Intelligence and the war in Bosnia 1992 - 1995 The role of the intelligence and security services
Dr. Cees Wiebes Lit Verlag, Berlin/London
This is a background report serving as an appendix to the report Srebrenica, a ‘safe’ area, produced by the Netherlands Institute for War Documentation (NIOD). See for an English version of this report: www.srebrenica.nl Overview of report Main report: Srebrenica, a 'safe’ area. Reconstruction, background, consequences and analyses of the fall of a Safe Area (11 July 1995) (NIOD) ISBN 90 5342 716 8 Background report: Intelligence and the war in Bosnia, 1992-1995. The role of the intelligence services (C. Wiebes) ISBN 90 5352 742 7 Background report: Western perceptions and Balkan realities (B. Naarden) ISBN 90 5352 743 5 Background report: History, memory and politics in Eastern Bosnia (G. Duijzings) ISBN 90 5352 744 3 Background report: Dutchbat III and the population: medical issues / Resupply by air (D.C.L. Schoonoord) ISBN 90 5352 790 7 Set of main report + 4 background reports including CD-ROM with extra background reports ISBN 90 5352 745 1
English translation: Taalcentrum-VU, Amsterdam
© 2003 Dr Cees Wiebes All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored digitally or made public in any way whatsoever, either digitally mechanically, via photocopies, recordings or any other means, without the prior written permission of the publisher.
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CONTENTS Acknowledgements List of Acronyms and Terms Introduction Chapter 1: THE UNITED NATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE 1. Introduction 2. A definition of intelligence 3. Intelligence and UN peacekeeping operations 4. Intelligence within the existing UN culture 5. Intelligence support for UN peacekeeping operations 6. The Military Information Office in Zagreb 7. Conclusions Chapter 2:
1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
THE WESTERN INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND THE WAR IN BOSNIA Introduction The Western intelligence mindset The problems regarding intelligence liaison between Western intelligence services The perception and information position of the Western intelligence services Conclusions
Chapter 3:
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.
THE NETHERLANDS INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY SERVICES AND THE WAR IN BOSNIA Introduction The Foreign Intelligence Service The National Security Service The Military Intelligence Service (MIS) Intelligence gathering in the enclave under Dutchbats I, II and III The collaboration between MIS/CO and MIS/Army The output of the MIS/Air Force Support from UNPROFOR for the MIS Intelligence and the senior levels of the Ministry of Defence The MIS and Military Security Conclusions
Chapter 4: SECRET ARMS SUPPLIES AND OTHER COVERT ACTION 1. Introduction 2. Arms supplies to the Bosnian Muslims 3. Secret arms supplies to the Bosnian Muslims 4. Military assistance to the Bosnian Serbs 5. The deployment of mercenaries, advisers and volunteers 6. Special Forces in Bosnia 7. Conclusions
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Chapter 5:
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.
THE SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE WAR OF THE WESTERN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES IN AND AROUND BOSNIA Introduction The advantages and disadvantages of Signals Intelligence The most important Western Signals Intelligence organizations The international exchange of Signals Intelligence The results of Signals Intelligence in Bosnia Dutch Signals Intelligence in the Bosnian conflict Conclusions
Chapter 6:
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.
THE SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE WAR OF THE WARRING FACTIONS Introduction The Signals Intelligence War of the Serbs and the Bosnian Serbs The Signals Intelligence operations of the Bosnian Muslims Was the ABiH Signals Intelligence of the Bosnian Muslims real-time? UNPROFOR and Dutchbat as a target for communications intelligence Conclusions
Chapter 7: IMAGERY INTELLIGENCE IN BOSNIA 1. Introduction 2. What instruments could be used and were used for imagery intelligence? 3. Who was the imagery intelligence shared with? 4. How were Albright’s satellite photos discovered? 5. What photos were taken and on which dates? 6. Conclusions Chapter 8: WAS ‘SREBRENICA’ AN INTELLIGENCE FAILURE? 1. Introduction 2. What is an intelligence failure? 3. Strategic prior knowledge 4. The attack on Srebrenica 5. The intelligence situation of UNPROFOR 6. Did The Hague have prior knowledge? 7. The foreign intelligence services 8. Conclusions
Consulted Archives References: books & articles Index
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Acknowledgements
My thanks go first of all to the entire Srebrenica team, the members of which were prepared to read the text contributions critically and to provide them with commentary. I would particularly like to thank my intelligence ‘buddy’ Dr Bob de Graaff for this. My gratitude is primarily directed, however, to my colleague and fellow Tuzlak , Dr Dick Schoonoord, with whom I have undertaken many journeys and whose definitive texts for the Srebrenica report constitute such a rich and valuable source. His contributions to Part III of the main Srebrenica report were absolutely indispensable to this study. Due to the specialist nature of this research and the imposed confidentiality, there was very little opportunity to exchange ideas with civil servants, other researchers and authors. I thus valued even more highly the trust shown to me by Matthew Aid, Richard Aldrich, Mats Berdal, Richard Connaughton, Timothy Crawford, Volker Foertsch, Nik Gowing, Alf Jacobson, Jan Kleffel, John Morrison, Dame Pauline Neville-Jones, Lord David Owen, Jeffrey Richelson, Tim Ripley, Erich Schmidt-Eenboom, Katherine Schwering, Michael Smith, Milos Stankovic, Jan-Inge Svensson, Renaud Theunens, Mark Urban, Pasi Välimäki and James Woolsey. In particular I would like to acknowledge Ric Morgan. My thankfulness to him is enormous. My thanks also go to Michael Herman, who organized a ‘Under Chatham House Rules’ seminar at St. Anthony’s College in Oxford specially for this research project. I must also thank Ted Kelly, the archivist at the Canadian Foreign Ministry in Ottawa and the Department of Peacekeeping of the Ministry of Defence. Finally, I extend many thanks to all the officers who work or worked for domestic and foreign intelligence and security services and who were prepared to talk to me on a confidential basis. These persons have supported the Srebrenica project in its attempts to track down and clarify vague indications or unclear formulated questions. This applies particularly to the many members of the Netherlands Military Intelligence Service. Without the help of the Dutch and the international intelligence communities this book would not have been written.
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List of Acronyms and Terms ABiH Armija Bosna i Hercegovina APC Armoured Personnel Carrier ATM Air Task Message AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System BfV Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz BHC Bosnia-Hercegovina Command BID Buitenlandse Inlichtingendienst BND Bundesnachrichtendienst BSA Bosnian Serb Army BSS British Security Services Organization BTF Balkan Task Force BVD Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst CAOC Combined Air Operations Centre CDS Chief of the Defence Staff CEE Central and Eastern Europe CENTCOM Central Command (US) CFIOG Canadian Forces Information Operations Group CI Counter Intelligence CIA Central Intelligence Agency CIC Current Intelligence Centre CINCSOUTH Commander in Chief Southern Europe (NATO) CIR Comité Interministériel du Renseignement COMINT Communications Intelligence COS Chief of Staff COS Chief of Station (CIA) CSE Communications Security Establishment CVIN Committee on the United Intelligence Services in the Netherlands DARO Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office DCBC Defence Crisis Management Centre DDIS Danish Defence Intelligence Service DFC Deputy Force Commander DGSE Direction Generale de la Securité Exterieure DIA Defense Intelligence Agency DIS Defence Information Summary DIS Defence Intelligence Staff DMZ Demilitarized Zone DND Department of National Defense DPA Department of Political Affairs DPKO Department of Peace Keeping Operations DRM Direction de Renseignement Militaire DSF Deployed Shed Facility DSD Defence Signals Directorate DST Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire ECMM European Commission Monitoring Mission ELINT Electronic Intelligence ERRF European Rapid Reaction Force ESDI European Security and Defence Identity
6 ESDP European Security and Defence Policy EU European Union EUCOM European Command (US) FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation FC Force Commander FISINT Foreign Instrumentation Intelligence FRY Former Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) GCHQ Government Communications Headquarters GPS Global Positioning System GMO Gratis Military Officers HF High Frequency HIC High Intensity Conflict HUMINT Human Intelligence HV Hrvatska Vojska HVO Hrvatsko Vijece Odbrane IAEA International Atomic Energy Authority ICFY International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia ICRC International Commission of the Red Cross IDB Inlichtingendienst Buitenland IFOR Implementation Force (NATO – Bosnia) IMINT Imagery Intelligence INTERFET International Force East Timor IOB Intelligence Oversight Board JAC Joint Analysis Center JARIC Joint Aerial Reconnaissance Intelligence Centre JCO Joint Commission Observer JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff JIC Joint Intelligence Committee JNA Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija KFOR Kosovo Force KLA Kosovo Liberation Army LIC Low Intensity Conflict LOCE Linked Operational Intelligence Centre Europe MIC Mid Intensity Conflict MICIV Ministerial Committee for the Intelligence and Security Services MID Militaire Inlichtingendienst MIO Military Information Office MIS Netherlands Military Intelligence Service MPRI Military Professional Resources Incorporated MSC Military Staff Committee of the United Nations MSF Médecins sans Frontières NAC North Atlantic Council NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation NETHNIC Netherlands National Intelligence Cell NFZ No Fly Zone NGO Non-Governmental Organisation NIE National Intelligence Estimate NIMA National Imagery and Mapping Agency NORAD North American Air Defense Agreement NPIC National Photographic Interpretation Center
7 NSA NRO NSC OP OPSTINA ORCI OSCE OSINT OVIC PDD PGP PHOTINT PJHQ PRD RADINT RM RS SACEUR SAM SAS SAT SATINT SBP SBS SCS SEAD SFOR SGR SHAPE SHED SIE SIGINT SIS SISMI SNE SPOT SVIC SWENIC TAB TACRECCE TACSAT TIVC TWRA UAV UN UNDOF UNDP UNHCR UNMIK UNMO
National Security Agency National Reconnaissance Office National Security Council Observation Post District of local government in Bosnia Herzegovina Office for Research and the Collection of Information Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe Open Source Intelligence Operational Sigint Centre in the Netherlands Presidential Decision Directive Pretty Good Privacy Photo Intelligence Permanent Joint Headquarters Presidential Review Directive Radar Intelligence Royal Marines Republika Serpska Supreme Allied Commander Europe (NATO) Surface to Air Missile Special Air Services Southern Air Transport Satellite Intelligence Staff Bureau Foreign Political Developments Special Boat Services Special Collection Service Suppression of Enemy Air Defence Stabilisation Force (NATO – Bosnia) Service Generale de Reinseignement Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (NATO) Special Handling and Evaluation Detachment Special Intelligence Estimate Signals Intelligence Secret Intelligence Service Servizio Informazioni e Sicurezza Militare Sector North East Système Pour l’Observation de la Terre Strategic Sigint Centre in the Netherlands Swedish National Intelligence Cell Tuzla Air Base Tactical Air Reconnaissance Tactical Satellite Radio Royal Netherlands Navy Technical Information Processing Centre Third World Relief Agency Unmanned Aerial Vehicle United Nations United Nations Disengagement Observer Force United Nations Development Programme United Nations High Commission for Refugees United Nations Mission in Kosovo United Nation Military Observer
8 UNOSOM UNPROFOR UNPF UNSCOM USMC VHF VJ VOPP VRS WEU
United Nations Operation in Somalia United Nations Protection Force United Nations Protection Force United Nations Special Commission in Iraq United States Marine Corps Very High Frequency Vojska Jugoslavija Vance Owen Peace Plan Vojska Republika Srpska Western European Union
9 Introduction
Sarajevo was a nest of spies at the time of the war in Bosnia. Everyone spied on everyone: the warring parties as well as the countries of the UN peacekeeping force.
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On 3 March 1994, 570 Dutch peacekeepers formally relieved the Canadian soldiers who had been stationed in Srebrenica since 1993. Within the framework of the United Nations peace mission in Bosnia-Hercegovina, the Dutch unit arrived there as part of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR). The Dutch battalion (Dutchbat) was placed in a small town located in East Bosnia in a deep valley with steep mountainsides, close to the river Drina. Except for a couple of days in April 1992, the Bosnian Muslim Army, the Armija Bosne i Hercegovine (ABiH), had control of the town – which was declared a Safe Area by the UN Security Council on 6 May 1993 – for three years of the war. However, Srebrenica was never completely demilitarized and small-scale confrontations around the enclave would continue to take place for more than two years. A Bosnian-Serb attack on Srebrenica started on 6 July 1995. The ABiH was not in a position to defend the enclave, and the Dutch soldiers had neither the resources nor the mandate for the purpose. When on 11 July the Bosnian enclave of Srebrenica was captured by the Bosnian Serb Army, the Vojska Republika Srpska (VRS), under the leadership of General Ratko Mladic, an ethnic cleansing operation began in which a large proportion of the Muslim men would be executed. Between 6 and 20 July, the Bosnian Serbs gained control of ‘the safe areas’ Srebrenica and Zepa, and drove out tens of thousands of Bosnian Muslims. Under the eyes of Dutchbat, the women, children and elderly were deported to Bosnian territory. Out of view of the Dutch peacekeepers, more than 10,000 men and boys, walking in a long line, tried to get from Srebrenica to the area around Tuzla, which was under the control of the Bosnian government. Several thousands became the victim of encounters with the Bosnian Serbs or fell into the hands of the VRS during that journey. They were killed in a horrifying way. This study is an appendix to the Srebrenica report by the Netherlands Institute for War Documentation (NIOD). A central position in the study is occupied by the
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'Sarajevo zat vol spionnen in oorlog' ('Sarajevo was full of spies during war'), Het Parool , 24/04/98.
10 role of national and international intelligence and security services in the war in Bosnia in general and Srebrenica in particular. From the outset, much remained unclear regarding the fall of the enclave, something, which was also considered on 18 August 1995 in the Dutch Ministerial Council. A minister was of the opinion that more information should be made available about the events before and after the fall of Srebrenica. According to this minister, this also applied to the role of the Western intelligence services prior to the attack on Srebrenica.2 This investigation sets out to satisfy this wish. The study has three objectives. Firstly, it is the intention to present in as much detail as possible the information position of the most important Western intelligence and security services during the war in Bosnia. The relevant question is what opportunities these services had for following the developments in East Bosnia. Secondly, this study sets out to examine whether these services were used in the armed conflict around Srebrenica. Finally, an objective of this investigation is to establish the information position of the Dutch intelligence and security services: were these services in a position to support the Dutch peacekeepers in Bosnia satisfactorily? These three objectives lead to the question: did the Western intelligence services have prior knowledge of the Bosnian Serb attack on Srebrenica? If the answer is no, the next question is why not? Was it an intelligence failure? However, if there was prior knowledge, the question then is what was done with this information, and whether that intelligence could not have prevented the attack on Srebrenica and the subsequent executions. It was no simple matter to try to obtain answers to the above questions and to satisfy the above objectives. Foreign intelligence and security services were not prepared to provide the NIOD investigators with direct access to the intelligence they had gathered. Fortunately, some services were prepared to provide some degree of insight into their information position through confidential briefings or background discussions. For the Srebrenica report by the Netherlands Institute for War Documentation (NIOD) more than 900 persons were interviewed. Ultimately, as regards this study off-the-record discussions were held with one hundred people in the Netherlands and other countries: many were officers who were involved in intelligence 2
Objectivized summary of the minutes of the Ministerial Council meeting of 18/08/95, prepared for the purposes of the present NIOD study.
11 work in Bosnia. This involved not only many former or still active staff of intelligence and security services, but also responsible ministers, politicians, diplomats and officials that acted as recipients of intelligence products concerning Bosnia. Inevitably, these one hundred off-the-record interviews did have consequences for the references of this study. This is why in the acknowledgement of sources, this study regularly has to resort to references such as 'Confidential interview'. 3 Staff of foreign intelligence and security services were prepared to speak to the NIOD on condition that their identities were protected in view of privacy considerations, because disclosure of their names and identities could considerably impede their work as analysts or operators in the future, or make it completely impossible, or because the prevailing legislation in their country did not permit it. Anonymity was promised by the NIOD to a large number of current and former staff of services in the Netherlands and other countries for reasons of their own. It was therefore necessary to opt for the footnote form that has been used. The most important consideration in making this choice was that the main issue was to reconstruct a general picture and not to establish the specific influence of individual people on the course of events. Moreover, there will be regular references to ‘Confidential information’. In general, these are written sources that the archive controller still considers to be confidential, or documents that have been passed to the NIOD privately, but which are still classified as ‘secret’ in the country concerned. It goes without saying that every effort has been made to verify the statements by means of supplementary interviews, background briefings or archival research whenever this was permissible. History is a discussion without end. This is all the more true for the history of intelligence and security services, the archive material of which is subject to far longer terms than other government archive material before disclosure is permitted. Researchers are generally not given access to catalogues, but have to ask for relevant documents more or less in the dark. Also because of confidentiality agreements imposed on staff does information on intelligence and security services reach researchers, and consequently the public, and then after a much longer period than in other cases. Whereas, with history of other kinds, the picture of the subject generally changes in the course of time only as a result of new points of view. In the case of the history of intelligence and security services, new information can continue to lead to an adjustment of the picture for far longer. 3
The number in brackets after the Confidential interview note refers to the interviewee concerned.
12 Fortunately this was not the case in the research for this study where Dutch archives were concerned.4 Generous access was given to the archives by the Netherlands intelligence and security services, especially the Military Intelligence Service (MIS), where the author was able to make independent selections. In a number of cases, more detailed agreements had to be made for specific sources. These cases were concerned with the unity of the Crown, the private lives of those involved and the Netherlands national security and security of the state. The latter point was especially relevant to sources for the activities of Dutch and other intelligence and security services. In particular, the identity of informants, the origin of information that was gathered by these services and the relationship of trust with foreign counterpart services had to be protected. An additional study of related archives was also carried out in the Netherlands, for example at the Cabinet Office, Foreign Affairs, Defence, and Justice. Comprehensive research in the archives of the United Nations in Geneva and New York sometimes yielded additional background material. It was also possible to speak freely with a large number of staff of the MIS and the Netherlands National Security Service (BVD). In addition to the usual privacy considerations, the fact that disclosure of their names and identities would impede or make impossible their future work as analysts or operators with intelligence and security services it was necessary to opt for referring to these more than thirty interviews as ‘confidential interviews’. Finally, we must not omit to mention that much information for this study was obtained from open sources. Historical research is usually based on all available literature on the events to be studied. At the start of this investigation, it was expected that a large number of publications would not be relevant. However, it turned out that articles in daily and weekly newspapers and some books actually contained more information than originally thought. This concerned the history of the Balkans in general and how this was represented, as well as the history of the conflict in Yugoslavia. Some of those involved wrote memoirs. In addition, private and government archive collections in Canada, the United States and several Western European countries were studied. Against this background it is only possible to state that the author has attempted in all good faith to verify the data issued to the institute. The possibility of errors cannot be ruled out. But this should not discourage anyone from writing about the role of intelligence and security services. 4
De Graaff & Wiebes, Villa Maarheeze, pp. 9 - 25.
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Dr. Cees Wiebes
Amsterdam, 1 February 2003
