Rahel Jaeggi
Critique of Forms of Life Forms of Life as Instances of Problemsolving Porto Alegre Sept. 2013
Is a critique of forms of life possible? Does it make sense to say that they are good, successful or even rational? Since Kant it is considered common sense that happiness or the good life, other than that which is morally right, cannot be determined philosophically. And since Rawls the ethical content of forms of life is often considered indisputable in virtue of the irreducible ethical pluralism of modern societies. Thus, philosophy retreats from the socratic question on "how we ought to live“ and instead restrains itself to the question on how a just way of living together, understood as the coexistence of different forms of life, can be secured once we acknowledge the sheer diversity of mutually incompatible "comprehensive doctrines". The political order of the liberal constitutional state presents itself as a way of organising this coexistence that is itself ethically neutral towards different forms of life. Once we are no longer concerned with what a good shared form of life should consist in, with but the frictionless coexistence of different forms of life, matters concerning the way we ought to lead our lives become „privatised”. The are removed into the realm of mere preferences that cannot be questioned any further or of matters of identity resistant to further analysis. A in matters of taste forms of life then cannot be a matter of dispute. In my paper I argue that “burden of proof” should be reversed: Questions concerning the forms of life we live in cannot simply be extracted from our individual as well as from our collective deliberation processes. Every social formation has always already given a specific answer to them. And this is also true for that social form that has made the pluralism of forms of life its primary matter of concern. But this means that, in a certain way, the question about the possibility of a critique of forms of life has not been put correctly. Not in spite but because of the situation of modern societies the issue of the possibility of such a critique cannot simply be abandoned into the reservation of particularistic preferences and
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commitments resistant to further analysis. It concerns a practice that in several respects we cannot avoid participating in. This becomes especially clear in situations of social conflict and transformation. Such situations might occur when so far unquestioned ethical principles are suddenly challenged by new technologies or when established social practices become problematic. Or they might occur when the ("internal" or "external") confrontation with other forms of life leads to crises of our self-understanding. In such cases, political liberalism's "ethical abstinence" reaches its limits. The project of a critique of forms of life is thus at the same time a kind of critique of ideology with regard to the liberal neutrality thesis, that is, of the basic "liberal" idea that social institutions should or can only be neutral towards particularistic forms of life and each individuals' ethical points of reference. The claim I want to discuss in this paper is the following: Forms of life can very well be disputed. More specifically, they can be disputed justifiably. The issue I am concerned with here in dealing with the possibility of their critique regards the specific rationality of forms of life. In this talk I can’t develop all the philosophical arguments and tools that one would need to make this claim. What I will nevertheless be doing is the following: 1. I will spell out the very question I’m concerned with What then are forms of life – and what does it mean to criticize a form of life as a form of life? 2. I will then give a short account of some of my underlying assumptions and give some hints about the „way to go“. The issue of criticizing forms of life can only be adressed in a fruitful way, so I think, if one goes beyond the constraints of the „ethics“ vs. „morality“ or the „good life vs. morality“ or the „right vs. the good“ framework and deals with the social ontological question of what forms of life are and how they work. (Simply put: to conceive of them as bundles of social practices with a certain character and a certain function and a certain kind of normativity involved makes the Rawlsian and Habermasian picture of a pluralistic variety of „comprehensive doctrines“ less persuasive than it seems to be on first sight.) 3. I will then „zoom in“ and develop to some extent my main thesis: Forms of life are instances of problem solving. But then: In order to make sense of this theses one has to take into account the specific character of „problems“ involved. Here the terminology might be misleading: I am not concerned with technical problems who might find a technical solution but with what I would like to call problems of a
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second order; problems that share some important characteristics with what in a Hegelian spirit might be called practical contradictions.
1. Was does it mean to criticize a form of life as a form of life? - One would laugh at a person who is seriously outraged over someone eating bananas or wearing red cowboy boots. Even if one felt disgust at the thought of bananas or bewildered in the face of red cowboy boots, it is hard to imagine a meaningful debate concerning whether it is right or wrong to eat bananas or to wear red cowboy boots. Such matters are, as they say, each person's own business and – literally – a matter of taste.4 - Matters appear differently if we see someone beating his child. Here we are outraged – so we might think – with good reason. We don't think this person is justified in acting in such a way. This is, we might be convinced, neither a matter of taste nor a merely “his own business.” Indeed, we may consider it our duty to intervene. - But what if one is thinking about whether one prefers to live in a shared flat or within a nuclear family, in a monogamous or an open relationship? Is intimacy appropriate for "chat rooms,” and should relationships be fostered in Tantra workshops? How do we consider the custom of living under the roof of a spouse's parents with a newly founded family? What attitude should we take towards the fact that the modern bourgeois nuclear family is typically constituted by the spatial and economic separation from the family of origin (a fact already highlighted in Hegel's discussion of the bourgeois family)? And what should we think when not dealing with child abuse but with the common practice of using the TV as a babysitter? On what basis can we object to the expansion of shopping malls in public spaces? And why do we prefer spending our leisure time in the theatre, cinema or in a pub to spending it with computer games or with watching TV; or prefer living in the city to living in the countryside (or the other way round)? We often have strong views on such issues. We criticize the TV viewer’s passivity and unsociability. We are disgusted with the conventionality of traditional marriage or the lack of commitment of those with open relationships. We either consider living in a nuclear family too isolated or living among extended family insufferably restrictive. We may be enthusiastic or skeptical about the expansion of commercial
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centers. We may love urban life or prefer the comfort of country living. And if capitalism as a form of life becomes all too intrusive – if, for instance, so-called "cultural values" are sacrificed to commerce – we might fear the trivialization or impoverishment of our lives. We may even feel that our lives are becoming “unreal.” These questions concern what I call “critique of forms of life.” While such positions are often firmly held and debate surrounding them can be acrimonious, the argumentative status of such positions remains unclear. Do we make a fool of ourselves if we, as in the case of the red cowboy boots, search for reasons for our views and attempt to convince others? Must not each person decide for herself how to act? In such cases, is there even such a thing as better or worse options that can be intersubjectively justified or that can claim universal validity? Criticizing forms of life as forms of life In examining these cases, what does it mean to criticize a form of life as a form of life? It means that we are concerned with the specific make up, the qualitative dimension of the attitudes and practices constitutive of it, rather than dealing with its consequences (even if these consequences might be morally or juridically unacceptable). To use a distinction established by Charles Larmore: We are dealing with the intrinsic content of a form of life, not its external effects. Put a different way, we are concerned with the ethical content rather than the moral consequences of forms of life; we are dealing with matters of value rather than disputes about norms. While such distinctions themselves might be controversial and their utility may be disputed, we can put the matter in the following way: these issues are not concerned with the effects that certain forms of life might have on others (e.g., the rights of third parties), but with the question if certain forms of life can be considered successful or rational as such. (Marx’s critique of capitalism is in this sense – I would argue – a critique of capitalism as a form of life, not just a critique of distributive justice or relations of domination.) 2. Why should one criticize forms of life? Nevertheless: Is a critique of forms of life even a sensible idea? Or, given the “fact of pluralism” so characteristic of our society, should we rather focus on the
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possible ways in which different and seemingly incompatible forms of life can peacefully coexist? The diagnosis of contemporary society considered here – that society is characterized by an irreducible pluralism – is often accompanied by a moralpolitical position of “ethical abstinence” towards questions about forms of life. This position attempts to refrain from taking a stand on different forms of life except insofar as they directly harm other members of society. (Whether held for reasons of liberal pragmatism, anti-paternalism, or a fixation with a particular interpretation of autonomy, this is a popular position nowadays.) Often the debate simply ends here or else gets entangled in a stale back and forth – e.g. regarding the priority of the good over the right or vice versa – or in the attempt to draw a line between questions for which publically justifiable judgments are possible and those we are forced to leave to what Charles Taylor calls the “extraphilosophical darkness.” I’d like to take a different approach and examine some considerations that motivate again taking up the process of critique. Out of the many possible reasons for engaging in critique, I’d like to focus on two:
(1) The urgency of ethical questions within modern life According to this diagnosis, the principle of “ethical abstinence” is of limited utility not despite but rather because of the situation confronting modern society. While “abstinence” may seem to have become a signature of modern society, it is also true that modernity and scientific-technical civilization increasingly confronts actors with topics that make assessing forms of life essential. (For example, the increased interdependence characteristic of modern society increases the need for rules and regulations. To take just one example, the existence of single-family homes depends on institutional settings like construction plans or subsidies from the state; likewise the availability of theater performances of a particular quality depends on state subsidies for cultural activities). The question whether it is possible to assess forms of life is thus caught up the sort of dialectic of individualization that can be read out of Hegels Philosophy of Right. As modern society (on the one hand) releases individuals from dependence on collective and tradition connections, it makes them (on the other hand) increasingly dependent on exchange and commerce, thus increasing their interdependence.
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“Thick ethical positions” concerning our way of life become increasingly difficult to justify (under conditions of modern pluralism) while they are at the same time becoming even more pressing - or even unavoidable
- under modern social
conditions. In this sense, the German philosopher Ludwig Siep is correct in remarking that: “Modern forms of life have such massive technical and infrastructural requirements that they are not possible without considerable public services.” Then, however, “the private formation of preferences and conceptions of happiness becomes an illusion.” When private happiness is decided publically and by law – by tax laws, governmental technological politics and so on – then the ways of life in which human beings find themselves must become matters of public discussion. However one wants to understand the rules of such a debate and wherever the ultimate decisions regarding such questions ends up taking place – the question, what reasons -- what kind of reasons -- can be validly employed in such a debate is one that philosophy can and should contribute to. (2) The “ideological character” of the neutrality thesis The next point similarly seeks to reverse the onus of argument. The ethical question “How is one to live?” is in every social formation already implicitly or explicitly answered -- and this holds even for those forms of social organization that understand themselves as pluralistic. Yet if this is correct, then the question regarding the possibility of critique has not been correctly posed. When one takes this view, then liberal “abstinence” appears as a way to obscure (or to make invisible) formative influences and to deny that particular institutions that present themselves neutral – for example, the market – bear the mark of a particular ethic. This means, to put it bluntly, that the “pluralism” and “antipaternalism” that motivate “remaining neutral” regarding different forms of life actually promotes what one might call the transformation of a form of life into a destiny. As the powers that define collective life conceal themselves, the result is not self-determination but rather loss of autonomy. To sum up my argument:
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Both of my arguments are less “refutations” of the liberal position of “neutrality” than they are motivations to take up again the question of how one can criticize forms of life. Neither of these arguments attempts to dispute the legitimacy of the modern antipaternalistic desire for autonomy. Neither do they encourage some sort of moral dictatorship. Rather, they wish to draw our attention to the conditions for the attainment of (individual and collective) self-determination, and, more specifically, to show that thematizing and discussing forms of life is such a condition. The claim that my project seeks to vindicate thus consists in the thesis that one can argue about forms of life and one can argue about them with reasons. That is, by way of the question of criticizability, I intend to investigate the specific rationality of forms of life. It is no coincidence that I’m investigating the success of forms of life from the perspective of critique. The goal is not to develop a general conception of a correct form of life. Nor is it to trace the conditions of such a conception. Such ethical system-building seems to me neither desirable nor promising. My focus is rather on the failure of forms of life, the crises to which they can fall victim, and the problems that can arise for and within them – in sum, the aspects that make them liable for criticism. The moment of “functional disturbance” or “crisis” in this context will show itself to be an important movens (or driver) of what I call “critique” and should remove any suspicion of paternalism. The critique of forms of life as I conceive it begins exactly there where there are problems, crises, and conflicts, even when these are not overtly manifest. For this reason, critique is not conducted from an external-authoritarian perspective. It is rather the catalyst of a process in which critique and self-critique are intertwined. The sort of critique we take as our goal should therefore be neither “ethically abstinent” nor paternalistic; it should not end in relativism but neither should it have anti-pluralistic implications.
2. What (then) are forms of life? In the context of my account, the term “form of life“ refers to a culturally shaped "order of human co-existence"1 that encompasses an "ensemble of practices and orientations"2 as well as their institutional manifestations and materializations.
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Differences amongst forms of life are not only expressed by different beliefs, values and attitudes; they are also manifested and materialized in fashion, architecture, juridical systems and family organization. As the forms in which we live, forms that give shape to our life, they are part of the sphere of “objective spirit.“ They belong to the– as Hannah Arendt would say – particularly human world, that world in which human beings make their lives. Forms of life – in the sense used throughout this paper – are concerned with the cultural and social reproduction of human life. The term is apt because it is plausible to speak of a form of life only in those cases in which we can think of something as being formed such that it can be reformed. A form of life encompasses more than actions and attitudes that are simply repeated or given by instinct. To put the point differently, I’m asking about forms of life in the plural. I’m interested in the different cultural forms that human life can take rather than in the form of human life (as contrasted, say, with that of a lion). Forms of life as inert bundle of practices Now, since the concept is notoriously unclear both in sociology and philosophy, I will at least outline my understanding of the very structure of forms of life: Forms of life, as I conceive of them, are inert bundles of social practices - The term social practice here refers to practices concerning oneself, others, and the material world. They are practices in which we participate and into which we are inaugurated. These practices are “social” not in the sense that they concern interpersonal relations or the coordination of social relationships. Rather, they are “social” in the sense that these practices can only exist and be understood against the background of a socially constituted realm of meaning. They are patterns in which we act. A practice therefore is a set of actions that has a repetetive and a habitual moment and an intrinsic idea of what it means to “fulfil” this practice (that is: to act rightly, according to the expectations that are involved in a certain practice.) - Forms of life are to be understood as a bundle of such practices in that they encompass a diversity of practices that are related to one another without building an impenetrable and closed totality. - Finally these bundles are inert, constituting an inert context of praxis. In contrast to more fluid practices, they maintain “sedimentary elements,” praxis components that are not always available, explicit, or transparent. Forms of life are not always
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engaged in deliberately. They are something that human beings participate in without planning, intending, or even knowing, exactly what they are doing. (There is habitualisation inherent as well as implicit knowlegde.) Nevertheless, they are something that human beings do and therefore could do otherwise. (And this is something that shows as soon as a certain set of practices and self-understandings comes to its limits, when things don’t run smoothly anymore; when a set of practices is interrupted, doesn’t go without saying anymore: the moment of crisis.) - Now forms of life are also normatively structured bundles of social practices. This does not only mean that as parts of a social order they contain rules, regulations, and implicit assumptions about what is right or wrong. The important point here is that the norms that structure forms of life – or rather that are expressed in them – cannot be understood as mere conventions. Rather, they can only be grasped in relation to their goal(s) that set certain demands and certain limits to what can be done in a certain form of life. The practices composing forms of life are directed by ethicalfunctional norms without which the practices could not function. Moreover, these practices are guided by what can be understood as their own immanent criteria of the good – that is, their own ethical-functional norms. INS it makes sense to link Hegels notion of the “concept” to this specific kind of normativity involved:
3. How can we criticize forms of life? My thesis about forms of life as instances of problem-solving
My thesis is: Forms of life are strategies for solving problems or better; instances of problem-solving. As such, they can succeed or fail. They can be rational or irrational, appropriate or inappropriate. And, going a step further: Since we now seem to only have shifted the burden of proof – taking into account that it might neither go without saying what (under the conditions of malleable human forms of life) “problems” are nor what there “solution” might look like this thesis needs to be accompagnied by a second thesis: The success or failure of forms of life as strategies to solve problems can only be judged procedurally – as the result of a successful or failed learning process. The general result of my project can thus be formulated as follows: Forms of life succeed
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when they can be understood as the result of successful processes of learning and when they enable further learning. And the task of a critique of forms of life is to ask the meta-question regarding the criteria whereby one can recognize whether a certain kind of dynamic - - has succeeded in becoming a process of learning. This means: In order to judge on forms of life we should establish criteria for the very quality of social dynaics of transformation. (Put more crudely – is there such a thing as progress?)
4. Zoom: Forms of Life as Problem-Solving Strategies My thesis was: A form of life is a strategy for solving problems. Forms of life respond to problems confronting our species (or individuals trying to shape their lives) and they are an attempt to solve these problems. According to this understanding, forms of life claim to constitute the best possible solution to the specific problems they both face and pose. The success of forms of life can then be measured by the extent to which they meet this demand. In which sense, then, are forms of life instances of problem solving? What exactly do I mean by “problem”, and what kind of problems are solved by a specific form of life? What are problems? What then are problems? And in what sense are forms of life strategies for solving them? As we will see, the idea of forms of life as instances of problem solving relies on a specific concept of “problems”. A) Problems are always already situated, they evolve out of a historical and social context, b) problems are “normatively loaden” or preconceptualized. Let me start with some observations. - The talk of “problems” can be elucidated by noticing that when we say someone is ‘confronted with a problem,’ we can either mean ‘He is confronted with a task’ or ‘He is confronted with a difficulty’. Accordingly, conceiving of forms of life as strategies for solving problems can either mean that the known ways of living together are confronted with certain tasks or that they are confronted with certain difficulties. Both of these aspects are relevant to my understanding of the word “problem”. As forms of life master their specific problems (in the sense of tasks), they always also encounter problems (in the sense of difficulties). They are
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confronted with shifting dynamics of change and conflict, which they cope with in different ways. Such coping strategies will never be complete and will always necessitate new attempts at solving the problems at hand. Thus, the starting point for an evaluation of forms of life is the fact that they become problematic. Problem vs. Needs The advantage of speaking of “problems” and “strategies for solving problems” with regard to forms of life can be made clear by comparing the talk of problems and their solutions with an alternative approach based on the idea of needs and their satisfaction. Rather than claiming that forms of life solve problems, one might argue that they satisfy human needs and are better or worse to the extent that they succeed in satisfying such needs. In contrast to the concept of “problems” that I have chosen, the concept of “needs” has a more static and ahistorical character. “Needs” (at least in a very rough understanding) understood as “basic needs” are commonly thought to be fundamental and unquestionable constants requiring no interpretation. Because they are independent of any particular historical or cultural formation, their satisfaction may seem the perfect candidate for an objective criterion for assessing the desirability of different forms of life. When speaking of ‘problems’, on the other hand, I share the well-known critique of such references to uninterpreted and ahistorical basic needs. First, needs are not determinable, i.e. they are dynamic in nature. Second, needs are variable. Human forms of life display fundamental differences, which – speaking with Arnold Gehlen– exhibit “such a conspicuous contrariness, right into the folds of the human heart, that one is almost lead to believe that we are dealing with different species.” The concept of ‘problems’ now takes into account the way in which human life is always already culturally formed and that its “higher-order” character requires interpretation: ‘One can never survive bare,” and forms of life are not directed towards ‘bare survival’ but rather a specific life, a life that will always already have been fashioned in a particular way. Note: One could also begin from a different concept of “needs” that took into account their mutability and cultural variability. Or one could try to start with a more sophisticated account of the human form of life that took account of such elements. However, it seems to me more productive to start directly with cultural
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formations themselves. And the concept of “problems” is a good tool to investigate these. – somehow starting from the opposite direction. Productivity and Characteristics of the Concept of “Problems” The approach that takes “problems” as central has three aspects that are important for my concerns: (1) This approach emphasizes the perspective in which difficulties and the possibility of crises explain a form of life’s dynamic as well as provide a basis for its critique (2) The approach emphasizes that problems are determined and formed in a particular socio-cultural context. Problems as they appear in connection with forms of life are always multiply mediated problems. They appear in the context of a form of life that is already historically situated and socially institutionalized. Such problems always appear against the background of an already formed and interpreted situation. The point of departure for a form of life is never the “aboriginal origin” of “bare needs” independent of one’s form of life. (3) The approach therefore opens up the possibility of understanding problems and their solutions as moments within a (potentially interminable) process of problemsolving. Problems, I claim, are always results of attempted solutions to earlier problems; they are in a way always “problems of the second order,” arising out of the solutions to other problems, Conversely, attempts to solve problems develop historically through grappling with other problem-solving strategies. Forms of life must then be understood in relation to their position in a history of problem-solving attempts. In other words, the problems with which human beings are confronted are not stable, they change. Particularly, it is not only the attempted solutions to problems that change but the problems themselves (and their description). The “history of problem-solving” in which a form of life is situated is therefore not a history of solutions (or rather repeated attempts at a solution) to the same problems but rather a history of attempts at problem-solving that under certain conditions leads to an accumulated history of problem-solving attempts. Problems are posed to a form of life that itself poses problems in reacting to the problems posed to it. (This leads to the suspicion – to which I will later return – that this is an unending process.)
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It will be easier to understand these characteristics by considering particular examples. The first example is of the interpretation of the modern nuclear family and bourgeois institution of marriage that Hegel provides in his Philosophy of Right. It should then become clear that “problems” regarding forms of life are always already historically developed and normatively understood (and thereby possess a particular structure). Example 1: Hegel’s Theory of the Family When Hegel introduces the family as an instance of Sittlichkeit in his Philosophy of Right, he considers a particular, historically distinct form of the family – the bourgeois nuclear family of Christian Europe. Hegel wants to provide both a description and justification of this form of the family. What makes his discussion interesting for us is that he attempts to show how the bourgeois family emerged from a historically-specific “ethical” context (in my terminology: “historically specific constellation of problems”) and shows to be superior to alternative ways of organizing family life. He does this by examining the way the institution of the family responded to tensions specific to this historical constellation. To translate this into my (which is naturally not Hegel’s vocabulary): the family was a superior problem-solving strategy. Furthermore: It is the normatively imbued solution to a normative problem. How should one describe the “constellation of problems” that Hegel’s discussion is responding to? When one examines Hegel’s theory of the Sittlichkeit of the family, one can identify two strands of argument used to establish the nuclear family’s superiority over alternative family arrangements: First he distinguishes the specifically modern ideal of the family characterized by independency of the married couple from the “traditional family” characterized by closer relations to blood relatives, and argues for the superiority of “exogamy” (that is: the choice of partner outside of association of the family) and monogamy. Second, he brings this ideal of the family “back to itself” in that he defends it against two misleading interpretations. On the one hand, he argues against the romantic ideal of love that threatens the ethical-institutional character of the family by overvaluing the emotional and erotic aspects of marriage. On the other hand, he argues that reducing the family to a contract fails to understand the emotional aspect
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of family relations as well as the way in which the ethical relations established in family life is taken as an end in itself. Both lines of confrontation are necessary for Hegel’s justification of the bourgeois family as an instance of Sittlichkeit in which freedom can be realized.
What does this examples show?
First we can see what it means to begin within a pre-formed situation in which claims and possible solutions are already established rather than starting from “bare needs” or uninterpreted problems. The problem that the bourgeois family solves is not simply the problem of organizing familial relations and socializing the subsequent generation (problems common to all human communities). The bourgeois family attempts to solve conflicts between nature and freedom and dependence and independence only intelligible when a certain historical moment has been reached. And the family does this in a situation in which the claims of the individual have already “made themselves heard.” To summarize, the ethical model of the bourgeois family can be understood as the adaequate solution to two sets of deficient alternatives (nature vs. ethical life and freedom vs. attachment).
Second, one also sees how the problems considered here are problems that arise from earlier solutions to problems and provide the opportunity for further solutions. Both the “contract” and “romantic” understandings of marriage can be seen as reactions to the traditional family structure’s neglect of the individuality and the self-sufficiency of individuals. However, these interpretations are themselves characterized by a one-sided emphasis on self-sufficiency, to which Hegel’s model reacts. Third, the dimension of conflict also receives its due: It is not coincidental or unimportant that Hegel develops his view against the background of alternatives and tensions that appeared to him as real tensions and conflicts. When the institution of bourgeois marriage is more sensitive to problems it itself poses than available alternatives, and when the ethical interpretation of marriage gets at the “truth” of this institution (if not necessarily its lived reality) better than alternatives, this demonstrates that the appropriateness of this ethical formation (and its
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interpretation) shows itself in the fact that it can better manage current conflicts than the available alternatives. To put it simply, the patriarchal model encounters problems as soon as the claim of individuals for independence is made. And once this claim acquires legitimacy, it leads to familial conflict. (Romeo and Juliette, Bollywood). Fourth, now we are finally in the position to discuss the normative dimension–. If the problem (understood as task) of the bourgeois family is not simply to secure natural reproduction but also to make ethical freedom possible – to provide the natural basis for ethical freedom and thereby to make possible individual autonomy -, then the challenges forms of life respond to are not only culturally formed but also normatively pre-defined. When forms of life succeed or fail, they do this in relation to the normative claims and challenges that they themselves have brought forth. Here one sees what one could call the “dialectical complexity” of the problems that forms of life attempt to solve and the way such problems can provide a basis for critique. (a) Where forms of life encounter crises (we’ll discuss crises shortly), they fail not only on external hindrances but on internal, self-created problems. (b) Forms of life don’t just fail. They fail only in relation to a normatively preformed problem. Such a form of normative failure cannot be separated from their actual and functional failure (that is one of the points of the approach that sees forms of life as problem-solving strategies). The normative and the functional are intertwined.
Example 2: Work and the crisis of the “labor society” Let me discuss a second example: the crisis of the labor society. This too – as far as it is related to the ethical dimension of our form of life (as I claim it is) – can only be understood when one considers that a historical situation has been reached in which particular claims are being raised that cannot be taken back. The labor society too is currently in a normative as well as functional crisis. The situation: The crisis of a labor society– a “labor society in which there is no longer any labor to be done” (as Hannah Arendt pointedly described the problem) – can only be understood when one has before one’s eyes the level of complexity of
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bourgeois society and the normative demands that characterize it. In such a society (according to Hegel’s classical description), work is not only a means to subsistence but also the means to social integration, recognition and honor. Moreover, because work has this function, it brings particular normative expectations with it (even if these are only seldom fulfilled). The crisis of the labor society thus is not only a crisis of subsistence but also a normative crisis that can only be understood as a crisis against the background of historically-specific normative assumptions and demands. Therefore, the task such a society faces is not only to secure a minimal subsistence for its members but also to provide work for members of society that can be understood as free work. (To put it concretely: no forced labor). The Problem (Difficulty): Every solution to the crisis – be it political or economic– must provide a functional equivalence for that which work provided. The crisis of the labor society is therefore only describable through a particular historically situated constellation, i.e. through the particular historical form that work has achieved and the normative claims that make sense within it. And any credible solution to the problem must start here as well. The crisis of the labor society therefore does not admit of a general solution completely divorced from the historical, social, and normative form that this problem has taken. To take as an example an issue being currently discussed:
If a basic income is to avoid
constituting a socially destabilizing “giveaway,” it cannot be interpreted as harkening back to a pre-bourgeois work ethos or embodying a simple distain for work. It must rather transform the bourgeois understanding of work.
Problems of the second order and dialectical contradictions I’ll conclude this part of my paper with some remarks on a few outstanding issues. (And a typology of the kind of problems that might be involved in forms of life) (1) First, a few remarks on the complex (or even dialectical) form of the very idea of a problem I am defending. (a) Problems that arise as problems of a certain form of life should be seen as problems of a second order. What do I mean by this? - Lets imagine a rural society that starves from hunger because it hasn’t been raining for months. The lack of food certainly is a problem for this society. People are starving. But it is not necessarily a problem for it as a form of life. This means: The
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fact that people starve as such doesn’t put into question any of the established practices and institutions the society in question consists of. Only if it turns out that this society is for some reasons (that might have to do with their misinterpretation of nature – maybe they accept starving as a punishment from god) is unable to react to the problem (for example by building speicherhäuser) this problem becomes a formof-life problem. Second order problems thus don’t adress “pure facts” but facts evolvong out of established practices and interpretations. (b) But, coming back to my examples taken from Hegel the picture is even more complicated. The normatively complex notion of “problem” I’ve sketched above is such that problems cannot – so to speak – “come from outside” but are in a particular way “self-made.” That is, such problems are not about normative claims made by some outside observer but rather concern the form of life’s own claims that it at the same time cannot meet. As should be clear from these examples, the sense in which these claims are the form of life’s own is not that they are explicit value claims or norms society pays lip service to. Rather, they are points of reference already contained in social practices and shared by those participating in the practice – even if they are not fully realized or even if in a particular situation they cannot be realized at all. In this way, problems emerge out of the specific constellation of the particular form of life – even out its particular way of being self-contradictory.
Exkursus: Problems as contradictions For Hegel thus, problems take the form of contradictions. In a given social and historical situation, they do not appear to be contingent or disturbances coming from the outside but rather the realization or updating of tensions that were already present in the situation itself. Problem as Contradiction: Immanent Character While other problem conceptions (e.g. John Dewey's pragmatic conception) present problems as unforeseeable and contingent occasions for learning, externally produced (material) obstacles to action, or interruptions that rupture the functioning of an inwardly reflected praxis context, for Hegel, the contradiction that leads to crisis is not external to the discovered constellation. By this understanding, it is not the case that what is intrinsically (or previously) stable does become instable, what is coherent does become incoherent, and what is certain does become uncertain. Instead, the form itself that is
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being challenged is characterized by the differences contained within it. Every historical and social constellation that is hereby challenged is, so to speak, the prior, necessarily instable specification of a problem or contradiction. Let's now look more closely at what characterizes the interpretation of crises and problems in the mode of the contradiction. First, for Hegel, problems are due to conflict. They appear as conflicts between irreconcilable claims. In itself, that is a very specific interpretation of the concept of crisis or problem that stands apart from the idea that a problem has to do with a simple form of non-knowing or non-ability. But what is even more decisive here is the fact that these conflicts are not, for instance, conflicts between two unconnected opponents. The conflicts that are challenged do not only come about through the simultaneous onset of two contrary claims. These claims are linked to one another – and that is precisely what makes up the immanent character and the systematic constitution of the conflict. Problems in the form of (dialectical) contradictions are then problems that are found systematically within a given social formation, are created by those formations themselves, and cannot be resolved within them. For example, the "deeper" meaning of the dissolution of Greek morality had an immanent character. With reference to Socrates, it is its own principle that opposes it and by which it is destroyed. The Greek polis simply had a principle of individuality that, embodied by Socrates, contradicts the morality of the polis, but at the same time was created by it Hegel's crisis diagnoses therefore describe the ruin of certain moral formations as, tersely put, "homemade." The historical constellations that he diagnoses as crisis-prone don't just fail, they fail unto themselves. Problem as Contradiction: Reflexive Character The immanence of problem development described here, however, would be inconceivable without another aspect: Problems are reflexively interpreted as "internal contradictions." Immanent contradictions exist only to the extent that cultural forms of life are (analogous to Charles Taylors "self-interpreting animals") "self-interpreting entities." They therefore fail "unto themselves" not only because they created the contradictory practices and institutions that contradict one another; instead they primarily fail unto themselves because they contradict their own self-conception, their own interpretation of the world and the claim to validity coming along with it. The fact
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that a way of life can be in "conflict" means that it has its own bases for validity; the meaning that is set with and by it and the normative reference points that are set with and by it are called into question. This explains the fact that ways of life can, in a way, internally "erode" or even that such an erosion, attributable to internal inadequacies, is the precondition for its actual failure. It is not the fact of poverty that allows bourgeois society to "fall apart into its extremities" but the fact that that reality contradicts its character as a society in which the individual can find "honor and substance" (only) through participation in it as a worker. The Constitutive-Productive Character of the Contradiction Another characteristic arises from this internally contradictory structure: the constitutiveproductive character of the crises that Hegel describes. Contradiction and crisis do not only indicate the decline of a particular historical or intellectual formation. Where they develop their dynamics, they are also the moment of motion that leads out of those dynamics, symbols of the "vibrancy" of such a formation. "Objective" Character of Contradictions This constitutive and systematically interpreted character of contradictions refers to another trait: Contradictions are "objective" in the sense that the "contradiction" is (also) on the side of the object. "Objective crises" are on the side of an institutional and practical structure that is alienated from itself and that grows to be at odds with itself due to the existence of conflicting principles. Contradictions, then, are interpreted as characteristic of social reality itself. They denote an internal relationship of corresponding moral form of the corresponding form of life. That is exactly why the theory of (social) contradiction does not (only) grasp the existence of an open (social) conflict: What can become the problem for us, the relationship that we contradict, must have already become latently problematic on the side of the object (on the side of reality). Interim Consideration: Contradictions in Social Reality Here I would like to introduce a few considerations regarding the question of what talk of contradictions in social reality actually implies, i.e. what it might mean that that reality is "composed in a contradictory way". (I do this in order to make out whether it makes sense to analyze social reality in term of "contradiction" at all – an assumption that doesn't seem to be settled.) How do social practices come to contradict one another?
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And how are we to explain the fact that such a social pattern might entail mutually contradictory practices and still endure? There are prima facie several options. (1) A praxis or institution contains various praxis-constitutive norms that cannot be simultaneously adhered to. This results in a contradictory relationship between the respective norms or between the practices that are constituted through them, insofar as they can neither be harmonized nor exist simultaneously. The imperative to "be your own person!" does not comport with the imperative to "conform!" But insofar as modern working relations often entail both imperatives, we might describe this as "inherently contradictory." The simplest variant in such a constellation is the classic double bind situation in which there is an imperative that, practically speaking, is simultaneously circumvented, a case in which, for example, working relations might be de facto repressive while a claim to creativity or self-fulfillment might simultaneously be postulated. (2) By contrast, a "stronger" version of a systematic internal (and in fact dialectical) tendency toward contradiction appears when two sets of practices and norms within a social context are both in effect and mutually contradictory. Such praxis does not merely postulate something that is not fulfilled within it but rather lives, so to speak, on equal obedience to both imperatives. This is exactly how we might describe the working relations involved in what is known as the "creative sector": They are based on the fact that individuals simultaneously conform and act creatively; they require a posture in which both coincide and they are also dependent upon both postures, provided that they live on one hand by mobilizing the resource of creativity and on the other hand want to steer toward exploitable channels. The question, then, is: How useful is it to call this condition a "contradiction"? If we look at the mutually contradictory norm-praxis structure, is there a common foundation on which we can discern a contradiction in the same respect? The plausibility of talk of the contradiction that is internal to the relations (the "real contradiction" of these relations) can obviously only be tested if it has been shown that the practices in question are in fact mutually dependent and mutually determined within the praxis context and that as such they cannot be fulfilled simultaneously, i.e. they are mutually evasive – despite the fact that they in fact arise together (otherwise the praxis context in question would not endure).
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(3) A third case in which we might speak of the onset of "practical contradictions" or a contradictory reality would be one in which the praxis-constitutive norms are systematically interpreted in such a way that they change into the opposite of what was intended (the goal that is being pursued) as soon as they are fulfilled. As such, the French Revolution's transition into the Jacobin Terror can be seen as the transformationinto-the-opposite of the original intent. If we can find an opposite or a contradiction here, it exists between the intentions that are linked with specific actions and the factual impacts and results that they create, the unintended consequences of processes that are planted in the world. But here as well, it is insufficient for a claim of a systematic and immanent "contradiction" to merely establish that the intention with which a project was initiated and the result of the process that it triggered are at odds with one another. Because "unintended consequences" in the social are likely to occur, such an understanding would be accompanied by an inappropriate overextension of the concept of a contradiction. It is thus crucial for the strong thesis of an immanent contradiction that the process in question does not take that course by coincidence but due to "deeply rooted and unavoidable reasons." To be seen as a "real contradiction" requires more than a "good intention" that has led to a disastrous result. The characteristics that cause that outcome are not only factually unfulfilled but also cannot be fulfilled. They must be built into the formulation of the outcome or, at any rate, linked with the means available for its fulfillment. (So, according to Hegel's analysis, the "horror" of the French Revolution is not a result of contingent side effects but built into the "absolute" model of freedom itself.) (4) Finally, the contradictory nature of a social way of life can be described such that connections that belong together have been torn apart within it such that its elements confront one another in dysfunctional one-sidedness. In this case, a social way of life is contradictory because, in its effective practices, it has been torn from its context and, more specifically, from unity with its opposition. Again the model for such a contradiction in the social would be Hegel's Antigone: If a functioning non-contradictory ethical life unites state order and familial solidarity, then both sides in the Antigone conflict become opposites of one another; the situation is contradictory because it is disunited.
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With his interpretation of problems as contradictions and the thesis of real contradictions that occur throughout reality itself, Hegel, as these general considerations have already explained, accepts various explanatory burdens and a large number of implications. It is, however, also an attractive concept for understanding social crises and transformation processes insofar as what emerges is what can be interpreted as the interconnection or entanglement of the functional and normative shortcomings of a form of life, a perspective which enables us to analyze a certain kind of social erosion, onesidedness, and atrophying can be seen as a precondition of failure. The fact that social practices and institutions – forms of life – have crises does not only mean that something "is not working" or that a praxis can no longer actually be reproduced in the way that one is used to. It means that that practice can no longer fit into the normative self-conception and the connection of practices with interpretations of the world that accounts for those practices and interpretations. Put another way: It means that something is wrong with that connection. It has become incoherent, turned out to be impractical and "inhabitable" (as Terry Pinkard puts it). Interpreting problems and crises as contradictions means embracing the situation such that ways of life are less confronted with problems than confront problems. And such that the problems that they are confronted with do not appear coincidentally but systematically for reasons that are constitutively connected with their disposition. Such problems that arise (as contradictions) are not only obstacles to action but simultaneously conditions of possible action; they are not only dysfunctional but in their dysfunction they are simultaneously constitutive for the modality in which the inherently contradictory formation functions. (Ideological criticism attaches to precisely this constitutive moment.) Let me get away from Hegel now – and come to the end.
Problems with the notion of problems (2) I have suggested to conceive of forms of life as problem solving; I have also suggested that we can judge on the relative merits (and even the rationality= of a form of life by looking the way it adresses these problems: adauquate of inadaequete – regressive or in a way that adresses the topics involved at the height of where the problem comes up. However, when one understands the concept of a “problem” and with it the concept of a “solution” in such a fashion, there is a difficulty.
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This difficulty consists in the dependence of problems and solutions on interpretation. Put as a question: are problems or crises just “subjective” – that is, are they constructed by us or “made” by our interpretations? Or are they “objective,” —that is, do they exist independently from our interpretation of the situation? My answer, briefly put, is that they are both. Problems are simultaneously given and made. Problems must be first understood as problems and therefore interpreted as such. However, that does not mean that they are “only constructed.” Problems “call out” as ways in which the practical sphere is confronted with obstacles without already having acquired the particular form that characterizes a “problem.” With this, we can resolve what looks like a paradoxical description of problems. A problem is given insofar as a situation provides indications of a crisis. It is made insofar as the identification of something as a problem „makes“ something out of inchoate material. Even when the problem calls out as something “objective” that cannot be ignored, that which shows itself is still so indefinite that it can only be made into a concrete problem through interpretation. In other words, a problem cannot be constructed “out of nothing.” It must be based on something “independent of us” that makes itself known through a disturbance. For this reason, problems cannot be simply talked away or ignored. Whether a problem is accurately interpreted and its ostensible solution successful can be seen by whether the “pressure” created by the problem lets up. And even when that is a question of interpretation, one can approach the “real content of a problem” through a process of adjustment of problem and problem description. However, this process – and here the fourth element of my approach plays a role – is exactly that: a process. Specifically, it is a learning process mediated through conflicts and crisis. And on this process’s success or lack thereof -- on the evaluation of its internal constitution – is where a critique of forms of life finds the criterion for which it has searched.
5. Conclusion: An experimental pluralism Do the conception of forms of life as problem-solving strategies and the related notion of an ethical learning process lead to a monism of forms of life? Do the
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“problems” sketched in my remarks have only a single correct solution such that in the distance lies a dystopian picture of a single, complete, and unified form of life? No. I’d like to follow a remark of Hilary Putnam’s that exhibits a different understanding of pluralism as well as the fundamental recognition of a plurality of forms of life. As Putnam notes, “the problem does not consist in the fact that we are acquainted with a multitude of forms of the good life that are incompatible but rather that we don’t know any good form of life, at least not one that does not have deficits as well as virtues.” To put it another way: we do not know of a form of life that solves problems without creating new ones. When one looks at the situation like this, then one sees -- on the one hand -different forms of life competing with one another to be the best. They compare themselves to others, and criticize themselves and each other on the basis of their inability to solve the problems they pose for themselves. But, on the other hand, this same activity can be seen as a motive for recognizing (even valuing) an ineliminable pluralism. This motive is neither purely pragmatic nor merely a romanticization of diversity. Rather, it is a different sort of pluralism: not a community of monads cut off from one another but rather a plurality of experiments in problem-solving whose results cannot be confidently predicted. And there should be as many of these as possible since experimentation is the only path to new solutions. When we in reality have not too many but rather not a single solution to the problem of how to live, then a plurality seems necessary because (in the pragmatist tradition) a diversity of trials is necessary to approach anything like an acceptable solution. And– in a “pragmatic spirit” – when the consequences of our actions cannot be anticipated with conceptual means alone, it is necessary to evaluate them by observing the way in which they weave back and forth in the process of confronting the products of their actions. My conception thus does not lead to a monism but rather to an experimental pluralism of forms of life. This is, however, fundamentally different from the pluralism of “ethical abstinence” that I discussed at the beginning. The sort of pluralism that I advocate is not one that principally excludes ethical questions but rather a pluralism of debate about the correct solution to the problem of how to lead a life. Simply put: a liberal agnosticism bracketing out ethical questions hinders the experiment.
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