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HSSE Management Tours: Asset Integrity Guide


Contents 1

Introduction •

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HSSE Management Tours: Asset Integrity Guide How to Structure Your Your Asset Integrity Management Tour Asset Integrity Overview

Managing Integrity

Key Integrity Barriers •

Topic 8 - Operati Operating ng within the Envelope

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Topic 9 - Pressure Safety Valves

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Topic 10 - Pressure Vessels

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Topic 11 - Piping (incl. small bore piping)

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Topic 12 - Structural Integrity

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Topic 1 - Maintenance - Maintenance of Barriers

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Topic 13 - Process Control

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Topic 2 - Integrity - Integrity Communication Communicationss

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Topic 14 - Alarm Management

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Topic 3 - Performance - Performance Management

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Topic 15 - Leak and Fire Detection

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Topic 4 - Planning - Planning and Resourcing

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Topic 16 - Emergency Shutdown & Blowdown Systems

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Topic 5 - Corporate - Corporate Safety Culture

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Topic 17 - Control of Ignition Sources

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Topic 6 - Management of Change

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Topic 18 - Fire Protection

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Topic 7 - The - The Safety Case

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Topic 19 - Escape, Muster and Evacua Evacuation tion

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Summary

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Introduction

HSSE Management Tours: Asset Integrity Guide •

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Asset integrity (process safety) differs from occupational safety (personal safety) because it focuses on the hazards that are more likely to result in major accidents (gas explosions, jet fires, ship collisions, etc.) affecting large numbers of personnel rather than incidents affecting individual workers (slips, falls, struck-by incidents, electrocution, etc.). The management of occupational safety and asset integrity has both similarities and differences, but it is important to understand that management of one does not assure management of the other. Robust systems need to be in place to manage both, and the workforce should understand that both are important to the success of BG Group. This handbook is intended to provide senior personnel with a basis for discussing asset integrity topics during a HSSE management tour. Historically

these tours have been dominated by occupational safety observations and discussions, and so the purpose of this handbook is to broaden the scope so that asset integrity is also discussed during such visits. •

This handbook should be used in conjunction with the “HSSE Management Tours: A Guide” handbook, which contains general guidance for planning and performing a HSSE Management Tour.

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Introduction

HSSE Management Tours: Asset Integrity Guide (continued) •

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Each topic in this handbook provides a broad overview of the subject area and suggested initial engagement questions. The language is deliberately plain to provide a level of comfort and confidence for users regardless of their background. The questions are structured in an open way to provide the basis for an open discussion with employees. Open discussions on asset integrity issues offer the potential to understand perceived problem areas and identify opportunities for improvement. An attitude of openness and honesty is required in discussions and the desire to listen to, and discuss, an individual’s issues is critical to avoid any potential filtering or ‘good news only’ responses.

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Introduction


How to Structure Your Asset Integrity Management Tour •

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Prior to the tour it will help to familiarise yourself with the safety case for the facility. This will provide a good overview of the facility, the processes, the associated hazards and the way in which the risks are managed. It will help you to decide what your focus areas will be. You should review the topics in this book prior to the tour and select a few topics that you plan to use (some of the topics may be selected by the organiser to ensure good coverage over several tours). Choose some topics from the “Managing Integrity” section and some topics that relate to typical barriers that are relevant for the facility (based on what you have learned from the safety case). BG Groups incident reporting system (Synergi) can also be used to see what recent incidents an asset may have had.

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Introduction

How to Structure Your Asset Integrity Management Tour (continued) •

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During the tour you should ensure that you speak to a range of people with different responsibilities for asset integrity. It is recommended to conduct visits to supporting departments in an asset (e.g. maintenance, engineering, contracts and procurement, human resources) as well as the operating plant and its personnel. The questions that you choose should be relevant to the people you are speaking to (their particular responsibilities and their level in the organisation). You should take the opportunity to inquire about specific activities that are ongoing during your tour, and in particular to ask about any activities that are not a part of what is considered as “normal operations”.

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A significant difference between occupational safety and asset integrity is that very often the deficiencies in asset integrity are not visible, and so these can only be uncovered by having the right conversations with the right people. Following visits and discussions, any identified concerns or issues should be fed back to the relevant line manager or the organising manager for consideration.

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Introduction

Asset Integrity Overview •

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Asset integrity (also referred to as “process safety”) is the ability of the asset to perform its required function effectively whilst safeguarding life and the environment. Good asset integrity is critical to our business, as a loss of asset integrity can have catastrophic effects, leading to major accidents that result in multiple fatalities as well as very large economic, environmental and reputational damage (for example Macondo, Texas City, Piper Alpha, etc). Asset integrity management is all about the prevention and mitigation of unintentional releases of potentially dangerous materials or energy. For BG Group, this means safely transporting hydrocarbons or energy from source to final destination without loss of containment or other hazardous event. In the event of a loss of containment or other hazardous event, systems need to be in place and be available in good working order to detect and control the event as well as mitigate the effects.

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Asset integrity management can be visualised as a series of control measures or barriers, which either prevent the hazard from being realised, or limit the effects of the incident if the hazard is realised. These barriers are depicted in the “swiss-cheese” model (see Figure 1) and each contains a mix of plant , people and processes. Each barrier is a high level functional grouping of safeguards and controls selected to prevent, or limit the effect of, a major accident or environmental event. A barrier may therefore include a number of safety critical systems, and safety critical elements (SCE). Physical plant barriers include, for example, systems provided for emergency shutdown, relief and blowdown, fire protection and evacuation. The presence of the physical plant barriers alone is not sufficient; these require competent people

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Introduction

Asset Integrity Overview (continued) and effective processes to ensure that they are correctly specified and that their ongoing suitability is assured. People and processes include internal procedures and work practices; for example operating procedures or training and experience. •

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The effectiveness of an assets integrity controls is a function of the quantity and the quality of the barriers which are used to protect against a major accident. No barrier is perfect – the design limitations, and the potential for barriers to fail or be by-passed is represented by the holes in the barrier (swiss-cheese) model. Asset integrity programs are primarily focussed on assuring the ongoing suitability, and improving, the barriers. Another way to visualise the role of barriers is by the use of bow-tie diagrams (see Figure 2). Bow-tie diagrams combine fault trees (the left hand side)

and event trees (the right hand side). The left hand side of the diagram shows all the causes (or threats) with the potential to cause the hazardous event (top event ). The top event is the release of the hazard, e.g. the release of a flammable gas stored under pressure. The right hand side of the diagram shows all the potential consequences (or end events) that can result from the top event . Taken together, the two sides show the links between the causes and consequences (for each chosen hazardous event) and the role of the barriers which prevent the event (left hand side) or control or mitigate the consequences (right hand side). •

Bow-tie diagrams provide a powerful visual representation of the role of the barriers in managing the hazards and are used in BG Group safety cases for this purpose.

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Introduction

Asset Integrity Overview (continued) Figure 1 – The Concept of Barriers Plant

People

e.g. Fire & Gas Detection

Processes

e.g. Training & Competence

e.g. Safe Working Practices

TOP EVENT

THREATS/ CAUSES

Prevention t n e m n i a t n o C y r a m i r P

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IMPACTS

Detection g n i & r o s t i s e n c o o r M P t l n a e c i m t i r p C i u q E

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Control

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Mitigation

m e t s y S n w o d t u h S

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Emergency Response

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& r n e s s e o u n i m w o t c r t i s a o g a a n u e P i l c R c A i y t a h y n v & c g n c u E i r e L n e g e m e r p t s g & e m a r u c e o m s M E C E m E

e s n s o t p s n e e R m y e c g n n e a r g r r e A m E

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Introduction

Asset Integrity Overview (continued) Figure 2 – Bow-Tie Diagram DETECTION, CONTROL, MITIGATION and EMERGENCY RESPONSE

PREVENTION Barriers to eliminate and prevent causes of hazardous event

Barriers to control consequences and effects

Barrier

Barrier Barrier

S E S U A C / S T A E R H T

Barrier

Barrier

Barrier

Barrier Barrier Barrier


e.g. Overpressure protection, collision warning system

Barrier

TOP EVENT Realisation of the hazard e.g. Loss of containment, ship collision, etc

Barrier Barrier

Barrier Barrier


e.g. Fire and gas detection, escape and evacuation

S E C N E U Q E S N O C / S T C A P M I

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Managing Integrity

Topic 1 – Maintenance of Barriers •

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All equipment placed into service on a plant will undergo some form of physical degradation, resulting in diminished performance and eventual failure over time. Maintenance activities seek to safeguard equipment performance and integrity by appropriate intervention. To do this successfully requires an understanding of the deterioration mechanisms such that the correct maintenance, testing activities and frequencies are established and carried out by competent persons. Equipment is classified as safety critical if their performance is deemed to be necessary for ongoing plant safety and effectiveness. In reviewing a maintenance management system, it is of vital importance that activities are carried out in accordance with the plans. A high ratio of planned maintenance to corrective/breakdown maintenance (planned maintenance should be

significantly greater) is a good indicator of an effective maintenance management system. •

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The presence of significant backlogs, especially of safety critical equipment, is symptomatic of a problem. A system for the approval of continued operation if integrity cannot be fully maintained (degraded barriers, inhibits, deferrals) should be in place, including escalation up to and including the AGM where necessary. Procedures relating to maintenance should be clearly understood and carried out to the desired quality. Sound maintenance implementation requires adequate budgets and resources as well as numerous support activities including logistics, warehousing, planning, contracts and operational support. Maintenance and inspection activities should also address the integrity of temporary equipment.

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Managing Integrity

Topic 1 – Maintenance of Barriers Questions

1. Tell me how maintenance of equipment is planned and executed on this plant? Who carries it out (core crew or 3rd Party)? What about temporary equipment? 2. How does the system for classifying equipment and work order criticality work? 3. How do we know how effective our maintenance management system is? 4. How are maintenance backlogs monitored and managed?

5. What is the process for the approval of continued operation in the event of degraded barriers, inhibited safety functions, or backlog of safety critical maintenance? 6. How is training and competency of maintenance personnel assured? How are 3rd party personnel included in this process?

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Managing Integrity

Topic 2 – Integrity Communications •

Asset integrity requires facilities to be designed, constructed, operated and maintained effectively. This requires significant amounts of written and face to face communication.

upon to operate; the concern is that it would not have worked when required if an accidental event had occurred. •

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As well as construction drawings and documentation, all maintenance and inspection history data (material wall thickness, function test results etc) must be kept for assessment, trending and fault analysis. Such information must be available and appropriately communicated to the correct personnel such that analysis and appropriate actions can be taken to prevent failures and incidents. It is essential that all asset integrity incidents and near-misses are identified and reported and that the potential for a major accident to have resulted from these incidents is recognised. A mature incident reporting system would consider an unrevealed failure of a barrier to be a high potential

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Having identified incidents and near-misses, rootcause failure analysis should be applied and the results of these analyses need to be communicated appropriately to ensure that learning and improvements can be implemented. The critical aspects in a functional integrity communication system are: – Goals, objectives and responsibilities for asset integrity are clear and have been communicated – Flow paths for integrity information, data and decisions are understood – All unplanned events are rigorously analysed and learning applied – Integrity data, documents and other relevant information is updated, shared and managed

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Managing Integrity

Topic 2 – Integrity Communications Questions

1. How do we ensure that information from inspection (and maintenance) is communicated to the right personnel? 2. How well do you think information flows up and down the management chain? How could this be improved? 3. Are integrity related data and documents readily available for those who need it? How do we ensure they are up to date? 4. How do you identify asset integrity related incidents and near-misses? What defines a high-potential incident or near-miss?

5. How do we determine the causes of unplanned events/failures when they occur? What type of personnel undertake these investigations? 6. Do we have a mechanism for capturing lessons and applying them to our operations? Have you applied the findings from incidents outside this site, from elsewhere in BG or the industry? Can you provide an example?

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Managing Integrity

Topic 3 – Performance Management •

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As with many processes, asset integrity management is founded on the concept of continuous improvement. To do this, systems must be in place to measure current performance and underlying trends (to allow improvements to be identified). Performance management within asset integrity is based upon the notion of having appropriate key performance indicators (KPIs) which provide clear measurement of critical aspects of the integrity management system. A process for analysis and review of the KPIs should be in place along with a mechanism for driving further improvements.

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The critical aspects in a performance management process are: – Ensuring that relevant KPIs are used (measurable, and in areas that do need improvement) – Implementing a regular process of performance review and improvement – Having clear plans for performance improvement (where required)

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Managing Integrity

Topic 3 – Performance Management Questions

1. Can you tell me some of the KPIs used to measure asset integrity performance? Do you report all of the required BG Group AI KPI’s and if not, why not? 2. How is KPI performance reviewed and communicated?

3. How does your role impact any of these KPIs? Which KPIs are most relevant to your role? 4. Do you see KPI performance results and trending on a regular basis? How do the results of these KPI’s influence the way you work now and going forward?

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Managing Integrity

Topic 4 – Planning and Resourcing •

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Good asset integrity requires a clear vision of the objectives that will maintain or improve the integrity performance. These goals need to be translated into clear plans at various levels and the plans must be supported by systems that provide the required resources. This approach forms the basis of BG Group aims to operate all Assets under a process of Integrated Activity Planning and Scheduling (IAPS). Integrated planning has to be done at multiple levels but must be consistent with the overall asset goals that have been set . Resources, which may consist of people, budgets, logistics, materials etc, are a crucial link in the integrity chain and if not available at the correct time and place will cause delays in risk reduction activities.

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Within planning and resourcing, the key areas are: – Having sound documented plans in place at all levels and for various timescales, from long-term strategic goals through to daily executable work – Management of the planning process to ensure fulfilment and adjustment of the plans based upon actual performance – Provision of adequate resourcing to ensure that activities can be done within the required time periods – Prioritisation and alignment of activities across functions to ensure that maintenance opportunities (e.g. during unplanned plant shutdown) are always taken and that maintenance activities are prioritised appropriately with respect to other activities

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Managing Integrity

Topic 4 – Planning and Resourcing Questions

1. What clear asset integrity improvement goals and targets have been set for this facility? 2. How do you input to plans and how do you manage delivery against plans?

3. What are the major resource restrictions you have in fulfilling your plans? 4. How do you manage the various resource requirements that you need to ensure successful completion of planned activities?

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Managing Integrity

Topic 5 – Corporate Safety Culture •

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The development of a strong corporate safety culture on a plant is just as important to asset integrity as is the design of sound facilities and development of the right work processes. The safety culture which is driven by the shared values at all levels of management and employees, serves to reinforce subconscious beliefs and therefore decision making related to asset integrity at all levels. Many integrity failures (up to 80%) have their root either in part or wholly in human factors. Against that background, it is clear that significant benefits would be derived from ensuring that there is a strong safety culture which is clearly understood at all levels and which translates into consistent and positive behaviour.

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A workforce that is convinced the organisation fully supports safety and asset integrity as a core value will tend to do the right things, in the right way, at the right time - even when no one else is looking. The perception of risk across all levels at a plant is also a good insight into the overall culture. Do they feel they are safer than other plants or do they recognise that they operate with a higher than typical level of risk; how well do the workforce feel that this is being managed? Has an abnormal increased risk become the accepted normal condition?

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Managing Integrity

Topic 5 – Corporate Safety Culture Questions

1. What messages do you get from asset management about the importance of asset integrity? 2. Can you describe any occasions when you felt there was not a suitable long term commitment to asset integrity? (For example where other shorter term targets have been over-emphasised?) 3. Where are asset integrity responsibilities defined and documented?

4. Are you (or plant personnel) comfortable in reporting equipment failures, incomplete work or other asset integrity shortcomings on site? 5. Where do you think that attention would best be directed to improve the process safety culture on the plant?

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Managing Integrity

Topic 6 – Management of Change •

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It is necessary to carry out changes on operating plants over time. This results in engineering, procedural and organisational modifications. Because changes can have impacts on many other aspects of the operation, they can introduce new or unintended risks. It is therefore critical that a comprehensive review of the potential change impacts is undertaken before implementation. The management of change process seeks to ensure that the potential impact of any change is fully understood, and that any risks associated with the change are mitigated appropriately. The critical aspects in a functional management of change process are: – Having a robust process that is documented and approved that applies at all levels (from day to day operations through to major plant modification)

– Ensuring that all changes follow the process – Having suitable quality arrangements in place for design, construction, commissioning and handover phases of all engineering modifications – Ensuring that the risk assessment of any change has the correct level of validity by including the relevant operational, engineering and technical safety personnel in the review process

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Managing Integrity

Topic 6 – Management of Change Questions

1. Tell me how we identify, approve and implement engineering changes / improvements to the plant?

4. What are the main challenges experienced in getting necessary changes implemented quickly (e.g. procedures)?

2. Do you think we get good design, construction and commissioning of modifications?

5. How good are we at managing procedural and organisational changes?

3. How are you involved in identifying and assessing the risk of any proposed changes?

6. How do you deal with assessing the changes required in day to day tasks – changing the way we have to operate something or when carrying out a predefined activity controlled by a permit?

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Managing Integrity

Topic 7 – The Safety Case •

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All BG operated facilities are required to have a safety case in place. The safety case documents the process that has been followed for the identification of major accident hazards, assessment of the risks and the control measures that are implemented to manage these risks. By doing this, the safety case provides a justification for the continued safe operation of the facility. The safety case should provide a description of: – The facility and the processes that it operates – The major accident hazards that are present – The HSE management system that is in place – The measures in place to manage the major accident hazards – The safe operating envelope for the facility

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The safety case should be a living document. It should be prepared, and regularly reviewed and updated as required, with the involvement of the workforce. The content of the safety case should be effectively communicated to the workforce as part of their first induction to the facility, and should also be utilised in subsequent training sessions, operational risk assessments, tool box talks, etc. It is important that the safety case is a true reflection of the way in which the facility is really operated and that the key assumptions made in the safety case remain valid.

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Managing Integrity

Topic 7 – The Safety Case Questions

1. What are the major accident hazards at this site? How can we be sure that we have identified them all?

4. How do you ensure that the Safety Case remains valid? What do you see as your role in this process?

2. Can you explain to me how the facility Safety Case has been communicated to you? Do you understand its purpose?

5. Have you been involved in the review of any part of the Safety Case, and if so, how?

3. Can you describe how the Safety Case is used at the facility?

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Key Integrity Barriers

Topic 8 – Operating – Operating within the Envelope •

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The key objective of operations is to ensure that the plant is operated safely and effectively within the limits of the design. In order to achieve this, competent operations personnel need to be provided with the required information, tools and training to understand and operate the plant. The operating environment changes over time; reservoir conditions change, networks grow, grow, third parties may be connected. Operational procedures need to be accurate, Operational understandable, followed in practice and updated appropriately. All the required operational support systems should be in place. In addition, a clear corporate safety culture which empowers operators to make the correct decisions under all circumstances is essential.

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Safe operations is therefore the end result of having well trained operators with the correct support systems in place and represents a crucial link in attaining asset integrity assurance – the operators are a key part of the barriers (Figure 1).

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Topic 8 – Operating – Operating within the Envelope Questions

procedures that 1. Describe the key operating procedures you follow to safely safely operate this this plant. Are these easy to understand? Do you follow them strictly or have actual operating practices “evolved” since the procedures were written? How do we ensure that our procedures are up to date? operating g envelope for the 2. Where is the operatin plant defined? Are there any areas where we are having problems operating within that envelope? 3. How is the training and competency of operations personnel undertaken and assured?

4. What makes you believe that you are empowered to take quick corrective action? (e.g. in the event of an asset integrity related failure or in discovering a potential pending failure) 5. How do we make sure that shortcuts (or ‘workarounds’) ‘workarounds’) do not develop in the way we operate this plant? How do you recommend operating changes to improve safety or production?

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Topic 9 – Pressure – Pressure Safety (Relief) Valves •

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Pressure safety or relief valves represent the last line of defence in a pressure protection system and are intended to safely dispose of hydrocarbons from a pressurised containment system when a set (high) pressure is reached. The critical issue for pressure safety valves (PSVs) is ensuring that the periodic inspections and tests have been carried out to prove that they will operate when required, i.e. at the right pressure. Failuree to carry out the prescribed testing could Failur potentially lead to the PSV failing to function on demand and so it is important to determine if there are any overdue inspection and testing activities. ac tivities. In the event that tests are deferred there there should be a structured system in place for the management of deferrals that is appropriately approved by the Asset Technical Authority.

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It is also important to ensure that the required tests are carried out by suitably certified personnel using suitably certified equipment.

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Topic 9 – Pressure Safety (Relief) Valves Questions

1. Tell me how PSVs are managed on this facility? 2. What would we do, if it was not possible to carry out a test at the required time? 3. How do we ensure that PSV testing is carried out correctly (calibration, competent personnel, records etc?)

4. Have we ever had a PSV fail to function when tested? If this occurred, how would we resolve this problem? Do we have any spares? 5. Who, in this asset, is the Technical Authority for PSVs and what are their responsibilities?

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Topic 10 – Pressure Vessels •

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Pressure vessels are key components in a pressurised containment system. Vessels facilitate hydrocarbon processing such as separation, mixing, distillation, reaction, etc. The critical issue for pressure vessels is ensuring that the periodic inspections have been identified, carried out to the full requirement, results assessed and that there are none overdue. Vessel failure usually occurs as a result of material degradation (from corrosion or erosion, etc.) and it is c ritical that inspections take place in order to understand the status of the vessels’ structural integrity. There are several inspection techniques ranging from non-destructive testing (NDT) methods such as ultrasonic inspections and radiography to external visual or internal inspections.

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All deferred inspections need to be done against the background of an agreed and robust system for management of deferrals that is suitably approved. Just as critical, is ensuring that the required tests and inspections are carried out appropriately and abnormal results are assessed by a competent person.

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Topic 10 – Pressure Vessels Questions

1. Tell me how we determine where, how and when we carry out pressure vessel inspections? 2. What happens when an inspection can’t be carried out as planned? At what level in your organisation are deferrals approved? 3. How do we ensure that pressure vessel inspections are carried out correctly (right type, calibration, procedures, competent persons, etc?)

4. How are results of inspections considered and what might result if abnormal results were reported? (e.g. lower than expected wall thickness or major loss of coating) 5. What parts of the vessel do we inspect – is it just the shell? What about the flange faces, bridles, supports, etc?

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Topic 11 – Piping (Incl. Small Bore Piping) •

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Piping systems represent the conduit in a pressure containment system by which hydrocarbons and other contained fluids are transported for processing. They form critical components of a pressurised containment system and are usually the weak point in the process as a result of material degradation through a range of mechanisms, predominantly corrosion (internal or external) or erosion processes. The critical issue in facility Piping systems is ensuring that the periodic inspections have been carried out. Because they are usually very complex, it is best to analyse and categorise piping systems using criticality (susceptibility to failure and likely consequences of failure). The inspection program is then driven by the derived criticality. Some important areas are: – Small bore piping (< 2”) is thin walled and

more susceptible to damage, and failure due to vibration. A register of small bore piping with a prescribed program of inspection is best practice. – Piping joints are particularly vulnerable. Flanges should be subject to a flange management programme to provide assurance of their quality. – Corrosion under insulation (CUI) is a key risk leading to piping failure. An assessed and documented inspection programme is needed. – Likely or expected internal corrosion mechanisms that relate to the fluids within the facility should be captured in a corrosion risk register. – Temporary repair of piping by various means (engineered clamps or wraps) may be allowed at site, however these repairs must be closely monitored whilst in place, be recorded on a register, have a maximum defined life and a clear priority for permanent repair.

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Topic 11 – Piping (Incl. Small Bore Piping) Questions

1. Please explain how we ensure that piping on our facility is in good condition 2. Have we had any piping systems failures? Do you know what caused them (e.g. damage, vibration in small bore piping, corrosion?). What have we done to prevent recurrences? 3. What do we do to minimise the risk of flange leaks or failures?

4. Which areas might be prone to Corrosion Under Insulation (CUI), or internal corrosion, on this site? How do we manage and minimise these risks? 5. Is there a procedure for temporary repairs to pipework? Do you know how many temporary repairs you have, and how the permanent repairs are prioritised?

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Topic 12 – Structural Integrity •

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Critical structures are those which are required to retain the overall integrity of the facility or to provide support for safety critical functions (for example large hydrocarbon vessels, control building, offshore accommodation, offshore helideck, etc.). Structures are also critical if their collapse could damage process equipment, causing significant hydrocarbon release and escalation of the event. The critical structures are required to resist the loads imposed on them by events including storms, earthquakes, fires and explosions.

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Critical structures will be periodically examined for signs of corrosion or other degradation, coating defects, etc. This will usually be as part of a risk-based inspection program, where the results of inspections will be used to determine future inspection requirements based on projected corrosion rates. Corrosion protection systems also require periodic inspection, testing and maintenance to ensure continuing protection.

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Topic 12 – Structural Integrity Questions

1. How is structural integrity assured on this facility? 2. Can you explain how structural inspections are prioritised? Is there a clear distinction between critical and non-critical structures on this facility? 3. How are the results of inspections used to optimise the inspection process?

4. If significant defects and degradation (i.e. corrosion of steel structures, breakdown of concrete structures) are identified in structures, who decides what the appropriate action should be? 5. Are you aware of any structural issues on this facility at the moment, and what is being done to resolve them?

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Topic 13 – Process Control •

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Process plants are usually controlled by complex process control systems which are essential to safely manage the fluid processing in the plant.

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There are many control loops in any given plant. Each loop typically consists of three main components:

As with other active systems, the process control system functionality must be tested and analysed periodically to ensure it will function as and when required. The critical aspects in a functional process control loop are: – A robust process for system function testing

– The sensor picks up data from the process (e.g. temperature, pressure, etc.)

– Ensuring that function tests are actually carried out and the results recorded for analysis

– The controller analyses the data from the sensor and sends signals to:

– Review of results and follow up on any deficiencies found

– The final control element (e.g. control valve, shutdown valve, etc.) which carries out required functions on command

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Certain testing activities will require isolation of one or a number of devices, and it is therefore important to fully understand what functions are being withdrawn in this period and that any risks and loss of operability are fully assessed.

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Topic 13 – Process Control Questions

1. How do we ensure functionality of the process control systems? 2. What happens when we find deficiencies in the system as a result of testing? 3. How are records from the testing of the process control system maintained and reviewed?

4. What problems have there been with the process control systems? Are there any modifications planned/ongoing to resolve these issues? 5. Are there currently any control loops on manual control? If so, why is this? Can you explain the process for management of process control over-rides.

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Topic 14 – Alarm Management •

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Alarms are placed within process plants to alert operators when specified process conditions (e.g. level, pressure, temperature) exceed specified values. Typically alarms are sent via the control system to the control room so that appropriate action can be taken. A problem that is faced in the industry is that of managing the number of alarms received by the control room operator. Having too many alarms can result in reduced efficiency and in many instances has been a critical factor in hiding integrity incidents until much too late. Managing this phenomenon, referred to as ‘alarm flooding’, is key to minimising risks.

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The critical aspects of alarm management are: – There is a clear hierarchy and system for prioritisation of alarms (design) – The number of alarms handled by the operator is measured and actions are taken to eliminate “nuisance” and other non-essential alarms – Having a plan to rationalise the alarm handling process (where this is needed)

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Topic 14 – Alarm Management Questions

1. Can you explain how alarms are received and responded to?

3. Who has responsibility for ensuring alarm rates are at a reasonable level?

2. How are alarm rates measured and managed? What is the current normal rate? How does that change when an unplanned shutdown or plant upset occurs?

4. If the operators are currently overloaded, what plans are there to improve the situation?

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Topic 15 – Leak and Fire Detection •

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One of the key objectives of asset integrity management is to ensure that the hazardous fluids remain within the confines of the pressurised containment system. However, if a leak occurs, then it has to be detected as quickly as possible to allow remedial actions such as equipment isolation, power supply shutoff or process shutdown to be taken.

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Various leak detection systems (flammable gas, toxic gas, fire, smoke) are provided on facilities to initiate actions, either automatically or through alarms, and thus mitigate possible effects of any releases. •

Leak detection has to function as required, when required. Thus such systems and their components are subject to periodic testing to confirm functionality. The function of operating personnel is also to be vigilant for the lower level ‘weeps’ and ‘seeps’ that could escalate if unchecked. Certain plant operations and maintenance may require that one or more leak detection devices are inhibited for a short time, and it is important to understand the degree of cover that remains during this time and that the risks have been assessed correctly. Construction work may result in long term inhibits (more than one shift) and it may be appropriate to revise the safety case for such activities.

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Topic 15 – Leak and Fire Detection Questions

1. What systems do we have to detect leaks, or fire, on this plant? Can you briefly describe how they work?

4. How are flowline or pipeline leaks detected? How can we ensure such systems are working properly?

2. How do we ensure that our leak/fire detection systems are reliable and will be available when needed? Do we measure this somehow? Is any of the testing overdue?

5. Do you know if any of these systems are inhibited at the moment? What is the associated risk? How long have the inhibits been in place?

3. How do we keep a record of all leaks and seeps? How is the output from this fed back into the system so that they are resolved?

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Topic 16 – Emergency Shutdown (ESD) and Blowdown Systems •

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Emergency shutdown systems are installed on plants to provide a mechanism to shut down the plant safely in the event of an emergency. ESD is usually triggered automatically if some key process parameter has been exceeded or a fire/gas release has been detected, or may be manually initiated if personnel believe that they are no longer able to ensure safe control of the plant. Blowdown systems provide a means to rapidly depressurise the plant by removing the gas inventory to a safe location (e.g. a flare). These systems are required to be functional when called upon to take action. In order to do this end-to-end tests of the systems (including sensors, control system and final control elements) have to be conducted periodically to ensure that the system

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The key areas in ensuring ESD and blowdown system functionality are: – A robust process(s) for system function testing of all components – Ensuring that function tests are actually carried out and the results recorded for analysis – Review of results and follow up on any deficiencies found

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Certain testing activities may require one or a number of devices to be isolated, and it is therefore important to fully understand what functions are being withdrawn in this period and that any risks are fully assessed.

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Topic 16 – Emergency Shutdown (ESD) and Blowdown Systems Questions

1. How do we make sure that ESD and blowdown systems will work when needed?

4. Who is technically responsible for the ESD and blowdown systems? How do they get involved?

2. What happens when deficiencies are found in the system(s)?

5. Are there any parts of these systems isolated at the moment and what is the reason? Is this a recent change?

3. Can you describe to me where testing records are kept and what is done with them?

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Topic 17 – Control of Ignition Sources •

Potential ignition sources at hydrocarbon handling facilities must be strictly controlled. Areas of the plant where there is the potential for a hazardous (i.e. flammable) atmosphere to be present must have suitably rated electrical equipment. This may be intrinsically safe (incapable of providing enough energy to cause ignition) or explosion proof (sealed to prevent gas ingress, referred to as “Ex” equipment). The emergency shutdown (ESD) system will isolate all non-essential electrical equipment in the event of a major gas release, but equipment that is required to continue to function in an emergency must be appropriately rated. All electrical equipment requires periodic inspection, testing and maintenance to ensure that it is not damaged or degraded such that its rating is compromised.

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Earth bonding is provided on equipment to prevent sparks due to stray current or static build-up. Lightning protection systems are provided to earth the currents from lightning strikes. Hot surfaces may also cause auto-ignition of flammable gas/air mixtures and so maximum surface temperatures are controlled in hazardous areas. Earth bonding and insulation materials require periodic inspection to ensure their integrity. The activities of personnel present potential ignition sources. Non-sparking tools must be used. Hot work must be strictly controlled by the permit-to-work system. All temporary and portable equipment must be inspected and certified before being brought onto site, and either periodically recertified or removed.

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Topic 17 – Control of Ignition Sources Questions

1. If a gas release were to occur, what would be the most likely ignition sources present at this facility? 2. How is the ignition potential from electrical equipment controlled?

3. How is hot-work managed to reduce the ignition risk? 4. How is the risk of ignition by temporary or portable equipment items managed at this facility?

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Topic 18 – Fire Protection •

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Fire protection systems are provided to mitigate the effects of fires, should they occur. These include passive and active systems. Passive fire protection systems include fire rated divisions (fire walls), and passive fire protection coatings (typically used on structures, supports, etc.) and jackets or enclosures (typically used on critical valves or vessels). Although the passive systems are inherently more reliable than active systems, they still require periodic inspection to ensure that they are not degraded or damaged in any way that might cause them to fail prematurely during a fire event.

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Active systems include firewater deluge systems, sprinkler systems, gaseous flooding systems, hydrants, monitors and mobile and portable fire extinguishers. These are provided in various locations on the facility, dependent upon the specific nature of the fire hazard. These systems and their components are subject to periodic inspection, testing and maintenance to ensure their functionality in accordance with established performance standards. If fire protection systems are unavailable or (wholly or partially) impaired for any period of time this may mean that the consequences of a fire in the event of a major accident could be much worse. Therefore in the event of unavailability or impairment a risk assessment should be carried out.

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Topic 18 – Fire Protection Questions

1. Which areas of this facility present the greatest fire hazard and why? 2. What are the principle means of fire protection in these areas of the facility? 3. How do we ensure that passive fire protection measures will be effective?

4. How do we ensure that our active fire protection systems will function as, and when, required? 5. What manual fire fighting measures do we have at this facility? What training has been provided in their use, and when should these be used?

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Topic 19 – Escape, Muster and Evacuation •

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All facilities are required to have emergency response plans in place and make suitable provisions for escape, muster and evacuation of all personnel at the facility in the event of a major accident. These arrangements and provisions are critical to preventing loss of life in the event of an integrity failure. Escape, muster and evacuation provisions may typically include escape routes, emergency communications, H2S escape sets, life-jackets, lifeboats, etc. The provisions required must be based on a specific assessment of the hazards at the facility, the particular environment and the number of personnel present. Some facilities (such as offshore platforms) will require specially designed muster locations to protect personnel from the effects of the accidental event while mustering takes place and a decision to evacuate is made.

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All emergency response facilities must be kept ready for use at all times. As such they must be periodically tested and re-certified for use. It is critical that this is carried out by organisations and personnel with the required equipment, skills and qualifications. In the event of unavailability or impairment a risk assessment must be carried out. The critical issues to be reviewed in examining the management of emergency response are: – A structured and documented system for maintenance and recertification of emergency response equipment exists – Implementation of appropriate drills and tests at defined intervals to ensure personnel are familiar with the emergency response arrangements and to enable continuous improvement. – Records are kept for examination and review

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Topic 19 – Escape, Muster and Evacuation Questions

1. What are the arrangements for escape and muster at this facility? How is it ensured that the muster points provide protection against the effects of major accident events? 2. Tell me how we ensure that life-saving appliances will work when needed? 3. How do we ensure that only certified personnel inspect and repair these units?

4. Tell me about the emergency response training you have received. How is this kept current and up to date? 5. Tell me about the last emergency response drill, exercise or test that you were involved in.

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Summary


HSSE Management Tour Briefing Cards •

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These cards are designed to provide senior personnel with a basis for discussing asset integrity based topics during HSSE management tours. Useful principles to remember are: – Questions are “open” to generate discussion use them as a starting point of conversations – Only use a few questions (2 or 3) with each person – Avoid reading cards during discussions – The objective is to discover individual’s roles and concerns, and understand their reality ‘on the ground’ regarding asset integrity or other safety issues – Any identified issues should be fed back to the relevant line or organising manager for consideration

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Summary

HSSE Management Tour Briefing Cards (continued) •

Related documents and tools which may also be referred to include: – BG Safety Behaviours – BG Asset Integrity Management standard and guideline – BG Safety Case standard and guideline – BG Asset Integrity Toolkit (https://www.bgassetintegrity.com/content/# ) – BG Safety Engineering and Asset Integrity Community (via BG Connect)

Comments and suggestions on these briefing cards are welcome. If you have any questions or comments, email [email protected]

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This booklet is part of a training programme that asset managers and senior supervisors should undertake to aid them in conducting successful HSSE management tours. The details on how this training should be delivered can be found in the BG Guideline, Guide to HSSE Management Tours, BG-GL-HSSE-EFF-524.

Hsse Asset Integrity Guide

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