PALS-Bar-Ops-Pilipinas-Must-Read-Cases-CIVIL-2015.docx

Civil Law

MUST READ CASES (CIVIL LAW) PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS Tanada vs Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27 (1985) Article 2 of the NCC does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. Tanada vs Tuvera,146 SCRA 446 (1986) If the law provides for its own effectivity date, then it takes effect on the said date, subject to the requirement of publication. The clause “unless otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not the to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. LA BUAL-B’LAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION INC. v. RAMOS, G.R. No. 127882, January 27, 2004 While the effectivity clause of E.O. No. 279 does not require its publication, it is not a ground for its invalidation since the Constitution, being "the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation," is deemed written in the law. Hence, the due process clause, which, so Tañada held, mandates the publication of statutes, is read into Section 8 of E.O. No. 279. Additionally, Section 1 of E.O. No. 200 which provides for publication "either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines," finds suppletory application. It is significant to note that E.O. No. 279 was actually published in the Official Gazette on August 3, 1987. Roy vs CA, G.R. NO 80718 Jan. 29, 1988 The term “laws” do not include decisions of the Supreme Court because lawyers in the active practice must keep abreast of decisions, particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated and published in advanced reports and the SCRA. Ty v. Cam G.R. NO. 127406, Nov. 27, 2000 The two marriages involved in this case was entered during the effectivity of the New Civil Code. The Family Code has retroactive effect unless there be impairment of vested rights. Floresca vs Philex Mining Corp.,G.R. 30642, April 30, 1985 The application or interpretation placed by the Supreme Court upon a law is part of the law as of the date of its enactment since the court’s application or interpretation merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the construed law purports to carry into effect.

Civil Law Dorn vs. Romillo G.R. NO.L-68470 October 8, 1985 Van

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, RCPI vs CA, 143 SCRA 657 (1986) Dionela filed a complaint for damages against RCPI alleging that the defamatory words on the telegram sent to him not only wounded his feelings but also caused him undue embarrassment and affected his business as well as because other people have come to know of said defamatory words. There is a clear case of breach of contract by the petitioner in adding extraneous and libelous matters in the message sent to Dionela. Gashme Shookat Baksh vs CA,219 SCRA115 (1993) Where a man’s promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to article 21 of the new civil code not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the wilful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. University of the East vs Jader, G.R. NO. 132344, Feb. 7, 2000 A law student was allowed to graduate by his school with a failing grade but was later on prohibited by the said school to take the bar exams. The negligent act of a professor who fails to observe the rules of the school, for instance by not promptly submitting a student's grade, is not only imputable to the professor but is an act of the school, being his employer. SPOUSES HING v. ALEXANDER CHOACHUY, SR. G.R. No. 179736. June 26, 2013 Thus, an individual’s right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code should not be confined to his house or residence as it may extend to places where he has the right to exclude the public or deny them access. The phrase "prying into the privacy of another’s residence," therefore, covers places, locations, or even situations which an individual considers as private. And as long as his right is recognized by society, other individuals may not infringe on his right to privacy. The CA, therefore, erred in limiting the application of Article 26(1) of the Civil Code only to residences. WILLAWARE PRODUCTS CORPORATION vs. JESICHRIS MANUFACTURING CORPORATION

G.R. No. 195549, September 3, 2014

The concept of "unfair competition" under Article 28 is very much broader than that covered by intellectual property laws. Article 28 of the Civil Code provides that "unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or industrial enterprises or in labor through the use of force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or high-handed method shall give rise to a right of action by the person who thereby suffers damage." Geluz vs CA, July 20, 1961 It is unquestionable that the appellant’s act in provoking the abortion of appellee’s wife, without medical necessity to warrant it, was a criminal and morally reprehensible act, that cannot be to severely condemned; and the consent of the woman or that of her husband does not excuse it. But the immorality or illegality of the act does not justify an award of damage that, under the circumstances on record, have no factual or legal basis. Quimiguing vs ICAO, 34 SCRA 132 (1970 A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided under article 40 of the civil code. Cariño v. Cariño, G.R. NO. 132529 , Feb. 02, 2001 351 SCRA 127 Whether or not the certification by the registrar of the non-existence of marriage license is enough to prove non-issuance thereof. The records reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license number and, as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such marriage license. Alcantara v. Alcantara, G.R. NO. 167746 , Aug. 28,2007 531 SCRA 446 Whether or not, a marriage license issued by a municipality or city to a non-resident invalidates the license. Issuance of a marriage license in a city or municipality, not the residence of either of the contracting parties, and issuance of a marriage license despite the absence of publication or prior to the completion of the 10-day period for publication are considered mere irregularities that do not affect the validity of the marriage Niñal vs. Bayadog 328 SCRA 122, March 14, 2000 In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent’s marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day because their cohabitation is not exclusive. The Court ruled that the cohabitation contemplated under said provisions must be in the “nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract” and “characterized by exclusivity meaning nothird party was involved at anytime within the 5 years andcontinuity that is unbroken.

Soriano v. Felix, L-9005, June 20, 1958

The affidavit is for the purpose of proving the basis for exemption from the marriage license. Even if there is failure on the part of the solemnizing officer to execute the necessary affidavit, such irregularity will not invalidate the marriage for the affidavit is not being required of the parties. Morigo v. People, G.R. NO. 145226 , Feb. 6, 200 The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage. MINORU FUJIKI v. MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, G.R. No. 196049, June 26, 2013 The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LIBERTY D. ALBIOS, G.R. No. 198780. October 16, 2013 A marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship is NOT void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent. Under Article 2 of the Family Code, consent is an essential requisite of marriage. Article 4 of the same Code provides that the absence of any essential requisite shall render a marriage void ab initio. Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the presence of a solemnizing officer. A "freely given" consent requires that the contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under Articles 45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue influence. Consent must also be conscious or intelligent, in that the parties must be capable of intelligently understanding the nature of, and both the beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their act. Their understanding should not be affected by insanity, intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism. Juliano-Llave v. Republic, G.R. NO. 169766 , Mar. 30, 2011 646 SCRA 637 The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated in 1958, solemnized under civil and Muslim rites. The only law in force governing marriage relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950, under the provisions of which only one marriage can exist at any given time. Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera, G.R. NO. 80116 June 30, 1989

Whether or not, the complainant, a foreigner, qualify as an offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree under his national law prior to his filing the criminal complaint. The person who initiates the adultery case must be an offended spouse, and by this is meant that he is still married to the accused spouse, at the time of the filing of the complaint.

Recio vs. Recio G.R. NO. 138322. October 2, 2001 Whether or not the divorce must be proved before it is to be recognized in the Philippines. Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient. Rep. v. Orbecido, G.R. NO. 154380, Oct. 05, 2005 Whether or not, a Filipino Spouse can remarry under ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE where his,her spouse is later naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry. The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry. Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, G.R.NO. 186571, Aug. 11, 2010 In Gerbert’s case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This Section requires proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. Santos v. Court of Appeals, 240 SCRA 20 (1995) The Supreme Court enumerated the three basic requirements of “psychological incapacity” as a ground for declaration of nullity of the marriage: (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability. Chi Ming Tsoi vs CA, 266 SCRA 324 (1997) In this case, there was no sexual contact between the parties since their marriage on May 22, 1988 up to Mar. 15, 1989 or for almost a year. The senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties of sexual cooperation for the procreation of children is equivalent to psychological incapacity. Ochosa v. Alano, G.R. NO. 167459 , Jan. 26, 2011 640 SCRA 517

In this case the court proved that respondent was the sex partner of many military officials. In view of the foregoing, the badges of Bona’s alleged psychological incapacity, i.e., her sexual infidelity and abandonment, can only be convincingly traced to the period of time after her marriage to Jose and not to the inception of the said marriage.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RODOLFO O. DE GRACIA G.R. No. 171577, February 12, 2014 “Psychological incapacity,” as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, should refer to no less than a mental – not merely physical – incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code, among others, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of “psychological incapacity” to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. Mendoza v. Republic, G.R. NO. 157649,Nov 12, 2012 685 SCRA 16 Here, the expert’s testimony on Dominic’s psychological profile did not identify, much less prove, the root cause of his psychological incapacity because said expert did not examine Dominic in person before completing her report but simply relied on other people’s recollection and opinion for that purpose. Expert evidence submitted here did not establish the precise cause of the supposed psychological incapacity of Dominic, much less show that the psychological incapacity existed at the inception of the marriage. Marcos vs Marcos, 343 SCRA 755 (2000) If the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to. VALERIO E. KALAW vs. MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ G.R. No. 166357, January 14, 2015 Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the abandonment of Molina in this case. We simply declare that, as aptly stated by Justice Dante O. Tinga in Antonio v. Reyes, there is need to emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the risk of being redundant, we reiterate once more the principle that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals. Tenebro v. CA, G.R. NO. 150758 , Feb. 18, 2004 423 SCRA 272

Whether or not, the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of PI is a valid defense for the crime of bigamy. The declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is not an indicator that petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity.

Nollora v. People, G.R. NO.191425 , Sept. 7, 2011 657 SCRA 330 Indeed, Article 13(2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws states that "[i]n case of a marriage between a Muslim and a non-Muslim, solemnized not in accordance with Muslim law or this Code, the [Family Code of the Philippines, or Executive Order NO. 209, in lieu of the Civil Code of the Philippines] shall apply." Thus, regardless of his professed religion, Nollora cannot claim exemption from liability for the crime of bigamy. Rep. v. Nolasco, G.R. NO. 94053 , Mar. 17, 1993 220 SCRA 20 In the case at bar, the Court considers that the investigation allegedly conducted by respondent in his attempt to ascertain Janet Monica Parker's whereabouts is too sketchy to form the basis of a reasonable or well-founded belief that she was already dead. When he arrived in San Jose, Antique after learning of Janet Monica's departure, instead of seeking the help of local authorities or of the British Embassy, he secured another seaman's contract and went to London, a vast city of many millions of inhabitants, to look for her there. Valdez v. Republic, G.R. NO.180863 , Sept. 08, 2009 598 SCRA 646 Since death is presumed to have taken place by the seventh year of absence, Sofio is to be presumed dead starting October 1982. To retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code requiring petitioner to exhibit "well-founded belief" will, ultimately, result in the invalidation of her second marriage, which was valid at the time it was celebrated. Rep. v. Tango, G.R. NO.161062 , Jul. 31, 2009 594 SCRA 560 By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall be immediately final and executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the trial court’s judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code CELERINA J. SANTOS vs. RICARDO T. SANTOS, G.R. No. 187061, 08 OCTOBER 2014 The proper remedy for a judicial declaration of presumptive death obtained by extrinsic fraud is an action to annul the judgment. An affidavit of reappearance is not the proper remedy when the person declared presumptively dead has never been absent. Ong v. Ong, G.R. NO. 153206, Oct. 23, 2006 505 SCRA 76 Also without merit is the argument of William that since Lucita has abandoned the family, a decree of legal separation should not be granted, following Art. 56, par. (4) of the Family Code which provides that legal separation shall be denied when both parties have given ground for

legal separation. The abandonment referred to by the Family Code is abandonment without justifiable cause for more than one year.

Pacete vs. Carriaga, G.R. NO. 53880, Mar. 17, 1994 231 SCRA 321 Whether or not, the order declaring in default a respondent in a legal separation case amounts to grave abuse of discretion. In case of non- appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not a collusion between the parties exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated. Arcaba vs. Batocael, G.R. NO.146683 , Nov.22, 2001 370 SCRA 414 Respondents having proven by a preponderance of evidence that Cirila and Francisco lived together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, the inescapable conclusion is that the donation made by Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the Family Code. Dewara v. Lamela G.R. NO. 179010, Apr. 11, 2011 647 SCRA 483 All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Registration in the name of the husband or the wife alone does not destroy this presumption. BOBBY TAN, v. GRACE ANDRADE, ET AL. v. BOBBY TAN, G.R. No. 172017 / G.R. No. 171904 August 7, 2013 The presumption under Article 160 of the New Civil Code, that property acquired during marriage is conjugal, does not apply where there is no showing as to when the property alleged to be conjugal was acquired. The presumption cannot prevail when the title is in the name of only one spouse and the rights of innocent third parties are involved. Moreover, when the property is registered in the name of only one spouse and there is no showing as to when the property was acquired by same spouse, this is an indication that the property belongs exclusively to the said spouse. Moreover, the presumption may be rebutted only with strong, clear, categorical and convincing evidence. There must be strict proof of the exclusive ownership of one of the spouses, and the burden of proof rests upon the party asserting it. Villegas v. Lingan G.R. NO. 153839 , Jun. 29, 2007 526 SCRA 63 Consequently, as correctly held by the CA, Marilou acquired ownership of the subject property. All rights and title of the judgment obligor are transferred upon the expiration of the right of redemption. And where the redemption is made under a property regime governed by the conjugal partnership of gains, Article 109 of the Family Code provides that property acquired by right of redemption is the exclusive property of the spouses redeeming the property. Ferrer v. Ferrer, G.R. NO.166496 , Nov. 29, 2006 508 SCRA 570

The obligation to reimburse rests on the spouse upon whom ownership of the entire property is vested. There is no obligation on the part of the purchaser of the property, in case the property is sold by the owner- spouse.

Pana v. Heirs of Jose Juanite G.R. NO. 164201,Dec. 10, 2012 687 SCRA 414 Contrary to Efren’s contention, Article 121 above allows payment of the criminal indemnities imposed on his wife, Melecia, out of the partnership assets even before these are liquidated. Indeed, it states that such indemnities "may be enforced against the partnership assets after the responsibilities enumerated in the preceding article have been covered." No prior liquidation of those assets is required. MBTC v. Pascual, G.R. NO. 163744, Feb. 29, 2008 547 SCRA 246 Termination of Conjugal Property Regime does not ipso facto End the Nature of Conjugal Ownership. While the declared nullity of marriage of Nicholson and Florencia severed their marital bond and dissolved the conjugal partnership, the character of the properties acquired before such declaration continues to subsist as conjugal properties until and after the liquidation and partition of the partnership. Espinosa v. Omaña, AC. 9081, Oct 12, 2011 659 SCRA 1 Extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without judicial approval is void. The Court has also ruled that a notary public should not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage and the family by encouraging the separation of the spouses and extrajudicially dissolving the conjugal partnership, which is exactly what Omaña did in this case. The "Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay" has no legal effect and is against public policy. Diño v. Diño, G.R. NO. 178044, Jan. 19, 2011 640 SCRA 178 The trial court erred in ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued only after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. The ruling has no basis because Section 19(1) of the Rule does not apply to cases governed under Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code. JUAN SEVILLA, JR. v. EDEN VILLENA AGUILA, G.R. No. 202370, September 23, 2013 Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code, as in this case. Under this property regime, property acquired during the marriage is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through the couple’s joint efforts and governed by the rules on co-ownership. In the present case, Salas did not rebut this presumption. In a similar case where the ground for nullity of marriage was also psychological incapacity, we held that the properties acquired during the union of the parties, as found by both the RTC and the CA, would be governed by co-ownership.

Valdes vs. RTC Br. 102, QC G.R. NO. 122749, Jul. 31, 1996 260 SCRA 221

Whether or not, Articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code govern the disposition of the family dwelling in cases where a marriage is declared void ab initio, including a marriage declared void by reason of the psychological incapacity of the spouses. The rules set up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages (in the latter case until the contract is annulled), are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between common-law spouses. Cariño v. Cariño, G.R. NO. 132529, Feb. 02, 2001 351 SCRA 127 As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, Article 147 of the Family Code governs. This article applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons, like the absence of a marriage license San Luis v. San Luis G.R. NO. 133743, Feb. 06, 2007 514 SCRA 294 In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under Article 144 76 of the Civil Code SERCONSISION R. MENDOZA vs. AURORA MENDOZA FERMIN G.R. No. 177235, July 07, 2014 As Leonardo and Serconsision were married sometime in 1985, the applicable provision governing the property relations of the spouses is Article 172 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which states that the wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the husband’s consent. In Felipe vs. Heirs of Maximo Aldon, a case decided under the provisions of the Civil Code, the Supreme Court had the occasion to rule that the sale of a land belonging to the conjugal partnership made by the wife without the consent of the husband is voidable. The Supreme Court further ruled that the view that the disposal by the wife of their conjugal property without the husband’s consent is voidable is supported by Article 173 of the Civil Code which states that contracts entered by the husband without the consent of the wife when such consent is required are annullable at her instance during the marriage and within ten years from the transaction questioned. In the present case, the fictitious Deed of Absolute Sale was executed on September 22, 1986, one month after or specifically on November 25, 1986, Leonardo died. Aurora as one of the heirs and the duly appointed administratrix of Leonardo’s estate, had the right therefore to seek for the annulment of the Deed of Sale as it deprived her and the other legal heirs of Leonardo of their hereditary rights. Arriola v. Arriola, G.R. NO. 177703, Jan. 28, 2008 542 SCRA 666

Furthermore, Articles 152 and 153 specifically extend the scope of the family home not just to the dwelling structure in which the family resides but also to the lot on which it stands. Thus,

applying these concepts, the subject house as well as the specific portion of the subject land on which it stands are deemed constituted as a family home by the deceased and petitioner Vilma from the moment they began occupying the same as a family residence 20 years back Modequillo vs. Breva, G.R. No. 86355, May 31, 1990. There is no need to constitute the same judicially or extrajudicially as required in the Civil Code. If the family actually resides in the premises, it is, therefore, a family home as contemplated by law Olivia De Mesa v. Acero, G.R. NO. 185064 Jan. 16, 2012 663 SCRA 40 The family home’s exemption from execution must be set up and proved to the Sheriff before the sale of the property at public auction. The petitioners now are barred from raising the same. Failure to do so estop them from later claiming the said exemption. Manacop vs. CA, 277 SCRA 57 (1997) Articles 152 and 153 of the Family Code do not have a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt from execution for the payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code. RODOLFO S. AGUILAR vs. EDNA G. SIASAT G.R. No. 200169, January 28, 2015 As petitioner correctly argues, Alfredo Aguilar’s SSS Form E-1 satisfies the requirement for proof of filiation and relationship to the Aguilar spouses under Article 172 of the Family Code; by itself, said document constitutes an “admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.” Labagla vs. Santiago, G.R. NO. 132305, Dec. 04, 2001 371 SCRA 360 A baptismal certificate, a private document, is not conclusive proof of filiation. More so are the entries made in an income tax return, which only shows that income tax has been paid and the amount thereof. Puno v. Puno Ent. Inc., G.R. NO. 177066, Sept. 11, 2009 599 SCRA 585 A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of the certificate. The local civil registrar has no authority to record the paternity of an illegitimate child on the information of a third person.

DE LA CRUZ v. GRACIA, G.R. No. 177728, July 31, 2009

1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted to prove filiation, there should be strict compliance with the requirement that the same must be signed by the acknowledging parent; and 2) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and competent evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have been made and handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such other evidence. GRACE M. GRANDE v. PATRICIO T. ANTONIO, G.R. No. 206248. February 18, 2014 An illegitimate child may use the surname of his father if the latter has expressly recognized their filiation. However, the child is under no compulsion to use his father’s surname. When Antonio recognized Andre Lewis and Jerard Patrick as his sons, the two children had the right to use the surname of Antonio. However, they were under no compulsion or mandate to use the same. The law uses the word ‘may’, which dictates that it is merely permissive. Tonog vs. CA, G.R. NO. 122906 , Feb. 07, 2002 376 SCRA 523 In the case at bar, bearing in mind that the welfare of the said minor as the controlling factor, the appellate court did not err in allowing her father to retain in the meantime parental custody over her. Meanwhile, the child should not be wrenched from her familiar surroundings, and thrust into a strange environment away from the people and places to which she had apparently formed an attachment. Abadilla vs. Tabiliran, Jr. A.M NO. MTJ-92-716, Oct. 25, 1995 249 SCRA 447 Whether or not, a child born out of wedlock, by parents who have a legal impediment to marry each other, can be legitimated. As a lawyer and a judge, respondent ought to know that, despite his subsequent marriage to Priscilla, these three children cannot be legitimated nor in any way be considered legitimate since at the time they were born, there was an existing valid marriage between respondent and his first wife, Teresita B. Tabiliran.

ROSARIO MATA CASTRO AND JOANNE BENEDICTA CHARISSIMA M. CASTRO, A.K.A. “MARIA SOCORRO M. CASTRO” AND “JAYROSE M. CASTRO” vs JOSE MARIA JED LEMUEL GREGORIO AND ANA MARIA REGINA GREGORIO G.R. NO. 188801, 15 October 2014, SECOND DIVISION (Leonen, J.) For the adoption to be valid, petitioners' consent was required by Republic Act No. 8552. Personal service of summons should have been effected on the spouse and all legitimate children to ensure that their substantive rights are protected. It is not enough to rely on constructive notice as in this case. Surreptitious use of procedural technicalities cannot be privileged over substantive statutory rights.

In re: Adoption of Michelle & Michael Lim G.R. NO.168992-93, May 21, 2009 588 SCRA 98

The filing of a case for dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and Olario is of no moment. It is not equivalent to a decree of dissolution of marriage. Until and unless there is a judicial decree for the dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and Olario, the marriage still subsists. That being the case, joint adoption by the husband and the wife is required. Gan vs. Reyes, G.R. NO.145527, May.28, 2002 382 SCRA 357 A judgment ordering for support is immediately executory despite pendency of appeal. De Asis vs. CA, G.R. NO.127578, Feb. 15, 1999 303 SCRA 176 Whether or not, a renunciation of the existence of filiation of the child and the putative father, made by the mother, is valid. It is true that in order to claim support, filiation and/or paternity must first be shown between the claimant and the parent, however, paternity and filiation or the lack of the same is a relationship that must be judicially established and it is for the court to declare its existence or absence. Laxamana v. Laxamana, G.R. NO. 144763, Sept. 3, 2002 388 SCRA 296 It is clear that every child [has] rights which are not and should not be dependent solely on the wishes, much less the whims and caprices, of his parents. His welfare should not be subject to the parents' say-so or mutual agreement alone. Where, as in this case, the parents are already separated in fact, the courts must step in to determine in whose custody the child can better be assured the rights granted to him by law. The need, therefore, to present evidence regarding this matter, becomes imperative. St. Mary’s Academy v. Carpitanos, G.R. NO. 143363, Feb. 6, 2002 376 SCRA 473 The liability for the accident, whether caused by the negligence of the minor driver or mechanical detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, must be pinned on the minor’s parents primarily. The negligence of petitioner St. Mary’s Academy was only a remote cause of the accident. Neri v. Heirs of Hadji Yusop, G.R. No 194366, Oct. 10, 2012 683 SCRA 253 Administration includes all acts for the preservation of the property and the receipt of fruits according to the natural purpose of the thing. Any act of disposition or alienation, or any reduction in the substance of the patrimony of child, exceeds the limits of administration. Thus, a father or mother, as the natural guardian of the minor under parental authority, does not have the power to dispose or encumber the property of the latter. FE FLORO VALINO vs. ROSARIO D. ADRIANO, FLORANTE D. ADRIANO,

RUBEN

D. ADRIANO, MARIA TERESA ADRIANO ONGOCO, VICTORIA ADRIANO BAYONA, AND LEAH ANTONETTE D. ADRIANO G.R. No. 182894, 22 April 2014, EN BANC (Mendoza J.)

The law gives the right and duty to make funeral arrangements to Rosario, she being the surviving legal wife of Atty. Adriano. The fact that she was living separately from her husband and was in the United States when he died has no controlling significance. To say that Rosario had, in effect, waived or renounced, expressly or impliedly, her right and duty to make arrangements for the funeral of her deceased husband is baseless. The right and duty to make funeral arrangements, like any other right, will not be considered as having been waived or renounced, except upon clear and satisfactory proof of conduct indicative of a free and voluntary intent to that end. It is generally recognized that the corpse of an individual is outside the commerce of man. However, the law recognizes that a certain right of possession over the corpse exists, for the purpose of a decent burial, and for the exclusion of the intrusion by third persons who have no legitimate interest in it. This quasi-property right, arising out of the duty of those obligated by law to bury their dead, also authorizes them to take possession of the dead body for purposes of burial to have it remain in its final resting place, or to even transfer it to a proper place where the memory of the dead may receive the respect of the living. This is a family right. There can be no doubt that persons having this right may recover the corpse from third persons. DR. FILOTEO A. ALANO vs. ZENAIDA MAGUD-LOGMAO, G.R. No. 175540, 14 April 2014 There can be no cavil that petitioner employed reasonable means to disseminate notifications intended to reach the relatives of the deceased. The only question that remains pertains to the sufficiency of time allowed for notices to reach the relatives of the deceased. PROPERTY Laurel vs. Abrogar, G.R. NO. 155076, Jan. 13, 2009 International telephone calls placed by Bay Super Orient Card holders, the telecommunication services provided by PLDT and its business of providing said services are not personal properties under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code. The construction by the respondents of Article 308 of the said Code to include, within its coverage, the aforesaid international telephone calls, telecommunication services and business is contrary to the letter and intent of the law. Tsai vs. CA, 366 SCRA 324 In the instant case, the parties: (1) executed a contract styled as “Real Estate Mortgage and Chattel Mortgage,” instead of just “Real Estate Mortgage” if indeed their intention is to treat all properties included therein as immovable, and (2) attached to the said contract a separate “LIST OF MACHINERIES & EQUIPMENT”. These facts, taken together, evince the conclusion that the parties’ intention is to treat these units of machinery as chattels.

Caltex Phils., Inc., vs. CBAA, May 31, 1982

SC held that the said equipment and machinery, as appurtenances to the gas station building or shed owned by Caltex (as to which it is subject to realty tax) and which fixtures are necessary to the operation of the gas station, for without them the gas station would be useless, and which have been attached or affixed permanently to the gas station site or embedded therein, are taxable improvements and machinery within the meaning of the Assessment Law and the Real Property Tax Code. MERALCO vs. CBAA, May 31, 1982 While the two storage tanks are not embedded in the land, they may, nevertheless, be considered as improvements on the land, enhancing its utility and rendering it useful to the oil industry. It is undeniable that the two tanks have been installed with some degree of permanence as receptacles for the considerable quantities of oil needed by Meralco for its operations. Republic vs CA, 132 SCRA 514 Properties of public dominion is not susceptible to private appropriation and cannot be acquired by acquisitive prescription and thus they cannot be registered under the Land Registration Law and be the subject of a torrents title. Manila International Airport Authority vs CA, 495 SCRA 591 Properties of public dominion, being for public use, are not subject to levy, encumbrance or disposition through public or private sale. Any encumbrance, levy on execution or auction sale of any property of public dominion is void for being contrary to public policy. German Management & Services, Inc. v. CA. 177 SCRA 495 (1989) The doctrine of self-help can only be exercised at the time of actual or threatened dispossession, and not when possession has already been lost. Palero-Tan v. Urdaneta AM NO. P--‐ 07--‐ 2399, Jun. 18, 2008 When a person who finds a thing that has been lost or mislaid by the owner takes the thing into his hands, he acquires physical custody only and does not become vested with legal possession. In assuming such custody, the finder is charged with the obligation of restoring the thing to its owner. It is thus respondent’s duty to report to his superior or his officemates that he found something. Mercado v. CA, 162 SCRA 75, 85 1988 To be deemed a builder in good faith, it is essential that a person asserts title to the land on which he builds, i.e., it is essential that he be a possessor in concept of owner and that he be unaware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.

Nuguid v. CA, 452 SCRA 243, 252 (2005)

The right of retention is considered as one of the measures devised by the law for the protection of builders in good faith. Its object is to guarantee full and prompt reimbursement as it permits the actual possessor to remain in possession while he has not been reimbursed (by the person who defeated him in the case for possession of the property) for those necessary expenses and useful improvements made by him on the things possessed. BPI v. SANCHEZES, G.R. No. 179518, November 11, 2014 The Sanchezes have the following options: (1) acquire the property with the townhouses and other buildings and improvements that may be thereon without indemnifying TSEI or the intervenors; (2) demand from TSEI or the intervenors to demolish what has been built on the property at the expense of TSEI or the intervenors; or (3) ask the intervenors to pay the price of the land. As such, the Sanchezes must choose from among these options within thirty (30) days from finality of this Decision. Should the Sanchezes opt to ask from the intervenors the value of the land, the case shall be remanded to the RTC for the sole purpose of determining the fair market value of the lot at the time the same were taken from the Sanchezes in 1988. Pecson v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115814 May 26, 1995 Thus in strict point of law, Article 448 is not apposite to the case at bar. Nevertheless, we believe that the provision therein on indemnity may be applied by analogy considering that the primary intent of Article 448 is to avoid a state of forced co-ownership and that the parties, including the two courts below, in the main agree that Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code are applicable and indemnity for the improvements may be paid although they differ as to the basis of the indemnity. Vda. de Nazareno v. CA, 257 SCRA 598 (1996) Since the subject land was the direct result of the dumping of sawdust by the Sun Valley Lumber Co., the accretion was man-made, hence, Art. 457 does not apply. Ergo, the subject land is part of the public domain. Cureg v. IAC, 177 SCRA 313 (1989) The accretion to registered land does not preclude acquisition of the additional area by another person through prescription. Agne v. Director of Lands, 181 SCRA 793, 805 (1990) There need be no act on their part to subject the old river bed to their ownership, as it is subject thereto ipso jure from the moment the mode of acquisition becomes evident, without need of any formal act of acquisition. Such abandoned riverbed had fallen to the private ownership of the

owner of the land through which the new river bed passes even without any formal act of his will and any unauthorized occupant thereof will be considered as a trespasser. Baha’is v. Pascual, G.R. 169272,July 11, 2012

Under Articles 476 and 477 of the Civil Code, the two (2) indispensable requisites in an action to quiet title are: (1) that the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) that a deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding is claimed to be casting cloud on his title. In this case, an action to quiet title is not the proper remedy because petitioner no longer had any legal or equitable title to or interest in the lots. The petitioner’s status as possessor and owner of the lots had been settled in the final and executory December 4, 1985 decision of the Bureau of Lands that the DENR Secretary and the OP affirmed on appeal. Thus, the petitioner is not entitled to the possession and ownership of the lots. Sanchez v. Court of Appeals, 404 SCRA 541, 548, June 20, 2003 Co-ownership is a form of trust and every co-owner is a trustee for the others, hence, the relationship of such co-owner to the other co-owners is fiduciary in character and attribute. Santos v. Heirs of Lustre, G.R. NO. 151016, Aug. 06, 2008 Any adverse ruling in the earlier case will not, in any way, prejudice the heirs who did not join, even if such case was actually filed in behalf of all the co-owners. In fact, if an action for recovery of property is dismissed, a subsequent action by a co- heir who did not join the earlier case should not be barred by prior judgment. Rey Castigador Catedrilla v. Mario and Margie Lauron, G.R. No. 179011. April 15, 2013 In suits to recover properties, all co-owners are real parties in interest. However, pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code and the relevant jurisprudence, any one of them may bring an action, any kind of action for the recovery of co-owned properties. Therefore, only one of the coowners, namely the co-owner who filed the suit for the recovery of the co-owned property, is an indispensable party thereto. The other co-owners are not indispensable parties. They are not even necessary parties, for a complete relief can be afforded in the suit even without their participation, since the suit is presumed to have been filed for the benefit of all co-owners. VIRGINIA Y. GOCHAN, FELIX Y. GOCHAN III, LOUISE Y. GOCHAN, ESTEBAN Y. GOCHAN, JR., and DOMINIC Y. GOCHAN v. CHARLES MANCAO, G.R. No. 182314, November 13, 2013 Only the redeeming co-owner and the buyer are the indispensable parties in an action for legal redemption, to the exclusion of the seller/co-owner A party who is not the co-owner of a land subject of a compromise agreement cannot claim that he was defrauded when the parties in the compromise agreement entered into the same. As a third party to the agreement, he is not indispensable for the agreement to materialize.

Parilla v. Pilar, G.R. NO. 167680, Nov. 30, 2006

One whose interest is merely that of a holder, such as a mere tenant, agent or usufructuary, is not qualified to become a possessor builder in good faith. Bunyi v. Factor, G.R. NO. 172547, Jun. 30, 2009 591 SCRA 350 For one to be considered in possession, one need not have actual or physical occupation of every square inch of the property at all times. Possession can be acquired not only by material occupation, but also by the fact that a thing is subject to the action of one’s will or by the proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such right, possession can be acquired by juridical acts. EDCA Publ. V. Santos, G.R. NO. 80298, Apr. 26, 1990 184 SCRA 614 Actual delivery of the books having been made, Cruz acquired ownership over the books which he could then validly transfer to the private respondents. The fact that he had not yet paid for them to EDCA was a matter between him and EDCA and did not impair the title acquired by the private respondents to the books. PILAR DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. RAMON DUMADAG, ET. AL., G.R. No. 194336, March 11, 2013 Squatters have no possessory rights over the land intruded upon. The length of time that they may have physically occupied the land is immaterial; they are deemed to have entered the same in bad faith, such that the nature of their possession is presumed to have retained the same character throughout their occupancy. Quintanilla v. Abangan, G.R. NO. 160613, Feb.12, 2008 As between a right of way that would demolish a fence of strong materials to provide ingress and egress to a public highway and another right of way which although longer will only require a van or vehicle to make a turn, the second alternative should be preferred. Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not what is required by law as the basis for setting up a compulsory easement. Reyes v. Ramos, G.R. No. 194488, February 11, 2015 Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not what is required by law as the basis of setting up a compulsory easement. Even in the face of necessity, if it can be satisfied without imposing the easement, the same should not be imposed. Hidalgo Enterprises v. Balandan, et. al, G.R. No. L-3422 Jun. 13, 1952

Nature has created streams, lakes and pools which attract children. Lurking in their waters is always the danger of drowning. Against this danger children are early instructed so that they are sufficiently presumed to know the danger; and if the owner of private property creates an

artificial pool on his own property, merely duplicating the work of nature without adding any new danger, . . . (he) is not liable because of having created an "attractive nuisance." Gancayco v. Quezon City, G.R. NO. 177807,Oct 11, 2011 The wing walls do not per se immediately and adversely affect the safety of persons and property. The fact that an ordinance may declare a structure illegal does not necessarily make that structure a nuisance. SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC., v. ARSENIO ALDECOA, ET. AL., G.R. No. 166330, September 11, 2013 Commercial and industrial activities which are lawful in themselves may become nuisances if they are so offensive to the senses that they render the enjoyment of life and property uncomfortable. The fact that the cause of the complaint must be substantial has often led to expressions in the opinions that to be a nuisance the noise must be deafening or loud or excessive and unreasonable. The determining factor when noise alone is the cause of complaint is not its intensity or volume. It is that the noise is of such character as to produce actual physical discomfort and annoyance to a person of ordinary sensibilities, rendering adjacent property less comfortable and valuable. If the noise does that it can well be said to be substantial and unreasonable in degree, and reasonableness is a question of fact dependent upon all the circumstances and conditions. There can be no fixed standard as to what kind of noise constitutes a nuisance. Republic v. Guzman, G.R. No. 132964, February 18, 2000 The donation is null and void when (a) the deed of donation fails to show the acceptance, or (b) where the formal notice of the acceptance made in a separate instrument is either not given to the donor or else noted in the deed of donation, and in the separate acceptance. Villanueva vs. Spouses Branoco, G.R. No. 172804, January 24, 2011 When the donor used the words that the gift "does not pass title during my lifetime; but when I die, she shall be the true owner of the two aforementioned parcels"] the donor meant nothing else than that she reserved of herself the possession and usufruct of said two parcels of land until her death, at which time the donee would be able to dispose of them freely. Quijada vs. CA, G.R. NO. 126444, Dec. 4, 1998 Since no period was imposed by the donor on when must the donee comply with the condition, the latter remains the owner so long as he has tried to comply with the condition within a reasonable period. Only then - when the non-fulfillment of the resolutory condition was brought

to the donor's knowledge - that ownership of the donated property reverted to the donor as provided in the automatic reversion clause of the deed of donation.

LAND TITLES AND DEEDS Legarda vs. Saleeby, G.R. NO. 8936, Oct. 2, 1915 The real purpose of the Torrens system of registration is to quiet title to land; to put a stop forever to any question of the legality of the title, except claims which were noted at the time of registration, in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. Sta. Lucia vs. Pasig, G.R.NO. 166838, June 15, 2011 While a certificate of title is conclusive as to its ownership and location, this does not preclude the filing of an action for the very purpose of attacking the statements therein. Mere reliance therefore on the face of the TCTs will not suffice as they can only be conclusive evidence of the subject properties' locations if both the stated and described locations point to the same area. Republic vs. Santos, G.R.NO. 180027, July 18, 2012 Jura Regalia simply means that the State is the original proprietor of all lands and, as such, is the general source of all private titles. Thus, pursuant to this principle, all claims of private title to land, save those acquired from native title, must be traced from some grant, whether express or implied, from the State. Absent a clear showing that land had been let into private ownership through the State’s imprimatur, such land is presumed to belong to the State. SPOUSES BERNADETTE AND RODULFO VILBAR v. ANGELITO L. OPINION, G.R. No. 176043. January 15, 2014 Registration is the operative act which gives validity to the transfer or creates a lien upon the land. A certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. Since the spouses Vilbar did not cause the transfer of the certificate title in their name, or at the very least, annotate or register such sale in the original title in the name of Dulos Realty, have no indefeasible and incontrovertible title over Lot 20 to support their claim. LUZVIMINDA APRAN CANLAS vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 200894, 10 November 2014, SECOND DIVISION (Leonen J.) In Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic, the Court further clarified the difference between Section 14(1) and Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529. The former refers to registration of title on the basis of possession, while the latter entitles the applicant to the registration of his property on the basis of prescription. Registration under the first mode is extended under the aegis of the P.D. No. 1529 and the Public Land Act (PLA) while under the second mode is made available both by P.D. No. 1529 and the Civil Code. Moreover, under Section 48(b) of the PLA, as amended by Republic Act No. 1472, the 30-year period is in relation to possession without regard to the Civil

Code, while under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, the 30-year period involves extraordinary prescription under the Civil Code, particularly Article 1113 in relation to Article 1137.

Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds 79 Phil 461 Aliens mat not acquire private or public agricultural lands. Ong Ching Po v. Court of Appeals G.R. NO. 113472, Dec. 20, 1994, 239 SCRA 341. The capacity to acquire private land is made dependent upon the capacity to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. Private land may be transferred or only to individuals or entities qualified to acquire lands of the public domain. Halili vs. Court of Appeals, 287 SCRA 465 A natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his citizenship may be a transferee of private lands, subject to limitations provided by law. Director of Lands vs. Intermediate Appellate Court and Acme, 146 SCRA 509 The time to determine whether a person acquiring land is qualified is the time the right to own it is acquired and not the time to register ownership. Tan vs. Republic April 16, 2012 Possession is open when it is patent, visible, apparent, notorious and not clandestine. It is continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent or occasional; exclusive when the adverse possessor can show exclusive dominion over the land and an appropriation of it to his own use and benefit; and notorious when it is so conspicuous that it is generally known and talked of by the public or the people in the neighborhood. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EMETERIA G. LUALHATI G.R. No. 183511, March 25, 2015 It is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable. Respondent failed to do so because the certifications presented by respondent do not, by themselves, prove that the land is alienable and disposable. Spouses Vallido v. Spouses Pono, et al., G.R. No. 200173. April 15, 2013 It is a recognized principle that a person dealing on a registered land need not go beyond its certificate of title, it is also a firmly settled rule that where there are circumstances which would

put a party on guard and prompt him to investigate or inspect the property being sold to him, such as the presence of occupants/tenants thereon, it is expected from the purchaser of a valued

piece of land to inquire first into the status or nature of possession of the occupants. The burden of proving good faith lies with the second buyer (petitioners herein) which is not discharged by simply invoking the ordinary presumption of good faith. After an assiduous assessment of the evidentiary records, this Court holds that the petitioners are NOT buyers in good faith as they failed to discharge their burden of proof. SPOUSE PERALTA v. ABALON, G.R. No. 183448, June 30, 2014 The established rule is that a forged deed is generally null and cannot convey title, the exception thereto, pursuant to Section 55 of the Land Registration Act, denotes the registration of titles from the forger to the innocent purchaser for value. Thus, the qualifying point here is that there must be a complete chain of registered titles. This means that all the transfers starting from the original rightful owner to the innocent holder for value – and that includes the transfer to the forger – must be duly registered, and the title must be properly issued to the transferee. Malabanan vs. Republic, 587 SCRA 172 Only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public domain begin to run. Alvarez vs. PICOP Resources, Inc., 606 SCRA 444 Forest lands cannot be alienated in favor of petitioner private persons or entities. Tan vs. Republic, G.R. No. 193443 G.R. No. 193443, April 16, 2012 There must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription. For one to invoke the provisions of Section 14(2) and set up acquisitive prescription against the State, it is primordial that the status of the property as patrimonial be first established. Furthermore, the period of possession preceding the classification of the property as patrimonial cannot be considered in determining the completion of the prescriptive period. AZNAR BROTHERS REALTY COMPANY vs. SPOUSES JOSE AND MAGDALENA YBAÑEZ G.R. No. 161380, 21 April 2014 FIRST DIVISION (Bersamin J.) Although a deed or instrument affecting unregistered lands would be valid only between the parties thereto, third parties would also be affected by the registered deed or instrument on the theory of constructive notice once it was further registered in accordance with Section 194, i.e.,

the deed or instrument was written or inscribed in the day book and the register book for unregistered lands in the Office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the realty was located.

The only exception to the rule on constructive notice by registration of the deed or instrument affecting unregistered realty exists in favor of “a third party with a better right.” This exception is provided in Section 194, as amended by Act No. 3344, to the effect that the registration “shall be understood to be without prejudice to a third party with a better right;” and in paragraph (b) of Section 113 of P.D. No. 1529, to the effect that “any recording made under this section shall be without prejudice to a third party with a better right.” WILLS AND SUCCESSION

In the matter of the Testate Estate of Edward Christensen, G.R. L-16749, January 31, 1963 Whether or not, the intrinsic validity of the testamentary disposition should be governed by Philippine Law, when the national law of the testator refers back to the Philippine Law. Edward is domiciled in the Philippines hence, Philippine court must apply its own laws which makes natural children legally acknowledge as forced heirs of the parent recognizing them. Vitug vs. Court of Appeals, G.R.NO. 82027, Mar. 29, 1990 183 SCRA 755 A will has been defined as "a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a capacitated person disposes of his property and rights and declares or complies with duties to take effect after his death." Cayatenao vs Leonidas, 129 SCRA 524 The law which governs Adoracion Campo’s will is the law of Pennsylvania, USA which is the national law of the decedent. It is settled that as regards to the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the wills as provided for by article 16 and 1039 of the New Civil Code, the national law of the decedent must apply. Parish Priest of Victoria vs. Rigor, 89 SCRA 483 The issue in this case is whether or not a male relative referred in the will should include those who are born after the testator’s death. To construe it as referring to the nearest male relative at any time after his death would render the provisions difficult to apply and create uncertainty as to the disposition of the estate. De Borja vs De Borja, G.R. No, L-28040, August 18, 1972 There is no legal bar to a successor to dispose his or her share immediately after such death, even if the actual extent of such share is not determined until the subsequent liquidation of the estate.

The effect of such alienation is to be deemed limited to what is ultimately adjudicated to the vendor heir. Bonilla vs Leon Barcena, G.R. L-41715, June 18, 1976

The right of the heirs to the property of the deceased vests in them even before the judicial declaration of their being declared as heirs. When Fortunata died, her claim or right to the parcel of land in litigation in civil case number 856 was not extinguished by her death but was transmitted to her heirs upon her death. Borromeo-Herrera vs Borromeo, 152 SCRA 171 The properties included in an existing inheritance cannot be the subject of a contract. The heirs acquire a right to succession from the moment of death of the decedent. In this case, the purported “waiver of hereditary rights” cannot be considered effective. Baltazar v. Laxa, G.R.NO. 174489, April, 11, 2012 It is an established rule that "[a] testament may not be disallowed just because the attesting witnesses declare against its due execution; neither does it have to be necessarily allowed just because all the attesting witnesses declare in favor of its legalization; what is decisive is that the court is convinced by evidence before it, not necessarily from the attesting witnesses, although they must testify, that the will was or was not duly executed in the manner required by law." Echavez vs. Dozen Cons., G.R.NO. 192916, Oct. 11, 2010 An attestation must state all the details the third paragraph of Article 805 requires. In the absence of the required avowal by the witnesses themselves, no attestation clause can be deemed embodied in the Acknowledgement of the Deed of Donation Mortis Causa. Lopez v. Lopez, G.R.NO. 189984, Nov. 12, 2012 The law is clear that the attestation must state the number of pages used upon which the will is written. The purpose of the law is to safeguard against possible interpolation or omission of one or some of its pages and prevent any increase or decrease in the pages. Azuela v. CA, 487 SCRA 119 The signatures on the left-hand corner of every page signify, among others, that the witnesses are aware that the page they are signing forms part of the will. On the other hand, the signatures to the attestation clause establish that the witnesses are referring to the statements contained in the attestation clause itself. Lee v. Tambago, 544 SCRA 393 An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in going before some competent officer or court and declaring it to be his act or deed. It involves an extra step undertaken whereby the signatory actually declares to the notary public that the same is his or her own free

act and deed. The acknowledgment in a notarial will has a two-fold purpose: (1) to safeguard the testator’s wishes long after his demise and (2) to assure that his estate is administered in the manner that he intends it to be done.

Suroza vs. Honrado, 110 SCRA 388 In the opening paragraph of the will, it was stated that English was a language "understood and known" to the testatrix but in its concluding paragraph, it was stated that the will was read to the testatrix "and translated into Filipino language". That could only mean that the will was written in a language not known to the illiterate testatrix and, therefore, it is void because of the mandatory provision of article 804 of the Civil Code that every will must be executed in a language or dialect known to the testator. Garcia vs. Vasquez, 32 SCRA 489 The rationale behind the requirement of reading the will to the testator if he is blind or incapable of reading the will himself (as when he is illiterate), is to make the provisions thereof known to him, so that he may be able to object if they are not in accordance with his wishes. That the aim of the law is to insure that the dispositions of the will are properly communicated to and understood by the handicapped testator, thus making them truly reflective of his desire, is evidenced by the requirement that the will should be read to the latter, not only once but twice, by two different persons, and that the witnesses have to act within the range of his (the testator's) other senses. Alvarado vs. Gaviola, Jr., 226 SCRA 348 This Court has held in a number of occasions that substantial compliance is acceptable where the purpose of the law has been satisfied, the reason being that the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills are intended to protect the testator from all kinds of fraud and trickery but are never intended to be so rigid and inflexible as to destroy the testamentary privilege. In the case at bar, private respondent read the testator's will and codicil aloud in the presence of the testator, his three instrumental witnesses, and the notary public. Prior and subsequent thereto, the testator affirmed, upon being asked, that the contents read corresponded with his instructions. Only then did the signing and acknowledgement take place. There is no evidence, and petitioner does not so allege, that the contents of the will and codicil were not sufficiently made known and communicated to the testator. On the contrary, with respect to the "Huling Habilin," the day of the execution was not the first time that Brigido had affirmed the truth and authenticity of the contents of the draft. The uncontradicted testimony of Atty. Rino is that Brigido Alvarado already acknowledged that the will was drafted in accordance with his expressed wishes even prior to 5 November 1977 when Atty. Rino went to the testator's residence precisely for the purpose of securing his conformity to the draft. Javellana vs. Ledesma GR. No. L-7179, 97 Phil 258 The subsequent signing and sealing by the notary of his certification that the testament was duly acknowledged by the participants therein is no part of the acknowledgment itself nor of the

testamentary act. Hence their separate execution out of the presence of the testatrix and her witnesses cannot be said to violate the rule that testaments should be completed without interruption. 37

Cruz vs. Villasor NO.L-32213, 54 SCRA 31 The notary public before whom the will was acknowledged cannot be considered as the third instrumental witness since he cannot acknowledge before himself his having signed the will. This cannot be done because he cannot split his personality into two so that one will appear before the other to acknowledge his participation in the making of the will. Caneda vs. CA, 222 SCRA 781 The rule on substantial compliance in Article 809 cannot be revoked or relied on by respondents since it presupposes that the defects in the attestation clause can be cured or supplied by the text of the will or a consideration of matters apparent therefrom which would provide the data not expressed in the attestation clause or from which it may necessarily be gleaned or clearly inferred that the acts not stated in the omitted textual requirements were actually complied within the execution of the will. Lopez v. Lopez, 685 SCRA 209 The statement in the Acknowledgment portion of the subject last will and testament that it "consists of 7 pages including the page on which the ratification and acknowledgment are written" cannot be deemed substantial compliance. The will actually consists of 8 pages including its acknowledgment which discrepancy cannot be explained by mere examination of the will itself but through the presentation of evidence aliunde. Guerrero v. Bihis, 521 SCRA 394 The issue in this case whether the will “acknowledged” by the testatrix and the instrumental witnesses before a notary public acting outside the place of his commission satisfies the requirement under Article 806 of the Civil Code? Outside the place of his commission, he is bereft of power to perform any notarial act; he is not a notary public. Any notarial act outside the limits of his jurisdiction has no force and effect. Celada v. Abena, 556 SCRA 569 While it is true that the attestation clause is not a part of the will, error in the number of pages of the will as stated in the attestation clause is not material to invalidate the subject will. It must be noted that the subject instrument is consecutively lettered with pages A, B, and C which is a sufficient safeguard from the possibility of an omission of some of the pages. 38 Rodelas vs. Aranza, 119 SCRA 16 The photostatic or xerox copy of a lost or destroyed holographic will may be admitted because then the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased can be determined by the probate court.

Codoy vs. Calugay, 312 SCRA 333

The word “shall” connotes a mandatory order. We have ruled that “shall” in a statute commonly denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion and that the presumption is that the word “shall,” when used in a statute is mandatory." Ajero vs. CA, 236 SCRA 488 Thus, unless the unauthenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions were made on the date of the holographic will or on testator's signature, their presence does not invalidate the will itself. The lack of authentication will only result in disallowance of such changes. Kalaw vs. Relova, 132 SCRA 237 To state that the Will as first written should be given efficacy is to disregard the seeming change of mind of the testatrix. But that change of mind can neither be given effect because she failed to authenticate it in the manner required by law by affixing her full signature. Roxas vs. De Jesus, 134 SCRA 245 As a general rule, the "date" in a holographic Will should include the day, month, and year of its execution. However, when as in the case at bar, there is no appearance of fraud, bad faith, undue influence and pressure and the authenticity of the Will is established and the only issue is whether or not the date "FEB.,61" appearing on the holographic Will is a valid compliance with Article 810 of the Civil Code, probate of the holographic Will should be allowed under the principle of substantial compliance. Labrador vs. CA, 184 SCRA 170 The law does not specify a particular location where the date should be placed in the will. The only requirements are that the date be in the will itself and executed in the hand of the testator. Seangio v. Reyes, 508 SCRA 172 Holographic wills being usually prepared by one who is not learned in the law, as illustrated in the present case, should be construed more liberally than the ones drawn by an expert, taking into account the circumstances surrounding the execution of the instrument and the intention of the testator. Palaganas v. Palaganas, 2011 640 SCRA 538 A foreign will can be given legal effects in our jurisdiction. But, reprobate or re-authentication of a will already probated and allowed in a foreign country is different from that probate where the will is presented for the first time before a competent court.

Vda.De Perez vs. Tolete, 232 SCRA 722

What the law expressly prohibits is the making of joint wills either for the testator’s reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third person (Civil Code of the Philippines, Article 818). In the case at bench, the Cunanan spouses executed separate wills. Since the two wills contain essentially the same provisions and pertain to property which in all probability are conjugal in nature, practical considerations dictate their joint probate. Casiano vs CA 158 SCRA 451 Revocation under this condition to be effective must have complied with the two requirements: the overt act as mentioned under the law; the intent to revoke on the part of the testator. The document or paper burned by one of the witnesses was not satisfactorily established to be the will at all, much less the will of Adriana. Adriana Maloto vs. CA, 158 SCRA 451 For one, the document or papers burned by Adriana's maid, Guadalupe, was not satisfactorily established to be a will at all, much less the will of Adriana Maloto. For another, the burning was not proven to have been done under the express direction of Adriana. And then, the burning was not in her presence. Gago vs. Mamuyac NO. L-26317, 49 Phil 902 Where a will which cannot be found is shown to have been in the possession of the testator, when last seen, the presumption is, in the absence of other competent evidence, that the same was cancelled or destroyed. The same presumption arises where it is shown that the testator had ready access to the will and it cannot be found after his death. It will not be presumed that such will has been destroyed by any other person without the knowledge or authority of the testator. Seangio v. Reyes, 2006 508 SCRA 172 For disinheritance to be valid, Article 916 of the Civil Code requires that the same must be effected through a will wherein the legal cause therefor shall be specified. With regard to the reasons for the disinheritance that were stated by Segundo in his document, the Court believes that the incidents, taken as a whole, can be considered a form of maltreatment of Segundo by his son, Alfredo, and that the matter presents a sufficient cause for the disinheritance of a child or descendant under Article 919 of the Civil Code. Molo vs. Molo NO. L- 2538, 90 Phil 37 The failure of a new testamentary disposition upon whose validity the revocation depends, is equivalent to the non-fulfillment of a suspensive conditions, and hence prevents the revocation of the original will. But a mere intent to make at some time a will in the place of that destroyed will not render the destruction conditional.

Gan vs Yap, 104 Phil. 509

The loss of the holographic will entail the loss of the only medium of proof; if the ordinary will is lost, the subscribing witnesses are available to authenticate. In case of holographic will if oral testimony were admissible only one man could engineer the fraud this way. Rodelas vs Aranza 119 SCRA 16 If the holographic will has been lost or destroyed and no other copy is available, the will cannot be probated because the best and only evidence is the handwriting of the testator. But a photostatic copy or Xerox copy of the holographic will may be allowed because comparison can be made with the standard writings of the testator. Azaola vs Singson 109 Phil. 102 Since the authenticity of the will was not contested, the appellant is not required to produce more than one witness. Even if the genuiness of the holographic will were contested, article 811 cannot be interpreted as to require the compulsory presentation of three witnesses to identify the handwriting of the testator, under penalty of having denied the probate. Codoy vs Calugay, 312 SCRA 333 We cannot eliminate the possibility that if the will is contested, the law requires that three witnesses to declare that the will was in the handwriting of the deceased. A visual examination of the holographic will convince us that the strokes are different when compared with other documents written by the testator. Gallanosa vs Arcangel, 83 SCRA 676 After the finality of the allowance of a will, the issue as to the voluntariness of its execution cannot be raised anymore. It is not only the 1939 probate proceeding that can be interposed as res judicata with respect to private respondents complaint. Roberts vs Leonidas, 129 SCRA 33 It is anomalous that the estate of a person who died testate should be settled in an intestate proceeding. Therefore, the intestate case should be consolidated with the testate proceeding and the judge assigned to the testate proceeding should hearing the two cases. Nepomuceno vs CA, 139 SCRA 206 The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the court’s area of inquiry is limited to an examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the will. Where practically considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue.

Aznar vs. Duncan, 17 SCRA 590

To constitute preterition, the omission must be total and complete, such that nothing must be given to the compulsory heir. Acain vs. IAC, 155 SCRA 100 Preterition annuls the institution of an heir and annulment throws open to intestate succession the entire inheritance. The only provisions which do not result in intestacy are the legacies and devises made in the will for they should stand valid and respected, except insofar as the legitimes are concerned. Nuguid vs. Nuguid, 17 SCRA 449 The will here does not explicitly disinherit the testatrix's parents, the forced heirs. It simply omits their names altogether. Said will rather than be labeled ineffective disinheritance is clearly one in which the said forced heirs suffer from preterition. Seangio v. Reyes G.R.NO. 140371-72, Nov. 27, 2006 508 SCRA 172 The mere mention of the name of one of the petitioners, Virginia, in the document did not operate to institute her as the universal heir. Her name was included plainly as a witness to the altercation between Segundo and his son, Alfredo. Legitime and Simulated Contracts; Spousal Marital Estrangement Francisco vs. Francisco-Alfonso, 354 SCRA 112 Obviously, the sale was Gregorio's way to transfer the property to his illegitimate daughters at the expense of his legitimate daughter. The sale was executed to prevent respondent Alfonso from claiming her legitime and rightful share in said property. Capitle v. Elbambuena, 509 SCRA 444 Although estranged from Olar, respondent Fortunata remained his wife and legal heir, mere estrangement not being a legal ground for the disqualification of a surviving spouse as an heir of the deceased spouse. VEVENCIA ECHIN PABALAN, ET. AL. v. THE HEIRS OF SIMEON A.B. MAAMO, SR., G.R. No. 174844, March 20, 2013 Reserva troncal is a special rule designed primarily to assure the return of a reservable property to the third degree relatives belonging to the line from which the property originally came, and avoid its being dissipated into and by the relatives of the inheriting ascendant. The reservor has the legal title and dominion to the reservable property but subject to the resolutory condition that

such title is extinguished if the reservor predeceased the reservee. The reservor is a usufructuary of the reservable property. He may alienate it subject to the reservation. The transferee gets the revocable and conditional ownership of the reservor. The transferee’s rights are revoked upon the

survival of the reservees at the time of the death of the reservor but become indefeasible when the reservees predecease the reservor. Sienes vs. Esparcia, 1 SCRA 750 The sale made by Andrea Gutang in favor of appellees was, therefore, subject to the condition that the vendees would definitely acquire ownership, by virtue of the alienation, only if the vendor died without being survived by any person entitled to the reservable property. Inasmuch much as when Andrea Gutang died, Cipriana Yaeso was still alive, the conclusion becomes inescapable that the previous sale made by the former in favor of appellants became of no legal effect and the reservable property subject matter thereof passed in exclusive ownership to Cipriana. Gonzales vs. CFI, 104 SCRA 479 Mrs. Legarda could not convey in her holographic will to her sixteen grandchildren the reservable properties which she had inherited from her daughter Filomena because the reservable properties did not form part of her estate (Cabardo vs. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, 191). The reservor cannot make a disposition mortis causa of the reservable properties as long as the reservees survived the reservor. Vizconde v. CA, 286 SCRA 217 Estrellita, it should be stressed, died ahead of Rafael, in fact, it was Rafael who inherited from Estrellita an amount more than the value of the Valenzuela property. Hence, even assuming that the Valenzuela property may be collated collation may not be allowed as the value of the Valenzuela property has long been returned to the estate of Rafael. Palacios vs Ramirez, 111 SCRA 704 The word “degree” means generation and the present code has obviously followed this interpretation by providing that the substitution shall not go beyond one degree from the heir originally instituted. The code thus clearly indicates that the second heir must be related to and one generation from the first heir. Crisologo vs Singzon, 49 SCRA 491 In fideicommissary substitution clearly impose an obligation upon the first heir to preserve and transmit to another the whole or part of the estate bequeathed to him, upon his death or upon the happening of a particular event. Rosales vs Rosales, 148 SCRA 69

The daughter-in-law is not an intestate heir of her spouse’s parents. There is no provision in the civil code which states that a widow is an intestate heir of her mother-in-law.

Delos Santos vs Dela Cruz, 37 SCRA 555 In an intestate succession, a grandniece of the deceased cannot participate in the inheritance with the surviving nieces and nephews because the existence of the latter excluded the more distant relatives. In the collateral line, the right of representation does not go beyond the children of brothers and sisters. Corpuz vs Corpuz, 85 SCRA 567 Since, Teodoro was an acknowledged natural child or was illegitimate and since Juanita was the legitimate child of Tomas, himself was a legitimate child, appellant Tomas has no cause of action to recovery of the supposed hereditary share of his daughter, Juanita as a legal heir, in Yangco’s estate. Santillon vs Mirandan, 14 SCRA 563 If there is only one legitimate child surviving with the spouse since they shall equally, one-half of the estate goes to the child and the other half goes to the surviving spouse. Although the law refers to children or descendants, the rule in the statutory construction that the plural can be understood to include the singular. Bacayo vs Borromeo, 14 SCRA 986 A decedent’s uncle and aunt may not succeed intestate so long as nephews and nieces of the decedent survive and are willing and qualified to succeed. In this case, the nephews and nieces were not inheriting by right of representation because they only do so if they concur with the brothers and sisters of the decedent. Bagunu vs. Piedad, 347 SCRA 571 The rule on proximity is a concept that favors the relatives nearest in degree to the decedent and excludes the more distant ones except when and to the extent that the right of representation can apply. In the collateral line, the right of representation may only take place in favor of the children of brothers or sisters of the decedent when such children survive with their uncles or aunts. Sayson vs. CA, 205 SCRA 321 The relationship created by the adoption is between only the adopting parents and the adopted child and does not extend to the blood relatives of either party. Corpus vs. Corpus, 85 SCRA 567

In default of natural ascendants, natural and legitimated children shall be succeeded by their natural brothers and sisters in accordance with the rules established for legitimate brothers and

sisters." Hence, Teodoro R. Yangco's half brothers on the Corpus side, who were legitimate, had no right to succeed to his estate under the rules of intestacy. Suntay v. Cojuangco-Suntay, 621 SCRA 142 Petitioner’s argument that the successional bar between the legitimate and illegitimate relatives of a decedent does not apply in this instance where facts indubitably demonstrate the contrary – Emilio III, an illegitimate grandchild of the decedent, was actually treated by the decedent and her husband as their own son, reared from infancy, educated and trained in their businesses, and eventually legally adopted by decedent’s husband, the original oppositor to respondent’s petition for letters of administration. Diaz vs. IAC, 150 SCRA 645 It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the New Civil Code that the phrase "legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother" includes Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero as the word "relative" includes all the kindred of the person spoken of. The record shows that from the commencement of this case the only parties who claimed to be the legitimate heirs of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero are Felisa Pamuti Jardin and the six minor natural or illegitimate children of Pablo Santero. Diaz vs. IAC, 182 SCRA 427 The term relatives, although used many times in the Code, is not defined by it. In accordance therefore with the canons of statutory interpretation, it should be understood to have a general and inclusive scope, inasmuch as the term is a general one. Heirs of Uriarte vs. CA, 284 SCRA 511 A nephew is considered a collateral relative who may inherit if no descendant, ascendant, or spouse survive the decedent. That private respondent is only a half-blood relative is immaterial. Delos Santos vs Ferraris-Borromeo, 14 SCRA 986 Nephews and nieces alone do not inherit by right of representation unless concurring with the brothers or sisters of the deceased which is provided in article 975 when children of one or more brothers or sisters of the deceased survive with their uncles and aunts but if they alone survive, they shall inherit in equal portions.

OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS DEGAÑOS vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 162826, October 14, 2013

Degaños claims that his partial payments to the complainants novated his contract with them from agency to loan, thereby converting his liability from criminal to civil. The incompatibility

in novation must take place in any of the essential elements of the obligation, such as its object, cause or principal conditions thereof; otherwise, the change would be merely modificatory in nature and insufficient to extinguish the original obligation. BPI EXPRESS CARD CORPORATION vs. MA. ANTONIA R. ARMOVIT G.R. No. 163654, 08 October 2014, FIRST DIVISION (BERSAMIN, J.) The relationship between the credit card issuer and the credit card holder is a contractual one that is governed by the terms and conditions found in the card membership agreement. Such terms and conditions constitute the law between the parties. In case of their breach, moral damages may be recovered where the defendant is shown to have acted fraudulently or in bad faith. Malice or bad faith implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity. However, a conscious or intentional design need not always be present because negligence may occasionally be so gross as to amount to malice or bad faith. Hence, bad faith in the context of Article 2220 of the Civil Code includes gross negligence. FIL-ESTATE PROPERTIES, INC. AND FIL-ESTATE NETWORK, INC., v. SPOUSES CONRADO AND MARIA VICTORIA RONQUILLO, , G.R. NO.185798. January 13, 2014 The 1997 Asian Financial Crisis cannot be said to be unforeseeable and beyond the control of a business corporation, especially a corporation engaged in real estate enterprise. Such corporation is considered a master in projections of commodities and currency movements and business risks. It has the ability to foresee such situation. Thus, the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis is not an instance of caso fortuito. ANSAY vs. BOARD OF DIRECTORS, G.R. NO. L-13667, April 29, 1960 Appellants filed against appellees in the CFI a complaint praying for a 20% Christmas bonus, contending that there exists a cause of action in their complaint because their claim rests on moral grounds or what in brief is defined by law as a natural obligation. Article 1423 of the New Civil Code classifies obligations into civil or natural, "Civil obligations are a right of action to compel their performance, while Natural obligations, not being based on positive law but on equity and natural law, do not grant a right of action to enforce their performance, but after voluntary fulfillment by the obligor, they authorize the retention of what has been delivered or rendered by reason thereof". SALEN vs. BALCE, G.R. NO. L-14414, April 27, 1960 Delfin, the father, was held jointly and severally liable with his minor son Dante arising from the criminal act committed by the latter. The civil liability which the law imposes upon the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may be caused by the minor children who live with them, is a necessary consequence of the parental authority they exercise over them which imposes upon the parents the "duty of supporting them, keeping them

in their company, educating them in proportion to their means", while, on the other hand, gives them the "right to correct and punish them in moderation" . SALUDAGA vs. FEU, G.R. NO. 179337 April 30, 2008

Saludaga, a sophomore law student of respondent FEU filed a case for damages against it after he was shot by one of the security guards on duty at the school premises. When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is a established contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties are bound to comply with but which FEU failed to perform when it did not provide a safe and secure environment to its students. NAPOCOR vs. CA, G.R. NO. 124378, March 8, 2005 The negligence of NPC as a result of its inability to maintain the level of water in its dams has been satisfactorily and extensively established. In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all damages, which are the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of and it is not necessary that such damages have been foreseen or could have reasonably been foreseen by the defendant. GAISANO CAGAYAN, INC. vs INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA, G.R. NO. 147839, June 8, 2006 Petitioner’s argument is that it is not liable for the unpaid accounts because the fire is a fortuitous event. If the obligation is generic in the sense that the object thereof is designated merely by its class or genus without any particular designation or physical segregation from all others of the same class, the loss or destruction of anything of the same kind even without the debtor’s fault and before he has incurred in delay will not have the effect of extinguishing the obligation, based on the principle that the genus of a thing can never perish, (Genus nunquan perit) and an obligation to pay money is generic; therefore, it is not excused by fortuitous loss of any specific property of the debtor. TELEFAST vs. CASTRO, G.R. NO. 73867, February 29, 1988 Petitioner and private respondent entered into a contract whereby, for a fee, petitioner undertook to send said private respondent's message overseas by telegram but which petitioner did not do, despite performance by said private respondent of her obligation by paying the required charges. Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages. MANUEL vs. CA, G.R. NO. 95469 July 25, 1991 Petitioner contends that private respondents are in mora accipiendi. The failure of the owners to collect or their refusal to accept the rentals are not valid defenses, since consignation under such circumstances, is necessary, and by this we mean one that is effected in full compliance with the specific requirements of the law therefor. UNLAD RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. DRAGON, G.R. NO. 149338, July 28, 2008

Petitioners contend that they have fully complied with their obligation under the Memorandum of Agreement but due to respondents’ failure to increase the capital stock of the corporation to an amount that will accommodate their undertaking, it had become impossible for them to perform

their end of the Agreement. In reciprocal obligations, failure of the other party to perform the obligation renders the other party to demand fulfillment of the obligation or asked for the rescission of the contract, but not simply not performing their part of the Agreement. HONGKONG AND SHANGHAI BANKING CORP. vs. BROQUEZA, G.R. NO. 178610 November 17, 2010 Respondents executed undated promissory notes. They were not able to pay the monthly amortizations of their respective loans, which were suppose to be paid through salary deduction, to the petitioner because of their dismissal. Loans secured by their future retirement benefits to which they are no longer entitled are reduced to unsecured and pure civil obligations and the absence of a period within which to pay the obligation, the fulfillment of which is demandable at once. JAVIER vs. CA, G.R. No. L-48194 March 15, 1990 When a contract is subject to a suspensive condition, its birth and effectivity can take place only if and when the event which constitutes the condition happens or is fulfilled, and if the suspensive condition does not take place, the parties would stand as if the conditional obligation had never existed. PARKS vs. PROVINCE OF TARLAC, G.R. NO. L-24190, July 13, 1926 Appellant contends that a condition precedent having been imposed in the donation and the same not having been complied with, the donation never became effective. The characteristic of a condition precedent is that the acquisition of the right is not effected while said condition is not complied with or is not deemed complied with, consequently, when a condition is imposed, the compliance of which cannot be effected except when the right is deemed acquired, such condition cannot be a condition precedent but a condition subsequent. ALILEO A. MAGLASANG v. NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY, INC., G.R. No. 188986, March 20, 2013 The court ruled that the power to rescind the obligations of the injured party is implied in reciprocal obligations, such as in this case. On this score, the CA correctly applied Article 1191, which provides thus: the power to rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal ones, in case one of the obligors should not comply with what is incumbent upon him. The injured party may choose between the fulfillment and the rescission of the obligation, with the payment of damages in either case. He may also seek rescission, even after he has chosen fulfillment, if the latter should become impossible. The court shall decree the rescission claimed, unless there be just cause authorizing the fixing of a period.

EDS MANUFACTURING, INC. v. HEALTHCHECK INTERNATIONAL INC. G.R. No. 162802, October 9, 2013

The general rule is that rescission of a contract will not be permitted for a slight or casual breach, but only for such substantial and fundamental violations as would defeat the very object of the parties in making the agreement. It must be pointed that in the absence of a stipulation, a party cannot unilaterally and extra judicially rescind a contract. A judicial or notarial act is necessary before a valid rescission can take place. Even if Article 1191 were applicable, petitioner would still not be entitled to automatic rescission. Under Article 1191of the Civil Code, the right to resolve reciprocal obligations, is deemed implied in case one of the obligors shall fail to comply with what is incumbent upon him. But that right must be invoked judicially. Consequently, even if the right to rescind is made available to the injured party, the obligation is not ipso facto erased by the failure of the other party to comply with what is incumbent upon him. The party entitled to rescind should apply to the court for a decree of rescission. The right cannot be exercised solely on a party’s own judgment that the other committed a breach of the obligation. The operative act which produces the resolution of the contract is the decree of the court and not the mere act of the vendor. UP vs. DE LOS ANGELES, G.R. NO. L-28602, September 29, In the first place, UP and ALUMCO had expressly stipulated in the "Acknowledgment of Debt and Proposed Manner of Payments" that, upon default by the debtor ALUMCO, the creditor (UP) has "the right and the power to consider, the Logging Agreement dated as rescinded without the necessity of any judicial suit." The party who deems the contract violated may consider it resolved or rescinded, and act accordingly, without previous court action, but it proceeds at its own risk, for it is only the final judgment of the corresponding court that will conclusively and finally settle whether the action taken was or was not correct in law. AYSON-SIMON vs. ADAMOS, G.R. NO. L-39378, August 28, 1984 Defendants contend (1) that the fulfillment and the rescission of the obligation in reciprocal ones are alternative remedies, and plaintiff having chosen fulfillment in the Civil Case, she cannot now seek rescission; and (2) that even if plaintiff could seek rescission the action to rescind the obligation has prescribed. The rule that the injured party can only choose between fulfillment and rescission of the obligation, and cannot have both, applies when the obligation is possible of fulfillment, if the fulfillment has become impossible, Article 1191 (3) allows the injured party to seek rescission even after he has chosen fulfillment. OSMEÑA III vs SSS, September 13, 2007 The Letter-Agreement, the SPA, the SSC resolutions assailed in this recourse, and the Invitation to Bid sent out to implement said resolutions, all have a common subject: the Shares – the 187.84

Million EPCIB common shares, which, as a necessary consequence of the BDO- EPCIB merger which saw EPCIB being absorbed by the surviving BDO, have been transferred to BDO and converted into BDO common shares under the exchange ratio set forth in the BDO-EPCIB Plan of Merger. As thus converted, the subject Shares are no longer equity security issuances of the

now defunct EPCIB, but those of BDO-EPCI, which, needless to stress, is a totally separate and distinct entity from what used to be EPCIB. Under the law on obligations and contracts, the obligation to give a determinate thing is extinguished if the object is lost without the fault of the debtor, and per Art. 1192 (2) of the Civil Code, a thing is considered lost when it perishes or disappears in such a way that it cannot be recovered. ARANETA, INC., vs.PHILIPPINE SUGAR ESTATES, G.R. NO. L-22558 May 31, 1967 Araneta, who was not able to comply with his obligation to create side streets on the sides of the land which were sold to the PSE due to the presence of squatters, questions the decision of the lower court ordering him to comply with his obligation within 2 years from the finality of the decision. It must be recalled that Article 1197 of the Civil Code involves a two-step process, the Court must first determine that "the obligation does not fix a period", or from the nature and the circumstances it can be inferred that a period was intended, because courts can not fix a period merely because in its opinion it is or should be reasonable and the complaint not having sought that the court should set a period, but must set the time that the parties are shown to have intended. RONQUILLO vs.CA, G.R. NO. L-55138September 28, 1984 Respondent filed a modification of the order of the lower court in a collection case praying for the "execution of the decision in its entirety against all defendants, jointly and severally." In the absence of a finding of facts that the defendants made themselves individually liable for the debt incurred they are each liable only for one-fourth of said amount, the obligation being described as "individually and jointly". SPOUSES MINIAN0 vs. CONCEPCION, G.R. 172825, October 11, 2012 Admittedly, payment of the remaining balance of P200,000.00 was not made to the creditors themselves, but rather, it was allegedly made to a certain Losloso who was the authorized agent of petitioners. Respondent’s obligation consists of payment of a sum of money, and in general, a payment in order to be effective to discharge an obligation, must be made to the proper person, thus, payment must be made to the obligee himself or to an agent having authority, express or implied, to receive the particular payment. Payment made to one having apparent authority to receive the money will, as a rule, be treated as though actual authority had been given for its receipt. If payment is made to one who by law is authorized to act for the creditor, it will work as a discharge. TIBAJIA vs. CA, G.R. NO. 100290, June 4, 1993 Checks representing deposit money do not have legal tender power and their acceptance in the payment of debts, both public and private, is at the option of the creditor.

SPS. NAMAEL AND LOURDES BONROSTRO v. SPS. JUAN AND CONSTACIA LUNA, G.R. No. 172346. July 24, 2013

Tender of payment "is the manifestation by the debtor of a desire to comply with or pay an obligation. If refused without just cause, the tender of payment will discharge the debtor of the obligation to pay but only after a valid consignation of the sum due shall have been made with the proper court." Consignation is the deposit of the proper amount with a judicial authority in accordance with rules prescribed by law, after the tender of payment has been refused or because of circumstances which render direct payment to the creditor impossible or inadvisable. Tender of payment, without more, produces no effect. To have the effect of payment and the consequent extinguishment of the obligation to pay, the law requires the companion acts of tender of payment and consignation. Spouses Oscar and Thelma Cacayorin v. Armed Forces and Police Mutual Benefit Association, Inc., G.R. No. 171298. April 15, 2013 Consignation is necessarily judicial. Article 1258 of the Civil Code specifically provides that consignation shall be made by depositing the thing or things due at the disposal of judicial authority. The said provision clearly precludes consignation in venues other than the courts. DALTON vs. FG.R. and DEVELOPMENT CORP, G.R. NO. 172577 January 19, 2011 The withdrawal by the creditor of the amounts consigned was subject to the express reservation of assailing the validity of the consignation. In such case, the creditor is not deemed to have waived the claims he reserved against his debtor. When the amount consigned does not cover the entire obligation, the creditor may accept it, reserving his right to the balance. FRANCIA vs. IAC, G.R. NO. L-67649 June 28, 1988 Francia contends that his tax delinquency has been extinguished by legal compensation and claims that the government owed him when a portion of his land was expropriated, hence, his tax obligation had been set-off by operation of law. The general rule based on grounds of public policy is well-settled that no set-off admissible against demands for taxes levied for general or local governmental purposes because taxes are not in the nature of contracts between the party and party but grow out of duty to, and are the positive acts of the government to the making and enforcing of which, the personal consent of individual taxpayers is not required. CALIFORNIA BUS LINES, INC. vs. STATE INVESTMENT HOUSE, INC., G.R. NO. 147950. December 11, 2003 There was no change in the object of the prior obligations in the restructuring agreement since it merely provided for a new schedule of payments and additional security giving Delta authority to take over the management and operations of CBLI in case CBLI fails to pay installments equivalent to 60 days. With respect to obligations to pay a sum of money, this Court has

consistently applied the well-settled rule that the obligation is not novated by an instrument that expressly recognizes the old, changes only the terms of payment, and adds other obligations not incompatible with the old ones, or where the new contract merely supplements the old one.

SPOUSES TONGSON vs. EMERGENCY PAWNSHOP BULA, G.R. 167874. January 15, 2010 A valid contract requires the concurrence of the following essential elements: (1) consent or meeting of the minds, that is, consent to transfer ownership in exchange for the price; (2) determinate subject matter; and (3) price certain in money or its equivalent. PALATTAO vs. CA, G.R. NO. 131726, May 7, 2002 Appellant made a qualified acceptance of appellee’s letter-offer of a parcel of land but appellee made a new proposal to pay the amount in staggered amounts within two years in quarterly amortizations. To convert the offer into a contract, the acceptance must be absolute and must not qualify the terms of the offer, for a qualified acceptance constitutes a counter-offer and is a rejection of the original offer and such acceptance is not sufficient to generate consent. GALLARDO vs.HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, G.R. NO. L67742 October 29, 1987 The issue here is whether or not the unnotarized deed of sale can be considered as a valid instrument for effecting the alienation by way of sale of a parcel of land registerd under the Torrens System. The general rule enunciated in said Art. 1356 is that contracts are obligatory, in whatever form they may have been entered, provided all the essential requisites for their validity are present, except when the law so requires requiring a contract to be in some form for validity or enforceability. SANCHEZ vs. RIGOS, G.R. NO. L-25494 June 14, 1972 Since there may be no valid contract without a cause or consideration, the promisor is not bound by his promise and may, accordingly, withdraw it, and pending notice of its withdrawal, his accepted promise partakes, however, of the nature of an offer to sell which, if accepted, results in a perfected contract of sale. TIU vs. PLATINUM PLANS PHIL., INC., G.R. NO. 163512 February 28, 2007 Respondent contends that the inclusion of the two-year non-involvement clause in petitioner’s contract of employment was reasonable and needed since her job gave her access to the company’s confidential marketing strategies. A non-involvement clause is not necessarily void for being in restraint of trade as long as there are reasonable limitations as to time, trade, and place. CABAHUG vs NAPOCOR, G.R. NO. 186069, January 30, 2013

Disregarding the stipulations in the contract allowing additional compensation for easement fee, the CA ruled that Cabahug's attempt to collect further sums by way of additional easement fee and,or just compensation is violative of said contract. It is settled that a contract constitutes the law between the parties who are bound by its stipulations which, when couched in clear and

plain language, should be applied according to their literal tenor and the courts cannot supply material stipulations, which contradict the intent of the parties. SPOUSES FLORENDO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 101771 December 17, 1996 In order that obligations arising from contracts may have the force of law between the parties, there must be mutuality between the parties based on their essential equality, hence, a contract containing a condition which makes its fulfillment dependent exclusively upon the uncontrolled will of one of the contracting parties, is void. DKC HOLDINGS CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 118248 April 5, 2000 Being an heir there is privity of interest between the heir and the deceased, hence, heirs are bound by contracts entered into by their predecessors-in-interest except when the rights and obligations arising therefrom are not transmissible by (1) their nature, (2) stipulation or (3) provision of law. PRUDENTIAL BANK AND TRUST COMPANY vs. ABASOLO, G.R. NO. September 27, 2010

186738,

Contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs, and if a contract should contain some stipulation in favor of a third person, the contracting parties must have clearly and deliberately conferred a favor upon the third person. FLORENTINO vs. ENCARNACION, SR., G.R. NO. L-27696 September 30, 1977 To constitute a valid stipulation pour autrui it must be the purpose and intent of the stipulating parties to benefit the third. It is not sufficient that the third person may be incidentally benefited by the stipulation. ASIAN CATHAY FINANCE AND LEASING CORPORATION vs. SPOUSES G.R.AVADOR et al, G.R. NO. 186550, July 5, 2010 A contract of adhesion may be struck down as void and unenforceable for being subversive to public policy, when the weaker party is completely deprived of the opportunity to bargain on equal footing. URETA vs. URETA, G.R. No. 165748, September 14, 2011 Lacking in an absolutely simulated contract is consent which is essential to a valid and enforceable contract. Thus, where a person, in order to place his property beyond the reach of his creditors, simulates a transfer of it to another, he does not really intend to divest himself of his title and control of the property; hence, the deed of transfer is but a sham. Similarly, in this case, Alfonso simulated a transfer to Policronio purely for taxation purposes, without intending to transfer ownership over the subject lands.

LITA ENTERPRISES, INC.,vs. IAC, G.R. NO. L-64693 April 27, 1984

Unquestionably, the parties herein operated under an arrangement, commonly known as the "kabit system", whereby a person who has been granted a certificate of convenience allows another person who owns motors vehicles to operate under such franchise for a fee, and the petitioner prays that private respondents be declared liable to petitioner for whatever amount the latter has paid. It is a fundamental principle of in pari delicto that the court will not aid either party to enforce an illegal contract, but will leave them both where it finds them. CARLOS A. LORIA vs. LUDOLFO P. MUÑOZ, JR. G.R. No. 187240, 15 October 2014, SECOND DIVISION (Leonen, J.) The application of the doctrine of in pari delicto is not always rigid. An accepted exception arises when its application contravenes well-established public policy. In this jurisdiction, public policy has been defined as “that principle of the law which holds that no subject or citizen can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the public or against the public good.” The prevention of unjust enrichment is a recognized public policy of the State. CORONEL vs. CONSTANTINO, G.R. NO. 121069, February 7, 2003 Applying Articles 1317 and 1403 of the Civil Code, the Court of Appeals ruled that through their inaction and silence, the three sons of Emilia are considered to have ratified the aforesaid sale of the subject property by their mother. Ratification means that one under no disability voluntarily adopts and gives sanction to some unauthorized act or defective proceeding, which without his sanction would not be binding on him , hence, an alleged silence and inaction may not be interpreted as an act of ratification on their part.

YUVIENCO vs. DACUYCUY, G.R. NO. L-55048 May 27, 1981 Respondent judge assumed that as long as the requirements of perfection of a contract are present in a contract which involves payment in installments, the Statute of Frauds would no longer apply as long as the total price or consideration is mentioned in some note or memorandum and there is no need of any indication of the manner in which such total price is to be paid. In any sale of real property on installments, the Statute of Frauds read together with the perfection requirements of Article 1475 of the Civil Code must be understood and applied in the sense that the idea of payment on installments must be in the requisite of a note or memorandum therein contemplated. ORDUÑA vs. FUENTEBELLA, G.R. NO. 176841, June 29, 2010 Gabriel Sr., during his lifetime, sold the subject property to Antonita, the purchase price payable on installment basis, thus, Gabriel Sr. appeared to have been a recipient of some partial payments but after his death, his son questions the verbal sale contract between Gabriel Sr. and Antonita, and alleged that the contract is unenforceable for non-compliance with the Statute of Frauds. The

Statute of Frauds, in context, provides that a contract for the sale of real property or of an interest therein shall be unenforceable unless the sale or some note or memorandum thereof is in writing and subscribed by the party or his agent. Where the verbal contract of sale, however, has been

partially executed through the partial payments made by one party duly received by the vendor, as in the present case, the contract is taken out of the scope of the Statute. AIR FRANCE vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 104234 June 30, 1995 Petitioner moved for the issuance of an alias writ of execution on the ground of unsatisfied judgment against respondents and It likewise moved to declare the sale to a third party of a parcel of land in the name of the private respondent as one in fraud of creditors which was granted by the lower court. Rescissible contracts, not being void, they remain legally effective until set aside in a rescissory action and may convey title, and an action for rescission may not be raised or set up in a summary proceeding through a motion, but in an independent civil action and only after a full-blown trial. LAW ON SALES PEÑALOSA vs. SANTOS, G.R. NO. 133749, August 23, 2001 Respondent insist that the second deed is a complete nullity because a) the consideration stated in the deed was not paid; b)seller was not present when the deed was notarized; c) seller did not surrender a copy of the title; d)real estate taxes were not paid. The elements of a valid contract of sale are: (1) consent or meeting of the minds; (2) determinate subject matter; and (3) price certain in money or its equivalent which are present in the second Deed of Sale hence there is already a perfected contract of sale. FIRST OPTIMA REALTY CORPORATION vs. SECURITRON SECURITY SERVICES, INC. G.R. No. 199648, January 28, 2015 Since there is no perfected sale between the parties, respondent had no obligation to make payment through the check; nor did it possess the right to deliver earnest money to petitioner in order to bind the latter to a sale. As contemplated under Art. 1482 of the Civil Code, “there must first be a perfected contract of sale before we can speak of earnest money.” “Where the parties merely exchanged offers and counter-offers, no contract is perfected since they did not yet give their consent to such offers. Earnest money applies to a perfected sale.” MOLDEX RAELTY INC. v. FLORA A. SABERON, G.R. No. 176289. April 8, 2013 The lack of a license to sell or the failure on the part of a subdivision developer to register the contract to sell or deed of conveyance with the Register of Deeds does not result to the nullification or invalidation of the contract to sell it entered into with a buyer. The contract to sell remains valid and subsisting. The intrinsic validity of the contract to sell is not affected by the developer’s violation of Section 5 of PD 957.Nevertheless, the respondent in this case is entitled to 50% refund under the Maceda Law.

SPOUSES DELFIN O. TUMIBAY AND AURORA T. TUMIBA-DECEASED ET AL. v. SPOUSES MELVIN A. LOPEZ, G.R. No. 171692, June 3, 2013

In a contract to sell, the seller retains ownership of the property until the buyer has paid the price in full. A buyer who covertly usurps the seller's ownership of the property prior to the full payment of the price is in breach of the contract and the seller is entitled to rescission because the breach is substantial and fundamental as it defeats the very object of the parties in entering into the contract to sell. In the case at bar, the court finds that respondent Rowena’s act of transferring the title to the subject land in her name, without the knowledge and consent of petitioners and despite non-payment of the full price thereof, constitutes a substantial and fundamental breach of the contract to sell.

HEIRS OF ARTURO REYES vs SOCCO-BELTRAN, G.R. 176474 November 27, 2008 It was unmistakably stated in the Contract to Sell and made clear to both parties thereto that the vendor was not yet the owner of the subject property and was merely expecting to inherit the same. The law specifically requires that the vendor must have ownership of the property at the time of delivery hence, there was no valid sale from which ownership of the subject property could have been transferred. DACLAG vs. MACAHILIG et al., G.R. NO. 159578, February 18, 2009 Petitioners contend that the 10-year period for reconveyance is applicable if the action is based on an implied or a constructive trust. However, since respondents' action for reconveyance was based on fraud, the action must be filed within four years from the discovery of the fraud. Respondent's action for reconveyance was not even subject to prescription, since the deed of sale that was executed in favor of petitioners was null and void because the seller was not the owner of the land, nor has the authority when she sold it to petitioners, hence, being an absolute nullity, the deed is subject to attack anytime because an action to declare the inexistence of a void contract does not prescribe. NOOL vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 116635 July 24, 1997 Petitioners contend that they could repurchase the property that they "sold" to private respondents when they allowed the respondent to redeem the properties for them from DBP but DBP certified that the mortgagors' right of redemption was not exercised within the period. Article 1505 of the Civil Code provides that "where goods are sold by a person who is not the owner thereof, and who does not sell them under authority or with consent of the owner, the buyer acquires no better title to the goods than the seller had, unless the owner of the goods is by his conduct precluded from denying the seller's authority to sell.", hence, petitioners "sold" nothing, it follows that they can also "repurchase" nothing. DAROY vs. ATTY. ABECIA, A.C. NO. 3046, October 26, 1998 The prohibition in Art. 1491 does not apply to the sale of a parcel of land, acquired by a client to satisfy a judgment in his favor to his counsel as long as the property was not the subject of the litigation.

ARCENIO vs. JUDGE PAGOROGON, A.M. NO. MTJ-89-270 July 5, 1993

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs. JUDGE PAGOROGON, A.M. NO. MTJ-92-637 July 5, 1993 The respondent judge engaged the services of a mechanic to tow the jeep in custodia legis and to place the jeep in good running condition, spending in the process her own money and also registered the same in her brother's name. The act of respondent judge is not unlike the prohibited acquisition by purchase described in Article 1491 of the New Civil code and is in fact, even worse when she did not acquire the said vehicle from it's owner but instead whimsically spent for its repairs and automatically appropriated the jeep for her own use and benefit. VALENCIA vs. ATTY. CABANTING, A.M. Nos. 1302, 1391 and 1543 April 26, 1991 Paulino alleged that the trial court failed to provide a workable solution concerning his house and while the petition for certiorari was pending the trial court issued an order of execution stating that "the decision in this case has already become final and executory". While it is true that Atty. Cabanting purchased the lot after finality of judgment, there was still a pending certiorari proceeding, and a thing is said to be in litigation not only if there is some contest or litigation over it in court, but also from the moment that it becomes subject to the judicial action of the judge. FABILLO vs. THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, G.R. NO. L68838 March 11, 1991 After the court declared with finality that the petitioners are the lawful owners, they refused to comply when the respondent lawyer proceeded to implement the contract of services between him and the petitioners by taking possession and exercising rights of ownership over 40% of said properties which are the subject of litigation. A contract between a lawyer and his client stipulating a contingent fee is not covered by said prohibition under Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code because the payment of said fee is not made during the pendency of the litigation but only after judgment has been rendered in the case handled by the lawyer. MANANQUIL vs. ATTY. VILLEGAS, A.M. NO. 2430 August 30, 1990 Complainant alleges that for over a period of 20 years, respondent counsel allowed lease contracts to be executed between his client and a partnership of which respondent is one of the partners, covering parcels of land of the estate, but respondent claims that he is only acting as an agent. Even if the respondent signed merely as an agent, the lease contracts are covered by the prohibition against any acquisition or lease by a lawyer of properties involved in litigation in which he takes part. BAUTISTA vs. ATTY. GONZALES, A.M. NO. 1625 February 12, 1990 The Solicitor General found that respondent counsel transferred to himself one-half of the properties of his clients during the pendency of the case where the properties were involved.

Persons mentioned in Art. 1491 of the Civil Code are prohibited from purchasing the property mentioned therein because of the existing fiduciary relationship with such property and rights, as well as with the client.

IN RE: SUSPENSION FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW IN THE TERRITORY OF GUAM OF ATTY. LEON G. MAQUERA, B.M. NO. 793. July 30, 2004 Maquera was suspended from the practice of law in Guam for misconduct, as he acquired his client’s property by exercising the right of redemption previously assigned to him by the client in payment of his legal services, then sold it and as a consequence obtained an unreasonably high fee for handling his client’s case. The prohibition extends to sales in legal redemption and such prohibition is founded on public policy because, by virtue of his office, an attorney may easily take advantage of the credulity and ignorance of his client and unduly enrich himself at the expense of his client. PROVINCE OF CEBU vs. HEIRS OF RUFINA MORALES, G.R. NO. 170115, FEBRUARY 19, 2008 The City of Cebu was no longer the owner of the lot when it ceded the same to petitioner under the compromise agreement and at that time, the city merely retained rights as an unpaid seller but had effectively transferred ownership of the lot to Morales. A successor-in-interest could only acquire rights that its predecessor had over the lo which include the right to seek rescission or fulfillment of the terms of the contract and the right to damages in either case. HEIRS OF AMPARO DEL ROSARIO vs. SANTOS, G.R. NO. L-46892 September 30, 1981 By the terms of the Deed of Sale itself, appellants declared themselves to be owners of one-half (1,2) interest thereof and contend that the deed of assignment of one-half (1,2) interest thereof executed by said Custodio in their favor is strictly personal between them. Notwithstanding the lack of any title to the said lot by appellants at the time of the execution of the deed of sale in favor of appellee, the said sale may be valid as there can be a sale of an expected thing. JAVIER vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. L-48194 March 15, 1990 The efficacy of a deed of assignment is subject to the condition that the application of private respondent for an additional area for forest concession be approved by the Bureau of Forestry which was not obtained. The efficacy of the sale of a mere hope or expectancy is deemed subject to the condition that the thing will come into existence, which did not happen, hence the agreement executed never became effective or enforceable. DEL PRADO vs SPOUSES CABALLERO, G.R. NO. 148225, March 3,2010 7 The parties agreed on the purchase price of P40,000.00 for a predetermined area of 4,000 sq m, more or less, but when the OCT was issued, the area was declared to be 14,475 sq m, with an excess of 10,475 sq m. Petititiomer, however, claims that respondents are, therefore, duty-bound to deliver the whole area within the boundaries stated, without any corresponding increase in the

price. Article 1542 is not hard and fast and admits of an exception and the use of “more or less” or similar words in designating quantity covers only a reasonable excess or deficiency, and clearly, the discrepancy of 10,475 sq m cannot be considered a slight difference in quantity.

SEMIRA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 76031 March 2, 1994 Private respondent sold Lot 4221 to his nephew by means of a "Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupa" which incorporated both the area and the definite boundaries of the lot, the former transferred not merely the 822.5 square meters stated in their document of sale but the entire area circumscribed within its boundaries. If besides mentioning the boundaries, which is indispensable in every conveyance of real estate, its area or number should be designated in the contract, the vendor shall be bound to deliver all that is included within said boundaries, even when it exceeds the area or number specified in the contract; and, should he not be able to do so, he shall suffer a reduction in the price, in proportion to what is lacking in the area or number, unless the contract is rescinded because the vendee does not accede to the failure to deliver what has been stipulated. DANGUILAN vs. IAC, G.R. NO. L-69970 November 28, 1988 Respondent admits that she did not take physical possession of property but argues that symbolic delivery was effected through the notarized deed of sale. The thing is considered to be delivered when it is placed "in the hands and possession of the vendee," and in order that this symbolic delivery may produce the effect of tradition, it is necessary that the vendor shall have had such control over the thing sold at the moment of the sale, but if there is no impediment to prevent the thing sold passing into the tenancy of the purchaser by the sole will of the vendor, symbolic delivery through the execution of a public instrument is sufficient. CHUA vs COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 119255, April 9, 2003 Petitioner insists that he was ready to pay the balance of the purchase price but withheld payment because he required that the property be registered first in his name before he would turn over the check to the private respondent. 8 The obligation of the seller is to transfer to the buyer ownership of the thing sold, but in the sale of a real property, the seller is not obligated to transfer in the name of the buyer a new certificate of title, but rather to transfer ownership of the real property, because as between the seller and buyer, ownership is transferred not by the issuance of a new certificate of title in the name of the buyer but by the execution of the instrument of sale in a public document. VISAYAN SAWMILL COMPANY, INC., vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 83851. March 3, 1993. The seller gave access to the buyer to enter his premises, manifesting no objection thereto but even sending people to start digging up the scrap iron. The seller has placed the goods in the control and possession of the vendee and such action or real delivery (traditio) transfered ownership. MUNICIPALITY OF VICTORIAS vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. L-31189

March 31, 1987

Respondent discovered that a parcel of land she owns is being used by Petitioner, Municipality of Victorias, as a cemetery for 29 years and when the Mayor replied that Petitioner bought the land from her grandmother, she asked to be shown the papers concerning the sale but petitioner refused to show the same. Where there is no express provision that title shall not pass until payment of the price, and the thing sold has been delivered, title passes from the moment the thing sold is placed in the possession and control of the buyer. DE LEON vs. ONG, G.R. NO. 170405, February 2, 2010 Petitioner sold three parcels of land to respondent which were mortgaged to a bank, hence petitioner and respondent executed a notarized deed of absolute sale with assumption of mortgage, but petitioner some time thereafter paid the mortgage and sold the properties to another person. Settled is the rule that the seller is obliged to transfer title over the properties and deliver the same to the buyer, and as a rule, the execution of a notarized deed of sale is equivalent to the delivery of a thing sold. PUROMINES, INC., vs. COURT OF APPEAL, G.R. NO. 91228. March 22, 1993. Petitioner argues that the sales contract does not include the contract of carriage which is a different contract entered into by the carrier with the cargo owners. As worded, the sales contract is comprehensive enough to include claims for damages arising from carriage and delivery of the goods. As a general rule, the seller has the obligation to transmit the goods to the buyer, and concomitant thereto, the contracting of a carrier to deliver the same. Art. 1523 of the Civil Code provides: "Art. 1523. Where in pursuance of a contract of sale, the seller in authorized or required to send the goods to the buyer, delivery of the goods to a carrier, whether named by the buyer or not, for the purpose of transmission to the buyer is deemed to be a delivery of the goods to the buyer, except in the cases provided for in article 1503, first, second and third paragraphs, or unless a contrary intent appear. "Unless otherwise authorized by the buyer, the seller must take such contract with the carrier on behalf of the buyer as may be reasonable, having regard to the nature of the goods and the other circumstances of the case. If the seller omit so to do, and the goods are lost or damaged in course of transit, the buyer may decline to treat the delivery to the carrier as a delivery to himself,, or may hold the seller responsible in damages." xxx xxx xxx The disputed sales contact provides for conditions relative to the delivery of goods, such as date of shipment, demurrage, weight as determined by the bill of lading at load port. BOY vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 125088, April 14, 2004 Petitioner sold the subject property to respondents as evidenced by a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale, but contends that the respondents have no right to material possession of the property since the respondents have not paid the property in full. Unless there is a stipulation to the contrary,

when the sale is made through a public instrument, the execution thereof is equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the object of the contract.

SPOUSES BUENAVENTURA et al vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. November 20, 2003

126376.

Petitioners assert that their respondent siblings did not actually pay the prices stated in the Deeds of Sale to their respondent father and assuming that there is consideration, the same is grossly inadequate as to invalidate the Deeds of Sale. If there is a meeting of the minds of the parties as to the price, the contract of sale is valid and gross inadequacy of price does not affect a contract of sale, except if there is a defect in the consent, or that the parties really intended a donation or some other contract. HO, JR. vs TENG GUI, G.R. NO. 130115, July 16, 2008 RTC considered that although the sales of the properties on the lot were simulated, it can be assumed that the intention of Ho in such transaction was to give and donate such properties to the respondent. The Court holds that the reliance of the trial court on the provisions of Article 1471 of the Civil Code to conclude that the simulated sales were a valid donation to the respondent is misplaced because its finding was based on a mere assumption when the law requires positive proof, which the respondent was unable to show. HYATT ELEVATORS vs. CATHEDRAL HEIGHTS, G.R. NO. 173881 December 1, 2010 As revealed by the records, it was only Hyatt who determined the price, without the acceptance or conformity of CHBCAI. The fixing of the price can never be left to the decision of one of the contracting parties, but a price fixed by one of the contracting parties, if accepted by the other, gives rise to a perfected sale. CHUA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 119255, April 9, 2003 On the agreed date, Chua refused to pay the balance of the purchase price as required by the contract to sell, the signed Deeds of Sale, and imposes another condition. The vendee is bound to accept delivery and to pay the price of the thing sold at the time and place stipulated in the contract. FULE vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 112212, March 2, 1998 While it is true that the amount of P40,000.00 forming part of the consideration was still payable to petitioner, its nonpayment by Dr. Cruz is not a sufficient cause to invalidate the contract or bar the transfer of ownership and possession of the things exchanged considering the fact that their contract is silent as to when it becomes due and demandable. Neither may such failure to pay the balance of the purchase price result in the payment of interest thereon. Article 1589 of the Civil Code prescribes the payment of interest by the vendee "for the period between the delivery of the thing and the payment of the price" in the following cases: (1) Should it have been so stipulated; (2) Should the thing sold and delivered produce fruits or income; (3) Should he be in default, from the time of judicial or extrajudicial demand for the payment of the price.

CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SPOUSES ALFONSO, G.R. NO. 131074, March 27, 2000

Respondents aver that they are entitled to cancel the obligation altogether in view of petitioner's failure to pay the purchase price when the same became due, while Petitioner claims that the respondent failed to comply with their contractual obligations hence it was entitled to withhold payment of the purchase price. Should the vendee be disturbed in the possession or ownership of the thing acquired, he may suspend the payment of the price until the vendor has cause the disturbance or danger to cease. This is not, however, the only justified cause for retention or withholding the payment of the agreed price, but also, if the vendor fails to perform any essential obligation of the contract. MANUEL UY & SONS, INC. v. VALBUECO, INCORPORATED, G.R. No. 179594. September 11, 2013 Articles 1191 and 1592 of the Civil Code are applicable to contracts of sale, while R.A. No. 6552 applies to contracts to sell. R.A. No. 6552, otherwise known as the Realty Installment Buyer Act, applies to the subject contracts to sell. R.A. No. 6552 (Maceda Law) recognizes in conditional sales of all kinds of real estate (industrial, commercial, residential) the right of the seller to cancel the contract upon non-payment of an installment by the buyer, which is simply an event that prevents the obligation of the vendor to convey title from acquiring binding force. SPOUSES JAIME SEBASTIAN AND EVANGELINE SEBASTIAN vs. BPI FAMILY BANK, INC., CARMELITA ITAPO AND BENJAMIN HAO G.R. No. 160107, 22 October 2014, FIRST DIVISION (Bersamin, J.) The protection of Republic Act No. 6552 (Realty Installment Buyer Protection Act) does not cover a loan extended by the employer to enable its employee to finance the purchase of a house and lot. The law protects only a buyer acquiring the property by installment, not a borrower whose rights are governed by the terms of the loan from the employer. SPOUSES MICHELLE M. NOYNAY AND NOEL S. NOYNAY vs. CITIHOMES BUILDER AND DEVELOPMENT, INC. G.R. No. 204160, September 22, 2014 In Pagtalunan v. Manzano, the Court stressed the importance of complying with the provisions of the Maceda Law as to the cancellation of contracts to sell involving realty installment schemes. There it was held that the cancellation of the contract by the seller must be in accordance with Section 3 (b) of the Maceda Law, which requires the notarial act of rescission and the refund to the buyer of the full payment of the cash surrender value of the payments made on the property. The actual cancellation of the contract takes place after thirty (30) days from receipt by the buyer of the notice of cancellation or the demand for rescission of the contract by a notarial act and upon full payment of the cash surrender value to the buyer. SKUNAC CORPORATION AND ALFONSO F. ENRIQUEZ vs. ROBERTO S. SYLIANTENG AND CAESAR S. SYLIANTENG

G.R. No. 205879, 23 April 2014, THIRD DIVISION (Peralta, J.)

The requisites that must concur for Article 1544 to apply are: (a) The two (or more sales) transactions must constitute valid sales; (b) The two (or more) sales transactions must pertain to exactly the same subject matter; (c) The two (or more) buyers at odds over the rightful ownership of the subject matter must each represent conflicting interests; and (d) The two (or more) buyers at odds over the rightful ownership of the subject matter must each have bought from the very same seller. Obviously, said provision has no application in cases where the sales involved were initiated not by just one but two vendors. SPOUSES CLEMENCIO C. SABITSANA, JR v. JUANITO F. MUERTEGUI, G.R. No. 181359 August 5, 2013 Article 1544 of the Civil Code does not apply to sales involving unregistered land. Suffice it to state that the issue of the buyer’s good or bad faith is relevant only where the subject of the sale is registered land, and the purchaser is buying the same from the registered owner whose title to the land is clean. In such case, the purchaser who relies on the clean title of the registered owner is protected if he is a purchaser in good faith for value. Act No. 3344 applies to sale of unregistered lands. What applies in this case is Act No. 3344, as amended, which provides for the system of recording of transactions over unregistered real estate. Act No. 3344 expressly declares that any registration made shall be without prejudice to a third party with a better right. INDUSTRIAL TEXTILE MANUFACTURING COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., vs. LPJ ENTERPRISES, INC., G.R. NO. 66140, January 21, 1993 21 Respondent alleges that it cannot be held liable for the 47,000 plastic bags which were not used for packing cement as originally intended invoking it's right of return. Article 1502 of the Civil Code, has no application at all to this case, since the provision in the Uniform Sales Act and the Uniform Commercial Code from which Article 1502 was taken, clearly requires an express written agreement to make a sales contract either a "sale or return" or a "sale on approval", which is absent in this case. Parol or extrinsic testimony could not be admitted for the purpose of showing that an invoice or bill of sale that was complete in every aspect and purporting to embody a sale without condition or restriction constituted a contract of sale or return. If the purchaser desired to incorporate a stipulation securing to him the right of return, he should have done so at the time the contract was made. On the other hand, the buyer cannot accept part and reject the rest of the goods since this falls outside the normal intent of the parties in the "on approval" situation. LO vs. KJS ECO-FORMWORK SYSTEM PHIL., INC., G.R. NO. 149420 October 8, 2003 The vendor in good faith shall be responsible for the existence and legality of the credit at the time of the sale, unless it should have been sold as doubtful; but not for the solvency of the

debtor, unless it has been so expressly stipulated or unless the insolvency was prior to the sale and of common knowledge. ANG vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 177874, September 29, 2008

The seller, in declaring that he owned and had clean title to the vehicle at the time the Deed of Absolute Sale, is giving an implied warranty of title which prescribes six months after the delivery of the vehicle. PNB vs MEGA PRIME REALTY AND HOLDINGS CORPORATION, G.R. NO. 173454, October 6, 2008 MEGA PRIME REALTY AND HOLDINGS CORPORATION vs. PNB, G.R. NO. 173456, October 6, 2008 In a contract of sale, unless a contrary intention appears, there is an implied warranty on the part of the seller that he has a right to sell the thing at the time when the ownership is to pass, and that the buyer shall have a peaceful possession of the thing and it shall be free from any hidden faults or defects, or any charge or encumbrance not declared or known to the buyer. ANG vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 177874, September 29, 2008 The seller, in pledging that he “will defend the same from all claims or any claim whatsoever [and] will save the vendee from any suit by the government of the Republic of the Philippines,” is giving a warranty against eviction. A breach of this warranty requires the concurrence of these four requisites:(1) The purchaser has been deprived of the whole or part of the thing sold; (2) This eviction is by a final judgment; (3) The basis thereof is by virtue of a right prior to the sale made by the vendor; and (4) The vendor has been summoned and made co-defendant in the suit for eviction at the instance of the vendee. DE YSASI vs. ARCEO, G.R. NO. 136586, November 22, 2001 Petitioner admitted that he inspected the premises three or four times before signing the lease contract and during his inspection, he noticed the rotten plywood on the ceiling which in his opinion was caused by leaking water or "anay" (termites), yet he decided to go through with the lease agreement. The lessor is responsible for warranty against hidden defects, but he is not answerable for patent defects or those which are visible. ENGINEERING & MACHINERY CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 52267, January 24, 1996 The original complaint is one for damages arising from breach of a written contract - and not a suit to enforce warranties against hidden defects. The remedy against violations of the warranty against hidden defects is either to withdraw from the contract (redhibitory action) or to demand a proportionate reduction of the price (accion quanti minoris), with damages in either case. DINO vs COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 113564, June 20, 2001 23 Respondent made the last delivery of the vinyl products to petitioners on September 28, 1988 and the action to recover the purchase price of the goods petitioners returned to the respondent was filed on July 24, 1989, more than nine months from the date of last delivery. Actions arising

from breach of warranty against hidden defects shall be barred after six months from the delivery of the thing sold.

LAFORTEZA vs. MACHUCA, G.R. NO. 137552, June 16, 2000 A MOA has this stipulation "....SELLER-LESSOR hereby agrees to sell unto BUYER-LESSEE the property described within six (6) months from the execution date hereof, or upon issuance by the Court of a new owner's certificate of title and the execution of extrajudicial partition with sale of the estate of Francisco Laforteza, whichever is earlier;...". Petitioner contends that since the condition was not met, they no longer had an obligation to proceed with the sale of the house and lot. The petitioners fail to distinguish between a condition imposed upon the perfection of the contract and a condition imposed on the performance of an obligation, failure to comply with the first condition results in the failure of a contract, while the failure to comply with the second condition only gives the other party the option either to refuse to proceed with the sale or to waive the condition. INTEGRATED PACKAGING CORP. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 115117, June 8, 2000 There is no dispute that the agreement provides for the delivery of printing paper on different dates and a separate price has been agreed upon for each delivery. When there is a contract of sale of goods to be delivered by stated installments, which are to be separately paid for, and the seller makes defective deliveries in respect of one or more installments, it depends in each case on the terms of the contract and the circumstances of the case, whether the breach of contract is so material as to justify the injured party in refusing to proceed further and suing for damages for breach of the entire contract, or whether the breach is severable, giving rise to a claim for compensation but not to a right to treat the whole contract as broken. VISAYAN SAWMILL COMPANY, INC., vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 83851. March 3, 1993. The petitioner agreed to deliver the scrap iron only upon payment of the purchase price by means of an irrevocable and unconditional letter of credit, which the respondent failed to obtain, thus, there was no actual sale. Where the goods have not been delivered to the buyer, and the buyer has repudiated the contract of sale, or has manifested his inability to perform his obligations, thereunder, or has committed a breach thereof, the seller may totally rescind the contract of sale by giving notice of his election to do to the buyer. DIAMANTE vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. L-51824 February 7, 1992 A right to repurchase was granted subsequently in an instrument different from the original document of sale which caused the cancellation of the permit or lease by the Secretary of Fisheries. An agreement to repurchase becomes a promise to sell when made after the sale, because when the sale is made without such an agreement, the purchaser acquires the thing sold absolutely, and if he afterwards grants the vendor the right to repurchase, it is a new contract entered into by the purchaser, as absolute owner already of the object. VASQUEZ vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 83759 July 12, 1991

Respondents sold the lot to the petitioners under a Deed of Sale, On the same day and along with the execution of the Deed of Sale, a separate instrument, denominated as Right to Repurchase was executed by the parties, Later, petitioners resisted the action for redemption. The transaction

between the petitioners and private respondents was not a sale with right to repurchase, the second instrument is just an option to buy since it is not embodied in the same document of sale but in a separate document, and since such option is not supported by a consideration distinct from the price, said deed for right to repurchase is not binding upon them. BAUTISTA vs UNANGST, G.R. NO. 173002, July 4, 2008 Where in a contract of sale with pacto de retro, the vendor remains in possession, as a lessee or otherwise, the contract shall be presumed to be an equitable mortgage because in a contract of sale with pacto de retro, the legal title to the property is immediately transferred to the vendee, subject to the vendor’s right to redeem and retention by the vendor of the possession of the property is inconsistent with the vendee’s acquisition of the right of ownership under a true sale. ABILLA vs. ANG GOBONSENG, JR., G.R. NO. 146651, January 17, 2002 The legal question to be resolved is "May the vendors in a sale judicially declared as a pacto de retro exercise the right of repurchase under Article 1606, third paragraph, of the Civil Code, after they have taken the position that the same was an equitable mortgage?" No, where the proofs established that there could be no honest doubt as to the parties’ intention, that the transaction was clearly and definitely a sale with pacto de retro, the vendor a retro is not entitled to the benefit of the third paragraph of Article 1606. AGAN vs. HEIRS OF SPS. NUEVA, G.R. NO. 155018, December 11, 2003 The lower court's dispositive position states: "However, the vendors can still exercise the right to repurchase said property within thirty (30) days from receipt of this decision pursuant to Article 1606 and 1607 of the New Civil Code." Article 1606 grants the vendor a retro thirty (30) days “from the time final judgment was rendered,” not from the defendant’s receipt of the judgment, "final judgment” must be construed to mean one that has become final and executory. Spouses CRUZ vs. LEIS et al., G.R. NO. 125233, March 9, 2000 26 The lower court rationalized that petitioners failed to comply with the provisions of Article 1607 of the Civil Code requiring a judicial order for the consolidation of the ownership in the vendee a retro to be recorded in the Registry of Property. A judicial order is necessary in order to determine the true nature of the transaction and to prevent the interposition of buyers in good faith while the determination is being made, however, notwithstanding Article 1607, the recording in the Registry of Property of the consolidation of ownership of the vendee is not a condition sine qua non to the transfer of ownership for the method prescribed thereunder is merely for the purpose of registering the consolidated title. BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, INC. vs. SPS. VELOSO, G.R. NO. 141974, August 9, 2004 The respondents offer to redeem the foreclosed properties and the subsequent consignation in court were made within the period of redemption, but the amount consigned did not include the interest and was also way below the amount paid by the highest bidder-purchaser of the properties during the auction sale. The redemption price should either be fully offered in legal

tender or else validly consigned in court because only by such means can the auction winner be assured that the offer to redeem is being made in good faith.

LEE CHUY REALTY CORPORATION vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 104114 December 4, 1995 Petitioner questions the ruling of the Court of Appeals which concluded that a prior tender or offer of redemption is a prerequisite or precondition to the filing of the action for legal redemption. To avail of the right of redemption what is essential is to make an offer to redeem within the prescribed period. There is actually no prescribed form for an offer to redeem to be properly effected. It can either be through a formal tender with consignation, or by filing a complaint in court coupled with consignation of the redemption price within the prescribed period. VILLANUEVA vs. HON. ALFREDO C. FLORENDO, G.R. NO. L-33158, October 17, 1985 It is not disputed that co-ownership exists but the lower court disallowed redemption because it considered the vendee, Vallangca, a co-heir, being married to Concepcion Villanueva. The term "third person" or "stranger” in Art. 1620 refers to all persons who are not heirs in succession, either by will or the law or any one who is not a co-owner.

PRIMARY STRUCTURES CORP. vs. SPS. VALENCIA, G.R. NO. 150060. August 19, 2003 Article 1621 of the Civil Code expresses that the right of redemption it grants to an adjoining owner of the property conveyed may be defeated if it can be shown that the buyer or grantee does not own any other rural land. G.R. NO. 134117. February 9, 2000 SEN PO EK MARKETING CORPORATION vs. MARTINEZ Petitioner invokes its right of first refusal against private respondents, when Teodora sold the property that petitioner has been leasing. Article 1622 of the New Civil Code only deals with small urban lands that are bought for speculation where only adjoining lot owners can exercise the right of pre-emption or redemption. It does not apply to a lessee trying to buy the land that it was leasing, especially when such right was never stipulated in any of the several lease contracts. CABALES vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 162421, August 31, 2007 Petitioners may redeem the subject property from respondents-spouses, but they must do so within thirty days from notice in writing of the sale by their co-owners vendors. In requiring written notice, Art. 1623 seeks to ensure that the redemptioner is properly notified of (a) the sale and (b) the date of such notice, as the date thereof becomes the reckoning point of the 30-day period of redemption. SPOUSES SI vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 122047, October 12, 2000 Co-owners with actual notice of the sale are not entitled to written notice. A written notice is a formal requisite to make certain that the co-owners have actual notice of the sale to enable them

to exercise their right of redemption within the limited period of thirty days. But where the coowners had actual notice of the sale at the time thereof and/or afterwards, a written notice of a

fact already known to them, would be superfluous. The statute does not demand what is unnecessary. FRANCISCO vs. BOISER, G.R. NO. 137677, May 31, 2000 Art. 1623 of the Civil Code is clear in requiring that the written notification should come from the vendor or prospective vendor, not from any other person. Since the vendor of an undivided interest is in the best position to know who are his co-owners who under the law must be notified of the sale, and is in the best position to confirm whether consent to the essential obligation of selling the property and transferring ownership thereof to the vendee has been given. LEDONIO vs. CAPITOL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, G.R. NO. 149040, July 4, 2007 An assignment of credit has been defined as an agreement by virtue of which the owner of a credit (known as the assignor), by a legal cause - such as sale, dation in payment or exchange or donation - and without need of the debtor's consent, transfers that credit and its accessory rights to another (known as the assignee), who acquires the power to enforce it, to the same extent as the assignor could have enforced it against the debtor. TEOCO, JR.,vs METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, G.R. NO. 162333, December 23, 2008 Would the exercise by the brothers Teoco of the right to redeem the properties in question be precluded by the fact that the assignment of right of redemption was not contained in a public document? NO, the phrase "effect as against third person" in Article 1625 of the Civil Code is interpreted as to be damage or prejudice to such third person, hence if the third person would not be prejudiced then the assignment of right to redeem may not be in a public instrument. HEIRS OR REYNALDO DELA ROSA, Namely: TEOFISTA DELA ROSA, JOSEPHINE SANTIAGO AND JOSEPH DELA ROSA, vs. MARIO A. BATONGBACAL, IRENEO BATONGBACAL, JOCELYN BA TONGBACAL, NESTOR BATONGBACAL AND LOURDES BA TONGBACAL G.R. No. 179205, July 30, 2014 An equitable mortgage is defined as one although lacking in some formality, or form or words, or other requisites demanded by a statute, nevertheless reveals the intention of the parties to charge real property as security for a debt, and contains nothing impossible or contrary to law. For the presumption of an equitable mortgage to arise, two requisites must concur: (1) that the parties entered into a contract denominated as a sale; and (2) the intention was to secure an existing debt by way of mortgage. CEBALLOS vs. Intestate Estate of the Late EMIGDIO MERCADO, G.R. NO. 155856, May 28, 2004 30

Petitioner argues that Mercado’s delay in registering the Deed of Absolute Sale and transferring the land title shows that the real agreement was an equitable mortgage. Delay in transferring title is not one of the instances enumerated by law in which an equitable mortgage can be presumed. DEHEZA-INAMARGA vs ALANO, G.R. NO. 171321, December 18, 2008 The provisions of Article 1602 shall also apply to a contract purporting to be an absolute sale, and in case of doubt, a contract purporting to be a sale with right to repurchase shall be construed as an equitable mortgage in consonance with the rule that the law favors the least transmission of property rights. EUGENIO vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, G.R. NO. 109404, January 22, 1996 Did the failure to develop a subdivision constitute legal justification for the non-payment of amortizations by a buyer on installment under land purchase agreements entered into prior to the enactment of P.D. 957, "The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers' Protective Decree"? P.D. 957 is undeniably applicable to the contracts in question, it follows that Section 23 thereof had been properly invoked by private respondent when he desisted from making further payment to petitioner due to petitioner's failure to develop the subdivision project according to the approved plans and within the time limit for complying with the same. PNB vs. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, G.R. NO. 104528, January 18, 1996 A buyer of a property at a foreclosure sale cannot disposses prior purchasers on installment of individual lots therein, or compel them to pay again for the lots which they previously bought from the defaulting mortgagor-subdivision developer on the theory that P.D. 957, "The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers' Protective Decree", is not applicable to the mortgage contract in question, the same having been executed prior to the enactment of P.D. 957. Moreover, the SC held that, P.D. 957 being applicable, Section 18 of said law obliges petitioner Bank to accept the payment of the remaining unpaid amortizations tendered by private respondents. Privity of contracts as a defense does not apply in this case for the law explicitly grants to the buyer the option to pay the installment payment for his lot or unit directly to the mortgagee (petitioner), which is required to apply such payments to reduce the corresponding portion of the mortgage indebtedness secured by the particular lot or unit being paid for. HULST vs. PR BUILDERS, INC., G.R. NO. 156364, September 25, 2008 Petitioner contends that the Contract to Sell between petitioner and respondent involved a condominium unit and did not violate the Constitutional proscription against ownership of land by aliens. The law expressly allows foreigners to acquire condominium units and shares in condominium corporations up to not more than 40% of the total and outstanding capital stock of a Filipino-owned or controlled corporation, since under this set up, the ownership of the land is legally separated from the unit itself. CARDINAL BUILDING OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. vs. ASSET RECOVERY AND MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, G.R. No. 149696, July 14, 2006

Section 20 of R.A. No. 4726, otherwise known as the Condominium Act, provides:

Sec. 20. An assessment upon any condominium made in accordance with a duly registered declaration of restrictions shall be an obligation of the owner thereof at the time the assessment is made. The amount of any such assessment plus any other charges thereon, such as interest, costs (including attorney's fees) and penalties, as such may be provided for in the declaration of restrictions, shall be and become a lien upon the condominium assessed when the management body causes a notice of assessment to be registered with the Register of Deeds of the city or province where such condominium project is located. The notice shall state the amount of such assessment and such other charges thereon as may be authorized by the declaration of restrictions, a description of the condominium unit against which the same has been assessed, and the name of the registered owner thereof. Such notice shall be signed by an authorized representative of the management body or as otherwise provided in the declaration of restrictions. Upon payment of said assessment and charges or other satisfaction thereof, the management body shall cause to be registered a release of the lien. Such lien shall be superior to all other liens registered subsequent to the registration of said notice of assessment except real property tax liens and except that the declaration of restrictions may provide for the subordination thereof to any other liens and encumbrances. Such liens may be enforced in the same manner provided for by law for the judicial or extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage or real property. Unless otherwise provided for in the declaration of restrictions, the management body shall have power to bid at foreclosure sale. The condominium owner shall have the right of redemption as in cases of judicial or extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgages. Records do not show that petitioner had its notice of assessment registered with the Registry of Deeds of Manila in order that the amount of such assessment could be considered a lien upon Marual's two condominium units. Clearly, pursuant to the above provisions, petitioner's claim can not be considered superior to that of respondent. As mentioned earlier, the deed of sale wherein Marual conveyed to respondent his two condominium units, was registered in the Registry of Deeds of Manila. CHATEAU DE BAIE CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION vs. SPOUSES MORENO, G.R. NO. 186271, February 23, 2011 The petition sought to prohibit the scheduled extrajudicial sale for lack of a special power to sell from the registered owner. Under RA 4726 (the Condominium Act), when a unit owner fails to pay the association dues, the condominium corporation can enforce a lien on the condominium unit by selling the unit in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale, and a special authority from the condominium owner before a condominium corporation can initiate a foreclosure proceeding is not needed. Pagurayan vs. Reyes, G.R. NO. 154577, July 23, 2008

A contract of lease is a consensual, bilateral, onerous and commutative contract by which the owner temporarily grants the use of his property to another who undertakes to pay the rent. Being a consensual contract, it is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of the minds on the thing and the cause and consideration which are to constitute the contract. Without the agreement

of both parties, no contract of lease can be said to have been created or established. Nobody can force an owner to lease out his property if he is not willing. CA-AG.R.O-INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT CORP. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. NO. 90027, March 3, 1993 We agree with the petitioner's contention that the contract for the rent of the safety deposit box is not an ordinary contract of lease as defined in Article 1643 of the Civil Code. It cannot be characterized as an ordinary contract of lease under Article 1643 because the full and absolute possession and control of the safety deposit box was not given to the joint renters — the petitioner and the Pugaos. PARTNERSHIP, AGENCY AND TRUST LIM TONG LIM vs. PHILIPPINE FISHING GEAR INDUSTRIES, INC., G.R. 136448, November 3, 1999

NO.

A partnership may be deemed to exist among parties who agree to borrow money to pursue a business and to divide the profits or losses that may arise therefrom, even if it is shown that they have not contributed any capital of their own to a "common fund." Their contribution may be in the form of credit or industry, not necessarily cash or fixed assets. ROSARIO U. YULO vs. YANG CHIAO SENG, G.R. NO. L-12541, August 28, 1959 The following are the requisites of partnership: (1) two or more persons who bind themselves to contribute money, property, or industry to a common fund; (2) intention on the part of the partners to divide the profits among themselves. (Art. 1767, Civil Code.). HEIRS OF TAN ENG KEE vs .COURT OF APPEALS and BENGUET LUMBER COMPANY, G.R. NO. 126881; October 3, 2000 In determining whether a partnership exists, these rules shall apply: (1) Except as provided by Article 1825, persons who are not partners as to each other are not partners as to third persons; (2) Co-ownership or co-possession does not of itself establish a partnership, whether such coowners or co-possessors do or do not share any profits made by the use of the property; (3) The sharing of gross returns does not of itself establish a partnership, whether or not the persons sharing them have a joint or common right or interest in any property which the returns are derived; (4) The receipt by a person of a share of the profits of a business is a prima facie evidence that he is a partner in the business, but no such inference shall be drawn if such profits were received in payment: (a) As a debt by installment or otherwise; (b) As wages of an employee or rent to a landlord; (c) As an annuity to a widow or representative of a deceased partner; (d) As interest on a loan, though the amount of payment vary with the profits of the business;

(e) As the consideration for the sale of a goodwill of a business or other property by installments or otherwise. ALFREDO N. AGUILA, JR vs. COURT OF APPEALS and FELICIDAD S. VDA. DE ABROGAR, G.R. NO. 127347, November 25, 1999 Under Art. 1768 of the Civil Code, a partnership “has a juridical personality separate and distinct from that of each of the partners.” The partners cannot be held liable for the obligations of the partnership unless it is shown that the legal fiction of a different juridical personality is being used for fraudulent, unfair, or illegal purposes, hence it is the partnership, not its officers or agents, which should be impleaded in any litigation involving property registered in its name, violation of this rule will result in the dismissal of the complaint. Villareal vs. Ramirez, G.R. NO. 144214. July 14, 2003 Since it is the partnership, as a separate and distinct entity, that must refund the shares of the partners, the amount to be refunded is necessarily limited to its total resources. In other words, it can only pay out what it has in its coffers, which consists of all its assets. However, before the partners can be paid their shares, the creditors of the partnership must first be compensated. After all the creditors have been paid, whatever is left of the partnership assets becomes available for the payment of the partners’ shares. Angeles vs. Secretary of Justice, G.R. NO. 142612, July 29, 2005 The Angeles spouses’ position that there is no partnership because of the lack of a public instrument indicating the same and a lack of registration with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) holds no water for the following reasons: first, the Angeles spouses contributed money to the partnership and not immovable property; and second, mere failure to register the contract of partnership with the SEC does not invalidate a contract that has the essential requisites of a partnership. The purpose of registration of the contract of partnership is to give notice to third parties. Failure to register the contract of partnership does not affect the liability of the partnership and of the partners to third persons. Neither does such failure to register affect the partnership’s juridical personality. A partnership may exist even if the partners do not use the words “partner” or “partnership.” Ortega vs. CA, G.R. NO. 109248, July 3, 1995 The right to choose with whom a person wishes to associate himself is the very foundation and essence of that partnership. Its continued existence is, in turn, dependent on the constancy of that mutual resolve, along with each partner's capability to give it, and the absence of a cause for dissolution provided by the law itself. Verily, any one of the partners may, at his sole pleasure, dictate a dissolution of the partnership at will. He must, however, act in good faith, not that the attendance of bad faith can prevent the dissolution of the partnership but that it can result in a

liability for damages. Among partners, mutual agency arises and the doctrine of delectus personae allows them to have the power, although not necessarily the right, to dissolve the

partnership. An unjustified dissolution by the partner can subject him to a possible action for damages. Liwanag vs. CA, G.R. NO. 114398, October 24, 1997 Petitioner was charged with the crime of estafa and advances the theory that the intention of the parties was to enter into a contract of partnership, wherein Rosales (private complainant for Estafa) would contribute the funds while she would buy and sell the cigarettes, and later divide the profits between them But even assuming that a contract of partnership was indeed entered into by and between the parties, SC ruled that when money or property have been received by a partner for a specific purpose (such as that obtaining in the instant case) and he later misappropriated it, such partner is guilty of estafa. Moran, Jr. vs. CA, G.R. NO. L-59956, October 31, 1984 The rule is, when a partner who has undertaken to contribute a sum of money fails to do so, he becomes a debtor of the partnership for whatever he may have promised to contribute (Art. 1786, Civil Code) and for interests and damages from the time he should have complied with his obligation (Art. 1788, Civil Code). Thus in Uy v. Puzon (79 SCRA 598), which interpreted Art. 2200 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, we allowed a total of P200,000.00 compensatory damages in favor of the appellee because the appellant therein was remiss in his obligations as a partner and as prime contractor of the construction projects in question. Tai Tong Chuache & Co. vs. Insurance Commission, G.R. NO. L-55397 February 29, 1988 Petitioner being a partnership may sue and be sued in its name or by its duly authorized representative. Thus, Chua as the managing partner of the partnership may execute all acts of administration including the right to sue debtors of the partnership in case of their failure to pay their obligations when it became due and demandable. Catalan vs. Gatchalian, G.R. NO. L-11648, April 22, 1959 Catalan and Gatchalian as partners mortgaged two lots together with the improvements thereon to secure a credit. Catalan redeemed the property and he contends that title should be cancelled and a new one must be issued in his name. Under Article 1807 of the NCC every partner becomes a trustee for his co-partner with regard to any benefits or profits derived from his act as a partner. Consequently, when Catalan redeemed the properties in question, he became a trustee and held the same in trust for his co partner Gatchalian, subject to his right to demand from the latter his contribution to the amount of redemption. Evangelista & Co. vs. Abad Santos, G.R. NO. L-31684 June 28, 1973

Respondent industrial partner has the right to demand for a formal accounting and to receive her share in the net profit that may result from such an accounting.

ISLAND SALES, INC. vs. UNITED PIONEERS GENERAL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, G.R. NO. L-22493, July 31, 1975 Defendant company, a general partnership purchased from the plaintiff a motor vehicle on an installment basis with the condition that failure to pay any of said installments as they fall due would render the whole unpaid balance immediately due and demandable. Having failed to receive the installment, the plaintiff sued the defendant company for the unpaid balance with Benjamin C. Daco, Daniel A. Guizona, Noel C. Sim, Romulo B. Lumauig, and Augusto Palisoc were included as co-defendants in their capacity as general partners of the defendant company. In this case, there were five (5) general partners when the promissory note in question was executed for and in behalf of the partnership. Since the liability of the partners is pro rata, the liability of the appellant Benjamin C. Daco shall be limited to only one-fifth of the obligations of the defendant company. The fact that the complaint against the defendant Romulo B. Lumauig was dismissed, upon motion of the plaintiff, does not unmake the said Lumauig as a general partner in the defendant company. In so moving to dismiss the complaint, the plaintiff merely condoned Lumauig's individual liability to the plaintiff. ELMO MUÑASQUE vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. L-39780, November 11, 1985 There is a general presumption that each individual partner is an authorized agent for the firm and that he has authority to bind the firm in carrying on the partnership transactions. The presumption is sufficient to permit third persons to hold the firm liable on transactions entered into by one of members of the firm acting apparently in its behalf and within the scope of his authority. ANTONIO C. GOQUIOLAY, ET AL. vs. WASHINGTON Z. SYCIP, ET AL, G.R. NO. L11840, December 10, 1963 Where the partnership business is to deal in merchandise and goods, i.e., movable property, the sale of its real property (immovables) is not within the ordinary powers of a partner, because it is not in line with the normal business of the firm. But where the express and avowed purpose of the partnership is to buy and sell real estate (as in the present case), the immovables thus acquired by the firm from part of its stock-in-trade, and the sale thereof is in pursuance of partnership purposes, hence within the ordinary powers of the partner. J. TIOSEJO INVESTMENT CORP. vs. Ang, G.R. NO. 174149, September 8, 2010 Petitioner cannot avoid liability by claiming that it was not in any way privy to the Contracts to Sell executed by PPGI and respondents. As correctly argued by the respondent, a joint venture is considered in this jurisdiction as a form of partnership and is, accordingly, governed by the law of partnerships and under Article 1824 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, all partners are solidarily liable with the partnership for everything chargeable to the partnership, including loss or injury caused to a third person or penalties incurred due to any wrongful act or omission of

any partner acting in the ordinary course of the business of the partnership or with the authority of his co-partners.

PRIMELINK PROPERTIES AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. LAZATINMAGAT, et.al, G.R. NO. 167379, June 27, 2006 On dissolution, the partnership is not terminated but continues until the winding up of partnership affairs is completed. Winding up means the administration of the assets of the partnership for the purpose of terminating the business and discharging the obligations of the partnership. MARJORIE TOCAO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 127405, October 4, 2000 An unjustified dissolution by a partner can subject him to action for damages because by the mutual agency that arises in a partnership, the doctrine of delectus personae allows the partners to have the power, although not necessarily the right to dissolve the partnership. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. WILLIAM J. SUTER, G.R. NO. 25532, February 28, 1969

L-

A limited partnership, named "William J. Suter 'Morcoin' Co., Ltd.," was formed on 30 September 1947 by herein respondent William J. Suter as the general partner, and Julia Spirig and Gustav Carlson, as the limited partners. The thesis that the limited partnership, William J. Suter "Morcoin" Co., Ltd., has been dissolved by operation of law because of the marriage of the only general partner, William J. Suter to the originally limited partner, Julia Spirig one year after the partnership was organized is not tenable. The subsequent marriage of the partners does not operate to dissolve it, such marriage not being one of the causes provided for that purpose either by the Spanish Civil Code or the Code of Commerce. The appellant's view, that by the marriage of both partners the company became a single proprietorship, is equally erroneous. The capital contributions of partners William J. Suter and Julia Spirig were separately owned and contributed by them before their marriage; and after they were joined in wedlock, such contributions remained their respective separate property under the Spanish Civil Code. Country Bankers Insurance Corp.. vs. Keppel Cebu Shipyard, June 18, 2012, G.R. NO. 166044 In a contract of agency, a person, the agent, binds himself to represent another, the principal, with the latter’s consent or authority. Thus, agency is based on representation, where the agent acts for and in behalf of the principal on matters within the scope of the authority conferred upon him. Such “acts have the same legal effect as if they were personally done by the principal. By this legal fiction of representation, the actual or legal absence of the principal is converted into his legal or juridical presence. SALLY YOSHIZAKI v. JOY TRAINING CENTER OF AURORA, INC., G.R. No. 174978. July 31, 2013

As a general rule, a contract of agency may be oral. However, it must be written when the law requires a specific form. Specifically, Article 1874 of the Civil Code provides that the contract of

agency must be written for the validity of the sale of a piece of land or any interest therein. Otherwise, the sale shall be void. A related provision, Article 1878 of the Civil Code, states that special powers of attorney are necessary to convey real rights over immovable properties. Further the special power of attorney mandated by law must be one that expressly mentions a sale or that includes a sale as a necessary ingredient of the authorized act. Such power must be must express in clear and unmistakable language. In the present case, the pieces of documentary evidence by Sally did not convince the Court as to the existence of agency. Necessarily, the absence of a contract of agency renders the contract of sale unenforceable. Joy Training effectively did not enter into a valid contract of sale with the spouses Yoshizaki. Lintoja vs. Eternit Corp., G.R. NO. 144805, June 8, 2006 It bears stressing that in an agent-principal relationship, the personality of the principal is extended through the facility of the agent. In so doing, the agent, by legal fiction, becomes the principal, authorized to perform all acts which the latter would have him do. Such a relationship can only be effected with the consent of the principal, which must not, in any way, be compelled by law or by any court. Eurotech Industrial Technologies, Inc. Cuizon, G.R. NO. 167552, April 23, 2007 In a contract of agency, a person binds himself to render some service or to do something in representation or on behalf of another with the latter’s consent. The underlying principle of the contract of agency is to accomplish results by using the services of others – to do a great variety of things like selling, buying, manufacturing, and transporting. Its purpose is to extend the personality of the principal or the party for whom another acts and from whom he or she derives the authority to act. It is said that the basis of agency is representation, that is, the agent acts for and on behalf of the principal on matters within the scope of his authority and said acts have the same legal effect as if they were personally executed by the principal. By this legal fiction, the actual or real absence of the principal is converted into his legal or juridical presence – qui facit per alium facit per se. The elements of the contract of agency are: (1) consent, express or implied, of the parties to establish the relationship; (2) the object is the execution of a juridical act in relation to a third person; (3) the agent acts as a representative and not for himself; (4) the agent acts within the scope of his authority. Lintoja vs. Eternit Corp., G.R. NO. 144805, June 8, 2006 An agency may be expressed or implied from the act of the principal, from his silence or lack of action, or his failure to repudiate the agency knowing that another person is acting on his behalf without authority. Acceptance by the agent may be expressed, or implied from his acts which carry out the agency, or from his silence or inaction according to the circumstances. Agency may be oral unless the law requires a specific form. However, to create or convey real rights over immovable property, a special power of attorney is necessary. Thus, when a sale of a piece of

land or any portion thereof is through an agent, the authority of the latter shall be in writing, otherwise, the sale shall be void. Naguiat vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. NO. 118375, October 3, 2003

The Court of Appeals recognized the existence of an “agency by estoppels citing Article 1873 of the Civil Code. Apparently, it considered that at the very least, as a consequence of the interaction between Naguiat and Ruebenfeldt, Queaño got the impression that Ruebenfeldt was the agent of Naguiat, but Naguiat did nothing to correct Queaño’s impression. In that situation, the rule is clear. One who clothes another with apparent authority as his agent, and holds him out to the public as such, cannot be permitted to deny the authority of such person to act as his agent, to the prejudice of innocent third parties dealing with such person in good faith, and in the honest belief that he is what he appears to be. The Court of Appeals is correct in invoking the said rule on agency by estoppel. Siasat vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. NO. L-67889, October 10, 1985 A general agent is one authorized to do all acts pertaining to a business of a certain kind or at a particular place, or all acts pertaining to a business of a particular class or series. He has usually authority either expressly conferred in general terms or in effect made general by the usages, customs or nature of the business which he is authorized to transact. An agent, therefore, who is empowered to transact all the business of his principal of a particular kind or in a particular place, would, for this reason, be ordinarily deemed a general agent. A special agent is one authorized to do some particular act or to act upon some particular occasion, acts usually in accordance with specific instructions or under limitations necessarily implied from the nature of the act to be done Veloso vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. NO. 102737, August 21, 1996 There was no need to execute a separate and special power of attorney since the general power of attorney had expressly authorized the agent or attorney in fact the power to sell the subject property. The special power of attorney can be included in the general power when it is specified therein the act or transaction for which the special power is required. Whether the instrument be denominated as “general power of attorney” or “special power of attorney,” what matters is the extent of the power or powers contemplated upon the agent or attorney in fact. If the power is couched in general terms, then such power cannot go beyond acts of administration. However, where the power to sell is specific, it not being merely implied, much less couched in general terms, there cannot be any doubt that the attorney in fact may execute a valid sale. An instrument may be captioned as “special power of attorney” but if the powers granted are couched in general terms without mentioning any specific power to sell or mortgage or to do other specific acts of strict dominion, then in that case only acts of administration may be deemed conferred Orbeta vs. Sendiong, G.R. NO. 155236, July 8, 2005 A special power of attorney simply refers to a clear mandate specifically authorizing the performance of a specific power and of express acts subsumed therein, and there is a specific authority given to Mae Sendiong to sign her name in behalf of Paul Sendiong in contracts and agreements and to institute suits in behalf of her father. Neither would the fact that the document

is captioned “General Power of Attorney” militate against its construction as granting specific powers to the agent pertaining to the petition for annulment of judgment she instituted in behalf

of her father. As Justice Paras has noted, a general power of attorney may include a special power if such special power is mentioned or referred to in the general power. Country Bankers Insurance Corp. vs. Keppel Cebu Shipyard, June 18, 2012, G.R. NO. 166044 Our law mandates an agent to act within the scope of his authority. The scope of an agent’s authority is what appears in the written terms of the power of attorney granted upon him. Under Article 1878(11) of the Civil Code, a special power of attorney is necessary to obligate the principal as a guarantor or surety. Mercado vs. Allied Banking Corpporation, G.R. NO. 171460, July 24, 2007 Equally relevant is the rule that a power of attorney must be strictly construed and pursued. The instrument will be held to grant only those powers which are specified therein, and the agent may neither go beyond nor deviate from the power of attorney. Where powers and duties are specified and defined in an instrument, all such powers and duties are limited and are confined to those which are specified and defined, and all other powers and duties are excluded. This is but in accord with the disinclination of courts to enlarge the authority G.R.anted beyond the powers expressly given and those which incidentally flow or derive therefrom as being usual and reasonably necessary and proper for the performance of such express powers. Angeles vs. Philippines National Railways, G.R. NO. 150128, August 31, 2006 A power of attorney is only but an instrument in writing by which a person, as principal, appoints another as his agent and confers upon him the authority to perform certain specified acts on behalf of the principal. The written authorization itself is the power of attorney, and this is clearly indicated by the fact that it has also been called a “letter of attorney.” Its primary purpose is not to define the authority of the agent as between himself and his principal but to evidence the authority of the agent to third parties with whom the agent deals. Except as may be required by statute, a power of attorney is valid although no notary public intervened in its execution. SHOPPER’S PARADISE REALTY & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. EFREN P. ROQUE, G.R. NO. 148775, January 13, 2004 Article 1878 of the Civil Code expresses that a special power of attorney is necessary to lease any real property to another person for more than one year. The lease of real property for more than one year is considered not merely an act of administration but an act of strict dominion or of ownership. A special power of attorney is thus necessary for its execution through an agent. VICTORIAS MILLING CO., INC. vs. COURT OF , G.R. NO. 117356, June 19, 2000 One factor which most clearly distinguishes agency from other legal concepts is control; one person - the agent - agrees to act under the control or direction of another - the principal. Indeed,

the very word "agency" has come to connote control by the principal. The control factor, more than any other, has caused the courts to put contracts between principal and agent in a separate category.

Republic vs. Evangelista, G.R. NO. 156015, August 11, 2005 A contract of agency is generally revocable as it is a personal contract of representation based on trust and confidence reposed by the principal on his agent. As the power of the agent to act depends on the will and license of the principal he represents, the power of the agent ceases when the will or permission is withdrawn by the principal. Thus, generally, the agency may be revoked by the principal at will. However, an exception to the revocability of a contract of agency is when it is coupled with interest, i.e., if a bilateral contract depends upon the agency. The reason for its irrevocability is because the agency becomes part of another obligation or agreement. It is not solely the rights of the principal but also that of the agent and third persons which are affected. Hence, the law provides that in such cases, the agency cannot be revoked at the sole will of the principal. Lim vs. Saban, G.R. NO. 163720, December 16, 2004 Under Article 1927 of the Civil Code, an agency cannot be revoked if a bilateral contract depends upon it, or if it is the means of fulfilling an obligation already contracted, or if a partner is appointed manager of a partnership in the contract of partnership and his removal from the management is unjustifiable. Stated differently, an agency is deemed as one coupled with an interest where it is established for the mutual benefit of the principal and of the agent, or for the interest of the principal and of third persons, and it cannot be revoked by the principal so long as the interest of the agent or of a third person subsists. In an agency coupled with an interest, the agent’s interest must be in the subject matter of the power conferred and not merely an interest in the exercise of the power because it entitles him to compensation. When an agent’s interest is confined to earning his agreed compensation, the agency is not one coupled with an interest, since an agent’s interest in obtaining his compensation as such agent is an ordinary incident of the agency relationship. RAMON RALLOS, Administrator of the Estate of CONCEPCION RALLOS vs. FELIX GO CHAN & SONS REALTY CORPORATION, G.R. NO. L-24332, January 31, 1978 By reason of the very nature of the relationship between principal and agent, agency is extinguished ipso jure upon the death of either principal or agent. Although a revocation of a power of attorney to be effective must be communicated to the parties concerned, yet a revocation by operation of law, such as by death of the principal is, as a rule, instantaneously effective inasmuch as "by legal fiction the agent's exercise of authority is regarded as an execution of the principal's continuing will. With death, the principal's will ceases or is the authority is extinguished. CREDIT TRANSACTIONS BONEVIE vs CA, G.R. NO. L-49101 October 24, 1983

Petitioner assails the validity of the mortgage between Lozano and PBCOM arguing that on the day the deed was executed there was yet no principal obligation to secure as the loan of

P75,000.00 was not received by the Lozano spouses, so that in the absence of a principal obligation, there is want of consideration in the accessory contract, which consequently impairs its validity and fatally affects its very existence. A contract of loan being a consensual contract, said contract of loan was perfected at the same time the contract of mortgage was executed, and the promissory note is only an evidence of indebtedness and does not indicate lack of consideration of the mortgage at the time of its execution. SAURA IMPORT and EXPORT CO., INC. vs. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. L-24968, April 27, 1972 The trial court rendered judgment for the plaintiff, ruling that there was a perfected contract between the parties when the application of Saura, Inc. for a loan was approved by resolution of the defendant, and the corresponding mortgage was executed and registered and that the defendant was guilty of breach thereof. An accepted promise to deliver something, by way of commodatum or simple loan is binding upon the parties, but the commodatum or simple loan itself shall not be perferted until the delivery of the object of the contract. FRANCISCO HERRERA vs. PETROPHIL CORPORATION, G.R. NO. December 29, 1986

L-48349,

Pursuant to a contract, the defendant-appellee paid to the plaintfff-appellant advance rentals for the first eight years, subtracting therefrom the amount of the interest or discount for the first eight years, Plaintiff-appellant insists that the lower court erred in the computation of the interest collected out of the rentals paid for the first eight years; that such interest was excessive and violative of the Usury Law. The contract between the parties is one of lease and not of loan since the provision for the payment of rentals in advance cannot be construed as a repayment of a loan because there was no grant or forbearance of money as to constitute an indebtedness on the part of the lessor, hence usury law will not apply. PNB vs. CA, G.R. NO. 75223, March 14, 1990 An escalation clause is a valid provision in the loan agreement provided that — (1) the increased rate imposed or charged does not exceed the ceiling fixed by law or the Monetary Board; (2) the increase is made effective not earlier than the effectivity of the law or regulation authorizing such an increase; and (3) the remaining maturities of the loans are more than 730 days as of the effectivity of the law or regulation authorizing such an increase. ILEANA DR. MACALINAO vs BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, G.R. 175490, September 17, 2009

NO.

In its Complaint, respondent BPI originally imposed the interest and penalty charges at the rate of 9.25% per month or 111% per annum which was declared as unconscionable by the lower courts for being clearly excessive, and was thus reduced to 2% per month or 24% per annum but which the CA modified increased them to 3% per month or 36% per annum based on the Terms

and Conditions Governing the Issuance and Use of the BPI Credit Card, which governs the transaction between petitioner Macalinao and respondent BPI. The courts may reduce the interest rate as reason and equity demand, for stipulations demanding interest excessive, iniquitous, unconscionable and exorbitant interest rates are void for being contrary to morals, if not against the law. ECE REALTY and DEVELOPMENT, INC. vs. HAYDYN HERNANDEZ G.R. No. 212689, August 11, 2014 Since July 1, 2013, the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum from finality of the judgment until satisfaction has been brought back to six percent (6%). Section 1 of Resolution No. 796 of the Monetary Board of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas dated May 16, 2013 provides: "The rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods or credits and the rate allowed in judgments, in the absence of an express contract as to such rate of interest, shall be six percent (6%) per annum." Thus, the rate of interest to be imposed from finality of judgments is now back at six percent (6%), the rate provided in Article 2209 of the Civil Code. CATHOLIC VICAR APOSTOLIC CHURCH vs. CA, G.R. L-80294-95, September 21, 1988 When respondents allowed the free use of the property they became bailors in commodatum and the petitioner the bailee. The bailees' failure to return the subject matter of commodatum to the bailor did not mean adverse possession on the part of the borrower. The bailee held in trust the property subject matter of commodatum. Hence, an adverse claim could not ripen into title by way of ordinary acquisitive prescription because of the absence of just title. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs BAGTAS, G.R. NO. L-17474, October 25, 1962 The appellant had been in possession of the bull even after the expiration of the contract. He contends, however, that since the contract was commodatum the appellee retained ownership or title to the bull. Hence, it should suffer its loss due to force majeure. A contract of commodatum is essentially gratuitous. If the breeding fee be considered a compensation, then the contract would be a lease of the bull. Under article 1671 of the Civil Code the lessee would be subject to the responsibilities of a possessor in bad faith, because she had continued possession of the bull after the expiry of the contract. And even if the contract be commodatum, still the appellant is liable, because article 1942 of the Civil Code provides that a bailee in a contract of commodatum — . . . is liable for loss of the things, even if it should be through a fortuitous event: (2) If he keeps it longer than the period stipulated . . . (3) If the thing loaned has been delivered with appraisal of its value, unless there is a stipulation exempting the bailee from responsibility in case of a fortuitous event; xxx REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CA, G.R. NO. L-46145 November 26, 1986

The disputed property is private land and this possession was interrupted only by the occupation of the land by the U.S. Navy which eventually abandoned the premises. The heirs of the late

Baloy, are now in actual possession, and this has been so since the abandonment by the U.S. Navy. The occupancy of the U.S. Navy partakes of the character of a commodatum, and one's ownership of a thing may be lost by prescription by reason of another's possession if such possession be under claim of ownership, not where the possession is only intended to be transient, in which case the owner is not divested of his title, although it cannot be exercised in the meantime. HERRERA vs. PETROPHIL CORPORATION, G.R. NO. L-48349 December 29, 1986 The difference between a discount and a loan or forbearance is that the former does not have to be repaid. The loan or forbearance is subject to repayment and is therefore governed by the laws on usury. BRIONES vs. CAMMAYO, G.R. NO. L-23559, October 4, 1971 In simple loan with stipulation of usurious interest, the prestation of the debtor to pay the principal debt, which is the cause of the contract is not illegal. The illegality lies only as to the prestation to pay the stipulated interest. Hence, being separable, the latter only should be deemed void, since it is the only one that is illegal. INTEGRATED REALTY CORPORATION vs. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, G.R. NO. L-60705, June 28, 1989 OBM contends that it had agreed to pay interest only up to the dates of maturity of the certificates of time deposit and that respondent Santos is not entitled to interest after the maturity dates had expired, unless the contracts are renewed. When respondent invested his money in time deposits with OBM they entered into a contract of simple loan or mutuum, not a contract of deposit. BPI vs. CA, G.R. NO. L-66826 August 19, 1988 The document which embodies the contract states that the US$3,000.00 was received by the bank for safekeeping. A deposit is constituted from the moment a person receives a thing belonging to another, with the obligation of safely keeping it and of returning the same, but if the safekeeping of the thing delivered is not the principal purpose of the contract, there is no deposit but some other contract. BPI vs. CA, G.R. NO. 104612, May 10, 1994 Bank deposits are in the nature of irregular deposits; they are really loans because they earn interest. The relationship then between a depositor and a bank is one of creditor and debtor, and the deposit under the questioned account was an ordinary bank deposit; hence, it was payable on demand of the depositor.

SERRANO vs. CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. L-30511, February 14, 1980

All kinds of bank deposits, whether fixed, savings, or current are to be treated as loans and are to be covered by the law on loans because it can use the same. Failure of he respondent Bank to honor the time deposit is failure to pay s obligation as a debtor and not a breach of trust arising from depositary's failure to return the subject matter of the deposit COMMONWEALTH INSURANCE CORPORATION vs. CA, G.R. NO. 130886. January 29, 2004 Petitioner’s liability under the suretyship contract is different from its liability under the law. There is no question that as a surety, petitioner should not be made to pay more than its assumed obligation under the surety bonds. However, it is clear from the above-cited jurisprudence that petitioner’s liability for the payment of interest is not by reason of the suretyship agreement itself but because of the delay in the payment of its obligation under the said agreement. THE MANILA INSURANCE CO INC vs SPOUSES AMURAO, G.R. NO. January 16, 2013

179628,

Petitioner imputes error on the part of the CA in treating petitioner as a solidary debtor instead of a solidary guarantor and argues that while a surety is bound solidarily with the obligor, this does not make the surety a solidary co-debtor. A surety’s liability is joint and several and although the contract of suretyship is secondary to the principal contract, the surety’s liability to the obligee is nevertheless direct, primary, and absolute. THE IMPERIAL INSURANCE, INC. vs. DE LOS ANGELES, G.R. NO. L-28030, January 18, 1982 Imperial Insurance, Inc. bound itself solidarily with the principal, the deceased defendant Reyes. In accordance with Article 2059, par. 2 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, excussion (previous exhaustion of the property of the debtor) shall not take place "if he (the guarantor) has bound himself solidarily with the debtor," hence the petitioner cannot escape liability on its counterbonds. MANILA SURETY & FIDELITY CO., INC. vs. ALMEDA, G.R. NO. L-27249 July 31, 1970 There is no question that under the bonds posted in favor of the NAMARCO in this case, the surety company assumed to make immediate payment to said firm of any due and unsettled accounts of the debtor-principal, even without demand and notice of the debtor's non-payment, the surety, in fact, agreeing that its liability to the creditor shall be direct, without benefit of exhaustion of the debtor's properties, and to remain valid and continuous until the guaranteed obligation is fully satisfied. In short, appellant secured to the creditor not just the payment by the debtor-principal of his accounts, but the payment itself of such accounts. Clearly, a contract of suretyship was thus created, the appellant becoming the insurer, not merely of the debtor's

solvency or ability to pay, but of the debt itself. Under the Civil Code, with the debtor's insolvency having been judicially recognized, herein appellant's resort to the courts to be released from the undertaking thus assumed would have been appropriate.

RCBC vs. ARRO, G.R. NO. L-49401, July 30, 1982 The surety agreement which was earlier signed by Enrique and private respondent, is an accessory obligation, it being dependent upon a principal one which, in this case is the loan obtained by Daicor as evidenced by a promissory note. By the terms, it can be clearly seen that the surety agreement was executed to guarantee future debts which Daicor may incur with petitioner since a guaranty may also be given as security for future debts, the amount of which is not yet known; there can be no claim against the guarantor until the debt is liquidated. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PAL-FOX LUMBER CO., INC., G.R. NO. L26473, February 29, 1972 On whether the surety's liability can exceed the amount of its bond, it is enough to remark that while the guarantee was for the original amount of the debt of Gabino Marquez, the amount of the judgment by the trial court in no way violates the rights of the surety. If it (the guaranty) be simple or indefinite, it shall comprise not only the principal obligation but also all its accessories, including judicial costs, provided with respect to the latter, that the guarantor shall only be liable for those costs incurred after he has been judicially required to pay. CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CA, G.R. NO. L-45710 October 3, 1985 The fact that when Sulpicio M. Tolentino executed a real estate mortgage, no consideration was then in existence, as there was no debt yet because Island Savings Bank had not made any release on the loan, does not make the real estate mortgage void for lack of consideration. It is not necessary that any consideration should pass at the time of the execution of the contract of real mortgage, it may either be a prior or subsequent matter, but when the consideration is subsequent to the mortgage, the mortgage can take effect only when the debt secured by it is created as a binding contract to pay. CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CA, G.R. NO. L-45710, October 3, 1985 Where the indebtedness actually owing to the holder of the mortgage is less than the sum named in the mortgage, the mortgage cannot be enforced for more than the actual sum due. INTEG.R.ATED REALTY CORPORATION vs. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, G.R. NO. L-60705, June 28, 1989 OVERSEAS BANK OF MANILA vs.CA, G.R. NO. L-60907 June 28, 1989 The facts and circumstances leading to the execution of the deed of assignment, has satisfied the requirements of a contract of pledge (1) that it be constituted to secure the fulfillment of a principal obligation; (2) that the pledgor be the absolute owner of the thing pledged; (3) that the persons constituting the pledge have the free disposal of their property, and in the absence thereof, that they be legally authorized for the purpose. The further requirement that the thing

pledged be placed in the possession of the creditor, or of a third person by common agreement was complied with by the execution of the deed of assignment in favor of PNB.

YULIONGSIU vs. PNB, G.R. NO. L-19227, February 17, 1968 67 The defendant bank as pledgee was therefore entitled to the actual possession of the vessels, and while it is true that plaintiff continued operating the vessels after the pledge contract was entered into, his possession was expressly made "subject to the order of the pledgee." On the other hand, there is an authority supporting the proposition that the pledgee can temporarily entrust the physical possession of the chattels pledged to the pledgor without invalidating the pledge. In such a case, the pledgor is regarded as holding the pledged property merely as trustee for the pledgee. MAKATI LEASING and FINANCE CORPORATION vs. WEAREVER TEXTILE MILLS, INC., G.R. NO. L-58469, May 16, 1983 A house of strong materials may be considered as personal property for purposes of executing a chattel mortgage thereon as long as the parties to the contract so agree and no innocent third party will be prejudiced thereby. There is absolutely no reason why a machinery, which is movable in its nature and becomes immobilized only by destination or purpose, may not be likewise treated as such. This is really because one who has so agreed is estopped from denying the existence of the chattel mortgage. BUNDALIAN vs. CA, G.R. NO. L-55739, June 22, 1984 The contract also provides that "it is agreed that the vendor shall have the right to possess, use, and build on, the property during the period of redemption." When the vendee acknowledged the right of the vendor to retain possession of the property the contract is one of loan guaranteed by mortgage, not a conditional sale or an option to repurchase. TIOSECO vs. CA, G.R. NO. L-66597, August 29, 1986 When the respondents chose to enforce their right of redemption thru a court action they were well within their right as the action was filed within one year from the registration of the foreclosure sale of the real estate. The law does not even require any previous notice to the vendee, nor a meeting between him and the redemptioner, much less a previous formal tender before any action is begun in court to enforce the right of redemption. PNB vs. CA, G.R. NO. L-60208, December 5, 1985 When the foreclosure proceedings are completed and the mortgaged property is sold to the purchaser then all interest of the mortgagor are cut off from the property Prior to the completion of the foreclosure, the mortgagor is liable for the interests on the mortgage. However, after the foreclosure proceedings and the execution of the corresponding certificate of sale of the property sold at public auction in favor of the successful bidder, the redemptioner mortgagor would be bound to pay only for the amount of the purchase price with interests thereon at the rate of one

per centum per month in addition up to the time of redemption, together with the amount of any assessments or taxes which the purchaser may have paid thereon after the purchase and interest on such last named amount at the same rate.

CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CA, G.R. NO. L-45710, October 3, 1985

Where the indebtedness actually owing to the holder of the mortgage is less than the sum named in the mortgage, the mortgage cannot be enforced for more than the actual sum due. RAMIREZ vs. CA, G.R. NO. L-38185, September 24, 1986 The antichretic creditor cannot ordinarily acquire by prescription the land surrendered to him by the debtor. The petitioners are not possessors in the concept of owner but mere holders placed in possession of the land by its owners, thus, their possession cannot serve as a title for acquiring dominion. OCAMPO vs. DOMALANTA, G.R. NO. L-21011, August 30, 1967 A proceeding for judicial foreclosure of mortgage is an action quasi in rem. It is based on a personal claim sought to be enforced against a specific property of a person named party defendant. And, its purpose is to have the property seized and sold by court order to the end that the proceeds thereof be applied to the payment of plaintiff's claim. CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CA, G.R. NO. L-45710, October 3, 1985 A pledge or mortgage is indivisible even though the debt may be divided among the successors in interest of the debtor or creditor. Therefore, the debtor's heirs who has paid a part of the debt can not ask for the proportionate extinguishment of the pledge or mortgage as long as the debt is not completely satisfied, neither can the creditor's heir who have received his share of the debt return the pledge or cancel the mortgage, to the prejudice of other heirs who have not been paid. PHILNICO INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION vs. PRIVATIZATION AND MANAGEMENT OFFICE G.R. No. 199420, August 27, 2014 The Pledge Agreement secures, for the benefit of PMO, the performance by PIC of its obligations under both the ARDA and the Pledge Agreement itself. It is with the execution of the Pledge Agreement that PIC turned over possession of its certificates of shares of stock in PPC to PMO. As the RTC pertinently observed in its Order dated June 19, 2003, there had already been a shift in the relations of PMO and PIC, from mere seller and buyer, to creditor-pledgee and debtor-pledgor. Having enjoyed the security and benefits of the Pledge Agreement, PMO cannot now insist on applying Section 8.02 of the ARDA and conveniently and arbitrarily exclude and/or ignore the Pledge Agreement so as to evade the prohibition against pactum commissorium.

More importantly, the Court, in determining the existence of pactum commissorium, had focused more on the evident intention of the parties, rather than the formal or written form. In A. Francisco Realty and Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, therein petitioner similarly

denied the existence of pactum commissorium because the proscribed stipulation was found in the promissory note and not in the mortgage deed.

680 HOME APPLIANCES, INC. vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 206599, September 29, 2014 The remedy provided under Section 8 of Act No. 3135 to the debtor becomes available only after the purchaser acquires actual possession of the property. This is required because until then the debtor, as the owner of the property, does not lose his right to possess. However, upon the lapse of the redemption period without the debtor exercising his right of redemption and the purchaser consolidates his title, it becomes unnecessary to require the purchaser to assume actual possession thereof before the debtor may contest it. Possession of the land becomes an absolute right of the purchaser, as this is merely an incident of his ownership. The debtor contesting the purchaser’s possession may no longer avail of the remedy under Section 8 of Act No. 3135, but should pursue a separate action e.g., action for recovery of ownership, for annulment of mortgage and/or annulment of foreclosure. TORTS AND DAMAGES Ylarde vs. Aquino, 163 SCRA 697 Teacher Edgardo Aquino, after bringing his pupils to an excavation site dug by them, left them all by themselves, and one of the pupils fell into the pit. A teacher acted with fault and gross negligence because a teacher who stands in loco parentis to his pupils would have made sure that the children are protected from all harm in his company. Cogeo-Cubao Operators and Drivers Association vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. NO. 100727, March 18, 1992 Cogeo-Cubao Operators and Drivers Association, a group of drivers, took over all jeepneys of a transportation company, Lungsod Corporation, as well as the operation of the service in the company’s route without authority from the Public Service Commission. The act was in violation of Article 21 of the Civil Code [Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for damages] because the constitutional right of the drivers to redress their grievances with the company should not undermine public peace and order nor should it violate the legal rights of other persons. F.F. Cruz and Co. vs. Court of Appeals, 164 SCRA 731 A fire that broke out in the furniture shop of the petitioner spread to an adjacent house because of the shop owner’s failure to construct a firewall as required by a city ordinance. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which is applied by the Court in this case, may be stated as follows: ‘Where the thing which caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the management of the

defendant or his servants and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have its management or control use proper care, it affords reasonable

evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care. Phoenix Construction, Inc. vs. Dionisio, 148 SCRA 353 The driver of a dump truck parked it improperly at night near his residence and it was bumped by the driver of a car, who suffered damages. The proximate cause of the accident was the improper parking of the dump truck. Africa vs. Caltex, 16 SCRA 448 A fire broke out at a gasoline station while gasoline was being hosed from a tank truck into the underground storage, right at the opening of the receiving tank where the nozzle of the hose was inserted, as a result of which several houses were burned. Under the principle of res ipsa loquitor, the employees’ negligence was the proximate cause of the fire which in the ordinary course of things does not happen. Gabeto vs. Araneta, 42 Phil. 232 Araneta stopped a calesa with passengers aboard on the street and seized the rein of the horse’s bridle, by reason of which the driver brought the carromata to the adjacent curb and alighted to fix the bridle, and while the driver was engaged at the horse’s head, the horse moved forward bringing down a police telephone box, and because of the noise caused thereby, the horse was frightened and it ran away and one of the passengers jumped and was killed. Araneta's act in stopping the horse was held as not the proximate cause of the accident because the bridle was old, and the leather of which it was made was probably so weak as to be easily broken. Gregorio vs. Go, 102 Phil. 556 Go ordered his cargador, who had only a student’s permit to drive his truck, but a policeman who boarded the truck took the wheel, and while driving the truck, it hit and ran over a pedestrian. There was no direct and proximate casual connection between the defendant’s negligence and the death because the proximate immediate and direct cause of the death was the negligence of the policeman. Phoenix Construction, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 148 SCRA 353 Dionisio's negligence was only contributory, that the "immediate and proximate cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due care" and that consequently respondent Dionisio may recover damages though such damages are subject to mitigation by the courts (Article 2179, Civil Code of the Philippines). Phoenix Construction, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 148 SCRA 353

Petitioners sought the application of the doctrine of "last clear chance". The Supreme Court said that the common law rule of contributory negligence prevented any recovery at all by a plaintiff

who was also negligent, even if the plaintiff's negligence was relatively minor as compared with the wrongful act or omission of the defendant. The common law notion of last clear chance permitted courts to grant recovery to a plaintiff who had also been negligent provided that the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the casualty and failed to do so. Accordingly, it is difficult to see what role, if any, the common law last clear chance doctrine has to play in a jurisdiction where the common law concept of contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery by the plaintiff, has itself been rejected, as it has been in Article 2179 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Is there perhaps a general concept of "last clear chance" that may be extracted from its common law matrix and utilized as a general rule in negligence cases in a civil law jurisdiction like ours? We do not believe so. Under Article 2179, the task of a court, in technical terms, is to determine whose negligence — the plaintiff's or the defendant's — was the legal or proximate cause of the injury. That task is not simply or even primarily an exercise in chronology or physics, as the petitioners seem to imply by the use of terms like "last" or "intervening" or "immediate." The relative location in the continuum of time of the plaintiff's and the defendant's negligent acts or omissions, is only one of the relevant factors that may be taken into account. Of more fundamental importance are the nature of the negligent act or omission of each party and the character and gravity of the risks created by such act or omission for the rest of the community. The petitioners urge that the truck driver (and therefore his employer) should be absolved from responsibility for his own prior negligence because the unfortunate plaintiff failed to act with that increased diligence which had become necessary to avoid the peril precisely created by the truck driver's own wrongful act or omission. To accept this proposition is to come too close to wiping out the fundamental principle of law that a man must respond for the forseeable consequences of his own negligent act or omission. Our law on quasi-delicts seeks to reduce the risks and burdens of living in society and to allocate them among the members of society. To accept the petitioners' pro-position must tend to weaken the very bonds of society. Philippine Bank of Commerce vs. Court of Appeals, 269 SCRA 695 Respondent entrusted company’s cash for deposit to his secretary who defrauded the company by depositing the money, not to the company’s account, but to her husband who maintained similar account with the bank, made possible because the duplicate slip was not compulsory required by the bank in accepting the deposits. Under the doctrine of last clear chance, an antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude the recovery of damages for the supervening negligence of, or bar a defense against liability sought by another, if the latter, who had the last fair chance, could have avoided, the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence. Here, assuming that the respondent company was negligent in entrusting cash to a dishonest employee, thus providing the latter with the opportunity to defraud the company, as advanced by the petitioner, yet it cannot be denied that the petitioner bank, thru its teller, had the last clear opportunity to avert the injury incurred by its client, simply by faithfully observing their selfimposed validation procedure.’’

Pantranco North Express, Inc. vs. Baesa, 179 SCRA 384

The driver of a Pantranco bus encroached into the lane of an incoming jeepney and failed to return the bus immediately to its own lane upon seeing the jeepney coming from the opposite direction, resulting to the death of eight passengers of the jeep. The doctrine of last clear chance does not take into operation here because it applies only in a situation where the plaintiff was guilty of prior or antecedent negligence but the defendant, who had the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so, is made liable for all the consequences of the accident notwithstanding the prior negligence of the plaintiff. Cebu Shipyard and Engineering Works, Inc. vs. William Lines, Inc., 306 SCRA 762 The passenger ship of William Lines, Inc. caught fire and sank while in the custody of Cebu Shipyard and Engineering Works to which it was brought for annual repair. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitor applies here because the fire that occurred and consumed MV Manila City would not have happened in the ordinary course of things if reasonable care and diligence had been exercised by Cebu Shipyard. Radio Communications of the Phils., Inc. [RCPI] vs. Court of Appeals, 143 SCRA 657 Defamatory words were inserted in the telegram sent by respondent Timan, which were not noticed and were included by the RCPI in the teleG.R.am when delivered. Since negligence may be hard to substantiate in some cases, we may apply the doctrine of RES IPSA LOQUITUR (the thing speaks for itself), by considering the presence of facts or circumstances surrounding the injury. Custodio vs. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 483 Custodio filed a case for damages because his tenants cancelled their contract of lease due to adobe fences constructed by adjoining lot owners which restricted passage from and to his apartment. To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action for a legal wrong inflicted by the defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom as a wrong without damage, or damage without wrong, does not constitute a cause of action, since damages are merely part of the remedy allowed for the injury caused by a breach or wrong. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company vs. Tan Chuan Leong, 42 SCRA 352 Although B&I Trading had knowledge of the simulated sale between Tan Chuan Leong and his son and had entered into the contract of mortgage pursuant to a design to defraud Leong’s creditors, no damage or prejudice appears to have been suffered by the petitioner thereby. Absent damage or prejudice, no right of action arises in favor of the petitioner because wrongful violation of a legal right is not a sufficient element of a cause of action unless it has resulted in an injury causing loss or damages. Yu vs. Court of Appeals, 217 SCRA 328

House of Mayfair, a foreign manufacturer of wall covering products, with which Yu has had an exclusive distributorship aageement was duped into believing that the goods ordered through the

FNF Trading were to be shipped to Nigeria only, but the goods were actually sent to and sold in the Philippines. A ploy of this character is akin to the scenario of a third person who induces a party to renege on or violate his undertaking under a contract, thereby entitling the other contracting party to relief therefrom. Valenzuela vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. NO. 83122, October 19, 1990 Valenzuela did not receive his full commission which amounted to P1.6 Million from the P4.4 Million insurance coverage of the Delta Motors he obtained for Philippine American General Insurance (Philamgen) because the Philamgen terminated their agency agreement after Valenzuela refused to share his commission with the company. Philamgen was found to have acted with bad faith and with abuse of right in terminating the agency under the principle that ‘every person must in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith (Art. 19, Civil Code), and every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damages to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same. Sanitary Steam Laundry, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 300 SCRA 20 83 The driver was in violation of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code when its vehicle got involved in an accident that killed three persons. For the driver to be found negligent petitioner must show that the violation of the statute was the proximate or legal cause of the injury or that it substantially contributed thereto because such negligence, consisting in whole or in part, of violation of law, like any other negligence is without legal consequence unless it is a contributing cause of the injury. Mckee vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 211 SCRA 517 A head-on-collision took place between a cargo truck driver and a car driver Jose Koh, which resulted in the death of Jose Koh and two others because the Koh avoided hitting two boys who suddenly darted across the lane. Under the Emergency Rule, Koh was not negligent because his entry into the lane of the truck was necessary in order to avoid what was, in his mind at that time, a greater peril of death or injury to the two boys. Under this rule, a person who, without fault or negligence on his part, is suddenly placed in an emergency or unexpected danger and compelled to act instantly and instinctively with no time for reflection and exercise of the required precaution, is not guilty of negligence and, therefore, exempt from liability, if he did not make the wisest choice of the available courses of conduct to avoid injury which a reasonably prudent person would have made under normal circumstances. Del Rosario vs. Manila Electric Co., 57 Phil. 478 An overhead wire of Meralco conducting electricity parted and one of the charged ends fell to the ground, and a nine (9) year old school child touched the wire and was electrocuted. It is

doubtful whether contributory negligence can properly be imputed to the deceased, owing to his immature years and the natural curiosity which a child would feel to do something out of the

ordinary, and the mere fact that the deceased ignored the caution of a companion of the age of 8 years does not, in our opinion, alter the case. Astudillo vs. Manila Electric Co., 55 Phil. 327 A young man by the name of Juan Diaz Astudillo met his death through electrocution, when he placed his right hand on a wire connected with an electric light pole owned by Meralco. Meralco was negligent in so placing the pole and wires as to be within the proximity of a place frequented by many persons, with the possibility of coming in contact with a highly charged and defectively insulated wire. Bernardo vs. Legaspi, 29 Phil. 12 Two automobiles, going in opposite directions, collide on turning a street corner, and it appears from the evidence that the drivers were equally negligent and contributed equally to the collision. Under the doctrine of contributory negligence, neither can recover from the other for the damages suffered. Negros Navigation Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 281 SCRA 534 The ship captain of MT Tacloban City, an oil tanker owned by PNOC, was playing mah-jong when it collided off the Tablan Strait in Mindoro, with M,V Don Juan owned by petitioner NENACO. The owner of the ship was found equally negligent with the ship captain because of tolerating the playing of mahjong by the ship captain and other crew members while on board the ship and failing to keep the ship seaworthy. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 178 SCRA 94 The jeepney of the respondents fell into an open excavation when the jeep swerved from the inside lane of the street, respondents being aware of the presence of said excavation. The negligence of respondent Antonio Esteban was not only contributory to his injuries and those of his wife but goes to the very cause of the occurrence of the accident, as one of its determining factors, and thereby precludes their right to recover damages. Ramos vs. Court of Appeals, 321 SCRA 584 At the time of her admission, patient Erlinda Ramos was neurologically sound but during the administration of anesthesia and prior to the performance of a gall bladder operation, she suffered irreparable damage to her brain and was diaganosed to be suffering from “diffuse cerebral parenchymal damage.” The damage sustained by Erlinda Erlinda in her brain prior to a scheduled gall bladder operation presents a case for the application of res ipsa loquitur in medical malpractice as it was found out that brain damage does not normally occur in the process

of gall bladder operations, and does not happen in the absence of negligence of someone in the administration of anesthesia and in the use of endotracheal tube. Batiquin vs. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 334

A piece of rubber glove was left in the abdomen of a patient after a caesarean section operation. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitor applies because aside from the caesarean section, private respondent Villegas underwent no other operation which could have caused the offending piece of rubber to appear in her uterus, it stands to reason that such could only have been a by-product of the caesarean section performed by Dr. Batiquin. Roque vs. Gunigundo, 89 SCRA 178 Atty. Gunigundo was charged by his client Roque with G.R.oss negligence in not seasonably filing their motion for reconsideration and in not perfecting an appeal from the trial court’s order of dismissal. Atty. Gunigundo's filing of motions for extension on the last day and sending them by registered mail (thus giving the court insufficient time to act before the extension sought had expired) and his omission to verify whether his second motion for extension was granted are indicative of lack of competence, diligence and fidelity in the dispatch of his clients’ business. Adarne vs. Aldaba, 83 SCRA 734 Adarne was declared in default for failure to appear in the hearing because his one of his lawyers honestly believed that he had appeared for the complainant only for a special purpose and that the complainant had agreed to contact his attorney of record to handle his case after the hearing of October 23, 1964, so that he did nothing more about it. An attorney is not bound to exercise extraordinary diligence, but only a reasonable degree of care and skill having reference to the character of the business he undertakes to do. Vestil vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 179 SCRA 47 Theness, a three-year old child, was killed after she was bitten by a dog while she was playing with the child of Purita Vestil in the house of Vicente Miranda, the late father of Purita. Spouses Vestil’s contention that they cannot be faulted as they are not the owner of the house where the child was bitten cannot be accepted because under the Article 2183 of the Civil Code the possessor of animal is liable even if the animal should “escape or be lost” and so be removed from his control. Amadora vs. Court of Appeals, 160 SCRA 315 Amadora was shot dead by his classmate Daffon inside the school auditorium, when the classes had formally ended. As long as it can be shown that the student is in the school premises in pursuance of a legitimate student objective, in the exercise of a legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student privilege, the responsibility of the school authorities over the student continues. Caedo vs. Yu Khe Thai, 26 SCRA 410

Yu was inside his car when his driver bumped a carretela in front and at the same time hit another car coming from the opposite direct. Under [Article 2184], if the causative factor was the

driver’s negligence, the owner of the vehicle who was present is likewise held liable if he could have prevented the mishap by the exercise of due diligence. ANDAMO vs. IAC, G.R. NO. 74761November 6, 1990 Clearly, from petitioner's complaint, the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation are alleged to have inundated the land of petitioners. All the elements of a quasidelict or culpa aquiliana are present, to wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff. PONCE vs. LEGASPI, G.R. NO. 79184 May 6, 1992 The present case stemmed from the filing before the Supreme Court OF a complaint for disbarment against respondent by petitioner which was dismissed. Respondent thereafter filed a complaint for damages against the petitioner. The adverse result of an action does not per se make the action wrongful and subject the actor to make payment of damages for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to because one who exercises his rights does no injury, and if damage results from a person's exercising his legal rights, it is damnum absque injuria. MERALCO vs. RAMOY, G.R. NO. 158911, March 4, 2008 In the present case, MERALCO wilfully caused injury to Leoncio Ramoy by withholding from him and his tenants the supply of electricity to which they were entitled under the Service Contract. MERALCO's failure to exercise utmost care and diligence in the performance of its obligation to its customer, is tantamount to bad faith hence is entitled to moral damages. MINDANAO TERMINAL AND BROKERAGE SERVICE, INC. vs. PHOENIX ASSURANCE COMPANY OF NEW YORK,MCGEE & CO., INC., G.R. NO. 162467, May 8, 2009 The Court ruled that Mindanao Terminal had duly exercised the required degree of diligence in loading and stowing the cargoes, which is the ordinary diligence of a good father of a family. There is no basis for the award of attorney’s fees in favor of petitioner since none of the circumstances enumerated in Article 2208 of the Civil Code exists because the present case is clearly not an unfounded civil action against the plaintiff as there is no showing that it was instituted for the mere purpose of vexation or injury. AIR FRANCE vs.CARRASCOSO, G.R. NO. L-21438, September 28, 1966

Plaintiff was forced out of his seat in the first class compartment of the plane belonging to the defendant Air France while at Bangkok, and was transferred to the tourist class without his consent and against his will. The contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended

with a public duty, and neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's employees, naturally, could give ground for an action for damages. BAYANI vs. PANAY ELECTRIC CO., INC., G.R. NO. 139680, April 12, 2000 The requisites for an action for damages based on malicious prosecution are: (1) the fact of the prosecution and the further fact that the defendant was himself the prosecutor, and that the action was finally terminated with an acquittal; (2) that in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause; and (3) the prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal malice. WASSMER vs VELEZ, G.R. NO. L-20089, December 26, 1964 Two days before the wedding, defendant, who was then 28 years old, simply left a note for plaintiff stating: "Will have to postpone wedding — My mother opposes it ... ", then enplaned to his home city in Mindanao, and never returned and was never heard from again. This is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry but unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 aforesaid and per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable in the cases mentioned in Article 21 of said Code. SANTOS VENTURA HOCORMA FOUNDATION, INC. vs. ERNESTO V. SANTOS and RIVERLAND, INC., G.R. NO. 153004, November 5, 2004 The demand letter sent to the petitioner on October 28, 1992, was in accordance with an extrajudicial demand contemplated by law. When the debtor knows the amount and period when he is to pay, interest as damages is generally allowed as a matter of right. TELEFAST COMMUNICATIONS vs. CASTRO, G.R. NO. 73867, February 29, 1988 Petitioner and private respondent entered into a contract whereby, for a fee, petitioner undertook to send said private respondent's message overseas by teleG.R.am but which petitioner did not do, despite performance by said private respondent of her obligation by paying the required charges. The award of exemplary damages by the trial court is likewise justified and, therefore, sustained as a warning to all teleG.R.am companies to observe due diligence in transmitting the messages of their customers. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs.COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 136202, January 25, 2007 Upon the prompting of Templonuevo and with full knowledge of the brewing dispute between Salazar and Templonuevo, petitioner debited the account held in the name of the sole proprietorship of Salazar without even serving due notice upon her. The award of exemplary damages is justified when the acts of the bank are attended by malice, bad faith or gross

negligence and the award of reasonable attorney’s fees is proper where exemplary damages are awarded because depositors are compelled to litigate to protect their interest.

VELASCO vs.MERALCO, G.R. NO. L-18390, August 6, 1971 It is undisputed that a sound unceasingly emanates from the substation of MERALCO and whether this sound constitutes an actionable nuisance or not is the principal issue in this case and appellant asked that he be declared entitled to recover compensatory, moral and other damages. Article 2203 clearly obligates the injured party to undertake measures that will alleviate and not aggravate his condition after the infliction of the injury, and places upon him the burden of explaining why he could not do so. BPI vs CA, G.R. NO. 136202, January 25, 2007 The bank froze and later unilaterally debited an amount from the account of A.A. Salazar Construction and Engineering Services without informing her that it had already done so, which caused plaintiff-appellee great damage and prejudice particularly when she had already issued checks drawn against the said account and as can be expected, the said checks bounced, thereby causing private respondent Salazar undue embarrassment and inflicting damage to her standing in the business community. A depositor has the right to recover reasonable moral damages even if the bank’s negligence may not have been attended with malice and bad faith, if the former suffered mental anguish, serious anxiety, embarrassment and humiliation. VILLA REY TRANSIT, INC., vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. February 18, 1970

L-25499

The trial court and the Court of Appeals, both found that the accident and the death of Policronio had been due to the negligence of the bus driver, for whom petitioner was liable under its contract of carriage with the deceased but the only issue raised in this appeal is the amount of damages recoverable by private respondents herein. The determination of the indemnity to be awarded to the heirs of a deceased person has therefore no fixed basis and much is left to the discretion of the court considering the moral and material damages involved, and so it has been said that "(t)here can be no exact or uniform rule for measuring the value of a human life and the measure of damages cannot be arrived at by precise mathematical calculation, but the amount recoverable depends on the particular facts and circumstances of each case. PEOPLE vs. EBAROLA, G.R. NO. L-69666, January 23, 1992 Appellant had been convicted of homicide and the trial court awarded the amount of P100,000.00 to the heirs of Manahan as indemnity for death. The indemnity for death must be reduced to P50,000.00 conformably with prevailing jurisprudence on the matter and aside from the ordinary indemnity for death appellant is obliged: (1) to compensate the heirs for the latter's loss of earning capacity; (2) to give support in the form of expenses for education to dependents of the deceased and (3) to pay the heirs for moral damages for the mental anguish suffered by them.

COJUANGCO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 119398. July 2, 1999

To hold public officers personally liable for moral and exemplary damages and for attorney’s fees for acts done in the performance of official functions, the plaintiff must prove that these officers exhibited acts characterized by evident bad faith, malice, or gross negligence, but even if their acts had not been so tainted, public officers may still be held liable for nominal damages if they had violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. PLENO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. L-56505, May 9, 1988 Temperate damages are included within the context of compensatory damages and in arriving at a reasonable level of temperate damages to be awarded, trial courts are guided by our ruling that: There are cases where from the nature of the case, definite proof of pecuniary loss cannot be offered, although the court is convinced that there has been such loss. AREOLA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 95641 September 22, 1994 Nominal damages are "recoverable where a legal right is technically violated and must be vindicated against an invasion that has produced no actual present loss of any kind, or where there has been a breach of contract and no substantial injury or actual damages whatsoever have been or can be shown.