Filippo Costa Buranelli
Foreign Policy Analysis IR 411
MSc International Relations Theory
Essay 1
Is neoclassical realism more suitable for foreign policy analysis than other realist approaches? (Summer 2010 Examination, Question 1)
Within foreign policy analysis , as well as within international relations theory, the realist tradition seems to be the most entrenched and developed, either due to its historical pre-eminence, or to its intellectual appeal, or to both factors. Inside this tradition, three major strands 1 are identifiable: classical realism, neorealism and neoclassical realism, each of them with its own features, characteristics and assumptions. However, since “theory is always for somebody and for some purpose” (Cox 1986), it may be argued that not all the three strands aforementioned are necessarily and completely suitable for a better understanding of foreign policy analysis; in this essay, indeed, I make a case for the better viability and explanatory power of neoclassical realism in assessing the behaviour of states within the international system, compared to the other two realist schools. The argument is structured as follows: firstly, I briefly present and sketch the three realist strands, elucidating their most important features and assumptions especially as far as foreign policy analisys discourse is concerned; secondly, I assess the contribution of neoclassical realism more specifically, evaluating its positive analytical tools and its innovative set of variables' combination in explaining foreign policy; finally, I summarize what said in the two previous section and try indicate potential developments of neoclassical realism theory. Realism and realisms The first strand under examination is classical realism. It is worth reminding that in this paragraph just a brief description is offered, since details and more analytical concerns will be addressed in the next paragraph whenever required.
1 In this sentence I prefer to use the word “strand” instead of “theory” since, according to many, classical realism is more a philosophical tradition rather than a theory properly said. When neorealism and neoclassical realism are be dealt singularly, the word “theory” will be used.
Classical realism, as many argue, may not be conceived as a theory, i.e. as a set of hypotheses, assumptions and intellectual procedures aimed to finding causal correlations among different variables. It is, rather, a philosophical tradition which dates back to Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes and other paramount figures in history who, in one way or another, defined the three major assumptions of this tradition: human nature is tendentiously bad, imperfect and sinful, the group has primacy over the individual, politics is a matter of power in an uncertain and hostile world and international politics is the consequential struggle among self-interested groups to gain power in order to satisfy the interests of the group itself. Being a philosophical and intellectual position rather than a “coherent research programme” (Lobell et al. 2009), classical realism's approach to foreign policy analysis is vague and loose: it emphasizes the role of national power, the character of states and their relationship with the domestic environment, overlooking any systemic factors or sources of explanations; reductionist explanations, i.e. explanations that are in the characteristics of the units of analysis, are often used, and normative and moral precepts on statesmanship and leadership are not rare (Morgenthau 1948). The second strand of realism is “neorealism” or “structural realism”, a theory developed in the Cold War context by Kenneth Waltz 2. This theory reflected the general ideas in academia during those years which were stemming from the behaviouralist revolution: assuming anarchy as the permissive cause of uncertainty and conflict, it shows, in fact, a strong economic logic, as it relies heavily on the theory of the firm and the market; a predilection for concision and abstraction rather than for a discursive and empirical analysis; an emphasis on a rationalist ontology, thinking of the world as split in structure, powerful and coercive, and agents (Waltz 1979). Due to the mentioned economic logic, states are seen as functionally undifferentiated actors, different just in relation to their material capabilities. Therefore, their internal features are bracketed, thus becoming black boxes. In a world influenced by such systemic pressures, foreign policy analysis becomes the art of best adapting to systemic imperatives and hints, through a process of perceptions' assessments and cost-benefit calculations (Waltz 1979: 118): the result of this simple interaction among the independent variable (system's structure) and the dependent one (states' behaviour) can be either an autonomy-seeking attitude (defensive realism) or an influencing-seeking one (offensive realism) (Baumann et al. 2001) in a quasi-perennial balance-of-power realm. 2 It is my intention to keep the discussion on a general level: therefore, here I will not distinguish in detail between defensive and offensive realism.
Finally, neoclassical realism is a relatively recent theory which comes from the works of Wohlforth (1993), Rose (1998), Zakaria (1998), Schweller (2006) and other major international scholars. As the name suggests, it combines the main features of the two previous strands, i.e. the value of the domestic realm and of the unit-level of classical realism and the urging constraints and pressures of the systemic architecture with a focus on the material power of states which are the cornerstone of the whole neorealist theory. Importantly, they assume the whole model of neorealism to be true, but just at the condition of applying a set of intervening variables between the independent (systemic constraints) and the dependent (state action). This synthesis is well described by Wohlforth, in that “[neoclassical realists] seek to recapture the grounding in the gritty details of foreign policy that marked classical realism, while also benefiting from the rigorous theorizing that typified neorealism” (Wohlforth 2008: 35). In the following section, then, neoclassical realism will be examined in detail, and its inherent theoretical specificities in better explaining foreign policy will be carried out. Neoclassical realism and foreign policy To understand why neoclassical realism is a better theory of foreign policy in comparison with neorealism and classical realism, it is essential to grasp what “foreign policy” is. Foreign policy here means the array of the actions taken and strategies pursued by a given state towards other external states or actors in the system which, tightly or loosely, are related to it; consequently, foreign policy analysis means the inquiry on the motives which lead a state to take a certain action, the decisionmaking process of how to define that action, the methods adopted by a state to carry out that action and the effects which that action has or had. These definitions provide an useful framework in which the contribution of neoclassical realism may be assessed. First of all, including in the model the domestic realm as an intervening variable, neoclassical realism provides a more comprehensive framework of foreign policy analysis avoiding at the same time the ultimate sin of reductionism. As a matter of fact, theories and approaches like classical realism and Innenpolitik cannot account for different behaviour of alike units and, reversely, cannot explain why different actors behave similarly, since they focus only on the domestic realm and, specifically in the case of classical realism, on the sole notion of power: for neoclassical realism this means that, in the long run, systemic constraints will inevitably shape actors' behaviour, since “the most powerful generalizable characteristic of a state in international relations is its relative position
in the international system” (Zakaria 1998: 482). However, neorealism realism may suffer from the same criticism: it cannot explain, in fact, why states in the same structural position act differently 3. This variation in behaviour, neoclassical realists argue, can be understood only if the intervening role of domestic factors is in play: otherwise, how it comes that certain states, for example, are status-quo seekers and others are revisionists? How can we explain why states seldom act rationally? How is it possible to account for the role of perceptions? Why states do not always act according to their systemic commitments and capabilities (Krasner 1993a: 21)? In the light of this argument, neoclassical realism might bee seen as a viable and more useful via media among pure structural approaches and constructivism (Rose 1998). This may be seen as the first contribution of neoclassical realism to a better understanding of foreign policy: since by definition foreign policy operates both at the domestic level (input) and at the external one (output) (Putnam 1988), the introduction of the domestic intervening variable in the wider structural argument makes neoclassical realism more complete, more accurate at, at the same time, more comprehensive. A second motivation for neoclassical realism's suitability for foreign policy analysis may be the fact that it better helps to understand the concept of “power”, so widely (ab)used by the former realist approaches. In fact, if, following the definition provided above, foreign policy analysis concerns both the domestic level and the external one, it consequently follows that “power” cannot be just an underspecified term apt to embrace the whole dimension of politics, as classical realism suggests, nor just the synonym of “material capabilities”, as argued by neorealists, since material capabilities are nothing if not mobilized and translated into the state apparatus 4: power, then, must be something more multifaceted, multidimensional, which can be viable and made viable on more than one single level of analysis. Thus, the distinction between national power and state power (Zakaria 1998) proves to be useful and extremely ductile for a better foreign policy analysis: meaning the former the neorealist material capabilities (i.e., roughly, the position of the state in the system) and meaning the latter the ability of a state to exploit and “concretise” its natural, military, economic and even societal resources through a process of internal extraction and internal mobilization (Mastanduno, Lake and
3 It must be said, in fairness, that Waltz himself considered neorealism as a theory of international politics rather than of foreign policy. 4 This lack of focus on the operationalization of power may be explained by neorealism's failure to provide a distinction between “state” and “nation-state” (Mastanduno, Lake, Ikenberry 1989).
Ikenberry 1989)5, the neoclassical model depicts a more complete portrayal of the state in the international realm, being it not a functionally indistinct black box any more but being a more complex, multi-layered entity better resembling what is witnessed in the real world. This, in sum, may be considered the second motive why a neoclassical realist approach can be seen as better than a classical or a neorealist one: splitting in a sophisticated way the concept of power
“by taking into account both the domestic and international constraints on the state,
and by articulating both the domestic and international choices available to the state, we are able to provide a more comprehensive, integrated approach to the analysis of state behaviour” (Mastanduno, Lake and Ikenberry 1989: 471). A third feature of neoclassical realism which renders it more suitable compared to structural realism is that states “are given a face”, i.e. the role of statesmanship, executives and decisionmaking elites is reaffirmed. Within neorealism, states are considered as unitary actors, billiard balls of different size (due to their different capabilities), impersonal units of a model. In neoclassical realism, on the contrary, the role of statesmen is important, necessary and functional to the model itself, since the intervening variable of domestic sets can “intervene” just if state executives and those concerned with foreign policy affairs, who are “flesh and blood officials” (Rose 1998), are able to implement strategic calculations, to spark mobilization, to rightly assess power perceptions and to build up social support6. In this way, neoclassical realism can solve the conundrum faced by both classical realism and neorealism: it can, that is, account for changes in a state's foreign policy “over time or across different states facing similar external constraints” (Labell et al. 2009). Finally, it may be argued that another main contribution of neoclassical realism in enhancing foreign policy analysis is what I call “the rehabilitation of the middle dimension”, i.e. a renovated concern with middle powers and the middle term, discarded by both classical and neorealism. As far as middle powers are concerned, the argument is the following: since great powers enjoy a great portion of the material power within the system, i.e. a greater freedom in the system, they tend to be more concerned with their domestic constraints; conversely, small powers are more oriented towards their domestic dimension as well, since they cannot afford to pose a threat to great and middle powers. Thus, middle powers are the only concerned both with domestic and international constraints, and with how to balance them, since “contrary to the small powers, they are sufficiently powerful to influence events in the international system” (Alons 2007). If this is the case, it is 5 Some authors have used the concept of “national political power” as well (Christensen 1996) 6 Although neoclassical realists adopt the conception of state of the German tradition (Hintze , von Ranke, Weber), i.e. the separation of the state itself from society, they “view policy responses as a product of state-society coordination and, at time, struggle” (Lobell et al. 2009: 27).
straightforward that a neoclassical theory of foreign policy better accounts for an explanation of middle powers' foreign policy. Concerning the chronological dimension, neoclassical realism performs better than its counterparts since, being focused on specific realities and actors in a given time, can provide a defined analysis of the short and the medium term, where a state's behaviour may differ from that shaped, in the long run, by the neorealist international structure. This, no need to say, fits perfectly with the widely acknowledged token that the most foreign policy analysis may aspire to is a kind of middle-range theorizing. Conclusion In this essay it has been attempted to prove, to a certain extent, the better viability of neoclassical realism in explaining foreign policy, since it embeds both the systemic and the domestic level of analysis. Waltz himself claimed that the international system, without the auxiliary support of the domestic one , was obscure and cryptic to understand (Waltz 1959). To quote Wivel, neoclassical realism well accounts for “explaining why state X made a certain move last Tuesday” (Wivel 2005: 355). However, neoclassical realism still faces the challenge of further theoretical sophistication and of better defining and operationalizing its intervening variables, perhaps including references to decision-making processes. It runs the risk, also, not to be fully applicable, since “the application of the approach to any given country requires a great deal of knowledge about the nation in question"(Christensen 1996: 248). To conclude, it is straightforward that neoclassical realism is more powerful in explaining specific situations rather than making long-term predictions: it will be analyst's choice, then, whether to be hedgehog or fox (Berlin 1992). References
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