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REASONS FOR BELIEVING

Contemporary European Cultural Studies Gian G ianni ni Vatt attimo imo and San Santia tiago go Za a a, Series Editors This series publishes English translations of works by contemporary European intellectuals from philosophy, religion, politics, law, ethics, aesthetics, social sciences, and history history.. Volumes Volumes included in this series will not be included simply for their specific subject matter, but also for their ability to interpret, describe, explain, analyze, or suggest theories that recognize its historicity.. Proposals and suggestions for this series should be directed to: historicity Gianni Vattimo Vattimo and Santiago Zabala, Series Editors The Davies Group Publishers PO Box 440140 Aurora, Colorado, 80044-0140 US

Manfred Frank, The Boundaries of Agreement Antonio Livi, Reasons for Believing Josef Niznik, Nizn ik, he Arbitrariness of Philosophy Paolo Crocchiolo, The Amorous Tinder José Guimón, Art and Madness Madnes s

REASONS FOR BELIEVING On the Rationality of Christian Faith

ANTONIO ANTO NIO LIVI

volume in the series Contemporary European Cultural Studies Gianni Vattimo Vattimo and Santiago Zabala, Editors

The Davies Group, Publishers

Aurora, Colorado

Previously published as Razionalità della fede nella Rivelazione: Un‘ analisi filosofica alla luce della logica aletica , Casa editrice Leonardo da Vinci, Rome, 200. ©2002, 2005 Antonio Livi.

All rights reserved. No part of the contents of this book may be reproduced, tored in an information retrieval system, or transcribed, in any form or by any means — electronic, digital, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwie — without the express written permission of the publisher, and the holder of copyright. Submit all inquiries and requests to the publisher: The Davies Group, Publishers, PO Box 440140, Aurora, CO 80044-0140, USA

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Livi, Antonio. [Razionalità della fede nella rivelazione. English] Reasons for believing : on the rationality of Christian faith / Antonio Livi. p. cm. -- (Contemporary European cultural studies) Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 1-888570-76-8 (alk. paper) 1. Faith and reason--Christianity. I. Title. II. Series. BT50.L55513 2005 231’.042--dc22 2005020299

Printed in the United States of America. Published 2005. The Davies Group Publishers, Aurora CO 1234567890

Contents Foreword

vii

Preface

xv

Introduction

1

Part One: Philosophical Insight on Knowing and Believing

Chapter One: What we Know About God Through Reason Alone

11

Chapter Two: Rationality of Believing in General

31

Part Two: Why Believing in Christian Revelation is Rational

Chapter Three: What Believing in Divine Revelation Means

59

Chapter Four: The Rationality of Faith in Divine Revelation

95

Part Three: Why According to Some Modern Philosophers Christian Faith is Based on Skepticism

Chapter Five: Modern Skepticism and Descartes’ Search for Uncertainty

117

ChapterSix: Cartesian Epistemology at the Center of the Debate on Faith and Reason

141

Conclusion

147

References

155

vi

Reasons for Believing

Foreword

For many years, Antonio Livi as addressed ey issues concerning t e ogica asis o t e act o ait , understood as t e ascent to a reality which in itself is knowable yet beyond the ordinary limits o uman cognition. Livi’s success in dea ing wit t is issue is quite clear from the bibliographical references listed at the end of this work. However, the influence of such speculation has been somew at imited to an Ita ian audience. Wit t is pu ication (w ic Santiago Zabala has generously included in his series ontemporary European Cultural Studies ), that influence will undoubtedly extend to a wider audience. In act, t is is precise y Za a a’s intention wit the publication of the series itself, convinced as he is that the suposed ‘rift’ between European and Anglo-American thought is arge y overstated. A diversity o anguages s ou d not impede a reciprocal cross-pollination between the two cultural contexts, and the writings of authors such as Richard Rorty and Gianni Vattimo demonstrate t at Nort American and European p i osop ica trends actually dovetail on many levels. T e Eng is version o aziona ità e a e e ne a Rive azione (significantly augmented and modified in terms of the original) comes at an important time in contemporary istory, w en many serious sc o ars are re ecting on w at can e termed a renewed, large-scale interest in religion and religious themes. The Presidentia e ection resu ts o 200 in t e United States c ear y surprised many thinkers (especially in Europe), because a large number of voters contended that their decision was based on ‘religious issues’, w ere t e two candidates were easi y di erentiated. It now seems

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fashionable to cover religious themes even in the secular press, and around t e wor d re igious convictions are eing scrutinized and weighed due to the considerable influence such ‘beliefs’ exert on wor d po itics and demograp ics. Two renowned socio ogists o re igion, Rodney Star and Massimo Introvigne, co-aut ored t e book, od Has Returne (originally in Italian, 2003), accurately demonstrating t e rise o re igion and re igions in t e West. A t oug many re igious eaders per aps ament an apparent decrease in religious practice, statistically speaking, there have been few periods in istory more re igious y c arged t an our own. Even ard core atheists are taking another look at God’s existence: recently, Antony Flew (the well known atheist from Oxford, famous for his c apter entit ed “T e Presumption o At eism” in is 198 oo God, Freedom and Immortality: A Critical Analysis ) has admitted that he now defends the existence of (some type of) God. 1 Paradoxica y enoug , Pro essor F ew’s turnaround was motivated y what he calls “scientific evidence” of the presence of a Supreme Intelligence. This is paradoxical only in the sense that many would suggest t at scienti c investigation tends to demonstrate t at t ere is no need to assert the existence of such an Intelligence in order to exp ain t e intricacies o nature, and t at re igious re ections ave no p ace in ‘true’ science. T e c assica science-re igion con ict is actually developing into more of a harmonious relationship (although suc a re ations ip is quite nuanced). 1. Cf. Institute for Metascientific Research, news bulletin for December 9, 2004: “The Institute for Metascientific Research (IMR) announced today that one of the best-known atheists in the academic world, Professor Antony Flew of the University of Reading, United Kingdom, has accepted the existence of God. In a symposium sponsored by the IMR at New York University earlier this year, Professor Flew stated that developments in modern science had led him to accept the action of an Intelligent Mind in the creation of the world. In ‘Has Science Discovered God?’ — the recording of the symposium released today — Flew said his conclusion was influenced by developments in DNA research.”

Foreword

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What makes this work particularly apropos today, however, is its focus on a sub-theme of this ‘religious re-awakening’, namely the notion that certain religions make objective truth claims . The notion that opposing truth claims can be compared and contrasted among different religious creeds has become very controversial as of late. For a arge majority o sc o ars in t e e d o re igion, p i osop y and socio ogy, re igious e ie s are intrinsica y su jective and t ereore do not a ow or o jective scrutiny regarding di erent trut c aims. Most re igious studies are t ere ore simp y escriptive ; w at ma es Livi’s approac interesting and time y is is insistence t at there is a fundamental rationa component to religious assent that can be examined and weighed against the back-drop of a type of ‘horizon of truth’, i.e., some claims by religions are true, and some are not. Some years back, John Hick seemed to be hinting at the same notion of the rationality of religious belief when he wrote, “The right question is whether it is rational for the religious man imse , given t at is re igious experience is co erent, persistent, and compe ing, to a rm t e rea ity o God.” 2 Yet is su sequent a rmations actua y suggest t at t e rationa ity to e investigated is not t at w ic o tains etween t e re igious person’s e ie and t e o jec o t e e ie itse , ut rat er t e rationa ity o t e re igious person in believing what he/she does . Hick states that we must conclude that the religious person’s belief is rational or him/her because of the subjective experience: “What is in question is the rationality of the one who has the religious experiences. If we regard im as a rational person we must acknowledge that he is rational in e ieving w at, given is experiences, e cannot e p e ieving” (p. 87). Livi re ocuses t e entire question concerning t e rationa ity o e ie , and e does so wit in an epistemo ogica context re erred to as a et ic ogic , i.e., t e epistemo ogica investigation o t e ogica consistency o re igious trut c aims. 2. John Hick, book review of Antony Flew’s God and Philosophy in Theology Today , Vol. 24, no. 1, pp. 86-87.

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This is a bold move, and strikes a central nerve of the corpus o serious re ection on re igion. Raising t e question a out t e rational structure of religious assent ushers in a host of polemics and controversies. “Is w at e/s e e ieves o jective y true? Is it true t at suc -and-suc (i.e., t e e ie ) is t e case?” T ere is no dou t t at the religious subject truly believes such-and-such to be the case, and t is constitutes t e interna rationa ity o t e e ie ; yet t e externa rationa ity o t e e ie comes into ocus w en we as w et er or not the belief corresponds to ‘how the world actually is’. 3 Now, from a scienti c point o view, t e question is rat er moot, or scienti c investigation generally shows us ‘how the world is’ from an empirica standpoint (yet not an empiricis standpoint) , whereas religious e ie s genera y purport to get at ‘ ow t e wor d is’ in some transcendent way. Scientifically sound evidence generally does not imply a free choice: we would consider a subject who chooses to deny c ear scienti c evidence as quite unreasona e (a t oug t ere are those who, for example, continue to maintain even today that the world is flat). Aside from the fact that contemporary science owes muc to t e comp exities o ‘scienti c t eories’ w ere ree options and choices do play a part in the scientific conclusions, generally spea ing, reasona e peop e treat scienti c conc usions as universa y true, reproduci e and accurate to suc a degree as to ma e t em indubitabl . In fact, ‘assent’ to scientific evidence is not an option as ong as one desires to remain wit in t e rea m o reasona eness. Certain y w at counts as ‘scienti c evidence’ in some speci c case is open to discussion; yet a failure to recognize the truth presented y actua evidence ordinari y is considered eit er a sign o menta pathology or an indication that the subject is lying (i.e., internally 3. Cf. Hilary Putnam, The Threefold Cord. Mind, Body and Worl (Columbia Univ. Press, New York, 1999). 4. Cf. Jean Bricmont and Alan Sokal, “Defense of a Modest Scientific Realism”, talk given at the Bielefeld-ZiF Conference, Welt und Wissen – Monde et Savoir – World and Knowledge , September 2001.

Foreword

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recognizing the truth yet choosing to deny it for some reason of greater orce). Religious truth claims are not of the same nature as scientific truth claims, yet (as Livi has insisted for years) there are objective epistemo ogica criteria avai a e in order to eva uate t e trut o these religious claims. Herein lies the originality of this work: Livi stri es t e a ance etween ationa ism and eism i.e., t e dua temptation to reduce re igious trut c aims entire y eit er to t eir rational components (grounding the claims only on what can be adduced rom a strict y rationa point o view) or t eir non-rationa components (grounding c aims on y on t at w ic ies eyond the religious subject, usually understood as originating in Divine Reve ation or in some sense o t e ivinum). T ose criteria are o jective, universal and testable, because they belong to the logical structure of human intelligence. What distinguishes the act of faith in Reve ation rom science or rom ot er orms o ‘ e ie ’ is ot an indifference to truth (as would be exemplified in the notion: “You can believe whatever you want as long as it’s meaningful for you, w et er it e true or a se”), ut precise y t e opposite: it is reasonable to believe something that transcends scientific boundaries because that which is proposed for such belief is in fact true, albeit not scienti ca y so. A ter a , Livi wi argue, w at constitutes t e difference between the eligious act of faith and uperstition Essentially, the difference is borne out through examining the notion of trut .5 Such a methodology is quite complex, and that is why Livi goes to great engt s in order to meticu ous y identi y t e steps invo ved in is reasoning. Hence, at times t e reading o t e oo may e. See Alvin Plantinga’s extensive treatment of this theme and related ones in is Warranted Christian Belie (Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford, 2000). This is is third work on the subject and perhaps his best. The other two are Warrant: The Current Debate , and Warrant and Proper Function , both published by Oxford Univ. Press in 1993.

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come somewhat arduous. Yet the intricacies are necessary to do justice to t e su ject matter. T ose same intricacies are a so required in order to avoid common pitfalls which are scattered over the terrain t roug out t e discussion concerning t e re ations ip etween trut and re igious e ie , i.e., ow to assert re igious e ie s firmly without becoming intolerant of other religious beliefs; how to adequate y exp ain t e ro e o uman reedom w i e ac now edging at t e same time t e o jectivity o trut ; ow to recognize conditioning factors such as culture and societal influences while maintaining t e capacity o every uman eing to accept or reject religious truth claims; and how to distinguish yet not separate (to borrow a phrase from Jacques Maritain) an act of faith and an act o reason. T e ey t roug out t ese discussions is t e use o ogica rigor: a typical trademark of Livi’s work on the subject. The act of faith in divine Revelation is never an isolated even , nor comp ete y di erentiated rom ot er i e experiences. One does not deal with these subjects in an epistemological vacuum nor in an ideally purified container. The complicated endeavor of merely earning a anguage a ready con itions one’s perspective and t e ormation of inescapable prejudices. What if the language you speak natura y a ready resupposes certain acts concerning divine reve ation, trut and re igious e ie ? Can t ere e a tru y onest conversation involving themes which appear implicitly decided in the most asic o presuppositions, t ose governing inguistic expression itse ? Ric ard Rorty as ecome we nown or raising precise y this type of objection. He writes in ontingency, Irony and Solidarity t at: “T e German idea ists, t e Frenc revo utionaries, and t e Romantic poets had in common a dim sense that human beings whose language changed so that they no longer spoke of themselves as responsi e to non uman powers wou d t ere y ecome a new kind of human beings.” Rorty himself is sympathetic to that suggestion. Livi attempts to turn the issue around by beginning with

Foreword

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the absolute novelty and irreducible datum of Revelation. Yet Livi, wit t is ‘turning’ o t e very inguistic turn t at Rorty e ped to usher in,7 does not strive to propose another linguistic (or conceptual) framework. Rather, he shows that the ‘framework’ already in p ace is not an epistemo ogica construct: it is in a rea sense ‘received’ or ‘found’. The job of the epistemologist is to explore and exp ain it. T ere ore, according to Livi, t e on y presuppositions t at are undenia e are t ose t at ground t e princip es o common sense; and those same presuppositions make rational discourse itse possi e.8 T at is w y suc presuppositions are rimitive in a way t at e a orated p i osop ica presuppositions are not. I t e resuppositions found at the very basis of the possibility of rationa discourse were epistemo ogica constructs, t en Rorty wou d e correct inasmuch as he views philosophy as literature, as conversation, as hermeneutics, as on a ontinuum more with poetry than wit science. Trut itse (i one may spea in t ese terms) wou d also be part and parcel of that same construct. However, by scrutinizing the logical structure of the principles of ‘common sense’ Livi exp ores t e pat t at eads to t e act o ait and de ends t e reasonableness of that path, employing a notion of truth that connects with scientific truth while also going beyond the limiting confines t at science imposes on itse . It is in this sense that this work is primarily a philosophical one (due to the methodology used), and only secondarily a theological one (due to t e o ject o researc , i.e., ait in divine Reve ation). Just like his post-modern interlocutors, Livi is willing to go beyond 6. Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity (Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, 19933), pp. 7-8. 7. Cf. The Linguistic Turn: Recent Essays in Philosophical Method ed. with an Introduction by Richard Rorty (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1967). 8. See the bibliographical references listed at the end of this book for a synopsis of Livi’s treatment of the principles of ‘common sense’.

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a type of modern dualism in conceiving philosophy and theology as opposed to eac ot er (or even osti e to eac ot er) 9; yet, un i e those same interlocutors, Livi’s overcoming this dualism does not require a andoning t e metap ysica structure o common uman experience. His is tru y a ‘post-modern’ critique o t e re igious act, yet outside both a deconstructionist and a nihilistic framework. T e editors o t is series, Contemporary European Cu tura Stu ies , s ow great inte ectua acumen and open-mindedness in publishing Reasons for Believing The fruit of their decision will be orne out in t e su sequent de ate and mutua enric ment t at will undoubtedly follow from English-speaking scholars in the field. For that, they deserve our appreciation.

Philip Larrey, Ph.D.

9. Cf. Santiago Zabala’s “Introduction” to Rorty’s and Vattimo’s most recent work, The Future of Religion (Columbia Univ. Press, New York, 2005).

Preface

umerous critica appraisa s pu is ed a ter t e rst Ita ian version o t is essay ave con rmed my strong conviction t at t e subject of the rationality of Christian faith is truly crucial in today’s cu tura wor d, ot in terms o p i osop y and o t eo ogy. I ave been able to clearly see that fideism, as I have been pointing out for some years now (cf. Livi [1978]), has been, and continues to be, the major danger regarding t e ait . I ave a so seen t at t e attempts on behalf of the Magisterium to warn the faithful of this danger ave not been heard nor followed, perhaps because they have not een received nor transmitted to cat o ic pu ic opinion y t ose who would have both the means and duty to do so; obviously, I am referring to the Encyclical Letter Fides et Ratio published by Pope Jo n Pau II in t e year 1998, ut a so to many magisteria interventions that have preceded and followed this historical documen . I a so need to recognize in t is pre ace severa e p u critiques that have been offered by friends and colleagues. One of these, Ange o Marc esi, in a ong and accurate commentary pu is ed in LOsservatore Romano, noted t at is t eo ogian o c oice, Kar Rahner, was scarcely quoted in my essay (cf. Marchesi [2003]). To t is I cannot answer t at I ave since added more re erences o t at German sc o ar, ecause I ave not, given t at I o d t at Ra ner’s thought is not compatible with the philosophical questions that are most important or me, w ic are t ose concerning ‘t e trut of thought’ in relation to Christian faith. Rahner has many and unanimously recognized theological merits, yet his philosophical oint o departure su ers rom Kantian transcendenta ism in t at

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form of ‘Transcendental Thomism’ that made his mentor Joseph Maréc a amous, and w o was criticized at t e time y t e Frenc philosopher Etienne Gilson and the Italian philosopher Cornelio Fa ro, ot o w om I regard as my mentors, s aring ot t eir princip es and met ods. I am in u agreement wit an American scholar who, in writing an interesting essay on Twentieth Century Thomists, defends the form of Thomism found in Étienne Gilson and, ater, in Josep Owens; is T omism is a e ed y im ‘Existential’, in order to distinguish it precisely from the ‘Transcendental T omism’ adopted y Kar Ra ner and Bernard Lonergan (c Knasas [2003]). In other commentaries, I have noticed certain perplexities about the vision that informs my investigations on the faith of Reve ation. I t ey were rom t eo ogians, invo ved in w at is ca ed ‘Fundamental Theology’, which deals with supernatural revelation and faith, I well understand the difficulties they encounter in accepting a conversation t at necessari y dea s wit t emes t at are also theological in nature, but which attempt to discuss them in a philosophical environment. The distinction between fundamental t eo ogy and a p i osop ica discip ine suc as a et ic ogic is t e following: in fundamental theology we are dealing with theological investigations, w ic , to t e degree in w ic t ey remain ait u to t eir speci c met od and epistemo ogica status, egin wit t e fact of faith accepted as such (as the thought of a believing subject) and t en proceed and arrive at conc usions w i e staying wit in t e environment o ait itse . In a et ic ogic, on t e ot er and, we are dealing with an attempt at scientific knowledge that begins with common uman experience and natura re ection (in and o itse foreign or prior to the act of faith, and always epistemologically independent of that act) in order to reach some ulterior understanding o empirica data, w i e remaining wit in t ese strict oundaries. As a result, if philosophy (from the point of view of alethic logic) becomes concerned with faith in Revelation, such analysis

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should be understood as dealing no with the act of faith ( des qua cre itur ) as a persona and ine a e experience o t e e ieving su ject (this act can not become an object of investigation ‘from the outside’ of the personal consciousness of each person, much less an o ject o universa scienti c ana ysis), ut rat er wit t e universa characteristics of the act of faith ‘viewed from the outside’, as certain now edge o somet ing, o tained t roug t e acceptance o qua i ed testimony — in t is sense, t e p i osop ica ana ysis o faith in Revelation will become part of a wider conversation, i.e., a roper y epistemic conversation concerning t e conditions o possi i ity o now edge t roug ait in genera . If I later deal with the content of the act of faith, i.e., ‘the doctrine o ait ’, as an o ject o t at act ( es quae cre itur , I must affirm that the sacred texts, Tradition, Magisterial documents and dogmas are not taken into consideration as ‘sources’ of the scientific trut t at is soug t, and even ess as ‘arguments’ demonstrating some philosophical thesis: they are instead taken into consideration in their ‘formal aspect’, i.e., in order to examine that which ‘they desire to assert’, t at w ic t ey propose or e ie in ot er words, their rational content; that content that can be the object of the hilosopher’s logical investigation, just as — independently of phiosop y — it can e t e o ject o even a minima degree o a e iever’s understanding, within the dynamics of the act of faith. Here I must admit — and I gladly admit this because it is true, and also ecause it does not ta e away anyt ing rom t e a orementioned investigation — that such an investigation proceeds ‘from the outside’, in quite a di erent way rom any t eo ogica investigation, inc uding t at o undamenta t eo ogy. In a collection of scholarly papers recently published in Italy, severa eading t eo ogians (among w om we nd Rino Fisic e la, Salvador Pie i Ninot and Hermann Pottmeyer) criticized some tendencies within their discipline to transform fundamental theol-

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ogy into a merely philosophical treatise of a ‘preamble nature’ (cf. Livi and Lorizio [2005]). W atever may e t e soundness o t e criticism that certain theologians level against this tendency, such criticisms do not app y to t e va idity o t e met od t at I use in t is study, given t at I do not intend to o er new ypot eses regarding fundamental theology but rather to apply the exclusively p i osop ica categories o a et ic ogic to t e uman experience o ait in Reve ation. There have also been equally ambiguous and somewhat irrelevant o servations made y t ose w o examined my oo t roug the prism of a different philosophical discipline than the one proper to it, i.e., the philosophy of religion; in fact, the philosophy of reigion is imited to de ving into re igious p enomena in genera , and may have as one of its goals that of showing the connection between the religious phenomenon as a social and historical fact and re igious consciousness as a necessary and universa dimension of fundamental human experience, i.e., as one of the components of ‘common sense’. I share this point of view, and in other writings, I ave asserted t e duty o p i osop y to pursue suc a goa (c . Livi [2004], [2005]); yet the philosophical analysis of the faith in Christian reve ation is anot er story, ecause it is nor onger a question o studying re igion as suc and universa y, muc ess o studying the so called ‘positive religions’ as historical forms of the one and on y ‘natura re igion’, eac one wit its own c aim to trut , per aps even on t e asis o a presumed divine reve ation; it is a question, rather, of directly studying the Christian religion from the point of view o its speci c doctrina content, as a resu t o w ic t e su ject that believes in it, i.e., holds it to be true, in the sense that he makes it his own not only as true but as the only absolutely true religion — assumes particu ar criteria o veri cation. Having made these necessary distinctions, I must now recognize that the philosophical analysis of the faith in Revelation, car-

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ried out through the prism of alethic logic, is aware of the most va id resu ts o t e p i osop y o re igion, and as muc to say concerning the theological conversation carried out by Fundamental Theology scholars (who are actually the most commonly quoted aut ors in my oo ). T e reason or t is is t at w en C ristian faith reflects on itself, that which emerges from this reflection is recise y t e rationa dimension — o ‘natura reason” — w ic c aracterizes t e ait in reve ation, ot as an inte ectua act o the human subject who requires ‘reasons for believing’ ( raeamu a ei ), as we as intrinsic contents o t e revea ed doctrine, w ic certain y consists o supernatura mysteries t at transcend all human understanding; yet, inasmuch as it is the Word of God o ered to man, it is endowed wit t at (re ative) inte igi i ity and that (absolute) plausibility that allow human reason to detect in the Word the ‘necessary arguments of credibility’ ( otiva credibilitatis ). T ose Fundamenta T eo ogy sc o ars w o ave appreciated my work have realized that I have further explored many lines of reflection offered in the Encyclical Fides et Ratio, which, as I have asserted in my commentaries to t is document (c . Livi [1999], [2005]), is precisely a reflection that ‘ des ’ directs towards itself, discovering in itself an intrinsic unity with ‘ atio’ On t e ot er and, I comp ete y agree wit certain American Catholic philosophers who have established a fruitful connection between their religious faith and their philosophical work. In a co ection o essays pu is ed recent y (c . Hancoc and Sweetman [2003]), one can find many similar currents of thought to t at w ic I ave deve oped in t is oo . For examp e, Mary F. Rousseau points out t at t e c oice o ait is a matter o conscience, and hence of reason; Jude P. Doughtery holds that philosoy, as t e Gree s understood it, can provide rationa justi cation for metaphysical principles, and so serve as a rational preamble to faith; Alice Ramos asserts that her goal is to defend faith against

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skepticism and to demonstrate metaphysically the existence and importance o some rationa premises o C ristian ait ( raeambula fidei ); and Ralph McInerny holds that modern philosophy conc udes y discrediting reason, and ‘ ait ’ now provides t e on y ope or reason. One last observation concerning the image that I used for the cover o t e Ita ian essay on t is su ject. I too it rom a amous painting y Mic e ange o Merisi, ca ed “t e Caravaggio”. It represents Thomas the Apostle touching the body of Jesus Christ as a proo t at is resurrection was true. I ave a ways t oug t t at there is no other image more relevant to the theme I am treating. Primarily, the biblical episode of the dialogue between Thomas the Apost e and Jesus is dea t wit in t e centra part o my essay; yet the entire logic of my essay derives from the situation that Caravaggio has rendered immortal — the Word of God made man, who revea s to men is mission as t e Savior, and t e Apost e w o did not want to believe the testimony of the other apostles who had seen the risen Christ. In that page of the Gospel I find the most explicit proc amation o C ristian ait , ormu ated y T omas imse with the words (to be understood as an affirmation and not invocation): “[Now I e ieve t at you are] my Lord and my God!” In t e eart o t is episode I nd t e Body o C rist: Jesus as tru y risen with his very body, and he has wanted to conserve the wounds of is passion so t at t ey remain or a eternity t e sign o t e trut o Redemption; and T omas rig t y demands — given is ca ing as a “witness to the resurrection” — empirical evidence of the glori ed ody o t e Lord, evidence w ic — united wit reason — is transformed in his conscience into the certainty of faith that Jesus is God, as he revealed to those who were his own in the world, and as e ad dec ared in ront o t e San edrin. T e words o Jesus that close the episode indicate the difference between the faith of the Apostles and the faith of those of us who have heard about the

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Gospel after Jesus was no longer visible among men: the faith of the Apost es is ased on t e empirica evidence o t e act o t e odi y Resurrection of Jesus, correctly interpreted as “the sign of Jonah,” and therefore as an argument of credibility in order to “take the words o t e Master as true,” in an a so ute sense. Our ait , on t e other hand, must be based initially on the testimony of the apostles, wit out w ic we cannot now wit certainty t at Jesus ived, died and rose according to t e Gospe narrations (and wit out nowing this we would not have arguments of credibility in order to “take t e words o eterna i e as true,” w ic t e Lord as proc aimed or our sa vation).

ntroduction

T is wor examines t e act o C ristian ait — understood as t e ascent o t e mind to t e trut o divine reve ation — wit in t e context of alethic logic , i.e ., that logic which deals with the truth of ropositions in connection wit t eir re erents. T ere ore, contrary to appearances (for example, the numerous works of fundamental theology given in the Bibliography), this is not a theological treatise ut rat er an investigation ed y a rigorous y p i osop ica met odology. The Christian event, with its historical manifestations (doctrinal, psychological and socio-cultural) can and should be considered as an important o ject o researc or p i osop y, inasmuch as it constitutes a part of our historical experience: this is why hilosophical Christology was born in the twentieth century; yet all o modern p i osop y is a constant witness to t e degree to w ic hilosophy is interested in the Christian event. This investigation can be conducted without prejudice in terms of the scientific results derived rom an ana ysis rom wit in a ‘ ait context’ and using a methodology belonging to theology. In fact, whenever philosophy intends to dea wit t emes connected to t e C ristian event, t at w ic distinguis es it rom t eo ogy is precise y its re ation to dogma (the believed truth of the Church, the object of Christian faith, es quae cre itur . W i e t eo ogy presumes t at dogma is its speci c point o departure (i.e ., as e ieved trut w ic is understood rationally in greater depth), philosophy, on the other hand, examines dogma rom a ogica and semantic point o view, as meaningful propositions that can lead to important rational investigations, carried out on the basis of common experience and of reason, all of w ic constitutes a proper y p i osop ica point o departure.

2


Thus, in our case, the philosophical scrutiny of Christian faith does not attempt to deduce doctrina or practica consequences o dogma — e.g., for the spiritual life of Christians, for catechetical purposes, or evange ization or dia ogue wit ot er re igions. It oo s rat er to understand t at w ic C ristian ait says a out itself in order to rationally grasp its internal logic, and therefore to e a e to spea o it adequate y, wit out etraying its essence, and wit out attri uting to it c aracteristics (suc as rationa ity or irrationality) that do not correspond to Christian faith (see Pieper [1962], Hinti a [1962], Wittgenstein [1966], Pottmeyer [1968], Swinburne [1981], Welte [1983], Redmond [2001] and [2004]). This is not an easy task, nor is it banal, because many modern errors concerning C ristian ait — w et er t ey e t ose coming from Enlightenment or idealistic rationalism, or those coming from voluntaristic or pragmatic fideism — are born from the fact that or centuries, instead o serious y considering w at C ristian ait says about itself and that which is effectively in the consciousness of believers, a series of arbitrary notions have been utilized which seem to ave een constructed precise y or po emica purposes or in order to legitimize, priori preconceived ideas. T ere ore, as stated e ore, t e speci c approac c osen or t is study is t at o a et ic ogic, i.e ., t e examination o t e conditions that confirm the truth of a certainty. The fundamental principles o t is p i osop ica met odo ogy are i ustrated in my treatise entit ed ow to Know i our T oug ts are True. Foun ations o A et ic Logic , to which I will frequently refer in this book. T e motivation o t is wor as een t e goa (w ic I ave pursued for many years) of debating and (possibly) of refuting that tendency that attempts to interpret Christian faith in terms of abso ute ‘ deism’, i.e ., wit s eptica or irrationa premises. T is is a tendency that has always been present in Christian culture, above all since the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (cf. Livi [2002b]),

Introduction

3

yet, which since the second half of the twentieth century, has become t e dominant doctrina tendency; so muc so t at t e deistic interpretation of the faith is that which is most often adopted by philosophers, whether they call themselves Christians, atheists, or agnostics. Among t ose w o de ne t emse ves as C ristians, in Italy we have Dario Antiseri (cf. [1992], [1994], [1999], and [2003]) and Gianni Vattimo (c . [1996] and [2002]); and among t e ot ers we ave Emanue e Severino (c . Severino [1995], [1999], and [2002]). In Germany we have many important thinkers who maintain t at C ristian ait as to e understood as somet ing extraneous to Western rationa ity; among t em t ere is HansGeorg Gadamer, the leading philosopher in the field of hermeneutic t oug t. He wrote: [T]he concept of faith…is uniquely suspended between a trut c aim t at ags e ind nowing and a certainty t at knowing lags behind (“Do not doubt of what you cannot see”). T is is a ig y questiona e p ace or t e concept of faith. To be sure, modern Cartesian science was not the rst to articu ate t e re igious meaning o t is concept. The relation of credo and intelligo pistis and gnosis is inherent in t e Judeo-C ristian tradition. T is indeed is w at accounts for the fact that modern science-based culture is both definitive and problematical, that it comprehends t e w o e eart yet is ormed y C ristendom, w ere t e Judaic emphasis on personality and Greek rationality are united. Modern civi ization, ased on science, as ac ieved such technological superiority in controlling the powers of nature t at no ot er cu ture can disp ace it, even i it is rooted in a completely different religious tradition. What does t is mean or us today? “T e concept o ait can scarcely claim to apply to the whole planet in the same way as t e concept o science” (Gadamer [1999], p. 121).

4


T e ey idea t at supports suc (Gadamer’s) interpretation is t e opposition between faith and modern science — an opposition that many ot er sc o ars do not accept at a (c . Ja i [1988], Trund e [1999], and Artigas [2000]); and I myse maintain anot er interpretation concerning the manner in which the concept of faith c anged in t e very eginnings o t e Modern Age as a resu t o C ristian s epticism (see Livi [200 ]). Evident y, p i osop ica research more often than not implies a meticulous clarification of concepts t roug precise de nitions and we t oug t out distinctions. The many concepts of faith that have been proposed in modern philosophy need such precise definitions and distinctions in order to per orm a p i osop ica y serious study on C ristianity. Here, allow me to proceed to define precisely the following concepts: ait in genera t e act o a e ieving su ject, understood as

the ascent of the mind to a proposition that is not verifiable through direct experience or through reasoning, but rather witnessed y a credi e source; faith in divine revelation, understood as the ascent of the mind to t e trut o t at w ic t e C urc presents as t e ‘Word o God’, on t e asis o t e testimony o t e Prop ets at rst, and later, on that of the very Son of God made Man, Jesus C rist; supernatura mysteries , o jects o t e act o ait , as divine reve ation of truths otherwise inaccessible to natural reason, for they dea wit t e intimate i e o God and is p an o sa vation. Upon this grounding, the following distinctions will be made: a) in terms o t e notion o ait in genera I wi accurate y distinguish between the credibility of testimony and the eliability of witness ; actually, both are necessary for a rational act of believing, and

Introduction

they must be valued together; but the former belongs to the logic o propositions and eads to a type o metap ysica certainty, w i e the latter belongs to the logic of human relations and presupposes hysical and moral certainties; ) in terms o t e now e ge o Go I wi esta is t e undamental distinction between natural knowledge (common sense, life experiences, p i osop y, particu ar sciences) and upernatura know e ge in genera (comprising t e act o ait common to a e ievers, theological reflection which is reserved for some intellectuals, and mystica experiences w ic presuppose speci c c arismas). T is is t e necessary distinction etween ‘seeing’ or ‘ ee ing’ (experience), ‘understanding’ (reasoning) and ‘believing’ (faith); c) more particu ar y I wi esta is t e distinction etween natual knowledge of the existence of Go (knowledge deriving from common sense, as well as metaphysical knowledge) and supernatural know e ge o t e ivine mysteries (t roug reve ation w ic God imself has manifested concerning his nature and his plan of salvation). It is important to purify common language of the ambiguous expression: ‘ e ie in God’, a most a ways re erring to natura knowledge, i.e ., to the certainty about the existence of God, which is proper of common sense; ) in a ition t e distinction etween natura t eo ogy (a so ca ed ‘philosophical theology’) and supernatural theology (also called ‘revealed theology’ or simply ‘theology’). This distinction is imortant, ecause ait in t e C ristian sense is not indispensa e for the formation and fulfillment of natural theology (such as that ound in P ato, Aristot e, and P otinus), w i e it is essentia or a t eo ogy o revea ed mysteries; e) furthermore , the necessary distinction between aith in divine eve ation, an indispensa e requirement in order to o tain t at sa vation offered by Christ, and theology as a science , which is rather a function of deeper speculation and intellectual progress certain-


ly indispensable for the community of believers, yet not for each individua ; and, f) finally the important distinction between the neffability of God (w ic concerns is own nature and is design o sa vation, mysteries w ic are inaccessi e or natura reason and w ic remain veiled by symbols even after they are known by believers through ait in Reve ation), and certainty regar ing is existence (certainty t at gives origin to natura re igion and unctions as a rationa premise for the acceptance of supernatural revelation); ignoring t is distinction as o ten ed to t e con usion etween t e ‘unknowability’ of God (in his essence) and the refusal of admitting his existence, .e ., atheism, as well as exasperating beyond all limits t e ‘negative’ c aracter o mysticism. This series of distinctions will be taken up again at the end of t is wor as Conc usions . As t e ase o t is study we presuppose the double dimension of rationality, which characterizes the faith in divine revelation: a) Rationa ity t at a ows t e understanding and t e acceptance o the datum revealed in the act of faith; and, ) Rationa ity w ic a ows and demands a constant specu ative deepening y t eo ogy, as t e searc or understanding w at t e revealed doctrine contains ( ntellectus fidei . Even t oug rom an a stract ogica point o view t e second dimension presupposes the first, in the vital reality of the Christian ait t ere is a unique circu arity, inasmuc as it is precise y in theology (specifically fundamental theology) where the believer becomes aware of the rationality of the act of faith. We can say further t at it is t e ‘ ived experience’ o t e ait , re ecting on itse , t at detects the proper rational foundation as an essential component of Revelation, both in terms of its conten as well as its credibility . And

Introduction

this awareness does not occur except through a methodology and conceptua mediation w ic are p i osop ica in nature (in act, they belong to alethic logic), which obliges us to recognize a connection (albeit a minimal one) between theological reflection and i osop ica criteria. Hence, we ave t e grounded ope t at t is essay — within the limits that are proper to philosophy, and notwit standing t e we - nown di cu ties concerning t e communication etween p i osop ica anguage and t eo ogica anguage — will prove to be useful for the building up of faith. Be ore ending t is Introduction, it is use u to quote an American p i osop er, Ro ert Audi, w o as underta en many important studies on the logic of believing. Although he uses the term ‘ e ie ’ to re er ot to direct now edge ( ased on evidence and inference) and to indirect knowledge (faith), and thus all types of certainty are for him simply ‘beliefs’, he has shown nevertheless ow p i osop y can c ari y t e ogica justi cation o t e act o believing something, i.e ., affirming that something is ‘true’. As a conclusion of an essay on elief, Reason, and Inference , he says, Reasons for which a person believes come in many kinds, and t ey di er in ot psyc o ogica strengt and evidential cogency. They may work singly or in sets; they may produce e ie s w ic S [t e su ject] need not even know he has, or may be unable to trace to their basis in is reasons; or they may generate beliefs through vividly conscious in erences. Our account is aimed at c ari ying all of these concepts and patterns; and if it is sound, it can e used in ot t e epistemo ogica appraisa o e ie s and the psychological assessment of cognition (Audi [1993], p. 273). My concern is about aith in particular, yet I have to take into account e ie in genera ; and I wi examine t e act o ait (espe-

8


cially faith in divine revelation) from an epistemological point of view, a t oug I recognize t at t e psyc o ogica point o view is also very interesting. However, the problem of how to justify the e ie t at C ristian doctrine is ‘t e on y trut o sa vation’ cannot e approac ed except y esta is ing and app ying t e ru es of alethic logic (the logic of knowing why some assertion is true), w ic is a ranc o epistemo ogica ogic, w ose met od is a soute y di erent rom any psyc o ogica met od (c . A ston [1989]). Multitudes of misunderstandings, from the beginning of the Modern Age up to Post-modern Cu ture, ave een produced y t ose philosophers who neglected the proper method in dealing with the very nature of Christian faith.

art One

Philosophical Insights on Knowing nd Believing

Chapter One

What We Know About God Through Reason Alone

Before delving into the heart of the subject matter, a certain inguistic am iguity requires attention, name y, t at w ic spea s of ‘faith’, referring to the rational certainty that God exists, i.e ., that certainty of common sense that grounds ‘natural religion’ (Cf. Livi [2000 ]; [2002a], pp. 107–122; [2005 ], pp. 166–180). One often hears the expression ‘to believe in God’ as indicating the position o t ose w o admit t e existence o God, just as t e expression ‘do not e ieve in God’ wou d re er to at eists. T ere ore, e ore speaking about the certainty — grounded upon testimonial witness — regarding t at w ic God as revea ed a out supernatura mysteries and a out is p ans o sa vation concerning men, I should clarify that there is primarily a natural knowledge about God, w ic wrong y is ca ed ‘ ait ’; t is is a natura now edge, based upon experience, from which ‘natural religion’ springs, quite different from ‘supernatural religion’, which springs from divine reve ation and is ased on ait (see P antinga [1967]). The fact of using the term ‘faith’ to describe the natural certainty that God exists — based on the evidence of the finiteness o eings t at comprise t e wor d and t e spontaneous in erence of a first Cause of everything — traces its rationale back to an historical upheaval in the history of philosophy, namely that which egins wit t e ‘universa dou t’ o Descartes and c oses wit radical skepticism concerning the existence of the world as something ‘external’ to thought. Thanks to this shift of an epistemological na-

12


ture, post-Cartesian skepticism (from Hume to Kant) has led us to consider any metap ysica notion as mere y su jective, t e resu t o an ‘extra’-rational option, beginning with the notions of substance and causa ity, and ending wit t e notion o God as rst Cause o t e wor d (C . Livi [1997a], [2002 ] and [2003]). In ot er words, the fact of calling the rational certainty about God ‘faith’ is simply t e inguistic expression o t e act o aving denied metap ysics its consistency, speci ca y, o aving denied ‘natura t eo ogy’. T is denial, already explicit in Kant, represents the dominant position in t e panorama o contemporary p i osop y, as one can see, or example, in an essay by Kolakowski aptly entitled “If God Does not Exist.” The Polish philosopher writes that “the believer should admit not on y t at e is una e to provide rationa arguments in favor of his faith, but that he cannot even explain the very content of his conception of the world in terms which are rationally inteligi e” (Ko a ows i [1997]), p. 196). Evident y e centers not on the problem we are interested in here — that of the rationality of faith proper — but rather a still more radical problem, that of the metap ysica rationa ity t at — rom P ato and Aristot e to Aquinas and Giambattista Vico — asserts the existence of God as rationa justi cation o t e existence o a wor d o nite and contingent eings. But t is is anot er pro em t at I ave approac ed in ot er works (cf. Livi [2002c] and [2004]).

Religious experience, grounded upon the evidence of common sense

We must begin with the notion of God as Creator inasmuch as it is connoted y t e set o existentia certainties o common sense (Cf. Livi [2004]), i.e ., inasmuch as this notion is rooted in the primary experience of the world, of the self and of moral val-


13

ues (those that regulate the interactions of human beings.) As John Henry Newman wrote in t e nineteent century, suc a notion deals with, a God w o is numerica y One, w o is persona , t e Author, Sustainer, and finisher of all things, the life of Law and Order, t e Mora Governor; One w o is Supreme and Sole; like Himself, unlike all things besides Himself which are ut His creatures; distinct rom, independent o t em all; One who is self-existing, absolutely infinite, who has ever een and ever wi e, to w om not ing is past or future; who is all perfection, and the fullness and archetype o every possi e exce ence, t e Trut Itse , Wisdom, Love, Justice, Holiness; One who is All-powerful, Allknowing, Omnipresent, Incomprehensible (An Essay in id o a Grammar o Assent [1870], London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1906, p. 101). We are not dealing here with a theological topic ( i.e ., the theological sciences) but rather with a study that attempts to identify t e experientia roots upon w ic t e notion o God and re igious ractice is grounded. These experiential roots are located where one can recognize the beginning of truth, that primum cognitum in t e ierarc y o judgments: t e existence o t ings in t e wor d, with their characteristic traits of plurality and contingency (cf. Livi [2002a], pp. 63–76; see a so So o ows i [1995]). ncient p i osop y a ready c ear y saw t at critica re ection could only confirm that which the wisdom of all people in all times ad nown intuitive y, giving origin to re igion: t at t e wor d, wit its p ysica and io ogica aws, spea s o an ordering inte igence that animates and transcends it. Thus, for example, does Seneca conc ude is p i osop ica journey, summarizing is mora and naturalistic investigations into the certainty that God is the reason

14


and the soul of the world, and man should gaze upon Him, beyond t e dar ness o deat (C . Lucius Annaeus Seneca, Stu ies on Nature , trans. by Richard Gummere, 1917). The nature of things calls or a Princip e t at justi es t eir existence, t eir re ations ips and t eir dynamism: on y in t is way can t e inte ect ecome aware o the logos , i.e ., that intrinsic rationality: In their being what they are, all things have being: yet precisely because they have it in the measure in which their nature accepts and determines it, t ey are never ‘ eing’, ut always and only being possessed and circumscribed by their respective oundaries. Not ing t at exists as ‘t at determined thing’ can pretend to be ‘being’. In their existing as t ose determined t ings w ic are not ‘ eing’, a t ings reveal — not being ‘being as such’ — yet existing, that they ave received t e gi t o ‘ eing’. However, t e awareness t at a thing exists in virtue of an act with which another thing as roug t it into eing does not mere y ear en ac in a orizontal way to its antecedent; such is the path of science which considers causality as the connection which necessari y inds one t ing to anot er. In t e metap ysica rea m, everything is more brief and simple, yet precisely because o t at more demanding: w erever t ere is a trace o received existence, there is the testimony of ‘Being’ that gives wit out receiving and wit out eing received. It does not matter how many things have received existence: however many t ey are and w erever t ey may e, t ey are never y themselves, nor are they the only ones, given that — if they ave received eing — t ere is a so t e ‘Being’ w ose c aracteristic trait is to never receive, yet only to give. […] It is, therefore, inasmuch as constitutively bound to being as its direct conversant t at reason arrives at t e Mystery, understanding the Mystery in no different way from the existent, ut as t e existent nown as ‘ eing-revea er-o -gratuity’ from which it springs (Sgubbi [2000], pp. 182; 184).


15

One notices that here the author speaks of “metaphysical order,” to e understood not in t e sense o a orma y metap ysica argument, i.e ., of a reasoning on a scientific level (reflective and methodical), but rather in the sense of the intuitions of common sense. T e act t at now edge o God as Creator egins wit t e existence of created things and therefore with the existential judgments o common sense (‘t ings exist’, ‘I exist’, ot ers simi ar to me exist’) is a t esis t at can c ear y e seen in t e p i osop y o Aquinas, who, responding to an objection concerning the need of nowing t e essence o God in order to demonstrate is existence, writes, T ere are t ings w ic are not nowa e in and o t emselves but rather through their effects, i.e ., as their cause. ow, w en t e e ect is proportionate to t e cause, t e essence of the effect becomes the principle which is used to demonstrate t at t e cause exists and t en to investigate the essence (from which one later proceeds to demonstrate the properties of such a cause); when, however, the effect is not proportionate to t e cause, t en t e e ect is used on y as a principle to demonstrate that the cause exists and has certain conditions wit out, owever, attaining a now edge of the essence — this later case is that of the separated su stances (Expositio super i rum Boet ii e trinitate , q. 6, art. 4). T is ogica pat as not gone unperceived y t ose w o study Aquinas, such as Carlos Llano, who correctly points out that the judgment regarding t e existence o God depends on judgments regarding t e existence o t ings: “T e in erence t at uses e cient causality is radically, constitutively and necessarily existential: it is not t at y t in ing o t e e ects we t in o God, ut t at t inking that such effects exist we begin to think that God exists (Llano

1


Cifuentes [1999], p. 170; see also Rocca [2004]). In addition, we nd su stantia y identica expressions in t e writings o Hans-Urs von Balthasar, who comes from a different perspective: “Beings are imited, ‘ eing’ is not. T is di erence, t is ‘rea distinction’ o St. T omas, is t e source o every re igious and p i osop ica t oug t of humanity. It is not necessary to affirm that every human philosop y is at t e same time essentia y re igious and t eo ogica , given t at it poses t e question a out a so ute eing, w et er it e in personal categories or not” (Balthasar [1994], p. 88).

What is understood as ‘religious experience’

I would now like to clarify that in this work I use the expression ‘experience’ to indicate that immediate and spontaneous knowledge (t us universa and necessary) o certain data t at every man intuits and later expresses (whenever he does give expression to such data) in many different ways; and I use the adjective ‘religious’ to indicate t at we are dea ing wit now edge re ative to God — to his existence and to the way of rendering him homage — and to eterna i e, .e ., to t e way o ac ieving sa vation. I t ere ore accept t e correct distinction etween t e term ‘re igiousness ( Re igiosität ’ and ‘religion (Religion ’; the alethic and logical investigation here dea s wit re igious experience understood as e igiousness (i an expression o trut ) and not re igion (‘w en’ re igion wou d e true and ‘which’ religion is true), even though the two questions are connected (C . Lang [1950]); owever, I wi dea wit t e concept of true religion later. As was the case for preceding argumentation, here also the investigation is simu taneous y enomeno ogica and metap ysica and should not be considered as reducible to psychological conjecture; the term ‘religious experience’ is not treated by way of empirical


17

sychology, as in the case of William James. From the phenomenoogica point o view, t ere is no dou t t at re igious consciousness as always appeared as that cognitive structure that is used to give meaning to all forms of culture. As a renowned writer of religions as a rmed, “re igious practice as a ways een t e rst ‘cu ture’: art, language, agriculture and all the rest proceed from the encounter etween God and man; t at w ic we ca cu ture or civi ization is simp y secu arized re igious practice” (Van Leeuw [1975], p. 333). In this sense, we can cite the well-known expression of Friedrich Sc eiermac er (a eit reductive yet correct) concerning re igious experience, de ned as “t e origina sense o dependence, w ic is not accidental but rather constitutes an essential element of human i e; it is not di erent rom person to person, ut t e same in every developed conscience” (Friedrich Daniel Schleiermacher, Über die Religion, 1799, § 37). The fact that modern psychology interprets re igious experience in di erent ways (a ways reductive y, met odologically denying the supernatural reality of its object) does not eliminate the fact that the experience is recognized as such, in its origina ity and universa ity: one need on y to examine t e t eories of James concerning the difference between ‘normal’ and ‘pathological’ religious experience (Cf. William James, The Varieties of Re igious Experience , 1902) or t ose o Freud concerning re igious experience as ‘universal obsessive neurosis’ (Cf. Die Zukunft einer Illusion 1927). et ic ogic — ased on t e trut o t e wor d, o t e se and of the moral law — manifests the presence (mysterious yet most certain) o an Inte igence and o a Love t at maintains everyt ing in eing, and o a Wisdom t at governs everyt ing as Law and Providence. The self, the world, and the moral law are evident facts: yet at t e same time t ey appear as rea ities t at wou d e a surd, incomprehensible, if they were not connected to some foundation and origin, if some ultimate reason were not discovered which

18


explains how it is possible for something that does not have in itself its reason or eing can actua y continue to exist. T e contingency and precariousness of the world — including the self and other individua s — are too evident to a ow an avoidance o t e ‘t eoogica question’ wit in uman consciousness; a question w ic is constantly renewed (because it is of a piece with rationality, i.e ., wit t e searc or meaning o everyt ing t at is experienced), and w ic constant y o tains t e answer — t e on y possi e answer — through the spontaneous and necessary deduction that ‘there must e a God’, even i e is not seen. As Nor ert Fis er as apt y explained (cf. [1997]), the ‘search for God’ is legitimized above all by the phenomenology of human conscience: there are in fact origina ant ropo ogica experiences (wonder and appiness, mourning the death of loved ones, perception of one’s own guilt) that show that it is impossible for man to understand himself and achieve se -rea ization u y in t is i e, and t ere ore t at point to a se transcendence (see also Pangallo [2004]). Thus understood, God remains as the mystery ar excellence : we now not ing a out im, ut t ere must e a God — in t e sense of a First Principle or Foundation, a Father of all, an inexausti e Wi to give —, it is evident. We may ca im ‘t e unnown God’: un nown and un nowa e in is essence or nature, yet most certainly known in his existential truth, untouchable yet evident (see; Danié ou [1956]; Tresmontant [1959]; Journet [196 ]). It is precise y t is constitutive un nowa e nature o God of human natural reason that allows us to conceive of the possibility o a supernatura now edge derived rom t e reve ation t at God makes of himself: such a divine revelation (if onfirmed as an historical event and ccepte as true, gives way to supernatural faith) is a rea possi i ity or reason, eyond eing a mere aspiration or dream, precisely because reason knows that God exists, yet does not know who he is; this is why the anonymous author of the Epistle to


19

Diognetus wrote, “Has there ever been someone among men who as nown w o Go Godd is is,, e ore He im imse se cam came? e? […] It was He who revealed himself” (VIII, 2). Religious experience is thus t hus the awareness of the mystery, of of the constitutive consti tutive inadeq inadequacy uacy o reason in in terms o Transcend ranscendence: ence: it is a continuous continuo us self-criticism, sel f-criticism, which has the t he value of a “negative prepatrue ue an iving o rati ra tioon or t e poss ssii e proc am amaati tioon o a God od,, tr w ic man can pray, o er sacri ce e ore w om man ca cann knee , u of reverence , and produce music and dance ” (Fisher [1997], p. 313).

The unknowable nature of God

s I have clarified before (Cf. Livi [2004]), the fact that when speaking of ‘religious experience’ one must insist on including the existe exis tenc ncee o Go Godd amo among ng t e cer certain tainti ties es o co comm mmon on se sens nsee cert certain ain y does not mean that one must accept the thesis that direc knowledge of God would be part of that experience. I hold that to be inadmissi e ecause it is t e same as a rming t at t e existence of God is immediately eviden ev identt to man ma n in his h is present condition, condition, and that by nature he has an experience of of God — of a God that becomes identi ed wit t e eing t at renders t e wor d inte igi e (Cf. Colombo [1989]). Ontologism implies the undemonstrated and indemonstrable hypothesis that God is an object of direct exerience, jus ustt as ar aree t e wor d, t e se an andd ot er eings gs.. From t is viewpoint viewp oint ontologism ontologism is closely connected to pantheism, pa ntheism, inasmuch as it identi es God wit t e eing o a t ings and t us denies t e a so ute tran anssce cenndence o God, t e di erence etw tweeen Su sistent Being and the abstract abstr act notion of ‘esse commune rerum’ , derived from t e now edg dgee o t in ings gs t at ar aree not eing yet ave par arti ticcipated being, i.e .,., they are creatures. What I do affirm, however, is that God is intuited by all as the result of a necessary inference that

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places him as the only reason for everything, as the foundation of every uman experience (o t e wor d, o t e se , o conscience ce,, and of moral values), which imperiously points to the t he “position “position”” of a Firs Firstt Prin Princi cipp e, a Firs Firstt Caus Cause, e, o a Legis Legis at ator or,, o a Pro Provi vide denc nce. e. T at w ic co comp mpris rises es imm immedi ediat atee exp exper erie ienc ncee is no nott o in Himse ut rather the necessity of thinking of a Principle or First Cause of the worr d, ey wo eyoond t e wo worr d; it is not is resence t t at is ex expe peri rien ence cedd y man man,, ut ra ratt er is sence — — an a sence t at ma es everyt ing else problematic or even absurd if one does not eventually think of a so ution to t is pro em t roug t e intuition o a Foundation that is not seen yet must certainly be there. “Concerning God, we have the presence of an absence. We can know that he exists, yet e is not di dire rect ct y e ore us us”” (A vi vira ra [2 [200 000], 0], pp. 23 -235) 5).. T is is what can be cal c alled led ‘derived or indirect experience’, experience’, inasmuch as it is a spontaneous and necessary inference based on original and direct experie expe rience nce (C . [Roy], [Roy], 2000). Speaking about natural knowledge of God, Jacques Maritain states that t hat it is “natural, “natura l,”” not only in the sense that it is of a rational order and does not e ong to t e supernatura order o ai aitt , ut a so in t e sense that it is pre-philosophica and proceeds in a natural way (we co couu d say in inssti tinnct ctiive y) y w ic t e rs rstt appe perrceptions of the intellect arise, before any philosophical or scienti ca y ra rati tioona iz ized ed e a ora rati tioon. Hence ce,, ev eveen e ore entering into the sphere of completely formed and articulated knowledge (and specifically before entering into the sp ere o metap ysica now edge), t e uman inte ect is capable of virtually metaphysical philosophical knowledge. T is is t e rst pat , t e primordia pat t roug w ic the intellect grasps consciousness of the existence of God (Maritain [1932], p. 123).


21

A few lines after af ter speaking speak ing of this “primordial “primordial path of the intellect,” intellect,” t e Frenc p i osop er descri es it in t ese terms: T e primordia intu tuiiti tioon o eing is t e intu tuiition o t e solidity and definitiveness of existence; yet it is also the intuition of death, of the nothingness to which my existence ex istence is su jected; na y, at t e very instan antt in w ic I rea ize the value of the intelligibility of being, I also realize that t is so id an andd de de ni niti tive ve exi exist sten ence ce pe perc rcei eive vedd in in ev everyt eryt in ingg implies – I as yet do not know in what way: perhaps within withi n t e very t ings, per aps separate y rom t em – an a so ute and unavoidable existence, completely free from nothingness, rom deat . T ese t ree steps y w ic t e inte ect arrives at actual existence as existence which is affirmed indepe ind epend nden entt y ro rom m me, and at ater er pr proceeds oceeds ro rom m t is com com-letely objective existence to my threatened existence, and finally from my existence permeated by nothingness to a so ute existence; t ese t ree steps ta e p ace wit in t e same intuition, which philosophers can explain as the intuiiti tu tivve pe perce ceppti tioon o t e ess esseenti tiaa y an ana ogi gica ca co conntent o the first concept, the concept of being ( Ibid .). .). A t oug Maritain’ Maritain’ss voca u ar aryy ints at is trou ed notion notion o “intellectual intuition of being,” the substance of his affirmation coincides wit w at I a rm in t is paragrap , name y t at rom t e first certainty of common sense (experience of the world), the human mind — through spontaneous inference — necessarily arrives at t e noti tioon o an onto og ogiica oun unda dati tioon o ev ever eryt yt in ingg co connce cern rn-ing the world, the self and moral order (the Absolute, the Eternal, the Creator, Providence). Along this same line of reasoning, some aut ors ave ig ig ted ( o owi winng an Augu gussti tinnian inspiration) the aesthetic component of the reality of the world, whose order is erceived also as harmony, as beauty which acts as ‘ vestigium Dei’ a sig ignn o Go Godd (C . Ba Ba t as asar ar [1987]) ])..

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That which I describe in analogical terms in order to justify the inc usion o t e existence o God among t e certainties o common sense, always of an epistemic type, others describe in existential or p enomeno ogica terms — one may t in o t e expressions suc as ‘experience o t e sacred,’ or ‘sense o t e sacred,’ or even ‘consciousness of the sacred’ ( Heilsgewißheit introduced by many aut ors o p i osop y o re igion; one may a so t in o t e p rase, “nosta gia o t e tota y ot er ( Se nsuc t nac em ganz An eren )” by Max Horckheimer. In historical-philosophical terms, religious experience is a so descri ed wit t e (Socratic, Augustinian and Cusanian) phrase, ‘ docta ignorantia ’: Finite man can now wit a so ute certainty on y t at t e infinite truth which he is searching for can only be sought a ter, yet never em raced t roug is own powers. T e understanding of the knowledge of not knowing is thus revea ed as a pre iminary step towards t e openness to God. This ‘not knowing’ becomes conceived as ‘a most holy not-knowing (sacratissima ignorantia) given that knowing that one does not know makes the finite spirit sensitive to the possibility (inconceivable in itself ) of the presence of an in nite God wit in man (Fis er [1997], p. 31). Now, t e oundation o re igion — as an istorica -cu tura p enomenon and as a meaningful datum of the history of philosophy — is precisely the experience of the sacred (religious experience) t at on t e one and eads to adoration o a God w o as a t ousand different faces, who is an ‘unknown God’ (Cf. Paul’s speech in Athens, narrated by St. Luke in the Acts of the Apostles, 17: 16-3 ), and on t e ot er and eads to t e rationa investigation about God (‘philosophical theology’) except for the fact that the various mani estations o t is omage to God are a constant in t e istory o umanity, w i e t e p i osop y o God is an epi-


23

sode (albeit an important one) which surfaces in Greek civilization around t e sixt century B.C. (C . Gi son [19 0]; [1983], p. 169–235). Christian theology has often used the term ‘natural revelation’ to designate t e experience o t e sacred. T e term indicates, in one sense, that God in Himself is not accessible to natural human now edge and t ere ore cannot e nown un ess e revea s imse ; in anot er sense, t at ‘traces’ o God ( vestigia Dei are apparent in the world, making it a revelation of God ( theophania , just as Scripture express y teac es (C . Book o Wis om, 13: 1–5; Epist e to t e Romans , 1: 19–21). C ear y, we are dea ing wit an indirect knowledge of God, through discursive reason, which utilizes the notion o causa ity. It is t ere ore an in erence, yet a necessary and spontaneous one, and thus universally practicable and practiced. As an ancient Christian writer asserts, I someone says e as seen God and as understood w at e as seen, it means t at e does not see God ut rat er something derived from Him (Dionigius the Mystic, Epistle to Caius . Patrologia Graeca, vol. III, col. 1065). gain, it is c ear t at t e God w o is t us revea ed n nature is only the Creator, not the One and Triune God that is revealed in esus C rist ; ‘natura reve ation’ does not ma e ‘supernatura ’ revelation superfluous — a revelation that requires faith in a strict sense (as we will see below). The common element between the two expressions, ‘natura reve ation’ and ‘supernatura reve ation’, is t e idea of mystery, i.e ., the idea of a truth that is only allusively present in immediate experience (of the world, of subjectivity, of morality) — in t e rst case, as a sign o w at s ou d a so ute y e t ere (God in his existence), and in the second case, as an expectation of what might happen (God in his intimate nature, communicated by Himse in t e istorica event o reve ation).

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Having made these distinctions, we can now speak of ‘religious experience’ (as a synonymous expression o t at ‘natura reve ation’), whose nucleus is constituted by the intuition that the world is created and governed y a persona God, to w om one can and s ou d give omage. God is — and a ways remains — t e un at oma e mystery. His knowledge is called ‘natural’ when it is brought about y t e wor s o creation. T roug t em, in ways and orms t at are per ect y adapted to man’s sensate and inte ectua nature, men know God’s wisdom, omnipotence, and goodness, so that they can sense is presence, encounter im and adore im. T is ‘natura revelation’ of God is of great importance, because it is through this that man more easily and more spontaneously ‘senses’ the presence o God, even e ore receiving t e message o ‘supernatura reve ation’. The certainty regarding the reality of the world (the knowable tota ity o t ings and events), rom w ic t e certainty o t e se emerges (subject of knowledge) and as a consequence ‘others’ are disclosed (agents and receivers of moral relationships), is substantiated y t eo ogy, i.e ., intentiona na ity, wit in t e ramewor o rational order. Physical laws and moral laws presuppose a rational order and an inte igent designer, a transcendent origin (Love) and a transcendent destination (Providence). Particu ar y, in terms o physical laws, it is significant that the finality of the universe — unmista a y captured y common sense — resists a attempts at criticism, deriving rom pseudo-metap ysica extrapo ations o some scientists (Jacques Monod, Stephen Hawking), and is re-confirmed as t e on y orm o rationa ity t at grasps t e trut o t e wor d (see Jaki [1988]; Davies [1993], and Artigas [2000]). Furthermore, in terms of the laws of the moral order (“natural law”), Kant’s “dead end” project o an “autonomous” mora ity as ed contemporary rationality down the path of asserting both the teleologica and heologica character of the natural moral law (Cf. Di Blasi [1999]).


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Natural Knowledge of God and ‘Natural Religion’

The certainties regarding the necessary relation between the world and God represent the elements of what has been called for cenntur ce turie iess ‘na natur turaa ’ re ig igiion (i (inn ord rder er to di dist stin ingui guiss it ro rom m C ri risstianity as reveale religion), at the base of which are ‘spontaneous an andd un uniivers rsaa e ie s’, i.e ., co connvi victi ctioons t at ar aree qui quite te di er eren entt — es espe peci ciaa y rom a orma po poin intt o vi view ew — t an ai aitt in di divi vinne revelation, which is by nature natu re contingent, historical, and a nd free. Now, Now, in term rmss o t e in inee o ar argum gumen entt I am dev evee opin ing, g, t e prope perr y reigious igi ous aspect o t is pr presu esuppo pposi sitio tionn does does no nott direct direct y conce concern rn us; owever, we are truly interested in the logical alethic aspect, that sam amee one t at as een stu tudi dieed y man anyy p i osop ers o ogi gic, c, an andd articula art icularly rly by Peirce. Peirce. The American A merican philosopher wrote in 1905, 1905, W en I sa say t at ‘Go ‘Godd ex exis ists ts’’, I mea eann to to sa sayy t at t e un undderstanding of God is the apex of what we can reach in terms o a compre ension o t e entire p ysica and psyc o ogical universe. Regarding agnostic and other opinions, this connvi co victi ctioon as t e ad advan vantag tagee o o er erin ingg ou ourr co cons nsci ciou ousn snes esss an object to love (Charles Sanders Peirce, The Nature of Science [No [Note oo I] I],, 1908) 8).. Even though the last words have an evidently pragmatist tone (for t at is t e most we nown c aracteristic o Peirce’s t oug t), t e entire phrase is very meaningful from a logical point of view, in terms of the connection between the evidence of the world and t e id idea ea o Go God. d. Pei eirce rce’’s in inee o argum argumen entt eco ecome mess mo more re de deve ve oped three years later (just before his death), as he points out that eopp e’ eo e’ss ives ives can cannnot e p ut e gr grooun undded on t e e ie o a ra radi dica ca inte igi i ity o t ings, as a resu t o t eir dependence on a Mind which creates, organizes and directs the events of the world (“A eg ec ectted Ar Argu gum men entt or t e Re Reaa ity o Go God” d” in Writings o C ar es

2


S. Peirce. A Chronological Edition , ed. M. H. Fisch, vol. 5, Indiana University Unive rsity Press, B oomington, 1995). 1995). Wee thus arrive at the never W never-suf -sufficiently ficiently-understood -understood doctrine o T omas Aquinas, w o, instead o t in ing t at our natura now edge o God is mere y o a orma metap ysica order, a rms that all men have ‘by creation’ a pre-disposition for that spontaneous in erence w ic ea eads ds us to co connc ude t at God ex exis ists ts (C . Summa T eo ogiae , I, q. 93, art. and 5). T e te term rm ‘ y cr crea eati tion on’’ is synonymous in Aquinas with the term ‘by nature’, as when he Homi mini ni us na natur turaa ite iterr in inser serta ta es estt qua quaee am Dei co cogni gniti tion one e ” writes, “Ho (Commentary of Psalm 21 21,, 23). Here also al so Aquinas recovers rec overs scattered fragments of a philosophy of common sense present in Aristotle, w o egan p i osop izing ro rom t is o serv rvaation, “A men ave, y physei the conviction that the gods exist” ( On the Heavens nature [ physei 270b, 5). There are echoes of this awareness in the early centuries o C ri rissti tian aniity ty,, or ex exam ampp e in aut ors suc as Aug ugus usti tinne an andd Jo n of Damascus, Damascu s, where we read, “the “the knowledge of God is within each eac h of us by nature [ hysei ” ( e fide orthodoxa , I, 1). The French philosopher Étienne Gilson takes up this same theme, speaking about philosophy in relation to the notions of ‘sa sacr cred’ ed’,, o ‘di ‘divi vine ne’’ and and o ‘Go God’ d’,, and and rea rea rm rmss t e conn connec ecti tioon etwee etw eenn ex expe peri rien ence ce o t e wo worr d (e (exis xiste tennt t in ings) gs) an andd re ig igiiou ouss ex ex-perience (inference of the existence exis tence of a Creator). Creator). In different ways and with different degrees of reflective elaboration, all civilizations seem to express the same conviction — spontan aneeous y orn rom t e t oug t o eac man — that there are forces, beings, and even a Being on w ic every man and a t e eings o t e universe deend. We are thus dealing with relations among existent eing ei ngs, s, an andd t e ve very ry exi exist sten ence ce o t es esee ei eing ngss is in invvo ve ved. d. o philosophical reflection is necessary for this notion to com co me in intto ein ing: g: in act ct,, one co couu d say t at p i osop y


27

always eventually encounters this notion, trying to render it in inte igi e (G (Gi son [1 [1983] 3],, p. p. 22 223) 3).. In t es esee words ds,, ro rom m a po post st um umoous wo worr y Gi so sonn, we can orig igin inaa ex ex-disc di scoover a co conn rmati rmatioon or t e re ati tioons ip etw etwee eenn or perience (of an existential nature) and rational reflection, whether i osop ica or sc scienti c in in t e mo modern sens nsee — rati tioona re ection which springs from the demands of a dialectical dialectic al foundation of the data provided by experience, which necessarily converge in the ori rigi ginna an andd uni univvers rsaa re igi gioous ex expe peri rieence ce.. T e mo moda iti ties es o suc a dialectical foundation can be, and have been, very diverse (Cf. Lobkowicz [2000]), yet I would now like to highlight only one of t em — t at any metap ysica rationa ization o t e natura now edge of God presupposes that original religious experience, seeing its limitations yet also its undeniable truth (see Seidl [2003]). This trut is so undenia e t at any metap ysica system t at wou d try to ignore it ends ends up abandoning the very ver y reason it began investigating in the first place (Cf. ( Cf. Livi [2002a], [20 02a], pp. 154-1 154-159). 59). T e exi xisstence o t is re igious experience (a (att t e as asee o ev ev-ery culture) is so evident that even such a modern philosopher as Vo tair taire, e, cru crude de y po emi emica ca to towar wards ds C ris ristian tianiity ty,, as wri writte ttenn and u is ed a very sign gnii ca cannt description o t e idea o God as par artt of common sense, even before a positive religion and philosophical phi losophical re ection intervene intervene upon man’ man’ss conscience, conscience, The Deist is a man firmly convinced of the existence of a Suprem emee Be Bein ingg w o is go good od an andd po pow wer u , an andd w o as given existence to all creatures, all extended, vegetative, sens se nsin ingg an and in inte te ig igen entt cr crea eatur tures; es; w o pe perp rpet etua uate tess t ei eirr species, who punishes crime without cruelty and rewards virtue wit gen generos erosity ity.. A deist does no nott no now w ow God unishes, favors or forgives, for he is not so rash as to presume to now God’ God’ss actions actions.. But e no nows ws t at God acts,

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and that he is just. Difficulties as regards Providence do not ma e is ait waver, or di cu ties, owever strong, are no proof; he submits to such Providence, despite perceiving on y some o its e ects and signs; and judging w at e does not see from what he does see, he thinks that this Providence extends everyw ere and t roug out a centuries. In this, he agrees with the rest of men […]. His religion is t e most ancient and widespread, ecause t e simp e worship of God has come before every [philosophical] system in istory (T éiste , in ictionnaire p i osop ique portative 1765). T ere ore, common sense mani ests t e evidence o a ‘rationa ity’ of the world, which shows a teleological order, a finality that characterizes the experience of all things and all events and that can on y e understood as an opus rationis y w ic t e experience o the world leads back to a truthful foundation that can only be the admission o t e existence o God as a Creative and Providentia Inte igence. Now, one o t e aspects o t e te eo ogica order o t e world, which is most important from the human perspective, other t an t at o t e na ity intrinsic to materia nature, is t at o t e moral order . As John Paul II has written, [T] e act t at t ere is mora good and evi , not reduci e to any other human goods or evils is a necessary and immediate consequence of the truth of creation, which ultimately grounds t e proper ignity o t e uman person: ca ed, because he is a person, to immediate communion with God; o ject, ecause e is a person, o a comp ete y unique Providence; man carries written in is eart a aw t at e as not given himself, yet which expresses the unchanging demands o is persona eing created y God, directed to God and endowed with a dignity infinitely greater than


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all things (Discourse to the Convention of Moral Theology Marc 12, 1991, §§ 3– ). Simone Weil expressed the same conviction in the 1940s when e wrote, God ma es t is universe exist agreeing not to dominate it (although he would be have the power to do so), allowing it to e governed on t e one and y mec anica necessity which regulates matter (even the psychic matter of the soul) and on the other hand by the autonomy which is roper o t in ing persons (Wei [1966], p. 1 6). In t e 1980s, t e same concept reappears in A asdair MacIntyre’s rig t y amous essay, “A ter Virtue,” in w ic e a rms t at it is impossible to understand the relation between man’s spontaneous nature and mora norms i suc a nature is not interpreted as potentially geared for a determined actuality , which is precisely man’s natural end. The law, in other terms, makes sense only if it represents an aid to uman wi so t at every person can ive in con ormity with his true end. However, the Scottish philosopher adds, “man’s true end cannot be determined arbitrarily; man discovers in himself an essence, a nature, w ic as een determined y Anot er; man discovers himself as a courier of a project which he did not invent, because the author is his Creator”(Cf. MacIntyre [1983], p. 70). Sti more radica is t e ana ysis o Sci ironi, w o o ds t at religious experience is rooted in everyman’s awareness that he has a ‘destiny’ ( .e ., a destiny intrinsic in is nature as creature) w ic transcends eart y i e: “T e destiny o uman i e is outside t at life: that is what being mortal means. Destined to die, he is also destined eyond t e possi i ities o i e. Li e itse , owever, existence as suc , is a journey outwards, an exodus, a transit. Man can grasp his limit, going beyond it without transcending it” (Scilironi

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[1994], p. 123); human existence, therefore, indicates its definitive possi i ity y pointing to t e gi t o eterna i e w ic comes from God, Lord of life and death (Cf. Ibid .). And, as an atheistic p i osop er as written, spea ing a out Migue de Unamuno, “[B]e ieving in God is e ieving in is power to rescue us rom death, in his paradoxical and triumphant capacity of overcoming t e inevita e, a ter somet ing irrepara e as occurre (C . Savater [1999], p. 23). Precisely because of its origin in the knowledge of the world and o t e se , now edge o God is c aracterized y t e synt esis of all the types of knowledge that logically come before it, a synthesis that brings together the cognitive process of going from t e e ects to t e cause (re itus ) and t e metap ysica process o deriving all things from God ( exitus ). Based on this convergence, Max Scheler has asserted that man not only knows God in lumine mun i ut a so nows t e wor d n umine Dei (C . Sc e er [1915], pp. 74–75); and Romano Guardini has grasped an analogous truth: the notion that man has of God corresponds to the notion that he constructs a out imse , as creature and as son, wit a dignity t at derives from being created “in the image and likeness of God”, and ecause o w ic man’s “iconic vocation” is t at o “ eing imse ”, i.e ., o recognizing imse and accepting imse as an image o God, given to himself from the hands of God (Cf. Guardini [1952], pp. 337–338).

Chapter Two

The Rationality of Believing in General

There is faith whenever what another affirms leads to certainty a out t ings not o vious or visi e, a “mystery” as it were. Historical faith in the events of the past, or in the friend who reveals aspects of his inner life, are both acts of faith in natural mysteries. Accepting w at God revea s is an act o ait in supernatura mysteries. ebrews 11:1 reminds us, “Faith is…the proof [Greek: é enc os] o t ings not seen.” Some rationa ist t in ers pretend t at t e notion o ait in divine revelation entails contradiction. They base the resulting specious controversy on t e dia ectic etween evidence and non-evidence (c . Severino [1995], [1999], and [2000 ]). It is a question then of showing that a believer who accepts statements that are neit er o vious nor prova e e aves w o y reasona y. Suc an act of faith responds to precise norms of the logic of correspondence. Bouillard wrote La Logique de la foi (1963) based precisely on such norms. In ot er words, ait is t oug t, and t ere ore now edge. As Augustine wrote,

re ere est cum assentione cogitare; qui cre it cogitat, et credendo cogitat et cogitando credi […] Fides, nisi cogitatur, i i es [To e ieve is to t in wit assent. He w o elieves thinks: he thinks by believing and believes by thinking […]. Un ess ait e t oug t a out, it is not ing] ( De raedestinatione sanctorum , II, 5).

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Moreover, it is a question of proving that faith is in function of truth unction o trut or etter t at it is itse

T e ogica structure o act o

e ieving somet ing

Let us egin y c ari ying exica misunderstandings. As a amous sc o ar remar s, Our idea o t e act o ait , wor ed out a ove a or religious ends, is a historical amalgam of various elements rom Jewis t eo ogy and rom Gree r etoric. T ese two distant and contrasting cultures came together in the Septuagint and t ence into t e New Testament, w ere t ey left their imprint. […] Such processing of the central core of belief was never homogenized. Despite the attempt by reormers and re igious movements at imposing t eir unitary conception, the differences were perpetuated and increasing y diversi ed t roug centuries o dogmatic quarre s and theological explanations, to say nothing of ingenious naïve trans ations. T e starting points were mn and pistis the Hebrew and Greek terms for ‘belief’ respectively. The meaning as grown in vastness and comp exity down to our days. The result is that after innumerable additions and variations o sense we nd ourse ves, even in a speci cally Christian context, with a notion of faith so confused, intricate and ambiguous as to cause increasing uncertainty (Need am [1972], pp. 51–52). Given t e undenia e di cu ty, et us c ari y one t ing at a time. Let us egin y stating t at t e term ‘ ait ’ as a di erent meaning in each of the following: C assica Gree p i osop y; The Bible;

he Rationality of Believing in General

33

Jewish theology; Cat o ic t eo ogy; Protestant theology; Psychology; Psyc oana ysis; Sociology; Cu tura ant ropo ogy. I will begin with today’s philosophical usage, leaving the others or ater i and w en necessary. One o today’s p i osop ica usages de nes ait as an inte ectua , ut not conceptua , intuition of the being to which we belong. This is, for example, the meaning o Jaspers’ ‘p i osop ica ait ’ ( er p i osop isc er G au e . A most all Catholic philosophers reject this notion; they don’t mind, though, using the term ‘faith’, not to denote accepting a testimony (w ic wou d entai an interpersona re ation), ut to denote t e relation between human mind and something more or less impersonal, which they call ‘the mystery of being’. Such relation allegedly springs rom perceiving an ‘onto ogica di erence’ etween entities and being. Entities are things, being is not. I remember coming across this usage in an old work by Fabro, first published in 1965, w o speci ca y mentioned Husser (c . Fa ro [200 ], pp. 510-12). The same usage appears in an essay by Cardinal Angelo Scola, Being is u timate y unattaina e y man. Tec nica y, eing cannot be deduced. But it can be communicated in the sign (event). In t e sign, eing revea s itse y questioning the subject and demanding assent. As event, being is always in a sign. As reve ation, t e event o eing a ways questions a conscience that can receive it. Freedom and reason must necessari y concur in giving assent to eing. Nevert e ess man is not in a position independently to know the conclusion o eing’s appea to im. Tec nica y, man cannot te

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apart the difference in the origin of things communicated to im. In t is sense, t e u timate structure o t e act wit which conscience links itself with reality is that of the act o ait , ut not o generic ait (Sco a [1997], p. 16 ). T e aut or uses a notion o ‘ ait ’, connecting it to a ‘reve ation’, and to an act o reedom concurring wit reason in order to ormulate the assent. This is precisely the notion of faith I intend to examine ere. He does not re er, owever, to a questioner w o is a rea one (a person), communicating to t e ot er a trut ot erwise unattainable. ‘Revelation,’ therefore, is neither something gratuitous nor an event. W en a su ject revea s somet ing to anot er, what is revealed must be different from the knowledge of being in general. The latter is the universal and necessary apprehension of a given onto ogica orizon wit in w ic one exists and can t in . Any reference to ‘freedom’ is rhetorical, for it is impossible to think that the knowledge of being can happen or not, or can happen to me and not to ot ers. T e paradigm o ‘ ait ’ as a transcendenta structure of conscience has been adopted by many philosophical currents of thought. Bernhard Welte, for instance, founds religion on a “transcendenta ait ,” de ned as “Fait t at ma es up existence, for it is what in the very first instance makes possible existence itse .” (We te [1983], p.9). T e sc o ars rom Mi an T eo ogica Facu ty ma e use o the term ‘transcendental faith’ to place faith properly so-called in a context w ere ait appears possi e or a toget er necessary (c . Co om o, ed. [1990]). W i e not accepting t ese aut ors’ transcendental paradigm, I share their intention, for it is motivated by t e need or epistemic unity. As we s a see, suc need can on y e coherently satisfied by means of the categories employed in dialogue between subjects, i.e . of truth by testimony. Persons must appear on t e orizon o t e eing o t ings, ut testimony presupposes t e


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truth that everyone may attain by direct experience as well as by roo .

Fait as

o ing to e true’

T e act o ait is indirect now edge. Experience and proo are orms o direct now edge, t e ormer t roug t e senses and the latter through reasoning, but faith is knowledge not attained direct y, i.e ., wit t e su ject’s own inte ectua capacity. In suc now edge, t e su ject, aware o is imitations, transcends t em by entrusting the self to someone else’s knowledge. Nevertheless, w at t e su ject is oo ing or, even wit an act o ait , is t e trut of things. In the realm of faith, the logic of correspondence is the only valid logic. Aesthetic, ethical, and least of all pragmatic logic are o no use (see Anscom e [1979]). The act of faith, logically considered, can be defined as an assent, made with certainty, that a given proposition is true. This means t at it corresponds to t e trut o t ings, even t oug t e subject is not in a position to verify such correspondence ( adaequatio , either by immediate evidence or by mediate proof — the truth o t e proposition is guarantee y anot er su ject, a t in ing eing who acts as witness. Now the essence of a thought that thinks something as true on the basis of testimony is precisely the need for trut . T at is w y direct and indirect evidence are not satis ying — the mind demands the truth of things it cannot see, for they are invisi e y nature, ut t e mind senses t em to e rea , i.e ., o exist and ave a certain nature. Nietzsc e denied t at ait may attain truth because he denied that thought may attain truth: “What is ait ? Every ait is to o d somet ing as true ( Fürwa r a ten . Extreme nihilism maintains that every ‘faith,’ every holding something as true is necessarily false, for there is no such thing as a real

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world. It is then an illusion with a certain perspective. Its origin is in ourse ves, w o need a restricted, imited and simp i ed wor d” (Friedrich Nieztsche, Posthumous fragments Milan: Adelphi, 1979, p. 1).

Dia ectics an Et ics o Testimony

In the rational process leading to the act of faith, the logic that eads to resu ts is c aracterized not on y y t e now edge attained, but also by the subject’s personal interest on being questioned by a testimony. Such interest is the sum total of his affective dispositions: positive or an open mind, or negative, w et er dictated y legitimate prudence or by illegitimate prejudice. Jürgen Habermas noticed this type of logic in the second half of the twentieth century (c . Ha ermas [1973]), ut it was a ready nown in t e rst half of the nineteenth century. John Henry Newman wrote, It is monstrous to see a w o e system o a priori o jections against [Christian] doctrine, while the powerful corpus of externa evidence supporting it remains unassai a e! It is as if one wanted to refute Newton not by uncovering defects in is reasoning, ut ecause e was a priori convinced o the ridiculousness and absurdity of the heliocentric theory. In rea ity, externa evidence must rec on wit t e asic criteria with which we judge the truth or falsehood of everyt ing proposed to us. […] And interna evidence depends a great deal on the moral sense […] We are playing with fire if, instead of considering the argument seriously and ersevering y wit t e intention o ascertaining t e trut of things, were to consider it superficially, in bad faith or wit indi erence (T e Letters an Diaries o Jo n Henry Newman ed. C.S.Dessan et al., Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978, pp. 21 & 170).


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ineteenth-century Jewish thought insistently highlighted the ant ropo ogica and et ica va ue o testimony in re ation to existential truth. A witness is credible, according to this thought, when is behavior shows that the certainty of the truth he testifies to is a so ute, in t e sense t at e is ready to put is i e on t e ine or it. Thus, the Jew philosopher Franz Rosenzweig wrote, ncient gnosis considered desperately static truths, like mathematics, as starting points, without however succeeding in going eyond or a ove t em. Suc trut s s ou d be considered, from now on, as limit cases, in the same way as rest is a imit case o motion. W at we oug t to consider as starting points are higher and more supreme trut s, o ten scorned as eing ctitious, postu ates, or mere needs. Starting from such truths, not absolutely important and t at everyone ta es or granted, one proceeds a ong the way that leads further, attaining truths for the sake of which one is ready to stake everything, which cannot be asserted wit out putting one’s i e on t e ine (Rosenzweig [1937], pp. 395–396). In light of such considerations, Christian philosophy had attained the same conclusions, as Balthasar’s apt expression, “Only ove is credi e” (c . Ba t asar [1966]). More recent studies ave ighlighted the ‘moral role’ of the witness: his moral qualities, his visi e credi i ity, are decisive in t e process t at causes a person to e ieve in t e testimony o anot er regarding t ings o w ic e cannot attain the knowledge (cf. Welte [1983], pp. 100-102; Doni [2000]). Freedom acts as t e oad- earing structure o t e act o ait . This is the decision to believe. That is why the act of faith entails not on y risk ut a so merit . T ere is merit ecause t ere is courage in taking up the risk, especially as regards positive values. Merit is

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also highlighted by the fact that the certainty of faith can withstand t e unavoida e attac o dou t. In any case, its certainty is mora , not physical or metaphysical or logical. Those who belittle moral certainty must necessari y e itt e every ot er type o ait , uman, and even more so, divine.

Be ieving in t e teac er’s aut ority

We must ac now edge t at ait in testimony is a structura characteristic of man’s rational behavior. Man spares no effort in seeking the truth of what he thinks. He does not rely exclusively on is individua resources. He ma es use o dia ogue, a ove a in t e time-honored form of education, in paying attention to the teachings of the elders, the teachers. T e gure o t e ‘discip e’ is rom time immemoria c aracterized by faith in the teacher. Only by faith in the teacher (faith that he is telling the truth) does one pass from simple ‘listening ( udire )’ to proper y ‘ earning ( iscere ’. T e isteners ( u itores ) ecome learners (discentes ) or disciples. To trust in a master is to practice t e mora virtues o ‘doci ity’ (see Mi án Pue es [1963]). I t e on y way o earning, o anyt ing y anyone, is to ave recourse to a master, it is indispensable to believe the master, to be able and wi ing to ave ait in is teac ing and t us acquire t e empirica or istorica now edge t at e may ave. Aristot e said as muc : He w o wants to earn must e ieve is teac er. Aquinas adds,

mnis […] ddiscens oportet quod credit, ad hoc quod ad erfectam scientiam pervenia [Whoever wants to learn


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must believe if he wants to attain perfection in what he nows] (Summa t eo ogiae II-IIae, q. 2, art. 3). The master ought to make the disciple grow (augere ) in knowledge. He is auctor , ut it is necessary or t e discip e to ac now edge t is auctoritas (authority). On acknowledging and accepting such aut ority, t e discip e enric es is now edge. He t en adds to is sc ent a ( is persona experience) and rat o ( is own t in ing) w at one who knows more communicates to him. Augustine remarked on t is p enomenon twice, What we believe we owe it to authority; what we know [understand] we owe it to reason ( De uti itate cre en i XII, 25; and Retractationes , I, 14, 25. The two texts are identica except or one word: in t e etractationes e says know” instead of “understand.”). ugustine does not contradict me in my contention that believing is a form of knowledge. His scire (knowing) and ntellegere (understanding) stand or now edge y experience and y reasoning respectively. In seeking truth, to rely on a testimony about the truth of t ings ot erwise attaina e y one’s persona e orts entai s giving up the effort of observing and thinking. That is why doctrinal or scienti c aut ority is t e wea est motive o assent to a proposition t at purports to te t e trut . T omas Aquinas, re erring to t e argument of authority in debate, whether of Christian or pagan aut ors, says t at, “ ocus a auctoritate, quae un atur super ratione umana, in rmissimus est [Re ying on aut ority, and ence on uman reason, is the feeblest way of debating]” ( Summa theologiae I, q. 1 art. 8). There are truths attainable, but not attained, by someone who endeavors to do so by observation and reasoning; and it is not a

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question of always accepting a certain truth by testimony. If someone does not quite manage to now somet ing y persona e ort, while others do manage, it is more than reasonable that he should see t e e p o someone w o sees and nows. Human communication, a ter a , is ased on trust in ot er peop e’s competence and sincerity. English-speaking philosophers have called this ‘principle o c arity’ (c . Longato [1999]), w ereas Continenta persona ist p i osop ers ca it ‘commun o personarum (Gryege [1999]). It is eminently reasonable, therefore, to expect that God, who lowers imse to spea to men, s ou d revea supernatura mysteries. To conclude, let us get rid of the rationalistic prejudice that deems it ‘prejudice’ to trust another’s doctrinal authority, in any historical context or circumstance. C ristian T omasius du s as “prejudice” “wherever authority and rashness intervene” (cf. raeiudicium auctoritatis et praecipitantia in Lectiones de praeiudiciis , 1690). All the aut ors o t e En ig tenment a or under t e same prejudice, “T e general enlightened tendency is not to admit any authority, and judge everything exclusively in terms of reason” (Gadamer [1960], p. 320). Kant sports t e same attitude in is interpretation o t e Aufklärung “Have the courage to make use of your own mind” (Beantwortung er Frage: Was ist Au k ärung? , 178 , § 1). Gadamer remar s, “It turns out t at t e overcoming o a prejudices, which is the absolute commandment of the Enlightenment, is a prejudice itse . By overcoming it, it wi e possi e adequate y to now t e imits not on y o our uman essence ut a so o our historical consciousness” (Gadamer [1960], p. 324). Human life mani ests in a most a its aspects t e a so ute rationa ity and reasonableness of faith in the authority of those who know. Augustine pointed out, I considered the innumerable things that I believed, without aving ever seen t em or aving een present w en


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they happened. There were historical events, places and towns never visited, riends, doctors and ot er peop e’s stories, and other things that, if we did not believe them, we wou d ard y ac ieve anyt ing in i e (T e Con essions VI, 5, 7).

Testimony as a source of scientific knowledge

Even science at times needs human testimony. That is where its data come from, especially when the very object of a given science is inaccessi e direct y, w et er to scientists or to anyone. T is is t e case of history, based exclusively on the testimony of protagonists or spectators of past events; of psychology, which makes use of reports a out t e inner experience o consciousness, neit er accessi e nor verifiable to the scientist from outside. Except for the behaviorists, who rely exclusively on observation, psychoanalysis and other psyc o ogy-re ated discip ines ma e use o t e testimony o t e su jects under examination as their primary source of information. ll in all one can say that, even if the argument of authority is wea , it is an argument nevert e ess; in many cases t ere is no better option, and there will never be; and in all cases, “[T]o contradict suc an argument, one a ways needs an argument o greater va idity t an aut ority” (Martin [1993], p. 123). The sociology of knowledge shows that every society, today’s even more t an yesteryear’s, is essentia y ased on t e communication o now edge y ormation and in ormation. Its ogica mec anism is authority/credit on one side and trust/faith on the other. Socia re ations imp y, sooner or ater, t e ogic o testimony. In all cases this is faith in human words; when divine revelation is istorically ascertainable, it is also faith in the Word of God. The c assica t in ers considered common consent on certain princip es as an important indication of truth, to the extent of formulating

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the principle that what all and at all times consider as true, must be true (c . Aristot e, Nicomac ean Et ics 1153 27-28; Averroes, n the soul according to Aristotle’s III book , ed Crawford, p.409 §§ 651652). T omas Aquinas, starting rom t e princip e t at “not ing comes rom not ing,” wrote, W at is eing repeated a ways and y a cannot e a together false. A false opinion is like a sickness of the mind, in t e same way as a wrong judgment a out appearances may be due to a disordered sense. Now every single defect appens by accident and not according to plan. What is accidenta cannot appen a ways and to a […] ut t is is what happens in the case of a universal judgment about trut : it cannot e a se ( i er e veritate cat o icae ei II, ch. 34). When all is said and done, let us remark that the logic of correspondence never allows recourse to authority, whether of one person, o society as a w o e, or even o ‘tradition’, to anyone w o has the capacity — and the duty — to seek truth. Consensus can never replace, not even in politics, the personal assent to evidence o served persona y and ac now edged in one’s su jective, individual experience. Aristotle himself, for all the importance he gives to the opinion of qualified majorities ( endoxa ), underscores that individua judgment a ways comes rst. Conventiona wisdom as no value in certain issues, and the ‘ endoxa ought to be weighed up and judged in t e ig t o trut persona y attained, i.e ., one’s persona criterion. T e rst and main en oxon is w at everyone orms in his conscience, anterior to taking stock of what the others may t in and o accepting t e opinion prevai ing in t e socia mi ieu (see Fait [1998]). Concluding, knowledge based on testimony ought to be valued wit a ance, a ove a or uman va ues em edded in a certain


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tradition. Every civilization has a tradition as the basis of its cultura identity. T is is a sum tota o traditions, re igious, po itica , artistic and leisure. In making use of reason, neither individual nor collective social consciousness can leave apart “reasoning historica y” (see Gadamer [1960]; Ortega y Gasset [1986]). T at is w y in the culture of all peoples much wisdom is handed over in the orm o narration: myt ica , re igious, mora , po itica and artistic (Ricoeur [1983]). Gadamer remar ed, “Is it true t at a iding y tradition is per se to be a victim of prejudice and suffer a limitation to our reedom? Is not our very uman existence, even t e most ree, imited and conditioned in many ways? I suc is t e case, t e ideal of reason free from everything, as is usually suggested, is not a rea option or umanity” (Gadamer [1960], p. 32 ).

Historica

now e ge

The Greeks coined the term ‘history’ to denote the careful o servation o natura p enomena. Etymo ogica y as muc as semantically, it denoted an immediate experience of material realities resent here and now (see Hager [1974], col. 344; Livi [2000a], p. 126). For the Romans, ‘history’ still meant the critical consideration of contemporary events. Only later did the term come to indicate a concept re ated to w at essentia y cannot e experienced: past and future as such, and the hidden rationality behind all events, past resent and uture. C ristian t eo ogy, particu ar y esc ato ogy, is responsi e or the shift. Late antiquity thus received a new notion of time, i.e ., ast, present, and uture t at ave a eginning and an end. T ere is motion towards a final goal, and hence a ‘sense’. This sense is imarted by the various changes that affect the things of this world. It

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is termed ‘progress’. This notion of history as sum total of world and uman events, orn o C ristian t eo ogy, wi orever remain an irrevocable patrimony of philosophy (see Gilson [1931-1932]), but t is ‘p i osop y o istory’ wi inevita y tend to return w ence it came, i.e . t eo ogy (see Löwit [19 9]; Caste i [1952]; Maritain [1957]). In p i osop y, t e term ‘ istory’ is o ten used today to indicate t e tempora nature o a t ings, t e dynamic dimension o human life, the changes inseparable from every aspect of human cu ture: anguage, art, custom, socia structures. In t is sense, uman immediate experience is also historical. Man is aware of being immersed in history, perceiving in the self the result of a sum total o p ysica , io ogica , ant ropo ogica , socia and re igious in uences. These have been produced by ancestors who have thus determined him intrinsically; furthermore, his life develops in touch wit a wor d o persons and t ings equa y c aracterized y eing historical. We shall not tackle here historical experience as much as historical knowledge . The difference lies in the fact that the latter is possi e exc usive y y testimony, and t ere ore it is socia and indirect. I postulate three levels of historical knowledge: direct now edge or experience, in irec now edge or ait , and scienti c re ection w et er p i osop ica or t eo ogica . T e re ections are what the Germans call eisteswissenschaften (sciences of the spirit). Yet, not everyone agrees. Di t ey, or instance, ignores t e midd e eve , “T e primary condition or a science o istory ies in t e act that I myself am a historical being, and that he who studies and investigates istory is a so t e one w o ma es istory” (Wi e m Dilthey, esammte Schriften, vol. VII, Berlin 1938, p.278). By ‘historical knowledge’ I mean neither the common experience o tempora ity nor t e p i osop ica /t eo ogica attempts at understanding the ‘sense’ of cosmic and human time. I mean the knowledge that men of a certain time may have of the past,


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i.e ., events affecting men who lived before them. Such events are nown y t e testimony o monuments, documents and ora transmission. Let us begin by distinguishing carefully between the knowledge o t e are acts and t eir interpretation, more or ess p ausi e, y means of classification, causal connection or analogy. The second orm o now edge is ermeneutics, p i osop ica or t eo ogica . It u y e ongs to t e searc or trut , ut y in erence, w ic is dea t with elsewhere (see Livi [2002], pp. 123-163). Historical knowledge in t e strict sense, regard ess o t e istoriograp ic tec niques eading to it, stops at t e rst, indispensa e p ase: t e survey o the facts of the past. Their interpretation, in order to give them ‘sense’ comes ater (see Marrou [195 ]). To con er sense to istorical events is the most compelling challenge of historical knowledge. It has often been repeated that when the framework of time is inserted in a design, w ere t e end in unction o w ic everyt ing appens appears in the end, the sense that spreads from such events transforms their simple happening one after another into history. History is orn on y w en ‘sense’ radiates over time, and events are no longer casual ‘happenings’, but part of a design that gives them meaning beyond their having simply occurred. Evident y t e pro em can e posited on y in t e context o realism. For idealistic historicism the knowledge of the past is no longer a problem, neither for the past as past (ontological premise) nor or its now edge (epistemic premise). In act:

For t ose w o ive in t e present, t e past is not a rea ity unattainable without the testimony of others. Monistic idealism rings everyt ing to a sing e consciousness, t e t oug t o t e Spirit (der Geist . This single subject has also a single object, the Self. The past is essentially identical to the present. Thanks to t e dia ectics o overta ing/conservation [ u e ung , a ast events are essentially conserved, even though necessarily

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overtaken. This is valid also for the future: the future is implicit y contained in t e present, waiting to ecome exp icit. Idea ism as it t at to now and to interpret istorica events is one and the same thing. They are both forms of self-knowledge, t e Su ject’s awareness. Monastica y understood, t e Subject has done everything in the previous phases of its own deve opment. Its activity is sti wit in It, w o e wit in t e Whole. Hegel wrote, T e universa viewpoint o t e p i osop ica istory o t e world [die philosophic Weltgeschichte is not universal in the a stract, ut in t e concrete and a so ute y actua . It is t e Spirit, which eternally lives in Itself, and for which there is no past. As Hermes is t e guide o t e peop es, so t e Idea is the true guide of the peoples and of the world. It is the Spirit, wit its rationa and necessary wi , w ic as guided and still guides world events. We want to know now the way in which the Spirit guides the world (Georg Wilhelm Friedric Hege , or esungen ü er ie P i osop iegesc ic te ed. 1822). Concluding, I have set the problems of historical knowledge in the framework of realism because to say “historical knowledge” makes sense on y i y now edge one understands t e re ation etween an individual human subject living in limited time and space, and an object which, even if not directly attainable, by experience or inference, can e nown on y indirect y, y testimony.


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Historical knowledge as based on moral certainty

Let us not get trapped y t e enticements o istoricism, and remain faithful to common sense evidence. This speaks to us of a lurality of subjects, of the inaccessibility of the past, and of the ossi i ity o gat ering in ormation a out it rom witnesses’ accounts. Historical knowledge will thus be understood for what it is: truth sought by testimony, not by reflecting on experience. The ast is no onger actua . It is metap ysica y exc uded rom direct experience, for experience and the presence of its object are linked in act. T e past is t ere ore a orm o natura ‘mystery’ t at mar s an insupera e oundary to uman experience. It is insupera e not in the sense of being always and necessarily unknowable, but in t e sense o eing a ways and necessari y nowa e t roug ot er eop e’s experience. A orms o istorica now edge: economic, social, religious or political, but not philosophical or theological, ave t eir inner ogic, y w ic one can attain reasona e certainties. Such certainties cannot belong to the physical order, and are not direct. Since the events are not physical, biological or astronomica , ut products o uman acts, it o ows t at: They cannot be deduced from metaphysical principles, as necessary causes o certain e ects necessari y produced. T ey are as contingent as can be, for human freedom is utterly unredicta e and decisive in e ecting istorica events. T ere is however an element of determinism, in the form of laws of syc o ogica and socio ogica e avior. s ar ac as t e En ig tenment sc o ars ad c ear y ormulated the criterion of correspondence entailed in historical now edge: c ec on t e trustwort iness o t e witnesses, understood as “proofs of what cannot be known directly since it belongs to the past” (cf. Nicolas Fréret, Réflections sur l’étude

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des anciennes histories, et sur le degree de certitude de leurs proeuves, in Mémoires e ’Aca émie roya e es Inscriptions et Be es Lettres t. VI, Paris 172 ). However, at the same time the ‘Pyrrhonians’, at work since the turning point of philosophy with Cartesian rationalism, were directing t eir s arp criticism at t e very possi i ity o attaining certainty from the witnesses of the past. Vico had taken a decisive stand in favor of ‘common sense’ to get out of the blind alley of mathematic rationa ism. Vico re-va ued t e trut o istorica now edge y distinguishing between ‘true’, ‘likely’ and ‘certain’. He was also t e rst epistemo ogist o trut y means o istoriograp y (c . Borg ero [1983]). A few years after the publication of Vico’s Principles for a New Science , t e Frenc Encyc opé ie ad t is to say: Historical facts, past, present and future, to which we assign some sort o destiny, ave to do wit pro a i ity, since we ignore their causes. Knowledge about the past and t e present, even t oug ounded on testimony a one, often produces in us a persuasion like that of an axiom (d’A em ert, Discours pré iminaire e ’Encyc opé ie , ed. Köhler, Hamburg 1955). Historical knowledge ought to be considered within the limits o its capacity or te ing t e trut . C ar es Sanders Peirce acute y remar ed t at istorica now edge is intrinsica y wea , ecause of the difficulty of sifting through sources and ‘documents’ with sufficient certainty, going back to the people who give witness of t e past (c . T e Logic o Drawing History rom Ancient Documents in ollected Papers , vol. VII: Science and Philosophy , Burks ed., Cambridge, Mass. 1958). The characteristic of knowledge based on testimony, w ic cou d we e ca ed ‘wea t oug t’, as een


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dramatic for Christians, creating what is known as “Lessing’s problem.” The problem consists, on the one hand to realize that the C ristian ait must o necessity e ased on istorica now edge, and on the other that such base can be doubted, since the certainty of testimony is no more than moral. Lessing used to say that the assing o time ad e t e ind a ‘c asm ( ra en)’ etween is contemporaries, imse inc uded, and Jesus C rist (c . Gott o Ephraim Lessing, Über den Beweis des Geistes und der Kraft , 1777, in Lessings Werke Hi d urg au en 1870 vo . IV, pp. 83– 88; 86). He wrote, “I I ad ived in Jesus C rist’s time, I wou d ave ad such faith in him as to submit my reason spontaneously to is” (Gott o Ep raim Lessing, Über den Beweis des Geistes und der Kra t cit., p. 8 ). Lessing’s pro em” was tac ed and overcome y Kier egaard, who re-valued moral certainty and re-dimensioned an exclusively t eoretica certainty. Today’s p i osop ica criticism as good reasons for keeping together historical and meta-historical truth.

Historical knowledge and the truth of history

Historica uman events are ot e ative (tied to a certain time and space and more or less important for subsequent events) and ontingen (they could not have happened, for being the result o uman reedom, persona or co ective). Some ave conc uded that the truth about a relative, contingent event must itself be relative and contingent: “Since trut in respect o a se ood is a sign o now edge, t e division o now edge into muta e or contingent and immutable or necessary, must apply also to truth. Historica now edge is non-necessary, t ere ore contingent. Necessary now edge transcends istory. T e rst possess istorica , t e second, meta-historical truth” (Seidl [1990], p. 84). The reasoning is

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substantially correct. Nevertheless, from the point of view of language p ease note t at in view o my oregoing argument it is not right to speak of “historical truth” as a lesser species of truth for eing re ative and contingent. Re ativity and contingency ave to do wit t e onto ogica rea ity o t e event o t e past, not wit its logical truth. The adequate and certain knowledge of a relative and contingent event, present or past, is not a re ative and contingent trut , ut an a so ute one, i.e ., va id or a and or ever, neit er refutable nor re-mouldable by anyone. Let us re-read Seidl’s second essay: “Know edge t at as to do wit muta e t ings or conditions is true for as long as such things or conditions remain the same, not when they change. Truths that depend on contingent acts are t emse ves contingent. For examp e, to now t at Ber in is the capital of Germany is true only for the period during which Berlin was actually the capital of Germany” (Seidl [1997]). Not rea y. A judgment asserting somet ing t at e ongs to t e past, i stated in its correct historical terms, is absolutely valid (true). To say “ erlin was the capital of Germany until 1945 is and will always e a so ute y true, even i in 19 5 Bonn ecame t e capita o West Germany and things changed once again later. Seidl seems to accept my argument, ut restricts is acceptance to on y two aspects: essentia /metap ysica and t eo ogica : Historica trut as to do wit uman acts and concomitant events in time. They are understood by the mind, toget er wit any tempora e ement. As soon as t e mind refers acts and events to certain effective principles in them, suc as t e uman rationa sou t at transcends istory, it may consider such acts and events independently of their duration in time.(Ibid .) This is correct, yet in a limited way. It is moreover applicable to very ew cases. W at is a ways app ica e is t e existentia criterion:


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the event that could have happened did in fact happen, irreversi y and immuta y. It cannot e made to ave un- appened. T e judgment about it is now absolute: it is absolutely true that such an event did happen at such a place and time. Augustine grasped this ‘eterna ’ aspect o uman trut in t e now edge even o present and past trivia. He went back up to their source, the eternity and immuta i ity o t e divine inte ect, w ere a t e events o istory are present toget er. We can t ere ore assert wit Rein o d Laut [cf. [1966]) the absolute un-historicity of truth [ bsolute Ungeschlic ic keit er Wa r eit ] . Historica trut is t ere ore a so a so ute, ecause a judgment per ect y adequate to an event t at occurred in a certain place at a certain time expresses an enduring truth, even if t e rea ity to w ic it re ers as not endured (see a so We te [1993] and [1996]).

Revealing one’s interiority

One o t e certainties o common sense is to ac now edge t at there are others, similar to the self. Such ‘similarity’ is attained by means of an intellectual operation: the perception of analogy. The xed route, a ong w ic suc ana ogica perception moves, is t e same route leading to the knowledge of self: starting from external, empirically verifiable actions, one arrives at the perception of spirit, i.e . a eing endowed wit inte igence and reedom. From the subject’s faculties one arrives at the subject’s universal nature. T e now edge o t e ot ers is t ere ore simi ar ut not equa to t e now edge o se ; w ereas t e now edge o se comes down to one’s personal individuality , that of the others stops at their abstract rationa nature, t eir a stract c aracter o persona eings, endowed with freedom and responsibility, of rights and duties, and concomitant dignity. But their subjectivity as such is precluded to another.

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The human subjects are relatively closed in respect to one another, as Lei niz ad t eorized wit is “monads.” T eir su jectivity is a closed book reciprocally speaking. Here is the metaphysical foundation o t e ‘onto ogica mystery’, sum tota o desires, wants and secret t oug ts usua y ca ed ‘conscience’, utter y out o ounds to the direct experience of another. All is left is testimony, confidence, t e ‘ ros ogion or t e reve ation o one’s interiority, Newman’s or a cor oquitur . As Léonard says, t ere are many ways o approac ing another’s interiority, but the decisive one, still founded on analogy and t ere ore indirect and a usive on y, is dia ogue: There are many means to find out what happens in the inner se o anot er. T e simp est consists in a num er of spontaneous physical reactions to an external stimulus. T ey do not deceive, ut t e communication t ey a ford is limited. Voluntary gestures and facial expressions revea more, ut t ey can a so air deception; t ey do a low a certain entrance in the interior universe of a person. T e most su t e and e cient is wit out dou t t e spo en word. Thanks to its flexible and infinitely malleable character, anguage ma es possi e to exc ange experiences and ideas incommunicable by any other instrument. It allows, though, the worst lies, for the interlocutor is not in a position to veri y t e coincidence etween words and thoughts. That is why the most revealing language, speech, is a orm o testimony. Since it is unveri a e, t e interlocutor must have faith in what is being said. And what if t e one w o spea s egins to con de persona aspects o is intimate life! We can do no better than ‘believing’ that ‘testimony’. It is a ‘reve ation’ o t e se , a so ute y unverifiable externally. Every form of human communication is t us trans-rationa . It escapes an ex austive outer c ec . Generally speaking, I cannot but rejoice at it. What miserable knowledge would I have of the others and the world


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were I to limit myself to the knowledge attainable by my own resources! (Léonard [1998], p.3) To accept t e testimony o anot er concerning is interior wor d is to adopt t e met od o ait . In t is particu ar case, it is human faith that arrives at a significant truth. It is, however a necessary instrument or iving toget er wit t e ot ers, ut unattainable except by having faith in what they say. Kant had noticed the inscrutability of another’s conscience. In is view, t is was a imit to t e carrying out o justice in society. He observed that every person in an ethical community is free to conform or not, within his conscience, to “pure moral legislation;” the ot ers are not, or wi ever e, in a position to esta is a criterion, rational or tangible, to know whether that person has or has not conformed to universal moral principles. It is impossible to know t e rig t intention o anot er, ecause we on y see externa ities, ut not his true inner world. At this point Kant introduces the notion of a heart-searching God [ Herzenskundiger : Only God, in fact, knows the intimacy of everyone’s intention, and on y He can see to it t at everyone is rewarded according to the merit of his works, as it must happen in every community (Immanue Kant, Die Re igion inner a der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft ed. Karl Vorlander, Felix Meiner Ver ag, Ham urg 1966, p. 108). Phenomenological anthropology has made great strides in this e d, especia y or w at concerns interpersona re ations o riends ip and ove (c . Stein [1917]; Wojty a [1960]), and interpersona relations of formation and education. The issue of the revelation o one’s interiority is equa y important in psyc o ogy and psyc oanalysis. There, the introspective methods have shown their constitutional limitations. Anglo-Saxon analytic philosophy has also

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uncovered a great deal of speculation in the problem of ‘privacy’ in ed to t e possi i ity o ‘ e ieving in someone’ w en suc a person reveals his interiority (cf. Anscombe [1958], [1979]; Balsvik [2003]).

Fait in ivine reve ation

As regards knowledge by testimony, the Christian event has introduced t e undamenta distinction etween ‘ uman’ and ‘divine’ faith. The latter is specific to Christianity based on supernatural, i.e ., divine, revelation. It began with the prophets of the O d Testament and pea ed wit t e teac ings o Jesus, t e Word of God made man. This installs the New and everlasting Covenant. As Hebrews reads, “In times past, God spoke in partial and various ways to our ancestors t roug t e prop ets; in t ese ast days, e spoke to us through his Son” (Heb 1:1). Faith in revelation is essentially faith in God’s word: the witness o t e mysteries to e e ieved is God imse , Deus seipsum revelans as the Constitution ei Verbum of Vatican II says. It is somet ing utter y di erent rom uman ait in anyone, owever aut oritative, i e ait in t e now edge o a great teac er, or in t e sanctity of a great religious leader. In t e ig t o suc distinction, we can see t at t e Gree pistis as itt e or not ing to do wit t e C ristian notion o ait in divine revelation. The only thing they have in common is the notion o certainty, understood as rm and undou ted assent. Clement of Alexandria, the first theoretician of the Christian faith, had taken note of this: Aristotle teaches that faith is the judgment that follows certain now edge, on t in ing t at a t ing is true. In t is


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sense, faith is superior to actual knowledge, because it is its criterion (Stromata II, , 15). He continues to s ow t e speci city and superiority o t e C ristian ait (c . Sear y [1999]); in act, ait in divine reve ation is not simply a certain assent. It has three specific, peculiar dimensions:

Soteriology : faith in divine revelation is directly related to the ro em o re igious trut at its core: sa vation ( soteria ; Mystery : to have faith in divine revelation is to access mystery roper y so ca ed, i.e ., to somet ing rea ut not evident, or being beyond today’s human sense apprehension. Supernatural mystery e ongs to divine transcendence, or it concerns God’s intimate i e and is design o sa vation; risto ogy : ait in divine reve ation is t e now edge o t e mystery o sa vation passing t roug t e word o t e on y possible testimony: the Word of God made man. As divine Wisdom, e as direct and persona now edge o t e mystery, and as Man he is accessible to men and communicates with them making use of their language. Concluding, when the term ‘faith’ is referred to Christianity, it should not be confused either with the human act of faith or even ess wit any re igious e ie as a mani estation o re igious experience dealt with elsewhere (cf. Livi [2002a], pp. 107-123). In fact, Christianity does not stop at claiming to be true religion on t e asis o con orming to w at according to rig t reason is a true religion. Christianity claims to be he true religion, therefore t e on y re igion, wanted y God or a man ind. At t e price o causing ma evo ent, s arp y osti e, reactions, C ristianity ee s t e duty of asserting to be not a true religion among others, but he

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true religion, because it is not a human attempt at getting in touch wit God. It is not an invention or an intuition o t e uman mind, penetrating divine mystery. It is not a rebirth of religious archetypes present in t e su conscious. It comes rom God. Its origin is not uman. It is divine, ecause it is t e resu t and t e expression o a revelation that God, almighty and eternal, has made to men at given moments o istory. C ristian reve ation is God’s se -maniestation and se -giving. It is a series o words, actions, gestures, with which God manifests his mystery, his will and his projects, giving imse , is ove and is grace. T us does God enter uman history, by communicating himself to chosen men and through them brought to the rest. Faith is the human answer to God’s selfmani estation and se -giving. Hence, T e distinction etween eo ogica ait and e ie in t e ot er re igions, must e rm y e . I ait is t e acceptance in grace of revealed truth, which “makes it possible to penetrate t e mystery in a way t at a ows us to understand it coherently” (cf. John Paul II, Fides et ratio, n.13), t en e ie in t e ot er re igions is t at sum o experience and thought that constitutes the human treasury of wisdom and re igious aspirations, w ic man in is searc or truth has conceived and acted upon in his relationship to God and t e A so ute (Congregation or t e Doctrine o the Faith, Declaration Dominus Iesus 6 August 2000).

art Two

Why Believing in Christian Revelation is R ational

Chapter Three What Believing in Divine Revelation Means

T omas Aquinas is t e medieva t in er t at est i ustrated t e rationa ity o t e ait . He identi ed its dynamics, starting wit “motives” to believe and proceeding by invariably verifying the relia i ity o t ese motives: When there is good will as regards the faith, man thinks a out it again and again [ super ea excog tat , pondering a the reasons that militate in its favour ( Summa theologiae II-IIae, q. 2, art. 10). The classical notion of faith, in crisis since Descartes, reappeared in Lei niz, w o was a Cartesian t in er wit an Aristote ian mind and a strong Christian background. He wrote: Faith is a simple act of assent. Assent, properly understood, cannot be given unless there is a good reason for it. He who e ieves or no reason may e in ove wit is own antasies, but it is not possible that he seeks truth (Gottfried Wi e m Lei niz, Nouveaux Essais : in Die p i osop isc en Schriften, ed. C.I. Gerhardt, vol. V, Berlin 1890, p. 477).

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Reason for Believing

Kant’s dichotomy: dichotomy: knowing/believing knowing/ believing

In t e wa e o ate Cartesian rationa ism, mar ed y Wo and Baumgarten, it was Kant, a modern Lutheran thinker, who took a decisive turning point in tackling faith philosophically. He c as ed ead-o -onn wi witt tradi diti tioon y ma ing is meta tapp ysics cs,, mora s and religion revolve around the presupposition that ‘to know’ and ‘to e iev evee’ ar aree ir irrrec ecoonci a e oppo possites es.. For im im,, ev eveery ac actt o ai aitt is mere y ‘su jec ecti tivve’, rati tioona y un unjjus usti ti a e. To e iev evee ( g au en) is not the same as to know ( wissen because faith is not amenable to de demo mons nstra trati tioon, and and t er eree ore it cann cannot rea reacc an in inte terr-s -suu je jecti ctive ve conse co nsensu nsus. s. To e ie ieve ve is to o d so some mett ing as tru true, e, ut pr priv ivat atee y (Privatfürwahrhalten), in the sense that the certainty that I have a out w at I e iev evee is mi minne an andd no one e se’s (c . ritik er reinen Vernunf B, B, II, § 73: ed. Reclam-Kehrbach, p. 99). But Kant was a phenomenologist to begin with. He denied the notion of truth as t e correspondence etw tweeen t oug t an andd t ings rom t e word go. Hence, he presupposed that the thing “in itself” is unknowable. Therefore, Therefore, his positio p ositionn is irrelevant ir relevant to the problem I am argua rguing a out ere. W en Ka Kannt denoun unce cess t e ac o “o ject ctiivi vity ty”” in faith, all he means is that there is no inter-subjective “consensus,” which only the transcendental use of reason ( llgemeine Menschenver ernnun t co couu d guar guaran ante tee. e. Suc re reaso asonn do does es at attai tainn now ed edge ge o reality (Wissen , but it is limited to phenomena, even though shared sha red y a t e nowi winng su jec ects ts or ein ingg tr tran anssce cenndenta (c . Odero [199 992]) 2]).. Wit Wit su succ ass assum umpt ptio ions ns,, itit is is no not surp surpri risi sing ng t at Kan Kantt should remove every rational foundation to history as human faith as we as to re igious us,, supernatur uraa ai aitt in t e C risti tian an sense o e ievin ievingg in divin divinee rev revee ati ation on.. He we went nt so ar as to say t at on onee as to trust faith in order to overcome baseless certainties about God and t e mora aw:

What Believing in Divine Revelation Means

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Ich musste also das Wissen aufheben, um zu Glauben Platz zu bekommen [I had to set knowledge aside so as to leave room or or e ie ] (Kritik er reine Vernun B, § 30: 30 : ed. Reclam-Kehrbach, p. 26). s Cornelio Fabro observed, “Kant’ “Kant’ss error was wa s to have opposed faith to knowledge. He reserved to faith the sole sphere of reason ta en y tr tran ansc scen enddenta Idea Ideas, s, t us ri ring ngin ingg in intto ein ingg a dou e antithesis: senses/intellect and intellect/reason. Such metaphysical idealist antithesis can only be overcome by bringing into it a transce cenndenta pri rinncip e, in w ic ai aitt ec ecoomes rea easson in act ct..” (F (Faa ro [2004], p. 488). Post ost-Kant -Kantian ian rati ration onaa ism ism,, Ja Jaco co i exce except pted ed (c . Livi [1 [199 992]), 2]), as een par arti ticu cu ar y impati tieent wi witt t e idea o ai aitt in Rev evee ati tioon. Johann Gottlieb Fichte, in his youthful enthusiasm for Kant, Ka nt, went went An Atso ar as to write Versuc einer Kritik a er O en arungen ( An temp te mptt at at a Cr Crit itiq ique ue o a Re Reve ve at atio ionn , pu is ed in t e year 1791. For Hegel, who conceived Christian religion only as a step toward u se consciousness o t e Spirit, “ ait is a certainty e d wit out immediate intuition of the senses, and also without being able to compre end t e need or w at it says” (Georg Wi e m Friedric Hegel, Glauben und Wissen, 1802, I, I, § 1). Many European and American philosophers are still sharing t is o d position against t e rationa ity o C ristian ait . For t e Italiann philosopher Emanuele Severino (cf. Italia (c f. [1995], [1995], [1999], [1999], [2002]) faith is an incomplete and contradictory certainty, because of its conncomitan co antt dou t. As t e o ject o ai aitt is not o vi vioous us,, Severino concludes that doubt is, and must remain, part and parcel of the faith. Another A nother Ital Italian ian thinker, th inker, Paolo Paolo Flores Flores d’Arcais, ironically ironica lly parapar aras ases es Jo n Pau II II’’s ency cycc ica as Aut Fi es Aut Ratio (c . [20 [2000] 00],, . 123). The American philosopher Richard Rorty, together with t e Ita ian Gi Giann annii Vat atim imoo, wr wroote an es essa sayy, “T e Futur turee o Re igioon,” in w ic C ri gi rissti tian an ai aitt is adm dmiitt tteed on y i it ex exppun ungges rom

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itself any kind of rational rational foundation foundation (cf. Rorty-V Rorty-Vattimo [2004]; c . a so Vatt attim imoo [199 996]; 6]; [20 [2000]). 00]). As man manyy av avee re ut uted ed su succ pos posiitions (cf., among among them, [Sgubbi [2004], and a nd Larrey [2005]), [20 05]), myself incc uded (c . Li in Livi vi [2 [200 000d 0d]) ]),, I wi not do it er ere. e. T es esee pe peoop e dei erate y ignore not on y t e es esssenti tiaa di erence etw tweeen ‘pro em’ and ‘mystery’, ‘mystery’, but also al so the role of knowledge k nowledge by testimony and that o t e moti tivves o credi i ity ty.. T es esee e ements ar aree es esssenti tiaa or a ratioona oun ti unda dati tioon o t e e ie ieve ver’ r’ss ce certa rtain inty ty.. Su Succ oun unda dati tioon is no nott private, but public, public, for it is communicable (see Bouill Bouillard ard [1963]). [1963]). Pope Jo n Pau II as re ent es esss y in inssis istted on t e co cogn gniiti tivve c ar ar-acter of the faith. He has explicitly refuted the thesis t hesis that faith is not knowledge absolutely speaking. speaki ng. It is for sure a “relative” “relative” knowledge, in t e se sense nse o ei eing ng co cons nsci ciou ouss o its own imi imitat tatio ions ns o my myst stery ery and not science. But it gives light, and is capable of directing a whole life. The ignorance of this feature of the faith is a consequence of t e in uence o a au t nding way o t in ing app ied to t e C ristian faith: Some contemporary philosophical schools seem to exert a strong influence on theological currents […]. They take easure in und unders erscor coring ing t at man man’’s undam undamen enta ta atti attitud tudee is to seek the infinite without ever attaining the end. Theoogians w o see t ings t is way a rm t at ait is not certainty but an unknown quantity, not clarity but a leap in t e dar (aposto ic etter atec esi tra en ae, 16 16 Oct ctoo er 1979, § 60). A ater document document o t e Ho y See as expanded expa nded on t is concept. Faith by its nature appeals to the mind, because it reveals to man t e tru rutt a out is des esti tinny an andd t e way to attain it. Even though revealed truth is way above our human talking, and our concepts are imperfect before the


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unfathomable that surpasses knowledge [Eph 3:19] it nevert e ess invites reason, as a gi t o God to attain trut , to enter its ig t. Reason ecomes t us capa e to a certain extent of understanding what it believes (Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, onum Veritatis , § 6).

Faith in divinely revealed truth

Christianity claims to be not only a true religion, but also he only true religion. It is therefore necessary to clarify on what logic suc c aim stands or a s. T e C ristian ait is ait in divine y revealed truth. It has been rightly emphasized that every statement o ait in divine reve ation is a proposition: it imp ies an o ject o now edge, a trut , a e to ma e t e e iever certain t at e or s e ‘knows’. Suc now edge is indeed pecu iar, ut a sum tota o pecu iarities do not ta e away its trut , as many European and American hilophers pointed out (see Gollwitzer-Weischedel [1965]; Conesa [199 ], pp. 123–13 ;). Nevert e ess, many ot ers sti insist in confusing lack of obviousness with impossibility of knowing; but as observed earlier, any faith, human or supernatural, is always a form o now edge, a eit indirect since t e o ject is not evident to t e knowing subject. As regards the Christian faith, it always claims to be certain knowledge of supernatural mysteries on the grounds of God’s Word. It is true t at t e now edge o w at is not o vious, owever guaranteed by the motives of credibility, does not make visible what is invisible, but gives a certain notice of it. It allows the ta ing into account o a certain rea ity persona y unperceived ut somehow ‘communicated’. Bi ica y, in ot t e O d Testament and t e New Testament, t e term ‘ ait ’ is am iguous. Its two meanings, not a ways we

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understood as really different, have rendered many interpretations o t e re ation etween ait and reason just as am iguous. T e basic meaning is cognitive the derived one, pragmatic . A hurried, iased exegesis, in uenced y t e anti-inte ectua Protestant tradition, as privi eged t e second meaning at t e expense o t e rst. The right interpretation can be read in Eastern theologians like Cyri o A exandria, The same term ‘faith’ stands for two realities. The first has to do wit t e trut o w at one e ieves. By an act o ait the soul understands and accepts as true, for his personal good, a divine y revea ed proposition […]. T e second is charismatic. It is a particular grace granted by Jesus Christ; […] T is c arisma o t e Ho y Spirit is directed not on y towards accepting divine truth, but also towards carrying out tas s way a ove uman strengt (Fi t Catec esis on aith and on its profession, 10: Migne, Patrologia Graeca vol. XXXIII, p. 518). Going back to Scripture, Paul uses the metaphor of the mirror to i ustrate ow we now. Seeing a re ected image o t e o ject is to now it somew at, even t oug not yet ‘ ace to ace’ ( roso on pros prosopon), i.e ., directly. Faith is nevertheless knowledge, but partia . At present I know partially; then I shall know fully, as I am u y nown. […] We oo not to w at is seen ut to w at is unseen; for what is seen is transitory, but what is unseen is eterna (1 Cor 13:12). That knowing the faith should be understood as considering it true is proved y Pau ’s (and Jo n’s) po emics on ort odoxy, w ic exclude heterodox error.


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I am amazed that you are so quickly forsaking the one who ca ed you y [t e] grace [o C rist] or a di erent gosel (not that there is another). But there are some who are distur ing you and wis to pervert t e gospe o C rist. But even if we or an angel from heaven should preach (to you) a gospe ot er t an t e one t at we preac ed to you, let that one be accursed! As we have said before, and now I say again, i anyone preac es to you a gospe ot er t an the one that you received, let that one be accursed! (Gal 1: 6–9). Paul’s doctrine latches onto the Old Testament concept of revea ed trut , as t e doctrine o t e Fat ers, ot Eastern and Western, particu ar y Augustine, atc es onto is: Wit out t e s ig test esitation Augustine gives C ristianity its due place […] in the context of rational philosophy. He is in per ect continuity wit t e rst t eo ogians o Christianity, the second-century apologists. He is also in continuity with the position assigned by Paul to Christianity in t e rst c apter o Romans, in turn ased on t e sapiential theology of the Old Testament, which goes as far ac as t e Psa ms t at moc at t e gods. C ristianity as its precursors and its preparation not in other religions, but in p i osop ica rationa ity. Bot Augustine and i ica tradition concur in not basing Christianity on mythical images and premonitions […]. T ey ase it on w atever divine can be perceived by rationally analysing reality. Exressed anot er way, Augustine identi es i ica monotheism with the ancient philosophical views about the foundations of the world. This is what Christianity claims rom t e time o t e speec at t e Areopagus: to e t e true religion. The Christian faith is not based on religion or po itics, t e two great sources o re igion; it is ased on knowledge (Ratzinger [2000], pp. 45–46).


Thomas Aquinas concurs. He defines faith in revelation as one o t e possi e orms o inte ectua assent, i.e ., a possi e rational certainty, “Faith entails the assent of the intellect to what one e ieves” [Fi es importat assensum inte ectus a i quo cre itur ] (Summa t eo ogiae q. 1 art. ). But as the object is not evident, the intellectual assent of faith entai s t e intervention o t e wi , “To e ieve is an act o t e inte ect, w ic assents to divine trut at t e urging o t e wi moved by divine grace” [ redere est actus intellectus assentientis divinae veritati su imperio vo untatis a gratia ivina motae ] (Summa t eo ogiae q. 2 art. 9). The term ‘assent’ is used in the documents of the solemn Magisterium t at treat o t e C ristian ait . T e Second Vatican Council (1965), in continuity with the teaching of Vatican I (1870), defines faith as the act through which, “[…] man abandons himself w o y and ree y to God, paying t e u omage o ot inte ect and will to God who reveals [cf. First Vatican council, Dogmatic Constitution ei Filius ] and giving voluntary assent to His revelation” (Dogmatic Constitution ei Ver um § ). Finally, Fides et ratio makes use of the expression “unity of trut ” to point out t at ait is now edge o trut as muc as, w en not more t an, experience and science. Supernatura reve ation, in fact, comes from the same God who created the world, con erring on it t e inte igi i ity t at a ows one to t in o it in trut (c . Jo n Pau II, encyc ica Fi es et ratio 1 Septem er 1998, § 3 ). T e now edge o divine mysteries made possi e y ait does not end in a series of rational propositions about ‘divine things’ (Die göttliche Dinge ). Faith puts the human person in direct touch wit God imse . Suc re ation wit t e revea ing God, one and triune, transcends objective knowledge. It consists in the mystical life, where non-objective knowledge is supreme. Even so, one must


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not lose sight of the fact that even mystical knowledge has a logical oundation. Its core, certain and communica e, is t e certainty o faith asserting something objective. Because the subject is firmly convinced of the truth of all that he believes, based on God’s word, is persona invo vement wit t e o ject o ait is tota . Mysticism is not opposed to the objective truth of what one believes; it presuposes it. An aut entic re ation wit God presupposes in act not to remain enc osed in su jectivity, ut getting out o it t roug an act of authentic knowledge: the mutual relation with the other.

Rationalism and Fideism are errors stemming from the same misun erstan ing o t e rationa ity o t e act o ait

ndré-Mutien Léonard, bishop of Namur, rightly distinguished etween “event” ( istorica trut ) and “content” (t eoretica /doctrinal truth). They are both attained rationally, albeit by different routes. He wrote, “Rationalism pretends to enclose both event and content o Reve ation wit in t e domain o reason, as i t e trut of faith were necessarily its product. Fideism, on the other hand, rejects the rational basis of the act of faith, and therefore presuposes t at t e very event o Reve ation as no need to justi y itse rationally. Faith becomes a matter of personal conviction” (Léonard [1998], p. 3). Persona ,” in t e a ove quote, rea y means ‘su jective’, ‘incommunicable’. In fact, every conviction is personal, but not every one o t em can e communicated and s ared on t e grounds o common or universa y accessi e reasons, usua y, ut improper y, called ‘objective’. (cf. Livi [2002a]). C ristian doctrina tradition as de ned ait according to Heb 11:1:

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Faith [ pistis] is the realization [ hypostasis] of what is hoped or [ rom God] and evidence [e enc os] o t ings not seen [the supernatural mysteries] T e Latin Vu gate, popu ar in t e Midd e Ages, rendered t e Gree as: “ ides est substantia rerum sperandarum, et argumentum non ap parentium.” T omas Aquinas made use o t e same i ica verse to emp asise t e certainty o t e supernatura act o ait : t e certainty is firm (substantia , motivated ( rgumentum) but at the same time ac ing immediate evidence ( on apparentium). He avers t at such faith is an act of the intellect, a thought, an item of knowledge, but with certain characteristics. It is not mere opinion (uncertain now edge) ut rm certainty. Suc certainty, owever, does not stem from experience, as direct knowledge, or from reasoned scientific argument, as indirect knowledge. He specifies the certainty of t e act o ait wit t e o owing contrast: In common wit scienti c now edge, ait as t e c aracter of firm and determined assent. It therefore differs from opinion, which accepts one of two contrary hypotheses but ears t at t e ot er may e t e true one. It a so di ers rom doubt, which wavers between the two. In common with opinion, ait as t e unavai a i ity o rea ities inaccessi e to the mind, and that is where it differs from science as muc as rom experience (In Li rum Boet ii e Trinitate , q. 3 art. 1). […] The believer differs from the doubter, because t e atter does not give a menta assent ut remains neutra . The believer also differs from one holding an opinion, because t e atter does menta y assent, ut wit t e ear t at the contrary hypothesis may be the true one. Finally the believer differs from one holding certain knowledge, but o tained t roug rationa argument. One can rig t y say, then, that faith lies somewhat between science and opinion (Aquinas’ Commentary to Rom 1:17).


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Hence, it is impossible to understand the Christian notion of ait y equating ait to ou t . Some contemporary aut ors, at loggerheads with the doctrine of the Church, do just that. The authentic doctrine can be read in its Catechism: Faith is first of all a personal adherence of man to God. At the same time, and inseparably, it is a free assent to the whole trut t at Go as revea e (Catec ism o Cat o ic C urc n. 50. Emp asis in t e origina ). Let us then point out here that the Christian faith claims to “ta e as true” t e Gospe message, doctrina y and istorica y. T e latter is the decisive aspect. The first Christians were aware of this, as we read in Ignatius o Antioc : Shut your ears when someone speaks about things other than Jesus Christ. He is of the stock of David, son of Mary; e was tru y orn, ate and dran ; e was tru y persecuted under Pontius Pi ate, cruci ed and died e ore eaven, earth and Hades. And he really resurrected from the dead (To the Christians of Tralles 8, 2: Funk 1, p. 210). Justin, the first philosopher convert to Christianity, insists in ca ing C ristian doctrine “p i osop y”; and in is irst Apo ogy on Behalf of Christians , he explicitly connotes Christian doctrine as a sum tota o statements to e accepted y t e mind, “No one s ou d approac t e Euc arist w o does not e ieve w at we teac ” (66: Greek Patrology , vol. VI, p. 427). ew years ater, C ement o A exandria decisive y oug t t e idea that Christian doctrine was no more than a “ doxa :” faith in divine reve ation is not ar itrary e ie ut true and proper now edge ( gnosis ). It is indeed the most certain knowledge, for it is anchored

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in God’s very wisdom: “Faith is the power of God, for it is the strength of truth” ( Stromata II, 9, 48). We continue to nd simi ar expressions in t e o owing centuries. For instance: God’s Providence too care o t is, taug t it and proposed it to the eyes and hearts of believers: the Lord Jesus Christ oug t to e nown as tru y resurrected, or e was tru y born, suffered and was buried [ oc providential Dei curavit, oc ocuit, oc suorum et ocu is insinuavit et cor i us, ut Dominus Iesus Christus vere agnosceretur resuscitatus, qui vere erat natus et passus et mortuus .] (St Leo t e Great, Seron 1, 3. Migne, atin Patrology, vol. LIV, p. 396). Mentioning t e armony etween ‘reason’ and ‘ ait ’ a ways presupposes the correspondence between the mind and the reality of things believed by divine revelation. Otherwise it would not be possi e to spea o ‘rationa ity’ o t e ait . Theology results from the blend of biblical faith with Greek rationa ity, w ic orm t e asis o istorica C ristianity in t e New Testament. T is is most evident in Jo n’s de nition o C rist as t e “Logos.” That text therefore expresses the conviction that reason is mani ested in t e C ristian ait , and undamenta y at t at. It also wants to say that the root of being is reason, and that reason is not a casual by-product of a hypothetical primeval ocean of unreason. T ere is a dou e a rmation in t e C ristian act o ait : 1) Reason is manifest in the Christian faith. Faith itself postulates reason precisely for being faith. 2) Reason is manifest through the C ristian ait ; reason presupposes ait as its own vita space (c . Ratzinger [1987], p. 147).


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God himself, revealed in Christ, is witness to the Revelation

I I ave ca ed t e C ristian ait “divine,” it is ecause its core is God testifying to himself. The term ‘testimony’ ( martyria is central to the New Testament, above all in John. See for instance I Jo n, w ere t e trut o reve ation, o ject o t e C ristian ait , is insistently linked to human testimony. This is taken to be a faithful echo of God’s witness in Christ: The Spirit is the one that testifies, and the Spirit is truth. So there are three that testify, the Spirit, the water, and the ood, and t e t ree are o one accord. I we accept uman testimony, t e testimony o God is sure y greater. Now t e testimony of God is this, that he has testified on behalf of is Son. Whoever believes in the Son of God has this testimony within himself. Whoever does not believe God has made im a iar y not e ieving t e testimony God as given a out is Son. And t is is t e testimony: God gave us eternal life, and this life is in his Son (1 John 5: 8-10). We s a see present y t at Jesus’ credentia s are t ose o “ ait ful testimony” of God: not in the sense of being one among many rop ets, men w o spo e on God’s e a , ut in t e sense o eing God’s own Word made “ es ,” and ence perceiva e y men. They have been given abundant proofs of truth, complete proof of is a so ute credi i ity (see Parenti [2000]), so as to now t at, “in him dwells the whole fullness of the deity bodily” (Col 2:9), Vatican II teaches, The Father completed and perfected Revelation and conrmed it wit divine guarantees. He did t is y t e tota fact of his presence and self-manifestation –by the words and works, signs and miracles, but above all by his death

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and glorious resurrection from the dead, and finally by sending t e Spirit o trut (Dogm. Const. Dei Ver um § ). Patristic literature is rich in explicit references to the testimony that God gives of himself in the person of the Son. The very early Letter to Diognetus says: Tru y, no man as ever seen God, or as made im nown to others. God revealed himself, and only to those who believe, for only he who believes has the privilege of seeing God. […] God conceived in is eart a great design o love, which we could not know about. He communicated it exc usive y to is Son. T at is w y during t e time w en e did not manifest himself, we could think that he was neg ecting us and was not t in ing o us. But w en e, through his most beloved Son, revealed to us what he had in mind rom t e eginning, and made us understand it, then he offered us all his benefits. He showed us his gifts and made us see and understand t em ( etter to Diognetus , 5: Funk, 1, 325). Ireneus o Lyon, one o t e ear iest Fat ers and apo ogists, wrote, o one can now t e Fat er wit out t e Word o God, i.e ., the Son’s revelation, and no one can know the Son without the Father’s benevolence […]. The Word knows t e Fat er, invisi e and inde na e y us, ut even i ine fable He knows how to speak of him. […] By manifesting imse , t e Son gives us t e now edge o t e Fat er; in fact, the knowledge of the Father comes only from his Son’s mani esting it to us. Everyt ing we oug t to now is manifested to us through the Word. Now the Father has made us now t e Son so as to ma e imse nown to all through him. He has wanted to receive all those who


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believe in the Son in sanctity, incorruptibility and eternal rest ( Against Heresies IV, 6, 3). Despite contrary assertions, medieva t eo ogy was u y conscious o t e essentia y C risto ogica c aracter o t e reve ation o the supernatural mysteries. In a liturgical poem, but of great specuative interest (see Wie oc [1998]), T omas Aquinas condenses the act of faith in very few words, “I believe everything that the Son of God said: nothing is truer than his true words” [“ redo qui qui ixit Dei Fi ius: ni i oc ver o veritatis verius” ( ymn Adoro Te Devote . This means that for the believer, faced with a statement of C ristian ait , t e most important t ings are, rst to re y on t e moral certainty of history and Scripture to know that it was Jesus to propose it (“the Son of God said”); then, to have the moral certainty t at Jesus is tru y t e Son o God made man, w o revea s the mysteries of salvation. He is divine wisdom, in a position to say of himself, “I am the truth.” That is how Thomas underscores the ersona istic structure o t e C ristian’s act o ait . It is an attitude of absolute trust in Christ’s words, once one has ascertained that he is God and t at e as said certain t ings. Rationa inquiry, ta ing stoc o t e pream es o ait and t e motives o credi i ity, puts together all that serves to ascertain that Jesus did actually prove to e God made man, and t at e actua y said certain t ings. It a so re ies on metap ysica and ogica certainties, y w ic t e statements are seen rationally possible, i.e ., not contradictory and not a surd. T e next step is made up o mora certainties, i.e ., trust in God who, as the First Vatican Council says, “can neither deceive nor be deceived” (Dogmatic Constitution ei Filius ). o t is is a ready part o t e rst ormu ations o C ristian doctrine by the Fathers of the Church. The Mystagogical Catechesis of Jerusalem, for instance, says,

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Jesus explicitly said that bread is his body. Who will dare dou t t at? He said t at t e wine is is ood. W o wi deny it, and assert that it is not? We must therefore receive t ese t ings wit a so ute certainty, nowing t at t ey are the body and blood of Christ (Migne, reek Patrology vol. 33 p. 1098). Let us observe that the structure of the act of faith is a complex one. Every undue simp i cation o it entai s t e oss o t e true sense of the Christian faith. The said structure intrinsically links, without confusing them, the epistemological criteria of human ait wit t ose o divine ait . Human ait (e.g. istory) p ays an indispensable role in the approach to God who reveals; even a ter t e instauration o divine ait , C ristian i e sti ma es use o proposa s entai ing uman ait . Examp es are t e c arismata of various Founders, with their proposals of specific pathways to sanctity wit in a common C ristian spiritua ity; ot er examp es are private revelations. The teaching of the Church concerning such things is, The approval of the Church to a given private revelation is no more t an a consent, granted a ter care u examination, for the revelation in question to be made known for the edification and good of the faithful. Even if approved by t e C urc , suc reve ations do not deserve an assent o Catholic faith, .e ., faith in divine revelation guaranteed y t e C urc . T ey deserve uman ait , prudent y given, in the measure to which such revelations are probable and credi e to pious persons. Hence, a Cat o ic may deny assent to such revelations and take them in no consideration, provided t is is done discreet y, wit good reasons and without spite. [Benedict XIV] Private apparitions and reve ations are neit er approved o nor condemned y the Holy See: they are admitted as credible by pious and


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reliable persons on the basis of the credit deserved by the witnesses w o re ate t em (Vatican Congregation o Rites, decree 6 February 1875).

Faith in Divine Revelation is Linked to Historical Knowledge

To accept the Gospel as revealed truth means to be certain that the events described there are historically true. The ‘history of salvation’, made up o t ose events, mani est God’s project o ove. St Ignatius of Antioch, a Father of the Apostolic Age, is quite passionate about this, I thank Jesus Christ our God for having made you so wise; I see t at you are p anted on an uns a ea e ait […] You firmly believe in our Lord Jesus Christ; you believe that he tru y ‘descended rom David according to t e es ’ (Rom 1: 3) and he is son of God according to God’s will and power; you e ieve t at e was tru y orn o a virgin; t at e was baptized by John ‘to fulfill all righteousness;’ (Mt 3: 15) that e was truly nailed on the cross for us in the flesh under Pontius Pi ate and Herod t e tetrarc ( or we are t e ruit of his Cross and his blessed Passion); you also firmly believe t at wit is resurrection, e as raised is standard or t e centuries, to gather under it his saints and his faithful, Jews as we as Genti es, in t e sing e ody o is C urc ; e as suffered his Passion for us to be saved; and suffered really, as a so rea y e resurrected y is own power. I now and firmly believe that even after the Resurrection he is in his flesh; when he appeared to Peter and his companions he said: ‘Touc me and see, ecause a g ost does not ave es and bones as you can see I have;’ and they touched him, and e ieved in t e rea ity o is es and o is spirit ( etter to the Christians of Smyrna , I, 2: Funk, 1, 235).

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Historical knowledge, i.e ., human faith in the testimony of past events, p ays a particu ar y important ro e in anding down t e faith in divine Revelation. For our contemporaries it is in fact possi e to now t e events o t e istory o sa vation, and particu ar y Jesus’ resurrection, on t e asis o t e c ain o witnesses going a the way back to the Apostles, who were the first. If this human faith in t e istoricity o t e resurrection ased on t e uman ait o t ese witnesses ad no trut -va ue or us men o today, we wou d lack a reasonable moral certainty of the truth of the facts handed down. T e w o e structure o t e C ristian ait , understood as possession of the truth that saves, would come crashing down, for being false at its very basis (see Aletti [1996]). From Christ to the Witnesses Chosen by Him

For us moderns to ave ait in C rist as saviour, it is essentia to understand the role played by human mediation, i.e ., by our contemporary witnesses. They hand down to us a message going back a t e way to t e Apost es, and rom t em to Jesus imse . As Vatican II teaches, Christ’s revelation is handed down the centuries in a c ain, wit its rst in in t e person o t e Apost es. T ey received Jesus’ mandate to e t e witnesses o is resurrection and to teach in his name: Christ the Lord, in whom the entire Revelation of the most high God is summed up (cf. 2 Cor 1:20; 3:16–4, 6), commanded t e Apost es to preac t e Gospe , w ic ad been promised beforehand by the prophets, and which he u ed in is own person and promu gated wit is own lips. In preaching the Gospel they were to communicate t e gi ts o God to a men. T is Gospe was to e t e source of all saving truth and moral discipline (Vatican II, Dogmatic constitution on Reve ation, Dei Ver um, § 7).


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In the Gospel Jesus demands two standards of faith. Of the c osen num er o t e Apost es, c oser to im and destined to a articular mission, he demands that they acknowledge him as God made man. As motive of credibility he exhibits the miracles, last and most important t e resurrection. O every ody e se e demands t e same certainty about his being God made man, guaranteeing only t e witness o t e rst ones. T ey wi o er t e motives o credi i ity. He says t is very t ing to T omas, Have you come to e ieve ecause you ave seen me? Blessed are those who have not seen and have believed (Jn 10: 29). The ‘blessed’ are those who believe Thomas’ and the other Apostles’ witness. T e Apost es understood t e ogic o t e reve ation o suernatural mysteries by the Incarnation of the Word, as well as the institution of the Church, with themselves as foundation stones. Peter says to t e Jews, God raised this Jesus; of this we are all witnesses. […] T ere ore et t e w o e ouse o Israe now or certain that God has made him both Lord and Messiah, this Jesus w om you cruci ed (Acts 2: 32 & 36). T e God o A raam, of Isaac and of Jacob, the God of our ancestors, has g ori ed is servant Jesus w om you anded over and denied in Pilate’s presence […]. But God raised him from the dead; o t is we are witnesses (I i 3: 13–1 ). T is man God raised on the third day and granted that he be visible, not to a t e peop e, ut to us, t e witnesses c osen y God in advance, who ate and drank with him after he rose from the dead ( Ibid . 10: 40–41). But God raised him from t e dead, and or many days e appeared to t ose w o ad come up with him from Galilee to Jerusalem. These are [now] is witnesses e ore t e peop e. We ourse ves are

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roclaiming this good news to you that what God promised our ancestors e as roug t to u ment or us, t eir children, by raising up Jesus (Ibid. 13: 30–33). This logical sequence is of extreme importance, but some insist on ignoring it: if the visible signs rendering credible Jesus’ divinity ave een empirica y veri ed on y y privi eged witnesses, this means that everybody else ought to solve the problem of Jesus’ credibility fte them. In other words divine faith (believing that God revea s imse in Jesus) necessari y presupposes uman ait (believing the Apostles who saw the risen Jesus and spent 40 days toget er wit im). T e need to pass t roug ait in t e Apost es, on t e grounds o t eir o y i e, martyrdom and extraordinary charismata, evidently responds to a providential plan. The foundation o t e C urc y C rist is a istorica extension o t e eart y sojourn o t e Incarnate Word. T e Apost es and t eir successors, up to our day, are the backbone of the sacramental presence of C rist w o revea s. T e connection etween uman and divine faith forms an integral part of God’s project, by which he wants to communicate supernatural mysteries to men. Human faith, with a its strengt and wea ness, is part and parce o t e act o divine faith. Let us re-read Peter praising the faith of the first disciples of the Apostles: Although you have not seen him you love him; even though you do not see im now yet e ieve in im, you rejoice wit an indescribable and glorious joy (1 Pt 1: 8). Comparing t is passage wit Jo n’s account o T omas, t e “not seeing” does not refer to Jesus’ divinity, which is a supernatural mystery to e e ieved wit divine ait . It re ers to is umanity a ter t e Resurrection. T e Apost es “saw” t at and “touc ed it with their hands.” Everyone else has to believe their words, i.e .,


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make an act of human faith. St Augustine commented on this passage t us: Thomas saw and touched the man, but confessed his faith in God w om e neit er saw nor touc ed ( ommentary on John’s Gospel ). Jo n’s Gospe , and is rst etter, read: It is this disciple who testifies to these things and has written t em, and we now t at is testimony is true (Jn 21:2 . This is the second epilogue to the Gospel). What was from t e eginning, w at we ave eard, w at we ave seen with our eyes, what we looked upon and touched with our ands concerns t e Word o i e — or t e i e was made visible; we have seen it and testify to it and proclaim to you the eternal life that was with the Father and was made visi e to us — w at we ave seen and eard we proc aim now to you, so that you too may have fellowship with us (1 Jn 1: 1–8). As biblical investigations have exhaustively shown (see Aletti [1996]), t e w o e o t e New Testament, and particu ar y Lu e’s scrupulous historical survey, announce the Good News in the form o narration, t e iterary orm most apt to t e istorica c aracter o t e trut to e announced. s time passed, the first generations of Christians, above all the contemporaries o Jesus and t e Apost es, passed on. Ever since, t e witness of the Apostles became a witness of past events, a historical one. Among the characteristic of such witness is now the necessity to ac now edge t e aut enticity o t e documents t at t e actua witnesses wrote and by which they intended to hand down what they had seen and touched. After his conversion to Christ, the Platonist Justin presented t e C ristian ait to t e pagans t us:

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The Apostles left written testimony called “Gospels.” In t em t ey anded down t at Jesus… (First Apo ogy on ehalf of the Christians , § 66. Migne, Greek Patrology , vol. VI, p. 27). Tertu ian states more precise y: During his entire time on earth, Christ Jesus our Lord revea ed w o e is, w at e ad een e ore, t e wi o is Father, and what man ought to do. He revealed all of this u ic y to t e peop e, ut a ove a to is discip es privately. Among them he chose twelve that they might share in is teac ing, w ic is addressed to t e w o e wor d. Therefore, as he was about to return to the Father after the Resurrection, he ordered to the Eleven to go everywhere and to communicate is doctrine to a nations […]. T e Apostles (which in Greek means “sent”) chose one of them y ot: Matt ias, to rep ace Judas […]. A ter receiving t e Holy Spirit according to Jesus’ promise, they were enabled to per orm mirac es and to preac . T us did t ey witness their faith in Jesus Christ, first in Judea and then in the w o e wor d y instituting particu ar c urc es […]. In order to know then what Christ revealed to them, we have to stand y t e witness o t ese very c urc es (De Praescriptione haereticorum, 20, 1-9; 21, 3).

Written testimonials and Historical Criticism

Historica now edge is no easy matter. It needs to e verified constantly and rationally. This is why Christian theologians ave a ways inged t eir catec etica , as muc as t eir apo ogetic, wor s on t e veri cation o t e aut enticity o t e sources and their interpretation. In the third century, the four Gospels, later


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canonically approved by the church, were circulating as a single codex. Origen, t e rst great Eastern t eo ogian, too on t e pagan philosopher Celsus, who had tried to discredit the Christian faith precisely by calling into question the historical truth of the Gospe s concerning t e i e and mirac es o Jesus. His attempt at such confutation was Celsus’ booklet titled The True Doctrine ( A êt inos ogos ) and pu is ed a out 177–180. T e oo ad scored suc a success among pagan inte ectua s t at sixty years later, about 245, Origen counterattacked with his Against Celsus . Origen understood t at e ad to de end t e ait rom t e accusation o its eing an irrationa e ie in impro a e or a surd events. The crucial problem therefore was the witnesses. Celsus in act rejected t e testimony o t e Apost es or t eir not eing neutral, i.e ., neither Christian nor pagan. Origen’s opening sentence of his apologia is as follows: Before my confutation, let me state that it is very difficu t, in some cases indeed impossi e, to e in a position to prove the authenticity of every historical event, even if true, and with absolute certainty. He then goes to Greek history and back to the Gospels: We have stated these points of introduction to the story of Jesus as handed down in the Gospels, not to invite open minds to accept an irrationa ait , ut wit t e desire to show that those who study such things need prudence, a lot o time or t eir researc , and oug t, as it were, enter t e mind of the writers to understand in what sense they might ave written a out a certain event (Contra Ce sum I, 2). Origen takes up the challenge about the quality of the witnesses, de ending t e istorica re ia i ity o t e Gospe s. At t e

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same time he rightly remarks that what the Gospel hands down a out Jesus is not pure istory, ut events wit an aposto ic motive. They are meant to convey the Good News as a supernatural truth. He ca s t is “spiritua sense,” w ic can e unrave ed y uncovering t e intention o t e aut ors o t e our gospe s. It is t ere ore necessary to rid biblical exegesis of problems about theologically irre evant acts, extracting instead t e kerygma , t e message t at t e account intends to convey. One o our contemporary exegetes writes: “I think that Origen’s method is still valid. The critical pro em oug t to e aced onest y, aware t oug t at rare y can one attain certainty in historical details. The most important thing remains the sense that the evangelists intended to convey with their istorica account” (Sega a [2000], p. 85). Recent studies have rigorously confirmed the historical character of the gospels. Their account is indeed a peculiar one, differing rom ancient c ronic es as muc as rom t e modern way o writing history. However, these recent studies have exploded nineteenthand twentieth-century criticism imbued with rationalist prejudice. T is T ir Quest as its practitioners ca it, as destroyed a positivist clichés. The first “Quest” denied miracles; the second demysti ed t em. Now, in t e ig t o rst-century Jewis mystics and o t e “magica papyri” t ey ave een re-va ued as a so ute y istorical. Let us then affirm that “a large group of scholars agree on the reva uation o t e istorica p ausi i ity o t e canonica gospe s, ut w at joins t em more is a greater trust in t e past” (Sega a [2000], p. 90). Significantly, Sanders admits: Historians of the ancient world usually warn their readers t at t e o ject o t eir researc gives at most partia knowledge and only rarely certainty […] In the decades 1910–1970 New Testament scholars, aware of such and ot er di cu ties, trou ed t emse ves in asserting t at we know little or nothing about the Jesus of history. Such


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judgement has provoked a reaction of increased trust, especia y in t e ast decades. (Sanders [1995], pp. VII–VIII). Romano Penna, a amous i ist, expounds, By historical truth of the Gospels I mean their historical plausi i ity i.e ., t e re ia i ity o t e origina witnesses anded down by ecclesial tradition from the beginning and written y t e our evange ists. T is means t at it is possi e to prove critically not only that Jesus existed, but also that one can reconstruct a c ear account o is actions, words and intentions, and their influence up to their been put into writing in t e gospe s. For t e ait t is is important. If, absurdly hypothesizing, a historian could show that Jesus was a non-existent myth, the Christian faith would be ounded on not ing (Penna [2000], p. 580).

From t e gospe s to t e Gospe

W at is t e re ation etween t e istorica p ausi i ity o t e four gospels that tell of the life of Jesus and the Gospel, i.e ., the Christian revelation as such? Let us clarify terms first. Referring to Penna’s text, just cited, pay attention to t e use o terms i e ‘ istorical plausibility’, historical reliability of the accounts’, ‘original witnesses’, ‘tradition’, etc. They are all terms proper to historical now edge, w ere it is possi e to accept on trust a witness’ account, judged ‘plausible’. Such possibility is due to the moral certainty of their reliability, added to the evidence of their lives and moral qualities. Sega a conc udes: I we understand t e istorica trut o t e gospe s as trut of the Gospel (Good News), the latter does not fall under t e sieve o istorica criticism. It is t e o ject o ait ,

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the meta-historical truth of Jesus as narrated by the four gospe s. […] T e eyes o ait see t is trut . It cannot e istorically proved. Nevertheless this truth is linked to the ausi i ity and re ia i ity o w at t e gospe s te . (Sega a [2000], p. 86-87). Commenting on Dei Verbum, the Canadian theologian René Latourelle writes, The Council unhesitatingly supports the historicity of the gospe s: t ey te t e trut . T ey preac certain events and their meaning. They ‘faithfully hand down what Jesus, the Son of God, while living among men, really did and taught or t eir eterna sa vation (§ 19).’ T e gospe s ave anded down ‘true things’ (authentic, not false) and sincere (not de i erate y a tered y t e aut ors). W at Jesus said and did has certainly been delved into and understood more in dept , ut not invented or de ormed. T e gospe s were written in the light of the Easter event and under inspiration o t e Ho y Spirit, ut t ey ocus on w at rea y apened . (Latourelle [1998], p. 61. Emphasis in the original; see a so Latoure e [1986]). Summarizing, human faith in the account of Jesus’ life and mirac es, “p ausi e” ecause o t e re ia i ity o t e witnesses, is historically credible. It is therefore possible to have divine faith in Jesus and thus in his saving words. This is a complex, but not comp icated, matter, as are a matters entai ing t e re ation man-God. God is indeed transcendent, but he intervenes in human history with the Incarnation. He reveals to men his designs of salvation t roug t e Gospe o Jesus C rist. Suc designs invo ve t e mu tiple relations of the individual with the human community, the known and unknown events of history, ecclesial tradition, the documents o t e rst evange ization, t e use o ana ogy y w ic


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uman language can attain something of God’s mysteries. The task o critica reason, t ere ore, is not to indu ge in undue and mysti ying simplifications, but to bare the core of meaning that stands out from the complexity of facts and the structures of human knowledge. Romano Guardini is a contemporary philosopher who has paid attention to t e pro ems o istorica now edge. He grasped t e essentia in etween trut in t e Gospe and t e trut o t e Christian event. As early as 1923 he wrote: “Not only because of its supernatura content, ut a so o its unique and unrepeata e c aracter, C ristianity is a rea ity veri a e exc usive y on t e grounds of act . In no way can it be deduced from mere concepts.” ( Auf der Weg , Munc en: Adamas Ver ag). Later e deve oped t e intuition around the idea that Christianity can be believed as true only by accepting the historical truth of Jesus (cfr. Das Wesen des Christentums , 1938). Penna is t ere ore rig t in saying t at “i it is true that history can exist without faith, the Christian faith cannot exist without history. In personalistic terms, a historian may not be a e iever; ut a e iever must some ow a so e a istorian. T e act is that history precludes all that is beyond itself; faith, on the other and, although not founded on history, not only presupposes history, ut a so entai s it wit in itse ” (Penna [2000], p. 56).

T e Historica Event is t e Main O ject o t e C ristian Fait

Fait does not re y on y on specu ative, metap ysica reasons, ut a so, and a ove a , on istorica ones. Know edge t ere, as I ave already remarked, is by testimony. There ought to be continuity, y ana ogy, rom natura reason to reason t at opens to supernatural faith. Natural reason is based on common sense judgements, i.e ., the truth of experience; faith in Revelation is based on

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factual judgements about events of the history of salvation, announced y testimony, i.e ., narrated (see Fisic e a [2000]; O ada Mina [2000]). Modern exegetes have distinguished between the type o announcement (kerygma ) and t e witness ( artyria in t e text o t e New Testament. One o t em commenting on Jo n’s Gospel, says: In at least two cases the author distinguishes a double level of evangelical communication: the happening and the discip es’ understanding o it. Jo n’s ermeneutica mode insists on the realism of both the flesh ( sarx and the contemp ation o t e g ory ( oxa o Jesus C rist. T e contemlation of faith, at the basis of the theology of the fourth gospe , is ased on t e istorica tradition o acts regarding Jesus and his words (Fabris [1992], p. 84). A second exegete reac es t e same conc usion as regards Pau ’s doctrine: It does not consist of eternal truths directly stated, but it is a t eo ogica interpretation o istory rom t ree vantage oints: the objective event of the death and resurrection of Jesus; Paul’s personally meeting Jesus on the way to Damascus; and t e re igious situation o t e various C ristian communities addressed to by Paul in his letters (cf. Penna [2000]). As T omas Aquinas c ear y remar s, t e speci c and undamenta o ject o t e ait in Reve ation is not so muc t e mystery of the eternal procession of the Son from the Father and the Holy Spirit rom Fat er and Son, as t e istorica mystery o t e Incarnation, with the rest of the historical events that have to do with the redemption carried out by Christ,


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Illud proprie et per se pertinet ad obiectum fidei per quod homo beatitudinem consequitur: via autem hominibus veniendi ad eatitu inem est mysterium incarnationis et passionis C risti [The object of faith by which man attains happiness is the Incarnation and Passion o C rist. T is way is opened or all men] (Summa theologiae , II-IIae, q. 2 art. 7). It is therefore right to say that Christian revelation gets grafted onto human reason without forcing. From the Christian viewpoint, t e istorica event enjoys primacy over gnoseo ogica experience (see Journet [1964]). There is no opposition between history and logic; starting from history, logic leads to theological inference, i.e ., to t e assertion o t e First Being t at is and does not ecome. It is therefore wrong to presuppose that hermeneutics be in a position to keep a time option in the face of essence finality, the historical accidenta ness o t e event in t e ace o t at ogica necessity, reedom and risk that alone can engender the act of faith (see Marchesi [1991], p. 87). C ristian p i osop y, i.e ., p i osop ising under t e impu se and inspiration of the Christian faith, has as its basis the continuity etween reason t at e ieves and reason t at p i osop ises. Bot are acting y ma ing use o t e ogic o correspondence app ied to istorical experience. Balthasar wrote, The Christian philosopher is very keen on truth. As believer, e nows t e Lord’s c aim to e Himse t e Trut . He is infinite truth as God, in the unity with the Father in the Holy Spirit, but this truth has made its appearance in the orm o nite, wor d y, trut . Ever since t e Son’s i e on earth, this truth can no longer be considered to be an unattaina e transcendence. It as ecome eminent y accessible, albeit eternally, overwhelmingly superior. (Balthasr [1998], pp. 23–2 ).

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This means that those who accept the Revelation think exactly in t e same way as t ose w o do not, w ic is w at Anse m o Canterbury maintained in his roslogion, Monologion, De Veritate and De Grammatico It is possi e to conceive o an istorica event as a p ace w ere divine Revelation burst forth, free and unpredictable, but the ups and downs o p i osop ica specu ation a undant y s ow t at t ere are minds radica y oc ed to suc a ypot esis. Aristotelian philosophy, for instance, did not conceive God’s possible interest in man, and even ess t at God cou d intervene in istory. The Stoics failed to acknowledge that a transcendent, personal God could ‘speak’ to men: that’s why they reacted as they did at Pau ’s speec at t e Areopagus. T e pagan p i osop ers o t e early Christian centuries engaged, very much as those of today still do, into heated controversy about revealed doctrine, against those w o argue in t e name o t eir oya ty to t e Gree conception o the eternity of the world and of the circular vision of history. The Neo-Platonists in particular were extremely averse to the idea of a ree divine intervention met wit y a ree uman response. In modern philosophy there are two schools of thought, both averse to a possi e divine supernatura reve ation: t e Deist-Kantian one o “re igion wit in t e imits o pure reason” and t e rationa istidealist one of Spinoza, Hegel and Schelling, which deems reason to e a ‘mode’ or ‘moment’ o t e se -awareness o t e A so ute — “From Spinoza to Hege , uman reason as een raised to a divine level, thus rendering the philosopher able to reveal the essence o t e A so ute. Hence t ere is no suc t ing as mystery, or Revelation” (Cottier [1998], p. 603). The “moment of grace ( kairós )” for divine revelation becomes the necessary progress of “the spirit (Geist .” T e Spirit revea s itse y nature (see Borg esi [1990]). Jean-Jacques Rousseau wrote:


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The highest notions about the divinity come to us exclusive y t roug reason. Loo at t e s ow o nature, isten to the inner voice: Hasn’t God said everything to our eyes, our conscience, our inte ect? W at can men add? T eir reve ations only demean God, by attributing human passions to im; I see t at t is t at or t e ot er dogma, ar rom c arifying the notions about the Great Being, confuse them; far rom e evating t em, t ey degrade t em. Suc dogmas add absurd contradictions to the incomprehensible mysteries surrounding God (Émile , § . Oeuvres complètes de J. J. Rousse u, vo . II, Ed. Firmin-Didot, Paris 1860, pp. 351–352). Today, peop e seem to e more open to understanding t e intrinsic relation between historical and saving truth proper to the Christian event. Nevertheless, even an existentialist like Jaspers (c . [1962], [1975]), wit is notion o p i osop isc er G au e , deemed Christianity to be a doctrine without historical basis. Cornelio Fabro retorted: Jaspers seems to have missed the infinite difference between qua itative dia ectics, proper to t e ait , and quantitative dialectics, proper to reason. He privileged the second in respect to t e rst, w ic is w at Kier egaard ad reproac ed Hegel in particular and rationalism in general (including Kant). He su stituted t e direct intervention o God in istory (this is the Revelation!) with the infinite course of istory, t e un imited expansion o t e Ungrei en e (Fa ro [2004], p. 206). W at we want to emp asise ere, t oug , is t at t e revea ed message appears always based on a saving event. Logically then, what absolutely predominates in the Gospell announcement, is a type o trut ounded on t e testimony o acts, w ic cannot e ascertained except by valuing moral certainty (the credibility of the

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witnesses). Such certainty guarantees entry to the reality of the past, no onger accessi e to t ose or w om it as passed.

Misun erstan ings Concerning C rist’s Resurrection as supreme proof ” of his Divinity

T e ina i ity adequate y to distinguis etween uman and divine faith has caused many misunderstandings concerning the proo va ue o t e Resurrection in t e C ristian ait . T ese misunderstandings have been made worse by the lack of trust in moral certainty, which is the essence of historical human faith, and also y t e prejudice t at t e istorica event, owever su cient y ascertained, cannot serve as a basis for certainty as regards supernatural mysteries. T ese and ot er misunderstandings Severino’s controversia pages. He obstinately insists on identifying the Christian faith with ‘doubt’, or with a constituent, perennial uncertainty supported by extra-rationa motives (c . Severino [2002]). An Ita ian t eo ogian rebutted Severino; he wrote, “The Resurrection of Jesus, which noody pretends to ave seen wit is own eyes…” (Sequeri [2002]). W y “no ody?” Do not t e Apost es c aim to e witnesses o t e Resurrection? And was not Thomas addressed by Jesus himself wit t e words, “Have you come to e ieve ecause you ave seen me? B essed are t ose w o ave not seen and ave e ieved” (Jn 20: 29). It is certain t at our ait today does not rest on direct experience but on the testimony of the Apostles. They, in turn, do not speak of the Resurrection as hearsay but as having experienced it, i.e ., seen wit t eir own eyes. One cou d t in Sequeri to mean that we must pass through human faith in the Apostles, witnesses to the Resurrection, in order to arrive at our divine faith in the


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Risen, but the text does not support this interpretation. Further on we read: “T e ‘ istorica trut ’ o t e resurrection remains, hilosophically speaking, ‘on the inside’ of the faith”. The phrase’s deliberate ambiguity could still save it; but the author’s intention seems to e one o support or Severino in is “uncertainty t at is art and parcel of faith.” There is nothing to save. It is an explicit ro ession o deism. I t e w o e itinerary o t e act o ait ta es ace “on t e inside,” t e Apost es, a ter a , wou d e no more t an some believers among many other believers like them. Why then, wou d t e Saviour ave sent t em to witness to t e w o e wor d t at e is risen, and t at t ere ore e can e e ieved to e t e Son of God come to save men? If they have not been sent for that, what e se s ou d ave t ey witnessed, and w at e se did t ey in act witness? But if they have truly been, as Scripture says, “witnesses of the Resurrection,” how could they be believed by those not ready to beieve? W at signs o credi i ity did t ey o er to t ose w om Jesus called blessed for believing their word? In what terms could they resent their meeting the Risen, the “sign of Jonah” that Jesus himse ad wanted to o er to t e Jews? T ere is no ogic w atever in wanting to keep the Gospel data as true and meaningful, and at the same time to interpret them with the ideology of “faith that begins rom itse ” and t at encompasses everyt ing in itse . In t e terms used in this essay, logic obliges one to choose between the ideology of a supposed faith that excludes every previous requirement, and t e Gospe datum t at presents ait as a persona event: t e ree decision on the part of the listeners to accept what they hear from t e evange isers, judging t at w at is announced is reasona e and deserves assent.

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Faith in divine revelation is for the sake of salvation

Evange ica trut an t e mora o igation to put it into practice From the point of view of alethic logic, faith in divine reve ation appears a ways wit t e c aracter o wisdom; w at’s more, with a saving character. It is a truth that demands being practiced as a necessary condition or eterna sa vation: […] t e genuineness o your ait , more precious t an go d that is perishable even though tested by fire, may prove to e or praise, g ory and onour at t e reve ation o Jesus Christ. Although you have not seen him you love him; even t oug you do not see im now yet e ieve in im, you rejoice with an indescribable and glorious joy, as you attain the goal of (your) faith, the salvation of your souls (1 Pet 1: 7–9). Paul, commenting on Deut. 30:14 and elsewhere, says much the same thing: T e word is near you, in your mout and in your eart (that is, the word of faith that we preach), for, if you coness wit your mout t at Jesus is Lord and e ieve in your eart that God raised him from the dead, you will be saved. For one believes with the heart and so is justified, and one con esses wit t e mout and so is saved (Rom 10: 8–9). God wi s everyone to e saved and to come to now edge of the truth (1 Tim 2: 4) [The text can be rendered more exp icit y as “God wi s everyone to attain now edge o the truth so as to be saved.”]. Suc et ica -pragmatic c aracter o Gospe trut necessari y demands that it be ‘lived’. It engages the believer into practising his


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faith, by covering the road opened and made practicable by Christ. Jesus said t at t e trut He taug t is strict y in ed to a “way” to e covered, and that every believer should “live” a certain lifestyle (cf. Jn 15: 3). More explicitly, he says: My mot er and my rot ers are t ose w o ear t e word of God and act on it (Luke 8: 21). In the same sense, one ought to understand the Apostle John: The way we may be sure that we know him [Jesus] is to eep is commandments. W oever says, “I now im,” but does not keep his commandments is a liar, and the trut is not in im (1 Jo n 2: 3– ). The Apostle James concurs: Faith divorced from works does not save (cf. James 2: 17). So does St Gregory of Nyssa: In uman i e ea t is a good; ut appiness does not consist in knowing the reason for health but in being healthy. That is how we ought to understand the words of the Lord: appiness does not consist in nowing some trut s a out God, but in having God within ourselves ( Homilies , 6. reek Patro ogy , vo . XLIV, p. 1270). T at is w y Cat o ic doctrine insists on t e ‘duty to e ieve’, rom the ethical-religious point of view. One has the ‘duty’ to seek revealed truth and to embrace it after having acknowledged the motives o credi i ity. Jo n Pau II as written, lthough each individual has a right to be respected in his own journey in searc o t e trut , t ere is a prior mora

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obligation, and a grave one at that, to seek the truth and to ad ere to it once nown (Encyc ica Letter eritatis Sp endor , § 3 ). ote carefully that such an ethical-pragmatic dimension of the Christian faith in no way implies that it has nothing to do with the ogic o correspondence. On t e contrary, w at motivates a tota trust in the saving power of the Word of God and in a complete abandonment of the believer’s soul to its action is precisely the fact t at its trut can e ogica y ascertained and guaranteed. Hence, the more one possesses faith as certainty that what God has revea ed is a so ute y true, t e more one ives ait as a trusting o edience. It is a capacity or “ oping against ope,” as Rom :18 puts it. This is also why the first Christians immediately called ‘ artyria’ t e conscious and wi ing sacri ce o one’s i e out o de ity to t e Gospe . Martyrdom is a pu ic mani estation t at proves ait in revealed truth, specifically in the truth that only Jesus, the GodMan, is to e adored.

Chapter Four e Rationa ity o Fait in Divine Reve ation

The nee or the raeam u a revea e message

ei ’ to un erstan an accept the

To see trut , to come to now it and to accept it are t e t ree steps of the journey towards faith. The final assent, adhesion to revealed truth, is possible only after the first two steps have been ta en: an open attitude to a possi e divine reve ation (see ing) and a sincere acknowledgement of the signs attesting that it has actually appened (coming to know it). The two previous steps have traditiona y een de ned as raeam u a ei’, t e steps o reason t at bring man to the doorstep of faith. The doctrine of the praeambula is from Aquinas. In his theoogica system t is doctrine occupies a undamenta p ace, not a marginal one. He starts with the natural knowledge of God, i.e . t e possi i ity o nowing t at God is, wit or wit out reve ation. T en e expands t e argument to encompass t e metap ysica and moral truths that may be related to a possible divine revelation. He says: [These truths] are not dogmas of faith ( rticuli fidei ) but t e presuppositions ( raeam u a) o t e dogmas. In act faith presupposes natural knowledge, as much as grace resupposes nature and as every per ection presupposes something that can be perfected ( Summa theologiae , I, q. 2, art. 2).

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What he means is that there is no possibility to accept the truths of ait as ‘true’ i t ere is no previous certainty, in t e uman conscience, of some specific truths attainable by natural reason. Later e adds:

ui credit non crederet, nisi videret ea esse credenda [The e iever wou d not e ieve, un ess e saw t at w at e is supposed to believe is credible] ( Summa theologiae , II-IIae, q. 1 art. ). Thanks to natural certainties previous to faith, man can arrive at judging “credi e” w at is eing proposed to im as trut revealed by God. Reason tells him that he may believe without sinning against reason itself; the will, supported by grace, induces him into assenting. Centuries ater Antonio Rosmini wrote: T ere is t ere ore a reason previous to ait . And to e ieve is also an act of the mind that obeys reason, although it is not the only act ( Studies on the author , ed. by M.A. Raschini, Rome 1979 p. 62). For ot Aquinas and Rosmini, t e presence o cognitive premises of the natural order in the act of supernatural faith responds to unavoidable logical requirements. Revelation appears as God speaking to man, y means o ot externa events and motions o t e spirit. But such speaking, as Thomas observes, reveals supernatural mysteries not in the sense of making them obvious, but in the sense o ma ing t em credi e y o ering adequate signs o trut :

Deus, interius inspiran o, non ex i it essentiam suam a videndum, sed aliquod suae essentiae signum, quod est aliquis spiritua is simi itu e suae sapientiae [W en God inspires, e does not exhibit his essence that it may be seen, but

The Rationality of Faith in Divine Revelation

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e shows signs of it, .e . a spiritual image of his wisdom] ( uaestiones isputatae De veritate q. 18 art. 3.) Fait , t en, does not ‘s ow’ t e supernatura . Proper y spea ing t is is God’s essence, reserved to t e ‘ umen g oriae o t e eati c vision. Faith permits seeing and making use of signs ‘adequate’ to t e essence o God. T is entai s t at man s ou d e a e to recognise the sign as such, so as to establish a rational link between it (event/words) and the right notion of God that creates, legislates and provides. Hence it is necessary to admit t at reve ation ‘presupposes’ the truth value of the natural knowledge of God. As an important French theologian noted: God created things, the world and other beings. Among t ese e created man, endowed wit t e power to utter t e truth about beings by means of his natural faculties. The crowning acu ty is to utter trut s a out t e supreme metahysical Cause of all things. God, though, has added new knowledge to all this, in the form of elements of his own se - now edge and t at o is projects (Congar [1965], p. 11). Speaking of the task of philosophy in theology, Thomas Aquinas places first the “consolidation” of the praeambula fidei . They are scienti ca y con rmed y “demonstration.” T roug common sense, the dialectical arguments used are the patrimony of anyone who has had the possibility of believing in divine revelation. Aquinas writes: We can use p i osop y in t eo ogy […] to demonstrate t e rational premises of faith [ ad demonstranda ea quae sunt raeam u a ei ]. T ey must necessari y e nown in order to believe. Truths about God that can be proved by natural

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reason are part and parcel of these premises. One of them is t at God exists and t at e is unique. But t ere are ot er truths about God and creatures, all amenable to be philosop ica y proved and w ic are previous to t e act o ait (Scriptum super librum Boethii de trinitate , 2, 3). The entire draft of the apologetic work iber de veritate catholicae fidei , concluded in 1264, revolves about the principle that diaogue wit t ose w o do not accept t e C ristian reve ation can e carried out exclusively on the basis of natural evidences shared by all, but which can serve to demonstrate the credibility of the supernatura mysteries (c . T omas Aquinas, Li er e veritate cat o icae fidei , 2). The same thesis imbues De rationibus fidei contra Saracenos, Graecos et Armenos ad cantorem Antiochiae . There, Thomas maintains t at t e Cat o ic ait can e de ended e ore t ose w o reject it as irrational. One has to demonstrate the perfect coherence wit t e premises o natura reason necessari y admitted y a . T is is ‘Rationem ei osten ere [to give an account o t e ait ], as the Apostle Peter demands in his first letter (cf. 1 Pet 3: 15). In an indirect rejoinder to t ose w o systematica y avoid t e issue o t e praeam u a , t e Frenc p i osop er De Finance tac ed the relation between philosophy and theology by shifting the argument onto t e scienti c p ane: As Vatican II and later documents remind us, theology is founded on, and is regulated by, God’s word. It is a salutary reminder, for there were opposite excesses in the past. Such warning, though, does not entail excluding the philosophical instrument. The tendency to exclude it would reduce theology to the exposition and interpretation of the content of Scripture and Tradition; the study of philosophy would simply serve to understand the thought of the Fathers and Doctors, not to judge where truth is to be found. It is however impossible to keep such a position. Man wants


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to understand, to deepen, to know the profound meaning of the formulae of the faith, and to solve apparent contradictions between various assertions of Scripture as much as between Scripture and other sources of knowledge (De Finance [1989], p. 8). The confusion likely stems from giving priority to the historica -existentia approac over t e ogica -systematic one; wit t e atter it is undenia e t at t e now edge o t e ait rests on previous natural knowledge. The Bible itself confirms it, by mentioning w at man nows a out God and is aw even e ore God revea ed to man the mysteries of divine life and divine projects of salvation (cf. Wis 13: 1–5; Rom 1: 18–32). As Cardinal Georges Cottier rig t y puts it, “wit out t e praeam u a ei , i.e ., w en one is suported exclusively by faith without the possibility of reflecting on it, the door is open to fideism” (Cottier [1998], p. 602). Fideism is, o course, a orm o scepticism (c . Tresmontant [1967]; Livi [1980]). It has threatened the rationality of faith in biblical revelation ever since the dawn of Christianity, as Tatian and Tertu ian a undant y s ow. Today deism is ac : Dario Antiseri re-proposes it with the categories of Kantian criticism; Jean-Luc Marion, wit t ose o Heidegger. Bot ase it on an ar itrary interpretation o t e raeam u a ei, du ing t ese as He enistic, Scholastic, or rationalistic ‘rationalisations’ of the Christian faith. T ey maintain t at t e C ristian ait s ou d e distinguis ed and separated rom ‘natura ’ now edge, w en not rom a now edge whatever. For a fideist, knowledge is always uncertain. The certainty o ait , t en, as its origin not in now edge ut in instinct, t e eart, sentiment, will, love etc. I have asserted otherwise: the Christian faith appears as essentially ‘cognitive’. Its contents are to be e d as ‘true’ on t e grounds o adequate ‘reasons’. Some o t ese reasons are metaphysical, others historical, but in either case they are reasons of natural knowledge.

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Please note here that the natural knowledge of things of this wor d, o t e se (sou ) as an imperis a e su ject, o t e duties towards the others (natural law) and of God (first principle, creator and ast end) is t at primary and universa now edge t at I ave een ca ing “common sense.” T e encyc ica Fi es et ratio says t e same thing: it is not so much philosophy as common sense that prepares t e way to t e ait or umans o a times and p aces (c . Jo n Pau II, Encyc ica Letter i es et ratio §§ 1–5; 7; see Livi [2000a], [2005]). Going back to Thomas, how and up to w at point can suc certainties e ta en as conditions ( raeambula ) for making faith in revelation possible? Before answering it is necessary to master the data of the issue. Thomas’ view of religious trut revo ves around w at one may ca a ‘3-D’ argument about God: He is the object of natural and universal knowledge (common sense); he is the object of metaphysics, which scientifica y proves t e need or a transcendenta First Cause; and na y of revelation, or better Self-revelation in his ineffable mystery. Many hasty commentators of Aquinas have overlooked his double distinction: t e natura now edge o God rom t e now edge of faith, and, within the former, common sense knowledge from p i osop ica now edge. Etienne Gi son most time y under ined t is second distinction. He uncovered a dou e sy ogistic structure in Thomas’ quinque viae : with the first, he concluded about t e transcendent First Cause, and wit t e second e identi ed t is metap ysica notion wit w at a men ca “God” (Gi son 1960a, pp. 70–80). Many o today’s Cat o ic t eo ogians, especia y Germans (Ratzinger, Kasper, Rahner, Hemmerle, Metz, Fries et al.) avoid speaking of the praeambula fidei . They seem to fear that in so doing t ey wou d support t e rationa ist position, or w ic ait ‘depends’ on human reason. Ratzinger, for instance, wrote that theological reflection cannot accept that it is possible to attain


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God “with a reasoning utterly divorced from faith, with a purely rationa certainty.” (Ratzinger [1996], p. 390; see a so [1998]). The doctrine of the praeambula , however, does not imply a necessary, determining dependence of faith on its rational presuppositions. T e presuppositions o t e ogic o correspondence are not always cogent. They are for certain aspects of experience and science, ut in t e case o ait and Reve ation t e same presuppositions may remain open to di erent conc usions. Given suc presuppositions, one may still believe or not, because the act of faith remains free. not t e e cient causes o t e act o ait . T ey T e raeam u a are are on y necessary previous conditions (con itiones sine qui us non) at the level of knowledge. The Italian scholar Epis, after diligently examining t e proposa s y t e a orementioned German t eo ogians, concludes that the universality of the raeambula does not exclude their being linked to the free response of the human subject receiving t e message; on t e contrary, it demands t at in . To justi y ait it is necessary to s ow t at t e radica p i osophical question (whose property is the universality), and t e singu arity o t e event o Jesus, are ot a so ute demands upon the person about to take a necessary decision regarding is identity and u ment. On y t en wi the real quality of the target of revelation appear as a critica resu t (Epis [2000], p. 283). T ere remains t e ear t at t e doctrine o t e raeam u a may depreciate the gratuitous, supernatural and sanctifying character of theological faith. This is what Gilson had to say about it: However certain anyone may e o is rationa conc usions, e cannot but realise that involuntary error can always intrude. But in our assent to ait t ere is no possi i ity o error: the object of the assent is what God himself reveals to us as true. Faith in Revelation therefore guarantees truths

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of a totally different order from the certainty of reason. Rationa now edge cannot possi y give suc a guarantee, and neither can faith be increased or decreased by acquiring, or osing, rationa now edge (Gi son [1960], p. 78). atura reason and Reve ation are t ere ore re ated, as T omas puts it, according to the principle of the superior that perfects the inferior:

Fides perficit rationem, sicut gratia naturam et perfectio perecti i e [Fait per ects reason as grace per ects nature and erfection what is not perfect] ( Summa theologiae I, q. 2, art. 2). This is what Christian thinkers of all ages have always said. Ta e or instance Irenaeus o Lyon: In order to prepare man for this supernatural way, the Lord Jesus imse uttered t e words o t e Deca ogue or all without distinction. That is why those words have remained wit us even a ter eing per ected and enric ed by him, who neither changed nor lessened them with the Incarnation. But precepts imited to t e ancient state o bondage were given to the former people of God with a di erent orce rom t at o t e Deca ogue. Hence w at was given to the people of Israel for its time of bondage or as pre-figuration was abolished on stipulating the new covenant o reedom. But t e precepts in erent in uman nature and appropriate to free men are common to all. T ese were per ected wit t e muni cent, generous gi t o the knowledge of God the Father, with the prerogative of adoption as c i dren and wit t e granting o per ect ove and of the faithful following of his Word ( Against Heresies , 16, -5; Sources C retiennes, vo . 100, p. 5729).


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Even German scholars who adopt the Kantian categories of transcendenta ism, i e Kar Ra ner, do not esitate to point out that knowledge previous to the faith acts as a rational premise for faith to be possible. Bernhard Welte, for example, maintains that t e uman certainties at t e asis o existence “are not speci ca y Christian yet, but […] are presupposed by the Christian faith” (We te [1983], p. 9).

T e Motives o Cre i i ity’ o Divine Reve ation

For the act of faith to be rational, I have shown that two things are necessary: t e credi i ity o t e witness and t e ogica and metaphysical coherence of the proposition (its being non-contradictory), in that order. In the Scriptures, words and deeds constantly orm a rationa context. One examp e is t e Annunciation, t us commented by a Father of the Church: T e ange announcing t e mystery wanted to guarantee its truth with a proof: the maternity of an old, barren woman to t e B essed Virgin Mary, to s ow t at not ing is impossible to God (Ambrose, Commentary on the Gospel of St Luke , 3, 2). Let us proceed in order, by first treating of the credibility of the witness.

Cre i i ity o t e Witness: persona

e aviour an signs

Paul refers to himself in writing to the Corinthians, whose faith he demands:

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The signs of an apostle were performed among you with all endurance, signs and wonders, and mig ty deeds (2 Cor 12: 12). The author of Hebrews says much the same thing, but in the third person. He ascribes to divine grace the possibility of “conrming t e witness” wit signs o credi i ity t at extend in time t e proof of Christ’s divinity by means of his miracles: God added is testimony y signs, wonders, various acts of power, and distribution of the gifts of the Holy Spirit according to is wi (He 2: ). T e ogic e ind t e mirac es in t e context o t e Good News is t at suc events can e immediate y experienced y a present at them. ‘Miracle’ (L. iraculum, mirari means something visible t at arouses admiration. A can ac now edge, t roug it, t e presence of God in the world, in history, and in the particular human event lived by those present. Moses thus spoke to the Israelites: Did any god venture to go and take a nation for himself rom t e midst o anot er nation, y testing, y signs and wonders, by war, with his strong hand and outstretched arm, and by great terrors, all of which the Lord, your God, did or you in Egypt e ore your very eyes? A t is you were allowed to see that you might know the Lord is God and t ere is no ot er (Deut : 3 –35). But, to ‘ now’ t at God is present in suc events, it is necessary to go rom t e signs to t eir meaning.


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From Sign to Meaning

Divine grace itse aci itates t is passage, a rat er di cu t eat for our darkened mind: You have seen all that the Lord did in the land of Egypt before your very eyes to Pharaoh and all his servants and to all his land, the great testing your own eyes have seen, and those great signs and wonders. But not even at the present day has the Lord yet given you a mind to understand, or eyes to see, or ears to hear (Heb 29: 1-3). Jesus continues this argument of Deuteronomy almost in the same erms: Do you ave eyes and not see, ears and not ear? (Mar : 18). So does Hebrews: For if the word announced through angels proved firm, and every transgression and disobedience received its just recompense, how shall we escape if we ignore so great a salvation? (Heb 2: 2). Conc uding, I t in per ect y va id t e termino ogy t at many t in out o date. I ca ‘motives o credi i ity’ ( otiva cre i i itatis ) those events and factual circumstances able to motivate, in those called to believe in revelation, a well-grounded moral certitude: it is divine reve ation, it is God’s Word proposed y one egitimate y spea ing on His e a (t e prop et) or y God imse made man (the incarnate Word).

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Relation between motives of credibility and rationality of the events

Unlike the raeambula , the character of the ‘motives’ is not metaphysical but empirical. The connection between the two orders o premises o t e C ristian ait is t at certain istorica events and factual situations can be taken as guaranteeing the witness’ credi i ity on y i interpreted in a certain way in t e ig t o t e metap ysica princip es, i.e ., o t e praeam u a . To egin wit , this concerns the proofs of credibility of the prophets of the Old Testament (c . Gri i [2000]); next, it concerns t e signs o proo o Jesus’ divinity as t e Incarnate Word; and na y t e signs o t e presence of God in the Church founded by Jesus: indefectibility and o iness t roug out istory. Suc signs are experienced empirically in sundry historical events, and they are signs of God’s presence for presupposing the certainty that there is a God who creates. He is t e on y one w o can sancti y men, or eing “t e Ho y One, fount of all holiness” and the only one who can intervene creatively by producing things out of nothing. The roductio rei ex nihilo sui et su iect is t at creative eat, proper y ca ed ‘mirac e’. The role of miracles, evident in the biblical stories of the prophets, is part and parcel of the credibility of the witness of divine t ings. T eir ro e is inserted in t e si ting o t e witness’ e aviour and moral authority. Jesus himself asks his disciples to discern true rom a se prop ets, and gives t em t e criterion, wit suc ogic: Beware of false prophets, who come to you in sheep’s clothing, ut underneat are ravenous wo ves. By t eir ruits you will know them. Do people pick grapes from thorn us es, or gs rom t ist es? Just so, every good tree ears good fruit, and a rotten tree bears bad fruit […] So by their ruits you wi now t em (Mt 7: 15–20).


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This logic of the Gospel is that of the principle of cause and e ect. Its so id rationa ity ma es it possi e to start rom acts, immediately perceivable, and proceed to their causes. As these are not immediately perceivable, they are liable to error. According to this ogic, true prop ets are credi e; a se prop ets are not, or on y the works of true prophets can assure their authenticity to one who rationa y weig s up t eir testimony. Reve ation ca s Jesus “true testimony” (Rev. 1: 2), or ma ing his testimony (revelation of supernatural mysteries) credible by means o empirica proo s. T eir unction is to ‘prove’ t at He is tru y w at e c aims: God come among men. In is own words, “I it is by the finger of God that I drive out demons, then the kingdom o God as come upon you” (Jn 5: 31–37). Hence, t e gospe o John calls ‘signs’ (in Greek semeia the extraordinary events in the life of Jesus. His words too assert the demonstrative function of the mirac es: I I testi y on my own e a , my testimony cannot e veried. But t ere is anot er w o testi es on my e a , and I now t at t e testimony e gives on my e a is true. You sent emissaries to Jo n, and e testi ed to t e trut . I do not accept testimony rom a uman eing, ut I say this so that you may be saved. […] But I have testimony greater than John’s. The works that the Father gave me to accomplish, these works that I perform testify on my bealf that the Father has sent me. Moreover, the Father who sent me has testified on my behalf. Believe me that I am in t e Fat er and t e Fat er is in me, or e se, e ieve ecause o t e wor s t emse ves (Jn 1 : 10). T e wor s I do in my Fat er’s name testi y to me (Jn 10: 25). In Acts, Luke follows the same line of reasoning in describing Jesus’ position to t ose o is contemporaries w o ad direct y

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experienced the events regarding him: Jesus of Nazareth was a man commended to you by God wit mig ty deeds, wonders and signs, w ic God wor ed through him in your midst (Acts 2: 22). Further on, Luke relates Paul’s speech at the Areopagus. There, Paul introduces Jesus to the pagan philosophers as: […] a man he has appointed, and has provided confirmation or a y raising im rom t e dead (Acts 17: 31). T e Resurrection is in act t e ‘ na proo ’, t e supreme mirac e t at attests Jesus’ credi i ity. He ad even predicted it, as a sign that would be enough all by itself, calling it “the sign of Jonah” (Lk. 11: 30). Note t at Pau spea s o Jesus and is credi i ity on y a ter having extracted the best and most fundamental certainties about God from Hellenistic philosophy and poetry (cf. Acts 17: 22-30). T e ogic o trut (a et ic ogic) demands t at ‘motives o credi i ity’ and raeambula fidei be strictly connected. The purpose of miracles is to furnish men to whom the Gospel is announced to nd t erein enoug reasons to commit t emse ves to have faith in Jesus’ words. They can verify , i.e ., acknowledge as true, the proposition: Jesus is God. This proposition is the kernel o t e C ristian evange ising message. T e inte ect sees in mirac es empirical-metaphysical elements that constitute authentic proof, i.e ., a convincing reason to t in i e t at. T e protagonists o t e gospe stories use t ese very terms w en t ey ma e t eir act o ait after acknowledging that God’s power acts in Jesus: — Truly, you are the Son of God (Mt. 14: 33). — Truly this man was the Son of God! (Mk 15: 39). — Jesus did t is at t e eginning o is signs in Cana


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in Galilee and so revealed his glory, and his disciples egan to e ieve in im (Jn 2: 11). — While he was in Jerusalem for the feast of Passover, many began to believe in his name when they saw the signs e was doing (Jn 2: 23). — Many of the crowd began to believe in him, and said, W en t e Messia comes, wi e per orm more signs t an t is man as done?” (Jn 7: 31). — [After Lazarus’ resurrection] many of the Jews who ad come to Mary and seen w at e ad done egan to e ieve in im (Jn 11: 5). Unti t e very end o is gospe , Jo n insists on t is very paradigm. In the so-called “first conclusion,” he continues to call the miracles “signs,” precisely to underscore their demonstrative function: ow Jesus did many other signs in the presence of his discip es t at are not written in t is oo . But t ese are written that you may come to believe that Jesus is the Messiah, the Son of God, and that through this belief you may have i e in is name (Jn 20: 30–31). Tresmontant, a sc o ar o ‘ i ica metap ysics’, o served t at the ‘signs’ of the NT are in full harmony with those of the Old Testament: Biblical faith is not blind. It is not, as Kierkegaard maintained, ‘a qua itative eap in a surdity.’ It is ‘reasona e’ adhesion of the intellect to the God of Abraham, who mani ests imse wit incontroverti e and s ining signs. The God of Israel allows himself to be tested by his people. T e Tora , t e Law and t e Prop ets, certi y t is wor . The pistis of the NT is not blind faith; on the contrary,

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it is intelligence, a discernment and reading of the signs. W en t e ea ing ra i Jesus o Nazaret wa s ac and forth along the pathways of Galilee, Samaria and Judea, e wor s signs visi e y a . No ody c a enges t em. Some have faith, the pistis . Others don’t and do not beieve in im. W at does it a mean? No one dou ts eit er God’s existence or this new prophet’s. Pistis has nothing to do wit t e existence o God, ut wit w et er t is man from Galilee does, or does not possess God’s power in im. Does e te t e trut ? […] Fait , in t e i ical sense, is intelligence. It is the supreme intellectual act that discerns the signs proposed by God. Faith is the inte ectua ad esion to God’s trut mani ested y means of intelligible and tangible signs. There is no qualitative eap into a surdity. T ere is discernment o t e signs and understanding of their meaning (Tresmontant [1967], p. 20). T ese signs are e ements o judgement ased on sense experience, t ere ore open to a . St Leo t e Great puts it t is way: Since t e trust o uman ignorance is s ow in e ieving what it does not see and hoping what it is ignorant of, it was necessary wise y to ui d up t e strengt o t e wea by means of bodily benefits, and excite them by visible mirac es (Sermon 95, 1; Latin Patro ogy vo . LIV, p. 61).

Motives o cre ibi ity’ an

raeam u a

ei

Let me insist on the point that Christ’s ‘works’ show the credi i ity o is word. It is a so ute y easona e to e ieve in is testimony, because with our reason, implicitly or explicitly, we reache the conclusion that such works are evidently God’s, not man’s.


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This means that Christ’s works and faith in him are related only y presupposing a metap ysica now edge o God, w ic in turn allows one to see ‘the hand of God’ in those works. God is not ‘discovered’, but ‘acknowledged’ in Christ. Ambrose says: He acted in such a way as to be believed as God and not as man, or w at is eyond nature is o t e Aut or o nature [Effecit denique ut ei de Deo crederetur cui de homine adhuc on cre eretur; quia quo u tra naturam est, e Auctore naturae est ] (St Ambrose, De Virginibus 2, 3). T ose w o now t at t ere is a God a so now t at on y He can erform ‘miracles’. But miracles are ‘creating’ acts, i.e . actions that outstrip the possibilities of any particular agent, for being beyond nature. W en t ere ore one empirica y sees t at C rist per orms miracles, concludes spontaneously, but altogether rationally, that C rist is a man in w om God operates, or even t at God imse as assumed uman nature. Hence Aquinas teac es: Everyt ing t e saints ave e ieved and taug t is aut enticated by God’s seal. This seal are works that no creature can per orm: mirac es. C rist con rmed t e words o t e postles and the Saints by performing miracles ( Expositio in “Credo in Unum Deum” , 1, 1). Meaningfully, the reaction of Jesus’ contemporaries to his mirac es was o announcing trut : “You are tru y t e Son o God!” But no amount of evidence can force the act of faith, otherwise it would not be faith; the evidence of the witness’ credibility in no way equa s t e evidence o t e t ings to e e ieved: t ese are sti non-evident mysteries. There is therefore room for man’s freedom: e can accept or reject the faith according to his moral dispositions. Accepting or rejecting divine reve ation is t ere ore a ways

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a free (and responsible) act: in accepting there is moral merit; in o stinate y rejecting it, mora ame. Jesus, ta ing to Nicodemus, says: Amen, amen I say to you, we speak of what we know and we testify to what we have seen, but you people do not accept our testimony. […] No one as gone up to eaven except the one who has come down from heaven, the Son o Man (Jn 3: 11–13). I to d you and you do not e ieve. The works I do in my Father’s name testify to me. But you do not e ieve, ecause you are not among my s eep (Jn 10: 25–26). A in a , t e motives o credi i ity are not necessary causes o the act of faith; they are elements of judgement for the intellect to ean towards u y assenting to divine reve ation, on t e grounds that the witness is more than man. In Newman’s writings this aspect of faith in revelation appears most c ear y: t e strengt o t e motives o credi i ity can e nu ified by prejudice, by obstinate diffidence, bad dispositions or a bad conscience. As he himself says: I wis to e distinc y understood t at I consider t e re jection o C ristianity to arise rom a au t o t e eart not o t e nte ect ; t at un e ie arises, not rom mere error o reasoning, ut eit er rom pride or rom sensua ity. It is important t at at starting I s ou d premise t is, est I s ou d appear inconsistent, and to assert ot t at t e C ristian evidences are most convincing, n yet t at are not i e y to convince t ose w o reject t em. A dis i e o t e contents o Scripture is t e asis o un e ie ; and since t ose contents must e rejected y air means or ou , it is p ain t at in order to t is t e evidences must in some way e attac ed. But it is quite an tert oug t ; and, t us


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unbelievers […] reverse the legitimate process of reasoning, and act in a manner which would be scouted as unfair were they examining Newton’s rincipia or Lavoisier’s hemistry (The Letters and Diaries of John Henry Newman ed. C. S. Dessain and A. Chaval, vol. I, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978, p. 219). Paradoxica y, deism and rationa ism ave joined orces, throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, in denying all rationa va ue to t e motives o credi i ity. T e reasons are di erent: rationa ism, driven y an anti-C ristian prejudice t at as nothing to do with pure rationality, devalues them as insufficient to open t e way to ait in divine reve ation. Fideism deva ues t em as incompati e wit t e reedom and gratuitousness o t e act o faith. Such disconcerting agreement is by no means fideism’s only aradox; it is even more disconcerting t at deism, and a Cat o ic one at that, should maintain the absoluteness of faith. This posture contradicts a doctrine of faith always held by the Church. It was even so emn y de ned y t e First Vatican Counci , w ic condemned the fideism of Bonald, Bonnetty and Maistre as much as the rationalism of Günther and Hermes. out deism, an 18 0 decree o t e Ho y See ad enjoined on Eugène Boutin not to teach that “reason cannot attain a true and full certainty regarding the motives of credibility, i.e . the motives t at render divine reve ation evident y credi e. Among t ese are miracles and prophecies, most especially Jesus Christ’s resurrection” (cf. Dz. nn. 2811–2814). Basing itself on this and other interventions o t e ordinary Magisterium, Vatican I did not esitate to use the language of solemn condemnation: Should anyone say that divine revelation cannot be made credible by external signs, and therefore that men must be driven to ait exc usive y y t e interior experience o eac

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one and by private inspiration, let him be anathema. […] S ou d anyone say t at mirac es are impossi e and t at therefore all the stories about them, including the Scriptures, are ut a es and myt s, or t at mirac es cannot be known with certainty, being it impossible rationally to rove t e divine origin o t e C ristian re igion, et im e anathema (Dogmatic Const. ei Filius , Dz. 1068). As one can see, extreme rationalism and extreme fideism join in the end. Both fail to acknowledge the logic of truth based on testimony. Fideism ac now edges exc usive y trut ased on experience; rationalism, exclusively that based on proof. It is true that fideism is a theoretical position about the act of faith ( des qua creditur , w ereas t e Counci dogma is a out its doctrina content ( es quae creditur ). But the paradox does not go away, because the doctrinal content has to do precisely with the rational characteristics of t e act o ait . A I want to s ow ere is t at t e ort odox notion of ‘faith in Revelation’ implies a full and unreserved acknowledgement of the validity of the ‘motives of credibility’. Together with t e praeam u a , t ey orm t e necessary in etween trut nown directly and truth believed through another’s testimony.

art Three

Why, According to Some Modern Philosophers, hristian Faith is Based on Skepticism

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Chapter Five Mo ern S epticism an Descartes’ Searc

or Certainty

n American p i osop er, spea ing recent y a out contemporary trends among p i osop ers in t eir approac to t e ogic o Christian faith, maintains that sometimes they made philosophy ecome t eo ogica . One o t e options or t is resu t is, according to him, when t e p i osop er stands to t e t eo ogian as t e s eptic stands to the believer, so philosophy becomes theological w en it egins to e ieve. T is position not on y ac s an appreciation of the hermeneutical circle of knowing, but a so negates t e critica strand o t oug t t at as existed throughout the history of the theological tradition, and w ic as ecome even more pronounced in t e ate modern and post-modern wor d as radica t eo ogians ave adopted the transcendental structure of critique as the cruci e t roug w ic a genuine y contemporary t eo ogy must pass. These critical theologies are radically skeptica and t ey ave e ective y trans ormed not on y w at it means to think theologically, but also what it means to e ieve and t e meaning o ait (Ro ins [2005], p. 16). ctually, what many philosophers show is just the lack of apreciation or w at I am trying to de end in t is oo , t at is t e rationality of faith — and Robbins seems to agree with this skeptical position, since he had previously written an essay on philosophy

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of religion claiming that it should be a “non-dogmatic theology,” w ic means a p i osop y dea ing wit C ristian ait on t e asis of a skeptical interpretation of it (cf. Robbins [2003]). But w at are t e origins o suc a trans ormation o t e meaning o ait in divine reve ation among many contemporary p ilosophers? A historical re-construction will perhaps provide some c ari cations. Western Philosophy and Christian Revelation

As I have repeatedly argued, modern Western philosophy is deeply dependent on Christian revelation. Such a dependence has een demonstrated y contemporary istorians on t e asis o two undeniable facts: i ) the fact that all modern philosophers, especially René Descartes, assumed many of their metaphysical concepts, i.e ., t e concept o God as t e in nite Being and t e creator o imited beings, from the theological systems of medieval Christian thinkers (see Gilson [1930]); and ii ) the fact that many modern Western p i osop ers were e ievers in C ristian reve ation, and re ected on their faith in order to find a philosophical justification for believing in a doctrine proposed y a visi e aut ority ut dea ing wit nonvisi e o jects. I t is dependence is tru y a istorica act, — and I think that it is — then all of the history of modern philosophy s ou d e understood as t e istory o C ristian p i osop y in t e modern age (c . Livi [1997a, 2005c]). So, severa modern p i osophical categories should be interpreted as having been produced y some ind o C ristian t eo ogica investigation, or at east as deeply connected with Christian theology. In light of this connection, I have presented the modern philosophical category of ‘faith’, w ic is so important a ter Hume’s Treatise on Human Un erstan ing arguing that such a notion of ‘faith’ is the origin of modern skepticism (cf. Livi [2003]). I would now like to suggest ideas for

Modern Skepticism and Descartes’ Search for Certainty

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interpreting the historical category of ‘fideism’ in the same way, w ic is evident y connected wit t e p i osop ica category o faith. o one among modern philosophers that current historians ca deists (Pasca , Kier egaard, and ot ers) ca ed imse a ‘ deist’ originally. Actually, this term was born at the end of nineteenth century, ut t e main reason w y t ose p i osop ers did not ca t emse ves deists is t at deism is not a p i osop ica category ut a historica one. Nevertheless, in the thought of Pascal, Kierkegaard, and ot er deists we s ou d nd some p i osop ica ideas t at justi y t is denomination. In my opinion, suc ideas sprang rom t e interpretation of Christian faith adopted by those philosophers on t e asis o modern s epticism. T e discussions e d on t is issue in the sixteenth century allow us to verify that modern skepticism was deeply accepted by both catholic and protestant thinkers. Precise y em edded in t ose discussions, we can detect t e point of departure of Descartes’ way of thinking, i.e ., the assumption of “universal doubt” as the most rational method for obtaining certain now edge. T e re evance o t is searc or certainty in t e epistemological interpretation of Christian faith is the issue I will now discuss. We must admit t at t e epistemo ogica question, so essentia to modern thought, revolves around the problem of certainty, and that the problem of certainty, as set out by Descartes and by all i osop ers w o o ow is met od, consists speci ca y in t e attempt to determine the conditions for assenting to what is not, or is not considered, se -evident. As Ra p McInerny wrote recent y: Descartes famously sought the beginnings of certain now edge in its primary instances, as t e resu t o t e aplication of a method. Claims he and others would make, revea ed t em a to e du ita e. T is means t at every claim to know for certain has been shown to be mistaken.

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More precisely, as all knowledge claims dependent on sense erception and a mat ematica propositions are susceptible of doubt, it is imaginable or conceivable that they are a se, and t ere ore t ey must e set aside. No one as any warrant simply to assert that he knows these to be true (McInerny [2002], p. 56). From this point of view, the main problem for a Christian phiosop er in t e Cartesian era was to express in rationa terms t e possibility of Christian faith, understood precisely as the firm assent to what is not self-evident. This problem, which did not exist at a in c assica Gree p i osop y, is instead at t e core o C ristian thought. C ristian reve ation, wit its nove ty and specu ative ric ness so well brought to light by Étienne Gilson in the thirties of last century (cf. Gilson [1931-1932]), has not only had a positive impact on p i osop y at t e eve o metap ysica , ant ropo ogica , and et ical notions, but also at the level of logical notions, among which the most important is without a doubt that of ‘faith’. It is here that, in my opinion, modern p i osop y so radica y di ers rom c assica philosophy, whereas it is otherwise of a piece with Christian-medieval philosophy (cf. Livi [1969]). Therefore, the rupture with tradition produced y t e Cartesian met od must e considered wit in a Christian philosophical universe. This universe, in turn, is at the roots of modern conceptual frameworks, very different from the pre-C ristian p i osop ica universe and not reduci e to it. In t is chapter I will examine an emblematic case, that of skepticism. My conviction is that the origins of modern skepticism are to be found in t e ypot esis — induced rom t e typica y C ristian pro em of faith — that what is essential lies beyond the ‘immediate’, and t at t e certainty a out t at w ic is ‘essentia ’ is reac ed a ter a ong critica journey and wit t e decisive participation o an act o free choice.


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Fideism as a result of modern skepticism among Christian philosophers

Even if in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries skepticalminded philosophers were called “Pyrrhonists” (evoking ancient s epticism), modern s epticism, aving deve oped wit in C ristian culture, is very different from its pre-Christian precursor, since the latter, as Brochard has pointed out, never completely denies t e metap ysica va ue o common sense (c . Broc ard [1923], p. 413). The new elements in modern skepticism have been brought to ig t y t e istorian Ric ard H. Pop in (c . [1960]), w o as examined p i osop ica t oug t in a speci c moment o transition, from the years 1500 to 1675. During these years, the reappearance in Europe o t e wor s o Sextus Empiricus provo ed a renewed interest in He enistic s epticism, precise y w en t e discussion about the epistemological problems raised by the Reformation was most intense. T e main epistemo ogica pro ems raised y the Reformation were about individual conscience and subjective certainty concerning faith, but the problem of philosophy and in genera t at o reason outside t e domain o Reve ation, and the problem of the doctrinal authority of tradition and of the Magisterium were also raised. An Italian scholar, summarizing Pop in’s researc , remar s t at “at t e origin o modern t oug t and science there is not a conflict of science and faith in the first lace, but a religious one: a problem within faith” (Marini [1995], . 12). I agree wit t is interpretation; urt ermore, I extend it to the entire philosophical adventure that begins with the encounter between Greek thought and Christian faith, which has given irt to entire y new pro ems and so utions, in re ation to preChristian classical times. In particular, in the general context of t e in uence o C ristianity on p i osop y, t e sixteent and seventeent centuries represent t e eginning o modern p i osop y,

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charac terized — always through the influence of Christia characterized Christianity nity — by t e pri rima macy cy o ep epis iste tem mo ogy gy.. One typ typiica tr trai aitt o t e pe peri riod od ro rom m the mid-1500s to the end of the 1600s is precisely the skepticism o a arge part o Cat o ic p i osop ica t oug t, w ereas Cat o ic t eo ogica t oug t st strengt ened itits do dogmatism. Bo Bot dimensions — skepticism in philosophy and dogmatism in theology — seem to arisee ro aris rom m t e cri crisi siss o re igi igious ous co cons nsci cien ence, ce, an and, d, mo more re part partic icuu ar y, rom t e eig tening o t e pro em o certainty a out t e ‘trut that saves’: namely, its sources, the channels through which it is trans tr ansmi mitt tted ed,, t e cr criite teri riaa o ve veri ri ca cati tioon, an andd t e sp spac acee or re reed edoom of interpretation interpretation.. It is well known k nown that Luther, against whom Erasmus of RotterRotterdam argued, denied t e aut ority o t e C urc , or o any uman magisterium whatsoever, in interpreting the Scriptures. After Luther, then, Christianity faces the problem of the regula fide : What is t e criterion y w ic one can identi y t e true doctrine o ait ? The criterion criterion of truth taken ta ken up by Lutherans was subjectivist and individualistic: dividuali stic: For the believer, only only that is true tr ue which his conscience cons co nstr train ainss im to e ie ieve ve ro rom m t e re read adin ingg o t e Sc Scri ript ptur ures es.. Er Erasasmus, on the contrary, considering the insurmountable difficulties in det eteerm rmin inin ingg t e tr truue mea eani ning ng o Sc Scri ripptu turre, em ra race cedd s ep epti tica ca wisdom wisd om and and advised advised trusting trusting t e aposto aposto ic successi succession on (Tradi (Traditio tion), n), submitting oneself to the interpretation given by the Church. In t is se sens nse, e, Er Eras asm mus can e se seeen as t e oun undi ding ng at er o a tr trad adiiti tioon o C ristian an-C -Caat o ic deism t at extends t roug out modernity and eventually becomes the prevailing position in Catholic culture in postm tmoodern ti tim mes es.. A ter im im,, man anyy wi us usee t e s epti tica ca ar argu gu-ment to defend their own faith: in the absence of incontrovertible rational arguments in favor of one confession over another, why not tru trust st ai aitt or tr trad adiiti tioon? Para arado doxi xica ca y, a si sign gnii cant cant num er of Catholic thinkers argued against the Lutherans on the same ideological ground, marked by anti-dogmatism and irrationalism.

Modern Skepticism Skepticism and Descartes’ Descartes’ Search for Certainty

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However, it is Michel de Montaigne (1533–1592) who expresses at t e time o Erasmus t e attitude o s eptica modern Cat o ics (t e ‘nouveaux ‘n ouveaux pyrrhoniens’) in all a ll its radica r adicalness. lness. He writes wr ites that “man’s “man’s lague is the conceit of knowledge” and the only way we have to now our ourse se ves is Go God’ d’ss Rev Revee ati tioon: “E “Everyt in ingg we we see see wi witt out t e light of his grace is nothing but vanity and madness” (Michel de Montaigne, Apo ogie e Raymon e Se on I, 3). T e pri ries estt Pierr rree C ar arrron (15 1–1603) an andd t e is op Jea eannPierre Camus (1530–1600) were followers of Montaigne. The former, in a oo written immediate y a ter t e deat o is teac er Monta taiign gnee, ext xtoo ed, “[ “[T] T] e wonder u eauty o t e un uniion etween skepticism and Catholicism” (Pierre Charron, es trois livres e a Sagesse , III, 1). The latter, who was also secretary of the bishop Saint Francis of Sales, argues arg ues against aga inst “protestant “protestant rationalism rationali sm”” and tries to protect Cat o ic ai aitt rom t e da danngers o a co connce ceiited um uman an reas asoon. T e best thing, in his opinion, is a faith that does not rely on human certainties, easily destroyed, since the only truths that men know are t ose w ic God wanted to revea to us: “A t e rest is not ing but dreams, wind, smoke and opinion” (Jean-Pierre Camus , Essay sceptique , I, 2, 3). In Fran rance ce,, t e s ep epti tica ca pe pers rspe pecti ctivve o Montai taign gne, e, Car Carro ronn, and and Camus becomes bec omes in the first decades dec ades of the 1600s the philosophy of the ‘erudite libertines’, including Gabriel Naudé (Richelieu’s and Maz azza zari rinno’s i ra rari rian an), ), Guy Pati tinn (R (Reect ctoor o t e Sc oo o Medi di-cine at the Sorbonne), Léonard Morandé (Richelieu’s secretary), Pierr rree Ga Gass sseendi (t e am amoous pri ries est, t, sc sciienti tist st,, an andd p i os osoop er er,, w o corr co rresp espon onde dedd wi witt Des Descarte cartes), s), Isa Isaac ac a Peyr eyrèr èree (se (secr cretary etary to t e Prince of Condé), and François de la Mothe le Vayer, for whom: the soul of a Christian skeptic is like a field clear of weeds, dev evooid o t e dan danggerous ax axiioms t at cr cram t e mi minds o so

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many cultivated people, and therefore ready to receive the dew o divine grace wi witt muc more appiness t an i it were still full fu ll of the presumption presumption that it has certain knowlk nowledge o a t ings and no dou ts o any sort. Few su succ ccee eede dedd in oppo possin ingg t e cu tu tura ra eg egeemony o t e ‘Py Pyrrr oni nian an’’ Ca Catt o ic in intte ec ectu tuaa s. T e Jes esui uitt Fra rannço çois is Gar aras assse da darred to stigmatize stigmatiz e Charron’s Charron’s “alleged piety,” piety,” calling ca lling it a, “very bad service serv ice done do ne to is Co Coun untry try and to is ai aitt .” Ano Anott er re igi igious ous,, Fran ranço çois is Ogier Ogi er,, rep rep ie iedd to Garas Garasse se in an irri irritat tated ed way: way: “C arr arron on’’s wor wor s are too elevated for a low and vulgar vulga r mind like yours.” Even Even Saint-Cyran Saint-Cyran react re acted ed vi vioo en entt y again against st Gara Garasse sse,, and is cr crit itic icis ism m o t e Jesu esuiit was so insistent that the authority of the Sorbonne finally final ly censured Garasse. Meanwhile, the work of the Portuguese Francisco Sánchez (1560– 60–11632), pu is ed in Lyo yonn in 1581 and, and, si sign gnii can cantt y, en enti titt ed Quod nihil scitur was becoming popular. This work expressed for the first time the idea of a voluntary and systematic doubt, which certain y insp inspire iredd Descart Descartes es or is iscours e a mét o e

A me proin e memetipsum retu r etu i, omniaque omniaq ue in u ium revocans, ac si a quopiam nil unquam dictum, res ipsas examiare coepi, qui verus est sciendi modus (Francisco (Francisco Sánchez, uo ni i scitur Ad Ad ectorem).

Apologetic atte a ttempts mpts and skeptic s keptical al value of the Cartesian Cart esian method m ethod

History tory o Skep Skeptici ticism sm, Po In is His Pop in des escr crii es Des esca cart rtes es as somebody who, while claiming to have “triumphed over skepticism,” remained substantially its prisoner, to the point of becomin co mingg a “sce scepti ptiqu quee ma ma gré ui. ui.”” T is in inte terpr rpreta etatio tion, n, i co corre rrect, ct, entails a clear characterization of rationalism in terms of skepticism. Rationalism, accordingly, would be much closer to British


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empiricism (Locke, Berkeley, Hume) than critics usually assert. Moreover, t is interpretation wou d o er a etter account o ow the ‘critical’ Kant could perform a synthesis between the rationalism inherited from Wolff and the empiricist stances coming rom t e reading o Hume. In s ort, t e nove ty o transcendenta hilosophy would have to be profoundly reassessed, in the sense t at it wou d e evident t at t e true ‘Copernican revo ution’ was t e one roug t a out, we e ore Kant, y René Descartes wit is new method. The Cartesian method, implicitly based on an a priori c oice, name y t e c oice to privi ege t e certainty o se -consciousness (t e impossi i ity o dou ting o a conscious y exercised doubt) over the certainty of the ‘things’ present to consciousness, represents indeed a turn o primary importance in t e istory of philosophy. From then on, the history of philosophy resents all thinkers necessarily aligned for or against the new met odo ogica starting point, or or against ‘Cartesianism’. As Augusto Del Noce correctly observed, it now became a question of choice: modern philosophy after Descartes has always been a igned eit er or or against t is c oice o ma ing t e rimum cognitum a pretext for affirming the subject’s freedom, for releasing consciousness from every dependency on the object (cf. Del Noce [1989]). As is nown, or Martin Heidegger t is is not t e essential point of the turn Descartes inaugurated. For Heidegger, the essential point was rather shifting the focus from the question of trut to t e question o certainty, or, in ot er words, giving up o the Greek notion of truth as manifestation of being ( aletheia ) and adopting instead t e Sc o astic notion o ‘con ormity’ o t oug t to t e o ject ( aequatio inte ectus a rem ), ut exaggerating t e subjective dimension: namely, the dimension in which the object o t oug t is not “ eing” ut on y t e “representation” o eing (cf. Heidegger [1979, 1992]). I do not want to focus now on the concept of truth proposed by Heidegger, which is compatible with

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the concept of truth as conformity of thought to its object (see Livi [2005 ]); neit er do I want to discuss ere Heidegger’s interpretation of the Cartesian turn, regarding which I would refer to an accurate istorica and critica study (see Messinese [200 ]). In my opinion, Descartes’ turn consists rat er in t e su stitution of the certainties proper to ‘common sense’ — which refer to the indu ita e presence o t ings in t e wor d — wit t e certainty o t e cog to. Cartesian og to is not ing e se ut t e dou t itse assumed as a limit that cannot be transcended, or, in gnoseologica terms, t oug t wit out an o ject di erent rom itse . Yet, t e declared aim of Descartes’ philosophy was to overcome the skepticism of his time and to elaborate a new apologetics of Catholic ait ; as Gi son wrote, “not on y t e aim o t e Cartesian dou t differs from the aim of the sceptical doubt, but its method is not the same either” (Gilson [1987], p. 269); however, this aim finally turns out to e su stantia y rustrated. S epticism remains t e substance of the method adopted by Descartes, even if his skepticism and that of his followers are radically different from the ancient one. In act, Descartes’ s epticism was orn and deve oped in the context of problems related to faith in Revelation and its de ense rom rationa istic criticisms. It must e ac now edged t at post-Cartesian s epticism is tru y a new orm o s epticism, theorized above all by Catholic thinkers who have followed Descartes’ met od. In t is regard, t e di erent view adopted y Giam attista Vico is very interesting ecause t is Neapo itan thinker dialectically opposed Cartesianism by focusing, not on its na outcomes, ut precise y on its met odo ogica princip es. We can and must admit without suspicion that Descartes was entirely sincere when he declared that the final aim of the Discourse on Met o is to reconstruct t e w o e edi ce o science, ‘ rst p ilosophy’ at its head, grounded on a new and most certain alethic foundation:


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My plan has never been more than to try to reform my own t oug ts and to ui d upon a oundation w ic is completely my own (René Descartes, Discourse on Method II, 15, trans. D. A. Cress. Indianapo is: Hac ett, 1980, p. ). The problem with his alethic foundation, i.e ., with the indubitability of thought in act (the cogito), is that it does not recover w at as een ope ess y ost at t e eginning wit t e yper o ic doubt, namely the object of thought (as knowledge), which primarily consists ( rimum cognitum) in the reality of the world. The cogito, in act, is t oug t c osed in upon itse , a t oug t t at remained ‘empty’, having expelled from itself, via the ‘ volo dubitare de omnibus’ the reality of the object. Certainly, this thought in act, from t e point o view o orma ogic, appears as indu ita e. However, considered in relation to its content, that is, from the point of view o materia ogic, t e cogito is simp y t e same dou t wit w ic t e Cartesian investigation ad egun its journey; t e same dou t t at as excluded all possible certainty about the world and all other evident certainties o common sense, considering t em incapa e o adjusting t emse ves to t e concept o evidence previous y adopted by Descartes. For this reason, I admit that Descartes sincerely ( rom a psyc o ogica point o view) set out to overcome s epticism in a rigorous and definitive way. Yet he actually continued to revolve within a skeptical logic, whose reasons he accepts and grants a toget er. T e nove ty o is met od to nd t e a et ic oundation of knowledge lies precisely in the extreme radicalization of the skeptical stance, with the conscious (and voluntary) acceptance o dou t even rom t e oundations o now edge, to t e point o withholding assent to the primum cognitum. The ‘hyperbolic’ doubt is therefore the most explicit expression of skepticism as universal ‘epoc é’. It su ces to t in t at t e ru es o pu ic mora ity and the dogmas of catholic faith are only pragmatically secured, i.e .,

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without any concern for its truth. Such truth could eventually be recovered in a second moment, ut on y as conc usions t at dia ectical reasoning obtains from the certainties resulting from the new met od: name y, t e certainty o t e t in ing se and t e certainty o t e existence o God as an innate idea. Let us recall how Descartes refers to the maxims of provisional mora ity and to t e dogmas o Cat o ic ait : A ter aving assured myse o t ese maxims and aving ut t em aside, a ong wit t e trut s o t e ait , w ic ave a ways e d rst p ace in my set o e ie s, I judged t at, as ar as t e rest o my opinions were concerned, I cou d ree y underta e to rid myse o t em ( iscourse on Met o , III, 29, p. 15). In these words the typical traits of ‘Catholic Pyrrhonism’ are easily recognizable. Faith is separated from philosophical reason, in t e sense t at w ereas ait means to pro ess certainty (on y externally?) without any rational foundation, philosophical reason adopts as starting point the ‘ doute hyperbolique’ . I repeat that at the psyc o ogica eve t ere is no di cu ty in admitting t at Descartes’ programmatic intention is actually that of finally overcoming the skeptical doubt. The fact is that, contrary to his good intentions, e wi never e a e to get out o a dou t t at em races t e evident certainties of common sense. The new certainties are of a different ind, as are di erent t e criterion o trut and t e credentia s t at t ose certainties can ex i it (in act, suc certainties wi e a andoned one-by-one by those modern thinkers who adopted the Cartesian met od). Regarding sixteent century Cat o ic s epticism, w ic was more ideo ogica t an t eoretica , t e Cartesian met od presents itself as the powerful and suggestive synthesis of two opposite stances: on t e one and, t e deconstructive stance, w ic leads to the hyperbolic extension of doubt; on the other hand, the


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constructive stance, which leads to the ambitious project of a comre ensive science ased upon a so ute y incontroverti e oundations. The possibility of uniting both contrary rational claims (which the Baroque period defines as the humility or weakness of human reason, as opposed to t e pride or se -consciousness o one’s own faculties) lies in having changed the place of the verification of truth rom t e domain o now edge (re ation o t oug t wit t e o ject extra mentem to t e domain o consciousness (re ation o t oug t with itself as representation, in the immanence of the object in the mind). Wit t e met odica dou t, t e immediate presence o extra-menta rea ity to consciousness is e iminated, and so or t e rst time in the history of philosophy all certainties of common sense are disqua i ed in t eir pretension to trut . T ey ad een unti then, for all philosophers — Greek and Christian — the certainties that had to be rightfully considered, from a logical point of view: t e primary, a so ute y incontroverti e, se -evident trut s. For t e first time then, philosophy expresses an act of freedom of thought, which means that thought emancipates itself from the metaphysica presence o t ings, o t e se , o God, and o t e mora aw. The Cartesian revolution changes the way of understanding alethic logic. The world and all other objects of experience — until then a starting point o a so ute a et ic va ue or p i osop ica re ection — become with Descartes precarious and provisional conclusions one can obtain starting from the cogito, considered as a founding certainty and mode o trut in genera . From t en on, t e itinerary of the mind, for those who accept the Cartesian method, is from t e se to t e wor d (wit t e mediation, or Descartes, o divine trut u ness), w ere t e ‘se ’ means t oug t in act, or t oug t as act (of ‘representing’, of ‘identifying’ the object). The language of scientists is sti orrowed rom t at o t e p i osop ers w o continue to hold the Cartesian turn as necessary and irreversible. See for example an Italian philosopher from the Catholic University of

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Milan, who has written: “That philosophy has regenerated herself nding its own starting point in t e certainty o t e ‘cogito’, is to be understood firstly as an essentially methodological gain, rather t an as an onto ogica one” (Me c iorre [2002], p. 16). Since we ad previous y mentioned t e Cat o ic inte ectua s (including clerics) who in the seventeenth century professed skepticism, we now want to point out t at t e Cat o ic Descartes, despite a is precautions, was na y su ject to t e condemnation o t e C urc , who could not help noticing that the Cartesian method, with regard to revea ed dogma, imp ies t e vo untary decision o dou ting a so faith, which for a Catholic is tantamount to an act of apostasy. Precisely for those reasons, in 1680 all Descartes’ works were included in t e n ex i rorum pro i itorum. But w at is more interesting or us is that from a specifically logical viewpoint Descartes doubts the certainties of common sense, which have a capital importance for ait , as t ey are its necessary premises. Indeed, it can e said t at the logic of common sense is even more fundamental than the notional contents of common sense, which constitute the ‘ raembula ei’ as Pope Jo n Pau II suggests in is encyc ica , Fi es et ratio (see Livi[1999, 2001]) . his logic can be condensed in the modern p i osop ica ormu a o ‘rea ism’, understood as Gi son did, name y as ‘met odica rea ism’, t at is as t e on y met od t at a ows p i osophy to be seen as a ‘search for the truth’ about the world, man and God (see Gi son [1935]). Metap ysica rea ism is indeed ait ’s own ogic, inso ar as divine reve ation is addressed to man wit a anguage that presupposes in him a true experience of the world and of himself, and t at e nows God as di erent rom t e wor d, as t e rst Cause and the ultimate End of everything — and all this with his natural reason alone, even if “as through a mirror, and in mystery.” We now ave to ana yze Descartes’ way o expressing is conviction of having overcome skepticism, even though he had begun with hyperbolic doubt; that is, with the discovery of the evidence


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is mind has of the doubt itself: “I think, therefore I am [ Je pense, onc je sui ].” Let us read w at e writes: nd noticing t at t is trut —I t in , t ere ore I am— was so firm and so certain that the most extravagant supositions o t e s eptics were una e to s a e it, I judged that I could accept it without scruple as the first principle of the philosophy I was seeking (Descartes, iscourse on Met o , IV, 32, p. 17). T e dou t — ere ies t e orce o t e Cartesian argument — is thought in act, and as such it is indubitably present to consciousness (presence of thought to thought). However, since this act o t oug t is a dou t — t at is, a o ding ac o t e judgment about the hypothesis of knowledge — it cannot be the thought of something; it can only be the thought of nothing (of nothingness as o ject o t oug t, o not ingness as true). T e certainty of the ‘cogito’, therefore, does not refer to anything outside the mind (a iqui extra mentem , et a one t e rea ities rom w ic yer o ic dou t ad reed itse . As as een rig t y o served, “t e cogito is not an act of reflection, it does not consist in thinking of t e t oug t — since t is wou d require a menta word — ut it consists direct y in pure t oug t, ree rom every t oug t o ject” (Corazón [1993], p. 49). If somebody were to object that this interretation is ar itrary, one s ou d answer t at it is Descartes imse who validated it. Indeed, to the objection that “there is no thought without object” he replied: I deny that the thinking substance is in need of anything ot er t an itse in order to per orm its own activity (Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy , Ad II biectiones, esponsiones , in ed. C. Adam and P. Tannery, Oeuvres e escartes : Vol. VII, Paris: Vrin, 1964, p. 136).

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The concept of ‘empty thought’ misses a characteristic of sub jectivity t at I ig ig ted e sew ere (c . Livi [200 ]), and t at ad already been analyzed by an eminent Spanish scholar (cf. MillánPue es [1970]), name y t at t e su ject, proper y spea ing, is never an immediate o ject o now edge to imse . T e reason is t at the (human) subject knows himself only by reflecting upon his own acts (especia y t oug ts and wis es), w ic ave t e materia wor d as t eir proper o ject. T e ( uman) su ject, according y, nows directly not himself (i.e ., the source of thought and free will) but an o ject o is own now edge. In ot er words, t e now edge t at the subject has of himself is a second intention knowledge attained by reflectively focusing on his acts of knowing the world—this is t e ogica order t at must e respected in p i osop y (c . T omas Aquinas, Summa theologiae , I, q. 87, aa. 1, 3). Now, this feature of human self-knowledge does not prevent thought from being ‘full’ rat er t an ‘empty’. Empty t oug t is postu ated on y w en t e thinking self (res cogitans wants to make of the existence of his own thought the first certainty absolutely speaking, in place of the certainty o t e existence o t e wor d. But t is ‘empty t oug t’ makes the very notion of ‘subject’ meaningless, as well as that of ‘ now edge’ (see Murdoc [1999]; Livi [2001]). As Ra ae Corazón incisive y o serves, “as ong as t e t oug t ocuses on somet ing, on an object, self-consciousness is impossible, because the subject is never o ject: Descartes seizes t e act o t in ing, not t e t oug t w en it is an o ject or t in ing” (Corazón [1993], pp. 9–50). Corazón concludes his analysis of the ‘cogito’ (which he locates in t e doctrine o innate ideas) as o ows: If the cogito is indeed an act of self-consciousness, thought is immediate y nown, wit out re ection: consequent y, there is no thought thinking itself, because what appears is on y t in ing t oug t. W at is distinctive in t is, as we as in the other innate ideas, is that they are not ideas as


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objects of thought, they do not lie ‘in front of’ the thought. T e reason is t at, were t ey o jects o t oug t, Descartes would have fallen again into the state of doubt; now, instead, e cannot a so ute y dou t t at e dou ts, i.e ., t at e thinks” (Corazón [1993], p. 51). It s ou d e noticed t at, un i e ancient s epticism, Descartes’ version does not consist in extending doubt to the widest possible range o o jects o now edge, ut in remaining wit in t oug t, aving removed its object. If it is true that Descartes, in so doing, finds a most certain starting point, which is a judgment of existence (as a et ic ogic requires), it is a so true t at, un i e t e concept o first judgment in ancient philosophy — that is, a judgment that allows for the search of an always wider and better knowledge, starting rom a most certain now edge, or a primum cognitum wit objective value — the Cartesian judgment is, strictly speaking, the elimination of knowledge. T e ogic o ounding science on t e cogito, t en, turns out to be a complete epistemic rupture with the whole of the classical tradition, above all, the pre-Christian one. As a French critic points out, “[I]n t e ‘ u ito , or ‘cogito , t oug t is grasped in a pure state, as gold after being purified from the slag. It is a first and absolute notion, ecause it is perceived independent y o everyt ing t at is not itse … It is a notion t at presupposes none ot er e ore” (Laorte [1950], p. 17). We are therefore completely immersed in the rea m o a ‘ ogic o presupposition’ to w ic I re erred e sew ere as t e oundation o a et ic ogic (c . Livi [2002a], pp. 2-3 ), and which consists in looking for the ‘first uncaused cause’ of the cognitive process. As an American p i osop er correct y wrote, “t e search for an authentically presuppositional- less philosophical system ends once one recognizes that thought, reality and language are a ways ound interdependent and t ere ore aden wit a ready established presuppositions” (Larrey [2002], p. 447). This cause is,

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for Descartes, thought perceived as actual by the thinking subject. T is is t e aut entic revo ution in t e istory o p i osop y, t e complete reversal of the logical order, starting from the self-evident perception o t e se t at comes e ore t e se -evident existence o t e wor d. And, since t is se is understood as pure t oug t wit out the world as its object, it is empty thought nourished by its sole se -consciousness. Let us see again ow Descartes’ argument goes: I will now close my eyes, I will stop my ears, I will turn away my senses rom t eir o jects, I wi even e ace rom my consciousness all the images of corporeal things; or at least, because t is can ard y e accomp is ed, I wi consider t em as empty and false; and thus, holding converse only with myse , and c ose y examining my nature, I wi endeavor to obtain by degrees a more intimate and familiar knowledge o myse ( Me itations on First P i osop y , III, 35, p. 2 ). When Descartes says that he “will consider empty and false” “a t e images o corporea t ings,” e ma es a judgment o a et ic value (or non-value) about the immediate self-evident truth of the wor d. In t is way, t is trut is condemned to e insigni cant, w ereas t e se -evident trut o t oug t (o an empty t oug t) is privileged. That this thought is empty results from a careful reading o a passage o t e Me itationes e prima p i osop ia in w ic Descartes, arguing or t e certainty o t e se , ma es recourse to the hypothesis of an evil genius: But there is some deceiver or other who is supremely power u and supreme y s y and w o is a ways de i erating deceiving me. Then too there is no doubt that I exist, if he is deceiving me. And et im do is est at deception, e wi never bring it about that I am nothing so long as I shall think that I am something ( Meditations on First Philosophy II, 25, p. 18).


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The key words in this text are “so long as I shall think.” Descartes is c ear y re erring to t e act o t in ing. It is t oug t in act that is self-evident to itself, that is always self-evident in and of itself, independently of its content, whatever it may be; even indeendent y o aving a content at a . Sure y, in t is rst instance o now edge, t ere is not ing but a certain clear and distinct perception of what I affirm ( Me itations on First P i osop y III, 35, p. 2 ). More explicitly: I only perceive the fact of perceiving, that is the fact that I think ( Meditations on First Philosophy II, 29, p. 20). The object of thought no longer exists, or better yet, it becomes irre evant. T ere ore, t e dou t a out t e rea ity o t e o jects o t oug t is not eradicated. T e s eptica dou t, Descartes argues, may still remain, and the hypothesis of error and complete deceit may e admitted. In order to give t is ‘new science’ a oundation it is enoug to e aware o dou ting, o t in ing in some way w atsoever: Yet I certainly do seem to see [certe videre videor ], hear, and ee warmt . T is cannot e a se. Proper y spea ing, t is is what in me is called ‘sensing.’ But this, precisely so taken, is nothing other than thinking ( Ibid.). There is a good reason why many scholars speak of Descartes’ su stantia s epticism (c . Grene [1999]). In act, t e undenia e rea ity o t e t in ing se does not so ve any pro em a out t e truth of our knowledge; it just makes the subject ‘certain’ (that is, it compe s t e su ject to assent due to t e intrinsic se -evident

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perception thought has of its own act of thinking). This interpretation is con rmed y t e studies o t ose w o ave qua i ed t e ‘cogito’ as a mere deixis , that is, as something of a purely indexical nature, wit out any notiona content, ut wit an exc usive y pragmatic unction. As Andrea Bonomi states: t e rst guaranteed certainty is on y possi e on t e asis of an experience that each of us can and should personally ave. In t is sense, t e w o e demonstration can e seen as an invitation to have this experience… The use (essential ere) of the indexical ‘I’ makes this argument pragmatic in a dou e sense: rst, in t e ordinary one, since it prompts an activity, a ‘doing something’ (which is basically a becoming aware rom a rst-person viewpoint); and, second, in the sense in which one speaks of pragmatic as opposed to syntax and semantics, as t e argument is centered around the indexical ‘I’, which allows one to denote each time a di erent su ject (Bonomi [1991], p. 27). From an analytic point of view, Philip Larrey shows that once common sense va idity is a andoned (as in Rorty), a ogica system cannot recuperate proper certainty (cf. (Larrey [2003], p. 90). A further confirmation is the impossibility of moving from this individua su jective certainty to a universa criterion o certainty. A deep logical inconsistency immediately becomes manifest as soon as Descartes tries to take this step. Here, reference could be made to Quine’s insistence on t e primary ro e o t e o jec in determining truth values, an insistence that many pass by without taking in account; as Larrey wrote, “Quine, t roug Tars i, t ere y maintains a consistent insistence on t e o ject’s primary ro e in understanding truth, albeit through the truth predicate. Even semantic considerations o ogica trut , w ere extra-menta rea ity wou d appear as irrelevant, bring us back to a triangular paradigm where the object’s


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role is determining” (Larrey [1996], p. 157). Some have even spoen o an ‘onto ogica a ’, in t e sense t at t e step rom t e eixis of the ‘cogito’ to the ontology of totality looks like a realistic residue Descartes probably inherited from the medieval Scholastics (cf. Henry [1985], pp. 53–56).

A New Concept o Trut

To conc ude t is point, we s ou d say t at rom a istorica viewpoint great attention s ou d e given to t e reversa roug t about in the concept of truth by the Cartesian revolution. Indeed, Descartes understands t e trut o t e ‘cogito’ as mere y indexica . The ‘I’ that is grasped with complete certainty is not a substance, but the act of thinking: thought in act. Consider the following senence: But dou t ess I did exist, i I persuaded myse o something ( Meditations on First Philosophy , II, 25, p. 18). T is and simi ar expressions s ou d e interpreted in t e ig t o what Descartes says immediately afterward: I am, I exist—this is certain. But for how long? For as long as I am t in ing; or per aps it cou d a so come to pass t at if I were to cease all thinking I would then utterly cease to exist ( Meditations on First Philosophy , II, 25, p. 19). s has been rightly observed: T e ‘cog to’ is t e paradigm o every trut , ecause i t ere is thought, there is necessarily a thinking subject.… It is not a matter o aving a su ject t at is ‘t oug t o ’, or o

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aving an idea of the subject.… The criterion is the facticity o t e su ject, its existence as a p ain and empirica act, so much so that the investigation of the nature of this subject comes su sequent y, and is not inc uded in t e rst se evident now edge.… T e re exive dimension o trut is substituted for in Descartes by self-consciousness, because in im, muc more t an in t e p i osop y e ore im, trut resides proper y in t e acu ty o now edge, since reality is never known. Truth in short is not conformity, ut consists in t e c arity and distinction o ideas, w ic allow the formulation of a judgment (Corazón [1993], pp. 5 –55). Using the same paradigm, the empiricist David Hume says that the simplest and most “vivid” sensations are those that deserve to e ta en as “true, even i t ey do not provide us wit t e now edge of substances and of causal processes” (see Livi [2002d]). The existence of the physical world is reached by Descartes only at the end o is new metap ysica construction. T e wor d is admitted as a conclusion of a demonstration, which starts with the ‘cogito’ and continues y deducing t e existence o God rom t e innate idea o t e in nite. T is ong and winding road conceives t e wor d as “non self-evident.” As was correctly observed, “the primordial and ounding certainty, universa y accepted y common sense — t at is, t e certainty o t e existence o t e visi e wor d, made o matter — becomes problematic, and must be recovered by means of a comp ex reasoning, w ic is on y possi e at t e end o t e p i osop ical itinerary” (Nicolosi [2000], p. 186). It is unavoidable, therefore, that the certainty about the existence of the world, which depends on an un i e y and comp ex demonstrative process, turns out to e a ‘faith’, a ‘belief’ based upon the will to believe (in fact, William James in the twentieth century will speak of a will to believe ).


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mong the Cartesians, David Hume was the first who called t e e ie a out t e existence o t e wor d “ ait ”’ (a e ie ). Hume’s openly skeptical outcome brings to light the logic at the base of the Cartesian method, which we could define — borrowing the exression rom Pietro Prini, w o app ied it to Ga rie Marce — t e “methodology of the unverifiable” (cf. Prini [1968]). Unverifiable, in Descartes, is not, as in t e C ristian p i osop y o t e Fat ers and o t e Midd e Ages, t e supernatura mystery—t at is, God, Who absolutely transcends the world, and demands faith in His revea ing Word. It is rat er t e wor d itse t at experience can no onger veri y, and w ic is — ypot etica y, in a precarious way — reached via a sequence of logical arguments that, incidentally, invo ve concepts (suc as ‘causa ity’) t at in turn presuppose t e knowledge of the world. But it is the will to believe in the existence of the world ( es extensa ) that makes what in itself is unverifia e an o ject o ‘ ait ’. Precise y t e same wi sets in motion t e deconstructive method of the hyperbolic doubt (‘ volo dubitare de omnibus ), and, for Descartes, has a power of determination over t e inte ect: [T] e wi is a so required, in order t at assent may e given to the thing which has been perceived in some way. Moreover, complete perception of the thing is not required, at east not in order to judge [it] in some way or anot er; for we can assent to many things which we know only very o scure y and con used y (Princip es o P i osop y I, 3 : trans. V. Rodger and R. P. Miller, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Pu is ers, 1939, 16). Many interpreters of Descartes oppose demonstrative reason (w ic con rms t e existence o t e wor d) to ait , w ic in no way is able to confirm the existence of what has been revealed through supernatural mysteries: “The strict delimitation of the

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comprehensibleness of first philosophy, regarding the incompreensi eness o ait , opens t e e d o p i osop y to reason a one” (Deschepper [2001], p. 758). In reality, Descartes does not distinguis etween demonstrative reason and ait , ut assumes as t e paradigm o ‘pure’ or ‘separated’ p i osop y precise y w at s ou d only pertain to faith, namely the certainty of what is not self-evident (see Vinci [1998]).

Chapter Six Cartesian Epistemo ogy at t e Center o t e De ate on Faith and Reason

ter Descartes, t e ortune o Cartesianism and anti-Cartesianism in France — related also to the philosophical systems o Spinoza and Lei niz — s ows ow rooted t e persuasion was that philosophy should be confronted in the first place with faith: a confrontation that should take place in the field of the certainty o w at is not se -evident. T e resu ts o t is con rontation are called ‘dogmatism’ (or rationalism), on the one hand, and ‘neoyrrhonism’, on the other. These two approaches both assume the Cartesian on-se -evi ent trut o t e sensi e wor rep aced y t e equally Cartesian self-evident truth of (empty) thought see, for example, the arguments adopted by each party in two famous controversies: t at o Geu incx against Spinoza and t at o Arnau d against Malebranche (cf. Rousset [1999], and Moreau [1999]). An attempt to open new critica orizons can e seen in B aise Pasca ’s (1623–1662) apo ogetic project. Pasca understood very we t at the non-self-evident truth of the world was such only if one assumed deductive demonstration as t e paradigm o rationa ity. We s ou d reca t e amous ‘t oug t’ in w ic Pasca tries to distinguish the intuitive function from the discursive function (calling t e ormer ‘ eart’, and eaving t e term ‘reason’ to t e atter): We know truth, not only by the reason, but also by the eart, and it is in t is ast way t at we now rst princip es;

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and reason, which has no part in it, tries in vain to impugn t em. T e s eptics, w o ave on y t is or t eir o ject, labor to no purpose. We know that we do not dream. And owever impossi e it is or us to prove it y reason, t is inability demonstrates only the weakness of our reason, ut not, as t ey a rm, t e uncertainty o a our now edge. For the knowledge of first principles, as space, time, motion, num er, is as sure as any o t ose w ic we get from reasoning. And reason must trust these intuitions of t e eart, and must ase on t em every argument (Pascal, Thoughts trans.W. F.Trotter, New York: P. F. Collier Son, 1910, n. 282). It is clear from this and many other passages that Pascal tried to give a new foundation to apologetics starting from the recognition o a ‘minimum’ o natura , pre-scienti c cognosci i ity o reality, thus indicating to French philosophy of his time the way out o t e a se di emma ‘eit er rationa ism or s epticism’. Pasca proposes an attitude o trust in reason t at may overcome s epticism, but without pretending to possess truth always and indubita y. He writes in anot er ragment, “T is is our true state; t is is what makes us incapable of certain knowledge and of absolute ignorance” (Pascal, Thoughts , n. 72). But it is a so c ear t at Pasca ’s attempt was not a e to succeed fully, due to the impossibility of avoiding, in his historical circumstances, the language and therefore the logical categories emp oyed y Descartes (c . Livi [1997], pp. 50–55). No wonder then if we find as well in the ensées clearly fideistic claims (selected and quoted later on by all those who, throughout the centuries, pre erred to read Pasca as a deist). For examp e, “Man is on y a subject full of error, natural and ineffaceable, without grace. Not ing s ows im t e trut . Everyt ing deceives im.” (Pasca , T oug ts, n. 83).

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The unity of the human intellect in its two different but not con icting unctions o inte ectus and ratio was sti in need o eing recovered. In this environment, and shortly afterward, a first outline of a philosophy of common sense came from the Jesuit Charles Bu er (1661–1737), w o inspired t e p i osop y o T omas Reid (1710–1796) and the Scottish School with his Traité des premières vérités et e a source e nos jugements , and w o is sti studied today wit interest y t ose w o oo or a way out o deism (see Marcil-Lacoste [1982]; McInerny [2002]). But in those years in France, neit er Bu er nor any ot er Cat o ic inte ectua cou d contain t e rising tide o deism, w ic many t eo ogians and c erics saw as the sole alternative to Cartesian rationalism and to the persistent attempts y Cartesians to rationa ize C ristian ait . Among Protestants, too (both Lutherans and Calvinists), fideism was the revailing position; and philosophical skepticism seemed to be the on y possi e option or C ristian e ievers. Indeed, this was the opinion expressed by Pierre Bayle (1647– 1706) in his famous ictionnaire historique et critique , first pubis ed in Rotterdam (1695–1697) and t en in Amsterdam (1702). On the Catholic side, Pierre-Daniel Huët’s work (1630–1721) is emblematic. He was bishop of Avranches and a great friend of two ot er important C urc sc o ars, Bossuet and Féne on. Huët, w o corresponded also with Leibniz, is known for having started his hilosophical production as a Cartesian and for having ended up as an anti-Cartesian, y pu is ing in 1689 is renowned ensura philosophiae cartesianae . In reality, both at the beginning and at the end, t e is op o Avranc es reasons according to t e s eptica assumptions present in t e Cartesian met od, even t oug is primary source is Gassendi. In Huët’s apologetic work, the question at sta e was t e pre iminary ro e t at reason s ou d ave in t e act of adhesion to faith. Huët was convinced that human reason, according to Descartes’ method, instead of being an aid for Christian

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faith, constitutes an almost insurmountable obstacle. In reassessing t e oundaries etween ait and reason, it was necessary to ring that ‘proud reason’ back to the limitations of its own constitutive wea ness, so t at it cou d easi y accept t e su mission to revea ed trut . S epticism seemed to e a suita e instrument or t at end, because it was able to show reason’s insufficiency already in the natura sp ere. T e origina ity o Huët’s strategy was in t is apo ogetic use o c assica s epticism, re-read and modernized t roug elements taken from Gassendi, and from Descartes’ philosophy as we . O t e atter, Huët stressed its Pyrr onist outcomes, t us attacking the Cartesian pretension of the self-evident truth of the “cogito,” showing that it is impossible to reach it in any domain, and justi ying at t e same time t e need o returning to tradition and authority. This is how Huët’s argument proceeds. In his Traité philosophique de la faiblesse de l’entendement humain e holds that phiosop y is t e “searc or trut ” ut is una e to reac some trut s with certainty — philosophy must thus yield the way to faith: Man cannot now t e trut wit per ect certainty i e relies upon his Reason alone, because the senses deceive us, t e inte ect is a i e, and se -evident trut itse is requently deceitful. For all these reasons we must admit that uman reason is not capa e o ‘true now edge,’ inso ar it lacks a ‘certain rule of the truth,’ that is, a procedure that wou d a ow to distinguis trut rom a sity in a de nite way (Pierre-Daniel Huët, Traité philosophique de la faiblesse e ’enten ement umain, Amsterdam: Henry du Sauzet, 1723, 234). T e Traité p i osop ique came out in 1723, a ter Huët’s deat . The Jesuit Baltus published a commentary in 1726, recognizing that the cultured bishop was motivated by the good intention of umi iating uman reason — so prone to pride — y inducing

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it to submit itself again to the authority of Tradition. However, Ba tus points out, Huët tended to grant too muc to t e positions of the ‘nouveaux Pyrrhonisme ’ (cf. Jean-François Baltus, “Sentiment sur le Traité de la faiblesse de l’esprit humain à M. l’Abbé d’Olivet, de ’Académie Françoise,” in ontinuation es Mémoires e Litterature et della’Histoire de M de Salangre 1 [1726], part I, p. 220). It is true t at Huët’s apo ogetic wor can e read as t e istory o a ong att e against Cartesian se -evident trut o t e cog to in the name of the certainty of faith and of the reassessment of the istorica acts in w ic Huët saw t e oundation o Reve ation. It is true too t at suc reassessment o t e istorica acts re ated to Christian revelation is absolutely necessary, and deserved a better reception y C ristian t eo ogians and p i osop ers — w o, due to the popularity of rationalism in the interpretation of Christianity (particularly after Lessing and Kant), preferred to follow instead ot er pat s (se Livi [2005 ], pp. 170-179). However, it is a so true that the discussion opposing rationalism to skepticism should have been overcome by bringing it back to its source; that is, by means o a radica criticism o Cartesian met od and its assumptions, t us allowing for the recovery of the epistemic foundations of every truth in the incontrovertible self-evident truth of the existence of t e wor d. Suc a oundation is on y imp icit in t e p i osop y o Thomas Aquinas, because nobody, in ancient Greek and Christian thought, nor in Christian medieval culture, had yet formulated the i osop ica ypot esis o denying t e se -evident trut o t e existence of the world as the starting point of metaphysics. But it is recise y y going ac to T omas’ met od t at many p i osop ers o t e twentiet century ave een a e to oppose post-Cartesian idealism with a valid realist theory, capable of resisting the criticism o dogmatism and naïveté t at Descartes’ eirs ave a ways addressed against it (see Arecchi [1996]; Livi [1997a], [2000g]).

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Conclusion

t t e eginning o t is wor , we ad pointed out t e undamenta distinction etween atura know e ge and supernatura knowledge in general concerning knowledge of God, further speciying t at t e ormer comprises common sense, i e experiences, i osop y and particu ar sciences (cu tura ant ropo ogy, psyc o ogy of religion, ethnology, sociology, the history of religions) while t e atter comprises, esides t e act o ait (common to a e ievers), theological reflection (which is proper of some intellectuals) and mystical experience (which is even more selective, inasmuch as it presupposes certain c arisms). Having made t ese distinctions, it is precisely the act of faith in Revelation that I have discussed, examining its constitutive characteristics under the prism of alethic ogic. T is as een a p i osop ica conversation t at as ta en into consideration that which Christian faith asserts about itself, that which it claims to be, i.e ., how it is presented when speaking a out itse . And it s ou d not e surprising t at p i osop y a so treats the Christian ‘phenomenon’ (Christianity as a historical reality t at is p enomeno ogica y o serva e), given t at p i osop ers ( e ievers and non- e ievers a i e) ave a ways done t is since t e time when the religion of Christ was spread in the Hellenistic world: we can t in o t e anti-C ristian po emics o t e Neo-P atonists (Proc us, Por rius, P otinus), and even e ore t at, o t e c ari cations and elaborations of the Church Fathers in their apologetics as an answer to t e o jections o t e adversaries o C ristianity ( ot from the Jews and Pagans), objections that often targeted the logical nature of the act of faith in Christian revelation (as in the case o Ce sus) or t e rationa ity o its contents (as in t e case o P otinus

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and Proclus). To all those who held that Christianity was merely a socia p enomenon reduci e to superstitious attitudes (an irrational acceptance, i.e ., not motivated, of novel religious and moral doctrines w ic were t emse ves unreasona e, a surd and un eieva e), t e apo ogists and C ristian po emists (Justin t e Martyr, Tertullian, Origin) replied by analyzing the nature of the act of ait in t e Gospe , pointing out its intrinsic rationa ity in re ation to t eir comp ete y easona e doctrina contents: a o w ic cou d not have been brought about except through an epistemic critique, i.e ., t roug p i osop y. T us as it een or a su sequent centuries, even today: it is enough to recall important episodes in the history of philosophy such as the controversies concerning the relation etween ait and reason during t e Re ormation and Counter-Reformation; the apologetic intent that guided Blaise Pascal in the writing of the unfinished work we know as the ensées the strugg es o ‘Cat o ic Pyrr onism’ and t e anti-sceptica po emics of the Cartesians and anti-Cartesians (Cf. Livi [2003d]); criticisms of the British and French Enlightenment authors concerning Christian dogma and t e deve opments o p i osop ica Deism; Kant’s distinction between ‘knowing’ and ‘believing’ in his ritique of Pure Reason ; t e dia ectic o ait and p i osop y in Hege ian ogic; t e anti-rationa istic reaction o Kier egaard and is conception o ‘faith’ as ‘risk’; the various forms of Catholic fideism in the nineteent and twentiet centuries; t e ypot esis o t e interpretation o p i osop y itse as ‘ ait ’ y Kar Jaspers… In t e na ana ysis, there is no doubt that the philosophical analysis of the act of faith, carried out wit t e intention o recognizing its rea connoted o jects within their authentic formulation (Sacred Scripture and the Magisterium of the Church), has demonstrated a fundamental interest or p i osop y ot istorica y and t eoretica y. In dealing with the act of faith in Revelation, I have emphasized the need to accurately distinguish between natural knowledge

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of the existence of Go (common sense knowledge and metaphysica now edge) and supernatura know e ge o ivine mysteries (through revelation that God has made about his nature and his salvific plan); in fact, it is necessary to bear in mind that there is a conceptua con usion in ordinary anguage w ic dea s wit ‘ ait in God’ and ‘believing in God’ almost always referring to natural now edge o God (i.e ., t e certainty a out God’s existence, proper o common sense), yet situated on t e same eve o t e acceptance of the supernatural mysteries revealed by God. If such a conceptual con usion is not overcome, any conversation concerning t e re ation etween ait and reason wi e ere t o t ose minima requirements of rigour that would make it a constructive conversation; and t e same rigour is required y t ose w o reject t e Cat o ic notion of faith and propose another one: either because they argue in favor of the exclusion of faith from the field of rationality, leaving space on y or dia ectica reason (rationa ism), or ecause t ey intend to conclude their analysis of faith by eliminating the rational component in favor of a voluntaristic option which would not need reasons ( deism). In ot cases, dia ogue can on y occur on t e asis of explicit definitions of what is intended, once the Catholic notion of faith is jettisoned, by ‘faith’ in relation to ‘reason’. T e ana ysis ere deve oped as a so c ari ed t e important distinction between the ineffable nature of Go (which concerns is essence and his plan for salvation, mysteries which are inaccessi e or natura reason and w ic remained vei ed y sym o s even when one achieves knowledge of them through faith in Revelation) and e certainty o is existence (certainty w ic provides t e asis or natura re igion and acts as a rationa premise or t e acceptance of supernatural revelation): ignoring this distinction has often led to con using t e ‘un nowa eness’ o God (in is essence) wit t e refusal of admitting his existence, i.e ., atheism; as well as exasperating beyond all limits the ‘negative’ character of mysticism.

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The speculative advantage of these investigations and distinctions as een t e disc osure o certain i egitimate presuppositions of modern and contemporary philosophical systems when dealing wit t e pro em o God. Under t e prism o w at must e a rmed — spea ing rigorous y — concerning t e rationa nature o C ristian faith in revealed mysteries, it becomes evident that modern p i osop y as contri uted — t roug am iguous and mis eading p i osop ica app ications o t e t eo ogica notion o ‘ ait ’ — to the introduction of conceptual confusion precisely where it is indispensa e to ave t ese distinction very c ear y drawn. A ove all, it can be clearly seen that Kant, with his exclusion of the notion of God from the deposit of knowledge qualified as ‘objective’ ( i.e ., grounded on sensate experience and on t e app ication o priori forms: space, time, categories), has been responsible for the false and unfounded conviction — for too long shared by a large part of Western cu ture — t at natura reason can not arrive at a rationa certainty concerning the existence of God and that all the metaphysical proofs of the existence of God — including the Thomistic w ys — are ac ing any specu ative oundation (C . Immanue Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft . Transzendentale Dialektik ). Yet t is p enomenistic prejudice, aving tenacious y survived many we grounded criticisms o t e Kantian system (C . Livi [1997]) today has received new criticism and, in light of the “overcoming” o t e so-ca ed “end o metap ysics”(C . Ottone o [2002]) and in ig t o t e contri utions o ana ytica p i osop y (C . Mic e etti [2002]), can be considered untenable, precisely because the metap ysica approac o t e w ys o Aquinas ave een recognized as valid, albeit with new and sophisticated interpretations concerning his point of departure and demonstrative method (Cf. Motta [2002]). Yet, the re-affirmed possibility of a natural knowledge of the existence of God (above all as patrimony of common sense, and later

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as a metaphysical formalization), here has the meaning and value o an indispensa e rationa premise o ait , in terms o t e condition of possibility for man’s understanding and acceptance of divine revelation, thus gaining access to supernatural knowledge . Such a rea rmation does not imp y a ‘rationa istic vision’ o t e now edge of God. Natural knowledge is, in fact, — as we have already shown — awareness o t e un at oma e mystery o Transcendence, even ac now edging t at t is Mystery is t e oundation o a rea ity; and supernatural knowledge is not presented as the definitive and comp ete unvei ing o t e divine nature, ut rat er t e grace w ic a ows us partia access to God’s intimacy, a vision “ i e in a mirror and in mystery,” and at the same time it is a prelude to further grace, to t e promise o a ‘ ace-to- ace’ encounter (t e umen g oriae . St. Paul, precisely in the passage of his Epistle containing these hrases, adds: “Now I know in an imperfect way, then I will know in a per ect way, just as I am nown [ y God]” (First Epist e to t e orinthians , 13:12). Faith’s knowledge is true knowledge, yet imerfect; with divine revelation, we know with certainty something o t e intimate i e o God, ut t at w ic we now (t e Trinity o Persons in the unity of divine substance, the eternal plan of salvation of all men through the Incarnation of the Word) we cannot u y un erstan w i e we are in statu viae In terms of this reality, the expressions of a classical author of mystica t eo ogy are very signi cant: W o can investigate t e su ime essence o God, ine fable and incomprehensible? Who can search his highest mysteries? W o wi dare say anyt ing a out im w o is the eternal existing principle of all created things? Who will boast of knowing the infinite God, who fills all with imse , encompasses a , transcends a , comprises a and escapes all? […] Let no one presume with investigating

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God’s incomprehensible mysteries: what, where and how e may e. T ese are ine a e, inscruta e, impenetra e mysteries. Believe one thing only, but with the strength o your w o e eart: t at God is a ways i e t is, as e as always been and will forever be. He is unchangeable. W o is God t en? Fat er, Son and Ho y Spirit are a sing e God. Do not desire to know anything else about God […]. S ou d any o you want to now w at to e ieve, eware that you will not understand more by speaking than by e ieving. T e more t e now edge o God ecomes an o ject of discussion, the farther it seems to move away from us. Seek therefore the knowledge of God that stems not rom wordy disputes, ut rom t e sanctity o a good i e. This knowledge springs from the simplicity of heart, not rom putting toget er earned ut impious opinions. I you ursue the Ineffable One with discussions, he will ‘go beyond you (Qo 7:23)’ more t an e ore. But i you see im in faith, you will find wisdom at the city gates next to your ome. You wi see, a eit part y. But you wi not e a e to attain it, for it still is invisible and incomprehensible. God is invisi e, and t at is w at we must e ieve, even t oug some knowledge can be had by those who have the gift of faith” (Abbot Columbanus, Instructions on Faith, –5; Works , Du in, 1957, 65–66). Contemporary t eo ogy g ad y recognizes t ese dynamic aspects o grace in terms o t e vision o God: “God did not revea himself as a reality that our mind could encompass and possess. Discovering im never ends. […] His reve ation attains its own coherence the moment when, coming close to it, we see that the revealed mystery is still largely hidden. Its partial revelation instils in us t e passionate desire to now and understand a ways more” (Fisichella [2002], p. 587). Therefore, a rigorous reflection on the faith in Revelation should not lead to any form of philosophical

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rationalism (and as a result, theological rationalism), nor should it ead to p i osop ica scepticism (w ic inevita y generates t eological fideism) which today seems to reign: the conclusions of a hilosophical analysis of the act of faith and of its object are to be understood t roug t e prism o a de icate yet necessary gnoseological balance, which an already quoted theologian summarizes we wit t ese words concerning man’s natura and supernatura o God: “He is not un nown or ignored y us, ut rat er t e One who is incomprehensible” ( Ibid.). nd yet, as one aut or as noticed, “Fait is not on y communica e, ut it is impossi e not to communicate it, at east t roug that implicit communication of meaning which is given to one’s actions” (Zennaro [2002], pp. 5- 6). Communication is orn from the answer that is given to the imposing presence of the reality that surrounds man, which poses inescapable questions and to w ic C ristianity o ers a g o a answer o meaning u ness. In t e first place, man examines the ‘ elational’ context of the first encounter with the truth of Christ . Andrew and John, the two who ask Jesus t e question: “Master, w ere do you ive?” are u y invo ved in their contemporary culture.

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