Lucien J. Frary, Russia and the Making of Modern Greek Identity, 1821-1844, Oxford University Press (2015)

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O X FO R D ST U D IES I N MODERN EUROPEAN HISTORY General Editors si m on di xo n m ark m azo wer j ames r etallack

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Russia and the Making of Modern Greek Identity, 1821–1844 LUCIEN J. FRARY

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Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP, United Kingdom Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries © Lucien J. Frary 2015 The moral rights of the author have been asserted First Edition published in 2015 Impression: 1 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, by licence or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above You must not circulate this work in any other form and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press 198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data available Library of Congress Control Number: 2014954692 ISBN 978–0–19–873377–5 Printed and bound by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CR0 4YY Links to third party websites are provided by Oxford in good faith and for information only. Oxford disclaims any responsibility for the materials contained in any third party website referenced in this work.

Acknowledgments At first, I conceived of this work as a critique of Paul Schroeder’s magisterial study of the transformation of modern European politics based on the cosmopolitan approach of Franco Venturi’s monumental analysis of the Italian Enlightenment. It began with a vision that I realize, in hindsight, was overly ambitious for a first monograph. Fortunately, the tradition of Mediterranean, Slavic, and Eastern Orthodox studies at the University of Minnesota inspired me to focus on one aspect of the revolutions and reforms taking place within the European periphery during the Congress of Vienna era. I was especially fortunate to move in this direction, since the posthumously published book by the late Richard Stites, The Four Horsemen: Riding to Liberty in Post-Napoleonic Europe, provides a splendidly original impression of the crises and insurrections emerging on the European fringes during this period. Many individuals working in Russian and Greek archives and libraries rendered me timely and professional assistance. Much of the Greek research was conducted at the Gennadius Library in Athens and facilitated by its helpful staff, particularly Andreas Sideris, Soula Panagopoulou, Dimitris Velentzas, and Mary Stavropoulou. In Athens, Evanthis Hatzivassiliou paid special attention to my project at a preliminary stage, and in Thessaloniki, the staff at the Institute of Balkan Studies provided valuable assistance. I have spent nearly two academic years and many summers working in the reading rooms of RGADA, AVPRI, GARF, RGIA, IRLI, the Russian Public Library, the Russian State Library, and elsewhere in Moscow and St Petersburg. At AVPRI, Natalia V. Borodina and Alla V. Abramenkova deserve special thanks for helping me make the most of my visits. To the wonderfully friendly staff at the State Public Historical Library in Moscow, I give a resounding thank you. Rider University’s Interlibrary Loan filled many lacunae, and access privileges to the amazing riches of the Firestone Library at Princeton University have been very important. Since the 1990s, the ready response and assistance of Dr Timothy O’Connor have made numerous research stints in Russia possible, and I am grateful for his continued friendship. In Moscow, for more than fifteen years, Liudmilla N. Dorofeevoi has opened her home and dacha to me, and I would like to thank her and her family for countless hours of laughter, learning, and conversation. Correspondence with Lora Gerd of St Petersburg State University and Olga E. Petrunina of Moscow State University has been inspiring. As a graduate student at the University of Minnesota, I benefitted greatly from many devoted scholars who helped me focus my intellectual curiosity. It is my pleasure to thank Professor Eric D. Weitz, now Dean of Humanities and Arts and Distinguished Professor of History at the City College of New York, for his kindness in advising me about many topics over the years. I am indebted to Professors J. Kim Munholland and Gary Jahn for overseeing my intellectual

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Acknowledgments

development at an early stage. Professor David O. Kieft deserves special acknowledgment for his genuine interest, encouragement, and generosity. Theophilus Prousis, Distinguished Professor of History at Northern Florida, has been one of my most valuable critics and advisors. In addition, I am truly grateful for the continued guidance and support of my friends and colleagues David Goldfrank, Mara Kozelsky, Joe Gowaskie, and Tom Callahan. Ani Chikovani and Medea Metreveli, both outstanding scholars of Modern Greek Studies at Tbilisi State University, have my warmest thanks for their many kindnesses over the years. I wish to express my grateful thanks to the Delegates of Oxford University Press for undertaking the publication of this book, and to all the members of the press who have been concerned in any way with its appearance in print. Funding has come from three sources: Summer Research Fellowships and a Research Leave from Rider University have been fundamental. The University of Minnesota’s Doctoral Dissertation Fellowship enabled me to spend nearly two years in Greece and Russia doing preliminary research, and the Basil Laourdas Fellowship allowed me to conceptualize the project at an early stage as well as compose it. Theofanis G. Stavrou, the world’s leading promoter of Greek-Slavic studies, professor of Russian and Near Eastern history and director of Modern Greek Studies at the University of Minnesota, is most responsible for what is worthwhile within this study. Since I first met him he has been an amazing source of inspiration, and I am deeply grateful for his wisdom, guidance, and encouragement. Lastly, my family has provided me with an inexhaustible reserve of support. I dedicate this book to my loving wife, Elena, and to our young son Nikola Hristov. Lucien J. Frary Lawrenceville, NJ January 2015

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Contents List of Maps and Figures List of Abbreviations Note on Transliteration, Names, and Dates

Introduction

ix xi xiii

1

1. Russia and the Movement for Greek Independence

18

2. From Anarchy to Absolutism

54

3. Autocephaly and Facets of Orthodoxy

93

4. The Russian Ecclesiastical Mission and the Defense of Orthodoxy

123

5. Secret Societies, Armed Rebellions, and Oracular Prophecies

167

6. Absolutism under Siege

204

Conclusion Bibliography Index

241 251 285

List of Maps and Figures MAPS 1. Greece and Surrounding Regions, 1820–56. 2. Expansion of the Greek Kingdom.

xiv xv

FIGURES 1.1. Surprise attack on the Turkish Camp at Zeituni in September 1824. Color engraving by J. Hussbiegel after Christian Gottfried Heinrich Geissler (1825). Courtesy of the Anne S. K. Brown Military Collection, Brown University. 1.2. President of Greece Ioannis Kapodistrias, from Sergei Glinka, Kartina istoricheskaia i politicheskaia Novoi Gretsii (Moscow: Tip. Avgusta Semena, 1829). 2.1. Theodoros Kolokotronis, from Sergei Glinka, Kartina istoricheskaia i politicheskaia Novoi Gretsii (Moscow: Tip. Avgusta Semena, 1829). 2.2. Arrival of His Majesty King Othon in Nafplion, February 6, 1833. Lithographic plate by I. B. Dreseli and Gustav Wilhelm Kraus (1833). Courtesy of the Anne S. K. Brown Military Collection, Brown University. 2.3. King Othon of Greece in national costume. Gustav Wilhelm Kraus (1840). Courtesy of the Anne S. K. Brown Military Collection, Brown University. 3.1. Adamantios Korais, Aristotelous Politikon ta sozomena (Paris: I. M. Everartos/Firmin Didot, 1821). 4.1. Konstantinos Oikonomos, from G. S. Destunis, “O zhizni i trudakh K. Ekonomosa,” Strannik 3 (1860), facing p. 1. 4.2. Othon, King of Greece, bids farewell. December 1832. Lithograph by G. Podt after Philipp von Foltz. Courtesy of the Anne S. K. Brown Military Collection, Brown University. 5.1. King Othon in national dress. Courtesy of the Bayerische Verwaltung der Staatlichen Schlösser, Gärten und Seen. 5.2. Greek Captain leads his palikaria, c.1835. Lithograph by P. Hess after Krazeisen, printed by Selb. Courtesy of the Bayerische Verwaltung der staatlichen Schlösser, Gärten und Seen. 6.1. Ambassador Gavriil Katakazy, from A. V. Nekliudov, Starye portrety. Semeinaia letopis, 2 vols (Nice: n.p., 1932–3). 7.1. Imperial Bears Grease (Greece) or a peep into futurity. London: T. McClean, 1828. William Heath (artist). Courtesy of the Anne S. K. Brown Military Collection, Brown University.

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41 58

63 70 99 140

156 174

193 206

243

List of Abbreviations ARCHIVES AVPRI GARF OR IRLI OR RGB OR RNB RGADA RGIA RGVIA

Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi Imperii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii Otdel rukopisei. Institut Rossiiskoi Literaturoi Otdel rukopisei. Rossiiskaia Gosudarstvennaia Biblioteka Otdel rukopisei. Rossiiskaia Natsional’naia Biblioteka Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Drevnikh Aktov Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Istoricheskii Arkhiv Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Voenno-Istoricheskii Arkhiv

JOURNALS, N EWSPAPERS, REFERENCE WORKS BdCh BS BI DIEEE EEQ Ephimeris JdSPB KG KhCh KhG MMEEM NNI OV OZ MEE MGSY MT MV Moskv RdDM RBS SEER SPch SPV SO ThIE VPR

Biblioteka dlia chteniia Balkan Studies Balkanskie issledovaniia Deltion tis Istorikis kai Ethnologikis Etaireias tis Ellados East European Quarterly Ephimeris tis Kyverniseos, Vasileion tis Ellados Journal de St-Pétersbourg Kommercheskaia gazeta Khristianskoe chtenie Khudozhestvennaia gazeta Minnesota Mediterranean and East European Monographs Novaia i noveishaia istoriia Odesskii vestnik Otechestvennye zapiski Megali Elliniki Enkyklopaideia Modern Greek Studies Yearbook Moskovskii telegraf Moskovskie vedomosti Moskvitianin Revue des Deux Mondes Russkii biograficheskii slovar Slavonic and East European Review Severnaia pchela Sankt-Peterburgskie vedomosti Syn otechestva Thriskeftiki kai Ithiki Enkyklopaideia Ministerstva inostrannykh del SSSR, Vneshniaia politika Rossii XIX i nachala XX v.: Dokumenty Rossiiskogo ministerstva inostrannykh del (Moscow: Nauka, 1960–94)

xii VZh ZhMNP

List of Abbreviations Voennyi zhurnal Zhurnal Ministerstva narodnago prosveshcheniia

A R C H I V A L N O T AT I O N f. op. d. l., ll. ob. k.

fond (collection) opis (inventory) delo (file) list listy (folio, folios) oborot (verso of list) karton (box)

Note on Transliteration, Names, and Dates I have used mostly Greek forms for place names in what would become the modern Greek state, and I have rendered the names of Greeks who served for the Russian Empire according to the Greek spelling. I adopt a modified, user-friendly Library of Congress transliteration from Russian with a few exceptions for proper names: Ribop’er for Ribeaupierre but Nesselrode for Nessel’rod. I have followed customary English usage when speaking of Russian tsars, such as Alexander I and Nicholas I. There is no single internationally recognized system for transliterating Modern Greek, and I suspect my renderings may not satisfy everyone. With some exceptions, I adopt a procedure that reproduces the letters, rather than the pronunciation, which is more useful when looking up a Greek author’s name in a library catalogue. I have rendered the Greek letter
with a “v” rather than a “b,” I indicate the letter Å with an “i,” and I have dispensed with diacritical marks even though some names with the diphthong “ÆØ” might look awkward at first glance without the diacritical marks. I have indicated the letter å with a “ch” even though an “h” may at times seem more appropriate. The Greek and Russian Old Style (OS) Orthodox calendar followed twelve days behind the Gregorian or New Style (NS) calendar in the nineteenth century. I have used the OS throughout unless otherwise noted. All translations in the text are mine.

Dnie s

SEA OF AZOV

Sulina Tulcea

Bosnia

AD

R

IA

A

O

T

T

O

M

A

NIA

AEGEAN SEA

Trabzon

E

A

N M

P

I

R

Tig

E Euphra te

Besika Bay Smyrna SYRIA Cyprus

Crete

Malta

Tripoli

I

T

E

R

R

EMPIRE

Sivas

Navarino

D

Erzurum

I A O L A T

Nafpactus Euboea Messolonghi Athens GREECE Nafplion Morea

E

A

Beyazid

PERSIAN

Bayburt

Chios

Ioannina

M

Erivan Kars NIA A ME

AR

Dardanelles

Ohrid Avlonya

N

S E A Sinop

Constantinople

Thessaloniki

Ardahan

B L A C K

Aydos

Gallipoli

Ìskodra

ALBA

SE

Sevastopol

Köstence Bucharest Silistre WALLACHIA Belgrade Oltenitsa Craiova Rusçuk Varna S¸umnu SERBIA Sistova Kalafat Vidin Sofia Bosporus Sizeboli Edirne/Adrianople

C

ÇERKES

N

E

A

Jaffa N

S

E

ris R

TI

C A U C A KABARDA DAGISTAN SUS M O U N TA INS Sokhum Poti MINGRELIA Akhaltzikhe GEORGIA Batum

Perek op Anapa Eupatoria Kerch CRIMEA

Odessa

R

IA AB AR R SS uth r BE P AVIA LD MO

Ochakov

KUBAN

xe s

rR

Jassy

EMPIRE

C A S P I A N S E A

ste

AU S T R I A N

R

E M P I R E

ra

Dnie

Do n

ter R

R U S S I A N

A

EGYPT

Map 1. Greece and Surrounding Regions, 1820–56.

Beirut

Jerusalem Bethlehem

sR

BLACK SEA

BULGARIA

SERBIA

rus

spo

AL

Adrianople

Bo

Constantinople

BANIA

T

(1923)

E

D

O

Limnos

E

A

Y

E G

THESSALY (1881)

EPIRUS

Kerkyra

Sea of Marmara

K

C

U

R

M

A

3) 91 (1 A Thessaloniki I N

Lesbos

E A

ARTA

Smyrna

N

IO

Euboea

Chios S

NI

E

Samos

A

AN

Athens

IS

Nafplion

LA N

I O

(1832)

D

I

DO

S

4

EK

6

8

)

N

A

S E A

D

(1

N

o

N A

E

CRETE (1913)

Original Greek Kingdom Ionian Islands ceded by Great Britain, 1864 Thessaly and Arta, added 1881 Macedonia, Crete and Islands added after the Balkan Wars 1913

SE

Rhodes (1

94

K a s t e ll o riz

7)

Ceded to Greece by Treaty of Sèvres (not ratified) 1920 Ceded to Greece by Treaty of Sèvres (not ratified) 1920 and awarded to Greece by Treaty of Lausanne, 1923 Dodekanese ceded by Italy, 1947 MILES 0 100 200

Map 2. Expansion of the Greek Kingdom.

Introduction This book explores Russia’s contribution to the making of modern Greece during the second quarter of the nineteenth century. Drawing upon a wide range of primary sources, most notably the archives of Russian embassies and consulates, it focuses on the potent intersection of religion and politics in the shaping of Greek identity. Starting in early 1821, as the chief Greek-inhabitants of the Peloponnese, the central mainland, and the Aegean archipelago reacted to the coercion and depredations of Ottoman officials, violence sprang up and escalated into all-out war for liberty. A decade of extremely brutal and bloody fighting followed, until the Greek state at last emerged independent in about 1830, an event marking a turning point in Balkan history as well as in the history of nationalism in general. A remarkable transformation ensued over the next fifteen years as the principal framework of the Greek state took shape. Throughout this process, I argue that the collective identity of the Greeks, formerly based on the religious community of the Ottoman Orthodox millet, developed into a new hybrid entity, through two overlapping phases: revolutionary nationalism that began before the founding of the nation-state, and a religious-secular synthesis that emerged after independence. I deal particularly with the role of Eastern Orthodoxy in the crystallization of Greek nationhood and concentrate on Russia’s intense endeavor to foster the moral and political regeneration of the Greek people by instilling Tsar Nicholas I’s unique blend of principles known as Official Nationality (Orthodoxy, autocracy, nationality). Whereas tsarist efforts to inculcate a particularly conservative form of nationalism failed to gain widespread support, St Petersburg’s mission to fortify the religious component of Greek identity yielded tangible results. The book presents the first comprehensive examination of Russian reactions to the establishment of the independent Greek Church (autocephalous in ecclesiastical terms), the earliest of its kind in the Orthodox Balkans, and elucidates the durability of the expectation of tsarist intervention in Balkan political and social thought in the nineteenth century. As a study of Russia and the making of Greek identity, the book sits at the intersection of multiple fields of historical inquiry. Chiefly, it offers fresh insight into the nature of Russian foreign policy in the Ottoman Empire, the Balkans, and the Near East during the second quarter of the nineteenth century.1 1 Nineteenth-cent. Russian and European observers employed the broad and fluid category of the “Near East” (Proche-Orient, Blizhnii Vostok) to describe the western lands of the Ottoman Empire, or the area formed by the converging extremities of Europe, Asia, and Africa. Although devised by the West, many scholars retain its usage as more historically minded and accurate than the term Orient, and applicable to a more general area than specific regional rubrics. Despite the complexity and diversity of the region, it forms a historical unit. For a critique of this and similar malleable categories, see Maria Todorova, Imagining the Balkans (Oxford: OUP, 1997).

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Russia and the Making of Greek Identity

On a secondary level, the work contributes to studies of Russia’s religious and political involvement in movements for independence in the Orthodox Balkans during the pre-Slavic period of Russian foreign policy. Russian participation in the shaping of national institutions in the Greek kingdom, most notably the monarchy and the independent church, during its early and formative period is crucial, for the ascendency of the “sacred communion” of the nation was more remarkable after the struggle for independence than during it.2 More broadly, my study explores Russia’s civilizing mission in the Orthodox world and supports the argument for Greece as the model nation for other states to emulate later in the century.3 By exploring Russian policy in this arena, at this time, my study shows as much about the limits as about the power of pan-Orthodox solidarity. Despite the priceless opportunities available to researchers since the end of the Cold War, imperial Russian foreign policy remains a sadly neglected field. Although synthetic works have appeared in recent decades, the venerable old volumes of Sergei S. Tatishchev, Sergei A. Zhigarev, Theodor Schiemann, and Michael T. Florinsky remain the best general guides for specialists in the reign of Nicholas I (1825–55).4 Building on these studies and several monographs that probe the origins and course of the Russian–Ottoman War (1828–9), Russia’s participation in the two-part Eastern Crisis of 1831–41, the Crimean War (1853–6), and other events typically gathered under the phrase the “Eastern Question,” it is part of my purpose here to address the issue anew, based on hitherto fallow archival materials.5 I approach the topic of Nicholaevan foreign policy by underscoring the religious element of its inspiration, with focus on nation

2 On the concept of the “sacred communion” of the nation, see Anthony D. Smith, “The ‘Sacred’ Dimension of Nationalism,” Millennium—Journal of International Studies, 29 (2000): 791–814; Anthony D. Smith, Chosen Peoples: Sacred Sources of National Identity (Oxford: OUP, 2003). 3 On Greece as the model nation, see Paschalis Kitromilides, “Paradigm Nation: The Study of Nationalism and the ‘Canonization’ of Greece,” in Roderick Beaton and David Ricks (eds), The Making of Modern Greece: Nationalism, Romanticism, and the Uses of the Past (1797–1896) (Farnham and Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2009), 21–32; Elie Kedourie, Nationalism in Asia and Africa (New York: New American Library, 1970), 37–48. 4 S. S. Tatishchev, Vneshniaia politika Imperatora Nikolaia Pervago (St Petersburg: Tip. I. N. Skorokhodova, 1887); S. Zhigarev, Russkaia politika v vostochnom voprose, 2 vols. (Moscow: Universitetskaia Tipografiia, 1896); T. Schiemann, Geschichte Russlands unter Kaiser Nikolaus I, 4 vols. (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1904–19); Michael T. Florinsky, Russia: A History and Interpretation, 2 vols. (New York: Macmillan, 1953). Recent interpretative studies include John LeDonne, The Russian Empire and the World, 1700–1917: The Geopolitics of Containment (Oxford: OUP, 1997); and William C. Fuller, Strategy and Power in Russia, 1600–1914 (New York: Free Press, 1992). See also the relevant chapters in Hugh Ragsdale (ed.), Imperial Russian Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1993). 5 On the Eastern Question, see the various essays in Lucien J. Frary and Mara Kozelsky (eds), Russian–Ottoman Borderlands: The Eastern Question Reconsidered (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014). See also V. N. Vinogradov, Dvuglavyi rossiiskii orel na Balkanakh: 1683–1914 (Moscow: Indrik, 2010); Alexander Bitis, Russia and the Eastern Question: Army, Government, and Society, 1815–33 (Oxford: OUP and British Academy, 2006); David Goldfrank, The Origins of the Crimean War (London: Longman, 1994); Barbara Jelavich, Russia’s Balkan Entanglements, 1806–1914 (Cambridge: CUP, 1991); V. I. Sheremet, Turtsiia Adrianopol’skii mir 1829 g.: Iz istorii vostochnogo voprosa (Moscow: Nauka, 1975); and M. S. Anderson: The Eastern Question 1744–1923: A Study in International Relations (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1966).

Introduction

3

state-building and identity formation in Greece.6 Given that Russian intervention was instrumental in the creation of the Greek nation-state, and that the protecting powers (Great Britain, Russia, and France) for a long time constituted a substantial element in Greek society, the international factor deserves particular emphasis. As this book highlights the challenges facing Russia during the decades preceding the Crimean War, it demonstrates that religion served as a powerful motivating force behind tsarist international relations. It deflates notions that Russia was persistently expansionistic, and challenges the argument, put forward in an important series of books and articles by Paul W. Schroeder, that the European states’ self-restraint during the Congress of Vienna era (1815–48) can be explained by the operation of law, international agreement, and mutual consent.7 Grounded in the reports of Russian ambassadors, consuls, secretaries, interpreters (dragomans), and agents stationed at posts in Greece and its borderlands, the book contributes to the new body of work that extends the meaning of international relations beyond the narrower and older form of diplomatic history into more nuanced and multifaceted kinds of international history. The book approaches foreign policy through reflections on a diverse range of ethnic, cultural, religious, and ideological issues, adding depth to what historians have often portrayed in military and diplomatic terms. The travelers’ tales and personal encounters of Russian officials illuminate social conditions and religious life, and foreign ministry reports enable a better understanding of both the complexities of state-building and the personal qualities of the officials involved. The military and political story of the Greek War of Independence (1821–30) has been told in splendid and enlightening detail.8 European and American scholars,

6 Most works dealing with the intersection of religion and foreign policy focus on the second half of the 19th cent. See e.g. Lora Gerd, Konstantinopol’skii Patriarkhat i Rossiia 1901/1914 (Moscow: Indrik, 2012); Gerd, Konstantinopol’ i Peterburg: tserkovnaia politika Rossii na pravoslavnom Vostoke, 1878–98 (Moscow: Indrik, 2006); L. V. Mel’nikova, Russkaia Pravoslavnaia Tserkov i Krymskaia Voina, 1853–6 gg. (Moscow: Kuchkovo pole, 2012); and N. N. Lisovoi, Russkoe dukhovnoe i politicheskoe prisutstvie v Sviatoi Zemle i na Blizhnem Vostoke v XIX–nachale XX v. (Moscow: Indrik, 2006). 7 Paul Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics, 1763–1848 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994); Schroeder, Austria, Great Britain, and the Crimean War: The Destruction of the European Concert (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1972); Schroeder, “Did the Vienna Settlement Rest on a Balance of Power?,” American Historical Review, 97 (1992): 683–706; Schroeder, “The Nineteenth Century System: Balance of Power or Political Equilibrium?,” Review of International Studies, 15/2 (Apr. 1989): 135–53; Schroeder, “The 19th-Century International System: Changes in the Structure,” World Politics, 39 (1986): 1–26. For the scholarly debate provoked by Schroeder’s views, see Peter Krüger and Paul W. Schröder (eds), “The Transformation of European Politics, 1763–1848”: Episode or Model in Modern History? (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002); Matthew Rendall, “Russia, the Concert of Europe, and Greece, 1821–9: A Test of Hypotheses about the Vienna System,” Security Studies, 9/4 (2000): 52–90; and the special issue of International History Review, 16/4 (1994). 8 Standard accounts include Thomas Gordon, History of the Greek Revolution, 2 vols. (Edinburgh: William Blackwood, 1832); George Finlay, History of the Greek Revolution, 2 vols. (Edinburgh: William Blackwood, 1861); and Douglas Dakin, The Greek Struggle for Independence, 1821–33 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1973). Recently, historians in Greece have taken a fresh look at the social and economic dimensions of the conflict: Petros Pizanias (ed.), The Greek Revolution of 1821: A European Event (Istanbul: Isis Press, 2011); Lysandros Papanikolaou, I kathimerini istoria tou Eikosiena (Athens: Kastaniotis, 2007); and Nikos Rotzokos, Epanastasi kai Emphylios sto Eikosiena (Athens: Plethron, 1997). The bibliography in N. P. Diamandouros et al.,

4

Russia and the Making of Greek Identity

including T. N. Pipinelis, Edouard Driault, and Barbara Jelavich have composed superb studies of the Greek kingdom in the era following independence.9 First published in 1968, the seminal study by John Petropulos remains unsurpassed in its assessment of the post-revolutionary decade, yet the author’s reliance on documents from British and French archives provides for views that are in some ways onesided.10 Russian and Soviet historians, led by Grigorii L. Arsh, have produced numerous first-rate monographs on Russian relations with Greece during the first half of the nineteenth century.11 Based in Russian archives and Greek sources, these works tend to focus on great power diplomacy, and simplify or neglect questions of society, religion, and identity. From the 1990s, monographs and articles by Theophilus C. Prousis and Olga E. Petrunina have explored various aspects of Russian policy in Greece.12 While Prousis focuses on the revolutionary period, Petrunina provides a general political narrative into the twentieth century. Until recently, historians have described the Greek revolt and the general revolutionary setting in the Balkan peninsula during the first half of the nineteenth century in terms of national liberation movements spawned by the ideas of the French Revolution, the expansion of merchant enterprise, and the decline of

Hellenism and the Greek War of Liberation (1821–30) (Thessaloniki: IMXA, 1976), 193–230, remains serviceable. 9 T. N. Pipinelis, I monarchia en Elladi, 1833–43 (Athens: I. Vartsos, 1932); E. Driault and M. Lhéritier, Histoire diplomatique de la Grèce de 1821 à nos jours, 5 vols. (Paris: Les Presses universitaires de France, 1925–6), ii; Barbara Jelavich, Russia and Greece during the Regency of King Othon, 1832–5 (Thessaloniki: IMXA, 1962); Jelavich, Russia and the Greek Revolution of 1843 (Munich: Verlag R. Oldenbourg, 1966). See also, Wolf Seidl, Bayern in Griechenland: Die Geburt des griechischen Nationalstaats und die Regierung König Ottos (Munich: Prestel, 1981). 10 John Petropulos, Politics and Statecraft in the Kingdom of Greece, 1833–43 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968). 11 G. L. Arsh, Rossiia i bor’ba Gretsii za osvobozhdenie: ot Ekateriny II do Nikolaia I. Ocherki (Moscow: Indrik, 2013); Arsh, Albaniia i Epir v kontse XVIII–nachale XIX vv. (Moscow: Nauka, 1963); Arsh, Taino obshchestvo “Filiki Eteriia” (Moscow: Nauka, 1965); Arsh, Eteristskoe dvizhenie v Rossii. Osvoboditel’naia bor’ba grecheskogo naroda v nachale XIX v. i russko-grecheskie sviazi (Moscow: Nauka, 1970); Arsh, Ioann Kapodistriia v Rossii (1809–22) (St Petersburg: Aleteiia, 2003); I. F. Iovva, Iuzhnye dekabristy i grecheskoe natsional’no-osvoboditel’noe dvizhenie (Kishinev: Kartia Moldoveniaske, 1963); Iovva, Bessarabiia i grecheskoe natsional’no-osvoboditel’noe dvizhenie (Kishinev: Shtinitsa, 1974); I. S. Dostian, Rossiia i balkanskii vopros (Moscow: Nauka, 1972); Dostian, Russkaia obshchestvennaia mysl’ i balkanskie narody (Moscow: Nauka, 1980); A. M. Stanislavskaia, Rossiia i Gretsiia v kontse XVIII–nachale XIX v.: Politika Rossii v Ionicheskoi Respublike, 1798–1807 gg. (Moscow: Nauka, 1976); Stanislavskaia, Politicheskaia deiatel’nost F. F. Ushakova v Gretsii, 1798–1800 gg. (Moscow: Nauka, 1983); and O. B. Shparo, Osvobozhdenie Gretsii i Rossiia, 1821–9 (Moscow: Mysl’, 1965). 12 Theophilus C. Prousis, Russian Society and the Greek Revolution (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 1994); Prousis, Russian-Ottoman Relations in the Levant: The Dashkov Archive (Minneapolis: MMEEM, 2002); Prousis, “Aleksandr S. Sturdza: A Russian Conservative Response to the Greek Revolution,” EEQ 26/3 (1992): 309–44; O. E. Petrunina, Grecheskaia natsiia i gosudarstvo v XVIII–XX vv. (Moscow: Universitet Knizhnyi Dom, 2010); Petrunina [O. E. Misiurevich], Stanovlenie natsional’nogo gosudarstva v Gretsii: “russkaia partiia” v 1837–44 gg. (Moscow: MGU, 1997); Petrunina [O. E. Misiurevich], “Vosstan’, o Gretsiia, vosstan’!” Rozhdenie grecheskoi nezavisimosti glazami sovremennikov (Simferopol: Tavriia, 1998). See also, O. V. Sokolovskaia, Grecheskaia koroleva Olga— “Pod molotom sudby” (Moscow: Nestor-Istoriia, 2011); Sokolovskaia, Rossiia na Krite: Iz istorii pervoi mirotvorcheskoi operatsii XX veka (Moscow: Indrik, 2006); and Sokolovskaia (ed.), Greki Balaklavy i Sevastopolia (Moscow: Indrik, 2013).

Introduction

5

Ottoman feudalism.13 Breaking from the nationalist strain of Balkan historiography, a recent surge of literature on the series of uprisings in the Ottoman Balkans during this era suggests that nationalism was not the driving cause.14 Rather, the efforts to strengthen their positions by Sultans Selim III (1789–1807) and Mahmud II (1808–39), which ruthlessly squeezed the population to the breaking point, created serious problems within Ottoman society. Maladministration, rampant monetary inflation, the search for military conscripts, and crushing taxes generated pressures that resulted in a breakdown of social order and the system of justice. Like other populations across Europe, the mostly rural population of the Balkans resented rising taxes and conscription, and the failure of the imperial regime to uphold basic standards of justice led to grass-roots resistance. Thus, the causes and context of the unrest in the Balkans were specifically Ottoman. Drawing on both interpretive perspectives, this book joins the debate over the nature of the nineteenth-century Balkan revolutions by examining the decades surrounding the general uprising in the Peloponnese and other parts of Greece. It argues that the Greeks launched the movement for independence in self-defense against a regime that seemed on the verge of imposing reforms through coercion and violence. Central to the corrosion of the Ottoman framework was the belief among Greek Christians in the imminent military intervention by Orthodox Russia, which was a major, if not the key, consideration leading to the revolution in the Peloponnese, in terms of purely local causes.15 A rumor that the Ottomans intended to imprison or execute Christian leaders in the Peloponnese intensified the feeling of despair and instilled a sense of revolutionary consciousness among the Greek masses. Yet rumors and the breakdown of law and order were not the only factors precipitating violence. In the Greek revolt, political antagonism and a feeling of religious separateness inspired the movement for secession from the Sultan. This blending of religious awareness and revolutionary consciousness

13 The main works to establish this paradigm are those of R. W. Seton-Watson, The Rise of Nationality in the Balkans (London: Constable & Co., 1917), and Leften Stavrianos, The Balkans since 1453 (New York: Holt, Rinehart, Winston, 1958). A landmark in Soviet studies, A. V. Fadeev’s Rossiia i vostochnyi krizis 20-kh godov XIX veka (Moscow: Izd-vo Akademii nauk SSSR, 1958) provides the Marxist interpretation of class struggle against the Ottoman feudal yoke. Synthesizing histories by Vinogradov, Dvuglavyi rossiiskii orel na Balkanakh; Barbara and Charles Jelavich, The Establishment of the Balkan Nation States, 1804–1920 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1977); and Denis Hupchick, The Balkans: From Constantinople to Communism (New York: Palgrave, 2002) favor the “rise of nations” interpretation. 14 See e.g. Frederick F. Anscombe, State, Faith, and Nation in Ottoman and Post-Ottoman Lands (Cambridge: CUP, 2014); Isa Blumi, Reinstating the Ottomans: Alternative Balkan Modernities, 1800–1912 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); Y. H. Erdem, “ ‘Do Not Think of the Greeks as Agricultural Labourers’. Ottoman Responses to the Greek War of Independence,” in Faruk Birtek and Thaleia Dragonas (eds), Citizenship and the Nation-State in Greece and Turkey (London: Routledge, 2005), 78–83; and the various chapters in Antonis Anastasopoulos and Elias Kolovos (eds), Ottoman Rule and the Balkans, 1760–1850: Conflict, Transformation, Adaption (Rethymno: University of Crete, 2007). 15 Numerous stories about Russian intervention circulated the Greek mainland at the time. See e.g. Stroganov to Kapodistrias, Constantinople, May 15, 1820; Dashkov to Stroganov, Patras, May 26, 1820, VPR xi. 388–90, 402–4; Vlassopoulos to Kapodistrias, Ithaka, Apr. 29, 1821, RGADA, f. 15, op. 1, d. 326, ll. 204–8; Vlassopoulos to Stroganov, Patras, Mar. 4, 1821, VPR xii. 47–8.

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Russia and the Making of Greek Identity

coalesced with anger against social inequality and some degree of ethnic difference. In essence, the perception that Orthodox Russia would intervene militarily, combined with the inability of the Ottoman system to provide law and order, sparked the Greek revolt. Russian state and society became entangled in the Greek movement for independence in multiple ways. First, the involvement of Russia in the general intellectual awakening known as the Modern Greek Enlightenment helped generate a sense of revolutionary nationalism among Greek intellectuals.16 Whereas scholars have devoted considerable attention to the eighteenth-century revival of Greek thought, few specialists have explored the Russian context, despite the fact that a number of fundamental figures resided and published their texts in Russia.17 Second, core formulators of Greek independence, including the conspiratorial group known as the Philiki Etaireia (Friendly Society), whose ultimate aim was the liberation of all Orthodox Christians of the Ottoman Empire, gained followers and resources in the Empire of the Tsars. The main significance of this explicitly nationalist society lay in its effective propaganda that ceaselessly proclaimed Russian sanction of its goals, which, in turn, provided the psychological encouragement and feeling of solidarity necessary for the Orthodox Greek-speaking community to overcome its sectional jealousies and “awaken.” In this respect, the dream of Russian deliverance played a crucial role in the movement for succession from the Sultan.18 That part of the revolt began by an armed incursion into the Danubian principalities led by Greek nationalists from Russia was hardly coincidence. Russia’s military and diplomatic role in destabilizing Ottoman authority in the Balkans, which involved threats of war and promises of support, constitutes a third factor catalyzing the revolutionary process. Centuries of oracular prophecies and millenarian beliefs popular among the unlettered Greek masses that predicted a forthcoming deliverance from the “Ottoman yoke” added credence to the prospect of Russian intervention while increasing the ambitions of the Christian social and

16 The Modern Greek Enlightenment is closely linked to the work of K. Th. Dimaras, Neoellinikos diaphotismos, 3rd edn (Athens: Ermis, 1983); and Paschalis Kitromilides, Enlightenment and Revolution: The Making of Modern Greece (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013); Kitromilides, The Enlightenment as Social Criticism. Iosipos Moisiodax and Greek Culture in the Eighteenth Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992). See also G. P. Henderson, The Revival of Greek Thought, 1620–1830 (Albany, NY: State University of New York, 1970); and Raphael Demos, “The Neohellenic Enlightenment, 1750–1821: A General Survey,” Journal of the History of Ideas, 4 (1958): 523–41. For the European setting, see Jonathan Israel, Democratic Enlightenment: Philosophy, Revolution, and Human Rights (1750–90) (Oxford: OUP, 2011), 609–30. 17 On Russia and the Greek intellectual revival, see S. K. Batalden, Catherine II’s Greek Prelate: Eugenios Voulgaris in Russia, 1771–1806 (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1982); Gregory Bruess, Religion, Identity and Empire: A Greek Archbishop in the Russia of Catherine II (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1997); Petrunina, Grecheskaia natsiia, 119–46; G. L. Arsh, “Novogrecheskoe Prosveshchenie i Rossiia (k postanovke problemy),” BI 9 (1984): 304–13; and Athanasios Karathanasis, “Dukhovnaia zhizn’ grekov v Rossii v XIX v.,” BI 11 (1989): 5–13. 18 Spyridon Trikoupis, Istoria tis Ellinikis Epanastaseos (London: Tavilorou kai Phrankiskou, 1853–7), i. 22, states that “Without this prudent ruse [of Russian support] the Philiki Etaireia would remain what it was—zero.”

Introduction

7

intellectual elite.19 Russian ambitions and designs southward during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries combined with conventional beliefs and a new wave of oracular prophecies to invigorate the yearning for independence. Indeed, Russian victories over the Ottomans in battle reinforced the view of tsarist intercession for Greek freedom. The enthusiasm for Russian intervention had concrete results. For example, it encouraged the regional magnate, Ali Pasha of Ioannina, to stage a rebellion in 1820, which triggered action among the local leadership in the Peloponnese.20 Almost immediately, the Greek revolt developed into a national movement for independence, an escalation driven by extreme brutality on both sides.21 Although the heterogeneous leadership exhibited at times a rather flimsy sense of unity, the primary documentation of the era indicates, it seems to me, that revolutionary nationalism constituted an important element of the struggle for independence.22 Overall, without Russian involvement, the Greek struggle for freedom would not have achieved success when it did. Despite the many disappointments of the past, the vision of Russian intervention for political and religious redemption persisted and remained meaningful for many participants in the period of nation-state construction that followed. When Greece eventually won its freedom in about 1830, Russian policy-makers, strongly committed to the legitimist and conservative convictions of Tsar Nicholas I, devoted various forms of material and spiritual support to the traditional Orthodox element of the Greek national symbiosis. Viewing the development of nationalism in post-revolutionary Greece through Russian materials is particularly advantageous due to the ideological and psychological bonds that joined the two countries together. Of the major states involved at the beginning of the nineteenth century, Russia had the closest relations with the Orthodox Christians of the 19 Kitromilides, Enlightenment and Revolution, i. 120–33; N. Rotzokos, Ethnaphypnisi kai ethnogenesi. Orlophika kai elliniki istoriographia (Athens: Vivliorama, 2007), 27–38, 219–86; Lucian N. Leustean, “Orthodoxy and Political Myths in Balkan National Identities,” National Identities, 10/4 (Dec. 2008): 421–32; Marios Hatzopoulos, “From Resurrection to Insurrection: ‘Sacred’ Myths, Motifs, and Symbols in the Greek War of Independence,” in The Making of Modern Greece, 81–93. 20 See Dennis Skiotis, “The Greek Revolution: Ali Pasha’s Last Gamble,” in Hellenism and the First Greek War of Liberation, 97–109; Skiotis, “Mountain Warriors and the Greek Revolution,” in V. J. Perry and M. E. Yapp (eds), War Technology and Society in the Middle East (London: OUP, 1975), 308–29; Skiotis, “From Bandit to Pasha: First Steps in the Rise to Power of Ali Tepelen, 1750–84,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, 2/3 (1971): 219–44; Katherine Fleming, The Muslim Bonaparte: Diplomacy and Orientalism in Ali Pasha’s Greece (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999); Vasilis Panagiotopoulos (ed.), Archeio Ali Pasa: Syllogism I. Chotzi (Athens: Institouto Neoellinikon Erevnon Ethnikou Idrymatos Erevnon, 2009); and Anastasios Papastavros, Ali Pasas: Apo listarchos igemonas (Ioannina: Ekdoseis Apeirotan, 2013). 21 On the intense violence, see Davide Rodogno, Against Massacre: Humanitarian Interventions in the Ottoman Empire 1815–1914 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 63–90; Gary J. Bass, Freedom’s Battle: The Origins of Humanitarian Intervention (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2008), 51–136; and Justin McCarthy, Death and Exile: The Ethnic Cleansing of Ottoman Muslims, 1821–1922 (Princeton: Darwin Press, 1984), 9–13. 22 The published dispatches of Russian and British observers demonstrate this point. See the writings of Russian consuls published in VPR xii–xvi; the dispatches of William Meyer, the British consul in Preveza, in Epirus, Ali Pasha and the Greek Revolution: Consular Reports of William Meyer from Preveza, ed. E. Prevelakis and K. Kalliataki Merticopoulou (Athens: Akademia of Athinon, 1996); and the writings of the British ambassador in Constantinople, Lord Strangford, in Theophilus C. Prousis, Lord Strangford at the Sublime Porte: The Eastern Question, i–iii (Istanbul: Isis Press, 2010, 2012, 2014).

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Russia and the Making of Greek Identity

Ottoman world. This was due to Russia’s Byzantine heritage. Since medieval times, the alternating movements of commodities, people, and ideas to and from the Mediterranean carried Byzantine civilization up rivers, across plains, and over seas to Russia and its borderlands. Russia’s religious and cultural connection with Byzantium continued as a powerful undercurrent into modern times. It allowed Russian society to claim a special position in regards to the Greek people and play a unique role in their national development. Scholars have long investigated the reflections of the Orthodox Commonwealth in Russian culture.23 Yet the significance of the linkage between Russia and Greece in the nineteenth century remains mostly unexplored. Whereas studies of nineteenthcentury Russian identity invariably register the central position of religion, no study has illuminated the strikingly similar intellectual experiments taking place in the Greek kingdom and their symbolic influence in Russian society. Intellectual arguments over the relationship of Byzantium and the West, debates about the translation of holy scripture, uncertainty about the proper form of written language, questions regarding the nature of political authority, and disputes about connections with history represent sacred properties of the modern Greek nation that engaged Russians to consider their own identity and place in the world. Whereas a complete investigation of the impact of Greek independence on Russian society and culture during the 1830s and 1840s falls outside the confines of this study, ample material exists for a fruitful comparison of identity formation in both countries. Scholarly work on nationalism and identity in the Balkans has gone in new and exciting directions in recent years. Whereas I recognize the contested nature of national identity, and that many scholars challenge its existence altogether, eschewing definitions, it seems to me, subtracts from the intellectual excitement of exploring a complex and contentious topic. In brief, by national identity I mean a constructed consciousness, fashioned by the elite and popularized through various methods—including symbols, laws, education, institutions, and traditions.24 This book argues that of these elements religion helped most to create Greek identity, but that modernizing and secular forces played an important role as well. In general, scholars have defined nationalism, as it emerged in the wake of the French Revolution, as an entity distinct from the religious systems found in premodern, traditional societies.25 According to this interpretation, nationalism could

23 The most important studies include Dmitri Obolensky, The Byzantine Commonwealth: Eastern Europe, 500–1453 (New York: Praeger, 1971); Boris Fonkich, Grechesko-russkie kul’turnye sviazi v XV– XVII vv.: Grecheskie rukopisi v Rossii (Moscow: Nauka, 1977); Nicholas Iorga, Byzance après Byzance (Bucharest: Institut d’études byzantines, 1935); and N. F. Kapterev, Kharakter otnoshenii rossii k pravoslavnomu vostoku v XVI i XVII stoletiiakh (Sergiev Posad: M. S. Elova, 1914). See also, Paschalis Kitromilides, From Orthodox Commonwealth to National Communities: Greek-Russian Intellectual and Ecclesiastical Ties in the Ottoman Era (Burlington, VT: Ashgate/Variorum, 2007). 24 For an excellent discussion of Greek national identity, see Peter Mackridge, Language and National Identity in Greece, 1766–1976 (Oxford: OUP, 2009), 8–13. 25 Elie Kedourie, Nationalism, 4th edn (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994); Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983); Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality (Cambridge: CUP, 1990); Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1991).

Introduction

9

be perceived as essentially a secular replacement for religious traditions. In contrast, the preeminent scholar of primordial nationalism, Anthony D. Smith, has suggested that no matter how secular nationalisms occur, they retain certain religious elements in an assortment of combinations (sacred texts, prophets, rituals, ceremonies, perceptions of the past, traditions). Smith proposes the concept of displacement (not identical to “religious replacement”) to explain how religion and nationalism interacted in the evolutionary process toward a modern national identity.26 This book draws on Smith’s work, as well as the substantial body of literature that challenges the secular understanding of nationalism through typologies, taxonomies, conceptual rubrics, and other characterizations to illuminate Russian– Greek relations in the nineteenth century.27 Part of the process of the making of modern Greece meant the radical changing of local ecclesiastical communities from the jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate into autocephalous institutions.28 While the Orthodox Church based in Constantinople complemented and, sometimes, even sustained its ecumenical values with the rational and secular currents of the age, nationalism posed a new challenge to the ecumenicity of Christian ideals. Whereas scholars studying the Balkans traditionally emphasize the role of religion in sustaining proto-national sentiments, particularly the church’s role in maintaining a sense of identity during Ottoman rule, many presume that after independence religion no longer unified collective identity as it had before. According to this interpretation, nationalism constituted a secular replacement for religious traditions. I argue here that the intense conflicts in domestic religious life resulting from the friction between Orthodox ecumenism and secular nationalism led to a fusion of nationalist ideology and Orthodox doctrine.29 The resulting Hellenic-Christian synthesis illustrates 26

Smith, Chosen Peoples, 13–14, 31. See Rogers Brubaker, “Religion and Nationalism: Four Approaches,” Nations and Nationalism, 18/1 (2012): 2–20; H. G. Haupt and D. Langewiesche (eds), Nation und Religion in Europa (Frankfurt: Campus, 2004); W. R. Hutchinson and H. Lehmann (eds), Many are the Chosen: Divine Election and Western Nationalisms (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1994); and P. Van der Veer and H. Lehmann (eds), Nation and Religion: Perspectives on Europe and Asia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999). 28 On this process, see Charles Frazee, The Orthodox Church and Independent Greece, 1821–52 (Cambridge: CUP, 1969); Paraskevas Matalas, Ethnos kai Orthodoxia: Oi peripeteies mias schesia apo to “Elladiko” sto Voulgariko schisma, 2nd edn (Irakleio: Panepistimiakes Ekdoseis Kritis, 2003), 45–90; Elpida K. Vogli, “Ellines to genos.” I ithageneia kai i taftotita sto ethniko kratos ton Ellinon (1821–44) (Irakleion: Panepistimiakes Ekdoseis Kritis, 2007), 39–81; D. Stamatopoulos, Metarrithmisi kai ekkosmikevsi: Pros mia anasinthesi tis istorias tou Oikoumenikou Patriarcheiou ton 19o aiona (Athens: Alexandria, 2003), 37–44; and E. Skopetea, To “Protypo Vasileio” kai i Megali Idea: Opseis tou ethnikou provlimatos stin Ellada (1830–80) (Athens: Politypo, 1988), 119–34. The older works by F. A. Kurganov, Ustroistvo upravleniia v tserkvi korolevstva grecheskago (Kazan: Universitetskoi Tipografii, 1871); and Chrysostomos Papadopoulos, Istoria tis ekklisias tis Ellados (Athens: P. A. Petrakos, 1920) remain very valuable. 29 On the blending of religion and nationalism, see Effi Gazi, “Revisiting Religion and Nationalism in Nineteenth-Century Greece,” in The Making of Modern Greece, 95–106; Gazi, O defteros vios ton Trion Ierarchon: Mia genealogia tou “Ellinochristianikou politismou” (Athens: Ekdoseis Nepheli, 2004); G. Mavrogordatos, “Orthodoxy and Nationalism in the Greek Case,” Western European Politics, 26/1 (2003): 117–36; Paschalis Kitromilides, “The Legacy of the French Revolution: Orthodoxy and Nationalism,” in The Cambridge History of Christianity, v. Eastern Christianity, ed. Michael Angold 27

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Russia and the Making of Greek Identity

the concept of displacement in the study of the complex relationship between nationalism and religion. Throughout the upheavals taking place in the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century, the Russian Foreign Ministry was willing to place religion at the forefront of international affairs. Independence movements by Balkan Christians triggered deeply felt commitments and complicated Russia’s position as the patron and defender of the Orthodox world. The correspondence of the chief architect of Russian foreign affairs during these years, Karl V. Nesselrode (1780–1862), with representatives in the primary outposts where ecumenical Orthodoxy confronted national independence underscores the prominence of religion in tsarist policy. Although religion never completely eradicated pragmatic goals, such as Black Sea commercial expansion and control of the Caucasus, protecting Orthodoxy provided Russian agents with a sense of mission. The Russian Foreign Ministry’s quest to defend Orthodoxy in Greece coincided with a crucial period in the formation of Russian identity. The 1830s and 1840s, the so-called “Marvelous Decade,” represent a new era of Russian culture, during which new notions of “Russianness” emerged. Thanks to common links, both real and imagined, to an Orthodox and Byzantine past, the question of Greece helped define Russia’s role in world affairs. Russia’s self-professed guardianship over Orthodox Greeks helped solidify its position in the European concert. The very idea of tsarist power had a religious foundation, strengthened by law.30 At the same time, the Russian state developed an ideology corresponding to the self-righteous, deeply religious, and fatalistic personality of the Tsar. Proclaimed in 1833 by the Minister of Education Sergei S. Uvarov, this ideology—known as Official Nationality—consisted of a core cultural identity (narodnost), a form of political authority (samoderzhavie), and a primary historical faith (pravoslavie).31 In the following years, this doctrine became the hallmark of the Empire and served as a rallying cry for “faith, tsar, and fatherland.” Although many scholars have commented on the significance of Official Nationality within Russian society, a neglected aspect of the tsarist triad consists of its execution abroad. Specifically, (Cambridge: CUP, 2006), 229–49; Dimitris Stamatopoulos, “Ecumenical Ideology in the Orthodox Millet (19th–20th Century),” in Lorans Tanatar Baruh and Vangelis Kechriotis (eds), Economy and Society on Both Shores of the Aegean (Athens: Alpha Bank, 2010), 201–47; and Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, Instilling Religion in Greek and Turkish Nationalism: A “Sacred Synthesis” (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). 30 e.g. according to the law code of 1833, the Russian throne could only be occupied by a person of Orthodox faith; the Tsar proclaimed himself as the supreme guardian of the Orthodox Church; and the concern of the state was to protect the church and the wellbeing of the clergy. Many of these values were translated into the constitutions of independent Balkan states. See Michael Cherniavsky, Tsar and People: Studies in Russian Myths (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961). 31 S. S. Uvarov, “Tsirkuliarnoe predlozhenie g. upravliaiushchego Ministerstvom Narodnogo Prosveshcheniia Nachalstvam Uchebnykh Okrugov ‘O vstuplenii v upravlenia Ministerstvom,’ ” ZhMNP, 1/1 (1834): p. xlix. Nicholas Riasanovsky, Nicholas I and Official Nationality in Russia, 1825–55 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1959); Cynthia H. Whittaker, The Origins of Modern Russian Education: An Intellectual Biography of Count Sergei Uvarov, 1786–1855 (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 1984); A. Zorin, “Ideologiia ‘Pravoslaviia-SamoderzhaviiaNarodnosti’: Opyt rekonstruktsii,” Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 26 (1997): 71–104.

Introduction

11

the architects of Russian policy attempted to instill these dogmas into the Greek king, church, and people through diplomatic pressure, economic incentive, and various forms of official and private patronage. Russia’s state-led ideological program in Greece provided an opportunity for experimentation, which would be useful for nationalist homogenization elsewhere later in the century. Drawing from the experience of intervention in Greece, formulators of Russian foreign policy and the educated public used Russia’s traditional commitments to Orthodoxy as a vital motivating force behind action in the greater Slavic world (Bulgarian and Serbian lands in particular) during the zenith of Panslavism in the 1870s.32 The Greek ecclesiastical establishment and the crown, as powerful agents of national unity, constitute the primary mechanisms whereby Russian officials attempted to implement Official Nationality. In the construction and maintenance of the religious establishment, St Petersburg attempted to guide the Greek clergy in determining solutions to its problems that maintained the canons of Orthodoxy and prevented the incursions of non-Orthodox beliefs. Regarding the Greek crown, Russian officials promoted absolutism by defending the concept that every source of authority and legitimacy emanated from the king as the divinely ordained sovereign. The first modern king of Greece, Otto (Othon in Greek) of the Wittelsbach dynasty, demonstrated this belief by managing power and regulating government decisions through the control of political parties and factions.33 When challenges to the Greek throne emerged, Russia actively intervened to bolster the power of the monarch and suppress democratic and constitutional tendencies. Although the consistent pressure Russia exerted to force Othon, a Bavarian Catholic, to convert to Orthodoxy ended in failure, his stalwart championing of absolutism reflected tsarist aims. Not until the Constitutional Revolution of 1843 did Greek political life exhibit modern institutions and mechanisms protecting the rights of individuals as autonomous and equal before the law. Although the 1843 revolution and national assembly in Greece violated the spirit of Official Nationality, they did not seriously alter tsarist policy, in part because St Petersburg did not consider Greece to be the only theater of its activity in the region. Tsarist agents supported the notion that people should be ruled under the system of government for which they were best fitted, like the father of a family rules over his obedient children. Thus, while Russia eventually recognized limits on autocracy in Greece, the religious revival of subsequent years, including the rapprochement with the Ecumenical Patriarchate in 1850, represented a victory for Russian policy. Besides, dominating Greek affairs 32 On this vast topic, see Gerd, Konstantinopol’skii Patriarkhat i Rossiia; Gerd, Konstantinopol i Peterburg; Ada Dialla, I Rosia apenanti sta Valkania: Ideologia kai politiki sto devtero miso tou 19ou aiona (Athens: Ekdoseis Alexandreia, 2009); Zina Markova, Bulgarkata eksarkhiia, 1870–9 (Sofia: Izd-stvo Bulgarskata akademiia naukite, 1989); B. H. Sumner, Russia and the Balkans, 1870–80 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1937); David MacKenzie, Serbs and Russian Panslavism, 1875–8 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1967); and Evangelos Kofos, Greece and the Eastern Crisis, 1875–8 (Thessaloniki: IMXA, 1975). 33 “Otto” became “Othon” a year before the Bavarian prince arrived in Greece, and the present study uses his Greek name. For a biography based on Bavarian archives, see Leonard Bower and Gordon Bolitho, Otho I, King of Greece (London: Selwyn & Blount, 1939).

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Russia and the Making of Greek Identity

was never a tsarist objective, and the program of Russian partisans in Greece was not identical to the one formulated in St Petersburg. At this juncture, a brief observation about what is described in European experience as “modernity” may help clarify my usage of this complicated concept. Simply stated, by modernity I mean technological advancement, the use of reason, and the belief in a better future in terms of material progress and prosperity. I also use the term in a social sense to describe the new forms of self-awareness that emerged in the decades following the French Revolution. In the Greek setting, the arrival of modernity challenged the monolithic belief systems of the past, including established forms of political organization and conventional values. Secularism became a belief system in its own right, which spurred on the expectation that religion would someday fade away. Although many thinkers doubted this would happen, secularism challenged traditional religious authority more than ever before. The matrix where the forces of tradition and innovation meet constitutes a central feature of the debates described in this book. In addition to new belief systems, modernity brought with it new systems of governance, including the nation-state and constitutions, which replaced the primacy of regional and kinship ties with the centrality of the national community. For the first time, the Greek rebellion directly exposed individuals to such concepts as nation, citizen, liberty, and constitution that went against the grain of traditional thinking about political authority and legitimacy. The war against the Ottomans also forced the Greeks to confront their internal divisions. The inner conflict among Greeks who wished to create a modern, centralized state, and those who desired traditional forms of authority raged during the formative and early period of the Greek state. The first group consisted of educated individuals with experience in western Europe, such as Alexandros Mavrokordatos and Theoklites Pharmakidis, who, inspired by the ideas of the Enlightenment, aimed for a constitutional government and a clear separation between church and state. The second consisted of military chieftains and members of the conservative clerical elite, like Theodoros Kolokotronis and Konstantinos Oikonomos, who possessed a political understanding based on absolute monarchy and strong church authority. The struggle between these two types of individuals represents the fundamental fault line within Greek society. Whereas certain Greek leaders sought to sacrifice the primacy of tradition in order to produce a secular future, other individuals aimed to configure independent Greece through a dynamic revival of tradition.34 This book explores how two major currents of self-awareness—the modern and the traditional—interacted to shape Greek identity. The challenges of independence led to the development of two alternative approaches: a comparatively radical, 34 Aleksandr Sturdza, a cosmopolitan Greek and longtime Russian subject, was one of the rare thinkers who developed a consistent blend of tradition and modernity. See Stella Ghervas, Réinventer la tradition: Alexandre Stourdza et l’Europe de la Sainte-Alliance (Paris: Honoré Champion, 2008). On the fault line in Greek society, see Paschalis M. Kitromilides, “The Last Battle of the Ancients and Moderns: Ancient Greece and Modern Europe in the Neohellenic Revival,” MGSY 1 (1985): 79–82; and Roderick Beaton, Byron’s War: Romantic Rebellion, Greek Revolution (Cambridge: CUP, 2013), 149.

Introduction

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secularizing current and a more conservative, Orthodox committed current. Rather than a simple binary, both currents interacted and gradually merged into a new form of self-awareness called the Hellenic-Christian synthesis. At critical moments, however, the opposition between the two currents could become intensely antagonistic. For example, the debates between traditionalists and moderns in Greece over the questions of ecclesiastical independence and the powers of the crown (like the arguments between Westernizers and Slavophiles in Russia) were responses to the challenges of sovereignty. As time progressed, both currents interacted, clashed, and converged, transforming themselves into a new and distinctive modern identity. The Greek rebellion also constitutes an important and under-appreciated aspect of the Ottoman reform drive known as the Tanzimat. The success of the Greek insurgents prompted the reform-minded Ottoman elite to reconsider their methods of governing, which led to reform activities, such as the Sultan’s decision to abolish the janissary corps in 1826. This and other changes aimed to improve the Empire’s ability to rule through a more effective political centralization and more orderly administrative organization. References in the book to the Ottoman reform program that began in the 1820s and 1830s incorporate the concepts of modernity and modernization to describe the process, although by this usage I do not intend to include the many implications about Western paths of development. The study of the arrival of modernity in borderland regions such as the Greek kingdom also suggests that alternative and indigenous modernities can exist in other cultural settings. As an extended analysis of the role of Russia and the making of modern Greek identity, this study lays the groundwork for a broader understanding of nineteenthcentury Russian foreign policy and religious enterprise in the Ottoman Balkans. It represents a unique attempt at exploring the transfer of Official Nationality to the larger and very different world stage and contributes to studies of tsarist policy toward non-Orthodox religions. Lastly, this book sheds light on the origins of Russian policy toward Balkan independence movements in the second half of the nineteenth century while contributing to the literature on the relationship between religion and nationalism. * * *

* *

While researching this book, I worked with untapped materials in archives and libraries in Moscow, St Petersburg, and Athens that were hitherto neglected by scholars. I have relied heavily on manuscripts from Russian embassies and consulates in the Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi Imperii (Foreign Ministry Archive of the Russian Empire). Stationed at the most significant centers of trade and strategic influence in the region, the duties of Russian ambassadors and consular agents ranged widely: they kept detailed records of the economic conditions within their jurisdiction, gathered information on military affairs and naval exercises, and composed summary reports on politics, religion, and society. An interesting aspect of Russian involvement in Greece during this era resides in the composition of its diplomats and agents, who in almost all cases were Orthodox Greeks. Like thousands of their coethnics, these individuals served and made careers in the Russian Empire while playing a major political and cultural role in their ancestral homeland.

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Russia and the Making of Greek Identity

Files of the Holy Synod, the governing institution of the Russian Orthodox Church, from the Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Istoricheskii Arkhiv (Russian State Historical Archive) provide insight into ecclesiastical conditions in Greece, debates about church independence, Russian attitudes toward non-Orthodox missionaries, and the Greek Church’s position between state and society. They supply much evidence for the direct involvement of Russian agents in Greek ecclesiastical affairs and the changing political and social realities in which they engaged. More generally, these collections provide historians with a treasure-trove for the study of national churches throughout the Balkans. The personal archives of individuals, such as the Destunis collection at the Otdel rukopisei Rossiiskaia Natsional’naia Biblioteka (Manuscript Division, Russian National Library), the archive of Aleksandr S. Sturdza at the Otdel rukopisei Institut Rossiiskoi Literaturoi (Manuscript Division, Institute of Russian Literature), the correspondence of Grigorii A. Stroganov and Ioannis Kapodistrias contained in the Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Drevnikh Aktov (Russian State Archive of Ancient Acts), as well as the materials compiled by prominent Russian intellectuals and artists at the Otdel rukopisei Rossiiskoi Gosudarstvenoi Biblioteki (Manuscript Division of the Russian State Library) illustrate Russian interest in Greek politics and culture. The archives of the Third Department of His Majesty’s Own Chancery at the Gosudarstvenyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (State Archive of the Russian Federation) contain files pertaining to Russian policy toward the press and details behind Russia’s involvement in the Greek Revolution of 1843. The Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Voenno-Istoricheskii Arkhiv (Russian State Military-Historical Archive) has materials relating to the Russian–Ottoman War of 1828–9 and the revolts of the Egyptian Pasha Mehmed Ali in 1832–3 and 1839–41. Research in Greek collections has helped elucidate the process of state formation in the kingdom while shedding light on the development of political factions, the newspaper press, and educational enterprise. Although Greek archival materials on the Othonian epoch are fragmented, publicist literature written by contemporaries describes the social situation of Greece and contains news about church affairs, constitutional thought, the economy, foreign intervention, and politics. The Gennadius Library of the American School of Classical Studies in Athens is unrivaled for this type of material. The Library of the Greek Parliament as well as the Center for Neo-Hellenic Studies in Athens contain nearly complete collections of Greek newspapers and journals published in the period, in addition to official proclamations, government decrees, and the correspondence of foreign powers with the Greek state. In the century that witnessed epic intellectual battles over the nature of Russian identity, Russian travelers and scholars addressed affairs in Greek-speaking lands in works that highlighted the special connections among Russians and the Orthodox Greeks.35 A whole spectrum of Russian society left records of their experiences 35 Among more extended studies on contemporary Greek topics by Russian scholars, see A. Kuznetsov, Istoricheskoe, staticheskoe i politicheskoe obozrenie Ottomanskoi Porty s anekdotami i vzgliadom na drevniuiu i noveishuiu Gretsiiu (Moscow: N. Stepanov, 1829); N. Poliakovoi, Turtsiia

Introduction

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when visiting Greece and Mount Athos, the spiritual focal points of the Orthodox tradition.36 The avid reception of Russian travel accounts of Greek-speaking lands by Konstantin M. Bazili, Andrei N. Murav’ev, Avraam S. Norov (and many others) illuminates unexplored dimensions of Greek history and its intersections with Russian society.37 Travelogues were an important forum of foreign news that could stimulate the imagination of readers, encourage self-reflection, and inspire readers to think in exotic terms. The variety of travel writing elucidating Greek affairs represents a panorama of Russia itself. Whereas the older, traditional pilgrimages remained popular reading, secular accounts kindled interest in the Orthodox East and exposed the public to the contemporary fate of Hellenism. Russian dailies and “thick journals” such as the Northern Bee, Notes of the Fatherland, Reading Library, and the Journal of the Ministry of the Public Education provide some of the most informative and dispassionate early attempts to describe conditions inside the Greek kingdom.38 Increased knowledge of Greek lands and peoples among Russian readers constituted the raw material from which were forged opinions about Greece and its potential to serve as a model for other emerging nations. Russian writers demonstrated their interest through their creative accomplishments as well as through donations and petitions in support of Greek lands. Writings about Greece stimulated thinking about Eastern Orthodoxy as a factor in Russian national consciousness, and the success of the Greek struggle reinforced notions of the Russian Empire’s prestige and power. * * *

* *

Divided into six chapters that proceed in roughly chronological fashion, Russia and the Making of Modern Greek Identity examines Russian involvement in the first decades of independent Greece as the base for a broader interpretation of Russian foreign policy and challenges to Ottoman rule in the Balkans. The first chapter provides the historical background of the movement for Greek independence in v eia proshedshee i nostoiashchee vremiia. Istoricheskoe obozrenie (Moscow: L. Stepanov, 1855); B. I. Ordynskii, Adamantii Korai. Prosvetitel novykh grekov (Moscow: Tip. Aleksandra Semena, 1856); V. I. Lamanskii, “O snosheniiakh Russkikh s Grekami,” Russkaia beseda, 4 (1858): 103–40; E. Feoktistov, Bor’ba Gretsii za nezavisimost (St Petersburg: I. I. Glazunova, 1863); G. Paleolog and M. Sivinis, Istoricheskii ocherk narodnoi voiny za nezavisimost Gretsii i vosstanovlenie korolevstva pri vmeshatel’stve velikikh derzhav Rossii, Anglii i Frantsii (St Petersburg: Morskago Ministerstva, 1867); and A. Annenskaia, “Osvobozhdenie Gretsii,” Osvoboditel’nye voiny XIX v. (St Petersburg: N. Vlasov, 1900). 36 See Theofanis G. Stavrou and Peter R. Weisensel, Russian Travelers to the Christian East from the Twelfth to the Twentieth Century (Columbus, OH: Slavica, 1986); and Feodora Iannitsi, Grecheskii mir v kontse XVIII-nachale XX vv. (St Petersburg: Aleteiia, 2005). 37 K. M. Bazili, Archipelag i Gretsiia v 1830–1 godakh (St Petersburg: Tip. N. Grech, 1834); Bazili, Enas Rosos stin Ellada tou Kapodistria, tr. O. Tsimpenko (Athens: Kalentes, 2000); A. N. Murav’ev, Puteshestvie k Sviatym mestam v 1830 godu (St Petersburg: Tip. III Otdeleniia Sobstvennoi E. I. V. kantseliarii, 1832); A. S. Norov, Puteshestvie po Sviatoi Zemle v 1835 g. (St Petersburg: A. Smirdin, 1838). 38 e.g. see “Athiny v 1839 godu,” OZ 3/4–5 (1839), 8, 92–7; K. Lippert, “Gretsiia v nyneshnem svoem sostoianii,” OZ 19/11–12 (1841), 3, 14–32, 49–70; “Gretsiia v nyneshnem svoem sostoianii,” ZhMNP 34 (1842), 6, 20–8; and G. S. Destunis, “Ocherki vozrozhdaiushcheisia Gretsii,” BdCh 5 (1858), 2, 1–28.

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Russia and the Making of Greek Identity

Russia, starting with an overview of Greek–Russian contacts from the 1770s to the outbreak of rebellion in 1821. The chapter goes on to summarize the main events leading to the formation of the Greek kingdom, with particular emphasis on the period from the Battle of Navarino in 1827, until the assassination of President Kapodistrias in 1831. The second chapter probes the creation of various state and social institutions in Greece as well as Russian interactions with the Regency of King Othon. It elucidates prevailing attitudes among Russian foreign policy officials toward the establishment of a state apparatus in Greece, including the formation of political factions and the key symbols and ceremonies that promoted the growth of nationalism. I discuss the emergence of the Russian party, one of the main political factions behind the construction of the state, as well as its rival French and British counterparts. In Chapters 3 and 4, I focus on ecclesiastical politics and policies, including the declaration of an autocephalous Greek Church and the formation of an active Russian ecclesiastical strategy. These chapters reveal the passionate reactions in the Russian Foreign Ministry and Holy Synod to the Greek schism and the spread of non-Orthodox missionaries, efforts to translate holy scripture, and debates about religious education. Tampering with the church was, to many Russian officials, the same as tampering with the fate of the people, and tsarist agents spearheaded the opposition to the ecclesiastical reforms. In the fifth chapter, I take up the formation of a religiously inspired secret society called the “Philorthodox,” while exploring Russian reactions to a major rebellion launched by Christians on Ottoman-ruled Crete. The chapter comments on a new wave of oracular texts that reflected the diplomatic conjunctures during the Eastern Crisis of 1839–41. The sixth and final chapter is an examination of Russian anger and disappointment at the resistance to absolutism that culminated in the Greek Revolution of 1843. In this chapter, I analyze questions of identity based upon the definition of Greek subjecthood according to the constitution of 1844. Lastly, the conclusion comments on the legacies of independence and Greek– Russian relations in subsequent decades. The Greek War of Independence presents a pivotal event in international history. As a result, the Ottoman Empire was partitioned and part of its former territory was transformed into a sovereign state for the first time. Although the Greek people had to wait until 1833 for the arrival of their King, the formal recognition by the international community of a more-or-less stable political entity based on clearly defined legal, commercial, diplomatic, and territorial foundations deserves emphasis. Whereas the Christians of the Belgrade province had successfully revolted in 1804, the rebel leaders (who did not initially aspire to break from the Sultan) had to be content with autonomy. Despite numerous uprisings in the Danubian principalities, Montenegro, Bulgaria, and Albania, these national communities would have to wait until the Congress of Berlin in 1878 (and after) for independence.39 Germany and Italy (by far larger and more influential countries) did not win recognition until the late 1860s, and only the Belgian revolt against 39 Here I use terms like “Bulgaria” and “Albania” as shorthand, but with the assumption that the population of these regions had a very fluid national consciousness until well into the 20th cent.

Introduction

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Dutch rule in 1830 and the Swiss Sonderbund War of 1847 resulted in the creation of clearly defined states. Viewed from this comparative perspective, one would expect Greece to take a prominent part in studies devoted to nationalism, which has become such an important and prominent field of scholarly inquiry in the past fifty years. Yet relatively few scholars have seized upon this opportunity to examine the first case of what we call today national self-determination, and how the Greek experience became a model for future states. By placing a dialogue between Russian and Greek sources at the center of this study, as part of the efforts in contextualizing Russian imperial and Balkan national traditions, this book contributes to our understanding of Russian foreign policy and the debates regarding religion and nationalism during a period long taken for granted as stable, peaceful, and conservative.

1 Russia and the Movement for Greek Independence A fascinating though neglected aspect of the Ottoman Balkans during the long nineteenth century (c.1789–1918) consists of its dynamic territorial fringes, where, entrenched in island fortresses and mountain redoubts, or nestled in thick forests and isolated peninsulas, Ottoman subjects first interacted with the forces of modernity. Borderland regions in the Balkans, such as Bosnia, Kosova, and Macedonia have commanded special attention in recent years, because of the richness of these cultural crossroads, the significant impact of historiography on identity formation, and their contested status as ancestral homelands. During the first decades of the nineteenth century, resistance movements in peripheral areas led by urban and provincial magnates (the ayans and derebeys), such as Pasvanoglu Osman Pasha, Ali Pasha of Tepenenli, and Mustapha Reshiti Bushati prepared the groundwork for the larger political, ultimately nationalistic, actions against the Sultan that marked a turning point in Ottoman and Balkan history. The challenges that affected everyone in the Balkans, including military conscription and the struggle for land ownership, forced the Sublime Porte to make difficult decisions regarding state control over political affairs and economic resources. The reforms initiated by Sultans Selim III and Mahmud II, which attempted to modernize and centralize Ottoman territories, deeply affected the lives of the indigenous peoples and engaged the attention of the great powers.1 When living conditions became unbearable for the Christians and Muslims loyal to the Sultan, social discontent developed into larger movements that sought complete independence. Of the chain of insurrections that detonated in the years following the Napoleonic Wars, the Greek War of Independence was by far the most significant. For Russia, the shared Orthodox faith, and hundreds of years of historical affinities that 1 On the reign of Selim III, see Stanford J. Shaw, Between Old and New: The Ottoman Empire under Sultan Selim III, 1789–1807 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971); and Shaw, “The Origins of Ottoman Military Reform: The Nizam-I cedid Army of Sultan Selim III,” Journal of Modern History, 37/3 (1965): 291–302. On Mahmud II, see Stanford Shaw and Ezel Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey (Cambridge: CUP, 1977), ii. 1–54; Avigdor Levy, “The Officer Corps in Mahmud II’s New Ottoman Army, 1826–39,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, 2/1 (1971): 21–39; and Levy, “The Ottoman Ulema and the Military Reforms of Sultan Mahmud II,” Asian and African Studies, 7 (1971): 13–39. On the instability in the Balkans at the turn of the century, see I. F. Makarova, “Na grebne feodal’noi anarkhii. Bolgarskie zemli v nachale XIX veka,” in V. N. Vinogradov (ed.), Istoriia Balkan: Vek deviatnadtsatyi (do Krymskoi voiny) (Moscow: KRASAND, 2012), 45–59; and Deena Sadat, “Ayan Aga: The Transformation of the Bektashi Corps in the Eighteenth Century,” The Muslim World, 63 (1973): 206–19.

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extended from medieval times to the present, amplified the meaning of the Greek movement for emancipation. The Greek revolt elicited an emotional response among the educated public that coincided with the great national struggle to expel Napoleon’s armies in 1812. Of the range of European reactions, Russia’s was perhaps the most comprehensive, in that it embraced classical, Byzantine, and Ottoman elements of the Greek experience. For men and women interested in the fate of Russia and the Orthodox world, the efforts of the Greeks to liberate themselves promised a crusade to reassert the primacy of Orthodoxy absent since the fall of Constantinople in 1453. The Greek War of Independence dragged the Russian Foreign Ministry into a complex international entanglement affecting the broad region from the Balkans to the Nile to the Caucasus. The internationalization of the crisis involved more than great power diplomacy: it resulted in a Russian–Ottoman war, the devastation of Crete and the Morea by an Egyptian army, the arrival of a French expeditionary force in the Peloponnese, a Russian blockade of the Dardanelles, and the disruption of Black Sea commerce and communications. Despite the outpouring of emotion among the Russian leadership, St Petersburg confronted an awkward dilemma, torn between its position as champion of Orthodoxy, and its commitment to the balance of power on the continent. In consequence, Russia developed a dual response to the Eastern Crisis of the 1820s. While working collectively with its great power allies to pacify the insurrection, St Petersburg tried to rectify Ottoman violations of treaties regarding Black Sea shipping, the Danubian principalities, and the religious rights of the Orthodox. At times intractable, at times assertive, tsarist policy exhibited restraint and readiness to act multilaterally. However, as the sectarian violence between Muslims and Christians intensified, educated public opinion and members of the Russian governing elite favored intervention. The unprecedented brutality that accompanied the rebellion was an important motivating factor. The carnage was so severe that many Russian officials described the Ottoman response as a “war of extermination” against their brothers and sisters in Christ. The Russian Foreign Ministry did not hesitate to claim that the concern about humanitarian catastrophe should take precedence over the maintenance of the peace with the Sultan. In this respect, the reaction to the Greek rebellion represents one of the forerunners of the professed humanitarian interventions of the late twentieth century. When by about 1830, despite imposing odds, the Greeks persevered in achieving independence St Petersburg encountered a unique opportunity to implement its conservative ideals in the heartland of the Orthodox world. Although Greek ties with Russia are very old, this chapter sketches Russian connections to the movement for Greek independence from the 1770s, until the assassination of President Ioannis Kapodistrias in September 1831, and its aftermath. It establishes a foundation for an understanding of Russia’s relationship to the Greek kingdom and provides the historical context for the avenues of political and religious intervention once the new state gained sovereignty. The reports of Russian ministers, officers, agents, and consuls in areas within and near the zones of contact provide unique vantage points from which to study tsarist personnel choices and policy formation in the decades of nation-state engineering to follow.

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Russia and the Making of Greek Identity R U SS I A N - G R EEK T I E S A T TH E T U R N O F T H E EI GHTEENTH AND NINETEENTH CENTURIES

Like so many other matters relating to modern Russia, Russian policies toward the Orthodox Balkans are traceable to Peter the Great (1696–1725). Peter’s reign coincided with a fascinating period in Balkan history that witnessed a great reshuffling of traditional power schemes. The emergence of Orthodox Russia as a major player in the European state system was a decisive development in Balkan affairs. The presence of Russia at the helm of the Orthodox world provided an aura of legitimacy to traditional Greek aspirations for spiritual and political renaissance. Rivalries among the great powers, the exposure of Ottoman military weaknesses, and the expansion of commercial enterprise affected the borderlands of the Greekspeaking heartland as well as diaspora communities within the neighboring European states. Purported Ottoman abuses against Christians in the Aegean islands, Moldavia, and Wallachia triggered tsarist support of monastic establishments and the issuance of manifestos against Muslim rule. However, religion was not the main concern under Peter, who championed Orthodoxy when convenient. Concrete issues, such as borderland raids and slave taking, superseded the crusading impulse in relations with the Ottoman Sultan and Crimean Khan.2 The Pruth campaign of 1711 set a precedent for successive generations of Greek intellectuals when Peter approved an official proclamation appealing to Orthodox Christians to rise against “the Turks,” join with the Russians to fight for “faith and homeland,” and to drive “the descendants of the heathen Muhammad into their old fatherland, the Arabian sand and steppes.”3 Despite a disastrous campaign, Peter strengthened ties with Balkan Orthodoxy by acquiring rights for Russian pilgrimage to Mount Athos and the Holy Land, and a guarantee to observe religious tolerance of Christians throughout the Ottoman realm. Although these initial efforts met with limited response, the issue of Russian responsibility toward the Orthodox Balkan people had been officially raised for the first time. The connection between Russia and the Balkans now became a weapon used to threaten the Sublime Porte, although it also incurred the suspicion and hostility of the European states. Significantly, the impact of Russian power on the Balkans stimulated an outpouring of oracular literature, poems predicting a Christian crusade, and several biographies of Peter the Great in Greek. The mirage of Russian expectation sprang from these developments and became a potent political force in Greek life throughout the century.4 2 For reviews of Peter’s Balkan policies, see V. N. Vinogradov, Dvuglavnyi rossiiskii orel na Balkanakh, 1683–1914 (Moscow: Indrik, 2010), 17–41; Lora A. Gerd, Konstantinopol i Peterburg: Tserkovnaia politika Rossii na pravoslavnom Vostoke, 1878–98 (Moscow: Indrik, 2006), 114–28; and the slender tour de force by B. H. Sumner, Peter the Great and the Ottoman Empire (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1965). 3 Quoted in Sumner, Peter the Great, 46; and Vinogradov, Dvuglavnyi rossiiskii, 29. 4 On the concept of Russian expectation, see Paschalis Kitromilides, Enlightenment and Revolution: The Making of Modern Greece (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013), 120–33; Kitromilides, War and Political Consciousness: Theoretical Implications of Eighteenth-Century Greek Historiography (Burlington, VT: Ashgate/Variorum, 1994).

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If Peter’s policy provided the initial impulse for Greek hopes for deliverance, the two wars of Catherine II (1762–96) against the Ottomans gave Greek elites serious reason to consider the question of political emancipation. Involvement in the Russian–Ottoman War of 1768–74 constituted a landmark in the Greek vision of Russian intervention, although it also caused great regret and disillusionment. On the eve of war, rumors of substantial Russian aid, including up to 10,000 troops, encouraged a spectrum of Greek society to consider challenging the Sultan. Plans for inciting the Christians to revolt, in order to divert Ottoman armies from the main fronts, were put into practical operation in 1769 when a Russian fleet appeared in the Mediterranean and Count Aleksei G. Orlov, brother of Catherine’s favorite, attempted to organize an army in the Peloponnesus. The Russian expedition to the Aegean Archipelago constitutes one of the most spectacular military events of the century. The diplomatic and propaganda machine behind the expedition employed an arsenal of myths and symbols generated by centuries of Russian exchanges with the Orthodox world to legitimize the thrust into the Mediterranean. The writings of pilgrims to the Holy Land and the popularity of oracular prophecies culminated in a discourse easily utilized by Russian officials to forward their plans for aggression. The rhetoric regarding Russia’s purported quest to liberate the Orthodox world from the Ottoman “yoke” entered the mainstream European lexicon at precisely this moment.5 The diplomatic prelude to Russia’s Mediterranean campaign was multifarious and innovative. As early as 1762, secret missions led by three Greeks in Russian service (Giovanni Palatino, Giorgios Papazolis, and Emmanouil Saros) explored the Morea and Montenegro with the objective of recruiting personnel and inciting the Orthodox community to join the struggle against the Sultan. The cautious voice of the acting Russian minister of foreign affairs, Nikita I. Panin, did little to dampen the expedition’s guiding force, “Alessandro Muscovita” Orlov, whose boundless enthusiasm inspired the Empress to pursue her dreams for glory. In early 1769, Orlov had generated enough support to prepare a diversionary mission to the Balkans of limited scope. An appeal to Greeks and Slavs sanctioned by Catherine (dated January 1769) provided the Orthodox people with assurances of Russian protection in the ensuing showdown.6 Catherine’s propaganda machine promised liberation and Russian subjecthood (poddanstvo) to willing insurgents. As the Russian fleet entered the eastern Mediterranean, plans for a diversion in the Peloponnese moved forward. Rumors that a huge number of Greeks were ready to fight fueled the excitement of Russian 5 The Russian expedition is covered in rich detail in I. M. Smilianskaia et al., Rossiia v Sredizemnomor’e: Arkhipelagskaia ekspeditsiia Ekateriny Velikoi (Moscow: Indrik, 2011). See also G. L. Arsh, Rossiia i bor’ba Gretsii za osvobozhdenie: Ot Ekateriny II do Nikolaia I. Ocherki (Moscow: Indrik, 2013), 11–34; Vinogradov, Dvuglavnyi rossiiskii, 75–152; Vinogradov (ed.), Vek Ekateriny II: Dela balkanskie (Moscow: Nauka, 2000), 93–156; Ariadna Camariano-Cioran, “La Guerre russoturque de 1768–74 et les Grecs,” Revue des Études sud-est européennes, 3/3–4 (1965): 513–47; and the panoramic account of Franco Venturi, The End of the Old Regime in Europe, 1768–76: The First Crisis, tr. R. Burr Litchfield (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 3–153. 6 Smilianskaia, Rossiia v Sredizemnomor’e, 74–9; Camariano-Cioran, “La Guerre russo-turque,” 521.

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officers. Entering Navarino bay in April 1770, Orlov issued a decree about freedom and faith that mirrored age-old Greek prophecies about foreign deliverance.7 However, once the initial excitement wore off, the Russians were unable to organize many Greeks, whose timidity and disbelief astounded them. The disappointment was shared by the Greeks, who were dismayed with the arrival of a poorly equipped expeditionary force of a few hundred soldiers. The upshot was a half-hearted Christian uprising in the Peloponnese, which ended in belied hopes and horrendous Ottoman reprisals.8 The debacle in the Peloponnese was only the beginning as the Russians continued their expedition in the Mediterranean. The great naval victory of Chesme (July 1770) off the coast of Asia Minor helped strengthen Russia’s presence in the region. A blockade of the Dardanelles followed, but a lack of suitable recruits stymied plans for a land assault on the Ottoman capital. Yet more was to come, as truly grandiose plans for the creation of an enlightened Aegean republic under Russian tutelage took shape in the following months. The Russian commander, Admiral Grigorii A. Spiridov, issued a manifesto (replete with references to ancient heroes) proclaiming the end of slavery and the dawn of a new era.9 The high clergy of the Archipelago replied that they were willing to submit to Russian leadership. Spiridov’s constitution (Proekt-Nakaz) for the Aegean republic consisted of an elected senate, social ranks, an administrative and financial system, police, laws, taxes, and so on. Regarding ecclesiastical affairs, the Russian admiral aimed to divide civil and religious authority by creating an autocephalous church based on the Spiritual Regulation of Peter I. Spiridov invited the former Ecumenical Patriarch Seraphim II (1757–61) from Mount Athos to participate in this riveting endeavor. Anchored in the excellent harbor of Nassau, in April of 1772, Spiridov launched his utopian “Archipelago principalities.” The local population seemed to approve. Meanwhile, Russian engineers and specialists gathered cartographic and scientific data, while exploring antiquities and ancient Christian remains (some of which found their way to the Hermitage). Orlov and his crew experimented with education programs for youth on Naxos, Paros, and elsewhere, and sent Greek boys on scholarship to Pisa and St Petersburg.10 The experiment began to take root, in part because the Russians extracted far fewer resources (less than one third) than the Ottomans. Russian building programs improved the islands’ infrastructure and resulted in several major dwellings. As Paros transformed into a second Kronshtadt, the Ottomans were keen to sign a peace treaty excluding the Russians from forming a permanent base. Upon the Russian fleet’s exodus, the residents panicked at the potential loss of security and revenue. 7 Smilianskaia, Rossiia v Sredizemnomor’e, 119; Camariano-Cioran, “La Guerre russo-turque,” 523–4, 528–9. 8 On the Ottoman counteractions, see P. M. Kontogiannis, Oi Ellines kata ton proton epi Aikaterinis V’ Rossotourkikon Polemon (1768–74) (Athens: P. D. Sakellariou, 1903), 357–77. 9 Smilianskaia, Rossiia v Sredizemnomor’e, 149–50. 10 See “O gimnazii, uchrezhdennoi pri artilleriiskom i inzhenernom shliakhetnom korpuse dlia mal’chikov, privezennykh iz Gretsii,” RGADA, f. 20, op. 1, d. 268.

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Although Ottoman forces brutally crushed the 1770 uprising in the Peloponnese, planting some doubts about the Russian Empress’s promises, Greek aspirations for Russian succor reached new heights.11 Both sponsors and members of the Russian expedition began to imagine the Greeks, whom they hoped to liberate, as heroes of the classical past, albeit clutching an Orthodox cross to their chests. As the military and diplomatic aspects of the expedition unfolded, Catherine continued to employ a variety of verbal weapons, including religious, cultural, and political arguments, in a rhetorical game that both attracted and diverted attention. One gem is the memorandum titled “Voti dei greci all’Europa cristiana” (written by Orlov’s secretary Antonio Gicca), which summoned sympathizers to continue the struggle to liberate Greece.12 Whipping up zeal to emancipate Christendom, Russian authorities organized a series of holidays in Moscow, St Petersburg, and other Russian cities, as well as in the Mediterranean bases, devoted to military and naval victories. These scenarios of power perpetuated Russian patriotism and the awesomeness of Russia’s autocrat. Catherine’s propaganda also drew upon the secular ideas of the Enlightenment by promoting the first Russian translations of ancient Greek texts and the importation of classical themes into Russian architecture, drama, ballet, and opera. Arguably, Empress Catherine was the founder of Russian philhellenism. In addition to military experience, the Archipelago expedition increased Russian contacts with the world of maritime transportation and commerce. Russians serving in the imperial flotilla gained rare opportunities to expand their intellectual horizons, and compare the mythological with the real. Many Russians learned that the Christian population of the Balkans was possibly ready to revolt. The Treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardji (1774) that ended the war represented a landmark in Russian and Ottoman history. The treaty made Crimea independent, granted Russia control of the northern Black Sea littoral, and awarded the Tsar a right of remonstrance on behalf of the principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia. In a seemingly minor concession in the agreement, the Ottomans granted Russia the right to a public “Russian-Greek” church in Constantinople. Subsequent interpretation expanded this clause into Russian protection over all Ottoman Orthodox Christians.13 Eugenios Voulgaris (1716–1806), one of the most distinguished Greek intellectuals of the time, celebrated the Russian victory in a hymn composed

11 For an excellent review of the connection between the Archipelago expedition and Greek selfconsciousness, see Nikos V. Rotzokos, Ethnaphypnisi kai ethnogenesi: Orlophika kai elliniki istoriographia (Athens: Vivliograma, 2007). 12 Smilianskaia, Rossiia v Sredizemnomor’e, 418–21; Venturi, End of the Old Regime, 83–4; Camariano-Cioran, “La Guerre russo-turque,” 531. 13 The text of the agreement is published in T. Iuzefovich, Dogovory Rossii s Voctokom politicheski i torgovye (St Petersburg: O. I. Bakst, 1869), 24–41. Important analyses include Roderic H. Davison, “ ‘Russian Skill and Turkish Imbecility’: The Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainardji Reconsidered” and “The ‘Dosografa’ Church in the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca,” in Essays in Ottoman and Turkish History, 1774–1923: The Impact of the West (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1990), 29–50, 51–9; E. I. Druzhinina, Kiuchuk-Kainardzhiiskii mir 1774 goda: Ego podgotovka i zakliuchenie (Moscow: Nauka, 1955); and Virginia H. Aksan, An Ottoman Statesman in War and Peace: Ahmed Resmi Efendi, 1700–83 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1995), 163–9.

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in ancient Greek meters. The illustrious leader of the Greek Enlightenment, Adamantios Korais (1748–1833), considered the war an important step in the march toward liberation.14 In subsequent decades, Greek yearnings for Russian protection were voiced in hymns, songs, and poems, which became a powerful device for asserting Russian predominance and prestige in the Balkans. Pamphlets and poems kindled the hope that redemption might come from the north. Prophecies spoke of a xanthon genos (blond race) and a diado Ivan (Uncle Ivan), destined to liberate Christians from their Muslim overlords. Russia’s leaders used the state’s primacy among the Orthodox peoples to extend their sphere of interest over all the Ottoman Orthodox. International events and internal circumstances led Catherine II to think deeply about the future of Russian influence in the Ottoman Balkans. The so-called Greek Project, an ambitious plan for a revived Greek kingdom with its capital in Constantinople, was the result of the Empress’s ruminations. Although it went unfulfilled, the project entailed an arrangement with Austria for the partition of Ottoman lands and the restoration of the Byzantine Empire.15 Two years later Crimea became Russian territory, and the Treaty of Commerce with the Sublime Porte (1783) reaffirmed special concessions for Russian subjects living and trading in Ottoman territory.16 Russian expansion southward, motivated by the rapid economic development of the Black Sea steppe, continued as impressive growth in grain exports to Europe increased the importance of free movement of merchant ships through the straits. Thus, traditional Orthodox ties, as well as commercial considerations, had an influence on the policy of St Petersburg. Although the outcome of the Russian–Ottoman War of 1787–92 bitterly disappointed the Greek world, intellectuals continued to advocate tsarist intervention as the basis of a comprehensible program of political action.17 The vast Russian Empire was a magnet for Orthodox people of the Balkans in the aftermath of the Russian–Ottoman Wars. Beginning in the 1760s, Russia actively encouraged immigration through an ambitious colonization program in Novorossiia (the north Black Sea littoral zone). Developing this territory promised 14 Eugenios Voulgaris, Epi ti panendoxo eirini in i aeisevastos, eftychis, efsevis, pason ton Rossion aftokrator Aikaterina B’ (St Petersburg, Aug. 3, 1774); cited in Kitromilides, Enlightenment and Revolution, 131; [Adamantios Korais], O nyneshnem prosveshchenii Gretsii, tr. Alexander Negri (St Petersburg: Tip. B. Plavil’shchikova, 1815), 23–4. 15 For a variety of views on this topic, see Andrei Zorin, Kormia dvuglavogo orla . . . literatura i gosudarstvennaia ideologiia v Rossii v poslednei treti XVIII–pervoi terti XIX veka (Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2001): 31–64; E. Hösh, “Das Sogenannte ‘griechische Project’ Katharinas II,” Jahrbücher für Geshichte Osteuropas, 12/2 (1964): 168–206; Vinogradov (ed.), Vek Ekateriny II, 209–18; Hugh Ragsdale, “Russian Projects of Conquest in the Eighteenth Century,” in Ragsdale (ed.), Imperial Russian Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1993), 82–102; Ragsdale, “Evaluating the Traditions of Russian Aggression: Catherine II and the Greek Project,” SEER 66/1 (1988): 91–117; and Ragsdale, “Montmarin and Catherine’s Greek Project,” Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique, 27 (1986): 27–44. 16 The Crimea is discussed in Alan W. Fisher, The Russian Annexation of the Crimea, 1772–83 (Cambridge: CUP, 1970). The Treaty of Commerce is printed in Gabriel Noradounghian, Recueil d’actes internationaux de l’Empire ottoman (Paris: Librairie Cotillon, 1897–1903), i. 351–72. The setting is surveyed in Vinogradov, Dvuglavnyi rossiiskii, 75–152. 17 On the disappointment of the Greeks, see Kitromilides, Enlightenment and Revolution, 133–9.

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to open an enormous expanse of virgin land to cultivation and settlement. The Russian state offered various incentives like cheap land, fishing privileges, and tax and state service exemptions to colonists from the Balkans. Settlements in Taganrog, Kerch, Sevastopol, and Nikolaev gave Russia a sizable Greek community. The Russian state was eager to employ talented Greeks in various government posts and actively recruited thousands of individuals.18 The Greek diaspora in Russia included major church figures, like Eugenios Voulgaris and Nikiphoros Theotokis (1731–1800), who contributed to the Greek Enlightenment.19 In later years, western European travelers made critical remarks about the unique relationship between Russians and Greeks, thus helping spawn the genre of Russophobic literature.20 Another factor encouraging Greek–Russian ties at this time concerned the expansion of economic enterprise in the Black Sea. Business opportunities led to the formation of Greek merchant houses (often family empires) in emporia such as Mariupol and Nezhin. Odessa in the second decade of the nineteenth century was the most rapidly growing port in the world. Greek merchants accumulated great wealth and established insurance companies, banks, and hospitals. Educational establishments founded by prominent Greeks included the Greek Commercial Gymnasium in Odessa, an institution that trained generations of young people who later served the Tsar in an official capacity. Given the circumstances, it was natural that close personal relations emerged, as demonstrated in studies of individuals like Spyridon Destunis, Grigorios Maraslis, and Dimitrios Inglezis.21 These 18 The settlement of Greek communities in Russia is the topic of a vast literature. See e.g. Vassilis Kardasis, Diaspora Merchants in the Black Sea: The Greeks in Southern Russia, 1775–1861 (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2001); G. L. Arsh, Eteristskoe dvizhenie v Rossii: Osvoboditel’naia bor’ba grecheskogo naroda v nachale XIX v. i russko-grecheskie sviazi (Moscow: Nauka, 1970), 129–66; Arsh, “Grecheskaia emigratsiia v Rossiiu v kontse XVIII–nachale XIX v.,” Sovetskaia etnografiia, 3 (1969): 85–95; Grigorii M. Piatigorskii, “Grecheskie pereselentsy v Odesse v kontse XVIII-pervoi treti XIX v.,” in V. N. Vinogradov (ed.), Iz istorii iazyka i kul’tury stran Tsentral’noi i Iugo-Vostochnoi Evropy (Moscow: Nauka, 1985), 33–60; I. I. Sokolov, “Mariupol’skie greki,” Trudy institute slavianovedeniia akademii nauk, SSSR, 1 (1932): 287–317; F. A. Braun, “Mariupol’skie greki,” Zhivaia starina, 1 (1890): 78–92; N. K. Storozhevskii, Nezhinskie greki (Kiev: Univ. tip., 1863). 19 Biographical sketches of Voulgaris and Theotokis were available to Russian readers in Portrety imenitykh muzhei rossiiskoi tserkvi (Moscow: n.p., 1843); A. S. Sturdza, “Evgenii Vulgaris i Nikifor Theotokis, predtechi umstvennago i politicheskago probuzhdeniia grekov,” Moskv, 2 (1844): 337–67; G. S. Destunis, “O zhizni i trudakh K. Ekonomosa,” Strannik, 3 (1860): 1–23; and Destunis, “Ocherki vozrozhdaiushcheisia Gretsii,” BdCh 5 (1858), 2, 9, which states that Voulgaris and Theotokis were too well-known in Russia to warrant detailed commentary. 20 See e.g. Adolphus Slade, Turkey, Greece, and Malta (London: Saunders & Otley, 1837), i. 220–45; Frederick Strong, Greece as a Kingdom, or a Statistical Description of that Country from the Arrival of K. Otho in 1833 down to the Present Time (London: Longman, 1842), 128–9, 146, 344–9, 381; Friedrich Thiersch, De l’état actuel de la Grèce (Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus, 1833), i. 61, 100, 111, 120, 148, 197, 201, 206, 209, 213–15, and ii. 184–99; Jean A. Buchon, La Grèce continentale de la Morée : Voyage, séjour et études historiques en 1840 et 1841 (Paris: C. Gosselin, 1843), 43–5, 99–100. 21 Accounts of Greek mercantile activity in Odessa include Patricia Herlihy, Odessa: A History, 1794–1914 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), 92–5, 125–6, 258–9; Kardasis, Diaspora Merchants, 45–62; Viron Karidis, “A Greek Mercantile paroikia: Odessa, 1774–1829,” in Richard Clogg (ed.), Balkan Society in the Age of Greek Independence (Totowa, NJ: Barnes & Noble, 1981), 111–36; Theophilus C. Prousis, “Dēmētrios S. Inglezēs: Greek Merchant and City Leader of Odessa,” SR 50 (1991): 672–9; Ioanna Papelasis-Minoglou, “The Greek Merchant House of the Russian Black Sea: A 19th-Century Example of a Traders’ Coalition,” International Journal of Maritime History, 10 (1998): 61–104; and K. Papoulidis, Oi Ellines tis Odissou (Thessaloniki: Adhelphon

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individuals assimilated to their adopted land but retained a sense of identity with their homeland. Their experience typifies that of others and contributes to the broader theme of historical connections between Russians and Greeks in the postByzantine era. The early decades of the nineteenth century represent the high-water mark of Greek immigration to the empire of the Tsars. Greek-speaking Christians enlisted in the government and made fortunes in the silk, wine, tobacco, and caviar trade. As Russian expansion toward the south brought increasing contacts with the Ottoman Empire, the Russian state required dragomans, agents, and protégés with knowledge of local affairs and languages. St Petersburg invited gifted individuals to Russia where they received an education and government salary before returning as official state representatives. Such a practice often became a family affair, as fathers found openings in tsarist service for their sons, daughters became educated, and wives received pensions. These personal connections served as strong binding elements between Russia and the people of the Balkans. Russia’s commitment to block French expansion in the eastern Mediterranean during the Napoleonic Wars helped forged an alliance with the Sublime Porte in 1799. As a result, a joint Russian–Ottoman fleet occupied the Ionian Islands, generating additional contacts between Greeks and Russians. Between 1800 and 1807, Russia maintained a protectorate over the Ionian Islands under the aegis of the Septinsular Republic (Kerkyra, Paxos, Lefkada, Ithaki, Kefalonia, Zakynthos, and Kythira), where it experimented with constitutional government of a moderate kind.22 Although it brought the Tsar little permanent territorial or strategic advantage, the Russian presence favorably impressed the Ionian aristocracy. Hundreds of mainland Greeks flocked to the islands and gained military training under the Russian occupational force. As many as 10,000 locally recruited troops trained on Kerkyra. Decades later, the islanders looked back upon the period of the shortlived republic as the “golden age.”23 Future leaders of the Greek kingdom and Ionian Republic, including Ioannis Kapodistrias, Theodoros Kolokotronis, and Andreas Metaxas, gained important lessons in self-rule, social equality, and constitutional government.

Kyrkiakidi, 1999). On the Greek gymnasium, see Kanones ton dioikiton tou Ellinikou Emporikou Scholeiou ton en Odisso graikon (Vilna: n.p., 1819); Ch. Voulodimos, Proti pentikontaetiris tis en Odisso Ellinemporikis Scholis 1817–67 (Odessa: A. Nitze, 1871); Uchebnyi ustav’ chastnago kommercheskago grecheskago uchilishcha v Odesse (Odessa: Trud’, 1878); G. L. Arsh, “Grecheskoe kommercheskoe uchilishche Odessy v 1817–30 gg.: Iz istorii novogrecheskogo Prosveshcheniia,” BI 10 (1987): 31–62; K. Papoulidis, “I Ellinoemporiki scholi tis Odissou, 1817–1917,” in Ellinorosika (Thessaloniki: Adhelphon Kyriakidi, 1988), 133–44; and Papoulidis, “Prosvetitel’skaia i kul’turnaia deiatel’nost’ grekov Odessy v XIX i XX v.,” BI 11 (1989): 190–9. 22 On Russia and the Ionian Republic, see A. M. Stanislavskaia, Rossiia i Gretsiia v kontse XVIII— nachale XIX v.: Politika Rossii v Ionicheskoi Respublike, 1798–1807 gg. (Moscow: Nauka, 1976); Stanislavskaia, Politicheskaia deiatel’nost F. F. Ushakova v Gretsii, 1798–1800 gg. (Moscow: Nauka, 1983); N. E. Saul, Russia and the Mediterranean, 1797–1807 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), 78–104; N. C. Pappas, Greeks in Russian Military Service in the Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries (Thessaloniki: IMXA, 1991), 121–258. 23 George F. Bowen, “Ionian Administration,” Quarterly Review, 91 (1852): 318.

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In the wake of the Russian–Ottoman campaign in the Mediterranean, thousands of Greeks immigrated to Russia. Individuals like Ioannis Vlassopoulos, the future Russian consul in the Peloponnesus, launched successful careers by volunteering for service aboard Russian privateer flotillas. The warm affection among Ionians for co-religionist Russia lived on during the period of the British protectorate (1815–64), and the Tsars maintained consulates and agents in Kerkyra, Kefalonia, and Zakynthos. St Petersburg was not content to remain a passive observer of Ionian affairs. Russia attempted intervention, on occasion, when British governors made arbitrary decisions and unlawful arrests of Ionian subjects. The Russian Foreign Ministry also played an important role in protecting Orthodox interests against the pressures of non-Orthodox missionaries. Russian expansion southward continued during the Russian–Ottoman War of 1806–12. By the Treaty of Bucharest (1812), parts of Serbia became autonomous and Russia obtained the right to annex most of Bessarabia. This brought Russia into close contact with vibrant Greek communities in towns such as Kishinev and Akkerman, which served as centers radiating stimuli about independence from the Sultan. Indeed, diaspora settlements in southern Russia formed the crucible for the arming of the Greek national struggle. RUSSIA AND THE GREEK WAR O F INDEPENDENCE (1821 – 18 27 ) In the course of about fifty years before the outbreak of the Greek War of Independence in 1821, many of the Christian reaya (tax-paying subjects) of the Ottoman Empire began gradually to adopt new types of self-awareness.24 An early champion for independence, the Greek poet and political thinker Rigas Velestinlis (1757–98), articulated a kind of democratic republic of Christians and Muslims under the umbrella of a common Greek language and government. Rigas published a constitution of an imagined Hellenic Republic with a map indicating concrete plans for political sovereignty.25 A less radical, more realistic vision for national 24 The scholarly literature on pre-revolutionary Greek national consciousness is extensive. I will cite here only Roderick Beaton, “Antique Nation? ‘Hellenes’ on the Eve of Greek Independence and in Twelfth-Century Byzantium,” Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies, 31/1 (2007): 76–95; Loukia Droulia, “Towards Modern Greek Consciousness,” Historical Review/La Revue Historique, 1 (2004): 51–67; and Petros Pizanias, “From Reaya to Greek Citizen: Enlightenment and Revolution, 1750–1832,” in Petros Pizanias (ed.), The Greek Revolution of 1821: A European Event (Istanbul: Isis Press, 2011), 11–81. 25 See C. M. Woodhouse, Rhigas Velestinlis: The Proto-Martyr of the Greek Revolution (London: Denise Harvey, 1995); Paschalis Kitromilides, Rigas Velestinlis: Theoria kai praksi (Athens: Greek Parliament, 1998); Kitromilides, “An Enlightenment Perspective on Balkan Cultural Pluralism: The Republican Vision of Rhigas Velestinlis,” History of Political Thought, 24 (2003): 465–79; and G. L. Arsh, “Rigas Velestinlis—grecheskii revoliutsioner-demokrat, borets protiv osmanskogo iga (ego prakticheskaia revoliutsionnaia deiatel’nost.),” Balkanskii istoricheskii sbornik (Kishinev: Izd. Shtiintsa, 1966), 7–37. For a fascinating glimpse into Rigas’s reception in Russia, see N. Traikoff, “Rigas Velestinlis en Russie: Traductions russes de la ‘Marseillaise grecque’ et du ‘Thourios’,” Byzantinisch-Neugriechische Jahrbücher, 16 (1939): 156–68.

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self-determination was developed by the philologist and physician Adamantios Korais, who incorporated the broader ideals of liberal rights and Christian morals into an outline of Greece’s future independence after a long period of preparation. Korais’s celebrated essay on the “progress of the Greek mind,” titled Mémoire sur l’état actuel de la civilization dans la Grèce, published in Paris in 1803, explores the sociological, cultural, and moral change necessary for liberty to flourish in Greece. The preface to the Russian translation of the Mémoire, published in St Petersburg in 1815, delivers a scorching indictment of Ottoman barbarism and tyranny. Celebrating the achievements of the author, the Russian translator avers that the renaissance of the Greeks is near.26 Whereas this intellectual activity set the groundwork for political emancipation, the Philiki Etaireia was the true organizing force for an uprising. Founded in Odessa in 1814 by three expatriate Greeks, recent research indicates that the society effectively began its activity two or three years later.27 A clandestine organization with rituals, symbols, and oaths similar to the Italian Carbonari, the Philiki Etaireia had important cells in Novorossiia and the Danubian principalities, and recruited members from Moscow, St Petersburg, Odessa, Taganrog, Kishinev, Kiev, and other towns. A contemporary essay in Russian archives notes that an early goal of the society consisted of “informing the Russian court that the nation was ready to take arms with the assistance of His Majesty the Emperor.”28 Many Greeks in Russian service supported or joined the Philiki Etaireia, including the secretary of the embassy at Constantinople and future Russian ambassador to Greece, Gavriil A. Katakazy. The dragoman of the Russian consulate in Patras, Ioannis K. Paparrigopoulos, was one of its most active members. He engaged in key negotiations with Ali Pasha in 1820 in Preveza, and undertook a mission to St Petersburg to make the case for war against the Sultan.29 Before leaving for Russia, Paparrigopoulos encouraged various kapitanioi and armatoloi (native Greeks 26 O nyneshnem prosveshchenii, unpaginated preface. On Korais, see Boris I. Ordynskii’s Adamantii Korai: Prosvetitel novykh grekov (Moscow: Tip. Aleksandra Semena, 1857), which contains critical commentary and excerpts of Korais’s autobiography in Russian translation; and Paschalis Kitromilides (ed.), Adamantios Korais and the European Enlightenment (Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 2010), with an extensive bibliography. The exhaustive survey by Emmanuel N. Franghiscos, “A Survey of Studies on Adamantios Korais during the Nineteenth Century,” Historical Review/La Revue Historique, 2 (2005): 93–128, omits Russian-language scholarship. 27 K. Svolopoulos, “I sistasi tis Philikis Etaireias: mia epanaprosengisi,” Ta Istorika, 35 (2001): 283–98; Roderick Beaton, Byron’s War: Romantic Rebellion, Greek Revolution (Cambridge: CUP, 2013), 74; G. L. Arsh, Tainoe obshchestvo “Filiki Eteriia” (Moscow: Nauka, 1965); Arsh, Eteristskoe dvizhenie v Rossii; Arsh, “Dorevoliutsionnaia Gretsiia,” in Vinogradov, Istoriia Balkan, 117–22; Theophilus C. Prousis, Russian Society and the Greek Revolution (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 1994), 18–24, 183–5; Petrunina, Grecheskaia natsiia, 147–52. 28 “Mémoire historique sur l’origine et les progrès de l’Hétairie rédigée d’après les notions fournis par le Prince A. Handjery et le Cte. Bulgari, les négociants S. Mavro et Bari, etc.,” RGADA, f. 1278, op. 1, d. 93, ll. 5–10. 29 Ioannis Philimon, Dokimion istorikon peri tis Ellinikis Epanastaseos (Athens: Typois P. Soutsa kai D. Ktena, 1859–61), ii. 407–8, 413–15; G. L. Arsh, Albaniia i Epir v kontse XVIII–nachale XIX v.: Zapadnobalkanskie pashalyki Osmanskoi imperii (Moscow: Nauka, 1963), 315–16; Arsh, Eteristskoe dvizhenie v Rossii, 167–8, 208–9, 224, 262, 276; Ioannis Nicolopoulos, “Ioannis Paparigopulos— eterist, rossiiskii konsul, grecheskii zemlevladelets,” in Greki i Rossiia XVII–XX vv. (St Petersburg: Aleteiia, 2007), 120–52.

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serving Ottoman military duty but who sometimes blended with the resistance), prominent clergy, and primates to join forces with the secessionist movement organized by the “Lion of Ioannina,” Ali Pasha. He argued that if Ali could delay the Ottomans for a period without Greek help, then the Russians would almost certainly become involved, and the Greek masses would rise in rebellion.30 In the meantime, Paparrigopoulos claimed to be seeking the advice of the mysterious Archi (supreme authority) of the Philiki Etaireia in St Petersburg. These schemes helped propagate the perception among the Greek military chieftains and primates of the Tsar’s support, an impression that was hard to extinguish. Rumors that Ioannis Kapodistrias, the Russian co-minister of foreign affairs, was the leader of the society, further invigorated Greek expectations. Kapodistrias’s refusal to endorse the society did little to dampen hopes for official Russian support.31 Next in line for the leadership of the society was a dashing young general in the Russian army named Alexandros Ypsilantis (1792–1828).32 An ethnic Greek prince from a Phanariot family, Ypsilantis began to recruit members and collect money for weapons and supplies. A Russian general as leader of the society swelled Greek hopes that the Tsar would support their fight for freedom. The society’s scattered allusions about Russian intervention further invigorated the dream for emancipation. According to the historical sketch on the Philiki Etaireia in Russian archives, “if the name of Russia was not placed at the forefront by Ypsilantis, the society would have languished without the least result and suffered the same fate as the plans of Rigas.”33 Tsar Alexander was placed in a difficult position therefore when, on February 22, 1821, Ypsilantis crossed the Pruth into Ottoman Moldavia accompanied by a small group of supporters, aiming to spark a general rebellion against Ottoman rule. Issuing a proclamation summoning Greeks and Moldavians to participate in “the fight for faith and motherland,” Ypsilantis sent written appeals to the Tsar for aid.34 Kapodistrias replied that the Tsar always had profound respect 30 Paparrigopoulos to Ypsilantis, in Philimon, Dokimion istorikon, i. 229–30. Denis Skiotis, “The Greek Revolution: Ali Pasha’s Last Gamble,” in Nikiforos Diamandouros et al. (eds), Hellenism and the First Greek War of Liberation (1821–30): Continuity and Change, (Thessaloniki: IMXA, 1976), 100, states that “it would hardly be an exaggeration . . . that it was in the secret councils of these two men [Ali Pasha and Paparrigopoulos] that the nature and timing of the revolution of 1821 was first shaped.” 31 On the complex relations between Kapodistrias and the society, see G. L. Arsh, Ioann Kapodistriia v Rossii (1809–22) (St Petersburg: Aleteiia, 2003), 156–90; and C. M. Woodhouse, “Kapodistrias and the Philiki Etairia, 1814–21,” in Richard Clogg (ed.), The Struggle for Greek Independence (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1973), 104–34. 32 See G. L. Arsh, “Aleksandr Ipsilanti i ego vsaimootnosheniia s pravitel’stvom Rossii,” in I. S. Dostian (ed.), Rossiia i Balkany: Iz istorii obshchestvenno-politicheskikh i kul’turnykh sviazei (Moscow: Nauka, 1995), 208–21; Arsh, “Ipsilanti v Rossii,” Voprosy istorii, 3 (1985): 88–101; G. L. Arsh and Constantin Svolopoulos (eds), Alexandre Ypsilanti: Correspondance inédite 1816–28 (Thessaloniki: IMXA, 1999). 33 “Mémoire historique sur l’origine et les progress de l’Heterie,” RGADA, f. 1278, op. 1, d. 93, l.10. 34 MV 32 (Apr. 20, 1821) reports the Ypsilantis proclamation “not just to the inhabitants of both Principalities but to the entire Greek nation living in other regions of the Ottoman Empire.” A contemporary Russian translation appears in Russkii arkhiv (1868): 294–7. Russian official policy and the ensuing War of Independence is covered in Prousis, Russian Society, 26–83; Richard Stites, The Four Horsemen: Riding to Liberty in Post-Napoleonic Europe (Oxford: OUP, 2014), 186–211; Alexander Bitis, Russia and the Eastern Question: Army, Government, and Society, 1815–33 (Oxford: OUP/British Academy, 2006), 98–121; B. Jelavich, Russia’s Balkan Entanglements (1806–1914) (Cambridge: CUP,

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for Ypsilantis and his noble sentiments, especially regarding Greek Christians, yet the insurrection in Moldavia would not justify rupturing relations with the Sublime Porte.35 Simultaneously, the raising of a Greek flag and the swearing-in of armed men took place in important towns and villages throughout the Peloponnese. Russian readers were well-informed about these events, thanks to prolific reporting in newspapers and “thick journals.” For example, a fascinating three-part essay titled “Contemporary Conditions in Greece,” published in the Moscow News in April 1821 states that: “The country, which spread enlightenment, science, and art to all of Europe, the fatherland of the Homeric gods and heroes, the people, which possesses great generals, statesmen, poets and philosophers, currently exists in the most uncivilized region of Europe. Without a doubt, the iron scepter of the Osmans [Ottomans] will use all means possible, so that Greece will never exit the barbarism from which it is currently immersed.” Incredibly, the essay goes on to describe the renaissance of the Greeks during the past thirty years, especially among the Greeks of Ioannina: Among their main subjects include the study of the ancient Greek language, and the perfection of modern Greek or Romaika and mathematics. Schools in which the ancient Greek language is taught exist everywhere: one in Smyrna, two in Ioannina, two in Athens, two on the island of Chios, one on Patmos, and so on. Greek students at the same time need to study a great deal before they can think about reinventing themselves and returning to a condition of freedom, which they very strongly desire, and which of course everybody wishes from the heart, except for the Turkish pasha.36

The tone of the article indicates the relative openness of Alexandrine Russia, as well as the incongruence between official policy and popular interests. Convinced that Ali Pasha’s diversion could keep the Ottomans at bay, in March the 50-year-old Archbishop Germanos of Patras, a member of the Philiki Etaireia since 1818, called for insurrection and declared Greece independent.37 Peasants and klephts (“brigands” in Greek) unfurled their banners and assembled their weapons. The separate and isolated movements of defiance against Ottoman 1991), 49–75; Petrunina, Grecheskaia natsiia, 147–93; G. L. Arsh, “Grecheskii narod podnialsia na revoliutsiiu,” in Vinogradov, Istoriia Balkan, 178–89. The relevant documents from the Russian Foreign Ministry for the period 1821–30 are published in VPR xii–xvi. The much neglected Ottoman perspective is provided by H. Şükrü Ilicak, “The Revolt of Alexandros Ipsilantis and the Fate of the Fanariots in Ottoman Documents,” and Yusuf Hakan Erdem, “The Greek Revolt and the End of the Old Ottoman Order,” in Pizanias, The Greek Revolution of 1821, 225–39, 257–64; and Y. H. Erdem, “ ‘Do Not Think of the Greeks as Agricultural Labourers’: Ottoman Responses to the Greek War of Independence,” in Faruk Birtek and Thaleia Dragonas (eds), Citizenship and the Nation-State in Greece and Turkey (London: Routledge, 2005), 78–83. 35 Kapodistrias to Ypsilantis, Laibach, Mar. 1821, RGADA, f. 3, op. 1, d., 68, ll. 1–3. See also, VPR x. 76–8. 36 MV 28 (Apr. 4, 1821), 33 (Apr. 23, 1821), 35 (Apr. 30, 1821). 37 According to Nicolopoulos, “Ioannis Paparigopulos,” 124, “The underlying Greek triumvirate: General Consul of Russia Vlassopulos, first dragoman Paparrigopoulos, and Bishop of Patras Germanos—was responsible for the Greek liberation uprising in the Peloponnesus.” MV 28 (Apr. 6, 1821) reported of Ali Pasha’s insurrection.

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officials were not coordinated, and Ypsilantis’s military escapade failed ignominiously. The Russians did not intervene and his appeal had little resonance among the non-Greek subjects who did not rise up in rebellion. But more followed in the Peloponnesus, the central mainland, and the islands, where concerted attacks by Muslims on Christians or by Christians on Muslims lasted for the next decade. The Greeks, disorganized and prone to infighting, often stood near complete defeat. Though profoundly affected by the plight of Orthodox Christians, Tsar Alexander initially disavowed the Greek rebellion and eschewed unilateral intervention. On April 20, the Moscow News reported that General Ypsilantis, “who considered himself chosen to liberate the Greeks from the Turkish yoke has been released from service by imperial decree.”38 However, a broad section of politically conscious Russians (and especially the military leadership) yearned to intervene in the increasingly vicious struggle. Press reports regarding the bravery of the Spartans, the massacres of Christians, and the enslavement of women and children sparked Russian Orthodox sympathy and support. Reports containing inflated figures of Ypsilantis’s army, “consisting of 20,000 Arnauts, Moldavians, and Greeks, who fight under the slogan ‘freedom or death,’ and armed with multiple cannon” naturally invited interest.39 A shift in temperament occurred when a mob in Constantinople executed the Ecumenical Patriarch, Gregorios V, on Easter Sunday in April 1821, along with three Greek bishops. The hanging of the patriarch’s body from the gate of the patriarchate became a central symbol of martyrdom in the narrative of the Greek revolt. Arrests of several more bishops and clergy, and widespread attacks against churches and property, led to an exodus of Christians from the Ottoman capital. The desecration of the patriarch’s body, which was left hanging in public for three days, dragged through the streets, and thrown into the Golden Horn, transformed the Greek revolt into a national crusade. The incident created one of the most intense diplomatic exchanges in the history of the Eastern Question.40 A most interesting source for the study of outbreak of the Greek rebellion consists of the dispatches and journal entries of the Russian ambassador to the Sublime Porte, Grigorii A. Stroganov (1770–1857). Placed in an extremely delicate situation, he aimed to strike a balance between working in concert with the other powers, negotiating with the Porte, and protecting Russian treaty rights and the lives of the Orthodox. His conduct received the full approbation of the Tsar, who wrote him a personal letter in March, just as news of Ypsilantis’s rebellion reached the great power conference at Laibach (Ljubljana). Stroganov’s journal from March to July 1821 provides a painstaking account of events as they unfolded. His entries emphasize the cruelty, barbarism, and lawlessness of the opening phase of the 38

MV 32 (Apr. 20,1821). MV 33 (Apr. 23, 1821); 35 (Apr. 30, 1821), 44 (June 1, 1825), 45 (June 4, 1821), 46 (June 8, 1821), 51 (June 25, 1821). 40 The dispatches of the British ambassador to Sublime Porte, Lord Strangford, ed. Theophilus Prousis, vividly depict these events, Lord Strangford at the Sublime Porte (1821): The Eastern Crisis, i (Istanbul: Isis Press, 2010). See also Robert Walsh, A Residence at Constantinople (London: Frederick Westley & A. H. Davis, 1836), i. 299–337. 39

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Greek rebellion.41 After repeated meetings with the grand vizier, Stroganov at last issued the Ottoman Divan an ultimatum regarding the treatment of Orthodox Christians. It was refused. Public executions of rebel fugitives, maltreatment of Russian merchants, and the prolonged occupation of Wallachia and Moldavia by Ottoman troops led to Stroganov’s departure from Constantinople, an act formalizing the break in Russian–Ottoman relations.42 He first relocated to Odessa, where the Greek community of the city (joined by scores of refuges from Constantinople) wrote to express their gratitude for his protection: “the captivity of the Greeks is about to end. The glorious day of their complete deliverance appears on the horizon! On this day, desired for so many centuries, the Greeks will repeat the sacred names of Emperor Alexander and his dignified minister Baron Stroganov with enthusiasm and veneration, between cries and tears of joy, for centuries to come!”43 In October 1823, Matvei Ia. Minchaki (Minciaky)—the former Russian consulgeneral in Iaşi (Jassy)—replaced Dimitrii V. Dashkov as the chargé d’affaires in Constantinople. It was not until 1825 that St Petersburg sent Aleksandr I. Ribop’er (Ribeaupierre) as the primary minister plenipotentiary (he became ambassador in January 1827) to the Sublime Porte. Ribop’er and Minchaki wrote copious memoranda on the Greek revolt based on intelligence from agents throughout the Aegean, the Morea, and the Ionian Islands. The activities of these diplomats received wide coverage in the Russian daily press.44 News of the Greek struggle ignited an intense response in Russian society, as thousands of Russians personally participated in the struggle to free “our coreligionist Greeks” (edinovertsy nam greki). Russian officialdom and the imperial family supported the campaign to alleviate the suffering of the Greek insurgents through humanitarian relief-aid. The Greek struggle stirred Russian intellectuals who began to rediscover both the classical heritage and their own past. The revolt inspired major writers, including Aleksandr S. Pushkin and Vasilii A. Zhukovskii, to lionize Greek heroes in their poems and stories. Russian scholars such as Aleksei N. Olenin and Porfirii Uspenskii began exploring Byzantine history for the first time. Support also came from the grassroots level as villages and parishes contributed to Greek 41 Alexander I to G. A. Stroganov, Laibach, Mar. 31, 1821, RGADA, f. 1278, op. 1, d. 77, l. 11. Stroganov’s journal is contained in RGADA, f. 1278, op. 1, d. 92, ll. 1–166; MV 35 (Apr. 30, 1821), 52 (June 29, 1821) report of Stroganov’s difficulties in negotiating with the Porte. 42 See Stroganov’s correspondence with St Petersburg in VPR xiii. 113–19, 132–3, 154–9, 162–8, 176–8, 203–10, 224–7, 637–48; E. P. Kudriavtseva, Russkie na Bosfore: Rossiiskoe posol’svto v Konstantinopole v pervoi polovine XIX veka (Moscow: Nauka, 2010), 211–15; Prousis, Lord Strangford at the Sublime Porte (1821); and Prousis, Russian Society, 37–8. 43 Letter (in French) signed (in Greek) by more than one hundred Greeks of Odessa and refugees from Constantinople to G. A. Stroganov, Odessa, Aug. 3, 1821, RGADA, f. 1278, op. 1, d. 77, ll. 13–14. See also G. M. Paitigorskii, “Vostochnyi krizis 20-kh gg. XIX v. i grecheskaia emigratsiia Odessy,” Sovetskoe Slavianovedenie, 1 (1985): 50–64. 44 Selected material from the writings of Minchaki and Ribop’er are published in VPR xiii–xvi. Russian agents reported from Aegina (Ioannis Vlassopoulos), Zakynthos (Anton Sandrini), Kerkyra (S. P. Popandopoulos), Mytilini and Syros (S. L. Svilarch), Santorini (B. Marchesini), Naxos (K. Raftopoulos), Samos (G. Svoronos), Mykonos (Pietro Kordia), Tinos (Ivan Dzhani), Navarino (P. Robert), Cyprus (Mario Santi), and elsewhere. See, “Delo ob uchrezhdenii konsul’stv,” AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 78 (1829); AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 163 (1831); Kudriavtseva, Russkie na Bosfore, 215–25. For newspaper reports, see e.g. SPch 25 (Feb. 27, 1826).

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refugee relief. The Odessa Relief Committee alone committed 1,150,000 rubles of aid to destitute Greek families.45 During the 1820s, the “Greek Question” constituted the hottest political issue in a relatively quiet period of international affairs. Despite the restrictions imposed by the censorship apparatus, the Third Section of His Imperial Majesty’s Own Chancellery, Russian fascination with revolutionary events continued unabated. Scores of pamphlets, historical essays, and booklets were published in connection with the Greek rebellion.46 Although tsarist ministers lost no time in voicing their disapproval of the uprising, reports circulated freely in the press. Throughout the 1820s, columns in popular dailies, such as the Northern Bee, Messenger of Odessa, Moscow News, and St Petersburg Gazette, contain a powerful concoction of divergent views. Illustrated books, travelogues, and paintings by Russians provided observers with remarkable impressions of the fight so that Greece might be free.47 Reports of ghastly sieges, bloody pitched battles, and the suffering of innocent victims evoke the struggles of the ancient Greeks against tyranny and the martyrdom of Orthodox saints. Detailed reports on the naval activities of Ibrahim Pasha (the son of the semi-independent ruler of Egypt, Mehmed Ali) in the Mediterranean and on Crete convey the intense brutality of the Greek– Ottoman encounter at sea.48 Besides military affairs, Russian newspapers contain abundant information on the cultural progress of the Greek people. The Northern Bee, on January 3, 1825, reports of the collection underway by many wealthy Greeks of the Morea for the establishment of a Greek university in Argos and the 45 See Prousis, Russian Society, 26–83; Arsh, “Grecheskii narod podnialsia na revoliutsiiu,” in Vinogradov, Istoriia Balkan, 178–89; I. S. Dostian, “Russkii uchastnik grecheskoi revoliutsii,” Voprosy istorii, 4 (1978): 210–14; S. Lukatos, “ ‘Pamiatnik’ russkim philellinam,” BI 11 (1989): 76–81; and G. M. Piatigoskii, “Deiatel’nost’ Odesskoi grecheskoi vspomogatel’noi komissii v 1821–33 gg. (Po materialam Gosudarstvennogo arkhiva Odesskoi obl.),” BI 8 (1982): 135–52. 46 A sampling of contemporary works includes E. Metaksa, Istoriia grecheskikh proizshestvii, obstoiatel’no i podrobno opisannykh ot pervonachal’nago deistviia grekov do sego vremeni (Moscow: Universitetskoi Tip., 1824); Sergei N. Glinka, Kartina istoricheskaia i politicheskaia Novoi Gretsii (Moscow: Tip. Avgusta Semena, 1829); Konstantin M. Bazili, Arkhipelag i Gretsiia v 1830 i 1831 godakh (St Petersburg: N. Grech, 1834); Bazili, “Korinf,” ZhMNP 11 (1836): 188–202; G. Pukevilia, Zhisn’ Ali Pashi Ianinskago, ot ego detstva do smerti: S podrobnym opisaniem neobychainykh ego zlodeistv i uzhasnoi tiranii nad poraboshchennymi narodami Gretsii, tr. Pavel Stroev (Moscow: Tip. S. Selivanovskago, 1822–4); Edgar Kine, Novaia Gretsiia v otnosheniiakh svoikh k drevnosti, tr. Ksenofontii Polevoi (Moscow: Tip. Lazarevykh Instituta Vostochnykh Iazykov, 1835); Vut’e, Zapiski polkovnika Vut’e o nyneshnei voine Grekov, tr. Orest Somov (St Petersburg: N. Grech, 1824–5); Stepan Martsell, Opravdanie grekov (St Petersburg: N. Grech, 1826); Istoriia Gretsii s chatiiu i drevnei istorii, sluzhashcheiu poiasneniem v politicheskikh zakliuchaiushchaia k sebe 43 kartiny dliia priiatnogo i poleznogo zaniatiia detei svoego pola (Moscow: Tip. Imp. Mosk. Teatra, 1824); F. V. Bulgarin, Kartina voiny Rossii s Turtsieiu v tsarstvovanie imperatora Nikolai I (St Petersburg: N. Grech, 1830); “Afinskia dvrevnosti, utselevshiia v nyneshniuiu voiny,” Severnyi arkhiv, 8 (1825): 381–91; O. I. Senkovskii, “Otryvok iz dnevnik putevykh zapisok g. Senkovskago,” Severnyi arkhiv, 1/5 (1822): 421–43. 47 O. A. Belobrova, “Grecheskaia tema v russkoi knizhnoi illiustratsii pervoi poloviny XIX v.,” BI 11 (1989): 95–122; Belobrova, “O grecheskoi teme v russkom iskusstve pervoi treti XIX v.,” BI 6 (1980): 140–61. 48 See e.g. SPch 9 (Jan. 20, 1825), 10 (Jan. 22, 1825), 13 (Jan. 29, 1825), 15 (Feb. 3, 1825), 16 (May 2, 1825), 21 (Feb. 17, 1825), 23 (Feb. 21, 1825), 25 (Feb. 26, 1825), 27 (Mar. 3, 1825), 28 (Mar. 5, 1825), 29 (Mar. 7, 1825), 53 (May 2, 1825), 66 (June 2, 1825), 67 (June 4, 1825), 116 (Aug. 26, 1825).

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foundation of a school of higher learning in Athens. The newspaper commented on philanthropic efforts underway in the United States to relieve besieged Greek rebels.49 Exhaustive reports covered the third and final siege of Missolonghi (April 1825–April 1826), an event that triggered an intensification of philhellenism. A letter from a Greek patron in Paris printed in the Northern Bee somewhat oddly expressed “Congratulations to all the friends of the heroes of Missolonghi! These heroes have at last prevailed over their enemies by falling in battle!”50 In essence, news about the Greek revolt could be challenging to the concepts of legitimacy and tradition central to the empire of the Tsars. Reports sanctioning a rebellion against the Sultan, the sovereign ruler, exude a strong sense of irony. Ambiguity abounds in reports of peasant uprisings against Ottoman landowners and the torching of ancestral estates. Above all, the Christian uprising helped inspire anti-tsarist and anti-Russian awakenings among Ukrainians, Poles, Armenians, and others in Russia, rumblings that later rejected the Russian state chauvinism of Official Nationality and arguably contributed to the demise of the empire. In addition, increased awareness of events in Greece and the Ottoman Empire encouraged the study of Oriental texts, often encoded with messages of political and ethnic diversity. Thus, the study of the anti-autocratic rhetoric connected to Greek independence in Russian print culture encourages a reconsideration of the Nicholaevan period as one of unmitigated oppression, the apogee of autocracy. In impressive ways, therefore, the Greek Revolution aroused interest from nearly all sectors of Russian society (see Figure 1.1). It elicited diverse opinions and exposed contradictory strains of reform and reaction among even the most conservative defenders of the legitimate order. In preliminary notes for an essay on “Modern Greece,” Spyridon Destunis, a native of Kefalonia and the Russian consul-general in Smyrna (1818–21), distinguished the positive and negative aspects of the conflict: “The insurrection of 1821 put to the fore what was most grand and most ignoble in the nation . . . On the one hand we have seen an admirable heroism, an implacable hate for tyranny, and passion for independence, for the conservation of honor, and for the national religion . . . but at the same time we have encountered arrogance after victory, despondency and cowardice in setbacks, fear towards the enemies, treasons and revolting perfidies.”51 Russian sympathy was intense, but overall public opinion had a minor impact on tsarist policy. Foreign Minister Nesselrode argued against cooperation in the emancipation of Greece, for he believed that such a measure would undermine the Tsar’s moral principles and threaten the status quo. A free and independent

49

SPch 2 (Jan. 3, 1825); SPch 8 (Jan. 17, 1825). SPch 55 (May 8, 1826). Particularly detailed reports are contained in SPch 38 (Mar. 30, 1826), 40 (Apr. 3, 1826), 42 (Apr. 8, 1826), 44 (Apr. 13, 1826), 45 (Apr. 15, 1826), 54 (May 6, 1826). 51 S. I. Destunis, “Vypiski o nov. gretsii,” in “Istoriia Venetsii srednikh vekov,” 1830–40s, OR RNB, f. 250, d. 72, l. 33. On the career of Destinus, see Theophilus C. Prousis, “The Destunis Collection in the Manuscript Section of the Saltykov-Shchedrin State Public Library in Leningrad,” MGSY 5 (1989): 395–452. 50

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Greece, he maintained, would guarantee complications in the future.52 Another state servant close to the throne, the enlightened and reform-minded Count Pavel D. Kiselev, vilified the Greek insurgents for having “exposed the weakness of Turkey and made visible the causes of its impending dissolution, inherent in its interior organization, acquiring day by day a progression that was impossible to stop.”53 Nesselrode and Kiselev were not alone in their aversion to the rebellion. From the beginning, Kapodistrias endeavored to maintain Russian neutrality, and to isolate the conflict at its source. Tsar Alexander also remained opposed to intervention, notwithstanding Ottoman reprisals against the Orthodox Church and violations of Russia’s Black Sea trading rights. In the eyes of the Tsar, the supreme necessity was to safeguard the structure of the conservative system articulated in 1815. No matter how oppressive Ottoman rule might be, St Petersburg refused to sanction support for rebels who were defying their legitimate sovereign. Torn between the desire to intercede on behalf of suffering Christians, and his commitment to cooperation with the other powers, Alexander’s dualist policy enabled the Greek struggle to remain a mostly internal Ottoman affair in the early 1820s. When, in 1825, a powerful Egyptian army led by Ibrahim Pasha landed in the Peloponnesus, representatives of Britain and Russia were striving to formulate a possible diplomatic way to deal with the crisis.54 Alexander’s unexpected death later in the year, however, temporarily suspended the negotiations. Tsar Nicholas I, who came to power in 1825, was motivated by factors similar to those of his brother’s later years, such as genuine idealism, religious conservatism, and a sense of supreme responsibility. Like his brother, he had a deep hostility to rebellion in any form and a sincere commitment to maintain international agreements. “My brother,” Nicholas said, “left me with extremely important affairs, and most important of all: the Eastern affair . . . Don’t begin to think that I will decide it unilaterally . . . I will be very pleased to settle with all of my allies.”55 Nicholas continued to search for means to pacify the region. By 1826, supported by many of his brother’s closest advisors, he began making plans for direct intervention. In a personal letter to the Tsar, Stroganov urged action: “the mantle has fallen on the father of the Russian people, on the liberator of all nations.” As a seasoned diplomat counseling a young executive, Stroganov argued that “only a policy that is strictly national and religious” would stop the carnage. “Your intervention will be an act of justice, piety, and magnanimity that will bestow upon the reign of Your Imperial 52

Nesselrode circular dispatch, Laibach, Mar. 18, 1831, VPR xii (1990): 70–1. P. D. Kiselev, “Quelques vues sur les affaires actuelles de la Turquie,” Bucharest, May 20, 1833, RGADA, f. 15, op. 1, d. 316, l. 246. 54 The clearest account of the diplomatic discussions remains C. W. Crawley, The Question of Greek Independence: A Study of British Policy in the Near East, 1821–33 (Cambridge: CUP, 1930), 43–62. The activities of Ibrahim in the Morea fill two entire years of SPch, 1–155 (1825), 1–156 (1826). See also, M. V. Sakellariou, I apovasi tou Ibraim stin Peloponniso katalytis gia tin apodiorganosi tis Ellinikis Epanastasis: 24 Phevrouariou–23 Maiou 1825 (Irakleio: Panepistimiakis Ekdoseis Kritis, 2012); and Hubert Lauvergne, Souvenirs de la Grèce pendant la campagne de 1825 (Paris: Chez Avril de Gastel, 1826). 55 Quoted in S. S. Tatishchev, Vneshniaia politika imperatora Nikolaia I (St Petersburg: Tip. I. N. Skorokhodova, 1887), 137–8. 53

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Fig. 1.1. Surprise attack on the Turkish Camp at Zeituni in September 1824. Color engraving by J. Hussbiegel after Christian Gottfried Heinrich Geissler (1825). Courtesy of the Anne S. K. Brown Military Collection, Brown University.

Majesty the greatest of all benedictions.” In short, Stroganov maintained, it was Russia’s moral and religious duty to intervene on behalf of the embattled Christians, “lest we witness the extermination of our brothers in Jesus Christ.”56 Content to work with his allies, Nicholas’s first foreign policy success was an agreement with Great Britain known as the St Petersburg Protocol (March 23, 1826). In the following year, Russia and Britain, now joined by France, were working hard to reach a settlement to the Greek Question when the near-accidental Battle of Navarino altered the international scene. In less than three hours on the afternoon of October 8, 1827, an allied naval squadron completely annihilated the Ottoman-Egyptian fleet at Navarino Bay in the southwestern Peloponnese. The encounter prevented the further supplying of the Ottoman-Egyptian forces in the Greek peninsula while alerting the Sublime Porte that the powers were willing to intervene effectively. Navarino was a major turning point in the Greek affair and in the history of international relations. First labeled a humanitarian intervention in the late 1820s, official documents characterized it as a consequence of a “war of extermination.”57 When news of the 56

Stroganov to Nicholas I, Paris, Jan. 20, 1826, RGADA, f. 1278, op. 1, d. 103, ll. 1–8. For detailed examinations of Russia’s role in the battle, see V. G. Andrienko, Do i posle Navarina (Moscow: AST, 2002); V. A. Liakhov, Russkaia armiia i flot v voine s otmanskoi turtsiei v 1828–9 godakh (Iaroslav: Verkhne-Volzhskoe knizhnoe izdatel’stvo, 1972), 203–26; and John C. K. Daly, Russian Seapower and “The Eastern Question,” 1827–41 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991), 9–21. See also, Davide Rodogno, Against Massacre: Humanitarian Interventions in the Ottoman Empire, 57

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encounter reached Russia, excerpts from contemporary documents appearing in the press extolled the patriotism, bravery, loyalty, and religious fervor of Russian participants. An eyewitness recounted how Vice-Admiral Login P. Heiden, commander of the Azov, the flagship of the Russian squadron in the Mediterranean, roused the spirits of his subordinates while entering the fray of battle by shouting “Lads, don’t tarnish the dignity of the Russian flag!” Heiden’s crew replied “better death, Your Highness!”58 The Northern Bee, Moscow Telegraph, Military Journal, and Maritime Magazine treated the intervention of Navarino at length.59 Publishers took advantage of the incident to underscore the conservative values of Tsar Nicholas, in a way that anticipated the spirit of Official Nationality. Hundreds of veterans returned to Russia with anecdotes of their exploits against their Ottoman foes. The press singled out one individual, Lieutenant Ivan P. Butenev, for displaying his unusual control of will and profound love for the glory of the fatherland. A cannon ball destroyed his arm during the battle. Ignoring the extreme pain, he held his position at the [artillery] battery, according to his previous orders not to be relieved of his post. They amputated his arm at the shoulder. Hardly had the surgeon finished bandaging him when they said to him that the Turkish frigate had been captured by the Azov fighters, and that our injured wished to participate in the general joy by tearing out their own arms for him.60

The author of an article in the Military Journal made the following interesting connection: “The memorable day of the Battle of Navarino, like 2306 years before it, was the day of liberation for Greece. At Salamis, on the 8th of October, Themistocles with three-hundred-and-eighty ships smashed and almost completely destroyed the fleet of Xerxes.”61 Statements such as these evoked the glory of classical Greece and promoted the national synthesis of the ancient past and the Christian present. Classical references in the press also invoked the polarity between barbarism and civilization already present in western European literature. They illustrate the degree to which Russian society followed Greek affairs. Indeed, it would hardly be an exaggeration to state that the Greek Question received more attention in Russian dailies than any other single topic of foreign affairs in the 1815–1914 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), 83–4, 88; and C. M. Woodhouse, The Battle of Navarino (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1965). 58 Bulgarin, Kartina voiny Rossii s Turtsieiu, 198. 59 Among the more substantial daily reports, see SPch 135 (Nov. 10, 1827), 136 (Nov. 12, 1827), 137 (Nov. 15, 1827), 138 (Nov. 17, 1827), and esp. 151 (Dec. 17, 1827), 142, 143, 144, 145 (1828); V. Bronevskii, “Navarinskaia bitva. (8-go Oktiabria 1827 goda),” VZh 3–4 (1829): 1–65, 1–23; Bulgarin, Kartina voiny Rossii s Turtsieiu; V. P. Mel’nitskii, “Tri glavy iz ocherka deistvii Russkago Flota pri osvobozhdenii Gretsii,” Morskoi sbornik, 2 (1861): 341–80. The fiftieth anniversary of the Battle of Navarino kindled new interest and led to the publication of two book-length studies: A. P. Rykachev, God navarinskoi kampanii 1827 i 1828 (Kronshtadt: Kronshtandskago vestnika, 1888); E. V. Bogdanovich, Navarin 1827–77, 2nd edn (Moscow: I. I. Rodzevich, 1877/French tr. Paris: Charpentier, 1887). See also L. Firsov, I Antarktida i Navarin (Iaroslav: Verkhne-Volzhskoe knizhnoe izdatel’stvo, 1983). 60 Bulgarin, Kartina voiny Rossii s Turtsieiu, 199; Eugene Bogdanovitch, La Bataille de Navarin (1827) d’après les documents inédits des archives impériales russes (Paris: Charpentier, 1887), 104; Butenev’s obituary in SPch 59 (Mar. 12, 1836) revisits the heroic episode. 61 Bronevskii, “Navarinskaia bitva,” 23. See also Bulgarin, Kartina voiny Rossii s Turtsieiu, 212.

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period between 1821 and 1833. The values of patriotism and honor, religious zeal and brotherly cooperation against a cruel infidel despot reflected the conservative ideals of the Tsar. Yet, paradoxically, reports on the Greek revolt could also spread anti-autocratic sentiment. The rebellion against “Ottoman oppression” and the “Turkish yoke” thus serves as a contradictory phenomenon, for while heralding the efforts of freedom fighters, Russian authors attempted to champion conservatism. The youthful Tsar Nicholas initially approved of the “glorious events of Navarino,” and bestowed copious praise, promotions, and decorations on the Russian participants. After nearly twenty years of reflection, however, the Tsar’s attitude toward the conflict became less than auspicious. In a fascinating memorandum dated October 1843, Nicholas wrote that “the Battle of Navarino crowned the whole affair [the Greek rebellion] by a bloody victory, achieved against the fleet of a power with whom we were not at war. But at least our fleet did not follow the orders of the English admiral under whose direction the battle was undertaken.”62 As he struggled to comprehend the parallel forces of revolution and nationalism, the Russian Emperor deplored an incident that thwarted the will of a legitimate sovereign. What the Duke of Wellington famously dubbed as the “untoward event” at Navarino made an unstable international situation more unpredictable. Heiden sailed for Malta to await fresh instructions while Katakazy, the fleet’s interpreter and diplomatic representative, raced overland to St Petersburg carrying news of the battle. The Russian armada suffered significant casualties in the clash, including 59 dead and 139 injured.63 Heiden instructed Russian Consul Vlassopoulos, who was continually moving from island to island in the Aegean collecting intelligence, to inform all individuals navigating under the Russian flag to use extreme caution. Russian vessels were ordered not to approach towns or ports occupied by Ottoman forces until they received assurance that the Russian minister in Constantinople continued to exercise his functions. Although he felt that the state of uncertainty would be only temporary, Heiden was convinced that it would be damaging to “our particular interests and to our commerce in general.”64 The destruction of the Ottoman-Egyptian fleet enabled the Greeks to redouble their efforts. They also began to consider what form their new state would take. A series of national assemblies, beginning in Epidaurus in 1822, debated the questions of leadership, self-government, and national values. Constitutions created during the revolutionary war articulated the notion of natural rights (liberty, 62 Nicholas I, “Affaire grecque,” St Petersburg, Oct. 1843, RGADA, f. 3, op. 1, d. 105, l. 20. For the Tsar’s initial reaction to the battle, see Nesselrode to Kapodistrias, Nov. 11, 1827, VPR xv. 290–1; and Nicholas I to Heiden, Dec. 5, 1828, VPR xvi. 48–50. See also Heiden to Nesselrode, Navarino Bay, Oct. 13, 1827, VPR xv. 273–4; and the first-hand account of Rykachev, God navarinskoi kampanii, 116–20, 158. 63 Bulgarin, Kartina voiny Rossii, 191–2. According to Bulgarin, the British suffered 287 casualties and the French 650. 64 Heiden to Vlassopoulos, Navarino, Oct. 12, 1827, RGADA, f. 15, op. 1 (dopolnenie), d. 84, l. 34.

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property, and honor) that mobilized and unified many of the fragmented segments of Greek society and legitimized the struggle for freedom. A turning point in the development of Greek identity appears in the provisional constitution ratified by the National Assembly at Epidaurus. Article 2 specified that “All indigenous inhabitants of the Land of Greece (Hellas) believing in Christ are Hellenes and are entitled to an equal enjoyment of every right.”65 Thus, at an early stage of the independence movement, two cultural orientations, both the secular “Hellenic” category and the “Romaic” Orthodox religious one, were central to self-awareness. The Epidaurus constitution displays the intellectual and social transformation of Ottoman reaya into Christian Hellenes, or independent Greek Orthodox subjects. In terms of state building, another transition point fashioned by the elite occurred in the spring of 1827, when, during the Third National Assembly in Troezen, the Greek leadership declared a republic and offered Ioannis Kapodistrias the presidency of the new state. According to the Troezen constitution, religion remained a powerful element of identity. It defined Greeks as all those born in the country or from Ottoman-occupied lands, who, “believe in Christ” and wish to fight with the insurgents or live in Greece.66 Still in imperial service, before accepting his new office Kapodistrias solicited the Tsar’s approval. A conservative politician by conviction, following the outbreak of violence in 1821, Kapodistrais’s immediate response was to exculpate himself from the actions of the rebels. “What’s really in my heart,” he wrote to Stroganov at the time, is that I deplore the misfortunes that have destroyed Greece, and I am beside myself to be in such a position. What consoles me is that I have not chosen this position, which I occupy obediently. I have always done my duty, for I have constantly been honest with my compatriots, as towards all those who have relations with me. I say officially to Prince Ypsilantis and Prince Soutsos [former hospodar of Moldavia], what I have said a thousand times before to all the Greeks, who, under different pretexts, have come into Russian territory to ask for consul and assistance. Anyone who supposes that I, tacitly at least, have encouraged the insurrection of Greece is in error, and nobody can better attest to that than you, based on the record of our correspondence since you have been in Constantinople.67

As the uprising unfolded, Kapodistrias tried to defend Greek interests while not jeopardizing those of Russia. In 1822, he recognized the chasm between himself and the Tsar, and retired to Geneva, where he worked with various philhellenic 65 On the translation of the article, see Droulia, “Towards Modern Greek Consciousness,” 51–2. See also, Elli Skopetea, To “Protypo Vasileio” kai i Megali Idea: Opseis tou ethnikou provlimatos stin Ellada, 1830–80 (Athens: Ekdoseis Polytypo, 1988), 35–8; Nikos Rotzokos, “The Nation as a Political Subject: Comments on the Greek National Movement,” in Pizanias, The Greek Revolution of 1821, 151–70; and Anna Couderc, “Religion et identité nationale en Grèce pendant la révolution d’indépendance (1821–32): Le Creuset ottoman et l’influence occidentale,” in Sylvie Gangloff (ed.), La Perception de l’Héritage Ottoman dans les Balkans (Paris: l’Harmattan, 2005), 21–41. 66 On the Troezene assembly and election of Kapodistrias, see Douglas Dakin, British and American Philhellenes during the War of Greek Independence, 1821–33 (Thessaloniki: IMXA, 1955), 145–8. 67 Kapodiastrias to Stroganov, Laibach, Mar. 14, 1821, RGADA, f. 1278, op. 1, d. 118, ll. 69–70.

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societies for the next several years. Still technically a Russian state servant, upon nomination to the presidency in the summer of 1827, Kapodistrias returned to Russia to meet with Tsar Nicholas. His initial plan was to request the Tsar’s permission to depart immediately on an official mission to Greece before the other powers had a chance to intervene. He asked for the huge sum of one million rubles “to assist the poor Greeks and the sorry population,” as well as “all the necessary powers to act as the circumstances of the moment dictate.” If the Tsar did not meet these conditions, then he felt compelled to resign.68 Given the sweeping nature of this proposal, Kapodistrias must have doubted the chances of its approval. Surprisingly, Nicholas initially favored sending him to Greece as the Russian minister extraordinary and plenipotentiary. Nicholas declared, I desire to put an end to the misfortunes in Greece, to the general agitation which they produce, and to the disorder of which it is the victim. In order to bring this about as soon as possible, I am ready to resort to arms. However, my aim is not to give the Greeks a full and complete independence. The primary goal will be to enforce that which my treaty grants unto them. When you arrive in the theater of events, since you know the men and affairs in general, tell me how I can possibly realize this new combination. It will be according to your reports, in conjunction with my allies, that I will make the subsequent and final decisions.69

Yet this stance placed Kapodistrias in a dilemma of sorts, for he preferred the role as Greek president and believed his position would be untenable if still serving under the Tsar. After several personal meetings at Tsarskoe Selo, on 1 July 1827, Nicholas granted his wish and issued a decree announcing his retirement from Russian service after thirty years of irreproachable conduct (see Figure 1.2).70 Despite the plans for intervention, Nicholas exhibited little sympathy for the Greek rebels, and later claimed to have reluctantly taken part in the conversations with Kapodistrias about the new state.71 The Tsar remained strong-willed and decisive, yet his sympathy for Orthodox Christians and desire for peace led to his sanctioning the establishment of an independent kingdom, where he hoped to build a state based upon his conservative values. Unlike his brother Alexander, Nicholas was not interested in the delicate game of diplomacy, in complex negotiations. In that respect, he was at times opposed to working in concert with the European powers and aimed instead at deciding international problems based on his principles. However, when it came to the question of the struggle against the revolutionary wave in Europe, Nicholas was prepared to cooperate.

68 Kapodiastrias to Stroganov, St Petersburg, June 20, 1827, RGADA, f. 1278, op. 1, d. 118, ll. 77–8. 69 Kapodistrias to Nicholas, St Petersburg, June 24, 1827, RGADA, f. 15, op. 1, d. 295, l. 82. 70 Nicholas I to Kapodistrias, Tsarskoe Selo, July 1, 1827; Kapodistrias to Nicholas I, St Petersburg, July 3, 1827, VPR xv. 154, 161–3. Kapodistrias refused a pension to further distance himself from tsarist service. 71 Nicholas I, “Affaire grecque,” Oct. 1843, RGADA, f. 3, op. 1, d. 103, l. 20.

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Fig. 1.2. President of Greece Ioannis Kapodistrias, from Sergei Glinka, Kartina istoricheskaia i politicheskaia Novoi Gretsii (Moscow: Tip. Avgusta Semena, 1829).

R US S I A N– GR EEK R EL AT I ON S D UR ING THE KAPODISTRIAN PRESIDENCY (1828 – 1 83 1) After visiting the cabinets in London and Paris, Kapodistrias arrived at Nafplion, the first Greek capital, on board the English vessel Warspite on January 4, 1828.72 Historians have hotly debated the president’s brief term in office. Some consider it a missed opportunity, with an eminently qualified individual cut down before his plans matured, while others perceive in it the first steps toward constructing an authoritarian regime. No one argues, however, that Kapodistrias did not try very hard to establish law and public order out of the ruins of war. His initial task was to fashion a European state with all of its trimmings, including an administration, police, public education, postal service, and fiscal system. Honest and diligent, Kapodistrias aimed to promote peace, improve agriculture, and strengthen the interior of the country through a highly centralized state. He moved slowly and carefully, and even deprecators would admit to his energetic efforts and positive

72 Vlassopoulos to Heiden, Aegina, Feb. 12, 1828, RGADA, f. 15, op. 1 (dopolnenie), d. 84, l. 204.

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intentions. However, he encountered an abundance of problems in a country totally devastated by seven years of war and internecine strife. As Kapodistrias set about creating order out of chaos, events on the northern frontier of the new state led to further Russian intervention. In December 1827, despite the elimination of the janissary corps, the beginning of sweeping military reforms, and the destruction of the fleet at Navarino, Sultan Mahmud II issued a hatti-sherif (imperial edict) calling for a holy war against Russia. The text of the decree demonstrates the impact of the Greek rebellion on the Sultan’s plans. It declared all infidels, but especially Russians, mortal enemies of “the Islamic millet and the Sublime State of Muhammad,” and accused the Russians of provoking their co-religionists into treason. The Sultan warned that the goal of the infidel rebels was to eradicate the Muslim millet from the face of the earth.73 Russia responded by declaring war against the Ottoman Empire. Aware of the Sultan’s intrigues, as well as the attitude of the western powers, Tsar Nicholas intended to maintain some degree of independence in foreign affairs. Contemporaries asserted that, in going to war, Nicholas was acting unilaterally, but this fails to account for Sublime Porte’s disregard for previous Russian–Ottoman treaties. Economic factors also played a role. “Open seafaring on the Black Sea,” Nesselrode stated in his annual report, “the loss of trade and all of our privileges in the Ottoman Empire, which no other power would tolerate . . . the manifesto [hatti-sherif] of Mahmud is a real declaration of war.”74 With respect to the Greek Question, Nesselrode informed Kapodistrias that Russia did not desire the fall of the Ottoman Empire, rather it aspired for conditions most favorable to Greece.75 During the Russian–Ottoman War (1828–9), the Russian fleet continued to police the waters of the Aegean. As Russian land forces descended into Ottoman territory, the naval squadron increased its efforts to end incidents of rapine and piracy. Preventing the shipment of munitions and military personnel to the Ottoman capital was the objective of a Russian blockade of the Dardanelles. For vessels that breached the blockade or refused the terms of inspection, Vice-Admiral Peter I. Rikord had orders to use force. Katakazy, who was serving on board the flotilla as a diplomat and interpreter, addressed a circular to the commanders of the naval forces of neutral countries like the United States and Denmark, reminding them of Tsar Nicholas’s desire for a solid and prompt peace with the Ottoman Empire. According to Katakazy’s circular, neutral vessels that submitted to an inspection and did not contain contraband could enter the Dardanelles and ports of Constantinople. Russia published its intentions widely to remove any chance of 73 Nesselrode to Lieven, Feb. 14, 1828, VPR xv. 439–42, 694–5. A Russian translation of the hattisherif appears in N. Epanchin, Ocherk pokhoda 1829 g. v Evropeiskoi Turtsii (St Petersburg: Izd-vo V. Sekachev, 1905), i. “Prilozheniia,” 7–11. See also, Virginia Aksan, Ottoman Wars, 1700–1870: An Empire Besieged (London: Pearson-Longman, 2007), 343–63; and Erdem, “Do Not Think of the Greeks,” 67–84. 74 “Otchety MID Rossii,” AVPRI, f. 137, 1828, l. 32; Nesselrode to Lieven, Feb. 14, 1828, VPR xv. 439–40. For Russia’s justification of the war, see Nesslerode’s circular, Apr. 14, 1828, VPR xv. 483–7; Nesselrode to Voronzov-Dashkov, St Petersburg, Apr. 14, 1828, in Barbara Jelavich, Russia and Greece during the Regency of King Othon 1832–5 (Thessaloniki: IMXA, 1962), 135–7. 75 Nesselrode to Kapodistrias, St Petersburg, Jan. 7, 1828, VPR xv. 360–7.

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misinterpretation or unforeseen consequences.76 At the same time, the Russian squadron was busy chasing pirates as smaller rebellions erupted in Mani, Crete, and Thessaly. Russian military and humanitarian relief-aid continued to flow to Greece during the war. One interesting example concerns the Tsar’s decision to purchase a “great number” of Greeks who had been enslaved during the Ottoman attack on the island of Chios in April 1822. The process of ransoming Christian captives began in November 1822 when the Russian Holy Synod issued an ukaz calling for donations. “The generosity of the Russian church consists, as always, as an energetic paradigm of the exploits of love for Christianity.” The stated goal was the ransoming and resettling of “Greeks taken into captivity as slaves by Ottoman soldiers in Sidon, Kassandra, and on the island of Chios.” Liberating several hundred Christian captives cost 120,000 rubles, not including the price of transporting them from Adrianople to suitable Greek harbors.77 Field Marshal Ivan I. Dibich also promised to send the Greek government a large number of “very distinguished” marine and terrain officers of Greek extraction for training the Greek military.78 The Russian government assigned thousands of rubles for the establishment of an orphanage in Ancona and allocated the Greek government an emergency allotment of 6,000 rifles and twelve pieces of artillery. According to one estimate, Russian aid to Greece in the period 1827–30 amounted to more than 3.5 million francs, not including religious contributions.79 The first year of the war against the Ottomans did not go well for Russia, but by the summer of 1829 Russian troops entered Adrianople (Edirne) and scored important victories in the Caucasus, forcing the Porte to sue for peace. The Treaty of Adrianople (September 2, 1829) ended the war and granted Russia benefits such as territory at the mouth of the Danube, free passage through the straits for commercial vessels, and the setting up of a new system of autonomy in Moldavia and Wallachia under its protection.80 In Article 10, the Ottomans recognized Greece as an autonomous, tributary state with a Christian monarch. 76 Katakazy, “Circulaire aux commandants,” Malta, Oct. 18, 1828, RGADA, f. 15, op. 1 (dopolnenie), d. 49, ll. 137–8. The correspondence between Captain Ivan Butenev, commander of the Russian brig Paris, and Admiral Rikord in OR RGB f. 607 sheds light on Russian activities in Greek waters at this time. See also K. Mosolov, “Obozrenie deistvii eskadry pod nachal’stvom KontrAdmirala Rikorda, v Sredizemnom more,” Morskoi sbornik, 11 (1855), 19–63. 77 Ukaz of the Holy Synod, Nov. 29, 1822, VPR xii. 605–6; Lucien J. Frary, “Slaves of the Sultan: Russian Reactions to Christian Captives during the Greek Revolution (1821–30),” in Lucien J. Frary and Mara Kozelsky (eds), Russian-Ottoman Borderlands: The Eastern Question Reconsidered (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014), 101–30. 78 Dibich to Kapodistrias, Burgas, 17 Mar. 1830, VPR xvi. 492–3. 79 For the school in Ancona, see Nesselrode to Kapodistrias, St Petersburg, Feb. 13, 1828, VPR xv. 430–1. On the shipment of weapons, see Nesselrode to Bulgari, St Petersburg, Dec. 5, 1828, VPR xvi. 57. The total figure of Russian aid is cited in V. G. Filatov, “La Russie et l’accession de la Grèce à l’indépendance dans les années 1827–30,” in Les Relations entre les peoples de l’URSS et les grecs: Fin du XVIIIème–début du XXème s. (Thessaloniki: IMXA, 1992), 41. 80 The treaty appears in VPR xvi. 261–70. On the peace settlement, see V. I. Sheremet, Turtsiia i Adrianopol’skii mir (Moscow: Nauka, 1975); N. K. Shil’der, Adrianopol’skii mir 1829 g. Iz perepiski Dibicha (St Petersburg: A. S. Suvorin, 1879); and V. N. Vinogradov, “Voina, otkryvshaia epokhu v istorii Balkan,” in Vinogradov, Istoriia Balkan, 214–23. A brilliant map of the new Russian–Ottoman boundaries is contained in RGIA, f. 1341, op. 33, d. 2641.

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The outcome of the peace settlement elicited interesting responses among Russian officials. Nesselrode, an outstanding proponent of legitimacy, congratulated Count Aleksei F. Orlov, the special Russian delegate in the negotiations, for winning Greek independence: “I am happy that you have inserted the Greek affair into the treaty, and that you realize all the value of this stipulation.”81 Field Marshal Dibich applauded Orlov and expressed “how much I was satisfied by the favorable end to the negotiations regarding the Greek affair. It is a guarantee of the security of the future, and I admit that I was worried for a long time that some sort of incident would create new embarrassments or complications for us.”82 A few months later, the Sultan formally acknowledged Greek independence. Thus, Russia’s military conquest not only assured the Greek victory, it legitimized the vision of Russian expectation. Russian society rejoiced at the triumph over the Ottoman armies and its consequences. Regarding Article 10 of the Adrianople agreement, “If this is not the base,” remarked Aleksandr Sturdza, an important state official, writer and publicist, then it provided “at least the stones of expectation for the new order of things, which Greece was not able to conquer by herself, but which she was known to merit by the perseverance of her warriors, the religious devotion of her people, the blood of her martyrs, and by her misfortunes—objects of sympathy for Europe and for the universe.”83 Sturdza thought that the Russian–Ottoman War “infinitely improved the position of the president [Kapodistrias], convinced Greece of great hopes, and flattered him that the immense and difficult tasks which remained to regenerate his nation would be crowned with success!”84 The Tsar himself deemed Article 10 a fundamental step toward the definitive conclusion of the Greek Question, and he remained determined to include Britain and France in Near Eastern affairs. From a purely military standpoint, therefore, no power contributed as much as Russia to the establishment of independent Greece. Russia’s achievements in the Near East also had the negative effect of alarming the other great powers. Great Britain, in particular, suspected that Russia aspired for territorial gains. As we have seen, Nicholas was not interested in bringing about

81

Nesselrode to Orlov, St Petersburg, Sept. 23, 1829, RGADA, f. 15, op. 1, d. 301 part 1, l. 43. Dibich to Orlov, Burgas, Apr. 23, 1830, RGADA, f. 15, op. 1, d. 301 part 1, l. 181. “Zapiski ob ustanovlenii otnoshenii Rossii s Gretsii,” Jan. 1830, OR IRLI, f. 288, op. 1, d. 20, ll. 14. On A. S. Sturdza, see Stella Ghervas, Alexandre Stourdza (1791–1854): Un intellectuel orthodoxe face à l’Occident (Geneva: Suzanne Hurter, 1999); Ghervas, Réinventer la tradition: Alexandre Stourdza et l’Europe de la Sainte-Alliance (Paris: Honoré Champion, 2008); Theophilus C. Prousis, “Aleksandr S. Sturdza: A Russian Conservative Response to the Greek Revolution,” EEQ 26/3 (1992): 309–44; Alexander Martin, Romantics, Reformers, Reactionaries: Russian Conservative Thought and Politics in the Reign of Alexander I (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 1997), 174–207. Interesting contemporary assessments are that of K. Oikonomos, Alexandros o Stourdzas: Viographikon schediasma (Athens: Ph. Karampini & K. Vapha, 1855); and Diktiadis, “Kratkoe svedenie ob A. S. Sturdze,” in Vospominaniia o zhizni i deianiiakh, Grafa I. A. Kapodistrii, ed. A. S. Sturdza (Moscow: Moskvit., 1864), 193–205. 84 “Bumagi, kasaiushchiesiia Gretsii, kopi protokoli konferentsii i dr.,” Mar. 18, 1830, OR IRLI, f. 288, op. 2, d. 13, l. 10. See also Kapodistrias to Panin, Aegina, Sept. 13, 1829; Kapodistrias to Panin, Nafplion, Nov. 3, 1829, in Correspondance du comte J. Capodistrias, président de la Grèce, ed. E. A. Bétant (Geneva: A. Cherbuliez, 1839), iii. 303, 392–3. 82 83

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the fall of the Ottoman state. “His Imperial Highness thinks,” wrote Nesselrode, “that the existing state of affairs in the Ottoman Empire should be preserved in the strictest way. We don’t want Constantinople. That would be a most dangerous achievement which we cannot make.”85 One of the great misfortunes of the international constellation first established at the Vienna Congress in 1815 related to the British government’s reluctance to take the Tsars’ proclamations at face value. In order to establish monarchical institutions, obtain large frontiers, and end the anarchy, Tsar Nicholas sent Count Mark N. Bulgari (1828–9) and Count Viktor N. Panin (1829–31) on special missions to Greece.86 Articles in the Northern Bee and Journal de St.-Pétersbourg informed the reading public of the diplomats’ endeavors, and, oftentimes, the Greek Question dominated whole issues of these newspapers. The Belgian revolt of 1830–1, the November Revolution in Poland in 1830, and the Russian spiritual mission in China were just a few of the contemporary matters that received slight attention in the press due, in part, to the intense interest in Hellenism. Before the creation of the Greek state, the Ottoman territory known as Rumelia was an expansive multi-ethnic, religious, and linguistic melting pot. When the Greek–Ottoman War ended, the question of the new state’s borders played an important part of the great power negotiations.87 The debate was outside the control of the Greek state, which still lacked general international recognition. Rather the so-called London Conference (which consisted of the French and Russian ambassadors and the British Foreign Secretary) determined these issues, while the fate of the Ottoman Empire hung in the balance.88 Russia attempted to secure territories for the Greek state based upon the principle of uti possidetis (meaning the property remains with the possessor). During the allied meeting at Poros in September 1828, the Russian delegate Ribop’er favored including the islands of Samos, Crete, Euboea, and regions of the mainland such as AitoliaAkarnania. In contrast, the French and British cabinets did all they could to limit

85 Quoted in V. A. Georgiev (ed.), Vostochnyi vopros vo vneshnei politike Rossii konets XVIII–nachalo XX v. (Moscow: Nauka, 1978), 94. 86 Selected correspondence by Bulgari and Panin is published in VPR xv–xvi. See also Lucien J. Frary, “Russian Consuls and the War of Greek Independence (1821–31),” Mediterranean Historical Review, 28/1 (June 2013), 46–65; and Arsh, Rossiia i bor’ba Gretsii, 215–26. 87 On the matter of the frontier, see Malcolm Wagstaff, “Independent Greece: The Search for a Frontier, 1822–35,” Kambos: Cambridge Papers in Modern Greek, 7 (1999): 59–70; and Lt-Col. Baker, “Memoir on the Northern Frontier of Greece,” Journal of the Royal Geographical Society of London, 7 (1837): 81–94. For discussions of the construction of the Greek nation through geographical concepts and literature, see Robert Shannan Peckham, National Histories, Natural States: Nationalism and the Politics of Place in Greece (London: I. B. Tauris, 2001); and Artemis Leontis, Topographies of Hellenism: Mapping the Homeland (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995). 88 On the Russian negotiations during the London Conference (more than 6,000 manuscript pages), see “Pacification de la Grèce,” AVPRI, f. 133, op. 468, d. 12960–7; V. N. Vinogradov, “Les Discussions sur la Grèce à Londres,” and C. A. Vacalopoulos, “L’Attitude de la Russie face à la question de l’indépendance grecque considérée par l’Ambassadeur russe Lieven (mai 1829),” in Les Relations gréco-russes pendant la domination turque et la guerre d’indépendance grecque (Thessaloniki: IMXA, 1983), 133–60, 160–9.

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Greek territories in the north and on the islands.89 According to reports appearing in the Northern Bee, Greece’s natural boundaries included Crete, Samos, Syros, Smyrna, Cyprus, and other places in the Aegean and eastern Mediterranean where people resided who professed the Orthodox religion and spoke the ancestral Greek language. By implication, the Ottoman authorities and the mightiest naval power, England, were thwarting the people’s wishes. Sympathetic accounts of Kapodistrias, who advocated a state frontier running from Preveza in the west to Lamia (as the very minimum), and whose task it was to form a strong state, also figure prominently in Russian newspaper reports.90 France and Britain, and their Greek factions, deeply suspected that Kapodistrias, as a former servant of the Tsar, was a puppet of Russian policy. Russian archival material does not support this impression. From the beginning, Kapodistrias struggled to extricate himself from the suspicion of being a tsarist agent. He sent numerous, heart-rending, letters to his friend Grigorii Stroganov, in which he took great pains to discredit rumors about a Russian scheme for domination in Greece.91 Others must have realized that he would not let his Russophilism take precedence over his patriotism, yet the element of foreign influence is crucial in understanding the decisions leading to the establishment of the Greek monarchy and the difficulties it faced. Indeed, rumors, feelings of mistrust, and actual events helped propagate the image of a Russian-sponsored presidency. Yet the Kapodistrian presidency also helped solidify the nucleus of a pro-Russian party in Greece that showed irresistible tenacity in later years. In the summer of 1831, anti-government rebellions in Mani, Hydra, and Atalanti forced the president to seek the support of Rikord, the Russian admiral. Rikord’s intervention prevented the spread of the rebellion and reinforced the authority of the fledgling government, yet did little to lessen suspicions about Russian connivance in Greek affairs. The Russian press reported that Rikord heroically succeeded in helping to contain the revolutionary contagion, although according to the censored version, all action was in conjunction with the allied fleets.92 In a letter to Peter I. Rikman (Rückmann), the Russian resident in Nafplion (1831–3), Kapodistrias expressed his gratitude for Rikord’s “brilliant valor and indefatigable activity.” “His presence encouraged a great part of the inhabitants of Poros and of the coasts of the Peloponnesus to reject the perfidious insinuations of the Hydriot-rebels. Moreover, he gave help and wise consul to our 89 For Russian policy during the Poros conference, see Nesselrode to Nicholas I, Dec. 10, 1828; Nesselrode to Nicholas I, Jan. 10, 1829; Nesselrode to Kapodistrias, St Petersburg, Mar. 2, 1829; Nesselrode to Bulgari and Ribeaupierre, Mar. 2, 1829, VPR xvi. 63–5, 88, 107–8, 574–5. For secondary discussions, D. C. Fleming, John Capodistrias and the Conference of London, 1828–1831 (Thessaloniki: IMXA, 1970), 48–66; Dakin, British and American Philhellenes, 190–2; Crawley, Question of Greek Independence, 142–54. 90 SPch 10 (Jan. 24, 1828), 15 (Feb. 4, 1828),19 (Feb. 14, 1828), 32 (Mar. 15, 1828), 63 (May 26, 1828), 147 (Dec. 8, 1828). 91 “Pis’ma Kapodistriia Ioanna Antonovicha,” RGADA, f. 1278, op. 1, d. 118. 92 See e.g. the lengthy front-page article in SPch 210 (Sept. 18, 1831). Mosolov, “Obozrenie deistvii eskadry pod nachal’stvom Kontr-Admirala Rikorda, v Sredizemnom more,” covers these events in detail.

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troops and our navy who remained loyal to the government.”93 Even the leader of the Hydriot revolt, Admiral Andreas Miaoulis, acknowledged the positive influence of the Russian fleet. However, Miaoulis also accused Kapodistrias of abusing the “Russian naval force destined to protect and not to persecute the liberty of Greece.”94 The rebellions of the Maniots and islanders were not the only manifestations of the internal opposition against the Kapodistrian regime. His inability to work with the diverse leadership, his authoritarian temperament, and his lack of understanding of the country as it emerged after the revolution caused serious dissent. Although he was prepared to grant certain compromises to the opposition, his efforts reached a tragic conclusion in the morning of September 27, 1831, when he was assassinated by Konstantinos and Georgios Mavromichalis while entering the church of St Spyridon in Nafplion.95 Though several of his policies proved somewhat enduring, many crumbled into dust during the tremendous civil unrest following his unfortunate demise. St Petersburg considered the assassination of Kapodistrias a calamity of the first order. Rikman wrote that “Greece will appreciate more and more with the passage of time the loss of an irreplaceable man whom the tsar had held in full esteem.”96 Russian traveler, litterateur, and diplomat Konstantin M. Bazili arrived in Nafplion two days after the incident. His popular travel account records that “the condition of the city was horrific” and that it was miraculous that any sort of public order existed at all.97 Many Russians believed that the assassination received silent consent in the governmental circles of Europe. In his memoirs, Ribop’er stated that he was fully convinced that the assassins of Kapodistrias were armed agents of England.98 Readers of St Petersburg newspapers began receiving reports of the assassination in November 1831, although the description of the incident was confusing. The Northern Bee printed reports from Constantinople and Odessa, which stated that the president was only wounded.99 Finally, on November 16, the Northern Bee published a report stating that “thus died, 55 years from birth, a person who should 93 “Kopii materialov, sobrannye S. Iu. Destunisa, po istorii Novoi Gretsii,” OR RNB, f. 250, d. 94, l. 81; “Kapodistriia, I. A. pis’mo P. I. Rikordu, 6 January 1832,” OR RNB, f. 542, d. 715. See also Arsh, Rossiia i bor’ba Gretsii, 187–214. 94 Gazette d’Idra (July 31, 1831), OR RNB, f. 250, d. 94, l. 75. Several years later, in a letter to Nesselrode, Nafplion, July 10, 1836, AVPRI, f. 161/1, op. 181/2, d. 51, ll. 5–9, Russian ambassador Katakazy lamented the decline of Russian influence in Greece due to the irresponsible actions of Rikord and Rikman. 95 Russian minister Rikman was among many witnesses of the assassination. See Rikman to Nesselrode, Nafplion, Oct. 6, 1831, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 234 (1831), ll. 503–10. The president’s brother informed Sturdza of the details of the assassination in a personal letter. See “Kapodistriia, Avgust Antonovich. Pis’ma ego (4) k Sturdziu, Aleksandru Skarlatovichu,” 17/ 29.08.1826-18/30.06.1854, OR IRLI, f. 288, op. 1, d. 185/2, ll. 3–4. For a detailed study of the Greek opposition, see Ch. Loukos, I antipolitevsi kata tou kiverniti Io. Kapodistria, 1828–31 (Athens: Themelio, 1988). 96 Quoted in D. Loulis, “I dolophonia tou I. Kapodistriou kai i Rosia,” Mnimon, 10 (1985): 95. 97 Bazili, Arkhipelag i Gretsiia, ii. 171. On Bazili, see James Alan Tabor, “In the Service of the Russian Tsar: The Life and Work of Konstantin Mikhailovich Bazili, 1809–84” (Ph.D. diss., University of Minnesota, 2003). 98 “Zapiski grafa Aleksandra Ivanovicha Ribop’era,” Russkii arkhiv, 5 (1877): 28. 99 SPch 249 (Nov. 3, 1831), 250 (Nov. 4, 1831), 251 (Nov. 5, 1831), 259 (Nov. 14, 1831).

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be named the angel-savior of Greece and who, without doubt, was one of the greatest men of his time.”100 The Ottoman governor and ayan of Serres, Hadji Ismail Bey, wrote in a letter appearing in the appendix to Bazili’s account (and republished in an illustrated book on Near Eastern affairs) that “‘My memory will never be effaced of his great integrity and his brilliance; I consider myself especially fortunate to have witnessed his work personally, and I can render justice in the fullest sense of the term that his name is on the list of the greatest men of Europe.”101 No doubt Russian journalists like Faddei V. Bulgarin and Nikolai I. Grech exploited Greek affairs to sell their newspapers, which glorified the actions of the deceased president, while reveling in the victory of Orthodoxy over the “Turkish yoke.” The lifetime achievements of Kapodistrias as a statesman, devout Christian, and zealous patriot continued to be an object of interest in Russian society in subsequent years.102 About two months after the assassination, the so-called fifth national assembly met in Nafplion and elected Count Agostino Kapodistrias, the former president’s younger brother, as the second president of Greece. Russia acknowledged this act immediately, in contrast to the other protecting powers.103 The Northern Bee reported that the English representative Edward Dawkins had left Greece altogether, because it was useless to maintain official relations with the government under the deceased president’s brother.104 As president, Agostino attempted to give the nation a monarchical constitution while urging the allied powers to hurry in their nomination of a sovereign prince. Rikman endeavored to support the president, and he deplored the unending

100

SPch 260 (Nov. 16, 1831). Bazili, Arkhipelag i Gretsia, ii. 280; Panteon znamenitykh sovremennikov 2nd edn (St Petersburg: B. Solomon, 1843). For the emotional reactions of Nesselrode and Sergei S. Uvarov to the article on Kapodistrias in Panteon before its publication, see “O stat’e, pod nazvaniem: Graf Kapodistriia. President Gretsii,” St Petersburg, Nov. 1838, RGIA, f. 772, op. 1, d. 1134. 102 A. Papadopoulos-Vretos gave Aleksandr N. Golitsyn a luxurious leather-bound journal about the events surrounding the assassination, OR RNB, f. 542, d. 717. See also, D. Iu. Struiskii, “Duma posviashchaetsia pamiati grafa Kapodistria (Otryvok),” Severnye tsvety (1832): 109–11; G. Korniliia, Vospominaniia o Vostoke: Konstantinopol’-Gretsiia-Ierusalim-Egipet’ (1831, 1832, 1833) (Moscow: N. Stepanov, 1837), i. 155–8; A. S. Sturdza, Oraison funèbre de Jean Antoine Compte Capodistrias, président de la Grèce (Odessa: Imprimerie de la ville, 1831); Sturdza, “Notice biographique sur le Comte J. Capodistrias, président de la Grèce,” in E. Bétant (ed.), Correspondance du Comte Jean Capodistrias (Geneva: A Cherbuliez, 1839), i. 1–128; Sturdza, Vospominaniia o zhizni i deianiiakh, Grafa I. A. Kapodistrii; Sturdza, Logos epitaphios eis ton kyvernitin tis Ellados Ioannin Kapodistrian (Aigini: G. A. Kosmitos, 1832); A. Papadopoulos-Vretos, Mémoires biographiques-historiques sur le président de la Grèce, le Comte Jean Capodistrias (Paris: Firman Didot, 1837); G. S. Destunis, “Ocherki vozrozhdaiushcheisia Gretsii,” 15–18; V. Teplov, Graf Ioann Kapodistriia, prezident Gretsii. Istoricheskii ocherk (St Petersburg: A. S. Suvoran, 1893); M. Pogodin, Graf Ioann Kapodistriia, prezident Gretsii. Istoricheskii ocherk V. Teplova (St Petersburg: V. M. Frish, 1896); Arsh, Rossiia i bor’ba Gretsii, 227–38. 103 Documents on the brief term of Agostino Kapodistrias as Greek president are contained in OR RNB, f. 250, d. 94. See also Eleni Gardika-Katsiadaki, “O rolos tis Diaskepsis tou Londinou ston ptosi tou Augoustinou Kapodistria,” Mnimon, 10 (1985): 248–69; John Petropulos, Politics and Statecraft in the Kingdom of Modern Greece, 1833–43 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), 125–9. 104 SPch 306 (Dec. 31, 1831). 101

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fractional discord and interference of foreigners. In a personal letter to Iakov A. Dashkov, the Russian consul-general in Bucharest, Rikman stated: I do my utmost to support this unfortunate country and to frustrate the foreign intrigues, but that she breathe her last! These revolutions are too violent to be easily put down, with such poor inadequate means as the present very weak government possesses; but I must do justice to Count Agostino for his firmness and courage in these critical moments. He never complains and his countenance is always bright and cheerful. I often hear him saying ‘I put all my confidence in God. My brother fell a victim to his country. I am ready to follow him.’ When at Nafplion I see him every day. Generally, I call on him after performing my usual walk before dinner. I cannot help admiring him. His popularity is great, but he has no money! And you know that in Greece money is everything.105

As Rikman’s letter suggests, the actual power of the government was limited. Soon after its formation, an anti-Kapodistrian coalition took shape, followed by disturbances in Rumelia. Greece slipped into civil war. Unable to construct a stable government, Agostino fled to Kerkyra on board the Russian brig Paris. He maintained close contacts with Russia and petitioned the Tsar throughout the next decade (he died in St Petersburg in 1857).106 In a moving letter written in August 1832, Sturdza begged Stroganov to provide special assistance to the deceased president’s brother, who was a victim of “French demagoguery and English Machiavelianism.”107 This sort of evidence, in part, illustrates the way in which the system of Russian clientage operated in Greek territory and suggests that the benefits could be considerable. RUSSIA A ND THE I NTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENT O F THE G RE E K Q UE S TI O N The Greek Question was finally resolved between 1830 and 1833. In the London Protocol of 22 January 1830, the three protecting powers agreed that Greece should be an independent state within restricted boundaries: the Peloponnesus with Attica and a narrow strip of land north of the Gulf of Corinth, with many Aegean islands.108 According to Sturdza and Destunis, the protocol was inadequate for numerous reasons. In a position paper composed in the early 1830s, Sturdza

105

Rikman to Ia. A. Dashkov, Apr. 25, 1832, GARF, f. 912, op. 1, d. 663, l. 6. A. Kapodistrias to Rodofinikin, Odessa, Oct. 1, 1837; A. Kapodistrias to Nesselrode, Odessa, Sept. 2, 1837, AVPRI, f. 161/1, op. 181/2, d. 52, ll. 15–16, 17–19; A. Kapodistrias to Nicholas I, Karlsbad, Aug. 6, 1838, GARF, f. 109, op. 4, d. 58; A. Kapodistrias to Count Vitte, Karlsbad, Aug. 7, 1838, GARF, f. 109, op. 4, d. 59. 107 Sturdza to Stroganov, Odessa, Aug. 30, 1832, RGADA, f. 1278, op. 1, d. 155, ll. 28–9. 108 The text of the protocol in French and Russian appears in VPR xvi. 438–9. For evidence of Russia’s acute and detailed knowledge of Greek territory, see “Karta beregovykh grants korolevstva Gretsii,” 1833; “Karta beregov Gretsii, Arkhipelagi i Ionicheskikh ostrovov,” 1839, RGVIA, f. 434, op. 1, d. 159 and d. 168. 106

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warned Ribop’er of the serious defects of the boundary settlement. “In effect,” wrote Sturdza, the delivery of Samos with its 60,000 inhabitants to Turkish authorities, and the pacification of Crete, which must contain more than 150,000 Christians, the elite of which are under arms; these two transactions equally prickling of anarchy and oppression should become the source of new complications. If the stipulations of the last protocol are irrevocable, doesn’t there exist some other means to alleviate the danger? In truth, the geographical position of Samos, in front of and close to all of Muslim Asia, presents major difficulties for its incorporation with the European Greek state. But if the vast island of Crete could be part of the new state, the population of Samos could be transferred in mass, and this painful immigration in all respects would be far better than the reactions and massacres that would follow the reentry of Turkish authorities to Samos.

Sturdza aimed at convincing men of power in St Petersburg of the political, economic, and moral disadvantages of leaving Crete under Ottoman control: “The island of Crete is a European island like all of those which have been ceded to Greece; she is not a member of the system of islands which are Asiatic.” The imagined contrast between “Western and Oriental civilizations” was more than a question of geography, according to Sturdza, who alleged that the Greeks were culturally superior to their Asian governors. Claiming that their “primitive institutions” made the Ottomans unfit to govern, Sturdza propagated the negative viewpoint of Ottoman inferiority and Christian enlightenment. In addition, questions of security were not absent from his proposal: “A Crete still inhabited by Greeks,” Sturdza declared, “offers no advantages to Turkey other than to hold Greece always in alarm, to cause it great expenses, and to facilitate attack as soon as the occasion presents itself.” Sturdza also pointed out the danger of allowing Britain to expand its interests in the region by taking advantage of declining Ottoman authority.109 Francophobic, Anglophobic, and Eurocentric perspectives of doctrinaire Orthodox thinkers like Sturdza were not isolated private affairs, as shown by a Northern Bee column praising the “extraordinary achievements” of the Greeks after centuries of “tyrannical rule by the Turks.” “Social enlightenment takes gigantic strides,” wrote the unnamed author, “ancient Greek is taught in all schools; Homer and Plato are read freely . . . not rarely, do you meet twelve-year-old boys who can solve problems of trigonometry.”110 The tone of the article epitomizes the patriotic and religious pretentiousness of the tsarist state trilogy. Later publications echoed the sense of Western superiority and insinuated that the era of Ottoman rule was a blow to the pride of European civilization.111 This sort of news could be confusing to

109 A. S. Sturdza, “Bumagi, kasaiushchiesia Gretsii. Kopii protokoli, konferentsii i dr.,” OR IRLI, f. 288, op. 2, d. 13, ll. 58, 62–3. 110 SPch 68 (Mar. 26, 1841). See also the two-page article contrasting the contemporary condition of Athens with the state of the city under the “Turks” in SPch 252 (Nov. 11, 1841). 111 I. Kapustina, “Istoricheskii ocherk ostrova Krita,” Russkaia mysl’, 12/1 (Jan. 1899): 32–3.

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Russian readers who desired the emancipation of Orthodox Christians, yet remained loyal to the Tsars’ policy of supporting the Sultan. Although Aleksandr Sturdza professed certain reservations about Russian intervention in Europe, he viewed the Orthodox East as an area of vast potential material and spiritual wealth. The Tsar’s top foreign policy officials echoed his emotional appeal: Ribop’er, Dashkov, and Nesselrode warned of future troubles if regions of the Ottoman Empire primarily inhabited by Greeks remained divided from the new state.112 Despite these misgivings, according to the final border agreements of the independent Greek state, Crete, Thessaly, Epirus, and other regions remained within the realm of the Sultan. The question of borders was not the only major difficulty confronting the allied courts. They also had to find a suitable sovereign among the bluebloods of Europe, since the Greeks lacked a “legitimate” aristocracy. Nicholas, opposed to all forms of rebellion, initially declared that he would never consent to give the Greeks a king. Eventually he changed his mind in order to bring an end to factional disorder, but he insisted that no member of his family would appear on the list of nominees.113 After considering at least six candidates, the powers agreed to offer the throne to Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg. Leopold declined the post, however, for he was dissatisfied with the terms of the arrangement, including the issue of the frontiers.114 At last the philhellene King Ludwig of Bavaria suggested his second son, named Otto (rendered Othon in Greek), for the Greek crown. The powers agreed, and the London Agreement of May 1832 sanctioned Othon as king “of the independent monarchical government” of Greece “under the guarantee of the three powers.”115 Although the Greek state was absent from the negotiations, they wrote a letter of thanks to King Ludwig.116 Othon, a Roman Catholic, was only 17 at the time, and he could not govern on his own, so his father entrusted a Regency of three prominent Bavarian figures. The powers also agreed to a small army of 3,500 Bavarian troops and a collective loan of 60 million francs. These issues opened wide possibilities for the protecting powers to interfere in Greek affairs. 112 See esp. Nesselrode to Heiden, St Petersburg, Mar. 31, 1829; Nesselrode to Heiden, St Petersburg, Apr. 24, 1829, RGADA, f. 15 (dopolnenie), op. 1, d. 53, ll. 77–81, 84–92; Nesselrode to Lieven, St Petersburg, Apr. 19, 1829; Nesselrode to Heiden, Warsaw, May 20, 1829; Nesselrode to Pozzo di Borgo, Warsaw, May 21, 1829; Bulgari, “Zapiski,” Sept. 4, 1829; Nesselrode to Butenev, St Petersburg, Oct. 3, 1829; Nesselrode to Kapodistrias, St Petersburg, Feb. 28, 1830, VPR xvi. 166–8, 206–7, 209–11, 294–7, 337–8, 473–8; Dashkov’s viewpoint is available in English tr. in Prousis, Russian–Ottoman Relations, 131. 113 Nicholas I, “Affaire grecque,” Oct. 1843, RGADA, f. 3, op. 1, d. 103, l. 20. 114 For the nomination of Prince Leopold (afterwards Leopold I of Belgium) based on British and French reports, see Fleming, John Capodistrias and the Conference of London, 109–47. For the Russian position, see Nesselrode to Kapodistrias, Warsaw, June 20, 1830, VPR xvi. 544–6. 115 The treaty appears in French and Russian in F. F. Martens, Sobranie traktatov i konventsii zakliuchennykh Rossieiu s inostrannymi derzhavami (St Petersburg: Tip. Min-va Putei Soobshcheniia︡, 1874–1909), xii. 29–36; and in Greek in Tryphon Evangelidis, Istoria tou Othonos vasileos tis Ellados (Athens: A. G. Galanos, 1893), 7–13. For a review of its essentials, see Petropulos, Politics and Statecraft, 144–7. 116 Georgios Laios, “I eklogi tou Othonos os vasileos tis Ellados kai i epikyrosis aftis ypo tis en Pronoia ethnosynelevseos,” DIEEE 19 (1967–70): 167–98.

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Former Russian consul in Smyrna, Spyridon Destunis, criticized the London Agreement from his new post in St Petersburg. He found issue with the articles regarding the loan, the boundaries, and the stationing of foreign troops. As for King Ludwig’s role in choosing the Regency: It is very strange that they have permitted a sovereign of a kingdom that has so few common interests with those of Greece to intervene in the affairs of the country without any opposition on the part of the allied courts, which have given the Regency their full approval. If, therefore, the sovereign acquires the power to intervene on one occasion, what guarantee is there that he will not intervene in others? And if there is no communal guarantee, and there doesn’t appear to be one, is not the independence of Greece erased?117

Destunis’s protests against foreign interference went unheeded, as great power politics frustrated the warnings of less-powerful officials. Yet another protocol, this one signed in Constantinople on July 21, 1832, redelimited the northern boundaries of the kingdom. Thanks in part to Russian diplomatic pressure the borders were extended to the Volos-Arta line. The change was significant, for it gave Greece a more defensible northern frontier and brought the western regions of Aitolia-Akarnania into the kingdom. Russia used both threats and incentives to force the allied governments to finalize the border settlement promptly. As we have seen, Russian aid could be generous. For example, in order to acquire Arkadia Greece was supposed to pay the Sublime Porte an indemnity of 40 million piasters. After receiving a request from the Bavarian Regency to help Greece pay this sum, Russia agreed to transfer 22 million piasters owed to it by the Ottoman Empire to the Greek government in the form of a loan.118 At the beginning of Othon’s reign the kingdom of Greece comprised Attica, Boeotia, Aitolia-Akarnania, the Peloponnesus, Euboea, and the Cyclades. The territory of free Greece was 13,888 square miles with a population between 651,233 (the figure produced by the first census of 1834) and 811,435 (the estimate formulated by Bavarian professor Friedrich Thiersch in 1832).119 The population in 1833 was probably around 740,000. About two-thirds of all Greeks still lived under Ottoman authority in Epirus, Thessaly, Samos, Crete, and other regions. Greeks inside the kingdom were not exactly free, for a Bavarian protectorate, acting on behalf of the three protecting powers, governed them. Problems

117 Destunis’s annotated text of the treaty is contained in “Zamechanie na konventsiiu mezhdu Rossiei, Angliei, Frantsiei i Bavariei ot 7 maia 1832 g. otnositel’no izbraniia bavarskogo printsa Ottona na grecheskii prestol,” 1832–5, OR RNB, f. 250, d. 85, ll. 1–5, here l. 5. 118 Rikman to Nesselrode, Nafplion, Mar. 16, 1833; Rikman to Nesselrode, Nafplion, May 14, 1833, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 82, ll. 245–7, 351–2. An international commission was named to survey the territory on both sides of the border. Interesting materials relative to the history of Albania, Epirus, and Thessaly are contained in the reports of the Russian member of the commission, Col. Aleksandr A. Skalon. See AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 239 (1830), d. 242 (1831), d. 257 (1832); VPR xvii. 508. 119 See John Petropulos, “The Greek Economy during the First Decade of Othonian Rule,” DIEEE 24 (1981): 142; and Stephanos Papageorgiou, Apo to genos sto ethnos: I themeliosi tou ellinikou kratous, 1821–1862 (Athens: Papazisis, 2004), 297–303.

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facing the Greek state were daunting, yet after four hundred years of Ottoman rule, at last Greece became self-governing. * * *

* *

From the earliest intellectual stirrings of independence during the waning decades of the eighteenth century, until the outbreak of the armed rebellion in 1821, the Greek movement for independence exhibited strong links to the Russian Empire. Although Tsar Alexander I hesitated to become more actively involved, his brother asserted a less ambiguous influence with regard to the fight for freedom among the Greek Orthodox of the Sultan. The Russian–Ottoman War of 1828–9 served as the major turning point that led to the creation of an internationally recognized sovereign Greek kingdom. Thus, without Russian intervention, Greece would not have achieved independence when it did. As the transition from Ottoman reaya to Greek subjects began to take root among the people, St Petersburg did not demure from continuing to assert a strong influence on this process. In the making of Greek institutions, including the government, the church, and public education (key factors in Eric Hobsbawm’s concept of nationalism) Russia played a prominent part.

2 From Anarchy to Absolutism The first period of King Othon’s reign, known as the Regency (February 1833– June 1835), was instrumental in the making of modern Greece. The Regency, despite internal quarrels and a short tenure, engineered the essential mechanisms of the nation-state, including a government administration, a taxation system, new legal codes, and an educational system that helped foster a sense of identity, unity, and purpose among the Greek people after a brutal, ten-year war. The period also witnessed the beginning of the creation of the symbols and holidays, ceremonies and rituals, monuments and landmarks central to the crystallization of national consciousness. The Regency even oversaw the “creation” of a new capital, Athens, which became the seat of government in 1834. For all its undeniable accomplishments, however, the Regency’s twenty-six months of rule have not featured favorably in the annals of Greek history. Foreign influences rose precipitously at this time, eventually to such an extent that they developed into three political parties—each oriented toward a protecting power—powerful entities capable of affecting society, the church, and statecraft. To understand politics and society in Greece during the Regency, therefore, requires a wide focus encompassing both domestic affairs and the international playing field. This chapter probes the process of nation-state building in Greece from the perspective of Russian archival materials during the transition period from anarchy to absolutism.1 It argues that Russian patronage and intervention helped engineer crucial aspects of the new imagined community that took shape. Whereas the scholarly literature on Greek nationalism is extensive, relatively few studies have explored the system of self-government constructed in the post-revolutionary period.2 The focus here is on the methods pursued by St Petersburg to implement Official Nationality in Greece and the reactions of Russian educated society to the reform program of the Regency. Ideologically, the Tsar and his ministers sought to promote a robust monarchy completely free from foreign influence. Yet, in its relations with the king and the Regency, Russia was more than a tranquil spectator.

1 See also the outstanding study by Olga E. Petrunina, Grecheskaia natsiia i gosudarstvo v XVIII–XX vv. Ocherki politicheskogo rasvitiia (Moscow: KDU, 2010), which focuses on party politics during the period 1837–41, and the pioneering work by Barbara Jelavich, Russia and Greece during the Regency of King Othon, 1832–5 (Thessaloniki: IMXA, 1962), which relies on Bavarian archives. 2 The exception is the authoritative work of John Petropulos, Politics and Statecraft in the Kingdom of Greece (1833–44) (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968).

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RUSSIA A ND THE I NTERREGNUM IN GREECE (1832 –1 83 3) Under the guarantee of the protecting powers, three key documents (the London Protocol of January 1830, the London Agreement of May 1832, and the Constantinople Arrangement of July 1832) purported to settle “forever” and “irrevocably” the final details regarding the Greek Question, yet by the end of the war for independence much remained uncertain. More than a decade of fighting against the Ottomans, followed by a vicious civil war, had left the country devastated. The majority of people were landless, society was cruelly divided into local factions, and the system of laws and justice, still based on Ottoman practices, required complete overhaul. The partial recovery achieved during the presidency of Kapodistrias was wiped out by the anarchy following his assassination.3 The Russian resident in Nafplion, Petr I. Rikman, characterized Greek life at the time: “It is impossible to recount at what point of misery the people is reduced. It dies of hunger. The same distress afflicts the soldiers who pillage and destroy in order to survive. Money has disappeared entirely. The cost of living has become excessive, and even in the capital, one lacks the main necessities of life. And there is not a large enough weight of gold with which one is able to obtain them.”4 According to the Russian Neo-Hellenist, Boris I. Ordynskii (1823–61), “even from Athens there were still no roads, bridges, or factories for the production of the most necessary things. There were no artists in the fatherland of Iktinos and Pheidias! The only thing worse than the shattered finances and the wretched administration was brigandage!”5 Letters from a Russian traveler in Greece appearing in the Northern Bee, Russia’s most popular daily, described the dilapidated condition of the buildings, streets, and markets of Nafplion, the first Greek capital. With respect to the churches, “there are very few in Nafplion,” wrote the Russian traveler, “I know of only four, two of which are cathedrals . . . These churches, though fairly well built, are very poor, without any sort of decoration. Worst of all, they are very dirty.”6 By emphasizing his concern for the people’s spiritual well-being, this unnamed explorer reflected the values of Official Nationality. Paradoxically, statements such as these could also expand the horizons of awareness of Russians and tempt them to become more involved in the fate of contemporary Hellenism. Through writings about Greece, the Russian reading public found themselves entangled with nationalist discourses 3 On the civil war, see K. A. Vakalopoulos, I periodos tis anarhias (1831–3): Esoterikos dihasmos kai xenes epemvaseis kata ti metakapodistriaki periodo (Thessaloniki: Paratiritis, 1984). 4 Rikman to Nesselrode, Nafplion, 10 Dec. 1832, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 82/1833, l. 66. For Rikman’s service record, see “Rikman, P. I.,” AVPRI, f. 159, op. 464, d. 2871; and Erik Amburger, Geschichte der Behördenorganisation Russlands von Peter dem Grossen bis 1917 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1966), 131, 445, 461. 5 B. I. Ordynskii, “Ob otnoshenii novo-gecheskago iazyka k drevne-grecheskomu,” ZhMNP 95 (1857): 133. Ordynskii taught Greek at the Iaroslavskii gymnasium. See E. A. Bobrivyi, “Boris Ivanovich Ordynskii,” Varshavskiia universitetskiia izvestiia, 8 (1903): 1–32; RBS 12: 305–6. Ordynskii’s translation of Aristophanes in OZ 1 (1849): 1–40; OZ 6 (1850): 123–60; OZ 12 (1850); 75–122, drew the interest of Aleksandr Herzen and A. A. Kraevskii. See Herzen to Kraevskii, Sokolovo, 23 June 1845; Herzen to Ordynskii, Moscow, 11 Nov. 1846, in A. I. Herzen, Sobranie sochinenii v tridtsati tomakh (Moscow: Izd-vo Akademii nauk SSSR, 1954–61), xxii. 240, 264, 422. 6 A. F., “Pis’ma russkago puteshestvenika po Gretsii,” SPch 26 (Feb. 7, 1833).

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taking place elsewhere in Europe, where Neoclassicism merged with romantic nationalism, and thus, within certain limits, was free to pursue ideas that diverged from tsarist orthodoxy. Statements such as these also helped consolidate the stereotypes, already well underway in the West, regarding civilization and barbarism. The War of Greek Independence became, in a sense, a continuation of the ancient wars against the Persians, only in this case the Ottomans became the barbaric “other.” In addition to the extensive vistas of destruction, years of war had resulted in a significant loss of population throughout the territory of newly founded Greece. By 1832, virtually all the Muslim and Jewish populations had been slain or forced out, huge tracts of land lay empty, and there were only nine towns that had escaped total destruction, among them Lamia, Vonitsa, Nafplion, and Chalcis. All the rest were in ruins. According to the Bavarian scholar Friedrich Thiersch, many villages were destroyed and the typical lodging was a hay hut. Two-thirds of the country’s olive trees had disappeared, three-quarters of its mills were gone, and the basic tools and methods in agriculture had changed little since the time of Hesiod.7 The collapse of road networks and communications resulted in the breakdown of trade, shipping, and education. In 1832, the state treasury was empty and exchange was carried out by barter. Russian vice-consul in Patras, Ioannis Kallogerakis, lamented that the cultivation of the Corinthian currant had declined sharply, increasing the suffering of those in the region. Wheat imported from Odessa sold more cheaply in Nafplion than wheat brought overland from Tripolis.8 Threatened by bandits and irregular soldiers, many people found refuge in the recesses of the mountains, as the country sank into anarchy. Not until November 1832, when the strongest military captains agreed to end the civil unrest and focus on recompensing their troops, was a modicum of order established.9 In the Peloponnese, the French brigade d’occupation (mandated during the London Conference to remove the Egyptian army) had assumed the basic administrative and police functions.10 Two factions based on regional allegiances and their relationship with the murdered president splintered what little government existed. A group of pro-Kapodistrian senators and a body of troops from the Peloponnese, led by General Kolokotronis, gathered near Argos in a coalition that proclaimed itself as “the military commission.”11 Using the government printing press, which they had smuggled out of Nafplion, they denounced a rival faction, labeled 7 Friedrich Thiersch, De l’état actuel de la Grèce et des moyens d’arriver à sa restauration (Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus, 1833), i. 266, 293–304, ii. 44–89. 8 Kallogerakis to Katakazy, Patras, July 22, 1833, AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 265/1833, ll. 38–42; John Petropulos, “The Greek Economy during the First Decade of Othonian Rule,” DIEEE 24 (1981): 149. 9 Rikman to Nesselrode, Nafplion, Nov. 3, 1832, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 82/1833, ll. 2–4. 10 On the activities of the French troops in Greece from 1828 to 1833, see Davide Rodogno, Against Massacre: Humanitarian Interventions in the Ottoman Empire, 1815–1914 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), 84–7; Thanos Veremis, The Military in Greek Politics: From Independence to Democracy (London: Hurst & Co., 1997), 12–22; and V. Kremmydas, “O gallikos stratos stin Peloponniso,” Peloponnisiaka, 12 (1976): 75–102. 11 O Ellinikos Kathreptis/Le Miroir grec, 2 (May 20, 1832), 11 (Sept. 22, 1832), 13 (Oct. 15, 1832).

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“the administrative commission,” consisting of a group of anti-Kapodistrian or “Constitutionalist” senators from the mainland.12 Weary of their forceful exclusion from power before the King’s arrival, the anti-Kapodistrians assembled in Nafplion, where they summoned the French troops to garrison Argos and petitioned the foreign residents for diplomatic support. Eager to demonstrate their Russophilism, the leaders of the military commission nominated Admiral Rikord, commander of the Russian flotilla in the Archipelago, as provisional president of Greece. He declined.13 The Russian representative in Nafplion, Rikman, supported the Argos group, although he doubted that their coalition would last long, and he accused the French troops of reducing the “moral influence of the government on the nation.” He claimed that the inter-factional discord among the Greeks and the arbitrary conduct of French military agents made governing the country impossible.14 In an ostensible effort to promote stability, Rikman publicly identified the Kolokotronis faction as the legitimate authority. Thus, political chaos and support from the Russian legation helped further solidify the nucleus of the Russian party in Greece. By the end of 1832, this party had clearly taken shape. Initially based upon personal factions and local clienteles formed under the leadership of General Kolokotronis (see Figure 2.1) during the revolutionary years, the group crystallized into a nationwide party during the nearly four-year rule of Kapodistrias. Placed in a precarious situation between balancing the Greek elite and favoring certain factions, Kapodistrias chose to foster a group of faithful lieutenants to administer the state and organize the people. As he planted partisans throughout the country, in the Peloponnese he found ready-made the Kolokotronis faction, which he cultivated into the keystone of his entire system. This so-called Kapodistrian party was the most recognizable political faction in the country at the time of the president’s assassination. Although not organized by the Russian government or individual Russians, it took on the label “Russian,” because of Kapodistrias’s service career in that country, its zealous support of Orthodoxy, and its conservative political principles. Moreover, due to the president’s widespread popularity among the peasants of the Peloponnesus, who continued to consider Orthodox Russia as the most promising avenue of support, and who transferred some of their warm love for Russia to the man who maintained close connections with that power, the party had grassroots appeal. The story of the French expeditionary corps in the Peloponnese underscores the nature of foreign interference in Greek politics during the interregnum. Provoking,

12 Rikman to Nesselrode, Nafplion, Nov. 13, 1832, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 82/1833, ll. 22–32; Le Moniteur grec, 17 (Nov. 23, 1832); Theodoros Kolokotronis, Memoirs from the Greek War of Independence, 1821–33, tr. G. Tertzetis (Chicago: Argonaut Publishers,1969), 301–4; Petropulos, Politics and Statecraft, 131–4. 13 See G. Paleolog and M. Sivinis, Istoricheskii ocherk narodnoi voiny za nezavisimost Gretsii i vosstanovlenie korolevstva pri vmeshatel’stve velikikh derzhav Rossii, Anglii i Frantsii (St Petersburg: Morskago Ministerstva, 1867), ii. 245, prilozheniia, 212; and George Finlay, History of Greece from its Conquest by the Romans to the Present Time (Oxford: Clarendon, 1877), vii. 97–8. 14 Rikman to Nesselrode, Nafplion, Dec. 10, 1832, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 82/1833, ll. 65–70.

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Fig. 2.1. Theodoros Kolokotronis, from Sergei Glinka, Kartina istoricheskaia i politicheskaia Novoi Gretsii (Moscow: Tip. Avgusta Semena, 1829).

sometimes violent, episodes with local Greeks, the activities of the brigade d’occupation intersected with great power rivalries and divergent cultural perceptions, personifying many of the same problems involved in today’s peacekeeping missions. For example, when the French soldiers arrived in Argos in January 1833, a fight broke out between them and a party of Greek palikaria (literally brave young men, or irregular soldiers). Tensions escalated near the town center, where the irregulars began throwing stones at the foreign troops. The French responded by taking position and opening fire on the Greeks. Substantial street fighting ensued, and the Greek irregulars were ousted. Among the four-hundred casualties were women, children, the elderly, and at least three French soldiers.15 The various Greek newspapers presented conflicting accounts, yet all agreed that the episode was awful. The contemporary British historian, George Finlay, remarked that the Greek irregulars 15

Rikman to Nesslerode, Nafplion, Jan. 10, 1833, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 82/1833, ll. 116–20.

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unexpectedly attacked the French brigade.16 In contrast, a Russian translation of a letter from two Greek captains, appearing in the Northern Bee, reported that the French drew first blood.17 Although Rikman was cognizant of the irregulars’ habit of causing disorder, he was far from exonerating the French forces involved. Soon after the debacle in Argos, French soldiers were accused of vandalizing a monastery and smashing icons and sacred vessels in several churches. “These profanities,” wrote Rikman, “have excited the indignation of the populace to the highest degree. The French feared new troubles in the village and asked the Regency for help.” Rikman was so upset that he referred to the French as “infidels, scarcely better than Turks.”18 The Russian diplomat’s temper was roused again when 18-year-old, Parisian-educated Nikolaos Kolokotronis (son of the general), was “arbitrarily and violently arrested” in Nafplion for being involved in the Argos affair. From his prison cell in the fortress of Itch-Kalé, the young Kolokotronis turned to Rikman for defense against what he considered unjust prosecution. Rikman responded by sending a confidential letter to the French authorities defending the prisoner.19 These incidents, among others, explain why one of Russia’s first objectives was the exodus of the French brigade d’occupation from Greek soil. The situation along the northern frontier of the new kingdom was hardly better. Among the most valuable sources for the history of central Rumelia during the second quarter of the nineteenth century are the reports of the Russian vice-consul in Thessaloniki, Angelos Moustoxydis.20 Consular reports from Thessaloniki detail the pandemonium engulfing Ottoman Europe at this time. Recurrent raids by armed bands under the leadership of Tafil-Bouzi, an Albanian Tosk chieftain who virtually ruled Epirus, western Macedonia, and parts of Thessaly in the 1830s, caused unrest among the peasantry and tempted unemployed Greek veterans to seek their fortunes outside the kingdom.21 Backed by a force of several thousand Albanian warriors, Tafil-Bouzi, like his better-known predecessor Ali Pasha of

16 Finlay, History of Greece, vii. 103–4; Petropulos, Politics and Statecraft, 134. See also the rabidly anti-Russian account by General Jean Pellion, La Grèce et les Capodistrias pendant l’occupation française de 1828 à 1834 (Paris: J. Dumaine, 1855), 358–65. 17 SPch 52 (Mar. 7, 1833); the same report appeared in OV 23 (Mar. 22, 1833). See also, SPch 34 (Feb. 14, 1833); OV 16 (Feb. 25, 1833). For an opposing version, see Le Moniteur grec, 20 ( Jan. 13, 1833). 18 Rikman to Nesselrode, Nafplion, Feb. 3, 1833, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 82/1833, l. 194. 19 Nikolaos Kolokotronis to Rikman, Nafplion, Jan. 8, 1833, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 82/1833, l. 123. See also, Kolokotronis, Memoirs, 302; O Ellinikos Kathreptis/Le Miroir grec, 27 ( Jan. 9, 1833). 20 For the service career of Angelos Moustoxydis, see Lucien J. Frary, “Russian Interests in Nineteenth Century Thessaloniki,” Mediterranean Historical Review, 23/1 ( June 2008): 15–33; and “Mustoksidi, Anzhelo Arsen’evich (1816–61),” AVPRI, f. 159, op. 464, d. 2343. 21 Moustoxydis to Butenev, Thessaloniki, Mar. 28, 1833; Moustoxydis to Butenev, Thessaloniki, Apr. 4, 1833; Moustoxydis to Butenev, Thessaloniki, Sept. 16, 1833, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 1297, ll. 18–19, 24–5, 98; Moustoxydis to Butenev, Thessaloniki, Nov. 1, 1834, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 1298, ll. 103–4; Moustoxydis to Butenev, Thessaloniki, Feb. 1, 1835, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 1300, l. 54. On Albania during this period, see the excellent discussion by G. L. Arsh, “Mustafa Bushati—poslednii samostoiatel’nyi pasha Albanii,” and “Albaniia—miatezhnaia Osmanskaia provintsiia,” in V. N. Vinogradov (ed.), Istoriia Balkan: Vek deviatnadtsatyi (do Krymskoi voiny) (Moscow: KRASAND, 2011), 131–42, 392–400; and G. L. Arsh (ed.), Kratkaia istoriia Albanii: S drevneishikh vremen do nashikh dnei (Moscow: Nauka, 1992), 141–50.

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Ioannina, menaced Ottoman forces and aimed to carve out an independent state. The process of the normalization of Greek–Ottoman relations stalled further when the Ottoman governor and ayan of Serres, Hadji Ismail Bey, decided to prevent the withdrawal of the remaining Muslims from Attica, Euboea, and Zeitouni. Thanks to the intercession of Russian consul in Athens, Ioannis Paparrigopoulos, violence was narrowly avoided. Rumors of an Albanian uprising, led by Abdoul Bey and Ibrahim Bey, spread over the Greek mainland during the winter of 1832–3. Both Albanian leaders, according to Russian observers, were agents of the Egyptian Pasha Mehmed Ali. Hostilities continued in the spring when Tafil-Bouzi arrived on Greek soil in order to win over the Greek captains. According to Rikman’s informants, the Albanian chief wanted to launch a constitutional revolution in the Ottoman Empire. Meanwhile, reports on the actions of Tafil-Bouzi and other “Albanian sheiks” reached Russian readers.22 Another complex problem facing the young state was the struggle for influence amongst the European powers. Each major power could claim to have vital interests at stake. Great Britain aspired to dominate the Middle East and secure possessions in India. France pursued with vigor its participation in Mediterranean trade networks while reviving its traditional friendship with the Sultan. For the Habsburg Empire, stability in Greece was essential to the maintenance of order and vibrant trading links in the Balkans.23 Religious concerns, as well as pragmatic designs, motivated Russian foreign policy. Consistently applied, Russian foreign policy was closely tied with the maintenance of the status quo in the territorial, political, and social sense. However, western European journalists manipulated the connection between Russia and the Ottoman Empire to transmit Russophobic emotions, which climaxed during the first years of independent Greece.24 The comments of Thiersch are characteristic of the misunderstanding among western Europeans: “They say that Russia aspires to possess Constantinople, that is to say, she aims to reunite the empire of the East with that of the North. The realization of this combination would overturn the system of Europe.” Finlay echoed this view: “I fear Constantinople is inevitably annexed to Russia—the last Punic war only remains to be achieved and Turkey will find the fate of Carthage.”25 The British naval officer Adolphus Slade, the author of several highly influential travel accounts, forwarded the following opinion: “When Russia obtains Turkey, Greece, unless Europe 22 Rikman to Nesselrode, Nafplion, Mar. 16, 1833, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 82/1833, ll. 249–54; Moustoxydis to Butenev, Thessaloniki, Mar. 28, 1833, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 1297, ll. 18–19; OV 53 ( July 8, 1833); JdSPB 92 (Aug. 3, 1833); KG 96 (Aug. 12, 1833); SPBV 148 ( July 27, 1833), 161 ( July 12, 1833), 175 ( July 28, 1833). 23 Friedrich Engel-Janosi, “Austria and the Beginnings of the Kingdom of Greece,” Journal of Central European Affairs, 1/1–2 (1941): 28–44, 208–23; Engel-Janosi, Geschichte auf dem Ballhausplatz (Vienna: Verlag Styria, 1963), 29–64. 24 See Ada Dialla, I Rosia apenanti sta Valkania: Ideologia kai politiki sto devtero miso tou 19ou aiona (Athens: Ekdoseis Alexandreia, 2009), 73–89; John Howes Gleason, The Genesis of Russophobia in Great Britain (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1950); and Raymond T. McNally, “The Origins of Russophobia in France: 1812–30,” American Slavic and East European Review, 17 (1958): 173–89. 25 Thiersch, De l’état actuel, i. 201; The Journals and Letters of George Finlay, ed. J. M. Hussey (Camberley: Porphyrogenitus, 1995), i. 87.

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timely alters her present tendency, will join it. Interest, beyond inclination, will prompt the union; for it is more advantageous, in which light the Greek chiefly regards political transactions, to form part of a large empire than to glory in Lilliputian independence.”26 The books and articles of David Urquhart, the most notorious of all sponsors of the menace of Russian expansionism, had a major impact on both British public opinion and foreign policy.27 Unfortunately, few western journalists or politicians realized, at that time, at least, that the Russian territorial advance was a myth. As will be outlined, the Tsar’s actions demonstrated time and again his disinterest in annexing portions of Ottoman Europe. The most tragic result of this misunderstanding was the Crimean War.

RUSSIA A ND THE R EGENCY OF KING OTHON (1833 –1 8 35 ) Bells rang and canons roared as the British corvette Madagascar arrived in Nafplion harbor with the 17-year-old Prince Othon, the Regency, and the royal entourage (consisting of over fifty people) on January 25, 1833. The Bavarian troops had arrived from Trieste shortly before. The Russian press unanimously reported that the Greek people greeted Othon with great jubilation.28 The second secretary of the Russian mission in Greece, Konstantin F. Lelli, described the King’s arrival: The entry of the king was as solemn and brilliant as it could be in Greece. Everything contributed in a most pleasing way. Nature and men reunited by a common accord to join in the splendor of the spectacle. The Greek people show a joy, an enthusiasm that matches perfectly this imposing pomp and the appearance of the young king, filled with dignity and grief, who just offered his salute to an unhappy people torn by anarchy and filled with hopes for the future. Doubtlessly, this day will be well remembered in the annals of Greece. All of the Greeks appear to have this sentiment more or less. The people are filled with confidence in the authority of the king.29

Lelli’s interest in the people’s support for the monarchy, his emphasis on pageantry and monarchical authority, illustrate the values of what would soon become the Russian state credo of Official Nationality. The extravagant arrival of the new sovereign must have presented a striking contrast to the preceding years of anarchy 26

Adolphus Slade, Turkey, Greece and Malta (London: Saunders & Otley, 1837), i. 220–1. See D. Urquhart, Portfolio, or, A Collection of State Papers (London: J. Maynard, 1836–7); Urquhart, The Spirit of the East (London: H. Colburn, 1838); Urquhart, Turkey and its Resources: Its Municipal Organization and Free Trade (London: Saunders & Otley, 1833); Urquhart, The Sultan Mahmoud and Mehemet Ali Pasha (London: J. Ridgway, 1835). See also G. H. Bolsover, “David Urquhart and the Eastern Question, 1833–7: A Study in Publicity and Diplomacy,” Journal of Modern History, 8 (1936): 444–67. 28 JdSPB 29 (Mar. 9, 1833); SPch 50 (Mar. 4, 1833); OV 23 (Mar. 22, 1833); SPBV 35 (Feb. 11, 1833), 42 (Feb. 19, 1833). 29 “Vypiska iz pis’ma Lelli iz Napoli di Romani ot 27 Ian. 1833,” AVPRI, f. 161/1, op. 181/2, d. 48, ll. 3. A detailed description of the procession into Nafplion is given in Rikman to Nesselrode, Nafplion, Jan. 26 Jan., 1833, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 82/1833, ll. 162–5. On Lelli, see “Lelli, Konstantin Fedorovich,” AVPRI, f. 159, op. 464, d. 1992. 27

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and bloodshed. Even before Othon’s arrival, Rikman had considered the disparity of the prince’s entourage and the misery of the population, yet he held high hopes for the monarchy to heal the country’s wounds.30 Russian newspaper coverage of the King’s entrance into Nafplion also underscored the splendor and majesty of the event, filled with music, parades, and festivity. The Northern Bee reported that “it is impossible to describe the delight of the inhabitants, their hopes fulfilled to see an end to the calamity of their unhappy fatherland.” General Kolokotronis and several other captains greeted the king near shore in ancient Greek costume. Tapping into the neoclassical spirit, a Russian reporter from the St Petersburg Gazette glorified the Greek people and observed that Kolokotronis “really reminded us of ancient Greek heroes.”31 The Russian press printed the official proclamation announcing the new dynasty, which, reportedly, the Greek people accepted joyously.32 Russian newspapers omitted mentioning, however, that in ascending the throne, the King solemnly proclaimed his assurance to the Greek people to “protect conscientiously your religion.” In an interview with the Regency, Rikman criticized the phrase “your religion” because he felt it distanced the sovereign from his people and gave the impression that the conversion of the dynasty to Orthodoxy would never take place. A more serious response came from the bishop of Rethymnon, who instructed his flock to refuse to pray for the sovereign and to ignore the laws, for the “national church” did not sanction the Regency. The Russian mission supported this sort of reaction and granted the Cretan bishop a Russian passport and travel subsidy, which enabled him to meet with the patriarch of Constantinople.33 Ensuing regional squabbles, and the need for repose, impeded the negative consequences that could have resulted from the mixed response to the royal decree. Fortunately, the public accepted without clamor the proclamation of January 30, 1833, which called for all Greek males to take an oath of fidelity to the King. The Russian press gave the oath wide circulation.34 At this point Greece entered a new epoch. The London Agreement of May 1832 finalized the decision to make Prince Frederick Otto (Othon) of Wittlesbach monarch of Greece (see Figure 2.2). The powers resolved that, until his majority, a Regency of three individuals chosen by Othon’s father, King Ludwig I of Bavaria, would govern the country. In addition, over 3,000 Bavarian soldiers would provide protection, and the powers agreed to guarantee Greece 20 million of a 60 million franc loan. After that, it was up to the three powers whether they wished to grant the remaining 40 million francs. Several articles of the London Agreement, including a vague promise about constitutional government, were unclear and prepared the way for future conflicts.

30

Rikman to Nesselrode, Nafplion, Dec. 20, 1832, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 82/1833, ll. 95, 112. SPch 64 (Mar. 21, 1833) employs the word “inhabitants” (zhitely), rather than “citizens” (grazhdany) or “subjects” (podannye); SPBV 66 (Mar. 19, 1833). 32 The proclamation in Russian appeared in SPch 51 (Mar. 6, 1833); SPBV 55 (Mar. 7, 1833); OV 32 (Apr. 26, 1833); and in French in JdSPB 29 (Mar. 9, 1833). 33 Rikman to Nesselrode, Nafplion, May 10, 1833; Rikman to Nesselrode, Nafplion, June 3, 1833, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 82/133, ll. 513, 542–6; Katakazy to Butenev, Nafplion, Aug. 5, 1833, f. 180, op. 517/1. d. 1801, ll. 164–5. 34 SPBV 83 (Apr. 12, 1833); SPch 84 (Apr. 18, 1833); OV 32 (Apr. 29, 1833). 31

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Fig. 2.2. Arrival of His Majesty King Othon in Nafplion, February 6, 1833. Lithographic plate by I. B. Dreseli and Gustav Wilhelm Kraus (1833). Courtesy of the Anne S. K. Brown Military Collection, Brown University.

In a decree of October 5, 1832, King Ludwig named three regents: Bavarian politician Count Joseph von Armansperg (1787–1853), law professor Georg Ludwig von Maurer (1790–1872), and Bavarian General Karl Wilhelm von Heideck (1788–1861). Although not regents, Karl Abel, a Bavarian politician known for his conservative opinions, served as secretary, and Bavarian bureaucrat, Johann Baptist Greiner, served as an expert economic advisor. Armansperg was president; Maurer supervised judicial, ecclesiastical, and educational affairs; and Heideck was in charge of military and naval matters. Each regent was instructed to gather data in his field and to create legislation that would be discussed among the Regency as a whole.35 In order to best guide the Regency’s efforts to create the Greek kingdom, the Russian Foreign Ministry established a permanent embassy with a specially trained

35 Most studies dealing with this era provide information about the regents. See E. Driault and M. Lhéritier, Histoire diplomatique de la Grèce de 1821 à nos jours (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1925–6), ii. 96; Petropulos, Politics and Statecraft, 155; Petrunina, Grecheskaia natsiia, 227; Wolf Seidl, Bayern in Griechenland: Die Geburt des griechischen Nationalstaats und die Regierung König Ottos (Munich: Prestel, 1981), 111–65; and F. A. Kurganov, Ustroistvo upravleniia v tserkvi korolevstva grecheskago (Kazan: Univ. tip., 1871), 102. Interesting profiles of the regents and Greek leaders are in Katakazy to Nesselrode, Athens, Feb. 15, 1835, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 102/1835, ll. 61–71.

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staff. Perhaps the most distinguishing feature of the Russian embassy was that all of its members were Orthodox Christians of Greek descent.36 Gavriil A. Katakazy (1787–1867), for instance, the Russian ambassador from 1833 until 1843, was born in Constantinople and spoke Turkish, as well as Russian, Greek, and French.37 First Secretary Ioannis E. Persiany (1790–1888), the second in command until 1843, when he took over Katakazy’s post, came from a Wallachian boyar family of Greek heritage.38 Ioannis K. Paparrigopoulos (1780–1874), born on Naxos and educated in Constantinople, Moscow, and Italy, was the Russian consul in northern Greece and on the island of Euboea from May 1830 until his retirement in 1864.39 The Russian consul in the Peloponnesus, Ioannis N. Vlassopoulos (1764–1836), a courageous individual whose life would make the plotline of a good novel, was a Greek from Syros with a long history of tsarist service.40 Russian vice-consul in Patras, Ioannis Kallogerakis, the author of some of the most interesting reports for the study of Greek–Russian relations in the period, 36 See Lucien J. Frary, “The Tsar’s Loyal Greeks: The Russian Diplomatic Mission to Independent Greece,” in Olga Katsiardi-Hering (ed.), Russia and the Mediterranean (Athens: National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, Herodotos Press, 2011), ii. 277–98; Iu. D. Priakhin, Greki v istorii Rossii XVIII–XIX vekov (St Petersburg: Aleteiia, 2008); K. Papoulidis, “À propos de l’uvre des employés grecs du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères de la Russie impériale aux XVIIIème, XIXème et XXème siècles,” BS 35 (1994): 5–14; and Papoulidis, “K voprosu o deiatel’nosti grekov, sluzhivshikh v MID Rossiiskoi Imperii v XVIII–XX vv,” in G. L. Arsh (ed.), Grecheskaia kul’tura v Rossii, XVII–XX vv. (Moscow: Nauka, 1999), 44–50. 37 The Katakazy family originally came from Italy and intertwined with Phanariot families in the course of the 17th cent. By the 18th cent., the family had roots in Mani and Zakynthos, and claimed close connections to the Ypsilantis family. After the 1770 uprising in the Peloponnese, the Katakazys began to immigrate to Russia. Gavriil Antonovich was born in Constantinople and educated at the Richelieu Lycée in Odessa. He became a Russian subject when he entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1816. See the biography by his grandson, A. V. Nekliudov, Starye portrety: Semeinaia letopis (Nice: n.p., 1932–3), ii. 167–211, 251–346. For his service record, see “Katakazi, Gavriil Antonovich,” AVPRI, f. 159, op. 464, d. 1649; Frary, “The Tsar’s Loyal Greeks,” ii. 277–98; K. Papoulidis, “Un document caractéristique de Gabriel Catacazy tire des Archives de la Politique Extérieure de Russie,” BS 9 (1982): 341–7; Amburger, Geschichte der Behördenorganisation Russlands, 197, 461; RBS 8: 545–6; and “Katrakazis, G. A.,” MEE 14: 129. 38 Persiany entered Russian service in 1815, became a Russian subject, and joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the next year. For his record, see “Persiani, I. E.,” AVPRI, f. 159, op. 464, d. 2602; O. E. Petrunina, “50 let na sluzhbe Rossii: portret rossiiskogo diplomata XIX v. I. E. Persiani,” Vestnik Moskovskogo Universiteta. Seriia 21 Upravlenie (Gosudarsvo i obshchestvo), 1 (2008): 84–96; Amburger, Geschichte der Behördenorganisation Russlands, 454, 461; RBS 13: 569–70. 39 Paparrigopoulos first entered Russian service sometime in the later 1810s. Before the outbreak of the Greek revolt, he served as dragoman for the general consulates in Smyrna and the Morea. Despite this long tenure, he did not become a Russian subject until 1846. See “Paparigopulo, I. K.,” AVPRI, f. 159, op. 464, d. 2565; J. Nicolopoulos, Greki v Rossii XVII–XIX vekov (St Petersburg: Aleteeia, 2007), 120–48; A. N. Goudas, Vioi paralliloi ton epi tis Ellados diaprepsanton andron (Athens: K. Antoniados, 1869–76), v. 203–48; G. L. Arsh, Albaniia i Epir v kontse XVIII–nachale XIX v. (Moscow: Nauka, 1963), 315–16; T. Kandiloros, I Philiki Etaireia 1814–21 (Athens: Typois N. D. Phrantzeskaki, 1926), 229, 233–5, 315–18, 353; V. Sphyroeras, “O Philikos Ioannis Paparrigopoulos kai o Ali Pasas,” Epeiriotiki Estia, 1 (1952): 661–71; N. C. Pappas, Greeks in Russian Military Service in the Late 18th and Early 19th Centuries (Thessaloniki: IMXA, 1991), 301–3. 40 In 1788, Vlassopoulos volunteered for service aboard the Russian flotilla in the Mediterranean and became a special messenger in the next year. See “Vlasopulo, I. N.,” AVPRI, f. 159, op. 464, d. 693; Katakazy to Nesselrode, Athens, Oct. 14, 1836; Katakazy to Anakanarii Petrovich, Athens, Nov. 13, 1836, AVPRI, f. 161/1, op. 181/2, d. 51/1836, ll. 2–3, 4–5; Katakazy to Vlassopoulos, Athens, July 25, 1835, AVPRI, f. 161/1, op. 181/2, d. 57/1837, ll. 20–1; A. M. Stanislavskaia, Rossiia i

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came from a Greek merchant family in Odessa.41 These gifted individuals, with the ability to write informative, highly readable reports, possessed unique knowledge of local affairs and an ability to speak directly to the people in Greek. Foreign Minister Nesselrode outlined the Tsar’s aims in the Greek kingdom in a dispatch to Katakazy dated January 1833.42 Russia followed certain definite policies in accordance with its national interests in the Near East and in its role as the most powerful of the conservative powers. Above all, the Foreign Ministry instructed Katakazy to convince Armansperg to consolidate domestic order. Nesselrode’s directives were frank: “It is necessary that the Regency, as soon as it is installed, commences to govern.” Without declaring special interests of any kind, Katakazy was to convince the Regency of the need for a strong monarchy unimpeded by constitutional restrictions. At no point was the Regency to consider drawing up a constitution before the King’s majority, and, in the meantime, it was to limit the electoral system in order to diminish the influence of democratic forces. A strong restraint of press liberties was to curtail public debate. Katakazy was instructed to persuade the regents to construct the state so that by the time of the King’s majority, if conditions warranted a constitution, it would be as monarchical as possible. With little hope of acquiring absolute control over Greek affairs, Russia desired that the Greek government remain free from foreign political influence. Russia wanted the Regency to sever ties with the Greek factions and impede British and French efforts to direct Greek affairs. The first step was the departure of the French brigade d’occupation from Greek soil (which finally took place in the first months of 1833). Once this was achieved, a recall of the naval squadrons of the three powers was to follow to prevent further embarrassment to the government, like the fiasco in Argos. Russia did not want Greece to play an active role in foreign policy, despite the fact that the boundaries made irredentist claims irresistible. Lastly, Russia desired that the Regency put the country’s finances in order and address the problems of “national industry and commerce.” In this connection, Katakazy was to keep a keen eye on state revenues. St Petersburg believed that Russian influence would increase through the expansion of trade and encouraged a Russian–Greek commercial treaty.

Gretsiia v kontse XVIII–nachale XIX veka. (Moscow: Nauka, 1976), 276, 281, 285–7, 310, 321–2, 332–3; Arsh, Albaniia i Epir, 221–7. 41 “Kallogeraki, I.,” AVPRI, f. 159, op. 464, d. 1592. The document is missing from its file. 42 The general instructions and memorandum on religious affairs are contained in Nesselrode to Katakazy, St Petersburg, Jan. 24, 1833, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 84/1833, ll. 5–32, 33–9. Both documents were approved by the Emperor in St Petersburg on Oct. 10, 1832, then signed and dispatched on Jan. 24, 1833. The majority of the text has been published in Jelavich, Russia and Greece, 55–67. Before reaching Greece, Katakazy went to Munich, where he confirmed to King Ludwig Russia’s approval of the Regency and the Bavarian security force. Next, Katakazy traveled to Nafplion, replaced Rikman in May, and presented himself to Armansperg as the provisional manager of the Russian mission. Rikman moved to the Russian embassy in Constantinople. See Nesselrode to Rikman, St Petersburg, Mar. 21, 1833 and Nesselrode to Rikman, St Petersburg, Jan. 24, 1833, RGADA, f. 3, op. 1, d. 100, part 2, ll. 9–11.

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A special annex to Katakazy’s general instructions contains the religious component of tsarist policy.43 Russia sought to strengthen Greek religious institutions and invigorate connections between Balkan Orthodoxy with the rest of the Orthodox world. St Petersburg endeavored to protect Orthodox believers in Greece from the so-called “imminent perils” of a Catholic sovereign and “the aggressive tendencies” of American Methodists, by preparing for a special ecclesiastical representative from Russia to oversee religious affairs. These detailed instructions regarding the church contrast with the directives of Ambassador Katakazy’s British and French counterparts, which hardly touch upon religious questions at all.44 St Petersburg based its desire to establish a strong and responsible regime in Greece not only on the extreme political turmoil of the past years, but also on general ideological considerations. Tsar Nicholas believed that it was in Russia’s best interest to influence the well-being of Greece through the ascendancy of the principles enshrined in Official Nationality. It was no coincidence that the Greek newspaper the Century, the main voice of the Russian party in Greece, adopted “Religion, Fatherland, and King” for its motto on its initial issues.45 Poems dedicated to “Religion, Othon, and Fatherland” and glowing praise of Tsar Nicholas appear in nearly every issue of this newspaper. According to St Petersburg, the people’s faithful submission to its sovereign and the maintenance of the unity of faith were essential to the repose of the Greek people. In numerous communications, Nesselrode instructed Katakazy to employ all the means at his disposal to convince the Regency that it was in their best interest to make the people serve and obey their sovereign without condition. In addition, St Petersburg ordered that Russophile leaders submit to the new administration in order to ensure public prosperity and order. “If Kolokotronis and his adherents,” wrote Nesselrode, “were well persuaded of this truth, there will be a better chance to attain power and get the upper hand on their liberal adversaries, who are trying without question to impose conditions on the government that are more difficult to satisfy.”46 Sympathetic to the moral make-up of an essentially traditional society bound to the soil, Russia attempted to implement a value system different from that prevailing in the West. Thus, Russian policy appealed to those who championed the Byzantine-Orthodox tradition over those more inclined toward European modernism. Russia’s commitment to deeply conservative customs and the Regency’s preference for modern forms of government reflects part of the political tension that continued in Greece for at least a century after independence.47 43 Nesselrode to Katakazy, St Petersburg, Jan. 24, 1833, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 84/1833, ll. 33–9. The special instructions regarding religion are in Russian tr. on ll. 40–9. See also “Mémoire sur les affaires de la religion en Grèce,” in Jelavich, Russia and Greece, 64–7. 44 On French and British policy, see Driault, Histoire diplomatique, ii. 84–93; and Charles Webster, The Foreign Policy of Palmerston, 1830–41 (London: G. Bell, 1969), i. 259–72. 45 See L. Droulia and G. Koutsopanagou (eds), Enkyklopaideia tou Ellinikou typou 1784–1974: Ephimerides, periodika, demosiographoi, ekdotes (Athens: Institouto Neoellinikon Erevnon, 2008), i. 153–4. 46 Nesselrode to Katakazy, St Petersburg, Jan. 24, 1833, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 84/1833, l. 16; Instruction to Katakazy, in Jelavich, Russia and Greece, 63. 47 For insight on this tension in Greek society, see M. Herzfeld, Ours Once More: Folklore, Ideology, and the Making of Modern Greece (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1982), 18–21, 123–8; Victor

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In the first months of 1833, official Russia’s initial reception of the Regency was favorable, due in part to the decision to postpone a constitution. In the opinion of Russian officialdom, republican and constitutional theories were deplorable influences that seduced the people. The Regency president Armansperg claimed to share this view in his correspondence with the Russian embassy. He assured Katakazy that the Regency would leave the choice and initiative for a constitution to the King at the time when he took the reins of government. However, Katakazy was not blind to the diplomatic pleasantries contained in Armansperg’s statements, for he considered them merely an adjournment of the main objective to limit monarchical power. The president of the Regency, observed Katakazy, desires to give Greece a constitution based on the principle of national representation, but he sees that this type of government would be inapplicable to the state of the country and that the king would find himself consequentially forced to revoke everything at his accession to the throne. On the other hand, he does not want to contradict the political principles that he manifested openly in Germany by becoming in Greece the instrument or the founder of monarchical power without legislative control and without liberty of the press.48

In order to stem the potential danger of constitutionalism at its source, Katakazy promised Nesselrode to try all means of persuasion, “including confidential discussions and pecuniary inducements,” to convince Armansperg and his colleagues of the necessity for a firm monarchical regime. While claiming absolute neutrality and conceding the possibility for a future constitution, the Russian embassy did not shy from opportunities to advance its conservative principles. Widespread social, political, and economic change characterized the period of the first Regency (February 1833–July 1834).49 The regents already had prepared their first measures in Munich following the suggestions of the Bavarian scholar Fredrick Thiersch and under the eyes of King Ludwig.50 The Regency’s first step was to reform the monetary system, so long connected to the Ottoman piaster. In February, the Government Gazette announced the replacement of the phoenix (the coinage used during Kapodistrias’s presidency) with the new drachma. The first Roudometof, “Invented Traditions, Symbolic Boundaries, and National Identity in Southeastern Europe: Greece and Serbia in Comparative Historical Perspective (1830–80),” EEQ 32/4 (1998): 430–43; and Ch. Giannaras, Orthodoxia kai dysi sti neoteri Ellada (Athens: Domos, 1992), 240–489, which includes selected primary documents. 48 Katakazy to Nesselrode, Nafplion, June 8, 1833, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 83/1833, ll. 30–1. 49 Maurer and Heideck played the dominant role in the first Regency. During the second Regency (Aug. 1834–May 1835), Armansperg was in control and continued to assert authority until after Otho came of age. 50 Russian opinions about Thiersch are contained in a report by Nesselrode, who called the Bavarian author an “ultra-liberal partisan with revolutionary ideas and a dangerous influence.” He considered his recall by Ludwig to be an “act of wisdom and good politics.” See Nesselrode to Potemkin, St Petersburg, July 16, 1832, in Jelavich, Russia and Greece, 49–50. A critical response to Thiersch’s work is that of [Viaro Kapodistrias], Examen critique de l’ouvrage “De l’état actuel de la Grèce et des moyens d’arriver à sa restauration,” par Mr. Fréderic Thiersch (Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus, 1835). Thiersch’s volumes were reviewed in a relatively neutral spirit in “Narodonaselenie grecheskago korolevstva,” BdCh 8 (1835), 7, 24–5; and SPch 212 (Sept. 17, 1836).

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coins bore an image of the King on one side and, on the obverse, a flag featuring a cross, topped by a crown flanked by olive laurels.51 A Russian translation of the decree appeared in the Commercial Gazette along with the exchange rate of various currencies against the drachma.52 Minting the new currency was significant, for it spared Greek commerce from having its wealth reduced because of its connection to the progressively depreciating piaster. Despite many fiscal vicissitudes, the new coinage stood the test of time; it remained in use until the adoption of the euro in 2001. Thousands of unemployed veterans constituted one of the most intractable problems facing the government. The violent incident in Argos greatly distressed the regents and served as a catalyst to implement military reforms. Bringing an end to the “spoliations, rapines, vexations, and troubles,” which followed the assassination of the president, was the object of a circular to all irregular troops dated January 28, 1833. Soon afterwards, the Regency published its scheme for the military’s reorganization.53 One part of the decree simply dismissed many irregular soldiers, while another implored them to observe discipline and turn in their arms. Rikman warned that, “in a country where everyone carries arms as much out of habit as for personal defense, disarmament necessarily ought to encounter great difficulties.”54 According to the Messenger of Odessa, the disarmament part of the decree was successful, thanks to the support of General Kolokotronis, who was among the first to hand in his weapons.55 The orderly and obedient behavior of a national hero such as Kolokotronis provided a popular and acceptable subject for Russian-language dailies, especially one based in a city like Odessa with a large Greek population. The Regency’s plan for the organization of the national army was as follows: about 5,000 Greek regulars regrouped into infantry, light cavalry, and artillery battalions; ten battalions of skirmishers absorbed some 2,000 former irregulars; and a police force was set up as a supplementary branch to the regular army and charged with the maintenance of public order. To administer this change Greece was divided into three regions, each with its own military command led by ambitious

51 Ephimeris, 3 (Feb. 28, 1833). Rikman to Nesselrode, Nafplion, Mar. 16, 1833, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 82/1833, ll. 256–9. See also, Jean-Paul Divo, Modern Greek Coins, 1828–1968 (Zurich: Bank Leu, 1969), 20–41; and S. Gardiakos, The Coinage of Modern Greece, Crete, the Ionian Islands and Cyprus (Chicago: Argonaut, 1969), 46–56. 52 KG 64 (May 30, 1833); KG 42 (Mar. 8, 1833); SPch 74 (Apr. 6, 1833); SPBV 79 (Apr. 7, 1833); OV 45 ( June 10, 1833). Katakazy to Nesselrode, Nafplion, Mar. 1, 1834, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 81/1834, ll. 39–68, notes that one drachma was the equivalent to 20 silver kopeks or 80 kopeks assignats. 53 Rikman to Nesselrode, Nafplion, Feb. 3, 1833, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 82/1833, ll. 196–7. The text of the decrees of military organization appeared in Ephimeris, 5–7 (Mar. 8–12, 1833). For detailed commentary, see Petropulos, Politics and Statecraft, 165–72; John Koliopoulos, Brigands with a Cause: Brigandage and Irredentism in Modern Greece (1821–1912) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), 76–88; Apostolos Vakalopoulos, Ta ellinika stratevmata tou 1821, 2nd edn (Thessaloniki: Ekdoseis Karagiannis, 1970), 286–92. 54 Rikman to Nesselrode, Nafplion, Mar. 16, 1833, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 82/1833, l. 300. 55 OV 24 (Mar. 25, 1833).

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revolutionary heroes.56 Despite the good intention, the military decrees brought few positive results. The King and his advisors aimed to expedite a constructive outcome by means of a general amnesty for all soldiers and lower officers of regular troops who within six weeks showed the authorities their desire to enter the regular army. By May, however, only thirty-five irregulars had enlisted in the skirmisher battalions, while as many as 6,000 had left for northern Greece and thence to the Ottoman domain.57 The remainder of the now unemployed and impoverished revolutionary army went home or moved in with relatives. The military reforms exemplified the tension between deeply rooted traditional structures and the practices of a centralized, modern European state. Moreover, they clashed with the swashbuckling klephtic way of life as personified by the revolutionary guerrilla leaders, who had made a singular contribution to the cause of independence before the arrival of the “Westernizers,” and who had become the symbol of heroism, aggressiveness, and manliness (andrismos). The Greek newspaper the Century reported that these measures and other layers of violence were blows to the national sentiment of the Greeks.58 The protests of the rebel-soldiers were understandable given the circumstances: after a long struggle for independence, the new regime refused to award them an indemnity, pension, or land grants. Indeed, surrendering one’s weapons to a group of foreign bureaucrats was a lot to ask, and most considered toiling behind a plow insulting after years of military service. The “Frankish” uniforms and weapons, particularly the bayonet, which the regime expected them to use, were a source of repugnance to them, observed Rikman.59 George Finlay recorded in his journal that “the government has thought fit to appoint a gendarme dressed in Frank uniform in place of the fustinello. It requires no conjuration to foresee that it will be worse than useless.”60 A central figure in the first years of the independent state, Ioannis Makrygiannis (1797–1864), among other leaders, refused to give up his palikar attire. In his famous memoirs, he recorded bitterly that the Bavarian troops received the best pay and positions.61 To many it appeared as if another form of foreign domination simply replaced the “Turkish yoke.” Perhaps in response to the popular backlash, the first images of the young King Othon depict him in a fustanella and traditional klephtic garb (see Figure 2.3).62 56 SPch 90 (Apr. 25, 1833), 106 (May 15, 1833) reported that Kolokotronis was in charge of the Peloponnesus, Notes Botsaris and Kitsos Tzavelas controlled continental Greece, and Dimitris Koliopoulos managed Nafplion and its environs. 57 Rikman to Nesselrode, Nafplion, Mar. 16, 1833, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 82/1833, l. 300; Rikman to Nesselrode, Nafplion, May 10, 1833, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 649, d. 82/1833, ll. 523–5. See also SPch 106 (May 15, 1833). 58 Aion, 118 (Dec. 6, 1839). On klephtism, see Herzfeld, Ours Once More, 50–2, 58–72. 59 Rikman to Nesselrode, Nafplion, Apr. 6, 1833, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 82/1833, l. 410. 60 Finlay, Journals and Letters, i. 71. 61 Ioannis Makrygiannis, Apomnimonevmata, ed. G. Vlachogiannis (Athens: E. G. Vagionaki, 1947), ii. 64–7. 62 Images of Otho and the Bavarians are printed in Christian Dümler et al., Von Athen nach Bamberg: König Otto von Griechenland (Munich: Bayerische Schlösserverwaltung, 2002); and Jan von Murken et al., König-Otto-von-Griechenland-Museum der Gemeinde Ottobrunn (Munich: Weltkunst, 1995).

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Fig. 2.3. King Othon of Greece in national costume. Gustav Wilhelm Kraus (1840). Courtesy of the Anne S. K. Brown Military Collection, Brown University.

Alienated and without means, the majority of unemployed veterans headed for the frontier. The influx of rebel-soldiers into Ottoman territory troubled Russian vice-consul Moustoxydis in Thessaloniki, who sent detailed reports, including lists of the best-known captains and excerpts from letters of local witnesses, to the Russian embassy in Constantinople. “Discontented with the existing established order in the country,” wrote Moustoxydis, “they [the unemployed veterans] departed it and arriving in mass they have taken up their old positions in Olympia

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and Trikala. They are prepared to make a common cause with the indigenous malcontents.” The Ottoman governor of Thessaloniki Omer Pasha protested that the Greek government was taking no measures to impede eruption of armed bands. Moustoxydis suspected that the Regency was secretly delighted, for the military decree had rid the country of thousands of troublemakers.63 In Nafplion, Lelli warned that “the whole corps of palikaria is in a state of revolt.” He seconded Moustoxydis’s concerns: “they have left their homeland armed with their rifles, and in despair they have crossed the Turkish frontier in small companies with banners inscribed: ‘The Soldiers Lament for Greece’.”64 In sum, the Regency’s bold move to end the threat of the irregular army, in one stroke, failed completely. While the reform deprived prominent chieftains and primates of their armed retainers, there was little incentive for the disbanded veterans to join the new army. In consequence, to maintain security the Regency sent the majority of Bavarian troops to the northern frontier, while other towns in the south remained unprotected. Foreign observers from opposite sides of the political spectrum pointed out the deficiencies of the Regency’s military reforms. Greek historian Tryphon Evangelidis characterized the whole thing as an “enormous mistake” executed in a “barbarous and unjust manner.”65 Russian Admiral Rikord, before departing Greek waters in July 1833, lamented that the “forgotten veterans, wounded, decorated comrades-in-arms of the struggle are scorned. People, who offered their services and lost their brothers for the homeland, are disappointed in their expectations.”66 The Regency incurred criticism later for creating a larger army than needed, which drained nearly half of the state budget. The issue was significant, for the military reform was a leading cause of unrest in the years to follow.67 Ironically, therefore, the attempt to create a professional military induced a sense of national unity among the Greek veterans. In another substantial initial reform, the Regency overhauled the fiscal and tax system. In the political chaos of 1832, the fiscal machinery had completely broken down and many documents were destroyed. When the Regency arrived, the treasury was empty and there were foreign debts to pay. Thus, the government aimed to economize while providing the minimum of security necessary for the revival of trade, industry, and agriculture. Corruption and tax evasion were rampant, and securing the remainder of the allied loan was dependent on fiscal order. To address these issues the Regency set up a control board consisting of a president, vice-president, royal commissioner, and four auditors. They established treasuries in Nafplion and several provinces, and revamped the tax-farming system. Actual control was in the hands of the president of the control board, a Frenchman named

63 Moustoxydis to Butenev, Thessaloniki, May 1, 1833, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 1297, ll. 50–1. 64 Lelli to Butenev, Nafplion, Apr. 21, 1833, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 1801 (1833), l. 107. 65 T. E. Evangelidis, Istoria tou Othonos, vasileos tis Ellados 1832–62 (Athens: A. G. Galanos, 1893), 46. 66 Paleolog and Sivinis, Istoricheskii ocherk narodnoi voiny za nezavisimost Gretsii, ii. 302. 67 Koliopoulos, Brigands with a Cause, 88–134.

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Arthémond Jean-François de Regny.68 Under his guidance, salt became a government monopoly, and the financial department took possession of all pasturelands in the kingdom. The land question presented the Regency with an acute dilemma. Success in solving the problems of war and in beginning social and economic development was dependent on wise and efficient use of land. A pressing question concerned the partition of territories once owned by Muslims who fled or perished during the revolt. In theory, the First National Congress of Epidaurus in 1821 confiscated all lands belonging to the “Turks” (the label for all Muslims) and designated them as “national estates” (ethnikes gaies). In 1833, these lands (some 45 percent of all cultivated territory in mainland Greece) remained national property.69 Technically the vast majority of peasants were landless. The Regency attempted to deal with the problem through colonization projects and the dotation law of 1835, which enabled Greek families to buy up to 40 stremata of land (one strema was about one-fourth of an acre) at public auction with a 2,000 drachma voucher from the state. Although the colonization plans had limited success, the dotation law was a failure, because the annual interest rate on the value of the land was too high, and taxes remained a major burden for individual landholders.70 The land reforms also sparked rebellions in the provinces against the government throughout the 1830s. In April 1833, the Regency established the institution of seven ministries: Exterior, Interior, Justice, Religious Affairs and Public Education, Economics, Army, and Navy.71 It also reorganized the administration by creating a new three-tiered system of provinces (nomoi), prefectures (eparchies), and municipalities (dimoi).72 Officials named the nomarch, eparch, and dimarch, and a council elected by the people accompanied the new units (which form the basis for the system in place today). Personnel already trained in service during the Kapodistrian period received posts, which gave the outward appearance of organized government. Rikman, however, was critical of the reform and doubted that the new organization would work. Indeed, it became a source of public protest, for the Regency imposed a system that ran against traditional allegiances and virtually abolished the old system under Ottoman rule, which permitted the people a share in naming their 68 See Ephimeris, 14 (Apr. 13, 1833); John Levandis, The Greek Foreign Debt and the Great Powers, 1821–98 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1944); and K. A. Vakalopoulos, L’Economiste français Arthémond de Regny et son role dans l’histoire financière de la Grèce (1831–41) (Thessaloniki: IMXA, 1977). 69 See William W. McGrew, Land and Revolution in Modern Greece, 1800–81 (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1985), 53–79; McGrew, “The Land Issue in the Greek War of Independence,” in N. P. Diamandouros et al., Hellenism and the First Greek War of Independence (Thessaloniki: IMXA, 1976), 111–29; and R. S. Peckham, National Histories, Natural States: Nationalism and the Politics of Place in Greece (London: I. B. Tauris, 2001), 29–30. 70 The text of the dotation law appeared in Ephimeris, 2 ( June 19, 1835). For analysis, see McGrew, Land and Revolution, 161–75, 243–7; and Petropulos, “The Greek Economy,” DIEEE 24 (1981): 186–92. 71 Ephimeris, 13 (Apr. 10, 1833). 72 Ephimeris, 12 (Apr. 6, 1833). The text of the decree “On the Administrative Division of the Country” in Russian tr. appeared in SPBV 137 ( June 14, 1833); SPch 132 ( June 15, 1833); and JdSPB 71 ( June 15, 1833).

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local and higher-ranking officials.73 Now the crown appointed these posts and gave the minister of the interior the power of suspending or transferring local officials at any time. The dimarch council of three, furthermore, was elected directly by the highest taxed. According to one observer, “the electors of the demos are told of the persons whom the king wishes to see elected. If his wishes be thwarted, woe to the local electors. They are called on for their arrears; they get no places; they get no public land; they get no justice from the tribunals; they are outlaws.”74 Russian vice-consul in Patras Kallogerakis foresaw a problem that would plague the government when he noted that the highly centralized system resulted in administrative paralysis due to conflict and jealousies among the authorities.75 In another early move, the Regency established a legal system and formulated a civil code. Rikman sarcastically noted that the reform was badly needed, for the system of justice, laws, and judges was altogether non-existent. First, the Regency announced a law against political crime and other infractions that might disrupt the internal tranquility of the state. Then a decree created three high courts of justice in Nafplion, Missolonghi, and Thebes, each with a president and four judges. These courts were able to condemn without appeal. Rikman praised the new penal law for its severity, yet protested against the leniency of the censorship and the flood of independent newspapers.76 Part of the process of nation building in Greece involved state-sponsored efforts to promote the study of folklore, literature, geography, and archeology that sought to demonstrate Greek culture’s historical integrity. The Regency endeavored to legitimize its role by establishing organizations for the conservation of antiquities, the advancement of archeology, and the study of the natural sciences, as well as a program of urban regeneration.77 It advanced the system of education by founding elementary and middle schools, and special institutes for teachers. Classroom instruction promoted the classical past and helped bind together the territories “liberated” from the Ottoman Empire. The Regency also made an effort to collect books for a national library and received generous donations for its construction from Russian families, including the Zosimades (Zosima) brothers in Moscow.78 The Regency did little to plan for a university, however, which had to wait 73 Rikman to Nesselrode, Nafplion, May 7, 1833, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 82/1833, l. 463. For a brief analysis of the administrative reform, see Nikolaos Pantazopoulos, O Ellinikos kinotismos kai i neoelliniki kinotiki paradosi (Athens: Parousia, 1993), 42–5. 74 N. Senior, A Journal Kept in Turkey and Greece during the Autumn of 1857, and the Beginning of 1858 (London: Longmans, 1859), 275. 75 Kallogerakis to Katakazy, Patras, Mar. 19, 1833. AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 378/1838, ll.124–9. 76 Rikman to Nesselrode, Nafplion, Mar. 16, 1833, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 82/1833, l. 269. The judicial decrees appeared in SPch 118 (May 30, 1833); and OV 45 ( June 10, 1833). 77 On this process, see Yannis Hamilakis, The Nation and its Ruins: Antiquity, Archaeology, and National Imagination in Greece (Oxford: OUP, 2007), 57–124; Vilma Hastaoglou-Martinidis, “City, Form and National Identity: Urban Designs in Nineteenth-Century Greece,” Journal of Modern Greek Studies, 13/1 (1995): 99–123; and Peckham, National Histories, Natural States, 33–5. 78 See JdSPB 117 (Sept. 30, 1833); K. Oikonomos, Ekthesis ton kata to ieron mnimosynon ton aeimniston Zosimadon (Athens: Ch. Anastasios, 1842), 52, 58; and G. A. Perdicaris, The Greece of the Greeks (New York: Paine & Burgess, 1845), ii. 297–8.

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until 1837. Rikman supported the improvements in education, yet criticized the Regency’s choice of personnel. In his view, Athanasios Polyzoides, member of the commission for the reorganization of public education, and Theoklitos Pharmakidis, member for the commission to examine church affairs, were terrible appointments: “Both of them have preached for more than a year in the well-known Hydriot newspaper Apollon the most revolutionary principles which are the most subversive to the state of society.”79 Various Russian publications praised the Greek government for its schools, restorations, museums, and excavations. Landscape painting also grew in popularity among artists visiting Greece. A number of distinguished Bavarian artists produced lithographs and painted historical compositions of Athens and its environs. In this setting, the famous Russian artist Karl P. Briullov and his companion, the diplomat Vladimir P. Davydov, toured Greece and recorded their impressions.80 In the first months of 1833, Russian observers had favorable opinions of the Regency and their dealings. Lelli portrayed the Regency in the following terms: “Count Armansperg and Mr Maurer are men who enjoy a distinguished reputation for their wisdom and merit. Mr Abel can be justly associated with them. Mr Heideck has local knowledge that can be useful to his colleagues during the first moments.”81 The semi-official Journal de St. Pétersbourg reported that the Regency “acted each day with more consistency . . . with more prudence.” “Everywhere one hears praises for the manner which the Regency endeavors to introduce regular institutions into the country and to make Greece free and happy.”82 Russian officialdom depicted King Othon in equally positive language. The Tsar congratulated and assured the new sovereign, “his brother,” of his affection. Nicholas looked forward to the King’s majority when experience and wisdom would convince him of the necessity to convert to Orthodoxy.83 Rikman reckoned that the selection of Othon “promised the most fortunate portents for the future.” Katakazy thought the young king would be “immensely beneficial for Greece,” because Othon had solid and precocious judgment for his age. He was also affable, simple, and moderate in his habits. Unfortunately, Katakazy grumbled, Armansperg and his

79 Rikman to Nesselrode, Nafplion, May 7, 1833, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 82/1833, l. 465. K. M. Bazili, Arkhipelag i Gretsiia v 1830 i 1831 godakh (St Petersburg: N. Grech, 1834), ii. 61–3, 143, 198, repeatedly condemns Apollon. For a good example of the anti-Russian position of the Hydriot newspaper, see Apollon, 56 (Sept. 19, 1831). 80 V. P. Davydov, Putevye zapiski vedennye vo vremia prebyvaniia na Ionicheskikh Ostrovakh, v Gretsii, Maloi Azii i Turtsii v 1835 godu (St Petersburg: E. Prats i E. Fisher, 1839–40); Davydov, Atlas k putevym zapiskam Davydova po Ionicheskim ostrovam, Gretsii, Maloi Azii i Turtsii (St Petersburg: Tip. E. Fisher, 1840). More generally, see Maria G. Maratza, Mirror of the Past: Sketches from King Otho’s Greece (Athens: Maurides, 1971); Marilena Z. Kazimati (ed.), Athina-Monaho: techni kai politismos sti nea Ellada (Athens: Ethniki Pinakothiki, 2000); Murken, König-Otto-von-Griechenland; Peckham, National Histories, Natural States, 26–9. 81 “Vypiska iz pis’ma Lelli iz Napoli di Romani ot 27 Ian. 1833,” AVPRI, f. 161/1, op. 181/2, d. 48, l. 6. 82 JdSPB 86 ( July 20, 1833), 92 (Aug. 3, 1833). 83 Nicholas I to Othon, St Petersburg, Jan. 24, 1833, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 84/1833, l. 215. See also Nesselrode to Lieven, St Petersburg, Feb. 17, 1832, in Jelavich, Russia and Greece, 38–41.

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colleagues rarely visited the sovereign.84 In contrast to western media such as the Morning Chronicle and David Urquhart’s The Portfolio, Russian newspapers and journals printed entirely upbeat assessments of the King. No doubt Russian publicists who supported Official Nationality printed accounts of royal ceremonies in order to counterbalance the reports of brigandage and political unrest in the Greek kingdom.85 Initially enthusiastic, by May 1833, Russian attitudes toward the Regency began to sour. A full-page article in the St Petersburg Gazette outlined the difficulties confronting the Greek government. First, the members of the Regency were foreigners without adequate knowledge of local conditions; second, the Regency was unable to unite the “two main parties” and should have remained above them; third, the Regency failed to put finances in order; and lastly, brigandage remained a source of widespread disorder.86 Ambassador Katakazy, recently installed at his new post, claimed that Armansperg had nothing but “very confused notions of the state of the country which he has come to govern, of the morals of its inhabitants, of their needs and their inclinations.” The Regency president wanted to create “an entirely independent state, a future extension of territory, and a very marked influence in the affairs of the East and by consequence those of Europe.” Armansperg and his colleagues were following a “false route” by employing “measures bad for a new state.” Worst of all, the Greek population, which greeted the young sovereign and his councilors with unanimous joy and approval, “today view the march of the new administration with distress and anxiety.”87 Thus, as champion of the Orthodox tradition, the Russian ambassador voiced his opposition to the modernizing and Westernizing efforts of the Regency. On the other hand, Katakazy’s disapproval of Armansperg’s plans to create an entirely independent state is interesting in the light of his general instructions, which call for precisely such an entity. As for the future extension of territory, the Messenger of Odessa reported in unambiguous terms the incompatibility of the frontiers with the actual composition of the Greek nation.88 The lack of censorship continued to draw the concern of the Russian mission. Kallogerakis warned Katakazy of “the hate and the passions that cruelly divide the Greek nation. These passions are sustained and culminate the most in the liberty of the press, which acts particularly for the patricians . . . of the constitutional journals.”89 The freedom of action given to the Greek press, which printed articles and editorials in 84 Rikman to Nesselrode, Nafplion, Mar. 26, 1833, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 82/1833, l. 164; Katakazy to Nesselrode, Nafplion, June 8, 1833, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 83/1833, ll. 10–18. 85 See e.g. SPch 64 (Mar. 21, 1833); SPBV 111 (May 14, 1833); “O vozobnovlenii afinskikh pamianikov drevnosti v kontse 1836 i v nachale 1837 godov,” OZ 7 ( July 1840), 2, 31–42, esp. 36–7; and “Pribytie grecheskoi korolevy v Afiny i pridvornyi bal v Gretsii,” BdCh 28 (1838), 7, 23–45. 86 SPBV 115 (May 19, 1833). 87 Katakazy to Nesselrode, Nafplion, June 8, 1833, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 83/1833, ll. 10–11, 14. 88 OV 101 (Dec. 23, 1833). 89 Kallogerakis to Katakazy, Patras, July 5, 1833, AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 265/1833, ll. 22–3. On the development of the Greek press at this time, see Aik. Koumarianou, Istoria tou ellinikou tipou: 18os–19os ai. (Athens: Ermis, 2010); and A. S. Skandamis, “O ellinikos typos kata tin periodon tou Othonos,” DIEEE 19 (1967–70): 251–304.

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blatant opposition to the throne, was indeed difficult to fathom for these proponents of unfettered autocracy. A potent source of anxiety for the Russian mission was the influence of Great Britain and France on the policy of the Regency. In June 1833, Katakazy claimed that Armasperg was falling into the hands of the English resident Edward Dawkins and the commander of the British corvette Madagascar Edmund Lyons. The Russian Foreign Ministry was convinced of Katakazy’s views and pressured London and Munich to recall Dawkins as well as the French resident Baron Alexandre Forth-Rouen. In a dispatch to Grigorii I. Gagarin, the Russian representative in Munich, Nesselrode complained of the intrigues of Rouen and the preponderant influence of Dawkins. He directed Gagarin to intensify his efforts to obtain their dismissal.90 The delayed exodus of the French troops from the Peloponnesus made emotions flare in St Petersburg. Yet the Regency approved of the corps’s protracted stay for reasons of national security. Katakazy disagreed: “One cannot say more than that the presence of 1,800 Frenchmen is dangerous to the independence of Greece. We already have 3,500 Bavarians!”91 Katakazy was instructed to inform the Regency that the Russian portion of the second-third of the loan would not be guaranteed if they did not expedite the evacuation of the French.92 Nesselrode claimed to be especially concerned of the possibility of the French troops aiding Mehmed Ali. Thus, controlling the loan disbursement was one way Russia implemented its policy in Greece. In August 1833, Nesselrode supplemented the general Russian directives with a lengthy memorandum informing Katakazy that, “we furnish you with the means to gain his [Armansperg’s] confidence, and also to gain influence on his spirit, by the praise which you are charged to give him.” Katakazy was to redouble his efforts to cultivate the loyalty of the King, “who is badly surrounded and poorly counseled,” as well as keep in touch with the chiefs and primates of the nation. One day it would be necessary to correct the errors of the Regency, Nesselrode continued, and the people must be prepared to rally around their sovereign when that time comes. Since St Petersburg deemed Armansperg an instrument of English policy, Katakazy was to cooperate with the other members of the Regency in order to neutralize the president’s power without damaging his vanity. “General Heideck appears to us to be the one who is destined by his position and his principles to serve as the center of support of the system of resistance.” Katakazy was to support the clergy, the army, and the “conservative party.” “We leave it up to you . . . to find the means to gradually revive this party, which we should protect and influence, because it contains in it the best guarantee of public order and interior peace.”93 This last 90 Nesselrode to Gagarin, St Petersburg, Aug. 1833, in Jelavich, Russia and Greece, 71–5. An earlier version of this plan is in Nesselrode to Rikman, St Petersburg, Mar. 21, 1833, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 84/1833, ll. 76–7. 91 Katakazy to Nesselrode, Poros, June 26, 1833, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 83, l. 61. 92 Nesselrode to Katakazy, St Petersburg, May 8, 1833, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 84/1833, ll. 93–4. 93 Nesselrode to Katakazy, St Petersburg, Aug. 5, 1833, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 84/1833, ll. 125–35.

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statement clearly shows that Russia was not above becoming involved in party interests, which it recognized was a key avenue to implement policy. Finally, Nesselrode reaffirmed the importance of Greek commerce and urged Katakazy to find a way to bring about a Russian–Greek commercial treaty. While professing absolute disinterest, Russia tried to manipulate the Regency to serve its aims. Katakazy’s critique did not stop at the top. Admitting that Maurer and Abel knew German law and finances well, he claimed they were ignorant of the actual conditions in Greece, which still lacked law and finances. General Heideck, observed Katakazy, was the only member who united good will with local experience. His opinions were often at variance with the other members of the Regency, however, and the English legation endeavored to get rid of him sooner or later. The result of all of this was veritable confusion.94 There is evidence, in fact, of special connections between Russia and Heideck. Nesselrode recommended Katakazy to Heideck before the general’s arrival in Greece.95 At one point, Katakazy said Heideck was of use in expediting the withdrawal of French troops, because he was close to the King.96 Nesselrode seconded Katakazy’s appraisal and more than once encouraged him to offer assistance to keep the general in a position of authority. Heideck was a useful source of information regarding Greek primates and military affairs, although unfortunately for Russia, he was too interested in painting and seashell collecting to be of real assistance in the coming year. Regarding the kingdom’s international relations, the Regency established a diplomatic and consular service and sent accredited envoys to foreign countries. The consular instructions of January 1834 and January 1835 established more than fifty consular posts, half of which were located in the Ottoman Empire and its provinces (Egypt, Moldavia, Wallachia), and the rest in Europe and America. These instructions contained detailed regulations on the execution of consular duties.97 In the wake of Othon’s arrival in Greece, there was much discussion about the choice of capitals, illustrating some of the dilemmas and tensions connected to the symbolism of the new nation, its relationship with classical antiquity, and the legitimacy of its Bavarian-born sovereign. Since all of the great Greek cities of the eastern Mediterranean (such as Constantinople, Smyrna, and Alexandria) were 94 Katakazy to Nesselrode, Nafplion, June 8, 1833, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 83/1833, l. 3. On Heideck during the War of Independence, see William St Clair, That Greece Might Still Be Free: The Philhellenes in the War of Independence, 2nd revised edn (Cambridge: Open Book Publishers, 2008), 322–35; and Berthold Seewald, Karl Wilhelm v. Heideck: Ein bayerischer General im befreiten Greichenland (1826–35) (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1994). 95 Nesselrode to General Heideck, St Petersburg, Jan. 24, 1833, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 84/ 1833, ll. 217–18. Nesselrode congratulated Heideck in a personal letter, undated [c.May 1832], in Jelavich, Russia and Greece, 46–8. 96 Katakazy to Nesselrode, Nafplion, Aug. 28, 1833, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 83/1833, l. 222. 97 Konstaninos Zographos was sent to Constantinople, Spyridon Trikoupis to London, Ioannis Kolettis to Paris, Mikhail Soutsos to Paris and then St Petersburg, Alexandros Mavrokordatos to Munich, Vienna, and Berlin, Richard Church to Stockholm, and Andreas Metaxas to Madrid. Katakazy thought that by sending Trikoupis and Kolettis abroad the Regency was reinforcing the already predominant French influence in the country. Katakazy to Nesselrode, Nafplion, Oct. 17, 1833, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 83/1833, ll. 287–8. See also JdSPB 85 ( July 17, 1834).

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outside the confines of the kingdom, Athens was a likely candidate, if only because of its classical past. Yet it did not have many other advantages with respect to the commerce and maritime strength of the kingdom. Regional differences also entered the debate. Inhabitants of the northern Peloponnesian coast argued for Corinth, while people from the southern plains lobbied for Argos, and still others favored the strong defenses and natural harbor of Nafplion. Although he abstained from giving the Regency advice on the matter, Katakazy was disposed toward Athens. He considered Nafplion unsuitable because of its poor sanitary conditions.98 Katakazy was further disinclined toward Nafplion, because of the advantages it could bring to a maritime power, like Britain. Athens was the most obvious choice, although it too had disadvantages. Dawkins, the British resident, was opposed to the site because it was too far from the Piraeus. Finlay concurred, writing in 1833 that the ancient capital was “in a state of ruins—not one quarter of the city is rebuilt and I doubt whether the number of the inhabitants exceeds 5,000 souls, indeed my own opinion is that it is under this number.”99 Katakazy warned that the withdrawing Ottoman troops left the city in a state of degradation. Nevertheless, he still preferred Athens.100 Othon’s father, King Ludwig, was another fervent supporter of choosing Athens as the capital. The debate about the new capital animated Greek society, and it is an indication of an early phase of the Megali Idea (Great Idea), Greece’s utopian dream of an enlarged state. Ioannis Kolettis, the Greek Minister or Shipping and Industry, was one of the main opponents of the move to Athens, in part because of its monuments.101 He insisted that Constantinople would be the permanent capital of the Kingdom of Hellas. Katakazy recorded that “certain flatterers of the court put forward their advice that Nafplion and Athens should only be considered as provisional stations, and that one day the Sovereign of Greece would establish his residence in Constantinople or Thessaloniki.”102 Katakazy, a native of Constantinople, was opposed to this type of language, at least according to the dispatches he sent to St Petersburg. A royal decree proclaimed Athens the capital of the Kingdom of Greece in December 1834. Government offices opened there on December 13. The official celebration took place on New Year’s Day. Happily, the move was a success,

98 A large number of government officials, Bavarian troops, and other foreigners suffered from the plague and typhus during the summer of 1833. Health concerns induced Armansperg to relocate first to Argos and then to Spetses. Katakazy and his family moved temporarily to Aegina, the British resident toured the Archipelago, and General Heideck became seriously ill. For reports of Armansperg’s illness, see SPBV 241 (Oct. 17, 1833) and SPch 235 (Oct. 17, 1833). For news of Katakazy’s return to Nafplion, see SPBV 251 (Oct. 28, 1833). First Secretary Persiany remained in Nafplion while Katakazy was away. On Heideck’s illness, see SPch 231 (Oct. 12, 1833). On the plague of 1833, see Donald Quataert, “The Age of Reforms, 1812–1914,” in Halil Inalcik and Donald Quataert (eds), An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire (1300–1914) (Cambridge: CUP, 1994), 787–9. 99 Finlay, Journals and Letters, i. 65. 100 Katakazy to Nesselrode, Nafplion, Dec. 9, 1834, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 102/1835, l. 8. 101 P. Papadopoulou-Symeonidou, I epilogi tis Athinas os protevousas tis Ellados, 1833–4 (Thessaloniki: Adelphon Kyriakidi, 1996), 50–6. 102 Katakazy to Nesselrode, Nafplion, Mar. 1, 1833, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 81/1834, ll. 70–1.

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and Athens underwent a rapid and radical regeneration.103 By becoming the capital of the new state, the city underwent a complete transformation. The King and his entourage, the foreign embassies, merchants, and, for a period, Bavarian troops, altered the culture of the city by their mere presence.104 The construction industry took on a feverish pace: the royal palace, the university, the mint, the cathedral, and the royal press were built or planned in the following years. The adoption of the neoclassical architectural style reflected the deliberate attempt to establish links with the ancient past, thus solidifying classical antiquity in the national imagination and serving as a legitimizing mechanism for King Othon. The home of Antonios Demetriou, a diaspora-Greek from Trieste, was among the most expensive projects. A duplex he built for his two married children, and as offices for his business, faced what was to become Syntagma square. The duplex later became the Grande Bretagne Hotel. With respect to the Russian consulate, according to the wellknown Greek author Alexandros Rangavis: “the biggest house in Athens was that of the Russian envoy Paparrigopoulos, which was reshaped and expanded from Turkish times, and occupied by a relative of my mother, Mr Katakazy, who was then the most hospitable of all in Athens.”105 By the second anniversary of its existence, the population of the capital grew to 20,000.106 The move to Athens coincided with the creation of several national symbols cementing the Greek people, including the emblem of the country, which consisted of the royal coat of arms featuring two crowned lions holding the royal crown. The unofficial anthem became the lengthy poem “A Hymn to Freedom,” by Dionysios Solomos (it was first set to music in 1865). The national flag, consisting of nine horizontal blue and white stripes with a white cross in the upper-left corner, unfurled outside state buildings and personal residences. Furthermore, the state motto, Eleftheria i thanatos (freedom or death), inspired by the Greek Revolution, became the motto of other Balkan independence movements to follow. Thus, despite, or because of, the opposition to the presence of non-Orthodox foreigners, the Greek nation-state emerged during the period of the Bavarian Regency. * * *

* *

103 The royal decree on the new capital is in AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 102/1835, l. 10. On the move to Athens and the building programs there, see SPch 79 (Apr. 7, 1834), 94 (Apr. 28 1834), 230 (Oct. 11, 1834), 231 (Oct. 12, 1834), 3 ( Jan. 4, 1835), 46 (Feb. 27, 1835), 98 (May 4, 1835); SPV 5 ( Jan. 6, 1835), 18 ( Jan. 22, 1835), 26 ( Jan. 31, 1835), and esp. 48 (Feb. 28, 1835); OV 5 ( Jan. 16, 1835), 11 (Feb. 6, 1835); 14 (Feb. 16, 1835); 22 (Mar. 16, 1835), 29 (Apr. 10, 1835), 41 (May 22, 1835). KhG 1–2 (Aug. 1836), 3 (Sept. 1838), 7 (Nov. 1836), 9–10 (Dec. 1836), “Sostoianie iskustv v Afinakh,” 16 (Aug. 18, 1841) also chronicled the transformation of the city. 104 See Kyriaki Koukouraki, Interkulturelle Beziehungen am Beispiel von Bayern und Griechen unter Otto I. (1833–43) (Hamburg: Verlag Dr. Kovać, 2009), 111–22. 105 A. R. Rangavis, Apomnimonevmata (Athens: Georgios Kasdonis, 1894–5), ii. 8. 106 The population statistic is printed in OV 26 (Mar. 28, 1835); and SPch 59 (Mar. 16, 1842). On the history of modern Athens, see E. Bastéa, The Creation of Modern Athens: Planning the Myth (Cambridge: CUP, 2000); Papadopoulou-Simeonidou, I Epilogi tis Athinas; K. Biris, Ai Athinai apo tou 19ou eis ton 20on aiona (Athens: Ekdoseis tou Kathidrymatos Poleodomias kai Istorias ton Athinon, 1966); and Biris, Ta prota schedia ton Athinon: Istoria kai analysis ton (Athens: Typois K. S. Papadogianni, 1933).

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A survey of the Regency’s reforms illustrates their intentions and limitations, the difficult problems they encountered, and the effectiveness of their actions in the light of inherited conditions. Tsar Nicholas and the Russian Foreign Ministry approved Katakazy’s first reports. In August 1833, he became permanent extraordinary Russian ambassador to the Greek kingdom.107 In the following months, Katakazy’s negative appraisals of the Regency increased in frequency, as Armansperg concentrated power into his own hands. How did this happen? Conflicts among the regents emerged almost immediately. Maurer, Heideck, and Abel, known as the Regency “majority,” soon found themselves in opposition to Armansperg, and the president decided to get rid of his colleagues through intrigue. In the summer of 1833, a vague conspiracy was uncovered that led to the dismissal of Maurer and Abel.108 The principal actor in the affair was a Bavarian professor of ancient Greek named Johann Franz, an interpreter in Armansperg’s confidence. Dr Franz circulated a petition to the King of Bavaria signed by sundry primates that called for the recall of Maurer and Heideck and nominated Armansperg as sole regent. Wary of an armed rebellion, and recognizing the danger of allowing the foreign powers to interfere with legally constituted rulers, the Regency “majority” arrested Dr Franz. However, to prevent the news of Armansperg’s connection to the plot, Franz was sent to Trieste before being tried.109 Katakazy thought that the public simply ignored the fact the Armansperg’s connivance was behind the intrigue.110 Meanwhile, an insurrection broke out in Tinos after the Greek government accused the bishop of the island of contributing to the troubles by criticizing the Regency’s ecclesiastical reforms. The Regency reacted by declaring martial law.111 Three weeks after the arrest of Dr Franz, the government claimed that a large insurrection was about to be launched, and it sanctioned the arrest of General Kolokotronis, Nikitas Stamatellopoulos, Kitsos Tzavellas, and several other wellknown backers of the deceased president Kapodistrias.112 The accusation and arrests constitute another of the so-called conspiracies and plots endemic to Greek political life at this time. Although the issue cannot be sorted out for certain, 107 Nesselrode to Katakazy, St Petersburg, Aug. 5, 1833, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 84/1833, l. 145. Katakazy expressed his gratitude for the appointment in Katakazy to Nesselrode, Nafplion, Aug. 27, 1833; Katakazy to Nesselrode, Nafplion, Sept. 30, 1833, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 83/1833, ll. 218–19, 225–6. 108 Katakazy first learned of the “minor plot” from General Heideck in Aug. See Katakazy to Nesselrode, Nafplion, Aug. 24, 1833, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 83/1833, ll. 108–15. Reports in the Russian press include SPch 244 (Oct. 27, 1833); SPBV 252 (Oct. 27, 1833); OV 90 (Nov. 15, 1833). For a concise account of the incident, see Petropulos, Politics and Statecraft, 201–4. 109 Athina, 141 (Aug. 23, 1833). 110 Katakazy to Nesselrode, Nafplion, Aug. 24, 1833, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 83/1833, l. 110. 111 Katakazy to Nesselrode, Nafplion, Sept. 30, 1833, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 83/1833, l. 246. Disturbances in Tinos were described in SPBV 252 (Oct. 27, 1833); and OV 90 (Nov. 15, 1833). 112 Katakazy to Nesselrode, Nafplion, Sept. 30, 1833, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 83/1833, ll. 244–7. SPBV 252 (Oct. 27, 1833), reported of the “conspiracy against the Regency; however, we do not give it special attention, because all of the mentioned individuals lost their power long ago.” The Russian press reported widely on the affair, see SPch 244 (Oct. 27, 1833), 246 (Oct. 30, 1833), 248 (Nov. 1, 1833), 256 (Nov. 10, 1833), 270 (Nov. 27, 1833), 287 (Dec. 14, 1833); OV 90 (Nov. 15, 1833).

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the Regency probably decided that the time had come to eliminate the opposition to its policies by several leading Greek captains. Kolokotronis, labeled in the memoirs of the writer and politician Nikolaos Dragoumis as “the Bavarian’s worst nightmare,” and his followers were the most visible figures.113 They had to be dealt with, so they were accused of staging a plot. The Russian press followed the story as presented by the Regency. Katakazy, however, believed the suspects were innocent, for they “have given proof of their submission and confidence in the government of King Othon.” He criticized the Regency for having no precise reasons for the arrests and sympathized with the old military chiefs who had lost their former rank and privileges. Kolokotronis was “too prudent to have taken part in the accusation for which he is being tried.”114 St Petersburg Gazette notified readers that the incarceration of Kolokotronis and other heroes of the War of Independence strongly agitated the inhabitants of Patras and other parts of Greece.115 The plot’s “discovery” led to the temporary banning of Greek opposition newspapers followed by new laws that included crimes for slander and press abuse.116 The laws forced editors of newspapers and periodicals to deposit 5,000 drachmas in the public treasury to act as security in case they were condemned for libel or made to pay fines. The press restrictions pleased Katakazy, although he was not completely satisfied. “In the state of agitation and malaise that the country still finds itself, and in the absence of regular tribunals,” he wrote, “it would have been perhaps most prudent to give the periodical press a preventative measure, that of the censor. But dominated always by the fear of appearing the enemy of liberal institutions, the Regency thought repressive means were sufficient.”117 Maurer and his associates led the prosecution of the major plot and tried the accused for treason. It was a risky affair, for the actions of the Regency could seem unfair and arbitrary if they were unsuccessful. Katakazy observed that a condemnation was “a political necessity which had to be achieved at all costs.” Yet he remained convinced of the innocence of the accused.118 After long and elaborate preparations, the government issued an indictment on March 7, 1834, which was

113

Nikolaos Dragoumis, Istorikai anamniseis (Athens: Ermis, 1973), i. 218. Katakazy to Nesselrode, Nafplion, Sept. 30, 1833, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 83/1833, ll. 244–7. Claims that Russophiles organized a conspiracy are unsubstantiated in Russian archival material, and the accusers themselves had no proof. See Petrunina, Grecheskaia natsiia, 236–9; and contrast the view of Petropulos, Politics and Statecraft, 202. 115 SPBV, 257 (Nov. 2, 1833), 269 (Nov. 16, 1833). 116 The text of the laws appeared in Ephimeris, 29 (Sept. 14, 1833); in Russian translation in SPch, 266 (Nov. 22, 1833); SPBV, 276 (Nov. 24, 1833). 117 Katakazy to Nesselrode, Nafplion, Sept. 30, 1833, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 83/1833, l. 252. Katakazy enclosed Ephimeris, 29 (Sept. 14, 1833) in his report, ll. 253–8. According to Finlay, History of Greece, vii. 133, this caused all four of the newspapers to close. 118 Katakazy to Nesselrode, Nafplion, June 17, 1834, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 81/1834, l. 128. A copy of this dispatch is printed in Jelavich, Russia and Greece, 98–103. For secondary accounts of the trial, see Anastasios Polyzoides, I diki ton Kolokotroni-Plapouta (Athens: Pelekanos, 2009); T. Kandiloros, I diki tou Kolokotroni kai i epanastasis tis Peloponnisou (Athens: Kochylas, 1960); D. Photiadis, I diki tou Kolokotroni kai tou Plapouta (Athens: S. I. Zacharopoulos, 1987); Finlay, History of Greece, vii. 139–40; Petropulos, Politics and Statecraft, 207–9. 114

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“more like a party statement than a legal document,” wrote Finlay.119 It charged Kolokotronis of organizing a conspiracy aiming to disturb the public peace. Three of the five judges found the accused guilty, whom they sentenced to death. The two dissenting judges refused to sign the majority condemnation (or even to hear it read), and attempted to quit the bench, but were forcibly retained in their places while the registrar read the sentence. Soon afterwards, the Regency dismissed them from their posts and initiated legal action against them. In sum, the government achieved its purpose, but violated its own laws concerning freedom of the press and the permanency of judges. The sentences were commuted first to incarceration for life, then to twenty-five years, until finally the King found it necessary to allay the popular indignation by pardoning the distinguished revolutionary veterans altogether. Vlassopoulos, the Russian consul-general in the Morea, described the day of Kolokotronis’s liberation: “The inhabitants of Nafplion assembled in mass outside of the gates of the city to receive him, and the whole crowd followed him to his house giving cries of joy and exclaiming ‘Long live the King and his justice.’ Everyone here, laymen and ecclesiastics, one after the other hurried to embrace him and kiss his hand.”120 Another Russian eyewitness, Karl Briullov, was equally impressed with the image of the emancipated warrior. Briullov’s sketch of the general standing defiantly with long gray locks in his fustanella illustrates brilliantly one Russian conception of free Greece.121 An article in the St Petersburg Gazette covered the event in detail.122 On Wednesday, June 27, 1835, Russian traveler and diplomat Davydov recorded his impression upon meeting Kolokotronis for the first time: We returned to Athens by sunset. Entering the city with the First Secretary of the Russian Mission [Persiany], I saw in the far distance a group of Greeks waving from one to another. I could not understand the reason why they were making such a gesture, but soon the first of them, an elder (starik) in Greek national costume, with gray hair, an aquiline nose, and striking dark eyes, approached my comrade and kissed him. Then he [Persiany] asked him in Greek about [his] health, and cracking a smile, he said to himself that the secretary had just kissed a twelve-month old child. This was the famous Kolokotronis, who reminded us of the anecdote that a year ago, he was condemned to death and, receiving a pardon, at that very moment he began a new life.123

Regent Georg Maurer’s prosecution of the Kolokotronis trial did little to improve his public standing. Armansperg attempted to profit from it by petitioning

119

Finlay, History of Greece, vii. 139; see also, Slade, Turkey, Greece and Malta, i. 201–7. Vlassopoulos to Katakazy, Nafplion, May 29, 1835, AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 305, ll. 35–6. 121 The sketch of Kolokotronis and other works are discussed in E. Smirnova, Briullovputeshestvennik (Moscow: Sovetskii khudozhnik, 1969); Smirnova, “Neizvestnye risunki K. Briullova,” Iskusstvo, 8 (1958): 64–70; E. Atsarkina, “Puteshestvie K. Briullova po Gretsii i Turtsii,” Iskusstvo, 6 (1954): 41–6; V. M. Polevoi, Iskusstvo Gretsii: Novoe Vremiia (Moscow: Sovetskii khudozhnik, 1975), 195–8. Vlassopoulos to Katakazy, Nafplion, May 29, 1835, AVPRI, 165/2, op. 507, d. 305, l. 38, informed the Russian embassy of Davydov’s travels just as Kolokotronis was released from prison. 122 SPV, 143 ( June 27, 1833). 123 Davydov, Putevye zapiski, i. 302. 120

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the Bavarian king for the removal of Maurer and Abel. Armansperg played his cards well, and the British and Russian government seconded his pleas.124 On July 31, 1834, King Ludwig ordered Maurer and Abel to return to Bavaria immediately. As a result, Armansperg gained full authority. Franz von Kobell, a philologist and professor of mineralogy at the University of Munich, replaced Maurer, and Heideck remained. The dismissal of two officials pleased Nesselrode in St Petersburg, for he deemed the two men liberal dreamers, infused with abstract theories and republican institutions. The Russian government was not fully satisfied with the change, however, for the Tsar also desired the replacement of Armansperg.125 Katakazy’s relations with Armansperg remained strained, and his unfavorable statements about the regent influenced the cabinet in St Petersburg. By the end of 1833, the conflict was serious enough to warrant sending Mikhail Soutsos, the Greek representative in Paris (and former hospodar of Moldavia), to St Petersburg to discuss outstanding problems.126 The main issues of Greek–Russian discord included the activity of the French occupational force, the relative freedom of the press, and the persecution of Kolokotronis and his followers. Nesselrode’s letter to Armansperg, concerning Soutsos’s mission, contains a classic statement of the Russian position: His Majesty does not look for any direct influence or exclusive advantage in the country; his unique desire is to see the co-religionist people enjoy a perfect tranquility under a government strong and stable. This has been the unique thought of the Emperor since his ascendancy to the throne. Until now . . . Greece has only been a subject of embarrassment and sacrifices for Russia. However, His Majesty will not regret them the moment when he sees the country prosper under the reign of a prince . . . [who] unifies all of the guarantees necessary for obtaining the common goal of the three powers.127

Nesselrode expanded on the subject of Russian objectives in a special memorandum to Soutsos. The document is a brilliant example of Official Nationality. After reflecting upon the value of monarchical institutions and the state of the church in the country, the communiqué delivers a directive straight to Othon: “In a word, govern Greece through the ascendancy of truly national ideas and not by theories

124 Nesselrode to Gagarin, St Petersburg, Aug. 29, 1833; Gise to Bray, Munich, June 27, 1833, in Jelavich, Russia and Greece, 83–91. 125 Gagarin to Nesselrode, Oct. 1, 1834, in Jelavich, Russia and Greece, 147–52. 126 Nicholas I to Othon, Nov. 30, 1833; Othon to Nicholas, Feb. 7, 1833, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 814/1833, ll. 241, 247. General Church, a British subject, was the first candidate for the mission to Russia; Alexandros Mavrokordatos was also considered. Considerable lobbying by the Russian embassy persuaded the Regency to send Soutsos. See Katakazy to Nesselrode, Nafplion, Oct. 17, 1833, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 83/1833, ll. 294–5, and annexes; Nesselrode to Katakazy, St Petersburg, Dec. 5, 1833; Nesselrode to Katakazy, St Petersburg, Nov. 30 1833, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 84/1833, ll. 109–16, 166–75; Katakazy to Nesselrode, Nafplion, Dec. 13, 1833; Katakazy to Nesselrode, Nafplion, Mar. 1, 1834, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 81/1834, ll. 4–5, 76–81. Church’s candidacy and Soutsos’s mission were announced in SPBV, 22 ( Jan. 27, 1834), 174 (Aug. 2, 1835); and OV 58 ( July 20, 1835). See also “Soutsos, M.,” MEE 17: 156. 127 Nesselrode to Armansperg, St Petersburg, Nov. 24, 1833, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 84/1833, l. 237.

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that are outside the realm of comprehension.”128 Soutsos’s interview with Nicholas went well, and the minister remained in the Tsar’s confidence, even though his goal of reaching a trade agreement did not reach fruition. In the coming years, the Russian government gave Soutsos material assistance and discussed a broad range of issues with him.129 Dissatisfaction with the Regency extended beyond the Greek and Russian capitals. The first armed revolt against the Regency erupted in Mani, and the Bavarian troops suffered a humiliating defeat. Lasting from February 1833 until July 1834, the uprising was a consequence of the Kolokotronis trial and the attempt to integrate all the territories of the kingdom into a unified state. Then, in 1834, a wave of revolts swept over Messenia that took the government six weeks to crush. Two years later a very dangerous threat to Armansperg’s regime emerged in an uprising in Aitolia-Akarnania.130 Another form of social protest was brigandage, a deeply rooted feature of Greek society. The move to reorganize and centralize the former bands of Greek warriors into a regular army encountered strong opposition. As we have seen, the military decrees actually increased brigandage in frontier zones like Euboea and Epirus, which became centers of highway robbery. For many observers, it was an outrage that the Regency was unable to protect its own citizens. T H E RI S E O F TH E R U SS I A N PA R T Y A N D I T S R I V A L S In addition to brigandage and general lawlessness in the countryside, a primary reason for recurrent discord in Greek life during the first Othonian decade was the existence of the three foreign-oriented political parties. Since the major tomes of John Petropulos, Olga Petrunina, and Gunnar Hering deal with them extensively, only a brief outline of the parties is necessary here.131 After the outbreak of violence in 1821, embryonic factions based on family ties and regional interests, socio-political divisions, and some degree of ideological overtone came into existence. During the first National Assemblies at Epidaurus and Astros, two groupings emerged, labeled the military and civilian parties.132 By 1826, the devastation wrought by the Egyptian troops throughout the Peloponnese, 128 Nesselrode to Soutsos, St Petersburg, Oct. 21, 1833, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 84/1833, ll. 266–87, here 287. 129 See “Prince Soutzo,” AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 83/1834; Katakazy to Seniavin, Athens, Feb. 25, 1839; I. A. Soutso to Katakazy, Athens, Feb. 7, 1839, AVPRI, f. 161/1, op. 181/2, d. 53/1839, ll. 2, 3. 130 These revolts are described detail in K. Aroni-Tsichli, Agrotikes exegerseis stin palia Ellada, 1833–81 (Athens: Papazisis, 1989), 85–173; Petropulos, Politics and Statecraft, 209–11, 218–25, 261–5. 131 Petropulos, Politics and Statecraft; Petrunina, Grecheskaia natsiia, 242–75; Gunnar Hering, Die politischen Parteien in Griechenland, 1821–1936 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1992), i. 11–245. For concise summaries, see M. Economopoulou, Parties and Politics in Greece (1844–55) (Athens: M. Economopoulou, 1984), 33–45; and Stephanos Papageorgiou, Apo to genos sto ethnos: I themeliosi tou ellinikou kratous, 1821–62 (Athens: Papazisis, 2004), 361–6. 132 Petropulos, Politics and Statecraft, 82–8.

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plus the fall of Messolonghi and Athens in the mainland, intensified the search for outside diplomatic support and triggered more permanent foreign connections. Meanwhile, personal factions, which had already existed as the core of the civilian– military alliances, crystallized and fused with the foreign-oriented groups. Most sources agree that by 1832, there were three major parties in Greece; each identified with a particular power, attitude toward foreign policy, and representative government, although exceptions occurred in every instance. The labels the parties acquired can be misleading, especially since each party owed its identification with a foreign power to its enemies, but they are helpful in generalizing about Greek society. The English or “Constitutional” party, led by Alexandros Mavrokordatos, one of the most talented and distinguished politicians of the era, had strong partisans among western merchants, Phanariots, and liberal ecclesiastics. The Anglophiles were socially liberal and advocated constitutionalism, missionary schools, and the use of a vernacular version of the scriptures. With the exception of a few months in 1841, when Mavrokordatos served as Greek premier, the party did not achieve prominence in political affairs until after the Crimean War. Its principal organ was the newspaper Athina, edited by the extremely liberal Emmanouil Antoniadis. The French party, also known as the National party, was led by Ioannis Kolettis, a charismatic Epirot of Vlach origin and the former doctor of Ali Pasha’s son. The French group gained its backing from liberal Greek politicians, many of whom had received a Western education, as well as Rumeliot captains and Peloponnesian magnates who received patronage from the French residents and opposed the Kolokotronis faction. Gaining a degree of prominence during the Near Eastern Crisis of 1839–41, the French party flourished during the 1840s. Francophiles favored the newspapers Friend of the People and Hope, edited by the “father of Greek journalism” Konstantinos Levidis. The Russian party, unlike its two opponents, had several names: Napist, kyvernitikoi (governmentalists), Philorthodox, and Kapodistrian. In general, the Russian party was socially conservative and included officials who worked under Kapodistrias, several major military figures, the rankand-file clergy, small landowners, and the agrarian population of the Peloponnese, which formed the party’s backbone. Included in its ranks were those Greeks involved with Russia’s brief rule in the Ionian Islands (1800–7), wandering monks with contacts in Russia, and those who had relatives in Russia or who had benefited from the excellent economic opportunities and patronage of the Tsar since at least the 1770s. The official newspaper of the Russian party was the Century, edited by the historian and member of the Philiki Etaireia Ioannis Philimon. In a dispatch to St Petersburg in 1840, Katakazy included a sketch on the origins of the three parties. He proposed that they appeared in Greece during the revolutionary period when the first attempts at government creation took place. At that time, Mavrokordatos and Kolettis came up with the idea of an English or French protectorate. The great powers, meanwhile, did not recognize the Greek government as legitimate, and a large number of captains, primates, merchants, and soldiers who entered the national government opposed a foreign protectorate. These people, according to Katakazy, created “the multifarious party called

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kyvernitikoi, or governmental, as soon as the president arrived and a regular administration was established.” The group was comprised of autochthonous Greeks who supported the president and who aimed for the perseverance of a national and independent government. General Kolokotronis and his followers, who at first were all relatives, formed its nucleus. By late 1832, the party enjoyed outstanding popularity among the agrarian families of the Peloponnesus, thanks mostly to the personality of Kolokotronis.133 Indeed, in an earlier dispatch Rikman recorded that all the provinces of the Peloponnesus were obliged to address letters to Kolokotronis in order to thank him for his noble patriotism during the war and the presidency.134 The party also acquired another label, the Philorthodox, because traditionalists who were opposed to church reforms, foreign missionary activity, and the translation of scripture into the vernacular united with others who either supported or had connections to Orthodox Russia. Why the group gained the name Napist is a mystery, although the great French historian Edouard Driault suggested that the term N.A.P. was an acronym for “Nicholas Autocrat of Russia,” signifying the Napist party.135 After the death of Kapodistrias, according to the French archeologist and philhellene Charles Lenormant, the Russian party committed a major mistake: instead of retreating from the policies of Kapodistrias, it remained a strong proponent of dictatorship.136 The arrest and trial of Kolokotronis in 1833–4 significantly diminished the authority of the party. In the following years the Regency forced several other members into retirement or exile, but by 1838, the Napists made a comeback, partly because leaders such as Soutsos, Andreas Metaxas, Georgios Glarakis, and Konstantinos Oikonomos received Russian patronage. As a rule, however, the Russian mission did not extend special privileges to this group. Indeed, on numerous occasions, Rikman and Katakazy courteously denied Napist requests for assistance, and Katakazy declared his relief that “no individual of Russian nationality or who enjoyed the special protection of Russia is in the service of the new state.”137 From late 1837 until early 1840, the party enjoyed its greatest influence as King Othon solidified his version of absolutist rule. Believing that Russia would be the greatest source of financial help, the King gave the majority of posts in the administration to Russophiles. With one or two notable exceptions, these parties remained bitterly divided in the post-revolutionary period. The Regency reacted at first by attempting to 133

Katakazy to Nesselrode, Athens, Apr. 10, 1840, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 9/1840, ll. 89–101. Rikman to Nesselrode, Nafplion, Dec. 10, 1832, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 82/1833, l. 66. 135 Driault, Histoire diplomatique, ii. 195, notes: “On sait que R. en russe et en grec, s’écrit P.” Greek historian Karolidis gives two versions of the etymology: the first pertains to a certain mythological figure named Napas; the second refers to Pliny and Diodora and their comments on an emperor named Napas. Petropulos suggests that the term stemmed from a hefty, rabid Russophile called Napas. See Pavlos Karolidis, Synchronos istoria ton Ellinon kai ton loipon laon tis Anatolis apo 1821 mechri 1921 (Athens: A. Vitsikovnaki, 1922–9), ii. 382; Petropulos, Politics and Statecraft, 10. 136 F. Lenormant, Le comte André Metaxa et le parti napiste en Grèce (Paris: Charles Douniol, 1861), 24; Petrunina, Grecheskaia natsiia, 249. 137 Rikman to Nesselrode, June 3, 1833, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 82/1833, ll. 542–6; Katakazy to Nesselrode, Athens, Apr. 10, 1840, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 9/1840, l. 101. 134

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suppress all political activity in the country. One way they did this was to name administrators and then place them in regions where they had no special connections. This had the positive affect of placing impartial officials in government posts, yet it deprived public servants of the ability to exercise their unique knowledge of local conditions. The Regency also exiled party chiefs to foreign diplomatic posts. Despite these efforts, the Regency was unable to strike a balance of political power in the country. Although theoretically the existence of political parties was anathema to the future proponents of Official Nationality, reports of political factions began reaching Russian readers by the mid-1820s. By 1833, anyone at all attentive to foreign affairs could have known a rather substantial amount about the Greek parties, their ideological viewpoint, and their leadership. However, as the foremost historians of the subject point out, these groups were not political parties in the strictest sense of the term, for they lacked well-defined principles and systematic means for membership. Rather they were groups of individuals united by family ties and general interests in the center of which stood one or two outstanding personalities. Despite their flagrant opposition to the legitimate order, the Russian press continued reporting on the parties throughout the 1830s and 1840s.

RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY A ND THE G REEK K I N G D O M : T H E EA S T E R N C R I SI S ( 1 8 3 2–18 3 3) Considering its geographical size and population, the Greek kingdom played a disproportionately large role in the foreign policy of Russia during the thirty-year reign of Nicholas I. Foreign Minister Nesselrode’s annual reports regularly begin with a separate chapter on Greece and Greek religious affairs.138 Russian foreign policy in Greece was an integral portion of the broader plans regarding strategic interests and power relations in the Near East in the second quarter of the nineteenth century. An appreciation of the condition of international relations in the region provides the context for Russian affairs in Greece. The implementation of Official Nationality in Greece coincided neatly with Russia’s general objectives in the Near East. The origins of Nicholaevan policy in the region can be traced to the reports of the special committee set up to consider the future of Russian–Ottoman relations in 1829. The committee recommended cautious action, although some diversity of opinion existed.139 The Tsar concluded that the advantages of the conservation of the Ottoman Empire outweighed its disadvantages. In the event of the Sublime Porte’s collapse, Russia called for an 138 “Otchety o deistviiakh nashei diplomatye za 1830 po 1852,” RGADA, f. 3, op. 1, d. 91; “Pis’mo Ministra Inostrannikh Del Nessel’rode K. V. Nikolaiu I s kharakteristikoi vneshnei politiki Rossii v sviazi s 25-letnem tsarstvovaniia Nikolaia I (kopiia),” Nov. 20, 1850, GARF, f. 109, op. 4, d. 82. 139 Documents relative to the special committee appear in VPR xvi. 278–301; and in English tr. in Theophilus C. Prousis, Russian-Ottoman Relations in the Levant: The Dashkov Archive (Minneapolis: MMEEM, 2002), 123–33. For an authoritative summary, see V. N. Vinogradov, Dvuglavnyi rossiiskii orel na Balkanakh, 1683–1914 (Moscow: Indrik, 2010), 242–3.

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international conference to discuss a peaceful division of territories and promised to take energetic measures to ensure control of the Black Sea. After considering several partition plans, the special committee decided that any effort to disrupt the integrity of the Ottoman Empire should be avoided, since a weak neighbor was preferable to a powerful rival. The plans of the committee went into practical operation when the revolt of the Egyptian Pasha Mehmed Ali forced the Sultan to seek the aid of his traditional enemy, tsarist Russia. The ensuing two-part Eastern Crisis of 1832–3 and 1839–41 was the product of a civil war within the Ottoman Empire.140 The basic problem concerned the Sublime Porte’s need for restructuring, which pitted a reforming Ottoman sultan against one ambitious, modernizing vali (governor) intent on securing his tenure in Egypt and hereditary rights for his descendents.141 The showdown, sparked by the Pasha’s demand to annex Syria in 1831 as a reward for his assistance against Greece, complicated international relations in the region, and the two leading powers, Russia and Britain, confronted each other at a critical juncture. The conflict between Sultan Mahmud and Mehmed Ali resulted in six months of hard battles and bitter sieges. The pivotal encounter took place at Koniah in December 1832, which resulted in a resounding Egyptian victory. With his capital nearly defenseless, the Sultan appealed for western European support, but in vain. At last he turned to St Petersburg for assistance. In an audience on January 20, 1833, the Ottoman Reis Effendi read the following statement to Russian Ambassador Butenev: “In consideration of the sincere amity that we have seen and has been proven on behalf of His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, the Sublime Porte asks not only for naval help but also for the help of land troops. In view of the progress of the enemy, the Sublime Porte solicits the [Russian] envoy to take all the measures in his power to send 25,000 or even better 30,000 men towards the Ottoman capital as soon as possible.”142 Butenev sought an answer from St Petersburg immediately, for the Egyptian army had extended its conquests into Anatolia and the Ottoman military had 140 See Virginia H. Aksan, Ottoman Wars 1700–1870: An Empire Besieged (London: PearsonLongman, 2007), 363–407; Muhammed Kutluoğlu, The Egyptian Question (1831–41) (Istanbul: Eren, 1998); Paul Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics, 1763–1848 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 726–35; M. S. Anderson, The Eastern Question 1774–1923: A Study in International Relations (New York: Macmillan, 1966), 77–109; H. W. L. Temperley, England and the Near East: The Crimea (London: Archon, 1964), 63–153; Vinogradov, Dvuglavnyi rossiiskii orel, 260–7; Vinogradov, “Obmanchivyi blesk Unkiar-Iskelesiiskogo,” in Istoriia Balkan, 407–22; V. A. Georgiev, Vneshniaia politika Rossii na Blizhnem Vostoke v kontse 30-nachale 40-x godov XIXv. (Moscow: Nauka, 1975). 141 On the modernization program of the Egyptian pasha, see Khalid Fahmy, All the Pasha’s Men: Mehmed Ali, his Army, and the Making of Modern Egypt (Cambridge: CUP, 1997); A. L. al-Sayyid Marsot, Egypt in the Reign of Muhammad Ali (Cambridge: CUP, 1984); Butrus Abu-Manneh, “Mehmed Ali Paşa and Sultan Mahmud II: The Genesis of a Conflict,” Turkish Historical Review, 1 (2010): 1–24; Henry Dodwell, The Founder of Modern Egypt: A Study of Muhammad ‘Ali (Cambridge: CUP, 1931); M. Sabry, L’Empire égyptien sous Mohamed-Ali et la question d’orient (1811–49) (Paris: Paul Genthner, 1930). See also the contemporary Russian account by K. M. Bazili, Siriia i Palestina pod turetskim pravitel’stvom v istoricheskom i politicheskom otnosheniiakh (Moscow: Mosty kul’tury, 2007). 142 Butenev to Kiselev, Büyükdere, Jan. 21, 1833, RGIA, f. 958, op. 1, d. 631, ll. 15–16.

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almost disappeared. Faithful to his conservative principles, the Tsar responded in favor of the Sultan’s request.143 On February 20, a Russian naval squadron arrived at Constantinople, and several weeks later, some 10,000 Russian troops landed on the Asiatic side of the Bosporus.144 In Greece, the presence of Russian troops near Constantinople bred rumors regarding the impending replacement of the crescent with a cross on the Basilica of Hagia Sofia. A temporary pause in disturbances along the northern frontier followed. Count Pavel Kiselev, reporting from Moldavia, believed that the tranquility in Greece was attributable “to the beneficial fear that inspires the malcontents of the idea of Russian armed intervention in favor of the Sultan.” Only the measures “dictated by the great wisdom of Our August Master maintain the established order in this part of Turkey.”145 Russian Vice-Consul Kallogerakis, in Patras, echoed this view when he remarked that the presence of imperial troops on the Bosporus compromised the insurrections brewing in Albania. With respect to official relations, Katakazy advised the Regency to observe the strictest neutrality.146 Russian intervention to diffuse the crisis received approval in Vienna and Berlin. Although the leadership in London and Paris explored means to offset the rise of Russian prestige, eventually the powers worked in concert to conclude the Ottoman–Egyptian war. After intense negotiations, the Sultan conceded. According to the Truce of Kutahia (May 6, 1833) Mehmed Ali remained the Sultan’s vassal, but now he had authority over all of Syria, and the district of Adana was ruled by his son, Ibrahim. A month later, the French and British squadrons arrived in the eastern Mediterranean, too late to affect the outcome of the settlement. In the broader picture, intervention granted Russia significant strategic and political advantages in the region. Nesselrode was proud of the achievement, for, among other issues, it served to discourage the ambitious Egyptian Pasha, who had no desire for Russia as an enemy.147 Such action also corresponded with the religious and legitimist convictions of the Russian autocrat. A memorandum to the special envoy in Constantinople, Aleksei F. Orlov, outlines the main points of Russia’s Near Eastern policy at this time. First, Russia aimed to neutralize threats to the Ottoman Empire by maintaining the Sultan on the throne and by prohibiting the Egyptian Pasha from new territorial extensions. In this connection, Russia was prepared to intervene more actively than any other power, a fact that warranted the continued occupation of the Danubian principalities. The doctrine of protection of 143 King Ludwig once asked Katakazy “why the emperor would not consent to the emancipation of Egypt and the formation of a new independent state in these lands.” Surprised, Katakazy replied: “If my August Master consented to let his third son rule over the Arabs, then Europe would be in a better condition.” See Katakazy to Nesselrode, Munich, Apr. 3, 1833, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 82/1833, l. 383. 144 For details regarding Russian negotiations, troop movements, naval operations, and assessments of Egyptian forces see the valuable, mostly unutilized files in RGADA, f. 15, op. 1, d. 316; and RGIA, f. 958, op. 1, d. 628, d. 629, d. 630. 145 Kiselev to Nesselrode, Jassy, Mar. 22, 1833, RGIA, f. 958, op. 1, d. 632, l. 23. 146 Kallogerakis to Katakazy, Patras, July 15, 1833, AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 265/1833, ll. 26–7; Nesselrode to Katakazy, St Petersburg, Jan. 29, 1833, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 84/1833, l. 61. 147 Nesselrode to Paskevich, St Petersburg, July 24, 1833, RGIA, f. 1018, op. 8, d. 21, l. 2.

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Orthodoxy remained vibrant: before new complications arose, Russia sought to cultivate the sympathy of Orthodox Christians through the assurance of affective and prompt intervention. Lastly, and most importantly, the cabinet in St Petersburg proposed a Russian–Ottoman defensive and offensive alliance.148 In between the fireworks and fêtes on Emperor Nicholas’s birthday, June 25, 1833, Orlov found a suitable moment to ask the Reis effendi for permission to evacuate the Russian troops from their position on the Bosporus.149 The day after, Russia and the Ottoman Empire concluded a defensive treaty of alliance at UnkiarSkelessi, a village on the Asian side of the Bosporus.150 The initiative for the agreement came from the Sultan, and the negotiations were elaborate and difficult. The document, based upon the Russian–Ottoman treaty of 1798, remained unsigned until the Russian forces had made the final preparations to withdraw, although numerous western accounts imply that Russian bayonets pressured the Sultan.151 Concluded for eight years, the treaty called for an eternal peace between the signatories and contained broad provisions for a defensive alliance. A separate and secret article exempted the Sublime Porte from helping Russia in the event of armed conflict, in exchange for keeping the Dardanelles closed to all foreign warships. Contrary to widespread contemporary conviction, the treaty did not provide for the passage of Russian vessels of war through the straits.152 Katakazy received news of the secret article promptly. In case they showed fear, he was to assure the regents that, in making the article, Russia was confirming older treaties with the Porte. Nesselrode ordered Katakazy to “let the Regency know that the 148 Nesselrode to Orlov, St Petersburg, May 8, 2833, RGADA, f. 15, op. 1, d. 316, ll. 122–43; see also AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 51/1833, ll. 190–207; and the copy in RGIA, f. 958, op. 1, d. 631, ll. 56–69. Reports from the Greek provinces—SPBV, 93 (Apr. 23, 1833); JdSPB 49 (Apr. 25, 1833); OV 35 (May 6, 1833)—recording the purchase by Jesuit and Catholic missionaries of large tracts of land in Euboea and Attica increased Russian concerns for the fate of Orthodoxy in the Near East. 149 “Compte rendu de l’ambassadeur extraordinaire du Comte Orloff à Constantinople et du ses résultats,” July 1833, RGADA, f. 15, op. 1, d. 316, ll. 102–17; see also, Butenev to Kiselev, Büyükdere, June 19, 1833; Butenev to Kiselev, Büyükdere, Aug. 6, 1833, RGIA, f. 958, op. 1, d. 630, ll. 113, 132. 150 The negotiations received ample coverage in the Russian daily press and “thick journals” like MT and VZh. The treaty was published in F. F. Martens, Sobranie traktatov i konventsii zakliuchennykh Rossieiu s inostrannymi derzhavami (St Petersburg: A. Böhnke, 1874–1909), xii. 42–52, which contains interesting commentary. The best Russian archival based study remains N. S. Kiniapina, “UnkiarIskelesiiskii dogovor 1833 g.,” Nauchnye doklady vyshei shkoly istoricheskie nauki, 2 (1958): 30–49. See generally, Aksan, Ottoman Wars, 374–6; Temperley, England and the Near East, 66–74; Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics, 730–1, 737–8, 753–4; Alexander Bitis, Russia and the Eastern Question: Army, Government, and Society, 1815–33 (Oxford: OUP/British Academy, 2006), 467–79; John C. K. Daly, Russian Seapower and “The Eastern Question” 1827–41 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991), 100–39. 151 See e.g. Y. Ancel, Manuel historique de la question d’Orient (1792–1925) (Paris: Delagrave, 1926), 112; Felix Ponteil, L’Eveil des nationalités et le mouvement libéral (1815–48) (Paris: PUF, 1960), 405, 407, 410, 419; William L. Langer, Political and Social Upheaval 1832–52 (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), 291; Driault, Histoire diplomatique, ii. 104–5; Webster, The Foreign Policy of Palmerston, i. 304; G. H. Bolsover, “Lord Ponsonby and the Eastern Question,” Slavonic Review, 13 (1934): 106; Bolsover, “David Urquhart and the Eastern Question, 1833–7,” 446. 152 Philip Mosely, Russian Diplomacy and the Opening of the Eastern Question in 1838 and 1839 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1934), 9–30; John LeDonne, The Russian Empire and the World, 1700–1917: The Geopolitics of Containment (New York: Oxford, 1997), 123.

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treaty could not be anything but agreeable to Greece.” Rumors of the treaty reached the Greek public shortly after Orlov’s departure from Constantinople. Katakazy wrote that the news, “accompanied by all kinds of commentaries and absurd rumors, has not produced a strong impression on Greece.”153 British and French diplomats in Athens, anxious to demonstrate the “anti-Greek” direction of Russian policy, made the most of the Unkiar-Skelessi agreement’s guarantee of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. The revolt of the Mehmed Ali was just one episode in the carnival of revolutions that erupted in the European periphery in the 1830s. Thus, an examination of the social and political realities of the Near East during the Congress of Vienna era demonstrates that the Ottoman Empire remained a major European power, sharing the dynamics, tensions, and problems of the Mediterranean world. The unrest in the region convinced Russian officialdom of the need to form strong alliances with likeminded powers. Consequentially, the rulers of Russia and Austria concluded the “Convention on Common Action on the Eastern Question” at a meeting in Münchengrätz in September 1833.154 According to the treaty, Russia and Austria reaffirmed their desire to maintain the existence of the Ottoman Empire under the present dynasty. They decided to resist any effort by Mehmed Ali to extend his authority and agreed to cooperate in the case that the Sultan was overthrown. Nesselrode informed Katakazy that the two emperors established a “most perfect entente regarding the affairs of the East founded on the conviction and mutual interest for the necessity of the conservation of the Ottoman Empire,” adding that “we want to see identical views and actions in Greece and Constantinople.” Katakazy was encouraged to strengthen relations with the Austrian envoy Anton von Prokesch-Osten, for “our union balances the two maritime powers.”155 In October of the same year, the Berlin Convention brought Russia, Austria, and Prussia together in a broad mutual defense agreement. Besides shoring up any problems in the Near East, these agreements reinforced the conservative order in Europe and they reduced opposition to the Unkiar-Skelessi settlement. * * *

* *

A survey of the international setting underscores the pressures and problems facing Russian officials as they promoted their vision of a strong church and state in Greece. During the coronation of King Othon in the summer of 1835, the Russian Foreign Ministry could look back upon the policy objectives it pursued with 153 Nesselrode to Katakazy, St Petersburg, Aug. 5, 1833; Nesselrode to Katakazy, St Petersburg, Dec. 21, 1833 AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 84/1833, ll. 155–6, 210–11; Katakazy to Nesselrode, Nafplion, Sept. 30, 1833, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 83/1833, ll. 228–9. 154 A copy of the Münchengrätz Convention is in RGADA, f. 15, op. 1, d. 315. An English tr. appears in J. C. Hurewitz (ed.), The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics: A Documentary Record, 2nd edn (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975), i. 254–5. See generally, Temperley, England and the Near East, 79–80; Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics, 733–5; Vernon Puryear, England, Russia and the Straits Question, 1844–56 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1931), 20–4. 155 Nesselrode to Katakazy, St Petersburg, Nov. 30, 1833, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 84/1833, ll. 181–3.

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general satisfaction. Despite the Regency’s attempted importation of modern methods of government, the Greek kingdom remained relatively conservative in character. The system of personal absolutism that reigned supreme in Athens reflected to a substantial degree the spirit of Official Nationality. With a few exceptions, the frequent warnings of revolts from Greek soil into Ottoman dominions or vice versa never materialized. The borders remained stable, the administration was strong, and the financial system functioned. New press laws inhibited the formation of opposition to the throne, and plans for a constitution crashed on the shoals of tsarist diplomacy. Popular pressure earned official pardons for Russophiles like Kolokotronis, who regained positions of authority in society and the government. Regents Maurer and Abel had departed and portions of the Regency’s reform program promised to bring positive results. In addition, Russian support enabled the entrenchment of conservative social forces (in part a reaction to Protestant influences) led by Russophile intellectuals and pro-Orthodox religious figures during the years of Othonian absolutism to follow. Although the Russian Foreign Ministry accomplished many of its goals, the religious status of the sovereign remained a subject of tremendous concern. In the mind of Tsar Nicholas, nothing was more urgent than the need for the King to embrace the religion of his people. Russian officials did not demure from drawing on the moral claims of public opinion to advance its objective of the King’s conversion to Orthodoxy. Yet, at least for the moment, St Petersburg could look with satisfaction upon the authoritarian disposition of the young sovereign, who appeared reluctant to relinquish absolute power. A review of contemporary Russian periodical literature, meanwhile, demonstrates how Russian educated society remained closely connected with Greek affairs. Through the press, St Petersburg utilized the moral claims of public opinion in its stated interests and effectively used the arguments of the Orthodox population to promote conservative principles and enhance the moral capital of the absolutist regime. Tsarist patronage nurtured key institutions in Greece’s nation-state construction endeavor, and Russia’s embassy and consulates worked together in consolidating the political principle of monarchical absolutism. The Russian-assisted transition from anarchy and ruin to order and absolutism in Greek political affairs depended on the skills of Russia’s officials and agents. An interesting aspect of Russia’s involvement in the first years of the Greek kingdom concerns the individual members of its mission. The well-trained and experienced personnel had special connections to Greek society. Unlike the representatives of the other powers, religion cemented the connections: in all cases, the mission’s members were Orthodox Christians. Since it represented the most powerful Orthodox state in the world, Russia was able to court a wide range of sympathetic clergy as a unique form of influence, a factor that became acutely significant during the campaign to establish an independent church.

3 Autocephaly and Facets of Orthodoxy Russian responses to ecclesiastical developments in the Greek kingdom demonstrate the centrality of religion to the foreign policy of St Petersburg during the reign of Nicholas I. Considering the relations between the two states as a whole, St Petersburg devoted more energy and resources to the church question than any other single issue. Nearly every dispatch sent to the Russian Foreign Ministry from the embassy and consular staff features commentary on religious affairs, and embassy instructions typically contain detailed advice on ecclesiastical subjects. While more tangible imperial goals, such as Mediterranean trade, Balkan political leverage, and Ottoman stability were never ignored by tsarist policy-makers, protecting Orthodoxy imparted a sense of mission to the Russian embassy in Greece. The personality of the Tsar and the history of Russian–Greek ties help explain the intensity of the Russian response. By the nineteenth century, Russia had been the only Orthodox state in the world for more than four hundred years, and the Russian government and Holy Synod had developed a long-standing tradition of assisting Orthodox churches in Balkan lands. Although the Russian autocrat and his advisors never considered the doctrine of Moscow, the Third Rome and guardian of Orthodoxy, as a serious guide to policy formulation, they fervently believed in Russia’s obligation to protect the Christian population of the Orthodox East.1 A direct challenge to the underpinning principles of the Nicholaevan order occurred in the summer of 1833, when the Bavarian Regency and a small group of Greek clerics unilaterally declared the Greek Church autocephalous from the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople. The declaration was part of a political program aimed at asserting the independence of the fledgling state and the sovereignty of the young king. The leader of the new autocephalous church was the Roman Catholic sovereign of the kingdom, and a Holy Synod appointed by the crown controlled its governance. The arrangement was modeled on the system of church–state relations prevailing in German Protestant states and Scandinavian kingdoms. Subsequent edicts, closing down the majority of monasteries and nunneries and announcing the restructuring of the ecclesiastical administration, 1 For a recent interpretation of Russian foreign policy based on the theory of a Neo-Byzantine revival, see Lora A. Gerd, Konstantinopol’skii Patriarkhat i Rossiia 1901/1914 (Moscow: Indrik, 2012). On the historical origins of the Third Rome doctrine, see the convincing reappraisal by Donald Ostrowski, “ ‘Moscow the Third Rome’ as a Historical Ghost,” in Sarah T. Brooks (ed.), Byzantium: Faith and Power (1261–1557): Perspectives on Late Byzantine Art and Culture (New York: Metropolitan Museum of Art, 2006), 170–9.

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aimed to centralize authority and nationalize the most powerful institution of prerevolutionary Greece. The Russian Foreign Ministry viewed these actions as grave errors that opened dangerous avenues for an influx of non-canonical practices and the unholy influences of non-Orthodox proselytizers. The issue was urgent, for it challenged the traditions of Eastern Orthodoxy and engaged Russia’s professed exclusive protectorate of the Orthodox world. In defense of united Orthodoxy, tsarist officials employed various methods to reverse the ecclesiastical reforms or at least discredit them. The embassy in Greece made serious efforts to spread literature and translations of canonical texts, contributed financial aid, and furnished equipment for liturgical service while supporting traditionalist Greek churchmen and placing diplomatic pressure on the government to conform to conservative views. Russian officials in the Greek kingdom campaigned to bolster the official Orthodox hierarchy and clergy in order to bring decency and regulation to church life. Church and state in Russia attempted to discipline and channel religiosity in Greece, just as they attempted to “Christianize” Russian society against threats from Old Believers, religious sects, and schismatics within the empire of the Tsars during the same period. The ecclesiastical settlement launched by the Bavarian Regency involved two competing visions of how best to maintain the purity of Orthodoxy in Greece and discipline its flock.2 One vision, led by liberal or modernizing clerics such as Theoklitos Pharmakidis and Neophytos Vamvas, spoke about a national Orthodox Church of Greece unfettered by the canonical strictures of the Ecumenical Patriarchate still under the control of the Sultan. In their view, the Orthodox Church had been traditionally bound to the state since Byzantine times, and ecclesiastical independence would solidify the Greek state’s Orthodoxy. Traditionalists or conservatives, led by Konstantinos Oikonomos, argued that the principle of eucharistic catholicity prevailed over national factionalism and championed the canons of the Mother Church in Constantinople. According to Oikonomos and likeminded traditionalists, any disengagement from the ecumenical center was not only unnecessary, it also threatened national identity itself. The topic of ecclesiastical independence, and the connected initiatives of monastic reform, biblical translation, and foreign missionaries that followed, provoked lively exchanges of views in church circles and the sharpest disagreement. The Russian Foreign Ministry favored the traditionalist standpoint, and intervened to support the universal church over ethnic nationalism. By 1850, these efforts bore fruit when the patriarch and the Greek Church reconciled, and the Tsar 2 Paraskevas Matalas refers to the “two Orthodoxies of modern Greece” in Ethnos kai Orthodoxia: Oi peripeteies mias schesia apo to “Elladiko” sto Voulgariko schisma (Irakleio: Panepistimiakes Ekdoseis Kritis, 2003), 45–84. For descriptions of the contrasting visions, see Charles A. Frazee, The Orthodox Church and Independent Greece 1821–52 (Cambridge: CUP, 1969), 125–70; Isabelle Dépret, Eglise orthodoxe et histoire en Grèce contemporaine: Versions officielles et controverses historiographiques (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2009), 27–39; Chrysostomos Papadopoulos, Istoria tis ekklisias tis Ellados (Athens: P. A. Petrakos, 1920), 49–55; and F. A. Kurganov, Ustroistvo upravleniia v tserkvi korolevstva grecheskago (Kazan: Universitetskoi Tipografii, 1871), 1–7.

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could reflect with satisfaction that Russia’s labors had not been in vain. Yet ironically, the Ecumenical Patriarchate’s “Synodal Tome” that recognized the Greek Church as autocephalous sanctioned the gradual division of the universal Orthodox Church into national churches. The final resolution of the conflict in Greece was particularly important as it set the precedent for dealing with similar cases in the Orthodox world during the latter part of the nineteenth and throughout the twentieth century.3 While the Russian state intervened vigorously in Greek ecclesiastical affairs, a conspicuous response among Russia’s educated elite followed, demonstrating the degree of sensitivity toward Greek affairs in the minds of the creators of Russian culture. The professed love for the Orthodox people of the Balkans, and the willingness to fight for their liberation, contributed to the rise of Slavophilism and other messianic movements in Russian social thought during this era. To paraphrase a poem by the Slavophile Aleksei S. Khomiakov (1804–60), the Russian eagle was the bigbrother protector over the small Orthodox nations that were groaning “in the steel chains of the Tartar.”4 For Russia’s conservative nationalists and religious thinkers, the destiny of Russia was inextricably tethered to resolving the disputes in the Orthodox world. In this respect, a study of Russian intervention in Greece is especially valuable, for it sheds new light on the religious component of Russian identity.5

TH E QU E S TION O F ECCLESIAST ICAL IND EPENDEN CE Before the War of Independence, a unified national consciousness existed, at best, in embryonic form among Greek intellectuals. Among the masses of people living in Rumelia, an ecclesiastical awareness, whether acute or vague, of being an Orthodox Christian, and of speaking the Romaic language defined a person’s station in life. Such consciousness did not necessarily signify being ethnically Greek. Instead the locus of identity was the neighboring community, a village or town church where kinship networks formed and fellow parishioners gathered after Sunday liturgy. Religion played a vital but variable role in the construction of Greek 3 See the excellent comparative overview by Paschalis Kitromilides, “The Orthodox Church in Modern State Formation in South-East Europe,” in Alina Mungiu-Pippidi and Wim Van Meurs (eds), Ottomans into Europeans: State and Institution-building in South-Eastern Europe (London: Hurst, 2010), 31–50. 4 From the poem “Orel” in A. S. Khomiakov, Polnoe sobranie socheneniia (Moscow: Univ. Tip., 1900), iv. 206. See also Peter K. Christoff, An Introduction to Nineteenth-Century Russian Slavophilism: A Study in Ideas, i. A. S. Xomjakov (The Hague: Mouton, 1961), 34. 5 In contrast to western European countries, relatively little writing has been devoted to Russian identity despite its obvious importance. In general, see Michael Cherniavsky, Tsar and People: Studies in Russian Myths (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960); Edward Thaden, Conservative Nationalism in Nineteenth-Century Russia (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1964); Jeffery Brooks, When Russia Learned to Read (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 212–32; Simon Franklin and Emma Widdis (eds), National Identity in Russian Culture: An Introduction (Cambridge: CUP, 2004); C. Ely, This Meager Nature: Landscape and National Identity in Imperial Russia (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 2002); and R. Aizlewood, “Revisiting Russian Identity in Russian Thought: From Chaadaev to the Early Twentieth Century,” SEER 78 (2000): 20–43.

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revolutionary consciousness. By its very position as a part of the Ottoman state, the Orthodox Church was not prepared to lead a national movement. The ultimate leader of the Orthodox community, the patriarch in Constantinople, was dependent on the Sublime Porte, which decided appointments and depositions, and encouraged competition among the leading clergymen when suitable. The patriarch was responsible only to the Sultan. He wielded far greater power than the patriarchs possessed in Byzantine times.6 Church authority stemmed from the unique predilection of the Ottoman state for dealing with its subjects as confessional units, or millets, instead of as individuals.7 The patriarch of Constantinople was the leader of the entire Greek millet, which encompassed all Orthodox Christian believers in the Sultan’s domain, including Serbs, Albanians, Arabs, as well as Greeks. Since its autonomy was bestowed by a theocratic state, the Greek millet was itself a theocracy. In virtue of his religious authority over the Orthodox community, the patriarch exercised judicial, fiscal, and administrative powers and delegated these tasks to the ecclesiastical hierarchy from archbishop down to village priest. This sort of system gave the Ottoman state the advantage of remaining above those who stood outside Muslim law. At the same time, the Sultan had authority over non-Muslims by acquiring the allegiance of the upper ecclesiastical leaders. The execution of Patriarch Gregorios V on Easter Day 1821, because of his failure to fulfill his duty as an official in the Ottoman power structure, is an example of how the Sultan’s power could function. It also helps to explain the political conservatism of the church hierarchy during the first phase of the Greek struggle. Although the great majority of Greek-speaking Ottoman Christians were devoted to their parish communities, the modern idea of an Orthodox Christian nation as a kind of corporate identity emerged with the Modern Greek Enlightenment in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.8 Stimulated by the activities of the merchant diaspora, educated Greek individuals and elite social groups began to criticize traditional institutions, develop anti-clerical views, and disengage from religious values and practices. A diffusion of secular ideas accompanied a rekindling of interest in the ancient Greek past, a turn to democratic 6 On the functioning of the Orthodox Church under Ottoman rule, see Elizabeth A. Zachariadou, Deka tourkika engrapha gia ti Megali Ekklisia (1483–1567) (Athens: Institute for Byzantine Research, 1996); Zachariadou, “The Great Church in Captivity, 1453–1586,” and Paschalis Kitromilides, “Orthodoxy and the West: Reformation to Enlightenment,” both in The Cambridge History of Christianity, v. Eastern Christianity, ed. Michael Angold (Cambridge: CUP, 2006), 169–86 and 187–209 respectively; Steven Runciman, The Great Church in Captivity: A Study of the Patriarchate of Constantinople from the Eve of the Turkish Conquest to the Greek War of Independence (Cambridge: CUP, 1968); Th. Papadopoullos, Studies and Documents Relating to the History of the Greek Church and People under Turkish Domination, 2nd edn (Aldershot and Burlington, VT: Variorum, 1990); and Kurganov, Ustroistvo upravleniia, 11–61. 7 Valuable studies on the millet system are in Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis (eds), Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1982), including Richard Clogg’s essay, “The Greek Millet in the Ottoman Empire,” i. 185–202. See also the interesting historical sketch in Harry Luke, The Old Turkey and the New: From Byzantium to Ankara (London: Bles, 1955), 66–98. 8 See K. T. Dimaras, Neoellinikos diaphotismos, 3rd edn (Athens: Ermes, 1985), 121–44; and Paschalis Kitromilides, “The Legacy of the French Revolution: Orthodoxy and Nationalism,” in The Cambridge History of Christianity, v. 229. See also Anna Tabaki, Peri neoellinikou diaphotismou (Athens: Ekdoseis Ergo, 2004).

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principles, and a desire to emulate the heroes of antiquity. The same fascination with the classics drew European observers to support the cause of Greek independence. At this point, the movement of national liberation collided with the traditional way of life tied to the idea of an Orthodox commonwealth. Marked tensions between the church and the leaders of the independence movement, many of whom had begun their careers as seminarians, emerged. For many Greek intellectuals at the time, the brilliance of Pericles and Socrates outshined the contribution of Byzantine Orthodoxy in both political and cultural terms. Yet the masses which eventually formed the backbone of the rebellion were inspired first by local quarrels or unfairness and only secondarily by religion, let alone the glories of ancient past.9 As a result, notions of “Church,” “nation,” “Orthodoxy,” “Romios,” and “Hellenism” began to be confused.10 Unfortunately, the great volume of historiography has perpetuated the confusion, in part because historians of the Balkan national churches have found it difficult to reconcile Orthodox ecumenicity and secular nationalism, when both are universal ideologies with transcendental values. As Anthony D. Smith has argued, “religious traditions, and especially beliefs about the sacred, underpin and suffuse to a greater or lesser degree the national identities of the populations of the constituent states. In fact, these beliefs and practices often shape and inspire the national identities and nationalisms of the modern world.”11 Orthodoxy thus did not originate as an important factor in the national struggle, although it contributed to the intensity of opposition against the Muslim community when violence erupted. After independence, religion lent power and depth to the development of a sense of the Greek national community. It took the deeply rooted values, symbols, myths, and traditions embedded in Orthodoxy, in addition to the efforts of the new state, focused on the creation of a secular, centralized, modern educational system (alongside military and other public institutions) to make the nation. The independent state thus transformed peasants who previously considered themselves to be Christians and ethnically Greek into members of the Hellenic-Christian nation.12 As part of this process, the ecumenical concept of Eastern Orthodoxy was

9 Consider the reaction of a military leader in the Greek rebellion, after a compliment by a philhellene: “What Achilles . . . are you talking about? Did his musket kill many?” See Richard Clogg, “The Greeks and their Past,” in Dennis Deletant and Harry Hanak (eds), Historians as Nation Builders: Central and Southeastern Europe (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1988), 24. 10 Key discussions on the meaning of these terms include Michael Herzfeld, Ours Once More: Folklore, Ideology and the Making of Modern Greece (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1982); R. Beaton, “Antique Nation? Hellenes on the Eve of Greek Independence,” Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies, 31/1 (2007): 76–95; and L. Droulia, “Towards Modern Greek Consciousness,” Historical Review/La Revue Historique, 1 (2004): 51–67. 11 Anthony D. Smith, “The ‘Sacred’ Dimension of Nationalism,” Millennium—Journal of International Studies, 29/3 (2000): 795. Contrast Paschalis Kitromilides, “Imagined Communities” and the Origins of the National Question in the Balkans (Brookfield, VT: Ashgate/Variorum, 1994), 184. The long-time resident in Greece, George Finlay, A History of Greece from its Conquest by the Romans to the Present Time, B.C. 146 to A.D. 1864 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1876), vii. 130, commented that “the ideas of nationality and Oriental orthodoxy are closely entwined.” 12 The historian Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos was the first thinker to seriously formulate this concept. See his Istoria tou ellinikou ethnous, 5th edn (Athens: Eleftherodakis, 1925).

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called into question and a separate national church emerged. Although the development of Greek nationalism is more complex than the binary opposition between religious and secular values seems to imply, students of the phenomenon need to take a critical stance toward the perpetuated antimony between religious and national identity.13

RUSS IA AND THE GREEK CHURCH DURING TH E WAR O F IND EPEND ENCE The Greek Revolution had an important impact on Eastern Orthodox ecclesiastical affairs and the canonical order and provided the paradigm for the transformation of the Orthodox communities of the Balkans into modern nation-states. When the revolt broke out in 1821, Patriarch Gregorios V disowned anyone taking part in the struggle against the Sultan. On Palm Sunday, April 3, the patriarch released a letter of excommunication and anathema that solemnly referred to the rebels as ungrateful traitors “who rise against their common protector and lawful sovereign, and against Christ.”14 The presence of the patriarch in the capital of the Ottoman Empire, however, where he was exposed to the continuous influence of Ottoman authorities, made a continuation of the dependence of the ecclesiastical sees in Greece upon the Mother Church, nearly impossible. Many Greek patriots disregarded the condemnation of succeeding patriarchs.15 Meanwhile, in the zones of violence, individual clerics consistently aimed to maintain the morals of the people and the canons of faith. Prelates and other members of the clergy who played important roles during the National Assemblies at Epidauros (1822), Astros (1823), and Troezen (1827), focused on matters concerning religion in an effort to uphold canonicity and respect for the patriarchate in Constantinople. The general chaos that resulted from the insurrection, however, introduced unforeseen and seminal changes into the roles of local clergy. As the control of the ecclesiastical center in Constantinople declined, sections of the indigenous clergy became empowered by virtue of their prominent role in the life of their communities. In regions in revolt, many local warrior-priests and monks were leaders of the insurrection, gained fame for their heroic exploits, and eventually became enshrined as national martyrs. Although torn between their allegiance to the Great Church and their responsibility as the moral and spiritual 13 See Effi Gazi, “Revisiting Religion and Nationalism in Nineteenth-Century Greece,” in Roderick Beaton and David Ricks (eds), The Making of Modern Greece: Nationalism, Romanticism, and the Uses of the Past (1797–1896) (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2009), 95–106. 14 The text of the letter appears in Robert Walsh, A Residence in Constantinople (London: Frederick Westley & A. H. Davis, 1836), i. 311. For the background, see Richard Clogg “The ‘Dhidhaskalia Patriki’ (1798): An Orthodox Reaction to French Revolutionary Propaganda,” Middle Eastern Studies, 5 (1969): 87–115; and Giorgos Makris, “Ekklisia kai epanastasi (1821–32): Oi scheseis tou Oikoumenikou Patriarcheiou me ta ethnika kinimata,” in S. Papageorgiou (ed.), Aphieroma ston Alexandro I. Despotopoulo (Athens: Papazisi, 1995), 101–13. 15 General Kolokotronis is reported to have said that the patriarch “does whatever the sultan tells him to do.” See T. N. Pipinelis, I monarchia en Elladi, 1833–43 (Athens: I. Vartsos, 1932), 62.

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guides of their flocks, individual members of the higher and lower clergy during the decade of violence often “crossed the Rubicon” to unite with the rising national community. Those who felt misgivings about abandoning the ecumenical lessons of Orthodoxy could take comfort in reciting selected passages of the Psalms (117: 1): “Praise the Lord, all nations!” and the Book of Daniel (10: 21; 12: 1): “the guardian angel of Greece will appear” when the time of trouble arrives, and “all the people of your nation whose names are written in God’s book will be saved.”16 Even before the initiation of armed conflict, many Greeks considered the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Constantinople as an instrument of Turkish tyranny and not as an institution concerned with political independence.17 Thus, dreams of political freedom naturally inspired the desire for an independent church. The opponents of autocephaly typically considered the issue of foreign making, although the first to pose the question of Greek ecclesiastical independence was the famous Greek philologist and political theorist Adamantios Korais (see Figure 3.1). In his commentary to Aristotle’s Politics, published in the first year of the Greek

Fig. 3.1. Adamantios Korais, Aristotelous Politikon ta sozomena. (Paris: I. M. Everartos/ Firmin Didot, 1821). 16 Kallistos Ware, “Catholicity and Nationalism: A Recent Debate in Athens,” Eastern Churches Review, 10/1 (1978): 12. 17 See e.g. the discussion in Papadopoullos, Studies and Documents, 146–9.

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struggle for independence, Korais formulated his precocious idea of a Greek Church liberated from the patriarch of Constantinople. The clergy of liberated Greece, Korais advised, “no longer need to acknowledge as its ecclesiastical leader the patriarch of Constantinople” who remains “contaminated by the seat of the lawless tyrant.” Arguing that it was “entirely untoward for the clergy of the free and autonomous Greeks to obey the orders of a patriarch elected by a tyrant,” Korais suggested that “they should instead be governed by a synod of priests, freely elected by clergy and laymen as practiced by the church of our co-religionists, the Russian.”18 Korais was the first writer to articulate a clear nationalist vision on ecclesiastical affairs, and his arguments over Greek autocephaly eventually inspired considerable reservation and suspicion. Although his advice appeared to have escaped lay and religious leaders in the 1820s, it was published on July 19, 1833 in the pro-Western newspaper Athina. Rather ironically, it was not enlightened liberals but the Protestant members of the Bavarian Regency who put Korais’s vision into effect. From the beginning of the insurrection, ecclesiastical affairs in the regions under arms presented a fundamental dilemma for Russian policy-makers. On the one hand, historical tradition and treaty rights justified Russian intervention in regions where Orthodoxy was under threat. On the other hand, the Congress of Vienna system and the principles of legitimacy and monarchical solidarity dictated nonintervention, particularly in the Near East where great power tensions could easily escalate. During the first years of the conflict, Russian involvement in Greek ecclesiastical affairs was cautious and restrained, reflecting this contradictory position. With the collapse of communications and the abandonment of Russian consular posts in the Aegean and eastern Mediterranean, much remained uncertain. The “war of extermination” launched by the Ottoman “Turks” against the Christian population of Greece constitutes a common theme emerging from the vast foreign ministry correspondence on Greek affairs. Writing from London in the wake of the Ottoman declaration of war against the Russians in 1828, Ambassador Christopher Lieven characterized tsarist views: The system the Ottoman Porte has adopted vis-à-vis the Greeks is as insane as barbarian. The civilized world has responded with indignation and horror at the Porte’s attack on the Christian religion and the existence of the Greek nation. The massacres of Constantinople, the pillages of the janissaries, the arrest of the principal families of the Phanar and the richest merchants . . . the assassination of the patriarch, his cadaver odiously desecrated, the symbol of the Christian faith insulted and almost

18 Adamantios Korais, Aristotelous Politikon ta sozomena (Paris: I. M. Everartos, 1821), 挖挪; Kitromilides, “The Legacy of the French Revolution,” 234; Kitromilides, “The Orthodox Church in Modern State Formation,” 43–4; D. S. Balanos, Ai thriskeftikai ideai tou Adamantiou Korai (Athens: I. N. Sideris, 1920), 82; Frazee, The Orthodox Church, 102; Philip Sherrard, “Church, State and the Greek War of Independence,” in Richard Clogg (ed.), The Struggle for Greek Independence (London: Archon Books, 1973), 182–3. See also Sophia Th. Grigoriadou, I Orthodoxi skepsi ston Adamantio Korai (Athens: Syllogos pros Diadosin Ophelimon Vivlion, 2002); Alexandros Papaderos, Metakenosis: Griechenlands kulturelle Herausforderung durch die Aufklärung in der Sicht des Korais und des Oikonomos (Meisenheim am Glan: Hain, 1970).

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all of the churches in ruins, and now the hatt-i sherif, inspired by fanaticism, that proclaims a war of religion and declares to the Turkish nation resting in a nomadic state and calls out all Muslims under the banner of Islamism. From now on, the Eastern Question must be classified under an entirely new name. Russia must intervene, for the war against the Greeks is not political, but one of extermination . . . Russia has the right to intervene in the troubles of the Orient, and the right to intervene alone.19

Despite the Tsars’ aversion to rebellion of any form, such rhetoric engaged Russian policy-makers to take an active role in Greek affairs. As the sectarian violence in Greece persisted, the prevailing attitude among Russian officials was to maintain the orderly regulation of ecclesiastical administration in the zones of revolt while safeguarding the lives of innocent Christians. With close attention, Russian policy-makers, such as Lieven, Nesselrode, Stroganov, Sturdza, and Dmitrii V. Dashkov followed the decrees on religious affairs and ecclesiastical order emanating from various revolutionary governments.20 Although the tragic demise of countless leading prelates and lower clergy horrified the Russian cabinet, the Greek revolutionary governments’ constitutional charters recognizing Orthodox Christianity as the “dominant religion” and the continued commemoration of the patriarch’s name in religious services eased concerns over uncanonical practices. Torn between the desire to adhere to the Concert of Europe and the emotional commitment to their co-religionists, Tsars Alexander I and Nicholas I were willing to respond to petitions from Greek ecclesiastics whose situation had been made critical by the war. Russian aid in the 1820s supported rebuilding programs on Mount Athos, for example, and Russian state and society donated thousands of rubles to purchase candelabras, bells, and books in various monasteries. The ransoming and release of thousands of Christian captives, taken prisoner by Ottoman soldiers, constitutes another relatively unexplored dimension of Russian religious and philanthropic aid to the Greek rebels.21 Another concern intersecting Russian ecclesiastical and foreign policy in revolutionary Greece consisted of the influence of western European philhellenes, who attempted to proselytize non-Orthodox beliefs among the Greek population.22 19

Lieven to Nesselrode, London, Feb. 8, 1830, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 468, d. 12961, ll. 105–7. See the exchanges e.g. in VPR xii–xvii; and “Diplomaticheskie bumagi Gretsiia,” RGADA, f. 1278, op. 1, d. 93. 21 On Russian church aid, see Nesselrode to Kapodistrias, St Petersburg, Feb. 13, 1828, AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 33 (1827–30), ll. 68–9; and Lucien J. Frary, “Slaves of the Sultan: Russian Ransoming of Christian Captives during the Greek Revolution (1821–31),” in Lucien J. Frary and Mara Kozelsky (eds), Russian-Ottoman Borderlands: The Eastern Question Reconsidered (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014), 101–30. 22 On the impact of Protestantism, see R. Clogg, “Some Protestant Tracts Printed at the Press of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Constantinople: 1818–20,” Eastern Churches Review, 2/2 (1968): 152–64; P. Thanailaki, Ameriki kai Protestantismos: I “Evangeliki Aftokratoria” kai oi oramatismoi ton Amerikanon misionarion gia tin Ellada to 19o aiona (Athens: Kastaniotis, 2005); K. Mamoni, “Agones tou Oikoumenikou Patriarcheiou kata ton Misionarion,” Mnimosyni, 8 (1980–1): 179–212; Constanze Güthenke, Placing Modern Greece: The Dynamics of Romantic Hellenism, 1770–1840 (Oxford: OUP, 2008), 93–139; and James A. Field, America and the Mediterranean World, 1776–1882 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), 130–3. 20

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According to St Petersburg, the pernicious influence of Protestants spelled a double calamity for the “innocent” Greeks, who were exposed to unhealthy political and religious thoughts. Writing to Stroganov in April 1826, Sturdza warned of the combined actions of Latin missionaries and the “progressive extinction of the religion of our fathers throughout the Christian East if Greece succumbs.” He lamented ironically that, “wherever the doctrine of our primitive faith is professed without alteration, the sources of social life are being attacked with the very sources of our faith.”23 In the next year, Foreign Minister Nesselrode sent a circular to the Russian ambassadors in Berlin and Geneva with instructions to warn their host governments of the evils of non-Orthodox adventurers on the spiritual lives of the Greek nation. Nesselrode also suspected the prelates from the British-held Ionian Islands of spreading false beliefs.24 The influx of American missionaries in Athens was particularly alarming to the Russian consul there, Ioannis Paparrigopoulos, who bitterly criticized American efforts to spread Protestantism among the Greek youth. He fumed over Protestant lessons that diminished the importance of the sign of the cross, the power of the saints, and the divinity of the Holy Virgin. “The books they have printed in Greek and sent to Athens,” Paparrigopoulos warned, “exposing children to all of these principles in an indirect manner, are destined to hasten their planned conversion.”25 Naturally the presence of Protestant missions incited tensions within the Greek ecclesiastical community as well. As a result, and inspired by Russian pressure, civil laws outlawing missionary activity and other policies against foreign beliefs were passed by the Greek government in the following years. The Russian embassy’s chargé d’affaires at the Sublime Porte from 1823 to 1827, Matvei Minchaki, was among the first Russian observers to foresee the potential for ecclesiastical discord in regions still nominally under the jurisdiction of the Great Church. In a position paper composed in June 1824, Minchaki praised Russian efforts “to assure the patriarch of Constantinople the inviolability that is due to his sacred person,” yet he questioned how the areas in revolt could continue to be governed by a pontiff, who “is considered by the Porte not only as the ecclesiastical chief of the Greek nation, but is also invested with temporal authority as the sole recognized and legitimate voice of the nation.” According to the privileges which have been assured to the patriarch, “his election and deposition cannot be done but by the consent and according to the wishes of the representatives of the clergy and the nation,” yet these very representatives are openly displaying their disobedience. “What will be the result,” questioned Minchaki, if the patriarch “becomes subjected today to the rights of man?” “Would it be better that he remain vulnerable to the caprices and the arbitrary acts of the Porte?” In any case, the “privileged provinces” in revolt, including Attica, Akarnania, Epirus, and the Archipelago, would want to defend their rights against the insults, 23

Sturdza to Stroganov, Paris, Apr. 1, 1826, RGADA, f. 1278, op. 1, d. 155, l. 3. “Dépêche circulaire réservé aux missions impériales en Allemagne et en Suisse,” St Petersburg, Sept. 14, 1827, AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 33 (1827–30), ll. 31–2. 25 Paparrigopoulos to Katakazy, Athens, July 1, 1833, AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 264 (1833), l. 3. 24

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inequalities, and spoliations of the Ottomans, thereby threatening the authority of the patriarch.26 A more focused Russian religious policy began to take shape during the short period of the government of Ioannis Kapodistrias.27 Two overall trends could be discerned in Russian ecclesiastical intervention in Greece at this time. One trend consisted of various Russian philanthropic activities, such as the establishment of orphanages and educational programs for Greek youth, as well as massive loans to support religious order and Christian morals in the state emerging from revolutionary war. The other general trend consisted of a continuous stream of dispatches, measures and expressions of concern for the orderly regulation of ecclesiastical affairs sent to the Sublime Porte as well as the Ecumenical Patriarchs. If such was the prevailing attitude of St Petersburg, President Kapodistrias also aimed to preserve the ancient contacts between the clergy of the new Greek state and the ecclesiastical center in Constantinople. In a special confidential dispatch in July 1827, Kapodistrias reassured Emperor Nicholas, whose “unique desire is to save Greece and pacify the Levant” that “the rapports that have existed between Russia and Greece have always been and always will be based on religious principles.” He pledged to pay special attention to raising the clergy of Greece to the greatest level of dignity through proper and sagacious education. Kapodistrias aimed to establish a seminary in Greece, petitioned the Tsar for succor, and requested that Konstantinos Oikonomos and several of his assistants be sent to lead it. In doing so, Kapodistrias hoped to ensure the maintenance of proper canonical practices.28 Despite his good intentions, Kapodistrias encountered a very difficult situation in May 1828, when Patriarch Agathangelos I (1826–30) sent a mission of four senior prelates to Greece asking the clergy and notables of the Peloponnese and the Aegean Islands to resubmit to the Sultan.29 The delegation toured the Peloponnese giving talks to crowds and encouraging them to end the rebellion in exchange for a general amnesty and diverse favors.30 Placed in a difficult position, Kapodistrias did not intend to return the country to the control of the Sultan. In his response to Agathangelos, he refused to relinquish the freedom the people of Greece had won through so much sacrifice.31 Meanwhile, St Petersburg suggested several solutions concerning the ecclesiastical status of the new state. One plan was the creation of a relationship analogous

26 Michaki to Nesselrode, Constantinople, June 19, 1824, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 438, d. 2348 (1824), ll. 22–9. 27 On the church policy of Kapodistrias, see E. I. Konstantinidis, Ioannis Kapodistrias kai i ekklisiastiki tou politiki (Athens: Erevnai peri tin Istorian tis Aftokephalou Ekklisias tis Ellados, 1983); and Frazee, The Orthodox Church, 71–88. 28 Kapodistrais to Nicholas I, St Petersburg, July 3, 1827, RGADA, f. 15, op. 1, d. 295, ll. 99–104. 29 See Manouil Gedeon, Patriarchikoi Pinakes, 2nd edn, ed. N. L. Phoropoulos (Athens: Syllogos pros Diadosin Ophilimon Biblion, 1996), 607; Frazee, The Orthodox Church, 76; and Kitromilides, “The Legacy of the French Revolution,” 233. 30 Heiden to Pozzo di Borgo, Malta, Apr. 12, 1828, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 468, d. 12961, l. 317. 31 Kapodistrias to Patriarch Agathangelos and the Synod of Constantinople, Poros, May 28, 1828, in Correspondance du comte J. Capodistrias, président de la Grèce, ed. E. A. Bétant (Geneva: A. Cherbuliez, 1839), ii. 153–7.

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to the one existing between the patriarch of Constantinople and the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, which practiced local autonomy under Ottoman sovereignty. The Russian Foreign Ministry proposed the patriarch as political leader of the Greek state and suggested occupying the principalities until the Sultan abided by the Treaty of London (1827). The complex negotiations regarding the establishment of frontiers, the choice of sovereign, the revitalization of the economy, and the general pacification of the region frustrated these efforts. Writing from Aegina in December of 1829, Russian ambassador in Constantinople, Aleksandr Ribop’er, noted that it would be dangerous to regulate the details of such an important subject as religion during the current negotiations, yet without precise arrangements with the patriarch the unity of the church in Greece would be in peril.32 Ribop’er worked closely on the question of the future status of the church of free Greece in direct relations with the patriarch. Acknowledging that Kapodistrias “recognizes the necessity of conserving the ancient line that unites the Church of Greece with its spiritual center,” he confessed that political independence made some concessions necessary. “In effect,” wrote Ribop’er, “for eight years Greece has been separated from its spiritual center, and religion has been prone to all the evils of anarchy that afflicts the former social life of the inhabitants. The Greek government aspires to renew the indispensible relations with the patriarch, and wishes to avoid a schism at all costs.” Caught between the Sultan’s authority and sanctioning autocephaly, the patriarchate appeared ready to grant certain concessions. Ribop’er speculated about the political implications if the Greek government refused to receive the bishops and prelates appointed by Constantinople. The status of ruined monasteries and the debts of dioceses constituted additional concerns.33 Russian minister in Nafplion, Nikita Panin, confirmed the uncertainties over church–state relations, reporting of the extreme misery and ignorance of Greek clergymen, “who can’t help but gain by the government’s measures to support education and religion through contact with the patriarchate.”34 Luckily, for Kapodistrias, the successor to Patriarch Agathangelos, Konstantinos I (1830–4), was more conciliatory. In a letter to Kapodistrias, the newly installed patriarch bestowed his blessings on the Greek state and its people. In reply, Kapodistrias expressed his gratitude and firm intention to end the progressive degradation of the church and to remain alert for heretical teachings.35 In such an atmosphere of renewal, Russian minister Panin expressed optimism about the president’s plan to secure new episcopal nominations in accordance with canonical practices, while providing destitute clergy with pensions and instituting a special ecclesiastical committee to search for solutions. He admitted that Kapodistrias 32 Ribop’er, “Résumé des entretiens de S. E. M. le Comte Capodistrias,” Aegina, Dec. 17, 1829, AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 41 (1828–30), ll. 66–70. 33 Ribop’er to Nesselrode, Constantinople, Feb. 28, 1830, AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 33 (1827–30), ll. 418–19. 34 Panin to Nesselrode, Argos, Aug. 10, 1829, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 1794, l. 136. 35 See Kapodistrias to Patriarch Konstantinos, Nafplion, Sept. 10, 1830, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 2627, ll. 92–3; Frazee, The Orthodox Church, 86; and Kitromilides, “The Legacy of the French Revolution,” 233.

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recognized the advantages of direct negotiations with the patriarch, especially concerning the status of dioceses and renewal of investitures. He was less certain, however, about Kapodistrias’s decision to send his brother Agostino to Constantinople, since he lacked canonical investiture.36 In a letter to Panin, Kapodistrias aimed to soothe Russian misgivings, “the government shares the wishes of the patriarch. It ardently desires to cement the union between the Church of the new Greek state and the Holy Synod . . . and hastens to enter into direct relations with the Holy See to regulate a common accord regarding this important matter.”37 Although not free from trouble, the general direction church affairs assumed under the presidency gained the approbation of the Russian Foreign Ministry. Elected by the Troezen National Assembly in 1827, Kapodistrias’s term in office was to terminate when the allies agreed upon a sovereign. As negotiations proceeded, the president continued to discuss ecclesiastical affairs with his own ministers as well as with those of the Tsar, insisting that the new sovereign must convert to Orthodoxy. Kapodistrias argued repeatedly that, if the sovereign possessed another religion, “the Greeks would always consider him a foreigner and would only submit to his authority by the throne.” Kapodistrias expressed deep frustration that the protocols of London remained silent about the religion of the state and its people.38 Beyond this, he continued to assure St Petersburg, and the patriarchs, of Greece’s devotion to the central authority of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. Unfortunately, for advocates of ecclesiastical union, political and military matters did not allow sufficient time for the president to develop more detailed plans. His assassination in September 1831 ended his goal for a smooth settlement of the religious dilemma between Greece and Constantinople. However, in the agonizing over the issues posed by modern politics and nationalism, the church’s relationship with the civil authorities gradually changed. The increase in respect, affection, and authority that the church enjoyed during the revolutionary period transformed the Orthodox Church from an agent of canonical conscience into a national institution. In this manner, the piecemeal transformation of Balkan Orthodoxy from an ecumenical whole into nationalist parts began to unfold.

R U S S IA A N D K IN G O T H O N’S C AT HOL IC IS M Before the actual ecclesiastical reform process began in independent Greece, the confessional status of the Bavarian-born sovereign engrossed the Tsar and his advisors, who devoted considerable energy to ensure that Othon embrace the religion of his subjects. During the negotiations in the early 1830s, Nesselrode 36 Panin to Ribop’er, Nafplion, July 14, 1830; Panin to Ribop’er, Nafplion, Sept. 27, 1830 AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 1797 (1830), l. 17, 141; Panin to Ribop’er, Nafplion, Apr. 9, 1830, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 1796 (1830), l. 183. 37 “Pro-memoria pour Mr. le Comte Panin,” Nafplion, July 3, 1830, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 2627, l. 90. 38 Kapodistrias to Nesslerode, Nafplion, Mar. 6, 1830, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 2621, l. 35; Kapodistrias to Nesselrode, Nafplion, Apr. 9, 1830, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 93, l. 63.

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attempted to persuade Othon’s father, King Ludwig, of the need for his son to convert to Orthodoxy to ensure the stability of his reign and the prosperity of his realm.39 Although England and France considered an Orthodox king on the Greek throne as an invitation for Russian domination, the vast majority of the Greek nation was Orthodox. Nesselrode argued that in order for the King to be popular among his subjects he ought to share their faith. The Russian foreign minister rather cleverly maintained that “the Greek nation, governed by a Catholic prince, would not cease to consider the Sovereign of Russia as the only true protector of their religion, while if the Greek sovereign embraced the dogmas of the Eastern Church, he would exercise this moral influence himself.”40 Unfortunately, for the Russian cause of ecclesiastical unity, Ludwig abstained from interfering in Othon’s conscience and conviction, and St Petersburg grudgingly agreed to consider the matter at a later time. The final treaty regarding Greek independence was signed without any religious conditions attached, although the Tsar insisted that he sanctioned it only on condition that Othon would convert to Orthodoxy in the future.41 The lobbying in London marked the beginning of a problem that beleaguered Greek–Russian relations throughout Othon’s reign. During an interview with King Ludwig in Munich in April 1833, the newly appointed Russian ambassador to Greece, Gavriil Katakazy, broached the subject of Othon’s conversion by emphasizing the benefits that would result: “Sire, the Greeks, governed by a prince professing the dogmas of the Roman Church will be neither Greeks nor Catholics, they will become impious [and] this would be the means to preserve the corrupt influence of France.” Ludwig’s reply was that as a Catholic he was unable to participate in the indoctrination of Othon into the dogmas of another communion. “I must leave the matter to Providence,” Ludwig pronounced: “I will not look for anything to contradict the decision which he [Othon] took according to his own conviction.” The Bavarian King deferred the matter by promising to award Russia special friendship vis-à-vis Greek affairs.42 Again, St Petersburg reluctantly agreed. Othon himself must have recognized that his Catholicism was an obstacle to obtaining the affection of the Greek people. Fortunately, in some respects the Greek people gradually grew accustomed to a Catholic governing them, for, according to Katakazy, they knew by experience that even the Sultan considered their needs and respected their beliefs. The people merely hoped that their sovereign would honor and protect their religion and raise his inheritors in the same

39 Nesselrode to Lieven, St Petersburg, Feb. 17, 1832, in Barbara Jelavich, Russia and Greece during the Regency of King Othon, 1832–5 (Thessaloniki: IMXA, 1962), 38–41. 40 Nesselrode to Potemkin, St Petersburg, May 11, 1832, in Jelavich, Russia and Greece, 43. 41 When, over a decade later, Othon remained a Catholic, Tsar Nicholas felt like the dupe of vague promises. Nicholas wrote that “the choice of a Catholic prince for a country which did not deserve to exist was excusable only by his attachment to the Orthodox faith . . . this choice never should have been sanctioned by me.” See Nicholas I, “Affaire grecque,” Oct. 1843, RGADA, f. 3, op. 1, d. 103, ll. 20–1. 42 See Katakazy to Nesselrode, Munich, Apr. 3, 1833, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 82/1833, l. 379–80; and Paparrigopoulos to Katakazy, Athens, Dec. 19, 1833, AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 264/ 1833, l. 77.

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fashion.43 Although the Russians were never able to bring about Othon’s conversion, their efforts sent a clear message to the Greek public of the significance of Orthodoxy to Russian policy.

RUSSIA AND T HE GREEK ECCLESIASTICAL SETTLEMENT (1833–1 8 35 ) From the outbreak of the revolution until the arrival of the Regency in 1833, the Greek government and religious hierarchy devoted considerable attention to ecclesiastical affairs without arriving at any settlement. The Greeks, it seems, were reluctant to take any actions that would legally divide them from the Ecumenical Patriarchate. Because of the vast chaos unleashed by a decade-long war, with the return of peace and order, some form of ecclesiastical reform in Greece was nevertheless necessary. Contemporary descriptions concerning religious institutions confirm the image of complete destruction. Thousands of priests and bishops had been killed during the war, almost half of all bishoprics were vacant, and some bishops had incorporated other sees.44 Although education for the clergy had improved slightly during Kapodistrias’s regime, one estimate stated that “scarcely ten among a thousand priests could write their names and those who were able to do so were and are considered learned men; and, as a sign of their learning, carried at their side a small inkstand.”45 Konstantin Lelli, Russian special envoy to Greece in 1833, remarked that “the six or seven bishops that we see in Greece are only known by their ignorance.” He observed that “the interests of the church, as well as the religious spirit of the people have already been strongly contaminated by the poison of new doctrines introduced by foreigners.”46 Hundreds of churches had been destroyed and priests were performing liturgy without the use of religious books and proper instruments. Russian representative in Nafplion, Petr Rikman, repeatedly complained of the large influx of American missionaries, who had arrived since the president’s assassination and set up schools for boys and girls. Rikman wrote: the patriarch of Constantinople had already spoken to me about this matter with distress before I left Turkey to come to Greece, and I petitioned the former president to take it into consideration . . . Moreover, a large portion of the clergy in Greece display indifference to religious matters and occupy themselves almost exclusively with the tissue of errors and follies that we call nowadays political science. One can only hope for an end to this disastrous tendency with the reestablishment of the ancient 43

Katakazy to Nesselrode, Athens, Aug. 8, 1843, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 9/1843, l. 349. Perhaps as many as 6,000 or 10,000, according to Konstantinos A. Vovolinis, I ekklisia eis ton agona tis eleftherias, 1453–1953 (Athens: P. A. Kleisiounes, 1952), 120. 45 G. von Maurer, Das griechische Volk in öffentlicher, kirchlicher und privatrechtlicher Beziehung von und nach dem Freiheitskampfe (Heidelberg: Neudruck der Ausgabe, 1835), ii. 153. See also von Maurer, “Observations on the Institution of the National Church of Greece,” The Portfolio, 4 (1836): 136. 46 Lelli to Butenev, Nafplion, Mar. 18, 1833, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517, d. 1801, l. 51. 44

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lines that have existed between the clergy of this country and the patriarchal leader of Constantinople.47

When Othon and the Regency arrived, the church issue was probably the most controversial among the myriad of unsettled problems. The Regency had ample reason to consider restructuring the institution of the church, and they did not hesitate. By the very fact that the Regency took the leading role in the process, conservative-minded individuals were able to object to foreign interference in such a crucial topic. The separation of the Greek Church from the Ecumenical Patriarchate “began gradually to assume in the imagination of the common people, fired with patriotic excitement, the specter of a diplomatic plot.”48 Although it was not a conspiracy, the entire ecclesiastical issue became a political one, both domestically and abroad. Because the religious establishment wielded major authority during Ottoman rule, the Regency viewed it as a powerful source of opposition. The Regency faced two important questions with regard to the church: how to remodel it while making it subservient to the state, and what to do about the connection between the patriarch of Constantinople, who owed allegiance to the Sultan, and the ecclesiastical hierarchy of the independent nation. Since religion was the Greek peasantry’s foremost cultural symbol, the Regency attempted to create an Orthodox national church under control of the state, not under a civil servant of the Sultan. Thus, the new government claimed to act out of concern for Ottoman interference. Actually, there was little reason to think the Sultan could somehow meddle in Greek affairs through the channel of the church. The protecting powers were jealous of each other’s influence. Surely, they would have interfered if the Sultan attempted to impose his will on the church of the sovereign kingdom. On the other hand, breaking the link between the new kingdom and the ecumenical center could be advantageous to the ministers of the western European powers, who desired to curtail what they believed to be Russian expansionism. Similar suspicions engaged the minds of Russian observers as the reform process ensued. Of the handful of Greeks involved in the actual process of ecclesiastical reform, theologian Theoklitos Pharmakidis was the most energetic and influential proponent. Born in Thessaly in 1784, as a youth Pharmakidis studied in various Greek schools where the works of Korais influenced him. A self-styled modernizer, he became one of the best-educated Greek clerics of the era, and reportedly developed a strong antipathy toward all things Russian while studying in Jassy (Iaşi) in Moldavia during the Russian occupation of that province after the Russian– Ottoman War of 1806–12.49 In the following years, he studied Protestant theology at the Ionian Academy in Corfu and at the University of Göttingen, an openly 47

Rikman to Nesselrode, Apr. 25, 1832, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 106 (1832), l. 18. Pipinelis, I monarchia, 293. 49 On Pharmakidis, see Frazee, The Orthodox Church, 103–5; D. S. Balanos, Theoklitos Pharmakidis, 1784–1860 (Athens: n.p., 1933), 1–19; Dimaras, Neoellinikos diaphotismos, 379–82; and O. E. Petrunina, Grecheskaia natsiia i gosudarstvo v XVIII–XX vv. Ocherki politicheskogo rasvitiia (Moscow: Universitet Knizhnyi Dom, 2010), 229. 48

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Protestant institution. Relatively inactive during the presidency of Kapodistrias, his Anglophilism and dislike of the “autocratic” methods of the president led to a brief imprisonment on the island of Spetses.50 His activities earned the dismay of Russian observers. Russian vice-consul in Patras, Ioannis Kallogerakis, referred to Pharmakidis as a subversive and irreligious factotum whose name inspired horror among the Greek clergy.51 Besides Pharmakidis, Regent Georg Ludwig von Maurer, a distinguished Bavarian jurist, was the co-architect of the Greek ecclesiastical settlement. In brief, Maurer believed that the Greek Church should be a department of state, and thus the need to end the ecclesiastical dependency upon Constantinople.52 The reform process leading to the separation of the Church of Greece from the patriarchate of Constantinople began on 15 March 1833 when the Regency convoked a special ecclesiastical commission of both laity and clergy to gather material and compile a report on the condition of the church and monasteries and to propose means for their improvement.53 Maurer and Pharmakidis were assisted by Spyridon Trikoupis, the minister of education and ecclesiastical affairs, and his subordinates in that ministry, Konstantinos Schinas and Skarlatos Vyzantinos. The last four formed the majority of the seven-member special ecclesiastical commission.54 The membership of the commission was enough to indicate the direction the church settlement would take. An announcement in a March issue of the Russian gazette Talk of the Town, a tri-weekly supplement to the Telescope, referred to the creation of a Greek Holy Synod independent of Constantinople, even though the ecclesiastical commission had just begun its investigation.55 Strengthening the traditional position of the church was a primary goal of Russian policy in Greece. St Petersburg aimed to frustrate the heterodox plans of the Regency as well as diminish the ideological allure of Western liberal Greeks who supported them. To do so, they focused on supporting the Greek traditionalists, such as Konstantinos Oikonomos and other members of the so-called Russian party. One way St Petersburg was able to assert its influence was by drawing on the traditional morality of the masses, who oftentimes suspected the Regency and its reform program as being unrepresentative of authentic Orthodoxy. The numerous episodes of unrest among the peasantry, in which protection of Orthodoxy and 50

Konstantinidis, Ioannis Kapodistrias, 39–49; Balanos, Theoklitos Pharmakidis, 19. Kallogerakis to Persiany, Patras, Apr. 17, 1844, AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 493 (1844), l. 35. 52 Much of the scholarship on ecclesiastical independence points to Maurer, a Protestant, as the principal guiding force behind the church reforms. His detailed work, Das griechische Volk, attempts to explain and justify his involvement in Greek affairs. According to Papadopoulos, Istoria tis ekklisias, 105–7, Maurer used the constitution of the Bavarian Protestant Church as his model. 53 See Sophoklis Oikonomos (ed.), Ta sozomena ekklisiastika syngrammata Konstantinou Presvyterou kai Oikonomou tou ex Oikonomon (Athens: Ph. Karampinos, 1862–6), ii. 97–8; and Kurganov, Ustroistvo upravleniia, 105–6. 54 See Ephimeris, 11 (Mar. 31–Apr. 12, 1833); Kurganov, Ustroistvo upravleniia, 103–4. The other members of the commission were Ignatios, bishop of Ardamerios; Paisios, bishop of Elaia and vicar of Messenia; and Panoutsos Notaras. Papadopoulos, Istoria tis ekklisias, 71, notes that Ignatios and Paisios were refugees and not natives of Greece; Kurganov, Ustroistvo upravleniia, 106, refers to them as noncanonical bishops. 55 Molva, 27 (Mar. 4, 1833). 51

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anti-Protestantism played a prominent role, provide evidence for mass aversion to the Regency’s ecclesiastical program.56 While opposed to protests against the legitimate order, St Petersburg exhibited sympathy for the peasant masses and drew moral clout from their protection of the traditionalist position. The Russian Foreign Ministry first learned in detail of the Regency’s ecclesiastical reform program from Rikman’s reports in the spring of 1833. Rikman criticized the ecclesiastical commission for being composed of secular members and directed his attack against Pharmakidis who “has outraged everyone” by encouraging “foreign beliefs.” He was appalled that the issue of an independent synod was being decided unilaterally. With respect to Greek society, Rikman maintained that the majority of people wanted to prevent a schism, although some Western-oriented individuals supported the idea of church independence. These figures envisioned of a future war with Ottoman Empire and believed that a declaration of excommunication by the patriarch at such a critical moment would sap the energy and courage of the nation. A similar opinion was held by the majority of the high clergy whom Rikman described as “imbued with the worst principles.” The Russian envoy also castigated the Regency for suppressing religious celebrations and permitting the establishment of foreign missionary societies. The latter issue was bound to open a vast field of troubles and heresies, brooded Rikman, who was disturbed further by a new ordinance which allowed individuals of different religions to intermarry, an act previously prohibited in Greece. He accused the Bavarians of “inundating the country with foreign settlers and their religion.”57 An important change in the Russian mission in the Greek kingdom took place in May 1833, when Katakazy replaced Rikman as leader of the Russian embassy. As the first officially accredited ambassador, traditionalist Greeks rejoiced at his arrival. Lelli observed that the presence of the new Russian ambassador excited the partisans of Kapodistrias, who hoped he would change the conduct of the Regency.58 Rikman was reassigned to the Russian embassy in Constantinople, and the change was meant to ease the tension between the representatives of the other protecting powers and the Regency.59 In the Ottoman capital, Rikman focused his activity on church affairs and worked hard to maintain direct relations with the patriarch and to encourage patience. Meanwhile, Russophiles and the patriarch had reason to be pleased with the new person in charge of the Russian mission in Greece. As an Orthodox Russian of Greek heritage Katakazy possessed special attributes. 56 On the unrest sparked in part by the religious reforms, see K. Aroni-Tsichli, Agrotikes exegerseis stin palia Ellada, 1833–81 (Athens: Papazisis, 1989), which provides outlines of the uprisings on Tinos (1833), Mani (1834, 1839, 1845), Messenia-Arkadia (1834), Aitolia-Akarnania (1836), Patras (1837), Hydra and Spetses (1838), and elsewhere. See also, V. Roudometof, “Invented Traditions, Symbolic Boundaries, and National Identity in Southeastern Europe: Greece and Serbia in Comparative Historical Perspective (1830–80),” EEQ 32/4 (1998): 433–5. 57 Rikman to Nesselrode, Nafplion, May 10, 1833, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 82/1833, ll. 515–17. 58 Lelli to Butenev, Nafplion, Apr. 21, 1833, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 1801 (1833), l. 108. 59 See Nesselrode to Rikman, St Petersburg, Mar. 21, 1833; and Nesselrode to Rikman, St Petersburg, Jan. 24, 1833, RGADA, f. 3, op. 1, d. 100, part 2, ll. 9–11.

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The ecclesiastical commission formed by the Regency started to operate on April 17 and finished its work on May 22. In its first meeting, it agreed to make the Greek Church autocephalous. In later sessions, the commission proposed the establishment of a synod and discussed its duties and composition. In all, there were eleven meetings. In early May, the commission sent a statement to the kingdom’s bishops, along with a survey seeking their views on ecclesiastical independence. The commission’s final report called for a new church constitution and suggested its provisions.60 Katakazy informed St Petersburg of the commission’s proposal in June and objected to the haste with which it was completed. He urged the Russian ambassador in Constantinople, Apollinarii P. Butenev, to petition the patriarch confidentially to address several exhortations to the bishops of Greece, encouraging them to oppose “the reformist party.” Russian reading society learned of the plans of the ecclesiastical commission in early July when reports began to appear in the daily press.61 Aware of what could be construed as an illegitimate declaration, the Regency on July 1 published a decree calling for an assembly of bishops, both canonical and non-canonical, to Nafplion to debate the proposal. The assembly met on July 15, approximately one month after the commission completed its survey.62 In the inaugural address, Trikoupis read a draft of the church constitution. Article 1 declared “the perfect independence of the Greek Church from any outward power or foreign influence.” Article 2 called for the creation of a Holy Synod “which should form the supreme ecclesiastical authority, in imitation of the Russian Church.”63 It is ironic Pharmakidis and the Regency looked to Russia for a solution to the ecclesiastical settlement in Greece. Pharmakidis was aware of the ecclesiastical reforms by Theofan Prokopovich during the reign of Peter the Great.64 Did Pharmakidis insert the clause on Russia out of a legitimate concern for an established precedent, or was it an attempt to conciliate Russia and the Russophiles? According to the French resident, Rouen, there were some bishops who “were strongly worked up against the expression of ‘in imitation of the Russian Church,’” because there was nothing in that country which the Greek Church

60 The minutes of the meetings and the final report are reproduced in Oikonomos, Ta sozomena, ii. 96–125; for analysis of them, see Kurganov, Ustroistvo upravleniia, 106–32; and Frazee, The Orthodox Church, 106–7. 61 See Katakazy to Butenev, Nafplion, June 8, 1833, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 1801 (1833), l. 129; SPV 158 (July 8, 1833); OV 57 (July 22, 1833); and SPch 219 (Sept. 28, 1833). 62 On the assembly of prelates, see Ephimeris, 23 (Aug. 1, 1833); Katakazy to Nesselrode, Nafplion, Aug. 20, 1833, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 83 (1833), ll. 20–3; Oikonomos, Ta sozomena, ii. 98, 163–77; iii. 168–90; Kurganov, Ustroistvo upravleniia, 133–40; Pipinelis, I monarchia en Elladi, 75–6; John Petropulos, Politics and Statecraft in the Kingdom of Greece, 1833–43 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), 185; Frazee, The Orthodox Church, 110–15. 63 Ephimeris, 23 (Aug. 1, 1833). An English tr. of the proposed constitution appears in Frederick Strong, Greece as a Kingdom, or a Statistical Description of that Country from the Arrival of K. Otho in 1833 to the Present Time (London: Longman, 1842), 348–51. 64 Balanos, Theokletos Pharmakidis, 53–5, 89–100; E. K. Kyriakidis, Istoria tou synchronou ellinismou apo tis idryseos tou vasileiou tis Ellados mechri ton imeron mas, 1832–1892 (Athens: V. N. Gregoriades, 1892–4), i. 610–11.

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needed to look to as an example.65 The Times of London printed an account of one prelate who was wearing a decoration from the Russian Church, but took it off because he did not want to appear a partisan of a foreign power.66 Katakazy suggested that the commission cited the Russian example to seduce the Greek clergy.67 In any case, the reference was deleted during subsequent deliberations and the protocol drawn up anew. A decade later Misail Apostolidis, a liberal monk educated in Austria and Italy and King Othon’s Greek tutor (later he became the Metropolitan of Athens), still used the example of the Russian Holy Synod to defend the Regency’s ecclesiastical settlement.68 The Regency and figures like Pharmakidis employed several tactics to push their program through quickly. They circulated invitations to the congregation only two weeks in advance, so that bishops in further districts had little opportunity to arrive before the proceedings began. Some bishops received the invitations at different times intentionally, so that they could not assemble as a unit.69 Only paltry opposition to the government plan could be presented, in part because most of the prelates were refugees without sees and authority. In some cases their dire circumstances made them pliable instruments in the hands of the Regency. Katakazy wrote that most of the bishops “are overwhelmed by age and infirmities, reduced to extreme poverty, and consequentially obligated to appeal to the generosity of the government.” The governors of the provinces, he added, had received secret instructions to convince the clerics to consent to the reform.70 After meeting from nine in the morning until five in the evening on July 15, the assembly accepted a slightly modified version of the commission’s proposals. On July 23, the Regency signed the new church constitution in the name of the King, and days later published the declaration in German and Greek.71 Article 1 declared the church of the Greek kingdom independent, “without prejudice to the unity of the faith hitherto recognized by all Orthodox churches,” with the King of Greece as its temporal head. Article 2 called for “a permanent synod, consisting exclusively of prelates appointed by the king, being constituted for the purpose of directing the affairs of the church, according to ecclesiastical laws.” Article 3 established the synod’s membership, and the following articles dealt with the conduct of business. Proselytism was forbidden as was any engagement of the priests in political affairs. 65

Rouen to Duke de Broglie, Nafplion, July 31, 1833; quoted in Frazee, The Orthodox Church, 111. The Times (Mar. 17, 1834); cited in Frazee, The Orthodox Church, 111. 67 Katakazy to Nesselrode, Nafplion, June 8, 1833, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 83 (1833), l. 21. See also Kurganov, Ustroistvo upravleniia, 134–5. 68 [Missail Apostolidis], Diatrivi aftoschedios peri tis archis kai tis exousias ton Patriarchon, kai peri tis scheseos tis ekklisiastikis archis pros tin politikin exousian (Athens: Ch. Nikolaidou Philadelpheos, 1843), 1. For commentary on this work, see Kurganov, Ustroistvo upravleniia, 117–19 n. 3; and Finlay, History of Greece, vii. 128–9. 69 The invitation is published in Athina, 129 (July 12, 1833); Kurganov, Ustroistvo upravleniia, 132. 70 Katakazy to Nesselrode, Nafplion, June 8, 1833, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 83 (1833), l. 21. 71 The act was announced in SPV 228 (Sept. 29, 1833); and SPch 242 (Oct. 25, 1833). The text appeared in Greek and German in Ephimeris, 23 (Aug. 1, 1833); in Greek in Oikonomos, Ta sozomena, i. 177–84; in Russian in Kurganov, Ustroistvo upravleniia, 140–7; and in English in Strong, Greece as a Kingdom, 352–6. The text was available to the Russian cabinet as “Déclaration de l’indépendance de l’église de la Grèce,” AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 83/1833, ll. 203–14. 66

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In sum, the synod’s power was subject to government control, and without its permission, no decision could be executed or published. American historian Charles Frazee, whose general interpretation of the reforms is sympathetic, remarks that “if ever a church was legally stripped of authority and reduced to complete dependence on the state, Maurer’s constitution did it to the church of Greece.”72 Centuries of church unity ended in a decision process replete with irregularities. Of the thirty-six prelates who eventually attached their signatures to the constitution, only twenty-two were present on the first day of deliberations and only eighteen were canonical bishops.73 Other prelates arrived later in July, and the last to sign the constitution did so as late as October. Others simply did not arrive. The Metropolitan of Andros Dionysios, for example, wrote a letter in which he stated that he was unable to come to Nafplion because of illness and that he agreed to everything.74 Pharmakidis and his companions, as well as the Bavarians in the government and modernizing Greeks, were pleased with the accomplishment, but others regretted the way in which the reform was executed. First, the haste with which it was carried out rendered it suspect. Second, the decree was unilateral and ignored centuries of historical precedent. Third, the possibility of gaining new posts made opportunists willing to overlook their genuine opinions for the favor of the crown. Furthermore, the dignitaries were called on to register their opinions in smaller groups as they arrived, and the revisions proposed by some bishops were simply ignored. Patriarch Konstantinos I, needless to say, became considerably disturbed, and prepared to excommunicate the Greek Church, but Russian intervention prevented him from doing so.75 Scottish philhellene and historian George Finlay, a witness to the events, believed there was opposition from the monks, clergy, and bishops outside the kingdom. Paparrigopoulos, Russian consul-general in Athens, remarked that people were asking him daily if it were true that the government was going to convert the nation to the Catholic cult. News about disturbances in Aegina, triggered by opponents of church independence, reached readers of the Northern Bee, and in various sermons the esteemed cleric, Konstantinos Oikonomos, altogether condemned the new church constitution.76 The proponents of church independence argued that they had every right to their decision based on Orthodox traditions.77 To institutionalize the Erastian

72

73 Kurganov, Ustroistvo upravleniia, 133. Frazee, The Orthodox Church, 114. Oikonomos, Ta sozomena, ii. 168–70; Kurganov, Ustroistvo upravleniia, 137–40. 75 Butenev to Katakazy, Büyükdere, Aug. 16, 1833, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 1801 (1833), l. 377; Medem to Nesselrode, London, Aug. 6, 1834, in Jelavich, Russia and Greece, 117. 76 Finlay, History of Greece, vii. 129; Paparrigopoulos to Katakazy, Athens, July 1, 1833, AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 264 (1833), ll. 3–6; SPch 250 (Nov. 3, 1833), 296 (Dec. 23, 1833); Oikonomos, Ta sozomena, 1–2. On the role of Oikonomos in the process, see G. D. Metallinos, Elladikou aftokephalou paraleipomena (Athens: Domos, 1989), 123–58; and Paraskevas Matalas, Ethnos kai Orthodoxia: Oi peripeteies mias schesia apo to “Elladiko” sto Voulgariko schisma, 2nd edn (Irakleio: Panepistimiakes Ekdoseis Kritis, 2003), 51–4. 77 See the extensive argument in Pharmakidis, Apologia (Athens: Angelidis Angelos, 1840). For a general discussion of the problem, see Alexander Schmemann, “A Meaningful Storm: Some Reflections on Autocephaly, Tradition and Ecclesiology,” St Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly, 15/1 (1971): 3–27. 74

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settlement, the Regency declared the opening day of the synod (July 15) a national holiday. The selection of the day was not an accident, and it is a perfect example of an invented tradition. According to a column in the Anglophile newspaper Athina, the day entered into “the annals of Greek history as the day in which the accomplishment of a great people is celebrated: on this day the sacred act of our church’s independence is consecrated.”78 Members of the Russian embassy boycotted the “national celebration,” and Katakazy composed an official protest in the name of imperial Russia against the reforms that “signaled the beginning of a schism.” Katakazy claimed that the absence of the Russian legation “stunned the public and the clergy, who considered it as a solemn protest against the recent innovations.”79 Armansperg dismissed Katakazy’s objections by assuring him that the conversion of the King with the passage of time would obviate any perceived difficulties. Although far from satisfied, Katakazy stopped short of additional remonstrations in order to keep the lid on the cauldron of protest. He observed that many of the prelates who were now returning to their dioceses repented the whole affair.80 Proponents of the reform maintained that the Greek Church and Holy Synod remained closely united to the patriarch of Constantinople, just as the patriarchates of Jerusalem, Antioch, and Alexandria were autonomous, and recognized the leadership of Constantinople. The reform invested King Othon, the head of the church, with the power of appointing the five members and two alternates of the synod annually. The new Holy Synod, theoretically an autonomous entity, became a department of state subject to royal approval according to Article 25 of the church constitution. Any contacts with religious bodies outside the kingdom were forbidden without the consent of the synod, a move potentially directed against Russia. On August 1, the official Government Gazette published the royal ordinance nominating the members of the synod (reports appeared in the Russian press months later).81 Their annual salaries, a total of 10,800 drachmas, derived from the state treasury and a newly created ecclesiastical fund. Katakazy noted that the new members of the synod had doubts about the church constitution which was “written in German and translated into Greek in a scarcely intelligible manner.”82 The Ecumenical Patriarchate rejected the settlement as soon as the ink on the decrees was dry. Patriarch Konstantinos and successive patriarchs considered the

78

Quoted in Oikonomos, Ta sozomena, ii. 186; and Kurganov, Ustroistvo upravleniia, 149. Katakazy to Butenev, Nafplion, Aug. 8, 1833, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 1801 (1833), l. 166. Katakazy to Nesselrode, Nafplion, July 19, 1833; Katakazy to Nesselrode, Nafplion, Aug. 27, 1833, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 83 (1833), ll. 102, 175–6. 81 Kyrillos, the metropolitan of Corinth, was named president, K. D. Schinas became royal commissioner, and the members were Paisios, the metropolitan of Thebes, Zacharias, the metropolitan of Santorini, Kyrillos, the former metropolitan of Larissa, and Joseph, the bishop of Androssa. Pharmakidis was made secretary, and the supernumerary members were Anthimos, bishop of Heliopolis, and Neophytos, bishop of Talanti. Ephimeris, 23 (Aug. 1, 1833); SPch 242 (Oct. 25, 1833); SPV 278 (Nov. 29, 1833); Katakazy to Nesselrode, Nafplion, Aug. 27, 1833, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 83 (1833), l. 215; Kurganov, Ustroistvo upravlenie, 148–9; and Strong, Greece as a Kingdom, 357. 82 Katakazy to Nesselrode, Nafplion, Sept. 30, 1833, AVRPI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 83 (1833), l. 265. 79 80

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reform non-canonical and the so-called “Church” of Greece schismatic. The problem was not necessarily about autocephaly, but rather about the procedure by which the Greek state proclaimed church independence. In 1833, Konstantinos forced a showdown by attempting to appoint a bishop to the episcopal seat of Zeitouni, but there the problem ended in stalemate. Hierarchs and monks from Mount Athos, who entered Greece as missionaries to support the claims of the patriarch, spearheaded another source of opposition. As I discuss in the next chapter, the Russian embassy rallied the traditionalist Greeks opposed to the settlement by awarding subsidies and spreading literature. Katakazy focused on what he considered the main pillars of Russian support in the kingdom: the clergy, the army, and the peasantry. Meanwhile, St Petersburg exerted great energy to dissuade the patriarch from excommunicating the Greeks. Russian envoy on special mission, Lelli, headed the effort in Constantinople to reverse the settlement by meeting confidentially with Patriarch Konstantinos. Lelli was impressed by the latter’s patience and tolerance.83 The gravity of the situation was such that the patriarch wrote to Prince Aleksandr N. Golitsyn, the former head of the Russian Dual Ministry of Religious Affairs and Public Education, pleading for intervention against the non-canonical action.84 “Recently our church had occasion to learn,” wrote the patriarch, “that in Greek eparchies a society of people susceptible to delusion secretly began to contrive and occupy themselves with criminal acts against our Eastern dogma.” If this so-called society, which succeeded in its goal for a great cataclysm, was not stopped soon, Konstantinos warned, “then without any doubt all of the Christian people of Greece will one day become the spoils of foreign congregations.” Konstantinos claimed that the ecclesiastical commission in Nafplion was “led solely by one diplomat” (apparently Maurer) who had no right to found a synod without the permission of the Mother Church. He hoped that “His Majesty the Emperor who himself practices the Eastern dogma” would not hesitate to search for suitable means to reverse the decree. The patriarch concomitantly petitioned Nesselrode to bring the matter to the attention of the autocrat. The Tsar and his ministers looked upon the church settlement as an error of the greatest magnitude. St Petersburg initially directed its criticism through legal channels, namely the Greek envoy in Paris, Mikhail Soutsos, whom the Regency sent on special mission to the northern Russian capital in the fall of 1833. The church question dominated the negotiations between the two states, which also consisted of a general trade agreement and a most-favored-nation clause. In a meeting in October 1833, Nesselrode underscored the need for unity of dogma, the inviolability of spiritual ties between the churches, and the great danger of a schism. Russia objected to the independence of the Greek Church for two reasons: first, it was done without the previous agreement of the patriarch; second, it came at 83

Lelli to Butenev, Büyükdere, Aug. 2, 1833, AVPRI, f. 180/1, op. 517/1, d. 1801, ll. 350–1. For the original document in Greek, see RGIA, f. 1409, op. 2, d. 5783, l. 2. There is a Russian tr. by Spyridon Destunis (l. 3) and an approved translation with the marginal note in pencil: “read to the Lord Emperor on 12 November 1833,” (l. 5). 84

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a time when the sovereign did not share the same faith of the nation. This double vice, Nesselrode asserted, sooner or later, would produce the following consequences: the synod would cease to obey its sovereign (who did not share its religion) and thus the nation would be divided by its fidelity toward the throne and its faith, or, the grand mass of people would be led to irreligion.85 Soon afterwards, Soutsos spoke directly to the Emperor and recorded Nicholas’s statements for the benefit of the Nafplion government. The Tsar observed that he understood the difficulty of the situation. However, “I will never understand how the leader of a Greek Church could be a Catholic sovereign . . . The only condition that I placed on the choice of Prince Othon was that he would embrace the religion of his new subjects.” The Tsar believed that the separation of the Greek Church from the patriarch meant “the conveyance, if not the introduction in Greece of the Catholic religion.” The only solution to the dilemma was the prompt conversion of the King. If this was not realized, the Tsar intimated, then “I must declare to you plainly, that all of the ties between Russia and Greece risk being broken . . . and your country will not receive any help on my behalf.”86 Despite this remonstrance, Soutsos remained a favorite of the Tsar and his ministers, who endeavored to secure government appointments for him in Athens in subsequent years. The Regency was aware of Soutsos’s strong Russian connections, however, and, suspicious of his past behavior, distanced him from the levers of power by stationing him in St Petersburg as Greek ambassador from 1835 to 1837.87 King Othon, who became the leader of the independent Greek Church, did not participate in the process openly. According to his correspondence with his father in Bavaria, he shared the views of Maurer and Pharmakidis, but prudently chose to stay out of the public debate.88 In the meantime, the Greek government employed diplomacy to reach an agreement with the patriarch. The Regency actually expected that the patriarch would sanction its church constitution and authorized the Greek minister at the Sublime Porte, Konstantinos Zographos, to negotiate a rapprochement by granting certain concessions. The patriarch remained sorely opposed to the arrangement, however, and dismissed Zographos’s efforts to reach a compromise. Although the Russian embassy in the Ottoman capital labored prodigiously to reconcile Greek–Ottoman relations, the whole episode frustrated Butenev and Rikman, who accused Zographos of not expressing himself with complete candor. 85 Nesselrode to Katakazy, St Petersburg, Nov. 30, 1833; Nesselrode to Soutsos, St Petersburg, Oct. 21, 1833, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 84/1833, ll. 168, 283. See also, “Memorandum,” Nov. 1833, in Jelavich, Russia and Greece, 75–82. 86 Soutsos’s summary to the Russian cabinet, Oct. 21, 1833, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 84/1833, ll. 290–3. 87 For an example of Russia’s attempt to elevate Soutsos’s position in the government, see Katakazy’s efforts to convince Armansperg to appoint him as state secretary for the royal household in Katakazy to Nesselrode, Athens, May 30, 1835, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 102/1835, l. 157. Katakazy complained that Armansperg never treated Soutsos with respect. Soutsos reached St Petersburg in the summer of 1835 and lived with his large family at 8 Efremova. See SPV 132 (July 14, 1835); and OV 58 (July 20, 1835). 88 See Hans Rall, “Die Anfänge des Konfessionspolitischen Ringens um den Wittelsbacher Thron in Athen,” in Bayern Staat und Kirche, Land und Reich (Munich: Karl Zink, 1961), 193; and Frazee, The Orthodox Church, 110.

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In particular, Rikman complained that Zographos refused to share the instructions he had received from the Regency relative to the church question.89 According to two prominent historians of modern Greece, the decree on autocephaly was the first step toward the Greek Church becoming “an accomplice of the state in its mission to spread the cohesive nationalist creed.”90 Rather than becoming handmaidens of the state, however, the majority of the Greek clergy desired reconciliation with Constantinople. Unfortunately for the traditionalists, their efforts to resolve matters with the patriarch were vetoed by the Regency and the partisan Holy Synod. Katakazy remained skeptical of a positive outcome without Russian intervention and correctly predicted that the Greek clerics interested in reconciliation were bound to face humiliation.91 Before recognizing the synod, Katakazy believed that the patriarch would insist upon three points in particular: (1) the recognition of the supremacy of the altar of Constantinople, (2) the Greek Church’s solicitation of the Mother Church each time it needed Holy Chrism, and (3) the mentioning of the Ecumenical Patriarch during liturgy in all Greek churches. Katakazy was optimistic that the Greek clergy would accept these three points. He also suggested that Rikman inform the patriarch most confidentially of a means that would make “a live and healthy impression on the people of Greece,” namely a patriarchal encyclical addressed to all the churches of the Orient, as well as to the Holy Synod of Russia, in which “the synod of Constantinople would declare its grievances against the Greek clergy, force the liberal reformers to lament their errors, and invite all of the Christian Orthodox to stand guard against innovations similar to those which were proclaimed in Nafplion.”92 Katakazy deemed that such a menacing statement would be strong enough to reconcile the two sides while inhibiting similar actions in the future. The bishops were another branch of government bureaucracy that had to be brought under the control of the modernizing Regency of the Greek kingdom. On November 20, 1833, the Regency promulgated an organic ordinance declaring that the number of eparchies in Greece was to be reduced to ten, in order to make them coincide with the prefectures into which the kingdom was now divided.93 The king, as the supreme head of the church, now exclusively made appointments of bishops. Overall, forty bishops were given posts in the old dioceses. When these men died, the eparchial seats were to be gradually united until there were only ten, and no more sees were to be considered metropolitanates. According to an anonymous Russian observer, “this law aroused well-founded displeasure, because the synod, whose membership was named by a Catholic king, did not have the power

89 Rikman to Katakazy, Pera, May 17, 1834, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 1802, ll. 192–3. Details of Zographos’s activity in Constantinople reached Russian readers: SPch 173 (Sept. 2, 1834); and SPV 237 (Oct. 12, 1834). 90 See T. Veremis, “From the National State to the Stateless Nation, 1821–1910,” EEQ 19 (1989): 136; see also Thomas W. Gallant, Modern Greece (London: Hodder Education, 2001), 69. 91 Katakazy to Nesselrode, Nafplion, Mar. 1, 1833, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 81 (1834), ll. 80–1. 92 Katakazy to Rikman, Nafplion, Mar. 1, 1833, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 81 (1834), l. 86. 93 See Ephimeris, 38 (Nov. 27, 1833); SPV 22 (Jan. 27, 1834); and Strong, Greece as a Kingdom, 358–60.

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to consecrate bishops without the sanction of the patriarch of Constantinople.” Furthermore, “the restriction of the number of eparchies to only ten conflicted with the morals and customs of the Greeks who wished to have, as was from time immemorial, a proper bishop in each eparchy.”94 Although the Greek government never gave up its power over the Greek Church, it did eventually abide by the demands of Russia and traditionalist Greeks for a regularization of relations with Constantinople. After a lengthy period of negotiations, in 1850 the Church of Greece received recognition from the patriarchate in the Synodal Tomos, which outlined the conditions of independence and the organizational structure of the church according to canon law. However, before this reconciliation could be achieved, protests emerged. Decrees abolishing nearly all monasteries and nunneries in the kingdom sparked part of the widespread resistance to the ecclesiastical settlement.

R U SS I A A N D TH E M O N A S T I C D IS S O L UT I O N D E C R E E S The stern remonstrance of the Tsar and patriarch against the separation decrees did not prevent the Regency from continuing ecclesiastical perestroika. Monasteries and monastic discipline were the next objects of business. The impetus for monastic reform was identical with the cause for the broader restructuring of the church establishment: a powerful monastic institution, embracing thousands of monks and controlling vast properties in Greece and abroad, could pose serious opposition to the regime’s authority. Moreover, the monasteries represented the “oriental traditions” which the Regency sought to pulverize, and anti-monasticism played a role in the debate between Eastern and Western worldviews that, in part, triggered the revolution.95 Monks were stigmatized for their corruption, avarice, simony, and other unethical behavior. The most brazen condemnation of monastic life was issued by the ecclesiastical commission in its “Report on the Situation of the Monasteries,” dated June 7 1833, which detailed the reasons for its complete overhaul.96 Additional factors inspired the anti-monastic campaign. War had destroyed many monastic buildings and thousands of monks who had taken up arms were killed in battle. In some cases, the monasteries had been actual battlegrounds. Their restoration and repopulation required immense resources so the Regency, already unsympathetic to monasticism, decided on their partial dissolution. The monasteries were also a means to augment the state coffers, or at least their dissolution would prevent the revenues of destroyed monasteries from being misappropriated.

See “Sostoianie tserkovnykh del v grecheskom korolevstve,” KhCh 2 (May 1863), 3, 126. See Richard Clogg, “Anti-Clericalism in Pre-Independence Greece c.1750–1821,” in Derek Baker (ed.), The Orthodox Churches and the West (Oxford: B. Blackwell, 1976), xiii. 257–76. 96 The text of the report appears in Spyridon Kokkinis, Ta monastiria tis Ellados (Athens: I. D. Kollarou, 1976), 219–23. 94 95

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The process of dissolution itself came in three parts: royal decrees of August 19 and September 25, 1833 ordered the suppression of all monasteries which had less than six monks or the buildings of which had been completely destroyed. The monasteries that continued to exist, by virtue of their having six or more monks, were to pay a special tax of one-tenth of their revenues in addition to the normal tithe. The collection of these taxes was the responsibility of public contractors who were to bid for the right to make assessments. This procedure opened up avenues of exploitation for unscrupulous tax farmers. Abuses induced the government in 1838 to decree that, henceforth, the monasteries would pay taxes directly to the state treasury.97 The second measure, dated February 25, 1834, dissolved all nunneries except three, each in a major geographical section of Greece. All nuns under the age of 40 were instructed to return to lay life unless they could show true devotion to the cloister. Nuns over 40 were permitted to leave the nunneries if they had some means of livelihood. Otherwise, they were to move to one of the three remaining convents. These three nunneries were to extend aid to orphan girls and the poor.98 The third edict on May 8, 1834 forbade donations of property by private individuals to the church. This last decree ended the practice that combined Christian devoutness with material interests and was designed to end attempts at usurpations of church land based upon previous dedications.99 The first two reforms caused the nationalization of the property of three-quarters of all of the monasteries in the Greek kingdom. According to the estimate of Finlay, seconded by Frazee, 412 monasteries were closed and their property confiscated.100 Over 50 of the approximately 150 remaining monasteries survived because they were in Mani. Katakazy referred to the Maniots’ promise that “as soon as the King gives us the lands which nourish us and doesn’t touch our churches we will be the most faithful subjects.” The government was unwilling to interfere there for fear of prolonging the revolt that had broken out after the dissolution decrees.101 Katakazy

97 The decrees on the dissolution are published in Kokkinis, Ta monastiria, 223–33; see also Petropulos, Politics and Statecraft, 182. 98 For the decree concerning convents, see Kokkinis, Ta monastiria, 235–6; and Petropulos, Politics and Statecraft, 182. 99 Petropulos, Politics and Statecraft, 182. 100 Based upon a report of the Greek Ministry of Finance, McGrew confirms the figure of 412 dissolved monasteries. Petropulos follows Oikonomos by referring to 378 closed holy communities, while Kurganov cites the figure 394. Finlay, History of Greece, vii. 130–1; Charles Frazee, “Church and State in Greece,” in John T. A. Koumoulides (ed.), Greece in Transition: Essays in the History of Modern Greece, 1821–1974 (London: Zeno Publishers, 1977), 133; William W. McGrew, Land and Revolution in Modern Greece, 1800–81 (Kent State, OH: Kent State University Press, 1985), 142; Oikonomos, Ta sozomena, ii. 264–5; Petropulos, Politics and Statecraft, 182–3; Kurganov, Ustroistvo upravleniia, 490. “Sostoianie tserkovnykh del v grecheskom korolevstve,” KhCh 2 (May 1863), 3, 131, states that 412 monasteries were dissolved. 101 On the Mani revolt, see Katakazy to Nesselrode, Nafplion, May 19, 1833, and Katakazy to Nesselrode, Nafplion, July 10, 1834, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 81/1834, ll. 117–18, 190–1; AroniTsichli, Agrotikes exegerseis, 85–110. The revolt received wide coverage in the Russian press: SPch 156 (July 13, 1834), 159 (July 17, 1834), 166 (July 25, 1834), 175 (Aug. 4, 1834), 183 (Aug. 16, 1834), 194 (Aug. 29, 1834), 230 (Oct. 11, 1834); SPV 131 (July 8, 1834), 163 (July 15, 1834), 165 (July 18, 1834), 177 (Aug. 1, 1834), 200 (Aug. 29, 1834), 215/216 (Sept. 26, 1834), 224 (Sept. 26, 1834). Kurganov, Ustroistvo upravleniia, 490, noted that sixty-three monasteries remained in Mani.

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sent St Petersburg news about an abbot in Mani who preached disobedience against “an administration composed of all sorts of heterodox Catholics, Lutherans, and Israelites, and the repulsion by arms of the [Bavarian] troops.” The reform forced nearly a thousand monks to seek accommodation in the remaining monasteries or else find different means of livelihood. Wary of popular protest, the government chose not to publish the dissolution decrees in the Government Gazette.102 A report in the Russian journal Christian Reading stated that the dissolution decree “caused very significant damage to the [Greek] people.”103 Dissent intensified when it became known that holy treasures and artifacts, once housed in the monasteries, were being sold and the proceeds turned over to the new ecclesiastical fund, under the control of the government. This fund was intended primarily for the support of education, such as teachers’ salaries, scholarships, and archeological studies, but it was also to help the clergy.104 The author of an essay in the Northern Bee hoped that the revenue from the closed monasteries would be used to build schools. However, the sale of holy objects appeared sacrilegious to the public and was not free from corruption. Katakazy reported that the consequences of the secularization of the monasteries led to brigandage and disorder on the Turkish frontier.105 Russian vice-consul in Patras, Ioannis Kallogerakis, wrote that: The government has dismantled the small, poor, inoffensive, hospitable monasteries for which the people profess much veneration . . . the Holy Synod has sold everything up to its sacred vessels; the proceeds of these sales have been swallowed by the coffers of the synod and nothing has resulted, not even the restoration of one church in order to aid religious instruction. The mass of the nation is attached to her religion, and this behavior has wounded it sharply. The Holy Synod has left the rest of the monasteries to subsist intact (ignoring the motive) and in all of their integrity, with all of their abuses. And the national properties are usurped by the large monasteries, which possess immense lands and possessions with rents of four to twenty-five thousand talaris per year . . . without granting refuge to the poor and elderly.106

The confiscation of monastic property also affected Greece’s foreign relations, for included among the appropriated lands were properties owned by holy institutions outside the new kingdom’s borders. Lastly, the annual income of the new treasury was not sufficient to cover the cost of the educational system and did nothing to aid the lower clergy.107 102 For further detail on the dissolution of the monasteries, see Papadopoulos, Istoria tis ekklisias, 133–45; Kurganov, Ustroistvo upravleniia, 461–502; and Frazee, The Orthodox Church, 125–7. 103 “Sostoianie tserkovnykh del v grecheskom korolevstve,” KhCh 2 (May 1863), 3, 132. 104 A balanced discussion of the liquidation of assets is that of McGrew, Land and Revolution, 136–49. See also the detailed discussion in Kurganov, Ustroistvo upravleniia, 461–533. On the separate ecclesiastical fund, see Oikonomos, Ta sozomena, ii. 268–70; Kurganov, Ustroistvo upravleniia, 489–91; Strong, Greece as a Kingdom, 363–4. 105 SPch 287 (Dec. 14, 1833); Katakazy to Nesselrode, Athens, Jan. 15, 1836, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 11/1836, l. 83. 106 Kallogerakis to Katakazy, Patras, Sept. 22, 1836, AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 352/1836, ll. 33–5. 107 On the financial outcome of the settlement, see Oikonomos, Ta sozomena, ii. 267–78; McGrew, Land and Revolution, 144–9.

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The Regency’s attempt to introduce the German-Protestant model of a statesponsored independent church aimed to marshal the energies of the nation behind the throne, while extinguishing potential sources of opposition, and severing an important avenue of influence via the patriarchate. The so-called modernizing Greeks, foremost among them Theoklitos Pharmakidis, drew upon the legacy of the ideas put forward by the Enlightenment thinker Adamantios Korais, although Pharmakidis does not seem to have appreciated the nuances of Korais’s views toward organized religion and morality. Pharmakidis supported the Regency’s plans, the main architect of which, Regent Georg Maurer, was largely inexperienced in the practices and traditions of Eastern Orthodoxy. Although sponsored by a minority, Pharmakidis and his companions represented the secular, modernized, element of Greek society that was gaining influence in political and cultural affairs in the post-revolutionary period. The declaration of autocephaly was a blow against their rivals, the pro-Orthodox and Russophile group, which vied for prominence among the Greek masses. Despite the Regency’s goal of quashing the opposition, the confiscation of monastic properties, the reduction of episcopates, and the split with the patriarchate created the impression among many Greeks of a general attack on Orthodox traditions. Additionally, the increased activities of Protestant and Catholic missionaries appeared as a conspiracy to convert the people to foreign beliefs. In such a climate of controversy involving central components of politics and culture, the Regency was bound to face a serious and sustained reaction. Leaders of the resistance to the ecclesiastical arrangement drew support from Russia. The direction of tsarist policy in Greece rested on the principles of Official Nationality. The Tsar believed that King Othon, a Catholic from Bavaria, would be unable to found a monarchy robust enough to resist democratic forces without exhibiting the ideological principles held paramount by the Russian state. As a result, the Russian state and society expressed intense support for Eastern Orthodox conservatism against Western secular trends in the following years, aiming to reverse the ecclesiastical reforms, or at least, to stem them at their source. The Russian Foreign Ministry thus concentrated on these issues, arguing that an Orthodox king governing according to absolutist principles would be best suited to unite and defend the nation-state against the challenges of modernity. One way the Russian government responded was by sending material aid to cathedrals and monasteries in the Greek kingdom, Epirus, Chalcedon, the island of Chalki, and other regions in the Levant.108 Another form of Philorthodox relief consisted of the 108 Among the extensive, largely untapped files, see “O vozobnovlenii khrama v Gretsii vo imia Sviatogo Georgiia,” St Petersburg, Sept. 2, 1835–Apr. 6, 1836, RGIA, f. 796, op. 116, d. 710; “O vvedenie milostinnoi dachi Uspenskomu Monastyriu, chto v Epire,” St Petersburg, Apr. 4, 1835–Sept. 26, 1835, RGIA, f. 797, op. 5, d. 19236; “O vydache Minastyriu Sv. Veli. Ephimii, Khalkedonskoi Eparkhii, milostinnoi dachi,” St Petersburg, June 26, 1843–Nov. 4, 1843, RGIA, f. 797, op. 13, d. 32633; “O vydache milostinnoi dachi Grecheskomu Monastyriu Sv. Troitsy . . . na ostrove Khalki,” St Petersburg, June 26, 1843–Mar. 11, 1844, RGIA, f. 797, op. 13, d. 32634. Vladimir Orlov-Davydov remarked that after the Russian–Ottoman War of 1828–9, “Our Government” received a request from the monks of Chalki for around 2,500 rubles assignats of relief-aid. Russia in response sent more than twice the requested sum. V. P. Davydov, Putevye zapiski, vedennyia vo vremia prebyvaniia na Ionicheskikh ostrovakh, v Gretsii, Maloi Azii i Turtsii v 1835 godu (St Petersburg: Tip. Eduarda Pratsa i Ko., 1839–40), ii. 104.

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spread of propaganda that emphasized the perceived dangers of the church reforms. Indeed, by this time, Russian support of Orthodox conservatism in the Near East was a well-established tradition. In order to implement its principles in Greek space, St Petersburg was prepared to intervene actively through its embassy. A unique component of the Russian embassy in Greece consisted of its ecclesiastical wing staffed with a well-trained assortment of clergy, the actions of which form the subject of the following chapter.

4 The Russian Ecclesiastical Mission and the Defense of Orthodoxy Responses to the independence of the Greek Church and the reform of ecclesiastical institutions and practices illustrate the central distinction within Greek society in the post-revolutionary era. Historians, literary scholars, and social scientists have expressed this divide in terms of two identity groups: the traditionalists, reflecting the indigenous Orthodox, conservative, and pre-modern (or Byzantine) element of Greek nationalism, and the modernizers, reflecting the neoclassical, “civilized,” and secular component of Greek nationalism.1 Remarkably, this dialectical split in Greek society is almost equivalent to the debate between Slavophiles and Westernizers in Russian intellectual circles during the 1830s and 1840s.2 Although this framework conveniently conveys the confrontation of modernity and tradition, the reduction of national identity to two polarities may need some modification. In Greece, it was not so much the fundamental antimony between religion and secular nationalism as a synthetic and syncretic blending of religious and national elements that crystallized into a distinct form of national identity. In this sense, the intervention of Orthodox Russia in the experiments taking place in Greece provides a valuable paradigm for the study of the other Balkan Orthodox Churches in the second half of the nineteenth century. The nationalist debate in Othonian Greece also finds a corollary in the twenty-first century, when in an effort to modernize the legal system, the Greek state abolished the religious oath in courts and the category of religion from identity cards, thus polarizing political and religious discourse.3 1 On this schematic distinction, see M. Herzfeld, Ours Once More: Folklore, Ideology, and the Making of Modern Greece (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1982), 19–21, 123–30; K. Th. Dimaras, Neoellinikos diaphotismos, 3rd edn (Athens: Ermis, 1983), 82–6; Alexis Politis, Romantika chronia: Ideologies kai Nootropies stin Ellada tou 1830–80 (Athens: E.M.N.E.-Mnimon, 1993); Alexandros Papaderos, Metakenosis: Griechenlands kulturelle Herausforderung durch die Aufklärung in der Sicht des Korais und des Oikonomos (Meisenheim am Glan: Hain, 1970), 61–72; and Nikiforos Diamandouros, Oi aparches tis synkrotisis synchronou kratous stin Ellada, 1821–8 (Athens: Morphotiko Idryma Ethnikis Trapezas, 2002). For critiques of this bipolar division, see Elli Skopetea, To “Protypo Vasileio” kai i Megali Idea: opseis tou ethnikou provlimatos stin Ellada, 1830–80 (Athens: Ekdoseis Polytypo, 1988); and D. Stamatopoulos, Metarrythmisi kai Ekkosmikevsi: Pros mia anasynthesi tis istorias tou Oikoumenikou Patriarcheiou ton 19o aiona (Athens: Alexandria, 2003). 2 Of the vast literature on this topic, I refer only to the standard works of Martin Malia, Alexander Herzen and the Birth of Russian Socialism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1961); and Andrzej Walicki, The Slavophile Controversy: History of a Conservative Utopia in Nineteenth-Century Russian Thought (Oxford: OUP, 1973). 3 See Renée Hirschon, “Dismantling the Millet: Religion and National Identity in Contemporary Greece,” in Ayhan Aktar, Niyazi Kizilyürek, and Umut Özkirimli (eds), Nationalism in the Troubled

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In the 1830s, traditionalist Greek clergy and intellectuals, supported by the Russian embassy and consuls, emerged as the principal defenders of the religious element of what became the new Hellenic-Christian imagined community. As a potent source of influence and resources, the Russian mission symbolized the traditions of Orthodoxy and conservatism held sacred by the majority of Greek people. Prominent Russophile intellectuals, church leaders, and politicians solidified their efforts into a party that exercised substantial power during the period 1837 to 1841.4 St Petersburg and the Russian mission reacted to the ecclesiastical reforms through diplomatic pressure, philanthropic relief, and by giving resources to conservative, pro-Orthodox intelligentsia. The Russian Holy Synod and embassy in Constantinople tried to mend the schism by engaging in direct relations with the Ecumenical Patriarch and by offering substantial incentives to bring about the reconciliation of the new Church with the Mother Church. Russian reactions to the transformation of the Greek Church illuminate the central part that Orthodoxy played in foreign relations during the Nicholaevan period. Reports in the Russian press promoting Greek Orthodoxy testify to the enduring relevance of Greek affairs within educated society. Viewing the development of Greek nationalism from the Russian perspective provides balance to the scholarly literature stressing the role of secular, Westernizing influences on identity formation. More generally, such a perspective contributes to the theoretical debate regarding the close links and affinities between religion and nationalism, and the similarities between the commemorative ceremonies that celebrate the myth of the nation and the rituals of religion. For example, Greek Independence Day, March 25, has both religious and national resonance, as the holiday commemorates the declaration of independence (symbolized by Bishop Germanos’s raising of the flag of revolt against the Ottomans in 1821), and the Annunciation by the Angel Gabriel to the Virgin Mary (one of the most important days in the Orthodox Christian calendar). The word Palingenesia (resurrection or renaissance) used to describe the War of Independence, in post-revolutionary historiography, conveys the rebirth of the glories of Greece’s classical past, and thus the notion of the fall and resurrection central to Christian belief becomes embedded in the notion of the nation.5 The ecclesiastical reforms and the actions of Protestant and Catholic missionaries sparked intense debate within the broader Orthodox world regarding the role of the state in protecting tradition against secular and heterodox influences. Leading the Triangle: Cyprus, Greece and Turkey (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 61–75; and Yannis Stavrakakis, “Politics and Religion: On the ‘Politicization’ of Greek Church Discourse,” Journal of Modern Greek Studies, 21/2 (Oct. 2003): 153–81. 4 See John Petropulos, Politics and Statecraft in the Kingdom of Greece, 1833–44 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), 270–344; and O. E. Petrunina, Grecheskaia natsiia i gosudarstvo v XVIII–XX vv. Ocherki politicheskogo rasvitiia (Moscow: KDU, 2010), 256–94. 5 For an exhaustive historiographical review, see Tasos Gritsopoulos, “Istoriographia tou Agonos,” Mnimosyni, 3 (1970–1): 33–253. See also, Skopetea, To “Protypo Vasileio” kai i Megali Idea, 207; Yannis Hamilakis, The Nation and its Ruins: Antiquity, Archaeology, and National Imagination in Greece (Oxford: OUP, 2007), 84; and Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, Instilling Religion in Greek and Turkish Nationalism: A “Sacred Synthesis” (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 31–3.

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charge against the challenge to Orthodoxy was the Russian embassy’s special ecclesiastical legation, which consisted of an archimandrite and several priests, monks, and cantors. The protection and support offered by the Russian embassy and its ecclesiastical legation to the pro-Orthodox element of Greek society helped galvanize traditionalist policy-makers and the church hierarchy against a small but disproportionately influential group of liberal critics as well as against the infiltrations of foreign “new religions.” The activities of the ecclesiastical legation also fortified the links between Greeks and Russians that blossomed during the religious revival of the following decades, when Archimandrite Antonin Kapustin led the mission in Athens.6 Controversies over the translation of the Old Testament into Modern Greek, the coronation ceremony upon the King’s majority, the spread of non-Orthodox schools and pamphlet literature, the actions of the British and Foreign Bible Society (BFBS), as well as the practice of heterodox forms of communal life appeared as assaults on Orthodoxy and attempts to convert the Greek people to Protestantism. In this respect, events taking place in Greece paralleled many of the problems facing the Russian state during the same period in its struggle to maintain the canons of Orthodoxy in areas populated by Jews, Old Believers, and other people perceived as harmful. In the construction of an indigenous Greek nationalism, the Russian mission exercised much appeal among the vast majority of ordinary people who still believed that Orthodoxy was the organizing canon of the world.

THE FO RM AT I ON O F THE RU S S I AN ECCLESIASTICAL MISSION The establishment of the Greek autocephalous Church and the break from the patriarchate generated reactions among the foreign ministries of the protecting powers. Since the reforms blocked an important conduit of Russian influence, the attitude in England and France was largely one of approval. In Russia, both state and society were sharply critical and employed numerous means of persuasion in order to curtail the changes or to bring about their reversal. Since it could not monopolize the government, support of the Orthodox Church was the most convenient avenue by which Russia could intervene. St Petersburg made plans to build a strong monarchical regime in Greece based, in part, on the Byzantine fusion of church and state. To implement this plan, the Russian Foreign Ministry, with the help of the Holy Synod, organized an ecclesiastical mission as a unique weapon against secularizing and heterodox intrusions. The creation of the Russian ecclesiastical mission in 1833 was the result of the Tsar’s concern for the condition and fate of the Greek people and their church. In foreign policy, as in domestic affairs, the Russian autocrat responded to events and 6 See Lucien J. Frary, “Russian Missions in the Orthodox East: Antonin Kapustin and his World (1817–94),” Russian History, 40 (2013): 133–51; and K. Papoulidis, O Ellinikos kosmos tou Antoniou Kapustin (1817–94) (Thessaloniki: IMXA, 1993).

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individuals in a personal and passionate manner. Stressing the advantages of an authoritarian system based upon a strong ethical framework, Nicholas wanted to help “the people who use one dogma,” by cultivating the traditional and historic religious links that bound the two states together. Convinced that a semblance of law and order in the new kingdom actually existed, the autocrat ordered that a priest (sviashchennik) be sent to Greece to manage the embassy church and to implement the spread of material aid among poor parishes and clergy. Characteristically, Nicholas entrusted this task to Foreign Minister Nesselrode, who conveyed the plan to the Ober-prokuror (chief procurator) of the Russian Holy Synod, Prince Petr S. Meshcherskii, in January 1833. Meshcherskii notified Nesselrode that the Holy Synod was able to help finance the expedition with 50,000 rubles. In a memorandum dated February 24, 1833, Meshcherskii informed the members of the synod of the Emperor’s wishes. Meshcherskii wrote that “our August Monarch deigned it opportune to revive our spiritual relations with this country [Greece] and to build a strong foundation for the spiritual influence which belongs exclusively to Russia and which no other power has or should have.”7 Among the leading proponents for Greek Church relief-aid were Metropolitan Filaret of Moscow, former Ober-prokuror Prince Aleksandr N. Golitsyn, and the writer, theologian, and diplomat Aleksandr S. Sturdza, all of whom were profoundly spiritual figures with broad contacts in Ottoman domains, the British “protected” Ionian Islands, the Greek kingdom, and Greek communities inside Russia.8 In close consultation with Nesselrode, these individuals helped organize the Russian ecclesiastical mission to Greece. It is worthy of note that the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and not the Holy Synod or independent philanthropists, made the most important decisions regarding the ecclesiastical mission. On March 4, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs agreed to the total of 100,000 rubles for the ecclesiastical mission, the reconstruction of destroyed churches in Greece, and for aid to poor clergy there.9 Based upon a sample of two years, 1836 and 1839, the annual budget for the Russian embassy in Greece, including the salaries of both diplomatic and ecclesiastical legations, exceeded 45,000 rubles, a substantial sum considering the small size and uncertain economic importance of the Greek kingdom during this period.10 The Tsar’s plan to support Orthodoxy in Greece through an ecclesiastical legation unfolded rapidly. The details regarding the personnel and annual remuneration of the mission received imperial approval on March 4, 1833. It was to consist of an archimandrite with an annual salary of 1,200 rubles, a deacon 7 See Nesselrode to Meshcherskii, St Petersburg, Jan. 12, 1833; Meshcherskii to Nesselrode, St Petersburg, Feb. 15, 1833; and Meshcherskii to the Holy Synod, St Petersburg, Feb. 24, 1833, RGIA, f. 797, op. 4, d. 17815, ll. 1, 6, 8–10. 8 For an introduction to these thinkers and their cultural milieu, see Alexander M. Martin, Romantics, Reformers, Reactionaries: Russian Conservative Thought and Politics in the Reign of Alexander I (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 1997). 9 “O posobii grecheskim tserkvam i dukhovenstvu,” Mar. 4, 1833, AVPRI, f. 161/1-1, op. 12/3, d. 9, ll. 1–2. 10 See Rodofinikin to Katakazy, St Petersburg, Sept. 1, 1836, AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 358/ 1836, l. 75; Seniavin to Katakazy, St Petersburg, Aug. 29, 1839, AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 399/ 1839, l. 90.

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(ierodiakon) with a salary of 700 rubles, two clergymen with a salary of 300 rubles each, and eight cantors receiving 2,800 rubles in total. Plans were made for repairs of the Russian embassy building (nash dom) and the construction of a chapel within the embassy grounds in Nafplion. In 1833, the annual allowance for the individual members of the Russian ecclesiastical mission was about 5,900 rubles.11 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in consultation with the Ministry of Finance, also provided 2,400 chervonets (gold coins) and 2,167 rubles 80 kopeks to help offset the expenses of the mission members to travel to Odessa with fifteen horses.12 The Russian Foreign Ministry thus established the foundation, including the personnel and financial support, of the Russian ecclesiastical mission in Greece, which was to remain in place until the Russian Revolutions of 1917. The next step involved the material needs of the mission, including chasubles, material for the iconostasis, mitres, icons, crosses, Bibles, plates, candles, lamps, and other instruments for the celebration of the liturgy, all of which became the responsibility of the Asiatic Department of the Foreign Ministry. On March 8, 1833, the director of the Asiatic Department, Konstantin K. Rodofinikin, compiled a price list for these items, ordered them deposited into ten wooden crates, and made arrangements for their delivery to Greece via Odessa and Constantinople. The total cost of the religious materials, some of which were made of gold and silver, was nearly 6,000 rubles. Additional funds were allocated for horses, food, temporary shelter, coaches, and drivers. According to Asiatic Department records, two troikas loaded with these items took twelve days to travel from the capital to Moscow and another month from there to Odessa. In September, the ten wooden crates arrived in Moscow, where the Asiatic Department secures two troikas for travel to Odessa for an additional 867 rubles and 12 kopeks. The process of the delivery of church relief-aid to Greece provides insight into the functioning of Russian officialdom and the interests of Russian educated society. Aleksandr Sturdza, for example, one of the best-informed tsarist state servants regarding Greek affairs, could not resist supplementing the delivery of religious objects with additional items he deemed useful. Upon their arrival in Odessa, Sturdza took the ten crates to his home for inspection, where he personally verified the contents, and prepared two of his own boxes for shipment to Greece. The total cargo (weighing more than 2,000 pounds) was shipped to Constantinople in October 1833 for another 600 rubles. A month later, Katakazy sent notice that the crates had arrived in Athens.13 Finally, Andrei Romashev, the main driver of the cargo to Odessa, required money for winter clothes, shoes, and horses for his return journey. The cost of the entire project was over 7,000 rubles.14 11 K. Rodofinikin, “Shtat vremennoi tserkvi uprezhdaemoi pri missii v Gretsii,” St Petersburg, Mar. 8, 1833, AVPRI, f. 161/4-16, op. 161, d. 1/1833, l. 2; a copy of this document is in RGIA, f. 797, op. 4, d. 17815, l. 13. 12 Nesselrode to Meshcherskii, St Petersburg, Mar. 8, 1833, RGIA, f. 797, op. 4, d. 17815, ll. 11–12. 13 Katakazy to Butenev, Nafplion, Nov. 30, 1833, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 1801, l. 252. 14 “Ob uchrezhdenii pri missii nashei v Gretsii vremenno Pravoslavnoi Tserkvi, o shtate onoi, i ob otpravlenii v Odessu 10 iashchikov s veshchami dlia oznachennoi tserkvi i pri nikh bezdovago Andreia Romasheva,” AVPRI, f. 166/4-16, op. 161, d. 1/1833.

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Once the decisions regarding funding and supplies had been made, the Russian Foreign Ministry began to search for suitable individuals to send on the mission to Greece. The first appointment to lead the legation, Archimandrite Irinarkh (Iakov Dmitrievich Popov, 1790–1877), does not seem to have had a choice in the matter. Before selecting him, Nesselrode invited the Holy Synod to ponder the proposal and suggest a suitable candidate. After a brief debate, the synod released Irinarkh for service abroad, although reluctantly, because “so high an official is useful in Russia for various religious tasks.”15 The synod wished to limit his service to two years, however the Foreign Ministry sent Irinarkh on a three-year mission. In early March, Nesselrode ordered the synod to inform Irinarkh of his new appointment and began searching for the deacon, clergymen, and cantors. Thus, six months before the formal establishment of the Greek autocephalous Church, the Russian government had budgeted at least 100,000 rubles of church relief-aid and created a special ecclesiastical mission headed by an experienced archimandrite. The fact that the Asiatic Department was the foremost director of these activities, and that the highest echelons of the Foreign Ministry were engaged in decisions about the number of cantors in a foreign embassy church, underscores the theme that religion formed a significant part of Greek policy developed in Nicholaevan Russia. The Ober-prokuror of the Holy Synod played a secondary role in determining the amount of aid, assembling the religious instruments, and choosing the mission’s personnel. The first leader of the Russian ecclesiastical mission, Archimandrite Irinarkh, was a descendant of a family of priests.16 Born in the village of Dolgo, Kursk province, in 1790, he began his education in 1804 at the Kursk Seminary. Ten years later, he matriculated at the St Petersburg Spiritual Academy, where he gained a reputation for intelligence and religious zeal. After receiving a kandidat degree in theology in 1817, he took his monastic vows, and was ordained ieromonakh. In 1818, he received a master’s degree and an appointment as inspector of the Orlov Seminary, where he also taught Greek, Hebrew, and church history. A year later, he went on mission to Italy as the chaplain (kapellan) to the Marquis of Tertsi, a relative of Prince Golitsyn. In 1824, he was stationed with the Russian embassy in Florence and Rome, where he contacted a small group of Russian artists studying there, including Karl P. Briullov. In 1831, he returned to Russia and received the post of archimandrite of the monastery of Tolgskii, a prestigious community in the Iaroslav Bishopric. In the spring of 1833, the Holy Synod recommended him for the medal 15 See Nesselrode to Meshcherskii, St Petersburg, Feb. 21, 1833, RGIA, f. 797, op. 4, d. 17815, l. 7; and V. Zhmakin, “Osnovanie russkoi dukhovnoi missii v Afinakh,” KhCh 5 (Sept.–Oct. 1893): 344–5. 16 For biographical information, see “Svedeniia o pochivshem arkhiepiskope Irinarkhe,” Strannik, 4/11 (Nov. 1877): 247–50; “Sochineniia Arkhiepiskopa Irinarkha,” Riazanskie eparkhial’nye vedomosti, 7 (Dec. 1870): 226–34; N. I. Barsov, “Pis’ma protoiereia B. I. Nordova k preosviashchennomu Innokentiiu, arkhiepiskopu Khersonskomu i Tavricheskomu,” Vologodskie eparkhial’nye vedomosti, 17–18 (1885): 351–63, 367–79; N. Suvorov, “Istoricheskiia svedeniia,” Vologodskie eparkhial’nye vedomosti, 15 (1868): 394–9; “Arkhimandrit Irinarkh,” Iaroslavskie eparkhial’nye vedomosti, 32–3 (1892): 497–510, 525–7; and N. Skabalanovich, “Spravka o preosviashchennom Irinarkhe,” Tserkovnyi vestnik, 36 (1892): 575–6.

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of St Anne Second Class for his services abroad. The timing of the Irinarkh’s visit to St Petersburg, his experience in Italy, his command of Greek, and his nomination for the medal (which the Tsar approved) brought him to the attention of the Foreign Ministry during its search for a leader of the mission to Greece.17 Shortly afterwards, the Archbishop of Iaroslav Avraam acknowledged Irinarkh’s new appointment and sent him 100 rubles. One year after his arrival in Nafplion, the 44–year-old Irinarkh (who remained a member of Tolgskii monastery) petitioned the newly appointed Ober-prokuror, Stepan D. Nechaev, to send him money from the monastery.18 After settling on the leader of the ecclesiastical legation, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs delegated the task of finding people to fill the other posts to the Holy Synod. On March 9, 1833, the synod commissioned the Metropolitan of Novgorod, Serafim, to choose suitable individuals.19 By July, the synod sanctioned Serafim’s list of candidates: Parfeny, of the Aleksandr Nevskii Lavra, was named deacon; his assistants were Athanasii Kamenev and Theodor Bogdanov, 22 and 19 years of age respectively. The cantors included two basses, Vasilii Zriakhov and Vasilii Orlov, two tenors, Aleksandr Skorodumov and Mikhail Zrelov, two altos, Semen Ivanov and Ivan Orlov, and two trebles, Lev Semenov and Dimitrii Bratoliubov. All of the cantors were in their twenties; two of them were married. The Regent of the Metropolitan of Kachanov tested the quality of the cantors’ voices in advance; many who desired to be sent to Athens were rejected. The Asiatic Department in close consultation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs carefully reviewed the choice of cantors. Reaching a decision was difficult because of the concern for the affects of the Greek climate on the young men’s voices. Of the eight originally sent on mission, both altos, both trebles, and one tenor returned to Russia in August 1835 because of purported changes to their voices. Replacements were sent to Athens.20 The members of the mission were equipped with over fifty prayer books, collections of songs, hymns, canons, books of the church fathers, service manuals, and other texts of a religious and theological nature.21 Although the search seems to have generated numerous willing candidates, in general, the members of the ecclesiastical mission did not particularly enjoy their experience in the Greek kingdom. In July 1833, Archimandrite Irinarkh arrived first, just a few days after the announcement of the church constitution. Katakazy regretted that Irinarkh had not arrived sooner, but believed that the distinguished 17

Ukaz of Nicholas, St Petersburg, Mar. 25, 1833, RGIA, f. 797, op. 4, d. 17815, l. 23. Irinarkh to Nechaev, Nafplion, Mar. 17, 1834, RGIA, f. 797, op. 4, d. 14295, ll. 1–2. 19 Meshcherskii to the Holy Synod, St Petersburg, Mar. 9, 1833, RGIA, f. 797, op. 4, d. 17815, ll. 15–16. 20 On the composition of the choir, see “Iz tserkovno-obshchestvennoi zhizni vtoroi chetverti nashego stoletiia: pis’ma k byvshemy ober-prokuroru Sv. Sinoda S. D. Nechaevu,” KhCh 1/1 (Jan.– Feb. 1896): 126. 21 The cost of shipping these items was around 550 rubles. For the list of books, their shipment, and cost, see Nesselrode to Meshcherskii, St Petersburg, July 31, 1833; Meshcherskii to the Holy Synod, St Petersburg, Aug. 29, 1833; Rodofinikin to Meshcherskii, St Petersburg, Sept. 20, 1833; and Rodofinikin to Meshcherskii, St Petersburg, Sept. 30, 1833, RGIA, f. 797, op. 4, d. 17815, ll. 27, 29–30, 32, 34. 18

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cleric’s wisdom would be of great assistance to the Greek clergy and the mission.22 Once through the quarantine outside Nafplion, Irinarkh composed a brief paper titled “On the condition of Orthodoxy in the Kingdom of Hellas and the declaration of the independence of that Church from the Patriarch of Constantinople, without consulting him about it.” The paper exemplifies the Russian conservative response to the church reforms. Irinarkh began by protesting that the assembly convoked to vote on the issue of church independence did not consist of archbishops, father superiors, or white priests. “Only bishops moved by their own personal self-interests and under the influence of foreign beliefs proclaimed the division of the Eastern Church.” Irinarkh placed most of the blame on the Regency: The behavior of the government in this matter is largely one of indiscretion and imprudence. The bishops’ attachment by sworn oath to the Altar of the Patriarch of Constantinople, which they were compelled to take upon assuming their offices, was done in a faithful and humble manner. By calling, or better said, by proclaiming the rupture with these sacred ties, without any prior arrangement with the patriarch, the government presents its subjects with a dangerous example of treachery. The people (narod) are unhappy with the division of the Church . . . The general tranquility and harmony of Greece is maintained on unstable foundations. . . . The poverty and disorder of the local church exceeds all comprehension. Tin vessels are used [during liturgy], and moreover in the worst condition . . . Archbishops serve liturgy without mitres, and some of the ones they use are in tatters.23

Less than a week later, Irinarkh elaborated his ideas in a longer memorandum titled “Observations on the Declaration of the Independence of the Church of the Greek Kingdom,” which he sent to the Imperial Legation in Constantinople and to the Ecumenical Patriarch, as well as to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. These “Observations” are literally a point-by-point critique of the Greek Church constitution. Irinarkh began his statement by questioning the sincerity of the delegates who signed the proclamation, insinuating that “the power of non-believers” had corrupted them. He wondered what authority the government had to divide the church, for such an act constituted dividing the body of Christ. Under the new law, he cautioned, nothing would inhibit the government from placing subservient men in positions of power. Irinarkh queried: Why aren’t the synod members given permanent appointments like in Russia? How can a Catholic king appoint members to an Orthodox synod? If the church was to be independent, why was the phrase ‘independent of any foreign power’ inserted instead of the term ‘autocephalous’? If the government was motivated by concern for the possible interference of the sultan, what would stop the pope from becoming involved in a kingdom whose sovereign is Catholic? The government claimed that it intended to improve religious services, but how could it know what religious affairs do and do not consist of? How are the people to show their enthusiasm for Orthodoxy by praying for 22

Katakazy to Nesselrode, Nafplion, July 19, 1833, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 83/1833, l. 103. “O sostoianii pravoslaviia v korolevstve Ellady i ob’iavlenii tamoshnei tserkvi nezavisimoiu ot Konstantinopolskogo Patriarkha, bes predeiavleniia emu ob etom,” Nafplion, Aug. 22, 1833, RGIA, f. 832, op. 1, d. 103, ll. 6–7. 23

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the king? Calling the king of Latin confession Devout Sovereign or other similar names would appear as corruptions (soblaznitel’nymi) for the Orthodox Greeks.

With respect to the last point, Irinarkh thought that the government would be better off remaining silent. Finally, it was obvious to Irinarkh that the constitution was drawn up without the help of the many spiritual books that the Greek Church in fact possessed.24 Irinarkh’s statements must have caused considerable apprehension in St Petersburg, for the Russian Foreign Ministry soon amplified its efforts to direct Greek ecclesiastical affairs. One of the first responses was to increase pressure on the young Bavarian-born sovereign to convert to Orthodoxy. The Russian mission attempted to accomplish this task through the manipulation of Othon’s education. Irinarkh brought with him a book by Metropolitan Filaret of Moscow which Katakazy translated as Entretiens entre deux personnes dont l’une examine l’orthodoxie de l’église greco-russe et l’autre en est persuadée. Katakazy tried to bring this volume and other works on Orthodoxy to Othon’s attention by giving them to Missail Apostolidis, a respected clergyman and, at the time, Othon’s Greek teacher. Katakazy encouraged Missail to engage in theological discussions with his royal pupil and to impress upon him the need to attend holy liturgy in public. Katakazy lamented the fact that Othon only celebrated Catholic mass in the interior of his home. Unfortunately, for the Russian mission, Othon did not seem interested in studying manuals on Orthodox belief, nor did he consent to celebrating liturgy in public.25 Spreading Greek church relief-aid was the task of Ambassador Katakazy and the other members of the Russian legation. Among the first acts of the ecclesiastical mission was the construction of a school in Athens. Concerned about the vices of youth, Katakazy decided in together with Irinarkh and Deacon Parfeny to create a class in which the mission cantors were to study for four hours a day: (1) the history of the Old and New Testament, (2) the Catechism, (3) Russian grammar, (4) arithmetic, (5) calligraphy, and (6) the reading aloud of spiritual books.26 Since Athens remained without a spiritual academy, classes from learned churchmen such as Irinarkh and Parfeny attracted curious Greeks, especially since schools supported by the Greek Church were considered schismatic. The Russian school also served to counteract the influence of schools headed by American missionaries, although the Russian counterpart did not generate the same degree of publicity. The activities of the Russian ecclesiastical mission played an important role in bolstering Orthodox traditions in the independent kingdom. Although well-funded, the Russian mission’s resources paled in comparison with the vast amount of public

24 “Zamechaniia na ob’iavlenie nezavisimosti Grecheskoi tserkvi,” Nafplion, Aug. 27, 1833, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 83/1833, ll. 181–200. 25 Katakazy to Nesselrode, Nafplion, Jan. 27, 1834, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 81/1834, ll. 245–51. For details about the Filaret volume, first publ. 1815, see W. W. Sawatsky, “Prince Alexander N. Golitsyn (1773–1844): Tsarist Minister of Piety” (Ph.D. diss., University of Minnesota, 1976), ii. 393–4. 26 See Anikita, Puteshestvie ieromonakha Anikity po Sviatym mestam Vostoka v 1834–6 godakh, ed. V. Zhmakin (St Petersburg: A. Katanskii, 1891), 126.

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support available to the BFBS.27 In Nicholaevan Russia, however, independent public associations, like the BFBS, were next to impossible, and thus the Russian ecclesiastical mission in Greece remained a purely state-run operation. In this respect, the centralized authority of the mission more accurately reflected the position of the Russian state in Greek Church affairs.

GREEK PETITIONS FOR RUSSIAN INTERVENTION Petitions written by Greeks in the archives of the Russian Holy Synod provide a barometer of Russian interest in Greek ecclesiastical affairs. Dozens of appeals composed by Greek clergy and ordinary laity testify to the quest for Russian intervention and material aid. A letter written by Father Kosmas Phlamiatos of Kephalonia to Father Eusebius Panas of the Patriarchal School in Constantinople typifies the Greek appeal for Russian protection.28 The letter reached the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Holy Synod through Sturdza and Golitsyn, and it was translated into Russian by Spyridon Destunis, a native of Kephalonia. In it, Phlamiatos articulates the distress felt among conservatives at the time: “In Greece, we know by both personal and official news that the church and the political condition of the people is in extreme danger,” because it “is slowly being taken over by the English.” The actions of the Protestant missionaries deeply troubled Phlamiatos, for “their teachings here, just as in the Greek kingdom, consist of introductions to Lutheran-Calvinism.” According to Phlamiatos, enemies of the Greek Church were using deception and secrecy to win over the masses, and “therefore our nation is threatened with the fate of the Jewish people.” Phlamiatos’s characterization of the so-called Age of Restoration reflects the general sense of xenophobia: “Of all the political declarations that the whole world has witnessed in the past years—the revolution in France, in Belgium, in Poland, the uprising of the Egyptian pasha and all things like it—all of these are episodes of one and the same comedy, which is now unleashed by the English people in order to concentrate the faults in unfortunate Greece.”29 Similar in spirit to Phlamiatos’s request for Russian succor is the collective petition by Archbishop Makarios Varamis, Archimandrite Daniil Agraphos, and eight Greek captains of the Pindus Mountains, to Aleksandr Sturdza in Odessa. Disturbed by the reforms of the new government, these individuals took refuge in 27 See the various chapters in Stephen Batalden et al., Sowing the Word: The Cultural Impact of the British and Foreign Bible Society, 1804–2004 (Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix Press, 2006). 28 The letter in Russian tr. is in “Pis’mo konstantinopol’skogo Patriarkha Konstantina Kn. A. N. Golitsynu o raskole grecheskoi pravoslavnoi tserkvi,” RGIA, f. 1409, op. 2, d. 5783, ll. 11–23. Letters from Greeks like this one are published in “O sostoianii grecheskoi tserkvi v 1833 i 1834 gg,” in Sbornik istoricheskikh materialov, izvelchennykh iz arkhiva sobstvennoi ego imperatorskago velichestva kantseliarii, ed. N. F. Dubrovin (St Petersburg: Gosudarstvennaia tip., 1876–1917), ix. 438–67. On Phlamiatos, see G. Metallinos, “K. Phlamiatos, enas martyras tis orthodoxou paradoseos sto elliniko kratos,” Theologia, 58 (Jan.–Dec. 1987): 294–321; ThIE 11: 1174–5; MEE 24: 50. 29 “Pis’mo konstantinopol’skogo Patriarkha Konstantina,” RGIA, f. 1409, op. 2, d. 5783, ll. 11–23.

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the mountains of Ottoman territory in the winter of 1833. By writing to Sturdza, they aimed to reveal to an experienced state servant the “miserable status” of the Orthodox people of Epirus, Thessaly, and Macedonia, and their struggle with the “evil machinations of impious apostles of foreign people.” They sought Russian protection, because: “Everything is being lost, our faith is in danger. We have decided either to die for her [our faith] or not to submit until she is cured. We hope that you, with the help of God, will cooperate with us to protect our faith. Thus, pay attention to the pitiful cries of your co-ethnics (edinoplemennykh). Hurry to help us or the Orthodox people will be deprived of courage!”30 Sturdza claimed to have no connection with these individuals, but his conscience obliged him to attend to their supplications. He received other letters from places as diverse as the Anatolian shore and the Adriatic Sea, such as the one by Priest Eugenios, dated January 15, 1834, which employs terminology similar to the Tsar’s conservative ideological trinity: “I sorrowfully and shamefully talk about my brothers in Christ, but if I remain quiet, then I would betray my conscience, church, and nation.”31 A conservative intellectual like Sturdza, firmly convinced of the superiority of Orthodox Greek-Russian culture over the Latin West, could hardly be expected to remain inactive. He warned Golitsyn of the dangers of the schism and demanded that something be done swiftly. Sturdza claimed that Russian intervention was legitimate and efficacious in such instances, and he reminded Golitsyn of Russia’s commitment to a concordat between the patriarch of Constantinople and Greece. Sturdza maintained that inertia on behalf of the Russian government would mean the ruin of the holy faith and the morals of Christians. He employed particularly menacing terms to describe the activities of English Methodists and American Quakers, who “are animated by a fanatic hatred towards our Church and who serve as instruments of a perverse policy that only Russia detests.” Sturdza demanded that action was needed to prevent these “heretical missionaries,” who were “openly protected” by the Bavarian Regency, from converging on Greek soil.32 The whole situation, however, placed Golitsyn in a bit of a dilemma, for he had supported the Quakers previously and could not be expected to consider their teachings as damaging to Orthodoxy. Golitsyn therefore submitted copies of the petitions to the Tsar Nicholas in May 1834 without editorial commentary. The Tsar considered them to be a matter of foreign policy and passed them on to Nesselrode. The upshot amplified the responsibilities of Katakazy and the ecclesiastical mission in Athens. The Russia cabinet in St Petersburg also received worrying reports from the Russian vice-consul on Zakynthos, Anton F. Sandrini, who criticized a proclamation of British High Commissioner, George Nugent, which promised equal treatment of religions in the Ionian Islands. Sandrini believed that the proclamation enabled a large number of Quakers and Methodists to practice missionary activities 30

RGIA, f. 1409, op. 2, d. 5783, ll. 36–7; Sbornik istoricheskikh materialov, ix. 451–2. RGIA, f. 1409, op. 2, d. 5783, l. 39; Sbornik istoricheskikh materialov, ix. 453. 32 Sturdza to Golitsyn, Odessa, Apr. 20, 1834, RGIA, f. 1409, op. 2, d. 5783, ll. 45–6; Sbornik istoricheskikh materialov, ix. 456–9. 31

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unimpeded, and that the local Greek clergy found the missionaries’ schools and their literature very threatening to Orthodoxy.33 The increased activity of Britishsponsored Masonic Lodges, furthermore, was considered an instrument of the antiChrist. Local clergy members claimed that through Masonry the British aimed to destroy the Orthodox Church.34 Taken as a whole, Greek appeals forced Russian government circles to consider seriously the fate of Orthodoxy in the Near East. Evidence that Russian intervention was needed to mend the schism is contained in the letters and writings of individuals such as Konstantin Lelli, Petr Rikman, and Sturdza. One interesting example is the eloquent epistle from Golitsyn to Patriarch Konstantinos that humbly calls for patience.35 These appeals coincided with an influx into Russian territory of Ottoman Greeks who, after taking an oath of loyalty to the Tsar, received Russian passports, and then returned to the Ottoman Empire with the benefits of tsarist protection, including relief from taxes and local jurisdiction.36 These petitions also increased the sense of urgency in the Russian cabinet for Othon’s conversion to Eastern Orthodoxy.

OTHO N ’S CO RO NA TI ON AN D TH E S TR OG A NO V MI S S IO N The main event of 1835 for the Greek kingdom was Othon’s twentieth birthday, marking the end of the Regency.37 The Regency planned for a great celebration in Athens, during which the church hierarchy would bless the King and anoint him with holy oil. The festivities were meant to exhibit the main symbols of the ancien régime: the crowning of a divinely sanctioned monarch as the incarnation of the state with sovereignty over all people and territories. Katakazy agreed that the coronation would be an ideal occasion to gain the people’s respect and love for the new dynasty. Yet he was disappointed that the young King, “while firmly committed to professing the Roman Catholic rite, desired that the religious ceremony of the coronation take place in the presence of Greek clergy, in the cathedral of Athens, and that the crown would be placed on his head by a Catholic prelate, followed by holy unction.” Without explicit instructions from St Petersburg, Katakazy advised the Holy Synod that the Orthodox Church could not 33 Sandrini to Nesselrode, Zakynthos, Dec. 5, 1832, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 225, ll. 2–3. Nugent’s “Proclamazione” is at ll. 3–7. Anton Frantzevich Sandrini (1777–1839) was vice-consul on Zakynthos 1833–9. See AVPRI, f. 159, op. 464, d. 2962; and VPR xv. 271–3. 34 See Thomas W. Gallant, Experiencing Dominion: Culture, Identity, and Power in the British Mediterranean (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2002), 200–1. 35 Golitsyn to Patriarch Konstantinos, St Petersburg, Dec. 3, 1833, RGIA, f. 1409, op. 2, d. 5783, ll. 65–9. 36 See H. H. Parish, The Diplomatic History of the Monarchy of Greece, from the Year 1830 (London: J. Hatchard & Son, 1838), 407–8; and Elpida K. Vogli, “Ellines to genos”: I ithageneia kai i tavtotita sto ethniko kratos ton ellinon (1821–44) (Irakleio: Panepistimiakes Ekdoseis Kritis, 2007), 179–80. 37 The King’s majority was reported in OV 54 (June 26, 1835), 57 (June 29, 1835); SPV 143 (July 27, 1835); Katakazy to Nesselrode, Athens, May 30, 1835, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 102/1835, ll. 135–6.

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permit the anointing of a Catholic king with holy oil. The advice of the Russian ambassador convinced many Greek bishops to leave the capital, forcing the Regency to alter its plans. During the coronation, Othon attended a service in St Irene where prayers were said for him, yet no representatives of the Russian mission were present, and members of the Holy Synod, according to Katakazy, “refused to give their approval to a project that so poorly conformed to the dignity of their religion and the stability of their church.”38 Thus, the coronation took place without the sacraments. However, the general atmosphere among the crowd remained cheerful. In the evening, the town was illuminated and outside observers described the reaction of the inhabitants as joyous. Russian traveler Vladimir P. Davydov remarked that upon hearing the news of the King’s ascension to power, the people shouted, “Good Othon! Long live Othon!”39 An important element of the coronation ceremony was the royal proclamation announcing the King’s majority and the foundation of a dynastic line. In the text of the decree, Othon promised to revere the Eastern Church and “to show particular attention to those matters which concern my descendants who shall inherit the throne of Greece.” Katakazy complained that the reference to Othon’s children, inserted into the manifesto at the last minute, left the future religious status of His Majesty’s progeny uncertain.40 Believing that a strict code of conduct was incumbent upon Christian rulers, Tsar Nicholas considered Othon’s coronation as incomplete without the sacraments. A few weeks after the ceremony, the Russian ambassador in London, Prince Khristofor A. Lieven, encouraged Katakazy to redouble his efforts “in a manner conforming to the wise and benevolent views of the Imperial Cabinet to influence the King’s religious instruction.” The Tsar considered the King’s conversion “as the most essential condition to our future rapports with Greece.” In the Tsar’s mind, “Othon freely accepted the crown of Greece. He solemnly promised to increase its peace and happiness. But he will not be able to fulfill this promise as long as he rests a stranger to his nation by the rite that he professes.”41 The policy of Nicholas I in Greece was an extension of his desire for unity in religious belief in Russia. The Russian Code of Laws (1833) required that Orthodoxy be the state religion, and that the Emperor be a member of the Orthodox Church “as a Christian ruler [who] 38 “Grèce (Mémoires sur le culte). Notions supplémentaires sur l’État de l’église en Grèce,” Aug. 5, 1836, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 89/1836, ll. 2–3. According to Charles Frazee, The Orthodox Church and Independent Greece, 1821–52 (Cambridge: CUP, 1969), 141, King Ludwig considered the Russian legation’s action on the day of the celebration as a grave insult. 39 V. P. Davydov, Putevye zapiski vedennye vo vremia prebyvaniia na Ionicheskikh Ostrovakh, v Gretsii, Maloi Azii i Turtsii v 1835 g. (St Petersburg: Tip. Eduarda Pratsa i Ko., 1839–40), i. 173–4. 40 Katakazy to Nesselrode, Athens, May 30, 1835, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 102/1835, l. 148. A tr. of the proclamation in Russian newspapers gave readers the impression that the King intended to raise his children in the Orthodox faith; the clause was vague enough to allow for speculation: SPV 156 (July 12, 1835); SPch 154 (July 13, 1835). 41 Lieven to Katakazy, Petergof, June 18, 1835; Lieven to Katakazy, Petergof, July 5, 1835, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 103/1835, ll. 50–3, 61. It is worth mentioning that the Tsar suggested on at least two occasions (in 1830 and 1832) that the Sultan, for the well-being of his reign, should convert to Orthodoxy. See Nicholas Riasanovsky, Nicholas I and Official Nationality in Russia, 1825–55 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1959), 264–5.

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is the supreme protector and preserver of the dogmas of the state faith.”42 Curiously, nobody seemed to recall that the Russian Church had declared itself autocephalous unilaterally in the sixteenth century and that Peter the Great’s ecclesiastical reforms created a Holy Synod led by a government official appointed by the crown. Ambassador Lieven’s instructions were consistent with Russian policy in the following months of 1835. Ironically, concern about Othon’s conversion resulted in Russia’s open engagement with the Greek Holy Synod for the first time. Katakazy encouraged the synod to become involved in the King’s confession and to bolster Othon’s resolve. However, Lieven cautioned the Russian envoy not to pronounce his opinions publicly and to use moderate language, for the Tsar did not want to appear to have a direct influence on the determinations of the King and thereby damage the moral vigor of the state.43 Katakazy also learned that St Petersburg was sending Count Aleksandr G. Stroganov (1795–1891), to the Greek court in the coming weeks. The “simple and courteous mission” was meant to congratulate the King on attaining his majority. Yet, as many suspected at the time, Stroganov’s intention was not to engage in honorific trivialities alone. Rather, the mission represented the Russian Tsar’s championing of legitimism and Orthodoxy in the Greek kingdom and the most direct attempt yet to convince the King to convert to the religion of his people.44 The Russian Foreign Ministry’s instructions to Stroganov, drafted in July 1835 and subtitled “principally relative to the need for King Othon to adopt the religion of his subjects,” open with a sketch of Russian–Greek relations during the period of the Regency. From the beginning, St Petersburg objected to the Regency’s reform methods and threatened to withhold financial aid. Events between 1834 and 1835 such as the pardoning of Kolokotronis and the forestalling of a constitution, raised St Petersburg’s confidence in the government, but the Tsar considered Othon’s conversion indispensable and considered the royal manifesto announcing the King’s majority too vague. The coronation ceremony was a purely civic act, and “the King’s authority in the eyes of the nation was deprived of the benedictions of the church.” Stroganov was instructed to convince Othon to resist foreign influences, gradually erase the divisions among the parties, and establish a firm administration based on monarchical institutions. Most importantly, Lieven instructed

42 Svod sakonov rossiiskoi imperii (St Petersburg: Pech. Graficheskogo Instituta, 1832), i, articles 42–3. 43 Lieven to Katakazy, Petergof, July 5, 1835, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 103/1835, ll. 77–84. 44 See “Grèce (Comte Stroganoff),” AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 105/1835; Lieven to Katakazy, Petergof, July 18, 1835, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 103/1835, ll. 101–4; and Katakazy to Lieven, Athens, Sept. 2, 1835, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 102/1835, ll. 189–91. Count Aleksandr Grigor’evich was the son of the former Russian ambassador to the Sublime Porte. Frazee, The Orthodox Church, 141, incorrectly refers to Aleksei Grigor’evich (1791–1831), Aleksandr’s younger brother. See also, Aleksandr G. Stroganov to Grigorii A. Stroganov, Athens, Aug. 23, 1835, RGADA, f. 1278, op. 1, d. 141, ll. 140–1. According to T. Evangelidis, Istoria tou Othonos Vasileos tis Ellados (1832–62) (Athens: A. G. Galanos, 1893), 119, the mission was meant to cement ties to the Greek throne through marriage to a Russian female. Davydov, Putevye zapiski, ii. 84, surmised that Stroganov was visiting Athens to give Othon the Order of St Andrew First Class.

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Stroganov to “combine all our efforts to affirm the new dynasty” through the unity of the sovereign with the faith of his subjects. Like Katakazy, Stroganov was ordered to employ moderate, unprovocative language so as not to excite the foreign diplomats “who are preoccupied by the fear of seeing Russia acquire a preponderant influence.”45 The Russian newspaper Messenger of Odessa reported that Stroganov had an audience with the Sultan on Friday August 10 before leaving for Greece.46 Arriving in Athens in late August, Stroganov’s appearance “produced an excellent effect in these countries,” according to Katakazy, who remarked that the count’s mission “proves to the Greek nation, as well as to the other co-religionist peoples of Russia, that our August Master, in his pious solicitude for the unity and maintenance of the Orthodox church, employs all possible means of persuasion to enlighten the young sovereign of Greece of his most sacred tasks, as well as of the dangers to which he exposes his throne and adoptive country.”47 In the following weeks, Stroganov met with the King frequently, causing him considerable distress. The Russian envoy pressured the King to convert for several reasons: the Tsar consented to his appointment at the London Conference on the condition that he eventually become Orthodox; the coronation was incomplete without the sanction of the church; Russian aid would end without such a conversion; and the rapport between Russia and Greece risked being broken entirely. Stroganov reserved the final point as a last resort.48 Stroganov also discussed foreign policy, internal administration, finances, and commercial affairs with the King. With respect to external affairs, he advised Othon to engage in neighborly relations with the Sublime Porte and to resist opportunities of enlarging the kingdom, especially in the case of future actions by the Egyptian pasha. Regarding domestic affairs, Stroganov encouraged the King to bring about a fusion among the various parties.49 Finally, Stroganov gathered information on Greek commerce in order to expand trade relations between southern Russia and the Near East. In keeping with the principles of Official Nationality, Stroganov advised Othon to resist subversive doctrines and external challenges, warning that revolutionary tendencies, overtly hostile toward Russia, were infiltrating the kingdom by way of malcontents in Serbia and the Danubian principalities. Foreign adventurers and Greek students who attended schools abroad were added sources of corruption. Stroganov advised Othon to restrict students from travel and to resist actions like 45 “Instruction à l’aide-de camp Génl. Comte Stroganoff,” stamped “Approved by the Emperor,” Petergof, July 13, 1835, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 105/1835, ll. 6–35. A more legible revision dated July 16, 1835 is at ll. 36–65. 46 OV 70 (Aug. 13, 1835). 47 Katakazy to Lieven, Athens, Sept. 2, 1835, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 102/1835, l. 191. According to E. Driault and M. Lhéritier, Histoire diplomatique de la Grèce de 1821 à nos jours (Paris: PUF, 1925–6), ii. 141, Stroganov’s visit “produced a grand sensation.” 48 “Instruction à l’aide-de camp Génl. Comte Stroganoff,” AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 105/1835, ll. 46–8. 49 Stroganov’s language corresponded with the phenomenon of fusionism (synchonevsis), or Napofusionism, referred to in the Greek newspapers at the time. The movement was meant to bring about the partial fusion of the French and Russian parties. See Petropulos, Politics and Statecraft, 308.

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those recently taken by Serbian primates who “imposed a constitutional regime on their country.” Stroganov informed the King that eliminating any indication of constitutionalism was the object of a special mission to Serbia by the former Russian envoy to Greece, Baron Petr Rikman.50 Despite official claims of nonintervention, Stroganov’s mission represented a serious attempt to influence the Greek government and its people. Stroganov employed incentives, such as the guarantee of the third part of the loan and a promise of 3 million francs immediately, as well as deterrents, in the form of threats, to ensure that Athens followed Russia’s advice. Rumors about these incentives circulated among the foreign embassies, and Stroganov was forced to reply that Othon’s conversion was not a condition for Russian assent to the third part of the loan, merely an encouragement. However uncomfortable the meetings between the two men may have been, Othon honored Stroganov on the eve of his departure with the highest decoration awarded by the Greek state, the Order of the Savior.51 Unfortunately, for Russian policy-makers, Stroganov’s mission did not result in Othon’s conversion, but it showed the Greek nation, as well as other co-religionists of the Levant, that Tsar Nicholas would use all possible means of persuasion to convince the King of the need to embrace the religion of his subjects.52 From a purely political perspective, the system of rule which emerged in Athens after Othon’s coronation complemented Russian absolutism. Although he may have personally disliked King Othon, Nicholas I supported the idea of unfettered autocracy. Overall, Russian aims were met during the next few years as Othon concentrated authority into his own hands. No other foreign power gained a preponderant influence in the country. Brigandage was gradually brought under control. The country did not expand its borders. The Holy Synod was led by conservatives, and no further religious reforms were initiated. However, problems remained which entangled the Russian state and society in Greek affairs, including the matter of finances, the regular army, and the spread of foreign missionary societies. In this regard, Russia was fortunate that it could draw on the services of likeminded Greek clergy in its struggle to protect the canons of Orthodoxy.

THE ECCLESIASTICAL MISSION AND T HE RUSSOPHILES: K ONSTANTINOS OIKONOMOS Since its arrival in Greece in the summer of 1833, the Russian ecclesiastical mission worked to support the majority of traditionalist clergy, politicians, and intellectuals 50 “Instruction à l’aide-de camp Génl. Comte Stroganoff,” Petergof, July 16, 1835, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 105/1835, l. 54. 51 See Lieven to Stroganov, Petergof, July 18, 1835, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 105/1835, ll. 68–9; and A. G. Stroganov to G. A. Stroganov, Athens–Constantinople, Sept. 12–21, 1835, RGADA, f. 1278, op. 1, d. 141, l. 142. 52 According to Driault, Histoire diplomatique de la Grèce, ii. 141–2, upon return from Greece, Stroganov showed Nicholas a letter from Othon stating, “I have taken the resolution to raise my sons destined for the throne of Greece in the Oriental religion.”

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in constructing a kingdom founded on the principals of Official Nationality. The foremost champion of the traditionalists, and undoubtedly the most pronounced opponent of the church reforms, was Konstantinos Oikonomos of the House of Oikonomos (1780–1857). His vision and labor was largely responsible for the reconciliation of the Greek Church with Constantinople in 1850.53 A charismatic priest, an outstanding scholar and brilliant orator, Oikonomos helped preserve the distinctive character of the Greek Church as preeminently Orthodox (see Figure 4.1). Born into a prominent family of priests in the village of Tsaritsani in Thessaly, Oikonomos began his education at home under the guidance of his learned father, who taught him Greek philology and Latin. As a teenager at the school in Ambelakia, he studied French, mathematics, philosophy, theology, and other subjects, including the writings of Adamantios Korais. In 1801, at the age of 20, he was ordained a deacon, and five years later a priest (presvyteros). He also married and had two children. Gaining prominence for his sermons, he quickly progressed through the ecclesiastical ranks and traveled widely in Ottoman Europe. For the next several years, Oikonomos taught and gave sermons at schools in Thessaloniki and elsewhere. Although elements of his preaching caused suspicion, in 1808, Patriarch Gregorios V invited Oikonomos to the monastery of St Ioannis in the archdiocese of Serres. Then, from 1809 to 1819, Oikonomos, his brother Stephanos, and their colleague Konstantinos Koumas taught philosophy, physics, history, mathematics, Latin, and geography at the Philological Gymnasium in Smyrna.54 There Oikonomos corresponded with Korais and became further acquainted with the Greek philologist’s teachings, including his view that the New Testament should be revised and republished. While in Smyrna, Oikonomos was 53 A modern biography of Oikonomos is sorely needed. The most important starting points are S. Oikonomos (ed.), Ta sozomena ekklisiastika syngrammata Konstantinou Presvyterou kai Oikonomou tou ex Oikonomon (Athens: F. Karampinos, 1862–6); and K. Lappas and Rodi Stamouli (eds), Allilographia (Athens: Academy of Athens-K.E.M.N.E., 1989–2001). For contemporary Russian accounts, see SPch 87 (Apr. 24, 1857); “Slovo, proiznesennoe Mikhailom Skhinasom v tserkvi Sv. Iriny (v Afinakh) pri pogrebnii Konstantina Ikonomosa, presvitera i Ikonoma,” KhCh 2 (Mar. 1857): 52–66; “Konstantinos Oikonomos,” Zhivopisnaiia russkiia biblioteka, 3 (1858): 12–23; and G. S. Destunis, “O zhizni i trudakh K. Ekonomosa,” Strannik, 3 (1860): 1–23. See also A. Goudas, Vioi paralliloi ton epi tis anagenniseos tis Ellados diaprepsandon andron (Athens: K. Antoniados, 1869–76), i. 169–206; Ch. Papadopoulos, Istoria tis ekklisias tis Ellados (Athens: Typogr. P. A. Petrakou, 1920), 145–64; Lewis J. Patsavos, “Konstantinos Oikonomos of the Oikonomoi,” in N. Michael Vaporis (ed.), Post-Byzantine Ecclesiastical Personalities (Brookline, MA: Holy Cross Orthodox Press, 1978), 69–85; D. S. Balanos, O Konstantinos Oikonomos o ex Oikonomos (Athens: Pyrsou, 1932); Balanos, “Konstantinos Oikonomos o ek Oikonomon,” Ekklisia, 34 (1953): 491–8; ThIE 9: 682–6; MEE 13: 144–5; RBS 24: 213–14. 54 See P. M. Kitromilides, Religious Criticism between Orthodoxy and Protestantism: Ideological Consequences of Social Conflict in Smyrna (Brookfield, VT: Ashgate/Variorum, 1994); Nikos Kararas, Konstantinos Oikonomos o ex Oikonomon kai i Smyrni (Athens: Enoseos Smyrnaion, 1971); E. G. Vallianatos, “Konstantinos Koumas and the Philological Gymnasium of Smyrna, 1810–19,” EEQ 6/4 (1973): 419–43; Vallianatos, From Graikos to Hellene: Adamantios Koraes and the Greek Revolution (Athens: Akadimia Athinon, 1987), 85–92; and G. Chassiotis, L’Instruction publique chez les Grecs, depuis la prise de Constantinople par les Turcs jusqu’à nos jours (Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1881), 66–8. Oikonomos wrote a short history of the bustling port: Aftoschedios diatrivi peri Smyrnis (Meliti: I en Londino Apostoliki Etaireia, 1831); Etude sur Smyrne, tr. B. F. Slaars (Smyrna: B. Tatikian, 1868). The study has recently been tr. into Turkish: Izmir: Destanlar Çağından 19. Yüzyıla: Etude sur Smyrne (Istanbul: Iletişim, 2001).

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Fig. 4.1. Konstantinos Oikonomos, from G. S. Destunis, “O zhizni i trudakh K. Ekonomosa,” Strannik, 3 (1860), facing p. 1.

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able to explore the subjects that interested him most on a consistent basis. The time spent there was one of the most creative periods of his life. He wrote books on philology, rhetoric, grammar, the Catechism, a translation of Molière’s comedy Le Misanthrope, and numerous other works, including a draft translation of the New Testament.55 The Philological Gymnasium was a success. Russian consul-general in Smyrna, Spyridon Destunis, noted that the richest and most honorable members of the country supported the school. Yet the progressivist viewpoint of Oikonomos and Koumas brought them into conflict with Smyrna’s conservative circles and its metropolitan, Kallinikos. According to Destunis, Kallinikos had a “profound secret hatred against Oikonomos, who is very erudite, very eloquent, and of irreproachable conduct.”56 Destunis characterized Kallinikos as “a pompous politician; in order to dominate, he has divided the inhabitants and raised the people against those individuals who are distinguished for their birth, riches, and education.” Oikonomos’s teaching on the other hand “is modern and naturally charitable.”57 Incensed with Oikonomos’s untraditional views, Kallinikos sent emissaries among the people spreading the idea that Oikonomos did not observe the canons and gave erroneous lessons to the youth. Despite the intervention of the Ecumenical Patriarch Gregorios V, who addressed an encyclical to “the Greek nation” (pros to Genos) recognizing Oikonomos as an excellent theologian and respected teacher, mounting public criticism forced Oikonomos and Koumas to leave Smyrna in July 1819.58 Their misfortune, according to Destunis, epitomized the low degree of culture in the port city. In the summer of 1819, Oikonomos moved to Mytilene. Because of his outstanding erudition and religious zeal, the patriarch in May 1820 appointed him “Catholic Missionary of the Great Church” and invited him to Constantinople. When the Greek Revolution broke out the following year, Oikonomos escaped the turbulent and charged atmosphere of the city by fleeing to Odessa. One of his first actions there was to give a sermon at the funeral service of Patriarch Gregorios V, whose body, after numerous calamities, had arrived in Russia for burial. Oikonomos filled his famous speech with statements meant to rouse the Russian people to aid their oppressed co-religionists.59 55 Technis ritorikis vivlia G (Vienna: I. Sneirer, 1813); Katichisis, i, Orthodoxos didaskalia tis Christianikis pisteos (Vienna: I. Sneirer, 1813); O Philargyros kata tou Molierou (Vienna: I. V. Tsveikig, 1816); Grammatikon i egkyklion paidevmaton vivlia D’ (Vienna: I. V. Tsveikig, 1817). See also N. Vamvas, Antepikrisis eis tin ypo tou presvyterou kai oikonomou Konstantinou tou ex Oikonomon (Athens: Angelos Angelidis, 1839), 36. 56 S. Destunis, “Chernovoi otpuski i donesenii i pisem ego za 1818–21 g.,” Smyrna, July 21, Nov. 17, and Oct. 30, 1819, OR RNB, f. 250, d. 40, ll. 60–2, 113–17, 183–5. For further commentary on Smyrna and Oikonomos, see S. I. Destunis, “Dnevnik, Smirna do smutty,” Smyrna, Apr. 10, 1819– Feb. 6, 1821, OR RNB, f. 250, d. 55; S. Destunis, “Turetskie smutty v Smirne v 1821: Otryvok iz dnevnika,” OR RNB, f. 250, d. 56; and G. Destunis, “Neskol’ko obrabotannykh materialov dlia biografii ottsa,” OR RNB, f. 250, d. 243. 57 Destunis to Sturdza, Smyrna, May 5, 1819, OR IRLI, f. 288, op. 1, d. 178, l. 1. 58 Papadopoulos, Istoria tis ekklisias, 151. 59 K. Oikonomos, Logos epitaphios eis ton aeimniston Patriarchin Konstantinoupoleos Grigorion (St Petersburg: Synod. Tip., 1821). Two published trs of the eulogy exist into Russian, including the one by Aleksandr Sturdza: Perevod nadgrobnogo slova blazhennomu Konstantinopol’skomu patriarkhu Grigoriiu (St Petersburg: N. Grech, 1821); it also was available in French. Other contemporary Russian accounts of the patriarch include A. S. Sturdza, “Pamiat’ Grigoriia V, patriarkha

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In the next year, Tsar Alexander I invited Oikonomos to St Petersburg, where he was sponsored by the Greek family Mourouzis, relatives of the Sturdzas. In the northern capital, Oikonomos succeeded in gaining favor in ecclesiastical and state circles, and he resumed his scholarly activities. After meeting with Prince Golitsyn, the president of the Russian Bible Society, Oikonomos suggested that the society consider using his translation of the New Testament, which, unfortunately he had left behind in Constantinople. The Russian Bible Society discussed this proposal, but apparently the matter did not proceed further.60 Meanwhile, he published several grammatical booklets, translations, and essays, including a short work for Kapodistrias on plans for a Greek academy, and a poem in Russian and Greek on the death of Tsar Alexander I.61 In an age when Russian philological study was in its infancy, Oikonomos completed a three-volume bi-lingual work demonstrating the close relationship between Greek and Slavic. Oikonomos aimed to show how linguistic affinities coincided with the bond of common faith. His dedication to Nicholas I summoned the Tsar to assist in the liberation of “oppressed Hellas” as Russia’s traditional Orthodox protectorate.62 He also assisted Nikolai I. Gnedich in his famous translation of Greek folksongs.63 These activities facilitated Oikonomos’s election to the St Petersburg Theological Academy and the Imperial Academy of Sciences. His experience in Russia from 1821 to 1833 marks an amazing shift toward more conservative views, both linguistic and theological, especially in the matter of scriptural translation. From being a disciple of Korais and partisan of Western ideas, he became a conservative and implacable opponent of biblical translation. Perhaps the criticism mounted against the Russian Bible Society by Archimandrite Fotii and others, which led to its closure in 1826, influenced his ideological transformation. Indeed, he began to venerate what he had once spurned and spurn what he had once venerated. Since Konstantinopol’skogo,” Moskv, 3/6 (1842): 380–4; S. S-v., “Grigorii Vi Patriarkh Konstantinopol’skii, postragavshii ot Turok v 1821 godu,” Moskv, 5/10 (1844): 441–8; V. Zhmakin, “Pogrebenie konstantinopol’skago Patriarkha Grigoriia V v Odesse,” Strannik (May 1871): 177–91; and Sovremennyia bumagi o konchane i pogrebenii Patriarkha Grigoriia, 1821 (St Petersburg: Synod. Tip., 1871). 60 On the Russian Bible Society, see Stephen K. Batalden, Russian Bible Wars: Modern Scriptural Translation and Cultural Authority (Cambridge: CUP, 2013); A. N. Pypin, Religioznayia dvizheniia pri Aleksandre I (Petrograd: Izdatel’stvo “OGNI,” 1916); Judith Zacek, “The Russian Bible Society and the Russian Orthodox Church,” Church History, 35/4 (1966): 411–37; Zacek, “The Russian Bible Society and the Catholic Church,” Canadian Slavic Studies, 5/1 (1971): 35–50. 61 O nachale obyknoveniia upotrebliat’ krasnye iaitsa vo vremiia Paskhu (St Petersburg: Morsk. Tip., 1826); Plan tserkovnoi akademii dlia grekov (St Petersburg: n.p., 1827); Poiima elegeion eis ton aoidimon aftokratora pason ton Rossion Alexandron Proton (St Petersburg: Tip. Departamenta Narodnago Prosveshcheniia, 1828); Peri tes gnisias prophoras tis ellinikis glossis (St Petersburg: Tip. Dimosiou Paidevseos, 1830). See also Papadopoulos, Istoria tis ekklesias, 155–7. 62 Opyt o blizhaishem srodstve iazyka slaviano-rossiiskogo s grecheskim (St Petersburg: Akademiia Nauk, 1828). See also I. I. Martynov, Nastavlenie ob istinnom proiznoshenii nekotorykh grecheskikh bukv, izvlechennoe iz knigi o sem zhe predmete grecheskogo sviashchennika Ekonomosa (St Petersburg: Tip. Departamenta Narodnago Prosveshcheniia, 1831); and S. Smirnov, K. Ekonomos i sochinenie ego o srodstve slaviano-russkogo iazyka s ellinskim (Moscow: n.p., 1873). 63 N. I. Gnedich, Prostonarodnye pesni nyneshnikh grekov s podlinnikom (St Petersburg: N. Grech, 1825). See also G. Evlampios, Amarantos, ili rozy vozrozhdennoi Ellady (St Petersburg: Akademiia Nauk, 1843), p. iv.

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his role in the ecclesiastical history of Greece in the 1830s and 1840s is so important, his experience in Russia is worthy of a special study.64 In 1833 Oikonomos decided to return to Greece. His subsequent journey took him through several European countries: he met with Kaiser Wilhelm II of Prussia and made an impression on the future biblical scholar Constantin von Tischendorf in Berlin. In Rome, he was received cordially by Pope Gregory XVI and several cardinals. Finally, in October 1834, Oikonomos set foot in the independent kingdom of Greece for the first time. Too late to participate in the ecclesiastical reforms, but with a real sense of mission, Oikonomos immediately expressed his personal antipathy to the reforms and the reformers. The traditionalists now had their leader, one whose intellectual power and energy were equal to their opponents. Throughout the 1830s and 1840s, Oikonomos published and reprinted his patriotic and dogmatic works (notices of which appeared in the Russian press) criticizing the reforms and aiming to widen the church’s influence in Greek political and social life. His arrival coincided with the arrest and trial of Kolokotronis, and his presence did much to encourage the pro-Russian group. However, Katakazy insisted that the distinguished cleric was devoted solely to his literary works, and because of his advanced age and infirmity, had made only a few rare visits to the Russian embassy since his arrival in Greece. In fact, Oikonomos never asked for special protection and did not behave like a Russian subject or a member of the Russian clergy. Although he remained in contact with Russian clergymen, such as Archimandrite Irinarkh and the subsequent leaders of the Russian ecclesiastical mission, and requested assistance from the Russian Holy Synod, this is insufficient evidence to suggest that he was acting under the Tsar’s orders.65 Foremost among Oikonomos’s many activities was the struggle against foreign missionaries and their efforts to translate scripture into Modern Greek. His primary opponents were the BFBS, the American missionary Reverend Jonas King, and the group of liberal Greek theologians led by Theoklitis Pharmakidis and Neophytos Vamvas.66 Russian responses to the spread of missionary societies and efforts to translate the scriptures in Greece illustrate attempts to implement Official Nationality abroad. Representatives of the BFBS and American missionary groups first came to Greece in the eighteenth century. By the early 1830s, their influence was rather strong.

64 For outstanding service, Oikonomos received the Order of St Anne and a lifelong pension of 7,000 rubles. The pension was, in part, compensation for the loss of his library that was consumed in a fire in St Petersburg. See the brief report by O. E. Misiurevich [Petrunina], “Konstantin Ikonomos i ego literaturnaia deiatel’nost v Odesse i S.-Peterburge v 1821–32 gg.,” in Ukraïna-Gretsiia: Istoriia ma suchasnist’. Tezi II (Kiev: Institut istorii Ukraïna, 1995), 87–90. 65 Katakazy to Nesselrode, Athens, Apr. 10, 1840, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 9/1840, l. 127; Archimandrite Porfirii to A. S. Sturdza, Constantinople, Oct.1, 1843, OR IRLI, f. 288, op. 1, d. 215, ll. 3–4. Frazee, The Orthodox Church, 134, overstates Oikonomos’s contacts with the Russian mission. 66 See Nomikos Michael Vaporis, “The Controversy of the Translation of the Scriptures into Modern Greek and its Effects, 1818–43” (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1970); M. Siotes, “Konstantinos Oikonomos of the House of Oikonomos and the Operations of the British Bible Society in Greece (1780–1857),” Greek Orthodox Theological Review, 6/1 (Summer 1960): 7–55; and Papadopoulos, Istoria tis ekklisias, 152–3, 195–223, 272–94.

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One of the missionaries’ main tasks was to secure the prevalence of a modern version of the scriptures. Other events, such as the creation of the Russian Bible Society, and Korais’s call for a new version of the Bible, accelerated their designs. In 1834, the BFBS helped publish Vamvas’s translation of the Pentateuch and the Books of Joshua and Isaiah from the Hebrew text.67 The event raised a storm of protest, and occupied the core agenda of religious debate in Greece for the next fifteen years. Oikonomos, fresh from similar debates in Russian religious circles, believed that the translation of the scriptures constituted one of the most delicate of theological tasks. While endorsing biblical commentary in the vernacular, Oikonomos was categorically opposed to new translations, which according to him would detract from their authenticity. A priest and colleague of Oikonomos, named Germanos, also attacked Vamvas’s translation as inaccurate and an instrument of Protestant missionaries. In two special letters to the editor of the Greek newspaper the Savior, Germanos denied the need for a translation of the Bible, because the Septuagint was available already in Greek. He scrutinized sections of Vamvas’s edition with the standard text published in Moscow. Vamvas fired back with a rebuttal in Athina and a pamphlet titled An Answer to Mr Germanos’s Diatribe against the Translation of the Holy Scriptures and the Bible Society.68 The Greek Synod responded in a long letter to the government, forbidding the distribution and use of the vernacular Bible until it had examined its contents.69 The intense struggle over translation, coming at the precise moment of the controversy of the independence of the Greek Church, interweaved politics, national identity, and religion. The question of biblical translation was inseparable from the schism and the interference of the great powers, and thus no room existed for purely religious debate. With the support of Oikonomos, Germanos began to publish his own newspaper, the Evangelical Trumpet, which aimed to combat heresy and alter the ecclesiastical structure of the Greek Church. Thus, Oikonomos and the traditionalists had a forum for their views. Attacks and counterattacks followed in a wave of blistering treatises, letters, pamphlets, and newspaper columns.70 The debate became so intense that the newly elected patriarch, Gregorios VI (1835–40), a traditionalist dedicated to extinguishing Protestant activity within his jurisdiction, organized a special committee and issued a general encyclical, countersigned by the other Orthodox patriarchs, condemning Protestant literature

67 N. Vamvas, Esoterikai energeiai tis empnevseos ton Graphon (Ermoupolis: I. I. Roberts, 1834). See also T. H. Darlow and H. F. Moule, Historical Catalogue of the Printed Editions of Holy Scripture in the Library of the British and Foreign Bible Society (London: Bible House, 1903–11), ii. 684–6. 68 See Sotir, 45 (June 21, 1834), 53 (July 3, 1834), 55 (July 29, 1834); Athina, 172 (Aug. 21, 1834); and Vamvas, Apantisis pros tin genomenin diatrivin para tou kyriou Germanou kata tis metaphraseos ton Ieron Graphon kai kata tis Vivlikes Etaireias (Ermopoulis: Philelliniko Typographeio ex Amerikis, 1834). 69 The letter to the Ministry of Ecclesiastical Affairs, dated Sept. 4, 1835, is reprinted in Oikonomos, Ta sozomena, ii. 301–5. 70 See Vaporis, “The Controversy,” 131–75.

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and heretical translations. Notice of the patriarch’s encyclical appeared in the Evangelical Trumpet.71 Vamvas was not content to remain a passive observer; he left Syros for Athens, where he organized a school for refugees from Chios in Piraeus. Toward the end of 1838, he published a brief treatise in defense of modern translations, arguing that the word of God should be written and taught in the language spoken and heard by the people, just as God taught the ancient Christians in ancient Greek. Vamvas accused Oikonomos of declaring war on the Modern Greek language.72 Although the Greek Synod remained opposed to the missionaries and translation work of Vamvas, the Ministry of Ecclesiastical Affairs and Public Education, led by Iakovos Rizos Neroulos, extended its blessings. Thus, the attitude of the government facilitated the appearance of Vamvas’s translation of the New Testament (completed with the help of British missionary H. D. Leeves) in print in 1838.73 The Holy Synod responded that “the Orthodox Church could justly hope that no son of hers would be found to cooperate and work with the heterodox on a translation for which it was impossible to avoid condemnation and rejection.”74 The pro-Russian newspaper the Century, furthermore, actively opposed Vamvas and “these so-called missionaries, because their books and schools undermine Orthodoxy and promote the foreign spirit (to xenon pnevma).”75 In the following years, Oikonomos continued to protest against Vamvas, Pharmakidis, and their supporters, and each side produced pamphlets, treatises, and letters. In 1835, for instance, Oikonomos published his Epistolary Treatise on the Three Hierarchical Orders of the Church, Including the Genuineness of the Apostolic Canons, which was aimed directly against Protestant missionaries and Greeks in sympathy with them. In 1839, in a book of nearly four hundred pages, Criticism Against the “On the New Greek Church”: A Brief Reply of the Most Erudite Master, Mr Neophytos Vamvas, Oikonomos expressed his reservations concerning all translations of the scriptures and literally offered a page-by-page scrutiny of his rival’s opinions. Katakazy supported the work, noting that it produced a profound impression on the local public, and he sent a copy signed by the author to Tsar Nicholas.76 Vamvas replied to Oikonomos’s Criticism with his own massive 71 See the various documents in Manouil Gedeon (ed.), Kanonikai diataxeis: Epistolai, lyseis, thespismata ton agiotaton patriarchon Konstantinoupoleos (Constantinople: Ek tou Patriarchikou typographeiou, 1888–9), ii. 248–80; and Evangeliki salpinx, 1 (Apr. 25, 1836). 72 N. Vamvas, Peri tis neoellinikis ekklisias tin opoian o aidesimotatos Presvyteros kai Oikonomos Konstantinos o ex Oikonomon symperainei ek tis metaphraseos ton Ieron Graphon (Athens: G. Polumeris, 1838), 5–6, 10, 15. 73 Tis Kainis Diathikis (Athens: A. Koromilas, 1838). 74 Oikonomos, Ta sozomena, ii. 387; Papadopoulos, Istoria tis ekklesias, 212. 75 Aion, 59 (Apr. 30 1839). On contemporary samizdat Russian trs of the scriptures, see Stephen K. Batalden, “Gerasim Pavskii’s Clandestine Old Testament: The Politics of Nineteenth-Century Russian Biblical Translation,” Church History, 57 (1988): 486–98. 76 Peri ton trion ieratikon tis Ekklesias vathmon epistolimaia diatrivi en i kai peri tis gnisiotetos ton Apostolikon Kanonon (Nafplion: K. Tobra Kydonieos kai K. Smyrnaios, 1835); Epikrisis eis tin peri neoellinikis ekklisias syntomon apantisin tou sophologiotatou didaskalou kyriou Neophytou Vamva (Athens: K. Rallis, 1839); Katakazy to Seniavin, Athens, Apr. 28, 1839, AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 400, ll. 83–4; Katakazy to Nesselrode, Athens, Aug. 17, 1839, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 11/1839, l. 350.

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Countercriticism, claiming that he had been misquoted and falsely accused.77 To this Oikonomos responded with his most substantial work of all, the four-volume On the Seventy Translators of Ancient Holy Scripture.78 Oikonomos tried to generate support in Russia by complaining to Sturdza, Golitsyn, and other members of the religious establishment of Pharmakidis’s “incorrect opinions about the importance of the Holy Fathers and the Holy Cross” and of the “damaging publications of Vamvas and the newspaper Athina.” Characteristically, Sturdza opposed the uncanonical translations and proposed translating his own religious studies in order to combat the deeds of the “Westernizers” and missionaries.79 In a strategy unequivocally parallel to movements in Russian intellectual circles, the Russian state supported the polemic between Oikonomos and Pharmakidis, arguing that it exposed the Greek people to the extreme danger of heterodox forces. Russian officials and Russophiles like Oikonomos also devoted their attention to the fight against Protestant schools. After the establishment of the Greek government, the representatives of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions were in an exceptionally favorable position. The most visible missionaries were the Protestant Episcopal John J. Hill and the Reverend Jonas King. In 1831, Hill and his colleagues started one of the first schools in Athens. Students from all over were invited, and eventually the enrollment reached 700, most of whom were girls. The Greek government at first did not impede the creation of schools like Hill’s, for they were considered to be of a purely educational character. The Russian government and the Russophiles, however, thought that their aim was essentially to proselytize.80 Russian reports of non-Orthodox teachings reached St Petersburg through several channels. In early 1833, Russian consul in northern Greece, Ioannis Paparrigopoulos, informed Katakazy that American missionaries in Athens had been teaching the Gospels in Greek for two years. At first, they taught the dogmas without commentary, but soon they began to circulate books that “exposed children to Protestant principles, while ridiculing the sign of the cross and reverence for saints, and calling into question the divine nature of the Holy Virgin.” The

77 Antepikrisis eis tin ypo Presvyterou kai Oikonomou Konstantinou tou ex Oikonomon epikrisin (Athens: A. Angelidis, 1839). See also Th. Pharmakidis, O Psevdonymos Germanos (Athens: n.p., 1838). 78 Peri ton Erminefton tis Palaias Theias Graphis (Athens: P. V. Melahouri kai Ph. Karabini, 1844–9). 79 “Vypiska iz pis’ma Sviashchennika Ikonomosi k Strurdze,” Athens and Odessa, June 27–July 29, 1838, RGIA, f. 1661, op. 1, d. 506. See also, Sturdza to Protasov, Odessa, July 18, 1841, RGIA, f. 797, op. 11, d. 28159, ll. 68–9. A Greek tr. of Sturdza’s Pis’ma o dolzhnostiakh sviashchennogo sana was published in the 1840s, and 400 copies were sent to the Orthodox of Greece and the Near East. See “O knige tainago sovetnika Sturdzy pis’ma o dolzhnostiakh sviashchennogo sana,” May 1, 1841– Apr. 10, 1843, RGIA, f. 797, op. 11, d. 28173; K. Oikonomos, Alexandros o Stourzas: Viographikon schediasma (Athens: Ph. Karabinis, 1855), 70–1. 80 The activities of American missionaries are explored in detail in the excellent work by P. Thanailaki, Ameriki kai Protestantismos: I “Evangeliki Aftokratoria” kai oi oramatismoi ton Amerikanon misionarion gia tin Ellada to 19o aiona (Athens: Kastaniotis, 2005). See also Th. Saloutos, “American Missionaries in Greece: 1820–69,” Church History, 24 (1955): 152–74; and Gerasimos Augustinos, “ ‘Enlightened’ Christians and the ‘Oriental’ Churches: Protestant Missions to the Greeks in Asia Minor, 1820–60,” Journal of Modern Greek Studies, 4/2 (1986): 129–42.

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missionaries’ goal, according to Paparrigopoulos, was the fall of the Eastern Church, and he singled out Hill and King for their anti-Orthodox behavior. Worst of all, since they were no longer content to rent homes for their schools the Americans bought land and constructed large buildings. The Russian envoy received warnings of a religious war “more terrible and fierce than the one which brought them [the Greeks] independence.”81 As the leading exponent of the traditionalist view, Oikonomos did not remain on the sidelines of the fight against foreign missionaries. In a personal letter to Destunis, he complained that Protestant missionaries were spreading books “in our language” which had corrupting influence on the Greek people, and he beseeched his friend to intervene.82 Even the first American representative to Greece, Gregory A. Perdicaris, recognized the unpopularity of the missionary schools. “The schools of American missionaries,” wrote Perdicaris, though very excellent in themselves, and very important as auxiliaries, when we consider the state of the country, were never regarded as national institutions; and while there were many of the Greeks who thought them great blessings, the mass of the people, with the church at their head, looked upon them with suspicion, and believing them to be nurseries of proselytism, never failed to oppose their influence and their progress.83

Russia’s anti-Protestant campaign in Greece reached its zenith in the early 1840s, and the defenders of Orthodoxy appealed to national sentiment in their writings. Conservative leaders of Russian officialdom could not comprehend how Protestants could spread their propaganda among the Greeks in a language other than that in which the Evangelists wrote themselves. In fighting foreign missionaries, Russia and the Russophiles worked together to defend the canons of Orthodoxy. Many issues of the Century reported the anti-Orthodox deeds of the leaders of the missionary schools.84 The newspaper’s main attack was directed against the school of John Hill, and it enjoyed some success. Because of the Century’s demands, the government investigated the school’s activities and eventually succeeded in acquiring a book from one of the schools which contained Protestant beliefs. The upshot was that Hill and his colleagues were compelled to curtail their activities, despite the support of Athina.85 Oikonomos and his Russian supporters backed the investigation, and replied with their own missionary message.

T H E RU S SI A N E C C L E SI A S T I C A L M I S S I O N I N A C T I O N In June 1835, Archimandrite Irinarkh petitioned the Asiatic Department for his recall, declaring that “the extremely hot summer and unusually damp winter here, 81

3–6.

Paparrigopoulos to Katakazy, Athens, July 1, 1833, AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 264/1833, ll.

“O missionerakh v Gretsii,” OR RNB, f. 250, d. 133. G. A. Perdicaris, The Greece of the Greeks (New York: Burgess, 1845), ii. 293. 84 See e.g. Aion, 42 (Feb. 22, 1839), 280 (July 30, 1841), 286 (Aug. 20, 1841), 342 (Apr. 1, 1842), 352–3 (May 13, 1842), 405 (Dec. 16, 1842), 406 (Dec. 20, 1842), 408 (Jan. 1, 1843). 85 Athina, 912 (Apr. 29, 1842), 913 (May 2, 1842). 82 83

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especially in the poorly constructed buildings, aggravates my suffering to the utmost degree and makes me particularly incapable of performing the tasks that I was sent here to do.”86 In August, Asiatic Department Director Rodofinikin transferred Irinarkh’s request to Ober-prokuror Nechaev, who discussed the matter with the Holy Synod. Irinarkh nominated Archimandrite Porfirii of the Uspenskii Monastery in Odessa as his substitute, based upon Porfirii’s “moral quality and his knowledge of the contemporary Greek language.”87 Irinarkh also wrote to Golitsyn from Athens requesting funds with which to travel home. He complained again of the climate, the incomplete Russian chapel, and “evangelists who remain all day in the square.” Golitsyn showed Irinarkh’s letter to the Emperor, who returned it with the response in pencil: “agreed” (soglasen). On September 2, Ober-prokuror Nechaev informed the synod of the Tsar’s decision to have Irinarkh return to the fatherland.88 Upon his arrival in St Petersburg in January 1836, Irinarkh received the Order of St Vladimir third class. The Holy Synod sent him to Tolgskii monastery with instructions to write a detailed report on the contemporary condition of the Greek Church.89 The fact that a copy of Irinarkh’s memorandum, titled “General Observations on the Condition of the Church in the Kingdom of Greece” (presented to the Section of Spiritual Affairs in the Department of Greek-Russian Confession), was sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, demonstrates that the upper echelons of the Russian government were terribly interested in the fate of Orthodoxy in Greece. The basic idea of the memorandum was that the Greek Church was undergoing a profound crisis. Irinarkh claimed that the Greek clergy were not in a position to correct the Bavarian church legislation independently, because they were uneducated, indifferent, and overwhelmed by the influence of non-believers. Irinarkh discussed, in detail, the dissolution decrees, the abolition of eparchies, the spread of missionaries, and Protestant book publishing. He concluded that the government was unsympathetic to religion and worse, they sent students to Munich to learn foreign ways: “Such is the condition of the Greek Church in the new kingdom! Separated from its center, enslaved by a king of foreign belief, degraded by submission to the minister of religious affairs, prey to enemy doctrines, threatened by the liberty of the press, she stands on the path towards her thoroughgoing transformation.”90 According to Nesselrode’s commentary, the Tsar read Irinarkh’s evaluation with profound dismay. The Russian foreign minister and the ambassador to Greece Zhmakin, “Osnovanie russkoi dukhovnoi missii v Afinakh,” 345. Rodofinikin to Nechaev, St Petersburg, Aug. 17, 1833, RGIA, f. 797, op. 4, d. 17815, l. 38. 88 Irinarkh to Golitsyn, Athens, June 1, 1833; Golitsyn to Nechaev, St Petersburg, Aug. 27, 1833; Golitsyn to Nechaev, St Petersburg, Aug. 28, 1833; Nechaev to Rodofinikin, St Petersburg, Sept. 22, 1833, RGIA, f. 797, op. 4, d. 17815, ll. 42–3, 40, 41, 46. 89 Protasov to Nesselrode, St Petersburg, 1836, AVPRI, f. 161/3, d. 2/1836. 90 The original document in Irinarkh’s handwriting is in RGIA, f. 797, op. 5, d. 17966; a more legible copy dated Mar. 31, 1833, is in RGIA, f. 797, op. 97, d. 391; parts are in French tr. in AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 11/1836, ll. 375–84. It is published in Zhmakin, “Osnovanie russkoi dukhovnoi missii v Afinakh,” 346–50. 86 87

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confirmed Irinarkh’s views, even though they remained more optimistic of a future remedy. According to Katakazy, the church had prevailed through three centuries of slavery under an Islamic empire, and it would doubtlessly triumph against the attacks of the heterodox government.91 Nesselrode also protested against the practice of sending Greek students to study abroad and pointed out that there was still no ecclesiastical school in the kingdom. He objected to the abolition of metropolitans and archbishops, the sale of sacred objects, and the monastic dissolution decrees. He even suggested that conditions in convents were less oppressive during Ottoman times. Nesselrode found it insulting that a minority in the Greek government persecuted the Orthodox, but respected the integrity of Catholic Greeks, and allowed American missionaries to spread their views. He believed that the “fatal schism” had been avoided, thanks in part to the actions of the Russian mission. Nesselrode’s advice to Katakazy was to intensify his expostulations and to find the means to protect the dominant religion. Katakazy feared that the church question caused the Emperor to be dissatisfied with him.92 With the threat of non-Orthodox missionary activities looming, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs soon took up the task of finding a candidate to occupy Irinarkh’s vacant post.93 Katakazy recommended Archimandrite Porfirii Uspenskii, but the synod considered him too valuable for service abroad. Then the Ministry of Foreign Affairs asked the synod to name “an individual of moral fortitude from a monastery who was of mature age and equipped with an excellent knowledge of Greek.” In an announcement dated October 1835, the Metropolitan of Novgorod Serafim designated Holy Father Anikita (Prince Sergei A. Shirinskii-Shikhmatov, 1783–1837) to occupy Irinarkh’s post. Already on pilgrimage in the Near East, Anikita did not receive notice of his appointment until he was in Haifa in April 1836.94 A nobleman by birth, by the 1830s Anikita was a distinguished cleric known for his profound religiosity, high education, and excellent command of Greek. He began his schooling in the Moscow cadet corps, and in 1804, he began service as a 91 “It would be perhaps superfluous to say,” Katakazy noted, “that the Imperial Legation in Greece is far from being a stranger or a passive spectator.” Katakazy promised that he would use all his power and influence to bring an end to the “malevolent attacks” against the church. See “Grèce (Mémoires sur le culte),” Aug. 5, 1836, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 89/1836, ll. 1–8. 92 Nesselrode to Katakazy, St Petersburg, May 12, 1836, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 11/1836, ll. 367–74; Katakazy to Nesselrode, Athens, Mar. 19, 1836, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 11/1836, l. 112. 93 In the following years, Irinarkh served as the bishop of Riga and vicar of the Pskov Bishopric, where he worked toward the suppression of Old Believers and other schismatic groups. In 1841, he was named vicar of Voronezh Bishopric; and in the next year bishop of Vologda; in 1844, he became bishop (later archbishop) of Kishinev; in 1858, he was named archbishop of Kamenets-Podol’skii, and in 1863 archbishop of Riazan. In 1867, he retired to a monastery for reasons of health. Several books of sermons, letters, and prayers were posthumously published: Sem’ slov’ o vere opravdyvaiushchei, o neobkhodimosti dobrykh del v dele spaseniia, o raspolozheniiakh potrebnykh v molitve, i o nekotorykh usloviiakh molitvy (Moscow: Univ. Tip., 1868); Pouchitel’nye slova na voskresenye dni (Moscow: Univ. Tip., 1868); Besedy i slova na nekotorye prazdnichnye, voskresenye i vysokotorzhesvennye dni (Moscow: Univ. Tip., 1868); Pauchitel’nye slova na katikhizis pravoslavnoi tserkvi (Moscow: Univ. Tip., 1868); and Pis’ma preosviashchennogo Irinarkh (Vologda: Volog. Gub. Prav., 1886). 94 Nechaev to the Holy Synod, St Petersburg, Oct. 9, 1835; Nesselrode to Nechaev, St Petersburg, Jan. 7, 1836, RGIA, f. 797, op. 4, d. 17815, ll. 49, 53.

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naval officer. In 1809, he became a member of the Academy of Sciences, and two years later inspector of the school at Tsarskoe Selo. After acquiring numerous merits of distinction, he took monastic vows in 1830 at the Iur’ev Monastery in the Novgorod district. From 1832 to 1833, he visited Solovetskii, Svirskii, Varlaamskii, and other Russian holy sites. In April 1834, he set off for the Near East, visiting Constantinople, Mount Athos, Thessaloniki, Cyprus, Jerusalem, Bethlehem, and the Dead Sea, noting his impressions of monasteries, churches, and sanctuaries in eight notebooks.95 On his travels, Anikita developed a strong affection for the Greek world. In the words of church historian Vasilii I. Zhmakin: “As a Russian patriot, and moreover as a profoundly religious, deeply spiritual, and devoted Orthodox churchman, Prince Sergii Shikhmatov could not but sympathize with our co-religionists – the Greeks.”96 On August 11, 1836, Anikita arrived in Piraeus where he was warmly greeted by Katakazy and the other members of the Russian legation. After several months of observation, he composed a scathing critique of the Greek educational system, the synod, and the laws concerning the dissolution of monasteries. “Public education,” wrote Anikita, “which the government seems to care for, not only is founded on foreign belief, but rests singularly on the sands of superstition and false doctrine.” He protested at the actions of American missionaries in the capital and other cities who “took children from poor families” and taught them “clearly abusive gossip against the reverence of holy icons, holy power, holy obligations . . . and in general against all of Orthodoxy.”97 Anikita sent a similar statement to Metropolitan Filaret of Moscow, and urged immediate intervention in favor of the unity of the Church of Greece with the patriarchate. Unfortunately, Anikita’s service in Greece was brief. Unrelenting travels and the climate took their toll on his health, and the Russian synod released him from service in April 1837 because of chronic illness. Despite the last-minute assistance of King Othon’s personal physician, Anikita passed away in Athens on July 7, 1837, apparently from an intestinal disorder. The funeral was conducted with great solemnity at the Monastery of the Archangel Michael east of Athens, and a special eulogy was prepared by Deacon Parfeny.98 At this point, Katakazy petitioned the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Holy Synod to fill the empty post by promoting Deacon Parfeny, but once again his proposal was disregarded. From November 1838 until the summer of 1843, the management of the ecclesiastical mission was in the hands of Archimandrite Anatolii Zographos. A Russian of Greek extraction, Anatolii had a native 95 See O zhizni i trudakh ieromonakha Anikity, v mire kniazia Sergiia Aleksandrovicha Shikhmatova, 2nd edn (St Petersburg: Tip. Morskago Kadetskago Korpusa, 1853); OV 65 (Aug. 14, 1837); and V. Zhmakin, Puteshestvie ieromonakha Anikity po sv. Mestam Vostoka v 1834–6 godakh (St Petersburg: A. Katanskii, 1891). 96 Puteshestvie ieromonakha Anikity, 115. 97 Anikita to Platon Aleksandrovich Shirinskii-Shikhmatov, Athens, Apr. 26, 1837, in Puteshestvie ieromonakha Anikity, 118–24. 98 “Podrobnosti o smerti ieromonakha Anikity, so slov’ diakona Partheniia, nakhodivshagosia pri russkoi missii v Afinakh i prisutstvivavshago pri ego konchine,” in Puteshestvie ieromonakha Anikity, 125–7.

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knowledge of the Greek language and customs. He actively supported Oikonomos and the Russophiles in the question about church independence and received praise for his moral and zealous activity by Patriarch Gregorios VI.99 In the winter of 1841–2, Archimandrite Anatolii and Deacon Parfeny requested to be relieved of their posts, complaining that the climate was damaging to their health. Katakazy sympathized and granted Anatolii leave to recuperate in a monastery on Mount Athos. He also petitioned the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for help in acquiring a pension for Parfeny, who had served in a zealous and distinguished fashion in Athens for eight years. After considerable discussion, Anatolii was given permission to return to Russia. He was replaced by Archimandrite Polikarp (Fedosii I. Radkevich, 1798–1867), a master of theology and rector of the Spiritual Academy of Smolensk.100 The Tsar granted Parfeny 300 silver rubles to return to the fatherland, and a place was reserved for him at the Alexander Nevski Lavra in St Petersburg. His post was filled by Nikolai Ziablovskii of the St Petersburg Spiritual Academy.101 Although Russian policy in Greece cannot be described as aggressive in character, vigorous action was employed in special situations. The main sphere where Russia could support its protagonists, while not making itself appear to be interfering, was in the area of religious education and book publishing. In addition, the Russian embassy chapel (the late tenth-century Byzantine church of the Resurrection, or the Savior of Kottaki) served as a focal point of Russian activities. Liturgies were reportedly popular there because the Gospels and chants were in Greek. Greek conservatives, furthermore, believed that only in this chapel was the celebration of the Orthodox liturgy authentic, since their Church was in schism.102 With respect to literary enterprises, the newspaper Evangelical Trumpet, edited by Father Germanos, was funded by the Russian Foreign Ministry in order to wage a campaign against the Protestants and the translation of the Bible. According to 99 “Ob opredelenii na vakansiu sviashchennika pri tserkvi missii nashei v Gretsii Grecheskago Ieromonakha Anatoliia,” RGIA, f. 796, op. 118, d. 1213. 100 Petr Polidorov, “Proesviashchennyi Polikarp, episkop orlovskii i sievskii (ocherk ego zhizni),” Strannik (1870): 239–63. Polikarp later became the bishop of Odessa, Orlov, and Sevsk. See Mara Kozelsky, Christianizing the Crimea: Shaping Sacred Space in the Russian Empire and Beyond (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 2010), 63, 86–7, 114, 121. 101 “O predosuditel’nom povedeniu grecheskoi missii Kameneva i nasnachenii k nei missii regenta,” St Petersburg, Apr. 24, 1836–Oct. 1, 1843, RGIA, f. 797, op. 5, d. 18881. For further details on the membership and activities of the ecclesiastical legation, see “O vozvrashenii v Rossiiu sostoiashchago pri tserkvi missii nashei v Afinakh,” RGIA, op. 797, op. 5, d. 18579; “Ob uvol’nenii ot dolzhnostei nakhodiashchikhsiia pri missii nashei v Gretsii . . . ,” RGIA, f. 797, op. 11, d. 28833; “O dozvolenii vozvratityia v Rossiiu . . . pevchemu Sedenko, i opredeleniia na mesto ego Iakova Gaveliia,” RGIA, f. 797, op. 12, d. 30541; “O dostavlennoi grecheskaiu missiiu vedomosti kasatel’no sostoianiia tserkvi,” RGIA, f. 797, op. 13, d. 32623; “O prislannom ot byvshego nastoiatelia posol’skoi tserkvi nashoi v Afinakh Arkhimandrita Anatoliia obraze Sv. Georgiia, Pavla I Arkhangelov,” RGIA, f. 797, op. 13, d. 32635; “O dosvanii nakhodiashcheshusiia pri tserkvi missii nashei v Gretsii regentu Sichinskomu vosvratitsiia v Rossiiu,” RGIA, f. 797, op. 13, d. 32637. 102 “Grèce (Mémoires sur le culte),” Aug. 5, 1836, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 89/1836, ll. 6–7; “Iz pisem D. V. Polenova vo vremia poezdki ego v Gretsiiu i sluzhby pri tamoshnem posol’stve. 1832–5,” Russkii arkhiv, 3 (1885): 135–6. See also, “Russian Policy in Greece,” Foreign Quarterly Review, 32 (Jan. 1836): 374.

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Russian archival records, the Evangelical Trumpet was meant to benefit a wide audience, including parents, children, and clergymen. In keeping with the tsarist axiom of Official Nationality, it emphasized themes such as the health of the fatherland and the sanctity of religious authority. The newspaper was printed in clear language and divided into sections on holy worship, church history, moral teachings, and miscellaneous advice on health, marriage, good deeds, and so on.103 More specifically, the newspaper hammered away at the ideas of Pharmakidis, Vamvas, and other Greek liberals. Numerous articles accused the government of non-canonical practices, such as allowing ordinary priests to function as full members of the synod.104 Katakazy allocated 5,000 rubles to the newspaper enterprise each year, and the Asiatic Department gave Germanos a complete set of the Russian journal Christian Reading. Moreover, Aleksandr Sturdza began advertising subscriptions to the Evangelical Trumpet in various venues in Odessa and Taganrog.105 Katakazy energetically supported publications that promoted Russian views. In the spring of 1839, for example, he informed the Director of the Asiatic Department, Lev G. Seniavin, that of the sum given by the Russian government to the mission, 7,232 rubles were to be used toward subsidizing newspapers such as the Observer and the Century, and preparations were initiated for the publication, in Greek, of Eugenios Voulgaris’s collected works. Katakazy wrote that the Observer deserved Russian support because it reinforced Orthodoxy and refuted the works of American missionaries.106 Katakazy also petitioned the Asiatic Department to help Greeks living in Russia stay informed of affairs in their homeland through a subscription to the Greek Courier, and he granted 550 rubles to help publish, in Greek, the Metropolitan of Moscow Platon’s work, the Catechism. Ironically, it is likely that the Greek rendition of Platon’s Catechism distributed by the Russian embassy was originally translated by Korais.107

103 The full run of the Evangeliki salpinx is available in two bound volumes (P48.2s and P4821s) in the Gennadius Library and on microfilm at the Greek Library of Parliament. For commentary, see Oikonomos, Ta sozomena, i. 516–21; Rodofinikin to Katakazy, St Petersburg, Apr. 28, 1836, AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 358/1836, l. 69; and Papadopoulos, Istoria tis ekklisias, 195, 199, 212–13, 273, 274. A yearly subscription cost 20 drachmas, or around 16 rubles, 60 kopeks. See “Ob Evangel’skoi Trube, izdaemoi v Gretsii Ieromonakhom Germanosom,” 1835–43, RGIA, f. 797, op. 5, d. 21346. 104 Oikonomos’s Peri ton trion ieratikon tis Ekklisias is also devoted to these topics and provides a critique of Korais’s religious views. For commentary, see S. Iu. Destunis, “Zametki, sdelannye rukoi S. Iu. Destnisa na knigakh i proch.,” OR RNB, f. 250, d. 126, l. 1. 105 Rodofinikin to Katakazy, St Petersburg, July 7, 1836, AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 358/1836, l. 98; and “Iz tserkovno-obshchestvennoi zhizni,” KhCh 1 (Jan.–Feb. 1896), 127. 106 See Katakazy to Seniavin, Athens, May 11, 1839, AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 400, l. 79; Katakazy to Seniavin, Athens, Apr. 22, 1838, AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 383, l. 89; Petrunina, Grecheskaia natsiia, 266. 107 Seniavin to Katakazy, Feb. 22, 1840, AVPRI, f. 165/2. op. 507, d. 412/1840, l. 72; Katakazy to Seniavin, Athens, May 11, 1839, AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 400, l. 77; Katakazy to Rodofinikin, Aegina, Sept. 30, 1836, in K. Papoulidis, “Rosiko endiapheron gia tin Ekklisia tis Ellados tin epochi tou Othona,” Theologia, 58 (1987): 150–1; Sophia Th. Grigoriadou, I Orthodoxi skepsi ston Adamantio Korai (Athens: Syllogos pros Diadosin Ophelimon Vivlion, 2002), 132–6; and Paschalis Kitromilides, Enlightenment and Revolution: The Making of Modern Greece (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013), 414–15.

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Sturdza contacted many prominent members of the Russian clergy in order to draw attention to what he considered the deplorable state of religious affairs in Greece.108 In November 1838, Sturdza and Ober-prokuror Nikolai A. Protasov initiated plans for the publication, in Greek, of the Imperial and Patriarchal Letters on the Establishment of the Synod in Russia and the Orthodox Confessions of the Eastern Catholic Church by the famous seventeenth-century monk Petr S. Mohyla.109 Translations of these works were intended to protect the Orthodox from the influence of Methodists, English proselytes, and Roman Catholics. According to Protasov, co-religionist Russia was obliged to protect the Greeks through books that contained healthy lessons in belief.110 After lengthy discussion, the synod decided to publish 1,500 copies of Mohyla’s texts in Greek for complimentary delivery throughout the Orthodox churches of the Near East. The cost of the project was nearly 1,500 rubles. Patriarch of Constantinople Anatolii received 619 exemplars, while former Patriarchs Gregorios and Konstantinos were given 11 copies each. Methodios, patriarch of Antioch, received 141 copies, and the patriarchs of Alexandria, Jerusalem, and Archbishop of Cyprus Ioannis were sent 26 exemplars each.111 In spring 1839, the Asiatic Department continued the project “to strengthen our co-religionist Greeks” by distributing free copies of books containing healthy messages of Orthodox belief. Katakazy received ten copies, in Greek translation, of three books by the popular religious writer Andrei N. Murav’ev: Letters on Divine Service, Exposition of the Symbol of Truth, and History of the Russian Church.112 The reason for sending the books, according to Protasov, was to “expose the false doctrines of American missionaries whose aims are against the dogma of the Orthodox Church.” Flattered by the proposal, Murav’ev thought that his book the Exposition of the Symbol of Truth was appropriate for the task. Metropolitan of 108 “Po zamecheniiam tainigo sovetnika Sturdzy o vrednykh deistviiakh Angliiskikh i Amerikanskikh Metodistov stremiashchikhsia k iskazheniiu Pravoslaviia v Grecheskom korolevstve,” 1838–40, RGIA, f. 797, op. 8, d. 24216. 109 According to the Russian consul in Beirut K. M. Bazili, Mohyla’s Tsarskye i patriarshye gramoty ob uchrezhdenie v Rossii Sv. Sinoda and Pravslavnoe ispovedenie vostochnoi katholicheskoi tserkvi and the Katekhisis of Holy Father Arsenii also were tr. into Arabic in order to counteract missionary activity in the Levant. See Bazili to Sturdza, Beirut, Feb. 18, 1842, OR IRLI, f. 288, op. 1, d. 155, ll. 1–2; and Porfirii to Sturdza, Beirut, Dec. 8, 1843, OR IRLI, f. 288, op. 1, d. 215, ll. 5–6. 110 Protasov to the Holy Synod, St Petersburg, Nov. 1, 1838, RGIA, f. 797, op. 8, d. 24236, ll. 1–2. A marginal note states that the Emperor was asked to allocate funds for the task from the account of the Committee for Spiritual Teaching. 111 The cost of publishing 1,300 exemplars on normal paper and 200 on the best paper was 675 rubles. 64 rubles and 98 kopeks were required to send them in six boxes from St Petersburg to Odessa, and it cost 20 silver rubles to send them from there to Constantinople. The cost of dispatching 450 copies from Constantinople to the Russian mission in Athens was 141 Turkish piasters 32 paras. Two copies were deposited in the Russian Public Library in St Petersburg and the rest were left with Sturdza to distribute as he saw fit. See “O napechatennii perevod Prostrannago Katikhizisi Pravoslavnoi Katholicheskoi Vostochnoi Tserkvi na novogrecheskom iazyke,” Apr. 24, 1840–Oct. 10, 1843, RGIA, f. 797, op. 11, d. 28159; Protasov to the Holy Synod, St Petersburg, Apr. 29, 1840, Nesselrode to Protasov, St Petersburg, Jan. 23, 1841, RGIA, f. 797, op. 8, d. 24236, ll. 41–2, 66. 112 Seniavin to Katakazy, St Petersburg, May 23, 1839, AVPRI, f. 165/2, d. 399, ll. 53–4. See also, Petrunina, Grecheskaia natsiia, 267; and Boris Fonkich, “The Greek Manuscripts of A. N. Murav’ev,” MGSY 4 (1988): 235–54.

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Kiev Filaret initially concurred that Murav’ev’s books would help to combat bad influences in Greece. However, the proposal triggered a formal review of Murav’ev’s works. Filaret sent Protasov his own copy pointing out various mistakes with copious marginalia in pencil. Murav’ev responded with a testy reply to Filaret’s criticisms, and it seems that Filaret dropped the issue.113 Other publications in the Greek language, sponsored by Russia, include collections of sermons by the famous missionary to eastern Siberia and Alaska, Bishop Innokentii (he ended his career as Metropolitan of Moscow), and the extremely successful Kyriakodromion of Nikiphoros Theotokis, which was printed no less than ten times between the late eighteenth and early twentieth centuries.114 In the summer of 1840, Director Seniavin sent Katakazy five copies of Canonical Decrees of the Orthodox Church in Greek, and two years later the Asiatic Department and the Russian synod sent Archimandrite Anatolii 230 exemplars in Greek translation of The Complete Orthodox Catechism for free distribution among the Greek clergy.115 When they arrived, Katakazy wrote that, “I haven’t abandoned applying authoritative means to execute goals of pious intention while performing [my functions]. However, I have used proper caution in order to avoid any possible harmful or improper interpretations on behalf of the missionaries and other foreigners residing in the East who operate in order to harm the Orthodox Church in Greece, as well as in Turkish territories.”116 Katakazy’s communication demonstrates that the Russian government did not want to advertise its actions directed toward strengthening its influence in Greece, so as not to jeopardize its relations with the other foreign powers. Unfortunately, for Russia, the other powers refused to believe the Tsar’s concerns were genuinely religious. French historian and statesman François Guizot, for example, wrote in his memoirs that St Petersburg “permitted the rebirth of Greece on the condition that she would be so small and weak that she would barely survive and never be able to grow.”117 Edmund Lyons, the British representative in Athens, went so far as to suggest that the Russian government wished to overthrow the Wittelsbach dynasty, and British historian, Charles Webster, claimed that Russia for long hoped to 113 “O rast. v Gretsii dukhovnykh sochinenii A. N. Murav’ev,” RGIA, f. 797, op. 8, d. 24570. “O zamechaniiakh Mitropolita Kievskago Filareta na knigu: Izlozhenie Simvola Veri Pravoslavnoi Katholicheskoi Tserkvi, sostavlennuiu kamer. Murav’evim,” RGIA, f. 797, op. 8, d. 24571 contains Filaret’s copy of the book. Murav’ev’s works were also distributed in the Levant by Bazili: “O gramote Patriarkha Antiokhiiskago na imia Sv. Sinoda i o pis’makh k kalergeru Murav’evu Patriarkhov Konstantiia i Methodiia i Konsula Bazili o poderzhanii pravoslavie na Vostoke,” Mar. 13–20, 1842, RGIA, f. 797, op. 12, d. 29813. See also, A. N. Murav’ev, Moi vospominaniia (Moscow: Synod Tip., 1913), 46–7. Gregory Freeze, The Parish Clergy in Nineteenth-Century Russia: Crisis, Reform, CounterReform (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 46, claims that the books did not reach Athens. 114 Innokentii (Ivan Popov), Odigos eis tin vasileian ton Ouranon (Odessa: Gosud. Tip., 1843); Nikifor Theotokis, Kyriakodromion (Moscow: Synod. Tip., 1837). 115 Seniavin to Katakazy, St Petersburg, Aug. 8, 1840, AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 412/1840, l. 38; Seniavin to Katakazy, St Petersburg, Oct. 10, 1842, AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 474/1843, l. 27; and Petrunina, Grecheskaia natsiia, 267. 116 Katakazy to Seniavin, Athens, Apr. 11, 1843, AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 475/1843, l. 15; Petrunina, Grecheskaia natsiia, 267. 117 F. Guizot, Mémoires pour server à l’histoire de mon temps (Paris: Michel Lévy, 1858–67), vii. 264.

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reverse the church reform, because it “rightly considered that this reduced Russian influence in Greece.”118 Indeed, the separation with the Ecumenical Patriarchate cut an important tie between Greece and the ancient center of Eastern Orthodoxy, but this did not mean that Russia aimed for the overthrow of Othon and the demise of a strong Greek state. Historians strongly influenced by the hatred of Russia propagated by the British Foreign Secretary and Prime Minister Lord Palmerston (among other Russophobe western statesmen) underestimated the Tsar’s religious devotion and the degree of pious motivation behind his foreign policy. Far from wishing to foment rebellion among the Greek subjects and the Ottoman Orthodox, the Tsar earnestly desired, in concert with the Sultan, the reconciliation of the Greek Church with the patriarch, not a radical change of the status quo. In addition to promoting Official Nationality in Greece through the spread of literature and material aid, Katakazy tried to stifle subversive ideas among Greeks living in Russia. For example, having learned that Alexandros Manos, Greek consul-general in Odessa, subscribed to the pro-English newspaper Athina, Katakazy informed the Asiatic Department and the Military Governor of Odessa, Aleksandr P. Tolstoi (later the Ober-prokuror of the Holy Synod), accordingly. He recommended prohibiting circulation of the paper in Russia because of its violent proclamations against the royal government and its ultra-liberal principles. Apparently, Manos read the journal aloud at his home to friends and acquaintances. Katakazy informed the Greek government that it would be far more respectable if Manos subscribed to the official government gazette or, in the extreme case, to journals of individual publishers who were more inclined to support the government and observe decent, healthy judgments. Katakazy also recommended the expulsion of Greek adventurers residing in Russia to the Third Department of His Majesty’s Own Chancellery.119

GREEK ECCLESIASTICAL AFFAIRS A ND T HE RI S E OF TH E R U SS O PHI LES In May 1836, Othon traveled abroad in search of a bride (Figure 4.2). Before leaving Athens, he sanctioned a new government and gave former Regency President Armansperg the position of Arch-chancellor (archikangellarios) which enabled him to ratify treaties, pardon the condemned, control the finances, and supervise the affairs of the Greek Holy Synod. To fulfill these tasks he was furnished with a budget of 40,000 drachmas. Katakazy wrote that the departure of the King did not

118

Charles Webster, The Foreign Policy of Palmerston (London: G. Bell, 1951), i. 496, 502–3. Katakazy to Seniavin, Athens, Oct. 15, 1838; and Katakazy to A. P. Tolstoi, Athens, Oct. 1838, AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 383, ll. 64–71. “O grecheskom poddannom Velio zamechennom s nevygodnoi storony v nravstvennom i politicheskom otnosheniiakh,” GARF, f. 109, 1 exped., op. 17/ 1842, d. 248, ll. 1–13. See also C. Papoulidis, “Un document caractéristique de Gabriel Catacazy tire des Archives de la Politique Extérieure de Russie,” BS 9 (1982): 341–7; and Petrunina, Grecheskaia natsiia, 267. 119

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Fig. 4.2. Othon, King of Greece, bids farewell. December 1832. Lithograph by G. Podt after Philipp von Foltz. Courtesy of the Anne S. K. Brown Military Collection, Brown University.

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make a good impression on the Greek public who considered Othon as their last hope against the foreign administration.120 Othon’s choice of bride naturally interested Russian officialdom. In response to Katakazy’s inquiry, Armansperg guaranteed that Othon’s children would be raised in the Orthodox Church even if he married a Protestant princess. When Katakazy learned of Othon’s decision to marry Amalia of Oldenburg (the ceremony took place in Munich in October 1836), a Protestant duchess, he thought that it had produced a bad impression on the public. Kallogerakis echoed this view and warned that people were murmuring about new disorders in Rumelia due to the government’s policy toward religion.121 Fortunately, when Othon returned to Athens in February 1837, his subjects greeted him with flowers, fireworks, and shouts of “Long live Othon!” Katakazy remarked of the “sincere and general joy among all classes” upon the sight of the young beautiful queen in national costume. According to Nesselrode, the marriage contract stipulated, “that the children of His Majesty the King will be raised according to the Greek religion.”122 Several months later Russian readers learned of the King’s declaration that he would indeed raise his children in the Orthodox Church.123 During the King’s absence Armansperg provoked considerable political opposition. His unpopularity, reported in Russian dailies in early 1836, led to his dismissal. Upon arrival in Athens, the King named Ignaz von Rudhart as Armansperg’s successor. St Petersburg supported Rudhart, especially since his clear and simple principles were similar to those of Austrian minister Klemens von Metternich. The Russian cabinet sincerely wished for the success of his administration and even corresponded with Rudhart in German, the new minister’s native language.124 Rudhart responded by praising Katakazy’s “distinguished character and wise, prudent conduct,” and he helped the Russian cause by arranging for the recall of Spyridon Trikoupis as ambassador in London and replacing him with Mikhail 120 Armansperg’s new title and responsibilities were reported in Ephimeris, 18 (May 4, 1836); Sotir, 96 (May 24, 1835); SPV 143 (July 27, 1835); and Katakazy to Nesselrode, Athens, Apr. 30, 1836, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 11/1836, l. 139. 121 Kallogerakis to Katakazy, Oct. 12,, Sept. 28 and 22, 1836, Patras, AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 352/1836, ll. 11, 22, 32. 122 Katakazy to Nesselrode, Athens, Feb. 7, 1837, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, b. 8/1837, ll. 153–4; Nesselrode to Katakazy, St Petersburg, Sept. 15, 1836, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 11/1836, l. 418. The royal marriage and Othon’s return to Athens were reported in OV 101 (Dec. 16, 1836), 20 (Mar. 10, 1837), 31 (Apr. 17, 1837); and SPch 205 (Sept. 8, 1836), 49 (Mar. 4, 1837). See generally, Hans Rall, “Die Anfänge des Konfessionspolitischen Ringens um den Wittelsbacher Thron in Athen,” in Wilhelm Winkler (ed.), Bayern: Staat und Kirche, Land und Reich (Munich: Staatliche Archive Bayerns, 1961), 181–215. The Russian writer and part-time diplomat Viktor G. Tepliakov was traveling in Greece at the time and recorded his impressions of the royal couple in letters to Roxandra Sturdza-Edling. See “Tepliakov, V. G. Pis’ma (11) k gr. Edling, R. S. up. Sturdza,” OR IRLI, f. 288, op. 1, d. 234, esp. the letters Smyrna, Mar. 25, 1837 and Athens, May 3, 1837, ll. 9, 11–14. For the response, see “Edling [rozhd. Sturdza], Roksandra Skarlatovna. Pis’ma (44) Viktoru Grigor’evichu Tepliakovu,” 1833–5, OR RNB, f. 768, op. 1, d. 3. 123 OV 20 (Mar. 10, 1837). See also Katakazy to Nesselrode, Athens, Feb. 25, 1837, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 8/1837, ll. 178–9. 124 For positive appraisals, see SPch 77 (Apr. 7, 1837), 78 (Apr. 8, 1837), 52 (Mar. 5, 1838); Katakazy to Nesselrode, Athens, Feb. 25, 1837, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 8/1837, ll. 167–70; and Nesselrode to Rudhart, St Petersburg, Nov. 23, 1837, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 79/1837, ll. 3–8.

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Soutsos, an ardent Russophile. Rudhart applauded tsarist policy by noting that, if the other two protecting powers and their legations were animated by the same kindly intentions, then “all the difficulties would be overcome, because the government would be sheltered from all partisan spirits.” Rudhart’s claim to be working toward the establishment of an impartial government and the restoration of the national religion delighted Tsar Nicholas and his ministers. Most importantly, Rudhart’s express desires to “reestablish the respect due to the national religion,” and end the “preponderant influence of the English government” and the improper conduct of its representative were like music to the ears of those in tsarist employ.125 The transfer of Mikhail Soutsos from the embassy in St Petersburg to London illustrates one of the methods that St Petersburg pursued to achieve its objectives. Before departing for his new post, Nesselrode informed Soutsos of Russia’s willingness to bestow the 1 million franc loan on Greece, and looked forward to a definitive treaty of commerce between Greece and the Porte. According to Konstantin Rodofinikin, Tsar Nicholas “was pleased with Rudhart’s efforts to found the well-being of Greece on the immutable base of monarchical and religious principles, which alone will assure the dynasty of King Othon a strong and durable authority.” Soutsos promised that he would do his best to convince the Greek government of Russia’s interest in maintaining peace along the Ottoman frontier. In particular, Soutsos noted the benefits of the constant support from the Russian embassy in Constantinople.126 At this time, St Petersburg began to increase pressure on King Othon to ensure that he would raise his children in the Orthodox Church. Katakazy advised the King indirectly through members of the palace entourage, as well as through meetings with the Greek Holy Synod. Katakazy hoped that the members of the synod, with Rudhart’s approval, would be able to convince Queen Amalia to raise her children according to the Orthodox rite. Katakazy described the satisfaction of a delegation of Greek bishops, which after meeting with the Queen expressed their benedictions and approval of the newly wed royal couple. The Russian ambassador drew hope from Rudhart’s conviction that the church question “was the most serious and the most important for the future of the country and the throne, and that the King and his ministers would work incessantly and with solicitude to end religious demoralization.”127 Although Rudhart worked diligently, he remained in office for less than a year. Opposition against his policies was generated by the British and Swedish representatives in Athens, who accused him of being a Russian agent and demanded his

125 Rudhart to the Russian cabinet, Athens, Apr. 15, 1837, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 79/1837, ll. 16–17. 126 Nesselrode to Soutsos, St Petersburg, July 30, 1837; Rodofinikin to Soutsos, St Petersburg, July 3, 1837; Soutsos to Nesselrode, St Petersburg, Apr. 6, 1837, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 80/1837, ll. 3–4, 8–10, 47–51. 127 Katakazy to Nesselrode, Athens, Feb. 25, 1837; Katakazy to Nesselrode, Athens, Mar. 30, 1837, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 8/1837, ll. 178–9, 228.

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replacement.128 However, the issue ending his term of service in Greece was not a clash with the foreign residents, but with Othon himself. The King wanted to rule as well as reign, and he resented Rudhart’s conduct regarding the budget and choice of ministers. Opposition was compounded thanks to his unpopularity with the Greek masses, which had tired of foreigners dominating the government. The King accepted Rudhart’s resignation on December 27, 1837, and thenceforward Othon ruled as an absolute monarch. On March 5, 1838, the Northern Bee noted that “the talents of Rudhart and his good intentions were not able to deliver fortunate results.”129 The period from the dismissal of Rudhart to the spring of 1840 was for the Russophiles the epoch of their highest flourishing. The rise to power of the Russophiles occurred late in 1837 when Georgios Glarakis (1789–1855) was appointed minister of internal affairs and Androkinos Paikos (1795–1880), a wealthy merchant and professor at the University of Athens, was named minister of justice.130 Glarakis, a native of Chios and a graduate of the University of Göttingen, began his professional bureaucratic career in 1821. During the presidency of Kapodistrias, whose policies he actively supported, he entered the cabinet of ministers; during the Regency, he was the governor of Achaia and supported the Russian party in the province. Russian vice-consul in Patras, Ioannis Kallogerakis, observed that Glarakis was known for his faithful and zealous services to the sovereign. His prudent administration benefited the kingdom in spite of the intrigues of the other parties.131 The Russophile ministers owed their positions to the unsuccessful policies of the King, the unpopular actions of the other parties, and to the traditional support of President Kapodistrias by a wide layer of Greek society. Glarakis and Paikos extended their influence beyond the confines of their official posts by utilizing a patronage network throughout the other ministries. Kallogerakis wrote that the nomination of Glarakis satisfied the true Greeks, who were opposed to foreign influences and constitutional ideas.132 Indeed, the Glarakis ministry was the first time in centuries that the Greeks themselves had a modicum of real power. In coming to power, the Russophiles were able to further centralize the government and curtail the problems of brigandage and finances. They enjoyed some success, and the ministry’s conservative position on the church question garnered the support of the masses. The government’s actions during the so-called Kairis affair, which will be discussed in the next section, its suppression of the translation 128 Swedish resident Heidenstam to Count Wetterstedt in Stockholm, Athens, Mar. 6, 1837 [NS]; Heidenstam to Count Lowenhelm in Vienna, Athens, Apr. 6, 1837 [NS], RGADA, f. 1, op. 2, d. 86, ll. 68–75, 150–1. 129 SPch 52 (Mar. 5, 1838); OV 7 (Jan. 22, 1838). 130 For detailed treatments of Greek politics in this period, see Petropulos, Politics and Statecraft, 299–329; and Petrunina, Grecheskaia natsiia, 256–69. 131 Kallogerakis to Katakazy, Patras, Feb. 22, 1836, AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 352/1836, l. 203. On Glarakis, see MEE 7: 211. 132 Kallogerakis to Katakazy, Patras, Dec. 4, 1837, AVPRI, f. 165/2. op. 507, d. 372/1837, l. 56. See also Heidenstam to Stierneld, Athens, Oct. 12, 1838; Count Waldkirch to Ludwig, Athens, July 12, 1838, RGADA, f. 1, op. 2, d. 90, ll. 139–41, 176–9.

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of the Bible, and the anti-Protestant campaign were not only aimed at protecting the traditional place of religion in society but also confirmed that Orthodoxy was a major criterion of the national identity of Greeks. Traditionalist Russophiles dominated the Greek Holy Synod at this time. In a direct challenge to the ecclesiastical settlement, the synod requested holy oil from the patriarch of Constantinople for the anointment of new bishops. Importantly, it secured the removal of Pharmakidis from his post as secretary-general of the synod and as professor of literature at the University of Athens.133 Because Pharmakidis was among those responsible for the ecclesiastical reforms, many observers interpreted his removal as a renunciation of the settlement of 1833.134 Earlier Pharmakidis had incurred the wrath of Oikonomos for authoring a brochure titled Pseudonymos Germanos which the Russian government considered heretical. In any event, with the advent of the Glarakis cabinet, St Petersburg and the Russophiles had reason to be pleased.

RUSSIA A ND THE KAIRIS EPISODE Another way to assess Russian officialdom’s concerns about spiritual developments in Greece is through its reactions to an event that captured the attention of most Greeks in the autumn of 1839, the so-called Kairis heresy.135 Born into a distinguished family on the island of Andros, Theophilos Kairis (1784–1853) began his education at various theological schools in Asia Minor and the Aegean archipelago. At the start of the nineteenth century, thanks to the generosity of a wealthy uncle, Kairis studied mathematics, natural sciences, and philosophy at universities in Pisa and Paris, where he became a student of Korais. Before the Greek Revolution he taught at the Academy of Ayvalik (Kydonies) on the northwestern Aegean coast of Asia Minor, where he became known for his nonconformism. Although an ordained priest, during the Greek Revolution, he distinguished himself in battle and through his philanthropic efforts. With the slowing of hostilities in 1828, he returned to his birthplace of Andros, where he established an orphanage that attracted students from all over the mainland and Aegean. In 1832, he traveled throughout Europe and collected substantial financial support from Western churches, including the Quakers. Upon his return to Andros in September 1835, 133 On Pharmakidis’s dismissal and the new synod, see Athina, 671 (Nov. 22, 1839); Petropulos, Politics and Statecraft, 300; Papadopoulos, Istoria tis ekklisias, 272–8; and Driault, Histoire diplomatique, ii. 194–5. 134 Count Waldkirch, the Bavarian resident, thought that the demotion of Pharmakidis was insulting, because Othon had named him to the synod in the first place. He feared that Russia would withhold the third part of the loan because of the religious question. See Count Waldkirch to Ludwig, Athens, July 12, 1838 [NS], RGADA, f. 1, op. 2, d. 90, ll. 176–9. 135 On Kairis, see the vast bibliography in Andriaka chronika, 20 (1993), 23 (1994), 24 (1995), as well as D. Paschalis, Theophilos Kairis (Athens: Estia, 1928). For a résumé of his activities by a Russian observer, see Katakazy to Nesselrode, Athens, Dec. 7, 1839, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 9/1840, ll. 3–8. General accounts include Papadopoulos, Istoria tis ekklisias, 223–72; Petrunina, Grecheskaia natsiia, 273–5; and Frazee, The Orthodox Church, 147–50.

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King Othon bestowed on him the Golden Cross of the Savior, and he received government permission to build a new home for his school. At first, he had some thirty children and few visitors, but within months, the school expanded to nearly 600 students. Though few of Kairis’s beliefs were canonical, most accounts agree that he was a charismatic, generous, and learned individual. The popularity of the school was testimony to his efforts to provide a solid education for his pupils. Reports of his heterodox teachings began reaching the patriarch in Constantinople and the synod in Athens in the mid-1830s. The first “irregularity” of the Andriot philosopher, according to Oikonomos, came in 1837 when some of his students did not observe fasts. In the following year, Kairis traveled to Constantinople and other islands of the archipelago practicing a belief he called Pietism. Oikonomos, who described the political opinions of Kairis as anarchistic, believed that this teaching constituted a combination of theosophy with esoteric cult.136 It consisted of new psalms, prayers, and a new calendar; Kairis even endeavored to construct his own church and ordain priests. Katakazy noted that Kairis’s philosophical ideas were based on Enlightenment thinkers, and his theological views were “a confused mélange of deism and theo-philanthropy, more absurd and more blasphemous than the writings of Dr Strauss,” professor of theology at the University of Zurich.137 Early in 1839, Kairis composed a treatise, published in London, outlining his beliefs, titled A Summary of Pietistic Teaching.138 The Greek Holy Synod responded by sending the protosyngellos of the bishop of the Cyclades, Leontios Kavanis, to Andros with instructions to invite Kairis to explain his views. Pharmakidis, a friend of the Andriot, came to his aid by composing a defense, which Kairis sent to Athens in July 1839. Kairis contended that he was a philosopher, not a theologian, and thus questions about his belief in the existence of the Trinity were irrelevant. He also provided a summary of his philosophical beliefs, but his explanation did little to encourage the synod of the orthodoxy of his teaching.139 The Greek Holy Synod received all of this information and gave the Andriot professor another letter in August that demanded he swear the confession of faith. Kairis replied with an ambiguous message, adding that he intended to leave the country in the next year. Finally, in September, Patriarch Gregorios VI issued an encyclical that condemned Pietism, accusing it of heretical doctrines.140 The Greek Holy Synod placed Kairis under the surveillance of Admiral Konstantinos Kanaris, who was sent to Andros with orders to bring the accused cleric to Athens. 136 Oikonomos, Ta sozomena, ii. 399–404; and Papadopoulos, Istoria tis ekklisias, 245–58, review the main points of Kairis’s teaching. See also G. Athanasios, Ta kata Kairin etoi to kirigma tis alitheias (Athens: S. Glavkopidos, 1840); and two anonymous pamphlets: Ta kata tou T. Kairin ek tou Ellinikou Tachydromou (Athens: n.p., 1840); Ta Kaireia (Syros: n.p., 1839). 137 Katakazy to Nesselrode, Athens, Dec. 7, 1839, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 9/1840, ll. 3–8. 138 T. Kairis, Epitomi theosevikis didaskalias (London: Gilbert Ribinton, 1839). For analysis, see Papadopoulos, Istoria tis ekklisias, 247–55; and Frazee, The Orthodox Church, 147–8. 139 Theoklitos Pharmakidis, Apologia (Athens: Angelou Angelidou, 1840), 181–6; and Papadopoulos, Istoria tis ekklisias, 259–61. 140 The text appears in G. D. Mansi (ed.), Sacrorum Conciliorum nova et amplissima collectio (Paris: H. Welter, 1901–27), xl. 319–26. See also Papadopoulos, Istoria tis ekklisias, 266.

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In the following months, Kairis appeared before the Greek Holy Synod for refusing to make the confession of faith. He repeated that his specialty was philosophy not theology, and that Pietism was not a form of religion. Despite the efforts of Pharmakidis, Kairis was stripped of his rank and office, expelled from the Greek Church, and proclaimed anathema. Sensing troublesome reactions among European and Greek liberal circles, King Othon revoked the decision and placed Kairis in a monastery in Skiaphos.141 Approving the condemnation, Katakazy sent copies of the works of the Andriot philosopher with statements by the synod and the patriarch to St Petersburg.142 Nesselrode concurred and relayed the news about “the destruction of the new heresy” in Athens to Ober-prokuror Protasov, who considered the incident important enough to order the translation of three copies of Kairis’s teachings into Russian.143 Russian vice-consul Kallogerakis in Patras claimed that the “public teaching of Atheism” by “the Antichrist Kairis” was infinitely more dangerous than the lessons of the American missionaries. The Russian vice-consul accused Kairis of flouting the laws of the country, corrupting the youth, practicing Jacobinism, and betraying the confidence of the public. True to the spirit of Official Nationality, Kallogerakis lamented that, if only the government had a well-organized state police, Kairis’s teaching would have stopped long ago. Unfortunately, for Kallogerakis, Kairis had many defenders in Patras and other areas of the country.144 The timing of the actions against Kairis is noteworthy, for the majority of the Greek Holy Synod members represented the traditionalist view. Reactions to the affair in the two rival newspapers, the Century and Athina, also display the rift between traditionalists and modernizers in Greek society. Generally, the Century appeared as the protector of church canons and the mouthpiece for the conservatives, yet the newspaper’s initial reaction is interesting: it praised Kairis as a philanthropist who did not deserve to be labeled a heretic, but urged him to confess his allegiance to Orthodoxy and reassure society of his faith.145 Weeks later an essay in the Century maintained that Kairis was really no Christian but had invented his own peculiar religion which opposed the Gospels. These reactions show that the religious question was considered of vital importance to Greek journalists and

141 Othon’s declaration was reported in Ephimeris, 24 (Nov. 18, 1839). See also, Oikonomos, Ta sozomena, ii. 421–2; Papadopoulos, Istoria tis ekklisias, 270. 142 Katakazy to Nesselrode, Athens, Dec. 7, 1839, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 9/1840, ll. 3–8; a copy of the same dispatch in Russian tr. is in RGIA, f. 797, op. 10, d. 26611, ll. 5–8. 143 Nesselrode to Protasov, St Petersburg, Jan. 24, 1840, and Protasov to Archimandrite Nikolai, St Petersburg, Jan., 1840, in “O vnov otkraevsheisia eresi v Gretsii, svedennoi byvshim monakhom Theofil Kairisom,” RGIA, f. 797, op. 10, d. 26611. 144 Kallogerakis to Katakazy, Patras, Nov. 25, 1839, AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 402, ll. 10–11. 145 See Aion, 82 (July 19, 1839), 86 (Aug. 2, 1839), 87 (Aug. 6, 1839), 110–11 (Nov. 12, 1839) 230 (Jan. 20, 1841), 391 (Oct. 25, 1842); Athina, 634 (July 22, 1839), 665 (Oct. 25, 1839), 668 (Nov. 11, 1839). The Memoirs of General Makriyannis, ed. and tr. H. A. Lidderdale (London: OUP, 1966), 164, treats Kairis with sympathy, even though the famous teacher “did not believe in the Holy Trinity or in other such matters.” For a review of the contemporary newspaper debates, see Paraskevas Matalas, Ethnos kai Orthodoxia: Oi peripeteies mias schesia apo to “Elladiko” sto Voulgariko schisma, 2nd edn (Irakleio: Panepistimiakes Ekdoseis Kritis, 2003), 61–70.

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politicians. It took on special significance in the ideology of the Russophiles, and church affairs precipitated sharp expressions of a political nature. The Greek constitution of 1844 decided the religious question in favor of the conservatives yet, ironically, it also enabled Kairis to return to his native island. His arrival in Greece caused a sensation that caught the attention of the secretary of the Russian embassy, Ioannis Persiany. Persiany believed that Kairis continued to teach dogmas contrary to Orthodoxy, and that all well-intentioned men received his return from exile bitterly. “Kairis was the same as always,” observed Persiany, only “now he lacked the force and courage of his earlier years.” “This perverse man has violated the sacred laws of religion by preaching atheism publicly on Andros.”146 Kairis remained faithful to Pietism until he passed away in jail, still awaiting trial for his religious convictions, on the island of Syros in 1853.

RUSSIA A ND THE R USSOPHILES: ORTHODOXY AND N ATIONAL I DENTITY Individual incidents like the Kairis episode were complicated because a wide section of the population believed that Orthodoxy was inseparable from the national ideology. Thus, an infringement of the rights of the church could be construed as a blow to national interests. The break with the patriarch, Pietism, the spread of Protestant schools and Western culture all could be viewed as consequences of the Bavarian regime. Russia wanted to appear as the only true defender of national interests, and Tsar Nicholas employed various methods to gain the support of his co-religionists. The Russian party represented the conservative, traditionalist position and relied on Russian support. Yet the Russophiles were not inclined to consider themselves as the Tsar’s representatives. They were orientated toward Russia because they were convinced that their country would benefit the most from this power. It may be added that, although the supporters of the Russian party fashioned themselves as the only true Orthodox believers, the concept of religiousnational identity was much more vibrant and diverse than this image implied, and many Anglophiles and Francophiles considered themselves to be devout Orthodox Christians. Abundant sources demonstrate the warm affection of Greeks for the Russian Empire, including reports of celebrations on Tsar Nicholas’s name day and birthday, news of special prayers given during Sunday liturgy, and poems in commemoration of Russian triumphs. News of Russian aid to build churches was greeted by the Greeks of Patras with shouts of “Blessed Russia! Blessed Nicholas our Father! Long live the Autocrat! Long live Russia.”147 In the spring of 1839, Kallogerakis wrote that Russia’s dignity and moral influence made a large impression on the 146

Persiany to Vorontsov, Athens, July 20, 1844, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 9/1844, ll. 181–2. See “Khristianskie drevnosti Gretsii,” ZhMNP 1–3 (1854): 46; O Ellinikos Kathreptis, 22 (Dec. 13, 1832); and Rikman to Nesselrode, Nafplion, Jan. 24, 1833, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 82/1833, ll. 128–9. 147

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Greek masses. By playing an active role, Kallogerakis averred, he was able to procure the friendship of respectable individuals of monarchical convictions who recognized Russia as the only power that worked to obtain the freedom of the country. “All the good Greeks are firmly convinced that co-religionist and benevolent Russia constantly watches out for Greece and its happiness.”148 Spyridon Destunis, writing after a stay in Greece in 1845–6, observed that the Greek nation was more sympathetic to Russia than any other power and that it desired a sovereign sent from Russia, for the Catholic king was disagreeable.149 In addition to supporting conservative publications with material aid, Katakazy helped likeminded individuals make personal connections, but he did so very carefully so as not to divert from his instructions. Various sources propagate the image of a large group of Greek agents and clients in tsarist employ. Evidence of special connections between Greek families and the Russian government exists in Russian archives, although the degree of Russian patronage was considerably less than depicted in accounts by contemporaries and later historians. According to Katakazy’s secret reports, Ioannis A. Soutsos (the son of the Greek ambassador and a professor and dean at the University of Athens) received 2,000 rubles every three years for “a well-known ministerial subject.” Another member of the Soutsos family, the former Metropolitan Makarios, received 3,000 rubles per annum since February 1830, and he enjoyed the rare ability to travel in Russia and abroad.150 With respect to the house of Metaxas, in the early 1840s, members of the family were given Russian government posts and their noble status was recognized officially.151 Members of the Kallergis family were also educated in Russia and received employment in the Russian government.152 During the Greek Revolution, a whole wave of Greek churchmen fled to Russia. Naturally, they received generous patronage from the Tsar. For example, in 1830, the Metropolitan of Adrianople Gerasimos was awarded a pension of 5,000 rubles a year (raised to 6,000 in 1838) and a passport to travel to Greece. In 1830, the Metropolitan Philotheos received an annual pension of 2,000 rubles and returned to Greece in the summer of 1832.153 Katakazy used his connections to place Russophiles in a more firm social position, yet he tried not to advertise his actions openly, in the same fashion as Russophiles tried to operate without being accused of carrying out Russian policy. 148

Kallogerakis to Katakazy, Patras, Apr. 13, 1839, AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 402, ll. 87–90. S. I. Destunis, “Vzgliad na proshchedshchee, nostoiashchee i budushchee grekov,” late 1840s, OR RNB, f. 250, d. 84, l. 7. 150 Katakazy to Seniavin, Athens, Feb. 25, and Dec. 31, 1839, AVPRI, f. 161/1, op. 181/2, d. 53, ll. 2, 4; Katakazy to Seniavin, Apr. 30, 1840, AVPRI, f. 161/1, op. 181/2, d. 54, l. 2; “Zhurnal Sviashchennogo Sinoda,” St Petersburg, Nov. 11, 1840, RGIA, f. 796, op. 121, d. 1383, l. 10. 151 “O priznanii v dvorianstve roda Metaksov,” 1840s, RGIA, f. 1405, op. 42, d. 2721. 152 “Ob ochredelenii byvshago poruchenie grecheskoi sluzhby Ivana Kalerzhi,” Sept. 11–Oct. 10, 1844, RGIA, f. 1329, op. 1, d. 559; “Delianis [Delegiannis] P. Zapiska k Nikolaiu Kalergi,” n.d., OR RNB, f. 250, d. 209; “Kalergi Emmaniuel. Pis’ma (2) k Spiridonu Iur’evichu Destunisu,” Aug. 1818– July 1819, OR RNB, f. 250, d. 181. 153 “O prizrenii v Rossii Grecheskago Adrianopol’skago Mitropolita Gerasima,” St Petersburg, May 24, 1830–Jan. 14, 1838, RGIA, f. 797, op. 3, d. 10256; “O dozvolenii Grecheskomu Mitropolitu Philoteo,” Apr. 23, 1830–22 July 1832, RGIA, f. 797, op. 3, d. 10255. 149

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In a noteworthy dispatch, Katakazy pointed out that none of the Greek state servitors were of Russian nationality, or benefited from Russian support, while English and French philhellenes occupied various posts in the government apparatus: General Church, British subject and member of the Greek Council of State; General Gordon, British subject and Governor-General of the Morea; and Mr Regny, French citizen and Inspector General of Greek Finances.154 Russia, in fact, financed those who sided with its views, although the claim of a vast network of Russian secret agents is unsubstantiated. Among the Greeks, the ideas of nationality and Orthodoxy were closely intertwined. The church question occupied central place because it was a major criterion of national identity and because it was connected with co-religionist Russia. For many Greeks the ecclesiastic reforms undermined their national sentiment, and thus they were inclined toward Russian protection. Defenders and opponents of Orthodoxy, as the Century suggested, could be considered like the opposing sides in the war between East and West.155 This point is of interest, for the same struggle between reform and tradition was emerging in the minds of the Slavophiles and Westernizers in contemporary Russia. Leading Russophiles attempted to court the good will of the Russian emperor in every way possible. One means of doing so was through pamphlets and periodicals. As we have seen, special apologists of the Russian Empire were the newspapers the Century and Evangelical Trumpet. Works by Andreas Papadopoulos-Vretos, Viaro Capodistrias, and Nikolaos T. Voulgaris openly sponsored the Russian position by idealizing the acts of the Russian mission as well as tsarist Near Eastern policy as a whole. These works attempted to show that Greece was able to obtain its independence thanks to Russia, and only Russia. They are also important for they are among the first concrete examples of Greek awareness of the history and culture of the empire of the Tsars.156 A fascinating example of wooing the Tsar’s favor occurred when the son of the Russian consul Ioannis Vlassopoulos inherited seventy icons upon the death of his father. Vlassopoulos, the younger, decided to present one of them, an image of the

154 Katakazy to Nesselrode, Athens, Apr. 10, 1840, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 9/1840, l. 101. Katakazy does not mention Minister of War Christian Schmaltz (1835–41) of Bavaria. For further reference to philhellenes in Greek service, see Piscatory, Athens, Sept. 19, 1843, in J. Poulos (ed. and tr.), “I epanastasis tis tritis Septemvriou 1843 epi ti vasei ton gallikon arheion,” DIEEE 9 (1956): 251. 155 Aion, 42 (Feb. 22, 1839). 156 A. Papadopoulos-Vretos, Mémoires biographiques-historiques sur le président de la Grèce, le Comte Jean Capodistrias (Paris: Firman Didot, 1837); Papadopoulos-Vretos, Istoriki ekthesis tis ephimeridos o Ellinikos Kathreptis (Athens: K. Gkarpolas, 1839); Papadopoulos-Vretos, Politika symmikta (Athens: A. Angelidos, 1840); Papadopoulos-Vretos, Un Grec très-dévoué à la Russie victime du chancelier de cet empire le Prince Gortchacoff (Marseilles: E. Camoin; Paris: Aymot Dentu, 1873); N. Voulgaris, Les Sept-Iles Ioniennes et les traits qui les concernent (Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus, 1859); Voulgaris, To vasileion tis Ellados kai i elliniki olomeleia (Corfu: Ermis, 1862); Viaro Kapodistrias, Remarks Respectfully Submitted to the Consideration of the British Parliament, upon a Despatch dated 10th April, 1840, from Sir Howard Douglas (London: J. Brettell, 1841); and G. T. von Faber, Notes pour l’histoire future de la régénération politique de la Grèce (Paris: Imprimerie de Mme Ve. Dondey Dupré, 1842). In 1856, the tr. of the first volume of Nikolai Karamzin’s history appeared: Istoria tis Aftokratorias tis Rossias, tr. Konstaninos S. Krokida (Athens: Philadelpheis Ch. Nikolaidou, 1856–9).

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Virgin Mary painted by Luke the Evangelist, to the Tsar. He sent the precious icon first to Papadopoulos-Vretos, who then was residing in Odessa, and from there it was delivered to Archbishop Gavriil of Kherson and Tavrov. The Ministry of the Imperial Household covered the cost (945 rubles and 28 kopeks) of transporting the icon to the Winter Palace. In return, Vlassopoulos and Papadopoulos-Vretos received decorations in gold and diamonds from the emperor.157 Thus, links established between Russia and the Greek kingdom during the 1830s and 1840s continued the traditional system of exchange within the Orthodox Commonwealth. *

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The rise of the Russian party in the Greek government and synod in the late 1830s promoted the conservative position. At this time, St Petersburg was obliged to support the Russophiles in order to secure its influence. The easiest way to convey this influence was through church channels. The religious question was paramount in the mind of the Tsar and his ministers. Overall, the Tsar pursued an active policy in Greece, although St Petersburg was reluctant to intervene more assertively lest it betray the confidence of the other powers. Russia used the institution of the church as a means to spread the principles of Official Nationality to a wide layer of the population, while simultaneously appearing benevolent in the eyes of the other powers. This chapter has shown how the Russian ecclesiastical mission attempted to diffuse Orthodox dogma among its co-religionists with the hope that by spreading material and diplomatic aid, the Tsar’s wishes would be implemented. With respect to the religious question, Russian society aimed to repeal the laws of 1833 while securing the conversion of the dynasty to Orthodoxy. Thus, the Russia mission reflected the convictions of a majority of the Greeks who feared that the entire Orthodox ecclesiastical and religious tradition was being subverted. This policy also aroused the spirits and jealousies of those who desired a more radical change.

157 “O privetennom ot nakhodiashchagosia v Gretsii syna statskago sovetnika Vlasopulo obraz Bozhiei Materi, pisannom Evangelistom Lukoiu, prednaznacheniom v dar Gosudariu Imperatoru,” Sept. 7–Nov. 30, 1839, RGIA, f. 797, op. 9, d. 25660.

5 Secret Societies, Armed Rebellions, and Oracular Prophecies Russia’s role in the formative years of the kingdom of Greece was further complicated by political intrigues, both real and imagined. In nineteenth-century Greece, as in Russia, secret societies and messianic literature provided nationalists with a repertoire of myths, rituals, and symbols easily adapted to modern politics. Secret societies bound groups of people with a shared moral belief system and a desire for social renewal into organizations capable of affecting both domestic politics and international affairs. Similarly, oracles and prophecies combined age-old beliefs in communal resurrection with nationalist aspirations for liberation and independence. Both phenomena lent themselves to modern politics thanks to their statuschanging properties and intrinsic appeal to a broad spectrum of society. These “sacred dimensions of the nation” provided patriots with powerful organizing instruments that survived well into the twentieth century.1 From late 1839 to mid-1840, the uncovering of a secret association in Athens called the Philorthodoxos Etaireia (Philorthodox Society) and a surge in oracular prophecies about the resurrection of an Orthodox empire in Constantinople provided an opportune moment for politically minded individuals to implement their vision of national revival in Greece and beyond. Capitalizing on the broader turmoil engulfing the Ottoman Empire during the Eastern Crisis of 1839–41, a group of nationalists drew upon the reservoir of myths and symbols relating to Russian salvation to mobilize traditional society toward certain implied goals, including the overthrow of the Bavarian-born sovereign and the “liberation” of territory still under Muslim rule. Although these objectives differed from those of official Russia, suspicions about a tsarist-backed conspiracy led to sweeping changes in the government and Holy Synod, which, paradoxically, undermined the traditionalists in power. Accusations regarding the conspiracy spread to neighboring 1 See Anthony D. Smith, “The ‘Sacred’ Dimension of Nationalism,” Millennium—Journal of International Studies, 29 (2000): 791–814; Smith, Chosen Peoples: Sacred Sources of National Identity (Oxford: OUP, 2003), 19–43. See also the insightful discussions of millenarianism and prophecy in E. J. Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels: Studies in Archaic Forms of Social Movement in the 19th and 20th Centuries (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1965), 57–107; Marios Hatzopoulos, “Oracular Prophecy and the Politics of Toppling Ottoman Rule in South-East Europe,” Historical Review/La Revue Historique 8 (2011): 95–116; and Hatzopoulos, “From Resurrection to Insurrection: ‘Sacred’ Myths, Motifs, and Symbols in the Greek War of Independence,” in R. Beaton and D. Ricks (eds), The Making of Modern Greece: Nationalism, Romanticism, and the Uses of the Past (1797–1896) (London: Ashgate, 2009), 81–93.

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regions, including the British-held Ionian Islands and Ottoman Crete. More was to come, as a major rebellion led by a patriotic organization called the Cretan Committee erupted on Crete in the spring of 1841 and nearly led to the enosis (union) of the island with the Greek state, thus marking an important early phase of the Megali Idea, Greece’s ambitious irredentist dream. Contextualizing these events is crucial to understanding Russian–Greek relations at this time. The events in Athens overlapped with the death of Sultan Mahmud II, with armed revolts in various Balkan provinces, and with the military victories of the Egyptian Pasha Mehmed Ali in Syria. Constantinople became the epicenter of international affairs as the young Sultan Abdülmecid I (1839–61) struggled for survival during the Eastern Crisis.2 When, in 1841, European intervention terminated this phase of the complex Ottoman-Egyptian question, Greek territorial aspirations remained unfulfilled and Greek Russophiles suffered persecution. Internationally, Russia relinquished the privileged status it enjoyed under the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi and British pressure forced the resignation of Ecumenical Patriarch Anthimos IV (1840–1). However, in exchange, Russia helped rescue the Ottoman Empire at little cost, appeared as a loyal member of the European concert, and proved once again a special alliance with the Orthodox world. Thus, an understanding of Russian–Greek relations during this era sheds light on the development of Russian foreign policy as well as on the tsarist image as the guardian of Orthodoxy in the decade preceding the Crimean War. P O L I T I C A L CO N SP I R A C I E S A N D S E C R E T S O C IE T I E S IN THE G REEK KINGDOM Although their influence and power have often been overstated, conspiratorial groups and clandestine societies helped orchestrate the major military uprisings of the 1820s: the Masons in Spain, the Carbonari in Italy, the Philiki Etaireia in Greece, and the Decembrists in Russia.3 The system of eighteenth-century 2 Russian policy during the Eastern Crisis is covered in V. A. Georgiev, Vneshniaia politika Rossii na Blizhnem Vostoke v kontse 30-nachale 40-x godov XIXv. (Moscow: Nauka, 1975); Harold N. Ingle, Nesselrode and the Russian Rapprochement with Britain, 1836–44 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1971), 110–47; V. N. Vinogradov, Dvuglavyi rossiiskii orel na Balkanakh: 1683–1914 (Moscow: Indrik, 2010), 260–7; Vinogradov, “Obmanchivyi blesk UnkiarIskelesiiskogo dogovora,” in Istoriia Balkan: Vek deviatnadtsatyi (do Krymskoi Viony) (Moscow: KRASAND, 2012), 407–22; and John C. K. Daly, Russian Seapower and “The Eastern Question,” 1827–41 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991), 140–74. For the Ottoman perspective, see Virginia H. Aksan, Ottoman Wars 1700–1870: An Empire Besieged (London: Pearson-Longman, 2007), 399–407. Paul Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics, 1763–1848 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 736–56, describes the international setting. 3 Relatively few studies highlight the role of secret societies during this era, despite their importance. See Richard Stites, The Four Horsemen: Riding to Liberty in Post-Napoleonic Europe (Oxford: OUP, 2014); O. I. Kiianskaia, Iuzhnoe obshchestvo dekabristov: Liudi i sobytiia. Ocherki istorii tainykh obshchestv 1820-kh godov (Moscow: RGGU, 2005); and Gérard Hertault, Franc-maçonnerie et sociétés secrètes contre Napoléon: Naissance de la nation allemande (Paris: Nouveau monde, 2005). General works include J. A. Roberts, The Mythology of Secret Societies (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1972); Norman MacKenzie (ed.), Secret Societies (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1967);

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Masonic lodges formed the basis of their organization, membership, and activities, and they grew and fed on the romantic ideas that spread over Europe in the wake of the French Revolution. Secret societies reached the peak of their power and influence during the Congress of Vienna era, when they received the greatest publicity and exerted a certain political and cultural impact. Many people considered them reputable, and governments showed their respect for them by pursuing them harder than ever before. They flowered in spite of rigorous regimes of censorship, police surveillance, agents provocateurs, and spies. Regardless of their seemingly modern aspirations, the characteristics of secret societies stemmed in part from traditional practices: participation involved many of the same activities as religious ceremonies, including communal meetings, sacred oaths, the reading of sacred texts, and the handling of revered objects often by specialized personnel distinguished by special clothing. The purpose of these activities is clear: to create a bond in the hearts and minds of participants by creating a communal pact. However, after 1815, the societies began to display a narrow political and realistic focus that represented a potent force against the status quo. Many Europeans believed that much of what was happening in the world around them only happened because secret societies planned it so. In the Balkans, the phenomenon of secret societies was distinctive because of its unique ties to social developments such as social banditry, revolutionary nationalism, and religiously inspired irredentism. The high degree of social mobility that suddenly emerged due to the success of the Greek War of Independence and the corresponding modernizing efforts of the Sublime Porte created fertile soil for ideas about new forms of government. The dream of national rebirth coalesced with traditional characteristics of society, and consequently religion became a component of politically sponsored movements. Shrouded in legends and obscured by myths, secret societies provided Greek patriots with powerful organizations well into the post-independence era. At least thirty were founded between the establishment of independence and the overthrow of King Othon in 1862.4 A society named the Phoenix, for example, created during the National Assembly of Argos in 1829, existed as a mystical association during the presidency of Kapodistrias. According to scattered sources, the Phoenix had a hierarchical leadership and used money and privileges to attract support for the president.5 In the early 1830s, Count Dmitrii P. Tatishchev, the Russian and C. H. Heckethorn, The Secret Societies of All Ages and Countries (New Hyde Park, NY: University Books, 1965). 4 See Angela Merou-Christopoulos, “Sociétés secrètes à caractère politique et irrédentiste de 1823 à 1862 en Grèce” (Doctoral thesis, University of Montreal, 1984), ii. 288; and Dinos Konomos, Mystikes etaireies sta chronia tis ethnegersias: Anekdota keimena (Athens: Typogr. Ph. Konstantinidi & K. Michala, 1973). 5 For information about the Phoenix, see Konstantin M. Bazili, Arkhipelag i Gretsiia v 1830–1 gg. (St Petersburg: N. Grech, 1834), i. 127; G. N. Philaretos, Xenokratia kai vasileia en Elladi (1821–97) (Athens: S. Kousoulinos, 1897), 85; Frederich Thiersch, De l’état actuel de la Grèce (Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus, 1833), i. 25–6; John Petropulos, Politics and Statecraft in the Kingdom of Greece, 1833–44 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), 111–12, 262; and Merou-Christopoulos, “Sociétés secrètes,” 62, 97–100, 111. In a letter to Duvergier de Hauranne, Konstantinos Zographos

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ambassador in Vienna, disclosed a secret society called the Corfu, which was spreading revolutionary ideas in the Balkans as well as in southern Russia. “Its agents have the primary goal of inciting the Greek population of anti-Russian sentiments,” wrote Tatishchev.6 A few years later, Ambassador Katakazy reported “emissaries from a secret society comprised mostly of Poles and Italians and working towards the great emancipation of peoples in the Orient.” Katakazy warned that the society was “preparing for a revolution in Constantinople and that certain members are active in the borderlands of Russia where they are rousing emotions and organizing insurrections.”7 In 1839, the prolific and versatile Greek writer Alexandros Rizos Rangavis and his friends formed a secret society in Athens that aimed at liberating the Greeks still living under Ottoman rule. Their society had a clear organization, including a president, military leadership, a secret oath, and plans for distributing arms and provoking rebellion in the name of the Holy Trinity. Representing an early attempt at a Balkan federation, the society considered a citizen of Greece to be any Christian who owned property in Greece or any Muslim who took up arms to liberate the Greeks from Ottoman authority.8 Unique among many of the clandestine organizations of the period, the Philorthodox Society has been the subject of journalistic and scholarly inquiry. The debates regarding the society reflect the ebb and flow of perceptions about Russia’s role in international affairs, making a brief discussion of its historiography relevant. The first works dealing with the society, by contemporary anti-Russian polemicists, claimed that its goal was to place Greece under Russian tutelage. The pro-English Greek newspaper Athina, essays and booklets by French and German publicists, and the celebrated memoirs of Ioannis Makrygiannis argue that the Philorthodox conspiracy was a Russian intrigue.9 Modern studies of distinction also deal with the claimed that the “Phoenix Society, that you affirm was organized by President Kapodistrias or under his government, never existed except in the imagination.” See “Lettre de M. Zographo à M. Duvergier de Hauranne, en réponse à son article inséré dans la Revue de Deux Mondes du 15 Octobre 1844,” Gennadius Library, [KGIO] Ellas 2. Politeia en Genei 1838–45. Douglas Dakin, The Unification of Greece 1770–1923 (London: Ernest Benn, 1972), 72, suggests that the Philorthodox Society was a continuation of the Phoenix Society. Incidentally, Alexandros Ypsilantis and President Kapodistrias both used a Phoenix as their seal when signing documents. 6 Tatishchev to Nesselrode, Vienna, Mar. 26, 1833, GARF, f. 109 (Sekretnyi arkhiv), op. 4, d. 28, ll. 1–4. 7 Katakazy to Nesselrode, Athens, July 31, 1838, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 7/1838, ll. 203–5; an annex on l. 206 contains a list of members of the society and other “dangerous adventurers.” For reports of another secret society on the frontier of Albania and Bosnia, see Katakazy to Nesselrode, Athens, May 5, 1837, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 8/1837, ll. 256–60. 8 See E. Th. Soulogiannis, Mystiki etaireia yper tou alytrotou ellinismou kai schedio “politevmatos” ton “yperorion” Ellinon (1839) (Athens: Keimena kai meletai neoellinikis philologias, 1977). There is a gap in Rangavis’s memoirs: A. Rizos-Rangavis, Apomnimonevmata (Athens: Georgios Kasdonis, 1894–5), ii. 92–4. See also, E. Th. Soulogiannis, Alexandros Rizos Rangavis: I zoi kai to ergo tou (Athens: Ekdoseis Arsenidi, 1995), 31, 35–6, 44–5; Merou-Christopoulos, “Sociétés secrètes,” 166–8; “Argyropoulos, Periklis,” MEE 5: 405; and “Karatzas, Ioannis,” MEE 13: 810. 9 See Athina, 681 (Dec. 27, 1839); The Memoirs of General Makriyannis 1797–1864, ed. and tr. H. A. Liderrdale (London: OUP, 1966), 164–5, 175–80; Edmond Texier, La Grèce et ses insurrections (Paris: Michel Lévy, 1854), 88–9; Texier, Le Roi Othon (Paris: Alphonse Taride, 1854), 8; Prosper Duvergier de Hauranne, “De la situation actuelle de la Grèce et de son avenir,” RdDM 8 (1844): 198, 204–5, 210–12; Duvergier de Hauranne, “La Grèce pendant les trois derniers mois,” RdDM 15

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society from an anti-Russian perspective. For example, British historian Charles Webster claimed that the conspiracy of the “ultra-Orthodox party (Philorthodox)” to unite the Greek Church with the Ecumenical Patriarch was “preliminary to bringing Greece itself under Russian hegemony and overthrowing the Bavarian dynasty.”10 The anti-Russian polemic generated a sharp response among Greek traditionalists, led by the historian-politician Andreas Papadopoulos-Vretos and the aide-decamp of King Othon Gennaios Kolokotronis (the son of the famous general). These individuals defended the Russian position by maintaining that the Philorthodox conspiracy was a phantom creation of Anglophiles who aimed to discredit the Orthodox leadership.11 The first mention of the conspiracy in a Russian work, published in 1863, refers indirectly to a “different party” that around 1840 combined questions of nationalism and political freedom with the aim to replace the King with an Orthodox sovereign. Modern Greek accounts by T. E. Evangelidis and Chrysostomos Papadopoulos, drawing on the pro-Russian newspaper the Century, reduce the significance of the conspiracy to the illconceived plans of a few disreputable individuals.12 In the 1960s, several works appeared that considered the conspiracy as a significant episode in Greek history. American historian Barbara Jelavich sparked a scholarly reconsideration of the topic in a pioneering essay that cast some doubt on the involvement of the Russian government. Although Jelavich’s article urged caution, the highly influential study by John Petropulos, published in 1968, supported the position of a Russian-inspired conspiracy, thanks to its heavy reliance on the reports of western diplomats and on an anonymous document titled “Memoirs concerning the Philorthodox Society introduced in Greece,” from the

(1844): 76, 98; H. A. Baron von St . . t, Geschichte der griechischen Revolution (Leipzig: Otto Wigand, 1845), 104–5; and Casimir Leconte, Etude économique de la Grèce, de sa position actuelle (Paris: Didot, 1847), 27, 411. 10 Charles Webster, The Foreign Policy of Palmerston, 1830–41 (London: G. Bell, 1951), i. 511. See also E. K. Kyriakidis, Istoria tou synchronou ellinismou apo tis idryseos tou vasileiou tis Ellados mechri ton imeron mas, 1832–92 (Athens: V. N. Gregoriades, 1892–4), i. 342–3; Pavlos Karolidis, Synchronos istoria ton Ellinon kai ton loipon laon tis Anatolis apo 1821 mechri 1921 (Athens: A. Vitsikovnaki, 1922–9), ii. 382–5; E. Driault and M. Lhéritier, Histoire diplomatique de la Grèce de 1821 à nos jours (Paris: PUF, 1925–6), ii. 195–6; T. N. Pipinelis, I monarchia en Elladi 1833–43 (Athens: I. Vartsos, 1932), 295; Giannis Kordatos, Istoria tis neoteris Elladas (Athens: “20os Aionas,” 1957–8), iii. 133–4; and “Katrakazis, G. A.,” MEE 14: 129. 11 See A. Papadopoulos-Vretos, Un Grec très dévoué à la Russie victime du chancelier de cet empire le Prince Gortchacoff (Paris: Amyot, Dentu, 1873), 7–8; Papadopoulos-Vretos, Notizie storico-biografiche sul colonnello Demetrio Callergi (Corfu: n.p., 1843), 24; Papadopoulos-Vretos, Biografia del Cavaliere Andrea Mustoxidi (Athens: P. A. Sakellarius, 1860), 13–15; and Gennaios Kolokotronis, Apomnimonevmata (Heirographon Defteron 1821–62), ed. Emmanuel G. Protopsaltis (Athens: Ethnikos Typographos, 1961), 83–5. N. Voulgaris, To vasileion tis Ellados kai i elliniki olomeleia (Corfu: Ermis, 1862), 187, states that the plot was used by the English representative to enact revenge on his adversaries. 12 E. Feoktistov, Bor’ba Gretsii za nezavisimost’. Episod iz istorii pervoi poloviny XIX veki (St Petersburg: I. I. Glazunova, 1863), 208; Aion, 120/121/122 (Jan. 1, 1840); T. E. Evangelidis, Istoria tou Othonos, vasileos tis Ellados 1832–62 (Athens: A. G. Galanos, 1893), 160; Chrysostomos Papadopoulos, Istoria tis ekklisias tis Ellados (Athens: Foinikos, 1920), 278.

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Mavrokordatos Archive, General State Archives, Athens.13 The image of a Russian conspiracy has therefore persisted. Several well-researched studies of Greek national identity, the Orthodox Church, and the Megali Idea repeat the argument that the Philorthodox Society was the creation of the Russian party, which aimed replace Othon with an Orthodox king of the Tsar’s choosing.14 Other scholars have put forward similar interpretations, asserting that Russian Ambassador Katakazy was the leader of the society that proposed to deliver Greece from Bavarian despotism, promulgate a constitution, and reunite the Greek Church with the patriarch.15 The confusion surrounding the conspiracy is partially due to the circumstantial nature of the evidence. Foreign diplomats, most notably British Ambassador Edmund Lyons, played a large role in spreading misinformation about the plot. In this regard, Russian archives are particularly valuable, since during the Nicholaevan era, the state took great pains to root out suspected conspiracies and opposition movements by collecting intelligence from a host of informants. The Third Section of His Majesty’s Imperial Chancery led these endeavors and gathered detailed files relating to episodes like the Philorthodox conspiracy. Although much of what seemed mysterious has remained so today, this chapter introduces new documents that illuminate the conspiracy, its background and consequences. The dispatches of Russian agents as well as those of the Swedish envoy, Carl Peter von Heidenstam, a native of Smyrna and close confidant of the royal family of Greece, supplied St Petersburg with valuable reports. These sources suggest that westernizing Greeks made the most of the repertoire of Russian expectation to oust traditionalist figures from their posts in the Holy Synod and government.

13 B. Jelavich, “The Philorthodox Conspiracy of 1839: A Report to Metternich,” BS 7 (1966), 89–102; Petropulos K, Politics and Statecraft, 329–43; Istoria tou ellinikou ethnous (Athens: Athinon A.E., 1970–2000), xiii. 75, 77–9; J. Petropoulos and A. Koumarianou, I themeliosi tou ellinikou kratous 1833–43 (Athens: Papazisis, 1982), 198, 204–12; Pavlos Karolidis’s continuation of K. Paparrigopoulos’s Istoria tou ellinikou ethnous (Athens: Eleftherodakis, 1932), vi. 247–8; “Memoirs Concerning the Philorthodox Society introduced in Greece,” [hereafter “Anonymous Memoirs”] in Petropulos, Politics and Statecraft, 519–33. 14 See Dimitris Stamelos, Nikitaras: Protypo palikarias kai aretis, 3rd edn (Athens: Estias, 2001), 267–87; Sparti Marangou-Drygiannaki, “Orthodoxy and Russian Policy towards Greece in the 19th Century: The Philorthodox Society’s Conspiracy (1830–40),” BS 41 (2000): 27–42; Victor Roudometof, Nationalism, Globalization, and Orthodoxy: The Social Origins of Ethnic Conflict in the Balkans (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2001), 104–5; Elpida K. Vogli, “Ellines to genos.” I ithageneia kai i taftotita sto ethniko kratos ton Ellinon (1821–44) (Irakleion: Panepistimiakes Ekdoseis Kritis, 2007), 189–90; Paraskevas Matalas, Ethnos kai Orthodoxia: Oi peripeteies mias schesia apo to “Elladiko” sto Voulgariko schisma, 2nd edn (Irakleio: Panepistimiakes Ekdoseis Kritis, 2003), 70–1; and Miranda Stavrinos-Paximadopoulos, I angliki politiki kai to kritiko zitima 1839–41 (Athens: Ekdoseis Domos, 1986), 83–4, 145. 15 Gunnar Hering, Die politischen Parteien in Griechenland, 1821–1936 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1992), i. 213–15; Mihail-Dimitri Sturdza, Dictionnaire historique et généalogique des grandes familles de Grèce, d’Albanie et de Constantinople (Paris: Chez l’auteur, 1983), 199, 201, 265–6; MerouChristopoulos, “Sociétés secrètes,” 157–65; K. Papoulidis, “Rosiko endiapheron gia tin ekklisia tis Ellados tin epochi tou Othona,” Theologia, 58 (1987): 149; John Nicopoulos, “From Agathangelos to the Megale Idea: Russia and the Emergence of Modern Greek Nationalism,” BS 26/1 (1985): 48–52.

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Anglophile nationalists thus appropriated the old discourse of Orthodox regeneration under Russian leadership by inventing the Philorthodox plot.16 I NT RI G U E I N T H E G RE E K C A P I T AL : THE PHILO RTHODOX C ONSPIRACY According to Greek memoirists, the Philorthodox affair began on December 22 when the government received information about a plot from Emmanouil Papas, a relative of the famous leader of the Philiki Etaireia with the same name, who turned himself in as a member of the so-called Philorthodox Society. Gaining access to the court through a friend, Papas handed over documents accusing two prominent figures, Georgios Kapodistrias (the younger brother of the murdered president) and Nikitaras Stamatellopoulos (a revolutionary hero), of plotting against the government.17 Based upon the reports of Ambassador Lyons, however, the affair began with the discovery in the Piraeus of a letter by Nikolaos Renieris, a Greek merchant based in Trieste, addressed to Georgios Kapodistrias containing plans for a conspiracy called the Philorthodox. And according to yet another version, Papas turned in his co-conspirators to the government for money.18 In one of his earliest dispatches about the issue, Katakazy asserted that the denunciation was undertaken by the “Constitutional or English clique,” which had no other goal than to obtain revenge and render suspect in the eyes of the King all those who were known to support the assassinated president.19 Apparently, King Othon (Figure 5.1) had already suspected that an antigovernment conspiracy was underway several weeks before Papas made his denunciation. During a meeting with the Minister of the Interior, Georgios Glarakis, in mid-December, Othon asked about the conspiracy currently in progress and ordered the government to make an investigation. Glarakis pleaded ignorance but promised to prepare an inquiry. Returning to the palace later the same day, Glarakis reported that two weeks earlier eight leaders of the Francophile party had met for dinner at the home of the French chargé d’affaires, Gautier de Sartiges. During the meal, the guests announced that they all had signed a document relating to an armed engagement forcing the King to grant a constitution. To this, the King replied: “And you know nothing more?” “No sire,” responded the minister. The meeting ended abruptly when the King said: “Then you may retire, I am better informed than you.”20

16 My perspective is indebted to O. E. Petrunina, Grecheskaia natsiia i gosudarstvo v XVIII–XX vv. (Moscow: Universitet Knizhnyi Dom, 2010), 275–94, the first study to draw on Russian archives. 17 See The Memoirs of General Makriyiannis, 164; and Kolokotronis, Apomnimonevmata, 83. 18 See Katakazy to Nesselrode, Aegina, July 17, 1840, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 9/1840, ll. 246–7; “Anonymous Memoirs,” 525; Petropulos, Politics and Statecraft, 331; and Petrunina, Grecheskaia natsiia, 277. 19 Katakazy to Nesselrode, Athens, Jan. 8, 1840, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 9, l. 28. 20 Heidenstam to Stierneld, Athens, Jan. 12, 1840 [NS]; Lyons to Palmerston, Athens, Feb. 20, 1840 [NS], RGADA, f. 1, op. 2, d. 94, ll. 159, 334.

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Fig. 5.1. King Othon in national dress. Courtesy of the Bayerische Verwaltung der Staatlichen Schlösser, Gärten und Seen.

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Regardless of the flimsiness of the accusations, the government responded with vigor by arresting and interrogating Nikitas, Kapodistrias, and Renieris for complicity in a treasonous conspiracy. Next, the police searched the homes of the first two accused, and found compromising documents, including various letters, papers, a “catechism of tasks,” and “diplomas for members of the society.” The latter is a rambling document with rubrics such as “System of Arch-presidency,” “Dread Oath,” “Oath of Presidents,” “Attributes and Rights of Representatives, Commissioners, Presidents, Assessors, and Missionaries,” and “To the Chief President of the Orthodox Society in Epirus.” According to Heidenstam, two letters addressed to the Russian Emperor were among the sequestered papers. Curiously, two hours after their arrest, the government released the accused men and sent copies of the confiscated documents to the foreign envoys.21 The central theme of the society, as it existed on paper, was the protection of the faith and the homeland. Like many secret societies of the era, the sources indicate a hierarchy of three orders of membership. The lowest order consisted of inexperienced individuals who were motivated by irredentist aspirations; the middle or grand order was comprised mostly of clergy dedicated to the restoration of Orthodoxy and charged with appointing apostles to supervise local cells; the highest membership, or the phriktos, consisted of three spheres: ecclesiastic, civil, and military. Only these people learned of the ultimate goal of the society, which purportedly was the establishment of an Orthodox kingdom and Russian party supremacy. Additional goals of the society (according to various other sources) were the emancipation of the Greek kingdom from the dominance of the Bavarians, the unification of the Greek Church with the patriarch, the closure of American schools and the British Foreign Bible Society in Greece, and the overthrow of British rule in the Ionian Islands.22 In pursuing these objectives, the group ostensibly doled out administrative posts and funds from a general collection. All of this was to culminate in a national assembly which, if necessary, would overthrow the King. The society’s organization corresponds to the system of Masonic lodges of the eighteenth century. Yet the government found only two people possessing such documents, and the biographies of the accused are less than flattering. Katakazy, who thought that the project was ridiculous, assured Nesselrode that if the organization indeed existed in the provinces and had developed a plan for an uprising, there was nothing about it in the seized papers.23 Regarding the society’s membership, Petropulos calculates that it amounted to over 1,000 in Athens alone, while Heidenstam states that more than 10,000 individuals were involved in the 21 Heidenstam to Stierneld, Athens, Jan. 12, 1840 [NS], RGADA, f. 1, op. 2, d. 94, l. 160. Copies of the seized documents are in Katakazy to Nesselrode, Athens, Jan. 8, 1840, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 9/1844, ll. 34–42. For a list of them, see Petropulos, Politics and Statecraft, 329 n. 129. The alleged letters addressed to the Tsar are absent from the packet Katakazy sent to St Petersburg. 22 Wallenburg to Metternich, Athens, Jan. 13, 1840 [NS], in Jelavich, “The Philorthodox Conspiracy,” 98; Papadopoulos, Istoria tis ekklisias, 278; Driault, Histoire diplomatique, ii. 195. 23 Katakazy to Nesselrode, Athens, Jan. 8, 1840, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 9/1840, ll. 15–23, 28–31. Wallenburg to Metternich, Athens, Jan. 13, 1840 [NS], in Jelavich, “The Philorthodox Conspiracy,” 97, states that some of the confiscated papers were simply copies of documents relating to the Philiki Etaireia.

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society. Katakazy thought that the active members of the society, if such a society existed, were probably outside Greece.24 When precisely the Philorthodox Society was founded remains a mystery. The generally accepted date is 1839, yet several sources suggest that the group emerged sometime after the arrival of Konstantinos Oikonomos in 1834 and crystallized as a definitive society when Georgios Kapodistrias moved to Athens in 1838.25 The anonymous memoir in the Mavrokordatos Archive claims that the Philorthodox Society was formed in Russia in 1830 under the leadership of the Tsar in order to “counteract the worldwide advance of the English and American Bible societies.” According to this source, the membership of the society included practically all of the Russian nobility as well as Katakazy, Lelli, Oikonomos, Glarakis, Nikitas, Kapodistrias, most of the higher clergy, the abbots of most monasteries, and many other “fanatical followers of the Russian party.” The society developed an anti-royal plot when, in their striving to protect Orthodoxy, the leaders adopted purely political goals. The conversion of the King and the adoption of Orthodoxy as the state religion were the paramount objectives, but the society also aimed to form a senate consisting only of autochthons, to expel foreign-born Greeks from military and civil posts, and to suspend the civil rights of the Mavromichalis family for their responsibility in the assassination of the president.26 Although this remarkably broad program does not fully coincide with Russian party interests, the opinions regarding the Russian party on the church question were accurate. Therefore, it is possible that anonymous memoirist mingled the facts with extreme opinions, hoping to discredit the Russophiles. The irredentist aspect of the society is outlined in a dispatch by Katakazy, who wrote that the conspirators “aimed by the design of Providence” to form three independent kingdoms in Epirus, Thessaly, and Macedonia, followed by the conquest of Constantinople, and the formation of a new Byzantine Empire under an Orthodox sovereign. All of this was to be achieved in the year 1840.27 Liberating and uniting the subject population in Ottoman territory with the Greek population was, naturally, a military operation. This raises two questions: how to supply arms to the population, and what to do once the “enslaved” Ottoman Greeks were united under the flag of Orthodoxy—issues not addressed in any of the sources. On December 24 and 25, in response to the allegations of a Russian-backed conspiracy, Katakazy sent several requests for a private interview with the King. A day later, during a meeting at the home of Foreign Minister Andronikos Paikos,

24 See Katakazy to Nesselrode, Athens, Jan. 8, 1833, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 9/1840, l. 18; Heidenstam to Stierneld, Athens, Jan. 12, 1840 [NS], RGADA, f. 1, op. 2, d. 94, l. 164; and Petropulos, Politics and Statecraft, 336. 25 See Frazee, The Orthodox Church, 153; Istoria tou ellinikou ethnous, 13: 78; K. Aroni-Tsichli, Agrotikes exegerseis stin palia Ellada, 1833–81 (Athens: Papazisis, 1989), 210–11; M. Economopoulou, Parties and Politics in Greece (1844–55) (Athens: M. Economopoulou, 1984), 23; Merou-Christopoulos, “Sociétés secrètes,” 157–8, 163; and Petrunina, Grecheskaia natsiia, 284. 26 “Anonymous Memoirs,” 519–20. 27 Katakazy to Nesselrode, Athens, Jan. 8, 1833, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 9/1840, l. 17.

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the British and French representatives again accused Russia of fomenting the plot. British Ambassador Lyons complained that Katakazy was manipulating the Austrian minister in order to influence the King. Coincidentally, the British newspaper the Globe reported that the Austrian envoy “has been used as the cat’s paw by the Russian Ambassador to blind the eyes of the king by his personal influence.” Katakazy had no doubt that Lyons was the source of this false information.28 Lyons continued to apply pressure by warning Paikos to convince the King to take strong measures against the perpetrators, or it would be as if the King nailed a declaration on the door of his palace stating: “I am so pro-Russian that I would assassinate myself and my kingdom, before perjuring myself.” The French envoy Sartiges agreed with his British colleague and thought it best to keep the confiscated papers confidential.29 Such hearsay influenced public opinion, which in turn played a role in King Othon’s decisions. In the last days of December, a wave of contradictory accusations and statements circulated between the foreign embassies and the palace. One piece of gossip insinuated that the members of the society were planning to assassinate the King in church on New Year’s Day, followed by a sort of Sicilian Vespers upon all those who were not supporters of the Russian party. These rumors, spread by numerous anti-government petitions, influenced a Globe article that refers to a “massacre that was to take place on the 1st of January.”30 However, according to the testimony of primary accuser, Papas, the society merely intended to confront the King on New Year’s Day and offer him the choice of converting to Orthodoxy or abdicating. Whatever the risk may have been, the royal couple attended the church services and received more than the normal ovation by their subjects, who shouted, “Long live the king!” Makrygiannis recorded that the popular response during the church services put heart into the King “because he had had a big fright.”31 In the meantime, the police continued to search for evidence and placed prominent Russophiles under surveillance. News of the plot soon reached the provinces. One result was that in Kalavryta (a village near Patras) local supporters of the Russian party sent letters to Kolokotronis denying any connection to the conspiracy. Kolokotronis showed these letters to the King, who advised him that in order to escape suspicion he must help the authorities. The whole affair was complicated further when Kolokotronis wrote a letter to the King that he sent through a friend along with some money. When the police intercepted the message, they accused Kolokotronis of complicity.32 Despite these measures the King gradually believed that the plot posed no real threat to the crown. Foreign Minister Paikos reported that, “In effect the event in question

28 Katakazy included the English text of the Globe (Jan. 30, 1840), and articles from Il Portofoglio Maltese (Jan. 27, 1840), and Gazetta de Corfu (Feb. 28, 1840), in Katakazy to Nesselrode, Athens, Mar. 10, 1840, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 9/1840 ll. 68–71. 29 Heidenstam to Stierneld, Athens, Jan. 12, 1840 [NS], RGADA, f. 1. op. 2, d. 94, l. 160. 30 Globe (Jan. 30, 1840). 31 The Memoirs of General Makriyannis, 165. 32 Kolokotronis, Apomnimonevmata, 84–5.

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serves as evidence of the sentiments of love and veneration for the nation which never belied its sovereign.”33 The turmoil unleashed by the uncovering of the Philorthodox plot illustrates the petty nature of Greek politics during this era. Newspapers propagated slanderous statements, including reports of secret meetings at the Russian embassy with various well-known individuals. Heidenstam recounted an episode when the mayor of Athens presented himself at the palace on December 27, 1839 and reported that the night before, Nikitas and Glarakis had entered Katakazy’s home through the back door and had a three-hour conference inside. Remarkably, on the same day, the police arrested Nikitas and Kapodistrias again and placed them in prison, the governor of Attica was dismissed, and four Russophile governors changed their posts. Meanwhile, Sartiges and Lyons visited Paikos again and tried to persuade him to have the King dismiss Glarakis. The King responded to the allegations by claiming that he never believed that Glarakis was involved, but that his minister had been led astray.34 Adding even more intricacy and obfuscation to the affair, on December 29, 1839 Sartiges informed the inspector of Greek finances that the French government would guarantee its portion of the third part of the loan if the King replaced Glarakis with Dimitrios Christidis, a prominent member of the French party. When Lyons found out, he became furious and went to Sartiges’s house to protest, claiming that Spyridon Trikoupis, a member of the English party, was much more capable than Christidis.35 Finally, on December 30 Glarakis was dismissed from his post by royal ordinance. Although the Anglophiles maintained that the discharge of Glarakis was justified, the government announced that his dismissal was due to his inefficient investigation of the plot. In return, Lyons promised that London would not insist upon the semester payment of the loan if Greece were unable to pay.36 In response to these changes in government, Katakazy wrote that the enemies of the Russian party, in an attempt to expel those in that party from their posts, “started to expose the sins and misdeeds of the government from the time of Kapodistrias until recent days.”37 Especially inclined to this position was the newspaper Athina, which reported that on the night of December 30 university students started a bonfire outside the home of Glarakis, where they shouted, “Long live the constitution. Down with Glarakis and the Napist party [i.e. the Russian

33 Paikos to Katakazy, Athens, Feb. 29, 1840, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 9/1840, ll. 64–5. See also Paikos to Katakazy, Athens, Dec. 27, 1839; Katakazy to Paikos, Athens, AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 401/1839, ll. 92, 121. 34 See Heidenstam to Stierneld, Athens, Jan. 12, 1840 [NS]; Lyons to Palmerston, Jan. 20, 1840 [NS], RGADA, f. 1. op. 2, d. 94, ll. 161–3, 333–4. 35 Heidenstam to Stierneld, Athens, Jan. 12, 1840 [NS], RGADA, f. 1. op. 2, d. 94, ll. 160–3. 36 On the dismissal of Glarakis, see Ephimeris, 2 (Jan. 18, 1840); Katakazy to Nesselrode, Athens, Jan. 8, 1840, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 9/1840, ll. 28–30; Regny to Eynard, Athens, Jan. 29, 1840 [NS]; Lyons to Palmerston, Athens, Feb. 29, 1840 [NS], RGADA, f. 1, op. 2, d. 94, ll. 309, 343; Kolokotronis, Apomnimonevmata, 84; and S. Oikonomos, Ta sozomena ekklisiastika syngrammata Konstantinou . . . tou ex Oikonomon (Athens: F. Karampinos, 1862–6), ii. 434. 37 Katakazy to Nesselrode, Athens, Jan. 8, 1840, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 9/1840, l. 19.

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party].”38 Katakazy used this occasion to reiterate the view that the liberty of the press was detrimental to the stability of the state and the authority of the sovereign. He singled out the semi-official Greek Courier for exaggerating the danger of the plot, printing erroneous accusations, and overall displaying a lack of moderation.39 The changes in government posts envenomed the already stormy relations among the parties and foreign ambassadors. After repeated requests, Katakazy finally obtained a two-hour personal audience with the King, during which he assured a visibly embarrassed Othon that the conspiracy was chimerical. In response to the accusations against certain members of the Greek clergy, Katakazy made the distinction between the “sacred cause of religion, protector of thrones and peoples, and the more or less dangerous political intrigues of which Greece unfortunately has been the theater since its first day of emancipation.”40 He later informed Nesselrode that “the King told me about the affairs of the society just discovered and expressed his indignation that it was permitted to mingle my name and that of the embassy employees in a scheme of which we were complete strangers.” Katakazy believed that Anglophiles conjured up the whole incident, and he portrayed the suspects in extremely derogatory terms.41 Amazingly, on New Year’s Day 1840, scattered news about the so-called plot engulfed Athens in hysteria. Rumors circulated accusing the Russophiles of aiming to assassinate the King, and to prevent unrest, the city garrison occupied positions throughout the capital. One foreign witness reported that the Greek steamship Othon suddenly left Piraeus “with various officers and a substitute public prosecutor,” following street demonstrations against the Russophile government.42 In his report to Stockholm, Heidenstam gave his opinion that the protests were a bit ridiculous in light of the “thousands of other incidents of the same genre that have occurred here during the last fortnight.”43 The Greek periodical press was responsible for much of the reason for the popular unrest. The general public first learned of the Philorthodox Society when the newspaper Athina came out with editorials regarding “The Napist Conspiracy” and the uncovering of a “terrible plot” (phrikti synomosia) the participants of which were members of “the party of Greeks which since 1828 served foreign interests” (a veiled way of saying the supporters of Kapodistrias).44 The author(s) of the columns in Athina manipulated all sorts of sketchy information about the conspiracy in order to attack their political opponents and personal adversaries. The incident represented a new twist in the relations between the Greek parties, and it served as a 38

See Athina, 682 (Jan. 3, 1840); and Petropulos, Politics and Statecraft, 332. The comments regarding O Ellinikos Tachydromos, 76 (Jan. 5, 1840) are in Katakazy to Nesselrode, Athens, Jan. 8, 1840, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 9/1840, ll. 24–6. 40 Katakazy to Nesselrode, Athens, Jan. 8, 1840, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 9/1840, l. 30. 41 Katakazy to Nesselrode, Athens, Apr. 11, 1840, AVPRI, f. 161/1, op. 181/2, d. 54/1840, l. 6; Katakazy to Nesselrode, Athens, May 27, 1840; Katakazy to Nesselrode, Aegina, Jan. 17, 1840, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 9/1840, ll. 176–7, 246–7. 42 Monsieur Zeschau to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Dresden, Athens, Jan. 9, 1840 [NS], RGADA, f. 1, op. 2, d. 94, l. 180. 43 Heidenstam to Stierneld, Athens, Jan. 12, 1840 [NS], RGADA, f. 1. op. 2, d. 94, l. 163. 44 Athina, 681 (Dec. 27, 1839). 39

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preface to the political struggle that continued in the following years. One column in Athina implied that Kolokotronis’s meetings with the governors and mayors of the Peloponnesus in 1838–9 were part of the plot, and another accused the Napists of sponsoring deluded prophecies about great changes in the year 1840. The Constitutionalist Nikolaos Pierrakos also accused the Russian government of bribing Maniots to initiate a rebellion by sending them 2,000 Ottoman piasters.45 The ensuing polemical war continued despite the lack of evidence. The defense of the Russian party was taken on by the newspaper the Century, which on January 1 came out with a series of apologetic columns under the heading “The Philorthodox Society.” The Century reported that a former bishop named Agathangelos had dreamed up the whole affair, thus influencing Renieris and Papas. The main objective of the society, according to the Century, was the emancipation of “the three large eparchies of Epirus, Thessaly, and Macedonia,” not the overthrow of King Othon or revolution in the Ionian Islands. Stooges of the English party, Renieris and Papas, had hoodwinked the unfortunate Nikitas and Kapodistrias.46 There are sufficient reasons to suspect that the Anglophiles devised the plot to oust their rivals. For instance, Russophiles dominated the current ministry, and members of the English party had not occupied influential government positions for several years. Of the twenty-four governors who held posts, eighteen supported the traditionalist government. Demands for representative institutions remained scuttled, and the government’s external orientation at the time alarmed the British Foreign Office, already weary of Russia’s extensive privileges in Ottoman territories. Moreover, Othon’s personal autocratic behavior reflected the spirit of Russian policy, and the dismissal of reform-minded clerics and the closure of Protestant schools diminished the liberals’ role in religion and public education. In the broader picture, Lord Palmerston never believed the Tsar’s professions of disinterest in Greek affairs. The reports of several external observers also support the hypothesis of an Anglophile genesis of the plot. Russian Vice-Consul Kallogerakis suggested that a forewarning of the plot came in August 1838 when “cabals of Constitutionalists caused conflict among the authorities of Patras and vexations among the rural mayors.” The Constitutionalists aimed to disturb public tranquility and make Glarakis appear incapable of administering the country. According to Kallogerakis, they wanted Glarakis to appear to be the cause of the commotions. He informed Katakazy of his opinion that the Philorthodox Society “was launched by the Constitutionals or Syndagmatics who desired the dismissal of Glarakis.”47 In

45 See Athina, 681 (Dec. 27, 1839), 682 (Dec. 30, 1839), 683 (Jan. 6, 1840), 684 (Jan. 10, 1840), 685 (Jan. 13, 1840); and Aroni-Tsichli, Agrotikes exegerseis, 211. 46 Aion, 120/121/122 (Jan. 1, 1840), 124 (Jan. 3, 1840), 132 (Jan. 10, 1840), 143 (Mar. 6, 1840), 163 (May 19, 1840), 166 (May 29, 1840), 167 (Feb. 4, 1840). Petropulos, Politics and Statecraft, 333, claims that the Century (Aion) responded to the accusation of the Napist plot with the charge of an English frame-up, but that no one really took the newspaper’s charges seriously. 47 See Kallogerakis to Katakazy, Patras, Aug. 10, 1838, AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 378/1838, ll. 45–7; Kallogerakis to Katakazy, Athens, Jan. 11, 1840; Kallogerakis to Katakazy, Athens, Jan. 9, 1840, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 507, d. 414/1840, ll. 78–9, 80–1.

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May 1839, Swedish envoy Heidenstam observed that relations between the government and the British legation had become worse than ever, especially over various commercial issues, and that Lyons for a few days considered demanding his passport. The Greek government’s decision to replace the Anglophile Trikoupis with the traditionalist Mikhail Soutsos as Greek minister in London further soured interstate relations. On the eve of his departure to London, Soutsos explained to Nesselrode that the society was another intrigue of Lyons and the Anglophiles.48 Heidenstam insinuated Anglophile animosity by relating an episode when Ambassador Soutsos first visited Palmerston, who asked the Greek prince: “Have you read Dante? Very well! Then each time that you present yourself at the Foreign Office, remember these lines: ‘Abandon all hope ye who enter here.’”49 While visiting the Greek kingdom a few years later, the Russian diplomat Spyridon Destunis wrote in his diary that the “Philorthodox Society was created by the English party to usurp the King.” Destunis defended Nikitas as a brave, loyal, and honest, “but a Russian in his soul,” and for this reason, the Greek government, jealous of Russian influence, unjustly prosecuted him.50 Thus, a spectrum of well-informed individuals accused the Anglophiles of conjuring up the conspiracy, yet for various reasons, their opinions enjoyed less support. THE PHILO RTHODOX C ONSPIRACY IN THE B R I T I SH - R U L E D IO N I A N I S L A N D S Soon after the Philorthodox affair erupted in Athens, news of the conspiracy reached the British-controlled Ionian Islands.51 Upon learning of the conspiracy, Anton F. Sandrini, Russian vice-consul in Zakynthos, independently declared that 48

Soutsos to Nesselrode, Athens, Apr. 11, 1840, AVPRI, f. 161/1, d. 54, ll. 9–12. See Heidenstam to Steirneld, Athens, May 28, 1839 [NS], RGADA, f. 1, op. 2, d. 93, ll. 92–5; Heidenstam to Steirneld, Athens, Oct. 12, 1838 [NS], RGADA, f. 1, op. 2, d. 90, ll. 139–41. Although disappointed to lose “a friend and talented minister,” Nesselrode was pleased with the King’s decision to transfer Soutsos from St Petersburg to London. See Nesselrode to Rudhart, St Petersburg, Nov. 9, 1837; Nesselrode to Rudhart, St Petersburg, Aug. 15, 1837, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 79/ 1837, ll. 10–11, 18–21. The Greek post in St Petersburg was left vacant. 50 See S. Destunis, “Dnevnik. 22 Dek. 1845-26 Ian. 1846,” OR RNB, f. 250, d. 68, l. 16; Destunis, “Raskhodnaiia tetrad’ vo vremiia puteshestviia za granitsei,” 1845–6, OR RNB, f. 250, d. 52, l. 10; Destunis, “Vzgliad na proshedshee, nastoiashchee i budushchee grekov,” late 1845–early 1846, OR RNB, f. 250, d. 84, l. 11. A less flattering appraisal of Nikitas appeared in V. Davydov, Putevyia zapiski, vedennyia vo vremia prebyvaniia na Ionicheskikh Ostrovakh, v Gretsii, Maloi Azii i Turtsii v 1835 gody (St Petersburg: E. Prats i E. Fisher, 1839–40), i. 290, 302–3. 51 The fullest account of the Ionian Islands under British rule remains Panagiotis Chiotis’s Istoria tou Ioniou Kratous apo systaseos aftou mechris enoseos (eti 1815–64) (Zakynthos: Ch. S. Chiotis, 1877). More recent works include Thomas W. Gallant, Experiencing Dominion: Culture, Identity, and Power in the British Mediterranean (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2002); Istoria tou ellinikou ethnous, xiii. 200–17; W. D. Wrigley, The Diplomatic Significance of Ionian Neutrality, 1821–1831 (New York: Peter Lang, 1988); Michael Pratt, Britain’s Greek Empire (London: Rex Collings, 1978); Bruce Knox, “British Policy and the Ionian Islands, 1847–64: Nationalism and Imperial Administration,” English Historical Review, 99 (1984): 503–29; and Miranda Stavrinos, “The Reformist Party in the Ionian Islands, (1848–52): Internal Conflicts and Nationalist Aspirations,” BS 26 (1985): 351–61. 49

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the Anglophiles had invented it. According to Sandrini, the government responded to the news about the plot by laying an embargo on all traffic with Greece. Arrests followed, as the British High Commissioner, Howard Douglas, took advantage of the affair. On December 31, 1839, fifty police surrounded and searched the house of Count Denis Romas, the leading member of one of the most respected families of the country and an ardent conservative. The count had recently stayed in Athens for several months visiting his close friend, King Othon. The police inspector entered Romas’s home, seized all of the count’s papers, and sent them to Douglas. Simultaneously, the Ionian Parliament increased police surveillance. The parliament’s “Proclamation,” dated December 31, referred to the Philorthodox conspiracy as undermining public order in the areas bordering Greece.52 In order to prevent the revolt that threatened to upset the peace, Douglas and the Ionian parliament announced that they were taking the necessary means to suppress it. Any suspicion of communicating with Greece served as a pretext for the government to carry out a search. Under scrutiny were individuals suspected of having connections with the Greek and Russian governments. Vice-Consul Sandrini observed that “these measures of terrorism” were taking place on all the Ionian Islands, and that other notables were subjected to the same scrutiny as the Romas family on Zakynthos.53 For instance, the historian from Lefkas, Giovanni Petrizzopulo, became the subject of police investigation: On the 11th of January last the Inspector of the Police of Corfu, accompanied by constables, entered my house, and as directed by the Lord High Commissioner using the powers of the High Police, obliged me to give up to him all my papers, which having been collected into two cases and a bag, and sealed by myself, were forthwith conveyed to the Palace of Saint Michael and George. (Of the motive of this unlooked for and undeserved attack, I was not informed.) A few hours afterwards, a notification of the Senate indirectly designated me as a participator in a Conspiracy in Greece, with the design, probably, of spreading disorder and disturbing the tranquility of these islands.54

Petrizzopulo was disgusted with the British government and accused it of exercising despotic power. The timing of the Philorthodox affair was fortuitous for Commissioner Douglas, for he used it to diminish the political opposition in the parliament as well as to discredit the pro-Russian patriarch of Constantinople, Anthimos IV. Douglas warned London that among the sequestered papers in Athens were letters to the patriarch and “his creatures in the [Greek] synod.” Soon afterwards, British ambassador to the Sublime Porte, John Ponsonby, notified Lord Palmerston of

52 “Proclamazione da porte di Suà Altezza il Presidente, e dei Prestantissimi Senatori degli Stati Uniti della Isole Ionie,” in Sandrini to Nesselrode, Zakynthos, Jan. 2, 1840, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 193, l. 54. 53 Sandrini to Nesselrode, Zakynthos, Jan. 2, 1840, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 193, ll. 53–5. 54 Giovanni D. Petrizzopulo, A Refutation of the Assertions of Sir Howard Douglass . . . Concerning the Faction which He Imagined to Exist in the Ionian Islands (London: Morton’s, 1840), 6.

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the deposition of Anthimos “for his attacks upon the Ionian states.”55 In one important respect, the affair affected Ionian society in the same way as it did mainland Greek society: the current government was completely disrupted and the traditionalists were removed from power. A few weeks after news of the plot became public, new elections for the seventh Ionian parliament were underway, and those under investigation were excluded from participation. Toward the end of January, Sandrini commented that good order reigned, free communications with the continent were reestablished, and “all the restrictions and terrorisms adopted by the government subsided.” Sandrini’s optimism, however, was premature. The examination of Count Romas’s papers was nearly complete, and the government was unable to find any compromising material, yet the papers of the Kapodistrias family in Kerkyra and those of several other families remained under the control of the commissioner. According to Sandrini, who claimed that everybody shared his opinion, the motivation for the searches was England’s suspicion of the “very extensive influence of Russia in the Ionian Islands.”56 These worries had been realized during the sixth Ionian parliament when Russophile representatives, including the prominent writer Sir Andreas Moustoxydis, the cousin of the Russian vice-consul in Thessaloniki, were able to boldly oppose the will of the British commissioner.57 News of the Philorthodox Society alarmed British agents, who apparently believed that the plot was a Russian intrigue and suspected that King Othon was involved. Douglas thought the King was waiting for intelligence from the Ionian Islands before acting further. Consequently, the British authorities took efforts to prove that the principal Ionian families, who were considered to be the most sympathetic to Russia, were hostile to the British government. According to Sandrini, the government used the prosecution of the society as a pretext to further three goals. The first was to find palpable proof in the papers of the suspected families of their treasonous connections to Russia. The second was to uncover in Count Romas’s papers the real intentions of King Othon and the society. The third was to remind the Ionian people of the “frightful epoch of terrorism” which could ensue if they did not obey the will of their protecting power.58 The mass of Ionian citizens did not react in the same way as their British governors. Sandrini remarked that “the people of good sense” believed that the 55 Ponsonby to Palmerston, Therapia, Mar. 3, 1840 [NS]; Douglas to Beauvale, Corfu, Feb. 14, 1840 [NS], RGADA, f. 1, op. 2, d. 94, ll. 282, 299. Sandrini to Nesselrode, Zante, Feb. 29, 1840, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 193, l. 30 also refers to the correspondence between the patriarch and the conspirators. See also Manouil Gedeon, Patriarchikoi Pinakes, 2nd edn, ed. N. L. Phoropoulos (Athens: Syllogos pros Diadosin Ophilimon Biblion, 1996), 614. 56 Sandrini to Nesselrode, Zakynthos, Jan. 29, 1840, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 193, ll. 38–49. For a critical statement of British policy in the Ionian Islands, see Katakazy to Nesselrode, Athens, May 20, 1839, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 11/1839, ll. 245–8. For the accusations alleged by Moustoxydis against British policy, see G. F. Bowen, “Ionian Adminstration,” Quarterly Review, 91 (1852): 326. 57 Moustoxydis’s biographer claims that Philorthodox plot was used by the British government to crack down on its opponents: Evangelos I. Manis, Andreas Moustoxydis, 1785–1860: O epistimon, o politikos, o ethnikos agonists (Athens: Philosophiki Scholi tou Ethnikou kai Kapodistriakou Panepistimiou Athinon, 1960), 132–3. 58 Sandrini to Nesselrode, Zakynthos, Jan. 29, 1840, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 193, ll. 38–49.

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Philorthodox Society was “nothing but a shrewd coup by England itself.” Many inhabitants of the islands thought that the British had staged a conspiracy that gave the impression of being a political work of Russia in order to spoil Greek–Russian relations. Sandrini suspected that the commissioner soon “will have full powers and special authorizations from his ministry in London.” Obviously, Commissioner Douglas focused directly on those most sympathetic to Russia. Moreover, the infringement of citizens’ rights by the violent and arbitrary means employed by the commissioner was in violation of the Constitutional Charter of 1817, which England itself bestowed upon the independent islanders. The British governors were allegedly tampering with diplomatic correspondence and the postal system. Sandrini assured St Petersburg that he was using great prudence and circumspection in his formal relations with the government. He was concerned that his dispatches would be intercepted.59 This was the general atmosphere when the seventh Ionian parliament opened on February 15, 1840. Douglas began the proceedings by justifying the dissolution of the previous parliament. He represented the latest events in Athens as intentional interference in the tranquility of the Septinsular Republic.60 New codes were promulgated without the cooperation of the parliament that bestowed upon the Lord High Commissioner greater influence in the formation of laws and diminished the amount of opposition in the legislative corps. In the opinion of Sandrini, the British government seized the opportunity to consolidate its influence on the younger generation through the strengthening of Protestant education. One way it did this was through the persecution of the eminent priest Konstantinos Typaldos, a co-founder of the Ionian Academy, whom the police arrested for communicating with Anthimos IV in Constantinople.61 This caused many islanders to fear that Orthodoxy was under attack. Sandrini warned that disciples of Luther and Calvin were threatening public morality and education behind a mask of generosity and benevolence. The investigations of Count Romas and the other suspects, including Andreas Moustoxydis and the Kapodistrias brothers, produced no concrete results, although the government intended to ship their papers to London. The Greek newspapers also fell under censorship. The government suppressed the Century in particular, while the journals of British-controlled Malta circulated with columns accusing Russia of complicity in the recent affairs in Athens.62 Indeed, on May 1, 1840 [NS], Act 8 of the first session of the seventh Ionian parliament, which called for a 59 Sandrini to Nesselrode, Zakynthos, Jan. 29, 1840, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 193, ll. 38–49. The Constitutional Charter of 1817 appears in R. M. Martin, History of the British Colonies (London: J. Cochrane, 1835), 551–71. See also A. W. Frewen Lord, Sir Thomas Maitland (London: Kemp Press, 1897), 192–214; and C. Willis Dixon, The Colonial Administrations of Sir Thomas Maitland (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1939), 179–215. 60 Great Britain Parliament, Ionian States (1840 House of Commons) (London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1840); Gazzetta Corfu (Feb. 27, 1840). 61 See Chiotis, Istoria tou ioniou kratous, 112–14; Spyros N. Avouris, Ta ekklisiastika tis eptanisou, 1815–67 (Athens: G. D. Kypraiou, 1965), 36–7, 43; and ThIE 11: 1174–5. 62 Sandrini to Nesselrode, Zakynthos, Feb. 29, 1840, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 193, ll. 29–36, 51–2.

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cessation of publications that “perverted the public spirit and placed the tranquility of the state in danger,” banned several Greek newspapers. Sandrini observed that Commissioner Douglas was obsessed with the idea of persecuting the Russian faction in every manner. Sandrini sent St Petersburg the translation of a circular dated August 18, 1840 [NS] from Douglas to the residents of Great Britain charging the Century of printing inflammatory missives from the patriarch of Constantinople and his emissaries. In addition to the law against Greek newspapers, the publication of religious encyclicals, pastorals, and instructions were placed under special surveillance. According to Sandrini, this development further compromised the Orthodox Church, as accusations against prominent Ionian families continued. Lord John Russell, a Liberal member of the British government, wrote to Douglas approving of the measures of prevention which were enacted against the “criminal authors of the conspiracy” hatched in Athens. Douglas invited Sandrini to a conference under the pretext of communicating the recent government acts, but where he actually fumed against Russian partisans.63 Viaro Kapodistrias (younger brother of the deceased president), Petrizzopulos, and Moustoxydis all published replies in response to Lord Russell’s statements. Kapodistrias asserted that as soon as the British government became convinced that “the idea of Philorthodoxy is quite a chimera the triumph of the oppressed will be placed beyond doubt.”64 Overall, the reaction of the Russian embassy in the Greek kingdom to the uncovering of the conspiracy was less drastic than that of Douglas. Katakazy treated the whole affair with a nonchalant attitude, emphasizing its ephemeral and trivial nature. While he continually called for more stringent press controls, Katakazy accused newspapers on both sides of the debate, including Athina, the Century, Friend of the People, and the Greek Courier, of irresponsible reporting. Katakazy never believed that the King had any connection to the plot, and he felt that the government treated the accused unjustly. The surprising thing is that the more liberal British government responded by invading the personal property of those suspected of complicity. Another Russian official, vice-consul Angelos Moustoxydis in Thessaloniki, complained of the persecution of Ionian citizens by English agents. “Even my cousin Andreas Moustoxydis,” wrote the Russian vice-consul, “who last year returned to Kerkyra after a mission to London was exposed to the complete resentment of Lord High Commissioner Mr Douglas, who wished to find a pretext to postpone the government by accusing him of being a suspect of the so-called Philorthodox Society in Athens.” Moustoxydis sent the embassy in Constantinople the translation of a

63 See Sandrini to Nesselrode, Zakynthos, July 3, 1840; and Russell to Douglas, June 6, 1840 [NS], AVPRI, f. 133, op. 468, d. 193, ll. 22–4, 25–6. 64 Viaro Kapodistrias, Remarks Respectfully Submitted to the Consideration of the British Parliament (London: J. Brettell, 1841), 10. An inscription on the back cover of this booklet in the Library of the Academy of Sciences in St Petersburg [1926/B-8139] reads: “À son Excellence M. Spiridion Destounis Conseiller d’État actuel au service de Russie à St Petersbourg.”

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particular article in the Century that defended his cousin.65 Katakazy tried to lessen the concerns of the Russian envoy in Thessaloniki by emphasizing the affair’s absurdity, although he lamented that the rumors had negative consequences, including the change of ministry in Athens. As for the individuals under arrest, Katakazy described them as dupes of questionable intelligence.66 Finally, an interesting attempt to point to British complicity in the Philorthodox affair was an unsigned letter (found in Russian archives) to a Russian official in Paris. In response to the rhetorical question, “Is the Philorthodox plot a chimera or a reality,” the author insists to the British governors of the Ionian Islands, “It is your work!”67 THE P RO SEC UTION OF THE A LLEGED CONSPIRATORS Although the Greek crown attempted to dismiss the affair as inconsequential, the legal proceedings against the accused members of the Philorthodox Society occupied the government for several months. The government’s official position, reported in the Greek Courier, was to focus on punishing individuals instead of groups. In a roundabout way, the Greek Courier reassured Russophiles that a general prosecution would not follow.68 The tense domestic situation worried Othon, and he made changes in the judiciary. Konstantinos Pitsipios, a pro-British politician, led the investigations of the plot, instead of the prosecutor of the Athenian court Ioannis Typaldos.69 The King’s decision to give control to Pitsipios reflected the royal shift toward the English party and away from the Russophiles. This also explains the replacement of the ministry and the shakeup of the synod’s membership in the summer of 1840. While they received certain advantages, the Constitutionalists or Anglophiles were not able to improve their position as much as they desired, owing to the prudent conduct of the King. As Heidenstam observed, it is perhaps a very great error to have attributed to the whole Napist party the intentions of several individuals, and it should be said that King Othon has behaved very wisely in this affair. Not only has he attributed little faith to the accusations against the Russian legation in Athens, he has prevented individual persecutions against the Greeks of the Napist party, who have been accused without proof. By this wise conduct, he has ended the impending conflict between the Constitutionalists and the Napists.70 65 Moustoxydis to Butenev, Thessaloniki, 21 June 1840, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517, d. 1305/1840, ll. 48–9; Aion, 166 (May 29, 1840). 66 Katakazy to Moustoxydis, Athens, Feb. 22, 1840, AVPRI, f. 279, op. 565, d. 16/1840, ll. 1–2. Two decades later Papadopoulos-Vretos in Biografia del Cavaliere Andrea Moustoxydis, 13, reiterated the claim that Sir Douglas had used the Philorthodox Society to eliminate Andreas from the opposition in Parliament. See also Kapodistrias, Remarks, 19. 67 “Pis’mo k. Gr. Svechinoi o polozhenii dukhovnykh del v Gretsii,” Odessa, Mar. 18, 1840, RGADA, f. 15, op. 1, d. 374, l. 6. 68 O Ellinikos Tachydromos (Jan. 14, 1840); Petropulos, Politics and Statecraft, 339. 69 See “Typaldos, Ioannis,” MEE 23: 491; and Petropulos, Politics and Statecraft, 340. 70 Heidenstam to Stierneld, Athens, Feb. 27, 1840 [NS], RGADA, f. 1, op. 2, d. 94, ll. 306–7.

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Despite months of intensive investigation, the government made only three further arrests. Significantly, it accused no member of the Greek clergy, which is rather curious given the supposed religious motivations of the society. All those arrested denied any sort of complicity in a plot to subvert the throne. Kapodistrias, the principal defendant, claimed that the plan for a secret society that was found among his papers was nothing but “a project in the air, a curious piece” that fell into his hands by chance. As for Nikitas and Renieris, the interrogators had difficulty in finding anything against them. No witnesses were able to furnish evidence of a conspiracy. Katakazy thought that the sad affair produced nothing but a scandal in the country while raising Ottoman apprehensions. Earlier, the Russian embassy in Constantinople informed Katakazy that the uncovering of the conspiracy produced “a profound impression” at the Sublime Porte. Fortunately, wrote Russian ambassador Apollon P. Butenev, the rigorous measures taken by the Greek government convinced the Porte that the “strange and odious intrigue” would not have regrettable consequences in the bordering territories or among the Orthodox clergy.71 The final indictment announced in May 1840 was lenient. The charges against the last three arrested were dismissed due to insufficient evidence. Nikitas and Kapodistrias, however, were accused of organizing a secret society with irredentist aspirations, and Renieris was charged with being an agent of the society. All three were charged with misdemeanor, not treason. Nikitas was released from prison without bail as he awaited his trial, while Kapodistrias and Renieris each paid a bail of 600 drachmas. The clemency of the terms was in part due to the government’s desire to lessen the gravity of the matter. The judicial proceedings of July 11, 1840, which made the final decisions regarding the Philorthodox plot, stated that Russia had not participated in the conspiracy. According to the verdict, the plot itself did not appear to be a real one, yet the overall results of the court proceedings were ambiguous. First, the relations between the defense lawyers reflected the polemical exchanges that had taken place in the pages of Athina and the Century since the society was uncovered. The prosecution used some of the seized documents as evidence, including the organization of the society and the letter from Kapodistrias to the patriarch of Constantinople, and they called on three witnesses. Before the defense presented its case, one of Renieris’s lawyers (an Englishman named Edward Masson) unexpectedly charged that there was a sub-conspiracy underway to exculpate Nikitas and Kapodistrias and place the blame solely on his client.72 Renieris’s lawyers requested a reexamination of the witnesses and, at the last minute, asked to question new

71 Katakazy to Nesselrode, Athens, Jan. 19, 1840; Katakazy to Nesselrode, Athens, Mar. 12, 1840, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 9/1840, ll. 55, 57–9; Butenev to Katakazy, Pera, Jan. 7, 1840; Butenev to Katakazy, Pera, Jan. 26, 1840, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1. d. 1808, ll. 78, 79–80. 72 Paparrigopoulos to Katakazy, Athens, July 13, 1840, AVPRI, f. 165/2, d. 419, ll. 15. For biographical information on Edward Masson, see Papadopoulos, Istoria tis ekklisias, 278 n. 3; Kordatos, Istoria tis neoteris Elladas, iii. 138 n. 1; D. K. Vardouniotos, “Edouardos Masson,” Parnassos, 11 (1915): 230–1; and Edward Masson, An Apology for the Greek Church; or Hints on the Means of Promoting the Religious Improvement of the Greek Nation (Athens: Royal Printing Office, 1843).

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ones, who could testify to the threats that Renieris had suffered. Next, the lawyers interrogated Renieris himself, which revealed that one of the supposed threats came from an old friend of his.73 Since there was no evidence to prove that the society actually existed, all five judges submitted a verdict of not guilty, and all the prosecuted were acquitted. Thus ended, wrote Katakazy, “this miserable intrigue that the newspapers and diplomatic correspondents” had manipulated in order to convince Europe “of a vast conspiracy, hatched under the auspices of Russia in order to revolutionize all of the Christians of the Orient.”74 No words were spoken during the trial about the domestic orientation of the society or the threat to the throne, and in this way, only the supposed irredentist strivings of the conspirators were exposed. Paparrigopulos, the Russian consul in Athens, recorded after the trial that “the public remains convinced of the absurdities of the rumors, which were widespread at the time of the revelation of the society.” As for the absolution of the accused, “this sentence was received with lively acclamations and marks of approbation by the public.” Paparrigopoulos claimed that Kapodistrias had embraced the projects of Papas hoping to use the society as a means to collect money, that Nikitas was simply gullible, and that Papas was an English lackey. However, he demurred that the judicial proceedings tarnished the King’s public image.75 Othon was angry and disappointed by the verdict, and he immediately dismissed the Athenian first court judge for not following the government’s instructions.76 Next, the government filed an appeal and attempted to prosecute the judges of the lower court, yet the court of appeals declared that it was unable to impose penalties on the three acquitted or prosecute the lower court judges. The King therefore resorted to other measures to gain satisfaction. Kapodistrias, as an Ionian subject, was expelled from the country, and Nikitas (who had become seriously ill while incarcerated) was exiled to Aegina. Judges and officials in Patras and Messenia, suspected of proRussian sympathies, were dismissed.77 Thus, the affair formally ended. RUSSIA, RUSSOPHILES, AND THE PHILORTHODOX AFFAIR The influence of the incident on the social and political situation in Greece offered an ideal opportunity for the politicians to settle scores with their rivals. As the

73 See Paparrigopoulos to Katakazy, Athens, July 13, 1840, AVPRI, f. 165/2, d. 419, l. 15; Katakazy to Nesselrode, Athens, May 27, 1840; Katakazy to Nesselrode, Aegina, July 17, 1840 AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 9/1840, ll. 176–8, 246–7. Detailed accounts of the trial include Aion, 179 (July 14, 1840), 180–2 (July 21, 1840), 180 (July 25, 1840), 183 (July 28, 1840); Athina, 732 (July 13, 1840); Petropulos, Politics and Statecraft, 341–2; and Petrunina, Grecheskaia natsiia, 280–1. 74 Katakazy to Nesselrode, Aegina, July 17, 1840, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 9/1840, ll. 176–8. 75 Paparrigopoulos to Katakazy, Athens, July 13, 1840, AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 419, ll. 15, 20. 76 See Paparrigopoulos to Katakazy, Athens, July 23, 1840; and Paparrigopoulos to Katakazy, Athens, July 13, 1840, AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 419, ll. 10, 13–21. 77 Heidenstam to Stierneld, Athens, June 27, 1840, RGADA, f. 1, op. 2, d. 95, l. 21.

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public learned of the plot, the different political groups took a variety of measures to bring the government and public opinion to their side. Generally, Ambassador Katakazy wanted to assure St Petersburg that no threat actually existed to the Greek throne or to the status quo in Ottoman domains, although he considered it important enough to urge the Russian embassy in Constantinople to deliver his dispatches to St Petersburg by the fastest means of transport possible. Before the trial, he was pleased with the vigilance of the government.78 His decision to request leave from the capital on January 19, 1840 is indicative of the seriousness to which Katakazy attached to the affair. He wanted to return to Russia for several months in order to arrange for his son’s education. Nesselrode appreciated Katakazy’s motives, yet he wrote that the Tsar considered the moment unfavorable. Katakazy postponed his departure until October.79 In contrast, many of Katakazy’s fellow diplomats considered the events extremely serious. Investigation into the biographies of Georgios Kapodistrias, Nikitas, and the others involved in the plot also shed light on the affair. Nearly all accounts of Kapodistrias are negative. Gambling debts forced him to leave his home in Kerkyra. When he first arrived in Athens in 1838, he pursued a legal dispute over money owed to his family. As an Ionian citizen, he solicited the assistance of Lyons, who ignored his claims. Since he could not return to Kerkyra, Kapodistrias remained in Greece without a livelihood. Katakazy thought it ridiculous to consider such a man as the mysterious, awe-inspiring author of plans for a vast revolution.80 The second accused, Nikitas “Turkophagos” or the “Turk-slayer,” was a hero of the revolution. During the Kapodistrian years, he wore the rank of general, but during the Regency, he was reduced to colonel. Therefore, he had a right to feel slighted, yet this is hardly proof of his involvement in a secret society committed to overthrowing the King.81 Information on Emmanouil Papas and Nikolaos Renieris is contained in mostly anecdotal sources often composed by opponents. Katakazy claimed that Renieris arrived in Athens after the police chased him out of Trieste. In 78 Katakazy to Butenev, Athens, Jan. 9, 1840; Katakazy to Butenev, Athens, 10.04.1840, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 1808, ll. 7, 18; Katakazy to Paikos, Dec. 30, 1839, Athens, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 401, ll. 121. See also Paikos to Katakazy, Athens, Dec. 27, 1839; Paikos to Katakazy, Dec. 27, 1839; Katakazy to Nesselrode, Aegina, Jan. 17, 1840, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 9/1840, ll. 22, 92, 246–7. 79 Katakazy to Nesselrode (personal), Athens, Jan. 19, 1840; Nesselrode to Katakazy, St Petersburg, Feb. 22, 1840, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 9/1840, ll. 420, 419. Numerous accounts maintain that the Tsar arranged Katakazy’s trip to Russia in order to scold his envoy for dangerous behavior: Karolidis, Synchronos istoria ton Ellinon, ii. 383–5; Driault, Histoire diplomatique, ii. 195; Pipinelis, I monarchia, 295; Frazee, The Orthodox Church, 153–4. Kallogerakis to Persiany, Patras, Oct. 3, 1840, AVPRI, F. 133, op. 165/2, op. 507, d. 414/1840, l. 26, reports that Katakazy left Athens around Oct. 1, 1840. 80 Katakazy to Nesselrode, Athens, Jan. 8, 1840, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 9/1840, l. 20. According to Katakazy to Vlassopoulos, Athens, July 25, 1835, AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 325/ 1835, l. 11, the Kapodistrias family had been petitioning the Greek government for money since 1833, and on occasion, it had requested Russian intervention. Wallenburg to Metternich, Athens, Jan. 13, 1840 [NS], in Jelavich, “The Philorthodox Conspiracy,” 97–8, states that Kapodistrias was a friend of the Constitutionalists. 81 Nikitas was the godfather of Katakazy’s son. However, the Russian ambassador does not refer to the old warrior in very flattering terms: Katakazy to Nesselrode, Athens, Apr. 10, 1840, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 9/1840, l. 84. Wallenburg to Metternich, Athens, Jan. 13, 1840 [NS], in Jelavich, “The Philorthodox Conspiracy,” 98, calls Nikitas “the biggest nothing.”

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Athens, he made the acquaintance of Papas, and the two adventurers then contacted pro-British circles. They used the other two suspects, Kapodistrias and Nikitas, as dupes in order to ingratiate themselves with the King and acquire money and titles. Katakazy suggested that they may have given Kapodistrias the idea of the society, and not the other way around, and that they took advantage of the naïve Nikitas.82 One reasonable hypothesis is that the instigators of the conspiracy, if one actually existed, decided to use the brother of President Kapodistrias and the revolutionary hero Nikitas as their front men. The author of the anonymous memoir makes an interesting assertion that the leaders of the society first asked Viaro Kapodistrias, but he declined, so they decided to appeal to the younger Georgios. Yet, if Georgios was the political figurehead and Nikitas the military chief, then it is still unclear who the ecclesiastical leader was. Of course the foremost traditionalist was Oikonomos, who himself called the whole Philorthodox affair “the most profound slander.”83 Katakazy seems to have sincerely believed that the conspiracy was preposterous and that the accused were victims of intrigue by Russophobes.84 A number of curious events add credence to the supposition that Lyons and the Anglophiles not only reaped the benefits of the incident, but also provoked it. Katakazy pointed out that an Englishman named Mr Black, who had held the post of chief of police during the Armansperg period, collected Kapodistrias when he left prison. Katakazy wrote to Nesselrode: “Without wishing to attach too much importance to this situation, I nevertheless cannot avoid remarking to Your Excellency that this appears even more significant and more affirmative than the thousands of false rumors against the Imperial Mission of Russia concerning the secret society.”85 Adding suspicion to this rather odd scenario, Edward Masson, the former lawyer of Renieris, also met with Kapodistrias after he was released from prison. For months, the Anglophiles worked diligently to blacken the image of the Russian party, remove its backers from the government, and make a link with the Russian embassy. They had some success, for the historiography has maintained that Katakazy was an organizer of secret societies. Of course, Lyons would greatly benefit from a scandal exposing Katakazy as the head of the conspiracy. As for the proof of Russia’s role, even the secretary of the Austrian legation, Wallenburg, observed that, “I am well informed about the nature of the evidence, and I myself am certain, that at this point it does not exist.” Wallenburg claimed that Katakazy had been unjustly implicated, that Glarakis had been betrayed, and that the King believed that the Russian embassy had no connection to the affair. Rather, Wallenburg believed that the French party instigated the incident as a blow against 82 Katakazy to Nesselrode, Athens, Apr. 10, 1840, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 9/1840, ll. 84–5. Paparrigopoulos to Katakazy, July 13, 1840, AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 419/1840, l. 20, reiterates this point. 83 Oikonomos, Ta sozomena, ii. 433–4. 84 Katakazy to Nesselrode, Athens, Feb. 12, 1840, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 9/1840, ll. 57–9. 85 Katakazy to Nesselrode, Athens, May 27, 1840; Katakazy to Nesselrode, Aegina, July 17, 1840, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 9/1840, ll. 177, 246–7.

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British–Russian cooperation in the Near East.86 A more or less disinterested Heidenstam thought that the accusations against the Russian ambassador were ludicrous. He felt that King Othon, however, mistrusted Katakazy and would continue to distance himself from the Napists without favoring the other parties.87 Russian archival sources reveal no relation with the Philorthodox Society before its exposure. St Petersburg first learned of it from Prince Metternich in Vienna. Foreign Minister Nesselrode expressed great displeasure that Katakazy had not informed his government of the seriousness of the plot in his first dispatches. The Constitutional party, according to Nesselrode, was using the power of religion as an instrument to stir the passions of “a lively and impressionable people profoundly attached to its beliefs.” In the middle of these frictions was the young and weak sovereign who was vacillating between one party and another. The best panacea, according to St Petersburg, was the conversion of the King to Orthodoxy. The main points of Russian foreign policy outlined by Nesselrode were the promotion of the legitimate monarchy, equilibrium among the influence of the protecting powers, and the suppression of expansionistic aspirations. Katakazy’s instructions after the uncovering of the affair show that the Russian government was ignorant of the Philorthodox Society until its exposure.88 St Petersburg ordered Katakazy to investigate the accusations against the Russian mission and Russophiles. Katakazy replied in a personal letter that no one believed in his involvement in the affair, and that Lelli and Oikonomos were innocent. “Everyone knows here,” wrote Katakazy, “and the investigations prove, that neither the Kolokotronises, nor the Soutsoses, nor the Kondouriotes, nor any of the bishops, nor any primate of the Morea had the least knowledge of the confidences that Georgios Kapodistrias received from the two other adventurers.” Katakazy stated that Kapodistrias was only at his home during large celebrations. Katakazy sent an official statement to Othon stating that he had no connection with the affair, but that Lyons and other diplomats wanted to diminish Russian influence in Greece.89 The Philorthodox Society, if it really existed, was unable to achieve any practical results, other than discrediting the Russophiles. If the Anglophiles invented the affair, they were very successful in ousting their rivals from key posts in the government and Holy Synod. In any case, the episode illuminates the nature of Greek politics during this period and underscores the role of religion in the formation of Greek identity. Despite the uncertainty of the parties or persons responsible, the inclusion of Orthodoxy as a driving force is a crucial factor. In comparison with contemporary clandestine organizations in Italy, Spain, Russia, 86 Wallenburg to Metternich, Athens, Jan. 13, 1840 [NS], in Jelavich, “The Philorthodox Conspiracy,” 98–9, 101, 102. 87 Heidenstam to Ihre, Athens, Oct. 12, 1840, RDADA, f. 1, op. 2, d. 97, l. 590. 88 Tatishchev to Katakazy, Vienna, Feb. 29, 1840, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 1808, ll. 13–14; Nesselrode to Katakazy, St Petersburg, Feb. 22, 1840, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 9/1840, ll. 399–405. 89 Nesselrode to Katakazy, St Petersburg, Feb. 22, 1840, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 9/1840, l. 407; Katakazy to Nesselrode, Athens, Apr. 11, 1840, AVPRI, f. 161/4, op. 181/2, d. 54, ll. 4–7; Petrunina, Grecheskaia natsiia, 291.

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and elsewhere, where religion played a variable role in effecting change, the Philorthodox affair demonstrates the potent matrix of religion and politics in Greece. In retrospect, one may only regret the violation of human rights caused by the obsessive suspicion of Russia. PATRIOTIC S OCIETIES, RUSSIA, AND THE CRETAN U P R I S IN G O F 18 4 1 Besides playing a major role in unsettling politics within the Greek kingdom, the uncovering of the Philorthodox conspiracy had serious reverberations on Ottomanruled Crete. For political and military figures from Crete, who had emigrated to Greece since the Revolution of 1821, the turmoil surrounding the Philorthodox affair and the Eastern Crisis provided an opportune moment to revive their struggle to “liberate” their homeland from Ottoman rule. Unsurprisingly, the movement also had ties to a quasi-clandestine patriotic organization founded in Athens by Cretan immigrants called the Cretan Committee, which exhibited many of the features of irredentist and national societies of the era, including a hierarchical leadership, oaths, and plans for an armed revolt. Indeed, events on Crete in the summer of 1841 testify to the importance of conspiracy and popular insurrection in Greek politics (see Figure 5.2). In the wake of the Greek Revolution, the Cretan question remained indirectly linked to the broader rivalries among the Ottoman Empire, Egypt, and the great powers in the eastern Mediterranean. More specifically, the determination of Christian Cretans to unite with the Greek state after 1830 entangled the protecting powers in a struggle to gain influence on the island. When the second Ottoman– Egyptian crisis erupted in April 1839, underground plans for an uprising, the collection of funds, and the transfer of weapons began taking place on Crete and in the Greek kingdom. The rebellion that broke out in February 1841 constitutes an important signpost in Greece’s irredentist quest and demonstrates how St Petersburg, while outwardly cooperating with the protecting powers, aimed to maintain its traditional sphere of influence in the Orthodox East.90 The outbreak of violence on Crete was one link in the long chain of insurrections taking place during the Eastern Crisis. A decade of prosperity on the island under

90 Brief treatments of the 1841 rebellion include Driault, Histoire diplomatique, ii. 212–20; D. G. Rozen, Istoriia Turtsii ot pobedy reformy v 1826 godu do Parizhskago traktata v 1856 godu (St Petersburg: Akademii Nauk, 1872), ii. 53–5; Th. E. Detoraki, Istoria tis Kritis (Athens: Th. E. Detoraki, 1986), 355–6; N. A. Dulina, Osmanskaia imperiia v mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniiakh (Moscow: Nauka, 1986), 130–8, 170; M. Sabry, L’Empire égyptien sous MohammedAli (Paris: P. Geuthner, 1936), 395–404; H. Dodwell, The Founder of Modern Egypt (Cambridge: CUP, 1931), 242–8; and William Miller, The Ottoman Empire and its Successors 1801–1927 (Cambridge: CUP, 1936), 166–8. For the British perspective, see M. Stavrinos-Paximadopoulos, I angliki politiki kai to kritiko zitima; and Stavrinos-Paximadopoulos, “Palmerston and the Cretan Question, 1839–41,” Journal of Modern Greek Studies, 10/2 (1992): 249–69.

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Fig. 5.2. Greek Captain leads his palikaria, c.1835. Lithograph by P. Hess after Krazeisen, printed by Selb. Courtesy of the Bayerische Verwaltung der staatlichen Schlösser, Gärten und Seen.

the Egyptian pasha’s subordinate, Mustafa Pasha, had done little to dampen desires among patriots for unification with Greece.91 In May 1840, Mario Santi, Russian 91 Mustafa Pasha was an “Albanian” in command of the Egyptian troops on the island since its occupation in 1824 by Ibrahim Pasha. The most detailed examination of Egyptokratia on Crete is that of Zeinab E. Rashed, I Kriti ypo tin aigyptiakin exousian, 1830–40, tr. E. Michalidis (Chania:

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consul in Cyprus, reported on confusion and disorder on the island “provoked by the indecision of the vast group of different parties that aimed for national integration.”92 When Crete passed under direct Ottoman control according to the Convention for the Pacification of the Levant, signed in London in July 1840, the desire for national unity gained force. Secret planning for an armed insurrection took place in the winter of 1840–1. According to British ambassador to the Sublime Porte John Ponsonby, the trouble on Crete was a “partial execution of the plan of extensive insurrection formed and attempted by the Philorthodox Society.” He warned London of similar plots “in numerous parts of the Ottoman Empire.”93 Based on the reports of P. Thoron, Russia’s agent in Chania (Canée), the event that sparked the conflagration occurred in February, when a group of about fifty Greek irregulars armed themselves outside Chania and proclaimed their desire for freedom and national unification. Following instructions from St Petersburg, Thoron adopted a policy of nonintervention and applauded the prudence of the Ottoman governor. In Thoron’s estimation, British agents were exploiting the incident to expand their influence by promising the creation of a constitutional government under their protection.94 As Thoron collected information, Karl K. Kiuster, the Russian agent on Syros, reported that the British resident and naval commander on Syros proposed a show of force to remind the insurgents on Crete of the consequences if they failed to disperse.95 In March 1841, panic broke out in western Crete because of the arrival of a few hundred Ottoman troops. In response, thousands of armed Christian irregulars, united under the banner of a self-styled “Greek National Committee,” formed in the Apokoronas region. St Petersburg reacted with an official statement regarding its unwillingness to participate in the Cretan imbroglio. The movement turned violent in April when a Greek Christian from Zakynthos killed a Muslim Cretan in

Ekdoseis Syllogou Politistikes Anaptiheos, 1978). Published primary accounts include K. Kritovoulidis, Apomnimonevmata tou peri tis aftonomies tis Ellados polemon ton Kriton (Athens: Ek tou Typographeiou Athinas, 1859); E. Prevelakis, “To kritiko zitima, 1821–1862,” Kritika Chronika, 21 (1969): 54–96; and E. Zampetakis, “Symvoli eis tin kalyteran gnosin tis epanastatikis periodou tou 1841 en Kriti,” Kritika Chronika, 10 (1956): 171–214. Among contemporary Russian assessments, see E. Papadaki, Ostrov Kandiia: Neskol’ko zametok kandiota o geografii, istorii i nyneshnem sostoianii ostrova (St Petersburg: A. Transhelia, 1867), 1–2, 71; and K. M. Bazili, Siriia i Palestina pod turetskim pravitel’stvom (Moscow: Mosty kul’tury, 2007), 102, 109–10, 117, 135, 151. 92 Santi to Butenev, Cyprus [Larnaca], May 30, 1840, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 1083, l. 3. 93 Ponsonby to Palmerston, Therapia, June 23, 1841 [NS], in Stavrinos-Paximadopoulos, I angliki politiki kai to kritiko zitima, 186–8. 94 Thoron to Medem, Chania, Mar. 19, 1841; Thoron to Titov, Chania, Apr. 10, 1841; Thoron to Titov, Chania, Apr. 21, 1841, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 1154, ll. 2, 10–11, 16–18. Thoron, the Dutch consul, was employed as Russia’s vice-consul since 1828. A selection of his correspondence is available in Cattaui Bey (ed.), Le règne de Mohamed Aly d’après les archives russes en Égypte (Cairo: Impr. de l’Institut français d’archéologie orientale du Caire, pour la Société royale de géographie d’Égypte, 1936). For a brief commentary, see Yannis A. Skourtis, “Deux mémoires du vice-consul de Russie à la Chania (1833–4),” in Les Relations entre les peoples de l’URSS et les grecs: Fin du XVIIIè—début du XXème s. (Thessaloniki: IMXA, 1992), 141–7. 95 Kiuster to Persiany, Syros, Mar. 21, 1841, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 8/1841, ll. 197–201.

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a secluded street of Chania. The morning after, an assembly of 500 Muslim Cretans demanded satisfaction, and the Ottoman authorities arrested and executed the man without a trial. In response, a deputation of armed Christians recovered his body and placed it under the windows of the governor’s residence. Soon after, more violence erupted when “two armed Turk-Cretan fanatics,” according to Thoron, “accidentally murdered two Cretan Greeks.” “Blood begets blood,” wrote the Tsar’s agent, who was certain that the entire Greek population was now in open revolt. As the Ottoman governor mustered his forces, at least 3,500 Cretan Christians prepared for a showdown.96 The turmoil on Crete naturally drew the interest of the Russian embassy in Athens. From October 1840 until late summer 1841, Katakazy was in St Petersburg, leaving First Secretary Ioannis Persiany in charge. Persiany’s voluminous dispatches, most of which relate to the disturbances on Crete and other regions of the Levant, demonstrate how Russian representatives officially and privately informed the Greek crown and government of St Petersburg’s condemnation of irredentist plans. Persiany maintained that Francophiles, secret societies, and groups of bandits working with Mehmed Ali had inspired the disorders on Crete.97 He accused Tzamis Karatasos and Nikolaos Renieris (two suspects in the Philorthodox conspiracy) of involvement in the insurrectional society named the Cretan Committee. Persiany insisted that members of the committee were to blame for the disorder, including Cretan natives Renieris, Archimandrite Missail Apostolidis, and Emmanouil Antoniadis (editor of Athina).98 As the Russian embassy in Constantinople worked on what was to become the Straits Convention of 1841, Russian ambassador Vladimir P. Titov ordered Persiany to collect detailed information about the Cretan question.99 According to Titov, the return of Ottoman administration in late 1840 triggered the action against the Sultan. Fedor A. Ivanov, Russian consul-general in Smyrna, agreed and wrote that the transfer of authority to the Ottomans “raised a storm of protest,” for the inhabitants of Crete preferred to live under the Egyptian governor.100 Apparently, conditions under Mustafa Pasha had been better than under the Sultan, although not all sources agree. One contemporary Greek-Russian observer wrote that life under “the Egyptian dynasty” was bitter. “Christian Cretans were reduced

96 Thoron to Titov, Chania, Apr. 14, 1841; Thoron to Titov, Chania, Mar. 14, 1841, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 1154, ll. 3–4, 10–11. 97 Persiany to Nesselrode, Athens, Dec., 1840, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 8/1841, ll. 11–17. A different version was given by the British envoy, who maintained that the trouble in the Ottoman provinces was due to Greek party-spirit and encouraged by the leading members of the Athenian government and the Egyptian pasha. According to Lord Douglas to Lord John Russell, Corfu, May 14, 1840 [NS], RGADA, f. 1, op. 2, d. 95, l. 55, “Muhammad Ali fearing that he cannot hold Candia is coquetting with King Othon for the cession of that island.” 98 Persiany to Nesselrode, Athens, Mar. 24, 1841, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 8, ll. 141–2. Suspected members of the Cretan Committee, including the British historian George Finlay and British clergyman John Hill, are listed in Stavrinos-Paximadopoulos, I angliki politiki kai to kritiko zitima, 100 n. 2. 99 Titov to Persiany, Büyükdere, June 18, 1841, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 1809, ll. 157–8. 100 Ivanov to Titov, Smyrna, Sept. 11, 1840, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 1454, l. 121.

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to such extremities that they lacked daily bread because of the tribute paid to the Turk [sic].”101 Meanwhile, St Petersburg remained unwilling to participate in the uprising and aimed to work in concert with the other powers. Yet in spite of the atmosphere of cooperation, British–Russian antagonism in the Near East was hard to extinguish. Thoron described the uprising on Crete as “a crude English intrigue.” “Members of a secret society,” he observed, “including some Sphakians and a relative of the British envoy on Crete” were taking advantage of the occasion to place the island under the authority of a freely elected president.102 To policy-makers in St Petersburg, this was paramount to British domination, a concern based on the experience of the Ionian Islands. As news of the Cretan revolt circulated in Greece, Russian envoy Persiany reported that the people drew inspiration from the Christians rebels, who “preferred to die than abandon their county without having obtained the goal of their complaints.” Unwilling to antagonize the foreign powers, fearful of bloodshed and lacking any resources, the Greek government had to be careful not to become too closely involved. Yet public sympathy was intense. Indeed, a theatrical performance in Athens provided the setting for a major fundraising drive for the Cretan rebels, during which the crown donated several thousand drachmas. Persiany reported that King Othon’s “symbolic contributions produced a profound sensation” on the public.103 One month later the Russian newspaper Northern Bee stated that King Othon had donated about 8,000 drachmas during the performance to assist the poor: “the money will probably be used to subsidize the needs of Cretan families which live in Greece or fled there recently.”104 In May 1841, the Sublime Porte responded to the Cretan uprising by setting up a blockade and landing a force of 2,000 men under Kapudan Tahir Pasha, developments that received extensive coverage in the Russian press.105 St Petersburg’s condemnation of the insurrection is reflected in its treatment of Persiany, who was ordered henceforward “to do nothing more than gather information and act with extreme circumspection.” Russia supported the new Greek cabinet and its opposition to the rebels.106 Again, St Petersburg instructed its envoys to work in concert with the other powers. Russian envoy in Constantinople Titov supported the Porte’s decision to dispatch 4,000 Albanians to Crete

101

Papadaki, Ostrov Kandiia, 18. Thoron to a Friend in Syros, Chania, Mar. 10, 1841, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 8/1841, ll. 192–3. 103 See Persiany to Nesselrode, Athens, Mar. 27, 1841; Persiany to Nesselrode, Athens, May 27, 1841, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 8/1841, ll. 175, 278–85. Persiany claimed that the collection at the theater produced a total of 12,000 drachmas. 104 SPch 128 (June 12, 1841). 105 SPch 102 (May 12, 1841), 103 (May 13, 1841), 115 (May 28, 1841), 128 (June 12, 1841), 151 (July 10, 1841). 106 Nesselrode to Persiany, St Petersburg, June 17, 1841; Nesselrode to Katakazy, St Petersburg, July 17, 1841, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 9/1841, ll. 109–13, 126–35; Persiany to Nesselrode, Athens, June 11, 1841, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 8/1841, l. 340. 102

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in order to fortify the Ottoman troops there, although he insisted that the Porte refrain from violence.107 The movement on Crete for national liberation aroused old sympathies and hopes which twelve years of peace had been unable to erase. Outside observers like Ponsonby, who placed the Cretan revolt within the wider scheme of the Philorthodox Society, fanned the spirit of insurrection. The Century reported that the spread of news about the massacres, revolts, and anarchy in the bordering regions “would clearly prove to Europe that Christians cannot live with the Turks . . . and that the natural and legitimate heir of Turkey in Europe is free Greece.” Unsurprisingly, Ottoman efforts to forbid subscriptions to Greek newspapers in Ottoman provinces garnered the support of Russian conservatives.108 Persiany remarked that secret associations organized in Greece “continue to furnish funds, provisions, and munitions of war to all those who go to Crete [and] to the islands of Saint Eustratios and Saint Marine, where adventurers who wish to stir up revolt in Thessaly are concentrating.”109 Events reached a climax in June 1841 with the arrival of a force of over 10,000 Ottoman soldiers. These troops forced the rebels to submit by the end of July. In order to prevent a massacre, French and British vessels helped hundreds of insurgents return to the Greek mainland. Indicative of the Tsar’s attitude, the Russian squadron did not assist in transporting the Cretan warriors, even though at least three Russian ships-of-war (the Ajax, Paris, and Silach) were stationed nearby. Under the cover of night, French and British vessels ran the Ottoman blockade with the rebels on deck. Thoron bitterly observed that “these guilty Greeks” were abandoning their debts: “this is truly a sad gift that they bestow on Greece.”110 St Petersburg’s decision to abstain from intervention on Crete demonstrates how tsarist policy, while maintaining its traditional devotion to Orthodoxy, aimed to cooperate with the western powers in the interest of European peace. This type of Russian strategy, sympathetic to the struggles led by Orthodox Christians, yet based on self-restraint and caution in Ottoman domains, illustrates the complexities of Russian–Ottoman relations and the internationalization of Near Eastern affairs. News of the rebellion, however, could be encouraging for Russian readers interested in the fate of Hellenism. The revolt also indicates the power of conspiratorial societies and revolutionary committees, which emerged as the principal agents of the national movement for unification during the Cretan Revolt of 1866–9 and beyond. Moreover, the Cretan upheaval of 1841 illuminates the growing opposition to King Othon because of his failure to carry out Greek national ideas fully.

107 Titov to Thoron, Pera, Mar. 15, 1841; Titov to Thoron, Pera, Apr. 8, 1841, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 1154, ll. 58, 59–61; Moustoxydis to Titov, Thessaloniki, June 10, 1841, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 1306, ll. 108–10. 108 See Aion, 264 (June 3, 1841); SPch 269 (Dec. 1, 1841). 109 Persiany to Nesselrode, Athens, May 27, 1841, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 8/1841, ll. 282–3. 110 Thoron to Titov, Chania, Aug. 6, 1841, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 1154, l. 37.

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The Philorthodox plot and the Cretan insurrection demonstrate the intersection of religion and politics in the formation of Greek national consciousness. An interesting aspect of popular religious culture linking Greece with the wider Orthodox world at this time consists of the outpouring of oracles and prophecies about the future resurrection of the Byzantine Empire and the appearance of an Orthodox ruler on the Sultan’s sofa. The near universal belief among the Greeks in prophecies and oracles foretelling their eventual “liberation” illuminates an authentic aspect of Greek popular culture.111 Any study of these oracles and legends displays the inadequacy of modernist interpretations of nationalism, such as the highly influential work of Benedict Anderson, which excludes unwritten forms of cultural representation.112 Furthermore, the spate of Greek oracles and prophecies that surfaced during the first decade of independent Greece combines allusions to contemporary affairs, especially to the intercession of Russia, with a mystical religious symbolism derived from the Revelation of St John. Oracles (chrismoi), books of oracles (chrismologia), and prophecies (propheteies), vague and obscure by nature, have multiple meanings for multiple audiences; ambiguity combines with fantasy, perhaps accounting for their entertainment value. They constitute an aspect of religious culture with a long history in Eastern Christianity. Created for the most part by educated, politically inclined figures, this type of storytelling employed apocalyptic themes capable of galvanizing the largely unlettered mass of traditional society. During the Byzantine period, the clergy served as the repository of these texts, despite their dubious theological soundness, and the clergy passed them on to the masses though their sermons and teachings.113 The keystone of the stories was the approaching Apocalypse, the exact date of which became an open secret and shared in various stories and anecdotes. After the fall of Constantinople, a whole corpus of legends and oracular texts used the fall of the Eastern Roman Empire as an explanation of God’s punishment for the sins of the Orthodox. The post-1453 Greek masses were nurtured on legends of the resurrection of the “Emperor turned into marble” (Marmaromenos Vasilias), and of the “Red Apple Tree” (Kokkini Milia) to which the “Turks” would one day 111 On this topic, see Richard Clogg, Elite and Popular Culture in Greece under Turkish Rule (Brookfield, VT: Ashgate/Variorum, 1996), 82; Paschalis Kitromilides, Enlightenment and Revolution: The Making of Modern Greece (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013), 122–4, 212–13. 112 See, in particular, Anthony D. Smith’s critique of Benedict Anderson in Nationalism and Modernism: A Critical Survey of Recent Theories of Nations and Nationalism (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), 131–42. 113 See P. J. Alexander, The Byzantine Apocalyptic Tradition (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1985); Cyril Mango, “Byzantinism and Romantic Hellenism,” Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes, 28 (1965), 35–6; and Mango, Byzantium: The Empire of New Rome (London: Scribner, 1980), 212–24. Whereas oracles expressed pre-Christian undertones about prognostication, prophecies exhibited more orthodox theological connotations. See Katerinas Kyriakou, Oi istorimenoi chrismoi tou Leontos 6, tou Sophou: Cheirographi paradosi kai ekdoseis kata tous 15–19 aiones (Athens: Syllogos pros Diadosin Ophelimon Vivlion, 1995), 13–14.

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return. The extremely popular oracles of the Emperor Leo the Wise conflated Byzantine imagery of the double-headed eagle with the Russians expelling “the Turk out of Greece and Europe.”114 In the seventeenth century, both Greek and Slavic prophetic texts forecast the liberation of Constantinople after two hundred years and the replacing of “the crescent with the cross on Hagia Sophia.”115 Eighteenth-century oracles cited the years 1766, 1767, 1771, and 1773 as possible dates for the Last Judgment, which, incidentally, coincided with Russia’s first military appearance in the region. Russian rulers, especially Peter the Great, became the center of Orthodox apocalyptic literature predicting a crusade. Folk myths proclaimed the future liberation of Orthodox Christians by a fair-haired people (xanthos genos) from the north, clearly implying the Russians. Although the connection was not explicit, such predictions blended with the myth of Moscow the Third Rome. During the Greek Revolution, the popularity of oracular literature and millenarian prophecies soared. Several members of the Philiki Etaireia tapped into traditional Greek communities by drawing on oracles that synthesized old Orthodox values with new ideas of Hellenism. For example, a founding member of the Philiki Etaireia, Emmanouil Xanthos, wrote in his memoirs that the society aimed at benefiting from the “age-old superstition of the enslaved Greeks that co-religionist Russia would liberate them from Turkish tyranny.” Other Hetaerists recognized the value of oracular literature in tapping into popular beliefs. Even Reverend Robert Walsh, chaplain of the British embassy in Constantinople in 1821, referred to the prophecies circulating among the Greeks that the Russians “should sack the city” and that “a race with yellow hair, along with their coadjutors, should overthrow Ishmael.”116 Study of this phenomenon demonstrates considerable continuity between messianic Byzantinism and nationalism: the power struggle between Orthodox Christians and non-Orthodox believers continued into the post-Ottoman period and fused with national dreams of liberating additional territories from Ottoman rule. Irredentist and religious inspired disorder helped spawn a revival of oracular literature in the post-independent period. During the 1830s, the age-old yearning 114 See Richard Clogg, “The Byzantine Legacy in the Modern Greek World: The Megali Idea,” in Lowell Clucas (ed.), The Byzantine Legacy in Eastern Europe (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1988), 253–81. For a detailed discussion of post-1453 prophecies, see A. Argyriou, Les Exégèses grecques de l’Apocalypse à l’époque turque (1453–1821). Esquisse d’une histoire des courants idéologiques au sein du peuple grec asservi (Thessaloniki: Etaireia Makedonikon Spoudon, 1982). 115 See T. Stoianovich, “Les Structures millénaristes sud-slaves aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles,” in Between East and West: The Balkan and Mediterranean Worlds (New Rochelle, NY: Caratzas, 1992–5), iv. 1–13. See also the Muslim perspective in S. Yerasimos, “De l’arbre à la pomme : La Généalogie d’un thème apocalyptique,” in B. Lellouch and S. Yerasimos (eds), Les Traditions apocalyptiques au tournant de la chute de Constantinople (Paris and Montreal: L’Harmattan, 1999), 153–92. 116 E. Xanthos, Apomnimonevmata peri tis Philikis Etaireias (Athens: Garpolas, 1845), 12; Photios Chryssanthopoulos [Photakos], Apomnimonevmata peri tis Ellinikis Epanastaseos (Athens: Etaireia Peloponnisiakon Spoudon, 1974), i. 35; Ioannis Philimon, Dokimion istorikon peri tis Philikis Etaireias (Nafplion: Kondazis kai Loulakis, 1834), 217–18; Robert Walsh, A Residence at Constantinople (London: Frederick Westley & A. H. Davis, 1836), i. 180; and Clogg, “The Byzantine Legacy,” 259.

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for Russian intervention culminated in an impressive spurt of prophecies regarding the resurrection of an Orthodox Empire. In particular, the text generally known as the Visions of Agathangelos enjoyed an illustrious revival. The prophecies of Agathangelos conflated historical facts with mystical notions and critical passages against non-Orthodox believers into an alluring depiction of contemporary affairs. They also reinforced a widely held belief throughout the kingdom that a new Orthodox Empire would be born in the year 1840. The publication history of the Agathangelos texts provides insight into the development of Greek nationalism. Modern research suggests that the first text, purportedly compiled in thirteenth-century Sicily, was in fact a mid-eighteenthcentury forgery of the episcopal vicar, Theoklitos Polyeides.117 The celebrated Greek patriot, Rigas Velestinlis, acquired a copy at the end of the eighteenth century, and a published edition appeared in Messolonghi in 1824. A manuscript copy dating to 1832 contains marginal notes left by Konstantinos Oikonomos, suggesting that oracular literature merited serious attention. Since he was traveling between Russia and Europe at the time, Oikonomos may have been responsible for the text’s reintroduction to Greece upon his return in 1834.118 The circulation of these texts had practical results. In 1836, for example, a rebellion in Akarnania against the Regency’s ecclesiastical reforms drew inspiration from the Agathangelos stories regarding a second coming.119 Three editions appeared between 1837 and 1838, precisely the moment when the Russophiles began to consolidate their power in the Holy Synod and government.120 Part of the popularity of these texts stemmed from their obscure, ambiguous, and even hypnotic quality. Their language allowed for the widest sort of interpretation. For example, after a lengthy discourse into European history and politics, the author of Oracles of Agathangelos, published in 1837, praises the Russian Tsars, particularly Peter the Great, and then predicts the military triumph of Russia over the “Turks.” “When Peter the Fourth is born, a new era of glory will reign until the Fifth Peter will rule the universe.” The author claims that “I heard the voice coming from the Great Bear (apo tis arktou), which said in the following manner: Russia wake up already from your slumber, the logos of the angel of the Lord was intended for you only. At dawn, before the sun appears in the East, your lamp will be filled with pure oil. Beloved friend you will command attention!”121 Such a text combines elite

117 See Paschalis Kitromilides, Enlightenment and Revolution, 123, 212–13; Alexis Politis, “I prosgraphomeni ston Riga proti ekdosi tou Agathangelou: To mono gnosto antitypo,” Eranistis, 7 (1969): 174–90; D. O. Doikos, “O Agathangelos os prophitikon apokalyptikon ergon kai to minyma tou,” Mnimi, 1821 (Thessaloniki: G. Geromihalos, 1971), 95–126. 118 Politis, “I prosgraphomeni ston Riga proti ekdosi tou Agathangelou,” 175. 119 Kallogerakis to Katakazy, Patras, Apr. 15, 1836, AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 352/1836, ll. 114–16, makes the connection between the revolt in Akarnania and the Agathangelos prophecies. See also Aroni-Tsichli, Agrotikes exegerseis, 134–73. 120 Chrismoi tou Agathangelou (Athens: A. Koromell, 1837); Tou syntaktou tou pnevmatikou syntagmatos (Ermoupolis: N. Barotsi, 1838); P. D. Stephanitzis, Syllogi diaphoron prorriseon (Athens: A. Angellidis, 1838). These editions and others are available in one volume in the Gennadius Library, EQ648, Q d’Orient 52. Prophéties, Prèsages, Sermons. 121 Chrismoi tou Agathangelou, 31.

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political thought with the age-old millenarianism of popular thought, with the great zeal for the intervention of Russia. The reinterpretation of the prophecies in terms of the Greek homeland and people provided nationalists with a weapon to attract the masses already accustomed to all sorts of divination. Indeed, the prophecies seemed to have their greatest appeal during times of national crisis and exaltation. The 1838 edition of prophecies compiled by Dr P. D. Stephanitzis, a Russophile who corresponded with various tsarist agents, contains clear links to Russian party members. An interesting “catalogue of subscribers” at the end of the text includes names like N. Stamatelopoulos [Nikitas], A. Metaxas, N. G. Theocharis, K. Axiotis, K. Kolokotronis, and I. Philimon (editor of the Century).122 Thus, many of the sponsors appear to have been orientated toward Russia. Several other editions appeared, including a collection of prophecies about the rise of a new king in Constantinople.123 Stemming essentially from a religious perspective, however, the oracles did not appeal to all of Greek society. Reactions to them reflect the duality of Greek national consciousness. Immediately after the uncovering of the Philorthodox Society, for example, Athina ran a front-page article on “The Error about the Prophecies of the Year 1840,” (“I plani ton prorriseon tou 1840 etous”) which attempted to demonstrate that prophecies about the future were nothing but oldfashioned fantasies.124 Even certain traditionalist observers remained unimpressed. In May 1841, for example, Moustoxydis in Thessaloniki warned the Russian embassy in Constantinople about a letter by a certain Bishop Agathangelos and a circular signed by notable Greeks that predicted an imminent revolution. Moustoxydis wrote that, even though this literature excited the primates and people of the region, “the so-called Agathangelos is an imposter and it would be unjust for the Christians to rise up against a paternal government like that of the Turk. One may add that the letter in question is very long and extremely interesting, and based upon its style it appears to have emanated from the Austrian government.”125 Moustoxydis’s curious interpretation reflects the malleability of the texts whose meaning could evolve and into which almost anything could be read. Of course using the name of Agathangelos allowed politically inspired publicists to voice their opinions under the name of an individual who had lived centuries before. Swedish minister Heidenstam remarked that the author of one of the brochures about the “ambiguous prophecies of Arkakanguels [sic],” was a priest named Nelenza. Heidenstam reported that the prophecy spread the view that “the 122

Stephanitzis, Syllogi diaphoron prorriseon, 201–15. Eusevous tinos syntaktou . . . Ziloprophitou, Syntagma Pnevmatikon (Ermoupolis: n.p., 1838); Niccolo Tommaseo, Storia de Agatangelo (Venice: S. Lazzano, 1845); Prophitikon dia ***ngelma [Pantachou minyma] peri ton genikon symvanton archomenon apo to trechon etos 1852 mechri tou 1857 (Athens, n.p., 1852); M. Anagnostopoulos, O palaios kai o neos Agathangelos (Athens: P. A. Sakellariou, 1860); O Agathangelos. Oi prophiteies tou gia to mellon ton ethnon kai tis Ellados (Thessaloniki, n.p., n.d.). See Gennadius Library, EQ648, Q d’Orient 52; Clogg, “The Byzantine Legacy,” 278 n. 34; Petrunina, Grecheskaia natsiia, 300; and Doikos, “O Agathangelos,” 126. 124 Athina, 682 (Dec. 30, 1839). 125 Moustoxydis to Titov, Thessaloniki, May 11, 1841; Moustoxydis to Titov, secret, Thessaloniki, May 19, 1841, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 1306, ll. 67, 75–6. 123

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year 1840 signifies one of the most memorable years of the world; that the Ottomans will fall under a blond race of the north, who will reign over Constantinople; that the fruitless Bavarians will be chased from Greece and that King Othon will be overthrown.” He wrote that “this brochure has spread by the thousands in the towns and villages. The Greek people have been so persuaded of the truth of this prophet that one often hears the villagers say: ‘I will not build and I will not plant until I have seen the year 1840 pass.’” Another European observer, Prussian envoy Heinrich Anton von Zeschau, reported of the predictions of the Sicilian Agathangelos, an astrologer of the fourteenth century, whose prophecies, several times realized, enjoy a high reputation for truthfulness in Greece, and appear to contain the project for the salvation of Epirus, Macedonia, and Thessaly under the pretext of religion. According to the Agathangelos prophecies, the year 1840 should lead to a prince of the Greek Orthodox religion with blond hair on the throne of the Orient. Upon his accession, the barbarians and infidels will return to their countries.126

Thus, the upsurge in prophecies directly reflected the political events of the era, demonstrating how religious traditions overlapped with secular ideas and intersected with military plans for insurrection. During the post-independence era, prophecies about the revival of an Orthodox Empire became an important factor in the ideology of both liberal and conservative Greek clerics (and worldly intellectuals) and provided them with an instrument to attract the traditional Orthodox stratum of society. Although they all may have embraced oracular literature, they did so for completely different reasons and with very different hopes and objectives. Thus, prophecies like Agathangelos could be considered as a point of transfer between the philosophy of Byzantium and the nationalism of modern times. Furthermore, Greek nationalists capitalized on the vision of Russia as the savior of the Orthodox world to legitimize their effort to instill political change. Although liberal clerics, including Neophytos Vamvas and Theoklitos Pharmakidis, employed the myths embedded in the oracular tradition, the majority of texts derive from conservatives drawing upon the Byzantine past. From this perspective, oracular prophecies demonstrate the durability of the expectation of tsarist intervention. *

* *

* *

One of the great benefits of working with Russian archival materials is the abundance of clear evidence on the activities of Russian representatives, who, at times, seemed to have little control over their adherents within the region in question. Regardless of their ability to set limits on the ambitions of traditionalists in the kingdom of Greece, it appears that Katakazy and the Russian diplomatic corps did their utmost to discourage those who wished to implement plans like the Philorthodox and the Agathangelos. The instructions of the Russian Foreign 126 Heidenstam to Stierneld, Athens, Jan. 12, 1840 [NS]; Zeschau to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Athens, Jan. 9, 1840 [NS], RGADA, f. 1, op. 2, d. 94, ll. 163–4, 181.

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Ministry are quite clear about the need to prevent irredentist activity. They also support Othon’s autocratic rule. Although he remained Catholic, Russian policy most certainly did not favor his expulsion and replacement by an Orthodox prince. A revived Byzantine Empire, under Greek rule, was also not part of Tsar Nicholas’s plans in the Near East. Whatever connections there may have been in fact or appearance in the incidents surrounding the Philorthodox Society, the Cretan revolt of 1841, and the spread of oracular prophecies, these episodes fit into a wider web of national aspirations, political rivalries, and expansionistic dreams, thus demonstrating how there is nothing static or immovable about nations and national identities.

6 Absolutism under Siege Late in the night of September 2, 1843, the Athenian garrison assembled in the square outside the royal palace to protest against the government of their Bavarianborn sovereign. Around midnight, the key organizers of the movement, including veterans of the revolutionary war, entered the palace and pressured the King to sign a series of decrees calling for national elections, an end to foreigners in government, and the introduction of a constitution. As morning dawned, thousands of people had joined the soldiers in the square, all shouting, “Long live the Constitution!” and “death to the Bavarians!” Suddenly carriages drew up in quick succession carrying the foreign diplomats, causing a mixture of cheers and whispers to arise from the crowd. After a brief meeting with the military leaders beneath the palace balcony, the foreign ministers departed, deeming that their presence might prolong the crisis. Lacking in popular support, estranged from the foreign representatives, and at odds with the political leaders, King Othon had no choice but to consent to the decrees stripping him of absolute power. These events, which changed the course of Greek history, demonstrate the power of conspiracy (by now a typical feature of political action in Greece) as well as the strength of the parties, when, for the first time, they united in opposition against the crown. Recorded in history as the Constitutional or September Revolution of 1843, the episode was more of a military coup than a deeply rooted popular movement. Directed primarily by the partisans of Russia and Great Britain, the insurgents aimed to end Bavarian interference while introducing representative government and cementing the connection between the throne and the Orthodox Church. The Athenian garrison, led by the cavalry commander Colonel Dimitrios Kallergis, demonstrated for the first time, but certainly not the last, the power of the military in Greek politics. Strikingly reminiscent of the Decembrist revolt of 1825 in Russia, the outcome of this coup was far different from the trials and trauma following the failed uprising in Russia. In Greece, the bloodless affair led to a peaceful transition of government, elements of which would last into the twenty-first century. Naturally, these events drew the interest of the allied governments closely involved in the affairs of the fledgling state since its inception ten years before. Ambassador Katakazy, the leader of the team of foreign ministers present that morning, claimed that the insurgents had announced the change of affairs as a fait accompli. Lacking the power to reverse the decrees, Katakazy (see Figure 6.1) felt that his first duty as loyal servant of the Tsar was “to preserve the sovereign from a horrible assassination that would lead to a complete disintegration of order in the

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country.”1 Although he refrained from openly supporting the actions of the rebels, his decision not to condemn them publicly incurred the wrath of Foreign Minister Nesselrode, who after learning of the change in government brusquely dismissed Katakazy from his post and from imperial service in general. “You are supposed to be filled with the intentions and principles of the Emperor,” wrote Nesselrode, “but you have entirely misunderstood them.” For taking an active part in the degradation of the throne, for counseling the King to adhere to “humiliations and concessions,” and for behaving contrary to the monarchical principle, Nesselrode ordered Katakazy to turn over the management of the embassy to First Secretary Persiany and embark for St Petersburg within the next three hours.2 The foreign policy of Tsar Nicholas I was remarkably consistent. Revolutionaries—both foreign and domestic—were enemies that had to be threatened into submission or eradicated by military might.3 As the Russian ruler watched with horror as Othon, the legitimate sovereign, moved in the direction of a constitutional government, he had difficulty fathoming how his ambassador could have tolerated such a course of events. The Tsar declared: What has happened in that country [Greece] is infamous, . . . that universal treason, the complete isolation in which the King found himself, the insolence with which they treated him—the violence which they did to him, cannot be condemned by strong enough terms, or dishonorable enough. Therefore I have commenced by throwing out my minister, yes, by throwing him out, for after conduct like his, so contrary to my wishes and my principles, he cannot remain any more in my service.4

“If it is true that Monsieur Katakazy gave way to the crowd around the palace,” continued the Tsar, “then I throw him out of my service as a wretch. I order you [Nesselrode] to execute my orders immediately and to inform all of the other courts.” Days after learning of the uprising the Tsar’s temper continued to boil: “All of this information confirms in full my complete indignation; to be informed that Mr Katakazy acted to the detriment of the King . . . has disposed me to throw him out of my service this instant.”5 The Tsar said that Katakazy “deserves to be shot,” and that if he had been Othon, “I would have left or have killed myself.”6

1 Katakazy to K. V. Nesselrode, Constantinople, Nov. 23, 1843, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 9/1843, ll. 484–90. Contrast Katakazy’s defense with G. K. Kordatos, Istoria tis neoteris Elladas (Athens: “20os Aionas,” 1957–8), iii. 245, 276. 2 Nesselrode to Katakazy, St Petersburg, Oct. 5, 1843, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 9/1843, ll. 542–53. 3 For an excellent overview of Nicholas’s reign, see William C. Fuller, Strategy and Power in Russia, 1600–1914 (New York: Free Press, 1992), 219–64. 4 Bray to Ludwig I, 2, St Petersburg, Oct. 12/24, 1843, in Bayerische Gesandtschaft Rußlands, 26, Geheimes Staatsarchiv München. Quoted in Barbara Jelavich, Russia and the Greek Revolution of 1843 (Munich: Verlag R. Oldenbourg, 1966), 33–4. 5 Marginal notes on two untitled memoranda, RGADA, f. 3, op. 1, d. 3, ll. 1, 2. 6 “A sa place, j’aurais abdiqué ou je me serais fait massacrer. Qu’ai-je à faire avec la constitution de Grèce? Je ne me connais point en constitutions. J’en laisse la joie à d’autres.” Quoted in F. Guizot, Mémoires pour server à l’histoire de mon temps (Paris: Michel Lévy, 1858–68), vii. 290. See also Kordatos, Istoria tis neoteris Elladas, iii. 281.

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Fig. 6.1. Ambassador Gavriil Katakazy, from A. V. Nekliudov, Starye portrety. Semeinaia letopis, 2 vols. (Nice: n. p., 1932–3).

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Although claiming to act out of concern for the royal family, Katakazy’s actions constituted a breach of Official Nationality. Until his abrupt departure, he had served as a Russian diplomat for almost thirty years, and there is no evidence that his sympathy for the Greeks interfered with his role as a Russian representative. Yet his efforts to extricate himself from the deep trouble he unwittingly stumbled into may have glossed over a more complex set of circumstances. As his dismissal suggests, Russian state employees of Greek heritage faced daunting challenges when the interests of the Greek nation and those of imperial Russia failed to coincide. Katakazy’s egregious misstep was one example of the potential clash between loyalty to Russia and his ethnic homeland. Given the large number of Greeks in Russian service at the time, Katakazy’s career is not uncharacteristic and adds to our understanding of service in the Russian foreign embassy and the pressures of nationalism in multi-ethnic empires. After Katakazy was withdrawn, the post remained occupied by Persiany as the chargé d’affaires until the end of 1844. Russia did not officially acknowledge the change in government until well after it was recognized by Britain and France. The 1843 revolution in Greece has been the subject of scholarly attention, but rarely from the perspective of the Russian mission.7 Analysis of the background and course of these events provides a means of evaluating Russia’s attitudes toward constitutionalism, nationalism, and foreign intervention when tsarist ideology was under threat. Russian archival materials help clarify many of the misconceptions prevalent in the historiography regarding the inspiration of the coup and the actions of the Russian ambassador. Furthermore, the episode sheds light on the reactions of Russian officials to a revolt led by their partisans, and provides an interesting case study of the functioning of the Russian Foreign Ministry during periods of crisis. Although tsarist censors sanitized the events surrounding the revolt in Athens and its consequences, the Russian reading public remained well informed about the changes taking place in Greece and its borderlands, although much later than the normal delay that the era’s communications imposed. Contemporary observers were not surprised to learn that Tsar Nicholas opposed the actions of the rebels; after all, the shadow of Decembrism still loomed large.8 Yet in the end, despite his

7 The only work to draw extensively on Russian archives is by O. E. Petrunina, Grecheskaia natsiia i gosudarstvo v XVIII–XX vv. (Moscow: Universitet Knizhnyi Dom, 2010), 334–50. The introductory essay in Jelavich, Russia and the Greek Revolution of 1843, 4–48, contains clear analysis, followed by documents from the Bavarian State Archive in Munich and the Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv in Vienna. See also G. L. Arsh, “Gretsiia: revoliutsiia 1843 goda, Megali Idea,” in V. N. Vinogradov (ed.), Istoriia Balkan: Vek deviatnadtsatyi (do Krymskoi Viony) (Moscow: KRASAND, 2011), 240–50; and T. P. Theodorou, “I Rosia kai i Epanastasi tis 3is Semptemvriou 1843 me vasi engrafa ton Archeion tis ESSD kai ton periodiko typo tis epochis,” Valkanika symmeikta, 4 (1992): 77–90. John Petropulos, Politics and Statecraft in the Kingdom of Greece, 1833–43 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), 455–500, remains fundamental. 8 A spectrum of witnesses considered the Tsar’s response vindictive, even irresponsible. Nicholas Riasanovsky, Nicholas I and Official Nationality in Russia, 1825–55 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1959), 254, points out that this was not the only time during Nicholas’s reign when the position of Russia in a foreign country was weakened by the angry recall of its high representative and the transfer of affairs to officials of lesser rank.

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strong condemnation of the coup, which the pro-Russian element of Greek society largely supported, the Russian autocrat abstained from forceful intervention. The National Assembly that met in the following months presented a new constitution to the King, which constituted a somewhat strange agreement, since Othon signed and promulgated it unwillingly. Although the protecting powers failed to agree on all subjects, they concurred, after the coup, that the constitution should be conservative enough to prevent Greece from becoming the center of further national and liberal revolutions.9 For that reason, the constitution of 1844 entirely safeguarded the monarchical principle. Moreover, in a unique article, which the Tsar supported, King Othon pledged that every successor to the Greek throne must belong to the Eastern Orthodox Church, even though this provision defied international conventions concerning Greece. Thus, while Russia eventually conceded limits on autocracy, a key element of its religious policy prevailed. An interesting aspect of the 1844 debates during the constitutional convention concerns the efforts of the old revolutionary elite to narrow the definition of what it meant to be “Greek.” The clash between the autochthons (who aimed to include only those living within the state borders) and the heterochthons (who regarded ethnic Greeks living in Ottoman territory as equal to the Greeks living within the kingdom’s boundaries) was won by the latter.10 This debate served as a catalyst to the irredentist drive, and the official beginning of an expansionist fantasy, the Megali Idea, which sought to incorporate Greeks everywhere in the region within the new state’s borders. Furthermore, in interesting ways, the irredentist dream added substance to the traditional links between Slavic and Greek Orthodox peoples and paralleled the rekindling of Byzantine studies in both Russia and Greece: a fascinating story that evokes the tension in tsarist policy between Slavcentered, Greek-centered, and Orthodox-centered initiatives.11 More broadly, the study of the 1843 revolution reveals how external factors can play major roles in bringing about regime change. The great powers were willing to intervene to salvage a failing government on the condition that violence 9 Nicholas Kaltchas, Introduction to the Constitutional History of Modern Greece (New York: Columbia University Press, 1940), 102–3, wrote that Greece in 1843 “provided a peculiarly propitious stage for that ideological sham battle of liberalism and constitutionalism against absolutism, which anticipated by exactly one hundred years the analogous international conflict between democracy and fascism, as a convenient disguise for the struggle for power among the major European states.” 10 The citizenship debate forms the central theme of Elpida K. Vogli, “Ellines to genos.” I ithageneia kai i taftotita sto ethniko kratos ton Ellinon (1821–44) (Irakleion: Panepistimiakes Ekdoseis Kritis, 2007); and Ioannis Dimakis, I politeiaki metavoli tou 1843 kai to zitima ton aftochthonon kai eterochthonon (Athens: Themelio, 1999). 11 The first Byzantine studies in Russia start at the beginning of the 19th cent. By the 1840s, several clerics were working on Byzantine manuscripts, Porfirii Uspenski among them. See I. P. Medvedev, “Russia as a Sponsor of European Byzantinology in the Nineteenth Century,” in Elizabeth Jeffreys and F. K. Haarer (eds), Proceedings of the 21st International Congress of Byzantine Studies (Aldershot and Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2006), iii. 356–7; Medvedev, “Aleksei Nikolaevich Olenin kak vizantinist,” in Otechestvennaia istoriia i istoricheskaia mysl’ v XIX–XX v. Sbornik statei k 75-letiiu A. N. Tsamutali (St Petersburg: Nesto-Istoriia, 2006), 17–29; and Medvedev, “Akademik Filipp Ivanovich Krug i ego arkhiv,” in T. V. Andreeva and M. F. Khartanovich (eds), Russkaia nauka v biographicheskikh ocherkakh (St Petersburg: D. Bulanin, 2003), 179–89.

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or radicalism would not spiral out of control. The events in Greece are also instructive of how the military, supported by segments of the population, can play a constructive role in politics. Moreover, King Othon’s decision to preserve his crown, rather than abdicate, demonstrates how a ruling system can be modified without drastic alterations in leadership. Lastly, an important cause of the conflict leading to the 1843 revolution involved the crisis in Greek finances. Nearly bankrupt and unable to pay its foreign debt, the crown’s austerity measures further alienated the masses from their sovereign. In nineteenth-century Greece, the policy of great power intervention led to successive altercations and frustrations, with results of uncertain value. R US S I A A ND T H E R O O T S OF TH E 18 4 3 R EV O L U T IO N The 1843 revolution marked a major turning point in modern Greek history and helped to bring to conclusion many of the problems discussed since independence. The efforts to raise the flag of rebellion during the upheavals of 1839–41 illustrate the enthusiastic élan and social mentality of Greek patriots during times of emergency. These recurrent external eruptions coincided with nagging domestic troubles. A crucial element of the general dissatisfaction was the financial crisis into which the kingdom entered early in 1843. On December 29, 1842, Greek Foreign Minister Iakovos Rizos-Neroulos informed the foreign delegates that even though the government and royal household had decreased their expenditures significantly, Greece would be unable to pay the service charge on the 60 million franc loan, due in March. As a result, he petitioned the protecting powers for a new loan in order to cover the interest payments.12 Katakazy replied to the proposal a week later by noting that the request was against the stipulations of the London Convention of 1832.13 In a position paper written in January 1843, Katakazy presented his argument to the Russian Foreign Ministry rejecting the request from Athens for an additional loan. Claiming that an exact evaluation of the Greek budget was impossible, because precise documents did not exist, the reliable records he had obtained showed that the government needed to curtail expenditure more drastically. In particular, Katakazy thought that the military budget absorbed far more treasury resources than necessary and took away from useful expenses, such as road 12 See Rizos to Katakazy, Dec. 29, 1842, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 9/1843, l. 18; and Lyons to Aberdeen, Athens, Jan. 19, 1843 [NS], in Correspondence Relative to the Affairs of Greece, 1841–44 (London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1845). Secondary accounts are those of Petropulos, Politics and Statecraft, 435–6; Édouard Driault and Michel Lhéritier, Histoire diplomatique de la Grèce à nos jours (Paris: PUF, 1925–6), ii. 232; Kordatos, Istoria tis neoteris Elladas, iii. 193; and T. N. Pipinelis, I monarchia en Elladi (Athens: Typois I. Vartsou, 1932), 355. See also J. A. Levandis, The Greek Foreign Debt and the Great Powers, 1821–98 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1944), 29–45; K. A. Vakalopoulos, Lemaître et la crise financière de la Grèce (1842–3) (Thessaloniki, n.p., 1979); and E. Chapuisat (ed.), La Restauration hellénique d’après la correspondance de Jean-Gabriel Eynard (Paris: J. Budry, 1924). 13 Katakazy to Rizos, Athens, Jan. 7, 1843, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 9/1843, l. 30.

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construction and agriculture. Even though no external enemy threatened Greece (in Katakazy’s view), the army consisted of 9,035 soldiers and 1,442 officers. Katakazy recommended an immediate reduction to a level sufficient to ensure domestic tranquility and guard the frontiers. This cutback would produce positive results, including releasing able bodies for farming and providing honorable retirement for a host of foreign officers.14 After all, Katakazy contended, ten years had passed without war or a severe domestic calamity, and yet the government remained unable to develop its resources sensibly. Katakazy’s comments in a personal letter to Russian Ambassador Butenev at the Sublime Porte are strangely prophetic: “This unpleasant phase of the Hellenic question will perhaps bring some sort of denouement to the interior affairs of the country and the course of its government. For it is impossible for me to suppose that the cabinets will decide to grant a loan again without asking King Othon and his councilors for an account of all the expenditures that they have made during the last ten years and the millions that they have received.”15 Russia was the first of the protecting powers to respond to the financial troubles by informing the Greek government that St Petersburg would cover the interest charge due in March.16 News of the Tsar’s assistance spread to the provinces and, according to Vice-Consul Kallogerakis in Patras, produced a soothing effect on the public on both sides of the Corinthian Gulf. “The peasants repeatedly blessed the name of the August Sovereign of Russia,” wrote Kallogerakis.17 Soon afterwards, Nesselrode sent a letter directly to the Greek government demanding repayment of the service charges of the loan by June. Nesselrode insisted that the government must achieve this through drastic curtailment in expenditure. The problems of Greek finances, Nesselrode observed, were due to bad government, inefficient administration, and an unnecessarily large military. Tsar Nicholas suggested a conference with the other protecting powers in order to discuss possible solutions, including direct intervention, if Greece did not meet its obligations.18

14 Katakazy to Nesselrode, Athens, Jan. 19, 1843, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 9/1843, ll. 22–8. According to Frederick Strong, Greece as a Kingdom, or a Statistical Description of that Country from the Arrival of K. Otho in 1833 down to the Present Time (London: Longman, 1842), 280–1, 393–9, the Greek military establishment around 1842 absorbed 43% of the state budget. The army contained 982 officers, 9,060 petty officers and enlisted men, and the war ministry in Athens employed 32 people. Following a report in Aion, 467 (Sept. 1, 1843), the total number of military personnel was 9,313. See also, Jelavich, Russia and the Greek Revolution, 23. 15 Katakazy to Butenev, Athens, Jan. 19, 1843, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 1811, l. 95. 16 See Nesselrode to Katakazy, St Petersburg, Feb. 23, 1843; and Nesselrode to Katakazy, Apr. 20, 1843, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 9/1843, ll. 590–7, 602–9. 17 Kallogerakis to Katakazy, Patras, May 5, 1843, AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 479, l. 71. Aion, 429 (Apr. 31, 1843) also praised Tsar Nicholas for his contribution to Greek finances. 18 The full text of Nesselrode’s note to Rizos (Feb. 23, 1843) appears in Greek tr. in Aion, 432 (Apr. 18, 1843); Pavlos Karolidis, Synchronos istoria ton Ellinon kai ton loipon laon tis Anatolis apo 1821 mechri 1921 (Athens: A. Vitsikounaki, 1922–9), ii. 391–5; and Kordatos, Istoria tis neoteris Elladas, iii. 194–7. It is discussed in Petropulos, Politics and Statecraft, 437; Driault, Histoire diplomatique, ii. 232; and Pipinelis, I monarchia, 357. St Petersburg protested against the publication of the note in Aion, see Katakazy to Rizos, Athens, Apr. 22, 1843; and Rizos to Katakazy, Athens, May 5, 1843, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 9/1843, ll. 172, 174. For further detail see, Nesselrode to Katakazy, St Petersburg,

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Commercial reports composed by Kallogerakis in Patras (extremely rich sources for the study of Levantine trade) reinforced St Petersburg’s concern over the Greek economy. Patras was a bustling trading center in the 1830s and 1840s, as Kallogerakis’s communiqués make plain. The port and the surrounding countryside began to experience serious economic difficulties late in 1842. Following the tabulations of the Russian vice-consul, the value of total exports in the period June 30– December 31, 1842 was 1,780,751 drachmas, and imports were valued at 1,140,047 drachmas. In the period January 1–July 1, 1843 exports fell dramatically to 418,565 drachmas, while imports increased to 1,409,480 drachmas.19 The decline was noticeable particularly in the amount of grapes and currants exported, the most lucrative crops of the region and important sources of revenue for merchants. As the Century reported in August, “the grapes in the largest part of the Peloponnesus this summer have been burned from drought, and the peasants have no money at all.”20 According to the Greek historian-politician T. [Panagiotes] N. Pipinelis, the bad harvests of 1842 and the general European depression caused the price of Greek exports, especially grapes, to drop on the world market, and thus the annual state income declined as well.21 Kallogerakis reported that economic difficulties sparked instances of social disorder, and he pointed to the need for an efficacious and prompt remedy. He observed that, “the harvest of cereals is not at all satisfying in the various districts of the Morea and continental Greece. The production of oils and silks of Messenia and Lacedaemonia is less than last year, and furthermore the Corinthian grape, which constitutes the sole resource of the inhabitants of the eastern bank of the Gulf of Lepanto and of Achaia, has fallen to very low prices. Only in distress do the buyers offer them 20–22 talaris for delivery of 1000 weight of these fruits of first quality . . . while last year they were acquired for as much as 40 talaris.”22 The fall in prices, the stagnation of commerce, the bad harvest and drought, and corrupt officials all spelled trouble for the Greek monarch. In addition to these problems, the Greek government’s delay in deciding the issue of the restitution of Muslim properties and wakfs (pious foundations) in the frontier zone and on Euboea, exacerbated Greek participation in Levantine trade. Feb. 23, 1843; Nesselrode to Katakazy, Apr. 20, 1843, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 9/1843, ll. 590–7, 602–9. 19 Kallogerakis to Katakazy, Patras, Oct. 22, 1843, AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 479, l. 126. For additional evidence on conditions in late 1842, see the newspaper Icho ton eparchion (Dec. 16, 1842; Jan. 17 and 20, 1843), cited in B. K. Lazaris, Politiki istoria tis Patras (Athens: Achaikes ekdoseis, 1986), i. 62–4. On the commercial history of Patras, see M. Wagstaff and E. Frangakis-Syrett, “The Port of Patras in the Second Ottoman Period: Economy, Demography, and Settlements c.1700–1830,” in Daniel Panzac (ed.), Les Balkans à l’époque Ottoman (Aix-en-Provence: Edisud, 1993), 79–94; Christos Moulias, To limani tis staphidas: Patra, 1828–1900. Emporio, viomichania, trapezes, asphaleies (Patras: Peri Technon, 2000). 20 Aion, 463 (Aug. 21, 1843). On the cotton crop and the general economic condition of the country, see Aion, 424 (Mar. 7, 1843). 21 Pipinelis, I monarchia, 353–4. Detailed reports on the Greek budget and commerce appeared in SPch 164 ( July 25, 1842); SPV 73 (Apr. 1, 1842) and 192 (Aug. 26, 1842). 22 See Kallogerakis to Katakazy, Patras, Aug. 16, 1843; and Kallogerakis to Katakazy, Patras, Sept. 1, 1843, AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 479, ll. 88, 92–7.

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Ottoman envoy Kostaki (Constantine) Musurus constantly pressed for resolution of the claims of Muslims who formerly owned land in the kingdom.23 The Russian embassy also beseeched the Greek government to compensate the Muslim proprietors and proposed forming a mixed commission to determine the value of the assets. Because of this issue, the regularization of Greek–Ottoman relations through a general trade agreement had little chance of success. Affairs between the two states suffered an additional setback when a major public disturbance broke out in Istanbul after the production of a tragedy by Aristophanes. The play, delivered in classical Greek, was the first such performance in the city since the outbreak of the Greek Revolution in 1821. At the end of the play, a crowd of enthusiastic Greeks took to the streets and caused commotion until the police moved in to restore order. The play was the last of its kind, for the Ottoman government published a decree forbidding future theatrical performances in the Greek language.24 Rumors of these events triggered unrest along the frontier, and Russian vice-consul Moustoxydis, writing from Thessaloniki, warned of an imminent explosion of armed bands if something were not done immediately.25 Compounding the instability of the region was the revolt currently underway in the principality of Belgrade, where various factions struggled for the Serbian crown. Such were the inauspicious beginnings of the period of Ottoman reform, known as the Tanzimat, announced by the Hatt-i Şerif of Gülhane in 1839. Since the Greek government was unable to pay the service charges on the loan, it faced the threat of foreign intervention. The only avenue was to raise revenue while continuing the reduction of state expenses. Othon and his ministers agreed to increase taxes, impose a levy on state employees, eliminate some diplomatic posts abroad, make cuts in the military, and lessen the pensions for the clergy.26 The government also reduced the army by about 1,200 men and agreed to remove the remaining Bavarians (of which there were still about 350 in 1842). Greek minister Rizos began his reply to Nesselrode’s note of February 23 by regretting that St Petersburg doubted the government’s efforts to develop the resources of the country and reduce public expenses. He cited the protracted war against the Ottomans as the main cause of financial difficulties and warned that anarchy would result if the powers refused to help. With his typical prolixity, Rizos illustrated all the actions taken to improve the budget and promised to continue

23 See Musurus to Rizos, Athens, Feb. 8, 1843; Katakazy to Nesselrode, Athens, Feb. 8, 1843; Katakazy to Nesselrode, Athens, Apr. 10, 1843, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 9/1843, l. 71, 69, 133. SPV 267 (Nov. 25, 1842) reported on the Ottoman demands for property compensation. 24 See SPch 81 (Apr. 11, 1842); and SPV 83 (Apr. 12, 1842). 25 Moustoxydis to Butenev, secret, Thessaloniki, Feb. 22, 1843, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 1308, ll. 15–18. 26 Katakazy to Nesselrode, Athens, Apr. 10, 1843, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 9/1843, ll. 151–6. These economies are treated in Petropulos, Politics and Statecraft, 438; Driault, Histoire diplomatique, ii. 233; and Pipinelis, I monarchia, 358–9. According to SPch 27 (Feb. 4, 1842), the Greek government maintained six embassies and eight general-consulates and consulates abroad. Moustoxydis was unhappy to learn that the Greek government recalled Consul Mikhail Soutsos from Thessaloniki, see Moustoxydis to Butenev, Thessaloniki, June 29, 1843, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 1308, ll. 64–7.

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the search for ways to diminish spending. He insisted that Greece would be unable to pay Russia by June without seriously disturbing the internal tranquility of the realm. Moreover, Rizos observed, the frugal policy of the government had grave repercussions on public morale, for many were dependent upon the state for their livelihood, and increased hardships upon individuals could be blamed on the King. Two weeks later, Athens announced additional reductions to the navy and army budget.27 Indeed, the reduction in the military budget incurred a very negative public reaction; the Century criticized the cutbacks as unpatriotic because they threatened the livelihood of many veterans of the revolutionary war.28 During previous state crises in Greece, foreign intervention led to a solution, and the case was no different after ten years of independence: the London Conference of May–July 1843 decided the fate of Greek finances. On July 5, the powers issued a protocol that formed the basis of the financial convention grudgingly signed by Greece on September 2.29 In brief, the powers, working in unison, forced the Greek government to reduce its budget, even though the proposed economies were insufficient to meet the annual interest and amortization of the loan, fixed at 3,635,922 francs.30 In the face of foreign pressure, King Othon was unable to form a united government. As a substitute, he used the tactic of allowing each party a brief spell at the helm of government as a sort of “royal party.”31 This policy was ineffective, for after their period of ascendancy it became clear to the separate parties that the King was unwilling to share power. Further limiting the chances of liberalizing the government was the King’s father, Ludwig of Bavaria, who instructed his son not to place any limits on his powers. Ludwig warned Othon that a constitution is “a lion’s den from which no footsteps emerge! It has consequences no man can foresee.”32 If such advice did not discourage Othon, at least it did not help him make quality, timely decisions during the crisis. In August 1843, Katakazy sent clear warnings to St Petersburg of threats against the Greek throne, only this time he emphasized Othon’s repeated refusal to convert 27 Rizos to Katakazy, Athens, Mar. 29, 1843, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 9/1843, ll. 112–31. Rizos’s note is printed in Aion, 433 (Apr. 21, 1843); Karolidis, Synchronos istoria, ii. 396–401; and Kordatos, Istoria tis neoteris Elladas, iii. 197–202. On the additional cuts, see Rizos to Katakazy, Athens, Jan. 10, 1843, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 9/1843, ll. 151–6. There are useful comments in G. Finlay, “The Bankruptcy of the Greek Kingdom,” Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine, 54 (Sept. 1843): 345–62. 28 Aion, 456 ( July 24, 1843). 29 See the letter of Katakazy, Piscatory, and Lyons to Rizos-Neroulos, Athens, Sept. 5, 1843 [NS] and the diplomats’ collective note in Jelavich, Russia and the Greek Revolution of 1843, 49–52. 30 The comte rendu of the London Conference and other relevant papers are in AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 9/1843, ll. 181–224. See also Petropulos, Politics and Statecraft, 439; Driault, Histoire diplomatique, ii. 232, 233, 236–7; Kordatos, Istoria tis neoteris Elladas, iii. 205; Douglas Dakin, The Unification of Greece, 1770–1923 (London: Benn, 1972), 76; and Pipinelis, I monarchia, 359–60. 31 On the “national or royal party,” see Piscatory, Athens, Sept. 16, 1843 [NS], in J. Poulos, “I epanastasis tis tritis Septemvriou 1843 epi ti vasi ton gallikon archeion,” DIEEE 9 (1956): 237. 32 See Ludwig Trost, König Ludwig I von Bayern in seinen Briefen an seinen Sohn den König von Griechenland (Bamberg: C. C. Buchnersche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1891), 130, 55; and F. EngelJanosi, Geschichte auf dem Ballhausplatz (Vienna: Verlag Styria, 1963), 32; as quoted in Jelavich, Russia and the Greek Revolution of 1843, 24–5.

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to Orthodoxy. He noted that the instability in the country was due to the economic crisis compounded by Othon’s religious indifference. He singled out the lack of capable bishops and the failure of the clergy to attend the spiritual needs of the people. Katakazy felt that the government seemed to be “trying daily” to supply its already dissatisfied subjects with reasons to take things into their own hands. Although there was some indication that the people were pleased with the efforts to provide for more bishops in the kingdom, Katakazy warned that “some believe that a revolution is inevitable in the city [Athens].” Although claiming not to partake in this view, he complained that the King reveled in unending promises.33 According to the Russian ambassador, the government personnel in Athens continued to commit “fatal errors” that spurred on the King’s irresolution. He lamented the fact that the government had done almost nothing to end corruption and inefficiencies, despite the steady warnings from various quarters. Now the dilemma was acute, for it became associated with the personality and religion of the King. Othon’s unpopularity was increasing due to the “unfortunate mistrust, or perhaps one may say the repugnance, which the young sovereign appears to maintain for all that pertains to the church and the clergy of the nation,” wrote Katakazy. The fact that the royal family still had not produced an heir encouraged subjects to contemplate alternative ways of placing their country on a more stable foundation.34 Adding to the general malaise was the continued practice of reducing the number of bishops, as the elder clergymen passed away, and of allowing the traditions of monastic life to dissipate. In a lengthy attachment to his general report, Katakazy included a sampling of the attitudes of the Greek people. While some believed that “a pure monarchy, a paternal and energetic government would gratify the wishes of the nation and shut the mouths of those troublemakers with constitutional theories,” others, referred to as “experimental men,” thought that the creation of a deliberative assembly was the sole means of preventing anarchy.35 Katakazy’s unique description of the atmosphere in the capital on the eve of the revolution demonstrates the complexity of the situation. One guesses why he attached so little weight to the rumors of an impending revolt. On the other hand, perhaps he was aware of the plot underway, yet chose his words carefully. Either way, his correspondence contains no evidence of involvement in the coup. Various other observers, including Greek General Gennaios Kolokotronis, French minister plenipotentiary Théobald Piscatory, and the Austrian envoy Anton von Prokesch-Osten argued that the interference of the powers and the financial crisis were the precipitating causes of the revolution.36 In a fascinating 33

Katakazy to Nesselrode, Athens, Aug. 8, 1843, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 9/1843, ll. 348–54. On this subject, see E. Poulakou-Rebelakou et al, “The Lack of a Child, the Loss of a Throne: The Infertility of the First Royal Couple of Greece (1833–62),” Journal of the Royal College of Physicians of Edinburgh, 41 (2011): 73–7. 35 Katakazy to Nesselrode, Athens, Aug. 8, 1843, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 9/1843, ll. 348–54, here 352. 36 See G. Kolokotronis, Apomnimonevmata (Cheirographon Defteron 1821–62), ed. E. G. Protopsaltis (Athens: Ethnikos Typographos, 1961), 88; Piscatory to Guizot, Athens, Sept. 16, 1843 [NS], in DIEEE 9 34

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essay written by an eyewitness, in Russian, with the general heading “Greece” in the Russian Archive of the Third Section of His Majesty’s Own Chancery, an anonymous author maintains that several foreign diplomats, their agents, and Greek journalists initiated the intrigue during the financial crisis.37 The conspirators aimed to place their candidate on the throne and raise the people in revolt for a constitution. The final stimulus came from the participation of France in the London deliberations. This act compromised the position of the Greek ministry led by Dimitrios Christidis, and the Greek populace became wary of further foreign intrusion. According to the anonymous author, because of the crown’s vulnerability to external pressure, revolution appeared as the only viable alternative to foreign control. Indeed, the budget cuts affected the lives of many Greeks, especially those in the military, where the economies made the atmosphere for conspiracy propitious. It was no accident that the cavalry, which was singled out for reductions, was a key factor in the coup d’état. Adding insult to injury, the King had decided to retain the Bavarian officers with full pay, while the salaries of Greek officers were reduced by two-thirds.38 Yet this was not the first time that the Greek kingdom experienced economic difficulties. Hard times help explain general dissatisfaction, but, this time with the absence of further allied loans, the austerity measures enacted by the government coincided with unpopular conscription decrees, with the rupture of commerce between Greece and the Sublime Porte, with numerous other unfulfilled agendas, and with rampant banditry in the bordering provinces. These factors compounded the central government’s fiscal problems. Thus, the populace had reason to feel despondent. The inability of Othon to form a national party became especially noticeable during these moments of crisis. According to British Ambassador Lyons, Othon realized at the last minute the precariousness of his situation; he decided to promulgate a constitution fifteen days before the revolution broke out. The decision, however, came too late.39 LAUNCHING THE INSURRECTION IN THE GREEK CAPITAL The prime movers of the conspiracy were Andreas Metaxas, Ioannis Makrygiannis, Konstantinos Zographos, Andreas Lontos, Rigas Palamidis, and Dimitrios (1956): 232; and Prokesch to Metternich, Sept. 21, 1843, in Aus dem Nachlasse des Grafen Prokesch-Osten, ed. A. Prokesch-Osten (Vienna: Carl Gerold’s Sohn, 1881), ii. 239. Dakin, The Unification of Greece, 76, writes of the powers’ efforts to curtail the Greek budget at the London Conference: “To the Greek mind these measures deprived Othon’s monarchy of its raison d’être: Othon was to be tolerated only if he could obtain from the powers financial support for Greece.” 37 “Gretsiia,” GARF, f. 109, 1 eksp., op. 18, d. 214, ll. 13–14. The full index title of d. 214, is “Po izvestiiam o vozstanii v Gretsii v 1843go godu. Tut zhe o pis’me po semu predmetu iz Afin k Pavlu Gomeru zhivushchemu v Odesse.” 38 Lyons to Aberdeen, Athens, Mar. 30, 1843 [NS], in Correspondence. 39 Lyons to Aberdeen, Athens, Sept. 15, 1843, “Secret and Confidential,” FO 32.122; cited in Petropulos, Politics and Statecraft, 442.

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Kallergis. They came from all three political factions, although the pro-Russian group formed a majority, and they had the support of most army officers, who were disgruntled at the reduction in the military establishment. The central aim of the conspirators was the introduction of a constitution that would limit the King’s authority and end foreign interference.40 In his memoirs, Makrygiannis maintains that before 1840 propaganda for a constitutional rebellion had a wide circulation among the clergy and monks, but not amongst the highest politicians and military, who were still under the influence of the foreign powers. By 1843, all three parties consciously agitated for the revolt.41 Anthonios Georgantas, another one of the conspirators, suggested that the plot existed a year before the revolution. At first, the rebellion was set for March 25 1844, Independence Day, the anniversary of the uprising against the Ottomans (the perfect example of an invented tradition).42 Aiming to present the change to the public and the powers as a fait accompli, the conspirators picked the national holiday to coincide with the introduction of the constitution. However, believing that their secret plan had been betrayed, the rebels decided to move their plans ahead of schedule. The main strength of the movement was in the military, more specifically in the Athenian garrison, and the leading schemers—Metaxas, Lontos, and Zographos— decided to act before they were certain of the garrison’s support. By a strange stroke of luck, Metaxas was able to gain time in order to marshal the necessary support in the capital because of an encounter with Gennaios Kolokotronis, a loyal member of the King’s bodyguard, which nearly led to the plot’s demise.43 Under pressure, the conspirators obtained the support of Colonel Kallergis (commander of the Athens cavalry), Nikolaos Skarvelis (head of the Athens infantry), and Spyridon Spyromilios (director of the military school in Piraeus).44 It is worthy of note that these figures, all Russophiles, became associated with the revolutionary leadership in August, not earlier, and the main source which implicates them is the memoirs of Makrygiannis. Being careful not to betray their intentions, the leaders came up with a plan to blockade the palace on the night of September 1, 1843. Kallergis and Skarvelis, however, failed to act at the last minute. On the next day, a police force from Sparta, whom Makrygiannis referred to later, in typically earthy fashion, as fortune seekers who used their “sense of honor to clean their boots,” surrounded his home.

40 Most accounts agree that the impulse for regime change occurred about two years before—after the attempt by Alexandros Mavrokordatos to execute reforms peacefully ended in failure. Kolokotronis, Apomnimonevmata, 87–8, makes this point. On the reform program of Mavrokordatos, see Petrunina, Grecheskaia natsiia, 314–18; Petropulos, Politics and Statecraft, 344–407; Dakin, The Unification of Greece, 74–5; and P. A. Agryopoulos, “O Alexandros Mavrokordatos kai i syntagmatiki prospatheia tou 1841,” Ellinika, 8–9 (1935–6): 247–67, 85–102. 41 The Memoirs of General Makriyannis, 190–204. 42 A. Georgantas, “Istorika apomnimonevmata tis vasileias Othonos,” Parnassos, 1 (1881): 837. Metaxas later told Lyons that the revolution “had broken out sooner than was intended,” see Lyons to Aberdeen, Athens, Sept. 21, 1843 [NS], Correspondence. 43 The Memoirs of General Makriyannis, 193–4; Petropulos, Politics and Statecraft, 442–3. 44 The Memoirs of General Makriyannis, 197–8.

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News of his arrest reached Metaxas and Kallergis in the morning via two doctors who treated Makrygiannis after he faked an illness.45 After some delay, the court received warning of a plot scheduled for September 5.46 It posted a list of suspects and took preventive measures such as placing army officers on alert and doubling the palace guard. Why the crown did not make any arrests remains a mystery. Perhaps Othon aimed to frighten the conspirators enough to abandon their plans, or maybe he was concerned of the consequences if the suspected leaders, all prominent men, were arrested. The court may have supposed that the conspirators were few in number and therefore easily controlled. Nevertheless, the relatively minor disturbance outside of the home of Makrygiannis served as a distraction while the real conspirators were organizing. Moreover, Makrygiannis’s virtual house arrest gave rise to a rumor that a general roundup of suspects would follow. The conspirators had no time to lose. On the evening of September 2, a few score of men loyal to Makrygiannis collected near his home to force his release, and then march to the square and demand an audience with the King. It was a risky business, for the well-armed police aimed to prohibit anyone from entering his home. As the supporters neared the gates, fighting broke out, and the police opened fire. Then, Makrygiannis wrote, his followers “fell upon the midst of the enemy like lions.” One police corporal was killed, the only fatality in an otherwise relatively peaceful evening.47 Markrygiannes maintained that the incident outside his home ignited the revolution. Skarvelis and Kallergis responded to the shots and headed for the palace. Other observers in the city, such as Dragoumis, Kallergis, and Rangavis, each refer to a different spark that kindled the revolutionary flame.48 Whichever account one follows, news of the actions outside Makrygiannis’s home spread fast. Infantry and cavalry units began to march toward the palace around midnight. When they reached the main square, Othon ordered the commander of an artillery battery to disperse them with cannon fire. To this order, the commander replied defiantly: “Who gave the order? I only take orders from the commandant!” Then the King sent the Minister of War and an aide with an order for the troops to submit. Both men were arrested before they reached the soldiers.49 About three hundred infantrymen, fifty cavalrymen, forty artillerymen with four cannon, and four hundred irregulars gathered outside the palace. The infantrymen initially claimed they were there to inquire about the health of the King, because their duty was to protect him. After some delay, Othon appeared on the balcony 45

The Memoirs of General Makriyannis, 199. Katakazy to Nesselrode, Athens, Sept. 18, 1843, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 9/1843, l. 437. 47 The Memoirs of General Makriyannis, 199–204. See also, “Gretsiia,” GARF, f. 109, 1 eksp., op. 18, d. 214, l. 14. It deserves note that many of the facts contained in “Gretsiia” are corroborated in the memoirs of Makrygiannis. 48 See The Memoirs of General Makriyannis, 203; Finlay, History of Greece, vii. 174–5; “Gretsiia,” GARF, f. 109, 1 eksp., op. 18, d. 214, l. 14; Nikolaos Dragoumis, Istorikai anamniseis (Athens: Ermis, 1973), ii. 70–3; and A. R. Rangavis, Apomnimonevmata (Athens: Georgios Kasdonis, 1894–5), ii. 129–31. 49 “Gretsiia,” GARF, f. 109, 1 eksp., op. 18, d. 214, l. 14. 46

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overlooking the square and tried to persuade the men to disperse. Kallergis refused to withdraw, and instead informed Othon of the “people’s desire for a constitution.” Othon, still delaying despite the crowd, said he would consider the request once the soldiers returned to their barracks. He asked for time to consult the cabinet and foreign representatives. As this transpired, four to five thousand civilians joined the soldiers in the square. Since he had difficulty speaking to such a large and boisterous crowd, Othon descended to the first floor windows.50 To ensure that the King met their demands, the revolutionary leaders sent soldiers to the homes of the cabinet ministers, who then were escorted to a meeting where Metaxas, Zographos, and Palamidis had been discussing their actions and objectives since early morning. The assembly of cabinet ministers added legitimacy to the proceedings and helped to ensure Othon’s isolation. Under pressure, the council of state agreed to several demands for presentation to the King, including the convocation of a national assembly within thirty days, the appointment of a provisional cabinet, the expulsion of all foreigners from government posts, and the right of the cabinet to convene a constitutional assembly. A special committee went to the palace with the proposals, and the King accepted them, but requested the ability to consult with the foreign diplomats. Instead, he received a time limit for his consent.51 T H E RU S S IA N E M B A S S Y A N D TH E E V E N T S O F 2 –3 SEPTEMBER 1 843 Russian archival materials enable us to discuss the activities of the Russian embassy during these hours with precision. They also help to dispel some of the myths that have become prevalent in the historiography. On the morning of September 2, Katakazy was in the countryside with his family when an invitation arrived from Foreign Minister Rizos to come to Athens to discuss finances. That afternoon the majority of Greek ministers met with the foreign delegates to put the final touches to the financial agreement. Katakazy observed that everyone seemed confident and secure, and there was no reason to suspect that a revolution would erupt that very night. Reflecting upon the episode two months later, he wondered if this was a sign of treason on behalf of the ministers, or if they were ignorant of what was happening. Either way, he complained that the government and the court remained careless and defenseless until it was too late.52 Later that evening, the foreign delegates met at Katakazy’s home with the intent of composing a collective report relative to the financial agreement. They worked 50 “Gretsiia,” GARF, f. 109, 1 eksp., op. 18, d. 214, ll. 14–15; Finlay, History of Greece, vii. 175; Piscatory, Athens, Sept. 16, 1843 [NS], in DIEEE 9 (1956): 243. 51 See “Gretsiia,” GARF, f. 109, 1 eksp., op. 18, d. 214, l. 15–16; Finlay, History, vii. 176; The Memoirs of General Makriyannis, 204; Petropulos, Politics and Statecraft, 447. For a detailed treatment of the actions of the cabinet ministers, see “Gretsiia,” GARF, f. 109, 1 eksp., op. 18, d. 214, l. 16–21. 52 Katakazy to Nesselrode, Constantinople, Nov. 23, 1843, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d.9/1843, ll. 484–6.

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until midnight when all of them retired. Towards one o’clock in the morning, Katakazy was surprised to hear a few rifle shots and commotion coming from different parts of the city. Soon after, he learned that the city population, as well as the garrison, had launched an uprising against the King, who remained in his palace. Katakazy’s first reaction was to unite with his colleagues in order to discuss how to diffuse the crisis and ensure Othon’s safety. In the early hours of September 3, the foreign residents convened at Katakazy’s home. After a brief meeting, their initial decision was to visit Foreign Minister Rizos, whom they found at home perfectly resigned to the coup. Rizos said that the movement was widespread and uncontrollable. Then the diplomats decided to try to speak to the King directly, whom they suspected had already invited them to the palace, but whose message was probably intercepted by rebels.53 Generally, the harmony among the foreign delegates is remarkable. They intended to support the King, convince him not to abdicate, and order the troops to return to their barracks. They also began to compose a collective report to the London Conference relative to the revolutionary events.54 When the envoys reached the palace, the commander of the Athenian garrison, Colonel Kallergis, refused them entry, for Othon had not yet signed all the documents. On the following day, in official letters to the Russian Foreign Ministry, the Russian embassy in Constantinople, as well as the Greek minister of war, Kallergis (a St Petersburg educated Russophile) defended his actions by saying that he was concerned about the welfare of the King and the tranquility of the capital.55 Once it became clear that the delegates of the protecting powers would not gain entry, Othon decided to accept the decrees. By mid-morning, the crowd outside the palace had grown considerably. According to the anonymous witness in the Russian Third Section archives, a crowd of more than 20,000 “with terrifying fury and outcry threatened to break into the palace through the windows of the ground floor” if the King did not appear, as they shouted “Long live the constitution” and “down with the Bavarians!”56 Some people demanded a constitution based upon the Third National Assembly of Troezene in 1827, while others demanded a congress of deputies. After several 53 According to “Gretsiia,” GARF, f. 109, 1 eksp., op. 18, d. 214, l. 16, the King sent a letter to the ambassadors early in the morning of Sept. 3, but it never reached them. 54 Katakazy to Nesselrode, Athens, Sept. 4, 1843; Katakazy to Nesselrode, Constantinople, Nov. 23, 1843, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d.9/1843, ll. 404–5, 484–6. The joint report of the British, French, and Russian representatives is in Katakazy to Nesselrode, Athens, Sept. 4, 1843, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 9/1843, ll. 406–12. It is printed in Guizot, Mémoires, vii. 276–80, and Jelavich, Russia and the Greek Revolution of 1843, 52–4. 55 His appeal to St Petersburg began by stating that “Without ever having ceased to be Greek and to honor my origin though my private conduct, my patriotism and my services in the sacred struggle for Hellenic independence, I have never forgotten the ties of recognition and affection that attach me to Russia, where I have passed the best years of my life and made my education.” See Kallergis to Nesselrode, Athens, Oct. 8, 1843, and Kallergis to Titov, Athens, Oct. 14, 1843, AVPRI, f. 161/1, op. 181, d. 57/1843, ll. 13–14, 15–18; copy of Kallergis to the Minister of War, Athens, Sept. 4, 1843, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 9/1843, ll. 433–44. See also “Lord Nugent’s Travels—Greece in 1843–4,” Quarterly Review, 156 (Oct. 1846): 309. 56 “Gretsiia,” GARF, f. 109, 1 eksp., op. 18, d. 214, l. 21.

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hours of delay, new cabinet ministers took the oath of office inside the palace, and declared September 3 a national holiday. Othon was pressured to decorate, with medals, the same people who had conspired against him. Next, he thanked the troops of the garrison for preventing bloodshed, and the army pledged fidelity to the country and constitutional throne, as well as to the institutions that the national assembly would establish. Finally, the insurgents allowed allied representatives to enter the palace. Once inside, they discovered that the King had already signed the decrees calling for a national assembly, a constitution, the dissolution of the cabinet, and the expulsion of all foreigners from government posts. Visibly shaken, Othon asked the ambassadors if he should abdicate in favor of his brother. Perhaps he had in mind his father’s advice when he said that “in Greece, constitution means nothing more, nor less than pillage. The ministers they have imposed upon me are mere puppets in the hands of a mob.”57 The European diplomats, with the exception of the Austrian envoy Anton Prokesch-Osten, advised Othon to accept the decrees in the hope that this would help restore the royal image. Ambassador Lyons, who enthusiastically supported the decrees, said to Othon that, “by his promise of a constitution, the despair of a million souls had been turned into hope.”58 Katakazy’s advice was evasive. According to the anonymous Russian source, Katakazy endeavored to convince the King not to accept two of the decrees, but without success. Afterwards, Katakazy claimed that he concurred with the decisions, albeit reluctantly, and considered the matter settled. Several weeks later, he defended his position by stating that any protests against the “authors of this criminal violence” would have exposed the King to further humiliation and personal danger.59 In the afternoon, the crowd dispersed “tranquilly and joyfully” when the King, the newly appointed ministers, and the foreign ambassadors appeared on the balcony of the palace and told the people that the revolutionary demands had been met. Among shouts of “Long live the King” and “Long live the constitution,” the ministers ordered the army to break up the crowd and then return to their barracks. By three o’clock, most people had left the square, “without trace of a mob having been there,” and the rest of the day was peaceful. “Not a window of the palace, or of the surrounding buildings, was broken . . . and of the reed fence, for “Gretsiia,” GARF, f. 109, 1 eksp., op. 18, d. 214, l. 22–3. Lyons to Aberdeen, Athens, Sept. 21, 1843 [NS], in Correspondence. According to Prussian minister Brassier (Meyendorff to Nesselrode, Berlin, Sept. 27 and Oct. 5, 1843, in Peter von Meyendorff: Ein russischer Diplomat an den Höfen von Berlin und Wien, ed. Otto Hoetzsch (Berlin and Leipzig: W. de Gruyter & Co., 1923), i. 263–4, 264–7) Katakazy “lost his head at the decisive moment.” On the other hand, Lyons reported that Brassier took a prominent part in engaging Othon to sign the ordinances. “For instance,” wrote Lyons, “when H. M. observed to the corps diplomatique that the officers who dictated the ordinances would cease to respect him if He signed them, it was Mons. Brassier who answered H. M. and said: ‘that he would still be the king, and need not always retain the officers in his service.’ ” See Lyons to Aberdeen, Athens, Nov. 10, 1843 [NS], RGADA, f. 3, op. 1, d. 103, ll. 32–4; and “Copie d’un mémoire de M. Brassier de St. Simon Ministre du Prusse en Grèce adressé à Mn. Baron du Bûlow,” Berlin, Feb. 14, 1844, GARF, f. 912, op. 1, d. 71, ll. 1–12. 59 “Gretsiia,” GARF, f. 109, 1 eksp., op. 18, d. 214, ll. 22–3; see also, Katakazy to Struve, Athens, Sept. 7, 1843; Katakazy to Nesselrode, Athens, Sept. 4, 1843; and Katakazy to Nesselrode, Athens, Constantinople, Nov. 23, 1843, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 9/1843, ll. 1–4, 404–5, 486–7. 57 58

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there was nothing more to separate the palace-gardens from the place where twenty thousand persons, for so many hours, had awaited a crisis, in which no retreat was left . . . of that frail fence not a reed was displaced.”60 In the evening, Othon rode around the city on horseback while receiving exclamations of “Long live the King!” News of the revolution spread quickly, and declarations relative to the new government appeared in Nafplion, Patras, Missolonghi, and elsewhere. Overall, the provinces remained tranquil, with only minor instances of disorder. On September 7, Katakazy received information that the islands and the principal cities of the mainland approved the changes to the government.61 Metaxas, the new foreign minister, sent letters to the delegates of the protecting powers informing them of the changes.62 In expectation of orders from St Petersburg, Katakazy conducted himself carefully. He did not recognize the new government, nor did he send a warm response. In contrast, Lyons informed Metaxas that “I look forward with sincere pleasure to entering into cordial relations with you and that I entirely participate in your desire, that our intercourse may be carried on, with reciprocal frankness and confidence.”63 Two days later, Katakazy simply acknowledged that things had gone badly for the King and promised to pass on the information to the court in St Petersburg.64 The Austrian response was more conservative, and Prince Metternich alluded to a connection between the Greek revolt and recent troubles in Italy. Metternich was concerned that events in Athens could serve as a “contagious example for the Greco-Slavs of Hungary and cause trouble in the provinces of European Turkey.”65 The involvement of the foreign representatives in the events of September has been the subject of conflicting interpretations by contemporaries and historians. Although their statements give us a rather full picture of the evening of September 2, some discrepancies exist. Overall, it appears that the conspirators aimed to isolate the King and force their plan of action without outside support. The diplomats, like always, wanted to manipulate the events to suit their own purposes, but the stalwart support of the Athenian garrison, which was unanimously in favor of the coup, thwarted their endeavors. In general, it appears that the uprising surprised the “Lord Nugent’s Travels,” 309–10. See “Gretsiia,” GARF, f. 109, 1 eksp., op. 18, d. 214, l. 23; Katakazy to Struve, Athens, Sept. 7, 1843; Katakazy to Nesselrode, Athens, Sept. 4, 1843; Katakazy to Nesselrode, Athens, Sept. 7, 1843, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d.9/1843, ll. 1–4, 404–5, 418; and Piscatory, Athens, Sept. 16, 1843 [NS], in DIEEE 9 (1956): 237, 247, 251. 62 “Copie d’un office adressé par la nouveau Ministre des Affaires Etrangères Métaxà à Mr. de Catacazy en date d’Athènes (4/16 Sept. 1843),” AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 9/1843, ll. 419–24. 63 Katakazy to Nesselrode, Sept. 7, 1843; Lyons to Metaxas, Athens, Sept. 16, 1843 [NS], AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 9/1843, ll. 417–18, 428–30; Lyons to Aberdeen, Athens, Sept. 17, 1843 [NS], annex Lyons to Metaxas, Athens, Sept. 16, 1843, in Correspondence. 64 Katakazy to Metaxas, Athens, Sept. 6, 1843, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 9/1843, ll. 426–7. 65 Information regarding Metternich’s attitude comes from Katakazy to Nesselrode, Athens, Oct. 19, 1843, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 9/1843, ll. 463–8. For a summary of the Austrian position, including excerpts from Prokesch-Osten’s daily journal, see Engel-Janosi, Geschichte auf dem Ballhausplatz, 48–52; and Grammata pros ti Vienni 1824–43, apo tin allilographia tou protou Austriakou presvevti stin Athina Anton Prokes phon Osten, ed. P. K. Enepekidis (Athens: Okeanida, 2007), 517–30. For the reaction to the revolution in Berlin, see the correspondence of Meyendorff with Nesselrode in Peter von Meyendorff, ed. Hoetzsch, i. 263–70. 60 61

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foreign envoys, although they reacted differently. Lyons, who supported the coup, claimed that he was worried that Katakazy would pressure Othon to refuse the revolutionary decrees, while French minister Piscatory suspected that Russia had inspired the plot to overthrow Othon and place an Orthodox King on the throne.66 The leadership of the revolution, including Kallergis, Lontos, Metaxas, and Soutsos, demonstrated that segments of all three parties were, for one reason or another, participants in the coup. The fact that all the parties deemed that governmental change was necessary helps explain the non-violent character of the events. Even though an unprecedented degree of harmony reigned among them in September, each group had different goals. The Anglophiles and Francophiles wished for representative institutions, while the Russophiles wanted to safeguard the position of the military, end the schism, and secure the religion of the dynasty. The history of the interactions between the leading political groups suggests that their union could only be temporary. It is interesting to point out that the fusion of the political factions coincided with the rapprochement between the protecting powers in the wake of the Near Eastern Crisis of 1839–41. The three powers were working together in unusual harmony, just like the political factions in Athens. Lyons and the French resident-minister Théodore Langrené received instructions from their ministries to support each other. Lyons and Katakazy were on good terms for the first time ever.67 Various sources agree that Othon was genuinely popular and that the events of September invited sympathy. The people’s displeasure was aimed only at the Bavarian ministers.68 Other contemporaries claimed that Othon’s reputation had declined over the last few years.69 Public discontent with a Catholic sovereign, and the fact that the royal couple remained childless did not improve the dynasty’s image. In general, it seems that the majority of people, driven to distress by the government’s austerity measures, simply wanted the foreign-dominated autocratic system to end.70 The goals of the revolutionaries are contained in numerous pamphlets that spread throughout the capital at the time of the uprising. Prominent writers such 66 See Poulos’s comments in DIEEE 9 (1956): 228–30. Karolidis, Synchronos istoria, ii. 382–3, 469–70, states that Katakazy, like Lyons, attempted to remove Othon from power. According to Dakin, The Unification of Greece, 76, Lyons played the main role in getting Othon to accept the decrees. In contrast, Pipinelis, I monarchia, 368, writes that Lyons and Katakazy were the chief supporters of the conspiracy. 67 Guizot, Mémoires, vi. 265–6, vii. 270; Katakazy to Nesselrode, Athens, 27 July 1842, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 10/1842, ll. 234–8; Lyons to Aberdeen, Athens, Sept. 21, 1843 [NS], in Correspondence. See also David Mclean, “The Greek Revolution and the Anglo-French Entente 1843–4,” English Historical Review, 92 (1981): 117–29. 68 See Kolokotronis, Apomnimonevmata, 78; A. K., O Komitis. Ta apanta tou syntagmatos (Athens, n.p. 1843); “Gretsiia,” GARF, f. 109, 1 eksp., op. 18, d. 214, l. 15; and “Lord Nugent’s Travels,” 309–10. 69 See Finlay, “The Bankruptcy of the Greek Kingdom,” 349; Guizot, Mémoires, vii. 271; and Katakazy to Nesselrode, Athens, Aug. 8, 1843, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 9/1843, l. 349. 70 Karolidis, Synchronos istoria, ii. 382–3, 469–70, thought that the general goal of the uprising was the overthrow of Othon. Charles Frazee, The Orthodox Church and Independent Greece, 1821–52 (Cambridge: CUP, 1969), 155–7, suggests that the reasons stemmed from the unfinished condition of the 1821 Revolution and the ineffectiveness of the Othonian government.

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as Alexandros Rangavis and Alexandros Soutsos published political tracts that demanded a constitution, an end to despotism, and individual freedoms. They also fumed against the Bavarians and the foreign legations for their interference in national affairs.71 According to the author of a pamphlet titled The Comet, the King wanted the best for the nation, but bad Bavarian advisors had led him astray.72 Additional contemporary observers add nuance to the reasons for political destabilization in the country. Kallergis, for example, wrote that the main motive of the uprising was to remove authority from the Bavarians and achieve representative government by a general constitution.73 Makrygiannis, rather hyperbolically, maintained that the primary goal was to bring about a national assembly and construct a constitution, but there was no intention to remove the King. “If the King signed [the constitution], we were for him; if he didn’t, we were against, for in that case he would have us shot.”74 Predictably, soon after the decrees became public, rumors began to circulate, accusing one or another faction of being the prime mover behind the insurrection. Articles alleging that Russia and the Russophiles triggered the conspiracy appeared in the European press. In an essay in Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine, George Finlay described the events as a truly popular movement, but that the initiative came from “the Philorthodox or Russian party,” which began to hatch the plot in the early part of 1843.75 Among the more interesting of these Russophobe accounts is an anonymous article in the British and Foreign Review, clearly implicating the pro-Russian faction, as well as the Russian embassy.76 Additional sources accuse Katakazy of complicity in the conspiracy, and that he was playing “va banque,” hoping that because of the revolution the King would either convert to Orthodoxy or flee the country, thus leaving the throne vacant for a Russian prince.77 In his memoirs, Greek politician Ioannis Dragoumis says that the main goal of the

71 See A. Rangavis, I triti Septemvriou (Athens: n.p., 1843); A. Soutsos, I metavoli tis tritis Septemvriou (Athens: X. Nikolaidou Philadelpheos, 1844); and Soutsos, Septemvriou eis phylladia pente (Athens: n.p., n.d.). See also I. G. P. Keios, O Agonistis Ellin (kata tin 3 Septemvriou 1843) (Athens: n.p., 1843); and D. I. Poimenidou, O eleftherotis i to tropaion tou 1821 kai o thriamvos tou 1843 (Athens: n.p., 1843). These pamphlets and others are bound together in the Gennadius Library, KG 384, Ellas, 28. 72 A. K., O Komitis (n.p., n.d.), 15–24; Petrunina, Grecheskaia natsiia, 338. 73 See Kallergis to Nesselrode, Aug. 20, 1843; and Kallergis to Titov, Oct. 14, 1843, AVPRI, f. 161/1, d. 57, ll. 13–19. 74 The Memoirs of General Makriyannis, 186. 75 Finlay, “The Actual Condition of the Greek State,” Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine, 55 ( Jan.– June 1844): 789; Finlay, History, vii. 172–3, 175. Finlay’s language suggests that he had access to Lyons’s dispatches, or perhaps the two collaborated, as the phraseology is that similar. 76 Anon., “The Late Revolution in Greece,” British and Foreign Review, 35 (1844): 239–82. 77 See Piscatory to Guizot, Athens, Sept. 16, 1843 [NS], DIEEE 9 (1956): 238–9; Prokesch-Osten to Metternich, Athens, Sept. 21, 1843 [NS], Aus dem Nachlasse, ii. 240; Driault, Histoire diplomatique, ii. 243–4; C. Papoulidis, “Un document caractéristique de Gabriel Catacazy tiré des Archives de la Politique Extérieure de Russie,” BS 20 (1982): 342; and Pipinelis, I monarchia, 368, 397. Petropulos, Politics and Statecraft, 449, writes that, “Most everyone strongly suspected Catacazy’s involvement and many Greeks believed that he had encouraged the conspirators in order to replace Othon with an Orthodox prince.”

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conspirators was the overthrow of Othon, and that Russia was behind the action because the King would not convert to Orthodoxy.78 A minority of voices defended the Russians against involvement in the conspiracy. In a letter to the French journalist Duvergier de Hauranne appearing in Revue des Deux Mondes, Greek minister Zographos insisted that not even a fraction of the Russian party had the intention of delivering the Greeks from the Bavarians or of removing the King.79 With respect to the Russian embassy, Kallergis explicitly denied that Katakazy had taken any direct or indirect part in the movement.80 The British envoy Lyons remarked, “The conduct of the Russian Mission here appears to be irreproachable. Still I perceive that Russia never forgets that a free and constitutional government in this kingdom would defeat her views of exercising paramount influence over the Greek Family in general.”81 Even French premier Guizot and Duvergier de Hauranne, certainly no Russophiles, agreed that Russia was an unlikely author of the revolution.82 Reports of the affair appeared in the Russian press more than a month later. All the major newspapers, including the Northern Bee, Russian Invalid, Moscow Messenger, Messenger of Odessa, and the Journal de St.-Pétersbourg reported sanitized accounts of the rebellion and its aftermath. The Northern Bee provided Russian readers with the first reports of the revolution in Athens, although the newspaper’s tone suggested that Othon was in control of the events. The terms “revolution,” “coup,” and “constitution” were not printed.83 The closest description of actual events appeared in the St Petersburg Messenger, which reported the new situation in Greece resulting “from the overturn of the former order of things” (ot etoi peremeny byvshago poriadka veshchei).84 Again, the word “constitution” did not appear, although the Russian Invalid employed the term “new Codex” (novyi Kodeks).85 Russian readers, however, received ample information about political and social affairs in Greece during the tumultuous months surrounding the revolt and constitutional convention.

78 Dragoumis, Istorikai anamniseis, ii. 68. In a somewhat contradictory passage (ii. 69), Dragoumis claims that three things were necessary for the movement to succeed: the participation of the French party, the support of the provinces, and money, but that the Francophiles were not involved. See also Petrunina, Grecheskaia natsiia, 334. 79 “Lettre de M. Zographo à M. Duvergier de Hauranne en réponse à son article,” RdDM (Oct. 15, 1844): 10–13. See also Persiany’s comments on Zographos’s letter, the full text of which he included in Persiany to Nesselrode, Athens, Nov. 18, 1844, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 10/1844, ll. 126–38. 80 Kallergis to Duvergier de Hauranne, Athens, Nov. 8, 1844, in Persiany to Nesselrode, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 10/1844, ll. 144–7. See also V. N. Vinogradov (ed.), Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia na Balkanakh, 1830–56 gg. (Moscow: Nauka, 1990), 107–9. 81 Lyons to Aberdeen, Athens, Sept. 21, 1843, in Correspondence. 82 See Guizot, Mémoires, vii. 284; P. Duvergier de Hauranne, “De la situation actuelle de la Grèce et son avenir,” RdDM 8 (1844): 212–13; and Duvergier de Hauranne, Ta kata tin Ellada epi ton parelthonton trion minon (n.p., n.d.), 7–11. 83 SPch 245 (Nov. 1, 1843). 84 SPV 254 (Nov. 9, 1843). 85 Russkii invalid (Nov. 2, 1843); MV (Oct. 5 and 9; Nov. 11, 1843); see also Theodorou, “I Rosia kai i Epanastasi tis 3is Semptemvriou 1843,” 88.

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R U S SI A A N D TH E I N T E R N A T I O N A L R E A C T I O N TO THE S E PTE MB E R REVOL UTI ON Each of the protecting powers reacted differently to the events of September 1843. Great Britain favored the change to constitutional monarchy, but was not particularly well disposed toward King Othon. St Petersburg opposed the challenge to absolute government and wished to see an Orthodox King on the throne. Although France supported the change to constitutional monarchy, the events caught the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs by surprise, for the coup overturned the Francophile cabinet in power. Nevertheless, once the protecting powers learned of the revolution, all recognized that some kind of limited monarchy would have to be established. The powers also agreed that the Wittelsbach dynasty, and specifically King Othon, should continue to wear the crown. All feared that a vacant throne would involve Europe in an endless argument over the successor, and potentially plunge Greece into anarchy. The protecting powers differed, however, over what sort of constitutional government should emerge. George Finlay’s articles reflect the popular British attitude. According to him, the constitution promised to increase British power in the country. Indeed, even before September, certain circles in London were not averse to supporting a small revolution in Athens. However, since a very liberal government could lead to further disturbances in the Near East, and a democratic constitution could lead to the abdication of Othon (which created the danger of a Russian partisan ascending the throne) London sought a moderately conservative government in Greece that would guarantee British interests in the region.86 Guizot and Metternich, who initially expressed an attitude of disapproval, eventually sought to cooperate with the British and adopted a similar attitude.87 In the following weeks, Katakazy did his utmost to distance himself from the affair while describing his actions in a positive light. His dispatches reveal no hint of his involvement in the uprising before its outbreak. Obviously concerned about the potential reaction in St Petersburg, Katakazy prepared to defend himself against potential criticism. In a detailed report dated September 18 (nearly three weeks before St Petersburg issued his dismissal), the Russian ambassador suggested that the revolution was not a spontaneous incident. Rather, “almost the totality of men who enjoy some influence in the capital and the provinces” had planned it. “Only it appears that for a long time they were undecided about how and where the explosion was to take place without exposing the King to danger and without compromising public tranquility.” Katakazy thought that a reason for the conspirators’ hesitation was the Conference of London. Since the protecting powers 86 See Finlay, “The Bankruptcy of the Greek Kingdom,” 347–62; Finlay, “The Actual Condition of the Greek State,” Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine, 55 ( June 1844): 785–96. 87 The French attitude can be followed in Driault, Histoire diplomatique, ii. 245–9; Guizot’s Mémoires, vii. 264–375; Guizot to Piscatory, Paris, Sept. 29, 1843 [NS]; and Guizot to Piscatory, Hotel, Sept. 28, 1843 [NS], in DIEEE 9 (1956): 252, 258. See also the assessment of Guizot’s Near Eastern policy in Roger Bullen, Palmerston, Guizot and the Collapse of the Entente Cordiale (London: Athlone Press, 1974), 25–49.

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unanimously disapproved of the state budget, some conspirators had hoped that the King would distance himself from the foreign powers and invite Greeks into his confidence. Then, as soon as the protocol of August 11 and the King’s response to it became public, the conspirators decided to take extraordinary action. The court became privy to the plot and sought to prosecute key figures like Metaxas, Lontos, and Zographos, but without proof, the King hesitated to authorize their arrests. In the end, according to Katakazy, the King had good information about the conspiracy, but expected it to happen later.88 In the same report, Katakazy wrote: “Now everyone is preoccupied here with the elections and the National Assembly, the opening of which is fixed for 1 November.” Regarding the composition of the assembly, he hesitated to offer an opinion. Relaying news that the provisional government had recalled Ambassadors Mavrokordatos and Kolettis from their posts abroad, Katakazy uncharacteristically hoped that these two men (both modernizers) would help rally the people around the throne.89 Although their return demonstrates the mood of toleration and nonpartisanship prevalent in the first weeks after the revolution, since he had been criticizing their policies for years, Katakazy’s reference to them seems rather insincere. Meanwhile, Katakazy observed that, “The King appeared calm and resigned while working with the ministers on the adoption of a new organization of government.” In separate dispatches, he instructed Russian consulates throughout the region to abstain from expressing opinions or offering advice regarding current affairs in Greece. He also ordered the commanders of the Russian squadron in the Archipelago to observe the strictest neutrality.90 St Petersburg first received concrete information about the coup d’état from the Russian envoys in London and Constantinople.91 Katakazy’s initial communiqué did not arrive at the Russian Foreign Ministry until September 27. He sent his packet with the son of Paparrigopoulos, Russian consul in Athens, with the following instructions: “Since it is improbable that you will receive my letters before the departure of the steamship to Odessa, I beg of you please dispatch them on the steam-powered war vessel that is at your disposition, and if not this one, and no other boat is available, send them on an express ground passage until our frontier, and from there on a relay-courier for St Petersburg.”92 The timetable of the postal service was not fortuitous for the Russian ambassador, for earlier that

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Katakazy to Nesselrode, Athens, Sept. 18, 1843, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 9/1843, ll. 436–9. Katakazy to Nesselrode, Athens, Sept. 18, 1843, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 9/1843, ll. 438–9. The arrival of Mavrokordatos and Kolettis and their appointment as ministers without portfolio were reported in SPch 275 (Dec. 7, 1843); and SPV 250 (Nov. 4, 1843). 90 Katakazy to Nesselrode, Athens, Sept. 18, 1843, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 9/1843, ll. 445 and annexes. 91 Nesselrode to Nicholas, St Petersburg, Sept. 26, 1843; Nesselrode to Nicholas, Sept. 28 1843, RGADA, f. 3, op. 1, d. 103, ll. 1, 2–4. Tsar Nicholas was in Berlin and returned to St Petersburg in early Oct. 92 Katakazy to Titov, Athens, Sept. 1843, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 1811, l. 63. For a fascinating discussion of the functioning of the Russian postal system from Constantinople to St Petersburg, see E. P. Kudriavtseva, Russkie na Bosfore. Rossiiskoe posol’svto v Konstantinopole v pervoi polovine XIX veka (Moscow: Nauka, 2010), 36–63. 89

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month articles in Allgemeine Zeitung, the Standard, and Gazette de Berlin, accusing Russia of initiating the revolution, scandalized Nesselrode.93 Katakazy attributed these and similar articles in the Gazette d’Augsburg to “certain Bavarians who attribute everything to us that is ugly and ignoble from Serbia to Afghanistan.”94 Nesselrode condemned the newspapers and demanded the enforcement of strict censorship. The circulation of these articles in Athens created similar impressions that St Petersburg considered damaging to the King. Despite doubts about their validity, the press reports placed Katakazy on uncertain terrain. The movement led by “men who for years were the most strongly pronounced against the introduction of a constitutional regime in Greece and always appeared most devoted to Russia,” confused Nesselrode. “Nevertheless,” he wrote, “it will be impossible not to strike their criminal assault with a strong condemnation.”95 Tsar Nicholas’s reaction to the events of September was typical. According to the Russian autocrat, the only way reform could be initiated was from the monarch. Notwithstanding the attempts of the other powers to persuade him otherwise, Nicholas strongly denounced the coup and believed that the outrage that befell Othon was an attack upon all other sovereigns. In a brief letter from Nesselrode dated October 5, Katakazy was dismissed not only from his post, but from imperial service in general. He was forced to leave the country and abandon his wife and children. The fallen envoy’s efforts to win an audience with the Emperor were in vain, although he sent numerous heart-breaking letters. Katakazy’s initial reaction to his dismissal was emotional: “Struck by the most serious misfortune which has ever befallen me, the disgrace of the Emperor, I should have ceased to live at this hour. What still attaches me to life is the need to justify myself before him who has given me benefactions and whom I have served with faith and truth.”96 Katakazy defended his actions by claiming that any other course would have placed the well-being of King Othon and the tranquility of the people in serious jeopardy. He confessed that his real sentiments were different from his official position. During the revolt he wanted the King to enter the crowd outside the palace on horseback in defense of the rights of the crown. If only Othon had done so, Katakazy exclaimed, then “I would never have left the King and I would have been happy to perish at his side in defense of a cause which our August Master supports and protects.” Unfortunately, the King was irresolute in times of crisis, and Katakazy insisted that abdication would have unleashed havoc. According to Katakazy, all other energetic action was futile, since the ordinances had been signed already by the time he and his colleagues gained entry to the

93 See Nesselrode to Meyendorff, St Petersburg, Nov. 1, 1843; and Nesselrode to Meyendorff, St Petersburg, Dec. 5, 1843, in Lettres et papiers du Chanclier Comte de Nesselrode, 1760–1856, ed. Alexandre Nesselrode (Paris: A. Lahure, 1904–12), viii. 222–4, 227–8. Articles from the Standard in Russian tr. are in “Gretsiia,” GARF, f. 109, 1 eksp., op. 18, d. 214, ll. 5–8, 9–12. 94 Katakazy to Struve, Athens, Sept. 7, 1843, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 9/1843, l. 4. 95 Nesselrode to Nicholas, St Petersburg, Sept. 28, 1843, RGADA, f. 3, op. 1, d. 103, l. 3. 96 Katakazy to Nesselrode, Constantinople, Nov. 23, 1843, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 9/1843, ll. 484–90. See also Katakazy to Nicholas, Apr. 15, 1844, AVPRI, f. 161/3, d. 3/1843, although I was denied access to this file.

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palace. When he learned of their contents, the crowd was threatening to enter. Abandoning the King was not an option, and protests would have failed in the face of the mob. Katakazy dismissed the possibility of transporting Othon to Trieste or elsewhere, claiming that it would have led to the overthrow of the dynasty, and an absent throne would have created worse complications for Russia. Lastly, Katakazy defended himself by claiming that, unlike his colleagues, he in no way supported the new government. Katakazy pleaded: “I had no other thought than that of preserving the sovereign from a horrible assassination which would lead to a complete disintegration of order in the country.”97 In the following months, the demoralized former Russian ambassador sent numerous emotional apologies to St Petersburg.98 Partially won over, Nesselrode hoped that the Emperor would take pity on Katakazy, whose wife and seven children had been reduced to misery. Although the conduct of “our poor Katakazy” flabbergasted the Russian foreign minister, he hoped to assure him of a means of livelihood in the future.99 The Russian press reported, laconically, that Katakazy had left Piraeus on a Russian corvette and that the Russian mission was under the control of State Councilor Persiany.100 Russia, like the other powers, was not averse to increasing its influence in the Greek kingdom. If the motivational force behind the revolt against Othonian absolutism was Russia, then it is logical that Katakazy would be pulling the strings.101 As I have noted, certain observers believed that Katakazy was playing a risky political game in order to bring about changes not necessarily in line with tsarist policy. Yet this is doubtful, and there is no proof of any sort that Katakazy deliberately acted outside his instructions. Far from his capital, like any other foreign envoy, Katakazy made decisions as circumstances presented themselves. In the absence of a telegraph connection, it is reasonable that Katakazy, at certain times, acted intuitively based upon his general instructions. Yet, besides advising the King to accept the revolutionary decrees, there is no evidence that Katakazy went against his orders. In fact, in a personal letter to Nesselrode, Katakazy inserted instructions he received from St Petersburg in 1838 relative to any major change in government or “catastrophic contingency,” during which he was to abstain from breaking formal relations without official authorization from the Emperor. Thus, he defended his actions by claiming that if he had advised the King to reject the

97 Katakazy to Nesselrode, Constantinople, Nov. 23, 1843, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 9/1843, ll. 484–90. In an effort to distance the rebels from the Russian embassy on Sept. 4, Katakazy expelled Kallergis from his home. See Piscatory to Guizot, Athens, Sept. 16 and 19, 1843, in DIEEE (1956): 239, 250. 98 See e.g. Katakazy to Nesselrode, Athens, Oct. 29, 1843; Katakazy to Nesselrode, Constantinople, Nov. 23, 1843; and Katakazy to Nesselrode, Odessa, Jan. 10, 1844, RGADA, f. 3, op. 1, d. 103, ll. 24–31, 35–8, 41–4. 99 Nesselrode to Butenev, St Petersburg, Nov. 7, 1843, RGADA, f. 15, op. 1, d. 357; see also Nesselrode to Meyendorff, St Petersburg, Dec. 12, 1843, in Lettres et papiers, viii. 228–9. 100 JdSPB provided the source for SPch 283 (Dec. 16, 1843), and SPV 286 (Dec. 17, 1843). 101 Jelavich, Russia and the Greek Revolution of 1843, 17–18; and Frazee, The Orthodox Church, 144, suggest that Katakazy often behaved against the spirit of his instructions.

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ordinances, he would have been forced to severe relations with the government, which would have contradicted his instructions.102 Katakazy’s arguments did not convince Tsar Nicholas, who, in addition to dismissing his ambassador, severed all contact with the current leaders of the Greek government. Indeed, the Tsar was uncertain if a government actually existed. Interestingly, his decision to remove Katakazy was unpopular among both Russophiles and Russophobes, who believed that the dismissal of the ambassador was rash. Lyons observed that, since his appointment as British minister, “no act from abroad has produced so great a sensation in the country, as this sudden recall of Mr Katakazy . . . Those who have hitherto been the avowed partisans of Russia now express very different sentiments.”103 The American representative George Perdicaris wrote that: “Monsieur Katakazy has been recalled . . . in a manner which bespeaks the displeasure of his superiors for the part he is supposed to have taken in the revolution of the 3rd of September. It is not very probable, however, that Monsieur Katakazy should have acted, if he acted at all, without orders; and his removal is only intended to satisfy such of the absolute governments as may be disposed to be dissatisfied with the revolutionary movement in Greece.”104

A Russian eyewitness of the revolution named Theodoros Homer also sympathized with the fallen Russian ambassador. He wrote to his brother Pavlos (a member of the first guild in the merchant house of Alexandros Mavros in Odessa) that a steamship express was ordered to leave Athens with Katakazy in the space of three hours, “and as you would believe, it [the order] was executed precisely.”105 Even the British press released a sympathetic article titled “The Rape of Catacazy.”106 Besides dismissing Katakazy, the Tsar revealed his displeasure with the developments in Greece by ordering Georgios Kallergis, the brother of Colonel Kallergis, to leave St Petersburg within twenty-four hours. He was told that the Russian Tsar

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Katakazy to Nesselrode, Odessa, Jan. 10, 1844, RGADA, f. 3, op. 1, d. 103, ll. 41–4. Lyons to Aberdeen, Athens, Dec. 30, 1843 [NS], in Correspondence. 104 G. A. Perdicaris, The Greece of the Greeks (New York: Paine and Burgess, 1845), i. 72–3. Perdicaris’s description of Katakazy is noteworthy: “Notwithstanding the opposition of the most able and the most enlightened of the Greeks to the policy and designs of Russia, still with the Church and the people on her side she is omnipotent. This is owing partly to the policy of her cabinet, and partly to the ability of her representative, who, being a Greek by birth, language, and religion, had been enabled to maintain his position in so masterly a manner as to be admired and respected even by those who are opposed to the policy of his government. Monsieur Katakazy, who is represented as subtle, and ‘as cunning as a Greek,’ is a diplomatist by nature as well as education, and the interests of Russia, whatever they may be, will not be apt to suffer so long as they are instructed to the hands of her able, dignified, and courteous representative.” 105 Theodoros Homer to Pavlos Stephen Homer, Athens, Nov. 18, 1843, GARF, f. 109, 1 eksp., op. 18, d. 214, ll. 60–1. Because it contained news from abroad the letter was confiscated in quarantine in Odessa and delivered to Count Aleksandr Kh. Benkendorf with a report on the background of the Homer family. Apparently, the modest lifestyle of Pavlos Stephen removed him from suspicion. See the reports to Benkendorf, labeled secret, Dec. 6 and 8, 1843, GARF, f. 109, 1 eksp., op. 18, d. 214, ll. 56–7, 58. 106 This article in a January number of the Examiner is described in Anon., “The Late Revolution in Greece,” British and Foreign Review, 35 (1844): 267. 103

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could not support the relative of someone who opposed his legitimate sovereign.107 Through these measures, the Russian government intended to demonstrate that, if the leadership of the plot was somehow connected to the Russian embassy, then its goals had nothing in common with the goals of the Russian government. While the Tsar paused to deliberate his course of action, Russia officially abandoned the Greek kingdom. Placed between the alternatives of sacrificing his principles or momentarily losing influence in Greece, the Tsar’s choice was never in doubt. In the first weeks of October 1843, Nesselrode and the Tsar exchanged ideas relative to the Greek Question. Nesselrode began the development of tsarist policy in post-revolutionary Greece by stressing the importance of counteracting the influence of France and England. Given the current situation, he believed that the other powers would exercise greater authority and possibly exclude Russia from intervening in Greek affairs altogether. Thus, the Greek Question could not be considered separately, for it affected the relations among all the great European powers. Abstaining from intervention in places such as Spain was conceivable, argued Nesselrode, but a policy of laissez-faire could not be adopted in Greece, for Russia had played an important role there for centuries: “Should we break with all the deeds, with all the sympathies, with all the affinities of religion that unite the Greek people to the Russian people?” As one would expect from a creative and experienced foreign minister, Nesselrode searched to find some advantage from the incident. Since men of religious conviction led the revolution, Russia could seize the moment to engage in Greek affairs and counteract French and English principles. Nesselrode felt that Russia must not risk diminishing its influence in the Near East by abandoning its coreligionists. What sort of policy did Nesselrode advise the Tsar to follow? The Russian Foreign Minister thought that isolation should be avoided and that contacts should be strengthened with Berlin and Vienna, the two courts that opposed regime change in Greece. Keeping diplomatic relations open was important, for Greece still owed Russia a substantial amount of money, and Russia could not remain indifferent to its financial obligations. Russia also needed to pressure the Greeks not to engage in schemes of territorial expansion, for this would upset the tranquility of the Ottoman Empire. With these considerations in mind, Nesselrode suggested that the Tsar adopt the following provisionary language with the new government: “The revolution which you just made was completely unnecessary and illegitimate. You have not only humiliated the royal authority, but you have forced it to thank you for its downfall. Our conscience obliges us to protest against these deeds.” Nesselrode believed that Russia would gain liberty of action by maintaining a posture of observation. Either the new government would be forced to regularize

107 Georgios complained that it was difficult for him to leave the homeland which he had loved for over twenty years. Nesselrode promised Kallergis that he would try to assuage the Tsar’s anger. See G. Kallergis to Col. D. Kallergis, Berlin, Dec. 30, 1843, in Lyons to Aberdeen, Athens, Jan. 1, 1844 [NS], in Correspondence.

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relations with St Petersburg, or the country would succumb to the forces of anarchy. Nesselrode continued by noting that France and Britain had a stronger maritime presence in the eastern Mediterranean, but this material advantage was compensated by the moral influence and religious sympathies that united the Greeks to Russia. The best course was to unite with the other powers in order to guarantee that Greece continued to pay its debts and maintain its territorial limits. This, in sum, was the position that Nesselrode thought Russia should take.108 Soon afterwards, Tsar Nicholas replied with his own position paper. Characteristically, the Tsar emphasized the religious connection between Greeks and Russians. He thought that four things could possibly occur in Greece. First, everything would remain tranquil, the King would be content to retain the power he currently held, and he would quietly consent to the constitution presented to him. Second, during the constitutional debates, the King and the notables could come into conflict, forcing Othon to abdicate and leave the country. Third, the King could abdicate because of new grievances placed against him. Or, fourth, the King would blindly participate in the proceedings and resist any sign of counter-revolution. In explaining the potential consequences of each scenario, the Tsar obviously favored the first. Nicholas was upset that France and Britain accepted the events as a fait accompli. After considering possible alternatives, the Tsar resolved that Russia must remain in contact with the Greek government in order to limit foreign influence and maintain the status quo, although he insisted that “outside of religion we have nothing in common with the Greeks. It’s folly to hope to consider them allies, and it’s criminal to nourish ideas of an impending reunion with Russia.”109 Overall, therefore, the Tsar and his Foreign Minister concluded that, despite their antipathy toward revolution, Russia needed to maintain close ties to the Greek kingdom for reasons of religion, finance, and security. Underlying these motives was the desire to uphold Russian prestige and the principles of Official Nationality. Before Katakazy left the country, he turned over the leadership of the embassy to First Secretary Persiany. Nesselrode’s first instructions to Persiany were candid, and there is a clear note of sarcasm in his appraisal of Othon’s proclamations. In fact, St Petersburg deigned from articulating a definite position, most likely because the Tsar remained uncertain. Somewhat like Othon in the preceding months, the Russian autocrat suspended making any decisions. St Petersburg instructed Persiany to abstain from all action and confine himself to gathering information.110

108 Nesselrode, “Mémorandum” to Nicholas, St Petersburg, Oct. 12, 1843, RGADA, f. 3, op. 1, d. 103, ll. 5–18. 109 Nicholas I, “Affaire grecque,” Oct. 1843, RGADA, f. 3, op. 1, d. 103, 19–23. 110 Nesselrode to Persiany, St Petersburg, Oct. 18, 1843, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 9/1843, ll. 622–7. These instructions are printed in Jelavich, Russia and the Greek Revolution of 1843, 59–61.

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The events of September 3, despite their non-violent character, brought about a real change in the political and social life of the Greek kingdom. Perdicaris described the revolution as “an act worthy of the better days of Greece.” British historian William Miller thought that the “peaceful transformation of the government from an autocracy to a democracy, from a foreign to a native administration, contrasted markedly with the sanguinary revolutions of 1830 and 1848 in France—a country far more civilized than contemporary Greece.”111 Fortunately, Colonel Kallergis, who became military governor of Athens, helped ensure that the transition to the new government remained peaceful. The 1843 revolution changed the nature of political power in the country and inaugurated a new period in the development of the Greek state. The Greeks for the first time seemed to control their own government, and their newspapers were freer than ever before to express themselves. The square outside the palace was renamed Plateia Syntagmatos, or Constitutional Square. The revolution also decided the fate of the Bavarians in the country (although most had left the kingdom well before 1843). In reflection of the Tsar’s esteem for German culture, a full-page article in the semi-official St Petersburg Messenger reported their expulsion in sympathetic terms, lamenting that many were forced to abandon their property and had insufficient means to return home.112 With the Bavarians expelled, the Greeks set about creating a new government. It is easy to dismiss with hindsight the fact that civil war became a real possibility during these months. Luckily, the collective fear of a return to the years of anarchy after the revolution of 1821 caused the leadership to cooperate. The peaceful character of the political change is also indicative of the desires of the Greek people. No political faction defended Othonian absolutism, and initially there were no major quarrels between the parties. In late November 1843, the St Petersburg Messenger reported that great tranquility reigned throughout the country. Writing from Patras, Russian Vice-Consul Kallogerakis corroborated this impression, but stated that the tranquility in the provinces was due to great indifference. He also noted pro-Russian demonstrations in the city, and shouts of “Long live His Majesty Emperor Nicholas, benefactor of Greece!”113 The only serious counter-revolutionary movement came from Gennaios Kolokotronis, who was sent by the King on September 27 to calm the soldiers in the capital. Instead, he tried to win over the troops in an effort to organize a 111 See Perdicaris, The Greece of the Greeks, i. 15; William Miller, A History of the Greek People (1821–1921) (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1922), 34; Petrunina, Grecheskaia natsiia, 348. 112 SPV 254 (Nov. 9, 1843). 113 SPV 250 (Nov. 4, 1843); a circular of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the provinces instructing the Greeks to follow the previous laws and to maintain order appeared in SPV 259 (Nov. 14, 1843); Kallogerakis to Katakazy, Patras, Sept. 13, 1843; Kallogerakis to Katakazy, Patras, Sept. 20, 1843; Kallogerakis to Katakazy, Patras, Oct. 5, 1843, AVPRI, f. 165/2, d. 479, ll. 100, 108, 111–14. See also Petrunina, Grecheskaia natsiia, 350–1.

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counter-coup, which became the subject of a detailed, purely factual article in the St Petersburg Messenger.114 Because of the threat he posed to the new government, Kolokotronis was dismissed from command of the royal bodyguard. To remove him honorably, the government sent him first to Bavaria (where he was welcomed by King Ludwig) and later to Naples as extraordinary envoy.115 Although one might think that Russia would favor a conservative counter-insurrection, St Petersburg remained isolated. In one of his last dispatches from Athens, Katakazy wrote that Kolokotronis had been unjustly accused of staging a reaction. One wonders if Katakazy was ignorant of what was transpiring, or whether his view was accurate and the Kolokotronis counter-coup was another false conspiracy.116 The composition of the new cabinet appointed by the King, or rather, forcibly extracted from him, demonstrated the concern to give equal representation to the three parties. Three of the seven ministers were Russophiles: Metaxas (prime minister and minister of foreign affairs), Michail Schinas (minister of religion and education), and Konstantinos Kanaris (head of the naval ministry). Two were Francophiles: Rigas Palamidis (minister of the interior) and Drosos Mansoulas (minister of the economy). Two were Anglophiles: Leon Melas (minister of justice) and Andreas Lontos (war minister).117 In addition, Kolettis and Mavrocordatos were given posts without portfolio. Of the most prominent Greek politicians, only Zographos was left out of the cabinet, despite the recommendation of Makrygiannis. Apparently, Zographos’s “self-delusive irrealism” during the negotiations over the abortive Greek–Ottoman treaty of commerce irrevocably tarnished his political reputation.118 Actual power, however, was not in the hands of the cabinet, but resided in what has been called the unofficial cabinet, consisting of three party leaders (Mavrokordatos, Kolettis, Metaxas), and three envoys in Athens (Lyons, Piscatory, and Prokesh-Osten).119 Ironically, this group gave the three active ambassadors more influence than before. The objectives of the unofficial cabinet were to restrain the King from reckless acts and to persuade the assembly to accept a moderate constitution.120 Such was the situation when the country held elections for the representatives to the Third of September National Assembly in Athens. Although little is known of these elections—how the local factions worked, and how far the parties in Athens

114

SPV 254 (Nov. 9, 1843). Kolokotronis, Apomnimonevmata, 89–90; The Memoirs of General Makriyannis, 210. Persiany reported Kolokotronis’s mission to Italy in Persiany to Nesselrode, Athens, Nov. 28, 1843, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 9/1843, l. 524–5. News of his ostracism appeared in SPV 270 ( Nov. 27, 1843); and OV 6 ( Jan. 19, 1844). A vivid account based on Greek archival material is that of Petropulos, Politics and Statecraft, 466, 469–71. 116 Katakazy to Nesselrode, Athens, Oct. 8, 1843, d. 9/1843, l. 457. 117 The new ministry was reported in SPch 245 (Nov. 1, 1843); and SPV 286 (Dec. 17, 1843). 118 See Sinan Kuneralp, “The Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the Ottoman Empire and the Kingdom of Greece (1834–40),” Studies on Ottoman Diplomatic History, 1 (1987): 74. 119 Petropulos, Politics and Statecraft, 461. 120 See Petropulos, Politics and Statecraft, 461–6, 473–7; Piscatory to Guizot, Athens, Sept. 16, 1843 [NS]; Piscatory to Guizot, Athens, Sept. 19, 1843 [NS], in DIEEE 9 (1956): 236–7, 249; and Lyons to Aberdeen, Athens, Sept. 21, 1843 [NS], in Correspondence. 115

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controlled them—Russian archives contain useful and interesting material for an analysis of the voting patterns in the Peloponnese. In Patras, for instance, the majority of delegates were Francophiles. Yet Kallogerakis argued that their success stemmed from their coalition with a “third party, the smallest, consisting of old Kapodistrians.” In Kalvryta, two Russophile deputies were elected, while the English party led the elections in Vostitza (today’s Aigio). Nevertheless, in general, the Peloponnesus remained the heartland of the Greek traditionalists.121 Russian archival sources also indicate that the western powers were not above campaigning to bring about election results that would favor their candidates. For example, Kallogerakis reported that, in the days before elections, an English corvette appeared in Patras and marshaled support for the Anglophiles by distributing gifts. A few days later Ambassador Lyons sent his son to the opposite bank of the Corinthian Gulf in order “to council the leaders about the elections.”122 Moreover, in certain provinces, according to the Greek historian Georgios Aspreas, either the people did not voice their opinion, or their opinion was falsified. The Century echoed this view and reported that violations in the elections occurred in many places, for example in Kalamata and Corinth.123 Ultimately, the military leadership of the September revolt became parliamentary deputies, although they did not obtain an outright majority. Persiany provided St Petersburg with his own analysis of the assembly. He believed that of 232 of the 243 deputies, ninety-six were of the kyvernitikoi or Russophiles, while eighty-seven allied themselves with Kolettis (pro-French), and forty-nine supported Mavrokordatos (pro-Britain).124 In general, the Mavrokodatos–Kolettis coalition emerged as a large minority, and once Metaxas (pro-Russian) and his supporters joined this group, it became a majority. The opposition consisted of Makrygiannis (and about sixty of his followers), a faction of thirty deputies around Palamidis, and disgruntled Russophiles behind Michail Schinas. Although the opposition groups lacked a clear platform, they directed their attention at denouncing Othon’s “advisors” and criticizing the interference of foreigners.125 On November 8, the official work of the National Assembly began. As Othon gave the inaugural address, he was greeted by shouts of “Long live the King.” According to Persiany, all the foreign legations, except the Russian, took part in the solemn occasion.126 The leader of the assembly, 106-year-old Panayiotis Notaras,

121 See Kallogerakis to Katakazy, Patras, Sept. 17, 1843; Kallogerakis to Katakazy, Patras, Oct. 5, 1843; Kallogerakis to Katakazy, Patras, Oct. 9, 1843, AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 479, ll. 103–6, 111–14, 115–16; and Petrunina, Grecheskaia natsiia, 351–2. 122 Kallogerakis to Katakazy, Patras, Oct. 5, 1843, AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 479, ll. 111–14. 123 G. K. Aspreas, Politiki istoria tis neoteras Ellados 1821–1921 (Athens: G. Vasileiou, 1922), i. 166; Aion, 475 (Oct. 3, 1843), 477 (Oct. 9, 1843), 479 (Oct. 17, 1843), 484 (Nov. 13, 1843). See also the excellent analysis and table of candidates in Petrunina, Grecheskaia natsiia, 352–6. 124 Persiany to Nesselrode, Athens, Dec. 8, 1843, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 9/1843, ll. 533–40. 125 Dakin, The Unification of Greece, 77. 126 Piscatory to Nesselrode, Athens, Nov. 18, 1843, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 9/1843, ll. 496–500, and annexes. Piscatory described in detail the ceremony inaugurating the opening of the assembly. He enclosed in his dispatch several documents in translation such as the King’s speech of Nov. 8 and the oath taken by the deputies.

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became chairman, although Mavrokordatos performed the main duties. On the opening day, the deputies appeared in national dress and the deliberations were conducted as they sat on the floor in “Turkish style.” In order to keep the assembly free from unlawful activity, the government issued a proclamation forbidding the deputies from wearing weapons. In addition, according to the St Petersburg Messenger, the irregular army of Makrygiannis was sent out of the capital, as the Athenian garrison was charged with keeping the peace.127 The main task of drawing up a constitution was in the hands of a twenty-onemember committee, directed by Mavrokordatos, Kolettis, and Metaxas. Creating the document took four months. While the committee developed a draft for the assembly, the Holy Synod worked on a proposal regarding the organization of the Greek Church, and Konstaninos Oikonomos visited Constantinople to engage in discussions with the patriarch over a possible method to mend the schism.128 In general, four major issues dominated the proceedings: (1) the ecclesiastical question, (2) the issue of citizenship, (3) the question of succession, and (4) the nature of the parliament. The relatively confined number of issues indicates both the eagerness of the deputies to finalize the document and their limited knowledge of constitutionalism. The ecclesiastical question was the first issue of debate, which began in early January 1844. The occasion provided an excellent opportunity for the traditionalists to forward their views regarding the possible end to the schism and modification of the 1833 reforms. The first article of the draft constitution declared Orthodoxy the official state religion. While it granted toleration of other faiths, it forbade proselytizing activities against the dominant religion. Article 2 proclaimed the Greek Church politically and administratively autocephalous, but recognized its dogmatic and canonical unity with the Mother Church in Constantinople. Article 3 made the King the defender and protector of the church, and Articles 4–8 dealt with the number of dioceses, their funding, and other questions regarding the religious establishment. These articles consumed three days of assembly discussion, centered on the issues of the relationship of the Greek Church with the Ecumenical Patriarch and the religion of the monarch. Schinas (a close colleague of Oikonomos) forwarded the traditionalist view in a series of nine amendments that aimed to remove secular influence from the church, limit the role of the King in religious affairs, place the authority of the Holy Synod above the minister of religion, and install obstacles against the prosecution of clergymen in secular law courts. These proposals, which would have made the church a closed institution free from state interference, were contained in a memorandum prepared by the Holy Synod and addressed to the minister of religion, who communicated it to the assembly. Russian chargé d’affaires Persiany reacted most favorably to these amendments. In one of his first dispatches to St Petersburg, he provided a detailed analysis of religious affairs accompanied by a translation of the Holy Synod’s memorandum, 127

SPV 268 (Nov. 25, 1843). The Holy Synod’s proposal is first mentioned in Persiany to Nesselrode, Athens, Nov. 28, 1843, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 9/1843, ll. 513–14. 128

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“which deplores the evils that have afflicted the church in the kingdom and exhorts the government to provide a prompt remedy.” Persiany maintained that, the complaints of the synod are justified. It asks that the organization of 1833, the vices of which have been demonstrated for ten consecutive years, be abrogated, that the church of the kingdom be dogmatically and canonically united with Constantinople, that an honorable revenue be allocated to bishops, that the number of bishoprics be determined, that schools intended for the instruction of the clergy be established from the expenses of the ecclesiastical fund, and that the independent church be recognized by the patriarchate of Constantinople.

While he criticized the assembly for “tergiversations that exasperated the nation,” he was optimistic that a large number of deputies would be inclined to adopt the synod’s propositions with few restrictions.129 Considering the immensity of the task, the assembly debate over the religious clauses of the draft constitution indicates the sensitivity and significance of the topic. Persiany remarked that the “immense majority of the deputies” found the first two articles of the draft constitution radically wrong, “in that they make no mention of the canonical union of the kingdom with the patriarch.”130 Since the synod’s amendments insisted that the independent status of the church required the sanction of the patriarch, if one agreed with the synod, then the ecclesiastical settlement of 1833 was not canonical. The modernizers or Westernizers, led by Spyridon Trikoupis (an author of the original settlement of 1833) argued that the people and clergy supported the 1833 arrangement. After heated debate, the assembly rejected the synod’s proposal requiring the sanction of the patriarch, which represented a major victory for the Westernizers.131 Another amendment stipulated that the Greek Church would maintain the canons and dogmas of Eastern Orthodoxy. The phrase was intended to safeguard the church against decisions of the government and to subject it to the canonical rulings of the patriarch. Eventually the assembly sanctioned a compromise phrase. An additional amendment passed specifying that the synod should be composed of bishops, which made it impossible for members of the lower clergy (such as Vamvas and Pharmakidis) to serve in the synod. As for the resurrection of relations with the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople, the relevant articles in the constitution only referred to dogma, and nothing was written about the unification between 129 Persiany to Nesselrode, Athens, Jan. 8, 1844, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 9/1844, ll. 23–7. The memorandum is on ll. 27–38 of the same file. It was composed by Neophytos, bishop of Euboea, Daniil, bishop of the Cyclades, Ionas, bishop of Eliad, Gregorios, bishop of Achaia, and Neophytos, bishop of Attica. In the same packet, Persiany included information about other articles devoted to important subjects like the reform of marriage legislation, the daily procedure of government, powers of the judiciary, and the composition of the senate. See Persiany to Nesselrode, Athens, Jan. 8, 1844, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 9/1844, ll. 4–21. 130 Persiany to Nesselrode, Athens, Jan. 8, 1844, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 9/1844, ll. 42. The Greek diplomat Zographos made certain suggestions, “which the clergy greeted with joy.” Persiany included Zographos’s proposed amendments to Articles 1–2 on ll. 44–5. 131 Lengthy excerpts from the speeches of Schinas and Trikoupis are quoted in D. A. Petrakakos, Koinovoulevtiki istoria tis Ellados (Athens: Ekdotikos Oikos Dimitrakou, 1935), ii. 395–9. The controversy was mirrored in articles appearing in Athina and Aion.

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the Mother Church and the Greek Church. Overall, the final decisions regarding the amended articles represented a defeat for the conservatives who desired a more definite connection to the patriarchate.132 The second major issue discussed at the National Assembly centered on the question of autochthons (Greeks born within the realm) and heterochthons (Greeks from abroad) in the Greek government.133 In late January 1844, the assembly began debating and defining Greek citizenship and public rights, covered in Articles 3 to 13 of the draft constitution. Article 3 of the projected constitution gave equal rights to all citizens. But, the question arose, who is a Greek citizen? Does an Ionian Greek, a member of the Ottoman Empire, or those who fought in the 1821 revolution, but were not born in Greece, qualify for citizenship? What of those individuals who had immigrated since 1827? It was a highly controversial matter, which preoccupied the assembly in rancorous debates for two entire weeks. Petitions that demanded a long period of residence as a necessary qualification for citizenship reflected the general xenophobia and bitterness toward those who had arrived in the country after the War of Independence, or toward those who had not sacrificed like the veterans of the war. The common aversion to the heterochthons also stemmed from their ability to take advantage of post-revolutionary conditions to acquire wealth, usurp offices, and buy up land. Since they tended to be better educated and in command of the skills required to administer a modern government, the crown had preferred them to staff the government bureaucracy. These factors (in addition to the general anti-Bavarian sentiment) reinforced a widespread antipathy toward the heterochthons. Persiany remarked that, “This most delicate topic provokes very animated debates, which have already displayed a certain degree of bitterness and violence that could end the tranquility of the capital.”134 An oftenquoted passage of Makrygiannis’s memoirs vividly reflects the animosity against these newcomers (neilydes), described as “the filth of Constantinople and Europe, with their plethora of carriages, balls, and sumptuousness and luxury, they are our masters and we their slaves.”135 The pro-autochthon faction aimed to address the problem by creating essentially two categories of citizenship based on one’s origins. Public petitions poured into the assembly containing hundreds of signatures, suggesting an organized opposition to the heterochthons. However, the extremist proposed amendment that would exclude citizenship for foreign-born individuals received only fifty-nine votes. Mavrokordatos and Kolettis raised enough support to pass a proposal that made 132 On the religious components of the constitution, see Petropulos, Politics and Statecraft, 483–6; Paraskevas Matalas, Ethnos kai Orthodoxia: Oi peripeteies mias schesia apo to “Elladiko” sto Voulgariko schisma, 2nd edn (Irakleio: Panepistimiakes Ekdoseis Kritis, 2003), 72–6; Vogli, “Ellines to genos,” 323–30; Tryphon E. Evangelidis, Istoria tou Othonos, vasileos tis Ellados 1832–62 (Athens: A. G. Galanos, 1893), 220–67; Chrysostomos Papadopoulos, Istoria tis ekklisias tis Ellados (Athens: P. A. Petrakos, 1920), 305–40; and Frazee, The Orthodox Church, 158–65. 133 On the heterochthon issue, see Vogli, “Ellines to genos,” 330–48; Dimakis, I politeiaki metavoli tou 1843; Petropulos, Politics and Statecraft, 486–91; and Kordatos, Istoria tis neoteris Elladas, iii. 295–309. 134 Persiany to Nesselrode, Athens, Jan. 19, 1844, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 9, l. 51. 135 See Ioannis Makrygiannis, Apomnimonevmata, ed. Giannis Vlachogiannis (Athens: E. G. Vagionaki, 1947), ii. 93; and Petropulos, Politics and Statecraft, 488–9.

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anyone who had lived in Greece before 1827 or who had fought in the war against the Ottomans eligible for citizenship. Those who emigrated during the period 1827–32 were eligible after two years of residence, those of 1832–7 after three years, and those of 1837–43 after four years. Next, the assembly debated the question of the religion of the sovereign. This became an international issue, since the constitutional provision, that “Every successor to the Greek throne must belong to the religion of the Eastern Orthodox Church of Christ” (Art. 40), constituted a unilateral modification of the treaty of 1832 establishing the Wittelsbach dynasty on the Greek throne by order of primogeniture. The issue became complicated because in 1844 the royal couple remained childless, and Othon’s younger brother and heir Luitpold had already announced that he would remain Catholic and raise his children as Catholics. Thus, the proposed article excluded Luitpold from inheriting the throne and thereby violated the international treaty of 1832. Public opinion was strongly behind the idea that all future kings of Greece should be Orthodox. Persiany remarked that, The Greek people are very attached to their religion. Religion is considered as the only power that preserved them from annihilation, as the soul of their nationality, as the guarantee of the future prosperity of their country. The attachment of the Greeks to their religion has acquired a new force since they have been governed by a prince that belongs to a communion commonly envisaged as hostile to their religion . . . the opinion of the Assembly is, in effect, favorable to their interests.136

Nesselrode also considered the article on succession “an essential condition to the political existence of Greece.”137 The final draft of the constitution contained the statement that every successor to the throne, or any future regent, must be a Greek citizen of the Orthodox faith. Although certain aspects of the final document disappointed the traditionalists, the issue of succession became a major victory for them. Ultimately, Othon accepted Articles 40 and 45 (providing that the succession must be approved by the senate) of the constitution after some hesitation. If he had not, he would have been deposed.138 The final contentious issue discussed during the national assembly concerned the future structure of the parliament, covered in Articles 14–20 of the draft constitution. The traditionalists argued for a senate appointed by the King, while the Westernizers lobbied for a two-chamber parliament based on elections. Auxiliary issues concerned the length of tenure and the method of selecting members (Art. 60). After some delay, by the time the issue reached the assembly, the conservatives conceded the issue of an elected second, lower chamber. A proposal for life tenure narrowly prevailed. In the end, the bicameral legislature consisted of 136

Persiany to Nesselrode, Athens, Feb. 27, 1844, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 9, ll. 122–8. Nesselrode to Persiany, St Petersburg, Mar. 21, 1844, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 10, l. 175. 138 For general discussion on the succession question, see Petropulos, Politics and Statecraft, 491–3; and Driault, Histoire diplomatique, ii. 257, 259–61. In the following year Article 40 became a major point of debate among the other European states, Bavaria in particular, and the Greek government. See Persiany’s correspondence with Nesselrode in AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 9–10/1845. 137

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one chamber (the Vouli) elected by mass enfranchisement, and a second chamber (the Gerousia) appointed by the King. In late February 1844, the assembly accepted the final articles and prepared the document for the King’s approval. According to the final arrangement, Othon retained the right to appoint and dismiss ministers, to dissolve the parliament, and to veto legislation. With the co-signature of a minister, he could issue royal decrees as law, and with the consent of the prime minister, he could appoint members to the upper chamber for life. The King also retained ultimate control over treaties of peace and alliance. A new system of government emerged from the National Assembly when Othon received the constitution for approval on February 24, 1844.139 Although Othon recommended certain changes, the opposition threatened to establish their own assembly if the royal suggestions passed. The King accepted the document in order to avoid abdication and civil war. Opening with the words “In the name of the Holy, Consubstantial and Indivisible Trinity,” the charter made Greece a limited constitutional monarchy, similar to the July Monarchy in France. The visible power of the Greek army and the mass of the people, which now turned their interests to national expansion, was an important consequence of these years. With the events of 1843–4, the Greek state entered a new epoch of national development. The Greeks themselves now named their chief political actors, and in general, the nation became more politically conscious. The clannish nature of Greek politics endured, however, and the relative harmony that had emerged during the National Assembly quickly dissolved. In fact, the new form of elected government actually stimulated interparty rivalries. Factional disputes, quarrels over dogmatic questions, conspiracies, and secret societies dominate the Russian mission reports in the following year. Despite the recall of Katakazy, St Petersburg remained well-attuned to Greek affairs, thanks to the energy and skill of Persiany, who became accredited with ambassadorial powers in 1844 when Russian–Greek relations were reestablished officially. Persiany’s talent is demonstrated by the fact that he remained in control of the embassy during the Crimean War, until finally leaving the post in Greece in 1857.140 Meanwhile, the rise of grain exports from Russian Black Sea ports strengthened a major link between the two countries. Within a decade, the main residence of the Russian embassy moved from Athens to the Piraeus, where a general consulate was also established.141

139 Persiany to Nesselrode, Athens, Mar. 8, 1844, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 9, ll. 138–47, 186–93, contains copies of the full document. See also a scan of the original at (last accessed Oct. 2014). 140 AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 9–10/1845. OV 59 ( July 22, 1844). Persiany’s successor, Konstantinos Vlassopoulos, was an experienced, second-generation state servant and author of a rich correspondence. One interesting dispatch regards the overthrow of Othon in 1862: “Pis’ma k. gr, Aleksandru Petrovichu Tolstomu,” OR RGB, f. A. G./I, k. 59, d. 13. In general, see G. L. Arsh, “Gretsiia posle Krymskoi voiny. Revoliutsiia 1862 goda,” in Vinogradov, Istoriia Balkan, 64–73. 141 “General’noe Konsul’stvo v Piree, (1847–1919),” AVPRI, f. 274, op. 563. See also K. Vlassopoulos to A. P. Tolstoi, Oct. 1864, OR RGB, f. A.G./1, k. 59, d. 14.

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Looking at these events through the prism of Official Nationality, a sense of Russia’s impending loss in its Greek enterprise is apparent. Not only did the September revolt and the constitution symbolize a victory for the forces of liberalism and constitutionalism (both of them condemned by Official Nationality) but the growth of secular modernity continued to challenge and undermine religious tradition and Orthodox ideals. Indeed, more than just absolutism was under siege by the 1840s. Yet the results of the 1843 revolution, and its resulting National Assembly, did not seriously alter tsarist policy, in part, because St Petersburg did not consider Greece the only theater of its activity in the region. Dominating Greek affairs was never a tsarist objective, and the program of the Russian party was not identical to the one formulated in St Petersburg. Interestingly, Russia, not a western power, was often the first to react to the introduction of representative government in Balkan states during this era (something rarely noted by scholars). Since the implementers of Official Nationality maintained that people should be governed under the system of rule for which they were best suited, like the father of a family rules over his dutiful children, Russia dexterously sponsored the Organic Statutes (Regulamentul Organic) in the Danubian principalities (1831–2) and the Serbian constitution of 1838.

Conclusion Russia’s contribution to the making of modern Greece during the period of royal absolutism marks a new stage of imperial Russian political and ecclesiastical enterprise in the Orthodox East. The popular appeal of tsarist Russia among a broad spectrum of Greek society demonstrates a common belief in the purported symphony between the Tsar and his people as the ideal model for an Orthodox nation to follow. Many prominent Greek subjects, from clergymen and intellectuals like Konstantinos Oikonomos and Ioannis Philimon, to military leaders and politicians like Theodoros Kolokotronis and Dimitrios Kallergis, shared Tsar Nicholas’s commitment to a united church, a strong monarchy, and a devoted Christian nation. Just as important, the credo of Official Nationality fitted neatly into the framework of traditional Greek society still partially rooted in the religious community of the Ottoman millet. By synthesizing beliefs in the unique qualities of the Greek people, their ancestral affinity, and religious heritage, the Russian mission safeguarded the “sacred communion” of the Greek nation. The activities of the Russian mission also set a precedent for intervention in the subsequent struggles for national independence in the Balkans. Although a small but disproportionately influential group of liberal reformers succeeded in implementing policies that went against tsarist principles, mostly notably the declaration of ecclesiastical independence, the image of Russia as the patron and protector of the Orthodox world endured. The Russian diplomat Spyridon Destunis captured the sense of Greek Russophilia in an essay written during a visit to Athens in 1845: “The great mass of the nation, the clergy, and all wise men love their country and are faithful to the religion and traditions of their fathers. Suspicious of the Catholic powers as enemies of the Orthodox Church, the Greek people remain attached to Russia, which they have always regarded and always will regard as the only power that wants the well-being of their country.”1 The Greek newspaper Chronos echoed this view in an article of the same year: “the Russian government has acquired the unlimited affection and gratitude of the Greek nation. The policy of this coreligionist power regarding Greece is always fair-minded and generous. It shows no interest in questions of political personnel, and never works to overthrow or divide [Greek] governments, but rather works towards their consolidation.”2 Testimonials such as these indicate the long-lasting 1 S. Iu. Destunis, “Vzglad na proshedshee, nastoiashchee, i budushchee grekov,” 1845–6, OR RNB, f. 250, d. 84, ll. 6–7. 2 Chronos, 69 (Aug. 18, 1845).

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imprint of Orthodox Russia on the development of modern Greece, its identity, and institutions, as well as on the notions of Greek elite and commoners alike of Greece’s place in the wider world. The Foreign Ministry under Nicholas I conceived of interventionist policies in Greece, and elsewhere not so much in proportion to imperial interests as in support of the abstract and overarching principles of Official Nationality. Arguably, the reign of Tsar Nicholas I represents the only period of Russian foreign policy before the twentieth century that was consistently motivated by an ideology.3 In this respect, the study of tsarist policy in Greece sheds light on Russia’s long-term strategy in Europe, the Mediterranean, the Black Sea, and beyond. Foreseeing challenges to legitimacy and established authority, Tsar Nicholas aimed to support the Ottoman Empire against disintegration or further partition, unequivocally declaring his conviction that its destruction would be contrary to Russia’s interests. That is why the Russian military, reinforced by the Treaties of Adrianople and Unkiar-Skelessi, defended the Sultan during the revolts of Mehmed Ali in 1833 and 1839 and the various revolts of military chieftains in the region called today Albania. Russian policy thus displayed substantial restraint, despite manifest opportunities for seizing greater gains. As Russia achieved diplomatic dominance at the Sublime Porte in 1833, Nicholas acknowledged that Balkan affairs constituted a general question for the European powers and abstained from further unilateral intervention. Yet the policy of preserving the Ottoman Empire created alarm in Britain and France, where the first major surge of Russophobia erupted in the popular press and among government officials. In the trying years that followed, the Russian autocrat did what he could to suppress the many-headed hydra of revolution as the “gendarme of Europe,” while defending Russia’s traditional position in the Orthodox East. Continued evidence of the Tsar’s attitude toward rebellions against sovereign rulers exists in the story of Russian intervention in Hungary, Transylvania, and the Ottoman borderlands in 1848–9 (Figure 7.1).4 An examination of Russian–Greek relations in the second quarter of the nineteenth century illustrates how contemporaries and later historians misunderstood the Tsar’s commitment to legitimacy and the maintenance of international order. Russian archival material demonstrates that the Tsar was not interested in territorial

3 See also John P. LeDonne, The Grand Strategy of the Russian Empire, 1650–1831 (Oxford: OUP, 2004). 4 Of the wide literature on this topic, see Ian W. Roberts, Nicholas I and the Russian Intervention in Hungary (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1991); Barbara Jelavich, “The Russian Intervention in Wallachia and Transylvania, September 1848 to March 1849,” Rumanian Studies, 4 (1976–9): 16–74; Michael T. Florinsky, Russia: A History and Interpretation (New York: Macmillan Co., 1953), ii. 850–8; T. Schiemann, Geschichte Russland unter Kaiser Nikolaus I (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1904–19), iv; N. K. Shil’der, Imperator Nikolai Pervyi: Ego zhizn’ i tsartsvovanie (St Petersburg: A. S. Suvorin, 1903), ii, appendix IV; R. Averbukh, “Avstriuskaia Revoliutsiia 1848g. i Nikolai I,” Krasny Arkhiv, 89/90 (1938): 155–207; and Averbukh, “Nikolai I i Evropeiskaia Reaktsiia 1848/49 gg.,” Krasny Arkhiv, 47–8 (1930): 3–49. For an introduction to Greece in 1848, see Michael B. Sakellariou, “Hellenism and 1848,” in François Fejtö (ed.), The Opening of an Era, 1848: An Historical Symposium (London: Allan Wingate, 1948), 377–93.

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Fig. 7.1. Imperial Bears Grease (Greece) or a peep into futurity. London: T. McClean, 1828. William Heath (artist). Courtesy of the Anne S. K. Brown Military Collection, Brown University.

acquisitions in Europe and nearly always worked in concert with the other powers to reach an agreement. Although there were moments when pragmatism trumped principles, Nicholas I consistently aimed to conserve the structure of international politics developed at the Congress of Vienna. In Greece, Nicholas abstained from association with local individuals and groups who promised to advance Russian objectives. The development in Greece of a political party composed of Russian partisans created circumstances that would have ostensibly benefitted Russia’s position in the country. However, this study demonstrates that Russia’s connections to the Russian party and the variety of pro-Orthodox individuals, secret societies, and patriotic groups were tangential at best. Overall, during the second quarter of the century the Russian Foreign Ministry achieved many of its main goals in both the Ottoman Empire and the Greek kingdom. On several issues, Russian policy prevailed: Greece remained a monarchy with more or less stable borders, Ottoman power endured, the protecting powers continued to work in concert, and revolutionary nationalism in the Balkans was to some extent suppressed. Despite the problems of state finances and the allied loan, the Greek kingdom never attached itself exclusively to one of the western powers, and the government in Athens made efforts to streamline its administration and curtail military spending. Although relations between Athens and the Sublime Porte were far from cordial, Greek–Ottoman connections since the end of the

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War of Independence had improved remarkably, especially after the ascension of Sultan Abdülmecid I in 1839. Thus, Russia achieved its original design to found a strong and stable Greek monarchy based on conservative principles and focused on domestic development. By remaining actively engaged in Greek affairs, the vision of tsarist expectation remained vibrant, especially among the traditional element of Greek society. In the decade following the September 1843 Revolution, three basic issues entangled the Russian state and Russian society in Greek affairs. The first consisted of the schism resulting from the ecclesiastical reforms, which continued to challenge Russia’s role as the guardian of Orthodox unity. As this book has shown, the religious factor dominated Russian policy in the Greek kingdom. St Petersburg’s initial aim to overturn the ecclesiastical reforms of 1833 gradually developed into a policy of reconciliation. In principle not opposed to autocephaly, the Russian Foreign Ministry and Holy Synod objected to its method of execution: the decrees on independence lacked the initial approval of the Ecumenical Patriarch according to ecclesiastical traditions and canonical procedure. The majority of Greek clergy shared this view and found support in the Russian ecclesiastical legation, which became an important element in bringing about the eventual settlement between the two churches. Russian initiatives like the mission led by Archimandrite Irinarkh and the visit of Count Aleksandr Stroganov helped show co-religionist Greeks that Tsar Nicholas refused to remain a passive observer of church affairs. Russian philanthropic assistance to poor Greek churches, monasteries, and clergymen, and financial backing for publishing ventures like the Evangelical Trumpet, appealed to all strata of Greek society. Russian efforts to ban non-Orthodox missionaries and support a growing network of educational institutions that reflected tsarist views helped bolster the traditionalist program. Likeminded Greeks rallied behind the Russian embassy in Athens where they found sympathetic support in their struggle against modernizing clerics like Theoklitos Pharmakidis and proselytizers like the Reverend Jonas King. Indeed, the condemnation by the Greek Holy Synod of the modern translations of the scriptures by Neophytos Vamvas, the suppression of progressive thinkers like Theophilos Kairis, and the promotion of the religious articles in the 1844 constitution demonstrates how the conservative position prevailed in certain cases. Manifestly, tsarist support brought about the reconciliation of the Greek Church with the Ecumenical Patriarchate in 1850, when Patriarch Anthimos IV (1848–52) accepted an agreement with the Greek state that in his judgment satisfied the holy canons.5 Russian representative Ioannis Persiany witnessed the great celebration in the Cathedral of St Irene in Athens when the royal ordinance announced the end of the schism: “It is difficult 5 See Charles Frazee, The Orthodox Church of Independent Greece, 1821–52 (Cambridge: CUP, 1969), 171–95; Paraskevas Matalas, Ethnos kai Orthodoxia: Oi peripeteies mias schesia apo to “Elladiko” sto Voulgariko schisma, 2nd edn (Irakleio: Panepistimiakes Ekdoseis Kritis, 2003), 85–98; Georgios D. Metallinos, Elladikou aftokephalou paraleipomena (Athens: Ekdoseis Domos, 1989), 123–277; Chysostomos Papadopoulos, Istoria tis ekklesias tis Ellados (Athens: Typogr. P.A. Petrakou, 1920), 351–4; and P. Karolidis, Synchronos istoria ton elliknon kai ton loipon laon tis Anatolis apo 1821 mechri 1921 (Athens: A. Vitsikounaki, 1922–4), ii. 6–20.

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to express the enthusiasm that this solemnity has produced on the Hellenic nation.” Perisany observed that only the Russian delegation attended the ceremony and that the absence of the non-Orthodox powers set off “a wave of accusations and perfidious insinuations.”6 The second factor entangling Russia in Greek affairs concerned the issue of Othon’s succession, which in the Tsar’s mind aggravated the sense of detachment between the ruler and his people. A subject of heated debate among European diplomats, especially since the royal couple remained childless, the succession clause in the 1844 constitution did not extinguish Russia’s effort to convince Othon of the benefits of converting to Orthodoxy. The recognition of autocephaly by the patriarch made the succession issue loom even larger. Persiany reported that Othon’s confessional status became the principal object preoccupying “the passions and prejudices of the Greek press, which agree on one point only, namely that the successor to the Greek throne must share the dominant religion of the country.”7 St Petersburg had focused on this problem since the kingdom’s foundation. According to the precepts of Official Nationality, God provided the basis of sovereign authority, and thus Othon’s refusal to adopt the religion of his subjects undermined the legitimacy of the crown. Russian pressure to resolve the issue enjoyed marginal success: upon the King’s marriage in 1835 to Amalia of Oldenburg, the royal couple proclaimed that they would raise their heirs in the Orthodox Church. In addition, the 1844 national assembly helped solve the dilemma by stipulating that all future sovereigns would be Orthodox. Yet the problems inherent in a non-Orthodox sovereign were real enough to assist in Othon’s ouster in 1862.8 The next king of Greece, George I (1864–1913) from Denmark, resolved not to repeat his predecessor’s mistake and adopted Orthodoxy on the eve of his accession. Destined to remain on the throne for fifty years, King George’s political acumen and reverence for religious institutions brought stability to his realm. He regularly attended Orthodox liturgy in the main cathedrals and was on good terms with the church hierarchy. His wife, Queen Olga Konstantinova, the granddaughter of Tsar Nicholas I, perpetuated traditional Orthodox ideals.9 For Tsar Nicholas, the struggle of legitimacy against the forces of revolution represented a battle of good against evil. The Russian autocrat made no such distinction in international affairs, and adhered to a policy that refrained from intervention, providing that the governments in question were in his terms, “legitimate under God.” Due to the political anarchy that engulfed Greece in the wake of the 1821 Revolution, St Petersburg determined that the country would be 6

Persiany to Seniavin, Athens, Aug. 27, 1850, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 7, ll. 64–5. Persiany to Seniavin, Athens, Nov. 5, 1850, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 7, l. 199. 8 See O. E. Petrunina, Grecheskaia natsiia i gosudarstvo v XVIII–XX vv. (Moscow: Universitet Knizhnyi Dom, 2010), 383–7; G. L. Arsh, “Gretsiia posle Krymskoi voiny. Revoliutsiia 1862 goda,” in V. N. Vinogradov (ed.), Istoriia Balkan: Sud’bonosnoe Dvadtsatiletie, 1856–78 gg. (Moscow: KRASAND, 2012), 64–73; E. Prevelakis, British Policy towards the Change of Dynasty in Greece, 1862–3 (Athens: n.p., 1953); and D. Michalopoulos, Vie politique en Grèce pendant les annees 1862–9 (Athens: National and Kapodistrian University, 1981). 9 See O. V. Sokolovskaia, Grecheskaia koroleva Ol’ga Konstantinovna—Pod molotom sud’by (Moscow: Institut slavianovedeniia RAN, 2011). 7

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best suited for monarchy. If representative institutions were needed, they could be gradually introduced once the basic laws and governing system had been established. Even though he may have disliked King Othon, the Tsar opposed the Greek coup d’état of 1843 because of its anti-monarchical character. The Russian autocrat rejected any association with the pro-Russian insurgents, whom he referred to as criminals. Utterly against constitutions, Nicholas could at least take some consolation that the 1844 settlement reinforced the link between the sovereign and the church. Moreover, the constitution of 1844 provided the King with strong powers. In his annual summary report on Russian policy in 1844, Nesselrode pointed to the contradiction between Russian interests and principles in Greece, yet he also admitted that, “The situation is not as bad as it could be vis-à-vis the monarchy.”10 The third major issue embroiling Russia in Greek affairs was the question of irredentism. Since a sizable Greek Orthodox population in Thessaly, Epirus, Macedonia, Asia Minor, and the Archipelago remained outside the kingdom, the irredentist movement known as the Megali Idea gained momentum as the process of nationalization took root.11 Whereas many Russian philhellenes sympathized with Greek claims for expansion, a more aggressive Greek foreign policy threatened Russia’s general strategy of maintaining the status quo in the Orthodox East. Besides the questions of church and state, a main element of Russian policy in Greece concerned the maintenance of peace and stability along the borders. Just as Nicholas I refrained from expansionist policies in Europe, so he aimed to limit the struggle for a “greater Greece.” In accordance with the main instructions to its delegates in Athens, St Petersburg wanted the Greek government to focus on internal prosperity and abstain from foreign gambles. Although sympathetic to the “hopes for emancipation” among Ottoman Christians, in the later 1840s, Nesselrode issued explicit orders warning of the dangers of inciting revolts in bordering regions.12 As reports of patriotic societies, banditry, and irredentist movements in neighboring provinces multiplied, St Petersburg began to consider alternatives in the event of a collapse of Ottoman authority in the region.13 In a 10 “Otchety o deistviiakh nashei diplomatii za gody 1839 po 1852,” RGADA, f. 3, op. 1, d. 91, ll. 218–22. 11 Recent works on this topic include Elli Skopetea, To “Protypo Vasileio” kai i Megali Idea: opseis tou ethnikou provlimatos stin Ellada, 1830–80 (Athens: Polytypo, 1988); Katerina Mystakidou, I Megali Idea ston typo tou genous: o typos stin Ellada kai stin Othomaniki Aftokratoria (1800–1923) (Athens: Patakis, 2004); Paschalis Kitromilides, On the Intellectual Content of Greek Nationalism: Paparrigopoulos, Byzantium and the Great Idea (Burlington, VT: Ashgate/Variorum, 2007); and Anastasia Stouraiti and Alexander Kazamias, “The Imaginary Topographies of the Megali Idea: National Territory as Utopia,” in P. Nikiforos Diamandouros et al., Spatial Conceptions of the Nation: Modernizing Geographies in Greece and Turkey (London: I. B. Tauris, 2010), 11–34. See also Edouard Driault, Le Grande Idée: La Renaissance de l’Hellénisme (Paris: Librairie Felix Alean, 1920); and Adamantia Pollis Koslin, “The Megali Idea: A Study of Greek Nationalism” (Ph.D. diss., Johns Hopkins University, 1958). 12 See Nesselrode to Persiany, St Petersburg, July 20, 1845, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 10/1845, ll. 381–2; and “Otchety o deistviiakh nashei diplomatii za gody 1839 po 1852,” RGADA, f. 3, op. 1, d. 91, l. 258. 13 References to secret societies with irredentist aspirations dominate Persiany’s 1845 reports to St Petersburg, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 9/1845. See also O. E. Petrunina, “ ‘Velikaia ideia’ v Gretsii kak politicheskaia programma,” Politiia, 4 (2002): 57–67; and Petrunina, “ ‘Velikaia ideia’ i geopoliticheskaia situatsiia na balkanakh na rubezhe XX–XXI vekov,” Politiia, 2 (2003): 91–113.

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lengthy position paper on the “Eastern Question” written in 1851, Russian ambassador in London, Baron Filipp I. Brunnov, considered the utility of Greek expansion in the Archipelago and northern mainland, “as long as it accorded with the material resources of the Greek kingdom and did not challenge the general maintenance of peace.” Brunnov suggested that, “A territorial augmentation, to a moderate degree, would not create difficulties, and will help rectify the frontiers of the Greek kingdom. To the north of Greece, we enter a country where Turkey has not reigned for a longtime except in terms of disorder.”14 Such was the atmosphere on the eve of the Crimean War, a clash that triggered a strong surge in Greek Russophilia.15 From the Cretan insurrection of 1841, to incursions into Thessaly during the Crimean War, through the Russian–Ottoman War of 1877–8 and the Balkan Wars of 1912–13, the nation-building project known as the Megali Idea aimed to homogenize and consolidate the Hellenic-Christian national synthesis. The battle for “enslaved Hellenism” (ypodoulos ellinismos) complicated Russian foreign policy and hastened the demise of Orthodox ecumenicity. By the second half of the century, revolutionary nationalism in Slavic and Romanian areas of the Ottoman Europe challenged the association of the multi-ethnic Balkan peoples who shared a common faith and religious culture. The resulting border disputes, economic rivalries, and battle for regional religious allegiance all accelerated the rise of contentious nation-states in a region held for four hundred years in relative harmony by the Ottoman Empire. As religion continued to synthesize with ethnicity and language in the makeup of national consciousness, Russia’s policy twisted and turned between the Orthodox Slavs and Orthodox Greeks.16 Russian responses to affairs in the Greek kingdom illumine other specific aspects of the Nicholaevan era. Arguably, the Greek question captivated Russian readers more than any foreign affairs issue during this period. No other single issue seems to have received as much consistent and detailed reporting in the foreign affairs columns of the daily press. Russian journalists printed news about experiments taking place in Greece that at times displayed ultra-patriotic and conservative views. Yet at times, contradictory notions about government and society in Greece also appeared in the press, thus in some small way (perhaps unintentionally and by

14 “Zapiski Barona F. Brunnova o Vostochnom Voprose,” 1851, RGADA, f. 3, op. 1, d. 120, ll. 44–5. 15 See Lucien J. Frary, “Russian–Greek Relations during the Crimean War,” Slovo, 21/1 (Spring 2009): 17–29; S. Papadopoulos, “Otnoshenie grekov k Rossii v period Krymskoi voiny (1853–6 gg),” BI 11 (1989): 87–94; and Maria Todorova, “The Greek Volunteers in the Crimean War,” BS 25 (1984): 539–63. 16 See Lora Gerd, Konstantinopol’skii Patriarkhat i Rossiia 1901/1914 (Moscow: Indrik, 2012); Gerd, Konstantinopol i Peterburg: tserkovnaia politika Rossii na pravoslavnom Vostoke, 1878–98 (Moscow: Indrik, 2006); Anta Dialla, I Rosia apenanti sta Valkania: Ideologia kai politiki sto devtero miso tou 19ou aiona (Athens: Ekdoseis Alexandreia, 2009); Dialla, “Russian Nationalism and the Eastern Question: The Case of Panslavism (1856–78),” Modern Greek Studies Yearbook, 24–5 (2008/ 9): 73–91; Evangelos Kofos, Greece and the Eastern Crisis, 1875–8 (Thessaloniki: IMXA, 1975); Kofos, “Rossiia i ellinism v period vostochnogo krizisa, 1875–8 gg.,” BI 11 (1989): 144–54; and G. L. Arsh, “Gretsiia i vostochnyi krizis 70-kh godov XIX v.,” BI 4 (1978): 168–90.

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inference) contributing to the gradual ideological polarization between educated opinion and government in Russian society during the 1840s and 1850s.17 Another interesting cultural consequence of the development of Greek–Russian ties concerns the expansion of interest in historical topics within Russian educated circles. Closer connections to the Greek world fueled the beginnings of archeological research, and led to the foundation of the Russian Archeological Institute in Constantinople.18 Fedor I. Uspenskii, the director of the Russian Archeological Institute, and Antonin Kapustin, the leader of the Russian ecclesiastical mission in Greece in the 1850s, were both pioneering archeologists and leading Byzantinists.19 While stationed in Athens, Antonin became fascinated with ancient Christian inscriptions and Byzantine monuments. A popular figure, whom people stopped on the streets “to express their concerns about the resurrection of the Byzantine Empire,” Antonin’s reflections on Greek identity suggest the fusion of religion and nationalism: The Greek as an idea, in a book, and the Greek in actuality, these are two completely separate subjects. Today’s Greek is a Byzantine Greek, and not a Hellenic Greek (nyneshnii Grek est’ Grek Vizantiiskii, a ne Ellinskii), if one can say so. First, the main and most important element in today’s Greek is that he is an Orthodox Christian. When Europe thinks about Greece as “Hellas” (Ellada), and uses this term, then it tries to mingle the “birth of gods and heroes” with a foreign western spirit, and it is mistaken.20

One of Antonin’s most celebrated activities was the restoration of the Byzantine church St Nikodim, which became the main place of worship for the Russian embassy.21 Antonin’s contribution to archeological and historical studies helped further these disciplines in Russia. Indeed, some of Russia’s first major Byzantinists, including Gavriil Destunis and Anthanasios Papadopoulos-Kerameus came from Greek families with strong ties to the independent kingdom.22 Their experience explains the quality of Russian Byzantine research in later decades. 17 See Nicholas Riasanovsky, A Parting of Ways: Government and the Educated Public in Russia, 1801–1855 (Oxford: OUP, 1976). 18 See E. Iu. Basargina, Russkii Arkheologicheskogo Instituta v Konstantinopole (St Petersburg: DB, 1999); and K. Papoulidis, To Rosiko Archaiologiko Institouto Konstantinoupoleos, 1894–1914 (Thessaloniki: IMXA, 1997). 19 See Lucien J. Frary, “Russian Missions in the Orthodox East: Antonin Kapustin and his World (1817–94),” Russian History, 40 (2013): 133–51; and S. A. Zhebelev, “F. I. Uspenskii i russkii arkheologicheskii institute v Konstantinople,” in Pamiati akademika Fedora Ivanovicha Uspenskogo, 1845–1928 (Leningrad: Izd-vo Akademii nauk SSSR, 1929), 53–66. 20 [Anon.], “Iz vospominanii o poezdke na Vostok v 1860g.,” Dushepoleznoe chtenie, 3 (1867): 180; Antonin (Kapustin), “Khristianskiia drevnosti Gretsii,” ZhMNP 1 (1854): 3; Antonin (Kapustin), “Khristianskiia drevnosti Gretsii,” ZhMNP, 1 (1854): 1–38; 3 (1854): 1–88. See also Antonin (Kapustin), Dnevnik god 1850, ed. L. A. Gerd and K. A. Bakh (Moscow: Indrik, 2013). 21 Antonin (Kapustin), O rasrytiiakh vnutri rossiisko-posol’skoi tserkvi v Athinakh (St Petersburg: Synodal’naia Tip., 1860). See also K. Bires, Ai Athinai apo tou 19ou eis ton 20on aiona (Athens: Ekdoseis tou Kathidrymatos Poleodomias kai Historias ton Athinon, 1966), 142–3. 22 See G. L. Kurbatov, “Iz istorii vozniknoveniia otechestvennoi shkoly nauchnogo vizantinovedeniia (G. S. Destunis),” Palestinskii sbornik, 23 (1971): 179–91; “Gavriil Spiridonovich Destunis,” Vizantiiskii vremennik, 2 (1895): 316–26; and the various essays in Igor P. Medvedev (ed.), Rukopisnoe nasledia russkikh vizantinistov v arkhivakh sankt-peterburga (St Petersburg: RAN, 1999).

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In Russian intellectual circles, Greece and the Near East remained major topics of interest, as classical and Byzantine studies flourished, in part due to collaboration with Greek intellectuals. Russian philhellenic zeal continued to inspire scholars, pilgrims, artists, and writers to visit Greece and record their impressions for the public.23 Systematic linguistic studies of the Modern Greek language began to appear in the 1840s.24 Interest in Greek affairs inspired one of the era’s great poets, Vasilii Zhukovskii, to translate Homer’s Odyssey, first published in 1849.25 The Russian lyrical poet and staunch monarchist Fedor I. Tiutchev kept alive Russia’s messianic mission with the poem titled “Prophecy” (1850): This is not the murmur of rumor in the land. This news was not just born for us. It is an ancient voice! A voice from on high: “The fourth age comes to a close. It will come to pass and the hour will crash out!” Then Sofia’s ancient vaults will once more house Christ’s altar in restored Byzantium. Fall before it, oh Tsar of Russia. Rise as Tsar of all the Slavs!26

The Russian poet of Greek heritage, Nikolai F. Shcherbina, published a collection of Greek Verses in Odessa, among other popular writings, in the same year as Tiutchev’s composition.27 In addition to cultural enterprise, Greek–Russian economic exchange blossomed during the second half of the nineteenth century. The amazing advancement of Russian Black Sea ports like Kherson, Odessa, Taganrog, 23 See e.g. N. V. Adlerberg, Iz Rima v Ierusalim (St Petersburg: Tip. Akademii nauk, 1853); G. S. Destunis, “Vospominaniia ob afinskoi ravine i Akropole,” ZhMNP (1848), literaturnoe pribavleniia, 8–32; A. N. Murav’ev, Pis’ma s vostoka v 1849–50 godakh (St Petersburg: Tip. III Otdeleniia Sobstvennoi E. I. V. kantseliarii, 1851); and I. D. Zakharov, Putevye zapiski russkogo khudozhnika (St Petersburg: I. I. Glazunova, 1854–60). 24 See e.g. M. Palaiologos, Kratkaia grammatika novogrecheskogo iazyka (Odessa: Typ. Gretskii Torgov. Uch., 1843); I. Kossovich, Grecheskii glagol’ v svoem razvitii (Moscow: Univ. Tip., 1846); B. I. Ordynskii, “O sledakh Slavianstva v iazyke Novo-Grekov,” ZhMNP 83, 7–9 (1854), 2, 94–112; and G. S. Destunis, Materialy dlia razsmotreniia voprosa o sledakh slavianstva v nyneshnem grecheskom iazyke (St Petersburg: Imp. Akad. Nauk, 1860). 25 “Odisseia,” OP RNB, f. 286, op. 1, d. 45, contains Zhukovskii’s drafts of the tr. from German. See the contemporary reviews by B. I. Ordynskii in OZ 45 (1849), 5, 1–36; Sovremennik, 20/3–4 (1850), 1–16, 27–44; G. Destunis, “O perevode Odissei V. A. Zhukovskim,” ZhMNP 57/8 (1850), 2, 59–99. Modern critical essays on the project are contained in V. A. Zhukovskii, Gomer. Odisseia, ed. V. N. Iarcho (Moscow: Nauka, 2000), 289–352; and A. N. Egunov, Gomer v russkikh perevodakh XVIII–XIX vekov (Moscow and Leningrad: Nauka, 1964). See also, O. B. Lebedev et al., V. A. Zhukovskii v vospominaniiakh sovremennikov (Moscow: Nauka, 1999); V. A. Zhukovskii, Perepiska V. A. Zhukovskago s A. S. Sturdzaiu (Odessa: Gorod. tip, 1855). 26 F. I. Tiutchev, “Prorochestvo,” in Stikhotvoreniia (Moscow: Progress-Pleiada, 2004), 301. Tr. adopted from that of F. Jude. See also Harsha Ram, The Imperial Sublime: A Russian Poetics of Empire (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2003), 217. 27 N. F. Shcherbina, Grecheskiia stikhotvoreniia (Odessa: L. Nitche, 1850); Shcherbina, Novye grecheskie stokhotvoreniia (Moscow: Moskvit., 1851); Shcherbina, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii (St Petersburg: A. Benke, 1873); Shcherbina, Izbrannye proizvedeniia (Leningrad: Sovietskii Pisatel’, 1970).

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Russia and the Making of Greek Identity

and Nezhin had important links to diaspora Greeks living in Russia and those in the independent kingdom.28 *

* *

* *

During the second quarter of the nineteenth century, the Greek kingdom constructed the basis of a modern bureaucracy, advanced its instruments of finance and commerce, sent diplomatic missions abroad, and founded a regular army. The political life of the Greeks was characterized by the rapid development of the nation-state and the articulation of national identity. Examination of this period provides the context for a fuller understanding of Russian involvement in the formation of Balkan nation-states in the second half of the nineteenth century. Russian intervention in Moldavia and Wallachia, for example, during the 1830s set the groundwork for a modern Romanian nation. Intensely involved in Serbian lands since the first uprising in the Belgrade pashalik in the early 1800s, Russian– Serbian ties remained strong throughout the century. In Bulgaria, Russian involvement was instrumental in the formation of the Bulgarian Exarchate, and later Bulgarian independence. Thus, an appreciation of the Greek precedent deserves greater emphasis in the general literature devoted to the formation of nation-states in Europe in the post-French Revolutionary era. The establishment of the Greek state and its deliberate and relentless pursuit of independence infused the people with nationalism and with what at least a portion of the elite perceived as modernity. Russia influenced the degree to which this “modernization” program progressed by supporting the conservative bastion of Greek society. From the support of the traditional ideas of the monarchy, to the struggle against imported beliefs about God and sacred texts, Russia’s ideological strategy helped moderate the fusion of traditional Orthodox views with modern secular visions of the nation. Of course, many other factors had an impact on the crystallization of Greek identity, such as rapid urbanization and the lingering aftershock of devastation caused by an extremely vicious, decade-long war, yet Russian activities helped in the deployment of Orthodoxy in this process. Just as religion and social status within the local community normally defined one’s identity in the Ottoman Balkans, in nineteenth-century independent Greece, religious identity and secular identity coexisted in a syncretic relationship. The competition between the Hellenic and the Christian definitions of Greek identity continued in the following decades. The result spelled the demise of the multiethnic, multi-religious Ottoman Empire, and the homogenization of nation-states throughout the Orthodox world. 28 For a sampling of the wide literature on this topic, see Vassilis Kardasis, Diaspora Merchants in the Black Sea: The Greeks in Southern Russia, 1775–1861 (New York: Lexington Books, 2001); Feodora Iannitsi, Grecheskii mir v kontse XVIII–nachale XX vv. (St Petersburg: Aleteiia, 2005); Patricia Herlihy, “The Greek Community in Odessa, 1861–1917,” Journal of Modern Greek Studies, 7 (1989): 235–51; Herlihy, “Greek Merchants in Odessa in the Nineteenth Century,” Harvard Ukrainian Studies, 3–4 (1979–80): 399–420; and Herlihy, “The Ethnic Composition of the City of Odessa in the Nineteenth Century,” Harvard Ukrainian Studies, 1 (1977): 53–78. The best general guide remains the venerated dissertation by Mose Lofley Harvey, “The Development of Russian Commerce on the Black Sea and its Significance” (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1938).

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Index Note: Page numbers in bold type indicate figures Abdoul Bey 60 Abdülmecid I, Sultan 168, 244 Abel, Karl 63, 74, 77, 80, 83, 92 absolutism 121, 241 from anarchy to 54–92 promoted 11 Russian anger and disappointment at resistance to 16 stalwart championing of 11 system of rule which complemented 138 under siege 204–40 Achaia 211 Adrianople, Treaty of (1829) 43–4, 242 see also Edirne; Gerasimos Aegean Archipelago 3, 21–3, 57, 102, 160, 161, 226, 246–7 Aegean islands 20, 49, 103 Aegina 104, 188 disturbances in 113 Afghanistan 227 Agathangelos I, Patriarch 103, 104 Agathangelos (former bishop) 180 Agathangelos prophecies 200–2 Age of Restoration 132 Agraphos, see Daniil Aitolia-Akarnania 45, 52, 84 Ajax (Russian ship-of-war) 197 Akarnania 102, 200 see also Aitolia-Akarnania Akkerman 27 Alaska 154 Albania 16, 59–60, 89, 96, 196–7, 242 Alexander I, emperor of Russia 29–30, 32, 53, 142 disavowal of Greek rebellion 31, 35 willingness to respond to petitions from Greek ecclesiastics 101 Alexandria 77, 114, 153 Ali Pasha of Ioannina/Tepenenli 7, 18, 28–30, 59–60, 85 Allgemeine Zeitung 227 Amalia of Oldenburg 157, 158, 245 American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions 146 Anatolii (Zographos), Archimandrite 150–1, 153, 154 Ancona 43 Anderson, Benedict 198 Andros 160–1, 163 see also Dionysios

Anglophiles 85, 109, 114, 163, 171, 173, 178–82, 186, 190–1, 222, 233, 234 Anglophobic perspectives 50 Anikita (Shirinskii-Shikhmatov), Holy Father 149–50 Anthimos IV, Ecumenical Patriarch 168, 182–3, 184, 244 anti-Protestantism 110, 147, 160 Antioch 114 see also Methodios Antoniadis, Emmanouil 85, 195 Antonin (Kapustin), Archimandrite 125, 248 Apokoronas 194 Argos 33, 56–9, 65, 68, 78, 169 Aristophanes 212 Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi Imperii 13 Armansperg, Count Joseph von 63, 65, 67, 74–6, 80, 82–4, 114, 155, 157, 190 armed rebellions 53, 80 Arsh, Grigorii L. 4 Asia Minor 22, 160, 246 Asiatic Department (Russian Foreign Ministry) 127–9, 147–8, 152–5 Aspreas, Georgios 234 Astros National Assembly 84, 98 Atalanti 46 Athens: absolutism in 92, 138 accusations against the Russian legation 186 biggest house in 79 British representative in 78, 154, 158, 189, 222–3 foundation of school of higher learning 34 fundraising drive for Cretan rebels 196 influx of American missionaries 102 lithographs and painted historical compositions of 74 military governor of 232 patriotic organization founded by Cretan immigrants 192 rapid and radical regeneration 79 relations between Sublime Porte and 243 revolution in 214, 224–5 Russian consul/embassy in 60, 113, 188, 195, 226, 239, 244 Russian ecclesiastical mission 125, 127, 129, 131, 133–4, 137–8, 146, 150–1 school for refugees in Piraeus 145 secret associations/societies 167–8, 170, 175–6, 178–82, 184–5

286

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Athens (cont.) Swedish representative in 158, 172 see also Cathedral of St Irene; Center for NeoHellenic Studies; Mavrokordatos Archive; Missail; University of Athens Athina (newspaper) 85, 100, 114, 144, 146, 147, 155, 162, 170, 178–80, 185, 187, 201 editor of 195 Athos, Mount 14, 20, 22, 101, 115, 150–1 Attica 49, 52, 60, 102, 178 Austria 24, 91, 112, 157, 177, 190, 201, 221 see also Prokesch-Osten; Vienna autocephaly 1, 9, 16, 22, 93–122, 130, 136, 244 establishment of 125, 128 opponents of 99 political and administrative 235 recognition of 95, 245 autochthons 86, 176, 208, 237 Avraam, archbishop of Iaroslav 129 Axiotis, K. 201 Azov (Russian flagship) 37 Balkan Wars (1912–13) 247 Balkans 2, 9, 25–6, 95 borderland regions 18 Christian population possibly ready to revolt 23 complex international entanglement affecting 19 diversionary mission to 21 national churches throughout 14 nationalism and identity 8 powerful device for asserting Russian predominance and prestige in 24 revolutionary nationalism 243 Russian policy and 1, 20 secret societies 169–70 struggles for national independence 241 transformation of Orthodox communities into modern nation-states 98 vibrant trading links in 60 see also Ottoman Balkans Bavarian Regency, see Regency of Othon Bazili, Konstantin M. 15, 47, 48 Belgian revolt (1830–1) 16–17, 45, 132 Belgrade 212, 250 Berlin 143 Berlin Convention (1833) 91 Bessarabia 27 Bethlehem 150 BFBS (British & Foreign Bible Society) 125, 132, 143–4 Bible societies 176 see also BFBS; Russian Bible Society Black (English chief of police) 190 Black Sea 23, 42, 239, 242 amazing advancement of Russian ports 249–51 commercial expansion 10

disruption of commerce and communications 19 expansion of economic enterprise 25 measures to ensure control of 88 rapid economic development of steppe 24 violations of Russia’s trading rights 35 Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine 223 Boeotia 52 Bogdanov, Theodor 129 Bosnia 18 Bosporus 89, 90 Bratoliubov, Dimitrii 129 Britain 3, 36, 44, 46, 60, 207, 242 influence on Regency policy 76 maritime presence in eastern Mediterranean 231 see also London British High Commissioners, see Douglas; Nugent Briullov, Karl P. 74, 82, 128 Brunnov, Baron Filipp I. 247 Bucharest, Treaty of (1812) 27 Bulgari, Count Mark N. 45 Bulgaria 11, 16, 250 Bulgarin, Faddei V. 48 Bushati, Mustapha Reshiti 18 Butenev, Apollinarii P. 88–9, 111, 116, 187, 210 Butenev, Lt. Ivan P. 37 Byzantium 77, 202, 249 Calvin, John 132, 184 Carbonari 28, 168 Carthage 60 Cathedral of St Irene (Athens) 244 Catherine II, empress of Russia 21, 23, 24 Catholicism 11, 51, 93, 94, 105–7, 116, 117, 130, 134–5, 141, 203, 238 activities of missionaries 121, 124 converting the nation to 113 heterodox 120 integrity respected 149 Othon’s celebration of mass in his home 131 protection of Orthodox believers from 66, 153 public discontent with sovereign 222 suspicion of powers as enemies of Orthodox Church 241 Caucasus 10, 19, 43 Center for Neo-Hellenic Studies (Athens) 14 Century (newspaper) 69, 152, 162, 165, 171, 180, 185–6, 187, 211, 234 editor of 201 suppressed by government 184 Chalcedon 121 Chalcis 56 Chalki 121 Chania (Canée) 194, 195 Chesme, Battle of (1770) 22 China 45 Chios 30, 43, 145, 159

Index Christian Reading (journal) 120, 152 Christidis, Dimitrios 178, 215 Chronos (newspaper) 242 Church, General 165 Comet, The (pamphlet) 223 Commerce, Treaty of (1783) 24 Commercial Gazette 68 Concert of Europe (1815–1914) 101 Congress of Vienna era (1815–48) 22, 91, 100, 169, 243 conspiracies, see Philorthodox Society; political conspiracies Constantinople: chaplain of British embassy in 199 chargé d’affaires replaced in 32 conquest of 176 ecclesiastical dependency upon 109 epicenter of international affairs 168 fall of (1453) 19, 198 prophecies about 167, 199, 201–2 reconciliation of Greek Church with 117, 139 Russia aspires to possess 60 Russia granted the right to public church in 2 Russian Archeological Institute in 248 Russian embassy/ambassador in 70, 104, 110, 111, 124, 158, 185–6, 187, 189, 195, 201, 219 secret society preparing for revolution in 170 special envoy in 89 see also Byzantium; Hagia Sophia; Istanbul; Patriarchate of Constantinople Constantinople Arrangement (1832) 55 Constitutional Charter (1817) 184 Constitutional party, see English party Constitutional Revolution (1843) 11 see also Greek Constitution Convention for the Pacification of the Levant (London 1840) 194 Convention on Common Action on the Eastern Question (1833) 91 Corfu (island) 108, 182 Corfu (secret society) 170 Corinth 234 Corinth, Gulf of 49, 210 Cretan Committee 168, 192, 195 Cretan Revolt (1866–9) 197 Cretan Uprising (1841) 192–7, 198, 203, 247 Crete 16, 33, 45, 46, 51, 52 devastation of 19 pacification of 50 rebellion in 43, 168, 197; see also Cretan Revolt; Cretan Uprising Crimea 23, 24 Crimean War (1853–6) 2, 61, 85, 239, 247 currants 56, 211 Cyclades 52, 161 Cyprus 46, 150 Russian consul in 193–4 see also Ioannis

287

Daniil (Agraphos), Archimandrite 132 Danubian principalities 6, 16, 19, 28, 89, 137, 240 Dardanelles 90 Russian blockade of 19, 22, 42 Dashkov, Dmitrii V. 32, 101 Dashkov, Iakov A. 49, 51 Davydov, Vladimir P. 74, 82, 135 Dawkins, Edward 48, 76, 78 Decembrists 168, 204 Demetriou, Antonios 79 Denmark 42, 245 Destunis, Gavriil S. 140, 248 Destunis, Spyridon 14, 25–6, 34, 49, 52, 132, 141, 147, 164, 181, 241 Dibich, Field-Marshal Ivan I. 43, 44 Dionysios, Metropolitan of Andros 113 Dolgo 128 Douglas, Howard 182–185 Dragoumis, Ioannis 223–4 Dragoumis, Nikolaos 81, 217 Driault, Edouard 33, 86 Duvergier de Hauranne, Prosper 224 Eastern Crisis (1831–41) 2, 16, 85, 87–92, 167, 168, 192, 222 ecclesiastical independence 13, 94–9, 111, 241 ecclesiastical settlement (1833–5) 94, 236 direct challenge to 160 Russia and 107–18 Edirne 43 Egypt 19, 56, 84, 192 see also Alexandria; Mehmed Ali; Mustafa Pasha; Ottoman-Egyptian fleet English party 85, 178, 181, 191, 234 royal shift toward 186 stooges of 180 enosis 168 Epidaurus National Assemblies 38–9, 72, 84, 98 Epirus 51, 52, 59, 84, 85, 102, 121, 133, 176, 180, 202, 246 Orthodox Society 175 Euboea 45, 52, 60, 64, 84, 211 Eugenios (priest) 133 Eurocentric perspectives 50 Evangelical Trumpet (newspaper) 144, 145, 151–2, 165, 245 Evangelidis, Tryphon E. 71, 171 Filaret, Metropolitan of Kiev 153–4 Filaret, Metropolitan of Moscow 126, 131, 150 Finlay, George 58–60, 69, 78, 82, 113, 119, 223, 225 Florence 128 Florinsky, Michael T. 2 Forth-Rouen, Baron Alexandre 76, 111–12 Fotii, Archimandrite 142 France 3, 36, 44, 46, 60, 125, 207, 225, 230, 242

288

Index

France (cont.) brigade d’occupation in Peloponnese 56 influence on Regency policy 76 July Monarchy 239 maritime presence in eastern Mediterranean 231 means to preserve corrupt influence of 106 participation in London deliberations 215 revolutions in 132, 232 see also Paris Francophiles 85, 163, 173, 195, 222, 225, 233, 234 Francophobic perspectives 50 Franz, Johann 80 Frazee, Charles 113, 119 French party 85, 178, 190–1 Friend of the People (newspaper) 85, 185 Gagarin, Grigorii I. 76 Gavriil, archbishop of Kherson and Tavrov 166 Gazette d’Augsburg 227 Gazette de Berlin 227 George I, king of Greece 245 Gerasimos, Metropolitan of Adrianople 164 Germanos, archbishop of Patras 30, 124, 144, 151, 152 Gerousia 239 Gicca, Antonio 23 Glarakis, Georgios 86, 159, 160, 173, 176, 178, 180, 190 Glinka, Sergei N. 41, 58 Gnedich, Nikolai I. 142 Golitsyn, Prince Aleksandr N. 115, 126, 128, 132–4, 142, 146, 148 Gordon, General 165 Government Gazette 67, 114, 120, 155 Grech, Nikolai I. 48 Greek Constitution (1844) 163, 232–40, 245 Greek Courier (newspaper) 179, 185, 186 Greek independence 8, 124 core formulators of 55 European observers support 97 final treaty regarding 106 Russia and the movement for 15–16, 18–53 see also Greek War of Independence Greek kingdom 13, 16, 126, 129, 250 bishops brought under control of Regency 117 brigandage and political unrest 75 change in political and social life 232 conditions inside 15 economic difficulties 215 emancipation from dominance of Bavarians 175 future leaders of 26 independence of the church in 130 internationally recognized 53 monasteries in 119, 121 Othon’s twentieth birthday 134

political conspiracies and secret societies 168–73 Protestant missionaries in 132 Regency’s efforts to create 63 see also Russia and the Greek kingdom Greek National Committee 194 Greek Parliament Library 14 Greek petitions 132–4 Greek Project 24 Greek Question 33, 36–8, 42, 45, 55, 230, 247 definitive conclusion of 44 Russia and international settlement of 49–53 Greek Revolution, see Greek War of Independence Greek Revolution of 1843 11, 14, 16, 204–9, 239, 240, 244, 246 insurrection, 215–33 international reaction, 225–31 origins, 209–15 Russia and, 218–24 Greek War of Independence (1821–30) 3–7, 18–19, 27–40, 56, 81, 124, 141, 160 important impact on Eastern Orthodox ecclesiastical affairs 98 oracular literature and millenarian prophecies popular during 199 Russia and 14, 16, 34, 98–105 social mobility due to success of 169 state motto inspired by 79 wave of Greek churchmen to Russia during 164 Gregorios V, Ecumenical Patriarch 31, 96, 98, 139, 141 Gregorios VI, Patriarch 144–5, 151, 153, 161 Greiner, Johann Baptist 63 Guizot, François 154, 224, 225 Gülhane, Hatt-i Şerif of 212 Hagia Sophia 199 Heideck, Gen. Karl Wilhelm von 63, 74, 76, 77, 80, 83 Heiden, Vice-Adml Login P. 37, 38 Heidenstam, Carl Peter von 172, 175–6, 178, 179, 181, 186, 191, 201–2 Hering, Gunnar 84 Hess, P. 193 heterochthons 208, 237 Hill, John J. 146, 147 Holy Land 20, 21 Homer 249 Hope (newspaper) 85 Hungary 221, 242 Hydra 46 Hydriot 46–7, 74 Iaroslav Bishopric 128 see also Avraam Ibrahim Bey 60

Index Ibrahim Pasha 33, 35 Imperial Academy of Sciences 142, 150 Inglezis, Dimitrios 25–6 Innokentii, bishop of Kamchatka 154 Interregnum in Greece (1832–3) 55–61 Ioannina 30 see also Ali Pasha Ioannis, archbishop of Cyprus 153 Ionian Islands 26, 32, 85, 102, 126, 133, 168, 180, 196 overthrow of British rule in 175 Philorthodox conspiracy in 181–6 Ionian Republic 26 Irinarkh (Popov), Archimandrite 128–31, 143, 147–9, 244 Ishmael 199 Ismail Bey, Hadji 48, 60 Istanbul 212 Italy 16, 64, 112, 129, 221 clandestine organizations 168, 191 see also Carbonari; Florence; Pisa; Rome; Sicily Itch-Kalé 59 Ithaki 26 Iur’ev Monastery 150 Ivanov, Fedor A. 195 Ivanov, Semen 129 Jelavich, Barbara 4, 171 Jerusalem 114, 150, 153 Jewish populations 56 Journal of the Ministry of the Public Education 15 Journal de St-Pétersbourg 45, 74, 224 Kachanov, Metropolitan of 129 Kairis, Theophilos 159–3, 244 Kalavryta 177 Kallergis, Col. Dimitrios 204, 215–19, 222–4, 232, 241 Kallergis, Georgios 229–30 Kallergis family 164 Kallinikos, Metropolitan of Smyrna 141 Kallogerakis, Ioannis 56, 64, 73, 75, 89, 109, 120, 157, 159, 162–4, 180, 210, 211, 232, 234 Kamenev, Athanasii 129 Kanaris, Adml Konstantinos 161 Kapodistrias, Count Agostino 48–9, 105 Kapodistrias, Georgios 173, 175, 176, 178, 180, 184, 187–90 Kapodistrias, Ioannis 14, 26, 27, 29–30, 35, 39, 41, 55–7, 68, 72, 80, 85, 86, 103–5, 107, 109, 110, 142, 159, 169, 179 assassination of 16, 19, 173 Russian-Greek relations during presidency 41–9 Kapodistrias, Viaro 165, 185, 190, 191 Kapodistrias family papers 183 Kapudan Tahir Pasha 196 Karatasos, Tzamis 195 Kassandra 43

289

Katakazy, Gavriil A. 28, 38, 42, 64–7, 74–81, 83, 85–6, 89–91, 106, 110–12, 114, 116–17, 119–20, 127, 129–31, 133–7, 143, 145–7, 149–58, 161–2, 164–5, 170, 172–80, 185–91, 195, 202, 204–5, 206, 207, 209–10, 213–14, 218–29, 231, 233, 239 Kavanis, Leontios, bishop of the Cyclades 161 Kefalonia 26, 27, 34 Kephalonia 132 Kerch 25 Kerkyra 26, 27, 49, 183, 185, 189 Kherson 160, 249 see also Gavriil Khomiakov, Aleksei S. 95 Kiev 28 see also Filaret King, Rev. Jonas 143, 146, 244 Kiselev, Count Pavel D. 35, 89 Kishinev 27, 28 Kobell, Franz von 83 Kolettis, Ioannis 78, 85, 226, 233–5, 237–8 Kolokotronis, Gennaios 171, 214, 216, 232–3 Kolokotronis, K. 201 Kolokotronis, Nikolaos 59 Kolokotronis, Theodoros 12, 26, 56, 57, 58, 62, 66, 68, 80–6, 92, 136, 143, 177, 180, 191, 241 Konstantinos I, Patriarch 104, 113–16, 134, 153 Korais, Adamantios 24, 28, 99–100, 108, 121, 139, 142, 144, 152, 160 Aristotelous Politikon ta sozomena 99 Kosova 18 Koumas, Konstantinos 139, 141 Kursk Seminary 128 Kutchuk-Kainardji, Treaty of (1774) 23 Kythira 26 Lacedaemonia 211 Laibach 31 Lamia 46, 56 Leeves, H. D. 145 Lefkada 26, 182 Lefkas 182 Lelli, Konstantin F. 61, 71, 74, 107, 110, 115, 134, 176, 191 Lenormant, Charles 86 Leo VII (the Wise), Byzantine emperor 199 Leopold of Saxe-Coburg, Prince 51 Lepanto, Gulf of 211 Levidis, Konstantinos 85 Lieven, Christopher 100–1, 135–7 Ljubljana, see Laibach London 41, 89, 100–1, 105, 106, 112, 161, 184–5, 194, 226 Greek ambassador in 157–8, 181 Russian ambassador in 135, 247 London Agreement (1832) 51–2, 55, 62, 209

290

Index

London Conference (1843) 45, 56, 137, 213, 215, 219, 225 London Protocol (1830) 49, 55 London, Treaty of (1827) 104 Lontos, Andreas 215, 216, 222, 226, 233 Ludwig I, king of Bavaria 51–2, 62–3, 67, 78, 80, 83, 106, 213, 233 see also Othon Luitpold, regent of Bavaria 238 Luther, Martin 132, 184 Lyons, Edmund 76, 154, 172, 173, 177, 178, 181, 189–91, 215, 220–2, 224, 229, 233, 234 Macedonia 18, 59, 133, 176, 180, 202, 246 Madagascar (British corvette) 61, 76 Mahmud II, Sultan 5, 18, 42, 168 Makarios Varamis, Archbishop 132 Makarios (Soutsos, former Metropolitan) 164 Makrygiannis, Ioannis 69, 170, 177, 215–17, 223, 233–5, 237 Malta 184 Mani 43, 46, 47, 84, 119, 120, 180 Manos, Alexandros 155 Mansoulas, Drosos 233 Maraslis, Grigorios 25–6 Maritime Magazine 37 Mariupol 25 Masons 168–9, 175 British-sponsored Lodges 134 Masson, Edward 187, 190 Maurer, Georg Ludwig von 63, 74, 77, 80–3, 92, 109, 113, 115, 116, 121 Mavrokordatos, Alexandros 12, 85, 226, 233–5, 237–8 Mavrokordatos Archive (Athens) 172, 176 Mavromichalis, Georgios 47 Mavromichalis family 176 Mediterranean 8, 21–3, 27, 33, 37, 91, 93, 242 eastern 26, 46, 77–8, 89, 100, 192, 231 trade networks 60 Megali Idea 78, 168, 172, 208, 246, 247 Mehmed Ali Pasha 14, 60, 76, 88, 89, 91, 132, 137, 168, 195, 242 see also Ibrahim Pasha Melas, Leon 233 Meshcherskii, Prince Petr S. 126 Messenger of Odessa 33, 68, 75, 137, 224 Messenia 211 Messolonghi 85, 200 Metaxas, Andreas 26, 86, 201, 215–18, 221, 222, 226, 233–5 Metaxas family 164 Methodios, Patriarch of Antioch 153 Methodists 66, 133, 153 Metternich, Prince Klemens von 157, 191, 221, 225 Military Journal 37

Miller, William 232 Minchaki, Matvei Ia. 32, 102 Missail (Apostolidis), Archimandrite 112, 131, 195 Missolonghi 34, 73, 221 Modern Greek Enlightenment 6, 24, 25, 96 Mohyla, Petr S. 153 Moldavia 20, 23, 43, 77, 83, 89, 104, 250 Jassy 32, 108 Molière 141 Monastery of the Archangel Michael 150 monastic dissolution decrees 118–22, 149 Montenegro 16, 21 Morea 21, 32, 33, 191, 211 devastation of 19 Governor-General of 165 Russian consul-general in 82 Morning Chronicle 75 Moscow 13, 23, 28, 64, 73, 127, 144, 149 metropolitans of 126, 131, 150, 152, 154 see also Third Rome doctrine Moscow Messenger 224 Moscow News 30, 31, 33 Moscow Telegraph 37 Mourouzis family 142 Moustoxydis, Andreas 183, 184 Moustoxydis, Angelos 59, 70–1, 183, 185–6, 201, 212 Münchengrätz 91 Munich 67, 76, 106, 148, 157 Murav’ev, Andrei N. 15, 153–4 Muslim populations 56 Mustafa Pasha 193, 195 Musurus, Kostaki 212 Nafplion 41, 48, 49, 56, 59, 61, 71, 73, 78, 82, 111, 113, 116, 117, 129, 221 church of St Spyridon 47 construction of chapel within Russian embassy grounds 127 ecclesiastical commission in 115 Othon’s entrance into (1833) 62, 63 Russian resident/minister in 46, 55, 57, 104, 107 Napists 85, 86, 178–80, 186, 191 Nassau 22 national identity 8, 9, 97, 144, 172, 203, 250 Orthodoxy and 160, 163–6 perpetuated antimony between religious and 98 reduction of 123 threatened 94 see also Official Nationality National party, see French party Navarino, Battle of (1827) 16, 36–8, 42 Navarino Bay 22, 36 Naxos 22, 64

Index Near East 44, 48, 85, 91, 100, 149, 150, 153, 225 British-Russian cooperation/antagonism in 190–191, 196 Russian policy/relations and 1, 65, 87, 89, 122, 134, 137, 165, 197, 203, 230, 249 Near Eastern Crisis (1839–41) 222 Nechaev, Stepan D. 129, 148 Nesselrode, Karl V. 10, 34–5, 42, 44, 45, 51, 65–7, 76, 77, 83–4, 87, 89–91, 101, 102, 105–6, 115–16, 126, 128, 133, 148–9, 157, 158, 162, 175, 179, 181, 189–91, 205, 210, 212, 227–8, 230–1, 238, 246 New Testament 131, 139, 141, 142, 145 Nezhin 25, 250 Nicholas I, emperor of Russia 1, 2, 38, 40, 42–3, 45, 51, 66, 74, 80, 84, 87, 93, 103, 116, 145, 158, 207–8, 210, 227, 229, 231, 232, 243, 244, 246 commitments of 241 conservative values of 37 factors motivating 35–6 foreign policy of 205, 242 methods employed to gain the support of co-religionists 163 Napist group and 86 need to embrace the religion of his people 92 Oikonomos’ dedication to 142 Othon’s conversion and 135, 138 petitions to 101, 133 plans in the Near East 203 Russian policy-makers committed to convictions of 66 stressing the advantages of an authoritarian system 126 struggle of legitimacy against forces of revolution 245 support for unfettered autocracy 138 Nikolaev (city) 25 Norov, Avraam S. 15 Northern Bee (newspaper) 15, 33, 34, 37, 45–8, 50, 55, 59, 62, 113, 120, 159, 196, 224 Notaras, Panayiotis 234–5 Notes of the Fatherland (journal) 15 Novgorod 150 Serafim, Metropolitan of 149 Novorossiia 24–5, 28 Nugent, George 133 nunneries 93, 118, 119 Observer (newspaper) 152 Odessa 32, 47, 56, 65, 68, 127, 132, 141, 166, 226, 229, 249 Greek Commercial Gymnasium 25 Greek consul-general in 155 Military Governor of 155 Philiki Etaireia founded in 28 Uspenskii Monastery 148 see also Messenger of Odessa

291

Odessa Relief Committee 33 Official Nationality 1, 37, 121, 137, 139, 152, 162, 166, 231, 241, 242, 245 ascendancy of principles enshrined in 66 attempts to implement/transfer 11, 13, 54, 87, 143 breach of 207 brilliant example of 83 liberalism and constitutionalism condemned by 240 personal absolutism and spirit of 92 political parties anathema to future proponents of 87 promoting in Greece 155 rejected 34 Russian publicists who supported 75 significance within Russian society 10 values of 55, 61 Oikonomos, Konstantinos 12, 86, 94, 103, 109, 113, 138, 139, 140–7, 151, 160, 161, 176, 190, 191, 200, 235, 241 Oikonomos, Stephanos 139 Old Testament 125, 131 Olenin, Aleksei N. 32 Olga (Konstantinova), queen of Greece 245 Olympia 70 Omer Pasha 71 oracular prophecies 6–7, 21, 167, 198–203 Ordynskii, Boris I. 55 Orlov, Count Aleksei F. 44, 89–91 Orlov, Count Aleksei G. 21–3 Orlov, Ivan 129 Orlov, Vasilii 129 Orlov Seminary 128 Orthodoxy 1, 15, 48, 62, 66, 184, 197, 250 autocephaly and facets of 93–122, 236 championed 19, 20, 136 clergy dedicated to restoration of 175 conversion to 11, 74, 92, 105, 106, 131, 134, 166, 177, 191, 213–14, 223–4, 246 crusade to reassert the primacy of 19 declared the official state religion 236 defense of 10, 147, 166; Russian ecclesiastical mission and 123–66 national identity and 163–6 protection of 10, 89–90, 93, 110, 176 zealous support of 57 Othon I, king of Greece 14, 70, 112, 156, 161, 162, 173, 174, 179, 182, 183, 188, 196, 205, 208, 210, 212, 217–22, 225, 227, 231, 234, 238–9, 246 absolutist rule 86, 92, 159, 203, 233; revolt against 229; stripping of 204 aide-de-camp of 171 aim to replace with an Orthodox king 172 conversion issue 11, 74, 105–7, 113, 114, 116, 131, 134–8, 166, 176, 177, 191, 223–4; refusal to convert 213–14, 224, 245

292

Index

Othon I, king of Greece (cont.) coronation 91–2; and Stroganov Mission 134–8 decision to preserve his crown 209 ensuring he would raise his children in the Orthodox Church 158 growing opposition to 197 inability to form a national party 215 invested head of church 114, 116 overthrow of 155, 167, 169, 175, 180, 189, 202, 222, 224 personal autocratic behavior 180 personal physician of 150 Russia and his Catholicism 105–7 Russian manipulation of his education 13 sanctioned by London Agreement (1832) 51 search for a bride 155, 157 shift away from Russophiles 186 unwillingness to share power 213 see also Regency of Othon Ottoman Balkans 6, 15 future of Russian influence in 24 identity defined in 250 neglected aspect of 18 Russian foreign policy and religious enterprise in 13 uprisings in 5 Ottoman-Egyptian fleet 36, 38 Ottoman Empire 10, 12, 22–3, 26, 29–30, 33, 36–9 abuses against Christians 20 barbarism and tyranny 28 decline of feudalism 4–5 Orthodox Christians of 6–8, 24, 31 partitioned 15, 24 peasant uprisings against landowners 34 policy of preserving 242 reform-minded elite of 13 reprisals against Orthodox Church 35 revolutionary nationalism in Slavic and Romanian areas 247 Russian foreign policy in 1, 15 see also Constantinople; Russian-Ottoman Wars; Sublime Porte Paikos, Androkinos 159, 176–8 Palamidis, Rigas 215, 218, 233, 234 Palatino, Giovanni 21 Palmerston, Henry, Lord 155, 180–3 Panas, Eusebius 132 Panin, Nikita I. 21 Panin, Viktor N. 45, 104–5 Panslavism 11 Papadopoulos, Chrysostomos 171 Papadopoulos-Kerameus, Athanasios 248 Papadopoulos-Vretos, Andreas 165, 166, 171 Paparrigopoulos, Ioannis K. 28–9, 60, 64, 79, 102, 113, 146–7, 188, 226 Papas, Emmanouil 173, 177, 180, 188–90

Papazolis, Giorgios 21 Parfeny, Deacon 129, 131, 150, 151 Paris (city) 28, 34, 41, 89, 160, 186 Greek representative in 83, 115 Paris (Russian brig) 49, 197 Paros 22 Pasvanoglu Osman Pasha 18 Patmos 30 Patras 28, 81, 163, 177, 188, 221 see also Germanos; Kallogerakis Patriarchate of Constantinople 93, 96, 99, 100, 102, 104, 107–8, 114, 187 consecration/anointment of bishops 117–18, 160 declaration of independence of Church from 130 discrediting of 182 effort to uphold canonicity and respect for 98 independent Church should be recognized by 236 inflammatory missives from 185 reports of heterodox teachings reach 161 Russia’s commitment to concordat between Greece and 133 separation of Church of Greece from 109 synod belief texts delivered to 153 see also Panas; Seraphim II patriotic societies 192–7, 246 Paxos 26 Peloponnese 1, 7, 21, 30, 31, 35, 46, 49, 52, 56, 78, 103, 180, 211 agrarian population of 85, 86 devastation by Egyptian troops throughout 84 French expeditionary force in 19, 57–8, 76 future Russian consul in 27 Kolokotronis faction 57, 85 Russian consul in 64 uprisings in 5, 22, 23 voting patterns in 234 see also Navarino Perdicaris, G. A. 147, 229, 232 Pericles 97 Persian wars 56 Persiany, Ioannis E. 64, 82, 163, 195–7, 205, 207, 228, 231, 234–6, 237–9, 244–5 Peter I (the Great), emperor of Russia 20–22, 111, 136, 199, 200 Petrizzopulo, Giovanni 182, 185 Petropulos, John 4, 84, 171, 175–6 Petrunina, Olga E. 4, 84 Phanariots 29, 85 Pharmakidis, Theoklitos 12, 74, 94, 108–13, 116, 121, 143, 145, 146, 152, 160–2, 202, 236, 244 Philiki Etaireia (Friendly Society) 6, 28, 30, 85, 168, 173, 199 Archi of 29 Philimon, Ioannis 85, 201, 241

Index Philorthodox Society/conspiracy 16, 85, 121–2, 167, 170–2, 187–92, 194, 195, 197, 198, 201–3, 223 in Athens 173–81 in British-ruled Ionian Islands 181–6 Phlamiatos of Kephalonia, Kosmas 132 Pierrakos, Nikolaos 180 Pietism 161–3 Pindus Mountains 132–3 Pipinelis, T. N. 4, 211 Piraeus 78, 145, 150, 173, 179, 216, 228, 239 Pisa 160 Piscatory, Théobald 214, 222, 233 Pitsipios, Konstantinos 186 Plateia Syntagmatos (Constitutional Square) 231 Platon, Metropolitan of Moscow 152 Poland (November Revolution 1830) 45, 132 Polikarp (Radkevich), Archimandrite 151 political conspiracies 168–73 Polyeides, Theoklitos 200 Polyzoides, Athanasios 74 Ponsonby, John 182–3, 194, 197 Popov, Iakov Dmitrievich, see Irinarkh Porfirii (Uspenskii), Archimandrite 32, 148–9, 248 Poros 45, 46 Preveza 28, 46 Prokesch-Osten, Anton von 91, 214, 220, 233 Prokopovich, Theofan 111 Protasov, Nikolai A. 153, 154, 162 Protestants 92, 93, 100, 108–9, 125, 157 campaign against 151 closure of schools 180 influence of 102, 184 literature condemned 144–5 missionary activities 121, 124, 132, 144–8 spread of schools 163 see also anti-Protestantism; Calvin; Luther Prousis, Theophilus C. 4 Prussia 91, 143, 202 Pruth, River 20, 29 Pushkin, Aleksandr S. 32 Quakers 133, 160 Radkevich, Fedosii I., see Polikarp Rangavis, Alexandros Rizos 79, 170, 217, 223 Reading Library 15 Regency of Othon 16, 51, 54, 59, 61–84, 86–7, 89–93, 107–8, 114–17, 121, 130, 133, 135, 159, 189 ecclesiastical reforms/settlement 94, 109–12, 118, 200 end of 134 King Ludwig’s role in choosing 52 Protestant members of 100 Russian-Greek relations during 136 Regny, Arthémond Jean-François de 72, 165

293

Renieris, Nikolaos 173, 175, 180, 187–90, 195 Revue des Deux Mondes 224 Ribop’er, Aleksandr I. 32, 45, 47, 50, 51, 104 Rikman, Baron Petr I. 46–9, 55, 57, 59, 60, 62, 68, 69, 72–4, 86, 107, 110, 116–17, 134, 138 Rikord, Vice-Adml Peter I. 42, 46, 57, 71 Rizos-Neroulos, Iakovos 145, 209, 212, 219 Rodofinikin, Konstantin K. 127, 148, 158 Romania 247, 250 Romas, Count Denis 182–4 Romashev, Andrei 127 Rome 128, 143 see also Third Rome doctrine Rudhart, Ignaz von 157–9 Rumelia 45, 49, 59, 95, 157 Russell, Lord John 185 Russia and the Greek kingdom 19, 24, 65, 110, 136, 181, 185, 230 increasing influence 228 intellectual experiments 8 links established 166 need to maintain close ties 231 permanent embassy established 63–4, 80 policy 87–92, 243, 244 responses to affairs 93, 94, 247 shaping of national institutions 2 studies in the era following independence 4 unsettling politics within 192 Russian Bible Society 142, 144 Russian Code of Laws (1833) 135–6 Russian ecclesiastical mission 123–6 Russian embassy 64, 67, 70, 93, 102, 110, 114–16, 124, 128, 143, 152, 158, 163, 189, 195, 201, 212, 230, 239, 244 annual budget for 126 chapel within 127, 151 main place of worship for 248 Philorthodoxy conspiracy and 185, 187, 190 repairs to 127 secret meetings with well-known individuals 178 September 1843 events 218–24 special ecclesiastical legation 125 unique component of 122 Russian-Greek ties 20–7, 93 Russian Imperial Chancery (Third Section) 172, 215, 219 Russian intervention 3, 42, 53, 89, 95, 113, 117, 242, 250 age-old yearning for 199–200 credence added to the prospect of 6 enthusiasm for 7 Greek petitions for 132–4 justified 100 reservations about 51 scattered allusions about 29 vision of 7, 21 Russian Invalid (newspaper) 224 Russian Orthodox Church 14

294

Index

Russian-Ottoman treaty (1798) 90–91 Russian-Ottoman Wars: (1768–74) 21 (1787–92) 24 (1806–12) 27, 108 (1828–9) 2, 14, 19, 42–4, 53 (1877–8) 247 Russian party 16, 57, 109, 159, 172, 175, 177, 201, 223, 224, 240 Anglophiles blacken the image of 190 defense of 180 enemies of 178 fanatical followers of 176 main voice of 66 reliance on Russian support 163 rise of 167; and rivals of 84–7 Russia’s connections to 243 see also Napists Russian Revolutions (1917) 127 Russophiles 46, 57, 66, 86, 110–11, 121, 151, 178, 180, 183, 201, 219, 222–4, 229, 233, 241, 247 accusations against 179, 191 associated with revolutionary leadership 216 consolidating power in Holy Synod and government 200 discrediting of 176, 191 disgruntled 234 ecclesiastical affairs and 138–47, 155–60 intellectuals and pro-Orthodox religious figures 92 official pardons for 92 persecuted 168 prominent 124; under surveillance 177 royal shift toward English party and away from 186 Russia and 163–6 Russophobia 25, 60, 190, 229 first major surge of 242 Saint Eustratios & Saint Marine (islands) 197 Salamis, Battle of (480 BC) 37 Samos 45, 46, 50, 52 Sandrini, Anton F. 133–4, 181–5 Santi, Mario 193–4 Saros, Emmanouil 21 Sartiges, Gautier de 173, 177, 178 Savior of Kottaki church 151 Schiemann, Theodor 2 Schinas, Konstantinos 109 Schinas, Michail 233–5 Schroeder, Paul W. 3 secret societies 167–73, 175 religiously inspired 16 see also Philorthodox Society Selim III, Sultan 5, 18, 88 Semenov, Lev 129 Seniavin, Lev G. 152, 154

Septinsular Republic 26, 184 Seraphim II, Ecumenical Patriarch 22 Serbia 11, 27, 96, 137–8, 227, 240 see also Belgrade Serres 48, 60, 139 Sevastopol 25 Shcherbina, Nikolai F. 249 Shirinskii-Shikhmatov, Sergei A., see Anikita Siberia 154 Sicilian Vespers 177 Sicily 200 Sidon 43 Silach (Russian ship-of-war) 197 Skiaphos 162 Skorodumov, Aleksandr 129 Slade, Adolphus 60–1 Slavophiles 95 and Westernizers 13, 123, 165 Smith, Anthony D. 97 Smyrna 30, 46, 77, 172 Philological Gymnasium 139–41 Russian consul-general in 34, 52, 141, 195 Socrates 97 Solomos, Dionysios 79 Solovetskii 150 Soutsos, Alexandros 223 Soutsos, Ioannis A. 164 Soutsos, Mikhail 39, 84, 86, 115–16, 157–8, 181, 222 Soutsos family 191 Spain 230 clandestine organizations 168, 191 Sparta 31, 216 Spiridov, Adml Grigorii A. 22 Spiridov, Peter I. 22 Spiritual Academy of Smolensk 151 St Ioannis monastery 139 St Petersburg: Greek boys sent on scholarship to 22 holidays in 23 Irinarkh’s arrival in 148 newspapers of, see Northern Bee; St Petersburg Gazette; St Petersburg Messenger Oikonomos invited to 142 Philiki Etaireia in 29 place reserved for Parfeny at Alexander Nevski Lavra 151 policy-makers in 196 Petersburg reports of non-Orthodox teachings reach 146 see also Imperial Academy of Sciences; Winter Palace St Petersburg Gazette 33, 62, 75, 81–2 St Petersburg Messenger 224, 232, 233, 235 St Petersburg Protocol (1826) 36 St Petersburg Spiritual Academy 128, 151 St Petersburg Theological Academy 142 Stamatellopoulos, Nikitas 80, 173, 175–6, 178, 180–1, 187–90, 201

Index Standard (newspaper) 227 Stephanitzis, P. D. 201 Stroganov, Count Aleksandr G. 136–8, 244 Stroganov, Grigorii A. 14, 31–2, 35–6, 39, 46, 49, 101, 102 Sturdza, Aleksandr S. 14, 44, 49–51, 101, 102, 126, 127, 132–4, 142, 146, 152–3 Sturdza family 142 Sublime Porte 26, 30, 36, 42, 52, 87, 103, 116, 187, 197, 215 British ambassador to 182–3, 194 diplomatic dominance of Russia at 242 exempted from helping Russia in the event of armed conflict 90 forced to make decisions regarding state control 19 modernizing efforts of 169 need for restructuring 88 Othon advised to engage in neighborly relations with 137 patriarch in Constantinople dependent on 96 relations between Athens and 243–4 response to Cretan uprising 196 Russian ambassador/embassy at 31–2, 102, 210 Treaty of Commerce with (1783) 24 weapon used to threaten 20 Svirskii 150 Swiss Sonderbund War (1847) 17 Syria 168 Syros 46, 64, 145, 163 Russian agent on 194 Tafil-Bouzi (Albanian Tosk chieftain) 59–60 Taganrog 25, 28, 152, 249 Talk of the Town (Russian gazette) 109 Tatishchev, Count Dmitrii P. 169–70 Tatishchev, Sergei S. 2 Tertsi, Marquis of 128 Themistocles 37 Theoharis, N. G. 201 Theotokis, Nikiphoros 25, 154 Thessaloniki 78, 139, 150 Ottoman governor of 71 Russian vice-consul in 59, 70–1, 183, 185–6, 201, 212 Thessaly 43, 51, 52, 59, 108, 133, 176, 180, 197, 202, 246, 247 Tsaritsani 139 Thiersch, Fredrick 52, 56, 60, 67 Third Rome doctrine 93, 199 Thoron, P. 194–7 Times, The (newspaper) 112 Tischendorf, Constantin von 143 Titov, Vladimir P. 195–7 Tiutchev, Fedor I. 249 Tolgskii monastery 128, 129, 148 Tolstoi, Aleksandr P. 155

295

Transylvania 242 Trieste 61, 79–80, 173, 189, 228 Trikala 71 Trikoupis, Spyridon 109, 111, 157, 178, 181, 236 Tripolis 56 Troezen National Assembly 39, 98, 105, 219 Truce of Kutahia (1833) 89 Tsarskoe Selo 40, 150 Turk-Cretan fanatics 195 Turkey 50, 60, 89, 107, 221, 247 natural and legitimate heir of 197 weakness of 35 Typaldos, Ioannis 186 Tzavellas, Kitsos 80 United States 34, 42 University of Athens 159–60, 164 University of Göttingen 108–9, 159 University of Munich 83 Unkiar-Skelessi, Treaty of (1833) 90, 91, 168, 242 Urquhart, David 61, 75 Uvarov, Sergei S. 10 Vamvas, Neophytos 94, 143–6, 152, 202, 236, 244 Varlaamskii 150 Velestinlis, Rigas 27, 200 Vienna 170, 191, 230 see also Congress of Vienna era Vlassopoulos, A. N. 165–6 Vlassopoulos, Ioannis N. 27, 38, 64, 82, 165 Vonitsa 56 Vostitza (Aigio) 234 Voulgaris, Eugenios 23–5, 152 Voulgaris, Nikolaos T. 165 Vyzantinos, Skarlatos 109 Wallachia 20, 23, 32, 43, 64, 77, 85, 104, 250 Walsh, Rev. Robert 199 Warspite (HMS) 41 Webster, Charles 154–5, 171 Wellington, Arthur Wellesley, 1st duke of 38 Wilhelm II of Prussia, Kaiser 143 Winter Palace 166 Wittelsbach dynasty 11, 154, 225, 238 Xanthos, Emmanouil 199 xenophobia 132, 237 Xerxes 37 Ypsilantis, Gen. Alexandros 29–31, 39 Zakynthos 26, 27, 194 see also Sandrini Zeitouni 60, 115 Turkish Camp 36

296 Zeschau, Heinrich Anton von 202 Zhigarev, Sergei A. 2 Zhmakin, Vasilii I. 150 Zhukovskii, Vasilii A. 32, 249 Ziablovskii, Nikolai 151

Index Zographos, Konstantinos 116–17, 215, 216, 218, 226 Zosimades brothers 73 Zrelov, Mikhail 129 Zriakhov, Vasilii 129