On Dignity

+ On Dignity Introduction

 The question question of dignity dignity has arisen in much of the contemporary contemporary political debate, with leaders from all sides of the political spectrum contributing to the movement. These thinkers range from giants like like John Rawls, whose thoughts have structured especially the merican political debate since his monumental piece  A Theory of Justice was !rst published, to thinkers like Jurgen "abermas, whose thoughts stem back to critical theory and The #rankfurt #rankfurt $chool in %ermany. %ermany. The impetus of the thoughts presented here is to demonstrate not only that the legacy of human dignity research has taken hold, but also to give the reader a better understanding of what e&actly this debate entails. To do this ' will draw on some of the contemporary research in the !eld to articulate both what dignity entails, but also to di(erentiate the ways in which various thinkers interpret it across the political spectrum. ' will then step back and analy)e dignity as a structural phenomenon capable of being studied as a structural phenomenon, with the intention of further analy)ing the e&tent to which dignity is structural vs. non*structural. The guiding assumption of this paper is that dignity can be studied as a structural phenomenon, a non*structural phenomenon, and a partially structural phenomenon because its features are comple& and because it has such a unique unique relationship with the basic structure. lso assumed here is that dignity is a paradigmatic concept and that no one unitary theory of dignity will ever encompass the spectrum of possibilities at

; stake in the concept. The result of this is that dignity is best articulated paradigmatically, studied paradigmatically and inter*paradigmatically, and assessed in terms of the ecacy of its conte&tual deployment.  -et  -et before before we sprint into into an analysis analysis of the term, term, let us !rst come come to some understanding of what e&actly one means when using the term dignity/ +0 1ore speci!cally, and of central importance to the thoughts presented here, what does one mean when using the term dignity in a political conte&t0 2olloquially, we speak of dignity as a way of addressing addressing another in a conte&t whereby we show that person either a formal or an informal respect, and in so doing, recogni)e their status as a person with intrinsic and inviolable worth. #or e&le, an individual may maintain the dignity of an individual or a household by not walking into a home and robbing that person of his property or slandering the name the head of the household. Dignity may also be understood colloquially as not violating an individual/s autonomy as an agent capable of autonomous action. n instance of this form of dignity may arise when an individual recogni)es and respects another person/s desire to cease with an activity, as might be the case in either market market e&changes or se&ual relations. Dignity can also be

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 3The Oxford English Dictionary de!nes dignity as a4 The quality or state of being worthy of esteem or respect, and b4 5having6 inherent nobility and worth. 7O8D online4. The Royal Royal 2ollege of 9ursing de!nes dignity as 3concerned with how people feel, think and behave in relation to the worth or value of themselves and others. To treat someone with dignity is to treat them as being of worth, in a way that is respectful of them as valued individuals.:

A studied as a purely sub
 $ee tterton, =eter, 3Dignity and the Other> Dignity and the =henomenological Tradition.: 7;?+@*?@*A?4. The 2ambridge "andbook of "uman Dignity> 'nterdisciplinary =erspectives 7p. ;BC4. 2ambridge niversity =ress. Eindle 8dition.

@ titled, 3"uman Dignity> #unctions and 1eanings,: the linguistic function of the concept of dignity operates in a number of seminal documents, documents such as the 2harter of the nited 9ations A, niversal Declaration of "uman Rights @, and the merican Declaration of the Rights and Duties of 1anF, among others, but it lacks a !&ed content, C which means that term has motive force but refers refers to nothing substantial and non*transient. The “what”  of what the term is denoting is di(use and Geeting, meaning, what quali!es as having dignity, showing dignity, or losing dignity is not a !&ed idea, making any attempt at narrowing in on a !&ed concept of dignity futile at the outset. 'n a similar vein, Ruth Ruth 1acklin, in her article titled, 3Dignity 3Dignity is a seless 2oncept: has argued that the term 3dignity: has no meaning beyond what is otherwise the orienting principle of medical ethics, respect for persons. Respect for persons in a medical setting implies needing to obtain voluntary consent, ensuring con!dentiality, the need to avoid discrimination, and the need to avoid abusive practices. 8ach of these domains of inquiry can be studied in isolation from each other, but as separate !elds of inquiry, complete with their own sub
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 3Rearm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small.: @  3Recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, #unctions and 1eanings.: =. @.

F dignity to the discourse appears to provide nothing substantively valuable, hence why 1acklin claims that the term is useless. B $o why add the term0 term0  To  To be sure, there there are are many formulations formulations of the the concept of of dignity that that attempt to elaborate on a central theme, or paradigm, and in so doing, establish a third term whose Telos Telos is dignity as a sub
use the term in a functional manner have a referent, but also have satisfaction conditionsI meaning, that there is some criteria by which to gauge whether or not the ecacy of the linguistic performative has

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 $teven =inker also articulates his frustration with the term dignity/ in his paper entitled, 3The $tupidity of Dignity> 2onservative ioethics Katest, 1ost Dangerous =loy:. 'n it, he follows 1acklin in protesting protesting the meaninglessness of the term on the grounds that the term is relative, which means that the meanings of the term vary with the time, place, and beholder of the termI the term is fungible, which means that other more appropriate terms can replace the term dignity/ and do so in a way that captures the essence of the paradigm being articulated more acutelyI and that the term is harmful in certain conte&ts, citing as
C materiali)ed, and that that criteria is grounded in facts about the world. 'f one or all of these paradigms of dignity lack a referent, and as such, lack satisfaction conditions that determine whether or not the linguistic performative has materiali)ed as a fact about the world, then the concept of dignity is in fact meaningless. $o why construct a positive paradigm0 't is clear that there are a number of positive paradigms of dignity that e&ist, many of which will be analy)ed in what follows. 2onsider as an e&le dignity as inclusion within a basic structure M, respect for autonomy N, having one/s basic needs met +?, equality of opportunity ++, due process in criminal proceedings +;, the right to speak in one/s defense +A, equality of recognition +@, morality in healthcare practices +F, dignity in dying +C, etc. 'n each case, the articulation of a paradigm is a conceptual construct whose Telos is dignity by some mechanism. y beginning with a pre*e&isting construct thinkers thinkers reserve for themselves principles of orientation that can be applied to a

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 $ee =akuluk, 1ichael. 3The Dignity of the "uman =erson in the =hilosophy of John Rawls.: N  $ee Kysaught, Therese. 3Respect> Or, "ow Respect for =ersons ecame Respect for f or utonomy  utonomy.: .: +?  $ee "oward, Rhoda. 3The #ull*elly Thesis> $hould 8conomic Rights Take =riority Over 2ivil and =olitical Rights0 8vidence from $ub*$aharan frica.: ++  Joseph, Kawrence. 3$ome ays of Thinking bout 8quality of Opportunity.: +;  $canlon, Thomas. 3Due =rocess.: +A  $ee -oung Eim, Janine. 3The Rhetoric of $elf*Defense.: +@  $ee Taylor, 2harles. 3The =olitics of Recognition: in Multiculturalism: Exloring the !olitics of "ecognition. +F  $ee %allagher, . 3Dignity and Respect for dignity*two key health professional values> implications for nursing practice.: +C  2hochinov, ".1. et. al., 3Dignity in the Terminally 'll>  Developing 8mpirical 1odel.:

B situation that act as a kind of cognitive road map with a starting point, sites to see along the way, and a destination.  The problem problem with constructin constructing g a paradigm paradigm of dignity dignity and then applying applying it to a situation is that how a situation is approached is constrained by the paradigmatic ga)e with which the thinker approaches it. ecause there is a prior paradigm, there also e&ists a set of predispositions L manifested in normativity or bias L that cause the situation to be viewed one way versus another, often to the e(ect that certain features of the scene are highlighted and others are ignoredI typically for a positive*paradigm thinker this translates into applying a set of principles to a situation, principles which have been established by the positive paradigm as reliably capable of producing dignity. dignity. 2onsider as an e&le the case of the right to speak freely.+B ithin such a paradigm, dignity is simply a question of was the defendant given the right to speak in a given situation0 'f so, ceterus paribus, the satisfaction conditions of the paradigm were met, which means dignity for the accused should be the result.  -et  -et what is the greate greatest st strength strength of the positive*paradi positive*paradigm gm thinker, thinker, however, is also his greatest weaknessI by outlining the conditions of the

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 The Declaration of the Rights of 1an and of the 2iti)en mentions freedom of speech in rticle ++ where it states> 3The free communication of ideas and opinions is one of the most precious of the rights of man. 8very citi)en may, accordingly, speak, write, and print with freedom, but shall be responsible for such abuses of this freedom as shall be de!ned by law.: law.: rticle +N of the niversal Declaration of "uman Rights reads> 38veryone has the right to freedom of opinion and e&pressionI this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.:

M possibility of dignity according to a third term whose Telos is dignity, the paradigm delimits the appropriateness of the application to the orienting principles derived  rior  to  to applying them to the situation, which means that the paradigm determines the sub
approach: to dignity begins from the assumption that the most appropriate way to approach the concept of dignity is to begin with an act or a practice that is often characteri)ed as a violation of human dignity rather than constructing a dignity*paradigm, deducing moral principles from that

N paradigm, and then applying them to a situation deemed appropriate. +M This view presupposes that one can learn more about dignity violations from investigating instances of these violations, and investigating what these violations mean to situated, embodied sub
Dignity as a !ositi'e(!aradigm

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 =. Eaufmann et al., #umiliation$ Degradation$ Dehumani%ation: #uman Dignity &iolated . =. ; +N  $ee =fordten, Dietmar Pon Der. 3On the Dignity of 1an in Eant.: ;?  $ee =. Eaufmann et al., #umiliation$ Degradation$ Dehumani%ation: #uman Dignity &iolated . =. ;, %oodwin, Jean. 32icero/s uthority,: and 2ancik, "ubert, Dignity of 1an/ and =ersona/ in $toic nthropology> $ome Remarks on 2icero, De O)ciis  ' +?F*+?B for a more detailed analysis of this position.

+? 'n his article 3The Dignity of the "uman =erson in the =hilosophy of  John Rawls,: Rawls,: 1ichael =akulu =akuluk k helps the reader reader identify identify the ways ways in which which John Rawls incorporates the concept of dignity into his late research. The logic of  A Theory of Justice, John Rawls/ magnum opus on how to
in the distribution of scarce resources by applying the results of a decision procedure that isolates an individual/s capacity to act as a sel!sh agent and then compels them to create a social structure from behind this so*called 3veil of ignorance,: ;+ is to generate a basic structure that reGects society/s desire to act from a position of equality, or to be more speci!c, to create formal and procedural conditions of

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 The goal of the so*called 3veil of ignorance: according to Rawls is> to 3nullify the e(ects of speci!c contingencies which put men at odds and tempt them to e&ploit social and natural circumstances to their own advantage.: 7++MQ'.;@4 ;;  $ee Rawls, J. Theory of Justice. $ect. '.@. ;A  Rawls claims> 39ow let us say that a society is well*ordered when it is not only designed to advance the good of its members but when it is also e(ectively regulated by a public conception of
++ +4 8ach person has the same indefeasible indefeasible claim to a fully fully adequate adequate scheme of equal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of liberties for allI and ;4 $ocial and economic economic inequalities inequalities are to satisfy two condition conditions> s> !rst, they are to be attached to oces and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunityI and second, they are to be to the greatest bene!t of the least*advantaged members of society 7the di(erence principle4. ;@ Rawls/ principles of
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 Justice as +airness: A "estatement  "estatement , p. @;. Theory of Justice, 2h. @, sect @?.

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+; sel!shly mirrors Eant/s concept of the kingdom of ends in that the sel!sh individual often uses the Other in disproportionately disadvantageous ways to ensure the products of their own will is carried out, thereby neglecting the Other/s status as a person with inviolable worth by relegating them to a mere thing, valuable but only so derivatively as means to the production of the sel!sh person/s endsI or to be more speci!c, creating the conditions of  
 2oncerning how the Original =osition creates the conditions of equality for rational actors deliberating on the basic structure, Rawls claims> 3Obviously the purpose of these conditions 5the conditions of the Original =osition6 is to represent equality between human beings as moral persons, as creatures having a conception of their good and capable of a sense of a4 equal material condition from which to deliberate on the basic structure, which include ignorance of race, gender, and social standing, and b4 equal consideration of persons/ conception of the %ood, in that conceptions of the %ood life are not ranked in value and thereby given

+A social position, natural endowment, etc., will play a part in the deliberation. ecause the veil of ignorance strips the agent of their understanding of where they fall in the post*veil*of*ignorance*lottery, it conditions rational agents to develop principles of
preferential treatment by the formal and procedural constraints produced by the original position of equality. equality. Kiberty, as a condition of the possibility of carrying out one/s own conception of the %ood, is derived from the initial conditions of equality that the Original =osition presupposes, making it contingent and derivative. 8quality in Rawls/ paradigm, then, can be thought of as either fundamental or derivative> it is fundamental in the sense that the Original =osition L the key intuition that produces the considerations of  
+@ own conception of the good life alongside other rational actors capable of carrying out their own version of the good lifeI
 'n his article, 3hy =unish the %uilty0 Towards a =hilosophical nalysis of the $tate/s Justi!cation of =unishment,: 2yril 1cDonnell argues that there is one possible 3Judicial punishment can never be used merely as a means to promote some good for the criminal herself or for civil society, but instead it must in all cases be imposed on him only on the ground that he has committed a crime, for a human being may never be manipulated merely as a means to the purposes of someone else.: 7AC4 This does not preclude the possibility of punishment having some positive social value L and certainly ought not be re the bad e(ects of an act on a4 a guilty agent 7i.e. an agent that acted ,nowingly , as the causal

+F Eeeping the preceding in mind, =akuluk details Rawls/ concept of dignity as entailing the following> +4 8ach 8ach perso person n has has an intrinsic worth as a human being. ccording to this view, humans are di(erent in kind than other entities found in the natural world, and this di(erence is not purely a di(erence in kind, but also entails a di(erence in worth. The di(erence in kind posited refers to the rational capacities of persons that may or may not e&ist in non*human animals. s such, persons are are thereby capable of acting as free, rational rational actors, a distinction that separates them from the other entities found in the world. 't is because of their rationality, and thereby autonomy, that they are free, and therefore capable of cooperating in a polis designed to advance the good of all members. These rational capacities also include the capacity to know what truth is and to know how this truth is to contribute to their pursuit of the %ood L or, more simply, what an individual !nds to be good in life. 'mportantly according to this view, members of kinds are categorically members of that kind, which entails that members are not more or less members, but are so categorically in virtue of qualifying as a rational animal/. This has serious implications especially for policy measures designed to ensure rights and freedoms to members of the kind protected, namely, that all members of that kind are to be granted access to the same set of rights L which implies the same set of responsibilities L as all other initiator of the harm, and as someone who could ha'e done otherwise4, b4 the bad e(ects of not doing what is otherwise praiseworthy, and c4 the bad e(ects of a morally wrong wrong act. ccording to Eant, only c is morally culpable and thus
+C members that fall into the same category. category. 'n this instance, the kind is rational animal,/ which would preclude limiting these rights for marginali)ed sub
+B %reeks, they are theion, or godlike/, and can achieve happiness only be becoming divini)ed. 1ore recently, recently, Kocke states that human beings are the worksmanship of %od and can only be understood as bearing his resemblance indirectly. indirectly. bove is the standard conception of dignity as it is commonly understood in the tradition. ll other components of the concept are are relevant insofar as they elaborate on these central themes. =olitically speaking, however, the concept is still obscure insofar as its normative features have yet to have been clearly articulated. The central question looms> how does a robust de!nition of dignity contribute to the pro
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 9ew O&ford merican Dictionary 7; nd 8d.4

+M rights are a simple e&le of how an idea can be proposed, accepted, and then materiali)ed as a fact about about a location. #or e&le, e&le, if ' have a negative right to life, citi)ens of a given area have a correlative responsibility not to take it from me. 'f they do, then they are sub
apart from purely setting up a logical binary and implementing norms based on that binaryI this is where the phenomenological character of dignity holds sway. sway. e therefore !nd the necessity of a reGe&ive reGe&ive reciprocity between the A?

 'n 3Of $weatshops  $ubsistence> "abermas on "uman Rights: David 'ngram claims that "abermas/ view of human rights begins !rst as a moral aspiration L and therefore is in essence non*
+N political character of the idea L which maintains origins in the conceptual L and the phenomenological character which, according to tterton A+ via Kevinas, maintains evaluative criteria in the #ace #ace of the Other. Other. fter further articulating how the conceptual contributes to the political, ' will return to tterton/s essay to help the reader further understand how and why phenomenology is of importance in the discussion. =olitically the concept entails that human beings, again, in virtue of belonging to the category rational animal,/ and therefore maintaining an intrinsic worth, are to be treated di(erently than other material entities in the world. nd because this di(erence belongs to human persons singularly, no metric of utility will "uman rights are prior to convention and agreement. greement and convention often direct behavior, but the central concern with agreement and convention is that only the stipulations of the agreement L without regard to further conditions than those stipulated in the agreement L determine the motive force of the contract. Kikewise with convention, the norms stipulated are often arbitrary and relative to an area or people, meaning, there is no further normative focus than that which A+

 $ee tterton, =eter, 3Dignity and the Other> Dignity and the =henomenological Tradition.: 7;?+@*?@*A?4. The 2ambridge "andbook of "uman Dignity> 'nterdisciplinary =erspectives 7p. ;BC4. 2ambridge niversity =ress. Eindle 8dition.

;? already e&ists e&ists as convention. 1ore dangerously, conventions may often transgress the ideals of dignity cited prior as in the case of involuntary female circumcision or stoning. ith an agreement*based ethics, or contractarianism as such, it is dicult to necessitate an adherence to dignity*based norms or policy measures due to the interest*based conditions that orient and
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The Imort of !henomenology 

'n his paper 3Dignity  the Other> Dignity and the =henomenological  Tradition  TraditionA;,: =eter tterton argues that dignity begins from a concrete, non* theoretical, sub
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 'n The .am-ridge #and-oo, of #uman Dignity: Interdiscilinary !ersecti'es  7;?+@4. AA  "usserl, 8dmond. /ogical In'estigations. =. +CM

;; =henomenologists was to disrupt the overly abstract work of the rationalists who, by very de!nition, abstracted away from the di(erence of the world and seeped their understanding of it into an impoverished epistemological nullity by relegating ob
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 ccording to "usserl, the pro +4 a systematic epoche of every ob
;A another, each with the intention of becoming self*certain of that which is most fundamental to consciousness, consciousness , namely, the self*certainty of the '. 'f dignity is given in conte&t, non*theoretically, as that which can be directly intuited in e&perience then it e&ists, either in fundamental human interaction or derivatively as a byproduct byproduct of structural forms. ecause "egel/s account of the independence and dependence of self*consciousness is so fundamental to human interaction for "egel, no account of dignity is complete without addressing it, even if only to dismiss it as an antiquated byproduct of pre*structural forms.  This primordial primordial interaction interaction begins begins with one essential essential fact about about self* self* consciousness, namely, that self*consciousness e&ists in itself and for itself.  The absolute absolute freedom freedom self*consciousn self*consciousness ess maintains maintains with regard regard to itself itself when it is by itself is a structural aspiration of self*consciousness more generally.  This absolute absolute freedom freedom with regard regard to itself itself is derived from self* self* consciousness/ ability to totali)e the contents of e&perience in such a way that nothing calls it into questionI that everything in e&perience can be understood, analy)ed, and controlled by a free self*consciousness certain of itself. part from e&isting e&isting in itself and for itself, it also e&ists e&ists in being acknowledged as a self*consciousne self*consciousness ss certain of itself. This 3unity in its duplication:AF has varied meanings and varied phenomenological moments that construct self*consciousness as self*consciousness certain of itself and construct self*consciousness as a relation to the Other which it confronts and

AF

 "egel, !henomenology of 0irit , 2h. M, =art .

;@ in some sense requires as as a condition of the possibility of itself. "egel/s analysis of the independence and dependence of self*consciousness is a phenomenological analysis of these moments of confrontation and constitution that begin with the initial face to face interaction with the Other.  The initial moment moment of this this interaction interaction is a move out out of the self*certainty self*certainty of self*consciousness and into the consciousness of the OtherI it !nds itself in an Other, or to be more speci!c, in the Other/s recognition that it is itself a self*consciousness certain of itself and for itself. s "egel states, 3This has twofold signi!cance> signi!cance> !rst, it has lost itself, for it !nds itself as an other  beingI  beingI secondly, in doing so it has superseded the other, for it does not see the other as an essential being, but in the other see its own self.: y superseding the Other, self*consciousness confronts the problem of the Otherness of itself, namely that as a being that e&ists in itself and for itself, and free with regard to itself because of its ability to totali)e the contents of e&perience, the Other presents the speci!cally phenomenological problem of one being that is self*certain of itself confronting another being that is also self*certain of itself, each e&isting as self*certain and for the Other, which means that it !nds in the Other both the means to its subsistence as self*certain of itself and Otherness which is not essential to the self*certainty of itselfI this Otherness calls self*certainty into question as non*totali)ability. non*totali)ability. To become certain of itself again, self*consciousness must supersede this Otherness in the self*consciousness that confronts it and in so doing gains for itself the self*certainty of itself as an essential being. The gift of of this supersession for

;F the self*consciousness that is once again certain of itself as an essential being is a return to itself, back into itself, and by superseding the Other, the self*consciousness now once again certain of itself becomes equal to itself and the Other self*consciousness which was superseded becomes a being for the Other that has superseded it, and thus becomes deendent  on  on the self* consciousness that has superseded it and thereby gained its independence as a self*consciousness self*certain of itself and for itself.  This movement movement is, as "egel describes, describes, 3simply the double double movement movement of the two self*consciousnes self*consciousnesses. ses. 8ach sees the other  do  do the same as it doesI each does itself what it demands of the other, and therefore also does what it does only in so far as the other does the same,: AC with the result being one consciousness that is dependent and another consciousness that is independent. 2haracteristic 2haracterist ic of this initial e&change e&change is each self* self* consciousness recogni%ing themselves as mutually recogni%ing one another, and then a process of supersession, containing distinct moments, with the end result being one consciousness that is for itself 7and thereby independent4 and the other consciousness that is for the Other 7and thereby dependent4. t this stage, the struggle of self*consciousne self*consciousness ss e&hibits a kind of sub
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 'bid. 2h. M, =art .

;C achieved for itself the status of being*for*itself, or sub
 'bid. 2h. M. =art .  'bid. 2h. M. =art .

AM

;B on the being*for*the*Other in more than
 "egel states> 3't is in this way, therefore, that consciousness, 1ua worker comes to see in the independent being 5of the ob
;M one/s labor versus another this lateral movement is guaranteed as a right. =erhaps dignity is guaranteed if a certain degree of autonomy is guaranteedI under this assumption one might !nd dignity to be the result of an appropriate work  life balance, such that while one does labor in the service of another/s en
Totality and In2nity , $ection A, =art   'bid.

@;

;N character. character. -et the face is not of the totality itself, which means it is not a species of intentional consciousness, meaning the 3ethical relationship which su-tends discourse34 is not a species of consciousness whose ray emanates

from the 'I it puts the ' in question.: @@ 't is immediately apparent that the ethical relationship brought on by the face*to*face interaction with the Other is not normative insofar as it does not initially call to action normatively, or to be more speci!c, is not a sub
choices of participants in interaction who are coordinating their actions via sanctioned imperatives and the reciprocal satisfaction of interests.: @F  9orms generated are socially generali)ed to every member of the group, which allows members of the group to e&pect certain actions from others in interaction and thereby commits them to acting in certain ways as well. The normative features of the interaction are derived from the employment of linguistic signs that, according to "abermas, have identical meanings for all

@A

 8mphasis added.  'bid. @F The Theory of .ommunicati'e Action &ol* &ol* II . =. AB @@

A? adherents which 3react upon the organism/s structure of drives and modes of  behavior:@C causing them to act out the motive features of the linguistic performative once the organism recogni)es both the sign and the function of the sign. The sign itself, and the intentional consciousness the sign represents L which itself has satisfaction conditions in material facts about the world, giving moral dictums derived from linguistic performatives a meaningful, non*arbitrary structure @B * are mode by which rational actors, capable of free action, construct and constrain the members privy to a contract by acting upon their biological organism with mechanisms like punishment or moral censure. 'n the case case of policy measures in a democratic society, which again, appeal to a situated polis, and actors acting within that polis by proposing ideas to that polis that are either accepted or re
 'bid. =. ;A  y the term 3non*arbitrary: ' mean to denote that signs have satisfaction conditions in the same way that speech*acts have satisfaction conditions. 'f ' say to my neighbor, 3grab me that rake,: and instead of a rake he hands me a shovel, the satisfaction conditions were not adequately met to qualify my neighbor as having complied with my request for a rake. $ee John $earle/s work 0eech Acts and Intentionality  in  in which he identi!es the main characteristics characteristi cs of speech acts and their conditions of satisfaction. There is, he claims, a relationship between intentional states of the mind and the ob
A+ members of the population are both sub
A; from positive rights, citi)ens are acting on an obligation L which entails the normative constraint L to conduct their behavior in a certain manner 7i.e. paying your ta&es4. #or Kevinas, however, respect for universal rights is not only warranted by the initial interaction with the #ace of the Other, but also in some sense is impossible without it as the a riori attachment to the Other precedes reason, autonomy, and discourse. =arado&ically, =arado&ically, he points out, the #ace #ace of the Other seems to present itself, not in an equal relationship but instead in one that is unequal, with the #ace of the Other coming as though from a height @MI This creates the parado& of equal dignity/ if we consider that article + of the Declaration states> ll human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights./ 'f it is the case that the #ace of the Other comes as though from a height, yet dignity is a concept that is intended to apply to all equally, how is it possible to ground dignity in the primordial #ace*to*#ace relation0 "uman beings are unique in virtue of the fact that they are able to be viewed ontologically as members of universal kinds 7such as human being/ or rational animal/4 where their singularity vanishes,/ but it is not possible to view them ethically so. Treating individuals as ethical requires requires treating them

@M

 'n Totality and In2nity Kevinas claims> 3To hear his destitution which cries out for
AA as 3unrepeatable and incomparable: @N 7see Rawl/s conception of dignity above on what this entails4. hat is fundamental to humans for Kevinas, Kevinas, which cannot be made common to other members of the species or beyond, is their interiority .F? 'nteriority is not something that stands above or as a distinction to one/s humanity but in a fundamental sense is one/s humanity, and thereby quali!es her as unique and separate. 't is only in virtue of this fundamental separation and sub
@N

 'n The .am-ridge #and-oo, of #uman Dignity: Interdiscilinary !ersecti'es  7;?+@4 =. S F? Totality and In2nity > 3'n the separated being the door must hence be at the same time open and closed.: 7+@N4

A@ implements models that universali)es the tenets derived from the #ace*to* #ace interaction. int eraction. F+  The natural natural conclusion conclusion of this is that the #ace*to*# #ace*to*#ace ace interaction interaction  
F+

 3't is a phenomenological claim about how rights appear to me as one who is endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood/.: 7;?+@*?@*A?4. The 2ambridge "andbook of "uman Dignity> 'nterdisciplinary =erspectives 7p. ;M+4. 2ambridge niversity =ress. Eindle 8dition.

AF because respect for the Other is not initially rational insofar pre*rational disruptions are required to establish the sub
Discussion

. $ome =reliminary Thoughts on Dignity efore we proceed further, let us not forget one profound insight, an insight that has constructed much of the political debate for the past several millennia, namely the insight given to us from ristotle/s !olitics regarding man/s essential nature. 'n it he makes makes the claim> 3#or man, when perfected, is the best of animals, but, when separated from law and
F;

 ristotle, !olitics . k '. ch. ''.

AC lthough written around the F th century 2, in a time before tanks, warplanes, credit card fraud, the atom bomb, and chemical warfare, ristotle/s claim resonates today because it speaks to a very pointed aspect of the human condition, namely its tendency to defer to what ristotle would call vice at moments in which accountability is lacking. 'n other words, in a society without formal structures 7laws, punishment, normativity, morality, etc.4 man tends to defer to vicious action towards his his fellow man. hile its cultural iterations have transformed over the epochs since the !olitics  was written, one must from the outset of the discussion of dignity question the e&tent to which dignity is possible at all given this proclivity of human nature. 'f it is true that human nature has this innate proclivity proclivity L no doubt considered a contingent proclivity, but a proclivity nonetheless L must not formal structures be erected as a means of procuring what is otherwise sacri!ced during moments in which this seduction holds sway, namely, again, universal human dignity. dignity. nd must not these formal structures be considered a necessary condition of producing dignity if after we analy)e the history of political forms and !nd that most, if not all, instances in which protections against this decline into vice is not prevented by laws and regulations that foresee this tendency and act proactively to prevent it there is a decline into some of the greatest greatest violence the human race has seen0 s we proceed with this discussion, this precursor, and a backdrop of e&les throughout human history in which this precursor is made manifest, must  dominate our attention, and it must dominate our attention in such a way

AB that only if it is considered to be the lesser of two evils can it ever be a4 create its own political organi)ation, which would be sub
AM societiesI by de!nition, this is what makes them democratic 7i.e. the forms are sub
AN dignity*based legal proceedings, which itself would result in a reversion back to concepts of
@? for those who preside under it. FA This is the standard dignity*based  
FA

 Kegal proceedings, then, which would otherwise be overseen by a
@+ legal considerations when attempting to ad =+> dignity is the result of set of procedural conditions that produce dignity. =;> the procedural conditions that produce dignity do so in part because they ad dignity is the result of ad
@; what is not outside the scope of this paper is a recognition that in the discussion of dignity and how it relates to the basic structure discussions must be domain*speci!c, and assumptions concerning how to produce dignity ought to come after a4 the conte&t of being has been established, b4 the assumptions concerning the what or the de re of dignity have been brought to the fore, and c4 the value of the various mechanisms of producing dignity been determined given the conte&t of being and the de re of dignity.  The !nal point point that ' would would like like to make make before before returning returning to the discussion on how dignity relates to the basic structure is that dignity is commonly understood to be the foundation for the liberal rights regime FF but dignity is not equivalent to having rights or presiding under a sovereign regime in which rights are bestowed. ' make this claim for a number of reasons. #irst, it is possible for a member of the population to have rights and still be denied the basis of dignity, as would be the case for a disadvantaged member of the population under a right libertarian government in which a conception of liberty as strictly negative liberty predominates. 'n this case, denied access to healthcare, denied access to education, denied access basic necessities, etc., this disadvantaged member of the population would be left destitute and without a means of recourse. ll other considerations of dignity aside 7i.e. whether dignity entails respect for one/s autonomy, whether dignity entails the right to upward mobility,

FF

 $ee aldron, Jeremy J., 3's Dignity the #oundation of "uman Rights0: for an analysis of the concept of foundation as it relates to human rights. Not sufcient.

@A etc.4, there is nothing digni!ed about destitution, and hardly can one be described as having the sub
. Dignity and the asic $tructure ith the preceding in mind let us return to the idea of dignity as it relates to the basic structure and attempt to re*confront the question of what dignity actually is. ccording to John Rawls/ Rawls/ political paradigm, determining

@@ what equality is and how to implement it in society is a matter of beginning from an original position of equality and then creating a basic structure that reGects this original position of equality. equality. %iven that humankind is rational, and thus capable of free, coordinated action, each member of the kind is given a say in the creation creation of the basic structure. %iven that this is in practice impossible 7i.e. that each member actually participates in the construction of the basic structure4, Rawls/ paradigm is meant to be a kind of  thought e&periment, which has at its foundation, political reconciliation as its driving motive. =ersons are are granted dignity within this paradigm because each is welcome to participate in the construction of the basic structure, and when absent, are still considered by it. ut more than considered by it, persons have intrinsic worth as human beings within it. y intrinsic worth, one means that persons are di(erent in kind than other entities found in the natural world, and that this di(erence in kind grants to them a certain kind of  consideration that is not granted to other members of other kindsI in virtue of their rationality, persons are considered secial in ways that other members of other kinds are not, which in part e&plains why they are considered individually in the construction of the basic structure. This di(erence in kind also implies that something is due to them. This 3something: for Rawls is an equal consideration in the original position and an equal consideration of one/s conception of the good once the deliberation from the original position position of equality has ended. #inally, in Rawls, we !nd that human beings have an origin and a goal that are divine, and that unlike

@F other members of other kinds they have the ability to re!ne their capacities, strive towards their own conceptions of the good, and ultimately reGect the image of %od. ecause of the Eantian orientation FC, dignity has a very unique relationship to the basic structure in Rawls/ paradigm. 'nitially, dignity is established ontologically as belonging to all entities of an ontological kind, namely the kind rational animal. That persons are rational is descriptive, and that rationality quali!es one to participate in deliberations on the basic structure is the result of the further descriptive claim that, in virtue of their capacity to be rational, persons are free to do other than what their emotions dictate. 't is because of their rationality that Eant, and subsequently Rawls, quali!es persons as having intrinsic worth , which establishes the foundation of a person/s dignity. dignity. ut again, at this if  then , 2 is , therefore 2 is , where  is intrinsic worth,  is dignity, and 2 is rational rational animal. -et this formalism quali!es persons as sub
FC

 #or a robust formulation of Eant/s usage of the term dignity throughout his writings see =fordten, D. 3On the Dignity of 1an in Eant:. lso see Rachels,  James, 3Eantian 3Eantian Theory Theory>> The 'dea of "uman "uman Dignity Dignity.: =. =. ++@*+B, +;;*;A. +;;*;A.

@C procedural conditions that result from the original position. hat is important to note here is that dignity is a purely formal concept attached to persons that qualify as rational animals and that are given the rights and protections of a basic structure designed by Rawls/ thought e&periment. e&periment. 9o account of the sub
FB

 $ee Dubber, 1. 3Rediscovering "egel/s Theory of 2rime and =unishment.:

@B the concept of dignity as a sub
we make a number of assumptions about the nature of dignity. dignity. The !rst assumption is that the study of dignity is category*speci!c, which means it belongs to some categories and not to others, and it belongs to these categories in virtue of there being some distinguishable ontological properties that qualify an entity as belonging to the category dignity*bearing. %iven that dignity has been described as having the sub valuable non* dignity*bearing entities do not have the same ontological status as dignity* bearing entities -ecause valuable*non*dignity bearing entities have value because they have been given it by dignity*bearing entities either intrinsically or e&trinsically e&trinsicall y.  rock cannot give value to a leaf and a rock rock

@M cannot give value to a person, but a person can give value to a rock because persons are value*bestowing entities. entities . -et because persons are are value* bestowing, the value of valuable*non*dignity*bearing entities is contingent upon a person bestowing value upon it, which means that value is contingent and derivative. hile a certain radical strain of thought may make the charge that dignity*bearing entities can have dignity only because other sub
@N sub
FM

 "egel, !henomenology of 0irit , 2h. M, =art .

F? being recogni)ed recogni)ed as a self*certain consciousness. hen the struggle for recognition ensues, a process of supersession and subordination ensues as well, which results in a being*for*itself and a being*for*the*other because each self*certain consciousness must supersede the Other in order to gain for itself the self*certainty self*certainty of itself as an essential being. hen this supersession takes place the self*certain consciousness that superseded the Other becomes equal to itself and the Other self*consciousness becomes a being for the Other that has superseded it. These are distinct moments in the unfolding of consciousness, each of which can be studied in isolation. "egel goes on further to analy)e how this process of supersession leads to a situation in which the being*for*itself has gained its independence as sub
F+ transformations, any statement concerning dignity must be a statement that attends not merely to the occurrent state of a(airs L complete with their plateaus and sub
FN

 Judith utler makes a similar point in !recarious /ife: The !owers of Mourning and &iolence  where she states> 3To ask for recognition, or to o(er it, is precisely not to ask for recognition for what one already is. is. 't is to solicit a becoming, to instigate a transformation, to petition the future always in relation to the Other. 7@@4

F; confront another consciousness self*certain of itself, and this struggle for recognition that ends in a being*for*itself and a being*for*the*Other cannot ensue, the spiritual will of the independent being equal to itself cannot become law, which means the spiritual will of the independent consciousness e&ists but only negatively negativ ely..  -et  -et problematical problematically ly at this
arise once the de re of dignity is articulated0 'f the e&perience e&perience of dignity L or the collapse thereof L is entirely sub
FA to be answered elsewhere. The point of the preceding preceding is to articulate the conditions in which such questions can have answers that attend to comple&ity of sub
F@ present thought is the possibility of laying the groundwork for a pro
C?

 $ee =akuluk, 1ichael. 3The Dignity of the "uman =erson in the =hilosophy of John Rawls.: C+  $ee Kysaught, Therese. 3Respect> Or, "ow Respect for =ersons ecame Respect for f or utonomy  utonomy.: .: C;  $ee "oward, Rhoda. 3The #ull*elly Thesis> $hould 8conomic Rights Take =riority Over 2ivil and =olitical Rights0 8vidence from $ub*$aharan frica.: CA  Joseph, Kawrence. 3$ome ays of Thinking bout 8quality of Opportunity.: C@  $canlon, Thomas. 3Due =rocess.: CF  $ee -oung Eim, Janine. 3The Rhetoric of $elf*Defense.: CC  $ee Taylor, 2harles. 3The =olitics of Recognition: in Multiculturalism: Exloring the !olitics of "ecognition. CB  $ee %allagher, . 3Dignity and Respect for dignity*two key health professional values> implications for nursing practice.: CM  2hochinov, ".1. et. al., 3Dignity in the Terminally 'll>  Developing 8mpirical 1odel.:

FF determines the modes of application to be assessed. The question at stake in the present thought is what degree of structural intervention each mode requires, such that a quali!cation of the third term is a quali!cation of a practice, not an instance or an agent, and the degree to which this practice has procedural requirements. #or e&le, does the concept of dignity as the maintenance of reciprocal recognition require a basic structure or can we assess it solely in terms terms of psychological practices or aesthetic practices0 'f we can assess these practices solely in virtue of a third term that is non* structural, then dignity itself can be analy)ed non*structurally in terms of its sub if  then , 2 is , therefore 2 is , where  is intrinsic worth,  is dignity, and 2 is rational animal. ccording to this paradigm, dignity is inclusion within a basic structure that provides for basic necessities, basic liberties, etc. for all those that are granted the rights and protections of a basic structure. $taying true to the theme of dignity as multiply*paradigmatic, with some paradigms of dignity being intrinsically structural and others being intrinsically non*structural, we are now confronted with the question of

FC whether dignity can be partially structural, seen as a third term with a Telos of dignity that is conceptuali)ed in terms of the gradations of its structural requirements. #or e&le, is maintaining equality of opportunity a structural requirement or a non*structural requirement0 On the one hand, dignity is assessed here purely in terms of the degree to which capacities in con
  =ew Research 2enter study conducted in ;?+C showed that wage* inequality in the workplace is as real today as it was AF years ago. lacks earn BF of hites in hourly earnings, with hites trailing sians slightly.  The income inequality inequality between hites, hites, lacks and and "ispanics "ispanics has changed changed very little over this AF*year time frame as well. Kikewise, college educated lack men and college educated "ispanics trailed college educated hite

FB structural intervention, perceived threat or other subconscious reservations may well be at work in the decision to hire hire as well. The implication of this is that structural intervention might well be insucient to carry out the Telos of  the third term, and instead psychological or aesthetic intervention might prove more ecacious at balancing opportunity in the workplace by undermining the subconscious boundaries preventing this equality from being reali)ed. B? ut psychological intervention is entirely non*structural, men by making only M? of what hite men earned hourly. hourly. 'n another study done by the rookings 'nstitute in ;?+F, a number of signs of racially*based inequalities in the workplace emerged as well. #irst, upward mobility is more more dicult for lack mericans, with F+ of the lack population in merica born in the lowest !fth of the earnings distribution remaining there at age @?. $econd, most lack middle class kids are downwardly mo-ile, with B out of +? of them born into the middle class falling into the lower class. Third it showed that lack wealth rarely e&ists, in that the median wealth of white households is now +A times greater than black households. 7www.brookings.eduQblogQsocial*mobility*memosQ;?+FQ?+Q+FQ!ve*bleak*facts* on*black*opportunity 4 $tudies such as these and others similar suggest that there pervades in the workforce and beyond what 2harles 1ills calls a 3Racial 2ontract: in his book titled The "acial .ontract . 'n it he makes makes the claim, and subsequently argues for, the idea that inequalities are as deeply embedded in the basic structure as the laws and regulations that hold it togetherI it is a contract between one subset of humans and another, with the meta*agreement that the disadvantaged group is privy to a disproportionate set of privileges and moral considerations, all to advantage of whites as a group. B?  'n the workplace itself there e&ists a comple& network of interrelations that often pervades the entire structure of an organi)ation that is at one turn functional L as in, required for the functional operation of the organi)ation as a unit L and at another social, with clearly identi!able practices, processes, actions, and meanings that result in what Joan cker calls 3'nequality Regimes: in her paper titled, 3'nequality Regimes> %ender, 2lass, and Race in Organi)ations.: $he de!nes 3inequality regimes: as the 3interrelated practices, processes, actions, and meanings that result in and maintain class, gender, and racial inequalities within particular organi)ations.: 7@@A4 These inequalities within organi)ations result in a systemic inequality in categories like participants in power, the distribution of resources, decision of outcomes, opportunities for promotion, bene!ts, pay, respect, and pleasures in one/s work. These regimes also have a schema that attests to the diculty of

FM even if we concede that left unfettered by structural or other normative requirements such interventions will quickly regress to non*dignity*producing forms. $imilar accounts of this binary and antagonism may be given for gender issues and other social issues a(ecting the body politic. hat is at stake here is the interrelation between the forms, whose Telos is the production of dignity, and the sub
disrupting these operations of power, schemas like disproportionately steep hierarchies that are correlated with race and gender, identi!cations of leadership qualities that are disproportionately masculine, patterns of employment segregation 7grooming men or whites for certain
FN structural considerations themselves deeply structural, if not derivatively so0 'n other words, if the normative and procedural structure of rights and responsibilities was absent, would the phenomenon under consideration that we/re calling the categorically sub
C? #ace calls the totali)ing power of the ' into question by disrupting its ability to act on the indigent Other that it confronts as 3in!nitely transcendent.: B+  This results in a non*normative imperative not to kill the Other, and subsequently an imperative to feed and clothe the indigent Other. Other. Re*confronting the question how the disruption of the #ace of the Other relates to a basic structure is a question of how an individual responds to the call of the Other that it confronts as though 3from a dimension of height.: B; This call to action is not normative in a formal Eantian sense in which a respect for persons and desire to act according to one/s duty by only engaging in an action which can be universali)ed to all persons, but instead begins with a desire for the 3absolutely other,: BA and because of the totali)ing 's inability to fully comprehend the interiority of the Other, the ga)e of the Other calls into question its ability to act, which manifests in the imperative not to kill. #or Eant, it is respect for the niversal Kaw and the higher*order, autonomous check on each individual sub
B+ B; BA

Totality and In2nity , $ection A, =art  Totality and In2nity , p. ;+F Totality and In2nity , $ection +, =art .+

C+ #ace in a political framework that must account for features of the basic structure that hold it together, such as punishment, civil rights, legal proceedings, property rights, etc. 2an an account of a sub 3 T  Two wo things things !ll the mind with with ever new and increasing increasing admiration admiration and and awe, the more often and steadily we reGect upon them> the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me.: The import of the disruption of the #ace of the Other, however, can act as a motivation for the rights regime that follows, such that Kevinas/ account of the #ace can act as a sort of e&istential political reconciliation for a pre*e&isting regime, or perhaps a call to reform it if the ethical relation to the indigent Other or the conditions of the possibility of ethics changes with varying socio*historical conditions.

C;  The question question of how the #ace #ace of the Other Other is related related to the basic basic structure is not altogether clear at !rst glance. The primordial e&perience e&perience of the disruption of the ' when confronted with the ga)e of the indigent Other is categorically non*structuralI as it is a sub
B@

 $ee utler, Judith, !recarious /ife: The !owers of Mourning and &iolence  for an analysis of vulnerability and it capacity to have motive force on interpersonal relations and the basic structure more generally.

CA the #ace of the indigent Other to be a motivation or a form of e&istential political reconciliation for a pre*e&isting structure of rights, an interpretation of dignity as inclusion within a basic structure would pre*dominate. 'nsofar as the concept of dignity was a consideration here, dignity would be doubly* transitively important> the #ace of the Other would motivate inclusion within a basic structure and a basic structure would produce produce dignity. dignity. The conclusion of this line of thought is that the #ace of the Other acts in isolation from the basic structure but can also act act as a further foundation for it. nd when the basic structure of rights and responsibilities is lacking in its capacity to ensure dignity L or at least the possibility of dignity L even after a sub
.onclusion

 The preceding preceding has has been an analysis analysis of the concept concept of dignity dignity from from a variety of paradigms. 8ach paradigm operates by appealing to a third term whose Telos is the production of dignity for the portion of the population about which the third term is concerned. '/ve shown that these paradigms can be studied paradigmatically and inter*paradigmatically, and that an appeal to a paradigm is an appeal to a process, a mechanism, or a structure that is itself to varying degrees structural. ' have also analy)ed the concept

C@ of dignity from a variety of di(erent thinkers concerned with the concept and from some who never speci!cally used the term but whose corpus contributes to an elaboration of the discussion modern thinkers are currently having. ' have also attempted re*orient re*orient the discussion concerning dignity to a discussion that takes into consideration the "egelian worldview, complete with its inter*sub
CF following principles ' propose ought to be applied to every conversation about dignity di gnity>> +4 %iven mankind/s mankind/s proclivity proclivity to descend descend to otherwise otherwise vicious vicious action when when accountability is lacking L typically resulting in a collapse of the conditions of the possibility of dignity L all discussions of dignity should begin by assuming that a basic structure is required for dignity, and that any  departure  departure from this orienting theme should be viewed as a departure from the conditions of the possibility of dignity such that only  in  in e&treme circumstances in which this departure is seen as the

lesser of two evils should it proposed as a positive value. ;4  The value of of political reconcilia reconciliation tion as a political political virtue virtue ought to be be assessed contemporaneously with conceptions of dignity if not prior. A4 Dignity*based criminal proceedings are confusing and add layers of comple&ity to the conditions of satisfaction of
CC after the value of the various mechanisms that produce dignity have been determined by the conte&t of being and the de re of dignity. F4 Dignity is not equivalent to having rights. 't is entirely possible that one can have rights under a regime that guarantees them and still be denied the basis of dignity. dignity. 't is important to keep this in mind when discussing how dignity relates to the basic structure. 'n closing, let us keep in mind that the concept of dignity has been analy)ed and de!ned in nearly as many di(erent ways as the di(erent thinkers that have have approached it as a topic worthy of discussion. ecause of this, the concept has lost its force as an idea and has taken on the character of a vacuous formalism often misconstrued with respecting persons or recogni)ing those di(erent di(erent from oneself. oneself. hat is at stake stake in the idea itself, and why the discussion is meaningful meaningful still, is simply that it contributes to how we as a culture assess mechanisms as third terms whose Telos Telos is the sub
CB dignity or whether an individual has e&perienced the sub
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