To what extent has the 'presumption of innocence' enunciated in the case Woolmington Woolmington v DPP [1935 !" #$% vis&a&vis criminal cases changed in light of the the uman (ights !ct 199)* Discuss+ History
The sixth century Digest 1 of Justinian (22.3.2) provides, as a general rule of evidence: Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat !roof lies on hi" #ho asserts, not on hi" #ho denies$. %t is there attri&uted to the second and third century 'urist !aul2. i"ilar to its o"anic predecessor, %sla"ic la# also holds the principle that the onus of proof is on the clai"ant, &ased on a hadith 3 docu"ented &y %"a" *a#a#i +. The collapse of estern estern -odern "pire "pire gave #ay to the the rise of feudalistic/ 'ustice syste". ithin it, there there #as no concept of presu"ption presu"ption of innocence. ather, it #as the duty of the accused to prove his 1 0lso no#n as the !andects (atin: Digesta seu Pandectae, adapted fro" 0ncient ree 4 pandektes pandektes5, 6allcontaining6), is a na"e given to a
co"pendiu" or digest of o"an la# co"piled &y order of the e"peror Justinian % in the 7th century (0D (0D /38/33). %t spans /8 volu"es, volu"es, and represented a reduction and codi9cation of all o"an la#s up to that ti"e. !rudentissi"us 2 Julius !aulus !rudentissi"us 3 ften translated as 6prophetic traditions6, "eaning the corpus of the
reports of the teachings, deeds and sayings of the %sla"ic prophet -uha""ad.
>) / Derived fro" ?eudalis" . The political, "ilitary, and social syste" in
the -iddle 0ges, &ased on the holding of lands in 9ef or fee and on the resulting relations &et#een lord and vassal.
innocence, either &y "eans of taing an oath of innocence or through undergoing lifethreatening ordeals. %t could thus &e reasona&ly inferred that the defendants #ere re@uired to prove p rove their innocence &eyond reasona&le dou&t.
Contemporary Development
The presu"ption presu"ption of innocence presu"es presu"es the defendant to &e innocent until proven guilty, #ith the prosecution re@uired to prove all the ele"ents of the oAence &eyond reasona&le dou&t. This principle #as laid do#n &y Biscount aney 7 in Woolming Woolm ington ton v DPP DP P7 : CThroughout the web o the English criminal law one golden thread is always to be seen ! that it is the duty o the prosecution to prove the prisoner"s guilt sub#ect to what $ have already said as to the deence o insanity and sub#ect also to any statutory e%ception&&&$
This 4golden thread5 thread5 #as su&se@uently ar"ed ar"ed in 0rticle 7(2) EF of the uropean Gonvention on Hu"an ights 18.
aney G 7 He has since &een recognised as ord aney > Woolmington v DPP I1F3/ 0G +72. E Hereafter no#n as 40rt7(2)5 F 4veryone charged #ith a cri"inal oAence shall &e presu"ed innocent
until proved guilty according to la#.5 18 Hereafter referred to as 4GH5
hile not a &urden of proof per se, the defendant in a cri"inal trial has an evidential &urden 11 #here he is seeing to rely on any co""on la# defence other than insanity. nce the defence &eco"es a live issue, the prosecution "ust again prove &eyond reasona&le dou&t that facts dictate other#ise &efore the 'ury can convict. Woolmington's decision #as profound as it changed the previous la#
&y re'ecting ?oster5s doctrine of the presu"ption of "alice 12. econdly, its reference to the duty of the prosecution to prove the accused5s guilt, and holding that the prosecution also had the &urden of disproving any co""on la# defences that the accused had speci9cally raised 13. Ho#ever it is dou&tful ho# far it has had either eAect, even after the Hu"an ights 0ct 1FFE1+. E%ceptions to the presumption
1. %nsanity
11 0n o&ligation on a party #ho #ishes to raise a particular issue to point
to so"e evidence that is capa&le of "aing the issue a live one, 9t for consideration &y a 'ury. 12 %n that case #ift J, an experienced 'udge had directed the 'ury that
once the prosecution had proved that the deceased had died at the hands of the accused, then that #as presu"ed to &e "urder unless the defendant could satisfy the 'ury that it #as an accident. %n this #ay the 'udge clearly placed on the defendant the &urden of proof of lac of "ens rea. Though heavily criticiKed &y today5s standards, there #as considera&le authority for it #as an accurate state"ent of la# in that ti"e. 13 % Dennis, The a# of vidence, + th edition, +/E. 1+ Hereafter no#n as 4H0 1FFEL
0part fro" his ordship5s exclusion in Woolmington, the authority of (c)aghten's *+ case clearly placed the &urden of proof of insanity on the
accused17 &ecause 4every "an is presu"ed to &e sane and to possess a sucient degree of reason to &e responsi&le for his cri"es, until the contrary &e proved to their satisfactionM5 1> Ho#ever in H v -
*.
, the
uropean Gourt of Hu"an ights 1F ruled that the insanity exception did not &reach 0rt 7(2) since the "ain concern #as the presu"ption of sanity.28 2. xpress tatutory eversal His ordship also excluded Cany statutory exception$ fro" the scope of presu"ption of innocence. tatutory exceptions are co""only said to &e of t#o types: express and i"plied. 21 hen express statutory provision o&liges the accused to prove his defence, it #ill auto"atically shift a legal &urden on hi" to prove his defence on the &alance of pro&a&ilities #ithout any assess"ent attached.
1/ (c)aghten (1E+3) 18 Gl. N ?in.288. 17 %an Dennis, /he 0aw o Evidence, +th edition, +/F. 1> Gharan'it ingh anda and -oha"ed a"'ohn, nlocking Evidence, 2nd
edition, 3/. 1E H v nited -ingdom 0ppn *o 1/823OEF, + 0pril 1FF8 (unreported). 1F Hereafter no#n as 4GtH5 28 -aureen pencer and John pencer, vidence, 2 nd edition, 1+. 21 % Dennis, /he 0aw o Evidence, +th dition,+78 +71.
0sh#orth and Plae 22 de"onstrated the extent to #hich !arlia"ent departed fro" Woolmington's principle in relation to indicta&le oAences. Their research found that no fe#er than +8 per cent of oAences tria&le in the Gro#n Gourt violated the presu"ption of innocence &y re@uiring the defendant to prove a statutory defence or disprove at least one ele"ent of the oAence. 23 3. %"plied tatutory eversal There are nu"&er of cases #here an enact"ent "ay &e constructed as i"pliedly i"posing a legal &urden on the accused. .181 of the -agistrates Gourts 0ct 1FE8 lays do#n the general principle in respect of su""ary oAences. The eAect of the section is that #here the conduct of the accused creates an oAence &ut in circu"stances #here the statute creates a defence in respect of an exception, exe"ption, proviso, excuse or @uali9cation, the &urden of proving of the defence #ill &e placed on the accused. The principle originates partly fro" the notion that it is favoura&le for the accused to prove that he falls #ithin the scope of defences &ecause of the access to the relevant infor"ation and partly fro" the original provision enacted in the s.3F(2) of the u""ary Jurisdiction 0ct 1E>F.2+
22 0sh#orth and Plae (The !resu"ption of %nnocence in nglish Gri"inal
a#, 1FF7 Gri". .. 387, at 38F) 23 % Dennis, /he 0aw o Evidence, +th dition, +71. 2+ Gharan'it ingh anda and -oha"ed a"'ohn, nlocking Evidence, 2nd
edition, 3>.
Presumption o $nnocence1 Post!H23 *44.
ince 2888, if the courts conclude that there is a violation of 0rt7(2), it can either "ae a declaration of inco"pati&ility under s.+ of the H0 1FFE or, alternatively, 4read do#n5 the provision under s.3, so that it &eco"es convention co"pliant. %n practice the latter is "ostly the preferred course for appellate courts.2/ 0ambert56 #as the 9rst case that de"onstrated this eAect 2> the
appellant #as convicted of possession of a class 0 controlled drug #ith intent to supply, contrary to s./(3) of the -isuse of Drugs 0ct 1F>1 2E. He #as found in possession of a &ag #hich contained the su&stance, and his defence, under s.2E, #as that he neither ne# nor suspected that the &ag contained the drugs and #as re@uired to &ear the legal &urden of proving this defence. He appealed on the grounds that the reversed onus 2F in the provision of s.2E conQicted #ith the presu"ption of innocence guaranteed &y 0rt7(2).38 The Gourt of 0ppeal dis"issed his appeal, as the House of ords, citing that the la# doesn5t operate retrospectively31. 2/ Durston, vidence: Text and -aterial, 183. 27 v a"&ert I2881 RSH 3> I2882 2 0.G I2881 2 Gr. 0pp & 2> This case is also a relevant exa"ple as to the application of an express
statutory reversal 2E -isuse of Drugs 0ct 1F>1, s./(3). 2F eversed legal &urden 38 ! -urphy, (urphy on Evidence,18th edition, 183. 31 This happened &efore the H0 1FFE ca"e into force.
*onetheless, in the o&iter the "a'ority of the House held the reverse legal &urden of s.2E #as inco"pati&le #ith 0rt7(2), as it had a high ris of #rongful conviction32. ith the result that s.2E "ust &e read as if it i"posed only an evidential &urden on the accused, the #ord 4proves5 as used in s.2E "ust &e construed to "ean 4give sucient evidence5, &y e"ploying s.3 of the H0 1FFE. /est o proportionality how could a reverse onus to be #usti8ed9
0s a result of 0ambert , it is su&"itted that the i"position of reverse legal &urdens of its prima acie:: inco"pati&le #ith 0rt7 of the GH, and "ust &e scrutiniKed #ith great care in light of the principle of proportionality.
3+
Ho#ever, House of ords also "ade it clear that not all legal &urdens #ere placed on a defendant in cri"inal trial violated the GH or 0rt7(2) in particular. The court held, it #as not an a&solute right in all the circu"stances. %n ;alabiaku v
&alance of pro&a&ilities that he did not no# that the pacage contained controlled drugs. %f the 'ury is in dou&t in this issue, they "ust convict hi"Ma guilty verdict "ay &e returned in respect of an oAence punisha&le &y life i"prison"ent even though the 'ury "ay consider that it is reasona&ly possi&le that the accused had &een duped.$ 33 atin for 4on its face5. efers to esta&lishing a case &y 9rstly looing at
the &are facts. 3+ ! -urphy, (urphy on Evidence,18th edition, F8. 3/ ;alabiaku v F GtH. 37 regory Durston, vidence: Text and -aterial,18+.
Hence the courts "ust ensure every reverse onus clause in nglish la# "ust &e "easured for convention co"pliance. 0lthough it is apparent that the onus on those seeing to persuade the courts that a reverse &urden is necessary is heavy, the courts continue to uphold such provisions. %n ;heldrake:7 their ordships also concluded that #hen conducting an assess"ent of proportionality, it #as necessary to &alance society5s interest in the eAective suppression of a social "ischief against the defendant5s right to a fair trial. hen #eighing up these t#o co"peting interests, several factors 3E could &e considered. This test depends upon the circu"stances of the individual case. %t follo#s that a legislative interference #ith the presu"ption of innocence re@uires 'usti9cation and "ust not &e greater than is necessary. The test of proportionality re@uires courts to consider #hether there #as a necessity to i"pose a legal &urden on the accused. 3F ,an Dennis- six cardinal rules
%an Dennis has su""ariKed the follo#ing factors to &e taen into account #hen applying the test of proportionality 'udicial deference, classi9cation of the oAence, construction of cri"inal lia&ility, signi9cance of "axi"u" penalty, ease of proof and peculiar no#ledge, presu"ption of %nnocence. 3> ;heldrake v DPP I288+RSH +3. 3E 0"ongst the" #ere the severity of the oAence in ter"s of potential
sentence, the ease of proof for one party or the other in relation to esta&lishing the reverse &urden, and the danger of convicting the innocent. 3F ! -urphy, (urphy on evidence, 18th edition, F2.
.udicial deference
%n response to the H0 1FFE, ho# far should the courts defer to the 'udg"ent of !arlia"entU %n the case of =ohnstone>?, ord *icholls has stressed that C!arlia"ent, not the court, is charged #ithM. #hat should &e the constituent ele"ents of a cri"inal oAence, the court #ill reach a diAerent conclusion fro" the legislature only #hen it is apparent the legislature has attached insucient i"portance to the funda"ental right of an individual to &e presu"ed innocent until proved guilty.$ ord oolf GJ too a si"ilar approach +1 , ruling that the assu"ption should &e that !arlia"ent #ould not have "ade an exception to the presu"ption of innocence #ithout good reason.
+2
Ho#ever, in ;heldrake ord Pingha" cast dou&t on ord oolf5s proposition, saying that such an approach "ay lead the courts to give too "uch #eight to the enact"ent and too little to the presu"ption of innocence and the o&ligation i"posed &y s3 of the H0 1FFE. *onetheless, he reiterated in @rown v ;cott
+3
that su&stantial respect
should &e paid &y the courts to the considered decisions of de"ocratic asse"&lies and govern"ents.
+8 =ohnstoneI2883 RSH 3>. +1 3ttorney!Aeneral's 2eerence B)o&* o 5??> I288+ G0 Gri" 182/. +2 % Dennis, /he 0aw o Evidence, +th dition, +>/. +3 @rown v ;cott I2883 1 0.G. 7E1
The divergence of vie#s leaves the issue rather unclear. Ho#ever, ord Hope5s state"ent in -ebilene>>, #hich re@uired the courts to "ae a distinction &et#een the legiti"ate ai" and the proportionality, could &e considered. %n identifying a legiti"ate ai" re@uires the courts to consider the policy goals of cri"inalisation &eing pursued &y the relevant provision. Then, the courts should as the"selves #hether the i"position of the reverse onus is proportionate to achieve !arlia"ent5s intentions. %an Dennis stressed that a strong principle of deference #ould see" to &e inappropriate, if there is no evidence that the !arlia"ent gave thought to the presu"ption of innocence #hen it enacted the reverse onus. %t should al#ays &e re"e"&ered that the i"portance of 0rt7(2) should al#ays prevail. %t is for the state to 'ustify derogation fro" the presu"ption of innocence and 'ustifying argu"ents should &e co"pelling if they are to succeed.
+/
"lassi/cation of 0ences
%n ;heldrake, Jac J referred to the recognised distinction &et#een truly cri"inal oAences and those #hich are regulatory and suggested that it is
++ v Director of !u&lic !rosecutions, x !arte Se&eline and thers I1FFF
RSH +3 +/ % Dennis, The a# of vidence, + th dition, +>++>7.
easier to 'ustify an interference #ith the presu"ption of innocence the lo#er in the scale the oAences is.
+7
Ho#ever classi9cation of oAences into mala in se>7 and mala prohibita>. is said to &e pro&le"atic as a guide to 'usti9a&le proportionality
of a reverse onus. ?irst, the distinction is not particularly de9nitive. %f it depends on the "oral @uality of the act then it is liely to &e contesta&le, #hile so"e oAences are attached #ith the "orally reprehensi&le colour &ut it only punisha&le under regulatory legislation only #ith a 9ne, as illustrated in Davies v Health and ;aety E%ecutive>4. %f the distinction depends on penalties, so that regulatory oAences are characterised as generally punisha&le &y 9ne, ho#ever "any regulatory oAences no# carry the possi&ility of a custodial sentence on conviction. -oreover, so"e su""ary oAences punisha&le only &y a 9ne "ay &e far fro" C"ere regulatory cri"inality$ &ut "ay &e Cof great social and e"otional i"portance to a large nu"&er of people$
/8
+7 % Dennis, /he 0aw o Evidence, +th dition, +>7. +> (the singular is "alu" in se) is a ter" that signi9es cri"e that is
considered #rong in and of itself. The phrase is atin and literally "eans #rong in itself. +E the atin ter" for 6#rong &ecause they are prohi&ited.6 +F Davies v Health and ;aety E%ecutive I2882 G0 Gri" 2F+F an
e"ployer #as charged under health and safety legislation #ith failure to ensure that his e"ployees #ere not to exposed to health and safety riss. The relevant e"ployee had died. /8 % Dennis, /he 0aw o Evidence, +th dition, +>7.
econdly, it does not follo# that a statutory defence to a regulatory oAence #ill &e any easier for the defendant to prove than an e@uivalent defence to a truly cri"inal oAence. There is no necessary relationship &et#een the degree of onerousness
/1
of a reverse onus and the type of
cri"e involved./2 u""ing up, the classi9cation is sho#n to &e dependent on the 'udges5 personal opinion, #hich "ay &e diAerent fro" each other. %n ;heldrake, t#o of the divisional court 'udges thought that an oAence #as
not a regulatory "atter, #hile Herin@ues J concluded the contrary. "onstruction of criminal lia2ilit4 elements of oences and defences+
The general rule is that presu"ption of innocence re@uires the prosecution to prove all essential ele"ents of oAences. %n 3ttorney! Aeneral or Hong -ong v 0ee -wong!kut /3ord oolf re"ared that if the
prosecution retained responsi&ility for proving the essential ingredient of the oAence, the less liely it is that an exception #ill &e regarded as unaccepta&le. %n 0ambert ord Hope distinguished &et#een the essential ele"ents of the oAence and defence of the type referred to in Edwards+>, suggest that reversing onus of such defence is "ore easily 'usti9ed. /1 Having or involving o&ligations or responsi&ilities, especially legal ones,
that out#eigh the advantages /2 % Dennis, /he 0aw o Evidence, +th dition, +>>. /3 3ttorney!Aeneral or Hong -ong v 0ee -wong!kut I1FF3 0.G.F/1. /+ 2 v Edward I1F>/ VP 2>.
%n the sa"e case, ord teyn noted the diAerence &et#een the ele"ent of the oAence and defensive issues #as so"eti"es only a "atter of drafting techni@ue. He suggested that it #as prefera&le to focus on "oral &la"e#orthiness. Defences such as those discussed in Edwards should &e distinguished fro" Cother cases #here the defence is so closely lined #ith "ens rea and "oral &la"e#orthiness that it #ould derogate fro" the presu"ption of innocence to transfer the legal &urden to the defendant$. %n 3A's 2eerence B)o&> o 5??5 //the courts held that 0rt7(2) re@uires the prosecution to prove the 4true nature5 of the oAence. 0pplication of this principle did not depend on for"al statutory separation of ele"ents and defences. igni/cance of maximum penalt
enerally the #eight of presu"ption of innocence ought to increase in proportion to the gravity of the oAence. %n 0ambert , ord teyn attached i"portance to the penalty of life i"prison"ent #hen reading do#n the reverse onuses in that case. %n ;heldrake, the House upheld the reverse onus, as the "axi"u" penalty of the oAence #as six "onths. %n 3A's 2eerence B)o&> o 5??5 the House read do#n the reverse onus, #here
the "axi"u" penalty #as 18 years. These 3 cases #ere dee"ed to &e co"pati&le of the guideline. Ho#ever, in =ohnstone the "axi"u" penalty for the oAence is sa"e #ith the a&ove"entioned 3A's 2eerence case, yet the House upheld the reverse onus. %t #ould see" that "axi"u" penalties are a very uncertain // 3ttorney!Aeneral's 2eerence B)o&> o 5??5 I2883G0 Gri" >72.
guide as to #hether a reverse onus #ill &e held to &e proportionate to the legiti"ate ai" of the oAence in @uestion. %t ought to &e the case that the "ore serious the oAence the "ore co"pelling should &e the 'usti9cation for a reverse onus, &ut application of such a principle has &een patchy to say the least.
/7
6ase of proof and peculiar 7nowledge
ase of proof is &y no "eans the sa"e concept as peculiar no#ledge. %n so"e circu"stances defendant doesn5t have peculiar no#ledge (i.e possession of a licence), &ecause that no#ledge is availa&le to prosecution fro" evidence (i.e registers), &ut it is "ore &urdenso"e and costly to locate it. n the other hand, so"eti"es defendant does have peculiar no#ledge />, &ut this doesn5t "ean that it #ill &e easier for hi" to prove the a&sence of "ens rea than prosecution to prove its presence.
/E
%n -ebilene ord Hope suggest that in striing the &alance re@uired &y the principle of proportionality, one of the @uestions to &e ased #as #hether the &urden on the defendant related to so"ething that #as #ithin his no#ledge or to #hich he readily had access. This suggestion is follo#ed &y ord *icholls in =ohnstone, he referred to defendant5s o#n /7 % Dennis, /he 0aw o Evidence, +th dition, +>F. /> 0s he has privilege to access to his intention, no#ledge or &elief. /E % Dennis, /he 0aw o Evidence, +th dition, +E8.
no#ledge or ready access as alternative relevant factors in a decision a&out co"pati&ility of a reverse onus. Gonversely, it should also &e re"e"&ered that in 0ambert the factor of the defendant5s peculiar no#ledge did not prevail over considerations of a "axi"u" penalty of life i"prison"ent and the unfairness of convicting the defendant #here the 'ury thought that his story #as as liely to &e as true as not. 0 reverse onus is to &e 'usti9ed &y reference of ease of proof the focus should &e on the #eight i"pose on the defendant &ut not loo into #hether it #ould &e dicult for the prosecution to prove guilt, as even #here proof of guilt #ould &e dicult for the prosecution, doesn5t "ean that it is easy for defendant to disprove his guilt. Ho#ever in (akuwa+4 the Gourt of 0ppeal upheld a reverse onus under s.31 of the %""igration and 0sylu" 0ct 1FFF, al"ost entirely on the &asis of the diculty of proof for the prosecution. The court glossed over any diculties of proof that the defendant "ight have, e"phasising instead the policy need to "aintain proper i""igration controls &y restricting the use of forged passports. %n contrast the Divisional Gourt held in DPP v Wright 6?, that a &urden on the defendant to prove that his hunting #as Cexe"pt$, #ould &e Coppressive, disproportionate, unfair, and an unnecessary intrusion on the
/F (akuwaI2887 G0 Gri" 1>/. 78 DPP v Wright I288F HG Gri" 18/.
presu"ption of innocence.$ chedule 1 of the Hunting 0ct 288+ contained a list of exe"pt for"s of hunting: so"e of the "atters #ould &e #ithin defendant5s no#ledge, so"e #ould &e easy for hi" to prove, &ut so"e #ould &e neither. %n these circu"stances the 0ct should &e read as i"posing only an evidential &urden on the defendant once the prosecution ne# #hich for" of exe"ption #as in issue it #ould not &e unduly &urdenso"e to re@uire the" to disprove it.
Presumption of ,nnocence
!resu"ption has &een said to &e the foundation of the right to fair trial under 0rt 7. Do"estic courts that have to decide on 'usti9a&ility of reverse onuses #ill generally &e doing so &efore then trial #hen rulings on the &urden of proof have to &e "ade. There are 3 diAerent conceptions of the presu"ption. The 9rst conception focuses "ore on process than outco"e the presu"ption is seen as a nor" of fairness rather than an instru"ent to ensure accuracy. This is the tras&ourg court5s approach #hich has e"phasised procedural of presu"ption of innocence. The second conception of the presu"ption, #hich descri&ed as a "orally su&stantive conception, e"phasises fairness
in &oth process and outco"e. The third one is descri&ed &y o&ert and ;ucer"an as Ca nor"ative "oral and legal standard encapsulating a strong co""it"ent to avoiding #rongful convictions, rather than a recipe for factual inference and ad'udication$ This characterises the presu"ption as a device for the avoidance of a particular outco"e of cri"inal proceedings. %t &eco"es a protective device rule for the defendant against the ris of error in ad'udication 71.72 nglish la# favours a "ore "orally su&stantive vie# of the presu"ption of innocence. ord teyn conceived the presu"ption as ensuring the issues of the defendant5s "oral &la"e#orthiness had to &e proved &y the prosecution. ne of ord teyn5s reasons for re'ecting a reverse onus in 0ambert #as that it #ould o&lige the court to convict the defendant #here it thought his version of fact #as as liely to &e true as not. This #as thought to &e unfair and unaccepta&le for an oAence punisha&le #ith life i"prison"ent. ord Pingha" too a si"ilar approach in 3ttorney! Aeneral's 2eerence B)o > o 5??5 to reverse the onus under s11(2) of the Terroris" 0ct 2888. Conclusion
Golin Tapper su""arises presu"ption of innocence to &e Ca funda"ental rule of cri"inal procedure$ and it is rightly so. 0nd yet 0ambert's case stands out to sho# us 'ust exactly #hat happens #hen this
ruling is carelessly ignored. o"e legal syste"s today have e"ployed de 71 4Judge"ent5 72 % Dennis, /he 0aw o Evidence, +th dition, +E3.
#ure6: presu"ptions of guilt, such as at an order to sho# cause cri"inal
proceeding. ther#ise, accusations of presu"ption of guilt generally do not i"ply an actual legal presu"ption of guilt, &ut rather denounce failures to ensure that suspects are treated #ell and are oAered good defence conditions. xa"ples include the #rongful detention of suspects in uantana"o Pay 7+ 0rt7(2) #ill continue to have a lasting i"pact on the RS5s legal syste"s, as #ell as throughout the rest of the uropean Rnion.
73 expression that "eans 6concerning la#6, as contrasted #ith de facto,
#hich "eans 6concerning fact6. 7+ 0lso referred to as uantWna"o, &ay or T- (pronounced Lgit"oL),
a Rnited tates "ilitary prison located #ithin uantana"o Pay *aval Pase, #hich fronts on uantWna"o Pay in Gu&a.
Bibliography @ooks
Dennis %, /he 0aw o Evidence (+th edn, #eet N -ax#ell 2813) -urphy !, (urphy on Evidence, (18th edition R!, xford 2818) Gharan'it and -oha"ed , nlocking Evidence (2nd edition, outledge 2813) pencer - and pencer J , Evidence, (2nd edition) Durston , Evidence1 /e%t and (aterial 3rticles
Dennis %, 4everse nuses and the !resu"ption of %nnocence: %n earch of !rinciple5 I288/ Gri" 1E F81F37 0sh#orth and Plae, LThe !resu"ption of %nnocence in nglish Gri"inal a#,L 1FF7 Gri". .. 387, at 38F
/able o ;tatutes
Hu"an ights 0ct 1FFE -agistrates Gourts 0ct 1FE8, s.181 u""ary Jurisdiction 0ct 1E>F, s.3F(2) -isuse of Drugs 0ct 1F>1, s./(3). -isuse of Drugs 0ct 1F>1,s.2E. Hunting 0ct 288+, chedule 1. Terroris" 0ct 2888,s.11(2) uropean Gonvention on Hu"an ights, 0rt7(2) s.31 %""igration and 0sylu" 0ct 1FFF
/able o Cases
-c*aghten (1E+3) 18 Gl. N ?in.288. ool"ington v D!! I1F3/ 0G +72. H v Rnited Singdo" 0ppn *o 1/823OEF, + 0pril 1FF8 (unreported). v a"&ert I2881 RSH 3> I2882 2 0.G I2881 2 Gr. 0pp. ala&iau v ?rance (0O1+10) (1FF1) 13 .H... 3>F GtH. heldrae v D!! I288+RSH +3. JohnstoneI2883 RSH 2E. 0ttorneyeneral5s eference (*o.1 of 288+) I288+ G0 Gri" 182/. Pro#n v cott I2883 1 0.G. 7E1 Davies v Health and afety xecutive I2882 G0 Gri" 2F+F v Director of !u&lic !rosecutions, x !arte Se&eline and thers I1FFF RSH +3 0ttorneyeneral for Hong Song v ee S#ongut I1FF3 0.G.F/1 v d#ard I1F>/ VP 2>. 0ttorneyeneral5s eference (*o.+ of 2882) I2883G0 Gri" >72. -au#aI2887 G0 Gri" 1>/.
D!! v right I288F HG Gri" 18/.
