J e s u s V e r g a r a v s . H a m m o n i a M ar a r i t i m e S er er v i c e s , I n c . a n d Atlantic Marine Ltd ., G.R. No. 172933, October 6, 2008, Second .,
Division (240-day principle) Facts: The seafarer was repatriated due to eye problem. After undergoing the required treatment, the company doctor declared the seafarer fit to resume further sea duty. The seafarer’s private doctors disagreed and gave the opinion that seafarer was not fit to work as a pump man because the job could precipitate the resurgence of his former condition. Issue: W/n the petitioners claim for permanent total disability benefits has a legal basis. Held: The Supreme Court held that a temporary total disability only becomes permanent when so declared by the company physician within the periods he is allowed to do so, or upon the expiration of the maximum 240-day medical treatment period without a declaration of either fitness to work or the existence of a permanent disability. In the instant case, the company-designated doctor duly made a declaration well within the extended 240-day period that the seafarer was fit to work.
C r y s t a l S h i p p i n g , In c . , a n d / o r A /S S t ei n L i n e B e r g e n v s . D eo P. Nativid ad , G.R. No. 154798, October 20,2005, First Division
(120-day principle) Facts: The seafarer was diagnosed with cancer and was assessed by the company-designated physician as suffering from Grade 9 disability while his private doctor issued a Grade 1 disability. Issue: w/n that the petitioners claim for disability benefits falls under the Grade 1 disability. Held: The Court ruled that permanent disability is the inability of the worker to perform his job for more than 120 days, regardless of whether or not he loses the use of any part of his body. As seafarer was unable to work from August 18, 1998 to February 22, 1999, at the least, or more than 120 days, due to his medical treatment, he was awarded full disability benefits. While the seafarer was able to work again as Chief Mate in March 2001, this does not alter the fact that as a result of his illness, the seafarer was unable to work as a Chief Mate for almost three years. It is of no consequence that seafarer was cured after a couple of years. What is important is that he was unable to
perform his customary work for more than 120 days which constitutes permanent total disability. N o t e : The Supreme Court clarified this ruling 12 February
2007 holding that seafarer’s disability should not be measured in terms of number of days but by gradings only. However, this clarification was never applied or cited by the Supreme Court in any of the subsequent cases that they rendered.
PASEI VS. DRILON [163 SCRA 386; L-81958; 30 JUN 1988] Monday, February 02, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: Petitioner, Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., is engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female of overseas employment. It challenges the constitutional validity of Dept. Order No. 1 (1998) of DOLE entitled “Guidelines Governing the Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino Domestic and Household Workers.” It claims that such order is a discrimination against males and females. The Order does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills, and that it is in violation of the right to travel, it also being an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power. Further, PASEI invokes Sec 3 of Art 13 of the Constitution, providing for worker participation in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law. Thereafter the Solicitor General on behalf of DOLE submitting to the validity of the challenged guidelines involving the police power of the State and informed the court that the respondent have lifted the deployment ban in some states where there exists bilateral agreement with the Philippines and existing mechanism providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection of the Filipino workers.
Issue: Whether or not there has been a valid classification in the challenged Department Order No. 1.
Held: SC in dismissing the petition ruled that there has been valid classification, the Filipino female domestics working abroad were in a class by themselves, because of the special risk to which their class was exposed. There is no question that Order No.1 applies only to female contract workers but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between sexes. It is G.R. No. 172038
April 14, 2008well
settled hat equality before the law under the
constitution does not import a perfect identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of classification, provided that: 1. Such classification rests on substantial distinctions 2. That they are germane to the purpose of the law 3. They are not confined to existing conditions 4. They apply equally to al members of the same class In the case at bar, the classifications made, rest on substantial distinctions. Dept. Order No. 1 does not impair the right to travel. The consequence of the deployment ban has on the right to travel does not impair the right, as the right to travel is subjects among other things, to the requirements of “public safety” as may be provided by law. Deployment ban of female domestic helper is a valid exercise of police power. Police power as been defined as the state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote general welfare. Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes an invalid exercise of legislative power as the labor code vest the DOLE with rule making powers.
DANTE DELA CRUZ , petitioner vs. MAERSK CREWING, INC. and ELITE SHIPPING, A.S ., respondent
Facts: rd engineer shipping hired Dela Cruz as 3 through Maersk Crewing. After a few months Dela Cruz was informed that he would be terminated under Art 1(7) of the CBA of Shipping and its employees. Art 1(7) of the CBA provides that the first 60 days of service is considered as a probationary period and the ship owner or ship captain may terminate the contract after giving a 14-day notice. Dela Cruz was terminated under this provision and that he was informed that his performance did not meet the required qualification by the ship captain. was made to disembarked and Petitioner repatriated to Manila Petitioner filed a case for illegal termination and that he is already a regular employee when he was terminated. assailed that he is on But the respondent probationary status only, which merits them to terminate him. Issue: Whether the petitioner is a regular employee. Held: It is well to remind both parties that, as early as Brent School, Inc. v. Zamora, we already held that seafarers are not covered by the term regular employment, as defined under Article 280 of the Labor Code. This was reiterated in Coyoca v. National Labor Relations Commission.20 Instead, they are considered contractual employees whose rights and obligations are governed primarily by the POEA Standard Employment Contract for Filipino Seamen (POEA Standard Employment Contract), the Rules and Regulations Governing Overseas Employment, and, more importantly, by Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise known as Th e Elite
Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995. Even the POEA Standard Employment Contract itself mandates that in no case shall a contract of employment concerning seamen exceed 12 months. It is an accepted maritime industry practice that the employment of seafarers is for a fixed period only. The Court acknowledges this to be for the mutual interest of both the seafarer and the employer. Seafarers cannot stay for a long and indefinite period of time at sea as limited access to shore activity during their employment has been shown to adversely affect them. Furthermore, the diversity in nationality, culture and language among the crew necessitates the limitation of the period of employment. In Millares v. NLRC, this Court had occasion to rule on the use of the terms "permanent and probationary masters and employees" vis-à-vis contracts of enlistment of seafarers. In that case, petitioners made much of the fact that they were continually re-hired for 20 years by private respondent Esso International. By such circumstances, they claimed to have acquired regular status with all the rights and benefits appurtenant thereto. The Court quoted with favor the NLRC's explanation that the reference to permanent and probationary masters and employees was a misnomer. It did not change the fact that the contract for employment was for a definite period of time. In using the terms "probationary" and "permanent" vis-à-vis seafarers, what was really meant was "eligible for
re-hire."
