Weighing Benefts and Costs o International Sanctions Against Iran
Weighing Beneits and Costs o International Sanctions Against Iran
D F Cz,
T pp - p pv A u u u I— . F u
A up U S Gv p U.S. u, u, upp pu p, “W B C I S A I.” I.” W ppu pp u jv, p px p p u. W u u pp, v pp p. W uv pp u pu A . W v P O’ p pu I u p p p u, u u u I u u p. T pp v ; k p p . I k - jv v p p A I. I , v u k k— , p v p I, z p v p. W p A pu p u u p A ’ u. A L , “I v pp. I v u p . T p .” T pp k “ ” , p puv v u p U.S. v I u p.
Tis document is published by Te Iran Project; the content is the collective view o the signers.
Signed and Endorsed by:
Signed and Endorsed by:
Hamid Biglari
Stephen A. Cheney, BrigGen.
William G. Miller, Amb.
Vali R. Nasr
Joseph Cirincione
Suzanne DiMaggio
Gregory S. Newbold, LtGen.
Sam Nunn, Sen.
Paul H. O'Neill
George Perkovich
Edward P. Djerejian, Amb.
James Dobbins
Leslie H. Gelb
Chuck Hagel, Sen.
Thomas R. Pickering, Amb.
Paul R. Pillar
Lee H. Hamilt Hamilton on
Michael V. Hayden, Gen.
William A. Reinsch
Karim Sadjadpour
Stephen B. Heintz
Carla A. Hills
Faraj Saghri
Paul A. Volcker
Joseph P. Hoar, Gen.
Gary C. Hufbauer
James Walsh
John C. Whitehead
Frank Kearney, LTG.
Daniel C. Kurtzer, Amb.
Lawrence B. Wilkerson, Col.
Ellen Laipson
William H. Luers, Amb.
Frank G. Wisner, Amb.
Jessica T. Matthews
Richard T. McCormack, Amb.
2 weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran
Timothy E. Wirth, Sen.
Anthony C. Zinni, Gen.
weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran
3
Signed and Endorsed by:
Signed and Endorsed by:
Hamid Biglari
Stephen A. Cheney, BrigGen.
William G. Miller, Amb.
Vali R. Nasr
Joseph Cirincione
Suzanne DiMaggio
Gregory S. Newbold, LtGen.
Sam Nunn, Sen.
Paul H. O'Neill
George Perkovich
Edward P. Djerejian, Amb.
James Dobbins
Leslie H. Gelb
Chuck Hagel, Sen.
Thomas R. Pickering, Amb.
Paul R. Pillar
Lee H. Hamilt Hamilton on
Michael V. Hayden, Gen.
William A. Reinsch
Karim Sadjadpour
Stephen B. Heintz
Carla A. Hills
Faraj Saghri
Paul A. Volcker
Joseph P. Hoar, Gen.
Gary C. Hufbauer
James Walsh
John C. Whitehead
Frank Kearney, LTG.
Daniel C. Kurtzer, Amb.
Lawrence B. Wilkerson, Col.
Ellen Laipson
William H. Luers, Amb.
Frank G. Wisner, Amb.
Jessica T. Matthews
Richard T. McCormack, Amb.
2 weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran
Timothy E. Wirth, Sen.
Anthony C. Zinni, Gen.
weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran
C
Letter ................................................................................................................................ 1 Executive Summary ................................................................................................... 7 I. Introduction .......................................................................................................... 19 II. Background Background on U.S. and U.S.-Led International Sanctions Against Iran .................................................................................... 23 1. Fu P S....................................................................................... 23
N- N- “ .
”
III. Reections on Making Sanctions Work .................................................. 27 1. T Ojv S .................................................................................. 27 2. Aup Au Au Iu D I’ ............................ 28 3. E L S S.......................................................................... 30
IV. Benefts o the Sanctions .............................................................................. 33 1. Av S S P App...................................................... 33
Theodore Roosevelt
2. S R Exp I’ Nu P .................................... 35 3. Wk I Ru R G Iu ........................ 35 4. C I Dv I ................................................ 39 5. E S M C I’ Nu N S .............. 41
V.. Costs o the Sanctions V Sanctions.................................................................................... 45 1. Dpu U.S. U.S. u ........................................................ 45 2. E v p u u u u I .............. 46 3. Ep - - , p v ....... 47 4. L- I U U S .................................... 48 5. I p U.S.–I U.S.–I v........................... 49 6. P u u I I ............................................................ 50 7. D U U S, Eup Eup , ....................................................................................................... 51 8. D upp k. ..................................................................... 54
A Primer on Sanctions Sanctions Against Against Iran ................................................................ 56 Chart Summarizing Sanctions Sanctions Against Iran, 1979 – Present................ 68 Endnotes ...................................................................................................................... 78 4 weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran
3
C
Letter ................................................................................................................................ 1 Executive Summary ................................................................................................... 7 I. Introduction .......................................................................................................... 19 II. Background Background on U.S. and U.S.-Led International Sanctions Against Iran .................................................................................... 23 1. Fu P S....................................................................................... 23
N- N- “ .
III. Reections on Making Sanctions Work .................................................. 27 1. T Ojv S .................................................................................. 27
”
2. Aup Au Au Iu D I’ ............................ 28 3. E L S S.......................................................................... 30
IV. Benefts o the Sanctions .............................................................................. 33 1. Av S S P App...................................................... 33 2. S R Exp I’ Nu P .................................... 35
Theodore Roosevelt
3. Wk I Ru R G Iu ........................ 35 4. C I Dv I ................................................ 39 5. E S M C I’ Nu N S .............. 41
V.. Costs o the Sanctions V Sanctions.................................................................................... 45 1. Dpu U.S. U.S. u ........................................................ 45 2. E v p u u u u I .............. 46 3. Ep - - , p v ....... 47 4. L- I U U S .................................... 48 5. I p U.S.–I U.S.–I v........................... 49 6. P u u I I ............................................................ 50 7. D U U S, Eup Eup , ....................................................................................................... 51 8. D upp k. ..................................................................... 54
A Primer on Sanctions Sanctions Against Against Iran ................................................................ 56 Chart Summarizing Sanctions Sanctions Against Iran, 1979 – Present................ 68 Endnotes ...................................................................................................................... 78 4 weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Weighing Benefts and Costs o International Sanctions Against Iran A Paper rom The Iran Project
INTRODUCTION
P , pu . “
Ronald Reagan
The United States and the international international community have used sanctions or nearly three decades to pressure Iran to adopt dierent oreign and domestic policies.
”
The sanctions regime now in place, including sanctions imposed by the United United Nations Security Council, demonstrates the ability o the United States to work eectively with allies and other concerned nations to build a common strategy on Iran. At its core, the sanctions regime reects the commitment o many key nations to preventing Iran rom becoming a nuclear-armed state. Sanctions against Iran have been perceived in diverse ways, by U.S. policymakers and legislators: As a means or getting Iran to the negotiating table; as bargaining chips in negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program; as a tactic or slowing the development o Iran’s nuclear program; as a counterterrorism measure designed to constrain Iran’s support o organizations such as Hezbollah and Hamas; as a way o orcing Iran to change domestic policies that violate the human rights o its citizens; even (in the minds o some) as a tool or bringing about regime change in Iran. Whatever the purpose or combination o purposes associated with a particular set o sanctions, the benefts o the sanctions have oten been taken as given, since the imposition o sanctions is widely considered to be the most powerul alternative to military action. Precisely because sanctions oer the possibility o achieving important objectives without the human and fnancial costs o ar med conict, the costs o sanctions themselves are not routinely addressed in the public or policymaking debate.
6 weighing beneits and costs o military action against iran
weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran 7
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Weighing Benefts and Costs o International Sanctions Against Iran A Paper rom The Iran Project
INTRODUCTION
P , pu . “
The United States and the international international community have used sanctions or nearly three decades to pressure Iran to adopt dierent oreign and domestic policies.
”
Ronald Reagan
The sanctions regime now in place, including sanctions imposed by the United United Nations Security Council, demonstrates the ability o the United States to work eectively with allies and other concerned nations to build a common strategy on Iran. At its core, the sanctions regime reects the commitment o many key nations to preventing Iran rom becoming a nuclear-armed state. Sanctions against Iran have been perceived in diverse ways, by U.S. policymakers and legislators: As a means or getting Iran to the negotiating table; as bargaining chips in negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program; as a tactic or slowing the development o Iran’s nuclear program; as a counterterrorism measure designed to constrain Iran’s support o organizations such as Hezbollah and Hamas; as a way o orcing Iran to change domestic policies that violate the human rights o its citizens; even (in the minds o some) as a tool or bringing about regime change in Iran. Whatever the purpose or combination o purposes associated with a particular set o sanctions, the benefts o the sanctions have oten been taken as given, since the imposition o sanctions is widely considered to be the most powerul alternative to military action. Precisely because sanctions oer the possibility o achieving important objectives without the human and fnancial costs o ar med conict, the costs o sanctions themselves are not routinely addressed in the public or policymaking debate.
weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran 7
6 weighing beneits and costs o military action against iran
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
THE PURPOSE OF THIS PAPER
and analyses that inorm the debate on sanctions against Iran, particularly
The authors and signers of this paper are senior experts from from the national security and oreign policy communities who believe that a careul assessment o the costs as well as the benefts o sanctions will enhance the quality o debate about the sanctions regime and the role o sanctions in overall U.S. policy toward Iran. This report is not an advocacy document, or or against sanctions. It does not oer oer policy recommendations. Like our recent report,“Weighing report, “Weighing Benets and Costs o Military Action Against Iran,” this paper is balanced and act-based. But while the paper on military action sought to evaluate the benefts and costs o an action not yet taken, this paper on sanctions ocuses on a course o action to which the United States is already committed. Given the United States’ international leadership on sanctions as a strategy or pressuring Iran, this paper not only provides our assessment o the benefts and costs o the sanctions regime, but also oers some reections that might help the United States and its allies to get maximum advantage rom sanctions against Iran, while minimizing the potential or negative consequences.
with regard to achieving our objectives on Iran’s nuclear program. •
We have based our analysis and judgments on careful review of the excellent
research available on the topic o U.S. and U.S.-led international sanctions against Iran. We have tried to give ull credit to the work o others in the endnotes to this paper. Our own proessional judgments, when oered, are clearly identifed as such. •
We are mindful of the challenges of evaluating what constitutes a benet and a
cost o the sanctions against Iran. The U.S.-led international sanctions regime is still evolving and its longer-range eects are not ully apparent. Nonetheless, we believe that insights from the past thirty years of experience with sanctions against Iran can serve as a reasonable basis or thinking through uture outcomes.
HIGHLIGHTS FROM THE PAPER The assessments highlighted below are treated treated in greater detail and with with ample source citations in the paper. 1. The complexity o the sanctions regime. The sanctions regime has evolved over almost three three decades and reects several
SHARED UNDERSTANDINGS The authors o this paper brought to their task some shared understandings that provided our diverse group with a common perspective.
unique stages in the troubled history o U.S.–Iran relations and international concerns about Iran. Many decision makers in Washington may not recall the history of the sanctions or fully gr asp their complexity. In summary form at the start of our paper, and in a detailed Primer on Sanctions Against Iran, Including Potential Future
•
We recognize that Iran’s actions—particularly with regard regard to its nuclear
Sanctions and Provisions or Liting the Sanctions, we attempt to disaggregate
program—pose complex and dangerous challenges to U.S. interests and security,
these multiple layers of sanctions, in order to provide a clearer context within
as well as to the security o Israel and possibly to stability in the Middle East. These
which to weigh sanctions’ benefts and costs.
challenges are serious and demand a response. That is the context within which we examine the benets and costs of sanctions.
Sanctions against Iran have been imposed through Executive Orders and legislation in the United States; resolutions passed by the United Nations Security Council; and
•
This paper focuses on the sanctions regime and does not consider complementary
actions taken by oreign gover nments. Dierent sets o sanctions rely on dierent
elements o U.S. policy toward Iran, such as the threat o military action or the pursuit
criteria, guidelines, and implementation vehicles. They also aim at a variety o outcomes,
o a negotiated settlement. In choosing to ocus on the sanctions element o U.S.
including achieving a negotiated agreement on Iran’ Iran’s s nuclear program; restricting Iran’s
policy,, we have oregone oppor tunities to weigh the benefts and costs o sanctions policy
ability to acquire materials or that program; slowing the development o Iran’s nuclear
as part o a larger strategy or dealing with Iran. In a subsequent paper, The Iran
program; ensuring that Iran discontinues unding o Hezbollah and Hamas; requiring
Project will ocus on a negotiating strategy or resolving tensions with Iran.
Iran to respect the human r ights of its citizens; limiting Iran’s ability to exert inuence
•
While there is a large body of literature iterature on the pros and cons of sanctions as a
policy tool, we make only occasional reerences to that broader debate. Nor do we attempt to assess the role that sanctions have played in recent U.S. and international eorts to aect the policies o states other than Iran. Our goal is to provide acts 8 weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran
in the region; and, or some in Washington, producing a change in Iran’s government (regime change or a undamental change in the Iranian gover nment’ nment’s s policy and orientation), although this latter objective has been disavowed by the U.S. government. The sanctions regime also includes a complicated mix of criteria and provisions for lifting or easing the sanctions currently in place, should that be warranted by Iranian actions. weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran 9
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
THE PURPOSE OF THIS PAPER
and analyses that inorm the debate on sanctions against Iran, particularly
The authors and signers of this paper are senior experts from from the national security and oreign policy communities who believe that a careul assessment o the costs as well as the benefts o sanctions will enhance the quality o debate about the sanctions regime and the role o sanctions in overall U.S. policy toward Iran. This report is not an advocacy document, or or against sanctions. It does not oer oer policy recommendations. Like our recent report,“Weighing report, “Weighing Benets and Costs o Military Action Against Iran,” this paper is balanced and act-based. But while the paper on military action sought to evaluate the benefts and costs o an action not yet taken, this paper on sanctions ocuses on a course o action to which the United States is already committed. Given the United States’ international leadership on sanctions as a strategy or pressuring Iran, this paper not only provides our assessment o the benefts and costs o the sanctions regime, but also oers some reections that might help the United States and its allies to get maximum advantage rom sanctions against Iran, while minimizing the potential or negative consequences.
with regard to achieving our objectives on Iran’s nuclear program. •
We have based our analysis and judgments on careful review of the excellent
research available on the topic o U.S. and U.S.-led international sanctions against Iran. We have tried to give ull credit to the work o others in the endnotes to this paper. Our own proessional judgments, when oered, are clearly identifed as such. •
We are mindful of the challenges of evaluating what constitutes a benet and a
cost o the sanctions against Iran. The U.S.-led international sanctions regime is still evolving and its longer-range eects are not ully apparent. Nonetheless, we believe that insights from the past thirty years of experience with sanctions against Iran can serve as a reasonable basis or thinking through uture outcomes.
HIGHLIGHTS FROM THE PAPER The assessments highlighted below are treated treated in greater detail and with with ample source citations in the paper. 1. The complexity o the sanctions regime. The sanctions regime has evolved over almost three three decades and reects several
SHARED UNDERSTANDINGS The authors o this paper brought to their task some shared understandings that provided our diverse group with a common perspective.
unique stages in the troubled history o U.S.–Iran relations and international concerns about Iran. Many decision makers in Washington may not recall the history of the sanctions or fully gr asp their complexity. In summary form at the start of our paper, and in a detailed Primer on Sanctions Against Iran, Including Potential Future
•
We recognize that Iran’s actions—particularly with regard regard to its nuclear
Sanctions and Provisions or Liting the Sanctions, we attempt to disaggregate
program—pose complex and dangerous challenges to U.S. interests and security,
these multiple layers of sanctions, in order to provide a clearer context within
as well as to the security o Israel and possibly to stability in the Middle East. These
which to weigh sanctions’ benefts and costs.
challenges are serious and demand a response. That is the context within which we examine the benets and costs of sanctions.
Sanctions against Iran have been imposed through Executive Orders and legislation in the United States; resolutions passed by the United Nations Security Council; and
•
This paper focuses on the sanctions regime and does not consider complementary
actions taken by oreign gover nments. Dierent sets o sanctions rely on dierent
elements o U.S. policy toward Iran, such as the threat o military action or the pursuit
criteria, guidelines, and implementation vehicles. They also aim at a variety o outcomes,
o a negotiated settlement. In choosing to ocus on the sanctions element o U.S.
including achieving a negotiated agreement on Iran’ Iran’s s nuclear program; restricting Iran’s
policy,, we have oregone oppor tunities to weigh the benefts and costs o sanctions policy
ability to acquire materials or that program; slowing the development o Iran’s nuclear
as part o a larger strategy or dealing with Iran. In a subsequent paper, The Iran
program; ensuring that Iran discontinues unding o Hezbollah and Hamas; requiring
Project will ocus on a negotiating strategy or resolving tensions with Iran.
Iran to respect the human r ights of its citizens; limiting Iran’s ability to exert inuence
•
While there is a large body of literature iterature on the pros and cons of sanctions as a
policy tool, we make only occasional reerences to that broader debate. Nor do we attempt to assess the role that sanctions have played in recent U.S. and international eorts to aect the policies o states other than Iran. Our goal is to provide acts
in the region; and, or some in Washington, producing a change in Iran’s government (regime change or a undamental change in the Iranian gover nment’ nment’s s policy and orientation), although this latter objective has been disavowed by the U.S. government. The sanctions regime also includes a complicated mix of criteria and provisions for lifting or easing the sanctions currently in place, should that be warranted by Iranian actions. weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran 9
8 weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
2. Making sanctions work.
Sanctioning states are aced with the question o whether increasing sanc-
Reecting on three decades of experience with sanctions against Iran, as well as
tions or maintaining them indefnitely will achieve the desired objectives—
on the nature o sanctions as a oreign policy tool, we oer sever al general obser-
or whether there is instead a point at which the addition o more sanctions
vations about how the United States and its international allies might get the great-
or the inexible application o existing sanctions might backfre or become
est possible advantage rom the sanctions imposed against Iran, while minimizing
counterproductive. Sanctioning states might get the maximum advantage from
potential negative impacts. All o these observations, in one way or another, make
sanctions by recognizing when an optimal degree o pressure has been reached,
the point that the eectiveness o sanctions against Iran will depend not
and beginning to convert a purely conrontational strategy into a strategy that
only on the sanctions themselves, but also on the negotiating strategy
combines pressure with a calibrated series o positive signals, thereby creating
associated with them.
momentum toward negotiations.
•
The objectives of sanctions: The multiple objectives embedded in the
•
Easing or lifting some sanctions: The complex mix of processes and
sanctions regime will complicate eorts to determine whether and/or when sanc-
criteria required to lit the sanctions that are now in place may make it challenging
tions have achieved their desired results. Dierent parties, with dierent agendas,
or an American administration to chart a clear and calibrated response to
can make conicting claims about the eectiveness o sanctions. We believe
progressive changes in Iran’s policies and actions. While the American President
the United States might be better able to gauge and maximize the eec-
generally has a high degree o discretion to reduce sanctions on any country,
tiveness o recent sanctions i the objectives that are most relevant and
including Iran, the act that so many o the U.S. sanctions against Iran have been
pressing today could be disentangled rom other objectives that have
enacted into law limits the President’s discretion. In some cases, easing sanctions
been linked with sanctions. Or, to put this dierently: Sanctions alone are not
would require coordination with other nations and the UN Security Council.
a policy. I resolving the nuclear issue is now the most important objective o the sanctions regime, then sanctions strategies—and the negotiating strategy associ associ-ated with sanctions—–should be assessed in terms of their effectiveness or likely eectiveness in achieving that objective. •
Assumptions about about inuencing the decisions of Iran’s leaders: The
Political realities and the diverse objectives reected in the current sanctions regime also are likely to complicate the progressive easing o economic pressure on Iran. Even i Iran were willing to reach an agreement on the nuclear issues, many sanctions that were imposed or other reasons would likely remain in place. Some members o the United States Congress are committed to maintaining sanctions indefnitely as one
diverse sanctions now in eect against Iran share an underlying assumption about
means, among others, o hastening the demise o the Iranian regime, and it could be
the ability o sanctions to produce changes in the policies o Iranian leadership by
difcult politically or the American president to begin liting sanctions, even though
escalating the economic pressure on Iran’s economy, institutions, private business
doing so may be within his legal authority in some cases. One extreme reading of
community,, and people. But while the pain o recent sanctions may well help bring community
the current sanctions regime is that Iran would need convincingly to reorient its entire
Iran to the negotiating table, it is not clear that these sanctions a lone will result in
foreign policy and many of its domestic policies—and perhaps change its leader -
agreements or changes in Iran ian policies, much less changes in Iran’s leadership.
ship—in order to achieve a complete lifting of U.S. sanctions.
The Iranian government is engaged in its own ongoing calculation calculation o costs and benets, and may conclude that its interests are best served by digging in— especially i the regime believes that sanctions will remain in place no matter what Tehran T ehran does. I Iran were to signal its ts willingness to modiy its ts nuclear program and to cooperate in verifying those modications, Iranian negotiators would expect the United States and its allies, in turn, to oer a plan or easing some o the sanctions. Absent a calibrated, positive response rom the West, Iran’s Iran’s leaders would have little incentive to move orward with negotiations.
10 weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran
So ar, neither the United States nor the UN Security Council has stipulated the precise criteria that Iran must meet to trigger the liting o sanctions, or the sanctions that would be lifted in exchange for Iran’s actions. There is no action-for-action plan that all parties understand. Our analysis suggests that the process o unwinding some o the sanctions will be difcult but not impossible. While we make no specifc recommendations in this paper about a process or sequence or easing sanctions in response to Iranian cooperation, we do underline the value and importance o the United States having a plan or such an eventuality.
weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran 11
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
2. Making sanctions work.
Sanctioning states are aced with the question o whether increasing sanc-
Reecting on three decades of experience with sanctions against Iran, as well as
tions or maintaining them indefnitely will achieve the desired objectives—
on the nature o sanctions as a oreign policy tool, we oer sever al general obser-
or whether there is instead a point at which the addition o more sanctions
vations about how the United States and its international allies might get the great-
or the inexible application o existing sanctions might backfre or become
est possible advantage rom the sanctions imposed against Iran, while minimizing
counterproductive. Sanctioning states might get the maximum advantage from
potential negative impacts. All o these observations, in one way or another, make
sanctions by recognizing when an optimal degree o pressure has been reached,
the point that the eectiveness o sanctions against Iran will depend not
and beginning to convert a purely conrontational strategy into a strategy that
only on the sanctions themselves, but also on the negotiating strategy
combines pressure with a calibrated series o positive signals, thereby creating
associated with them.
momentum toward negotiations.
•
The objectives of sanctions: The multiple objectives embedded in the
•
Easing or lifting some sanctions: The complex mix of processes and
sanctions regime will complicate eorts to determine whether and/or when sanc-
criteria required to lit the sanctions that are now in place may make it challenging
tions have achieved their desired results. Dierent parties, with dierent agendas,
or an American administration to chart a clear and calibrated response to
can make conicting claims about the eectiveness o sanctions. We believe
progressive changes in Iran’s policies and actions. While the American President
the United States might be better able to gauge and maximize the eec-
generally has a high degree o discretion to reduce sanctions on any country,
tiveness o recent sanctions i the objectives that are most relevant and
including Iran, the act that so many o the U.S. sanctions against Iran have been
pressing today could be disentangled rom other objectives that have
enacted into law limits the President’s discretion. In some cases, easing sanctions
been linked with sanctions. Or, to put this dierently: Sanctions alone are not
would require coordination with other nations and the UN Security Council.
a policy. I resolving the nuclear issue is now the most important objective o the sanctions regime, then sanctions strategies—and the negotiating strategy associ associ-ated with sanctions—–should be assessed in terms of their effectiveness or likely eectiveness in achieving that objective. •
Assumptions about about inuencing the decisions of Iran’s leaders: The
Political realities and the diverse objectives reected in the current sanctions regime also are likely to complicate the progressive easing o economic pressure on Iran. Even i Iran were willing to reach an agreement on the nuclear issues, many sanctions that were imposed or other reasons would likely remain in place. Some members o the United States Congress are committed to maintaining sanctions indefnitely as one
diverse sanctions now in eect against Iran share an underlying assumption about
means, among others, o hastening the demise o the Iranian regime, and it could be
the ability o sanctions to produce changes in the policies o Iranian leadership by
difcult politically or the American president to begin liting sanctions, even though
escalating the economic pressure on Iran’s economy, institutions, private business
doing so may be within his legal authority in some cases. One extreme reading of
community,, and people. But while the pain o recent sanctions may well help bring community
the current sanctions regime is that Iran would need convincingly to reorient its entire
Iran to the negotiating table, it is not clear that these sanctions a lone will result in
foreign policy and many of its domestic policies—and perhaps change its leader -
agreements or changes in Iran ian policies, much less changes in Iran’s leadership.
ship—in order to achieve a complete lifting of U.S. sanctions.
The Iranian government is engaged in its own ongoing calculation calculation o costs and benets, and may conclude that its interests are best served by digging in— especially i the regime believes that sanctions will remain in place no matter what Tehran T ehran does. I Iran were to signal its ts willingness to modiy its ts nuclear program and to cooperate in verifying those modications, Iranian negotiators would expect the United States and its allies, in turn, to oer a plan or easing some o the sanctions. Absent a calibrated, positive response rom the West, Iran’s Iran’s leaders would have little incentive to move orward with negotiations.
So ar, neither the United States nor the UN Security Council has stipulated the precise criteria that Iran must meet to trigger the liting o sanctions, or the sanctions that would be lifted in exchange for Iran’s actions. There is no action-for-action plan that all parties understand. Our analysis suggests that the process o unwinding some o the sanctions will be difcult but not impossible. While we make no specifc recommendations in this paper about a process or sequence or easing sanctions in response to Iranian cooperation, we do underline the value and importance o the United States having a plan or such an eventuality.
weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran 11
10 weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
3. Benefts and potential benefts o sanctions.
essential parts is hurting some manuacturing sectors. This year, Iran cut imports
Targeted (or “smart”) sanctions have reduced Iran’s Iran’s ability to acquire material that
o non-essential goods. While Iran’s economy appears to be acing severe problems
could be used or a nuclear weapons program and its ability to modernize its armed
today,, we are cautious about extrapolating longer-term trends from discrete statis today
orces. Recently imposed comprehensive (or “crippling”) sanctions have sent a clear
tics. It is difcult to estimate the extent of the impact of sanctions over time or the
message to Iran’s leadership about the economic cost o continuing to ignore the
ability o Iran to adapt to the new environment. Sanctions also have driven a sub-
demands o the United States, the UN Security Council, and others. Sanctions have
stantial amount o commerce underground and into the black market, which urther
worked to constrain some Iranian activities as well as to damage Iran’s economy
complicates eorts to gauge economic activity within and across Iran’ Iran’s s borders.
and urther isolate Iran rom the international community. The test now is whether the sanctions will ultimately work to change Iranian policies and behavior. Among the benefts and potential benefts o sanctions are the ollowing: •
A basis for coalition building. Sanctions have proved to be a way or many
nations to demonstrate a unifed purpose and the seriousness o their concerns about Iran’s nuclear intentions and support or violent non-state actors such as Hezbollah and Hamas, without going to war. The severity and comprehensiveness o the sanctions regime has also reassured riendly states in the region that the United States understands their security needs. •
Slowing the expansion of Iran’ Iran’s s nuclear program. U.S. government
ofcials and other experts have said that targeted sanctions are slowing the expan sion o Iran’s nuclear program, including the production o centriuges. Some hav e even argued that without sanctions and other pressures, Iran would already have a nuclear weapon. We disagree with this judgment, however, since U.S. intelligence ofcials have stated with a high degree o confdence that the decision to build a nuclear weapon has not yet been taken by Iran’ Iran’s s Supreme Leader. Sanctions are thought to have been largely eective in reducing the importation o dual-purpose materials that would enable Iran to move orward with any plans or the development o missile-delivery systems and other aspects o a nuclear weapons capability. According to recent International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports, however, however, Iran’s Iran’ s capacity to enrich uranium continues to expand, and Iran’ Iran’s s stockpile of low-enriched uranium (enriched to the level o 3.5–5%) has continued to grow. This raises doubts about whether sanctions have had a signifcant eect on an aspect of Iran’s nuclear program—uranium enrichment—that is central to the creation o a nuclear weapon. •
Iran’s s oil Weakening the Iranian economy. Sanctions are cutting into Iran’
revenues and disrupting its trade with neighboring states. Iran’s economy appears to have been signifcantly weakened (corruption and mismanagement are endemic problems as well). Ination and unemployment are high; the inability to purchase
12 weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran
•
Regional military balance increasingly increasingly unfavorable to Iran. Iran. The ban on
heavy weapons sales has limited Iran’s Iran’s ability to modernize its armed orces at a time when Iran’s neighbors have been getting U.S. assistance in upgra ding their militaries. While Iran is now able to manuacture most basic military hardware domestically,, sanctions are preventing Iran rom purchasing or developing hi-tech domestically military equipment. We assume, however, that in the event o conict, Iran’s retaliatory and even its oensive military strategies would rely primarily on asymmetrical warare rather than conventional orces. •
Elite distress and public unhappiness over economic conditions. Both
elites and the general public in Iran are eeling the eects o the economic deterioration produced by the sanctions regime. President Ahmadinejad has been criticized within elite circles or his mismanagement o the economy, but it is difcult to judge whether debate has also been stimulated over Iran’s oreign policy, including whether Iran should make some concessions on its nuclear program in order to achieve sanctions relie. Certainly, the threat o stier sanctions does not appear to have stopped Iran rom taking steps in its nuclear program that alarm the international community. (The Supreme Leader, who would make the fnal decision about whether Iran should pursue a nuclear weapon, is thought to believe that the nuclear issue is just a pretext or regime change, and that sanctions will remain in place no matter what Tehran does.). Public discontent with economic conditions and domestic policies is growing. But here, too, it is difcult to judge whether public unhappiness will lead to pressure for a change in foreign policy or national leadership—or to public fearfulness, passivity,, and accommodation under a more harshly repressive state. passivity •
Enhanced sanctions might change Iran’ Iran’s s nuclear negotiating strategy.
As international sanctions have increased in severity and comprehensiveness, comprehensiveness, the United States has seen some indications o a greater willingness on the part o Iranian leadership to negotiate seriously. So ar, though, little actual progress has been made toward achieving agreement on any o the outstanding issues. It seems doubtul to us that the current seve re sanctions regime will signifcantly aect the decision making of Iran’s leaders—any more than past sanctions did—barring some weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran 13
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
3. Benefts and potential benefts o sanctions.
essential parts is hurting some manuacturing sectors. This year, Iran cut imports
Targeted (or “smart”) sanctions have reduced Iran’s Iran’s ability to acquire material that
o non-essential goods. While Iran’s economy appears to be acing severe problems
could be used or a nuclear weapons program and its ability to modernize its armed
today,, we are cautious about extrapolating longer-term trends from discrete statis today
orces. Recently imposed comprehensive (or “crippling”) sanctions have sent a clear
tics. It is difcult to estimate the extent of the impact of sanctions over time or the
message to Iran’s leadership about the economic cost o continuing to ignore the
ability o Iran to adapt to the new environment. Sanctions also have driven a sub-
demands o the United States, the UN Security Council, and others. Sanctions have
stantial amount o commerce underground and into the black market, which urther
worked to constrain some Iranian activities as well as to damage Iran’s economy
complicates eorts to gauge economic activity within and across Iran’ Iran’s s borders.
and urther isolate Iran rom the international community. The test now is whether the sanctions will ultimately work to change Iranian policies and behavior. Among the benefts and potential benefts o sanctions are the ollowing: •
A basis for coalition building. Sanctions have proved to be a way or many
nations to demonstrate a unifed purpose and the seriousness o their concerns about Iran’s nuclear intentions and support or violent non-state actors such as Hezbollah and Hamas, without going to war. The severity and comprehensiveness o the sanctions regime has also reassured riendly states in the region that the United States understands their security needs. •
Slowing the expansion of Iran’ Iran’s s nuclear program. U.S. government
ofcials and other experts have said that targeted sanctions are slowing the expan sion o Iran’s nuclear program, including the production o centriuges. Some hav e even argued that without sanctions and other pressures, Iran would already have a nuclear weapon. We disagree with this judgment, however, since U.S. intelligence ofcials have stated with a high degree o confdence that the decision to build a nuclear weapon has not yet been taken by Iran’ Iran’s s Supreme Leader. Sanctions are thought to have been largely eective in reducing the importation o dual-purpose materials that would enable Iran to move orward with any plans or the development o missile-delivery systems and other aspects o a nuclear weapons capability. According to recent International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports, however, however, Iran’s Iran’ s capacity to enrich uranium continues to expand, and Iran’ Iran’s s stockpile of low-enriched uranium (enriched to the level o 3.5–5%) has continued to grow. This raises doubts about whether sanctions have had a signifcant eect on an aspect of Iran’s nuclear program—uranium enrichment—that is central to the creation o a nuclear weapon. •
Iran’s s oil Weakening the Iranian economy. Sanctions are cutting into Iran’
revenues and disrupting its trade with neighboring states. Iran’s economy appears to have been signifcantly weakened (corruption and mismanagement are endemic problems as well). Ination and unemployment are high; the inability to purchase
•
Regional military balance increasingly increasingly unfavorable to Iran. Iran. The ban on
heavy weapons sales has limited Iran’s Iran’s ability to modernize its armed orces at a time when Iran’s neighbors have been getting U.S. assistance in upgra ding their militaries. While Iran is now able to manuacture most basic military hardware domestically,, sanctions are preventing Iran rom purchasing or developing hi-tech domestically military equipment. We assume, however, that in the event o conict, Iran’s retaliatory and even its oensive military strategies would rely primarily on asymmetrical warare rather than conventional orces. •
Elite distress and public unhappiness over economic conditions. Both
elites and the general public in Iran are eeling the eects o the economic deterioration produced by the sanctions regime. President Ahmadinejad has been criticized within elite circles or his mismanagement o the economy, but it is difcult to judge whether debate has also been stimulated over Iran’s oreign policy, including whether Iran should make some concessions on its nuclear program in order to achieve sanctions relie. Certainly, the threat o stier sanctions does not appear to have stopped Iran rom taking steps in its nuclear program that alarm the international community. (The Supreme Leader, who would make the fnal decision about whether Iran should pursue a nuclear weapon, is thought to believe that the nuclear issue is just a pretext or regime change, and that sanctions will remain in place no matter what Tehran does.). Public discontent with economic conditions and domestic policies is growing. But here, too, it is difcult to judge whether public unhappiness will lead to pressure for a change in foreign policy or national leadership—or to public fearfulness, passivity,, and accommodation under a more harshly repressive state. passivity •
Enhanced sanctions might change Iran’ Iran’s s nuclear negotiating strategy.
As international sanctions have increased in severity and comprehensiveness, comprehensiveness, the United States has seen some indications o a greater willingness on the part o Iranian leadership to negotiate seriously. So ar, though, little actual progress has been made toward achieving agreement on any o the outstanding issues. It seems doubtul to us that the current seve re sanctions regime will signifcantly aect the decision making of Iran’s leaders—any more than past sanctions did—barring some weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran 13
12 weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
willingness on the part o sanctioning countries to combine continued pressure with
•
positive signals and decisions on matters o great interest to Iran.
hensive sanctions take their toll on the quality o lie in Iran, the United States risks
Long-term alienation between the United States and Iran. As compre-
losing the admiration of many of Iran’ Iran’s s people—including the younger generation. 4. Costs and potential costs o sanctions. The decision on to make make international international sanctions sanctions a centerpiece centerpiece o its Iran strategy has has had some geopolitical costs or the United States, and ault lines are developing in
Resentment over the hardships caused by sanctions could reduce the prospects or improving or normalizing U.S. and Iranian relations over time, even i Iranian leadership were to change.
the alliance, potentially giving Iran some options or osetting the impacts o the The international sanctions, combined with Increased potential for conict. conict. The
sanctions. Sanctions designed to weaken Iran’s economy and put pressure on Iranian
•
leadership are having some eect, but they also are having some unintended negative
threats rom Israel and a U.S. military buildup in the Persian Gul, may have height-
consequences. And while the tightening sanctions seem to be having a modest eect
ened Iran’s readiness or asymmetrical retaliation against U.S. and allied interests.
on Iran’s nuclear negotiating strategy, they also risk undermining other long-term
In addition, according to the U.S. Deense Department, Iran has responded to the
U.S. policy objectives vis-à-vis Iran and or regional peace and stability.
limits on its arms purchases by expanding its own arms industry—developing ballistic and cruise missiles, building more small boats to use in the Per sian Gul,
Among the costs and potential costs o sanctions are the ollowing: •
Disputes with allies and other countries. Dierences with Russia, China,
and other countries—including India, Turkey, and South Korea—have widened as more comprehensive sanctions take eect that aim to pressure Iran’s leaders by harming the civilian economy. Sanctions-related tensions among the United States and Russia and China have complicated U.S. eorts to achieve Security Council unity on international action in Libya and Syria. •
Increased corruption and control control of the economy by unaccountable unaccountable
and acquiring additional ships and submarines. The sanctions, and especially the partial oil embargo against Iran, have also caused Iran’s leaders to threaten action to close the strategic Strait o Hormuz. •
Potential humanitarian effects. Sanctions have the potential to produce
human suering that could be morally repugnant and that could undermine international support or sanctions, hurt the United States’ global image and credibility, and contribute to urther alienation o the Iranian public. The comprehensive sanctions introduced in 2010 have lowered the standard o living and wellbeing o Iran’s
actions. Iranians who depend on cash-strapped government agencies or public
population, including by reducing the availability o ood, medicine, and other basic
services and social-welare benefts may be orced to turn to inuential amily and
human requirements. Some hardships are an inevitable result o sanctions cutting
actional connections who are in positions o power. This is likely to enhance the
deeply into the economy or long periods o time. In addition, while the United
inuence o conservative and repressive actions (such as the Iranian Revolutionary
States Treasury Department permits the export of humanitarian goods to Iran, U.S.
Guard Corps, or IRGC) that have control over fnancial resources. IRGC-controlled
frms are not always willing to undertake the licensing process that is required, and
frms have acquired large stakes in key economic sectors, including telecommuni-
oreign frms and banks may hold back rom any transactions with Iran or ear o
cations, banking, transportation, and energy—where sanctions have forced global
U.S. penalties and volatility in the value o Iran’s currency. currency. Inadvertently, a widely
companies to abandon some projects to IRGC-linked companies. The longer
accepted principle o sanctions⎯that the availability o ood and medicines should
sanctions persist, the more economic transactions will be controlled by the Iranian
not be affected⎯is at risk of being violated. Meanwhile, as the number and complex -
leadership through black-market channels.
ity o sanctions on Iran have increased, humanitarian relie groups complain that it is increasingly difcult for U.S. citizens to donate to relief efforts in Iran (for example,
•
Empowering anti-reform voices and disempowering civil society.
ater the August 2012 earthquakes in Northern Iran).
Comprehensive international sanctions against Iran may be enhancing the political power o repressive leaders and ultra-conservative actions by enabling them to
•
portray sanctions as U.S.-led aggression, even “economic warare,” and by causing
allies, and the region. The sanctions now in place are creating new international
the regime to repress opposition elements more har shly than ever. To To the extent
patterns o trade that are potentially detrimental to the U.S., European, and regional
that ultra-conservatives increase their control over the Iranian system, room or
economies. The eects o the most crippling sanctions are not yet visible in the
political dissent and civil society will continue to shrink.
available economic data, and a combination of factors—including exemptions of
14 weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran
Detrimental economic effects on the United States, States, its its European
weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran 15
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
willingness on the part o sanctioning countries to combine continued pressure with
•
positive signals and decisions on matters o great interest to Iran.
hensive sanctions take their toll on the quality o lie in Iran, the United States risks
Long-term alienation between the United States and Iran. As compre-
losing the admiration of many of Iran’ Iran’s s people—including the younger generation. 4. Costs and potential costs o sanctions. The decision on to make make international international sanctions sanctions a centerpiece centerpiece o its Iran strategy has has had some geopolitical costs or the United States, and ault lines are developing in
Resentment over the hardships caused by sanctions could reduce the prospects or improving or normalizing U.S. and Iranian relations over time, even i Iranian leadership were to change.
the alliance, potentially giving Iran some options or osetting the impacts o the The international sanctions, combined with Increased potential for conict. conict. The
sanctions. Sanctions designed to weaken Iran’s economy and put pressure on Iranian
•
leadership are having some eect, but they also are having some unintended negative
threats rom Israel and a U.S. military buildup in the Persian Gul, may have height-
consequences. And while the tightening sanctions seem to be having a modest eect
ened Iran’s readiness or asymmetrical retaliation against U.S. and allied interests.
on Iran’s nuclear negotiating strategy, they also risk undermining other long-term
In addition, according to the U.S. Deense Department, Iran has responded to the
U.S. policy objectives vis-à-vis Iran and or regional peace and stability.
limits on its arms purchases by expanding its own arms industry—developing ballistic and cruise missiles, building more small boats to use in the Per sian Gul,
Among the costs and potential costs o sanctions are the ollowing: •
Disputes with allies and other countries. Dierences with Russia, China,
and other countries—including India, Turkey, and South Korea—have widened as more comprehensive sanctions take eect that aim to pressure Iran’s leaders by harming the civilian economy. Sanctions-related tensions among the United States and Russia and China have complicated U.S. eorts to achieve Security Council unity on international action in Libya and Syria. •
Increased corruption and control control of the economy by unaccountable unaccountable
and acquiring additional ships and submarines. The sanctions, and especially the partial oil embargo against Iran, have also caused Iran’s leaders to threaten action to close the strategic Strait o Hormuz. •
Potential humanitarian effects. Sanctions have the potential to produce
human suering that could be morally repugnant and that could undermine international support or sanctions, hurt the United States’ global image and credibility, and contribute to urther alienation o the Iranian public. The comprehensive sanctions introduced in 2010 have lowered the standard o living and wellbeing o Iran’s
actions. Iranians who depend on cash-strapped government agencies or public
population, including by reducing the availability o ood, medicine, and other basic
services and social-welare benefts may be orced to turn to inuential amily and
human requirements. Some hardships are an inevitable result o sanctions cutting
actional connections who are in positions o power. This is likely to enhance the
deeply into the economy or long periods o time. In addition, while the United
inuence o conservative and repressive actions (such as the Iranian Revolutionary
States Treasury Department permits the export of humanitarian goods to Iran, U.S.
Guard Corps, or IRGC) that have control over fnancial resources. IRGC-controlled
frms are not always willing to undertake the licensing process that is required, and
frms have acquired large stakes in key economic sectors, including telecommuni-
oreign frms and banks may hold back rom any transactions with Iran or ear o
cations, banking, transportation, and energy—where sanctions have forced global
U.S. penalties and volatility in the value o Iran’s currency. currency. Inadvertently, a widely
companies to abandon some projects to IRGC-linked companies. The longer
accepted principle o sanctions⎯that the availability o ood and medicines should
sanctions persist, the more economic transactions will be controlled by the Iranian
not be affected⎯is at risk of being violated. Meanwhile, as the number and complex -
leadership through black-market channels.
ity o sanctions on Iran have increased, humanitarian relie groups complain that it is increasingly difcult for U.S. citizens to donate to relief efforts in Iran (for example,
•
Empowering anti-reform voices and disempowering civil society.
ater the August 2012 earthquakes in Northern Iran).
Comprehensive international sanctions against Iran may be enhancing the political power o repressive leaders and ultra-conservative actions by enabling them to
•
portray sanctions as U.S.-led aggression, even “economic warare,” and by causing
allies, and the region. The sanctions now in place are creating new international
the regime to repress opposition elements more har shly than ever. To To the extent
patterns o trade that are potentially detrimental to the U.S., European, and regional
that ultra-conservatives increase their control over the Iranian system, room or
economies. The eects o the most crippling sanctions are not yet visible in the
political dissent and civil society will continue to shrink.
available economic data, and a combination of factors—including exemptions of
14 weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran
Detrimental economic effects on the United States, States, its its European
weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran 15
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
various kinds, the expansion of black market trading, and non-compliance by some parties—makes it difcult to calculate precisely the economic impacts of sanctions on the United States, the European Union (EU) countries, and countries in the Middle East. But one obvious “opportunity cost” o sanctions is that they exclude U.S. and allied rms from potentially lucrative business opportunities in Iran. Goods rom China and India, two o the countries that have sought to avoid sanctions on Iranian banks by bartering or oil, are taking hold in the Iranian market, and it may prove difcult to realign trade patterns to include the EU countries (or which Iran was a airly signifcant market in the past). The Gul Cooperation Council countries, which had enjoyed a blossoming o trade activity with Iran beore tightened sanctions took eect, ear the loss o that income. Meanwhile, the rapid expansion of unofcial, black-market trade between Iran and Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, and Turkey is distorting and undermining the economies o those states and the region.
This Executive Summary cannot do justice to the extended debates and months o study that that have gone gone into preparin preparing g the paper paper that ollows, ollows, or to the
•
Detrimental effects on on the global global energy supply and the the stability stability of the the
global energy market. In the past, a rise in tensions between Iran and the international community has oten produced a jump in world oil prices. While that v olatility
rigor o the the research research and analysis analysis that buttress buttress its ndings. Our aim throughthroughout this eort has been to present the best possible assessments—based on
may be reduced somewhat now—due to the relatively soft market for oil and the
a large body body o expert expert analysis analysis and and opinion—o on—o a key strategy strategy or addressing ng
calculation that Iran’s share of the global oil market is in decline—world oil prices
one o the most critical security challenges acing the United States. We hope
remain sensitive to such tensions. Even i the EU oil embargo were to be terminated as part o a nuclear deal, Iran’s oil felds will have deteriorated and Iran’s presence in the global oil market will diminish, at least over the mid-term. And sanctions hav e
the acts and proessional judgments we have assembled will stimulate inormed debate and and refection refection among among citizens citizens and leaders eaders alike. alike.
aected Iran’s Iran’s ability to supply liquefed na tural gas to the global mark et, by preventing Iran from using any patents or accessing international expertise to develop a capacity to export liqueed natural gas.
16 weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran
weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran 17
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
various kinds, the expansion of black market trading, and non-compliance by some parties—makes it difcult to calculate precisely the economic impacts of sanctions on the United States, the European Union (EU) countries, and countries in the Middle East. But one obvious “opportunity cost” o sanctions is that they exclude U.S. and allied rms from potentially lucrative business opportunities in Iran. Goods rom China and India, two o the countries that have sought to avoid sanctions on Iranian banks by bartering or oil, are taking hold in the Iranian market, and it may prove difcult to realign trade patterns to include the EU countries (or which Iran was a airly signifcant market in the past). The Gul Cooperation Council countries, which had enjoyed a blossoming o trade activity with Iran beore tightened sanctions took eect, ear the loss o that income. Meanwhile, the rapid expansion of unofcial, black-market trade between Iran and Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, and Turkey is distorting and undermining the economies o those states and the region.
This Executive Summary cannot do justice to the extended debates and months o study that that have gone gone into preparin preparing g the paper paper that ollows, ollows, or to the
•
Detrimental effects on on the global global energy supply and the the stability stability of the the
global energy market. In the past, a rise in tensions between Iran and the international community has oten produced a jump in world oil prices. While that v olatility
rigor o the the research research and analysis analysis that buttress buttress its ndings. Our aim throughthroughout this eort has been to present the best possible assessments—based on
may be reduced somewhat now—due to the relatively soft market for oil and the
a large body body o expert expert analysis analysis and and opinion—o on—o a key strategy strategy or addressing ng
calculation that Iran’s share of the global oil market is in decline—world oil prices
one o the most critical security challenges acing the United States. We hope
remain sensitive to such tensions. Even i the EU oil embargo were to be terminated as part o a nuclear deal, Iran’s oil felds will have deteriorated and Iran’s presence in the global oil market will diminish, at least over the mid-term. And sanctions hav e
the acts and proessional judgments we have assembled will stimulate inormed debate and and refection refection among among citizens citizens and leaders eaders alike. alike.
aected Iran’s Iran’s ability to supply liquefed na tural gas to the global mark et, by preventing Iran from using any patents or accessing international expertise to develop a capacity to export liqueed natural gas.
weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran 17
16 weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran
I.
Introduction T U S u v u u v p p, u ( ) p u v pv u v. T I vv v pu I p p.
F u ; v u , u , “ u p, v. John Adams
”
S I v pv p k : p v I’ u p; I ; U S’ u u p u p p vp u p; u u I’ upp z u Hz H; I p v u z; v (u) I. Bu v pup pup pu , p v k v, p pu v v U.S. . A p u p p v p jv u u , p v v u pu pk . T u pp xp u p u v a careul assessment o the costs as well as the benefts o sanctions will enhance the quality o the discussion about the sanctions regime and overall U.S. policy toward Iran.
T v u, p p . I, u pu qu v p u . W p u u p u. W z I p U.S. p pp vv p (u u) upp p . I pvu pu pp T I Pj W B C M A A I, z
weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran 19
I.
Introduction T U S u v u u v p p, u ( ) p u v pv u v. T I vv v pu I p p.
F u ; v u , u , “ u p, v. John Adams
”
S I v pv p k : p v I’ u p; I ; U S’ u u p u p p vp u p; u u I’ upp z u Hz H; I p v u z; v (u) I. Bu v pup pup pu , p v k v, p pu v v U.S. . A p u p p v p jv u u , p v v u pu pk . T u pp xp u p u v a careul assessment o the costs as well as the benefts o sanctions will enhance the quality o the discussion about the sanctions regime and overall U.S. policy toward Iran.
T v u, p p . I, u pu qu v p u . W p u u p u. W z I p U.S. p pp vv p (u u) upp p . I pvu pu pp T I Pj W B C M A A I, z
weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran 19
INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION
u I. I uqu pp, u puu
p. T x
p u u .
. I k pv v p -
Lk u p u , p v u p pk . T v u, p p . Bu pp u . T pp u u vu k. T pp u u U S . T p p v pp u k. Ovu, k p p , x p pp pj p uu. L vu, pp, p u k. Given the United States’ deep engagement and international leadership on sanctions as a strategy or pressuring Iran, we believe it is appropriate here not only to lay out our assessment o the benefts and costs o this strategy, but also to
, u u v k ( v u , v u v ). • W u I p
U.S. p vv p (u u) upp p . T p U.S. p pp. W u u pp, “W B C M A I”; uqu pp, u p u. I x U.S. p p, v ppu . Bu v u p p I, pu vu pv , - j p v U S.
oer reections that might help the United States and its allies get maximum
• W u u
advantage rom the sanctions placed on Iran, while minimizing the potential
p , k . N p
or negative consequences. A, pp u p
v p U.S.
k k, p u u .
p I. Ou u U.S. U.S.- -
T pp Exuv Su p v p: I.
Iu
II.
Bku S
I. Ou pv u u p u p I, pu v I’ u p. • W u ju u v x
III. R Mk S Wk
v p U.S. U.S.- I.
IV.. B S IV
W v v u k pp. Ou
V.
p ju, , u.
C S
A Primer on on Sanctions Sanctions Agains Againstt Iran, Iran, Includi Including ng Potentia Potentiall Future Future Sanctions Sanctions and Provisions Provisions or Liing the Sanctions, p u uz 1979.
• W u vu
I. S U S uu p —u k—
Shared Understandings: T u pp u k
v u, u
u pv u v up ppv.
pu u. I , U.S.-
• W z I’ v—pu u p—p
px u U.S. u, u I p M E. T u
20 weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran
vv - u pp. N, v p xp I v k u uu p.
weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran 21
INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION
u I. I uqu pp, u puu
p. T x
p u u .
. I k pv v p -
Lk u p u , p v u p pk . T v u, p p . Bu pp u . T pp u u vu k. T pp u u U S . T p p v pp u k. Ovu, k p p , x p pp pj p uu. L vu, pp, p u k. Given the United States’ deep engagement and international leadership on sanctions as a strategy or pressuring Iran, we believe it is appropriate here not only to lay out our assessment o the benefts and costs o this strategy, but also to
, u u v k ( v u , v u v ). • W u I p
U.S. p vv p (u u) upp p . T p U.S. p pp. W u u pp, “W B C M A I”; uqu pp, u p u. I x U.S. p p, v ppu . Bu v u p p I, pu vu pv , - j p v U S.
oer reections that might help the United States and its allies get maximum
• W u u
advantage rom the sanctions placed on Iran, while minimizing the potential
p , k . N p
or negative consequences. A, pp u p
v p U.S.
k k, p u u .
p I. Ou u U.S. U.S.- -
T pp Exuv Su p v p: I.
Iu
II.
Bku S
I. Ou pv u u p u p I, pu v I’ u p. • W u ju u v x
III. R Mk S Wk
v p U.S. U.S.- I.
IV.. B S IV
W v v u k pp. Ou
V.
p ju, , u.
C S
A Primer on on Sanctions Sanctions Agains Againstt Iran, Iran, Includi Including ng Potentia Potentiall Future Future Sanctions Sanctions and Provisions Provisions or Liing the Sanctions, p u uz
• W u vu
I. S U S
1979.
uu p —u k— Shared Understandings: T u pp u k
v u, u
u pv u v up ppv.
pu u. I , U.S.-
• W z I’ v—pu u p—p
px u U.S. u, u I p M E. T u
vv - u pp. N, v p xp I v k u uu p.
weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran 21
20 weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran
II.
Background on U.S. and U.S.-Led International Sanctions Against Iran U.S. I p v uqu u U.S.–I , v u U.S. v u I. 1 Ov , v p jv. O u pp k k up , pv x
N N p u p xu “ .
”
Dean Acheson
x p uu I.
1. FOUR PHASES OF SANCTIONS W u j p U.S. I 1979, p . T u p uz . 1.1 The frst phase, dating rom 1979 through 1995, u
p U S. I p p 1979, 1984, I p U.S. “ p ” u up I vv 1983 k U.S. M k L. A pu p u - I–Iq , u I’ I’ p pu u I u up . U.S. -1990 p I’ upp H’ p u I, —v u I’ I’ u — p I Ru u v u p Bu. Ov, u I’ upp px up; I I’ ’ v v p; I’ vp u p. T uu u v A P p p ( xp, v I p , ). 1.2 The second phase, rom 1996 to 2006, u vu—
u u —up I pu u up. L p 1996 ( I–L S A, ILSA, I S A, ISA) pv p k j v I’ . Au weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran 23
II.
Background on U.S. and U.S.-Led International Sanctions Against Iran U.S. I p v uqu u U.S.–I , v u U.S. v u I. 1 Ov , v p jv. O u pp k k up , pv x
N N p u p xu “ .
”
Dean Acheson
x p uu I.
1. FOUR PHASES OF SANCTIONS W u j p U.S. I 1979, p . T u p uz . 1.1 The frst phase, dating rom 1979 through 1995, u
p U S. I p p 1979, 1984, I p U.S. “ p ” u up I vv 1983 k U.S. M k L. A pu p u - I–Iq , u I’ I’ p pu u I u up . U.S. -1990 p I’ upp H’ p u I, —v u I’ I’ u — p I Ru u v u p Bu. Ov, u I’ upp px up; I I’ ’ v v p; I’ vp u p. T uu u v A P p p ( xp, v I p , ). 1.2 The second phase, rom 1996 to 2006, u vu—
u u —up I pu u up. L p 1996 ( I–L S A, ILSA, I S A, ISA) pv p k j v I’ . Au weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran 23
II . BACKGROUND ON U.S. AND U.S.-LED INTERNATIONAL
II . BACKGROUND ON U.S. AND U.S.-LED INTERNATIONAL
SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN
SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN
pu k U.S. j U S p
’ p G Mv p Ju 12, 2009,
I, puu “ u” I p
S ( I A v).
p. A p
T z U.S.- I up
k Sp 11, 2 001, pv U.S. z u-
u u, p I C Bk. Rvk
u (u v I) v
u qu p UNSC u,
ju pv upp upp z. z. T P
U.S. C, p v Exuv O.
pp .
F , u p uu
1.3 In the third phase, rom 2006 through 2010, U S u
pv , p pp, A pp, A Primer
upp u, p u C Ru,
on Sanctions Against Iran.
p U N Su Cu (UNSC) u (1737, 1747, 1803) p I. T u pu I up uu; “A P” Nu N-P 1966, u p xp p I’ u I A E A (IAEA); “EU3” (B, F, G) uu I’ u p. T u p I qup u u vp u p. T p UNSC u u up pvu u. 1.4 The ourth phase o sanctions began in 2010 u u
p. T pv p , v u v I’ v . T px, vv v p v jv, p I u u u, p v I’ I’ . S v upp U.S. C, U.S. , U N Su Cu (u B, F, G, Ru, C). T UNSC u 1929, p 2010, p k I’ u, pv pp u , u I k. T U.S. C k UNSC u 1929 p u Cpv I S AuAu Dv A (CISADA), pv I k v I k. A pu p Exuv O U.S. C, I 24 weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran
weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran 25
II . BACKGROUND ON U.S. AND U.S.-LED INTERNATIONAL
II . BACKGROUND ON U.S. AND U.S.-LED INTERNATIONAL
SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN
SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN
pu k U.S. j U S p
’ p G Mv p Ju 12, 2009,
I, puu “ u” I p
S ( I A v).
p. A p
T z U.S.- I up
k Sp 11, 2 001, pv U.S. z u-
u u, p I C Bk. Rvk
u (u v I) v
u qu p UNSC u,
ju pv upp upp z. z. T P
U.S. C, p v Exuv O.
pp .
F , u p uu
1.3 In the third phase, rom 2006 through 2010, U S u
pv , p pp, A pp, A Primer
upp u, p u C Ru,
on Sanctions Against Iran.
p U N Su Cu (UNSC) u (1737, 1747, 1803) p I. T u pu I up uu; “A P” Nu N-P 1966, u p xp p I’ u I A E A (IAEA); “EU3” (B, F, G) uu I’ u p. T u p I qup u u vp u p. T p UNSC u u up pvu u. 1.4 The ourth phase o sanctions began in 2010 u u
p. T pv p , v u v I’ v . T px, vv v p v jv, p I u u u, p v I’ I’ . S v upp U.S. C, U.S. , U N Su Cu (u B, F, G, Ru, C). T UNSC u 1929, p 2010, p k I’ u, pv pp u , u I k. T U.S. C k UNSC u 1929 p u Cpv I S AuAu Dv A (CISADA), pv I k v I k. A pu p Exuv O U.S. C, I weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran 25
24 weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran
III.
Reections on Making Sanctions Work
T U S p pu I p . T I v u v x p ; j u upp, u I’ ; v p v -p . A u, I p
Lp u u “ .
”
Dwight D. Eisenhower
pu p u v v. R xp I, u p , v u U S p v p I, z p v p. A v, , k p v I p v, u . A v, u uqu p T I Pj.
1. THE OBJECTIVES OF SANCTIONS Bu I v vv v , v k W u p px . A u v p pp, I pu p, v k. T v p u v , v u . T , u, p v. A , v jv, u: • Achieving a negotiated agreement on Iran’s Iran’s nuclear program u
k I vp u p pv u . • Restricting Iran’s Iran’s ability to acquire parts and materials needed or its nuclear program, . • Ensuring that Iran discontinues unding and support or Hezbollah and Hamas,2 - ( , pp
I’’ upp A S). I weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran 27
III.
Reections on Making Sanctions Work
T U S p pu I p . T I v u v x p ; j u upp, u I’ ; v p v -p . A u, I p
Lp u u “ .
”
Dwight D. Eisenhower
pu p u v v. R xp I, u p , v u U S p v p I, z p v p. A v, , k p v I p v, u . A v, u uqu p T I Pj.
1. THE OBJECTIVES OF SANCTIONS Bu I v vv v , v k W u p px . A u v p pp, I pu p, v k. T v p u v , v u . T , u, p v. A , v jv, u: • Achieving a negotiated agreement on Iran’s Iran’s nuclear program u
k I vp u p pv u . • Restricting Iran’s Iran’s ability to acquire parts and materials needed or its nuclear program, . • Ensuring that Iran discontinues unding and support or Hezbollah and Hamas,2 - ( , pp
I’’ upp A S). I weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran 27
III. REFLECTIONS ON MAKING SANCTIONS WORK
III. REFLECTIONS ON MAKING SANCTIONS WORK
• Requiring Iran to respect the human rights p v
pu I I’ ’ , , u, pv u -
I pp.
u,, pp. A p, I v— pu— u
• Limiting Iran’s Iran’s military capabilities and its ability to exert inuence in the
v u ,
3
region. T u I’ vp u
vp v p. F W, W, jv producing a change in Iran’s government (regime change or a undamental change in the Iranian government’s policies and orientation),
v pu I I’’ p. W jv v U.S. Dp S, uu U.S.- , xp U.S. upp pp up, v p I u p I’ I’ puu .4 I u k “ p,” U.S. u p u u I p p. S xp p u, v, v I p, u v u k k p k u, u u pp I p . 5 T up jv p U.S. U.S. pk’ / v “u” pu u. D p , , k u v . We believe the United States might be better able to gauge and
p v I u , p . T k u, v, U S u uz up u u I’ . W p u p u p jv—u v I k pv u u u— u v p jv, k I’ pu U.S. I Rpu I. A S IV pp, pv 2010 v u u I’ pu I’ . Bu p p I , u I p, u I’ I’ p. I I u p p v , xp, xp, I u xp U S , u, p . A , pv p W, I’ u v v v . Ix p, vu v I p, u u u u. B -
maximize the eectiveness o recent sanctions i the objectives that are
u u jv, u pu U.S.
most relevant and pressing today could be disentangled rom other
, U S u v u p
objectives that have been linked with sanctions. O, pu :
S p. I v u u p jv , — —u v k v v jv.6
u v - jv. 7 I , I v u , u v . S pu I’ I’ u up u p pp I , u v p I ppu. T u
2. ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT INFLUENCING THE DECISIONS DECISIONS OF IRAN’S LEADERS T v p I u up u pu p I p 28 weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran
I Iq, 1980, v I p’ u, v . T uu u u p . Sanctioning states are aced with the question o weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran 29
III. REFLECTIONS ON MAKING SANCTIONS WORK
III. REFLECTIONS ON MAKING SANCTIONS WORK
• Requiring Iran to respect the human rights p v
pu I I’ ’ , , u, pv u -
I pp.3
u,, pp. A p, I v— pu— u
• Limiting Iran’s Iran’s military capabilities and its ability to exert inuence in the
v u ,
region. T u I’ vp u
vp v p. F W, W, jv producing a change in Iran’s government (regime change or a undamental change in the Iranian government’s policies and orientation),
v pu I I’’ p. W jv v U.S. Dp S, uu U.S.- , xp U.S. upp pp up, v p I u p I’ I’ puu .4 I u k “ p,” U.S. u p u u I p p. S xp p u, v, v I p, u v u k k p k u, u u pp I p . 5 T up jv p U.S. U.S. pk’ / v “u” pu u. D p , , k u v . We believe the United States might be better able to gauge and
p v I u , p . T k u, v, U S u uz up u u I’ . W p u p u p jv—u v I k pv u u u— u v p jv, k I’ pu U.S. I Rpu I. A S IV pp, pv 2010 v u u I’ pu I’ . Bu p p I , u I p, u I’ I’ p. I I u p p v , xp, xp, I u xp U S , u, p . A , pv p W, I’ u v v v . Ix p, vu v I p, u u u u. B -
maximize the eectiveness o recent sanctions i the objectives that are
u u jv, u pu U.S.
most relevant and pressing today could be disentangled rom other
, U S u v u p
objectives that have been linked with sanctions. O, pu :
S p. I v u u p jv , — —u v k v v jv.6
u v - jv. 7 I , I v u , u v . S pu I’ I’ u up u p pp I , u v p I ppu. T u
2. ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT INFLUENCING THE DECISIONS DECISIONS OF IRAN’S LEADERS T v p I u up u pu p I p 28 weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran
I Iq, 1980, v I p’ u, v . T uu u u p . Sanctioning states are aced with the question o weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran 29
III. REFLECTIONS ON MAKING SANCTIONS WORK
III. REFLECTIONS ON MAKING SANCTIONS WORK
whether increasing sanctions or maintaining them indefnitely will achieve
; 3) p U.S. u .
the desired objectives—or whether there is instead a point at which the
T P u k pp
addition o more sanctions or the inexible application o existing sanc-
p I—u u u k pp
tions might backfre or become counterproductive. F ,
U.S. C,
, qu “ u v ,”
, , I .
u “ u v’ uu, u
T v jv u k
?” S xu
p pv pu I. Ev I
v z p pu
u u, p
, v pu
I’ I’ u v u k p (p
pu pv , u -
u v I’ k u p ). O
. H p “” , u, u
x u I u v
p uv.
p p— pp p— v p U.S. , u
3. EASING OR LIFTING SOME SANCTIONS T px x p qu
p I. F, U.S. p vv
p k A
, u qu
p pv I’ p . T A
p u UN Su Cu. Gv p p
P u u,
U S. xp pu u j ,
u I. A p Exuv O
v u k qu u .
Exuv O p . I I, v,
S , U S UN S u Cu pu
U.S. v P-
p I u ,
’ . Vu v u p v
u x I I’ ’ . T -- p
pp u . U
p u. Ou u p u
, P p v
u u p; pu, u
; u p u
P , u C ppv, p
I. I , P u
. While we make no specifc recommendations here
v. T CISADA (Cpv I S Au Dv
about a process or sequence or easing sanctions in response to Iranian
A) I u v p u
cooperation, we do wish to underline the value and importance o the
C v P k p u u
United States having a plan or such an eventuality.
U.S.–I . R, v p U.S. I, P’ P’
O u, z v “x” “x” u u . I p
p . T I S A, xp, p
v jv, U S v u -
U.S. , u p I u
. M p u
. T P I 1)
v U.S. u. S
, vp, qu u xpv v, / p,
u v p, , v
; 2) v U.S. p
. (F p, T I Pj’ Pj’ p, Weighing Benefts and Costs o Military Action Against Iran. )
30 weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran
weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran 31
III. REFLECTIONS ON MAKING SANCTIONS WORK
III. REFLECTIONS ON MAKING SANCTIONS WORK
whether increasing sanctions or maintaining them indefnitely will achieve
; 3) p U.S. u .
the desired objectives—or whether there is instead a point at which the
T P u k pp
addition o more sanctions or the inexible application o existing sanc-
p I—u u u k pp
tions might backfre or become counterproductive. F ,
U.S. C,
, qu “ u v ,”
, , I .
u “ u v’ uu, u
T v jv u k
?” S xu
p pv pu I. Ev I
v z p pu
u u, p
, v pu
I’ I’ u v u k p (p
pu pv , u -
u v I’ k u p ). O
. H p “” , u, u
x u I u v
p uv.
p p— pp p— v p U.S. , u
3. EASING OR LIFTING SOME SANCTIONS
p I.
T px x p qu
F, U.S. p vv
p k A
, u qu
p pv I’ p . T A
p u UN Su Cu. Gv p p
P u u,
U S. xp pu u j ,
u I. A p Exuv O
v u k qu u .
Exuv O p . I I, v,
S , U S UN S u Cu pu
U.S. v P-
p I u ,
’ . Vu v u p v
u x I I’ ’ . T -- p
pp u . U
p u. Ou u p u
, P p v
u u p; pu, u
; u p u
P , u C ppv, p
I. I , P u
. While we make no specifc recommendations here
v. T CISADA (Cpv I S Au Dv
about a process or sequence or easing sanctions in response to Iranian
A) I u v p u
cooperation, we do wish to underline the value and importance o the
C v P k p u u
United States having a plan or such an eventuality.
O u, z v “x” “x”
U.S.–I . R, v p U.S. I, P’ P’
u u . I p
p . T I S A, xp, p
v jv, U S v u -
U.S. , u p I u
. M p u
. T P I 1)
v U.S. u. S
, vp, qu u xpv v, / p,
u v p, , v
; 2) v U.S. p
. (F p, T I Pj’ Pj’ p, Weighing Benefts and Costs o Military Action Against Iran. ) weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran 31
30 weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran
IV.
Benefts o the Sanctions
I I, U S, v p u u u I’ u p, I’ p u — I’ , , u— u U S, U N Su Cu, . ( “”) v u
I u pu , u I v pu , “ k. I I , ju , . Dwight D. Eisenhower
”
I’ I ’ qu u u u p p z . U.S. p u , u I, u U S’ u pp u I’ I’ . A u III v, j uu pp pv k I’ v u pu pu j p p I’ I ’ , p I’ u p. S v k I’ u I u. u. T u k I p. Bu vv - pp, u v u vv u pu. I , xp p z, v p .
1. ADVANT ADVANTAGES AGES OF SANCTIONS AS A POLICY APPROACH S v pv u u I’ I’ u upp v - u Hz H, u . 1.1. Demonstrating international support. B k
z pp pp I p , U S uu v v p I xp pp I v. A’ pz I u p v v , u U S j upp u z u . Gu, v weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran 33
IV.
Benefts o the Sanctions
I I, U S, v p u u u I’ u p, I’ p u — I’ , , u— u U S, U N Su Cu, . ( “”) v u
I u pu , u I v pu , “ k. I I , ju , . Dwight D. Eisenhower
”
I’ I ’ qu u u u p p z . U.S. p u , u I, u U S’ u pp u I’ I’ . A u III v, j uu pp pv k I’ v u pu pu j p p I’ I ’ , p I’ u p. S v k I’ u I u. u. T u k I p. Bu vv - pp, u v u vv u pu. I , xp p z, v p .
1. ADVANT ADVANTAGES AGES OF SANCTIONS AS A POLICY APPROACH S v pv u u I’ I’ u upp v - u Hz H, u . 1.1. Demonstrating international support. B k
z pp pp I p , U S uu v v p I xp pp I v. A’ pz I u p v v , u U S j upp u z u . Gu, v weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran 33
IV. BENEFITS OF THE SANCTIONS
IV. BENEFITS OF THE SANCTIONS
I’ — Ru C, u v—v
x u puu p u, u u I
v pp vu I. T
u pu— uk, u p.
u 36 , u U S, . 8
1.4 Deterring other states rom developing nuclear weapons. A j U.S.
1.2. Reassuring regional allies. T v pv -
p jv p vp
u I U
p u u p. T
S u u pv I vp-
upp I p p
u p, v p v z
v U.S. p , , xp p
. A , v p u I
k u p.
k u I’ I’ u .9 I pu, p I up U S u u k
2. SLOWING THE RATE RATE OF EXPANSION OF IRAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM
u , u , I u
U.S. v v v xp I’
I’ I ’ . . T , I v u
u p.10 S v v u u pu, I
p, u p pu
u v u p.11 W ju, v, U.S.
I’ u p.
v u
I’ k xp U.S. k
M v — xp Iq,
u p k I’ Sup L. 12 S u
A, p uk Pk—v
v v u p u-pup u
v upp ( pu) pp I.
I v p vp -v
M u u I’ I’ v
p u p p. p.
pv I u- . Ip -
A I A E A (IAEA) p ,
x, u
v, I’ p uu u xp, I’ kp
Gu S, uk, uk, Ep u p —
- uu ( v 3.5–5%) u .13 S-
v— . I , v up p
pp v I’ I’ u . I p
p I, v u v uu
u k — I v- qup
k k, u .
v uu.14 I u u
1.3 Keeping the door open or renewed diplomacy and diplomacy and a better relationship in the long run. S k pv -
p z p I pp v, v (u pv , u u). I u k U S vu v k p pu u u k v uu -
, - u. 15 Bu I’ I’ u p 2002, I u, , p 10,000 u; uu 20% v ( v u p- uu). T u u v p I’ u p u p.16 I u u p 2002.
. O , u
34 weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran
weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran 35
IV. BENEFITS OF THE SANCTIONS
IV. BENEFITS OF THE SANCTIONS
I’ — Ru C, u v—v
x u puu p u, u u I
v pp vu I. T
u pu— uk, u p.
u 36 , u U S, .
8
1.4 Deterring other states rom developing nuclear weapons. A j U.S.
1.2. Reassuring regional allies. T v pv -
p jv p vp
u I U
p u u p. T
S u u pv I vp-
upp I p p
u p, v p v z
v U.S. p , , xp p
. A , v p u I
k u p.
9
k u I’ I’ u . I pu, p I up U S u u k
2. SLOWING THE RATE RATE OF EXPANSION OF IRAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM
u , u , I u
U.S. v v v xp I’
I’ I ’ . . T , I v u
u p.10 S v v u u pu, I
p, u p pu
u v u p.11 W ju, v, U.S.
I’ u p.
v u
I’ k xp U.S. k
M v — xp Iq,
u p k I’ Sup L. 12 S u
A, p uk Pk—v
v v u p u-pup u
v upp ( pu) pp I.
I v p vp -v
M u u I’ I’ v
p u p p. p.
pv I u- . Ip -
A I A E A (IAEA) p ,
x, u
v, I’ p uu u xp, I’ kp
Gu S, uk, uk, Ep u p —
- uu ( v 3.5–5%) u .13 S-
v— . I , v up p
pp v I’ I’ u . I p
p I, v u v uu
u k — I v- qup
k k, u .
v uu.14 I u u
1.3 Keeping the door open or renewed diplomacy and diplomacy and a better relationship in the long run. S k pv -
p z p I pp v, v (u pv , u u). I u k U S vu v k p pu u u k v uu -
, - u. 15 Bu I’ I’ u p 2002, I u, , p 10,000 u; uu 20% v ( v u p- uu). T u u v p I’ u p u p.16 I u u p 2002.
. O , u
weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran 35
34 weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran
IV. BENEFITS OF THE SANCTIONS
IV. BENEFITS OF THE SANCTIONS
3. WEAKENING IRAN AND REDUCING ITS ITS REGIONAL AND GLO GLOBAL BAL INF INFLUE LUENCE NCE
A (EIA), I u 1 p 2011, v 2.5 p — u u 40%. 24 E
Pp v u u I’ vu up , I u u Iq, A, S, L, P Gu u. W vu u v, U S p I v pu upp v u Hz. I , ’ ’ v I. A u I’ xp, u , I I’ ’ u p . S , p, v I’ I’ x u . I u pv upp, u p, L Hz, S Iq, A.17 I pp I Rvu Gu Cp (IRGC) v v v B A A S, pp. 18 x, I’ u I j v - up p, , u p uu, u, , .
v u p EU , Ju 2012, I xp v u 1.3 p . v U.S. I’ C Bk, I C p I , u pv I u.25 Bu u , I u k, k v u pu — p I u v u u . T I’ I’ u p u vu u 40% p Sp 2011 O 2012. 26 I , I v u v, u $70 , $106 2011 (I (I’ ’ C Bk v v u u $150 , u xp u x).27 I P Mu Aj M 2012 I u v , v I p xp . I u , I u xp u v pu pu pu, . Bu v , p I’ xp k u p I’ I’ v u. O u uu u xp -
3.1. Iran’s economy substantially weakened. I v -
v . A I M Fu,
k I’ , u
u I v, I Rpu u
up, k u . 19 B U.S. , I’
p , u pj x pv. 28 O
xp v 40%. Au ; x
, p ’ up “pp”
up 70% 100% ,
- 2011, ’ u . I ,
k I v 27%.
20
C up
z. Up 17% u u 21
.
T I ,
pu p u uu, u I’ u u. A, I u p - .
u. Cup k-k x v I’ . I v u I, u u u.
22
I , , pu EU p k Jp, Su K, I, uk uk u pu I , I’ u p.23 A 2012, E I
36 weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran
u , I v v u u u-
I’’ v up 3.2. Regional trading disrupted. I v v u p I U S, p uu u . F xp, I u pu I p A pu,
weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran 37
IV. BENEFITS OF THE SANCTIONS
IV. BENEFITS OF THE SANCTIONS
3. WEAKENING IRAN AND REDUCING ITS ITS REGIONAL AND GLO GLOBAL BAL INF INFLUE LUENCE NCE
A (EIA), I u 1 p 2011,
Pp v u u I’ vu up , I u u Iq, A, S, L, P Gu u. W vu u v, U S p I v pu upp v u Hz. I , ’ ’ v I. A u I’ xp, u , I I’ ’ u p . S , p, v I’ I’ x u . I u pv upp, u p, L Hz, S Iq, A.17 I pp I Rvu Gu Cp (IRGC) v v v B A A S, pp. 18 x, I’ u I j v - up p, , u p uu, u, , .
v 2.5 p — u u 40%. 24 E v u p EU , Ju 2012, I xp v u 1.3 p . v U.S. I’ C Bk, I C p I , u pv I u.25 Bu u , I u k, k v u pu — p I u v u u . T I’ I’ u p u vu u 40% p Sp 2011 O 2012. 26 I , I v u v, u $70 , $106 2011 (I (I’ ’ C Bk v v u u $150 , u xp u x).27 I P Mu Aj M 2012 I u v , v I p xp . I u , I u xp u v pu pu pu, . Bu v , p I’ xp k u p I’ I’ v u. O u uu u xp -
3.1. Iran’s economy substantially weakened. I v -
v . A I M Fu,
k I’ , u
u I v, I Rpu u
up, k u .
19
B U.S. , I’
p , u pj x pv. 28 O
xp v 40%. Au ; x
, p ’ up “pp”
up 70% 100% ,
- 2011, ’ u . I ,
k I v 27%. 20 C up
u , I v v u u u-
z. Up 17% u u
u. Cup k-k x
.21 T I ,
v I’ . I v
pu p u uu, u I’ u
u I, u u u.
u. A, I u p - . 22 I , , pu EU p k Jp, Su K, I, uk uk u pu I , I’ u p.23 A 2012, E I
36 weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran
IV. BENEFITS OF THE SANCTIONS
I’’ v up 3.2. Regional trading disrupted. I v v u p I U S, p uu u . F xp, I u pu I p A pu,
weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran 37
IV. BENEFITS OF THE SANCTIONS
U A E (UAE), pvu u z I (
p ) k p 1990, UN Ru 1929 p u
pu), pv UAE k p
I p p pv v p. W
I. 29
I uu , -
I , Ku Ku u I p pv-
pv I vp - qup.
A ’ Cpv I S Au Dv A
Ru p Ru 1929 v p S-300
(CISADA). Su A, v I v u M E,
I, I . S ,
u u pu I.
v v p v . 34
O , I xp
I , I’ P Gu qupp
v . I
, pu vu p p U
xp Iq u B’ - p. 30
S. T Gu S u I’ I’
Pk U.S. pu k u pp
, u p qup p p
I. uk uk u u u pu I
. I , Gu S v v v qup-
, p v v u I u
, u I . M qu
x u , u
U S v p uz I . 36
rials.. uk I $6.4 u I rials
I p p, u, I
, u 50% uk’ I.31 A O
vp p k. A I
2012, EU p I u -xp uk uk,, I I’ ’
u, I’ u; u
uk uu. Bu I
.37 Mv Mv,, u I’ v v
uk u k - . uk p I
v v —v p, k
188% 2007–2011,32 uk v
S u, u k, .
, 1,470 I p uk uk 2010, p 319 2002. uk qu I p p u. 33 Bu uk u vu U S M E, u U.S. pk pu uk u I. I p, xp k-k - I p v k v.
3.4. Iran declining in importance as a global energy player. A u
I’’ xp, upp p I vu u k u u I . T k ju u p I xp v p . T , I kp. A I p u S Huz— u, M E—u u p pk. 38
3.3. Regional military balance shiting against Iran. T v p
4. CREA CREATING TING INTERNAL DIVISION AND DISCONTENT IN IRAN
I, p UN Su Cu Ru 1929 2010, I’ I’
B pu I -
z U.S. -
pu . E pu upp u
up ( ). T v I’ v-
pu I p, u I’ I’
p v u I’ p p
u p. Bu u ju
pj. I’ j u v pu (k, ,
, u u, v U.S. .
38 weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran
weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran 39
IV. BENEFITS OF THE SANCTIONS
IV. BENEFITS OF THE SANCTIONS
U A E (UAE), pvu u z I (
p ) k p 1990, UN Ru 1929 p u
pu), pv UAE k p
I p p pv v p. W
I.
29
I uu , -
I , Ku Ku u I p pv-
pv I vp - qup.
A ’ Cpv I S Au Dv A
Ru p Ru 1929 v p S-300
(CISADA). Su A, v I v u M E,
I, I . S ,
u u pu I.
v v p v . 34
O , I xp
I , I’ P Gu qupp
v . I
, pu vu p p U
xp Iq u B’ - p. 30
S. T Gu S u I’ I’
Pk U.S. pu k u pp
, u p qup p p
I. uk uk u u u pu I
. I , Gu S v v v qup-
, p v v u I u
, u I . M qu
x u , u
U S v p uz I . 36
rials.. uk I $6.4 u I rials 31
, u 50% uk’ I.
A O
I p p, u, I vp p k. A I
2012, EU p I u -xp uk uk,, I I’ ’
u, I’ u; u
uk uu. Bu I
.37 Mv Mv,, u I’ v v
uk u k - . uk p I
v v —v p, k
188% 2007–2011,
32
uk v
, 1,470 I p uk uk 2010, p 319 2002. uk qu I p p u. 33 Bu uk u vu U S M E, u U.S. pk pu uk u I. I p, xp k-k - I p v k v.
S u, u k, . 3.4. Iran declining in importance as a global energy player. A u
I’’ xp, upp p I vu u k u u I . T k ju u p I xp v p . T , I kp. A I p u S Huz— u, M E—u u p pk. 38
3.3. Regional military balance shiting against Iran. T v p
4. CREA CREATING TING INTERNAL DIVISION AND DISCONTENT IN IRAN
I, p UN Su Cu Ru 1929 2010, I’ I’
B pu I -
z U.S. -
pu . E pu upp u
up ( ). T v I’ v-
pu I p, u I’ I’
p v u I’ p p
u p. Bu u ju
pj. I’ j u v pu (k, ,
, u u, v U.S. .
38 weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran
weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran 39
IV. BENEFITS OF THE SANCTIONS
IV. BENEFITS OF THE SANCTIONS
4.1. Eects on elite thinking. T u
p p—, , pu upp I-
I v p I’ u, u IRGC,
— pu u, pv,
Bz ( ), , — k I I’ ’ -
u v z u . 40 W u
px p uu. Dv k
u pu u u k I ,
. S- v I u
v k pv u pv ppu
( u u C S ),
u v. 41
p —u k u , pu p
5. ENHANCED SANCTIONS MIGHT CHANGE CHANGE IRAN’S NUCLEAR NEGOTIATING STRATEGY
. W P Aj z
I S III, Mk S Wk, Wk, I v
, , u ju
u v , pv, p -
pu z v u v I’ I’
p ( p). T v v u p
p, u I u k u p.
p u. u. F ,
N u u v
p pu p p
U S. Ou u k I’ I’ p uu
v. I I I I’ ’ p p pu u
u p k u U
u pv u
S I.
, i i
I k quk I pp-
U.S. C 2012 I
u u u
puu vp u p. 39 Ev ,
u , v u pu u
pp v pp I k p u
-.
p u. T Sup L’ uu
Ev I u p,
uu––u u p j p,
u ;
p u (
v puv . Bu u u u
Sup L’ atwa atwa,, u , u u
v vu — p ,
u p, u u p u
, v.
U S ). I Sup L v
E, pp v u p -
’ ’ I’ u p ,
I’ . Bu v v
uu; p, u v u u ju px
pv, U S
, p .
p I p u. T I’ u-
4.2. Eects on public thinking. Su v u
qu I, u I’ v u u u-k p pu v. Pu p . Bu , , u ju pu upp pu
40 weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran
UNSC , P5+1 ( v p Su Cu, pu G), G), . I Ap 2012, I u u k P5+1 Iu; k B M 2012, M Ju 2012. “Exp v” . I k, I u up uu 20% v.
weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran 41
IV. BENEFITS OF THE SANCTIONS
IV. BENEFITS OF THE SANCTIONS
4.1. Eects on elite thinking. T u
p p—, , pu upp I-
I v p I’ u, u IRGC,
— pu u, pv,
Bz ( ), , — k I I’ ’ -
u v z u . 40 W u
px p uu. Dv k
u pu u u k I ,
. S- v I u
v k pv u pv ppu
( u u C S ),
u v. 41
p —u k u , pu p
5. ENHANCED SANCTIONS MIGHT CHANGE CHANGE IRAN’S NUCLEAR NEGOTIATING STRATEGY
. W P Aj z
I S III, Mk S Wk, Wk, I v
, , u ju
u v , pv, p -
pu z v u v I’ I’
p ( p). T v v u p
p, u I u k u p.
p u. u. F ,
N u u v
p pu p p
U S. Ou u k I’ I’ p uu
v. I I I I’ ’ p p pu u
u p k u U
u pv u
S I.
, i i
I k quk I pp-
U.S. C 2012 I
u u u
puu vp u p. 39 Ev ,
u , v u pu u
pp v pp I k p u
-.
p u. T Sup L’ uu
Ev I u p,
uu––u u p j p,
u ;
p u (
v puv . Bu u u u
Sup L’ atwa atwa,, u , u u
v vu — p ,
u p, u u p u
, v.
U S ). I Sup L v
E, pp v u p -
’ ’ I’ u p ,
I’ . Bu v v
uu; p, u v u u ju px
pv, U S
, p .
p I p u. T I’ u-
4.2. Eects on public thinking. Su v u
qu I, u I’ v u u u-k p pu v. Pu p . Bu , , u ju pu upp pu
40 weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran
UNSC , P5+1 ( v p Su Cu, pu G), G), . I Ap 2012, I u u k P5+1 Iu; k B M 2012, M Ju 2012. “Exp v” . I k, I u up uu 20% v.
weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran 41
IV. BENEFITS OF THE SANCTIONS
T k v , v, pu ku u p . A 20% , I EU I pu I’ uu pu pup z—p P5+1 k ( p). W vp u pp I’ k vu u v p I , u p v u u. T k v u v jv vu. A , v, uu u u v k I’ — p — p u u pu pv I.
42 weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran
weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran 43
IV. BENEFITS OF THE SANCTIONS
T k v , v, pu ku u p . A 20% , I EU I pu I’ uu pu pup z—p P5+1 k ( p). W vp u pp I’ k vu u v p I , u p v u u. T k v u v jv vu. A , v, uu u u v k I’ — p — p u u pu pv I.
weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran 43
42 weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran
V.
Costs o the Sanctions
T k p I U S u uuu u I’ I ’ u upp v - up. Bu p U S, u vp , v I p p . S k I’ , I’ u,
W k up u V W, N Su Av Bu p “the “ the endurance o the enemy.” enemy. ”
pu pu I p v , v—u v u v qu, u p xp k-k p up uu . W v I’ u , , k u - U.S. p jv v-à-v I, p . I pu u u u p , M E, u k
McGeorge Bundy
.
1. DISPUTES WITH U.S. ALLIES AND OTHER COUNTRIES T U S’ u u p . D Ru, C, u—u I, uk, uk, Su K—v . Ru C pp U.S.U.S.- pu I’ I’ v .. S- U S Ru C p U.S. U.S. v Su Cu u pp v L, 201 1. k , L v u Su Cu u S. I uk Ru C u I. T u u u Ru, I, uk, C u pv I k . M, U.S. v v xp p p Ru C I, U S u u p p k p u U.S. Ru C upp. weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran 45
V.
Costs o the Sanctions
T k p I U S u uuu u I’ I ’ u upp v - up. Bu p U S, u vp , v I p p . S k I’ , I’ u,
W k up u V W, N Su Av Bu p “the “ the endurance o the enemy.” enemy. ”
pu pu I p v , v—u v u v qu, u p xp k-k p up uu . W v I’ u , , k u - U.S. p jv v-à-v I, p . I pu u u u p , M E, u k
McGeorge Bundy
.
1. DISPUTES WITH U.S. ALLIES AND OTHER COUNTRIES T U S’ u u p . D Ru, C, u—u I, uk, uk, Su K—v . Ru C pp U.S.U.S.- pu I’ I’ v .. S- U S Ru C p U.S. U.S. v Su Cu u pp v L, 201 1. k , L v u Su Cu u S. I uk Ru C u I. T u u u Ru, I, uk, C u pv I k . M, U.S. v v xp p p Ru C I, U S u u p p k p u U.S. Ru C upp. weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran 45
V. COSTS OF THE SANCTIONS
V. COSTS OF THE SANCTIONS
Eup pp x- ( pz
H u u I
p), u I S A, pk
. W ,
Eup 1998.42 T pu u p EU
v xp v - k. ,
p U S u I upp ,
v u u I .
U S v F’ vv pj vp I’ M p).43 Ov p , EU p vv,
3. EMPOWERING ANTI-REFORM LEADERS AND FACTIONS, FACTIONS, AND DIS DISEMP EMPOWE OWERIN RING G CIVI CIVIL L SOCI SOCIETY ETY
Eup u v v
I v , I
uu v. Bu Eup’ Eup’ u u
p p pv u-vv , u
upp I, 2012, Eup
p I v pp up p.
Su P ( p SA F, Ru
u j U.S. I’ I’ C Bk, u p U S I. T p EU u u u .
2. EROSION OF GOVERNANCE CAPACITY AND INSTITUTIONAL ACCOUNT ACC OUNTABI ABILIT LITY Y IN IRA IRAN N S v p u p I p vv p up.
3.1 Helping conservatives and the IRGC to rally support. E -
p I , u v--pu I Rvu Gu Cp (IRGC), pu upp v p U.S.- , v “ .” .” 47 I’ u u v uu p M 2012, I z u . A , pup uu 65%, v pu upp I I’ ’
2.1 Enranchising and enriching powerul actions, including the IRGC. A
pu.48 (O xp uu p, u pu
I’ I ’ vu u v p , v
pu ’ p.)
v I’ pp, p v-
A , Sup L A K v
pu v . I
vu I vu 1979 u U S. R
u u p
pp , pu I
p. T u IRGC , vv
u u. T ,
pv v v u. T -
p .
up k u u..44 A, IRGC- IRGC- v qu k k , u u, k, p, ( v p pj IRGC-k p).45 IRGC p v p v u, u k U.S. . S v u p I’ . T p, I p u k-k . U u , I u .46 46 weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran
3.2. Decreasing space or civil society. x u-vv
IRGC v I , p v u k. I p I Ju 2013 p p Aj Sup L’ u.49 Bu u pv p u u U S p . T u v qu v v. S pv I v weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran 47
V. COSTS OF THE SANCTIONS
V. COSTS OF THE SANCTIONS
Eup pp x- ( pz
H u u I
p), u I S A, pk
. W ,
Eup 1998.
42
T pu u p EU
p U S u I upp ,
v xp v - k. , v u u I .
U S v F’ vv pj vp I’ Su P ( p SA F, Ru 43
M p).
Ov p , EU p vv,
3. EMPOWERING ANTI-REFORM LEADERS AND FACTIONS, FACTIONS, AND DIS DISEMP EMPOWE OWERIN RING G CIVI CIVIL L SOCI SOCIETY ETY
Eup u v v
I v , I
uu v. Bu Eup’ Eup’ u u
p p pv u-vv , u
upp I, 2012, Eup
p I v pp up p.
u j U.S. I’ I’ C Bk, u p U S I. T p EU u u u .
2. EROSION OF GOVERNANCE CAPACITY AND INSTITUTIONAL ACCOUNT ACC OUNTABI ABILIT LITY Y IN IRA IRAN N S v p u p I p vv p up.
3.1 Helping conservatives and the IRGC to rally support. E -
p I , u v--pu I Rvu Gu Cp (IRGC), pu upp v p U.S.- , v “ .” .” 47 I’ u u v uu p M 2012, I z u . A , pup uu 65%, v pu upp I I’ ’
2.1 Enranchising and enriching powerul actions, including the IRGC. A
pu.48 (O xp uu p, u pu
I’ I ’ vu u v p , v
pu ’ p.)
v I’ pp, p v-
A , Sup L A K v
pu v . I
vu I vu 1979 u U S. R
u u p
pp , pu I
p. T u IRGC , vv
u u. T ,
pv v v u. T -
p .
up k u u..
44
A, IRGC- IRGC- v qu k k , u u, k, p, ( v p pj IRGC-k p).45 IRGC p v p v u, u k U.S. . S v u p I’ . T p, I p u k-k . U u , I u .46 46 weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran
3.2. Decreasing space or civil society. x u-vv
IRGC v I , p v u k. I p I Ju 2013 p p Aj Sup L’ u.49 Bu u pv p u u U S p . T u v qu v v. S pv I v weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran 47
V. COSTS OF THE SANCTIONS
V. COSTS OF THE SANCTIONS
qup u u I pv
5. INCREASED POTENTIAL FOR U.S.–IRAN CONFLICT AND REGIONAL REGIONAL VIOLENCE VIOLENCE
I’ u, I-vv ppu u u u . 50 T CISADA z p p xp xp I v . T xp pp , u I k . Cp k qup v u I pp xp u Dp, u p u p xp. T v k. 51
T U S v — u u v p v . Bu I v v u , k k . I v “ .” 54 S U.S. v u u u p “ uv”; , u “p p ,” pv . 55 C, u pp, U S v u
4. LONG-TERM ALIENATION ALIENATION BETWEEN IRAN AND THE UNITED STATES
pv v .56 T , I U.S. uup P Gu, v I’
A pv k v , I’
U S . A u
k u, U S k I’ I’
I’ I ’ Q ( u IRGC p u I’ )
pp—u u . 52 R v p u
uk u — xp, pup I p, v U.S.
u u pp pv z U.S. I
O 2011, Su A U S,
v , v u I p.
IRGC’ pp S . 57 O u
T I up 2009— G Mv— u I u p uu . A
p I I’’ xp u, I p pp u S Huz.
uu ( pk, v p vv I), p p . T
5.1. Expansion o Iran’s domestic arms industry. T v
v p, u u . W up
u I’ v p (u v, u B)
u v G Mv p ppu I
p u I I’’ xp
A v I v
u. U U pu , I vp
k . T u p pp I k
uvv u , u u
I u 30 ( - I ppu),
P Gu, qu p u, Ap 2012
I. R- I p
p U.S. Dp D. Pvu D Dp p, u
upp u v u . .
u 2010, p I’ p. T v
53
I , v v u I u
u I v uv Ru 1929 ,
v U S pp uu x p—v
x, vp u— v p-
I v u upp.
u p . 58 T u v U.S. P Gu.
48 weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran
weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran 49
V. COSTS OF THE SANCTIONS
V. COSTS OF THE SANCTIONS
qup u u I pv
5. INCREASED POTENTIAL FOR U.S.–IRAN CONFLICT AND REGIONAL REGIONAL VIOLENCE VIOLENCE
I’ u, I-vv ppu u u u . 50 T CISADA z p p xp xp I v . T xp pp , u I k . Cp k qup v u I pp xp u Dp, u p u p xp. T v k. 51
T U S v — u u v p v . Bu I v v u , k k . I v “ .” 54 S U.S. v u u u p “ uv”; , u “p p ,” pv . 55 C, u pp, U S v u
4. LONG-TERM ALIENATION ALIENATION BETWEEN IRAN AND THE UNITED STATES
pv v .56 T , I U.S. uup P Gu, v I’
A pv k v , I’
U S . A u
k u, U S k I’ I’
I’ I ’ Q ( u IRGC p u I’ )
pp—u u . 52 R v p u
uk u — xp, pup I p, v U.S.
u u pp pv z U.S. I
O 2011, Su A U S,
v , v u I p.
IRGC’ pp S . 57 O u
T I up 2009— G Mv— u I u p uu . A
p I I’’ xp u, I p pp u S Huz.
uu ( pk, v p vv I), p p . T
5.1. Expansion o Iran’s domestic arms industry. T v
v p, u u . W up
u I’ v p (u v, u B)
u v G Mv p ppu I
p u I I’’ xp
A v I v
u. U U pu , I vp
k . T u p pp I k
uvv u , u u
I u 30 ( - I ppu),
P Gu, qu p u, Ap 2012
I. R- I p
p U.S. Dp D. Pvu D Dp p, u
upp u v u . .
u 2010, p I’ p. T v
53
I , v v u I u
u I v uv Ru 1929 ,
v U S pp uu x p—v
x, vp u— v p-
I v u upp.
u p . 58 T u v U.S. P Gu.
weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran 49
48 weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran
V. COSTS OF THE SANCTIONS
V. COSTS OF THE SANCTIONS
5.2. Potential or conict in the Strait o Hormuz. T , p
I p v.65
p I, v u I’
I,, I u vu , , I
S Huz pp.
59
W u p
EU Ju 1, 2012, I u qu p u S . 60 I I u ( ), P Gu u k u— u u I u S. 61 T U S , uu , U.S. u p p S I k pp u u k-p.
x p.66 6.2. Difculty obtaining spare parts or passenger aircrat. T 1995 U.S.
I u xp p p U.S.- v , v I’ . Hv, u v u U.S. pu, u p - up; k v k u pu. I I’ ’ p , u
6. POTENTIAL HUMANITARIAN HUMANITARIAN EFFECTS ON IRANIANS
u p p U S.67
T pv v u 2010 u qu-
6.3. Complicating humanitarian relie donations. A u px
v u v v
I v , u up v p
- I I’ ’ ppu. L- u “pp ” ”
u U.S. z I. T
v pp I . Au
up Auu 2012, quk I. T u
xp u v I ppu-
up pp OFAC pp -
, v p pu u u u
.68 P vu I ( xp,
pu u u upp , u U
pk ), u z k I
S’ , u u I
p u u z u I k ,
62
pu.
S p v u u p
qu p u Dp .69
p . I , u Dp’ O U.S. uk p qu,
7. DETRIMENTAL DETRIMENTAL ECONOMIC EFFECTS ON THE UNITED STATES, ITS EUROPEAN ALLIES, AND THE REGION
k k I U.S.
T p, u p ,
p k p pu . 63 Iv Iv,, p
p p U.S., Eup,
pp — v u
, p ppu . S
— k v.
p u pp B
F A C (OFAC) (OFAC) p xp u I,
6.1. Reduction in the availability o ood and other basic human requirements. T u u p k
I v v . A Iq u v uu p , p x I uu v, u, . I Ju 2012, k p Npu v kk p, pu k, p I .64 Ev ppu I, u u . 50 weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran
S (u u p pu I u ) u U S . Evv , xp vu k, xp k-k , -p -p p k u u p U S, EU u, M E—u . N vu Eup M E I u , p p uu . Bu v weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran 51
V. COSTS OF THE SANCTIONS
V. COSTS OF THE SANCTIONS
5.2. Potential or conict in the Strait o Hormuz. T , p
I p v.65
p I, v u I’
I,, I u vu , , I
S Huz pp.
59
W u p
EU Ju 1, 2012, I u qu p u S . 60 I I u ( ), P Gu u k u— u u I u S. 61 T U S , uu , U.S. u p p S I k pp u u k-p.
x p.66 6.2. Difculty obtaining spare parts or passenger aircrat. T 1995 U.S.
I u xp p p U.S.- v , v I’ . Hv, u v u U.S. pu, u p - up; k v k u pu. I I’ ’ p , u
6. POTENTIAL HUMANITARIAN HUMANITARIAN EFFECTS ON IRANIANS
u p p U S.67
T pv v u 2010 u qu-
6.3. Complicating humanitarian relie donations. A u px
v u v v
I v , u up v p
- I I’ ’ ppu. L- u “pp ” ”
u U.S. z I. T
v pp I . Au
up Auu 2012, quk I. T u
xp u v I ppu-
up pp OFAC pp -
, v p pu u u u
.68 P vu I ( xp,
pu u u upp , u U
pk ), u z k I
S’ , u u I
p u u z u I k ,
62
pu.
S p v u u p
qu p u Dp .69
p . I , u Dp’ O U.S. uk p qu,
7. DETRIMENTAL DETRIMENTAL ECONOMIC EFFECTS ON THE UNITED STATES, ITS EUROPEAN ALLIES, AND THE REGION
k k I U.S.
T p, u p ,
F A C (OFAC) (OFAC) p xp u I,
p k p pu .
63
Iv,, p Iv
p p U.S., Eup,
pp — v u
, p ppu . S
— k v.
p u pp B
6.1. Reduction in the availability o ood and other basic human requirements. T u u p k
I v v . A Iq u v uu p , p x I uu v, u, . I Ju 2012, k p Npu v kk p, pu k, p I .64 Ev ppu I, u u . 50 weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran
S (u u p pu I u ) u U S . Evv , xp vu k, xp k-k , -p -p p k u u p U S, EU u, M E—u . N vu Eup M E I u , p p uu . Bu v weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran 51
V. COSTS OF THE SANCTIONS
V. COSTS OF THE SANCTIONS
,, p v
I k “ “ u” pu I (“
p u . S p
u”” ). 77 Hv, u u u v
u k ,
p . 78 S Eup u v
U S.
I p UN S u Cu EU ,
7.1. The exclusion o U.S. and allied frms rom opportunities in Iran. O
vu “ppu “ppu ” xu U.S. p uv u ppu I.70 A p pu u I vp k, p xp U S’ , 71 IRGC , u C, V, Bu, M, Uk, u U.S. . I v p, 72 u p p vv p v I. C, pu , up upp I u v. C I’ I’ pu (u C u pu I, pp
p u I. 79 Bu EU I v up u - p. S EU u pv u EU I. 80 M, u k I’ I’ C Bk v p I’ uv . T M 2012 S W Ik F u, SWIF, I ( p) pp I’ v u, u u I. S u C, Pk, M, —, uk k Eup v u U S—v v quk pz I’ u. 81
u u upp ),
7.3. Possible negative impact on economies o the Middle East. T
v, C v $1 ’ ’ uu.73 T
I’ u Gu Cp Cu u,
p— “Az “Az”” I — v
j v I k .
v p Eup, .74
Du, -xp pu I,
7.2. Possible negative impacts on economies o European countries. T
I u v v I’ I’ u p, Eup U, v k v Eup ( ). I k Eup, PPP (pu p p) GDP u $1 , 75 - p k W u . W v EU (u 2011, pv ) p Eup, . G C I, u v , k I k. 76 I pv u p u EU u, v . S- k pu Eup v v
v p v. R , v u 2011, p M E, pp u pv I u 2010. 82 A u , p xp u, k-k I A, Iq, Pk, uk A I .83 Bu pu k. I A, up - u u , k k k A 84 U S k v u u. A, A, u A k pvu p I, A ,, u A u k, v v . 85
u Eup u u - pu
52 weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran
weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran 53
V. COSTS OF THE SANCTIONS
V. COSTS OF THE SANCTIONS
,, p v
I k “ “ u” pu I (“
p u . S p
u”” ). 77 Hv, u u u v
u k ,
p . 78 S Eup u v
U S.
I p UN S u Cu EU ,
7.1. The exclusion o U.S. and allied frms rom opportunities in Iran. O
vu “ppu “ppu ” xu U.S. p uv u ppu I.70 A p pu u I vp k, p xp U S’ , 71 IRGC , u C, V, Bu, M, Uk, u U.S. . I v p, 72 u p p vv p v I. C, pu , up upp I u v. C I’ I’ pu (u C u pu I, pp
p u I. 79 Bu EU I v up u - p. S EU u pv u EU I. 80 M, u k I’ I’ C Bk v p I’ uv . T M 2012 S W Ik F u, SWIF, I ( p) pp I’ v u, u u I. S u C, Pk, M, —, uk k Eup v u U S—v v quk pz I’ u. 81
u u upp ),
7.3. Possible negative impact on economies o the Middle East. T
v, C v $1 ’ ’ uu.73 T
I’ u Gu Cp Cu u,
p— “Az “Az”” I — v
j v I k .
74
v p Eup, .
7.2. Possible negative impacts on economies o European countries. T
I u v v I’ I’ u p, Eup U, v k v Eup ( ). I k Eup, PPP (pu p p) GDP u $1 , 75 - p k W u . W v EU (u 2011, pv ) p Eup, . G C I, u v , k I k. 76 I pv u p u EU u, v . S- k pu Eup v v
Du, -xp pu I, v p v. R , v u 2011, p M E, pp u pv I u 2010. 82 A u , p xp u, k-k I A, Iq, Pk, uk A I .83 Bu pu k. I A, up - u u , k k k A 84 U S k v u u. A, A, u A k pvu p I, A ,, u A u k, v v . 85
u Eup u u - pu
52 weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran
weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran 53
V. COSTS OF THE SANCTIONS
V. COSTS OF THE SANCTIONS
8. DETRIMENTAL EFFECTS ON THE GLOBAL ENERGY SUPPLY AND THE STABILITY OF THE GLOBAL ENERGY MARKET
p xp qu u (LNG). I 2011, I vu
8.1. World oil prices elevated by tensions with Iran. I ’
LNG p (u j upp u uk, u pp).89 I u u j , pu v.
u- pv v (137 9.3% ’ ). I 2010— u E I A p —I OPEC’ - pu ’ - xp ( Su A Ru).86 I p, I u
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS Ou pp u k — — u
(u p ) pu
u. W v v k -
jup p. , , v u , , u
p, u, u qu. W v
v k p ; pu-
pp px qu: W jv ? A -
U S; u I’ I’ k
k p U S v jv?
.87 Bu p p. I
A , u ? I p
k S Huz, u u 35% -u
x pp x k
, v pu p p p. O p
upuv? H U S xu v
2011 2012 I u . I
p I, z p v -
EU u (Ju 1, 2012). Suqu, I
qu? A v pp ( uu pp),
(u F M A Ak S) I u k
v I p v, u
S pp . S, p v
.
u , pu v U S’ S’ u-up Gu, u Gu I. 8.2. Long-term removal o Iranian supplies rom the global energy market.
Ev EU p u , I’ I’ p k , v -. T pu -
T p u u qu p . T pp - u p ju, u v xp p. W p u p up u p u pu u u I.
p , , k u I’ . S u vv, , I v pv u vp puv . I u pu 1.3 p . 88 8.3. Iran unable to supply liquefed natural gas. I ’ -
u v. S I’ u k pv I u p xp vp
54 weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran
weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran 55
V. COSTS OF THE SANCTIONS
V. COSTS OF THE SANCTIONS
8. DETRIMENTAL EFFECTS ON THE GLOBAL ENERGY SUPPLY AND THE STABILITY OF THE GLOBAL ENERGY MARKET
p xp qu u (LNG). I 2011, I vu
8.1. World oil prices elevated by tensions with Iran. I ’
LNG p (u j upp u uk, u pp).89 I u u j , pu v.
u- pv v (137 9.3% ’ ). I 2010— u E I A p —I OPEC’ - pu ’ - 86
xp ( Su A Ru).
I p, I u
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS Ou pp u k — — u
(u p ) pu
u. W v v k -
jup p. , , v u , , u
p, u, u qu. W v
v k p ; pu-
pp px qu: W jv ? A -
U S; u I’ I’ k
k p U S v jv?
87
Bu p p. I
A , u ? I p
k S Huz, u u 35% -u
x pp x k
, v pu p p p. O p
upuv? H U S xu v
2011 2012 I u . I
p I, z p v -
EU u (Ju 1, 2012). Suqu, I
qu? A v pp ( uu pp),
(u F M A Ak S) I u k
v I p v, u
S pp . S, p v
.
.
u , pu v U S’ S’ u-up Gu, u Gu I. 8.2. Long-term removal o Iranian supplies rom the global energy market.
Ev EU p u , I’ I’ p k , v -. T pu -
T p u u qu p . T pp - u p ju, u v xp p. W p u p up u p u pu u u I.
p , , k u I’ . S u vv, , I v pv u vp puv . I u pu 1.3 p . 88 8.3. Iran unable to supply liquefed natural gas. I ’ -
u v. S I’ u k pv I u p xp vp
weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran 55
54 weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran
A Primer on Sanctions Sanctions Against Iran, Including Potential Future Sanctions and Provisions or Liting the Sanctions
I. OVERVIEW OF SANCTIONS AGAINST THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN
1.3 Trade and investment ban imposed. I M 1995, C
p U.S. v I, u I E E P A (IEEPA). T k p u I
1. U.S. unilateral sanctions, 1979–1995. Du 1979–1984, I u, p U S . Du p, U.S. p pup— u I upp up M E, u Hz H; I’ v p I’ p qu v v v v ; ; I I’’ v vp p p p u u (WMD), pu u p. T U.S. u p : 1.1. Sanctions connected to the hostage crisis in 1979. I Nv 1979, P-
C u I Exuv O u “ u I u uuu x u, p U S.” 90 A jv jv p p pu u I I v v , , p u I k I’ xp vu u. T v u I I’’ p pu u - Iq, u u up up.. 1.2. Iran named state sponsor o terrorism. I S
Dp p Ju 1984, I-p I-p Hz v L U.S. M k Bu, O 23, 1983, k 241 M. T I p p I U.S. . T u U.S. I U.S. xp I, U.S. xp I u v WMD pp (“u u ”) U S v I. T u v pv upp I, qu U S u u p k I. T p —u A Exp C A A- Ev D P A— pp pv u . A u u , P u v u k qu C, u C vu u v-p j . 56 weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran
I-upp P I up, H I J, I Ru p v u p Bu. T I U.S. k I . T u, p Exuv O 12957, u U.S. I’ , v pv U.S. I v. IEEPA v P u u P p U S. Su I M 1995, v . T u p u puu Exuv O, u 2010, U.S. u u v . T 1999 2000, pv p- v P M K. A u , Cpv I S, Au, Dv A u P’’ u p u u P up Exuv O. 1.4. Iran–Iraq Arms Non-Prolieration Act. I 1992, I–Iq A N-P-
A (P.L. 102-484) p I qu j (k, , p , u) Ru C. T u u upp uu I, pu I’ v p. T A pv u u WMD “z u p” v v I. O k , xp, u “z u p.” T v P p — p u —u p .
2. U.S. secondary sanctions sanctions to compel allies to isolate Iran: 1996–2006. I 1996, C u pvu U.S. v I v u weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran 57
A Primer on Sanctions Sanctions Against Iran, Including Potential Future Sanctions and Provisions or Liting the Sanctions
I. OVERVIEW OF SANCTIONS AGAINST THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN
1.3 Trade and investment ban imposed. I M 1995, C
p U.S. v I, u I E E P A (IEEPA). T k p u I I-upp P I up, H I J, I
1. U.S. unilateral sanctions, 1979–1995. Du 1979–1984, I u, p U S . Du p, U.S. p pup— u I upp up M E, u Hz H; I’ v p I’ p qu v v v v ; ; I I’’ v vp p p p u u (WMD), pu u p.
Ru p v u p Bu. T I U.S. k I . T u, p Exuv O 12957, u U.S. I’ , v pv U.S. I v. IEEPA v P u u P p U S.
T U.S. u p : 1.1. Sanctions connected to the hostage crisis in 1979. I Nv 1979, P-
C u I Exuv O u “ u I u uuu x u, p U S.” 90 A jv jv p p pu u I I v v , , p u I k I’ xp vu u. T v u I I’’ p pu u - Iq, u u up up.. 1.2. Iran named state sponsor o terrorism. I S
Dp p Ju 1984, I-p I-p Hz v L U.S. M k Bu, O 23, 1983, k 241 M. T I p p I U.S. . T u U.S. I U.S. xp I, U.S. xp I u v WMD pp (“u u ”) U S v I. T u v pv upp I, qu U S u u p k I. T p —u A Exp C A A- Ev D P A— pp pv u . A u u , P u v u k qu C, u C vu u v-p j .
Su I M 1995, v . T u p u puu Exuv O, u 2010, U.S. u u v . T 1999 2000, pv p- v P M K. A u , Cpv I S, Au, Dv A u P’’ u p u u P up Exuv O. 1.4. Iran–Iraq Arms Non-Prolieration Act. I 1992, I–Iq A N-P-
A (P.L. 102-484) p I qu j (k, , p , u) Ru C. T u u upp uu I, pu I’ v p. T A pv u u WMD “z u p” v v I. O k , xp, u “z u p.” T v P p — p u —u p .
2. U.S. secondary sanctions sanctions to compel allies to isolate Iran: 1996–2006. I 1996, C u pvu U.S. v I v u weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran 57
56 weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran
A PR IM ER ON SA NC TI ON S AG AI NS T IR AN
A PR IM ER ON SA NC TI ON S AG AI NS T IR AN
p. I p, u U.S. j U.S.
3. UN Sanctions to persuade Iran to negotiate seriously: 2006–2010.
v I. Bu , C v v Eup p u U S u I. W’ pu u p , px, p - M K. U K’ p, I p I v, p W’ upp k I.
I 2002, u I’ u p p, v I u v u , u p uu. I 2003, Eup u ( EU3: B, F, G) p k pu I p uu . . T I up uu 2003 , p , u 2004–2005. I’ up u ku u
2.1. The Iran Sanctions Act. I Auu 1996, I p up
I A P Nu N-P
v, j , I S A (P.L. 104-172), p.
(NP)— p u p I’ u
I pv P
I A E A (IAEA). I v xp
v v $20 vp I’ .
91
T
Eup p u u I’ u p ,
I S A u I’ pu p
u uu v (3.5–5%). T EU3 pp
I vu u up vp
ppv U S I’ xp.
p. Hv, Hv, v , v I S A
T u I v u, Auu 2005, vu
v I’ , I’ pu vu
up v jv EU3 U S z
u u v , v p I’ p.
I’ “ ” ” NP, u I’
A u , I S A p I u
u. T x Mu Aj k
, P u , . T pv-
I’ p p u p.
v v,
I v. Suqu, 2005– 2006, U
, pp u p.
S u I
2.2. Executive Orders 13224 and 13382. T Exuv O u Sp-
2001 ( Sp 11 k) Ju 2005, pv pv.. Exuv
, u I’ u p IAEA U N Su Cu.
O 13224 k U.S.- pv U.S. p u
3.1. During 2006–2010, three UN Security Council Resolutions (1737, 1747,
v pv upp . Exuv O 13382
and 1803) p I, p UN
p pv upp WMD p.
I qup u u vp u p.
T Exuv O I p, Exuv O 13224 p u A Q’ p. Hv, , uu I v u Dp u O— u I u
T pp upp Ru C— kp I’ v p v Su Cu . Rp pv UN u u u qu Su Cu p u up u.
upp v v pu u u p. p u E.O. 13382, IRGC Q F— IRGC u upp
4. Oil export-related multilateral sanctions to orce Iran to negotiate seriously on its nuclear program: 2010–2012.
I’ péé v u Hz— upp
Du 2010–2012, U S pv
u E.O. 13224.
p p 2010 I’ p uu, pu I
A j xp, I Rvu Gu Cp (IRGC)
T P p u Exuv O, v .
x-u up (“P5+1”— U S, B, F, G, Ru, C) up u. T U S, upp , pu u I’ v v pu I’ u .
58 weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran
weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran 59
A PR IM ER ON SA NC TI ON S AG AI NS T IR AN
A PR IM ER ON SA NC TI ON S AG AI NS T IR AN
p. I p, u U.S. j U.S.
3. UN Sanctions to persuade Iran to negotiate seriously: 2006–2010.
v I. Bu , C v v Eup p u U S u I. W’ pu u p , px, p - M K. U K’ p, I p I v, p W’ upp k I.
I 2002, u I’ u p p, v I u v u , u p uu. I 2003, Eup u ( EU3: B, F, G) p k pu I p uu . . T I up uu 2003 , p , u 2004–2005. I’ up u ku u
2.1. The Iran Sanctions Act. I Auu 1996, I p up
I A P Nu N-P
v, j , I S A (P.L. 104-172), p.
(NP)— p u p I’ u
I pv P
I A E A (IAEA). I v xp
v v $20 vp I’ . 91 T
Eup p u u I’ u p ,
I S A u I’ pu p
u uu v (3.5–5%). T EU3 pp
I vu u up vp
ppv U S I’ xp.
p. Hv, Hv, v , v I S A
T u I v u, Auu 2005, vu
v I’ , I’ pu vu
up v jv EU3 U S z
u u v , v p I’ p.
I’ “ ” ” NP, u I’
A u , I S A p I u
u. T x Mu Aj k
, P u , . T pv-
I’ p p u p.
v v,
I v. Suqu, 2005– 2006, U
, pp u p.
S u I
2.2. Executive Orders 13224 and 13382. T Exuv O u Sp-
2001 ( Sp 11 k) Ju 2005, pv pv.. Exuv
, u I’ u p IAEA U N Su Cu.
O 13224 k U.S.- pv U.S. p u
3.1. During 2006–2010, three UN Security Council Resolutions (1737, 1747,
v pv upp . Exuv O 13382
and 1803) p I, p UN
p pv upp WMD p.
I qup u u vp u p.
T Exuv O I p, Exuv O 13224 p u A Q’ p. Hv, , uu I v u Dp u O— u I u
T pp upp Ru C— kp I’ v p v Su Cu . Rp pv UN u u u qu Su Cu p u up u.
upp v v pu u u p. p u E.O. 13382, IRGC Q F— IRGC u upp
4. Oil export-related multilateral sanctions to orce Iran to negotiate seriously on its nuclear program: 2010–2012.
I’ péé v u Hz— upp
Du 2010–2012, U S pv
u E.O. 13224.
p p 2010 I’ p uu, pu I
A j xp, I Rvu Gu Cp (IRGC)
T P p u Exuv O, v .
x-u up (“P5+1”— U S, B, F, G, Ru, C) up u. T U S, upp , pu u I’ v v pu I’ u . weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran 59
58 weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran
A PR IM ER ON SA NC TI ON S AG AI NS T IR AN
A PR IM ER ON SA NC TI ON S AG AI NS T IR AN
4.1 UN Security Council Resolution 1929. O M 17, 2010, Bz
pv u - P Aj. T upp
uk u k — D-
up
— pp u vu 2009.
u u pp. S “ ”
I u v I xp uu (LEU, (LEU, v
I p k pp “G Mv”
3.5–5%) , u, v u uu ( 20%)
p, pv I’
u p R R, I u pu
I- v.
p pup. T Bz uk v v v v
O Sp 28, 2010, u IEEPA u ( v), P O
v k P O, Ap 20
u Exuv O 13553, k U.S.- I
u “u u u
v u u I z v pv
u u I’ - uu kp.”
92
W Bz uk u I
upp u u. T O u U S. A Exuv O u, qu v-
D, up U.S. v. W
I k u O v
v quk p UN Su Cu Ru (1929) v
U.S.- pu, u k k U S. T
u UN p k
P p v u p
I’ u, pv pp u , u
Exuv O u.
I’ k. T U.S. xp I k
T CISADA , v, pv
pu p u, u, ju v upp
v p I I. CISADA
Ru C, u u u p.
u v U.S. v . CISADA p , u P p pv
4.2 CISADA Law. T U S u u
u v v u.
Ru 1929, Ru, C, v u p pv u. T U S p
4.4. U.S. sanctions on Iran Central Bank. I 2011, C xp
u Ju 2010, Cpv I S, Au,
u p I p UN u -
Dv A (CISADA), I
uu. M C v
k u U S k u -
I’ v xp p I p. I D D 2011, p
k I k.
upp — u p
A v, CISADA — xp
U.S. —C ( pv FY2012 N D
u xp I p U.S.
Auz A) u U S k u -
— — v v p 1995 Exuv
I’ C Bk. T pv qu I’ vu u
O 12957. T P’ u
u I’ C Bk u p I u I . T
u u u Exuv O.
P u, u , Eup u
93
A u p CISADA u qu ( P
v xp j U S pu
u) . Hv, I S A, CISADA
I’ xp . T xp p
pv v P v,
u “ u” pu I.
v, P u .
Au u qu p u, P u p. I
4.3 Sanctions against Iranian human rights abusers. Du 2010–2012,
u xp,
C u pu I -
u “ “ u” pu I.
p pp. T U.S. upp I pp, u up u Ju–D 2009 pk 60 weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran
weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran
61
A PR IM ER ON SA NC TI ON S AG AI NS T IR AN
A PR IM ER ON SA NC TI ON S AG AI NS T IR AN
4.1 UN Security Council Resolution 1929. O M 17, 2010, Bz
pv u - P Aj. T upp
uk u k — D-
up
— pp u vu 2009.
u u pp. S “ ”
I u v I xp uu (LEU, (LEU, v
I p k pp “G Mv”
3.5–5%) , u, v u uu ( 20%)
p, pv I’
u p R R, I u pu
I- v. O Sp 28, 2010, u IEEPA u ( v), P O
p pup. T Bz uk v v v v v k P O, Ap 20
u Exuv O 13553, k U.S.- I
u “u u u
v u u I z v pv
u u I’ - uu kp.” 92
upp u u. T O u
W Bz uk u I
U S. A Exuv O u, qu v-
D, up U.S. v. W
I k u O v
v quk p UN Su Cu Ru (1929) v
U.S.- pu, u k k U S. T
u UN p k
P p v u p
I’ u, pv pp u , u
Exuv O u. T CISADA , v, pv
I’ k. T U.S. xp I k pu p u, u, ju v upp
v p I I. CISADA
Ru C, u u u p.
u v U.S. v . CISADA p , u P p pv
4.2 CISADA Law. T U S u u
u v v u.
Ru 1929, Ru, C, v u p pv u. T U S p
4.4. U.S. sanctions on Iran Central Bank. I 2011, C xp
u Ju 2010, Cpv I S, Au,
u p I p UN u -
Dv A (CISADA), I
uu. M C v
k u U S k u -
I’ v xp p I p. I D D 2011, p
k I k.
upp — u p
A v, CISADA — xp
U.S. —C ( pv FY2012 N D
u xp I p U.S.
Auz A) u U S k u -
— — v v p 1995 Exuv
I’ C Bk. T pv qu I’ vu u
O 12957.93 T P’ u
u I’ C Bk u p I u I . T
u u u Exuv O.
P u, u , Eup u
A u p CISADA u qu ( P
v xp j U S pu
u) . Hv, I S A, CISADA
I’ xp . T xp p
pv v P v,
u “ u” pu I. Au u qu p u,
v, P u .
P u p. I 4.3 Sanctions against Iranian human rights abusers. Du 2010–2012,
u xp,
C u pu I -
u “ “ u” pu I.
p pp. T U.S. upp I pp, u up u Ju–D 2009 pk weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran
60 weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran
A PR IM ER ON SA NC TI ON S AG AI NS T IR AN
4.5. July 1, 2012, EU embargo on oil. I 2011, v I
A PR IM ER ON SA NC TI ON S AG AI NS T IR AN
•
Op v u p I u . T
x u p, U.S. Eup pp
pp p u v v xp u
p U S I u. I Ju 2012, Eup
C Bk u v.
U k j p p pu I
•
, k u Ju 1, 2012. T EU u Nv 2011, v-k I k B p pp
Pv u -u N I O Cp (NIOC) N I k Cp (NIC).
•
Pp j vp vu I, u I,
p B’ I’ C Bk. I
vu v u Ju Ju 1, 1, 2002. 2002. T T v v pp pp
p , EU, , u I’ xp u 25%—
v u xp vu Cp S, u S Dz
u u p pp I’ , v p vu (u 70% v u vu). 94
. •
T EU p v u u U.S. ju ju . . T p p u u p p u u EU EU u , u u U.S. . O
61
Pp j vu I , pu, p uu.
•
Pu u v v I, u I v .
, p u EU vk xp ( EU u v v u xp)
T vk , u, u
u C Bk u v.
I S A CISADA, u p pv u p k
4.6. Executive Order 13622 (July 30, 2012): B pu I u
u v.
p pu. O Ju 30, 2012, P O u Exuv O 13622 pp vu ISA — k— P v: •
pu pu pu I;
•
u N I O Cp (NIOC) N I Cp (NICO);
•
pu p pu I.
5. Potential uture sanctions. Au pv p uu U.S. I, u px . Fuu u u ( xp, p u v p , ). T
T pp p u u u
U S Eup U
v xp u S 1245 P.L. 112-81 ( xp
p. T v u p upp p.
“ u” pu I). T Exuv O k u U.S. pp pv upp NIOC, NICO, C Bk I, p U.S.- p I pu U.S. k pu . T Exuv O u vk P’ .
5.1. Future sanctions being considered by the United States: S U.S. pk-
u xp U.S. k k u I k (u k u v I k). 95 S pk p
4.7. H.R. 1905: Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012.
u "xp," u u pu I
A Hu–S j I , H.R. 1905, p
u u I' C Bk. I , u p u
C Auu 1, 2012, v u I S
U.S. pv pu I .96 I
A. T p ISA CISADA, u pv u qu
u U.S. u u p upp p,
p H.R. 1905, , , u
u pk k k pp C 2013.
v, ISA p I. T u ISA H.R. 1905 u:
62 weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran
5.2. Future sanctions being considered by the European Union: O O
15, 2012, EU p p u I, weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran 63
A PR IM ER ON SA NC TI ON S AG AI NS T IR AN
A PR IM ER ON SA NC TI ON S AG AI NS T IR AN
4.5. July 1, 2012, EU embargo on oil. I 2011, v I
•
x u p, U.S. Eup pp
pp p u v v xp u
p U S I u. I Ju 2012, Eup U k j p p pu I
C Bk u v. •
, k u Ju 1, 2012. T EU u Nv 2011, v-k I k B p pp
Op v u p I u . T
Pv u -u N I O Cp (NIOC) N I k Cp (NIC).
•
Pp j vp vu I, u I,
p B’ I’ C Bk. I
vu v u Ju Ju 1, 1, 2002. 2002. T T v v pp pp
p , EU, , u I’ xp u 25%—
v u xp vu Cp S, u S Dz
u u p pp I’ , v
.
p vu (u 70% v u vu). 94
•
T EU p v u u U.S. ju ju . . T p p u u p p u u EU EU u , u u U.S. . O
Pp j vu I , pu, p uu.
•
Pu u v v I, u I v .
, p u EU vk xp ( EU u v v u xp)
T vk , u, u
u C Bk u v.
I S A CISADA, u p pv u p k
4.6. Executive Order 13622 (July 30, 2012): B pu I u
u v.
p pu. O Ju 30, 2012, P O u Exuv O 13622 pp vu ISA — k— P v:
Au pv p uu U.S.
•
pu pu pu I;
•
u N I O Cp (NIOC) N I Cp (NICO);
•
5. Potential uture sanctions. I, u px . Fuu u u ( xp, p u v p ,
pu p pu I.
). T
T pp p u u u
U S Eup U
v xp u S 1245 P.L. 112-81 ( xp
p. T v u p upp p.
“ u” pu I). T Exuv O k u U.S. pp pv upp NIOC, NICO, C Bk I, p U.S.- p I pu U.S. k pu . T Exuv O u vk P’ .
5.1. Future sanctions being considered by the United States: S U.S. pk-
u xp U.S. k k u I k (u k u v I k). 95 S pk p
4.7. H.R. 1905: Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012.
u "xp," u u pu I
A Hu–S j I , H.R. 1905, p
u u I' C Bk. I , u p u
C Auu 1, 2012, v u I S
U.S. pv pu I .96 I
A. T p ISA CISADA, u pv u qu
u U.S. u u p upp p,
p H.R. 1905, , , u
u pk k k pp C 2013.
v, ISA p I. T u ISA H.R. 1905 u:
5.2. Future sanctions being considered by the European Union: O O
15, 2012, EU p p u I, weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran 63
62 weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran
A PR IM ER ON SA NC TI ON S AG AI NS T IR AN
A PR IM ER ON SA NC TI ON S AG AI NS T IR AN
I p k . 97 T v p
v u I u
pp “I-O-F Z” u v -
p j U.S. C
x I u .
98
I p, u
v p I’ u p. T EU
. T p u u u
pv I A Eup U u pv I u
p, vu U.S. L,
p ( u v p I’ pp).
pv v . T , I u
A, EU “U-u” k I
u vv u p v vu
EU k. F, EU 34 I p u
L.
z. T EU pv ppv ppv , u I’ u p pu “up I k p k.” 99
W u u , up, pp .
5.3 Possible uture multilateral sanctions. O v
1. Discretion on presidential presidential application and authority to issue waivers.
pp p u pu.
T A P u
F xp, u ,
u, u I. Hv, u u U.S. I
p I. 100 S I
v , P’
p v , u u k p.
. S, v u P’ u,
A, k pu xp
P u p u
pu qup v I, v v
I, U.S. I. A
I’ . A pp u I all all
I, pu I S A, u ,
u, u (UNSC u 1747
pu P u pp
p u, u u -u ). R
p I. Y , v p U.S. I, P
p , u , I pp p,
u k k .
101
I ( j p , u qup).
1.1. Authority under IEEPA/Executive Orders. A p
Exuv O, u u u IEEPA, Exuv O
II. LIFTING THE SANCTIONS N U S UN Su Cu , up , pu p I u u -
p . I , P u p I Exuv O, U S I .
x I’ . T -- p. T
1.2 Administration discretion in determination. I , P
U S k u . I 2011–2012,
u p, I
k u u
, v . F
20% IAEA I’ u p; u p p,
xp, I u Exuv O 13224 13382 u
x I’
v v P, . A U.S.
uu pu pup.
k
I v u U S S k pv p I, U S p
ppp pp . T, p, ,, p .
u uu vpp , v I u u p v .
1.3 Waiver authority. I v u v pv
T p u p u p p p
u P v pp .
64 weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran
weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran 65
A PR IM ER ON SA NC TI ON S AG AI NS T IR AN
A PR IM ER ON SA NC TI ON S AG AI NS T IR AN
I p k . 97 T v p
v u I u
pp “I-O-F Z” u v -
p j U.S. C
x I u . 98 I p, u
.
v p I’ u p. T EU
T p u u u
pv I A Eup U u pv I u
p, vu U.S. L,
p ( u v p I’ pp).
pv v . T , I u
A, EU “U-u” k I
u vv u p v vu
EU k. F, EU 34 I p u
L.
z. T EU pv ppv ppv , u I’ u p pu “up I k p k.” 99
W u u , up, pp .
5.3 Possible uture multilateral sanctions. O v
1. Discretion on presidential presidential application and authority to issue waivers.
pp p u pu.
T A P u
F xp, u ,
u, u I. Hv, u u U.S. I
p I. 100 S I
v , P’
p v , u u k p.
. S, v u P’ u,
A, k pu xp
P u p u
pu qup v I, v v
I, U.S. I. A
I’ . A pp u I all all
I, pu I S A, u ,
u, u (UNSC u 1747
pu P u pp
p u, u u -u ). R
p I. Y , v p U.S. I, P
p , u , I pp p,
u k k .
I ( j p , u qup).101
1.1. Authority under IEEPA/Executive Orders. A p
Exuv O, u u u IEEPA, Exuv O
II. LIFTING THE SANCTIONS N U S UN Su Cu , up , pu p I u u -
p . I , P u p I Exuv O, U S I .
x I’ . T -- p. T
1.2 Administration discretion in determination. I , P
U S k u . I 2011–2012,
u p, I
k u u
, v . F
20% IAEA I’ u p; u p p,
xp, I u Exuv O 13224 13382 u
x I’
v v P, . A U.S.
uu pu pup.
k
I v u U S S k pv p I, U S p
ppp pp . T, p, ,, p .
u uu vpp , v I u u p v .
1.3 Waiver authority. I v u v pv
T p u p u p p p
u P v pp . weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran 65
64 weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran
A PR IM ER ON SA NC TI ON S AG AI NS T IR AN
A PR IM ER ON SA NC TI ON S AG AI NS T IR AN
A P u , u u, v
Hv, u N K k 2008
I’ u p ju v p . A pv
x p u p, p N K k
I S A, pv I’ C Bk,
upp v. I 1982, Iq k
v P u u.
—xp Au N. I Iq v p xp U.S. upp I–Iq . I 2006,
2. Termination o the Iran Sanctions Act.
L v u v up p u p
T I S A p U.S U.S.. . T u p-
2004. I v I u v qu
I u . T I S A
P5+1 u u, u u I u v
P I k: k: 1)
j, v u —u upp
, vp, qu u xpv v, / p, p, -
Hz— U.S. p u v I .
; 2) v U.S. p ; 3) p U.S. u . I , P u k -
4. Termination o the U.S. Trade Ban. T U.S. v I p Exuv O. T
pp p I. T G W. Bu
p u p P u I E
u pp p L, L u v
E P A, puu P x
WMD U S 2004. (T I
U S u qu. I I, u
L S A, pv pp I L. I uqu
u M 1995 u v , u kp
I S A pp L .). A
v p.
P pp pv u k pp U.S. C, u u p .
3. Termination o the State Sponsorship Spons orship o Terrorism Terrorism Designation. Designation . M U.S. p I pu p u I’ p . T P u v u -
4.1. CISADA codifes the trade ban. T CISADA
I. T, P u p u Exuv O , U S I. C u p u CISADA pv p u u k P.
, uj ppv. v I , P
4.2. Administration repeal. I CISADA , P -
u C I 1) pv upp
u U.S.–I S.–I , P u
p x ; 2) u U S upp
I x. Hv, P u v ju u
uu. C k u v j u pp,
I’ v. O P u p
u P v j u— C u qu -
v u, u Exuv O . n
j v v kp I . 3.1 Waiting period. W P k I , u
qu C 45 v u v— p qu . 3.2 Relevant past experiences. A pv Exp A-
A , u’ upp u, u u u p p u’ p.
66 weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran
weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran 67
A PR IM ER ON SA NC TI ON S AG AI NS T IR AN
A PR IM ER ON SA NC TI ON S AG AI NS T IR AN
A P u , u u, v
Hv, u N K k 2008
I’ u p ju v p . A pv
x p u p, p N K k
I S A, pv I’ C Bk,
upp v. I 1982, Iq k
v P u u.
—xp Au N. I Iq v p xp U.S. upp I–Iq . I 2006,
2. Termination o the Iran Sanctions Act.
L v u v up p u p
T I S A p U.S U.S.. . T u p-
2004. I v I u v qu
I u . T I S A
P5+1 u u, u u I u v
P I k: k: 1)
j, v u —u upp
, vp, qu u xpv v, / p, p, -
Hz— U.S. p u v I .
; 2) v U.S. p ; 3) p U.S. u . I , P u k -
4. Termination o the U.S. Trade Ban. T U.S. v I p Exuv O. T
pp p I. T G W. Bu
p u p P u I E
u pp p L, L u v
E P A, puu P x
WMD U S 2004. (T I
U S u qu. I I, u
L S A, pv pp I L. I uqu
u M 1995 u v , u kp
I S A pp L .). A
v p.
P pp pv u k pp U.S. C, u u p .
4.1. CISADA codifes the trade ban. T CISADA
I. T, P u p
3. Termination o the State Sponsorship Spons orship o Terrorism Terrorism Designation. Designation . M U.S. p I pu p u I’ p . T P u v u -
u Exuv O , U S I. C u p u CISADA pv p u u k P.
, uj ppv. v I , P
4.2. Administration repeal. I CISADA , P -
u C I 1) pv upp
u U.S.–I S.–I , P u
p x ; 2) u U S upp
I x. Hv, P u v ju u
uu. C k u v j u pp,
I’ v. O P u p
u P v j u— C u qu -
v u, u Exuv O . n
j v v kp I . 3.1 Waiting period. W P k I , u
qu C 45 v u v— p qu . 3.2 Relevant past experiences. A pv Exp A-
A , u’ upp u, u u u p p u’ p.
weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran 67
66 weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran
SUMMARY OF SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN, 1979 – PRESENT* * NOTE: This chart is a highly simplifed representation o the complex sanctions matrix. It is intended as a quick reerence tool and is by no means comprehensive.
Source
Date
UNSC#/US Law/ Exec Order #
Lit Requirement
Action
Objective
US Ca Cart rter er
11/1 11 /14/ 4/19 1979 79
Exec Ex ecut utiv ivee Or Orde derr 12 1217 170 0
Exec Ex ecut utiv ivee Or Orde derr
Blocking Bloc king Iran Iranian ian gover governmen nmentt propert property. y.
Pressure Iran to ree Pressure ree American can dipl diplomati omatic hostages.
US Carter
1/23/1981
Executive Order 12277
Executive Order
On to transer Iranian government assets.
US Carter
1/23/1981
Executive Order 12276
Executive Order
Direction relating to establishment o escrow accounts.
US Carter
1/23/1981
Executive Order 12278
Executive Order
Direction to transer Iranian assets overseas.
US Carter
1/23/1981
Executive Order 12279
Executive Order
Direction to transer Iranian government assets held by domestic banks.
US Carter
1/23/1981
Executive Order 12278
Executive Order
Direction to transer Iranian government assets overseas.
US Carter
1/23/1981
Executive Order 12280
Executive Order
Direction to transer Iranian government nancial assets held by non-banking institutions.
US Carter
1/23/1981
Executive Order 12281
Executive Order
Direction to transer certain Iranian government assets.
US Carter
1/23/1981
Executive Order 12283
Executive Order
Non-prosecution o claims o hostages Non-prosecution and or actions at the United States Embassy and elsewhere.
US Carter
1/23/1981
Executive Order 12284
Executive Order
Restrictions on the transer o property o the shah o Iran.
US Carter
2/26/1981
Executive Order 12294
Executive Order
Suspension o litigation against Iran.
US De Dept pt.. o St Stat atee
1/19 1/ 19/1 /198 984 4
Iran Ir an ad adde dedd to to Sta State te Sp Spon on-sors o Terrorism List
Presidential authority, subject to congressional approval. I Congress blocks with a joint resolution, President can veto.
Restrictions on U.S. oreign assistance; a ban on deense exports and sales; certain controls over exports o dual use items; and miscellaneous nancial and other restrictions.
Limit Iran’s military capability and constrain Iran’s support o terrorism, weaken its eorts to export the revolution to regional countries.
US Re Reagan
10/29/1987
Executive Or Order 12 12613
Executive Or Order
Proh Pr ohib ibit itin ingg imp impor orts ts r rom om Ir Iran an..
Limitt Ir Limi Iran an’’s mi mililita tary ry ca capa pabi bilility ty an andd pu puni nish sh mi mililita tary ry actions, constrain Iran’s nancial support o terrorism organizations, limit Iran’s regional infuence.
68 weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran
*Note: This group o Executive Orders on 1/23/81 and 2/26/81 are result o the Algiers Accord and negotiat negotiations ions to to ree hostag hostages. es. Some not included here were implemented and revoked during this period.
weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran 69
SUMMARY OF SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN, 1979 – PRESENT* * NOTE: This chart is a highly simplifed representation o the complex sanctions matrix. It is intended as a quick reerence tool and is by no means comprehensive.
Source
Date
UNSC#/US Law/ Exec Order #
Lit Requirement
Action
Objective
US Ca Cart rter er
11/1 11 /14/ 4/19 1979 79
Exec Ex ecut utiv ivee Or Orde derr 12 1217 170 0
Exec Ex ecut utiv ivee Or Orde derr
Blocking Bloc king Iran Iranian ian gover governmen nmentt propert property. y.
Pressure Iran to ree Pressure ree American can dipl diplomati omatic hostages.
US Carter
1/23/1981
Executive Order 12277
Executive Order
On to transer Iranian government assets.
US Carter
1/23/1981
Executive Order 12276
Executive Order
Direction relating to establishment o escrow accounts.
US Carter
1/23/1981
Executive Order 12278
Executive Order
Direction to transer Iranian assets overseas.
US Carter
1/23/1981
Executive Order 12279
Executive Order
Direction to transer Iranian government assets held by domestic banks.
US Carter
1/23/1981
Executive Order 12278
Executive Order
Direction to transer Iranian government assets overseas.
US Carter
1/23/1981
Executive Order 12280
Executive Order
Direction to transer Iranian government nancial assets held by non-banking institutions.
US Carter
1/23/1981
Executive Order 12281
Executive Order
Direction to transer certain Iranian government assets.
US Carter
1/23/1981
Executive Order 12283
Executive Order
Non-prosecution o claims o hostages Non-prosecution and or actions at the United States Embassy and elsewhere.
US Carter
1/23/1981
Executive Order 12284
Executive Order
Restrictions on the transer o property o the shah o Iran.
*Note: This group o Executive Orders on 1/23/81 and 2/26/81 are result o the Algiers Accord and negotiat negotiations ions to to ree hostag hostages. es. Some not included here were implemented and revoked during this period.
US Carter
2/26/1981
Executive Order 12294
Executive Order
Suspension o litigation against Iran.
US De Dept pt.. o St Stat atee
1/19 1/ 19/1 /198 984 4
Iran ad Iran adde dedd to to Sta State te Sp Spon on-sors o Terrorism List
Presidential authority, subject to congressional approval. I Congress blocks with a joint resolution, President can veto.
Restrictions on U.S. oreign assistance; a ban on deense exports and sales; certain controls over exports o dual use items; and miscellaneous nancial and other restrictions.
Limit Iran’s military capability and constrain Iran’s support o terrorism, weaken its eorts to export the revolution to regional countries.
US Re Reagan
10/29/1987
Executive Or Order 12 12613
Executive Or Order
Proh Pr ohib ibit itin ingg imp impor orts ts r rom om Ir Iran an..
Limitt Ir Limi Iran an’’s mi mililita tary ry ca capa pabi bilility ty an andd pu puni nish sh mi mililita tary ry actions, constrain Iran’s nancial support o terrorism organizations, limit Iran’s regional infuence.
weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran 69
68 weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran
SUMMARY OF SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN, 1979 – PRESENT* * NOTE: This chart is a highly simplifed representation o the complex sanctions matrix. It is intended as a quick reerence tool and is by no means comprehensive.
Source
Date
US Bush
10/23/1992
US Cl Clinton
UNSC#/US Law/ Exec Order #
Lit Requirement
Action
Objective
Iran-Iraq Arms Nonprolieration Act (P.L. 102-484)
Presidential discretion to implement or to rerain rom imposing sanctions under it. Congressional action to terminate.
Oppose any transer to Iran or Iraq o any goods or technology, including dual-use goods or technology, wherever that transer could materially contribute to either country's acquiring chemical, biological, nuclear, or destabilizing numbers and types o advanced conventional weapons.
Limit Iran’s conventional military power by dissuading such arms suppliers (Russia, China) rom uture sales to Iran, limit Iran’s regional infuence.
3/15/1995
Executive Order 12 12957
Superceded by by CISDA. Congressionall repeal or Congressiona substantial amendment to the CISADA provision in order to place ull authority back in the hands o the President.
Prohibiting Certain Transactions With Respect to the Development o Iranian Petroleum Resources.
Force Iran to change domestic policies, pressure to end support or terrorism, weaken its infuence regionally.
US Clinton
5/6/1995
Executive Order 12959
Executive Order
Prohibiting Certain Transactions With Respect to the Development o Iranian Petroleum Resources.
Strengthen Executive Order 12957.
US Clinton
8/5/191996
Iran Sanctions Act (P.L. 104-172)
Congressional action and Congressional Presidential concurrence. Or, president can waive application o Act.
To impose sanctions on persons making certain investments directly and signicantly contributing to the enhancement o the ability o Iran to develop its petroleum resources.
Reduce Iran’s oil and gas production potential to limit Iran’s unding to regional militant groups and developing its strategic capacity.
US Clinton
8/19/1997
Executive Order 13059
Executive Order
Prohibiting Certain Transactions With Respect to Iran.
Strengthen Executive Order 12957.
US Cl Clinton
3/14/2000
Iran No Nonprolieration Ac Act
Congressional re repeal or or substantial amendment to the CISADA provision in order to place ull authority back in the hands o the President.
Sanctions against entities that are determined to be involved in or supplying Iran’s WMD programs, incl. asset reezing, ban on transaction with the entity.
Pressure international entities (Russia, specically) or aiding Iran in nuclear prolieration and development o missile delivery systems.
US Bu Bush
9/30/2001
Executive Or Order 13 13224/ISA Extension Act o 2001
Congressional action and Congressional Presidential concurrence. Or, president can waive application o Act.
Blocking property and prohibiting transactions with persons who commit, threaten to commit, or support terrorism.
Prevent any U.S. citizen rom conducting business transactions with entities (including Iran) that have been judged to provide support or terrorist organizations organizations..
US Bush
6/28/2005
Executive Order 13382
Executive Order
Blocking property o weapons o mass de- Halt Iranian nuclear prolieration and struction prolierators and their supporters, development o missile delivery systems. includes restrictions on Iranian shipping.
70 weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran
weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran 71
SUMMARY OF SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN, 1979 – PRESENT* * NOTE: This chart is a highly simplifed representation o the complex sanctions matrix. It is intended as a quick reerence tool and is by no means comprehensive.
Source
Date
US Bush
10/23/1992
US Cl Clinton
UNSC#/US Law/ Exec Order #
Lit Requirement
Action
Objective
Iran-Iraq Arms Nonprolieration Act (P.L. 102-484)
Presidential discretion to implement or to rerain rom imposing sanctions under it. Congressional action to terminate.
Oppose any transer to Iran or Iraq o any goods or technology, including dual-use goods or technology, wherever that transer could materially contribute to either country's acquiring chemical, biological, nuclear, or destabilizing numbers and types o advanced conventional weapons.
Limit Iran’s conventional military power by dissuading such arms suppliers (Russia, China) rom uture sales to Iran, limit Iran’s regional infuence.
3/15/1995
Executive Order 12 12957
Superceded by by CISDA. Congressionall repeal or Congressiona substantial amendment to the CISADA provision in order to place ull authority back in the hands o the President.
Prohibiting Certain Transactions With Respect to the Development o Iranian Petroleum Resources.
Force Iran to change domestic policies, pressure to end support or terrorism, weaken its infuence regionally.
US Clinton
5/6/1995
Executive Order 12959
Executive Order
Prohibiting Certain Transactions With Respect to the Development o Iranian Petroleum Resources.
Strengthen Executive Order 12957.
US Clinton
8/5/191996
Iran Sanctions Act (P.L. 104-172)
Congressional action and Congressional Presidential concurrence. Or, president can waive application o Act.
To impose sanctions on persons making certain investments directly and signicantly contributing to the enhancement o the ability o Iran to develop its petroleum resources.
Reduce Iran’s oil and gas production potential to limit Iran’s unding to regional militant groups and developing its strategic capacity.
US Clinton
8/19/1997
Executive Order 13059
Executive Order
Prohibiting Certain Transactions With Respect to Iran.
Strengthen Executive Order 12957.
US Cl Clinton
3/14/2000
Iran No Nonprolieration Ac Act
Congressional re repeal or or substantial amendment to the CISADA provision in order to place ull authority back in the hands o the President.
Sanctions against entities that are determined to be involved in or supplying Iran’s WMD programs, incl. asset reezing, ban on transaction with the entity.
Pressure international entities (Russia, specically) or aiding Iran in nuclear prolieration and development o missile delivery systems.
US Bu Bush
9/30/2001
Executive Or Order 13 13224/ISA Extension Act o 2001
Congressional action and Congressional Presidential concurrence. Or, president can waive application o Act.
Blocking property and prohibiting transactions with persons who commit, threaten to commit, or support terrorism.
Prevent any U.S. citizen rom conducting business transactions with entities (including Iran) that have been judged to provide support or terrorist organizations organizations..
US Bush
6/28/2005
Executive Order 13382
Executive Order
Blocking property o weapons o mass de- Halt Iranian nuclear prolieration and struction prolierators and their supporters, development o missile delivery systems. includes restrictions on Iranian shipping.
weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran 71
70 weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran
SUMMARY OF SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN, 1979 – PRESENT* * NOTE: This chart is a highly simplifed representation o the complex sanctions matrix. It is intended as a quick reerence tool and is by no means comprehensive.
Source
Date
US Bush
9/30/2006
UN
UNSC#/US Law/ Exec Order #
Lit Requirement
Action
Objective
Iran Freedom Support Act (ILSA) (P.L. 109-293)
Congressional action and Congressional Presidential concurrence. The act “codies” EO 12957, 12959, 13059 into law.
Codies sanctions against Iran, bans investment in Iran (amends ISA), provides nancial and political assistant or democracy promotion, sanctions against countries assisting Iran in nuclear prolieration and advanced weapons development, prevention o money laundering or weapons o mass destruction.
Force Iran to change domestic policies, punish Iran or support o terrorism, support domestic and oreign pro-democracy groups.
7/31/2 7/3 1/2006 006
Securi Sec urity ty Cou Counci ncill Res Resolu olutio tionn 1696
UN Resolution
Demands Iran suspend uranium enrichment, or ace possible economic, diplomatic sanctions.
Persuade Iran to cease nuclear prolieration..
UN
12/27/ 12/ 27/200 2006 6
Securi Sec urity ty Cou Counci ncill Resolution 1737
UN Resolution
Imposes sanctions on Iran or ailure to halt uranium enrichment.
Persuade Iran to cease uranium enrichment, permit expanded inspection o nuclear acilities by the IAEA and to reach a negotiated agreement on its nuclear program.
UN
3/24/2 3/2 4/2007 007
Securi Sec urity ty Cou Counci ncill Res Resolu olutio tionn 1747
UN Resolution
Toughens sanctions against Iran, adds arms embargo.
Persuade Iran to cease uranium enrichment, permit expanded inspection o nuclear acilities by the IAEA and to reach a negotiated agreement on its nuclear program.
US Bush
7/7/2007
Executive Order 13438
Executive Order
Blocking property o certain persons who threaten stabilization eorts in Iraq.
Punish Iran’s attempts to exert infuence regionally.
UN
3/3/ 3/ 3/20 2008 08
Secu Se curi rity ty Co Coun unci cill Re Reso solu luti tion on 1803
UN Resolution
Tightens restrictions on Iran’s prolieration-sensitive nuclear activities, increases vigilance over Iranian banks, has states inspect cargo.
Persuade Iran to cease uranium enrichment, permit expanded inspection o nuclear acilities by the IAEA and to reach a negotiated agreement on its nuclear program.
UN
9/27/2 9/2 7/2008 008
Securi Sec urity ty Cou Counci ncill Res Resolu olutio tionn 1835
UN Resolution
Rearms earlier resolutions on Iranian uranium enrichment.
Persuade Iran to cease uranium enrichment, permit expanded inspection o nuclear acilities by the IAEA and to reach a negotiated agreement on its nuclear program.
UN
6/9/ 6/ 9/20 2010 10
Secu Se curi rity ty Co Coun unci cill Re Reso solu luti tion on 1929
UN Resolution
Expands an arms embargo and tightening restrictions on nancial and shipping enterprises related to “prolierationsensitive activities.”
Pressure Iran’s civilian economy to persuade leaders to permanently to cease uranium enrichment, permit expanded inspection o nuclear acilities by the IAEA and to reach a negotiated agreement on its nuclear program.
72 weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran
weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran 73
SUMMARY OF SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN, 1979 – PRESENT* * NOTE: This chart is a highly simplifed representation o the complex sanctions matrix. It is intended as a quick reerence tool and is by no means comprehensive.
Source
Date
US Bush
9/30/2006
UN
UNSC#/US Law/ Exec Order #
Lit Requirement
Action
Objective
Iran Freedom Support Act (ILSA) (P.L. 109-293)
Congressional action and Congressional Presidential concurrence. The act “codies” EO 12957, 12959, 13059 into law.
Codies sanctions against Iran, bans investment in Iran (amends ISA), provides nancial and political assistant or democracy promotion, sanctions against countries assisting Iran in nuclear prolieration and advanced weapons development, prevention o money laundering or weapons o mass destruction.
Force Iran to change domestic policies, punish Iran or support o terrorism, support domestic and oreign pro-democracy groups.
7/31/2 7/3 1/2006 006
Securi Sec urity ty Cou Counci ncill Res Resolu olutio tionn 1696
UN Resolution
Demands Iran suspend uranium enrichment, or ace possible economic, diplomatic sanctions.
Persuade Iran to cease nuclear prolieration..
UN
12/27/ 12/ 27/200 2006 6
Securi Sec urity ty Cou Counci ncill Resolution 1737
UN Resolution
Imposes sanctions on Iran or ailure to halt uranium enrichment.
Persuade Iran to cease uranium enrichment, permit expanded inspection o nuclear acilities by the IAEA and to reach a negotiated agreement on its nuclear program.
UN
3/24/2 3/2 4/2007 007
Securi Sec urity ty Cou Counci ncill Res Resolu olutio tionn 1747
UN Resolution
Toughens sanctions against Iran, adds arms embargo.
Persuade Iran to cease uranium enrichment, permit expanded inspection o nuclear acilities by the IAEA and to reach a negotiated agreement on its nuclear program.
US Bush
7/7/2007
Executive Order 13438
Executive Order
Blocking property o certain persons who threaten stabilization eorts in Iraq.
Punish Iran’s attempts to exert infuence regionally.
UN
3/3/ 3/ 3/20 2008 08
Secu Se curi rity ty Co Coun unci cill Re Reso solu luti tion on 1803
UN Resolution
Tightens restrictions on Iran’s prolieration-sensitive nuclear activities, increases vigilance over Iranian banks, has states inspect cargo.
Persuade Iran to cease uranium enrichment, permit expanded inspection o nuclear acilities by the IAEA and to reach a negotiated agreement on its nuclear program.
UN
9/27/2 9/2 7/2008 008
Securi Sec urity ty Cou Counci ncill Res Resolu olutio tionn 1835
UN Resolution
Rearms earlier resolutions on Iranian uranium enrichment.
Persuade Iran to cease uranium enrichment, permit expanded inspection o nuclear acilities by the IAEA and to reach a negotiated agreement on its nuclear program.
UN
6/9/ 6/ 9/20 2010 10
Secu Se curi rity ty Co Coun unci cill Re Reso solu luti tion on 1929
UN Resolution
Expands an arms embargo and tightening restrictions on nancial and shipping enterprises related to “prolierationsensitive activities.”
Pressure Iran’s civilian economy to persuade leaders to permanently to cease uranium enrichment, permit expanded inspection o nuclear acilities by the IAEA and to reach a negotiated agreement on its nuclear program.
weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran 73
72 weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran
SUMMARY OF SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN, 1979 – PRESENT* * NOTE: This chart is a highly simplifed representation o the complex sanctions matrix. It is intended as a quick reerence tool and is by no means comprehensive.
Source
Date
US Obama
7/1/2010
US Ob Obama
UNSC#/US Law/ Exec Order #
Lit Requirement
Action
Objective
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act o 2010 (CISADA, P.L. 111-195)
Congressional action and Congressional Presidential concurrence. President discretion to determine violations, and to consider oreign rms not in violation.
Expansion o sanctions under the Iran Sanctions Act o 1996, mandatory sanctions with respect to nancial institutions, imposition o sanctions on certain persons who are responsible or or complicit in human rights abuses, prohibition on procurement contracts with persons that export sensitive technology to Iran, harmonization o criminal penalties or violations o sanctions, increased capacity or eorts to combat unlawul or terrorist nancing, sanctions on rms that conduct any type o transaction with/in Iran’s energy sector.
Pressure Iran to change Iranian domestic policies, build a oundation or uture multilateral sanctions, pressure Iran to permanently cease development o nuclear weapons and support o terrorism, pro-democracy groups.
9/28/2010
Executive Order 13 13553
Executive Order
Blocking property o certain persons with respect to serious human rights abuses by the government o Iran and taking certain other actions
Highlight and punish Iranian government’s human rights abuses, support opposition groups and civil liberties, pressure Iran to change domestic policies or encourage regime change, permanently to cease uranium enrichment and to reach a negotiated agreement on its nuclear program.
US Ob Obama
12/31/11
FY2012 Na National De Deense Authorization Act (NDAA, P.L. 112-81) 112-8 1)
Congressional action and Congressional Presidential concurrence. President discretion to determine violations, and to consider oreign rms not in violation.
Blocking property o certain persons with respect to serious human rights abuses by the government o Iran, provisions to sanction oreign banks that deal with Iran’s Central Bank, etc.
Compel Iran to compromise on its nuclear program.
US Ob Obama
4/29/2011
Executive Order 13 13572
Executive Order
Blocking property o certain persons with respect to human rights abuses in Syria
Punish Iran’s attempts to exert infuence regionally and or supporting Assad government in Syria.
US Ob Obama
5/23/2011
Executive Order 13 13574
Executive Order
Authorizing the implementatio implementationn o certain Strengthen CISADA, compel Iran to permanently sanctions set orth in the Iran Sanctions cease nuclear prolieration and to reach a negoti Act o 1996, as amended. amended. ated agreement on its nuclear program.
US Obama
11/20/2011
Executive Order 13590
Executive Order
Authorizing zing the impositi imposition on o certain certain sanctions with respect to the provision o goods, services, technology, or support or Iran’s energy and petrochemical sectors.
74 weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran
Strengthen CISADA, compel Iran to permanently cease nuclear prolieration and to reach a negotiated agreement on its nuclear program.
weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran 75
SUMMARY OF SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN, 1979 – PRESENT* * NOTE: This chart is a highly simplifed representation o the complex sanctions matrix. It is intended as a quick reerence tool and is by no means comprehensive.
Source
Date
US Obama
7/1/2010
US Ob Obama
UNSC#/US Law/ Exec Order #
Lit Requirement
Action
Objective
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act o 2010 (CISADA, P.L. 111-195)
Congressional action and Congressional Presidential concurrence. President discretion to determine violations, and to consider oreign rms not in violation.
Expansion o sanctions under the Iran Sanctions Act o 1996, mandatory sanctions with respect to nancial institutions, imposition o sanctions on certain persons who are responsible or or complicit in human rights abuses, prohibition on procurement contracts with persons that export sensitive technology to Iran, harmonization o criminal penalties or violations o sanctions, increased capacity or eorts to combat unlawul or terrorist nancing, sanctions on rms that conduct any type o transaction with/in Iran’s energy sector.
Pressure Iran to change Iranian domestic policies, build a oundation or uture multilateral sanctions, pressure Iran to permanently cease development o nuclear weapons and support o terrorism, pro-democracy groups.
9/28/2010
Executive Order 13 13553
Executive Order
Blocking property o certain persons with respect to serious human rights abuses by the government o Iran and taking certain other actions
Highlight and punish Iranian government’s human rights abuses, support opposition groups and civil liberties, pressure Iran to change domestic policies or encourage regime change, permanently to cease uranium enrichment and to reach a negotiated agreement on its nuclear program.
US Ob Obama
12/31/11
FY2012 Na National De Deense Authorization Act (NDAA, P.L. 112-81) 112-8 1)
Congressional action and Congressional Presidential concurrence. President discretion to determine violations, and to consider oreign rms not in violation.
Blocking property o certain persons with respect to serious human rights abuses by the government o Iran, provisions to sanction oreign banks that deal with Iran’s Central Bank, etc.
Compel Iran to compromise on its nuclear program.
US Ob Obama
4/29/2011
Executive Order 13 13572
Executive Order
Blocking property o certain persons with respect to human rights abuses in Syria
Punish Iran’s attempts to exert infuence regionally and or supporting Assad government in Syria.
US Ob Obama
5/23/2011
Executive Order 13 13574
Executive Order
Authorizing the implementatio implementationn o certain Strengthen CISADA, compel Iran to permanently sanctions set orth in the Iran Sanctions cease nuclear prolieration and to reach a negoti Act o 1996, as amended. amended. ated agreement on its nuclear program.
US Obama
11/20/2011
Executive Order 13590
Executive Order
Authorizing zing the impositi imposition on o certain certain sanctions with respect to the provision o goods, services, technology, or support or Iran’s energy and petrochemical sectors.
Strengthen CISADA, compel Iran to permanently cease nuclear prolieration and to reach a negotiated agreement on its nuclear program.
weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran 75
74 weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran
SUMMARY OF SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN, 1979 – PRESENT* * NOTE: This chart is a highly simplifed representation o the complex sanctions matrix. It is intended as a quick reerence tool and is by no means comprehensive.
Source
Date
UNSC#/US Law/ Exec Order #
Lit Requirement
Action
US Obama
7/30/2012
Executive Order 13622
Executive Order
Authorizing Authoriz ing add additio itional nal san sanctio ctions ns wit withh respe respect ct Target Iran’s oil revenues, compel to permanently to Iran. cease nuclear prolieration and to reach a negotiated agreement on its nuclear program.
US Obama
8/1/2012
Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act o 2012 (H.R. 1905 (P.L. 112-158)
Congressional action to Congressional repeal or amend, or Administrationn certica Administratio tion. President discretion to determine violations, and to consider oreign rms not in violation.
Expansion o multilateral sanctions regime with respect to Iran, expansion o sanctions relating to the energy sector o Iran and prolieration o weapons o mass destruction by Iran, sanctions with respect to Iran’s revolutionary guard corps, measures relating to human rights abuses in Iran, sanctions with respect to human rights abuses in Syria.
Highlight and punish Iranian government’s human rights abuses, support opposition groups and civil liberties, pressure Iran to change domestic policies or encourage regime change, punish Iran or supporting Assad government in Syria.
US Obama
2/5/2012
Executive Order 13599
Executive Order
Blocking property o the government o Iran and Iranian nancial institutions.
Target Iran’s overall economy, compel to permanently cease nuclear prolieration and to reach a negotiated agreement on its nuclear program.
US Obama
4/23/2012
Executive Order 13606
Congressional action and Presidential concurrence. EO codied Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act (P.L. 112-158) into law.
Blocking the property and suspending entry into the United States o certain persons with respect to grave human rights abuses by the governments o Iran and Syria via inormation technology.
Punish Iranian government’s human rights abuses in regard to inormation technology, support pro-democracy groups.
US Ob Obama
10/9/2012
Executive Order 13 13628
Executive Order
Authorizing the implementation o certain sanctions set orth in the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act o 2012 and additional sanctions with respect to Iran.
Implements provisions provisions contained in the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act o 2012. Highlight and punish Iranian government’s human rights abuses, support pro-democracy groups and civil liberties, pressure Iran to change domestic policies, punish Iran or supporting Assad government government in Syria.
76 weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran
Objective
weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran 77
SUMMARY OF SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN, 1979 – PRESENT* * NOTE: This chart is a highly simplifed representation o the complex sanctions matrix. It is intended as a quick reerence tool and is by no means comprehensive.
Source
Date
UNSC#/US Law/ Exec Order #
Lit Requirement
Action
US Obama
7/30/2012
Executive Order 13622
Executive Order
Authorizing Authoriz ing add additio itional nal san sanctio ctions ns wit withh respe respect ct Target Iran’s oil revenues, compel to permanently to Iran. cease nuclear prolieration and to reach a negotiated agreement on its nuclear program.
US Obama
8/1/2012
Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act o 2012 (H.R. 1905 (P.L. 112-158)
Congressional action to Congressional repeal or amend, or Administrationn certica Administratio tion. President discretion to determine violations, and to consider oreign rms not in violation.
Expansion o multilateral sanctions regime with respect to Iran, expansion o sanctions relating to the energy sector o Iran and prolieration o weapons o mass destruction by Iran, sanctions with respect to Iran’s revolutionary guard corps, measures relating to human rights abuses in Iran, sanctions with respect to human rights abuses in Syria.
Highlight and punish Iranian government’s human rights abuses, support opposition groups and civil liberties, pressure Iran to change domestic policies or encourage regime change, punish Iran or supporting Assad government in Syria.
US Obama
2/5/2012
Executive Order 13599
Executive Order
Blocking property o the government o Iran and Iranian nancial institutions.
Target Iran’s overall economy, compel to permanently cease nuclear prolieration and to reach a negotiated agreement on its nuclear program.
US Obama
4/23/2012
Executive Order 13606
Congressional action and Presidential concurrence. EO codied Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act (P.L. 112-158) into law.
Blocking the property and suspending entry into the United States o certain persons with respect to grave human rights abuses by the governments o Iran and Syria via inormation technology.
Punish Iranian government’s human rights abuses in regard to inormation technology, support pro-democracy groups.
US Ob Obama
10/9/2012
Executive Order 13 13628
Executive Order
Authorizing the implementation o certain sanctions set orth in the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act o 2012 and additional sanctions with respect to Iran.
Implements provisions provisions contained in the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act o 2012. Highlight and punish Iranian government’s human rights abuses, support pro-democracy groups and civil liberties, pressure Iran to change domestic policies, punish Iran or supporting Assad government government in Syria.
weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran 77
76 weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran
Endnotes
1
F U.S. I, K Kz,Iran Kz, Iran Sanctions Act , C R
Sv Rp C RS20871, O. 2007, p://../p///RS20871.p p://../p///RS20871.p 2
Objective
Endnotes
11
Dv A, Pu B, A Sk, . , “Pv I G Nu Wp: Wp: C I Fuu
Nu Op,” Iu S I Su, M 5, 2012, p://-./up/-p/u/ p://-./up/-p/u/ USIP_p_5M2012-1.p
T vv upp . T u I upp u, ju,
u I v u S Hu. A u
12
I p u u v . S Du J, “I H Rp 9
“U S S R W T A A U.S. I Cu S S
Dp' D,” New York imes, imes, Sp. 11, 1998, p://../1998/09 p://../1998/09/11//---p /11//---p---
C I,” p J R. Cpp, D N I. I (M 10, 2011)
9-p-.?p=&=p
U.S. S C A Sv, Cpp xp v I up p,p://-v..v/p/2011/03%20M/11 p://-v..v/p/2011/03%20M/11-11%20-%203-10-11.p -11%20-%203-10-11.p
3
I’ p vu pu u p, u , p 6 J. 31, 2012,
F I’ u , State Department Country Report on Human Rights: Iran, M 24, 2012. A
S Dp B Nv. 21, 2011, S S H C I’ “u “u u u, pu
13 IAEA B Gv, “Ip NP Su A Rv Pv Su Cu
, p ”” u “ pu ” u ,
I Rpu I,” F. 24, 2012, p://.u.//p/IAEA_I_Rp_24F p://.u.//p/IAEA_I_Rp_24Fu2012.p u2012.p
Ru-
p://..v//p/p/p/2011/11/177613. 14 4
Av p U.S. p J–S I S Au
S Dv A A Sk, “I’ Nu Sk: A K U.S. Dp,” Te Iran Primer , U.S. Iu P,
J. 18, 2011, p://p.up.///Dv%20A p://p.up.///Dv%20A
Hu R A 2012, p S M 2012. T u “p-” u u pu pv I qup p upp u (u u,
15
, uv qup). T v Pp’ Mj I S Dp’ z, I p W’ . S Ek S-Buj,
E P, O. 23, 2012.
Sanctioning Iran: Implications and Consequences, Ox R Gup, O. 2012, p 4, p://.x p://.xup up..uk/ ..uk/
16
pu/_pp__p/__p__qu
Rpu I,” M 25, 2012, p://.. p://../-p-052512.p /-p-052512.p
S H O H, “Nu I: Iu Ov N,” W Iu N
IAEA, “Ip NP Su A Rv Pv Su Cu Ru I
F u u ( pv) p p, E S, ., Sanctions, Statecra and Nuclear Prolieration, Prolieration, C Uv P, 2012, pp 1–23.
17
5
H S, “H Ru u M Supp I A W W I,”Guardian I,”Guardian,, M 6, 2012, p://.u-
F N I O, Pu P, u u v “' k u I
I p v u upp P I up H -2011, u u H ( Su up) upp A’ Su pp, u v u I u upp H.
uqu I Rpu” “u u u u .” T u u u
..uk//2012//06/-----
p, u pu upp, I pp I p . “I
F x u I’ upp , G Bu, “S Sp: I,” Cu F
S p p R C,”National C,”NationalInterest , O. 3, 2012, p://.//pu-p/-p---7554
R, O. 13, 2011, p://..//-p-/p9362 p://..//-p-/p9362 18
6
M L. O’Suv, U.S. Dpu N Su Av Iq A, xp ,
S K D, “S A B A I ,” Guardian Guardian,, M 28, 2012, p://.u..uk/
/2012//28/---
: “I p k v ‘k’ k up .” S R D. Bk, ., “I: T Nu C” T Cu F R, Ju 2012, p.15. T U.S. u u Dp
19
u p p v , Dv C, D G, A Szu, I k . S u “v p,”
up P. T v pu u u v p uz u p u, p I' p
p p” G, u “v p.” S E C, “M A’ S Cp,” CNN, Nv. 5,
z v p. Y , “I P M H Aj E P,” Ru,
2012, p://../20 p://../2012/11/05///- 12/11/05///--u.u/ -u.u/x. x.
O.7, 2012, p://.u. p://.u.//2012/10/07/u-- //2012/10/07/u---USBRE8950 -USBRE8950B320121007 B320121007
7
S u x I p, u. A pu p F F, “ u u u. F, …
20
T u , v p P Aj’ p, u u -
U.S. Dp u P C, “Rk U S F I Dv C B N Yk Uv S L ‘ T L P I S,’” ’” Sp. 12, 2012, p://.u.v/
p -vu ( P5+1 u). S, qu
p-/p-/P/1706.px
v v kk-k k u u . . T u u
O u v uz 34% Ju 2012. S L N, “I
pp p . Ix x.” S J R, “O W A S-
Lk S I I 33.5 P,” B N, Ju 8, 2012, p://..//20 p://..//2012-07-08/-k12-07-08/-k-
P O Su D W I,” Nv. 7, 2012, p://../-----p--up://../-----p--u--/
---33-5-p--p.
8
Ru 1929. 9
21
T U.S. pu up I 17%, u “k .” I.
22
I v u p u p . T ISNA p $10 -
T u v, p k p u k k UN Su
F u I u u k I’ u ,
u p uxu , u u , uu. T p p uxu , I’ p u $50 I
J Z, K Kz, Sv H, J G. “I: P M Sk A I’ Nu F,”
v, u u pu x v. S k u k u up
C R Sv Rp C R42443, M 28, 2012.
k-k . S, Ru, “I u p ,” O 15, 2012. A, v pv u 36% u uu, u p u I p.
10
N Su Av D 2011: “T . Cup k
S-Buj,, p. ., p 13. S-Buj
u I, v I’ u . S xp v u I qu k qup p, u I pu .” Sp
23
I - pu I , I uk uk’ ’ p, , p 12.
Bk Iu, Nv. 22, 2011.
78 weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran
weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran 79
Endnotes
1
F U.S. I, K Kz,Iran Kz, Iran Sanctions Act , C R
Sv Rp C RS20871, O. 2007, p://../p///RS20871.p p://../p///RS20871.p 2
Endnotes
11
Dv A, Pu B, A Sk, . , “Pv I G Nu Wp: Wp: C I Fuu
Nu Op,” Iu S I Su, M 5, 2012, p://-./up/-p/u/ p://-./up/-p/u/ USIP_p_5M2012-1.p
T vv upp . T u I upp u, ju,
u I v u S Hu. A u
12
I p u u v . S Du J, “I H Rp 9
“U S S R W T A A U.S. I Cu S S
Dp' D,” New York imes, imes, Sp. 11, 1998, p://../1998/09 p://../1998/09/11//---p /11//---p---
C I,” p J R. Cpp, D N I. I (M 10, 2011)
9-p-.?p=&=p
U.S. S C A Sv, Cpp xp v I up p,p://-v..v/p/2011/03%20M/11 p://-v..v/p/2011/03%20M/11-11%20-%203-10-11.p -11%20-%203-10-11.p
3
I’ p vu pu u p, u , p 6 J. 31, 2012,
F I’ u , State Department Country Report on Human Rights: Iran, M 24, 2012. A
S Dp B Nv. 21, 2011, S S H C I’ “u “u u u, pu
13 IAEA B Gv, “Ip NP Su A Rv Pv Su Cu
, p ”” u “ pu ” u ,
I Rpu I,” F. 24, 2012, p://.u.//p/IAEA_I_Rp_24F p://.u.//p/IAEA_I_Rp_24Fu2012.p u2012.p
Ru-
p://..v//p/p/p/2011/11/177613. 14 4
Av p U.S. p J–S I S Au
S Dv A A Sk, “I’ Nu Sk: A K U.S. Dp,” Te Iran Primer , U.S. Iu P,
J. 18, 2011, p://p.up.///Dv%20A p://p.up.///Dv%20A
Hu R A 2012, p S M 2012. T u “p-” u u pu pv I qup p upp u (u u,
15
, uv qup). T v Pp’ Mj I S Dp’ z, I p W’ . S Ek S-Buj,
E P, O. 23, 2012.
Sanctioning Iran: Implications and Consequences, Ox R Gup, O. 2012, p 4, p://.x p://.xup up..uk/ ..uk/
16
pu/_pp__p/__p__qu
Rpu I,” M 25, 2012, p://.. p://../-p-052512.p /-p-052512.p
S H O H, “Nu I: Iu Ov N,” W Iu N
IAEA, “Ip NP Su A Rv Pv Su Cu Ru I
F u u ( pv) p p, E S, ., Sanctions, Statecra and Nuclear Prolieration, Prolieration, C Uv P, 2012, pp 1–23.
17
5
H S, “H Ru u M Supp I A W W I,”Guardian I,”Guardian,, M 6, 2012, p://.u-
F N I O, Pu P, u u v “' k u I
I p v u upp P I up H -2011, u u H ( Su up) upp A’ Su pp, u v u I u upp H.
uqu I Rpu” “u u u u .” T u u u
..uk//2012//06/-----
p, u pu upp, I pp I p . “I
F x u I’ upp , G Bu, “S Sp: I,” Cu F
S p p R C,”National C,”NationalInterest , O. 3, 2012, p://.//pu-p/-p---7554
R, O. 13, 2011, p://..//-p-/p9362 p://..//-p-/p9362 18
6
M L. O’Suv, U.S. Dpu N Su Av Iq A, xp ,
S K D, “S A B A I ,” Guardian Guardian,, M 28, 2012, p://.u..uk/
/2012//28/---
: “I p k v ‘k’ k up .” S R D. Bk, ., “I: T Nu C” T Cu F R, Ju 2012, p.15. T U.S. u u Dp
19
u p p v , Dv C, D G, A Szu, I k . S u “v p,”
up P. T v pu u u v p uz u p u, p I' p
p p” G, u “v p.” S E C, “M A’ S Cp,” CNN, Nv. 5,
z v p. Y , “I P M H Aj E P,” Ru,
2012, p://../20 p://../2012/11/05///- 12/11/05///--u.u/ -u.u/x. x.
O.7, 2012, p://.u. p://.u.//2012/10/07/u-- //2012/10/07/u---USBRE8950 -USBRE8950B320121007 B320121007
7
S u x I p, u. A pu p F F, “ u u u. F, …
20
T u , v p P Aj’ p, u u -
U.S. Dp u P C, “Rk U S F I Dv C B N Yk Uv S L ‘ T L P I S,’” ’” Sp. 12, 2012, p://.u.v/
p -vu ( P5+1 u). S, qu
p-/p-/P/1706.px
v v kk-k k u u . . T u u
O u v uz 34% Ju 2012. S L N, “I
pp p . Ix x.” S J R, “O W A S-
Lk S I I 33.5 P,” B N, Ju 8, 2012, p://..//20 p://..//2012-07-08/-k12-07-08/-k-
P O Su D W I,” Nv. 7, 2012, p://../-----p--up://../-----p--u--/
---33-5-p--p.
8
21
T U.S. pu up I 17%, u “k .” I.
22
I v u p u p . T ISNA p $10 -
T u v, p k p u k k UN Su
Ru 1929.
u p uxu , u u , uu. 9
F u I u u k I’ u ,
T p p uxu , I’ p u $50 I
J Z, K Kz, Sv H, J G. “I: P M Sk A I’ Nu F,”
v, u u pu x v. S k u k u up
C R Sv Rp C R42443, M 28, 2012.
k-k . S, Ru, “I u p ,” O 15, 2012. A, v pv u 36% u uu, u p u I p.
10
N Su Av D 2011: “T . Cup k
u I, v I’ u . S xp v u I qu k qup p, u I pu .” Sp
S-Buj,, p. ., p 13. S-Buj 23
I - pu I , I uk uk’ ’ p, , p 12.
Bk Iu, Nv. 22, 2011.
weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran 79
78 weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran
Endnotes
Endnotes
24
38
T p u p I u xp. S S S H R C,
I v v p j u— Cp S P Gu. I
2011 2.5 p (p), u 1.5 p, $8
- u v . I up S Huz, p,
vu v qu. S “R S Ru I Cu O Pu,” Ju 28, 2012. p:// ..v/
35% v u 90% GCC Iq -u xp. T
//2012/06/194200.. A p p u 2.2 p 2010 1.2 p Auu 2012. S
u p x v I up. Hv, xp v u v u u
S. C S. R G. (.) C W, “T P I: A E E E Nu I,” Bp P C, O. 2012. W U.S. Dp u pu 55% 2.4 p
k, p . W Su A pu , v up, u p u u . S D Mup, “I' v S Huz? U, u N E,”
2011, 1 p 2012.T , I - xp ,
Christian Science Monitor , D. 28, 2012, p://../W ./W/Bk/2011/122 /Bk/2011/1228/I---v 8/I---v-S--S--
$100 . I xp I up $5 , I u
Huz-U-u--
u u k vu. S U.S. Dp u u P C, “Rk U S F I Dv C B N Yk Uv S L ‘T L P I S,’” ’” Sp. 12, 2012, p://.u p://.u.v/p-/p .v/p-/p-/P/170 -/P/1706.px 6.px 25
F I A.R. Lk P N, “I C Sk I S W ‘Juk O,’” B
N, M 30, 2012, p://..//20 p://..//2012-03-29/---k-- 12-03-29/---k----juk---. --juk---. 26
S Rk G, “A N S D I’ Cu F,” New York imes, imes, O 1, 2012, p://..
/2012/10/02///--pu---.?_=0
39
Op . J Cpp, S S C I, J. 31, 2012.
40
S U.S. pv v I u “pu ” ” p p v-
u p p, U.S. . I u I , , “ p [] v I z .” H “ qu pp v pu ’ pu ,” , “vu v p .” S K DYu DYu S W, “Pu I O G I S, U.S. O S,”Washin S,”Washington gton Post , J. 10, 2012, p://.p./ p://.p.//-u/----- /-u/------p-u--/2012/0 -p-u--/2012/01/10/ 1/10/
27
O I’ u v, Ru, “UPDAE 3-I R Pu W S B,” O. 1, 2012, p://.
IQA0KJP_.
u.//2012/10/01/-u-p- u.//2012 /10/01/-u-p-USL6E8L1ASL20 USL6E8L1ASL20121001. 121001. S Mu G , “I P Cu ‘Mu’ O E,” Ru, Ju 1, 2012, p://.u.//2012/07/01/--INL6E8I106C201207 p://.u.//2012/07/01/--INL6E8I106C20120701 01
41
28
v v " . S Bzu D, “E I Cz Aj,”
“Cp H D Su G,” I M Fu, O. 2012, p://../x/pu//
/2012/02/p/x.p
T I pp p p p u . I 2008, up 60 I u k Aj' "-" p, u " Los Angeles imes, imes, Nv. 10, 2008. I , M 2012, Aj u p .. S L N, “Aj j G B S E Spu,” B, M 25, 2012, p://.
29
imes,, Au. 12, 2012, p://..////0/63880 C H, “Du J Ov Bu I,”Financial I,” Financial imes p://..////0/6388023-111-89-0014449.#xzz2BZ47
.//2012-03-25/j-------pu .//2012-03-25/j----- --pu.. .. I u pu Aj p , , .
30
42
Ak Fk, “U.S.–I S Tv,”Te Tv,” Te Iran Primer , U.S. Iu P, Ap 10, 2012, p://p.up./ p://p.up./
Bu W’ x- u, k p C Iq k, u
/2012/p/10/u----v-0
I , uu p u u I. S-Buj, p. ., p 14.
31
43
Kz, “I S,” p. .
I G,” Wall Street Journal , Nv.23, 2012p://.j.//SB1000142412788732435200457813697360 p://.j.//SB10001424127887324352004578136973602198776. 2198776.
44
W IRGC pv u , p IRGC u quk
S , Hu Guv, W’ I uk ?, Ju 9, 2012. p://../-/2012/07/09/-p://../-/2012/07/09/--
I pp u , pu p -
----uk-/#xzz208GjjS
. W v p I’ IRGC, u k IRGC p . E S, ., Sanctions, Statecra and Nuclear Prolieration, Prolieration, C Uv
32
P, 2012, p 20.
I pv 18% uk' u 51% ( 40%) . I u 60% uk' xp
uk' I 50% $16 2011. J Pk E Pk, “uk Sp G
N H, “uk I: G E R Dp W S,” Midd Middle le East East Brie Brie , N. 62, M 2012,
p://..u//pu//MEB62.p 45 33
Sv A, “S I uk' L Hp H I,” Ru, Au. 16, 2012, p://.u.//2012/08/16/uk--INL6E8JGC8U20120816
IRGC- v qu k k , u u (I j
IRGC), k, p. T IRGC v u v u vu 1,260 , u —v pv —u u v. T v u u C Bk, I’
34
F u x UN xp p p, p:// .. ..//UNSC/u-pxpp-06 //UNSC/u-pxpp-061212.p 1212.p
35
F xv U.S. p P Gu GCC, S F R
u v, u u z u IRGC. T v p ppu. T IRGC uv vp u v, I’ u v. O R Q IRGC,
C, “T Gu Su Au: Pp W Gu Cp Cu,” Mj S Rp, Ju 19, 2012.
pp 2011, p IRGC k v pv v p. A A, “I' Rvu Gu Sk O,” Midd O,” Middle le East East Quarterly Quarterly , W 2012,
36
p://.u./3153/-vu-u-k-
“Wp “W p U S p 2011 , v j P Gu .” “Ov
p U S $66.3 , -qu k.” Su A u $33.4 . S T Sk, “U.S. A S Mk up M G Mk,” New York imes, imes, Au. 26,
46
N K, “P Gp I.”New I.” New York imes, imes, Ju 16, 2012.
47
F IRGC , A A, “H I A Rvu Gu I’
2012, p://../2012/0 p://../2012/08/27///u- 8/27///u-----66-3---20 ----66-3---2011. 11. 37
M E, “I' B M P,”Te P,” Te Iran Primer , U.S. Iu P, p://p.u p://p.up./u p./u//-
--p
E,” E ,” p://..//-- p://..//---p//--- -p//----/----/---vu-u---/. vu-u ---/. AEI, O. 22, 2007. F -p IRGC I I, Kz, K, Te Warriors o Islam: Iran’s Revolutionary Guard . Wv P, 1993. O “ ,” I C Bk, M B, k , S-Buj, p. ., p 14.
80 weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran
weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran 81
Endnotes
Endnotes
24
38
T p u p I u xp. S S S H R C,
I v v p j u— Cp S P Gu. I
2011 2.5 p (p), u 1.5 p, $8
- u v . I up S Huz, p,
vu v qu. S “R S Ru I Cu O Pu,” Ju 28, 2012. p:// ..v/
35% v u 90% GCC Iq -u xp. T
//2012/06/194200.. A p p u 2.2 p 2010 1.2 p Auu 2012. S
u p x v I up. Hv, xp v u v u u
S. C S. R G. (.) C W, “T P I: A E E E Nu I,” Bp P C, O. 2012. W U.S. Dp u pu 55% 2.4 p
k, p . W Su A pu , v up, u p u u . S D Mup, “I' v S Huz? U, u N E,”
2011, 1 p 2012.T , I - xp ,
Christian Science Monitor , D. 28, 2012, p://../W ./W/Bk/2011/122 /Bk/2011/1228/I---v 8/I---v-S--S--
$100 . I xp I up $5 , I u
Huz-U-u--
u u k vu. S U.S. Dp u u P C, “Rk U S F I Dv C B N Yk Uv S L ‘T L P I S,’” ’” Sp. 12, 2012, p://.u p://.u.v/p-/p .v/p-/p-/P/170 -/P/1706.px 6.px 25
F I A.R. Lk P N, “I C Sk I S W ‘Juk O,’” B
N, M 30, 2012, p://..//20 p://..//2012-03-29/---k-- 12-03-29/---k----juk---. --juk---. 26
S Rk G, “A N S D I’ Cu F,” New York imes, imes, O 1, 2012, p://..
/2012/10/02///--pu---.?_=0
39
Op . J Cpp, S S C I, J. 31, 2012.
40
S U.S. pv v I u “pu ” ” p p v-
u p p, U.S. . I u I , , “ p [] v I z .” H “ qu pp v pu ’ pu ,” , “vu v p .” S K DYu DYu S W, “Pu I O G I S, U.S. O S,”Washin S,”Washington gton Post , J. 10, 2012, p://.p./ p://.p.//-u/----- /-u/------p-u--/2012/0 -p-u--/2012/01/10/ 1/10/
27
O I’ u v, Ru, “UPDAE 3-I R Pu W S B,” O. 1, 2012, p://.
IQA0KJP_.
u.//2012/10/01/-u-p- u.//2012 /10/01/-u-p-USL6E8L1ASL20 USL6E8L1ASL20121001. 121001. S Mu G , “I P Cu ‘Mu’ O E,” Ru, Ju 1, 2012, p://.u.//2012/07/01/--INL6E8I106C201207 p://.u.//2012/07/01/--INL6E8I106C20120701 01
41
28
v v " . S Bzu D, “E I Cz Aj,”
“Cp H D Su G,” I M Fu, O. 2012, p://../x/pu//
/2012/02/p/x.p
T I pp p p p u . I 2008, up 60 I u k Aj' "-" p, u " Los Angeles imes, imes, Nv. 10, 2008. I , M 2012, Aj u p .. S L N, “Aj j G B S E Spu,” B, M 25, 2012, p://.
29
imes, Au. 12, 2012, p://..////0/63880 C H, “Du J Ov Bu I,”Financial I,” Financial imes, p://..////0/6388023-111-89-0014449.#xzz2BZ47
.//2012-03-25/j-------pu .//2012-03-25/j----- --pu.. .. I u pu Aj p , , .
30
42
Ak Fk, “U.S.–I S Tv,”Te Tv,” Te Iran Primer , U.S. Iu P, Ap 10, 2012, p://p.up./ p://p.up./
Bu W’ x- u, k p C Iq k, u
/2012/p/10/u----v-0
I , uu p u u I. S-Buj, p. ., p 14.
31
43
Kz, “I S,” p. .
I G,” Wall Street Journal , Nv.23, 2012p://.j.//SB1000142412788732435200457813697360 p://.j.//SB10001424127887324352004578136973602198776. 2198776.
44
W IRGC pv u , p IRGC u quk
S , Hu Guv, W’ I uk ?, Ju 9, 2012. p://../-/2012/07/09/-p://../-/2012/07/09/--
I pp u , pu p -
----uk-/#xzz208GjjS
. W v p I’ IRGC, u k IRGC p . E S, ., Sanctions, Statecra and Nuclear Prolieration, Prolieration, C Uv
32
P, 2012, p 20.
I pv 18% uk' u 51% ( 40%) . I u 60% uk' xp
uk' I 50% $16 2011. J Pk E Pk, “uk Sp G
N H, “uk I: G E R Dp W S,” Midd Middle le East East Brie Brie , N. 62, M 2012,
p://..u//pu//MEB62.p 45 33
Sv A, “S I uk' L Hp H I,” Ru, Au. 16, 2012, p://.u.//2012/08/16/uk--INL6E8JGC8U20120816
IRGC- v qu k k , u u (I j
IRGC), k, p. T IRGC v u v u vu 1,260 , u —v pv —u u v. T v u u C Bk, I’
34
F u x UN xp p p, p:// .. ..//UNSC/u-pxpp-06 //UNSC/u-pxpp-061212.p 1212.p
35
F xv U.S. p P Gu GCC, S F R
u v, u u z u IRGC. T v p ppu. T IRGC uv vp u v, I’ u v. O R Q IRGC,
C, “T Gu Su Au: Pp W Gu Cp Cu,” Mj S Rp, Ju 19, 2012.
pp 2011, p IRGC k v pv v p. A A, “I' Rvu Gu Sk O,” Midd O,” Middle le East East Quarterly Quarterly , W 2012,
36
p://.u./3153/-vu-u-k-
“Wp “W p U S p 2011 , v j P Gu .” “Ov
p U S $66.3 , -qu k.” Su A u $33.4 . S T Sk, “U.S. A S Mk up M G Mk,” New York imes, imes, Au. 26,
46
N K, “P Gp I.”New I.” New York imes, imes, Ju 16, 2012.
47
F IRGC , A A, “H I A Rvu Gu I’
2012, p://../2012/0 p://../2012/08/27///u- 8/27///u-----66-3---20 ----66-3---2011. 11. 37
M E, “I' B M P,”Te P,” Te Iran Primer , U.S. Iu P, p://p.u p://p.up./u p./u//-
--p
E,” E ,” p://..//-- p://..//---p//--- -p//----/----/---vu-u---/. vu-u ---/. AEI, O. 22, 2007. F -p IRGC I I, Kz, K, Te Warriors o Islam: Iran’s Revolutionary Guard . Wv P, 1993. O “ ,” I C Bk, M B, k , S-Buj, p. ., p 14.
weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran 81
80 weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran
Endnotes
Endnotes
48
Huz, 35% p- u p. S Gu Cz, “B P S C W O,” Financialimes, imes, Nv. 4, 2012, p://..////0/397 p://..////0/3978-1-112-81-0 8-1-112-81-001440.#xzz2BZ 01440.#xzz2BZYJIv YJIv
M A S, p , xp “p uu u
,” p R F. W New York imes, imes, “I’ Gv D Hu uu F N V S ’09 P,” M 2, 2012.
62
P (.., Iq 1990) v upp v u u u
49
I u p v Sup L K p 2013 p . I u k , . R u
u u . S , vv u pp I .
, p , p k p p U
63
S. N S, “R Lv: I D P P E 2013,” C C
I M 2012, S W W Ik F u (SWIF) I k , p, u p I' p , u -
M E Su, Ju 2012.
. “P SWIF xp I k Su,” Ru, M 15, 2012. p://.u.//2012/03/15/ p://.u.//2012/03/15/ u-u--USBRE82E15M20120 u-u-- USBRE82E15M20120315. 315. S , Nj Bz “I I, S k Sk,” T W
50
J B, “S “S’’ U : Opp,”Washin Opp,” Washington gton Post , Au. 15, 2012.
51
S u v px I’ vp, k
P, Sp. 4, 2012 p://.p.//_/-k----k/2012/09/04/07 p://.p.//_/-k----k/2012/09/04/072-622-62111-8253-349570650_.
pu , , , . “S I Au E, F
64
A,” M N A v J Dk, O. 14, 2012.
p u v I z. S Muz Hu, “S S: F Iq I,” Ajz,
I I, p p , u k , v kk, -uquu , u k, v
O. 3, 2012, p://.jz./p/p/2012/10/201210373854792889. p://.jz./p/p/2012/10/201210373854792889. 52
T p I z I’ p-A u ppu. S S
L, “I S Sk A-US S,” Ajz, Nv. 5, 2012.
65
A, p I’ u, 1996 2006, u 70% up. P v
S P I “ j p up ” u u- x
j v . S-Buj, p. . p 19.
p… u, u 100 p v pu up . S-Buj, p. ., p 13.
53
66
Gv A, “F G Mv L,” Te Iran Primer , U.S. Iu P, O. 11, 2011, p://p.up. p://p.up.
I’ pu p u . A,
Au T Eup U U S v xp xp I, p
//2011//11/--v-
u v p v p , pu u . T u u k k, up, uu u u x u -
54
Mu B, Gv C Bk I (CBI), CBI
p. S PBS F, “Dp P 1: T Dpp Lv Du,” Nv. 8, 2012, p://.p.//p/-
. I S, “E S I: A D W,” G R, Au. 6, 2012, p://../ -------/32222
/uu/2012/11/-k-p-1-- /uu /2012/11/-k-p-1--pp--v-u pp--v-u.#xzz2BjzNU76. .#xzz2BjzNU76.A, p
55
G C Hufu . ., EconomicSanctions Reconsidere Reconsidered d , P Iu I E, U Bk P, 2007.
v x p v , u - , pp. I p “vu A Eup k vv I, pu vv.” T u Dp u p W k u I. O W p , “Bk , ’ u I.”
F qu k I, T I Pj’ pp,Weigh pp,Weighing ing the Benefts and Costs o Military Action Against Iran, Sp. 2012, .pj./ .pj./p p
S T Ek, “I S k Uxp M Ip,” New York imes, imes, Nv. 2, 2012, p:// ..
57
67
56
Cpp , p. .
/2012/11/03///--k----p. /2012/11/03/ //--k----p.?p= ?p= . I p v u p v p I
pu U.S. v k . S T Ek, “I’ A A F S A F 58
x p u p://..//p/-.p
U U.S. S,” New York imes, imes, Ju 14, 2012.
59
I Ju 2012, I A V , “I pv u S
68
u u Dp, O F A C, “C Gu: Hu A I,” Au. 13, 2012.
Eup I’ xp. S “I Iu N T S Huz,” Te National , J. 5, 2012. A A Fv, v
69
I B quk D 2003, OFAC u k , 90- p, z
I’ IRGC : "T IRGC' v v [I–Iq] p S Huz v p p u.” S “I' p p L D Bk S Huz,”
v u u pp p.
A, Ju 14, 2012.
70
Huz.” S p, A Buj, “ v xp u S Huz”
60
I’ p qu MP I A-M: "T pp N Su
I 1995— p pp I u v u j A p—C Cp.
I vp I’ S I, P Gu . C v up pj , 1995 v ( p pp) p U S.
F P P k k u v I.” H u, “T vp Eup U' I Rpu I." Ru, “I D B Bk Huz Gu O k,” Ju 2, 2012, p://.u.//2012/07/02/u--p://.u.//2012/07/02/u---
71
uz-USBRE8610R920120702
u u.
61
T xp I S A “p u”—u
v p’ v I p p x vp u I k
72
Kz, “I S A,” p. .
2.59 upp, v 500,000 p Cup), p p . C , p u p M E, xp
73
“T L Iv: I S Bu W C Mx B,”Economist B,” Economist , Au. 18, 2012,
k p up Gu upp. F U.S. p. “Ev u p z,
p://..//21560614
W U S - pu u (u p v
’ u u vu p k,” Dv G, G G S, u. O p v, , p k uu p p u.
74
pv p v, U.S. k u u k p u S
U.S. v O 2012 p. I Auu 2012, C k u v p
82 weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran
T C–I p W’ x- k . C v
weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran 83
Endnotes
Endnotes
48
Huz, 35% p- u p. S Gu Cz, “B P S C W O,” Financialimes, imes, Nv. 4, 2012, p://..////0/397 p://..////0/3978-1-112-81-0 8-1-112-81-001440.#xzz2BZ 01440.#xzz2BZYJIv YJIv
M A S, p , xp “p uu u
,” p R F. W New York imes, imes, “I’ Gv D Hu uu F N V S ’09 P,” M 2, 2012.
62
P (.., Iq 1990) v upp v u u u
49
I u p v Sup L K p 2013 p . I u k , . R u
u u . S , vv u pp I .
, p , p k p p U
63
S. N S, “R Lv: I D P P E 2013,” C C
I M 2012, S W W Ik F u (SWIF) I k , p, u p I' p , u -
M E Su, Ju 2012.
. “P SWIF xp I k Su,” Ru, M 15, 2012. p://.u.//2012/03/15/ p://.u.//2012/03/15/ u-u--USBRE82E15M20120 u-u-- USBRE82E15M20120315. 315. S , Nj Bz “I I, S k Sk,” T W
50
J B, “S “S’’ U : Opp,”Washin Opp,” Washington gton Post , Au. 15, 2012.
51
S u v px I’ vp, k
P, Sp. 4, 2012 p://.p.//_/-k----k/2012/09/04/07 p://.p.//_/-k----k/2012/09/04/072-622-62111-8253-349570650_.
pu , , , . “S I Au E, F
64
A,” M N A v J Dk, O. 14, 2012.
p u v I z. S Muz Hu, “S S: F Iq I,” Ajz,
I I, p p , u k , v kk, -uquu , u k, v
O. 3, 2012, p://.jz./p/p/2012/10/201210373854792889. p://.jz./p/p/2012/10/201210373854792889. 52
T p I z I’ p-A u ppu. S S
L, “I S Sk A-US S,” Ajz, Nv. 5, 2012.
65
A, p I’ u, 1996 2006, u 70% up. P v
S P I “ j p up ” u u- x
j v . S-Buj, p. . p 19.
p… u, u 100 p v pu up . S-Buj, p. ., p 13.
53
66
Gv A, “F G Mv L,” Te Iran Primer , U.S. Iu P, O. 11, 2011, p://p.up. p://p.up.
I’ pu p u . A,
Au T Eup U U S v xp xp I, p
//2011//11/--v-
u v p v p , pu u . T u u k k, up, uu u u x u -
54
Mu B, Gv C Bk I (CBI), CBI
p. S PBS F, “Dp P 1: T Dpp Lv Du,” Nv. 8, 2012, p://.p.//p/-
. I S, “E S I: A D W,” G R, Au. 6, 2012, p://../ -------/32222
/uu/2012/11/-k-p-1-- /uu /2012/11/-k-p-1--pp--v-u pp--v-u.#xzz2BjzNU76. .#xzz2BjzNU76.A, p
55
G C Hufu . ., EconomicSanctions Reconsidere Reconsidered d , P Iu I E, U Bk P, 2007.
v x p v , u - , pp. I p “vu A Eup k vv I, pu vv.” T u Dp u p W k u I. O W p , “Bk , ’ u I.”
F qu k I, T I Pj’ pp,Weigh pp,Weighing ing the Benefts and Costs o Military Action Against Iran, Sp. 2012, .pj./ .pj./p p
S T Ek, “I S k Uxp M Ip,” New York imes, imes, Nv. 2, 2012, p:// ..
57
67
56
Cpp , p. .
/2012/11/03///--k----p. /2012/11/03/ //--k----p.?p= ?p= . I p v u p v p I
pu U.S. v k . S T Ek, “I’ A A F S A F 58
x p u p://..//p/-.p
U U.S. S,” New York imes, imes, Ju 14, 2012.
59
I Ju 2012, I A V , “I pv u S
68
u u Dp, O F A C, “C Gu: Hu A I,” Au. 13, 2012.
Eup I’ xp. S “I Iu N T S Huz,” Te National , J. 5, 2012. A A Fv, v
69
I B quk D 2003, OFAC u k , 90- p, z
I’ IRGC : "T IRGC' v v [I–Iq] p S Huz v p p u.” S “I' p p L D Bk S Huz,”
v u u pp p.
A, Ju 14, 2012.
70
Huz.” S p, A Buj, “ v xp u S Huz”
60
I’ p qu MP I A-M: "T pp N Su
I 1995— p pp I u v u j A p—C Cp.
I vp I’ S I, P Gu . C v up pj , 1995 v ( p pp) p U S.
F P P k k u v I.” H u, “T vp Eup U' I Rpu I." Ru, “I D B Bk Huz Gu O k,” Ju 2, 2012, p://.u.//2012/07/02/u--p://.u.//2012/07/02/u---
71
uz-USBRE8610R920120702
u u.
61
T xp I S A “p u”—u
v p’ v I p p x vp u I k
72
Kz, “I S A,” p. .
2.59 upp, v 500,000 p Cup), p p . C , p u p M E, xp
73
“T L Iv: I S Bu W C Mx B,”Economist B,” Economist , Au. 18, 2012,
k p up Gu upp. F U.S. p. “Ev u p z,
p://..//21560614
W U S - pu u (u p v
’ u u vu p k,” Dv G, G G S, u. O p v, , p k uu p p u.
74
pv p v, U.S. k u u k p u S
U.S. v O 2012 p. I Auu 2012, C k u v p
T C–I p W’ x- k . C v
weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran 83
82 weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran
Endnotes
Endnotes
I k u B, A k. C pu u Challenge,” R D. Bk, ., Cu F R P, 2012. ppx 20% I’ xp, Iran: Te Nuclear Challenge,”
S Fu Bz Spu S, “A Cu-Ex Cu-Ex W C I” R F Eup, O. 5, 2012, p://..//---u-/24729954.
A, pu R S, D USA E N F Cu p v, O. 19, 2012. O p A v v . Mu A u v upp ,
85
k pu vp. Mj I u, u I, Jp, Su K, v
1,000 A u A j ’v I. S I , A v u
p U.S. 2011. Ov , pvu j EU pu I u ,
, up. P , H, 75 I , v u NAO ,
- u Eup, k u p I. S S. C S. R G. (.) C W, “T P I: A E E E Nu I,” Bp P C, O. 2012.
u v A . T u k I u v u v H, . S Economist , “A: L, L. A R Tv C I
T I A k I . I
I N Su u,” Nv. 10–16, 2012. 75
E I’ GDP v. F $1 “I Cu Rp,” Global Finance Magazine, Magazine,
p://../p--u-p/253--p-u-p.#xzz2CAIL
86
E I A, Cu A B: I, F. 17, 2012.
76
87
W W pu quk, 2012, k up 92 p , p
T O ju p I S A C’ “ ” -
p . S v v u C’ upp 2012 UN I “
p 3.5 . M, u, u u,
v I’ .” G , U S k C, p://u.
k x 89 p . H p p p -
/Iu/S-P/I/. /Iu/S -P/I/. A, 2007 2011, I p C 200%, I xp
v v up up v, v qu pu x . Su
C 128%, v C p U.S. . A Ru, “S up C' u v p p upp k
A upp k up u I xp. Cu p v u u I u pp P Gu. Au
.” I , v p I, C pu p v u .
v p , u p. W p u p u u
S Ju Hu Ax L, “C Bu up Su, Ru O Squz I,” Ru, F. 7, 2012.
k, k p u u p u . S L Mu, “T C O Gu: T R F Sp Mk P S Du O P,” Wall Street Journal , Nv. 6, 2012, p://.j.
77
S pv u Dp “ u” u 18%
pu u p p ( ju vu). A v u xp. Kz, C R Sv, O. 15, 2012, 19. A, O J. 23, 2012, T Eup U p Cu D 2012/35/CFSP, D 2010/413/CFSP v u I. N u
//SB1000142405297020471290 //SB100014 24052970204712904578094980730090 4578094980730090350. 350. 88
“I upu, xp u—IEA,” Ru, Nv. 13, 2012, p://.u./ p://.u.//2012/11/13/-US/2012/11/13/-US-
S8E7LQ02G20121113
p, p, pu I u , pu, p pu up 92% EU p I. S, pu, p, k pu ; p , u,
89
I’ p u; C Bk I . F EU Cu D,p://..up.u///2012/u/_149069.p p://..up.u///2012/u/_149069.p
u p I xp U.S. xp D 3, uk E M Yz . S “uk W N Ru I O G Ip: E M,” Ru, Nv. 9, 2012, p://.u./
I 1996, I uk 25- upp 10 u uk u. u. uk -
/2012/11/08/uk---AFL5E8M86YX20121108 78
Lu E-K B Fu, “T O E M I O Wp,” Ox Iu E
Su, F. 2012, pp 3–4.
90
Exuv O 12170, Nv. 14, 1979, 44 F.R. 65729 Bk I Gv Pp, p://.u.v/u p://.u.v/u/ /
/P/Du/Exuv%20O%2012170.p 79
“S H— M— G W I,” Wall Street Journal , D. 17, 2011, p://.j.//SB10001424
052970204323904577040172793024832.
91
T I L S A (ILSA), pp pv L I. T
p L 2004 L v up u p p pp 80
I p E p $2 I’ p NIOC,
u p u p. S, “T O E M I O Wp,” Lu E-K B Fu, Ox Iu E Su, F. 2012, p 3.
U S. Suqu I S A. 92
K Dvp, H O Pp I Nu Iu, Auu 2012, p://..//
I_Nu_Pp 81
S-Buj,, p. . A, U S v v u Eup S-Buj
“k” C, M, V u E Eup k v . O
93
v, v, p p “k” I pj v p pvu
Cu Buu ), u , u $89.2 u Auu 2012. T v v
Eup v I’ . S K Kz, p. .
k p u u , xp — U.S. xp—u u p I p u U.S. . M pu pu
82
$14.9 $26.7 ( 2011 2012). S U.S. u u k k,
N H, “T Ip S I-GCC E R,” M E B, N. 45, Nv. 2010,
p://..u//pu//MEB45.p
U.S. xp I 1/3 p ( $199.5 $150.8 ,
xp v pk u , u k k. S Ru, “U.S. Exp I R N O-T Dp S,” O. 15, 2012, p://.u. p://.u.//2012/10/15/u--u//2012/10/15/u--u-
83
T O p I’ x u u A . O Ju 30, 2012, P O p Exuv O v u Dp “p pu p
xp-USBRE89E04L20121015
u pu , k , I v.” M R A L, “I
94
Cu F Hv A,” New York imes, imes, Au. 17, 2012, p://../2012/08/18/// p://../2012/08/18///
O xp u 21% I’ GDP p 30% 50% A P Gu ,”
-u----k.?p=
p://.-./pu//2012/-/ p://.- ./pu//2012/-/---p ---p-. -.
84
95
A v v u I , I v
x uquu A , v - vu .
W v I , “I’ v v.
T v -v z up u U A Nu I, u pp v
pp U.S. v j u I pp pp I’ u p. S K Kz, “I S,” C R Sv, O. 15, 2012, p 68.
84 weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran
weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran 85
Endnotes
Endnotes
I k u B, A k. C pu u Challenge,” R D. Bk, ., Cu F R P, 2012. ppx 20% I’ xp, Iran: Te Nuclear Challenge,”
S Fu Bz Spu S, “A Cu-Ex Cu-Ex W C I” R F Eup, O. 5, 2012, p://..//---u-/24729954.
A, pu R S, D USA E N F Cu p v, O. 19, 2012. O p A v v . Mu A u v upp ,
85
k pu vp. Mj I u, u I, Jp, Su K, v
1,000 A u A j ’v I. S I , A v u
p U.S. 2011. Ov , pvu j EU pu I u ,
, up. P , H, 75 I , v u NAO ,
- u Eup, k u p I. S S. C S. R G. (.) C W, “T P I: A E E E Nu I,” Bp P C, O. 2012.
u v A . T u k I u v u v H, . S Economist , “A: L, L. A R Tv C I
T I A k I . I
I N Su u,” Nv. 10–16, 2012. 75
E I’ GDP v. F $1 “I Cu Rp,” Global Finance Magazine, Magazine,
p://../p--u-p/253--p-u-p.#xzz2CAIL
86
E I A, Cu A B: I, F. 17, 2012.
76
87
W W pu quk, 2012, k up 92 p , p
T O ju p I S A C’ “ ” -
p . S v v u C’ upp 2012 UN I “
p 3.5 . M, u, u u,
v I’ .” G , U S k C, p://u.
k x 89 p . H p p p -
/Iu/S-P/I/. /Iu/S -P/I/. A, 2007 2011, I p C 200%, I xp
v v up up v, v qu pu x . Su
C 128%, v C p U.S. . A Ru, “S up C' u v p p upp k
A upp k up u I xp. Cu p v u u I u pp P Gu. Au
.” I , v p I, C pu p v u .
v p , u p. W p u p u u
S Ju Hu Ax L, “C Bu up Su, Ru O Squz I,” Ru, F. 7, 2012.
k, k p u u p u . S L Mu, “T C O Gu: T R F Sp Mk P S Du O P,” Wall Street Journal , Nv. 6, 2012, p://.j.
77
S pv u Dp “ u” u 18%
pu u p p ( ju vu). A v u xp. Kz, C R Sv, O. 15, 2012, 19. A, O J. 23, 2012, T Eup U p Cu D 2012/35/CFSP, D 2010/413/CFSP v u I. N u
//SB1000142405297020471290 //SB100014 24052970204712904578094980730090 4578094980730090350. 350. 88
“I upu, xp u—IEA,” Ru, Nv. 13, 2012, p://.u./ p://.u.//2012/11/13/-US/2012/11/13/-US-
S8E7LQ02G20121113
p, p, pu I u , pu, p pu up 92% EU p I. S, pu, p, k pu ; p , u,
89
I’ p u; C Bk I . F EU Cu D,p://..up.u///2012/u/_149069.p p://..up.u///2012/u/_149069.p
u p I xp U.S. xp D 3, uk E M Yz . S “uk W N Ru I O G Ip: E M,” Ru, Nv. 9, 2012, p://.u./
I 1996, I uk 25- upp 10 u uk u. u. uk -
/2012/11/08/uk---AFL5E8M86YX20121108 78
Lu E-K B Fu, “T O E M I O Wp,” Ox Iu E
Su, F. 2012, pp 3–4.
90
Exuv O 12170, Nv. 14, 1979, 44 F.R. 65729 Bk I Gv Pp, p://.u.v/u p://.u.v/u/ /
/P/Du/Exuv%20O%2012170.p 79
“S H— M— G W I,” Wall Street Journal , D. 17, 2011, p://.j.//SB10001424
052970204323904577040172793024832.
91
T I L S A (ILSA), pp pv L I. T
p L 2004 L v up u p p pp 80
I p E p $2 I’ p NIOC,
u p u p. S, “T O E M I O Wp,” Lu E-K B Fu, Ox Iu E Su, F. 2012, p 3.
U S. Suqu I S A. 92
K Dvp, H O Pp I Nu Iu, Auu 2012, p://..//
I_Nu_Pp 81
S-Buj,, p. . A, U S v v u Eup S-Buj
“k” C, M, V u E Eup k v . O
93
v, v, p p “k” I pj v p pvu
Cu Buu ), u , u $89.2 u Auu 2012. T v v
Eup v I’ . S K Kz, p. .
k p u u , xp — U.S. xp—u u p I p u U.S. . M pu pu
82
$14.9 $26.7 ( 2011 2012). S U.S. u u k k,
N H, “T Ip S I-GCC E R,” M E B, N. 45, Nv. 2010,
p://..u//pu//MEB45.p
U.S. xp I 1/3 p ( $199.5 $150.8 ,
xp v pk u , u k k. S Ru, “U.S. Exp I R N O-T Dp S,” O. 15, 2012, p://.u. p://.u.//2012/10/15/u--u//2012/10/15/u--u-
83
T O p I’ x u u A . O Ju 30, 2012, P O p Exuv O v u Dp “p pu p
xp-USBRE89E04L20121015
u pu , k , I v.” M R A L, “I
94
Cu F Hv A,” New York imes, imes, Au. 17, 2012, p://../2012/08/18/// p://../2012/08/18///
O xp u 21% I’ GDP p 30% 50% A P Gu ,”
-u----k.?p=
p://.-./pu//2012/-/ p://.- ./pu//2012/-/---p ---p-. -.
84
95
A v v u I , I v
x uquu A , v - vu .
W v I , “I’ v v.
T v -v z up u U A Nu I, u pp v
pp U.S. v j u I pp pp I’ u p. S K Kz, “I S,” C R Sv, O. 15, 2012, p 68.
weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran 85
84 weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran
Endnotes
96
Exuv O 13622 P.L. 112-158 u U.S. u v p pu I , , p 68.
97
T u Eup I vu. I p v uk, Az p . S Ju Pk, “EU Mv C N I S,” Ru, O. 12, 2012, p://.u.//2012/10/12/u-u-- p://.u./ /2012/10/12/u-u---USBRE89B0VJ201 -USBRE89B0VJ20121012 21012 98
B EU O 2012, u p p
U.S. u I u , “ x u’ Eup , p pu.” Kz, p. . “I S,” p 68. 99
Ju Pk, p. .
100
T EU p v “p UN pv upp I' p-
-v u v vp u p v …. v u pp 104 p —43 v UN, …[ ] EU.” Fuu u xp u v . S Cu Eup U, “F, T Eup U I,” Bu, Bu, O. 16, 2012, p 5. 101
S Kz, p. . “I S,” pp 68–69 .
T pp W Lu, D T I Pj; I B, T I Pj C; P L, T I Pj. T v K Kz pv vu u . T pp v p u T R. Pk, J W MI Sp Hz Rk B’ Fu. M vu u. B u pp p . A pv Rx E. Ou p , L, O D, I., Ok N, u vu k pu p.
86 weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran
T I Pj -v -v z k pv U S I v. Fu 2002 U N A USA Rk B’ B’ Fu, T I Pj p 2009. T T I Pj v v : Sp Hz, W Lu, W M, T Pk, J W, Fk W. © 2012 T I Pj
Endnotes
96
Exuv O 13622 P.L. 112-158 u U.S. u v p pu I , , p 68.
97
T u Eup I vu. I p v uk, Az p . S Ju Pk, “EU Mv C N I S,” Ru, O. 12, 2012, p://.u.//2012/10/12/u-u-- p://.u./ /2012/10/12/u-u---USBRE89B0VJ201 -USBRE89B0VJ20121012 21012 98
B EU O 2012, u p p
U.S. u I u , “ x u’ Eup , p pu.” Kz, p. . “I S,” p 68. 99
Ju Pk, p. .
100
T EU p v “p UN pv upp I' p-
-v u v vp u p v …. v u pp 104 p —43 v UN, …[ ] EU.” Fuu u xp u v . S Cu Eup U, “F, T Eup U I,” Bu, Bu, O. 16, 2012, p 5. 101
S Kz, p. . “I S,” pp 68–69 .
T pp W Lu, D T I Pj; I B, T I Pj C; P L, T I Pj. T v K Kz pv vu u . T pp v p u T R. Pk, J W MI Sp Hz Rk B’ Fu. M vu u. B u pp p . A pv Rx E. Ou p , L, O D, I., Ok N, u vu k pu p.
86 weighing beneits and costs o international sanctions against iran
T I Pj -v -v z k pv U S I v. Fu 2002 U N A USA Rk B’ B’ Fu, T I Pj p 2009. T T I Pj v v : Sp Hz, W Lu, W M, T Pk, J W, Fk W. © 2012 T I Pj
THE IRAN PROJECT The Iran Project 475 Riverside Drive Suite 900 New York, NY 10115 email:
[email protected] www.theiranproject.org
THE IRAN PROJECT The Iran Project 475 Riverside Drive Suite 900 New York, NY 10115 email:
[email protected] www.theiranproject.org