Jose B. Sarmiento vs. Employees’ Compensation Commission & Government Service Insurance System (National Power Corporation) May 11, 1988 GR No. L-65680 Gutierrez, Jr.,J. Facts The late Flordeliza Sarmiento was employed by the National Power Corporation in Quezon City as accounting clerk in May 1974. At the time of her death on August 12, 1981 she was manager of the budget division. The deceased’s illness was a cancer known as “differential squarrous cell carcinoma”, and sought treatment in various hospitals. And on August 12, 1981,she succumbed to cardiorespiratory arrest due to parotid carcinoma, and she was 20 years old. Believing that the deceased’s fatal illness having been contracted during her employment was service-connected, Jose B. Sarmiento filed a claim for death benefits under PD 626. On September 9, 1982, the GSIS, through its Medical Services Center, denied the claim. It was pointed out that the illness of Flordeliza was not caused by employment and employment conditions. Dissatisfied with the respondent’s decision of denial, Jose Sarmiento wrote a letter to the GSIS requesting that the records of the claim be elevated to the Employees’ Compensation Commission for review pursuant to the law and the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation. The respondent Commission affirmed the GSIS’ decision, it found that the deceased’s death is not compensable because she did not contract nor suffer from the same reason of her work but by reason of embryonic rests and epithelial growth. Issue Whether or not the deceased’s illness under PD 626, compensable? Held Under PD 626, a compensable illness means illness accepted as an occupational disease and listed by the Employees’ Compensation Commission, or any illness caused by employment subject to proof by the employee that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working conditions.
ZAIDA G. RARO, vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCESYSTEM (Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences), Facts: The petitioner states that she was in perfect health when employed as a clerk by the Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences at its Daet, Camarines Norte regional office on March 17,1975. About four years later, she began suffering from severe and recurrent headaches coupled with blurring of vision. Forced to take sick leaves every now and then, she sought medical treatment in Manila. The petitioner was diagnosed at the Makati Medical Center to be suffering from brain tumor. By that time, her memory, sense of time, vision, and reasoning power had been lost. A claim for disability benefits filed by her husband with the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS)was denied. A motion for reconsideration was similarly denied. An appeal to the Employees' Compensation Commission resulted in the Commission's affirming the GSIS decision. On January 1, 1975, the Workmen's Compensation Act was replaced by a novel scheme under the new Labor Code. The new law discarded, among others, the concepts of "presumption of compensability" and "aggravation" and substituted a system based on social security principles. The present system is also administered by social insurance agencies — the Government Service Insurance System and Social Security System — under the Employees' Compensation Commission. The intent was to restore a sensible equilibrium between the employer's obligation to pay workmen's compensation and the employee's right to receive reparation for work-connected death or disability. Issues: Whether brain tumor which causes are unknown but contracted during employment is compensable under the present compensation laws. 2. Whether the presumption of compensability is absolutely inapplicable under the present compensation laws when a disease is not listed as occupational disease. Held: The Court saw no arbitrariness in the Commission's allowing vinyl chloride workers or plastic workers to be compensated for brain cancer. What the law requires for others is proof. The law, as it now stands requires the claimant to prove a positive thing – The illness was caused by employment and the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions. To say that since the proof is not available, therefore, the trust fund has the obligation to pay is contrary to the legal requirement that proof must be adduced. The existence of otherwise non-existent proof cannot be presumed .The Court has recognized the validity of the present law and has granted and rejected claims according to its provisions. We find in it no infringement of the worker's constitutional rights.
BELARMINO V. EMPLOYEES’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION185 SCRA 304GRIÑO-AQUINO, J. FACTS Oania Belarmino was a classroom teacher of the Department of Education Culture and Sports assigned at the Burucan Elementary School in Dimasalang, Masbate for11 years. On January 14, 1982, Mrs. Belarmino who was in her 8th month of pregnancy, accidentally slipped and fell on the classroom floor. She complained of abdominal pain and stomach cramps but she continued reporting for work because there was much work to do. On January 25, 1982, she went into labor and prematurely delivered a baby girl at home .Her abdominal pain persisted even after delivery .When she was brought to the hospital, her physician informed her that she was suffering from septicemia post partum due to infected lacerations of the vagina .After she was discharged from the hospital, she died three days thereafter .The GSIS denied the claim on the ground that septicemia post partum, the cause of death is an occupational disease and neither was there any showing that the ailment was contracted by reason of her employment. On appeal to the Employees Compensation Commission, latter also denied the claim affirming the denial of the claim by GSIS. ISSUE Whether of not the cause death of Mrs. Belarmino is not work-related and therefore not compensable. HELD NO. The death of Mrs. Belarmino from septicemia post partum is compensable because an employment accident and the conditions of her employment contributed to its development. The condition of the classroom floor caused Mrs. Belarmino to slip and fall and suffer injury as a result. The fall precipitated the onset of recurrent abdominal pains which culminated in the premature termination of her pregnancy with tragic consequences to her. Her fall on the classroom floor brought about her premature delivery which caused the development of postpartum septicemia which resulted in death. Her fall therefore was the proximate cause 1 That set in motion an unbroken chain of events, leading to her demise. The right to compensation extends to disability due to disease supervening upon and proximately and naturally resulting from a compensable injury. Where the primary injury is shown to have arisen in the course of employment, every natural consequence that flows from the injury likewise arises out of the employment, unless it is the result of an independent intervening cause attributable to claimant’s own negligence or misconduct. Mrs. Belarmino’s fall was the primary injury that arose in the course of her employment as a classroom teacher, hence, all the medical consequences flowing from it: her recurrent abdominal pains, the premature delivery of her baby, her septicemia post partum and death are compensable.
HINOGUIN V. EMPLOYEES’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION172 SCRA 350FELICIANO, J. FACTS .Sgt. Lemick Hinoguin was a sergeant in “A” company, 14th Infantry Battalion, 5th Infantry Division .The headquarters of the 14th Infantry Battalion was located at Bical, Muñoz, Nueva Ecija..On August 1, 1985, Sgt. Hinoguin, Cpl. Rogelio Clavo and Dft. Nicomedes Alibuyog sought permission from Capt. Frankie Besas, to go on overnight pass to Aritao, Nueva Viscaya. Capt. Besas orally granted them permission to go to Aritao and to take their issued firearms with them considering that Aritao was regarded as “a critical place.”.The three soldiers went to Dft. Alibuyog’s home for a meal and some drinks. At around 7:00 PM, the soldiers headed back to the headquarters. They boarded a tricycle, Hinoguin and Clavo seating themselves in the tricycle cab while Alibuyog occupied the seat behind the tricycle driver. When they reached the poblacion, Alibuyog dismounted from the tricycle. Not noticing that his rifle’s safety lever was on “semi-automatic,” he accidentally touched the trigger, firing a single shot in the process and hitting Sgt. Hinoguin in the left lower abdomen. Sgt. Hinoguin died a few days after the incident.8.In the investigation conducted by the 14th Infantry Battalion, it was found that the shooting of Sgt. Hinoguin was purely accidental in nature and that he died in the lineof duty. The Life of Duty Board of Officers recommended that all benefits due the legal dependents of the late Sgt. Hinoguin be given.9.However, when the father of the deceased made a claim from GSIS, the same was denied on the ground that the deceased was not at his work place nor performing his duty as a soldier of the Philippine Army at the time of his death. This denial was confirmed by the ECC. ISSUE Whether or not the death of Sgt. Hinoguin compensable under the applicable statute and regulations. HELD YES. The amended Implementing Rules provides in part as follows: SEC. 1. Conditions to Entitlement – (a) The beneficiaries of a deceased employee shall be entitled to an income benefit if all of the following conditions are satisfied: The employee had been duly reported to the System; He died as a result of injury or sickness; and The System has been duly notified of his death, as well as the injury or sickness which caused his death. His employer shall be liable for the benefit if such death occurred before the employer is duly reported for coverage of the System. Art. 167 (k) of the Labor Code defines Grounds – (a) For the injury and resulting disability or death to be compensable, the injury must be the result of an employment accident satisfying all of the following grounds:(1)The employee must have been injured at the place where his work requires him to be.(2)The employee must have been performing his official functions; and(3)If the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been executing an order for the employer.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) vs. THE HONORABLECOURT OF APPEALS and FELONILA ALEGRE, FACTS: Private respondent Felonila Alegre’s deceased husband, SPO2 Florencio A. Alegre, was a police officer assigned to the Philippine National Police station in the town of Vigan, Ilocos Sur.On December 6, 1994, he was driving his tricycle and ferrying passengers within the vicinity of Imelda Commercial Complex when SPO4 Alejandro Tenorio, Jr., Team/Desk Officer of the Police Assistance Center located at said complex, confronted him regarding his tour of duty.SPO2 Alegre allegedly snubbed SPO4 Tenorio and even directed curse words upon the latter. A verbal tussle then ensued between the two which led to the fatal shooting of the deceased police officer. On account of her husband’s death, private respondent seasonably filed a claim for death benefits with petitioner Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 626. In its decision on August 7, 1995, the GSIS, denied the claim on the ground that at the time of SPO2 Alegre’s death, he was performing a personal activity which was notwork-connected which was later on affirmed by the Employees’ Compensation Commission(ECC. Private respondent finally obtained a favorable ruling in the Court of Appeals when it reversed the ECC’s decision and ruled that SPO2 Alegre’s death was work-connected and, therefore, compensable. Hence; GSIS filed a petition for review on certiorari to the Supreme Court; reiterating its position that SPO2 Alegre’s death lacks the requisite element of compensability which is, that the activity being performed at the time of death must be work-connected. ISSUE: Whether or not the SPO2 Alegre’s death is compensable pursuant to the applicable laws and regulations. HELD: Taking together existing jurisprudence and the pertinent guidelines of the ECC with respect to claims for death benefits, namely: (a) that the employee must be at the place where his work requires him to be; (b) that the employee must have been performing his official functions; and(c) that if the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been executing an order for the employer, it is not difficult to understand then why SPO2 Alegre’s widow should be denied the claims otherwise due her. Obviously, the matter SPO2 Alegre was attending to at the time he met his death, that of ferrying passengers for a fee, was intrinsically private and unofficial in nature proceeding as it did from no particular directive or permission of his superior officer. That he may be called upon at any time to render police work as he is considered to be on a round-the-clock duty and was not on an approved vacation leave will not change the conclusion arrived at considering that he was not placed in a situation where he was required to exercise his authority and duty as a policeman. In fact, he was refusing to render one pointing out that he already complied with the duty detail. At any rate, the 24-hour duty doctrine, as applied to policemen and soldiers, serves more as an after-the-fact validation of their acts to place them within the scope of the guidelines rather than a blanket license to benefit them in all situations that may give rise to their deaths.
G.R. No. 136200 June 8, 2000CELERINO VALERIANO vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCESYSTEM, The Facts: Celerino S. Valeriano was employed as a fire truck driver assigned at the San Juan Fire Station. Sometime on the evening of July 3, 1985, petitioner was standing along Santolan Road, Quezon City, when he met a friend by the name of Alexander Agawin. They decided to proceed to Bonanza Restaurant in EDSA, Quezon City, for dinner. On their way home at around 9:30PM, the owner-type jeepney they were riding in figured in a head-on collision with another vehicle at the intersection of N. Domingo and Broadway streets in Quezon City. Due to the strong impact of the collision, petitioner was thrown out of the vehicle and was severely injured. As a result of the mishap, petitioner was brought to several hospitals for treatment. On September 16, 1985, he filed a claim for income benefits under PD 626, with the Government Security Insurance Service. His claim for benefits was opposed on the ground that the injuries he sustained did not directly arise or result from the nature of his work .Under the present compensation law, injury and the resulting disability or death is compensable if the injury resulted from an accident arising out of and in the course of employment. It means that the injury or death must be sustained while the employee is in the performance of his official duty; that the injury is sustained at the place where his work requires him to be; and if the injury is sustained elsewhere, that the employee is executing an order for the employer. The aforementioned conditions are found wanting in the instant case. The accident that the appellant met in the instant case occurred outside of his time and place of work. Neither was appellant performing his official duties as a fireman at the time of the accident. In fact, appellant just left the Bonanza Restaurant where he and his friends had dinner. Apparently, the injuries appellant sustained from the accident did not arise out of [and] in the course of his employment The Issues: WHETHER PETITIONER'S INJURIES ARE WORK-CONNECTED. HELD: Thus, for injury to be compensable, the standard of "work connection" must be substantially satisfied. The injury and the resulting disability sustained by reason of employment are compensable regardless of the place where the injured occurred, if it can be proven that at the time of the injury, the employee was acting within the purview of his or her employment and performing an act reasonably necessary or incidental thereto .Petitioner Valeriano was not able to demonstrate solidly how his job as a fire truck driver was related to the injuries he had suffered. That he sustained the injuries after pursuing a purely personal and social function — having dinner with some friends — is clear from the records of the case. His injuries were not acquired at his work place; nor were they sustained while he was performing an act within the scope of his employment or in pursuit of an order of his superior. Thus, we agree with the conclusion reached by the appellate court that his injuries and consequent disability were not workconnected and thus not compensable.
ILOILO DOCK & ENGINEERING CO. vs. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION G.R. No. L-26341 November 27, 1968FACTS: At about 5:02 o'clock in the afternoon of January 29, 1960, Pablo, who was employed as a mechanic of the IDECO, while walking on his way home, was shot to death in front of, and about 20 meters away from, the main IDECO gate, on a private road commonly called the IDECO road. The slayer, Martin Cordero, was not heard to say anything before or after the killing. The motive for the crime was and still is unknown as Cordero was himself killed before he could be tried for Pablo's death. At the time of the killing, Pablo's companion was Rodolfo Galopez, another employee, who, like Pablo, had finished overtime work at 5:00 p.m. and was going home. From the main IDECO gate to the spot where Pablo was killed, there were four "carinderias" on the left side of the road and two "carinderias" and a residential house on the right side. The entire length of the road is nowhere stated in the record .According to the IDECO, the Commission erred (1) in holding that Pablo's death occurred in the course of employment and in presuming that it arose out of the employment; (2) in applyingthe "proximity rule;" and (3) in holding that Pablo's death was an accident within the purview of the Workmen's Compensation Act. ISSUE: Whether the injuries are "in the course of" and not "out of" the employment. RULING: The general rule in workmen's compensation law known as the "going & coming rule," simplystated, is that "in the absence of special circumstances, an employee injured in, going to, or coming from his place of work is excluded from the benefits of workmen's compensationacts." This rule, however, admits of four well-recognized exceptions, to wit: (1) where theemployee is proceeding to or from his work on the premises of his employer; (2) where theemployee is about to enter or about to leave the premises of his employer by way of theexclusive or customary means of ingress and egress; (3) where the employee is charged, whileon his way to or from his place of employment or at his home, or during his employment, withsome duty or special errand connected with his employment; and (4) where the employer, as anincident of the employment, provides the means of transportation to and from the place of employment.
ALANO vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION G.R. No. L-48594 March 16, 1988 FACTS: Dedicacion de Vera, a government employee during her lifetime, worked as principal of Salinap Community School in San Carlos City, Pangasinan. Her tour of duty was from 7:30 a.m. to 5:30p.m. On November 29, 1976, at 7:00 A.M., while she was waiting for a ride at Plaza Jaycee inSan Carlos City on her way to the school, she was bumped and run over by a speeding Toyota mini-bus which resulted in her instantaneous death. She is survived by her four sons and a daughter. On June 27, 1977, Generoso C. Alano, brother of the deceased, filed the instant claim for income benefit with the GSIS for and in behalf of the decedent's children. The claim was, however, denied on the same date on the ground that the "injury upon which compensation is being claimed is not an employment accident satisfying all the conditions prescribed by law." On July 19, 1977 appellant requested for a reconsideration of the system's decision, but the same was denied and the records of the case were elevated to this Commission for review. (Rollo, p.12) ISSUE: Whether or not the death of Dedicacion de Vera can be compensable. HELD: In this case, it is not disputed that the deceased died while going to her place of work. She was at the place where, as the petitioner puts it, her job necessarily required her to be if she was to reach her place of work on time. There was nothing private or personal about the school principal's being at the place of the accident. She was there because her employment required her to be there. As to the Government Service Insurance System's manifestation, we hold that it is not fatal to this case that it was not impleaded as a party respondent. As early as the case of La O v.Employees' Compensation Commission, (97 SCRA 782) up to Cabanero v. Employees' Compensation Commission (111 SCRA 413) and recently, Clemente v. Government Service Insurance System (G.R. No. L-47521, August 31,1987), this Court has ruled that the Government Service Insurance System is a proper party in employees' compensation cases as the ultimate implementing agency of the Employees' Compensation Commission. We held in the aforecited cases that "the law and the rules refer to the said System in all aspects of employee compensation including enforcement of decisions (Article 182 of ImplementingRules)."
SALVADOR LAZO vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION & GOVERNMENTSERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM G.R. No. 78617June 18, 1990 FACTS: Salvador Lazo, is a security guard of the Central Bank of the Philippines assigned to its main office in Malate, Manila. His regular tour of duty is from 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon to 10:00 o'clock in the evening. On 18 June 1986, the petitioner rendered duty from2:00 o'clock in the afternoon to 10:00 o'clock in the evening. But, as the security guard who wasto relieve him failed to arrive, the petitioner rendered overtime duty up to 5:00 o'clock in the morning of 19 June 1986, when he asked permission from his superior to leave early in order to take home to Binangonan, Rizal, his sack of rice.On his way home, at about 6:00 o'clock in the morning of 19 June 1986, the passenger jeepney the petitioner was riding on turned turtle due to slippery road. As a result, he sustained injuries and was taken to the Angono Emergency Hospital for treatment. He was later transferred to the National Orthopedic Hospital where he was confined until 25 July 1986.For the injuries he sustained, petitioner filed a claim for disability benefits under PD 626, as amended. His claim, however, was denied by the GSIS for the reason that —It appears that after performing your regular duties as Security Guard from 2:00 P.M. to 10:00P.M. on June 18, 1986, you rendered overtime duty from 10:00 P.M. to 5:06 A.M. of the following day; that at about 5:06 A.M. after asking permission from your superior you were allowed to leave the Office to do certain personal matter — that of bringing home a sack of riceand that, while on your way home, you met a vehicular accident that resulted to (sic) your injuries. From the foregoing informations, it is evident that you were not at your work place performing your duties when the incident occurred. 1It was held that the condition for compensability had not been satisfied. Upon review of the case, the respondent Employees Compensation Commission affirmed the decision since the accident which involved the petitioner occurred far from his work place and while he was attending to a personal matter. Hence, the present recourse. ISSUE: Whether petitioner's injury comes within the meaning of and intendment of the phrase 'arising out of and in the course of employment? HELD: We held that 'where an employee, after working hours, attempted to ride on the platform of a service truck of the company near his place of work, and, while thus attempting, slipped and fell to the ground and was run over by the truck, resulting in his death, the accident may be saidto have arisen out of or in the course of employment, for which reason his death is compensable. The fact standing alone, that the truck was in motion when the employee boarded, is insufficient to justify the conclusion that he had been notoriously negligent, where it does not appear that the truck was running at a great speed.' And, in a later case, Iloilo Dock &Engineering Co. vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 26 SCRA 102, 103, We ruled that'(e)mployment includes not only the actual doing of the work, but a reasonable margin of time and space necessary to be used in passing to and from the place where the work is to be done. If the employee be injured while passing, with the express or implied consent of the employer, to
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or from his work by a way over the employer's premises, or over those of another in such proximity and relation as to be in practical effect a part of the employer's premises, the injury is one arising out of and in the course of the employment as much as though it had happened while the employee was engaged in his work at the place of its performance.
G.R. No. L-48488 April 25, 1980 GLORIA D. MENEZ, vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCESYSTEM (DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION & CULTURE), FACTS: Petition for review on certiorari from the decision en banc dated March 1, 1978 of the Employees' Compensation Commission in ECC Case No. 0462, affirming the denial by the Government Service Insurance System of the claim of petitioner for benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626 (now Title II the New Labor Code) and dismissing said claim. Petitioner Gloria D. Menez was employed by the Department (now Ministry) of Education& Culture as a school teacher. She retired on August 31, 1975 under the disability retirement plan at the age of 54 years after 32 years of teaching, due to rheumatoid arthritis and pneumonitis. Before her retirement, she was assigned at Raja Soliman High School in Tondo-Binondo, Manila near a dirty creek. On October 21, 1976, petitioner filed a claim for disability benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, with respondent Government Service Insurance System. On October 25, 1976, respondent GSIS denied said claim on the ground that petitioner's ailments, rheumatoid arthritis and pneumonitis, are not occupational diseases taking into consideration the nature of her particular work. In denying aforesaid claim, respondent GSIS thus resolved:Upon evaluation based on general accepted medical authorities, your ailments are found to be the least causally related to your duties and conditions of work. We believe that your ailments are principally traceable to factors which are definitely not work-connected. Moreover, the evidences you have, submitted have not shown that the said ailments directly resulted from your occupation as Teacher IV of Raja Soliman High School,Manila ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner’s ailments are causally related to her duties and conditions of work, hence, she is entitled to disability benefit from the GSIS. HELD: Republic Act 4670, otherwise known as the Magna Charta for Public School Teachers, recognized the enervating effects of these factors (duties and activities of a school teacher certainly involve physical, mental and emotional stresses) on the health of school teachers when it directed in one of its provisions that "Teachers shall be protected against the consequences of employment injury in accordance with existing laws. The effects of the physical and nervous strain on the teachers' health shall be recognized as compensable occupational diseases in accordance with laws" (Pantoja vs. Republic, et al.. L43317,December 29, 1978).
G.R. No. 94167 January 21, 1991MABUHAY SHIPPING SERVICES, INC. AND SKIPPERS MARITIME CO., LTD., vs. HON. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (FIRST DIVISION) AND CECILIASENTINA, FACTS: Romulo Sentina was hired as a 4th Engineer by petitioner Mabuhay Shipping Services, Inc.(MSSI) for and in behalf of co-petitioner, Skippers Maritime Co., Ltd. to work aboard the M/V Harmony I for a period of one year. He reported for duty aboard said vessel on July 13, 1987.On January 16, 1988 at about 3 p.m., while the vessel was docked alongside Drapetona Pier,Piraeus, Greece, Sentina arrived aboard the ship from shore leave visibly drunk. He went to the mess hall and took a fire axe and challenged those eating therein. He was pacified by his shipmates who led him to his cabin. However, later he went out of his cabin and proceeded to the mess hall. He became violent. He smashed and threw a cup towards the head of an oiler Emmanuel Ero, who was then eating. Ero touched his head and noticed blood. This infuriated Ero which led to a fight between the two. After the shipmates broke the fight, Sentina was takento the hospital where he passed away on January 17, 1988. Ero was arrested by the Greek authorities and was jailed in Piraeus.On October 26, 1988, private respondents filed a complaint against petitioners with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) for payment of death benefits, burial expenses, unpaid salaries on board and overtime pay with damages docketed as POEA Case No. (M) 88-10-896. POEA rendered a decision favoring Sentina. A motion for reconsideration and/or appeal was filed by petitioners which the respondent First Division of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) disposed of in a resolution dated March 31, 1990 dismissing the appeal and affirming the appealed decision. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT AN EMPLOYER IS REQUIRED TO PAY DEATH BENEFITS TO ANEMPLOYEE WHO RAN AMUCK THAT RESULTED TO HIS DEATH. HELD: The mere death of the seaman during the term of his employment does not automatically give rise to compensation. The circumstances which led to the death as well as the provisions of the contract, and the right and obligation of the employer and seaman must be taken into consideration, in consonance with the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. There are limitations to the liability to pay death benefits. When the death of the seaman resulted from a deliberate or willful act on his own life, and it is directly attributable to the seaman, such death is not compensable. No doubt a case of suicide is covered by this provision. By the same token, when as in this case the seaman, in a state of intoxication, ran amuck, or committed an unlawful aggression against another, inflicting injury on the latter, so that in his own defense the latter fought back and in the process killed the seaman, the circumstances of the death of the seaman could be categorized as a deliberate and willful act on his own life directly attributable to him. First he challenged everyone to a fight with an axe. Thereafter, here turned to the mess hall picked up and broke a cup and hurled it at an oiler Ero who suffered injury. Thus provoked, the oiler fought back The death of seaman Sentina is attributable to his unlawful aggression and thus is not compensable.
G.R. No. 115497 September 16, 1996 INTERORIENT MARITIME ENTERPRISES, INC., FIRCROFT SHIPPING CORPORATION and TIMES SURETY & INSURANCE CO., INC. vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and CONSTANCIA PINEDA, FACTS: The proceedings below originated as a claim for death compensation benefits filed by Constancia Pineda as heir of her deceased son, seaman Jeremias Pineda, against Interorient Maritime Enterprises, Inc. and its foreign principal, Fircroft Shipping Corporation and the Times Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. The following facts were found by the POEA Administrator: As can be gathered from the records of the case, it was alleged that deceased seaman, Jeremias Pineda was contracted to work as Oiler on board the vessels, "MV Amazonia", owned and operated by its foreign principal, Fircroft Shipping Corporation for a period of nine (9)months with additional three (3) months upon mutual consent of both parties with a monthly basic salary of US$276.00 plus fixed overtime rate of US$83.00 and a leave pay of 2 1/2 days per month; that on October 2, 1989, he met his death when he was shot by a Thai Policeman in Bangkok, Thailand; that considering that the deceased seaman was suffering from mental disorders aggravated by threats on his life by his fellow seamen, the Ship Captain should not have allowed him to travel alone. The instant petition seeks the reversal and/or modification of the Resolution dated March30, 1994 of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission dismissing the appeals of petitioners and affirming the decision dated November 16, 1992 of Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) Administrator Felicisimo C. Joson, which ordered that. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, respondents are hereby jointly and severally held liable to pay the complainant the following amounts:1. P130,000.00 as death compensation benefits.2. P18,000.00 as burial expenses. ISSUE: Are the local crewing or manning agent and its foreign principal (the shipowner) liable for the death of a Filipino seaman-employee who, after having been discharged, was killed in transit while being repatriated home? HELD: De Jesus is misplaced, as the death and burial benefits being claimed in this case are not payable by the Employee's Compensation Commission and chargeable against the State Insurance Fund. These claims arose from the responsibility of the foreign employer together with the local agency for the safety of the employee during his repatriation and until his arrival in this country, the point of hire. Through the termination of the employment contract was duly effected in Dubai, still, the responsibility of the foreign employer to see to it that Pineda was duly repatriated to the point of hiring subsisted. Section 4,Rule VIII of the Rules and Regulations Governing Overseas Employment clearly provides for the duration of the mandatory personal accident and life insurance covering accident death ,dismemberment and disability of overseas workers: Sec. 4.
NAESS Shipping Philippines, Inc., vs. NLRC G.R. No. 73441 September 4, 1987 Facts: On the night of September 3, 1983, while the vessel M/V DYVI PACIFIC was plying the seas enroute from Santos, Brazil to Port Said, Egypt, Pablo Dublin the vessel's chief steward, fatally stabbed the second cook, Rodolfo Fernandez, during a quarrel, then ran to the deck from which he jumped or fell overboard. An alarm was immediately raised, and the vessel turned to comb the surrounding area for Dublin. After some time his floating body was briefly sighted, but it disappeared from view even as preparations to retrieve it were being made, and was never seen again although the search went on through the night and was called off only at 6:00o'clock the next morning. Under a Special Agreement in the employment contract, between the International Workers Federation (ITF) and NAESS Shipping, NAESS is bound to pay cash benefits for loss of life the of workers enrolled therein. For the death of Dublin his widow Zenaida, by whom he had one child, Ivy, born January 22,1971, collected the amount of P75,000.00 under Clause A of the ITF Collective Bargaining Agreement. She also filed with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) a complaint against NAESS for payment of death benefits to US$74,512.00 under both paragraph 17 of the cited Special Agreement and what she claimed to be the also applicable Singapore Workmens' Compensation Ordinance. The POEA rendered judgment for the complainant, holding Dublin's death compensable under said Special Agreement and ordering NAESS to pay complainant and her child compensation benefits totalling US$31,962.00 and her attorneys of record fees amounting to US$3,196.00, the equivalents of said sums in Philippine pesos at prevailing rates of exchange .NAESS filed a motion for reconsideration but was dismissed by the NLRC for lack of merit, with an express affirmance of the POEA decision. Hence, this appeal. Issue: Whether or not the POEA and the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in adjudging that death by suicide is compensable. Held: It makes no difference whether Dublin intentionally took his own life, or he killed himself in a moment of temporary aberration triggered by remorse over the killing of the second cook, or he accidentally fell overboard while trying to flee from imagined pursuit, which last possibility cannot be ruled out considering the state of the evidence. There is no question that NAESS freely bound itself to a contract which on its face makes it unqualifiedly liable to pay compensation benefits for Dublin's death while in its service, regardless of whether or not it intended to make itself the insurer, in the legal sense, of Dublin's life. No law or rule has been cited which would make it illegal for an employer to assume such obligation in favor of his or its employee in their contract of employment. Thus, contract, ... which are the private laws of the contracting parties, should be fulfilled according to the literal sense of their stipulations, if their terms are clear and leave no room for doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties, for contracts are obligatory, no matter what their form may be, whenever the essential
requisites for their validity are present. To compel payment of death benefits in this case would amount not only to rewarding the act of murder or homicide, but also inequitably to placing on NAESS the twin burdens of compensating both the killer and his victim, who allegedly had also been employed under a contract with a similar death benefits clause. This argument, in confusing the legal implications and effects of two distinct and independent agreements, carries within itself the seeds of its own refutation. On Dublin's part, entitlement to death benefits resulted from his death while serving out his contract of employment; it was not a consequence of his killing of the second cook, Rodolfo Fernandez. If the latter's death is also compensable, that is due to the solitary fact of his death while covered by a similar contract, not precisely to the fact that he met death at the hands of Dublin That both deaths may be related by cause and effect and NAESS is the single obligor liable for compensation in both cases must, insofar as the factual and legal bases of such liability is concerned, be regarded as purely accidental circumstances.
YSMAEL MARITIME CORPORATION V. AVELINO 151 SCRA 333FERNAN, J. FACTS: On December 22, 1971, Rolando Lim, a licensed second mate, died when the vessel he was on board ran aground and sank near Sabtan, Batanes. The vessel was owned by petitioner Ysmael Maritime Corporation. The parents of the deceased claiming that the untimely death of their son was due to the negligence of the petitioner, sued the petitioner in the CFI for damages. By way of affirmative defense, petitioner claimed that the private respondents had already been compensated by the Workman’s Compensation Commission (WCC) for the same incident, for which reason they are now precluded from seeking other remedies against the same employer under the Civil Code. ISSUE: Whether the compensation remedy under the Workmen’s Compensation Act (WCA), and now under the Labor Code, for work-connected death or injuries sustained by an employee,is exclusive of the other remedies under the Civil Code. HELD: In the recent case of Floresca v. Philex Mining Company, the Court was confronted with three divergent opinion on the exclusivity rule. One view is that the injured employee or his heirs, in case of death, may initiate an action tore cover damages (not compensation under the Workman’s Compensation Act) with the regular courts on the basis of negligence of the employer pursuant to the Civil Code. Another view, is that the remedy of an employee for work-connected injury or accident is exclusive in accordance with Section 5 of WCA. The third view is that the action is selective and the employee or his heirs have a choice of availing themselves of the benefits under the WCA or of suing in the regular courts under the Code for higher damages from the employer by reason of his negligence. But once the election has been exercised, the employee or his heirs are no longer free to opt for the other remedy. This latter view was adopted by the Court in Floresca v. Philex Mining Company. In doing so, the Court rejected the doctrine of exclusivity of the rights and remedies granted by the WCA.As thus applied to the case at bar, respondent Lim spouses cannot be allowed to maintain their present action to recover additional damages against petitioner under the Civil Code. In open court, respondent admitted that they had previously filed a claim for death benefits with the WCC and had received the compensation payable to them under the WCA. It is therefore clear that the respondents had not only opted to recover under the Act but they had also been duly paid. At the very least, a sense of fair play would demand that if a person entitled to a choice of remedies made a first election and accepted the benefits thereof, he should no longer be allowed to exercise the second option. Having staked his fortunes on a particular remedy, he is precluded from pursuing the alternate course, at least until the prior claim is rejected by the Compensation Commission.
Pampanga Bus Company, INC., vs. PAMBUSCO Employees' Union, Inc. G.R. No. 46739 September 23, 1939E FACTS: On May 31, 1939, the Court of Industrial Relations issued an order, directing the petitioner herein, Pampanga Bus Company, Inc., to recruit from the respondent, Pambusco Employees'Union, Inc., new employees or laborers it may need to replace members of the union who may be dismissed from the service of the company, with the proviso that, if the union fails to provide employees possessing the necessary qualifications, the company may employ any other persons it may desire. This order, in substance and in effect, compels the company, against its will, to employ preferentially, in its service, the members of the union. Issue: Whether or not the said order issued by the CIR valid and not violative of the right of the employer to select employees. Held: We hold that the court has no authority to issue such compulsory order. The general right to make a contract in relation to one's business is an essential part of the liberty of the citizens protected by the due-process clause of the Constitution. The right of the laborer to sell his labor to such person as he may choose is, in its essence, the same as the right of an employer to purchase labor from any person whom it chooses. The employer and the employee have thus an equality of right guaranteed by the Constitution. Section of Commonwealth Act No. 213 confers upon labor organizations the right "to collective bargaining with employers for the purpose of seeking better working and living conditions, fair wages, and shorter working hours for laborers, and, in general, to promote the material, social and moral well-being of their members." This provision in granting to labor unions merely the right of collective bargaining, impliedly recognizes the employer's liberty to enter or not into collective agreements with them. Indeed, we know of no provision of the law compelling such agreements. Such a fundamental curtailment of freedom, if ever intended by law upon grounds of public policy, should be effected in a manner that is beyond all possibility of doubt. The supreme mandates of the Constitution should not be loosely brushed aside. As held by the Supreme Court of the United States in Hitchman Coal & Co. vs. Mitchell (245 U. S., 229; 62Law. ed., 260, 276):
