PRINCIPLE THAT IDENTICAL EXPRESSIONS TO HAVE SAME MEANING

PRINCIPLE THAT IDENTICAL EXPRESSIONS TO HAVE SAME MEANING (Interpretation Of Statutes) A PROJECT REPORT Submitted to the UNIVERSITY FIVE YEAR LAW COLLEGE UNIVERSITY OF RAJASTHAN JAIPUR

(YEAR-2011)

Supervised by: Prof.T.BHATTACHARYYA Prof.T.BHATTACHARY YA Faculty Lecturer

Submitted by AJIT YADAV B.A.,LL.B(HONS.) VI Semester

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that AJIT YADAV, student student of B.A B.A LL.B LL.B VI Semester,

Uviversity

Five

Year

Law

College

University

of 

Rajasthan, Jaipur has submitted the project entitled "PRINCIPLE

THAT IDENTICAL EXPRESSIONS TO HAVE SAME MEANING" under my supervision and guidance.

It is further certified that the candidate has done a sincere efforts in this work on the topic mentioned above.

Prof. T.BHATTACHARYY T.BHATTACHARYYA A Supervisor

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT I have written this presentation entitled "PRINCIPLE THAT IDENTICAL EXPRESSIONS TO HAVE SAME MEANING "

under the supervision of  Prof. T.BHATTACHARYYA, Faculty Lecturer, University Five Year Law College, Jaipur. I find no words to express my sense of gratitude for Prof. T.BHATTACHARYYA, Faculty lecturer for providing the

necessary guidance and constant encouragement at every step of his endeavour. The pains taken by him in the scrut crutin iny y of the rough ough draf draftt as well ell his valu valua abl ble e suggestions to plug the loopholes therein have not only helped immensely in making this work see the light of the day, but above all, have helped in developing an analytical approach to this work. I am grateful and thankful to Prof. Mridul Srivastava, Director of University Five Year Law College, University of  Rajasthan, Rajasthan, Jaipur for her cooperation and guidance. Further I am grateful to my learned teachers for their academic

patronage

extended to me.

and

persistent

encouragement

I am highly indebted to the office and Library Staff of  the University Five Year Law College, University of  Rajasthan,

Jaipur

for

the

support

and

cooperation

extended by them from time to time. I cannot conclude with recording my gratefulness to my

parents,

family

members

and

friends

for

the

assistance received from them in the preparation of this dissertation for which I am indebted to them.

AJIT YADAV. Student of B.A.,LLB. (Hons.) Fifth Semester UFYLC University of Rajasthan, Jaipur Roll No. 007

LIST OF CONTENTS Certificate.................................................... Certificate....................... .......................................................... ............................... i. Acknowledgement.................................. Acknowledgement............................................................... ...................................ii. ......ii.

CHAPTER-1 Introduction…………………………………………………….1.

Research methodology………………………………………...2. Hypothesis……………………………………………………..2. CHAPTER -2

Identical expressions to have same meaning………………….. 3. CHAPTER- 3

Same words in statutes Pari Materia…………………………..4. CHAPTER- 4

Identical expressions to have same meaning- Judicial application………………………………………………………5. CHAPTER-5 Conclusion………………………………………………………10. Table of cases……………………………………………………11. Bibliography & Webliography

CHAPTER-I

INTRODUCTION Words are generally used in the same sense throughout in a statute unless there is something repugnant in the context. The same expressions, if it appears more than once in the same statute or for that matter in the same provision, should receive the same meaning unless, the context suggests otherwise. Where in a statute, a word is not defined, but it is used in different sections, it ought to be interpreted in the same sense throughout, unless the context in any particular section plainly requires that it should be understood in a different differ ent sense. 1 It is a reasonable presume that the same meaning is implied by the use of the same expression in every part of Act. If the language of the statute 2 be plain, admitting of  only one meaning, the legislature must be taken to have meant and intended what it has plainly expressed, and whatever it has in clear terms enacted must be enforced though it should lead to absurd 3 and mischievous 4 results. The proper rule of construction, therefore, is to look at the section itself and find out the meaning of word in question from the context in which it is used, though it would be permissible to find out is meaning from the other sections where the same word is used, if it is not possible to do so, from the section itself. But it is clear that the same word might carry different meaning when used in different parts of the statute depending upon the context in which it is used, and in such a case that sense has to be adopted which is harmonious 5 with the context and promotes in the fullest manner the policy object of the legislation. Indeed cases are not lacking where the same word would carry different meanings, even though used in the same section.

1

Presume means Take to be the case or to be true; accept without verification or proof. Statute is (law) an act passed by a legislative body. 3 Absurd means Inconsistent with reason, logic or common sense. 4 Mischievous means Deliberately causing harm or damage. 5 Harmonious means Existing together in harmony. 2

1.1 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY Researcher has used doctrinal method while dealing with the research project related to “Principle that identical expressions to have same meaning”.

1.2 HYPOTHESIS :- Principle that identical expressions to have same meaning is an important tools in statutory interpretation which can resolve various problems while interpreting statutes and thus ensure a just, fair and equitable result.

CHAPTER-2

Identical expressions expressions to have same meaning :-

A word which occurs more than once in the same Act should be given the same meaning throughout the Act, unless the context shows that the legislature has used the word in a different sense. This is made clear by the legislature inserting in the interpretation clause word such as ‘unless the context otherwise requires’. It is reasonable to assume that when the legislature has used a particular  expression6 in a statute many times, the expression must bear the same meaning everywhere. To call the same thing by the same name is a very safe proposition 7. But the courts should be very careful caref ul while applying this principle because the same expression expressed in a different context than the earlier one may have been intended by the legislature to have a different meaning. To find out, therefore, whether the same word should have the same meaning or not is a very difficult task  for the court. The courts while interpreting the same expression differently generally give the reason that their context is different. differ ent. Another reason for doing so may be that the word exists in a consolidating statute where it has been derived from two distinct enactments. Word of a statute must not be read in isolation but structurally and in their context, for their significance may vary with their  contextual setting. The context and object of the Act as envisaged by the legislature may indicate that the same word was not intended to be used in the same sense throughout the statute. Very often the legislature clarifies the application of the rule and guides the reader of the statute as to how the rule is to be applied by inserting the words ‘unless the context otherwise requires’ in the interpretation clause. The implication of these words in the interpretation clause is that it becomes amply clear that the presumption of same word same meaning stands unless the context in which the word shows that a different meaning must be given to it.

6 7

Expression means A word or phrase that particular people use in particular situation. Proposition means A task to be dealt with.

CHAPTER-3

Same Words in Statutes Pari Materia :-

Word defined in a statute may have the same meaning in another statute which is in pari materia therewith. If the language of the two statutes in all respects is identical no question of construing one Act with the assistance of the other Act can arise. It is only when where one Act is ambiguous or some provision appears to be of doubtful meaning that the assistance is sought from f rom another statute in pari material to remove the doubt or ambiguity. It is only in such circumstances that assistance in ascertaining the meaning of an enactment is permitted under this rule to be obtained by comparing its language with the words given in earlier statute relating to the same subject. Law of Limitation and the Civil Procedure Pr ocedure Code are statutes in pari materia m ateria and should be read together and taken and construed together as one system and explanatory of each other. The implication of this is that a particular word in the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 having a particular meaning will be presumed to have same meaning if it also occurs in the Limitation Act, 1963.

CHAPTER-4 Identical expressions expressions to have same meaning – Judicial Application -

The rule of same word same meaning has been applied and commented upon vastly by the judiciary while interpreting statutes. Case law is thus probably 8 the best source to view the application of this rule, its entire ramifications 9 and to see its developments and correct usage. Thus case law is the light that will illuminate 10 and give us a comprehensive 11 understanding of the rule. In D.D.Rego v. Rajiv Gandhi University of Health Sciences 12, the Karnataka High Court held that it is settled law that in matters relating to educational institutions if two interpretations are possible, the court would be reluctant13 to accept that which would upset and reverse the decision of the educational authorities and would accept the interpretation made by such institutions. Thus, when examination regulations for the purpose of declaration of  results were notified by the University and the candidates knew about the procedure to be adopted by the University fully well, they cannot turn around to say that the University regulations are contrary 14 to regulations framed by the Medical Council of India.

8

Probably means With considerable certainty; without much doubt. Ramification Ramification means The act of branching out or dividing into branches. 10 The word illuminate means Make free from confusion or ambiguity; make clear. 11 Comprehensive means Broad in scope. 12 AIR1999karn203. 13 Reluctant means Unwillingness to do something contrary to your custom. 14 Contrary means Very opposed in nature, character or purpose. 9

In Bhogilal v. State of Bombay 15, a charge of criminal 16 breach of trust was brought against the appellant 17, a cashier in a company. After the happening was discovered certain officers of the company discussed certain matters with the appellant in presence of solicitor 18 of the company. During the trial 19, the solicitor, who appeared appeared as a witness, witness, gave evidence 20 about the happenings which took  place in his presence and wanted to give certain notes in evidence under Section 157 of the Evidence Act as a previous statement of his. On the question whether  such statement has been used many times in different sections of the Act in its ordinary sense of something that is stated. It is a basic principle of interpretation that the same expression must have the same meaning unless the context demand otherwise. There is the nothing in the context so as to give a different differ ent meaning to the word statement used in Section 157 of the Act. It is not necessary that there should be an element of communication to some other person before that can be taken to be a statement. So construed 21, therefore, the statement in the form of  notes is admissible 22.

15

AIR1959SC356. Criminal means Someone who has committed a crime or has been legally convicted of a crime. 17 Appellant is The party who appeals a decision of a lower court. 18 Solicitor is A lawyer who gives legal advice and prepares legal documents. 19 Trial means the determination of a person's innocence or guilt by due process of law. 20 Evidence means all the means by which any alleged matter of fact whose truth is investigated at judicial trial is established or disproved. 21 Construed means Make sense of; assign a meaning to. 22 Admissible means Deserving to be admitted. 16

In N.T.Veluswami v. G. Raja Nainar 23, the appellant was a successful candidate in an election to the State Legislative Assembly. The respondent, a voter, filed an election petition challenging the election of the appellant on the ground that at the time of scrutiny of the nomination papers of all prospective candidates the nomination24 papers of all prospective candidates the nomination of one candidate was wrongly rejected. The appellant then tried to justify rejection on other grounds and the Election Tribunal 25 upheld that such grounds could be urged. The respondent then filed a writ petition on which the High Court ruled that the Tribunal could give its ruling only about the ground on which the nomination was rejected. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and stated that the whole controversy in this case resolves round the interpretation of the expression improperly rejected  used in section 100(1)(c) of the Representation of People Act, 1951. The word improper exists in section 100(1)(d)(i) also in relation to the grounds of disqualification mentioned in Section 36(2) of the Act. It was, therefore, held that the expression improper used in Section 100(1)(c) and 100(1) (d)(i) must be given the same meaning as there is nothing in the context to hold otherwise. In Maharaj Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh 26 , the word vest was being interpreted. The State Government was authorized under Section 117(1) of  the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1951 to declare hats, bazaars and melas which vested in the State shall vest in the Gaon Sabhas. The Supreme Court held that whereas vesting in the State was absolute vesting in the Gaon Sabhas was only for the limited purpose of possession and management.

23

AIR1959SC422. Nomination means The condition of having been proposed as a suitable candidate for appointment or election. 25 Tribunal means An assembly (including one or more judges) to conduct judicial business. 26 AIR1976SC2608. 24

In Lal Chand v. Radha Krishan 27 , the Court observed: “where the same expression is used in the same statute at different places the same meaning ought to be given to that expression as far as possible. In the intant case, the word ‘tenant’ has been used in more than one placein Section 19 of the Slum Areas(Improvement & Clearance) Act,1956, and it is only reasonable to construe it in the same sense throughout. So, in the absence of compelling circumstances, and in order to better effectuate the object of the Act, there is no reason why the word ‘tenant’ should not bear the same meaning in Section 19(1)(a) as in Section 19(4)(a). The policy of Act being that the slum dweller should not be evicted unless alternative accommodation is available to him, the word tenant in Section 19(1)(a) must for the purpose of advancing the remedy provided by the statute be construed to include a person against whom a decree or order for an eviction has been passed.

T hana28, In Shamrao Vishnu Parulekar v. District Magistrate, Thana interpretation of the word ‘statement’ under section 157 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and of the words ‘the grounds on which the order has been made’ under  section 3(3) and 7(1) of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 were involved. The Supreme Court held that the word ‘statement’ has been used in sections 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 32, 39, 145 and 157 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and in all these sections it has been used in same sense, that is to say, ‘something that is stated’. Therefore, where a prosecution witness who while recording his conversation with other witnesses has prepared notes, these notes could be used for corroboration under section 157 as these were ‘something ‘ something that is stated’. But, on the contrary, the Supreme Court also held that the words ‘the grounds on which the order has been made’ under section 3(3) and 7(1) of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 did not have the same meaning because the authority could withholds fact on ground of  public interest under section 7(2) while stating the grounds of detention to the detenue under section 7(1), but those facts could be stated to the State Government while reporting to it the grounds of detention under section 3(3).

27 28

(1977)2SCC88. AIR1957SC23.

In Raghubans Narain v. Government of Uttar Pradesh 29, the question involved was the interpretation of section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 which stated, ‘if the sum which, in opinion of the court, the collector ought to have awarded as compensation, the award of the court may direct that the Collector shall pay interest on such excess of the sum which the Collector did award as compensation, the award of the court may direct that the Collector shall pay interest on such excess at the rate of 6% per annum’. The argument of the appellant was that payment at the date of 6% interest was obligatory whereas the respondent contended that, that was the maximum limit of the interest to be paid. The Supreme Court said that payment at the rate r ate of 6% interest by the Collector has been mentioned in Section 34 of the Act also in those cases where amount of  compensation is not paid or deposited before taking possession of the land by the government. Observing the principle same expression to have same meaning unless context requires otherwise the Supreme Court held that first part of section 28 which uses the word may direct is non-obligatory, that is to say, the court may or may not direct the Collector to pay interest. But the latter part of the section using the word shall means mandatory, that is to say, that once the court has exercised its option that interest should be paid, there is no option except to pay the interest at the rate of 6%.

In Aswini Kumar Ghose v. Arabinda Bose 30, the Court observed : “The word ‘practise’ need not always mean ‘plead and act’. It is not necessary that the same word should be given the same meaning wherever it occurs in an Act, for the context excludes such meanings”.

29 30

AIR1967SC465. AIR1952SC369:1953SCR1.

CHAPTER-5 Conclusion :Having comprehensively studied the Rule of Identical expression to have same meaning from various facts including legal principles and rules related to them and analyzing their application and development in statutory interpretation through case laws it is clear that the rule is an integral part of statutory interpretation and greatly aids in reading and applying statutes. Thus the presumptions same word same meaning is subsidiary rules in name only. It play an important role in ascertaining the meaning of keywords in statutes and their proper application often results in being the decisive factor which determines the rights and liabilities of persons correctly and thus ensures justice. In fact the importance of this rule lies in the fact that it is not hard and fast rule. This rule, thus, is extremely important for correct statutory interpretation and it is hoped that the Courts will apply the rule identical expression to have same meaning constructively and in the interests of justice.

Table of Cases •

• • • • • • •

D.D.Rego v. Rajiv Gandhi University of Health Sciences. [AIR1999Karn203]. Bhogilal v. State of Bombay.[AIR1959SC356]. N.T.Veluswami v. G. Raja Nainar.[AIR1959SC422]. Maharaj Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh.[AIR1976SC2608]. Lal Chand v. Radha Krishan.[(1977)2SCC88]. Shamrao Vishnu Parulekar v. District Magistrate, Thana.[AIR1957SC23]. Raghubans Narain v. Government of Uttar Pradesh.[AIR1967SC465]. Aswini Kumar Ghose v. Arabinda Bose.[AIR1952SC369].

Bibliography and Webliography 1. Dr. Avtar Singh, Introduction to Interpretation of Statutes Statutes (New Delhi: Wadhwa and Company Law Publishers,2001). P ublishers,2001). 2. Jagdish Swarup, Legislation and and Interpretation (Allahabad: Dandewal Dandewal publishing House,1968). 3. Prof. T.Bhattachatyya, The Interpretation of Statutes. 4. Vepa P. Sarathi, The Interpretation of Statutes (Lucknow: Eastern Book  Company, 1975). 5. N.S.Bindra, Interpretation of Statutes (Revised by Justice K. Shanmukham) (Allahabad: The Law Book Company (p) Limited, 1997). 6. P. St. J. Langan, Maxwell on The Interpretation of of Statutes (Bombay: N.M.Tripathi Private Limited, 1976).