The agent must meet the qualification standards for controlled pairs using the M11 SIG Sauer pistol. For example, the shooter is given an M11 SIG Sauer pistol, 2 magazines, 20 rounds of ammunition, a type-E silhouette target with an 8-inch circle overlay, a 15-meter range, and a requirement to fire from the standing unsupported position. The shooter must— Engage a single target from various distances up to the 15-meter line. Place the first round from each distance in the 8-inch circle overlay and the second round within 4 inches of the first round. M4 RIFLE AND MP5 SUBMACHINE GUN C-68. The agent must meet the qualification standards for controlled pairs using the M4 rifle and the MP5 submachine gun. For example, the shooter is given an M4 rifle, an MP5 submachine gun, two magazines each, 40 rounds of ammunition, a type-E silhouette target with a 6-inch circle overlay, a 15-meter range, and a requirement to fire from the standing unsupported position. The shooter must— Engage a single target from various distances up to the 15-meter line. Place the first round from each distance in the 6-inch circle overlay and the second round within 4 inches of the first round.

TRAVERSING DRILL C-69. When providing PS, the threat may be encountered from any direction (see FM 3-23.35 for traversing techniques). Most of these techniques may be applied to pistols and long guns.


FM 3-19.12

C-70. In addition to the information found in FM 3-23.35, every effort must be made to achieve the shooting stance previously described. This will require positioning the feet and turning towards the threat in the same manner as executing column movements and/or a rear march in a dismounted drill. It is critical that the muzzle is controlled, and that the shooter avoids crossing his legs and maintains his balance.

M11 SIG SAUER PISTOL MALFUNCTION AND IMMEDIATE-ACTION DRILL C-71. Several typical stoppages or malfunctions can occur with the weapon. Most malfunctions can be prevented with proper care and cleaning before and after firing the weapon. C-72. Four typical stoppages are the misfeed, double feed, misfire, and stovepipe. A misfeed usually occurs when the magazine is not fully inserted and the round does not feed into the chamber. A double feed occurs when 2 rounds are fed into the chamber at the same time. A misfire is when the round primer is tapped, but the round does not fire. A stovepipe occurs when the expended cartridge gets caught in the slide instead of falling free of the weapon. TAP, RACK, BANG, RIP, WORK MALFUNCTION DRILL C-73. To clear a malfunction, the shooter will execute the following steps: Step 1. First tap the magazine, and ensure that it is fully seated. Step 2. Invert the weapon and pull the slide to the rear and release it, allowing the extraction of a potential obstruction and the next round to be chambered, then get back on the target. A short phrase for this step is "rack" the slide or slingshot. Step 3. Fire at the target, if needed. If this does not work, go through the secondary method of immediate action. Step 4. Rip or remove the magazine from the weapon to clear the double feed or defective magazine from the weapon. Step 5. Work the slide back and forth to clear any defective or loose rounds out of the chamber area and magazine well. Look into the weapon, checking for a reason for the malfunction. TAP, RACK, BANG IMMEDIATE-ACTION DRILL C-74. Tap in a fresh magazine and follow the steps above for the primary method of immediate action. For example, a shooter is given a weapon, a magazine, 5 rounds of ammunition, 4 rounds of dummy ammunition, a type-E silhouette target with an 8-inch circle overlay, a 10-meter range, and a requirement to fire from the standing unsupported position. The shooter must— Fire from various distances up to the 10-meter line. Engage a single target using magazines loaded with live and dummy ammunition.


FM 3-19.12

Perform the correct "malfunction" or "immediate-action" drill to clear all dummy rounds. Place all fired rounds in the 8-inch circle overlay.

M4 RIFLE AND MP5 SUBMACHINE GUN MALFUNCTION AND IMMEDIATE-ACTION DRILL C-75. The M4 rifle and MP5 submachine gun malfunction and immediate-action drill is also known as the failure drill. The shooter must be able to clear any malfunctions. For example, the shooter is given an M4 rifle, an MP5 submachine gun, 4 rounds of dummy ammunition, a type-E silhouette target with a 6-inch circle overlay, a 10-meter range, and a requirement to fire from the unsupported standing position. The shooter must— Fire from various distances up to the 10-meter line. Engage a single target using magazines loaded with live and dummy ammunition. Perform the correct malfunction or immediate-action drill to clear all dummy rounds. Place all rounds fired from the M4 and MP5 in the 6-inch circle overlay. M4 RIFLE C-76. For a description of the steps that must be performed for immediate action on the M4 rifle, see STP 21-1-SMCT and FM 3-22.9. MP5 SUBMACHINE GUN C-77. For a description of the steps that must be performed for immediate action on the MP5 submachine gun, see the manufacturer instructions.



Appendix D

Order of Precedence Lists A mistake in determining the order of precedence for the individuals participating in an event can cause extreme embarrassment to the principal and his official party. This appendix offers the DOD Order of Precedence, as published by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Administration and Management, as guidance to use on PSD missions involving multiple dignitaries. As published by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Administration and Management, the following memorandum (Figure D-1, pages D-2 through D-6) offers the relative protocol order of precedence within DOD as of 20 October 2003. This list is subject to change on a semiannual basis. Contact the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Protocol Office to obtain the most recent listing of the DOD Order of Precedence.

Order of Precedence Lists D-1

FM 3-19.12

Figure D-1. DOD Order of Precedence Memorandum, 20 October 2003, Page 1

D-2 Order of Precedence Lists

FM 3-19.12



FM 3-19.12



FM 3-19.12



FM 3-19.12




Appendix E

Weapons and Equipment The weapons and equipment used by the PSD are vital for effectiveness and mission accomplishment. Specific mission and response capabilities are partially determined by the selection and availability of equipment.

SECTION I – WEAPONS E-1. Each agent must completely understand the functions, operations, capabilities, and limitations of his assigned weapon and equipment. He should know the equipment so well that he can operate it under the most adverse conditions.

PROCUREMENT E-2. Standard Army weapons and equipment should be used to perform PSD missions. However, execution of full-time PSD missions may require use of special equipment and materials. If items are not provided by table(s) of organization and equipment (TOE) and tables of distribution and allowances (TDA) authorization, or through routine supply channels, commanders will consider local purchase, procurement, or lease of the equipment (AR 190-58).

STANDARD WEAPONS E-3. This equipment and weapons package is designed to provide full-time PSDs with enough firepower to fight, win, and survive in any environment that will require them to engage hostile elements. The following weapons are recommended for full-time PSDs: SIG Sauer P228, M11, 9-millimeter pistol. H&K MP5K submachine gun. M4 rifle. SIG SAUER P228, M11, 9-MILLIMETER PISTOL E-4. PSDs use the M11 SIG Sauer pistol as the primary weapon system. This pistol is adequate for close-in protection but has a limited effective range (50 meters or less). The M11 SIG Sauer pistol is employed as a primary shortrange weapon, as it is concealable. H&K MP5K SUBMACHINE GUN E-5. The M11 is augmented by the H&K MP5K for close-in PSD agents, as it is very compact and concealable. The H&K MP5K is a nonstandard weapon,

Weapons and Equipment E-1

FM 3-19.12

which has a limited effective range of 100 meters. At 12.80 inches in length, it has a folding stock and weighs 4.40 pounds without the magazine. E-6. The recommended carrying configuration on a PSD is bolt forward, the magazine inserted, the camber empty, and the selector switch on "Fire." It can also be carried in a shoulder holster with the stock folded, but when removed from the holster the folding stock will lock itself out to the firing position. This provides the concealment to conduct the close-in protection mission, but the firepower needed to break contact, if required. M4 RIFLE E-7. The M4 rifle, a 5.56-millimeter rifle, is used as a perimeter weapons system for possible engagements beyond 100 meters. This weapon provides the firepower to break out during an ambush and is ideal for a high-threat overseas location. This weapon system is smaller than the M16 (7.5 pounds and 29.75 to 33 inches in length). This weapon provides the third level of weapon protection to the PSD.

WEAPONS MANAGEMENT E-8. Weapons management is vital to the survival of the agent. He must understand the functions, operations, capabilities, and limitations of his weapon and equipment. HOLSTERS E-9. For PSD missions, it is recommended to wear a concealed waist holster. This type of holster is comfortable and is secured to the belt of the wearer. E-10. An urban carry (fanny pack) bag is another type of concealment equipment that can work for PSD agents if properly used and trained on. These bags come in two versions: a Velcro® rip or zippered opening. The Velcro bag can allow quicker access to the weapon; however, Velcro can become worn and weaken to the point where it does not stay secure and can become undone unintentionally. The zipper style can be easy to access as well, but the teeth of the zipper can misfeed and get stuck, thus making it difficult to draw the weapon and engage the threat. It is important that both bags be part of the training that makes the agent proficient at using the equipment. E-11. Caution must be exercised when deciding on a system other than the standard issue. The vertical or horizontal shoulder holsters tend to have problems when working within a PSD and are not recommended for any closein PSD agent. With the horizontal shoulder holster, the weapon, no matter how it is secured, will have a tendency to be pointed at the principal or someone within the PSD at some time during normal movement. The vertical shoulder holster is not recommended because in order to draw the weapon, the user will, albeit unintentionally, point the weapon toward someone in the detail during transition to overt. Drivers may opt for vertical shoulder holsters for comfort reasons, since drivers, will only draw their weapon when the vehicle is disabled and is no longer a means of escape. Use of horizontal shoulder holsters is not recommended for drivers since horizontal holsters

E-2 Weapons and Equipment

FM 3-19.12

position the weapon to point toward the backseat of the vehicle where the principal and/or a spouse may be seated. AMMUNITION E-12. The recommended ammunition for a PSD is NATO ball or semijacketed, hollow-point due to the lessened chance of penetration beyond the intended target. The use of hollow-point ammunition may be prohibited in some overseas areas. The advance team should inquire on this issue so that proper ammunition is available for weapons in these areas. WEAPONS CARRYING AND CONCEALMENT E-13. By keeping weapons concealed, an adversary lacks the knowledge of the team capabilities. The potential to catch the attacker off guard, causing him to pause to interpret the situation and decide his response, is increased. The PSD exploits this pause in order to survive the attack and protect the principal. E-14. It is imperative that one learns habits in movement and conduct that will prevent unintended exposure of concealed weapons. The following four factors must be considered and practiced for effective concealment: Attire. Having quality, functional gear and concealment attire that is suited to the needs and activities of the agent will aid tremendously in this process. All attire worn during a PSD mission should be evaluated with regards to suitability for concealment and for comfort while concealing. This typically involves testing out various garments, belts, and gear to determine what types and combinations are effective. The better the fit and comfort of the attire, the less likely the PSD agent will need to adjust the weapon for comfort during long periods of wear or movement. Concealment. Ensure that the weapon does in fact remain concealed through all clothing. Changes in body position and activity can dramatically affect the concealed carry system. The weapon should remain completely hidden with no silhouette of the weapon or accessories visible during any type of movement. A trainer should evaluate the concealment system for printing and unintended exposure by observing the agent's concealment while performing normal activities, such as walking, running, bending over, sitting down, getting up from a seated position, reaching upward, leaning forward or sideways, kneeling down, entering and exiting a vehicle, and reaching for items in pockets. Transition into operation. One must be able to effectively transition the weapon from covert (concealment) to overt operation without attire or other equipment interfering with the transition. Environment. There may be times that the weapon, holster, or ammunition pouch may need to be checked or rearranged in public. One must be acutely aware of the environment during these situations, as many locations will not be suitable due to high visibility. The best place to check or adjust the weapon is in a private locked room or other private location that no one could view or walk in. Be cautious that the location chosen is not one subject to hidden security


FM 3-19.12

cameras or other types of surveillance, such as dressing rooms or elevators. E-15. Armed security agents must remain cognizant of their actions at all times when carrying a concealed firearm. It is very easy to become somewhat lax and habituated when carrying a concealed weapon on a regular basis. Habits and actions to avoid include— Printing. Revealing the outline of the weapon or accessories, typically due to close-fitting clothing. Exposing. Unintentionally exposing the weapon, holster, or an accessory to the public. Adjusting. A habit of touching or repositioning the weapon, holster, or an accessory in plain view. Telegraphing. Giving away the fact that you might be carrying a weapon or preparing for action either by body language and motion (such as transitioning to a "combat-ready" stance), or items of clothing or adornments which might indicate the presence of an armed agent (such as clothing or watches with law enforcement logos). Bumping or sounding. Wearing equipment that may make contact with a surface, thus revealing its presence (such as inside an elevator, next to a vehicle, sitting in a booth in a restaurant, or bumping up against someone). Forgetting. Forgetting that one is carrying a concealed weapon (such as opening your suit jacket when reaching into the inside pocket). This is not unusual for an agent who has become accustomed to carrying a concealed weapon, especially when wearing an extremely comfortable holster or lightweight weapon. Dropping. Dropping an item, such as a magazine, from concealment. This is often due to apparel or equipment that does not adequately secure or retain the item, not securing the item following a change in mode (such as exiting a vehicle), or not being aware of how changes in body position and activity can affect the concealed carry system. E-16. Special considerations need to be made when a PSD agent carries the MP5K submachine gun concealed on their person. The concealed carry system is unlike anything that most security agents have dealt with before. The system itself is designed to hang from the shoulder and lie between the arm and the ribcage, thus making it awkward for the security agent to perform normal body movement. Units have a tendency to have the PSD agent qualify with the gun overt, but have it concealed on missions. Ensuring that the PSD agent not only knows how to qualify with the system, but also how to employ the system is imperative. E-17. Another type of concealed weapon, the MP5 submachine gun, is contained inside a briefcase. Working with this type of MP5 submachine gun system should require the PSD agent to become familiar with the briefcase and the system when firing.


FM 3-19.12

E-18. With the proper training, changing from the gun being carried overtly to covertly will be smooth. This allows the PSD agent to maintain the equipment in a concealed manner.

SECTION II – EQUIPMENT E-19. PSD agents must ensure that they are equipped with the equipment necessary for the mission. PSD agents should also know how to operate it under the most adverse conditions.

COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT E-20. Consider the following when setting up communications for various locations: Communications may be limited to availability in the location of the mission. Whether or not secure telephone lines are available. Clearance of frequencies for radio communications.

BALLISTIC APPAREL E-21. Ballistic apparel (body armor) is very important equipment for all PSD agents. Ballistic apparel is not bulletproof, it is bullet-resistant. The bullet is stopped by an elastic deformation of the ballistic fabric. The energy transfer of the striking bullet is rapid and severe enough to induce a blunt trauma causing external and internal damage to the area of the body behind the point of impact. Body armor can be penetrated if it is impacted by a bullet of a higher caliber than the armor is rated to withstand, impacted near the edge, or impacted close to another impact. It may also be penetrated by the thrust of a sharp pointed weapon, such as an ice pick or knife. E-22. Manufacturers rate the level of protection of ballistic apparel according to the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) standard threat levels. As the level of ballistic protection increases, so does the weight and bulk of the apparel. The level of mobility required and the length of time the armor is worn should dictate the amount of protection used. Level IIIA is recommended for PSD missions. E-23. Ballistic fabrics can be manufactured and disguised as many things, such as jean jackets, overcoats, windbreakers, raincoats, curtains, portfolios, and briefcases. The primary consideration when purchasing ballistic apparel is comfort. The apparel should be comfortable, as lightweight as possible, and custom-fit to the individual. Proof of product liability insurance, along with a ballistics report to ensure that the level of protection rating of the apparel should be requested for each piece.

MEDICAL EQUIPMENT E-24. At a minimum, every PSD agent should be current in first aid and CPR. Additionally, every PSD agent should have a basic knowledge of how to treat


FM 3-19.12

trauma cases. Each vehicle should be equipped with a mobile trauma bag, an extra supply of current medications for the principal, and a first aid kit. Based on the principal's medical condition, additional portable medical equipment may be required (such as a defibrillator).

MISSION EQUIPMENT E-25. The equipment authorized by the common table of allowances (CTA), the TOE, and the TDA should be used if possible. Until appropriate authorization documents are revised, local purchase may be necessary to obtain some of the listed equipment. E-26. Each PSD should have the following types of equipment on hand for each mission: Adapter kits. These are an electrical power plug and telephone jack adapter kit that is used when traveling to foreign countries. Attaché cases. These are a small handbag used to carry and conceal a submachine gun and/or a small case, such as a day planner used to conceal a pistol. Belly bands. These are thick pieces of elastic worn around the waist during physical activity. Most of them are made specifically for certain weapons, usually small, medium, or large framed weapons. They come with a variety of pouches in them, but can be made for specific missions. Individual trouser belts. A heavy, thick nylon belt is best for PSDs in uniformed areas. PSD agents should avoid elastic or a thin military issue belt, as it will not hold all of the equipment that is required to conduct the mission. A custom designed leather concealment equipment belt is the best thing for a PSD agent that is in a civilian environment. At a minimum, a thick leather belt is recommended. Binoculars. Binoculars can be either military issue or civilian. They should be small enough to fit in a coat pocket or under a jacket. A monocular is recommended due to its size. Carrying cases. A carrying case for a M4 rifle and MPK5 is recommended. Portable radio chargers. Each agent should be issued an individual radio charger and an extra battery (110 or 220 volt depending on the locations to be visited). Laptop computers. These should be capable of obtaining all official PSD documents. Portable laptop printers. These should be capable of printing all official PSD documents. Concealable weapon fanny packs (urban carry). These are used while wearing casual clothing where a jacket is not required, but a weapon must be concealed (such as in hot climates or during sports activities). Flash lights. Flash lights should be small, compact, and lightweight with a minimum of 6500-candle power. It must be capable of being


FM 3-19.12

placed into a pocket or a belt-mounted holster. They should be able to be equipped with a red or a blue lense. Flash light holsters. Flashlight holsters may be leather, nylon, plastic, or a combination of nylon and plastic. They can have covers with snaps, or Velcro or use a pressure screw or rubber washer or a molded pressure plates to hold the flashlight in the pouch. They can be worn through the belt, paddle style, or clipped on. Global Positioning Systems. GPS systems may be either military issue or civilian as long as it is small enough to fit in a coat pocket or under a jacket. They should have all the appropriate software for the locations to be visited (such as street maps). Handcuffs. These may be either military issue or civilian. Concealable weapon holsters. These can be leather, nylon, plastic, or a combination of nylon and plastic. They can have a thumb break, trigger guard pressure retention, or a combination of the two. It can be worn through the belt, paddle style, or clip on. Handcuff holsters. These may be leather, nylon, plastic, or a combination of nylon and plastic. They can have covers with snaps or Velcro. Magazine ammunition holsters. These can be leather, nylon, plastic, or a combination of nylon and plastic. It can have covers with snaps or Velcro or use a pressure screw or rubber washer or a molded pressure plate to hold the magazine in the pouch. A double compartment holster is needed. This holster may be worn through the belt, paddle style, or clipped on. Radio holsters. These can be leather, nylon, plastic, or a combination of nylon and plastic. They can have holders with strings or straps and be connected with snaps, Velcro, or fast-x connectors. Tactical thigh holsters. These can be leather, nylon, plastic, or a combination of nylon or plastic. They can have a thumb break or a rotating hood. They should have a single or multiple thigh retention (elastic) straps. These would be used in a tactical environment. Security lapel pins. These should be conservative in nature, specific to the protection detail, and no larger than a nickel. Portable trauma medical bags. There should be, at a minimum, one trauma bag per vehicle in the motorcade. If the principal is taking a prescription medication, ensure that the medication is in the trauma bag with all the instructions needed to administer it properly. Portable handheld metal detector. These can be either military issue or civilian. They should be small enough to fit a coat pocket or under a jacket. Extendable handheld search mirrors. These can be either military issue or civilian. They should be small enough to fit a coat pocket or under a jacket. Night vision devices. These can be either military issue or civilian. They should be small enough to fit a coat pocket or under a jacket. A monocular (such as an AN-PVS-14) is recommended due to its size.


FM 3-19.12

Personal data assistants. Personal data assistants (PDAs) should be small, lightweight, and have camera and GPS capabilities. Mobile cellular telephones. Each agent should be issued a telephone. It needs to have international dialing capabilities and must have a vibrate mode as not to interrupt conversations or meetings. Cellular telephones can augment two-way radios, have a greater range, and provide an additional means of communication. Availability of service may hinder performance, hence backup radios are recommended even when the service area appears adequate. Pistols. Each agent should have a SIG Sauer P228, M11, 9-millimeter pistol (or current unit issue). Pistol magazines. Each agent should have a minimum of three ammunition magazines. Portable base station radios. Radios should be 4 to 5 watts, multichannel, very high frequency (VHF), and secure voice capable. They should be capable of programmable frequencies and fit inside a small brief case. They must also have an exterior antenna (110 or 220 volt depending on the areas to be visited). Handheld radios. Two-way radios are the primary source of communication between the close-in agents. They should be capable of having programmable frequencies, secure voice, and have a surveillance kit adapter. Portable radio repeaters. Repeaters (mobile or fixed) will increase the range, reliability, and the secure voice capabilities. Dual-voltage (110 or 220 volt depending on the areas to be visited) with 35-watt capability is recommended. They should be capable of having programmable frequencies, secure voice, and fit inside a small brief case. They must also have an exterior antenna. Long rifles. These should be a 5.56-millimeter or 7.62-millimeter semiautomatic rifle that can be used for threats at distances from 0 to 500 meters. They are highly recommended for open areas. Rifle magazines. Each agent should have a minimum of two 30-round magazines with an H clip. Portable security systems. These systems should consist of two components, a video monitoring system and a sensor monitoring system. The video and sensor, system should be small enough to fit into a briefcase-sized container, with its own monitor capable of being connected to an outside monitoring source. The video cameras and sensors should be battery-operated wireless. The entire system should be 110 and 220 compatible as well as battery operated. Submachine guns. Each agent should have an MP5K, an MP5KPDW, or an MP5A3 (or the current issue of concealable submachine gun). Submachine gun magazines. Each submachine gun should be equipped with a minimum of two 30-round magazines with H clips. Individual radio surveillance kits. These are necessary to maintain radio communications without allowing it to be heard by unauthorized personnel. (Custom ear molds can be obtained through the local medical facility.)


FM 3-19.12

Umbrellas. These should be small enough to fit in a coat pocket or under a jacket. Armored vehicles. These vehicles need to be bullet and explosive resistant, to include the body and the windows. The choice of a HAV or a LAV will be dependant on the threat level. These vehicles should be equipped with covert (front grill and rear deck mounted) and overt (being able to be placed on the roof) emergency equipment (blue or red lights and sirens). Follow vehicle security. The follow vehicle should be of equal size and power or larger. The follow vehicle is the security and back-up vehicle for the principal and as such needs to be commensurate as the principal primary vehicle. This vehicle needs to be bullet and explosive resistant, to include the body and the windows. The choice of a HAV or a LAV will be dependant on the threat level. An SUV would be optimum. This vehicle should be equipped with covert (front grill and rear deck mounted) and overt (being able to be placed on the roof) emergency equipment (blue or red lights and sirens). Bullet resistant vests. Each agent should be issued a vest that is custom fit to that individual with a trauma plate. The vest must have a minimum of Level IIIA protection. Photographer safari vests. These are for the use of concealing duty gear while in areas where a full coat or jacket would be too warm (such as Africa, South America, or the Middle East). They should be made of a durable material and be a suitable color (such as gray, tan, or black). Load-bearing tactical vests. These are used in the areas where the overt ca rrying of duty gear is n eed ed , usual ly in a tactica l environment.

MISCELLANEOUS EQUIPMENT E-27. The following list of equipment is recommended for the PSD to have on hand based on the requirements of the specific mission: Cameras and film. Three by five note cards. Multitools. Pencil and pens.



Glossary AAR ACIC

after-action review Army Counterintelligence Center

admin

administrative

AFOSI

Air Force Office of Special Investigations

AOP

attack on principal

AOR

area of responsibility

APFT AR ASAC ATF ATTN

Army physical fitness test Army regulation assistant special agent in charge Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms attention

BDU

battle dress uniform

CAT

counterassault team

CBRN

chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear

CCTV

closed-circuit television

CFR CG CID

code of federal regulation commanding general Criminal Investigation Division

CINC

Commander in charge

CJCS

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

COA commo COMSEC cont CONUS

coarse of action communications communications security continued continental United States

CoS

Chief of Staff

CPA

coalition provisional authority

CPR

cardiac pulmonary resuscitation

CPT

captain

CRC

Crime Records Center

CTA

common table of allowances

CTMI

counterterrorism on military installations

CY

calendar year

DA

Department of the Army

DAO DC

defense attaché officer District of Columbia

Glossary-1

FM 3-19.12

DCJCS DCU

desert camouflage uniform

DEA

Drug Enforcement Agency

dept

department

DEROS DIA div

date of expected return from overseas station Defense Intelligence Agency division

DNA

deoxyribonucleic acid

DOB

date of birth

DOD

Department of Defense

DODD DSS DV DVQ dvr

Department of Defense Directive Diplomatic Security Service distinguished visitors (referred to as VIP) distinguished visitors quarters driver

E4

specialist

E5

sergeant

E7

sergeant first class

E9

sergeant major

ELSEC

electronic security

EMS

emergency medical services

encl

enclosure

EOD

explosive ordinance disposal

ER

emergency room

etc

et ceteria

evac

evacuation

FAA

Federal Aviation Administration

FBI

Federal Bureau of Investigation

FEBA FLETC

forward edge of the battlefield area Federal Law Enforcement Training Center

FM

frequency modulated

FM

field manual

FORSCOM ft

forces command feet; foot

GOV

government-owned vehicle

GPS

Global Positioning System

grp

Glossary-2

Deputy Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff

group

GSO

general support officer

GTA

graphic training aid

HAV

heavy-armored vehicle

FM 3-19.12

HFZ

hostile fire zone

high-risk billet

Authorized personnel billet (identified and recommended by the appropriate authority) that because of grade, assignment, travel itinerary, or symbolic value may make a person filling it an especially attractive or accessible terrorist target (DODD 2000.12, E2.1.14, AR 525.13).

high-risk target

Resources or facilities considered to be at risk as potential terrorist targets because of mission sensitivity, ease of access, isolation, symbolic value, and/or the potential for mass casualty (AR 525-13).

HMMWV

high-mobility, multipurpose wheeled vehicle

HN

host nation

HQ

headquarters

HRP

high-risk personnel

HRP Level I

Level I HRP have such a significantly high potential as terrorist or criminal targets as to warrant assignment of full-time protective services. This would include long-term PS based on assignment location or short-term PS based on a specific threat.

HRP Level II

Level II HRP do not warrant assignment of full-time PS, but require additional office, residential, and travel security measures as deemed appropriate based on local conditions.

ID

identification

IDD

international direct dial

IED

improvised explosive device

IMA

individual mobilization augmentee

intel

intelligence

IFPT

international police task force

JTR K-9

joint travel regulation military working dog program

LAV

light-armored vehicle

LBE

load-bearing equipment

LBV

load-bearing vests

LCE

load-carrying equipment

limo

limousine

LT

lieutenant

LTC MACOM MANSCEN max MCO med MI

lieutenant colonel Major Army Command Maneuver Support Center maximum movement control officer medical military intelligence

Glossary-3

FM 3-19.12

mm MOS MP MPI

military occupational specialty military police military police investigators

Mr

mister

Mrs

misses

Ms

miss

MSAC

mission special agent in charge

MSGT

master sergeant

MTOE

modification table of organization and equipment

MWD N/A NATO NAVEUR

military working dog not applicable North Atlantic Treaty Organization Naval Command Europe

NCIC

National Criminal Information Center

NCIS

Naval Criminal Investigative Service

NIJ

National Institute of Justice

NTV

nontactical vehicle

O&O

operational and organizational

OCONUS Oct ODC official party OJT

outside the continental United States October Office of Defense Cooperation Persons accompanying the principal. Persons may include family members, friends, staff, and so forth. on-the-job training

OMC

Office of Military Cooperation

oper

operational

OPLAN opns OPSEC OSI

operation plan operations operational security Office of Special Investigations

PAO

Public Affairs Office

PCS

permanent change of station

PDA

personal data assistant

PDW

personal defense weapon

PEDD

patrol explosive detector dogs

PIN

personal identification number

PIT

police intercept tactic

PM

provost marshal

PMCS POC

Glossary-4

millimeter

preventive-maintenance checks and services point of contact

FM 3-19.12

POV PS

privately owned vehicle protective services

PSD

protective-services detail

PSO

personal security officer

PSTC PSU PSVA PT RADM recon

protective-services training course protective-services unit personal security vulnerability assessment physical training rear admiral reconnaissance

ROE

rules of engagement

RON

remain overnight

RSO

regional security officer

SA

security agent

SAC

special agent in charge

SCR

security control room

seq

sequence

SES

senior executive service

SGT

sergeant

SIGSEC SIPERNET SJA SL SOCOM

signal security secret internet protocol router network Staff Judge Advocate shift leader US Special Operations Command

SOF

special operations forces

SOP

standard operating procedure

SP

suspicious person

SP

security police

SRT SSGT

special reaction team staff sergeant

SSN

social security number

STU

secure telephone unit

SUV

sport utility vehicle

SWAT

special weapons and tactics

TCSM

technical countersurveillance measures

TDA

tables of distribution and allowances

TDY

temporary duty

Glossary-5

FM 3-19.12

terrorism

The calculated use of unlawful violence or the threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological. Those acts are usually planned to attract widespread publicity and are designed to focus attention on the existence, cause, or demands of the terrorists.

terrorist

An individual who uses violence, terror, and intimidation to achieve a result.

TM TOE TRADOC

table(s) of organization and equipment United States Army Training and Doctrine Command

TSA

Transportation Security Administration

TTP

tactics, techniques, and procedures

TV

television

UCMJ

Uniform Code of Military Justice

UDAA

unarmed defense against an attack

UN

United Nations

US

United States

USACIDC USAMPS USC USSS UXO v VCJCS VHF VIP w/

Glossary-6

technical manual

United States Army Criminal Investigation Command United States Army Military Police School United States Code United States Secret Service unexploded ordnance volt Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff very high frequency very important person with

w/o

without

XO

executive officer

Bibliography 18 USC 1385. Use of Army and Air Force a Posse Comitatus. 7 January 2003. 22 CFR 2.1. Designation of Personnel to Carry Firearms and Exercise Appropriate Power of Arrest. 1 April 2003 49 CFR 1544.219. Carriage of Accessible Weapons. 1 October 2003 AR 1-4. Employment of Department of the Army Resources in Support of the United States Secret Service. 10 March 1986 AR 58-1. Management, Acquisition and Use of Administrative Use Motor Vehicles. 28 January 2000 AR 190-14. Carrying of Firearms and Use of Force for Law Enforcement and Security Duties. 12 March 1993 AR 190-40. Serious Incident Report. 30 November 1993 AR 190-58. Personal Security. 22 March 1989 AR 195-2. Criminal Investigation Activities. 30 October 1985 AR 195-4. Use of Contingency Limitation.0015 Funds for Criminal Investigative Activities. 15 April 1983 AR 525-13. Antiterrorism. 4 January 2002 AR 600-9. The Army Weight Control Program. 10 June 1987 AR 670-1. Wear and Appearance of Army Uniforms and Insignia. 5 September 2003 CID Pamphlet 195-7. Personal Security Assessment Briefings: Action Officers Guide. January 1983 CID Regulation 195-1. Criminal Investigation Operational Procedures. 15 January 2004 DA Form 2028. Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms. 1 February 1974. DA Form 2818. Firearms Authorization. September 1966 DOD Handbook O-2000.12-H. Protection of DOD Personnel and Activities Against Acts of Terrorism and Political Turbulance Abroad. February 1993. DOD Order of Precedence. 20 October 2003 DODD 2000.12. DOD Antiterrorism (AT) Program. 18 August 2003. FBI Form 6-136. Bomb Threat Checklist. FM 21-20. Physical Fitness Training. 30 September 1992 FM 3-22.9. Rifle Marksmanship M16A1, M16A2/3, M16A4 and M4 Carbine. 24 April 2003

Bibliography-1

FM 3-19.12

FM 3-23.35. Combat Training With Pistols, M9 and M11. 25 June 2003 GTA 19-04-003. Individual Protective Measures. 3 July 1997 JTR. The Joint Travel Regulations, Volume 2. 1 December 2003 Notice 71. Bombs By Mail. February 1998 STP 21-1-SMCT. Soldier's Manual of Common Tasks Skill Level 1. 31 August 2003

Bibliography-2

Index A

C

D

AAR. See after-action review (AAR). access rosters and badge, 6-3 administrative information, 5-3 advance team, 2-7, 2-9 work, 2-10, 5-1 adverse action, 2-18 after-action review (AAR), 2-8, 14-8 agents, 2-17 aircraft, 13-4 airport, 5-7 alternate and contingency plans, 1-6 ammunition, E-3 AOP. See attack on principal (AOP). AOR. See area of responsibility (AOR). APFT. See Army physical fitness test (APFT). AR 190-58. See Army Regulation (AR). area of responsibility (AOR), 1-9 arm's reach principles, 7-16 armed security agents, E-4 Army law enforcement personnel, 1-12 Army physical fitness test (APFT), 2-3 Army Regulation (AR), 1-1 assignment of security details, 1-3 attack on principal (AOP), 2-19 attire, 3-3, 13-6, E-3 authority, 1-1 auxiliary vehicles, 9-6

cardboard targets, C-1 cardiac pulmonary resuscitation (CPR), 2-19 CAT. See counterassault team (CAT). cave-in formation, 7-12 checklists, 4-9, B-1 checkpoint, 6-7 choke points, 11-6 chronological events journal, 14-1 circle formation, 7-13 civilian police, 2-7 close-in agents, 7-1 protection, 1-7 protection team, 2-7 security, 7-1 COA. See course of action (COA). combat-ready stance, E-4 common table of allowances (CTA), E-6 communication equipment, 13-5 communications, E-5 communications security (COMSEC), 13-6 COMSEC. See communications security (COMSEC). concealed weapons, 1-12, E-3 confrontation, 11-7 continental United States (CONUS), 1-2, 4-3 contingency funds, 1-13 controlled pair, C-15 CONUS. See continental United States (CONUS). counterassault team (CAT), 2-2, 5-1 country message, 14-5 course of action (COA), 1-11 covering the principal, 7-17 covert phase, 4-8 CPR. See cardiac pulmonary resuscitation (CPR). critique, 14-8 CTA. See common table of allowances (CTA).

DAO. See defense attaché officer (DAO). defense attaché officer (DAO), 14-4 defense in depth, 1-7 defensive formation, 7-12 designees Level I, 1-3 Level II, 1-3 device, 7-19, 11-4 diamond formation, 7-2 dignitaries, 2-1 diplomatic corps, 2-6 Diplomatic Security Service (DSS), 2-11 distinguished persons, 1-5 doorways, 7-15 drivers, 2-7, 2-16, 9-6 drop-dead time, 5-12 DSS. See Diplomatic Security Service (DSS).

B backing techniques, 9-17 backup limo, 9-5 badges dual identification, 6-4 identification, 6-3 baggage team, 2-7, 2-16 ballistic apparel, E-5 base of operations, 6-1 bomb device, 10-6

E electronic security (ELSEC), 13-6 ELSEC. See electronic security (ELSEC). embassy, 14-4 emergency equipment, 9-3 procedures, 5-1 EOD. See explosive ordnance disposal (EOD). equipment, 6-8, 9-3, 9-4, 13-4, 14-5, E-1, E-6, E-9 equipment and weapons requests, 14-6 essential fundamentals, 1-4 evacuation, 7-18, 8-2, 10-12 routes, 14-1 evasive driving course, 2-3 maneuvers, 9-17 execution or attack phase, 11-5 execution stage, 14-7 executive protection, 7-11 exit brief phase, 4-9 experience, 2-4 explosive detection dogs, 10-2

Index-1

FM 3-19.12

explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), 2-13 explosives, 10-1 extended arm’s reach principle, 7-18 lead vehicle, 9-6 exterior search, 10-6

F FBI. See Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). FEBA. See forward edge of the battlefield area (FEBA). Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 2-11 Federal law enforcement officers, 1-13 fence line formation, 7-7 figure four clamp technique, 8-2 flank agents, 7-3 flying armed, 14-5 follow vehicle, 9-5 forces command (FORSCOM), 14-6 FORSCOM. See forces command (FORSCOM). forward edge of the battlefield area (FEBA), 13-2 full-time protection, 1-3 fund cite, 14-2 funds .0015, 1-13, 3-6

G general support officer (GSO), 14-4 gifts, 3-4 GSO. See general support officer (GSO). gun, 7-20

H H&K MP5K, E-1 hallways, 7-15 handshakes, 7-15 hardened vehicles, 9-1 HAV. See heavy-armored vehicles (HAV). heavy-armored vehicles (HAV), 9-1, 13-3 helicopters, 13-4 HFZ. See hostile fire zone (HFZ). high-mobility, multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs), 13-3

Index-2

high-risk billet, 1-3 category, 1-3 target, 1-4 high-risk personnel (HRP), 1-3, 10-10 HMMWVs. See high-mobility, multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs). hoaxes, 10-13 holster, E-2 hostage negotiations, 2-2 hostile fire zone (HFZ), 2-19, 13-1 hotel room, 5-7, 6-2 HRP Level I, 1-3 Level II, 1-3 HRP. See high-risk personnel (HRP). hygiene, 3-4

I IED. See improvised explosive device (IED). improvised explosive device (IED), 2-16 in-brief phase, 4-6 inner cordon, 1-7 in-route (moving) surveillance, 11-3 in-service training, 2-18 inspections, 5-6 Installation Force Protection Operational and Organizational (O&O) Plan, 2-2 intelligence files, 14-3 interior search, 10-6 internal security teams, 5-10 international police task force (IPTF), 13-2 interpreter, 2-7, 14-6 interval between motorcade vehicles, 9-9 IPTF. See international police task force (IPTF). itinerary, 1-6, 5-6, 14-7

J joint security survey, 5-8 J-turn, 9-17

K key control systems, 6-5 issuance, 6-5

kill zone, 7-20

L land mines, 13-2 lane changes, 9-11 LAV. See light-armored vehicles (LAV). law enforcement, 4-3 LBV. See load-bearing vests (LBV). lead agent, 7-3 flank agent, 7-9 vehicle, 9-5 leading surveillance, 11-4 leapfrog, 2-10, 5-12 legal authority, 1-12 levels of alertness, 1-6 light-armored vehicles (LAV), 9-1 limo. See limousine (limo). limousine (limo), 9-1 load-bearing vests (LBV), 13-7 local itinerary, 2-11 threat information, 2-11 low-intensity conflict, 1-3 low-profile operation, 1-11 lunge or slash defense, 8-4

M M11 SIG Sauer pistol, C-3, C-14, C-15, E-1 M4 rifle, C-14, C-15, C-17, E-2 M9, C-14 mail bombs, 10-11 MCO. See movement control officer (MCO). medical emergency, 7-16 equipment, E-6 MI. See military intelligence (MI). middle cordon, 1-7, 7-12 military intelligence (MI), 2-13 military occupational specialty (MOS), 2-3 military working dog (MWD), 2-7 mission, 14-8 file, 2-10, 14-3 mission special agent in charge (MSAC), 1-5, 2-7, 2-8 modification table of organization and equipment (MTOE), 13-1 MOS. See military occupational specialty (MOS).

FM 3-19.12

motorcade alignment, 9-10 movements, 9-9 operations, 9-5 parking, 6-6, 9-11 parking areas, 5-11 vehicles, 9-3 motorcycle escorts, 9-14 movement, 9-11 movement control officer (MCO), 13-2 moving or a fixed-site formation, 7-14 MP5 submachine gun, C-14, C-15, C-17 MSAC. See mission special agent in charge (MSAC). MTOE. See modification table of organization and equipment (MTOE). multiple identification badges, 6-4 multiple motorcades, 9-14 multiple targets, C-2 MWD. See military working dog (MWD).

N night firing, C-3 nonprojectile-firing devices, 8-3 nontactical vehicles (NTV), 13-3 notification phase, 14-1 NTV. See nontactical vehicles (NTV).

O objectives, 1-4 OCONUS. See outside the continental United States (OCONUS). off-duty hours, 3-6 official party, 5-4 on-site security surveys, 2-10 operation plan (OPLAN), 14-3 operational security (OPSEC), 2-8 OPLAN. See operation plan (OPLAN). OPSEC. See operational security (OPSEC). order of precedence, 3-1, D-1 outer cordon, 1-7 outside the continental United States (OCONUS), 2-9, 4-3 overhead knife strike, 8-7 overt phase, 4-8

P package control, 6-6 PAO. See Public Affairs Office (PAO). parades, 5-9 patrol explosive detector dogs (PEDD), 10-1 PEDD teams, 10-1 PEDD. See patrol explosive detector dogs (PEDD). personal relationships, 3-5 personal security officer (PSO), 1-5, 2-7, 2-9, 7-2, 7-4 personal security vulnerability assessment (PSVA), 1-9, 4-5 PIT. See police intercept tactic (PIT). planning and coordination, 14-2 police intercept tactic (PIT), 9-17 potential attacker, 7-19 threat, 4-2, 7-17 prerequisites, 2-3 press personnel, 1-6 primary and alternate route surveys, 2-10 principal, 1-4, 2-17, 5-2 proactive measures, 12-4 progressive surveillance, 11-4 projectile-firing devices, 8-2 protection measures, 12-5, 13-3 protective formations, 7-1 protective services detail (PSD), 1-1 protective services training course (PSTC), 1-7, 2-18 PSD. See protective services detail (PSD). PSO. See personal security officer (PSO). PSTC. See protective services training course (PSTC). PSVA. See personal security vulnerability assessment (PSVA). Public Affairs Office (PAO), 1-6 public parking areas, 6-6 push out, 9-18

Q qualification standards, C-3 questionnaires, 4-10

R railroad, 5-8 ramming, 9-18

range box, C-1 reactive measure, 12-5 ready stance, C-4 realistic targets, C-1 rear agent, 7-3 regional security officer (RSO), 4-5, 14-4 religious services, 5-9 remain overnight (RON), 2-15 research phase, 4-7 residence examinations, 2-13 watch, 2-14 responsibilities, 14-2 reverse out, 9-17 ROE. See rules of engagement (ROE). RON. See remain overnight (RON). routes, 11-1 RSO. See regional security officer (RSO). rules of engagement (ROE), 1-12

S safe havens, 7-18, 11-6 safety, 9-4 scheduling arrivals and departures, 14-1 SCR team, 2-7, 2-15 SCR. See security control room (SCR). screening, 9-14 seating assignments, 9-8 Secretary of Defense, 2-2 security, 5-7 arrangements, 2-11 checkpoints, 10-6 classifications, 1-6 personnel, 1-5, 1-8 pins, 6-4 plan, 5-1 posts, 6-6 security control room (SCR), 1-11 selection of personnel, 5-1 senior official, 1-5 shift leader (SL), 1-7, 2-7, 2-9 shooting drills, C-2 signal security (SIGSEC), 13-6 SIGSEC. See signal security (SIGSEC). site survey, 5-6, 5-7, 14-1, B-1 SL. See shift leader (SL). social or sporting event, 5-10

Index-3

FM 3-19.12

SOF. See special operations forces (SOF). sound off, 7-17 special considerations, 5-5 events, 14-6 special operations forces (SOF), 13-2 special reaction team (SRT), 2-2 speed, 9-17 speed and intervals, 9-11 SRT. See special reaction team (SRT). staff members, 6-1 staffing requirements, 1-8 staging areas, 5-11 stairways, 7-15 stationary or fixed surveillance, 11-3 strip map, 5-3 support elements, 5-3 personnel, 2-7, 2-17, 14-2 surveillance, 1-11 detection, 11-5, 12-4 detection teams, 11-2 operation, 11-5 post, 6-7 techniques, 11-4 surveillants, 11-3 suspicious item, 10-11 object, 10-1

T table(s) of organization and equipment (TOE), E-1 tables of distribution and allowances (TDA), E-1 tactical vehicles, 9-6 tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP), i-vi target selection phase, 11-5 targets, C-1 TCSM. See technical countersurveillance measures (TCSM). TDA. See tables of distribution and allowances (TDA). technical and evasive driving, 9-16 technical assistance, 2-13 technical countersurveillance measures (TCSM), 14-6 terrorism, 12-1

Index-4

terrorist actions, 11-1 attacks, 12-2 groups, 12-1 surveillance, 11-1 targets, 12-2 threat, 1-10 analysis, 4-1 area, 8-2 assessment, 4-1, 14-3 collection effort, 14-3 identify, 7-17 information, 4-5 level, 1-6, 5-4, 14-2 three-car motorcade, 7-20, 9-14 three-dimensional targets, C-1 three-inch dots, C-2 TOE. See table(s) of organization and equipment (TOE). training area, C-1 transporting weapons, 14-4 travel, 5-4 route reconnaissance, 5-6 traveling by sea, 5-8 traversing techniques, C-15 triangle formation, 7-5 TTP. See tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). two-car motorcade, 7-22, 9-14, 9-18

U UCMJ. See Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). UDAA techniques, 8-1 UDAA. See unarmed defense against attack (UDAA). UN. See United Nations (UN). unarmed defense against attack (UDAA), 2-18 unarmed in an attack, 2-19 Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 2-4 United Nations (UN), 13-2 US Embassies, 14-4 US Secret Service, 2-11

V vehicle formations, 9-12 searches, 10-2 visa requirements, 14-4

W weapon, 7-20, 13-4, E-1 cleaning, C-2

management, E-2 weather, 1-4 wedge formation, 7-4


FM 3-19.12 11 AUGUST 2004

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

PETER J. SCHOOMAKER General, United States Army Chief of Staff

Official:

JOEL B. HUDSON Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army

DISTRIBUTION: Active Army, Army National Guard, and US Army Reserve: To be distributed in accordance with the initial distribution number 115923, requirements for FM 3-19.12

PIN: 078609-000

Protective Services (FM 3-19.12 - 2004).pdf

Recommend Documents