Belarmino v. Employees’ Compensation Commission G.R. No. 90104, May 11, 1990 Facts: Oanis Belarmino was a classroom teacher for eleven years. While performing her duties as a classroom teacher, Mrs.
Belarmino who was in her 8th month of pregnancy, accidentally slipped and fell on the classroom loor. Moments later, she complained of abdominal pain and stomach cramps. For several days, she continued to suffer from recurrent abdominal pain and a feeling of heaviness in her stomach, but heedless of the advice of her female coteachers to ta!e a leave of absence, she continued wor!ing. "leven days after the accident she prematurely delivered a baby girl. #er abdominal pain persisted even after delivery, accompanied by high fever and headache. $he doctor found that she was suffering suffering from septicemia post partum due to infected lacerations of the vagina. %even days later, she died. $he cause of death was septicemia post partum . $he &%'% denied the husband(s claim for death beneits. 't held that septicemia post partum was not an occupational disease, and neither was there any showing that the ailment was contracted by reason of her employment. $he alleged accident could not have precipitated the death but rather the death resulted from the infection of her lacerated wounds as a result of her delivery at home. $he "mployees( )ompensation )ommission agreed with the decision of the &%'%. Ruling: $he %upreme )ourt ordered the &%'% to pay death beneits to the husband of Oanis with legal interest plus attorney(s
fees e*uivalent to +- of the award. $he condition of the classroom loor caused Mrs. Belarmino to slip and fall and suffer inury as a result. $he fall precipitated the onset onset of recurr recurrent ent abdomina abdominall pains pains which which culminat culminated ed in the prematur premature e terminati termination on of her pregnanc pregnancy y with tragic conse*uences to her. #er fall on the classroom loor brought about her premature delivery which caused the development of septicem sept icemia ia post partum partum which which resulted resulted in death. #er fall was the proximat proximate e or responsible responsible cause that set in motion an unbro!en chain of events, leading to her demise. Mrs. Belarmino(s fall was the primary inury that arose in the course of her employment as a classroom teacher/ hence, all the medical conse*uences lowing lowing from it, her recurrent abdominal pains, the premature delivery of her baby, baby, her septicemia post partum, and death, are compensable. 't is true that if she had delivered her baby under sterile conditions in a hospital operating room instead of an unsterile environment environment of her house, and if she had been attended by specially trained doctors and nurses, she probably would would not have suffered lacerations of the vagina and would not have contracted the fatal infection. But who is to blame for her inability to afford a hospital delivery and the services of trained doctors and nurses0 $he court may ta!e udicial notice of the meager salaries that government pays its school teachers. Forced to live on the margin of poverty, they are unable to afford e1pensive hospital care. 2enury compelled the deceased to scrimp by delivering delivering her baby at home instead of in a hospital. $he &overnment is not entirely blameless for her death for it is not entirely blameless for her poverty. &overnment has yet to perform its declared policy 3to free the people from poverty, provide ade*uate social services, attend to them a decent standard of living, and improve the *uality of life for all.4 %ocial ustice for the lowly and underpaid public school teachers will only be an empty shibboleth until &overnment adopts measures to ameliorate their economic condition and provides them with ade*uate medical care or the means to afford it. )ompassion for for the poor is an imperative imperative of every humane society. society. By their denial of the petitioner(s claim for beneits arising from the death of his wife, the public respondents ignored this imperative of &overnment and thereby committed a grave abuse of discretion.
Hinoguin v. Employees’ Compensation Commission G.R. No. 840, !pril 1",1989 Facts: %gt. #inoguin was a detachment noncommissioned oficer at )arranglan, 5ueva "cia. On 6ugust +, +78, he and two
members of his detachment sought permission from the )ompany )ommander to go on overnight pass to 6ritao, 5ueva 9i:caya 3to settle an important matter thereat.4 $he )ompany )ommander orally granted them permission and allowed them to ta!e their irearms with them because 6ritao was a 3critical place.4 'n 6ritao 2oblacion, one of #inoguin(s companions dismounted, wal!ed towards and in front of the tricycle cab, holding his M+; rile in his right hand, not noticing that the rile(s safety lever was on 3semiautomatic4
ine of ?uty Board declared %gt. #inoguin(s death to have been 3in line of duty,4 and recommended that all beneits due %gt. #inoguin(s dependents be given. %gt. #inoguin(s claim for compensation beneits under 2.?. 5o. ;@;
of and in the course of his employment as a soldier on active duty status in the 6rmed Forces of the 2hilippines and, hence, compensable. $he concept of a 3wor!place4 cannot always be literally applied to a soldier on active duty status. 6 soldier must go where his company is stationed. %gt. #inoguin and his companions had permission to proceed to 6ritao. 6 place which soldiers have secured lawful permission to be at cannot be very different from a place where they are re*uired to go by their commanding oficer. #inoguin and his companions were not on vacation leave. $hey are authori:ed to carry their irearms with which they were to defend themselves if 526 elements happen to attac! them. $he >ine of ?uty Board of Oficers had already determined that #inoguin(s death occurred 3in line of duty.4 6 soldier on active duty status is really on duty @A hours a day. #e is subect to call and to orders of his superior at all times, e1cept when he is on vacation leave status
GSIS v. CA and F. Alegre G.R. No. 1$8%$4, !pril $0, 1999 Facts: %2O@ 6legre, a police oficer was driving his tricycle and ferrying passengers within the vicinity of a commercial
)omple1 when %2OA 6. $enorio, r., $eamC?es! Oficer, confronted him regarding his tour of duty. 6legre allegedly snubbed $enorio and even directed curse words upon the latter. 6 verbal tussle ensued between the two which led to the fatal shooting of %2O@ 6legre. $he widow iled a claim for death beneits with &%'% which denied the claim on the ground that at the time of his death, 6legre was performing a personal activity which was not wor!connected. $he "mployees( )ompensation )ommission <"))= afirmed the ruling of the &%'%. But the )ourt of 6ppeals reversed the "))(s decision and ruled that 6legre(s death was wor!connected, hence, compensable. )iting Nitura vs. Employees’ Compensation Commission and Employees’ Compensation Commission vs. Court of Appeals, the appellate court e1plained its conclusion, thusD 3E$he %upreme )ourt held that the concept of a Gwor!place( cannot always be literally applied to a person in active duty status, as if he were a machine operator or a wor!er in an assembly line in a factory or a cler! in a particular i1ed ofice. 't is our considered view that, as applied to a peace oficer, his wor! place is not conined to the police precinct or station but to any place where his services, as lawman, to maintain peace and security, are re*uired. 6t the time of his death, 6legre was driving a tricycle at the northeastern part of the 'melda )ommercial )omple1 where the police assistance center is located. $here can be dispute therefore that he met his death literally in his place of wor!. 't is true that the deceased was driving his tricycle, with passengers aboard, when he was accosted by another police oficer. $his would lend some semblance of viability to the argument that he was not in the performance of oficial duty at the time. #owever, the argument, though initially plausible, overloo!s the fact that policemen, by the nature of their function, are deemed to be on a round-the-clock duty.4
&%'% goes to the %) on petition for review on certiorari reiterating its position that %2O@ 6legre(s death lac!s the re*uisite element of compensability which is, that the activity being performed at the time of death must be wor!connected. Ruling: We grant the petition.
Hnder the pertinent guidelines of the ")) on compensability, for the inury and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the inury must be the result of an employment accident satisfying all of the following conditionsD <+= $he employee must have been inured at the place where his wor! re*uires him to be/ <@= $he employee must have been performing his oficial functions/ and imec #inoguin, together with two other members of his detachment, sought and were orally granted permission by the commanding oficer of their company to leave their station in )arranglan, 5ueva "cia to go on overnight pass to 6ritao, 5ueva 9i:caya. 6s they were returning to their head*uarters, one of his companions, not !nowing that his M+; rile was on 3semiautomatic4 mode, accidentally pulled the trigger and shot %gt. #inoguin who then died as a result thereof. Juling for the grant of death compensation beneits this )ourt heldD 3$he concept of a Gwor!place( referred to in &round +, for instance, cannot always be literally applied to a soldier on active duty status, as if he were a machine operator or a wor!er in assembly line in a factory or a cler! in a particular i1ed ofice. Obviously, a soldier must go where his company is stationed. 'n the instant case, 6ritao, 5ueva 9i:caya was not of course, )arranglan, 5ueva "cia, 6ritao, being appro1imately ++C@ hours away from the latter by public transportation. But %gt. #inoguin, )pl. )lavo and ?ft. 6libuyog had permission from their )ommanding Oficer to proceed to 6ritao, and it appears to us that a place which soldiers have secured lawful permission to be at cannot be very different, legally spea!ing, from a place where they are reuired to go by their commanding oficer. We note that the three
were re*uired or authori:ed to carry their irearms with which presumably they were to defend themselves if 526 elements happened to attac! them while en route to and from 6ritao or with which to attac! and see! to capture such 526 elements as they might encounter. 'ndeed, if the three
$hen came the case of Nitura, li!ewise involving a member of the 2hilippine 6rmy, 2fc. J.%. 5itura, who was assigned at Basagan, Katipunan, Lamboanga del 5orte. 6t the time he met his death, he was instructed by his battalion commander to chec! on several personnel of his command post who were then attending a dance party in Barangay %an ose, ?ipolog )ity. But on his way bac! to the camp, he passed, crossed and fell from a hanging wooden bridge which accident caused his death. Jeversing the ")) which earlier denied death beneits to the deceased(s widow, the )ourt ruledD 36 soldier must go where his company is stationed. 'n the case at bar, 2fc. 5itura(s station was at Basagan, Katipunan, Lamboanga del 5orte. But then his presence at the site of the accident was with the permission of his superior oficer... 6s to the *uestion of whether or not he was performing an oficial function at the time of the incident, it has been held that a soldier on active duty status is really on a @A hours a day oficial duty status and is subect to military discipline and military law @A hours a day. #e is subect to call and to the orders of his superior oficers at all times, seven <= days a wee!, e1cept, of course, when he is on vacation leave status...4
$he more recent case which was cited by the appellate court in support of its decision is Employees’ Compensation Commission vs. Court of Appeals. $his time, the claim for death compensation beneits was made in behalf of a deceased police oficer, 2C%gt. W. 6lvaran, who, at the time of his death, was a member of the Mandaluyong 2olice %tation but assigned to the 2asig 2rovincial ail. Findings showed that the deceased brought his son to the Mandaluyong 2olice %tation for interview because the latter was involved in a stabbing incident. While in front of the said station, the deceased was approached by another policeman Ewho shot him to death. Both the &%'% and the ")) denied the claim by the deceased(s widow on the ground that %gt. 6lvaran was plainly acting as a father to his son and that he was in a place where he was not re*uired to be. $he )ourt of 6ppeals reversed said denial which decision was afirmed by this )ourt, declaring thatD 3But for clarity(s sa!e and as a guide for future cases, we hereby hold that members of the national police, li!e 2C%gt. 6lvaran, are by the nature of their functions technically on duty @A hours a day. "1cept when they are on vacation leave, policemen are subect to call all anytime and may be as!ed by their superiors or by any distressed citi:en to assist in maintaining the peace and security of the community. 111 111 111 We hold that by analogy and for purposes of granting compensation under 2.?. 5o. ;@;, as amended, policemen should be treated in the same manner as soldiers. While it is true that, 3geographically4 spea!ing, 2C%gt. 6lvaran was not actually at his assigned post at the 2asig 2rovincial ail when he was attac!ed and !illed, it could not also be denied that in bringing his son N as a suspect in a case N to the police station for *uestioning to shed l ight on a stabbing incident, he was not merely acting as father but as a peace oficer.4
From the foregoing cases, it can be gleaned that the )ourt did not ustify its grant of death beneits merely on account of the rule that soldiers or policemen, as the case may be, are virtually wor!ing roundthecloc!. 5ote that the )ourt li!ewise attempted in each case to ind a reasonable ne1us between the absence of the deceased from his assigned place of wor! and the incident that led to his death. $a!ing together urisprudence and the pertinent guidelines of the ")), with respect to claims for death beneits, namely
Valeriano v. Employees’ Compensation Commission and Government Service Insurance System G.R. No. 1&$00, 'une 8, $000 Facts: ).%. 9aleriano was employed as a ire truc! driver assigned at the %an uan Fire %tation. On the evening of uly I, +78, he
was standing along %antolan Joad, ue:on )ity, when he met a friend. $hey decided to proceed to Bonan:a Jestaurant in "?%6, ue:on )ity, for dinner. On their way home at around 7DI 2M, the ownertype eepney they were riding in igured in a headon collision with another vehicle at the intersection of 5. ?omingo and Broadway streets in ue:on )ity. 9aleriano, thrown out of the vehicle, was severely inured. 2ursuing his ") claim, 9aleriano argued that the e1igency of his ob as a ireman re*uires a constant observance of his duties as such/ thus, he should be considered to have been 3on call4 when he met the accident. #e underscored the applicability of Hinoguin vs. ECC and Nitura vs. ECC to his case. Ruling: 2etitioner 9aleriano was not able to demonstrate solidly how his ob as a iretruc! driver was related to the inuries he
had suffered. $hat he sustained the inuries after pursuing a purely personal and social function N having dinner with some friends N is clear from the records of the case. #is inuries were not ac*uired at his wor! place/ nor were they sustained while he was performing an act within the scope of his employment or in pursuit of an order of his superior. $hus his inuries and conse*uent disability were not wor!connected and thus not compensable. $he circumstances in the present case do not call for the application of Hinoguin and Nitura . Following the rationali:ation in !"#" vs. Alegre the @Ahourduty doctrine cannot be applied to petitioner(s case, because he was neither at his assigned wor! place nor in pursuit of the orders of his superiors when he met an accident. But the more important ustiication for the )ourt(s stance is that he was not doing an act within his duty and authority as a iretruc! driver, or any other act of such nature, at the time he sustained his inuries. $here is no any reasonable connection between his inuries and his wor! as a iretruc! driver.
Iloilo Doc ! Eng’g. Co. v. "CC# et al. G.R. No. ()$&41, No*ember $", 19"8 Facts: 6t about D@ in the afternoon of anuary @7, +7;, 2ablo, who was employed as a mechanic of the '?")O, while wal!ing
on his way home, was shot to death in front of, and about @ meters away from, the main '?")O gate, on a private road commonly called the '?")O road. $he slayer, Martin )ordero, was not heard to say anything before or after the !illing. $he motive for the crime was and still is un!nown as )ordero was himself !illed before he could be tried for 2ablo(s death. 6t the time of the !illing, 2ablo(s companion was Jodolfo &alope:, another employee, who, li!e 2ablo, had inished overtime wor! at D p.m. and was going home. From the main '?")O gate to the spot where 2ablo was !illed, there were four 3carinderias4 on the left side of the road and two 3carinderias4 and a residential house on the right side. $he entire length of the road is nowhere stated in the record. #ssue: Whether 2ablo(s death comes within the meaning and intendment of that 3deceptively simple and litigiously proliic4
phrase 3arising out of and in the course of employment.4 Ruling: $he general rule in wor!men(s compensation law !nown as the 3going and coming rule,4 simply stated, is that 3in the
absence of special circumstances, an employee inured in, going to, or coming from, his place of wor! is e1cluded from the beneits of wor!men(s compensation acts.4 $his rule, however, admits four wellrecogni:ed e1ceptions, to $it D <+= where the employee is proceeding to or from his wor! on the premises of his employer/ <@= where the employee is about to enter or about to leave the premises of his employer by way of the e1clusive or customary means of ingress and egress/
Alano v. ECC
G.R. No. ()48%94, Marc+ 1&, 1988 Facts: ?edication was a school principal whose tour of duty was from DI a.m. to DI p.m. While waiting for a ride at a public
pla:a on her way to school, she was bumped and run over by a speeding bus which caused her death. $he "mployees( )ompensation )ommission denied the claim iled by her heirs on the ground that the inury was not an employment accident satisfying all the conditions prescribed by law. Ruling: $he deceased died while going to her place of wor!. %he was at the place where her ob necessarily re*uired her to be
if she was to reach her place of wor! on time. $here was nothing private or personal about her being at the place of the accident. %he was there because her employment re*uired her to be there. $he &%'%, as the ultimate implementing agency of the "mployees( )ompensation )ommission, is ordered to pay the claimants.
$a%o v. Employees’ Compensation Commission
G.R. No. "8&1", 'une 18, 1990 Facts: >a:o is a security guard of the )entral Ban! assigned to its main ofice. #is regular tour of duty is from @ o(cloc! in the
afternoon to + o(cloc! in the evening. On une +8, +78;, he rendered duty from @ o(cloc! in the afternoon to + o(cloc! in the evening. But as the security guard who was to relieve him failed to arrive, he rendered overtime duty up to o(cloc! in the morning of une +7. On his way home, at about ; o(cloc! that morning, the passenger eepney the petitioner was riding on turned turtle due to slippery road. 6s a result, he sustained inuries and was ta!en to the hospital for treatment. Ruling: $he claim is compensable. #ere, >a:o left his station at the )entral Ban! several hours after his regular time off,
because the reliever did not arrive, and so he was as!ed to go on overtime. 6fter permission to leave was given, he went home. $here is no evidence that he deviated from his usual, regular homeward route or that interruptions occurred in the ourney. "mployment includes not only the actual doing of the wor!, but a reasonable margin of time and space necessary to be used in passing to and from the place where the wor! is to be done. 'f the employee be inured while passing, with the e1press or implied consent of the employer, to or from his wor! by a way over the employer(s premises, or over those of another in such pro1imity and relation as to be in practical effect a part of the employer(s premises, the inury is one arising out of and in the course of the employment as much as though it had happened while the employee was engaged in his wor! at the place of its performance.
&FD International 'anning Agents# Inc.(Bar)er S*ip 'anagement $td. v. Illescas
G.R. No. 180%4, eptember $9, $010 Facts: 'llescas was employed as $hird Oficer of MC9 %hinrei through a 2O"6approved employment contract for nine months
with H%P8A. monthly salary. On May +;, @I, in the seventh month of 'llescas( employment, the vessel oficers ordered 'llescas to carry @ ire hydrant caps from the dec! to the engine wor!shop. $he ne1t day, while doing the same !ind of wor!, he felt a sudden snap on his bac!, with pain that radiated down to the left side of his hips. Jepatriated to the 2hilippines, he underwent operations, but his condition did not improve, causing an orthopedic specialist to declare him 3unit to wor! at sea in any capacity as seaman.4 #e claimed disability beneit under the contract that grants as much as H%P7,. to the seafarer who suffers permanent disability 3as a result of an accident.4 $he employer denied the claim, insisting that the disability was not due to an 3accident.4 Ruling: Blac!(s >aw ?ictionary deines 3accident4 as 3Ean unintended and unforeseen inurious occurrence/ something that
does not occur in the usual course of events or that could not be reasonably anticipated, 1 1 1 Ean unforeseen and inurious occurrence not attributable to mista!e, negligence, neglect or misconduct.4 $he 2hilippine >aw ?ictionary deines the word 3accident4 as 3Ethat which happens by chance or fortuitously, without intention and design, and which is une1pected, unusual and unforeseen.4 36ccident,4 in its commonly accepted meaning, or in its ordinary sense, has been deined asD E6 fortuitous circumstance, event, or happening, an event happening without any human agency, or if happening wholly or partly through human agency, an event which under the circumstances is unusual and une1pected by the person to whom it happens 1 1 1. -+e or/ may be employe/ as /enoting a calamity, casualty, catastrophe, disaster, an undersirable or unfortunate happening/ any unexpecte/ personal inury resulting rom any unloo2e/ or mis+ap or occurrence / any unpleasant or unfortunate occurrence, that causes inury, loss, suffering or death/ some untoward occurrence aside from the usual course of events.
$he )ourt holds that the snap on the bac! of respondent was not an accident, but an inury sustained by respondent from carrying the heavy bas!etful of ire hydrant caps, which inury resulted in his disability. $he inury cannot be said to be the result of an accident, that is, an unloo!ed for mishap, occurrence, or fortuitous event, because the inury resulted from the performance of a duty. 6lthough respondent may not have e1pected the inury, yet, it is common !nowledge that carrying heavy obects can cause bac! inury, as what happened in this case. #ence, the inury cannot be viewed as unusual under the circumstances, and is not synonymous with the term 3accident4 as deined above. 6lthough the disability of respondent was not caused by an accident, his disability is still compensable under 6rticle +I of the )B6 under the following provisionD 6 seafarerCoficer who is disabled as a result of any inury, and who is assessed as less than - permanently disabled, but permanently unit for further service at sea in any capacity, shall also be entitled to a +- compensation.
Jespondent E'llescas is, therefore, entitled to disability beneit in the amount H%P7,. under the )B6.
'e+e% v. Employees’ Compensation Commission# et al.
G.R. No. ()48488, !pril $%, 1980 Facts: 2etitioner, &.?. MenQe:, was employed by the ?epartment
%he retired on 6ugust I+, +7 under the disability retirement plan at the age of A after I@ years of teaching, due to rheumatoid arthritis and pneumonitis. Before her retirement, she was assigned at Jaa %oliman #igh %chool in $ondoBinondo, Manila, near a dirty cree!. On October @+, +7;, petitioner iled a claim for disability beneits under 2.?. 5o. ;@;, as amended, with respondent &overnment %ervice 'nsurance %ystem which denied the claim on October @, +7; on the ground that petitioner(s ailments were not occupational diseases, ta!ing into consideration the nature of her particular wor!. Je*uests for reconsideration were also denied by the %ystem/ hence, the case was elevated to the "mployees( )ompensation )ommission for review. On March +, +78, the )ommission en banc afirmed the decision of respondent &%'%. 'n her petition for review on certiorari, petitioner claims that she contracted pneumonitis andCor bronchiectasis with hemoptysis and rheumatoid arthritis on anuary @, +7 after wetting and chilling during the course of employment. %he claimed these diseases are permanent and recurring in nature and wor!connected. Ruling: 6n occupational disease is one Gwhich results from the nature of the employment, and by nature is meant conditions to
which all employees of a class are subect and which produce the disease as a natural incident of a particular occupation, and attach to that occupation a ha:ard which distinguishes it from the usual run of occupations and is in e1cess of the ha:ard attending the employment in general.( $o be occupational, the disease must be one due wholly to causes and conditions which are normal and constantly present and characteristic of the particular occupation/ that is, those things which science and industry have not yet learned how to eliminate. "very wor!er in every plant of the same industry is ali!e constantly e1posed to the danger of contracting a particular occupational disease. 6n occupational disease is one which develops as a result of ha:ards peculiar to certain occupations, due to to1ic substances abor )ode since under Jule ''', %ection +
Clemente v. Government Service Insurance System
G.R. No. 4"$1, 'uly 1, 198" Facts: $he husband of claimant wor!ed in a s!in clinic. 6s anitor of the clinic, he was e1posed to different carriers of viral and
bacterial diseases. #e had to clean the clinic itself where patients with different illnesses come and go. #e had to put in order the hospital e*uipment that had been used. #e had to dispose of garbage and wastes that accumulated in the course of each wor!ing day. #e was the employee most e1posed to the dangerous concentration of infected materials, and, not being a medical practitioner, least li!ely to !now how to avoid infection. Ruling: $he wor!ing conditions of claimant(s husband increased the ris! of his contracting the ailments, i.e., nephritis, leprosy,
etc.
&ara%o v. Employees’ Compensation Commission
G.R. No. 801%", February &, 1990 Facts: $he death of petitioner(s husband was caused by 3Hremia due to obstructive nephropathy and benign prostatic
hypertrophy,4 which is admittedly not among those listed as occupational diseases. 6s per inding of the ")), 3Hremia is a to1ic clinical condition characteri:ed by restlessness, muscular twitching, mental disturbance, nausea, and vomiting associated with utenal insuficiency brought about by the retention in blood of nitrogenous urinary waste products.4 One of its causes is the obstruction in the low of urinary waste products. $he nature of the wor! of the deceased as Budget "1aminer in the Ofice of the &overnor dealt with the detailed preparation of the budget, inancial reports and review andCor e1amination of the budget of other provincial and municipal ofices. Full concentration and thorough study of the entries of accounts in the budget andCor inancial reports were necessary, such that the deceased had to sit for hours, and more often than not, delay and even forego urination in order not to interrupt the low of concentration. 'n addition, tension and pressure must have aggravated the situation. Ruling: Hnder the foregoing circumstances, the cause of death of petitioner(s husband is wor!connected, i.e., the ris! of
contracting the illness was aggravated by the nature of the wor!, so much so that petitioner is entitled to receive compensation beneits for the death of her husband. From human e1perience, prolonged sitting down and putting off urination result in stagnation of the urine. $his encourages the growth of bacteria in the urine, and affects the delicate balance between bacterial multiplication rates and the host defense mechanisms. ?elayed e1cretion may permit the retention and survival of microorganisms which multiply rapidly, and infect the urinary tract. $hese are predisposing factors to pylonephritis and uremia. $hus, while we may concede that these illnesses are not directly caused by the nature of the duties of a teacher, the ris! of contracting the same is aggravated by their wor!ing habits necessitated by demands of ob eficiency.
$im)o v. Employees’ Compensation Commission and Social Security System
G.R. No. 14&891, 'uly 0, $00$ Facts: 2etitioner J. >imbo was employed at 5estle 2hilippines since +7;; as a salesman and was later promoted as 6reas %ales
%upervisor in +7. 'n ?ecember +77A, he was conined for one wee! at the 2hilippine &eneral #ospital for oint pains. 't was revealed that he had elevated BH5, creatinine and anemia, and that he had chronic renal disease. #e underwent a renal transplant and was discharged on anuary +I, +77. #e claimed compensation beneits under the %%%")) invo!ing 2.?. ;@;/ however, his claim was denied on the ground that his illness had no causal relationship to his ob as 6rea %ales %upervisor. #e appealed to the "mployees( )ompensation )ommission which afirmed the decision of the %%%. $he )ourt of 6ppeals li!ewise dismissed his petition. #ssue: Whether or not 3endstage renal disease secondary to uric acid nephropathy4 is compensable under 2.?. ;@; as
amended. Ruling: $he )ourt considered the wor!load and areas of responsibility of petitioner and found that it was not unli!ely for him
to develop hypertension leading to uremia. 'n determining whether a disease is compensable, it is enough that there e1ists a reasonable wor! connection as the wor!men(s claim is based on probability and not certainty. Hnder the 6mended Jules on "mployees( )ompensation, 3iason of the territory with the 5ational %ales Manager, 6reas %ales Manager and other 5estle units/ eads and manages territory sales force and Ird party support.
)onsidering the wor!load and areas of responsibility of petitioner in this case, it is not unli!ely for him to develop hypertension, which in turn led to uremia. 't should be stressed that in determining whether a disease is compensable, it is enough that there e1ists a reasonable wor! connection. 't is suficient that the hypothesis on which the wor!men(s claim is based is probable since probability, not certainty, is the touchstone.
,aro v. Employees’ Compensation Commission
G.R. No. %844%, !pril $", 1989
)ancer is a disease that stri!es people in general. $he nature of a person(s employment appears to have no relevance. )ancer can stri!e a lowly paid laborer or a highly paid e1ecutive or one who wor!s on land, in water, or in the bowels of the earth. 't ma!es no difference whether the victim is employed or unemployed, a white collar employee or a blue collar wor!er, a house!eeper, an urban dweller or a resident of a rural area. urisprudence on the compensability of cancer ailments has of late become a source of confusion among the claimants and the government agencies enforcing the employees( compensation law. $he strongly lingering inluence of the principles of 3presumption of compensability4 and 3aggravation4 found in the defunct Wor!men(s )ompensation 6ct but e1pressly discarded under the present compensation scheme has led to conlict and inconsistency in employees( compensation decisions. $he problem is attributable to the inherent dificulty in applying the new principle of 3proof of increased ris!.4 $here are two approaches to a solution in cases where it cannot be proved that the ris! of contracting an illness not listed a s an occupational disease was increased by the claimant(s wor!ing conditions. One approach is that if a claimant cannot prove the necessary wor! connection because the causes of the disease are still un!nown, it must be presumed that wor!ing conditions increased the ris! of contracting the ailment. $he other approach is that if there is no proof of the re*uired wor! connection, the disease is not compensable because the law says so. 't is not correct to say that all cancers are not compensable. $he list of occupational diseases prepared by the "mployees( )ompensation )ommission includes some cancers as compensable. $here is no arbitrariness in the )ommission(s allowing vinyl chloride wor!ers or plastic wor!ers to be compensated for brain cancer. $here are certain cancers which are reasonably considered as strongly induced by speciic causes. #eavy doses of radiation as in )hernobyl, H%%J, cigarette smo!e over a long period for lung cancer, certain chemicals for speciic cancers, and asbestos dust, among others, are generally accepted as increasing the ris!s of contracting speciic cancers. What the law re*uires for others is proof. )ancer is a disease of still un!nown origin which stri!es people in all wal!s of life, employed or unemployed. Hnless it be shown that a particular form of cancer is caused by speciic wor!ing conditions < e.g., chemical fumes, nuclear radiation, asbestos dust, etc.=, the )ourt cannot conclude that it was the employment which increased the ris! of contracting the disease. For the guidance of the administrative agencies and practicing lawyers concerned, the decision of the %upreme )ourt in (aro vs. Employees’ Compensation Commission, &.J. 5o. 8AA, 6pril @, +787, en banc, &utierre:, r., ). superse/es the decisions in %anotes vs. Employees’ Compensation Commission <+@8 %)J6 AI E+78A=/ *ercado vs. Employees’ Compensation Commission <+@ %)J6 ;;A E+78A=/ +venson vs. Employees’ Compensation Commission <+; %)J6 @ E+78=/ Nemaria vs. Employees’ Compensation Commission <+ %)J6 +;; E+78= and other cases with conclusions different from those stated in (aro vs. Employees’ Compensation Commission.
&AESS S*ipping -*il. v. &$,C
G.R. No. "441, eptember 4, 198" Facts: While plying the seas from Bra:il to "gypt, the vessel(s chief steward, named ?ublin, fatally stabbed Fernande:, the
second coo!, during a *uarrel. ?ublin then ran to the dec! from which he umped or fell overboard. $he body was never recovered. For the death of ?ublin, his widow Lenaida collected the amount of 2, under the '$F )ollective Bargaining 6greement. %he also iled with the 2hilippine Overseas "mployment 6dministration <2O"6= a complaint against 56"%% for payment of death beneits totalling H%PA,+@, under both the %pecial 6greement and what she claimed to be also the applicable %ingapore Wor!men(s )ompensation Ordinance. Hnder the special agreement, a crewman of the vessel is entitled to compensation for 3loss of life.4 $he 2O"6 rendered udgment for complainant, holding ?ublin(s death compensable under the %pecial 6greement. 56"%% went to the %upreme )ourt charging grave abuse of discretion by 2O"6 and raised the issue whether 3death caused by suicide4 <umping overboard= is compensable. Ruling: 5o law or rule would ma!e it illegal for an employer to assume the obligation to pay death beneits in favor of his
employee in their contract of employment. %ince 56"%% freely bound itself to a contract which on its face ma!es it un*ualiiedly liable to pay compensation beneits for ?ublin(s death while in its service, regardless of whether or not it intended to ma!e itself the insurer, in the legal sense, of ?ublin(s life, 56"%% cannot escape liability. )ontracts which are the private laws of the contracting parties should be fulilled according to the literal sense of their stipulation, if their terms are clear and leave no room for doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties, for contracts are obligatory, no matter what their form may be, whenever the essential re*uisites for their validity are present. $he argument N that to compel payment of death beneits would amount not only to rewarding the act of murder or homicide, but also ine*uitably places on 56"%% the twin burdens of compensating both the !iller and his victim, who allegedly had also been employed under a contract with a similar death beneits clause N confuses the legal implications and effects of two distinct and independent agreements. 't carries within itself the seeds of its own refutation. "ntitlement of ?ublin to death beneits resulted from his death while serving out his contract of employment. 't was not a conse*uence of his !illing of Fernande:. 'f the latter(s death is also compensable, that is due to the solitary fact of his death while covered by a similar contract, not precisely to the fact that he met death at the hands of ?ublin. $hat both deaths may be related by abuse and effect and 56"%% is the single obligor liable for compensation in both cases must, insofar as factual and legal basis of such liability is concerned, be regarded as purely accidental circumstances. 6ccording to 6merican authorities, suicide is compensable in the following casesD
Solidum v. GSIS
3 ase No. 40&1, promulgate/ on No*ember $, 1988 Facts: %olidum was an enlisted man of the 2hilippine Marines, assigned to the +th Marine Battalion, stationed at Lamboanga
)ity. One morning in March +78, %olidum, who was then resting after a patrol mission, o!ingly challenged his comrades to a duel, but they all ignored him. 2ointing the mu::le of his loaded rile at his temple and, saying 3'ahala na,4 %olidum s*uee:ed the trigger. #e died instantly. #is father iled a claim for death beneits under 2.?. 5o. ;@;. $he &%'% denied his claim because the contingency did not arise out of and in the course of employment. $he %ystem pointed out that the deceased was not performing his duties as a soldier when the accident occurred. Moreover, it said, the deceased(s death was caused by his notorious negligence and not by an accident or by 3an act of &od.4 6fter his re*uest for reconsideration failed, the appellant elevated the case to the "mployees( )ompensation )ommission. Ruling: $he ")) sustained the %ystem(s decision. $he ")) noted that the deceased pointed the mu::le of his rile to himself
and s*uee:ed its trigger causing his death. 3%uch an act, we believe, constitutes notorious negligence. $he employees( compensation program under which the appellant see!s relief is designed to compensate only the wor!ing men who are victims of wor!connected inuries and other contingencies. 'n the case before us, the contingency did not arise out of and in the course of employment, and therefore is not compensable.4
ui%on v. GSIS
3 ase No. 01%, promulgate/ on 5ctober $&, 198" Facts: 6 2hilippine 6rmy soldier died in ?ecember +78 due to dynamite blast at $umalutab detachment in 'pil, Lamboanga
)ity. 'nvestigation showed that after lunch that day, he as!ed permission from his unit to test the dynamite they had earlier coniscated. #e too! a civilian pumpboat and proceeded towards nearby %inonog 'sland. 6long the way, however, he accidentally ignited the fuse of the dynamite, causing it to e1plode prematurely. $he soldier died on the spot. For his death, his father iled a claim for compensation beneits but the &%'% denied it because the deceased at the time of accident was not performing his duties aside from being notoriously negligent. 6ppellant sought a reconsideration of the ruling. #e averred that his son belonged to the Janger $raining &roup whose primary mission is to develop selected soldiers in the ield of speciali:ed small unit tactics, particularly on weapons, e1plosives, and handtohand combat, among others. $hus, testing a dynamite was part of the deceased(s training as a ranger. 3'n fact,4 appellant said, 3no less than the Minister of 5ational ?efense through his legal chief, Brig. &en. %amuel %oriano, supported the line of duty status of his son(s death.4 3Moreover,4 appellant added, 3it was not the commanding oficer of the deceased as alleged in respondent(s adverse decision who advised him not to test the dynamite, but merely a colleague of the same ran! as the deceased.4 Ruling: We Ethe ")) believe that there was indeed negligence on the part of the deceased soldier. #owever, his negligence was
not notorious as perceived by the respondent. 5otorious negligence is something more than simple or contributory negligence. 't signiies a deliberate act of the employee to disregard his own personal safety. ?isobedience to rules does not in itself constitute notorious negligence, if no intention can be attributed to the inured to end his life. $hus, in line with the principle of liberally construing compensation law, to attain its purpose for which it was enacted, the correct view to be followed is that no man in his right senses would deliberately court death. $he presumption then to be adopted is that any person by his instinct of selfpreservation wants to avoid such danger unless an intention is attributed to him to end his life. )onsidering the soldier(s training on e1plosives as a ranger, his desire to test the coniscated dynamite is but a natural reaction on his part to the e1tent that he even ignored the advice of his colleague against his plan. Hnfortunately, the dynamite e1ploded prematurely causing his instant death. $he ")) reversed the respondent %ystem(s decision and ordered payment of the claim.
GSIS v. Court o/ Appeals and ,. Balais
G.R. No. 11"%"$, 'anuary $9, 1998 Facts: 'n ?ecember +787, the employee claimant was diagnosed to be suffering from Juptured 6neurysm. %he underwent
craniotomy. But despite her operation, she could not perform her duties as cashier in the 5#6 as eficiently as she did before her illness. $his forced her to retire on March +, +77 at the age of si1tytwo <;@=. %he iled a claim for disability beneits. $he &%'% granted her temporary total disability <$$?= beneits and, subse*uently, permanent partial disability <22?= beneits for nine months. 'n 5ovember +77@, she re*uested the &%'% to convert the classiication of her disability beneits from permanent partial disability <22?= to permanent total disability <2$?=. &%'% denied the re*uest and informed her that her condition did not satisfy the criteria for permanent total disability. %he as!ed for reconsideration. &%'% denied it, and ")) afirmed the denial. But on a petition for review, the )ourt of 6ppeals promulgated a decision favorable to her. &%'% petitions the %upreme )ourt to reverse the )ourt of 6ppeals. #ssue: 's private respondent entitled to conversion of her beneits from permanent partial disability to permanent total
disability0 Ruling: $he %upreme )ourt, through ustice Jomero, refused to reverse the )ourt of 6ppeals.
While it is true that the degree of private respondent(s physical condition at the time of her retirement was not considered as permanent total disability, yet, it cannot be denied that her condition subse*uently worsened after her head operation and conse*uent retirement. 'n fact, she suffered afterwards from some ailments li!e headaches, di::iness, wea!ness, inability to sleep properly, inability to wal! without support and failure to regain her memory. 6ll these circumstances ineluctably demonstrate the seriousness of her condition, contrary to the claim of petitioner. More than that, it was also undisputed that private respondent was made to ta!e her medication for life. 36 person(s disability may not manifest fully at one precise moment in time but rather over a period of time. 't is possible that an inury which at irst was considered to be temporary may later on become permanent or one who suffers a partial disability becomes totally and permanently disabled from the same cause.4 'n the same vein, this )ourt has ruled that 3disability should not be understood more on its medical signiicance but on the loss of earning capacity.4 2rivate respondent(s persistent illness indeed forced her to retire early which, in turn, resulted in her unemployment, and loss of earning capacity. udicial precedents li!ewise show that disability is intimately related to one(s earning capacity. 't has been a consistent pronouncement of this )ourt that 3permanent total disability means disablement of an employee to earn wages in the same !ind of wor!, or wor! of a similar nature that she was trained for or accustomed to perform, or any !ind of wor! which a person of her mentality and attainment could do.4 3't does not mean state of absolute helplessness, but inability to do substantially all material acts necessary to prosecution of an occupation for remuneration or proit in substantially customary and usual manner. $he )ourt construed permanent total disability as the 3lac! of ability to follow continuously some substantially gainful occupation without serious discomfort or pain and without material inury or danger to life.4 't is, therefore, clear from established urisprudence that the loss of one(s earning capacity determines the disability compensation one is entitled to. 't is also important to note that private respondent was constrained to retire at the age of ;@ years because of her impaired physical condition. $his, again, is another indication that her disability is permanent and total.
Central A%ucarera Don -edro v. C. de $eon# in *is capacity as "ormen’s Compensation Commissioner and $. Alla
G.R. No. ()100&, 6ecember $8, 19%"
$he claimant laborer was granted beneit for temporary total disability. When the disability ceased, he found a new employment at a higher salary. Meantime, he iled a claim for permanent partial disability but the ")) denied the claim because in fact his salary was higher than before. Ruling: $he alleged new employment does not appear to have been duly established and, indeed, even supposing it to be true, that fact $ould not in itself necessarily affect the laborer’s claim for compensation for a permanent partial disability. An inured laborer’s incapacity for $ork is not to be measured solely by the $ages he receives, or his earning, after the inury, since the amount of such $ages or earnings may be affected by various etraneous matters or factors.
6s noted in the 6merican >aw Jeports, 3there are a number of possible e1planations of the fact that an employee $ho receives higher $ages after an inury than $hat he earned before may still have suffered an impairment of earning capacity. $hus, it may indicateD <+= that the employee is the beneiciary of a mere gratuity and does not actually Gearn( his wages/ <@= that the employee, by education and training, has itted himself for more remunerative employment/
