Weighing Benefts and Costs o Military Action Against Iran.
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Tis document is published by Te Iran Project; the content is the collective view of the signers. 2 weighing beneits and costs o military action against iran
Signed and Endorsed by:
Signed and Endorsed by:
Morton Abramowitz, Amb.
Richard L. Armitage
Ellen Laipson
Jessica T. Mathews
Samuel Berger
Zbigniew Brzezinski
William G. Miller, Amb.
Gregory S. Newbold, LtGen.
Nicholas Burns, Amb.
Stephen A. Cheney BrigGen.
Sam Nunn, Sen.
Thomas R. Pickering, Amb.
Joseph Cirincione
Edward P. Djerejian, Amb.
Paul Pillar
Joe Sestak, RADM.
James Dobbins
William J. Fallon, Adm.
Brent Scowcroft, Gen.
Ann-Marie Sl aught aughter er
Leslie H. Gelb
Chuck Hagel, Sen.
Paul Volcker
James Walsh
Lee H. Hamilt Hamilton on
Stephen B. Heintz
John C. Whitehead
Lawrence B. Wilkerson, Col.
Carla A. Hills
Frank Kearney, LTG.
Timothy E. Wirth, Sen.
Frank G. Wisner, Amb.
Daniel C. Kurtzer, Amb.
William H. Luers, Amb.
Anthony C. Zinni, Gen.
2 weighing beneits and costs o military action against iran
weighing beneits and costs o military action against iran 3
Signed and Endorsed by:
Signed and Endorsed by:
Morton Abramowitz, Amb.
Richard L. Armitage
Ellen Laipson
Jessica T. Mathews
Samuel Berger
Zbigniew Brzezinski
William G. Miller, Amb.
Gregory S. Newbold, LtGen.
Nicholas Burns, Amb.
Stephen A. Cheney BrigGen.
Sam Nunn, Sen.
Thomas R. Pickering, Amb.
Joseph Cirincione
Edward P. Djerejian, Amb.
Paul Pillar
Joe Sestak, RADM.
James Dobbins
William J. Fallon, Adm.
Brent Scowcroft, Gen.
Ann-Marie Sl aught aughter er
Leslie H. Gelb
Chuck Hagel, Sen.
Paul Volcker
James Walsh
Lee H. Hamilt Hamilton on
Stephen B. Heintz
John C. Whitehead
Lawrence B. Wilkerson, Col.
Carla A. Hills
Frank Kearney, LTG.
Timothy E. Wirth, Sen.
Frank G. Wisner, Amb.
Daniel C. Kurtzer, Amb.
William H. Luers, Amb.
Anthony C. Zinni, Gen.
weighing beneits and costs o military action against iran 3
2 weighing beneits and costs o military action against iran
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Weighing Benets and Costs o Military Action against Iran American Presidents have proclaimed or over a decade they they would “take no option o the table” to stop Iran rom building a nuclear bomb—leaving the door open or military action against Iran under certain circumstances.
THE PURPOSE OF THIS PAPER At a time when debate on this this critical issue is oten driven by politics tics and based on
“
I v v pp. I v u, p up . T p .
Abraham Lincoln
”
unexamined assumptions about the ability o military action to achieve U.S. objectives, this paper seeks to provide a oundation or clear thinking about the potential use o orce against Iran. The paper’s authors and signers, a bipartisan group o senior national security experts, recognize that this debate is part o a broader conversation about U.S. policy toward Iran. But we believe that it will be impossible to make a rational assessment o the role o military orce in any overall Iran strategy, without rst careully assessing the likely benets and costs o military action. This paper draws rom a large reservoir o inormed analysis analysis and opinion, all o it publicly available (including unclassied intelligence reports). The pape r is act-based when possible and straightorward about areas o disagreement or uncertainty. Given the quantity and richness o research on many o the issues treated in this paper, we have had to summarize some important exper t discussions in the endnotes; we encourage interested readers to consult those notes or urther details. Our proessional judgments, when oered, are clearly identied as such. This is not an advocacy document; we hope that our balanced consideration o this highly charged issue will help readers draw their own inormed conclusions as to the wisdom o a military action against Iran.
SHARED UNDERSTANDINGS The authors o this paper brought to their their task some shared understandings that provided our diverse group with a common perspective. • We recognize that military action against Ira n is being contemplated because a nuclear-armed Iran would pose dangerous challenges to U.S. interests and security, as well as to the security o Israel. • We are mindful that Iran has twice in the past attempted to expand its nuclear program secretly—eorts that were detected and halted—and that Iran is currently in violation o United Nations Security Council Resolutions requiring it to cease enrichment activities. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which 6 weighing beneits and costs o military action against iran
weighing beneits and costs o military action against iran 7
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Weighing Benets and Costs o Military Action against Iran American Presidents have proclaimed or over a decade they they would “take no option o the table” to stop Iran rom building a nuclear bomb—leaving the door open or military action against Iran under certain circumstances.
THE PURPOSE OF THIS PAPER At a time when debate on this this critical issue is oten driven by politics tics and based on
“
I v v pp. I v u, p up . T p .
Abraham Lincoln
”
unexamined assumptions about the ability o military action to achieve U.S. objectives, this paper seeks to provide a oundation or clear thinking about the potential use o orce against Iran. The paper’s authors and signers, a bipartisan group o senior national security experts, recognize that this debate is part o a broader conversation about U.S. policy toward Iran. But we believe that it will be impossible to make a rational assessment o the role o military orce in any overall Iran strategy, without rst careully assessing the likely benets and costs o military action. This paper draws rom a large reservoir o inormed analysis analysis and opinion, all o it publicly available (including unclassied intelligence reports). The pape r is act-based when possible and straightorward about areas o disagreement or uncertainty. Given the quantity and richness o research on many o the issues treated in this paper, we have had to summarize some important exper t discussions in the endnotes; we encourage interested readers to consult those notes or urther details. Our proessional judgments, when oered, are clearly identied as such. This is not an advocacy document; we hope that our balanced consideration o this highly charged issue will help readers draw their own inormed conclusions as to the wisdom o a military action against Iran.
SHARED UNDERSTANDINGS The authors o this paper brought to their their task some shared understandings that provided our diverse group with a common perspective. • We recognize that military action against Ira n is being contemplated because a nuclear-armed Iran would pose dangerous challenges to U.S. interests and security, as well as to the security o Israel. • We are mindful that Iran has twice in the past attempted to expand its nuclear program secretly—eorts that were detected and halted—and that Iran is currently in violation o United Nations Security Council Resolutions requiring it to cease enrichment activities. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which weighing beneits and costs o military action against iran 7
6 weighing beneits and costs o military action against iran
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
monitors Iran’s Iran’s nuclear program, continues to call or clarication o Iran’s evasive responses to questions about the past record o deception. Nor has the IAEA been able to gain ull access to Iran’s military acilities to conrm the current status o an Iranian nuclear weapons program that intelligence ocials believe was halted in 2003. In addition, Iranian leaders have repeatedly made statements that have threatened Israel and that have been interpreted as challenging the right o the State o Israel to exist.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The assessments assessments highlighted ighted below below are treated in greater greater detail and with ample source citations in the paper.
HIGHLIGHTS I. Timing, Objectives, Capability, and Exit Strategy. The U.S. has signaled that it is prepared to implement “all options”—including the use o military orce against Iran, should sanctions and diplomacy ail—i or when there is a clear indication that
• We agreed not to address broad questions about the United States’ commitment to
Iran has decided to build a nuclear weapon. Ater deciding to “dash” or a bomb,
nuclear nonprolieration that would be raised by a U.S. decision to use orce against Iran
Iran would need rom one to our months to produce enough weapons-grade
to head o a nuclear weapon, including whether the United States would continue to
uranium or a single nuclear device. Additional time—up to two years, according
use orce against other nations that might decide to develop nuclear weapons. Rathe r,
to conservative estimates—would be required or Iran to build a nuclear warhead
we ocused on questions related to the particular case o Iran.
that would be reliably deliverable by a missile. Given extensive monitoring and
• We believe that the use of military force should be a last resort and must be accompanied by a rigorous analysis o likely benets and costs. • We chose not to address alternatives to the use of force in this paper, but will make that the ocus o a uture paper.
surveillance o Iranian activities, signs o an Iranian decision to build a nuclear weapon would likely be detected, and the U.S. would have at least a month to implement a course o action. According to ocial al statements, statements, the the objective ve o U.S. U.S. military tary action on at that that point would be to prevent Iran rom developing a nuclear weapon. In our judgment, that
• We acknowledge that the potential benets of military action against Iran are easier
objective is unlikely to be achieved through a military action that relies on aerial strikes
to describe concisely than the costs o such action—especially the long-term costs,
supplemented by cyber attacks, covert operations, and perhaps special opera-
which are more speculative, and the costs o possible unintended consequences.
tions orces. Ater reviewing many studies on this controversial question, we have come to believe that extended military strikes by the U.S. alone or in concert
• We recognize that there is disagreement on a number of the most important ques tions addressed in the paper. We agreed to explain those disagreements objectively and base our own judgments on careul review o expert analyses and opinion. • Our aim is to provide facts and analyses that could inform discussion of an urgent security challenge in an election year.
OVERVIEW The paper paper is organized organized aroun around d questions that U.S. leaders and citizens should
with Israel could destroy or severely damage the six most important known nuclear acilities in Iran, setting back Iran’s nuclear program or up to our years. Our inormed estimate is that a military strike by Israel alone could delay Iran’s ability to build a bomb or up to two years. In our view, Israel could not replicate the success o its earlier surgical strikes against single reactors in Iraq and Syria, since Iran’s nuclear sites are numerous and widely dispersed, with one (Fordow) buried deep underground. I no lasting resolution o tensions over Iran’s nuclear program can be achieved in the atermath o U.S. and/or Israeli attacks (as discussed below, we
ask themselves when contemplating any military action: At what point is the
believe military action is more likely to reduce than enhance the prospects or such a
use of force justied? What would be the objectives of military action? Do we have the
political resolution), attacks might need to be resumed at some uture point.
capacity to achieve those objectives? What is our exit strategy? What are the likely
We note that there is a marked lack o consensus and clarity in Washington
benets of using military force in this situation? What are the costs, both immediate
about what the U.S. should aim to achieve through any military action against
and long-term? A primer on Iran’ Iran’s s nuclear program concludes the paper.
Iran. Privately, some national security experts and advisors may have embraced the more modest objective o delaying Iran’s ability to build a nuclear weapon, as a step toward prevention; but some others may have embraced objectives that are ar broader than ocial statements currently suggest. Even in order to ulll the stated
8 weighing beneits and costs o military action against iran
weighing beneits and costs o military action against iran 9
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
monitors Iran’s Iran’s nuclear program, continues to call or clarication o Iran’s evasive responses to questions about the past record o deception. Nor has the IAEA been able to gain ull access to Iran’s military acilities to conrm the current status o an Iranian nuclear weapons program that intelligence ocials believe was halted in 2003. In addition, Iranian leaders have repeatedly made statements that have threatened Israel and that have been interpreted as challenging the right o the State o Israel to exist.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The assessments assessments highlighted ighted below below are treated in greater greater detail and with ample source citations in the paper.
HIGHLIGHTS I. Timing, Objectives, Capability, and Exit Strategy. The U.S. has signaled that it is prepared to implement “all options”—including the use o military orce against Iran, should sanctions and diplomacy ail—i or when there is a clear indication that
• We agreed not to address broad questions about the United States’ commitment to
Iran has decided to build a nuclear weapon. Ater deciding to “dash” or a bomb,
nuclear nonprolieration that would be raised by a U.S. decision to use orce against Iran
Iran would need rom one to our months to produce enough weapons-grade
to head o a nuclear weapon, including whether the United States would continue to
uranium or a single nuclear device. Additional time—up to two years, according
use orce against other nations that might decide to develop nuclear weapons. Rathe r,
to conservative estimates—would be required or Iran to build a nuclear warhead
we ocused on questions related to the particular case o Iran.
that would be reliably deliverable by a missile. Given extensive monitoring and
• We believe that the use of military force should be a last resort and must be accompanied by a rigorous analysis o likely benets and costs. • We chose not to address alternatives to the use of force in this paper, but will make that the ocus o a uture paper.
surveillance o Iranian activities, signs o an Iranian decision to build a nuclear weapon would likely be detected, and the U.S. would have at least a month to implement a course o action. According to ocial al statements, statements, the the objective ve o U.S. U.S. military tary action on at that that point would be to prevent Iran rom developing a nuclear weapon. In our judgment, that
• We acknowledge that the potential benets of military action against Iran are easier
objective is unlikely to be achieved through a military action that relies on aerial strikes
to describe concisely than the costs o such action—especially the long-term costs,
supplemented by cyber attacks, covert operations, and perhaps special opera-
which are more speculative, and the costs o possible unintended consequences.
tions orces. Ater reviewing many studies on this controversial question, we have come to believe that extended military strikes by the U.S. alone or in concert
• We recognize that there is disagreement on a number of the most important ques tions addressed in the paper. We agreed to explain those disagreements objectively and base our own judgments on careul review o expert analyses and opinion. • Our aim is to provide facts and analyses that could inform discussion of an urgent security challenge in an election year.
OVERVIEW The paper paper is organized organized aroun around d questions that U.S. leaders and citizens should
with Israel could destroy or severely damage the six most important known nuclear acilities in Iran, setting back Iran’s nuclear program or up to our years. Our inormed estimate is that a military strike by Israel alone could delay Iran’s ability to build a bomb or up to two years. In our view, Israel could not replicate the success o its earlier surgical strikes against single reactors in Iraq and Syria, since Iran’s nuclear sites are numerous and widely dispersed, with one (Fordow) buried deep underground. I no lasting resolution o tensions over Iran’s nuclear program can be achieved in the atermath o U.S. and/or Israeli attacks (as discussed below, we
ask themselves when contemplating any military action: At what point is the
believe military action is more likely to reduce than enhance the prospects or such a
use of force justied? What would be the objectives of military action? Do we have the
political resolution), attacks might need to be resumed at some uture point.
capacity to achieve those objectives? What is our exit strategy? What are the likely
We note that there is a marked lack o consensus and clarity in Washington
benets of using military force in this situation? What are the costs, both immediate
about what the U.S. should aim to achieve through any military action against
and long-term? A primer on Iran’ Iran’s s nuclear program concludes the paper.
Iran. Privately, some national security experts and advisors may have embraced the more modest objective o delaying Iran’s ability to build a nuclear weapon, as a step toward prevention; but some others may have embraced objectives that are ar broader than ocial statements currently suggest. Even in order to ulll the stated
weighing beneits and costs o military action against iran 9
8 weighing beneits and costs o military action against iran
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
objective o ensuring that Iran never acquires a nuclear bomb, the U.S. would need
also disrupt Iranian gover nment control, deplete the Iranian treasury, and raise
to conduct a signicantly expanded air and sea war over a prolonged period o time,
internal tensions—although we do not believe it would lead to regime change,
likely several years. I the U.S. decided to seek a more ambitious objective,
regime collapse, or capitulation.
such as regime change in Iran or undermining Iran’s infuence in the region, then an even greater commitment o orce would be required to occupy all or part o the country. Given Iran’s large size and population, and the strength o Iranian nationalism, we estimate that the occupation o Iran would require a commitment o resources and personnel greater than what the U.S. has expended over the past 10 years in the Iraq and Aghanistan wars combined. The more ambitious the objectives objectives o military action and the longer onger the confict goes on, the more dicult it would be to design an e ective exit strategy.
• Help to deter nuclear weapons prolieration. U.S. military action against Iran’ Iran’s s nuclear program may also reduce the odds that other countries in the region will seek nuclear weapons. I Iran ’s nuclear program were set back, key regional players such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Turkey, and Egypt would eel less pressure to pursue their own nuclear programs. U.S. military action might also deter others—inside and outside the region—rom pursuing their nuclear ambitions, earing that i they do, it might invite a similar U.S. response. We estimate that unilateral Israeli military action could set back Iran’s nuclear
II. Benets. We recognize that the objectives and targets of any military action
program or up to two years, given Israel’s more limited military capability. Israeli
against Iran could well range rom very limited to quite broad. In estimating that
strikes could damage or destroy the Natanz enrichment acility; the conversion
preventive U.S. attacks could delay or up to our years Iran’s ability to build a
acilities at Esahan and Tehran; and the suspected nuclear weapons- development
nuclear weapon, we are assuming the deployment o American air power, drones,
acility at Parchin. Israel could not do great damage to the deeply buried
sea-launched missiles, and perhaps special operations orces and cyber attacks
Fordow enrichment acility, without resorting to riskier ground attacks.
or several weeks or more, seriously damaging hundreds o targets. Such a military action could produce the ollowing benets: • Damage or destroy Iran’ Iran’s s declared major enrichment acilities at Natanz; the uranium conversion acilities at Tehran and Esahan; the nu clear research complex in Tehran; the partially completed heavy water reactor and production plant (that could be used to develop plutonium) at Arak; and some centriuge production installations. With more difculty, difculty, a U.S. air campaign would also damage or destroy the Fordow enrichment acility (which is buried under 200-300 eet o rock). • Damage Iranian military capabilities, including its air deenses, radar, air orce elements, command and control acilities, and much o Iran’s direct retaliatory capa-
III. Costs. In addition to the nancial costs o conducting military attacks against Iran, which would be signicant (particularly i the U.S. had to carry out thousands o sorties and i it had to return to the use o orce periodically or years to come), there would likely be near-term costs associated with Iranian retaliation, through both direct and surrogate asymmetrical attacks. Serious costs to U.S. interests would also be elt over the longer term, we believe, with problematic consequences or global and regional stability, including economic stability. A dynamic o escalation, action, and counteraction could produce serious unintended consequences that would signicantly increase all o these costs and lead, potentially, potentially, to all-out regional war. Among the potential costs discussed in this paper are the ollowing:
bility, such as the main military bases and acilities o the Iranian Revolutionary Guard
• Direct Iranian retaliation against the U.S. While some argue that Iran might hold
Corps (IRGC) and o the Iranian Navy, Army, and Air Force. Strikes would also target
back using orce in order to avoid provoking a larger scale confict, we believe that Iran
non-nuclear acilities suspected o being used or weapons development, such as
would retaliate, costing American lives; damaging U.S. acilities in the region; and aect-
the Parchin site.
ing U.S. interests in Iraq, Aghanistan, the Gul, and elsewhere. Iran would draw on its extensive conventional rocket capability and IRGC anti-ship missiles, small submarines,
• Demonstrate U.S. seriousness and credibility, showing Iran that the U.S.
ast attack boats, and mine warare in the Gul. Iran might attempt to close the Strait o
is determined to prevent it rom acquiring a nuclear weapon and showing other
Hormuz, which could rattle global markets and cause a signicant spike in oil prices
Middle Eastern governments that are concerned about Iran’s regional ambitions
(as well as blocking the main ar tery or export o Iran’s own oil).
that the United States is committed to their secur ity ity.. U.S. military action could
10 weighing beneits and costs o military action against iran
weighing beneits and costs o military action against iran 11
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
objective o ensuring that Iran never acquires a nuclear bomb, the U.S. would need
also disrupt Iranian gover nment control, deplete the Iranian treasury, and raise
to conduct a signicantly expanded air and sea war over a prolonged period o time,
internal tensions—although we do not believe it would lead to regime change,
likely several years. I the U.S. decided to seek a more ambitious objective,
regime collapse, or capitulation.
such as regime change in Iran or undermining Iran’s infuence in the region, then an even greater commitment o orce would be required to occupy all or part o the country. Given Iran’s large size and population, and the strength o Iranian nationalism, we estimate that the occupation o Iran would require a commitment o resources and personnel greater than what the U.S. has expended over the past 10 years in the Iraq and Aghanistan wars combined. The more ambitious the objectives objectives o military action and the longer onger the confict goes on, the more dicult it would be to design an e ective exit strategy.
• Help to deter nuclear weapons prolieration. U.S. military action against Iran’ Iran’s s nuclear program may also reduce the odds that other countries in the region will seek nuclear weapons. I Iran ’s nuclear program were set back, key regional players such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Turkey, and Egypt would eel less pressure to pursue their own nuclear programs. U.S. military action might also deter others—inside and outside the region—rom pursuing their nuclear ambitions, earing that i they do, it might invite a similar U.S. response. We estimate that unilateral Israeli military action could set back Iran’s nuclear
II. Benets. We recognize that the objectives and targets of any military action
program or up to two years, given Israel’s more limited military capability. Israeli
against Iran could well range rom very limited to quite broad. In estimating that
strikes could damage or destroy the Natanz enrichment acility; the conversion
preventive U.S. attacks could delay or up to our years Iran’s ability to build a
acilities at Esahan and Tehran; and the suspected nuclear weapons- development
nuclear weapon, we are assuming the deployment o American air power, drones,
acility at Parchin. Israel could not do great damage to the deeply buried
sea-launched missiles, and perhaps special operations orces and cyber attacks
Fordow enrichment acility, without resorting to riskier ground attacks.
or several weeks or more, seriously damaging hundreds o targets. Such a military action could produce the ollowing benets: • Damage or destroy Iran’ Iran’s s declared major enrichment acilities at Natanz; the uranium conversion acilities at Tehran and Esahan; the nu clear research complex in Tehran; the partially completed heavy water reactor and production plant (that could be used to develop plutonium) at Arak; and some centriuge production installations. With more difculty, difculty, a U.S. air campaign would also damage or destroy the Fordow enrichment acility (which is buried under 200-300 eet o rock). • Damage Iranian military capabilities, including its air deenses, radar, air orce elements, command and control acilities, and much o Iran’s direct retaliatory capa-
III. Costs. In addition to the nancial costs o conducting military attacks against Iran, which would be signicant (particularly i the U.S. had to carry out thousands o sorties and i it had to return to the use o orce periodically or years to come), there would likely be near-term costs associated with Iranian retaliation, through both direct and surrogate asymmetrical attacks. Serious costs to U.S. interests would also be elt over the longer term, we believe, with problematic consequences or global and regional stability, including economic stability. A dynamic o escalation, action, and counteraction could produce serious unintended consequences that would signicantly increase all o these costs and lead, potentially, potentially, to all-out regional war. Among the potential costs discussed in this paper are the ollowing:
bility, such as the main military bases and acilities o the Iranian Revolutionary Guard
• Direct Iranian retaliation against the U.S. While some argue that Iran might hold
Corps (IRGC) and o the Iranian Navy, Army, and Air Force. Strikes would also target
back using orce in order to avoid provoking a larger scale confict, we believe that Iran
non-nuclear acilities suspected o being used or weapons development, such as
would retaliate, costing American lives; damaging U.S. acilities in the region; and aect-
the Parchin site.
ing U.S. interests in Iraq, Aghanistan, the Gul, and elsewhere. Iran would draw on its extensive conventional rocket capability and IRGC anti-ship missiles, small submarines,
• Demonstrate U.S. seriousness and credibility, showing Iran that the U.S.
ast attack boats, and mine warare in the Gul. Iran might attempt to close the Strait o
is determined to prevent it rom acquiring a nuclear weapon and showing other
Hormuz, which could rattle global markets and cause a signicant spike in oil prices
Middle Eastern governments that are concerned about Iran’s regional ambitions
(as well as blocking the main ar tery or export o Iran’s own oil).
that the United States is committed to their secur ity ity.. U.S. military action could
weighing beneits and costs o military action against iran 11
10 weighing beneits and costs o military action against iran
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
• Iranian strikes against Israel. Israel. Iran would hold Israel partly responsible or any
• Damage to the United States’ global reputation and increased credibility
attacks, whether or not Israeli forces par ticipated in military action. While Israel’s
or anti-American extremist groups. groups. U.S. military action, especially i unilateral,
anti-missile and civilian deense programs are strong, sustained air strikes by Iran
could urther alienate Muslims and others worldwide, reinorcing the view that the
would result in casualties and damage to acilities, perhaps including the Israeli
United States resorts too oten to military orce. An attack on a Muslim nation could
nuclear complex at Dimona.
enhance the recruiting ability o r adical Islamist groups, including Al Qaeda. Even
• Indirect retaliation by Iran. Iran . Attacks by well-armed proxies such as Hezbollah or Shiite militant groups in Iraq, as well as by Iran’s covert orces and the IRGC
though some Sunni Muslims might be pleased to see attacks on Shiite Iran, the likely impact on U.S. stature in the Muslim world would be negative.
Qods Force, could be even more damaging to U.S. and Israeli interests than direct
On the contested issue o whether military action would weaken or strengthen
Iranian retaliation. Such indirect retaliation on could include the use o missiles and rockets
Iranian public support or the current regime, we conclude that U.S. and/or Israeli
by proxies as well as terrorist attacks and covert action, such as sabotage and
strikes are more likely to uniy the population behind the government than
assassination. I Hezbollah were to make heavy use o the missiles and rockets it has
to generate resistance.
deployed in southern Lebanon, that could expand the confict, possibly leading to a regional war in the Levant.
Some o these costs would be mitigated i a U.S. strike were to occur in response to Iranian actions that clearly revealed an intention to develop a nuclear weapon.
• A potential potential breakdown breakdown o o hard-won hard-won global global solidarity solidarity against Iran’ Iran’s s nuclear
Such actions might include the expulsion o IAEA inspectors and withdrawal rom
program. We believe that if Iran’s nuclear program is attacked by the U.S. or Israel
the NPT, or the launch o a crash program to raise existing supplies o low-and
in the absence o an international mandate or a multinational coalition, support or
medium-enriched uranium to a weapons-grade level o enrichment. Given the time
maintaining sanctions against Iran could be substantially weakened. Weapons sales
required or Iran to progress rom the decision to weaponize to possession o a
to Iran that are now prohibited by sanctions could resume, as might the sale o
reliable, deliverable weapon, the United States would ha ve an opportunity to
materials that could be used or making a nuclear weapon.
develop international support or multilateral action against Iran, including urther
• Increased likelihood o Iran becoming a nuclear state. state . While it is not impossible that aerial aerial attacks attacks could drive Iran to the negotiating table, we believe that military action probably would reduce the poss ibility o reaching a more permanent political resolution o concerns about Iran’ Iran’s s nuclear program. In act, we believe that a U.S. attack on Iran would increase Iran’ Iran’s s motivation to build a bomb, beca use 1) the
sanctions, additional negotiations, and the use o military orce. While the costs associated with Iranian retaliation would not signicantly be altered i other nations approved or joined in a U.S. military strike, the longer-term costs to U.S. interests would be somewhat lessened. ❘❙❘❙❘❙❘❙❘❙❘❙❘❙❘❙❘❙❘❙❘❙❘❙❘❙❘❙❘❙❘❙❘❙❘
Iranian leadership would become more convinced than ever that regime change is the goal o U.S. policy, and 2) building a bomb would be seen as a way to inhibit uture attacks and redress the humiliation o being attacked. Iran could also with-
This Executive Summary cannot do justice to the extended debates and months o study that have gone into preparing the paper that ollows, or to the rigor o the
draw rom the Nuclear Non-Prolieration Treaty (NPT) and end all cooper ation
research and analysis that buttress its ndings. Our aim throughout this eort has
with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), leaving the international
been to present the best possible assessments—based on a large body o expert
community with greatly reduced knowledge o Iran’s nuclear program.
analysis and opinion—o how the use o military litary orce against Iran might contribute to or detract rom resolving one o the most critical security challenges now acing
• Global political and economic instability, including disruptions in energy supply and security . A U.S. and/or Israeli attack on Iran could introduce destabilizing political and economic orces in a region already experiencing major
the United States. We hope the acts and proessional judgments we have assem bled will stimulate inormed inormed debate and refection among citizens and leaders alike.
transormations. In addition to costing the U.S. economy hundreds o billions o dollars yearly, a sustained confict would boost the pr ice o oil and urther disrupt an already ragile world ec onomy. 12 weighing beneits and costs o military action against iran
weighing beneits and costs o military action against iran 13
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
• Iranian strikes against Israel. Israel. Iran would hold Israel partly responsible or any
• Damage to the United States’ global reputation and increased credibility
attacks, whether or not Israeli forces par ticipated in military action. While Israel’s
or anti-American extremist groups. groups. U.S. military action, especially i unilateral,
anti-missile and civilian deense programs are strong, sustained air strikes by Iran
could urther alienate Muslims and others worldwide, reinorcing the view that the
would result in casualties and damage to acilities, perhaps including the Israeli
United States resorts too oten to military orce. An attack on a Muslim nation could
nuclear complex at Dimona.
enhance the recruiting ability o r adical Islamist groups, including Al Qaeda. Even
• Indirect retaliation by Iran. Iran . Attacks by well-armed proxies such as Hezbollah or Shiite militant groups in Iraq, as well as by Iran’s covert orces and the IRGC
though some Sunni Muslims might be pleased to see attacks on Shiite Iran, the likely impact on U.S. stature in the Muslim world would be negative.
Qods Force, could be even more damaging to U.S. and Israeli interests than direct
On the contested issue o whether military action would weaken or strengthen
Iranian retaliation. Such indirect retaliation on could include the use o missiles and rockets
Iranian public support or the current regime, we conclude that U.S. and/or Israeli
by proxies as well as terrorist attacks and covert action, such as sabotage and
strikes are more likely to uniy the population behind the government than
assassination. I Hezbollah were to make heavy use o the missiles and rockets it has
to generate resistance.
deployed in southern Lebanon, that could expand the confict, possibly leading to a regional war in the Levant.
Some o these costs would be mitigated i a U.S. strike were to occur in response to Iranian actions that clearly revealed an intention to develop a nuclear weapon.
• A potential potential breakdown breakdown o o hard-won hard-won global global solidarity solidarity against Iran’ Iran’s s nuclear
Such actions might include the expulsion o IAEA inspectors and withdrawal rom
program. We believe that if Iran’s nuclear program is attacked by the U.S. or Israel
the NPT, or the launch o a crash program to raise existing supplies o low-and
in the absence o an international mandate or a multinational coalition, support or
medium-enriched uranium to a weapons-grade level o enrichment. Given the time
maintaining sanctions against Iran could be substantially weakened. Weapons sales
required or Iran to progress rom the decision to weaponize to possession o a
to Iran that are now prohibited by sanctions could resume, as might the sale o
reliable, deliverable weapon, the United States would ha ve an opportunity to
materials that could be used or making a nuclear weapon.
develop international support or multilateral action against Iran, including urther
• Increased likelihood o Iran becoming a nuclear state. state . While it is not impossible that aerial aerial attacks attacks could drive Iran to the negotiating table, we believe that military action probably would reduce the poss ibility o reaching a more permanent political resolution o concerns about Iran’ Iran’s s nuclear program. In act, we believe that a U.S. attack on Iran would increase Iran’ Iran’s s motivation to build a bomb, beca use 1) the
sanctions, additional negotiations, and the use o military orce. While the costs associated with Iranian retaliation would not signicantly be altered i other nations approved or joined in a U.S. military strike, the longer-term costs to U.S. interests would be somewhat lessened. ❘❙❘❙❘❙❘❙❘❙❘❙❘❙❘❙❘❙❘❙❘❙❘❙❘❙❘❙❘❙❘❙❘❙❘
Iranian leadership would become more convinced than ever that regime change is the goal o U.S. policy, and 2) building a bomb would be seen as a way to inhibit uture attacks and redress the humiliation o being attacked. Iran could also with-
This Executive Summary cannot do justice to the extended debates and months o study that have gone into preparing the paper that ollows, or to the rigor o the
draw rom the Nuclear Non-Prolieration Treaty (NPT) and end all cooper ation
research and analysis that buttress its ndings. Our aim throughout this eort has
with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), leaving the international
been to present the best possible assessments—based on a large body o expert
community with greatly reduced knowledge o Iran’s nuclear program.
analysis and opinion—o how the use o military litary orce against Iran might contribute to or detract rom resolving one o the most critical security challenges now acing
• Global political and economic instability, including disruptions in energy supply and security . A U.S. and/or Israeli attack on Iran could introduce destabilizing political and economic orces in a region already experiencing major
the United States. We hope the acts and proessional judgments we have assem bled will stimulate inormed inormed debate and refection among citizens and leaders alike.
transormations. In addition to costing the U.S. economy hundreds o billions o dollars yearly, a sustained confict would boost the pr ice o oil and urther disrupt an already ragile world ec onomy. 12 weighing beneits and costs o military action against iran
weighing beneits and costs o military action against iran 13
Tis paper was drafed by Austin Long, o Columbia University and
Tis paper was drafed by Austin Long, o Columbia University and William Luers, Director o the Iran Project. Tey were advised by Colin Kahl o Georgetown University and received important contributions rom Tomas R. Pickering, Jim Walsh o MI, and Stephen Heintz o the Rockeeller Brothers Fund. Te other core members o Te Iran Project and a large number o the endorsers o the paper made valuable additions to the paper. Priscilla Lewis, the editor, has been an excellent partner and is largely responsible or the nal version. Iris Bieri, Te Iran Project Coordinator, has managed the complex process o bringing together the many dierent points o view and individuals involved, to get the paper to completion. Our copy editor, rish Leader, and design team rom On Design, Inc., led by Okey Nestor, contributed their invaluable invaluab le talents and time t ime to make this publication possible.
Te Iran Project is a non-governmental organization that seeks to improve ocial contacts between the United States and Iranian governments. Founded in 2002 by the United Nations Association o the USA and Rockeeller Brother’s Fund, Te Iran Project became independent in 2009. Te core members o Te Iran Project or over a decade have been: Stephen Heintz, William Luers, William Miller, Tomas Pickering, Jim Walsh, Walsh, and Frank Wisner. Wisner. © 2012 Te Iran Project
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