FACULTY OF LAW
SUBMITTED SUBM ITTED BY: BY: BY:
SUPERVISED SUPE RVISED
PAVITRA VITR A SHIVHARE SHIV HARE PRABHAT SAHA
DR.
SUBJECT –INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES TOPIC: “COUR “COURTS TS & INTENT OF LEGISLATURE LEGISLATURE ENACTING ENACTING THE STA STATUTE”
SESSION: 20161! 1#1$!LA0##
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BANARAS HINDU UNIVERSITY P%' ( 1
VARANASI (INDIA) 2016
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E)'*+ ,-*. %//-345' 34 % '%47*'% 4'84' -9 4%349%/3-8" H-,')'*; % 87<'* -9 '-' %4- -3)%'; /*33/3=' %8 %*'/3%' % ,-*. ,35 5'3* -<>'/3)' 3'%4 %8 -383-84" H'8/'; I ,-7 3.' - 74' 534 --*783+ 5%8. %; ,5- 5%)' 3*'/+ -* 383*'/+ 5'' ' - /-'' 534 *->'/ 47+" F3*4+; I ,-7 3.' - 5%8. + *-9'44-* Dr.Prabha Saha; 9-* 3)38 ' 534 --*783+ - - 534 ,-8'*97 *->'/ %8 9-* 534 5'97 /-'84 5% 5'' ' - 3*-)' + *->'/ -8 5' -3/: !Courts and Intent of Legislature enacting the Statute” ; ,53/5 %4- 5'' ' 38 -38 % - -9 *'4'%*/5 %8 I /%' - .8-, %<-7 4- %8+ 8', 9%/4 %8 *7'4 *'%' - I8'**'%3-8 -9 S%7'4" T5' 47+ *'%' - 534 *->'/ 5%4 38'' 5'' ' - '?-*' -*' .8-,''%<' %)'87'4 *'%' - + 47<>'/ -9 I8'**'%3-8 -9 S%7'4 %8 I % 47*' 3 ,3 5' ' 38 977*'" I ,-7 %4- 3.' - 5%8. + %*'84 %8 9*3'84 ,5- 5'' ' 38 @8%3=38 534 *->'/; ,35-7 ,5- 534 *->'/ /-'3-8 ,-7 8- <' -443<' %8 I 9'' 9-*78%' '8-75 - ' 5'3* /-84%8 47-* %8 '8/-7*%''8" L%4+; I /%8 38-*' 5' L%, S/5-- L3<*%*+ 4% ,53/5 5'' ' 38 47//'4497+ /-'38 534 *->'/ ,-*."
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We are living in a democratic world where people have rights and obligations toward the state as well as the society. But, ‘How is this order maintained in the society?’ It is done because of the presence of ‘aw’. !he aw maintains an order for "ust and stable e#istence of the man$ind because it is evident from the human tendency that some $ind of sanctions is necessary to regulate the behavior and it is done only by the presence of ‘aws’. !his fact can also be proved if we go by the history of the man$ind starting from %tone &ge to the 'yber &ge. aw is that element which binds the members of the community together in their adherence to recogni(ed values and standards. !he aw derives its presence in society from various source li$e 'ustoms, )recedents and egislations. But, the most authentic and reliable source among all sources, is P%' ( #
‘%tatutes’ or popularly $nown as ‘*nacted laws, +odern acts and rules’. !hese are made by the parliament in consideration of the demand of the hour and the need of the society. !hese are used as the primary source by any "udicial authority for dispensing "ustice in their day to day operation ranging from the smallest +agistrate 'ourt to the %upreme 'ourt of India. *ach and every "udicial and administrative body wor$s as per the enacted laws, prescribed rules and regulations. But, there is a problem with this source of law and that is with the change of time, the society changes and this finally changes the mindset, leading to a need for its interpretation by the courts. !hese enacted laws, specially the +odern &cts and rules, are drafted by legal e#perts and it is e#pected that the language used in that particular statute will leave little room for interpretation or construction. But, the reality is different as those persons who bear this tas$ of application of law, finds difficulty in interpreting the meaning of the ambiguous words and e#pressions while resolving the inconsistencies. !he main reason for such problem is the indifference in the person who drafts the law and the person who applies the law in wor$ing. !hus, to address this problem of application of enacted laws certain rules of ‘Interpretation’ or construction has been formulated and one is ‘Intention of egislature’. !his interpretation or construction of statute by the court is done when it cannot go through the ordinary rules of interpretation then the court do it by "ust loo$ing at the intention of legislature and it is derived from the words of the statute which was used while enacting the statute.
But, if we go by the Indian conte#t, courts have often gone beyond the words of the statute and interpreted statutory provisions in a manner as to what they considered as be socially and morally sound. !his is the main reason that "udicial activism has been praised and the slight circumvention of the canons of interpretation has been ignored in the Indian udicial system. But, such -activism brings into /uestion as to, what is the theoretical binding value of legislative intent? !his gave rise to an issue that whether the role of legislative intent in statutory construction has over the years dwindled considerably or not. But, we will do it later on0 first of all we will loo$ what is the concept behind this intention of legislature and interpretation of statutes. We all $now that, a statute is understood as the edict of the egislature. However, the e#tent to which the legislature’s intent shapes the understanding and implementation of a statute is indeterminate. !he binding value of legislative intent varies with time as well as across "urisprudences. In India, in a time where "udicial activism is hailed as the protective force behind the rights of the citi(enry, it becomes P%' (
necessary to evaluate the role of legislative intent in statutory interpretation. %o, in this pro"ect study, we will loo$ toward the issue for understanding how court is using this intention of legislature for doing interpretation.
I NTERPREATAT I ON OFSTAT UTE
We all $now that, ‘Words spo$en or written are the means of communication’. Where they are possible of giving one and only one meaning there is no problem. But where there is a possibility of two meanings, a problem arises and the real intention is to be sorted out by the court. If two persons communicating with each other are sitting together0 they can by subse/uent conversation clear the confusion and ma$e things clear. But what will happen if a provision in any statute is found to convey more than one meaning? !he udges and the awyers whose duty it is to interpret and to aid in interpretation of statutes have no opportunity to converse with the egislature which had enacted a particular statute. !he egislature, after enacting statutes becomes functus officio so far as those statutes are concerned. It is not their function to interpret the statutes. !hus two functions are clearly demarcated. egislature enacts and the udges interpret. P%' ( 6
!he difficulty with udges is that they cannot say that they do not understand a particular provision of an enactment. !hey have to interpret in one way or another. !hey cannot remand or refer bac$ the matter to the egislature for interpretation. !hat situation led to the birth of principles of interpretation to find out the real intent of the egislature. 'onse/uently, the %uperior 'ourts had to give us the rules of interpretation to ease ambiguities, inconsistencies, contradictions or lacunas. !he rules of interpretation come into play only where clarity or precision in the provisions of the statute are found missing. 1ood enactments are those which have least ambiguities, inconsistencies, contradictions or lacunas. Bad enactments are gold mine for lawyers because for half of the litigation the legislative draftsmen are undoubtedly the cause. !he purpose of the interpretation of the statute is to unloc$ the loc$s put by the egislature. 2or such unloc$ing, $eys are to be found out. !hese $eys may be termed as aids for interpretation and principles of interpretation. !he aids for interpretation may be divided into two categories, namely, Internal and *#ternal aids for interpretation. !he Internal &ids are those which are found within the statute. !hey may be as follows3 4 5. ong title 6. )reamble 7. 'hapter Headings 8. +arginal 9otes to every section of statute. :. )unctuations. ;. Illustrations given below the sections. <. =efinitions. >. )rovisos. . *#planation. 5@. %aving 'lauses and non4obstante 'lauses.
*#ternal &id for interpretation are those which are not contained in the statute but are found else4where. !hey may be as follows3 4 5. Historical bac$ground. 6. %tatement of ob"ects and reasons. 7. !he original Bill as drafted and introduced. 8. =ebates in the egislature. :. %tate of things at the time a particular legislation was enacted. ;. udicial construction. <. egal dictionaries. >. 'ommonsense. 9ow, we can say that it is this process of Interpretation which court applies to find out the true meaning of the ambiguous word or any phrase in the egislation. !his whole process is done between the situation, when the law is drafted and when it reach the court in the manner of a dispute. !hen at this "uncture of time the act is sent to the court for Interpretation of that particular ambiguous word or phrase. udges here try to ascertain what meaning the parliament had thought of for that particular ambiguous or uncertain word while in the process of drafting. !his process itself ma$es the interpretation rigorous because there could be different P%' ( !
interpretations by different "udges as the strategy ta$en by one "udge in interpreting the same word could be different by the second "udge. !hus, this process is done by care and caution because you might not $now in what dimensions you might venture while interpreting the vague and undefined word of the statute. It is also one important fact that "udges should not pursue his own ideologies to interpret a statute and he should interpret that only according to the ob"ectives of statute. But, -What is this Interpretation? iterally spea$ing Interpretation is, ‘how "udges loo$ into the word with matter or the principle’, which means that when court see$s to loo$ into the word which is difficult to interpret this process is called as Interpretation. 9ow, if we go by the legal definition of this term Interpretation then this is defined by %&+A9= in his urisprudence as, -the process by which the court seeks to ascertain the meaning of the Legislature through the medium of authoritative forms in which it is expressed . But, 'AA* has defined this in much simple sense, he said - Interpretations is the art of finding the true sense which their author is intended to convey, and of enabling others to derive from them the same idea which the author intended to convey. !here is an another word for this process of clearing ambiguity of statute called ‘'onstruction’ which WHI!* . has defined synonymous to the word Interpretation and so in this study we are going to use these two e#pressions in a common sense. !his was all about the Interpretation and now we will study the ‘Intention’ of legislature and various principles of construction related to this rule. COURTS&I NT ENT I ON OFL EGI SL AT URE
!he first and the foremost step to understand this topic is to understand, what the Intention of egislature island how court uses this for interpretation of statutes. If we define it in a general sense, -egislative intent as such is nothing more than the purpose the legislature had in mind as to the meaning and implication of the words of a statute while framing it. In general the purpose behind framing any statute is to curb some public evil or effectuate some public benefit. 5 With this in mind, the legislature is presumed to garner certain meaning to the words of a statute. & statute must be rendered in accordance with such meaning. When we interprets a statute we go by the Cules of Interpretation and these rules are used to gather the facts which are later processed to clear the vagueness of the statute and giving a meaning to the ambiguous word or phrase. In general parlance 1United Bank of India, Culcutta v. Abhijit Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd "; AIR 2000 SC 2!" P%' (
this process of interpretation is done going "ust by the words of the statute but sometimes the statute itself is open to more than one interpretations. !hen, what is the resort to the court. In this situation the 'ourt has to choose the ‘Intention of egislature’ used in enacting a statute and specifically that interpretation which represents the true intention of the legislature, 6 so court will always loo$ to the ‘legal meaning’ or ‘true meaning’ of the statutory provision. Dnder these conditions the legislative intent of the legislature in enacting legislation is considered. !he "udiciary does so in the following provided reasons3
When the ‘Words’ are imperfect symbols to communicate intent. !hey are ambiguous and change in meaning over time, does not appear to be directly or ade/uately addressing a particular issue and when there appears to have been a legislative drafting error.7 Dnforeseen situations are inevitable, and new technologies and cultures ma$e application of e#isting laws difficult. Dncertainties may be added to the statute in the course of enactment, such as the need for compromise or catering to special interest groups.
But, when a statute is clear and unambiguous, the courts have said, repeatedly, that the in/uiry into legislative intent ends at that point.
!hus, we can say that the intention of the legislature is to be construed only when there is a possibility that two different interpretations are arising otherwise not and this intention has to be essentially constructed of two aspects3 the ‘ concept of meaning’, i.e., what the words mean and in the another aspect, it conveys the ‘concept of purpose and object’ or the ‘reason and spirit’ pervading through the statute. !he former connotes an understanding derived from the literal meaning of the words of a statute. !he latter points to the spirit and reason pervading through the statute.8!he process of construction, therefore, combines both the literal and purposive approaches. In other words the legislative intention, i.e., the true or legal meaning of an enactment is derived by considering the meaning of the words used in the enactment in the light of any discernible purpose or ob"ect which comprehends 2Venkataswami aidu, ! v. a"asa"n a"aindas, AIR 166 SC $61" $L'34%3)' I8'8 38 I8'**'%3-8 -9 S%7'4; %)%3%<' %: 54:'8",3.3'3%"-*,3.3L'34%3)'38'8 V343' -8 O/-<'* 26; 2016" #G7*7 P*%4%88% S385; P*38/3'4 -9 S%7-*+ I8'**'%3-8; 125 E"; 12 2010" P%' (
the mischief and its remedy to which the enactment is directed. !hus, the courts have to $eep these aspects in mind while reading a statute0 and are aided in this tas$ by certain sources of legislative intent. !hese popularly include3 : 5. !he te#t of the statute as proposed to the legislature. 6. )roposed amendments to the statute, whether accepted or re"ected, with reasons thereof. 7. !he record of hearings on the topic. 8. egislative records or "ournals. :. %peeches and parliamentary debates made prior to the vote on the bill. ;. egislative subcommittee Esuch as %tanding 'ommitteeF minutes, factual findings, andGor reports <. Ather relevant statutes that can be used to understand the definitions in the statute on /uestion0 for e#ample the 1eneral 'lauses &ct, 5><. >. Ather relevant statutes which indicate the limits of the statute in /uestion0 such as previous statutes on the same matter. . egislative files of the e#ecutive branch, such as the governor or president. 5@. 'ase law prior to the statute or following it which demonstrates the problems or issues the legislature was attempting to tac$le with the statute. 55. 'onstitutional determinations 56.egislative intent, which is the reason for passing the law
%o, it can be said that this e#pression ‘Intention of legislature’ is a shorthand reference to the meaning of the words used by the egislature ob"ectively determined with the guidance furnished by the accepted principles of interpretation. !his is crucial because if one may gather the true intent behind something then it might become easy for doing interpretation of that particular word or phrase of the statute. !his is done by "udges when they place themselves into the situation when that legislation was being drafted because we $now that a statute is an edict of the egislature; and if they could ascertain the mind map of the legislature only then it becomes possible in what sense that word or phrase in the statute which is important to impart "ustice fairly. %o, it is the prime reason that this conventional way of interpretation of a statute is done according to the ‘intention’ of those persons who ma$e it. %almond has also said that, it is the ‘duty of the "udicature to act upon the true intention of legislature4 the mens or sentential legis’. By this he tried to convey that, -the ob"ect of interpreting a statute is to ascertain the intention of the legislature enacting it. !hus, we can say that this e#pression ‘intention of legislature’ Y7' 3; CRS R'-* 9-* C-8*'44; S%7-*+ I8'**'%3-8: G'8'*% P*38/3'4 %8 R'/'8 T*'84 200" 6Vishnu P"ata# $u%a" &o"ks 'Pvt( Ltd. v. Chief Ins#ecto" of $tam#, AIR 16 SC 102" P%' ( 10
is a shorthand reference to the meaning of the words used by the legislature ob"ectively determined with the guidance furnished by the accepted principles of interpretation.< 9ow, the importance of this sub"ect is considerable because the primary function of modern appellate courts is the interpretation of statutes, and it is conventional for courts to ma$e use of the rules in the course of interpretation. Aur law has gradually developed a vast body of authority pertaining to statutory interpretation. %ome of the rules in this law are very ancient, others rather recent. +ost of this authority is applicable to statutes in any field0 some of it only to one field, such as criminal law or constitutional law. 9early all of it is entirely "udge made, although a few rules of interpretation appear in the general statutes of most states. > !he words rules of statutory interpretation are used loosely in this article to include any of the legal principles and concepts devoted to the meaning of statutes. %ome of these rules are fre/uently referred to by the courts as canons of construction. !he ostensible purpose of every rule is to clarify statutory meaning. !he appellate courts of all the states have used substantially all of these rules at one time or another. +ost rules of statutory interpretation can be classified in one of two ways3 those concerned with relations between the words of a statute0 and those concerned with the relation of the words in a statute to outside materials. In addition, there is a scattering of rules that do not fit either of these ma"or categories.
!hus, as stated above, certain principles of interpretation as formulated by the %uperior 'ourts to find out the ‘real intent of the egislature’ may be enumerated as follows3 4 1. Literal construction: In construing a statutory provision the first and the foremost rule of construction is that of literal construction. &ll that the 'ourt has to see at the very outset is, what does the provision say? !he 'ourts are bound by the mandate of the egislature and once it has e#pressed its intention in words which have a clear significance and meaning, the 'ourt is precluded from speculating. If the provision is unambiguous and if from that provision the legislative intent is clear, the other rules of construction of statutes need not be called into aid. !hey are called into aid only when the legislative intention is not clear. But the courts would !!. v. $ec"eta") of $tate fo" the *nvi"onment e+#a"te $#ath olme, K2001 1 A ER 1" 73838 J-584-8'; “A8 E)%7%3-8 -9 5' R7'4 -9 S%7-*+ I8'**'%3-8”; 2 YLJ 12 1#" P%' ( 11
not be "ustified in so straining the language of the statutory provision as to ascribe the meaning which cannot be warranted by the words employed by the egislature. If the words are clear, they must be applied, even though the intention of the legislator may have been different or the result is harsh or undesirable. !he literal rule is what the law says instead of what the law was intended to say. 2. No external aid Where words plain and unambiguous3 Where the words of a statute are plain, precise and unambiguous, the intention of the egislature is to be gathered from the language of the statute itself and no e#ternal aid is admissible to construe those words. It is only where a statute is not e#haustive or where its language is ambiguous, uncertain, clouded or susceptible of more than one meaning or shades of meaning that the e#ternal aid may be loo$ed into for the purpose of ascertaining the ob"ect which the egislature had in view in using the words in /uestion. 3. Mischief rule (e!don"s case#: When a /uestion arises as to the interpretation to be put on an enactment, what the 'ourt is to do is to ascertain the intent of them that ma$e it, and that must of course be gathered from the words actually used in the statute. !hat, however, does not mean that the decision should rest on a literal interpretation of the words used in disregard of all other materials. !he literal construction, then, has, in general, but prima facie preference. egislative intent is determined by e#amining secondary sources, such as committee reports, treatises, law review articles and corresponding statutes. !he application of this rule gives the "udge more discretion than the literal and the golden rule as it allows him to effectively decide on )arliaments intent. It can be argued that this undermines )arliaments supremacy and is undemocratic as it ta$es law4ma$ing decisions away from the legislature. !o arrive at the real meaning, it is always necessary to get an e#act conception of the aim, scope and ob"ect of the whole &ct0 to consider3 5. What was law before the &ct was passed? 6. What was the mischief and defect for which the law had not provided? 7. What remedy )arliament has resolved and appointed to cure the disease? &nd 8. !he true reason of the remedy and then the "udges have to ma$e such construction as shall suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle inventions and evasions for continuance of the mischief. $. Words coupled together to ta%e colour from each other3 !he rule is when two or more words which are susceptible of analogous meaning are coupled together, they are understood to be used in their cognate sense and they ta$e their colour from each other, the meaning of the more general being restricted to a sense analogous to that of the less general. !his rule, however, does not apply P%' ( 12
where the egislature has deliberately used wider words in order to widen the scope of the provision. :. &he golden rule3 No h!pothetical considerations' &rgument on hypothetical considerations should not have much weight in interpreting a statute. However, if the language so permits, it is open to the 'ourt to give to the statute that meaning which promotes the benignant intent of the legislation. & 'ourt has the power to depart from the grammatical construction, if it finds that strict adherence to the grammatical construction will defeat the ob"ect the egislature had In view. 9o doubt, grammar is a good guide to meaning but a bad master to dictate. ;. bsurdit! or hardship3 If a literal interpretation of a statute leads to absurdity, hardship or in"ustice, presumably not Intended, then a construction may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words and even the structure of the sentence. &gain, however, the 'ourt has no power to give the language of the statute a wider or narrower meaning than the literal one, unless there is compelling reason to give such other meaning. If the language is plain the fact that the conse/uence of giving effect to it may lead to some absurd result is not a factor to be ta$en into account in interpreting a provision, as it is for the egislature to step in and remove the absurdity. If on either of two possible views hardship must result to one or the other party, then the considerations of hardship ought to be ignored.
<. )ontextual interpretation3 <hough the meaning of the statutory provision has to be ascertained only from the words employed by the egislature, the set up and conte#t are also relevant for ascertaining what e#actly was meant to be conveyed by the terminology employed. !he same words may mean one thing in one conte#t and another in a different conte#t. In ascertaining the true intention, of the egislature, the 'ourt must not only loo$ at the words used by the egislature but also have regard to the conte#t and the setting in which they occur, !he e#act colour and shape of the meaning of words in an enactment is not to be ascertained by reading them in isolation, !he provisions of the statutes which bear upon the same sub"ect4matter must be read as a whole and in their entirety, each throwing light on and illumining the meaning of the other. !he 'ourt must have regard to the aim, ob"ect and scope of the statute to be read in its entirety. It must ascertain the intention of the egislature by directing its attention not merely to the clause to be construed but to the entire statute0 it must compare the clause with the other parts of the law, and the setting in which the P%' ( 1$
clause to be Interpreted occurs. If the conte#t clearly suggests that a particular rule of grammar is inapplicable then the re/uirement of conte#t must prevail over the rule of grammar. >. Liberal construction3 In construing a provision of a statute the 'ourt should be slow to adopt construction which tends to ma$e any part of the statute meaningless or ineffective. &n attempt must always be made to reconcile the relevant provision as to advance the remedy intended by the statute. Where the literal meaning of the words used in a statutory provision would manifestly defeat its ob"ect by ma$ing a part of it meaningless and ineffective, it is legitimate and even necessary to adopt the rule of liberal construction so as to give meaning to all parts of the statute and to ma$e the whole of it effective and operative. Whether the narrower or the wider sense of a term should be adopted depends not only on the provisions of the statute in which that term occurs but also on facts and circumstances of each case. But again if the words used in the statutory provision are reasonably capable of only one construction the doctrine of liberal construction can be of no assistance. )rocedural enactments should be construed liberally in such a manner as to render the enforcement of substantive rights effective. But the re/uirements as to the time4imit within which an administrative act is to be performed are to be liberally construed. )rovisions ensuring the security of fundamental human rights must, unless the mandate be precise and un/ualified, be construed liberally so as to uphold the right. !his rule applies to the interpretation of constitutional and statutory provisions ali$e. Welfare, social and beneficial statutes are not to be construed strictly. =oubts are resolved in favour of the class of persons for whose benefit the statute is enacted. An the other hand penal and ta#ing statutes and statutes e#cluding 'ourts "urisdiction should be strictly construed. . armonious construction3 *very statute has to be construed as a whole and the construction given should be a harmonious one. It is a cardinal rule of construction that when there are in a statute two provisions which are in such conflict with each other, that both of them cannot stand together, they should possibly be so interpreted that effect can be given to both and that a construction which renders either of them inoperative and useless should not be adopted e#cept in the last resort. It is the duty of the 'ourts to avoid conflict between two provisions, and whenever it is possible to do so to construe provisions which appear to conflict so that they harmonise. !his rule of harmonious construction applies not only to different provisions in one &ct but also to different cognate &cts such as the 'ourt 2ees &ct and the 'ode of 'ivil )rocedure. Where, however, the words of the statute are not reasonably capable of the construction canvassed, then It would be unreasonable and illegitimate for the 'ourt to limit the P%' ( 1#
scope of those words 4 arbitrarily solely for the purpose of establishing harmony between the assumed ob"ect and the scheme of the &ct. 5@. )onstruction to a*oid in*alidit! 3 It is the duty of the 'ourt to endeavour as far as possible to construe a statute in such a manner that the construction results in validity rather than its invalidity and gives effect to the manifest Intention of the egislature enacting that statute. &n interpretation leading to the failure of the plain intention of the egislature by reason of a slight in e#actitude in the language of the provision should be avoided. & statute is designed to be wor$able, and the interpretation thereof by a 'ourt should be to secure that ob"ect, unless crucial omission or clear direction ma$es that end unattainable. !he reason behind the ma#im is that it is to be presumed that the egislature or other legislative authority would not ma$e an infructuous or unconstitutional provision. !he words of a statute must be construed so as to give sensible meaning to them. &n interpretation which would defeat the purpose of the statutory provision and, in effect obliterate it from the statute boo$ should be eschewed. If more than one construction is possible, the one which preserves its wor$ability and efficacy should be preferred to the other which would render it otiose or sterile. !hus, an &ct of egislature must be so interpreted, wherever possible, so as to ma$e it constitutional rather than unconstitutional. i$ewise, a rule, i.e. a piece of delegated legislation, should be so interpreted as to ma$e it not only constitutional but also within the authority conferred by the egislature on the 1overnment while conferring on it the power to ma$e rules. 55. +eading down3 While ma$ing such construction it is permissible for the 'ourt even to read down a provision in order to so understand it as not to attempt something beyond the competence of the legislative body. !his is called the principle of reading down. 56.,-usdem generis3 !he e"usdem generis rule is e#plained in Halsburys aws of *ngland thus4 &s a rule, where in a statute there are general words following particular and specific words, the general words must be confined to things of the same $ind as those specified, although this, as a rule of construction0, must be applied with caution, and sub"ect to the primary rule that statutes are to be construed in accordance with the intention of )arliament. 2or the e"usdem rule to apply, the specific words must constitute a category, class or genus0 if they do constitute such a category, class or genus, then only things which belong to that category, class or genus fall within the general words. P%' ( 1
57.ame words/ same meaning3 Where a egislature uses same e#pression in the same statute at two places or more, then the same interpretation should be given to that e#pression unless the conte#t otherwise re/uires. But the application of the rule of same word, same meaning may be e#cluded by the conte#t. If one construction will lead to an ambiguity while another will give effect to what common sense would show was obviously Intended, the construction which would defeat the ends of the &ct must be re"ected even if same words used in the same section and even in the same sentence have to be construed differently. 1$. Later law abrogates earlier laws not consistent with 0t: !his principle is e#pressed in the atin ma#im posteriores leges priores contrarias abrogant . !his principle has been applied by the %upreme 'ourt in several cases. &fter discussing the principles of interpretation it would also be useful to discuss about mandatory and directory provisions. Mandator! and irector! ro*isions 3 !he study of numerous cases on this topic does not lead to formulation of any universal rule e#cept this that language alone most often is not decisive. !he use of words shall and may is not the determinant factor. Cegard must be given to the conte#t, sub"ect matter and ob"ect of the statutory provision in /uestion, in determining whether the same is mandatory or directory.
But, 'ourt has to always too$ into consideration that they didn’t start doing legislative function in the form of the interpretation or in the disguise of interpretation and they must avoid the danger of an a priori determination of the meaning of a provision based on their own preconceived notions of ideological structure or scheme into which the provision is to be interpreted is somewhat how fitted. !his only means that "udges cannot interpret statutes in the light of their views as to policy0 but they can adopt a purposive interpretation if they can find in the statute read as a whole or in the material to which they are permitted by law to refer as aids to interpretation an e#pression of )arliament’s purpose or policy. &s warned by AC= %'&C+&9 that, -udges have no doubt a genuine creative role but the 'onstitution’s separation of powers, or more accurately functions, must be observed if the "udicial independence is not to be put at ris$. 2or if the people and )arliament come to thin$ that the "udicial power is to be confined by nothing other -.A. Venkatachalam v. -). T"ans#o"t Commissione" ; AIR 1!! SCC #2; %' $; #" P%' ( 16
than the "udge’s sense of what is right, confidence in the "udicial system will be replace by the fear of it becoming uncertain and arbitrary in its application. !hus, the "udges have to be conscious in their tas$ of interpreting and applying a statute, that in the end the statute is the master and not the servant of the "udgement and that ‘no "udge has choice between implementing the law and disobeying it’.
CONCL USI ON
!rrors are committed by the humans and !rrors are corrected by the humans, so better to learn from the past and make future better because "ustice is all what humanity wants from the "udicial #ystem.$ Hence, we can conclude that the usage of intention of the legislature by the court should be "ustified by proper reasons and its usage should not be left open to each and every statute. We all $now that court is assigned this tas$ of statutory interpretation but it should always be done with proper care and caution ta$ing care of all the rules of construction. !his is because the court can always go to interpret in its own way as to what considers to them right. %o, it should always be ta$en in care that the statute gets that interpretation which first derives from the word used under it and then a recourse can always be made toward the ob"ect and reason for finding out the intention of legislature in enacting the statute. !here can be different statutes where intention can be loo$ed upon but in the case of ‘!a#ation’ and ‘)enal 'ode’ statutes the intention is never loo$ed by the court. !he interpretation of these statutes is different from the ordinary statutes because here P%' ( 1!
we have clear provisions as to what impose ta# or liability on certain sub"ects and if it is not so, then it is better to left it on the legislature because the matter of !a#ation and )enal %tatute is directly related to public policy and the people will be the ultimate sufferer in case the interpretation goes in the wrong way. !his is the main reason that both of these statutes should be clear for interpretation because if it is ambiguous or unclear then there will be no interpretation. In these statutes the court does not give effect to each and every word and court will only interpret if that is 'rystal clear and thus in case of ambiguity the court doesn’t loo$s toward the aim J ob"ective of the statute but will always loo$ into the enacting provisions of the statute. In these statutes the court only applies the iteral interpretation by restraining the words of the statute and by ta$ing a popular or ordinary meaning of that word in the statute but in otherwise the court does not apply any canon of construction for interpretation of statute. !hus, it is to be ta$en care of by the court that they should move at that path where "ustice is provided ta$ing care of the all the care of all the rules of construction. In aw every word has a meaning and we all $now that law is a world of words. %o, you cannot e#pect to interpret in that way that the interpretation itself becomes outside the scope and beyond the reach of the ob"ectives and reasons for which the statute was enacted in the legislature. %o, this tas$ of the court should be rest on the shoulders of the learned council and the "udges because of whom suggestions and understanding this all construction is possible in case of any statute or constitutional provision.
BI BL I OGRAPHY
Boo$s3 5. ustice 1.). %ingh, )rinciples of %tatutory Interpretation E58 th edn, e#is 9e#is )ublications 6@5;F. 6. =r. +.). !andon, Interpretation of %tatutes J egislation E56 th edn, &llahabad aw &gency 6@5;F.
Website references3 P%' ( 1
5. egislative Intent in Interpretation of %tatutes, available at3 54EKisited on Actober 6;, 6@5;F. 6. udicial Interpretation, available at3 https3GGen.wi$ipedia.orgGwi$iGudicialLinterpretation EKisited on Actober 6<, 6@5;F. 7. %tatutory Interpretation, available at3 http3GGwww.i"tr.nic.inGarticlesGart65.pdf EKisited on Actober 6, 6@5;F. 8. 1oogle %cholar4egislative Intent, available at3 https3GGscholar.google.co.inGscholar? startM5@J/McourtsNandNintentionNofNtheNlegislatureNinNenactingNtheNstatut eJhlMenJasLsdtM@,: EKisited on Actober 7@, 6@5;F.
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