Hegel's Absolute Knowledge and its Many Interpretations

 

 

Jacob  Blumenfeld,  NSSR  2012    

  The  Difference  That  is  No  Difference:   Absolute  Knowledge  and  its  Many  Interpretations    

Hegel’s   Phenomenology   of   Spirit   provides   an   account   of   how   modern   individuals,   born   into   communities   braced   with   the   historical   legacy   of   Europe,   have   come   to   understand  themselves  as  self-­‐conscious,  socially  grounded  knowing  agents.    Hegel   develops   the   content   of   such   knowing   agents   through   a   developmental,   rational   reconstruction   of   the   forms   of   normative   authority   which   legitimize   different   models  of  knowledge,  selfhood,  individuality,  action,  community,  morality,  religion,   and   ultimate,   normative   authority   itself.     These   pictures   of   the   self   and   the   world,   which   Hegel   calls   shapes   of   consciousness   and   shapes   of   spirit,   become   progressively   more   and   more   comprehensive   as   Hegel   uses   myriad   skeptical   strategies   to   highlight   the   contradictory   relations   between   the   goal   of   each   model   and  the  elements  or  means  used  to  achieve  it.   The   goal   of   the   entire   investigation   is   simply   to   know   what   knowing   is,   but   this   seemingly   trivial   question   opens   a   Pandora’s   box   into   a   whole   host   of   other   problems,   ones   which   we   readers   are   required   to   traverse   before   knowing   what   knowing  fully  and  actually  is.  The  motivation  to  know  what  knowing  is  comes  from   Hegel’s  desire  to  introduce  us  moderns  into  the  kind  of  thinking  that  philosophical   science   requires.   This   kind   of   thinking   cannot   just   be   accepted   as   self-­‐evidently   “true,”   for   the   whole   task   of   philosophy   is   to   not   take   anything   granted   for   being   self-­‐evidently   true.   Hence,   if   one   wants   to   genuinely   think   philosophically,   i.e.,   scientifically,   then   one   must   come   to   adopt   this   position   somehow   on   their   own   grounds   and   at   the   same   time   on   the   grounds   required   by   philosophy.   This   impossible   task   is   the   self-­‐education   of   consciousness   that   constitutes   the   path   of   the   Phenomenology  of  Spirit   and   culminates   in   Absolute   Knowing.   The   task   of   this   paper  is  to  explain  this  culmination.     There   is   a   strong   resistance,   however,   to   interpreting   the   last   chapter   of   the   Phenomenology  of  Spirit.  Some  commentators  barely  get  past  Self-­‐Consciousness,  let   alone  the  next  three  chapters,  dismissing  everything  after  the  attainment  of  Reason   as   repetition.1  Others   take   the   brevity   and   cursory   quality   of   the   final   chapter   to   merit  it  unworthy  of  anything  more  than  a  final  summary  of  what  we  already  know.2   The   journey   is   the   goal,   such   readers   argue.   I,   however,   am   doubtful   of   this   rhetorical   trick.   Hence,   it   seems   strangely   untraditional   to   posit   something   as   seemingly   conservative   as   I   will   here,   namely,   that   Hegel’s   exposition   of   the   self-­‐ education   of   consciousness   does   have   a   goal,   an   end,   and   that   end   is   Absolute   Knowledge.   This   end   is   in   no   way   unreachable,   and   neither   is   it   mystical;   it   is   not                                                                                                                   1  For   instance,   Heidegger,   Hegel’s   Phenomenology   of   Spirit   (1988),   and   Pippin,   Robert   B.   Hegel's   Idealism  (1989)   2  For   instance,   Solomon,   Robert   C.   In   the   Spirit   of   Hegel   (1983);   Stern,   Robert.   Hegel   and   the   Phenomenology  of  Spirit  (2002)  

 

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any   empirical   knowledge,   nor   is   it   a   purely   theoretical   insight   without   bearing   on   the   world.   My   claim   is   that   without   Absolute   Knowledge,   the   project   of   the   Phenomenology   makes   no   sense.   It   is   not   an   afterthought,   a   last   minute   review   of   what   was,   or   a   foreshadowing   preview   of   what   will   come;   it   is   rather   the   final   justification  for  the  path  itself.  Although  there  is  much  to  learn  from  every  shape  of   consciousness   and   spirit   in   their   own   right,   the   pathway   of   self-­‐consciousness   through   them   would   have   been   ultimately   in   vain   without   having   attained   the   last   standpoint.     Before   I   work   on   explicating   the   last   shape   of   spirit   through   a   detailed   reconstruction   of   its   key   “moments”,   I   will   prepare   the   way   forward   by   offering   a   brief   overview   the   journey   traveled   so   far,   compressed   and   translated   into   a   clear   language   which   forsakes   any   short-­‐cut   through   Hegelian   jargon.   This   will,   by   necessity,   be   too   abstract   and   too   general   at   parts,   but   that   is   a   cost   I’m   willing   to   take.  Then  I  will  present  a  compendium  of  the  most  well  known  and  best  articulated   competing  interpretations  of  the  final  chapter,  from  Marx’s  early  1844  account  up  to   Brandom’s  as  of  yet  (winter  2012)  still  unpublished  analysis.    Finally,  I  will  give  my   own  exegesis  of  the  final  chapter  along  with  comments  on  its  relevance  for  Hegel’s   project(s)  as  a  whole.       I.  The  Path  So  Far     Hegel’s  task,  as  articulated  in  the  Introduction,  is  to  know  the  Absolute;  or  rather,  it   is  to  know  something  that  is  absolutely  certain.  Hegel  seeks  to  secure  a  ground  for   truth,  a  ground  which  can  sustain  itself  against  the  full  onslaught  of  skeptical  attacks   against   it.   To   do   this   is   a   seemingly   impossible   task,   Hegel   admits,   for   the   ancient   skeptical  problems  of  the  criteria,  infinite  regress  and  circular  reasoning  have  been   proven  over  millennia  to  be  unanswerable.  Most  philosophers  either  naively  ignore   these   charges   or   they   reluctantly   succumb   to   a   form   of   skepticism   themselves.   Hegel,  however,  attempts  to  bypass  this  dilemma  by  incorporating  such  skepticism   itself   into   his   method.   This   makes   skepticism   into   the   driving   force   motivating   a   progressively   richer   series   of   more   comprehensive   frameworks   for   securing   truth,   certainty,  and  the  absolute.     Hegel   notes   that   every   modern   account   of   knowing   presupposes   a   conception   of   consciousness  and  the  objects  that  consciousness  knows;  instead  of  criticizing  such   conceptions   for   being   “wrong”—which   would   require   some   “correct”   criterion   from   which   to   speak—Hegel   uses   the   implicit   criteria   generated   by   the   conception   of   consciousness  and  its  relation  to  objects  to  bring  its  own  contradictions  to  light.  This   internally  motivated  skeptical  procedure  requires  two  perspectives  to  be  held  at  the   same  time:  on  the  one  hand,  the  perspective  of  the  consciousness  in  its  relation  to   objects   as   it   appears,   and   on   the   other   hand,   the   perspective   of   the   observer   of   such   consciousness-­‐object   relations.   The   first   perspective   will   perform   the   activity   of   knowing   under   the   constraints   and   standards   for   truth   which   its   consciousness-­‐ object   conception   allows,   and   the   second   perspective   will   see   if   such   a   conception   enables   one   to   achieve   the   knowledge   it   purports   to   without   falling   into  

 

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contradiction   or   requiring   more   premises   outside   the   bounds   of   what   is   allowed.   The   series   of   different   forms   of   consciousness   in   their   relation   to   objects   will   be   called   “Shapes   of   Consciousness”,   and   Hegel   begins   by   analyzing   the   most   “immediate”  of  them  all,  Sense-­‐Certainty.   The  first  three  shapes  of  consciousness  that  Hegel  investigates  could  all  be  generally   called  “object”  theories  of  cognition,  in  that  their  validity  is  determined  fully  on  the   object  side  of  the  analysis.  Hegel  begins  with  these  accounts  for  they  “appear”  to  be   the   most   natural   and   complete   to   both   everyday   consciousness   and   to   the   philosophical   justification   that   usually   accompanies   it,   namely,   empiricism.   Beginning  with  the  ‘raw’  immediacy  of  the  this-­‐here-­‐now  experience,  the  first  shape   of   consciousness   cannot   help   but   lose   the   absolute   in   the   very   act   of   declaring   it.     The   supposed   immediate   truth   dissolves   into   a   mediated   structure   dependent   of   what   is   not-­‐here,   not-­‐this,   not-­‐now.   That   is,   the   object   as   an   individual   requires   relations  to  even  pick  it  out  as  individual.     This   individual-­‐with-­‐its-­‐relations   becomes   the   Thing   of   perception,   the   second   shape   of   consciousness.   Here,   the   old   Parmenidean   problem   of   the   one   and   the   many  reemerges.  In  trying  to  get  a  hold  of  the  object  in  this  picture,  we  are  forced  to   reckon   with   the   relation   between   the   many   properties   of   the   thing   and   its   one   indivisible   unity.     Locked   into   an   antinomy   which   perception   itself   cannot   answer,   another   level   of   mediation   is   internally   developed   which   accounts   for   the   supersensible   stability   of   the   object   underneath   its   phenomenal   appearances.   This   new   shape   conforms   to   one   of   naturalistic   explanation   by   laws,   or   Force.   By   explaining  every  appearance  as  the  immediate  expression  of  an  essence,  this  shape   of   consciousness   appears   to   have   won   its   truth,   but   it   results   in   turning   the   world   upside  down  instead.  For  there  seems  to  be  no  way  of  accounting  for  the  necessary   relations   between   the   forces   themselves   without   positing   some   ultra-­‐force,   one   which   is   not   immediately   tied   to   its   expression.   In   other   words,   either   the   laws   themselves   are   ungrounded,   or   we   are   required   to   posit   a   certainty   unifying   force   which   itself   cannot   be   an   object.   This   unifying   force   is   nothing   else   than   the   understanding  in  its  activity  of  explanation.   This   shape   of   consciousness   has   exhausted   the   series   of   object-­‐only   accounts,   for   truth   now   necessarily   requires   an   explanation   by   a   subject.   In   explanation,   “consciousness   is   communing   directly   with   itself,”   [in   unmittelbarem   Selbstgespräche   mit   sich]”3  and   hence   to   understand   this   activity   requires   taking   oneself  as  the  object.  This  move  shifts  the  kinds  of  cognitive  models  developed  so  far   around   from   their   dependency   on   given   objects   to   a   new   dependency   on   active   subjects.  What  is  gained  in  this  first  series  of  shapes,  in  short,  is  the  negative  truth   that   there   is   no   unmediated   access   to   reality,   that   certain   normative   practices   taken   by   subjects   are   required   to   access   truth   at   all.   What   is   gained,   in   other   words,   is   Kantian  Transcendental  philosophy.                                                                                                                      Hegel,   Phänomenologie   des   Geistes   (PhG)   §163.   For   almost   every   citation   from   Hegel’s   Phenomenology   of   Spirit,   I   use   Terry   Pinkard’s   2012   translation,   accessible   on   his   website,   to   be   eventually  published  with  Cambridge.    Otherwise,  I  use  A.V.  Miller’s  standard  translation,  or  my  own.   3

 

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From   now   on,   all   shapes   of   consciousness   are   shapes   of   self-­‐consciousness,   but   grasping   “what   consciousness   knows   in   knowing   itself”4  is   still   far   from   clear.   In   chapter  IV,  on  the  Truth  of  Self-­‐Certainty,  Hegel  constructs  models  of  what  this  self-­‐ consciousness  “in  the  act  of  knowing”  consists  in,  beginning  with  the  most  minimal   and   moving   to   the   more   complex.   What   these   forms   of   self-­‐consciousness   have   in   common  is  the  inverse  of  what  earlier  bound  the  forms  of  consciousness  together:   whereas  previously,  the  truth  had  to  be  contained  in  something  outside  the  self,  now   the  truth  is  only  determined  in  the  self.     In   order   for   self-­‐consciousness   to   be   absolute   in   the   sense   that   the   object   of   consciousness  was  previously  taken  to  be,  it  cannot  be  determined  by  any  external   factors.   That   is,   the   self   of   self-­‐consciousness   cannot   be   taken   as   simply   the   contingent   result   of   the   biological   drive   of   self-­‐reproduction,   instinct,   and   hunger.   This   self   must   be   in   control   of   itself,   that   is,   it   must   have   a   certain   power   to   determine,   or   dominate   its   conditions   of   existence.   Hegel   fleshes   this   out   by   identifying   self-­‐consciousness   at   it   most   basic   level   with   desire   [es   ist   Begierde   überhaupt],  which  can  be  read  as  a  certain  directedness  toward  the  world,  even  an   independence   from   it.   Yet   it   is   only   from   the   world   that   desire   can   take   its   contents,   and  so  the  problem  reemerges  of  the  actual  independence  and  absoluteness  of  the   self.   For   the   self’s   desires   not   to   be   determined   by   something   outside   of   itself,   the   self  must  desire  something  that  freely  gives  itself  to  it,  something  that  confirms  the   independence  and  not  the  dependence  of  the  self.     For   Hegel,   the   only   object   that   can   do   this   is   no   object   at   all,   rather,   it   is   the   same   structure   as   the   self-­‐consciousness:   Das  Selbstbewußtsein  erreicht  seine  Befriedigung   nur   in   einem   andern   Selbstbewußtsein.   The   self   desires   not   an   object,   but   mutual   recognition   of   itself   by   another   subject.   This   recognition   is   the   basis   from   which   any   self-­‐consciousness  can  actually  be  what  it  claims.  If  we  take  this  as  a  response  to  the   epistemological   failures   of   the   first   object-­‐oriented   sections,   then   we   see   it   as   not   just   a   sociological   thesis,   but   as   a   claim   into   what   grounds   the   possibility   of   knowledge,  or  as  others  have  said,  what  legitimizes  normative  authority.  5   This   Wendungspunkt   is   the   ur-­‐form   from   which   later   key   developments   in   spirit’s   self-­‐education  on  the  path  to  absolute  knowing  take  shape.  For  what  is  gained  here   is  the  abstract  kernel  of  spirit,  the  basis  structure  of  mutual  recognition  which  will   come  to  authorize,  in  different  forms,  the  individual  and  social  practices  of  rational,   moral,  and  historical  agents.  Yet  here,  in  Self-­‐Consciousness,  such  recognition  is  still   very   abstract   in   it’s   content,   for   it   is   only   the   form   that   is   being   made   explicit.   In   the   rest   of   the   chapter,   Hegel   shows   why   such   recognition   cannot   satisfy   both   self-­‐ consciousness’   desires,   and   necessarily   leads   to   a   situation   of   domination   and   submission  or,  more  abstractly,  of  independence  and  dependence  of  the  self  on  an                                                                                                                   4  PhG,  §165  

5  This  analysis  of  self-­‐consciousness  leans  heavily  on  Pinkard  (1994)  and  Pippin  (1989,  1993).    

 

 

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other.  The  analysis  proceeds  into  different  formal  “strategies”,  as  Pippin  writes,6  by   which   such   self-­‐consciousness   tries   to   achieve   its   satisfaction,   recognition   and   independence:   from   the   formative   work   of   the   death-­‐fearing   slave   to   the   free   contentless   thinking   of   the   stoic,   the   self-­‐defeating   power   of   the   skeptic,   and   the   internally  divided  soul  of  the  unhappy  consciousness.     Each   of   these   forms   of   self-­‐consciousness   or   strategies   for   satisfying   conditions   of   independence  are  laden  with  inconsistencies,  but  the  lesson  at  the  end  of  this  stage   is   that   self-­‐consciousness   cannot   help   but   simultaneously   affirm  and  deny   it’s   own   independent,  absolute  authority.  Epistemic  certainty  for  the  unhappy  consciousness   is  contained  in  its  recognition  of  itself  as  necessarily  inadequate  to  be  certain  about   anything   on   it’s   own   terms.   Hence,   the   doubling   over,   the   certainty   of   uncertainty   without   something   beyond   oneself,   becomes   itself   the   recognition   that   the   self-­‐ consciousness   sought   after   in   vain   in   the   “unchangeable”,   God,   the   mediator.   For   self-­‐consciousness   is   on   both   sides   of   the   divide,   and   the   only   way   this   can   be   possible   is   if   it   contains   “the   beyond”   within   itself,   not   as   a   given   object,   but   as   a   dynamic   project.   This   project   is   Reason,   “the   certainty   of   being   all   reality,”   [Die   Vernunft  ist  die  Gewißheit,  alle  Realität  zu  sein].7     Reason   is   the   positive   project   of   self-­‐consciousness   confirming   its’   own   mutually   recognitive  normative  authority  by  engaging  with  the  contents  of  the  world,  being   that  they  are  its  contents.  At  first  passively,  but  increasingly  becoming  more  active,   reason  is  considered  in  the  forms  of  observational  science,  individualist  expression,   and   moral   individualism.   Mimicking   the   earlier   transition   from   consciousness   to   self-­‐consciousness,   this   chapter   moves   from   a   rational   investigation   of   beings   modeled   on   observable   things,   to   an   investigation   of   the   kinds   of   actions   and   claims   expressed   by   individual   subjects   in   accordance   with   themselves,   each   other,   and   the   world   at   large.   This   section   expresses   “modern   life’s   self-­‐justification”,   as   Pinkard   writes,  the  attempt  to  ground  one’s  independence  and  authority  only  through  forms   of   individual   rational   activity.   First   theoretically   expressed   as   observational   science,   this   attempt   breaks   down   under   the   antinomy   of   treating   spiritual   beings   as   unspiritual  objects.  From  here  on,  the  perspective  shifts  towards  analyzing  forms  of   agency   and   their   normative   justifications.   Beginning   with   individual   character   types   (in   a   self-­‐consciously   literary   presentation),   Hegel   depicts   progressively   more   complex   iterations   of   these   forms   of   agency   which   disavow,   avow,   and   avowingly   disavow  their  dependence  on  others  for  their  own  acts  to  be  meaningful  at  all.  The   various   appeals   to   ethical   hedonism,   sentimentalism,   natural   virtue,   and   moral   rationalism   for   justification   all   fail,   for   they   cannot   account   for   their   own   conditions   of   existence   in   the   end;   these   conditions   are   shown   to   be   essentially   social   (as   collectively   instituted   forms   of   mutual   recognition)   and   historical  (as   the   legacy   of                                                                                                                   6  Pippin   (1993),   p71:   “Stoic   dualism,   the   negative   activity   of   skepticism,   and   the   "unhappy"   displacement  of  real  worth  and  subjectivity  in  a  relation  to  a  beyond  and  an  afterlife  are  all  said  to   represent   strategies   by   which   laboring,   dependent   subjects   could   still   nevertheless   affirm,   collectively,  without  engendering  a  new  struggle  for  recognition,  what  cannot  be  denied  even  if  not   yet  realized:  their  independence  or  freedom.”     7  PhG  §235  

 

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actual  processes  of  self-­‐formation  and  alienation  in  the  European  community).   When  rationality  is  no  longer  conceived  of  as  an  impersonal,  ahistorical,  individual   activity,  but  rather  as  actual  modes  of  institutionalized  “reflective  social  practice,”8   then  we  have  entered  the  realm  of  Spirit.  As  it  turns  out,  we  have  always  been  in  this   realm,   albeit  blind   to   its   holistic,   dynamic   form;  9  it   is   only   now   that   we   can   begin   to   see   the   grounds   from   which   we   have   always   been   judging   ourselves,   grounds   which   legitimize  our  claims  to  knowledge  and  action.  Geist  is  Hegel’s  broad  name  for  any   culturally   integrated,   reciprocally   related   community   of   self-­‐determining   agents,   bound   together   as   a   community,   and   not   a   mere   collection   of   atoms,   by   self-­‐ generated,  reflective  norms.10     Without   any   spurious   break,   the   epistemological   question   of   the   foundation   of   knowledge  had  led  us  to  an  ethical  investigation  into  the  history  of  Western   culture.     Strange,   but   logical.   The   best   way   to   study   spirit   is   no   longer   to   abstract   from   its   inter-­‐dynamics,  but  rather  to  dive  right  in.  “Die  lebendige  sittliche  Welt  ist  der  Geist   in  seiner  Wahrheit,”  and   hence   the  living  ethical  world  is  our  new  object.  Or,  in  other   words,   spirit   is   the   actuality   of   what   former   philosophers   called   substance,   that   is,   the   ultimate   foundation   of   being,   knowledge,   truth,   and   value.   Deducing   this   claim   from   the   immanent   movement   of   shapes   of   consciousness   so   far   does   not   tell   us   what   this   spirit   consists   in,   i.e.,   what   its   content   has   come   to   be.   The   task   of   the   phenomenologist,  at  this  point,  cannot  be  to  abstractly  lay  out  consciousness-­‐object   frames   anymore,   for   that   entire   picture   of   knowledge   has   been   shown   to   be   inadequate   to   answer   it’s   own   questions.   The   task   is   rather   to   display   for   consciousness  “shapes  of  spirit,”  that  is,  dialectical  images  of  the  guiding  values,  life   goals,   institutional   mechanisms,   social   categories,   and   reflective   strategies   that   constitute  the  specificity  of  an  actual  social  formation.     By  depicting  the  values  of  a  society  alongside  the  established  means  it  authorizes  for   individuals  to  collectively  express  those  values,  the  observing  consciousness  is  able   to   see   the   gap   between   such   means   and   ends.   This   gap   is   produced   internally   by   the   very   movement   of   the   elements   of   the   structure   of   spirit.   What   is   under   consideration   here   is   how   mutually   recognizing   self-­‐determining   reflective   agents   come   to   inhabit   roles,   languages,   and   activities   that  end   up  denying   the  recognition,   freedom,   and   reflection   upon   which   they   are   based.   But   these   denials   are   productive,  or  determinate  in  Hegel’s  sense,  in  that  they  produce  a  new  set  of  norms   and   institutional   means   by   which   to   account   for   the   failures   of   the   previous   set.   The                                                                                                                   8  This  is  Pinkard’s  term.  

9  PhG   §439:   “Der   Geist   ist   hiemit   das   sich   selbst   tragende   absolute   reale   Wesen.   Alle   bisherigen   Gestalten  des  Bewußtseins  sind  Abstraktionen  desselben;  sie  sind  dies,  daß  er  sich  analysiert,  seine   Momente  unterscheidet,  und  bei  einzelnen  verweilt.”     10  PhG   §440:   “Der   Geist   ist   das   sittliche  Leben  eines   Volks,  insofern   er   die   unmittelbare  Wahrheit  ist;   das   Individuum,   das   eine   Welt   ist.   Er   muß   zum   Bewußtsein   über   das,   was   er   unmittelbar   ist,   fortgehen,   das   schöne   sittliche   Leben   aufheben,   und   durch   eine   Reihe   von   Gestalten   zum   Wissen   seiner  selbst  gelangen.  Diese  unterscheiden  sich  aber  von  den  vorhergehenden  dadurch,  daß  sie  die   realen   Geister   sind,   eigentliche   Wirklichkeiten,   und   statt   Gestalten   nur   des   Bewußtseins,   Gestalten   einer  Welt.”    

 

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story   of   spirit   is   the   tragic,   comic   and   novelistic11  account   of   these   productive   breakdowns  in  the  normative  authority  of  social  formations  across  Western  Europe,   from  ancient  Greece  and  Rome,  through  the  late  Middle  Ages  of  absolutist  states  and   growing   civil   society,   to   the   religious   revivals   and   philosophical   battles   of   the   Enlightenment,   the   French   Revolution,   and   modern   moralistic   Germany   itself.   Obviously   this   is   not   a   complete   picture,   but   each   case   is   meant   to   provide   an   account   of   a   key   strategic   advance   in   the   cumulative   development   of   modern   self-­‐ reflective  self-­‐determined  subjectivity.     In   gross   terms,   we   can   say   that   the   true  ethical  spirit   [Der  wahre  Geist]   of   the   Greeks   failed  for  it’s  inability  to  account  for  individuality,  that  is,  to  provide  a  rational  space   in  which  individual  action  within  and  against  social  roles  can  make  sense.  The  space   of   action,   although   mutually   constituted   and   legally   regulated,   is   legitimized   as   ultimately  something  substantially  given,  and  hence,  unbreakable.  The  world  of  self-­‐ alienated   spirit   [Die   Welt   des   sich   entfremdeten   Geistes]   develops   from   the   breakdown   in   the   content   of   social   roles   in   Rome   produced   by   the   emptiness   of   individuals  taken  as  mere  property  holding  persons.    The  culture   of  the  aristocracy,   courts,  flattery,  praise,  wealth,  and  irony  empties  the  final  air  out  of  the  balloon  of   Sittlichkeit.  Once  the  previously  given  authority  of  social  roles  are  brought  down  to   earth,  the  relation  between  the  individual  and  society  is  up  for  grabs,  and  becomes  a   public  affair.   Alienation   is   a   historically   specific   phenomena   of   late   Medieval,   early   modern   Europe   which   consists   in   deposing   the   authority   of   church   and   state   in   regulating   meaningful   action   and   replacing   it   with   self-­‐generated   accounts   of   reason,   utility,   freedom,  will,  and  conscience.  In  the  process  of  Bildung,  linguistic  forms,  economic   relations,  religious  faith,  and  political  revolution  all  play  a  role  in  building  a  subject   capable  of  taking  itself  to  be  authoritative  in  constituting  the  ground  for  a  modern,   free   society.   This   self-­‐alienated   subject,   as   mutually   recognizing   spirit,   ends   completely   emptied   of   every   possible   external   determination.     Absolutely   free,   utilitarian,  and  deist,  this  spirit  overthrows  the  Ancien   Régime,   and  leaves  no  space   for   any   social   roles   between   the   universal   expression   of   itself   and   it’s   individuals   members.   The   culmination   of   Self-­‐Alienation   comes   with   the   Terror,   the   utter   destruction  of  particularity.     From  here,  Hegel  seamlessly  moves  to  a  discussion  of  morality,  as  if  to  display  the   inner  compatibility  between  Kantian  ethics  and  the  French  Terror.  Both,  according   to   the   reading   here,   are   problematic   attempts   to   find   a   suitable   ground   to   account   for   the   individual   expression   of   a   universal   will.     But   whereas   the   Terror   must   eliminate   all   the   particularity   of   the   subject   in  deed,   the   spirit   that   is   certain   of   itself   as   Morality   [Der   seiner   selbst   gewisse   Geist.   Die   Moralität]   attempts   to   bring   the   particular  back  in  thought.  Morality  is  the  certainty  of  spirit’s  own  self-­‐authorizing   activity   out   of   the   depths   of   the   subject   itself.     The   breach   between   the   finite,   individual  subject  and  the  absolute,  universal  moral  law  is  sutured  together  through                                                                                                                  

11  On  this  theme,  see  Speight,  Allen.  Hegel,  Literature,  and  the  Problem  of  Agency  (2001)    

 

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a  series  of  postulates  that  effectively  rationalize  the  gap  away.     When  the  moral  quality  of  an  action  is  placed  all  on  the  side  of  its  universal,  absolute   form,   then   the   finite,   particulizaring   content   of   the   individual   desires   which   actually   motivate  action  become  a  problem.  These  desires  both  are  and  are  not   determinate;   they   both   give   and   deny   morality   its   content.   The   moral   worldview   is   essentially   duplicitous,  the  argument  goes,  for  it  actually  scorns  the  world  of  action  in  which  it   is  supposed  to  be  at  home.  Such  morality  presupposes  a  dualism  of  perfect  duty  and   imperfect   nature,   and   places   itself   in   between   as   the   spuriously   infinite   striving   to   overcome  its  lack.  But  nature,  action,  particularity,  dependency,  desire,  and  finitude— what  are  called  evil   by  the  moral  worldview—are  the  very  conditions  of  possibility   for  mutually  recognizing  self-­‐determining  rational  agents  to  exist  in  the  first  place,   and   hence   their   expulsion   outside   the   domain   of   value   is   unwarranted   and   dissembling.       The   division   between   one’s   particular   nature   and   universal   essence   is   practically   overcome  in  the  consciousness  of  a  kind  of  action  which  is  right  because  it  follows   the   conviction   of   the   doer   herself,   and   this   authority   is   recognized   by   others.   Fully   being   oneself   is   being   moral,   and   being   moral   is   following   one’s   convictions,   expressing   them   in   language   to   others,   and   being   home   therein.   This   is   conscience   [das  Gewissen],  the  last  form  of  spirit,  the  site  of  the  final  phenomenological  moves   which   will   be   repeated   in   the   end   of   the   Religion   chapter,   and   in   Absolute   Knowledge  as  well.     Conscience   captures   the   romanticism   of   reflective   agents   that   seek   their   own   absolute   authenticity   in   community   with   others,   but   all   the   same   cannot   seem   to   grasp   the   constraints   that   others   put   on   them.   In   a   sense,   conscience   is   the   spirit   that  is  certain  of  its  own  particularity,  but  still  does  not  understand  what  this  entails,   what   the   consequences   of   such   a   realization   are.   The   consequences   turn   out   to   be   two-­‐fold:   on   the   one   hand,   the   particular   self   realizes   that   there   is   nothing   compelling  her  to  her  own  convictions  and  actions,  they  are  ultimately  self-­‐chosen   or   authentically   rejected.   On   the   other   hand,   the   self   realizes   that   it’s   own   convictions   do   not   amount   to   anything   whatsoever   unless   they   are   conferred   an   actually   by   the   normative   practices   of   mutual   recognition   which   bind   a   self-­‐ determined  community  together.   The   beautiful   souls  [die  schöne  Seele]  are  literary   expressions  of  these  forms  of  consciousness  as  they  act  and  judge  each  other.    Hegel   splits  these  perspectives  up  into  two  actual  selves  that  dialogue  with  each  other  as   an  acting  consciousness  and  a  judging  consciousness.     The   judging   consciousness   is   the   morally   righteous   soul   who’s   purity   of   intention   can   never   be   sullied   with   the   contingencies   of   actual   action;   the   acting   consciousness  is  the  spirit  who  realizes  that  its  own  contingency  is  the  contingency   of   all,   and   hence,   it   acts   with   a   certain   carefree   manner,   distant   to   its   own   convictions.  The  voices  here  recall  all  those  earlier  moments  of  the  Phenomenology   when   divisions   between   thinking   and   acting,   universality   and   particularity,   objective   and   subjective,   personal   and   impersonal,   freedom   and   necessity,   master  

 

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and  slave,  or  the  absolute  and  the  contingent  structured  the  mode  of  consciousness   under  observation.  Here,  in  this  last  moment  of  spirit,  such  divisions  are  brought  to   a  dramatic  height,  separated  into  autonomous  voices,  placed  at  each  other’s  throats,   with  absolute  evil  and  goodness  being  the  stakes.  All  the  conflicts  of  consciousness   are   somehow   wrapped   in   this   dilemma   between   acting   and   judging,   between   the   evil  I  and  the  universal  We.     The   movement,   which   goes   from   around   §661   to   §671,   reveals   the   way   in   which   mutually   recognizing   consciousness’s   can   reconcile   themselves   to   the   ineliminable   finitude  of  each  other.  The  self-­‐legitimizing  rational  and  moral  practices  of  modern   spirit   are   here   brought   out   in   their   strongest   antithetical   forms,   as   absolutely   individual  self-­‐determination  and  as  absolutely  universal  authorization,  in  order  to   show  the  need  for  both  perspectives  to  somehow  hold  simultaneously.    The  tension   between   the   purity   of   the   universal   judge   of   reason   and   the   evil   of   the   particular   agent   of   conscience   is   itself   the   motor   to   reconciliation,   to   recognizing   each   other   as   they  are,  and  accepting  it.     To  give  an  actuality  to  the  conscientious  consciousness,  it  must  act  and  express  itself   in   the   world;   it   must   give   its   universal   duty   a   particular   content,   whatever   the   consequences   may   be.   But   precisely   because   the   consequences   are   out   of   one’s   control  and  can  go  badly,  acting  is  shunned  by  the  conscientious  community.    Hence,   by   practically   disavowing   the   community   of   morally   beautiful   souls,   the   acting   consciousness  is  judged  evil.  The  judge  sees  the  action  as  an  individualistic  rejection   of   the   collective   normative   standards   which   bind   them   together   as   free   agents,   which  they  have  reflectively  deliberated  upon  and  chosen  as  the  absolute  ground  for   meaningful   activity.   The   actor   sees   those   standards   as   just   another   expression   of   some  particular  beliefs  of  individuals,  and  hence  refuses  to  acquiesce  to  it.  The  judge   recognizes   this   very   attitude   as   produced   only   within   the   recognitive   community   which  allows  the  acting  consciousness  to  express  claims  like  that,  and  hence  brings   him  closer  into  the  community  by  judging  him.  The  actor  realizes  that  the  judge  is   also  another  acting  consciousness,  in  the  form  of  judgment,  and  that  the  hypocrisy   of  an  action  without  moral  judgment  is  mirrored  in  the  hypocrisy  of  a  judgment  that   is  not  a  particular  act.  The  acting  consciousness,  seeing  itself  in  the  other,  confesses,   hoping   to   overcome   their   separation   in   a   mutual   identity   forged   in   language,   for   “language  is  the  existence  of  Spirit  as  an  immediate  self”  [weil  die  Sprache  das  Dasein   des   Geistes   als   unmittelbaren   Selbsts   ist].12  The   judge,   however,   holds   back,   and   blocks   the   reciprocity   that   the   confessing   agent   desired.   This   gap,   this   delay   between   the   confession   and   forgiveness,   is   the   key   to   the   movement   at   hand.   The   confession  of  one’s  finitude  is  not  merely  another  reason  given  which  can  make  up   for  that  finitude;  it  is  a  lived  experience  with  determinate  consequences,  and  it  must   rather   come   to   be   accepted   in   the   process   of   experiencing   it,   and   not   a  priori  as   a   minor   premise   of   a   syllogism.     The   hard-­‐hearted   judge,   therefore,   refuses   the   confession,  and  suffers  the  result.  By  rejecting  the  recognition  offered  by  the  acting   soul,   the   judge   rejects   its   own   finitude,   for   it   is   only   certain   of   itself   in   it’s   normative                                                                                                                   12  PhG  §666  

 

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reassurance  with  others.  By  blocking  this  mutual  reassurance,  the  judge  has  nothing   to   affirm   except   its   own   non-­‐affirmation.   Without   a   form   to   express   itself,   yet   conscious  of  the  fact  that  its  judgments  only  exist  in  their  actualization,  the  judging   soul  withers  away  in  madness,  as  the  romantics  themselves  did.     For  Hegel,  this  swirl  of  perspectives  comes  together  in  the  breakdown  of  the  hard-­‐ heart   and   its   forgiveness.   This   breaking   occurs   with   the   realization   of   what   inextricably  binds  the  two  together  as  both  “moments  of  Spirit”,  that  is,  as  parts  of  a   community   which   is   able   to   continually   reflect   upon   and   reconsider   its   own   normative   standards   for   criticism   and   scorn,   praise   and   blessing,   truth   and   falsity.   The  collective  openness  to  the  legitimacy  of  action  and  knowledge  is  the  ultimately   redeeming   characteristic   of   spiritual   self-­‐consciousness,   and   for   this   reason   Hegel   describes   this   process   as   a   “reciprocal   recognition   which   is   absolute   spirit”   [ein   gegenseitiges  Anerkennen,  welches  der  absolute  Geist  ist].13     The  absoluteness  invoked   here  is  the  goal  that  the  self-­‐education  of  consciousness   on  its  path  to  knowing  has  sought  after  all  along.  The  forgiveness  [Verzeihung]  and   reconciliation  [Versöhnung]  of  the  antithetical  but  ultimately  identical  perspectives   of  judging  and  acting  validates  the  modern  practices  of  knowing  as  ultimately  true.   This   truth   is   not   the   truth   of   sense-­‐certainty,   stoic   freedom,   natural   science,   aesthetic   harmony,   ironic   culture,   or   moral   duty,   but   the   truth   of   historical,   social   communities  who,  in  their  experiences,  prove  to  each  other  their  capacity  to  confer   and  retract  authority  on  what  they  do  and  say.  Even  this  authority  is  itself  capable  of   coming   under   review,   confessing   its   partiality,   and   being   welcomed   back   into   the   forgiving  arms  of  collective  self-­‐reflection.     Absolute  spirit,  achieved  in  forgiveness  and  confession,  means  letting  go  of  the  quest   for   absolute   certainty   as   if   it   was   a   fact   of   nature   an   individual   can   discover   or   produce;  it  means  recognizing  the  experience  of  coming  to  truth  as  the  openness  to   failure,  as  continual  collective  reconsideration  of  the  norms  for  certainty  which  have   been   developed   along   the   way.   When   this   experiential   recognition   is   solidified   in   communal  practices  and  individual  convictions,  then  a  new  form  of  community  has   been  achieved  beyond  the  pseudo-­‐community  of  beautiful  souls.  This  community  is   characterized   by   its   infinite   openness   to   otherness,   dependency,   error,   loss   and   finitude;  it  is,  in  more  Hegelian  terms,  reconciled  with  its  own  negativity,  “at  home   in   another,”   satisfied.   The   historical   name   given   to   the   absolutely   grounded   normative  relations  of  mutually  recognitive,  forgiving  sociality  is  God:   The  reconciling  yes,  in  which  both  I’s  let  go  of  their  opposed  existence,   is  the   existence   of   the   I   expanded   into   two-­‐ness,   which   therein   remains   in   parity   with  itself  and  which  has  the  certainty  of  itself  in  its  complete  self-­‐emptying   and   in   its   opposite.   –   It   is   God   appearing   in   the   midst   of   those   who   know   themselves  as  pure  knowledge.14  

                                                                                                                13  PhG  §670  

14  PhG   §671:   “Das   versöhnende   Ja,   worin   beide   Ich   von   ihrem   entgegengesetzten  Dasein  ablassen,   ist  

das   Dasein   des   zur   Zweiheit   ausgedehnten   Ichs,   das   darin   sich   gleich   bleibt,   und   in   seiner  

 

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  The  subject  of  the  Phenomenology  has  finally  discovered  itself  to  be  the  substance  of   its   own   cognitive   and   ethical   authority   through   a   patient   series   of   reflections   motivated   by   an   unrelenting   skepticism   at   every   turn.   However,   the   reverse   has   not   been   shown   to   be   the   case;   that   is,   does   the   absolute   ground   of   moral   and   epistemological  authority  collectively  reflected  on  throughout  history  also  turn  out   to  be  the  subjects  of  those  reflections?  In  other  words,  does  the  phenomenological   movement   from   subject   to   substance   reflect   itself   in   a   religious   movement   from   substance  to  subject?       The   penultimate   chapter   of   the   Phenomenology   answers   this   question   through   a   display   of   shapes   of   religious   spirit,   in   which   actual   reflections   on   absolute   spirit   itself  constitutes  the  explicit  object  from  the  beginning.  This  is  an  investigation  into   shapes   of   religious   spirit   because   it   is   precisely   in   religion   where   the   absolute   is   taken  as  its  explicit  object.  Hegel’s  move  to  religion  is  not  a  theologization  of  spirit,   but  an  analysis  of  spirit’s  own  self-­‐representations  as  absolute.  The  history  of  these   collective   representations   of   spirit   about   itself   provides   the   specific   institutional   tradition  from  which  the  Phenomenology  of  Spirit  as  one  reflection  on  the  absolute  is   composed.  Hence,  by  illuminating  these  shapes,  even  in  their  one-­‐sided  forms,  Hegel   is  securing  the  truths  gained  in  his  own  work  as  the  truths  that  spirit  as  a  whole  has   come  to  see  over  time,  and  not  merely  as  the  workings  of  one  subjective  will.       This  movement  restarts  the  phenomenology  from  the  beginning,  taking  the  absolute   as   initially   immediate   being   in   the   form   of   nature   (light,   animal,   artifact),   as   mediated   expression   through   the   artwork   of   man   (architecture,   cult,   epic,   drama),   and   finally   as   self-­‐mediated   unity   in   the   revealed   religion   of   the   God-­‐Man   (Christianity).     What   occurs   in   this   development   through   various   allegories,   symbols,   and   narratives   on   what   is   absolutely   sacred   to   humans,   or   in   our   terms,   on   what   grounds   the   normative   authority   of   human   agency   and   knowledge,   is   the   progressive   realization   of   the   sacredness   of   self-­‐determined,   reflective,   mutually   recognizing   social   subjectivity   itself.   From   so-­‐called   Egyptian   immediacy   to   Greek   reflexivity,   the   emergence   of   the   free   human   subject   in   its   moral   action   is   brought   out  as  absolutely  valuable.  But  it  is  only  with  the  move  to  Roman  Christianity  that   this   empty   subject   is   embedded   back   into   the   social   norms   and   constraints   from   which   it   emerged,   albeit   reflectively   open   to   their   meanings   and   consequences.   What  the  “revealed”  religion  reveals  are  the  self-­‐made  rules,  criteria,  and  processes   of   accountability   which   a   community   of   modern   moral   subjects   needs   in   order   to   explain  itself  to  itself,  with  all  of  its  faults,  disruptions,  imbalances,  and  crises.  The   confession   of   finitude,   its   hard-­‐hearted   refusal,   and   the   infinite   forgiveness   that   ultimately   receives   it   are   recounted   symbolically   in   the   story   of   the   incarnation,   crucifixion  and  resurrection.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                

vollkommnen  Entäußerung  und  Gegenteile  die  Gewißheit  seiner  selbst  hat;   -­‐  es  ist  der  erscheinende   Gott  mitten  unter  ihnen,  die  sich  als  das  reine  Wissen  wissen.”      

 

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But   these   are   just   stories,   Hegel   acknowledges,   allegorical   representations   that   separate  out  the  “moments  of  spirit”  into  independent  temporal  events,  including  its   irreparable   finitude,   infinite   self-­‐awareness,   and   recognitive   relational   structure.   Revealed  Religion  squeezes  spirit  between  a  past  trauma  and  a  future  redemption,   leaving   no   room   for   any   present   reconciliation.   What   would   such   a   present   reconciliation  look  like?  Nothing  other  than  the  Phenomenology  of  Spirit  itself.       Hegel’s   claim   is   not   that   he   has   personally   reconciled   the   irreconcilable   moments   of   Spirit   left   over   from   revealed   religion,   but   that   only   a   modern,   self-­‐consciously   phenomenological   explanation   of   Spirit   can   account   for   modern,   self-­‐conscious   subjectivity   in   a   non-­‐allegorical,   non-­‐temporally   broken   way.   Hegel   calls   this   operation  Absolute  Knowledge  [Das  absolute  Wissen],  and  this  marks  the  final  shape   of  spirit.       Absolute   Knowledge   is   the   point   at   which   the   Phenomenology   reflects   on   it’s   own   methodological   procedures   as   the   way   in   which   spirit   can   adequately   understand   itself   as   itself,   that   is,   in   which   a   community   of   mutually   recognizing   self-­‐ determining  subjects  can  know  what  it  is  that  they  are  doing  when  they  understand,   judge,   act,   critique,   reflect,   recognize,   confess,   and   forgive   each   other.   Here,   the   internal   oppositions   that   have   been   driving   the   movement   between   consciousness   and  object,  self  and  other,  mind  and  world,  and  individual  and  collective  are  brought   out   into   the   open   and   made   into   explicit   topics   for   reflection,   motivation,   and   healing  between  the  members  of  a  community  who  seek  to  know  who  they  are  and   how  they’ve  come  to  be.       But  what  are  these  “methodological  procedures,”  and  why  should  we  accept  them  as   they   are?   Why   is   the   Phenomenology   the   representative   of   Absolute   Knowledge?   And   how   do   all   of   the   twists   and   turns   that   make   up   the   pathway   of   knowing   somehow   come   together   into   one   non-­‐symbolic,   temporally   unified,   conceptual   form?   What   can   this   form   do?   What   is   the   relation   between   such   knowledge   and   science?   History?   Logic?   In   short,   what   are   we   to   make   of   Absolute   Knowing,   and   hence,  of  the  Phenomenology  as  a  whole  which  led  up  to  it?   II.  Interpretations  of  Absolute  Knowing   It’s  fair  to  say  that  in  the  history  of  the  interpretation  of  Hegel,  how  one  reads  the   chapter  on  Absolute  Knowledge  can  determine  one’s  whole  perspective.    Instead  of   assuming  what  it  already  means  and  deducing  the  interpretation  therein,  I  will  give   a  close  reading  of  the  chapter  so  as  to  elucidate  its  actual  content.  But  this  cannot  be   done  in  a  vacuum;  one’s  philosophical  orientations  toward  a  text  are  as  important  as   the   text   itself.   Hence,   I   proceed   first   with   a   review   of   certain   families   of   interpretations   on   Absolute   Knowing,   all   of   which   lays   bare   the   hermeneutic   pathways   into   the   chapter   that   will   accompany   the   already   presented   reconstruction  of  the  Phenomenology  as  a  whole.     Categorizing   the   many   interpretations   I’ve   come   across   is   about   as   easy   as    

12  

categorizing   the   Phenomenology   of  Spirit   as   a   whole;   nonetheless,   I   will   try.   First   I   begin  with  thirteen  different  interpretations  of  Absolute  Knowledge,  including  Marx,   Heidegger,   Hyppolite,   Kojève,   Derrida,   Miller,   De   Laurentiis,   Pinkard,   Pippin,   Brandom,  Bernstein,  Comay,  and  Malabou.  Some  interpretations  are  elliptical,  some   are   comprehensive,   and   others   offer   barely   anything   at   all.   Next,   I   separate   them   into   two   extended   families.   The   first   family   I’ll   call   Absolute   Knowledge   as   the   Conditions  of  Existence   being  a  theory  of  Finitude   (in   short,   the  question  of  Finitude   reading),   and   the   second   family   I’ll   call   Absolute   Knowledge   as   the   Conditions   of   Cognition   being   a   theory   of   Action   (in   short,   the   question   of   normativity   reading).   Now   these   two   families   are   not   necessarily   opposed;   rather   they   approach   the   problem   in   different   ways,   and   hence   end   up   speaking   about   different   things.   It   might  just  be  possible  to  read  these  families  of  interpretations  together;  we’ll  have   to   wait   and   see.   Then,   I   break   down   each   family   into   pairs   of   two   (with   one   threesome).   Within   the   first   family,   its   runs   as   such:   Marx,   Heidegger   and   Derrida   constitute   the   first   group   under   the   heading,  Fear  of  Finitude;   Kojeve   and   Malabou   run   together   under   the   End   of   Alienated   Temporality;   Comay   and   Bernstein   are   placed   together   with   the   Work   of   Mourning.   Within   the   second,   it   goes   like   this:   Hyppolite  and  Miller  under  the  Birth  of  Science,  Pinkard  and  Pippin  as  the  Structure   of   Modern   Normativity,   and   finally   Brandom   and   De   Laurentiis   with   a   Theory   of   Conceptual  Content.     The   first   family   of   interpretations   broadly   considers   Absolute   Knowledge   to   be   determined  by  the  relation  between  existence  and  finitude;  one  way  to  cash  this  out   is   to   say   that   the   ultimate   authority   for   epistemological   and   ethical   judgments   is   decided,   in   the   last   instance,   by   how   otherness   is   or   is   not   incorporated   into   the   experience  of  modern  subjectivity.  “Otherness”  is  whatever  limits  any  subject  from   being  fully  autonomous  and  independent  in  its  self-­‐identity,  rendering  it  structurally   finite;   “experience”   is   the   name   for   the   process   in   which   such   self-­‐identity   is   forged,   the  process  of  mutually  recognizing  subjects  coming  to  awareness  about  their  own   condition.     In   one   of   the   earliest   critiques   of   the   Phenomenology,   Marx   in   1844   presented   the   basic   objections   to   Absolute   Knowing   which   were   later   reiterated   by   Lukács,   Heidegger   and   Derrida   in   their   own   jargon   in   the   20th   century.15  Although   Marx   praised   Hegel   for   discovering   the   “dialectic   of   negativity   as   the   moving   and   producing   principle,”   he   nonetheless   rebukes   him   for   “equating   man   with   self-­‐ consciousness”,   and   hence   denying   the   objectivity   that   lies   beyond   the   control   of   such   consciousness. 16  Marx   reads   Absolute   Knowledge—which   “contains   the   concentrated   essence   of   the   Phenomenology” 17 —as   the   overcoming   of   all   estrangement  from  nature,  as  the  overcoming  of  nature  itself,  and  its  full  inclusion                                                                                                                   15  Since  Lukács  (1976)  just  recites  and  defends  Marx’s  original  critique    of  Hegel  almost  word  for   word,  I  leave  him  out  of  my  comments  below.   16  See   the   last   part   of   the   third   of   Marx’s   1844   Economic   and   Philosophic   Manuscripts,   entitled,   “Critique  of  Hegel’s  Dialectic  and  General  Philosophy”,   collected  in  Marx,   Early  Writings  (1992),  page   386   17  Marx,  p386  

 

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into   the   realm   of   self-­‐consciousness.   For   Marx,   Hegel’s   Absolute   Knowledge   reduces   man  to  a  purely  knowing  being,  which  has  only  cognitive  relations  with  objects,  as   opposed   to   material   relations.   Because   objects   are   only   thoughts   abstracted   from   their   source,   the   mind,   the   overcoming   of   such   otherness   is   purely   a   mental   affair.18   This,  according  to  Marx,  is  unnatural.  He  writes:     A   being   which   does   not   have   its   nature   outside   itself   is   not   a   natural   being   and   plays   no   part   in   the   system   of   nature.   A   being   which   has   no   object   outside  itself  is  not  an  objective  being.  A  being  which  is  not  itself  an  object   for   a   third   being   has   no   being   for   its   object,   i.e.   it   has   no   objective   relationships   and   its   existence   is   not   objective.   A   non-­‐objective   being   is   a   non-­‐being.19  

Without  an  outside,  man  is  no  longer  man;  without  its  relation  to  something  other,   man  is  no  longer  part  of  an  objective  world,  no  longer  constrained  by  natural  facts,   social  norms,  or  cognitive  rules.    In  short,  Hegel  misses  the  essential  finitude  of  man,   and   he   does   this   because   he   (mis)conceives   man   as   essentially   a   rational   self-­‐ consciousness,  as  opposed  to  a  material,  historical  being.  In  Heidegger’s  introductory   lectures  on  Hegel’s  Phenomenology  of  Spirit  ninety  years  later,  he  makes  the  similar   critique  of  Absolute  Knowing.  First,  that  Absolute  Knowing  is  unfairly  presupposed   from  the  beginning,  and  second,  that  it  is  based  on  a  faulty  metaphysics,  one  which   reduces   man   to   pure   ratio   and   logos,   discounting   the   ecstatic   temporality   of   Dasein. 20  Heidegger   claims   that   Hegel’s   Phenomenology   removes   a   certain   conception  of  finitude  from  philosophy,  but  the  question  remains  if  whether  or  not   this  was  the  “original”  finitude,  or  just  some  “incidental”  one.     I  see  these  critiques  as  mere  modifications  of  Marx’s  original  criticisms,  which  states   that  Hegel  reduces  man  to  rationality,  and  that  Absolute  Knowledge’s  overcoming  of   finitude   is   plagued   with   problems   which   stymie   its   goal.   What   Heidegger   adds   is   merely  the  language  of  Being—but  even  this  is  not  so  far  from  Marx,  who  criticized   Hegel   from   the   standpoint   of   Species-­‐being.   Derrida’s   1974   text   Glas,   where   it   touches  Hegel  on  Absolute  Knowing,  merely  repeats  the  refrain  that  Hegel  has  a  fear   of   finitude,   and   that   he   reduces   man   to   a   rational   animal.   Derrida   recognizes   his   affinity   to   the   young   Marx   here,   for   he   even   favorably   quotes   from   Marx’s   1844   Manuscripts,   the   exact   critiques   of   Hegel   that   have   already   been   stated   above.21   Given   my   above   reconstruction   of   Hegel’s   argument,   these   readings   are   clearly   wrong,   for   Hegel   does   nothing   of   the   sort   by   which   he   is   accused.   The   interesting   question   is   here   is   if   these   readings   have   something   partially   right   about   them,   something  which  can  be  useful  to  understand  Absolute  Knowing.                                                                                                                  

18  Marx,   p396:   “Because   Hegel   equates   man   with   self-­‐consciousness,   the   estranged   object,   the   estranged   essential   reality   of   man   is   nothing   but   consciousness,   nothing   but   the   thought   of   estrangement,   its   abstract   and   hence   hollow   and   unreal   expression,   negation.   The   supersession   of   alienation   is   therefore   likewise   nothing   but   an   abstract,   hollow   supersession   of   that   hollow   abstraction,  the  negation  of  the  negation.”     19  Marx,  p390   20  See  Heidegger,  Hegel’s  Phenomenology  of  Spirit  (1988)   21  See  Derrida,  Glas  (1986)  

 

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The   next   pair   of   readings   focuses   on   the   success   of   Hegel’s   attempt   to   overcome   finitude   with   Absolute   Knowledge,   but   this   time   finitude   or   otherness   is   read   as   time.   I   place   Kojève’s   famous   1938   analysis   together   with   the   more   recent   interpretation  by  Malabou  from  1996,  for  no  matter  how  far  apart  in  content  they   may  be,  they  both  zero  in  on  this  liberating  quality  of  overcoming  a  certain  form   of   temporality.   For   Kojève,   the   Phenomenology   is   the   reconstruction   of   the   “real   historical   evolution   of   humanity,”22  according   to   its   logical   necessity,   which,   when   understood  by  the  Philosopher,  “definitively  overcomes  Time,”  making  possible  the   revelation   of   eternal   Being,   that   is,   the   Logic.   Kojève   recognizes   that   this   occurs   in   time,   that   Absolute   Knowledge   is,   in   a   sense,   a   denial   of   transcendence;   but   this   denial   only   means   that   the   timelessness   about   man’s   being   is   different   from   the   temporality  of  man’s  becoming.  23      To   Malabou,   the   pathway   of   despair   through   the  Phenomenology   has   also   led   to   the   overcoming   of   time,   but   this   is   a   particular   time,   the   “time   of   alienation,”   linear   time.24  Here,  Absolute  Knowledge  means  producing  a  new  temporality  of  freedom  in   which   the   static   subject-­‐object   temporal   sequence   of   recognition   is   overcome   in   a   “new   era   of   plasticity  in   which   subjectivity   gives   itself   the   form   which   at   the   same   time   it   receives.”25  The   relationship   to   the   future   is   qualitatively   transformed,   and   the   infinite   being   of   man   is   released   into   its   own   proper   shape   for   eternal   self-­‐ fashioning.   The   otherness   of   time   is   overcome   in   a   new   mode   of   experience,   one   christened  by  Malabou  as  plastic.  There  is  something  right  about  this  reading,  but  its   strong  emphasis  on  overcoming  temporality,  as  opposed  to  reckoning  with  it,  strains                                                                                                                   22  Kojève   (1969),   p166:   “But,   once   more,   this   "a   priori"   construction   can   be   carried   out   only   after   the  

fact.  It  is  first  necessary  that  real  History  be  completed;  next,  it  must  be  narrated  to  Man;  and  only   then  can  the  Philosopher,  becoming  a  Wise  man,  understand  it  by  reconstructing  it  "a  priori"  in  the   Phenomenology.  And  this  same  phenomenological  understanding  of  History  is  what  transforms  the   Philosopher  into  a  Wise  man;  for  it  is  what  definitively  overcomes  Time,  and  thus  makes  possible  the   adequate   revelation   of   completed   and   perfect,   that   is,   eternal   and   immutable,   Being-­‐a   revelation   effected  in  and  by  the  Logik.”     23  Kojève,  p166:  “This  is  to  say  that  the  Infinite  in  question  is  Man's  infinite.  And  hence  the  "Science"   that   reveals   this   infinite-­‐Being   is   a   Science   of   Man   in   two   ways:   on   the   one   hand,   it   is   the   result   of   History-­‐   that   is,   a   product   of   Man;   and   on   the   other,   it   talks   about   Man:   about   his   temporal   or   historical  becoming  (in  the  Phenomenology),  and  about  his  eternal  being  (in  the  Logik)”     24  Malabou  (1996),  p128:  “Clearly,  in  the  chapter  on  ‘Absolute  Knowledge’,  the  time  Hegel  is  talking   about   is   the   time   of   alienation:   even   more   precisely,   this   time   is   Entäußerung   itself.   As   a   form   of   temporality,  the  time  analysed  here  represents  a  determinate  epoch  in  the  translation  from  spirit  to   the  sensuous.  It  is,  specifically,  the  moment  in  which  the  concept  gives  itself  the  shape  of  an  existent   thing,  becoming  in  its  turn  the  object  of  sensory  intuition,  of  a  momentary  phenomenal  presence.  In   the   chapter   on   ‘Absolute   Knowledge’   Hegel   is   not   considering   time   in   general   but   linear   time,   the   time   in   which   the   subject   ‘sees   itself   as   a   passing   moment’.   Furthermore,   the   Entäußerung   is   disclosed  as  linear  time  itself.”     25  Malabou,   p133:   “The   moment   of   Absolute   Knowledge   only   causes   the   dialectical   suppression   of   one   certain   time,   one   specific   temporality.   From   this   moment   on,   far   from   closing   all   horizons,   Absolute   Knowledge   announces   in   fact   a   new   temporality,   one   born   from   the   synthesis   of   two   temporalities,   the   Greek   and   the   Christian.   The   moment   which   dialectically   gives   rise   to   the   two   temporalities   marks   the   emergence   of   a   new   era   of   plasticity   in   which   subjectivity   gives   itself   the   form  which  at  the  same  time  it  receives.  This  event  is  presented  in  the  last  section  of  the  Philosophy  of   Spirit,  ‘Philosophy’.”    

 

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one   element   of   Absolute   Knowing   beyond   its   role,   at   the   behest   of   ignoring   its   other   aspects.   The  final  pairing  of  interpretations  in  this  family  takes  Absolute  Knowledge  to  be  an   endless  work  of  mourning;  in  this  view,  the  ultimate  condition  of  modern  subjective   existence  is  the  necessity  of  coming  to  terms  with  the  dead  in  order  to  give  meaning   to  the  present.  Given  the  finality  of  their  departure,  this  can  only  be  a  kind  of  ethical   mourning,   one   which   recognizes   the   finitude,   loss,   and   fragility   of   the   human   condition,  and  especially  of  the  particular  humans  which  have  brought  one  to  where   one   is.     According   to   Rebecca   Comay,   this   loss   can   never   be   overcome,   even   in   thought,   for   the   comprehension   of   it   is   too  late   to   compensate   for   its   effects.26  The   long   historical   struggle   whose   result   is   modern   subjectivity   is   littered   with   dead   bodies,  unresolved  traumas,  and  unspeakable  horrors,  all  in  the  name  of  freedom.     Subjectivity   is   itself   the   trauma,   the   injury   is   self-­‐inflicted.   Rather   than   wishing   away   the   injury   or   demonizing   its   malignancy,   the   point   is   to   confront   the   infinity   of   the   infirmity.   The   only   way   to   close   the   wound,   or   rather   to   undo   its   coercive   power,   is   to   reopen   it:   to   become   what   we   are.   Absolute   knowing   is   just   the   subject’s   identification   with   the   woundedness   that  it  is.27    

For   Comay,   the   woundedness   of   the   subject   which   Absolute   Knowing   recognizes   comes   from   the   process   of   revolution,   especially   the   French   Revolution   and   its   Terror.   The   failure   to   institute   the   lofty   demands   of   revolution,   demands   which   exposed   the   subjects   of   revolution   to   their   own   finitude,   forces   one   to   recognize   the   limits  of  any  ultimate  ground  for  ethical  or  cognitive  judgment.    Every  affirmation  of   subjectivity   is   also   an   affirmation   of   the   failure   to   account   for   itself,   to   close   its   wounds,   so   to   speak.     Absolute   Knowing   is   the   post-­‐revolutionary   mourning   of   modern,  free  subjects  whose  own  modernity  and  freedom  is  forever  compromised   by  the  terrible  deeds  that  were  required  to  accomplish  it.28     Jay   Bernstein’s   interpretation   as   presented   in   his   series   of   lectures   on   the                                                                                                                  

26  Comay  (2011),  p6:  “Consciousness  is  nothing  but  its  own  noncoincidence  with  itself—a  repetitive  

struggle   to   define   and   position   itself   in   a   world   to   which   it   will   not   conform.   Anachronism   is   its   signature:   experience   is   continually   outbidding   itself,   perpetually   making   demands   that   it   (i.e.,   the   world)  is  unequipped  to  realize  and  unprepared  to  recognize,  and  comprehension  inevitably  comes   too  late  to  make  a  difference,  if  only  because  the  stakes  have  already  changed.  Absolute  knowing  is   the  exposition  of  this  delay.  Its  mandate  is  to  make  explicit  the  structural  dissonance  of  experience.  If   philosophy   makes   any   claim   to   universality,   this   is   not   because   it   synchronizes   the   calendars   or   provides   intellectual   compensation   for   its   own   tardiness.   Its   contribution   is   rather   to   formalize   the   necessity   of   the   delay,   together   with   the   inventive   strategies   with   which   such   a   delay   itself   is   invariably  disguised,  ignored,  glamorized,  or  rationalized.”   27  Comay,  p130   28  Comay,   p125:   “Absolute   knowing   is   neither   compensation,   as   in   the   redemption   of   a   debt,   nor   fulfillment:   the   void   is   constitutive   (which   does   not   mean   that   it   is   not   historically   over-­‐determined).   Rather  than  trying  to  plug  the  gap  through  the  accumulation  of  conceptual  surplus  value,  Hegel  sets   out   to   demystify   the   phantasms   we   find   to   fill   it;   the   dialectic   is   in   this   sense   best   understood   as   a   relentless  counterfetishistic  practice.”    

 

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Phenomenology   of   Spirit   at   Berkeley   and   the   New   School   for   Social   Research   also   takes   Absolute   Knowing   to   be   a   kind   of   work   of   mourning,   but   he   gives   a   more   determinate  character  to  this  trauerspiel.  This  mourning  is,  first  of  all,  not  only  for   the   revolutionary   catastrophes   of   past   and   present,   but   for   all  the   catastrophes   of   past   and   present   which   make   up   the   content   of   ethical   recollection.   For   Bernstein,   understanding   the   perspective   of   Absolute   Knowing   as   a   kind   of   mourning   means   taking  Hegel’s  earlier  reflections  on  forgiveness  in  ethical  action  and  rethematizing   them   as   the   method   in   which   modern   subjects   come   to   terms   with   their   own   experience   of   finitude,   dependency,   and   freedom.   Forgiveness   here   is   no   longer   just   an  ethical  act  between  two  subjects,  but  the  proper  cognitive  and  normative  attitude   to  objects  and  subject  in  general  by  anyone  seeking  truth.  Truth  here  is  achieved  in   the   experience   of   letting   go   of   the   desire   for   ultimate   judgment,   recognizing   that   knowledge   and   action   can   be   infinitely   reconsidered   in   the   light   of   time,   which   a   subject   is   able   to   recollect,   reorient,   and   review.   The   negativity   of   experience,   its   failures,   resistance,   and   obstinacy   toward   the   will   of   subjective   desire   is   no   longer   taken   as   something   to   be   overcome,   but   as   the   source   of   knowledge,   action,   and   freedom   itself.   Absolute   knowledge   as   mourning   is   the   recollective   forgiveness   toward  any  object,  deed,  or   otherness  in  general  which  limits  the  independence  of   my   experience.   It   is   absolute   because   there   is   nothing   which   cannot   be   forgiven,   nothing  which  cannot  be  mourned,  nothing  which  cannot  be  recollected  and  taken   up  as  a  new  possibility.  Not  even  the  modes  of  mourning  themselves  are  safe  from   recollection,  and  hence,  the  infinite  self-­‐relation  of  absolute  knowledge  ushers  in  a   new  mode  of  experience,  one  as  universal  as  it  is  particular,  as  much  finite  as  it  is   infinite.29     I  take  these  last  two  readings  to  be  especially  helpful  in  wading  through  the  thicket   of   the   Phenomenology’s   last   chapter,   and   the   structure   of   forgiveness   will   be   a   guideline  in  my  own  exegesis  as  well.     The   second   family   of   readings   broadly   considers   Absolute   Knowledge   to   be   the   ultimate   justification   of   normative   authority,   both   in   the   sense   of   cognition   and   action.   In   other   words,   the   standpoint   of   absolute   knowledge   guarantees   modern   subjects   that   their   actions   and   concepts   are   truly   valid   in   just   the   way   they   think   they  are.  How  it  does  this  differs  according  to  the  various  interpretations  below.   The  first  group  under  this  generic  heading  takes  Absolute  Knowledge  as  the  proper   authoritative  standpoint  from  which  a  true  Science  can  begin.  Jean  Hyppolite’s  1946   commentary   on   the   Phenomenology   and   Mitchell   Miller’s   seminal   1976   paper   on   Absolute  Knowing  both,  broadly  speaking,  break  down  the  final  chapter  into  a  three-­‐                                                                                                                 29  This   interpretation   comes   from   notes   from   Jay   Bernstein’s   2008-­‐9   class   at   the   New   School   for   Social   Research,   as   well   as   from   reading   through   the   1994   and   2006   notes   online   at   www.bernsteintapes.com.   Bernstein’s   own   interpretation   appears   to   be   heavily   indebted   to   H.S.   Harris’  reading  of  Absolute  Knowledge  in  his  two  volume  mega-­‐commentary  on  the  Phenomenology   entitled,  Hegel’s   Ladder,  a  text  too  large  for  me  to  cover  here.  See  also,  Bernstein’s  review  of  Harris’   commentary  in  Dialogue:  Canadian  Philosophical  Review  (2000),  volume  39,  issue  4,  entitled  “Hegel’s   Ladder:  The  Ethical  Presupposition  of  Absolute  Knowing.”  

 

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part   structure   which   explains   what   this   Science   is.   Hyppolite   believes   that   this   “ontologic,  which  is  the  thought  of  thought  at  the  same  time  that  it  is  the  thought  of   all   things,   constitutes   absolute   knowledge.”30  This   dialectical   monism   of   being   and   thinking   takes   the   form   of   the   Concept,   and   this   form   must   look   to   its   own   presuppositions  in  philosophy  and  history  (that  is,  to  the  phenomenology  of  spirit)   in   order   to   know   what   it’s   tasks   are   in   the   present.   The   project   of   Absolute   Knowledge  is,  in  the  end,  to  proceed  from  the  result  of  this  phenomenology  as  a  bare   “ontological  logic”  into  the  full  richness  of  experience  in  space  and  time,  or  nature   and  history.     Miller’s  in  depth  analysis  of  the  Absolute  Knowledge  chapter  goes  further  than  any   other   interpretation   in   explaining   each   paragraph   and   each   turn   of   Hegel’s   argument.     Although   he   retains   the   three-­‐part   structure   of   Hyppolite’s   analysis,   Miller   shows   how   each   element   of   Absolute   Knowledge   is   won. 31  First,   the   attainment   of   the   Absolute   Standpoint   is   taken   to   be   a   working   through   of   the   subject  shape  gained  by  Revealed  Religion  paired  along  with  the  object  shapes  of  the   previous  chapters.  The  reconciliation  of  the  infinite  and  finite  in  Revealed  Religion  is   taken   as   the   elevation   of   the   earlier   reconciliation   of   judging   and   acting   consciousness   in   Morality   to   the   level   of   spiritual   self-­‐awareness.   Through   a   recollection  of  the  previous  division  and  reconciliations  of  object  and  subject,  acting   and   thinking,   universal   and   particular,   and   finite   and   infinite,   consciousness   achieves  a  standpoint  so  absolutely  inclusive  that  its  understanding  of  itself  and  its’   world   is   rendered   fully   transparent,   whole,   and   true.   Second,   this   standpoint   still   needs  to  overcome  its  conception  of  time  as  the  container  in  which  it  develops,  and   instead   include   time   itself   into   its   own   self-­‐constitution,   as   the   necessary   way   in   which   spirit   comes   to   knowledge   about   itself.   History,   in   this   view,   is   the   actual   progress   in   time   towards   this   self-­‐consciousness   of   spirit   as   time,   that   is,   as   the   recognition   that   it   is   this   very   movement   and   not   something   other   to   it.   Hegel   provides  the  proof  of  this  in  an  extremely  condensed  philosophical  reconstruction  of                                                                                                                   30  Hyppolite   (1974),   p574:“Through   the   reconsideration   of   certain   previous   figures   of   consciousness,   Hegel   begins   by   showing   how   the   self   has   experienced   itself   as   identical   with   being.   This   identity   between   self   and   being,   which   has   been   revealed   concretely   through   the   various   alienations   of   the   self  and  through  the  characters  of  being-­‐for-­‐consciousness,  is  the  result  of  the  Phenomenology,  which   culminates   in   the   conception   of   a   science   which   is   simultaneously   the   science   of   being   and   the   position  of  the  self  in  being.  Being  thinks  itself  as  self,  and  self  thinks  itself  as  being.  This  thought  of   the  self,  this  ontologic,  which  is  the  thought  of  thought  at  the  same  time  that  it  is  the  thought  of  all   things,   constitutes   absolute   knowledge.   In   a   second   paragraph,   Hegel   summarily   indicates   the   characteristics   of   this   science,   which   essentially   exists   in   the   form   of   the   concept,   and   he   examines   the   historical   and   philosophical   presuppositions   of   this   absolute   knowledge.   Then,   in   a   last   paragraph,   Hegel-­‐following   his   circular   method-­‐comes   back   from   this   ontological   logic   to   phenomenology,   to   nature   and   history.   Just   as   phenomenology   is   the   path   leading   to   speculative   philosophy,  so  too,  speculative  philosophy  leads  us  back  to  the  experience  of  consciousness  and  to  its   development,  to  the  alienation  of  spirit  in  space  (nature)  and  in  time  (history).”     31  Miller   (1998),   p427:   “The   arrival   of   consciousness   at   the   absolute   standpoint,   the   completion   of   phenomenology,  will  be  the  actual  recognition  by  consciousness  itself  of  itself  as  this  process  of  self-­‐ determination—a   process   that   has,   as   its   own   culminating   moment,   precisely   the   appearance   of   consciousness  to  itself  as  this  very  self-­‐consciousness  of  itself  as  process.”      

 

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the   movement   to   such   absolute   awareness,   the   movement   towards   Hegel’s   philosophy   itself   (paragraphs   803-­‐804).     Third,   and   finally,   Hegel   provides   the   content  of  what  Absolute  Knowledge  is  to  know  in  its  specificity:  ontology  (logic),  its   “self”  externalized  in  space  (nature)  and  time  (history).  Since  this  Encyclopedia  is  a   circular  path  which  justifies  only  itself,  an  entryway  is  needed,  and  this  entry  is  the   Phenomenology  of  Spirit.     The  brilliance  of  these  readings,  and  Miller’s  especially,  is  to  treat  the  last  shape  of   spirit   as   something   which   has   determinate   elements   that   add   to   the   development   of   the  phenomenology  so  far,  and  not  merely  present  a  task  to  be  done.  However,  by   sticking  so  closely  to  the  language  of  the  text,  the  meaning  of  Absolute  Knowledge   remains   a   bit   too   obscured   in   Hegelian   jargon.   The   next   pair   of   interpretations   brushes   this   jargon   away   through   reading   Absolute   Knowledge   in   the   context   of   a   comprehensive  theory  of  the  Phenomenology  as  a  whole.    Terry  Pinkard’s  1994  book   and   Robert   Pippin’s   2008   essay   provide   some   of   the   clearest,   contemporary   perspectives  on  what  is  going  on  in  Hegel’s  work  at  all.  Both  of  these  philosophers   take  Hegel  to  be  a  critical  post-­‐Kantian  thinker  who  develops  Kant’s  insights  on  the   essential  normativity  of  concepts  by  placing  them  within  a  comprehensive  theory  of   modernity  as  such.   In   Pinkard’s   reading,   Absolute   Knowledge   follows   Religion   in   being   the   explicit   “communal  self-­‐reflection  of  the  human  community”,  but  it  differs  in  that  it  posits  no   external  ground  from  which  it  justifies  itself,  no  “metaphysical  other”  from  which  it   ascertains   its   authority.  32     Hence,   its   “absolute”   nature   comes   from   the   completely   internal   deduction   of   the   normative   authority   for   modern,   reflective   communities   within  the  social  practices  it  has  come  to  take  as  valid  for  its  own  self-­‐evaluation.  33   What   emerges   in   the   reflection   on   practices   of   self-­‐evaluation   itself   is   the   very   community   or   spirit   that   has   progressively   developed   its   justificatory   accounts   of   agency   and   cognition   in   the   Phenomenology   of   Spirit.   The   identity   of   subject   and   object  is  now  explicit  and  absolute,  for  nothing  other  than  a  reflective  community’s   own  history  of  self-­‐understanding  has  come  into  relief  as  the  only  ground  possible   for   judging   that   community’s   own   authority.   This   self-­‐aware   community   has   now   become  absolute   spirit,  and  this  social  practice  of  self-­‐reflection  that  takes  the  form   of  a  phenomenology  has  now  become  Absolute  Knowledge.       Pinkard’s  next  move  is  to  articulate  what  it  is  that  Absolute  Knowing  does  as  a  social   reflective  practice,  and  then  to  show  how  this  is  historically  possible.  As  previously                                                                                                                   32  Pinkard,  p261  

33  Pinkard   p262:   “Absolute   knowledge   is   absolute   in   that   is   has   no   ‘object’   external   to   itself   that   mediates  it  in  the  way  the  natural  worlds  mediates  the  claims  of  natural  science.  Absolute  knowledge   is   thus   the   way   in   which   absolute   spirit   articulates   itself   in   modern   life;   it   is   the   practice   through   which   the   modern   community   thinks   about   itself   without   attempting   to   posit   any   metaphysical   ‘other’   or   set   of   ‘natural   constraints’   that   would   underwrite   those   practices.   Absolute   knowledge   is   the   internal   reflection   on   the   social   practices   of   a   modern   community   that   takes   its   authoritative   standards   to   come   only   from   within   the   structure   of   the   practices   it   uses   to   legitimate   and   authenticate  itself.”    

 

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described   by   Bernstein   and   Miller,   Absolute   Knowing   is   essentially   a   kind   of   reconciliation.   But   whereas   with   Bernstein   this   reconciliation   occurs   between   an   infinite   judgment   and   an   acting   subject’s   own   finitude   and   takes   the   form   of   forgiveness,   and   whereas   with   Miller   this   reconciliation   occurs   between   subject   and   object   and   takes   the   form   of   the   Concept,   with   Pinkard,   this   reconciliation   is   essentially   three-­‐way,   between   the   necessity   of   action,   reflection,   and   the   institutionalization   of   both.34  This   reconciliation   of   thinking   and   practice   by   means   of   their   institutionalization   in   a   norm-­‐governed,   social   practice   of   self-­‐reflection   begins   in   religion   but   achieves   its   full   expression   in   philosophy,   particularly   the   dialectical   philosophy   which   takes   no   norm   or   practice   as   absolute   except   the   history  of  self-­‐generated  normative  practices  as  a  whole.    This  meta-­‐account  of  the   history   of   justificatory   accounts   provides   the   method   in   which   spirit   can   know   itself   as   it   has   come   to   be   itself;   this   transparent   mirror   of   spirit   works   through   a   rational   reconstruction  of  its  own  standards  for  action  and  thinking,  coming  to  the  place  in   which   it   is   now,   that   is,   the   place   of   communal   self-­‐reflection   on   the   human   community.   This   point   of   contact   between   present   and   historical   forms   of   self-­‐ justification   in   the   institution   of   philosophy   is   one   of   the   greatest   achievements   of   modernity.  35     Finally,   Pinkard   shows   how   Absolute   Knowledge   helps   us   understand   what   the   Phenomenology   of   Spirit   is,   and   what   it   has   achieved.   The   Phenomenology,   as   “the   philosophical  reflection  on  who  we  are  in  modern  life,”36  shows  us  how  the  shape  of   Absolute  Knowing  is  not  just  a  contingent  possibility  of  a  reflective  community,  but   the  necessary  result  of  a  reflective  community’s  pathway  to  full,  transparent  clarity   of   the   self-­‐generated   internal   grounds   for   practical   and   cognitive   authority.37  This   result,   as   crystallized   in   the   Phenomenology,   had   to   arise   because   every   other   attempt  at  grounding  spirit’s  actions  and  judgments,  as  seen  in  the  series  of  shapes   of   consciousness   and   spirit   that   litter   the   highway   of   despair,   failed   to   institutionalize   the   reconciliation   between   action   and   reflection,   and   these   failures   one   by   one   determinately   shaped   the   adequate   structure   for   such   a   normative   reconciliation,  the  structure  of  Absolute  Knowledge.38  This  final  shape  of  spirit  is  a   new   kind   of   philosophy   whose   product   Hegel   calls   “begriffne   Geschicte”,   that   is,   comprehended   history.   Such   history,   like   the   one   produced   through   the                                                                                                                   34  Pinkard,  p265  

35  Pinkard,  p265:  “Absolute  knowing  in  the  form  of  the  historical  practices  and  modern  institutions  of  

philosophy   is   the   form   of   reflection   on   that   ‘social   space’   in   which   the   kinds   of   reasons   and   legitimations  of  the  ‘ground  rules’—of  what  is  authoritative  for  us  in  thought  and  action  and  whether   they  can  be  authoritative  for  us—are  rationally  reconstructed  to  see  if  they  can  indeed  affirm  for  us   our  sense  of  who  we  are.”     36  Pinkard,  p267   37  Pinkard,   p267   “It   is   the   explanation   of   how   we   came   to   be   the   people   for   whom   ‘absolute   knowing’—that  is,  the  human  community’s  coming  to  a  reflective  non-­‐metaphysical  understanding  of   what   it   must   take   as   authoritative   grounds   for   belief   and   action—is   not   just   a   possibility   but   something  that  essentially  characterizes  our  self-­‐understanding.”   38  Pinkard,  p268:  “From  our  standpoint,  we,  the  readers  of  the  Phenomenology,  can  understand  that  it   was  the  failure  of  a  satisfactory  account  of  reflective  agency  a  form  of  life  that  integrated  reflection   and  action  within  itself  that  explains  the  failures  of  these  earlier  self-­‐conceptions.”  

 

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Phenomenology,  differs  from  all  other  philosophical  and  historical  accounts  in  that  it   manifestly   seeks   to   explain   its   own   possibility.   This   quasi-­‐transcendental,   quasi-­‐ historical   nature   of   Absolute   Knowledge   can   properly   be   described   as   dialectical.   The   content   of   this   dialectic   is   the   integrated   field   of   human   thought   and   practice,   and  its  goal  is  the  understanding  of  all  there  is,  all  we  are.       According   to   Pippin’s   analysis,   Absolute   Knowledge   is   a   way   to   understand   normativity,   but   it   should   not   be   taken   as   the   “self   reflection   of   the   human   community,”   as   Pinkard   does.   Rather,   Absolute   Knowledge   is   closer   to   a   unified   theory  of  action,  one  whose  basic  elements  are  to  be  found  within  previous  shapes   of  the  Phenomenology,  particularly  in  the  section  of  Reason,  V.C  Individuality  which   takes  itself  to  be  real  in  and  for  itself,  and  a  section  of  Spirit,  VI.C  Spirit  that  is  certain   of   itself.   Morality.   This   unified   theory   of   action   provides   the   true   model   for   understanding   conceptuality,   and   the   perspective   of   the   concept   is   what   the   Phenomenology  has  been  seeking  all  along.  Pippin  provocatively  highlights  the  unity   of   conceptuality   and   agency   in   Absolute   Knowledge   by   calling   it   the   “logic   of   experience.”       First,  Pippin  describes  the  Phenomenology  as  a  developmental  theory  of  subjectivity,   “driven   by   self-­‐inflicted   negation,   which   works   by   means   of   a   complete   skepticism   which   loses   itself   along   the   way.”39  Pippin   understands   this   self-­‐negation   as   the   process  by  which  a  picture  of  the  world,  or  a  shape  of  spirit,  loses  its  validity  in  the   face   of   those   whom   it   is   supposed   to   reflect,   support,   and   justify.40  Pippin   believes   that  this  loss  is  not  just  a  theoretical  undermining  of  a  model  of  subjectivity,  but  an   experiential   breakdown   of   an   actual   historical   subject   constrained   by   a   specific   model.  These  breakdowns  of  experience  constitute  the    “wounds  of  spirit”  that  Hegel   speaks   of   near   the   end   of   the   Phenomenology,   wounds   which,   according   to   Pippin,   it   is   the   purpose   of   Absolute   Knowing   to   heal.   To   heal   these   wounds   is   to   recollect   them   into   a   comprehensive   theory   of   experience   which   accounts   for   its   own   woundedness.41  (It   is   not   too   difficult   here   to   see   the   parallels,   perhaps   identities,   between   this   reading   and   Comay   and   Bernstein’s   earlier   interpretations   of   the   constitutive  woundedness  of  life.)       To   grasp   spirit   through   a   logical   account   of   these   dynamic   experiences   is   to   catch   absolute  spirit  in  its  “actuality,”  a  task  which  earns  the  name  of  Absolute  Knowing.   But   what   does   this   actuality   mean?     To   Pippin,   actuality   means   externalization   [Entäußerung],  and  Hegel  gives  us  clues  in  the  final  chapter  to  understanding  spirit’s   externalization   by   pointing   us   toward   the   accounts   of   action   and   their   failures   in   previous  shapes.  In  these  earlier  accounts  (V.C  and  VI.C),  a  subject  of  experience  in   the  former  case  tries  to  individually  externalize  its  intentions  without  regard  for  its                                                                                                                   39  Pippin  (2008),  p213   40  Pippin   (2008),   p214:   “What   Hegel   appears   to   be   addressing   is   the   problem   of   what   it   is   for   a   ‘‘picture’’  or  shape  of  spirit  to  lose  its  grip,  cease  to  command  allegiance,  fail  in  some  way,  and  all  this   in  a  way  that  is  open  to  a  philosophical,  not  merely  sociological  or  historical  explanation.”     41  Pippin  (2008),  p214    

 

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consequences,   and   in   the   latter   case   it   tries   to   express   itself   as   a   subject   of   moral   conviction   without   any   doubts.   Pippin   takes   the   lesson   of   these   models   of   agency   to   be   that   a   subject   cannot   base   its   self-­‐conception   on   pure   intentions   or   individual   desire.   Rather,   the   expression   of   intentions   into   the   public   sphere   of   language   and   action,  mediation  and  consequence,  changes  the  meaning  of  the  intention  itself,  and   hence  changes  the  self-­‐conception  of  the  acting  subject.       To   put   this   in   the   terms   of   Absolute   Knowledge,   just   as   an   intention   cannot   be   explained   without   the   action   it   intends,   a   concept   cannot   be   explained   without   its   actualization  in  the  world.  Or,  the  absolute  normativity  of  human  beings  cannot  be   explained   without   giving   an   account   of   the   various   real   norms   and   standards   that   human   beings   have   put   into   practice   across   time.  42  To   realize   this   is   to   grasp   the   “logical   form   of   ‘reconciled’   experience:”   absolute   knowledge. 43 When   this   reconciliation   between   the   inner,   pure   intention   (concept)   and   the   outer,   public   deed   (actualization)   is   not   accomplished,   than   the   result   is   madness,   breakdown,   frenzy.   Giving   up   the   attachment   to   inner   purity   which   characterizes   the   former   position,   most   pointedly   in   the   figures   of   the   Beautiful   Soul   and   Christ,   means   “sacrificing”  oneself,  letting  go  of  one’s  autonomy  to  decide  on  one’s  own  meaning,   ground,  or  authority.       In   sum,   Pippin   sees   Absolute   Knowledge   as   a   unified   theory   of   agency   which   can   account  for  the  self-­‐generated  standards  and  actual  failures  of  concepts  and  deeds  in   their   lived   reality.   This   theory   is   normative   because,   according   to   Pippin’s   Hegel,   conceptuality   is   normative.44  Although   the   form   of   Absolute   Knowledge   has   been   won,  basically  as  a  framework  for  “exercising  normativity  authority,”45  it’s  content  is   so  far,  empty.  For  Pippin,  this  means  that  the  Phenomenology  has  not  actually  made   any   legitimate   claims   about   the   content   of   spirit,   only   failed   attempts   along   with   their   productively   wrong   models   of   justification.     Only   now   can   something   true   be   said,   and   hence   the   entire   wealth   of   spirit—in   logic,   nature,   history,   politics,   art,   etc.—is  open  for  science.         The  final  pair  of  interpretations  that  I  will  review  follows  this  normative  reading  of                                                                                                                  

42     Pippin   (2008),   p221:   “But   in   our   context,   this   position   makes   intuitively   clearer   why   Hegel   is  

referring   so   frequently   to   this   position   as   a   way   of   explaining   why   there   is   no   strict   separation   between   a   concept   and   its   ‘‘actualization’’   or   ‘‘fulfillment,’’   why   the   comprehension   of   conceptual   content  requires  attention  to  the  ‘‘fluidity’’  and  ‘‘living  spirituality’’  of  a  norm,  what  I  have  identified   as  the  core  position  of  the  Phenomenology.”     43  Pippin  (2008),  p222   44  Pippin   (2008),   p224:   “   […]   I   would   suggest   that   Hegel   treats   the   problem   of   conceptuality   as   in   general  the  problem  of  normativity,  where  that  simply  means:  The  question  is  what  ought  to  be  done   to  render  a  phenomenon  intelligible  and  how  actions  ought  to  be  justified  (what  ought  to  be  believed   and  what  ought  to  be  done,  one  could  say),  not  how  the  brain  processes  information  or  what  actually   motivates  human  beings.”     45  Pippin  (2008),  p224:  “Under  these  assumptions,  exercising  normative  authority  is  understood  very   much   like   the   expression   of   intention   in   a   public,   social   space,   functioning   as   authoritative   only   if   there   is   a   sufficiently   harmonious   social,   meaningful   context,   and   responsive,   in   the   right   way,   to   possible  challenges  to  such  authority.”    

 

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Hegel’s  thought,  taking  the  Phenomenology  to  be  essentially  a  theory  of  conceptual   content.  Allegra  de  Laurentiis’  recent  essay  outlining  the  conceptual  structure  of  the   final  chapter  of  the  Phenomenology  is  perhaps  the  first  reading  since  Miller’s  1977   essay   to   give   a   close   exegesis   of   every   major   argumentative   move   of   the   Absolute   Knowing   chapter.46  In   this   account,   Absolute   Knowing   provides   the   mechanism   by   which  all  the  previous  faults  in  the  shapes  of  spirit  and  consciousness  are  resolved,   and  the  movement  to  the  Encyclopedia  is  simultaneously  prepared.  This  is  achieved   by  the  consciousness  of  the  structural  identity  between  the  investigating  subject  and   investigated  object,  a  consciousness  that  must  abandon  its  phenomenological  form   and   become   conceptual.   This  self-­‐generated   conceptual   awareness   of   spirit   reveals   the   structural   identity   between   thinking   subject   and   thought   object   as   essentially   syllogistic,  or  inferentially  structured.47       The   movement   from   almost   every   shape   in   the   Phenomenology   to   the   next   occurs   because  Spirit  realizes  itself  to  be  somehow  a  part  of  the  object  it  is  investigating.48   But  in  Absolute  Knowing  this  identification  is  made  complete,  not  through  a  sensory   or   perceptual   understanding,   not   through   an   natural   scientific   awareness,   an   individual   certitude,   or   an   aesthetic   identity,   not   through   a   political   will,   a   moral   conscience   or   a   religious   intuition,   but   through   a   conceptual   grasp   of   the   relation   between   universal,   particular,   and   individual   judgments.49  The   object   of   thinking   spirit   at   the   point   of   Absolute   Knowledge   is   thought   itself,   and   hence   grasping   a   syllogistic  structure  by  means  of  syllogisms  accomplishes  the  identity  of  subject  and   substance  that  was  announced  at  the  helm  of  the  project.       Hegel   names   this   identical   structure   of   the   self   and   world,   “the   Concept.”   The   concept   is   not   any   concept,   but   the   inferential,   mediating   and   self-­‐relating   structure   that  gives  determinacy  to  objectivity  as  well  as  subjectivity.  “Knowing”  anything  at   all   means   knowing   its   concept,   its   inferential   structure.50  This   structure,   since   it   is   not  immediately  present,  can  only  be  known  through  the  very  experiences,  actions,   or   ‘externalizations’   of   the   subject   under   consideration.   In   other   words,   grasping                                                                                                                   46  This  does  not,  of  course,  include  H.S.  Harris,  whose  micro-­‐reading  of  the  entire  Phenomenology  is  

unfortunately  too  large  to  cover  here   47  de  Laurentiis,  p255:  “At  the  end  of  the  Phenomenology,  then,  the  logical  structure  of  thinking  and  of   its  object  is  recognized  as  syllogistic.”     48  de  Laurentiis,  p246     49  de   Laurentiis,   p248:   “The   previous   chapters   have   proven   precisely   that   the   structural   identity   of   thinking   and   object   cannot   be   sensed,   perceived,   nor   understood   (verstanden).   Neither   can   it   be   “produced”  or  “intuited”  as  argued  –  in  Hegel’s  eyes,  unsuccessfully  –  in  other  idealistic  systems.  This   identity  can  only  be  grasped  or  comprehended  (begriffen).  It  is  purely  conceptual  and  results  from   reflecting   upon,   rather   than   within,   phenomenal   consciousness.   For   Hegel   as   for   Plato,   comprehending   or   grasping   differs   from   understanding,   opining,   and   believing   because   it   involves   providing  the  logical  account  of  what  is  grasped.”     50  de  Laurentiis,  p254:  “The  spiritual  nature  of  the  object  becomes  known  only  by   grasping  that  each   of   its   determinations   is   a   facet   of   the   knowing   Self.   Hegel   calls   the   logical   structure   of   the   Self   “the   Concept”  (der  Begriff).  In  “Absolute  Knowing,”  he  now  claims  that  this  structure  is  syllogistic.  In  other   words,   he   likens   the   concept   of   objectivity   (the   concept   of   a   world)   to   that   of   selfhood,   and   the   latter   to  that  of  syllogistic  inference  –  not  to  a  specific  syllogistic  form  or  figure,  although  he  considers  the   categorical  syllogism  as  the  paradigm  of  all  such  inferences.”    

 

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something  individual  means  “recollecting”  its  particular  moments  and  placing  them   into  a  formal  universal  relation.51  This  dynamic  movement  of  thinking  is  the  Self  in   action,   but   it   is   simultaneously   the   movement   of   objectivity   which   the   self   appropriates.   Because   the   Concept   refers   to   both   thinking   and   its   object,   it   has   no   Other  to  be  alien  too,  and  hence,  it  is  absolute.       For   de   Laurentiis,   absolute   knowledge   is   akin   to   an   Aristotelian   thesis   of   a   being   coming  to  completion  by  actualizing  its  inner  potentiality.  Here,  the  goal  of  knowing   is  actualized  through  knowing  itself  absolutely,  that  is,  knowing  its  own  structure  of   knowing.   This   logic   is   the   formal   ground   by   which   an   analysis   of   all   the   realms   of   being   can   be   known,   and   the   Phenomenology   now   appears   as   nothing   but   the   preparation   for   this   ground.   Bringing   this   ground   into   awareness   has   been   the   movement   of   bringing   the   structure   of   the   self   into   view   as   the   structure   of   the   world.52       Robert  Brandom’s  account  of  the   Phenomenology   is  the  inferentialist  interpretation   par   excellence.   As   he   writes   in   chapter   eight   of   his   Spirit   of   Trust,   hitherto   only   published  online:     Throughout  this  work  I  have  emphasized  Hegel’s  concern  to  offer  an  account   of   the   nature   of   conceptual  content—not   just   in   the   Science  of  Logic,   where   that   concern   is   most   manifest,   but   already   as   an   organizing   and   animating   theme  of  the  Phenomenology  .  .  .  Hegel’s  diagnosis  of  what  goes  wrong  with   the  shapes  of  consciousness  that  most  explicitly  express  the  alienation  that   accompanied   the   modern   rise   of   subjectivity   is   that   they   cannot   fund   an   intelligible   notion   of   determinate   conceptual   content.     His   overarching   indictment   turns   on   the   claim   that   cognitive,   practical,   and   recognitive   practices   whose   theoretical   expression   exhibits   the   atomistic   form   of   Verstand   (the   model   of   independence)   cannot   achieve   an   adequate   conception  of  conceptual  content,  which  must  await  post-­‐modern  practices   whose   theoretical   expression   exhibits   the   holistic   form   of   Vernunft   (the   model   of   freedom).   And   that   requires   the   cognitive,   practical,   and   recognitive  epiphany  that  he  calls  the  advent  of  ‘Absolute  Knowing’.53  

  The   search   for   an   adequate   theory   of   conceptual   content,   according   to   Brandom,   drives   the   movement   of   consciousness   forward   until   it   has   an   adequate   model   for   grasping   itself   and   the   world,   and   this   model   is   Absolute   Knowing.   But   unlike   the   strictly   syllogistic   and   logical   interpretation   of   de   Laurentiis,   Brandom’s   reading   is   much  closer  to  Bernstein  and  Pinkard,  for  he  emphasizes  that  Absolute  Knowing  is                                                                                                                  

51     de   Laurentiis,   p254:   “Put   differently:   Hegel’s   “syllogism   of   reason”   denotes   the   very   concept   of   syllogistic   inference,   a   concept   underlying   not   only   formal-­‐logical   reasoning   but   also   the   rational   aspects   of   reality,   including   the   reality   of   selfhood.   Thus   a   thinking   subject   is   best   described   as   the   ‘mediating  ground  between  the  singularity  and  universality  of  what  is  real’  (Enc.  §180).  ‘The  Concept’   refers   to   the   dynamics   of   a   thinking   subject   who,   like   a   living   syllogism,   permanently   distinguishes   and  unifies  what  is  universal,  particular,  and  singular.”     52  de  Laurentiis,  p256:  “Thus,  the  phenomenological  journey  as  a  whole  appears  now  to  have  been  a   preparatory  exercise  for  comprehending  the  logic  of  the  “I.”     53  Brandom,  Chapter  VIII  of  The  Spirit  of  Trust,  p128-­‐129  

 

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basically  already  achieved  at  the  end  of  the  Spirit  chapter,  as  the  structure  of  mutual   recognition  and  forgiveness,  and  that  the  final  chapter  functions  mostly  as  a  call  for   a   spiritual   transition   to   a   more   self-­‐reflective   community   of   modern,   ethical   subjects.  For  Brandom,  Geist  is  Hegel’s  name  for  the  one  major  event  of  history,  the   movement   of   modernity   as   the   self-­‐determination   of   a   reflective   community. 54   Absolute   Knowing   is   the   fulfillment   of   Geist,   as   the   recognition   of   norms   of   confession  and  forgiveness  for  the  essentially  historical  and  social  being  of  man.  If   the   Phenomenology   has   documented   the   “the   cognitive,   recognitive,   and   practical   dimensions   of   conceptual   activity,” 55  than   Absolute   Knowing   provides   the   recollection   of   the   historical   and   logical   movement   towards   such   self-­‐awareness,   accepting   all   the   faults   and   failures   along   the   way   as   necessary   factors   of   the   imperfect   nature   of   free   agents.   The   conceptual   content   achieved   at   the   end   incorporates  the  finitude  of  man  into  the  very  structure  of  normativity.             Thus   concludes   the   overview   of   interpretations   of   Absolute   Knowledge,   but   do   we   fare   any   better?   What   are   we   to   make   of   this   intricate   web   of   thoughts   all   circling   around   the   Absolute?   The   challenge   I   see   is   to   read   the   two   families   of   interpretations   together,   perhaps   as   two   forms   of   holistic   reflection   on   a   single   grand   community.   The   questions   that   run   through   these   interpretations   cannot   be   easily  reconciled.  I  take  the  major  fault  lines  that  have  emerged  to  be  the  following:     Is   absolute   knowledge   an   overcoming   of   human   finitude   or   is   it   the   ultimate   recognition  of  finitude?     Is   absolute   knowledge   the   grounding   of   modern   subjectivity   or   is   it   the   recognition  of  its  groundlessness?     Is  absolute  knowledge  the  crowning  accomplishment  of  the  phenomenological   project   of   knowing   what   knowing   is,   or   is   it   the   acceptance   of   failure   for   a   project  that  was  doomed  from  the  beginning?     Does   absolute   knowledge   provide   the   normative   authority   that   a   reflective   community   requires   for   it   to   be   justified   in   its   judgments   and   actions,   or   does   it   provide   rather   an   ethical   attitude   and   historical   sensibility   for   mourning   the   absence  of  such  authority,  allowing  one  to  live  with  such  an  absence?     The   proper   answer   to   each   of   these   questions   has   to   be   the   “reconciling   Yes,   in   which  the  two  I’s  let  go  of  their  antithetical  existence,”56  and  show  themselves  to  be  a                                                                                                                  

54  Brandom,   p162:   “The   principal   aim   of   the   book   is   to   articulate,   work   out,   and   apply   a   way   of   understanding   the   transition   from   pre-­‐modern   to   modern   social   practices,   institutions,   selves,   and   their   immanent   forms   of   understanding.     ‘Geist’   is   Hegel’s   collective   term   for   everything   that   has   a   history   rather   than   a   nature—or,   put   otherwise,   everything   whose   nature   is   essentially   historical.     Geist   as   a   whole   has   a   history,   and   it   is   Hegel’s   view   that   in   an   important   sense,   that   history   boils   down  to  one  grand  event.    That  event—the  only  thing  that  has  ever  really  happened  to  Geist—is  its   structural  transformation  from  a  traditional  to  a  modern  form.”   55  Brandom,  p162   56  PhG  §671  

 

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single  self  expanded  into  a  duality.  A  series  of  speculative  propositions  can  put  this   easily   into   words,   as   Hegel   does   in   the   Preface,   but   the   comprehension   of   such   propositions  requires  an  ethical-­‐conceptual  experience  of  understanding-­‐forgiving.  I   take   the   Absolute   Knowledge   chapter   to   be   the   final   test   of   comprehension   for   a   subject  that  is  unified  in  its  division,  grounded  in  its  groundlessness,  and  infinitely   free   in   its   recognition   of   finitude.   The   movement   of   Absolute   Knowledge,   in   this   account,   is   the   coming   to   rest   of   spirit   in   its   very   restlessness,   its   forgiving   acceptance   of   its   own   confession   of   failure.   This   meta-­‐reflection   on   spirit’s   own   inadequacy   to   fully   account   for   itself   is   satisfied   by   spirit’s   recognition   of   the   constitutive  nature  of  its  inadequacy.  The  failure  of  spirit  to  independently  account   for   itself   forces   it   to   keep   moving,   and   hence   the   true   judgment   of   spirit’s   goal   of   self-­‐knowledge  cannot  be  made  until  it  has  also  provided  a  rational  account  of  the   realms   of   nature   and   history,   art   and   politics,   anthropology   and   religion,   logic   and   philosophy.     As   one   aspect   that   needs   to   be   integrated,   I   take   Bernstein   and   Comay’s   forgiveness   and  mourning  interpretation  as  exemplary,  for  they  claim  that  absolute  knowledge   is   the   ultimate   recognition   and   affirmation   of   the   loss   of   all   grounds   for   complete   social-­‐self   knowing.   As   the   seemingly   antithetical   aspect   to   be   integrated,   I   take   Brandom,  Pinkard  and  Pippin’s  normative  readings  to  be  exemplary,  for  they  claim   that  absolute  knowledge  provides  the  ultimate,  immanent  legitimation  of  authority   of   grounds   for   social   self-­‐practices   of   knowing.   One   should   read   the   former   interpretations  as  acting  consciousness  confessing  its  finitude,  and  the  latter  as  the   judging   consciousness   with   its   hard   heart,   staking   its   universalistic   claims;   the   normative   readings   breakdown   into   an   awareness   of   their   historical   finitude,   and   hence   forgiveness   emerges   in   both   families   as   the   proper   modality   of   absolute   knowledge,  as  the  way  in  which  knowledge  relates  to  itself.     A   unified   account   would   have   to   show   the   fear   of   finitude   to   be   as   constitutive   as   its   infinite  overcoming,  the  end  of  a  certain  mode  of  temporality  to  be  the  condition  for   actual  thinking  and  the  horizon  for  thoughtful  action,  and  the  work  of  mourning  to   be   the   structure   of   modern   normativity.   Showing   how   this   is   the   case   means   working   through   the   movement   of   Absolute   Knowledge   itself,   a   task   I   can   begin   now.  I  will  proceed  paragraph  by  paragraph,  with  the  references  to  the  actual  text  in   English  and  German  in  the  footnotes,  and  my  own  reconstruction  of  the  content  in   the  body.  Throughout  the  following,  I  will  freely  reference  and  incorporate  certain   elements  of  the  interpretations  covered  here.  All  have  certain  elements  right,  but  by   focusing   on   only   one   major   thread   of   the   chapter—be   it   finitude,   subjectivity,   forgiveness,  mourning,  reconciliation,  temporality,  action,  syllogisms,  conceptuality   or   normativity—they   mistake   the   part   for   the   whole.   My   intention   is   to   hold   all   of   these   threads   together   in   a   dynamic   unity,   privileging   some   elements   over   others,   but   recognizing   the   mutual   implication   of   all   in   determining   the   precise   shape   of   absolute  knowing  as  it  has  come  to  be.   III.  A  Close  Reading  of  Absolute  Knowing    

 

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The  object  of  Revealed  Religion,  as  absolute  spirit,  begins  constrained  by  its  formal   and  temporal  representation.  In  other  words,  the  framework  for  the  reflection  of  a   community  on  its  own  ethical  and  conceptual  foundations  by  means  of  a  complex  set   of   social   practices   of   justification,   recognition,   and   forgiveness   is  not   able   to   express   the   fact   that   these   practices   are   self-­‐determined   and   present.     Overcoming   [Überwindung]   this   framework   means   changing   its   “object   shape”,   the   way   it   appears  to  consciousness,  by  making  its  form  transparent  to  its  content.  This  is  not   the   same   as   negating   it,   for   the   proper   shape   of   an   object   of   consciousness   has   already  been  discovered  in  the  first  movement  of  the  book:  the  proper  shape  of  an   object   of   consciousness   is   another   self-­‐consciousness.   Hence,   to   give   the   object   of   revealed   religion   its   proper   shape   is   to   rethink   its   objectivity  just  as  we  rethought   objectivity  in  the  first  movement  from  consciousness  to  self-­‐consciousness.57     The   constitution   of   objectivity   in   the   movement   of   consciousness   was   seen   to   include  three  moments:  the  individual  immediacy  of  sense-­‐certainty,  the  relational   particularity   of   perception,   and   the   categorical   universality   of   essence.   Hegel   unifies   these   moments   here   not   as   one   would   anticipate,   as   the   Self,   but   rather   as   the   syllogism.  In  a  preview  of  the  Doctrine  of  the  Concept  in  his  Wissenschaft   der   Logik,   he  writes:   The  object  as  a  whole  is  the  syllogism,  that  is,  the  movement  of  the  universal   into   individuality   by   way   of   determination,   as   well   as   the   converse   movement   from   individuality   to   the   universal   by   way   of   sublated   individuality,  that  is,  determination.58  

  The  syllogistic  nature  of  the  object  of  thought—as  a  dynamic  unity  of  universality,   particularity,   and   individuality—is   the   true   victory   of   the   early   Phenomenology,   a   prize  not  explicitly  understood  until  this  very  moment.  As  the  bare  structure  of  any   object  of  thought  (including  the  thought  of  thought  itself),  the  task  of  the  Logic  and   the   Science   to   come   will   be   to   know   all   objects   in   this   mode.   “Consciousness   must   therefore  know  the  object  as  itself  in  terms  of  these  three  determinations.“59       But   we   are   not   yet   concerned   with   the   Logic   here,   not   with   the   “pure   comprehension  of  the  object”,  but  rather  with  how  this  knowledge  comes  into  being   from   within   consciousness   itself;   we   are   concerned   with   the   phenomenology   of   conceptuality,  not  the  determinate  forms  of  conceptuality.60  This  impure  knowledge   is  the  determinate  result  of  all  the  failures  of  the  previous  shapes  of  consciousness,   forms  of  agency,  and  pictures  of  the  world.  It  was  not  “there”  from  the  beginning  nor                                                                                                                   57  PhG  §788  

58 PhG   §789:   “Er   ist,   als   Ganzes,   der   Schluß   oder   die   Bewegung   des   Allgemeinen   durch   die   Bestimmung   zur   Einzelnheit,   wie   die   umgekehrte,   von   der   Einzelnheit   durch   sie   als   aufgehobne   oder   die  Bestimmung  zum  Allgemeinen.”     59  PhG  §789:  “Nach  diesen  drei  Bestimmungen  also  muß  das  Bewußtsein  ihn  als  sich  selbst  wissen.”   60  PhG  §789:  “Nonetheless,  we  are  not  speaking  here  of  knowledge  as  a  pure  comprehension  of  the   object;   rather,   this   knowledge   is   supposed   to   be   disclosed   merely   in   its   coming-­‐to-­‐be,   that   is,   in   its   moments  in  terms  of  the  aspects  which  belong  to  consciousness  as  such  and  in  terms  of  the  moments   of  the  genuine  concept,  that  is,  of  pure  knowledge  in  the  form  of  the  shapes  of  consciousness.”    

 

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necessarily   determined,   but   rather   it   was   conditioned   by   the   series   of   accounts   humans   told   themselves   about   themselves   over   time   and   space,   and   the   self-­‐ generated   inadequacies   which   specifically   led   to   more   complex   accounts   to   accommodate  the  failures  of  previous  ones.  The  task  now  is  for  we  phenomenologists   to  gather  together  [die  wir  zusammennehmen]  the  determinate  moments  of  all  these   failed   shapes   and   partial   relations   into   a   new   account   adequate   to   the   form   of   objectivity   and   conduct   of   subjectivity   present   in   the   self-­‐consciously   spiritual   community.61     Recalling   [erinnern]   the   previous   shapes   of   consciousness   is   the   method   at   work   now,   and   not   skeptically   interrogating   a   new   contender.   We   begin   by   recalling   from   Observing  Reason  that  even  with  “indifferent  objects”,  the  activity  of  the  subject  is   just   as   important   as   the   perceptual   qualities   of   the   object,   i.e.,   the   “seeking   and   finding”  of  self-­‐consciousness  is  necessary  to  bring  out  the  concept  of  the  object.  The   highest   judgment   of   this   observing   consciousness   comes   with   the   introspective   claim,  “The  being  of  the  I  is  a  thing”  [Sein  des  Ich  ein  Ding  ist].  At  first  glance,  this  was   absurd,  for  the  I   is  a  dynamic  relational,  immaterial  inter-­‐subjective  activity,  not  an   individual,   sensuously   immediate   thing.   But   now,   we   recognize   the   profundity   of   judgment.   For   it   is   really   saying   that   the   structure   of   thinghood   is   akin   to   the   structure   of   self-­‐consciousness,   that   the   Thing   is   like   an   I,   a   dynamic,   immaterial   inter-­‐subjective  activity,  and  not  just  a  sensuously  immediate  appearance.62       The  truth  of  this  judgment  is  not  made  explicit  until  the  development  of  Pure  Insight   and   the   Enlightenment,   in   which   the   meaningfulness   of   objective   thinghood   as   an   indifferent,  independent  reality  is  completely  abolished.  “The  thing  is  I”  [Das  Ding  ist   Ich]   means   that   only   in   relation   to   thinking   subjects   does   something   have   value   at   all;   only   “through   I”   [durch   Ich]   can   it   be   taken   as   meaningful.   This   emerges   as   a   historically   explicit   framework   for   objectivity   with   the   category   of   utility   [Nützlichkeit],  and  the  world  is  emptied  and  reinterpreted  according  to  the  values  of   self-­‐determining  man  with  the  development  of  culture  [gebildete  Selbstbewußtein].   Nothing   remains   of   value   in   the   world   that   is   not   determined   relationally   through   the   conduct   and   opinions   of   society,   and   hence   the   stability   of   objectivity   is   overturned  with  everyone  anew.63     Re-­‐inscribing  the  developments  of  knowledge  of  objectivity  in  Observing  Reason  as   the  “Immediacy  of  being”  and  Culture  as  its  “determinateness”,  Hegel  writes  that  we   still   need   to   know   its   “essence.”   What   we   are   doing   here   is   syllogizing   these   moments,   making   the   structure   of   thinghood   into   a   dynamic   unity   of   immediate   individuality,   determinate   particularity,   and   finally,   universal   essence.   We   are   showing   the   phenomenology   of   the   parts   of   the   Concept   in   the   very   structure   of   objectivity  that  we  developed  on  the  path  to  knowing.  The  moment  of  universality,   essentially,   or   the   inner,   comes   with   Moral   self-­‐consciousness   which   knows   “Being                                                                                                                   61  PhG  §789   62  PhG  §790   63  PhG  §791  

 

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per  se  as  pure  will  or  pure  knowledge”  [das  Sein  schlechthin   als  den  reinen  Willen   oder  Wissen].  At  this  point,  only  the  universal,  moral  duty  or  intention  is  considered   to  be  really  true,  and  the  particular  actions  or  individual  existence  of  such  morality   in  the  world  is  seen  as  the  “empty  husk”  of  the  pure  duty  inside.  The  hypocrisy  this   brings   to   moral   consciousness   comes   to   a   halt   with   conscience   [Gewissen],   where   the   inner   moral   truth   of   self-­‐certain   spirit   is   confirmed   by   objective   action   as   the   sphere  of  its  real  existence.64       Here,   where   spirit   understands   that   its   actual   experience   grounds   its   inner   knowledge   of   itself,   the   sough   after   reconciliation   of   spirit   [Versöhnung   des   Geistes]   with  its  form  of  consciousness  has  been  won.  Yet  it  is  particularly  this  last  moment   of   Conscience   and   Forgiveness   within   the   Self-­‐Certain   Spirit   of   Morality   that   provides   the   explicit   “force”   of   this   reconciled   unity   of   individual   moments,   and   hence  understanding  this  last  moment  of  Spirit  allows  one  to  understand  them  all.     The   nature   of   self-­‐certain   moral   spirit   is   not   only   to   act   out   of   conviction,   and   be   fully  oneself  in  acting,  but  to  express  this  conviction  in  language,  and  hence  release   it’s   meaning   to   the   public   for   recognition.   Such   expression   makes   the   action   meaningfully   count   [diese   seine   Sprache   ist   das   Gelten   seines   Handelns].   But   the   individual   action   done   out   of   duty   and   the   particular   acknowledgement   of   the   dutiful   action   by   an   other   are   not   the   same   thing;   in   the   gap   between   action   and   acknowledgement   can   division,   error,   suffering,   and   misrecognition   occur.   The   realization  of  the  possibility  of  a  gap  between  the  individual  actor  and  his  own  inner   conviction  proves  to  the  actor  that  truth  is  always  to  be  determined  in  experience  by   open,   recognitive   relationships   at   every   level,   all   the   way   down   to   his   own   inner   convictions  and  individual  acts.  The  “confession”  of  this  truth  about  truth  confronts   the  perspective  of  judgment,  which  then  sticks  to  itself  as  the  true  actuality,  as  the   “hard   heart”   against   such   individual   error.   But   this   breaks   down   under   its   own   particularity,   and   the   universal   logic   of   forgiveness   is   revealed   as   the   true   force   of   reconciliation   between   individuality   and   particularity   concerning   concepts   and   deeds.     Truthful   action   is   shown   to   be   “pure   knowledge”,   that   is,   it   is   conceptually   and   normatively  structured:    a)  immediate  individual  experience  knows  itself  as  true,  b)   particular,   determinate,   relational   judgment   knows   the   limits   of   this   immediacy   and   knows   the   standards   of   knowledge   to   which   it   fall   short,   and   c)   the   universal   essence   of   forgiveness   knows   these   two   sets   of   knowledge   confronting   each   other   are  what  make  up  the  very  dynamic  of  the  self  and  its  progress  towards  knowledge   and   truth   overall.   In   other   words,   forgiveness   means   the   reciprocal   recognition   of   individuality   (as   action   and   its   limits)   and   particularity   (as   judgment   and   its   standards)   within   universality   (as   the   community   of   knowers   who   are   able   to   act   and   judge   each   other   together).   This   syllogistic   or   conceptual   structure   of   forgiveness   is   shown   not   only   to   be   the   shape   of   objectivity,   but   to   express   the                                                                                                                   64  PhG  §792  

 

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content  of  subjectivity  as  well.65       But   this   reconciliation   between   objective   shape   and   subjective   content   has   happened   twice   already   in   the   Phenomenology,   once   as   the   movement   from   consciousness   to   self-­‐consciousness,   in   which   the   “contentless   form”   of   self-­‐ consciousness   was   discovered   as   the   proper   shape   of   objectivity,   and   once   in   religious  spirit,  in  which  the    “absolute  content”  was  discovered  to  be  historical  self-­‐ consciousness   in   its   self-­‐reflective,   conscientious   community.     In   other   words,   looking   for   the   structure   of   objectivity   we   have   found   the   content   of   subjectivity,   and   looking   for   the   content   of   subjectivity,   we   have   found   the   structure   of   objectivity.   The   point   now   is   to   unify   both   the   structure   of   objectivity   and   the   content  of  subjectivity  together,  and  to  comprehend  this  unity.  As  the  single  grasp  of   both   form   and   content   of   subject   and   object   in   one   unified   structure,   we   will   have   ended  the  journey  through  the  shapes  of  spirit.66       This   unification   of   perspectives   occured   within   revealed   religion,   but   it   took   this   unification  as  simply  an  external  given,  as  a  representation  from  the  past,  and  not  as   the  result  of  present  conceptualizing  and  synthesizing  self-­‐activity.  “The  unification   that   is   still   lacking   is   the   simple   unity   of   the   concept.” 67  The   proper   form   for   unification   comes   rather   from   within   the   perspective   that   takes   the   shape   of   the   object   to   be   modeled   on   self-­‐consciousness,   particularly   as   the   figure   of   the   Beautiful   Soul   [schöne   Seele].   Although   we   just   reviewed   Conscience   and   Forgiveness  as  the  theatre  of  reconciliation  between  spirit  and  its  consciousness,  we   are   about   to   review   it   again,   but   this   time   with   a   different   aim.   The   point   now   is   not   to   understand   the   structure   of   forgiveness,   but   to   grasp   the   general   shape   of   the   Beautiful   Soul   as   the   means   to   rethink   the   way   in   which   revealed   religion   presented   its   absolute   content.   We   are   searching   for   a   dynamic,   self-­‐relating   mode   of   presentation   for   the   unity   of   subjective   content   and   objective   form,   one   we   know   to   be  conceptual;  but  this  conceptual  mode  must  be  retrieved  phenomenologically  from   within   the   development   of   knowledge   itself,   and   as   the   last   shape   of   spirit   before   religion,  the  Beautiful  Soul  presents  that  opportunity.       Hegel  takes  the  steadfast  inactivity  of  the  Beautiful  Soul  to  be  key  to  its  conceptual   treasure.    We  recall  that  the   Beautiful  Soul  holds  fast  to  its  refusal  to  be  determined,   to  be  fulfilled  in  “action”  or  “particularity,”  to  be  realized  at  all  within  the  contingent   world  of  cause  and  effect,  finitude  and  error.  The  Beautiful  Soul  seeks  to  maintain  its   infinite,   universal   purity   in   a   community   of   like-­‐minded,   withdrawn   individuals.   But   this  rejection  is  itself  the  determinacy  of  the  concept  we  have  been  looking  for,  since   its   own   truth   consists   in   remaining   determinately   universal   against   its   realization.   By  remaining  universal,  the  concept  overcomes  its  refusal  to  be  fulfilled  and  fulfills   itself  as  this  refusal.  In  Hegel’s  terms:   Its   self-­‐consciousness   achieves   the   form   of   universality   and   what   remains  

                                                                                                                65  PhG  §793   66  PhG  §794   67  PhG  §795:  “die  Vereinigung,  welche  noch  fehlt,  ist  die  einfache  Einheit  des  Begriffs.”  

 

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for   it   is   its   genuinely   true   concept,   the   concept   which   has   attained   its   realization.  That  self-­‐consciousness  is  the  concept  in  its  truth,  that  is,  in  the   unity  with  its  self-­‐emptying.68  

  It  is  exactly  this  “unity  with  its  self-­‐emptying”  [der  Einheit  mit  seiner  Entäußerung]   that   provides   the   universal   space   for   thinking   the   unified   structure   of   objectivity   and  content  of  subjectivity  in  a  dynamic,  self-­‐activating  way,  a  way  which  revealed   religion  could  point  to,  but  not  account  for.  The  Beautiful  Soul  is  the  model  for  this   particular,  individual,  Universal  knowing.  It  is  the   knowledge  of  knowing  in  the  act  of   particular   knowing,   unlike   duty,   which   only   knows   knowing   in   the   abstract.   This   makes   itself   a   genuine   Object,   the   object   we’ve   been   looking   for,   because   it   is   an   object   whose   form   is   self-­‐consciousness   in   all   its   determinacy   and   activity,   that   is,   it   is   the   self   existing-­‐for-­‐itself,   thinking   as   acting,   being   as   becoming.   This   is   the   concept  not  of  the  divine,  but  the  “divine’s  self-­‐intuition.”69       The  structure  of  the  concept,  as  that  which  realizes  itself  by  refusing  to  be  realized   in  any  particular,  i.e.,  as  universality,  is  expressed  in  the  content  of  the  absolute  spirit   in  Religion,  and  in  the  form  of  the  acting  self  in  the  Beautiful  Soul.  It  is  the  form  of   the  acting  self,  however,  which  is  the  proper  shape  for  grasping  absolute  spirit,  for  it   shows  “the  self  putting  the  life  of  absolute  spirit  into  practice  [das  Selbst  führt  das   Leben  des  absoluten  Geistes  durch].”70  In  other  words,  the  form  of  knowledge  here   is  not  a  picture  or  representation,  but  a  living,  acting,  reciprocally  recognizing  being.   But   as   the   shape   of   an   acting   being,   as   existent,   this   universal   form   cannot   stay   simply  universal.       The   actuality   of   the   concept—its   being,   existence,   and   essence—is   completely   negative,  having  nothing  to  do  with  any  determinate  content,  only  the  form  in  which   content  can  appear.  This  negative  withdrawal  from  content,  this  “pure  knowledge  of   the   essence,”   which   appears   as   its   nonactuality   and   nonactivity,   is,   however,   the   positive   way   in   which   the   concept   “participates”   in   the   world.71  Here,   the   Concept   as   the  logic  of  the  Beautiful  Soul  divides  itself  into  two  perspectives:  on  the  one  hand,   the  pure  stance  of  remaining  universal,  free  from  content,  the  eternal  judge  or  God   that   is   good,   and   on   the   other   hand,   the   finite   stance   of   the   estranged   actor,   the   particular  creature  that  is  evil.72       To   summarize   this   moral-­‐religious   account   of   action   and   reflection   in   turns   of   its                                                                                                                   68PhG   §795:   “…sein   Selbstbewußtsein   gewinnt   die   Form   der   Allgemeinheit,   und   was   ihm   bleibt,   ist  

sein   wahrhafter   Begriff,   oder   der   Begriff,   der   seine   Realisierung   gewonnen;   es   ist   er   in   seiner   Wahrheit,  nämlich  in  der  Einheit  mit  seiner  Entäußerung.”   69  PhG  §795   70  PhG  §796   71  PhG  §796:  “This  taking-­‐the-­‐inward-­‐turn  constitutes  the  opposition  of  the  concept  and  is  thereby  the   appearance  on  the  scene  of  the   non-­‐acting,  non-­‐actual  pure  knowledge  of  the  essence.  However,  its   coming  on  the  scene  within  this  opposition  is  its  participation  in  the  opposition;”   72  PhG   §796:   “The   pure   knowledge   of   essence   has   in   itself   emptied   itself   of   its   simplicity,   for   it   is   estrangement,  that   is,   the   negativity   which   is   the   concept.   Insofar   as   this   estrangement   is   the   coming-­‐ to-­‐be-­‐for-­‐itself,  it  is  what  is  evil;  insofar  as  it  is  the  in-­‐itself,  it  is  what  remains  good.”    

 

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logical   result:     The   purely   self-­‐knowing   Beautiful   Soul   (God)   turns   inward,   takes   only   itself   as   real,   but   since   it   does   this,   it   is   no   longer   simply   itself   in   an   eternal   reflective  static  mode,  but  itself  taking  itself  as  real,  as  doing  something  particular,   as   active   in   the   act   of   taking   itself   to   be   the   only   truth   –   this   is   the   concept   in   action,   as   the   self   thinking   itself   as   a   thinking   self;   on   the   side   of   its   conscious   becoming   (acting),  it  is  evil;  on  the  side  of  its  immediate  being  (judging-­‐thinking),  it  is  good.       This   internal   division   of   the   concept   now   repeats   itself   on   each   side:   the   evil   particularity   of   conceptual   action   divides   into   its   particular   activity   of   remaining   universal   and   its   universal   knowledge   of   itself   as   this   particular,   while   the   good   universality   of   conceptual   action   divides   into   its   universal   activity   of   becoming   particular  and  its  particular  knowledge  of  itself  as  this  universal.  At  this  point,  these   two   “opposed”   sides   “give   up”   [Ablassen]   their   independence,   and   recognize   their   mutual   dependency.   In   other   words,   there   can   be   no   particularity   without   universality,   and   no   universality   without   particularity;   there   can   be   no   thinking   without   action,   and   no   action   without   thinking.   Seeing   “one”   is   always   seeing   two   in   the   shape   of   one.   “Giving   up”   or   letting   go   here   is   both   conceptual,   meaning   to   accommodate   oneself   to   the   immediacy   of   experience,   and   ethical,   meaning   to   forgive  others  who’s  deeds  do  not  fully  realize  the  norms  of  the  community  to  which   they   are   a   part.73  Renouncing   one’s   self-­‐determinacy   means   welcoming   the   project   of   reinterpreting   particular   phenomena   or   finite   deeds   within   universal   concepts   or   norms,   which   themselves   can   also   be   reinterpreted   as   particular   concepts   and   finite   norms.  One  can  call  this,  with  good  reason,  the  structure  of  normativity,  the  logic  of   experience,  or  even  the  work  of  mourning.     Hegel   writes   that   “the   beginning”   was   a   relinquishing   of   determinacy,   but   this   relinquishing   is   now   self-­‐made,   self-­‐conscious,   and   hence,   free,   infinite,   universal.   The  beginning  spoken  of  could  mean  the  beginning  of  the  Phenomenology  as  sense-­‐ certainty,   which   was   the   result   of   a   certain   renouncing   of   conceptuality   for   direct,   immediate   awareness.   We   now   learn   that   this   apparent   immediacy   of   experience   was   not   wrong   per   se,   but   a   result   of   self-­‐consciousness   letting   go   of   its   purely   universal  perspective,  so  as  to  discover  within  this  immediacy  the  structure  of  the   universal.      

In  other  words,  the  immediacy  of  truth  in  the  beginning  was  never  immediate,  but   the  abstraction  or  negativity  of  the  self  that  gave  up  its  claim  to  totality  and  truth,  so   as  to  let  itself  act  and  perceive  the  world  in  all  its  contingency,  finitude,  and  error.   Now,   knowing   this,   we   can   understand   the   truth   of   the   beginning,   making   it   explicit   as   the   negativity   of   the   self   which   determines   the   object   and   the   subject   together,   hence,  overcoming  their  separation.                                                                                                                   73  PhG   §796:   “This   giving   up   [Ablassen]   of   self-­‐sufficiency   is   the   same   act   of   relinquishing   the   one-­‐ sidedness  of  the  concept  [Verzichttun  auf  die  Einseitigkeit  des  Begriffs]  which  in  itself  constituted  the   beginning,  but  it  is  henceforth  its  own  act  of  relinquishing  [aber  es  ist  nunmehr  sein  Verzichttun],  just   as  the  concept  which  it  relinquishes  is  its  own  concept  [so  wie  der  Begriff,  auf  welchen  es  Verzicht   tut,  der  seinige  ist].”    

 

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  But   this   relinquishing,   at   the   point   we   are   at   now,   does   not   occur   immediately.   As   the   dynamic   of   confession,   refusal   and   forgiveness   show,   the   internal   opposition   between   the   doubly   divided   Concept   in   its   universality   and   particularity   must   undergo   a   process   of   mutual   recognition.   Hegel   re-­‐interprets   the   forgiveness/crucifixion   story   one   last   time   in   utter   brevity.   The   acting,   particular   self   “dies   back   from   its   being-­‐for-­‐itself   and   empties   itself   and   confesses.”74  This   death   of   god   or   confession   of   finitude   makes   the   particular   agent   into   a   universal   structure   by   letting   go   of   all   of   its   particular   contents,   and   recognizing   its   acting   form   as   the   true   essence   itself;   this   could   not   have   occurred   without   being   confronted   by   the   judging,   universal   God   or   thinker,   in   whose   universal   judging,   the   activity  of  the  self  is  reflected  and  recognized  as  his  own.  The  judge  “disavows  the   rigidity  [Härte]  of  its  abstract  universality  and  thereby  dies  back  from  its  lifeless  self   and   its   unmoved   universality.” 75  Each   element   is   seen   as   the   means   of   accomplishment  for  the  other:  the  universal  must  take  the  form  of  a  self  to  express   itself,   and   the   particular   must   express   itself   in   universals.   This   comprehended   dynamic   unity   of   universal   knowledge   and   particular   self-­‐activity   provides   the   shape   of   spirit   adequate   to   the   content   of   revealed   religion   we   have   been   seeking.     For  “through  this  movement  of  acting,  spirit  .  .  .  comes  forth  as  the  pure  universality   of   knowledge   which   is   self-­‐consciousness,   as   the   self-­‐consciousness   which   is   the   simple  unity  of  knowing.”76     With   this   final   move,   the   content   of   revealed   religion   as   the   content   of   something   other  than  the  community  of  those  who  are  creating  it,  e.g.,  as  the  representation  of   God,   is   shown   to   be   nothing   other   than   their   own   self-­‐activity.   For   any   set   of   practices  or  concepts  to  ground  the  normative  authority  of  a  reflective  community,   they  must  conform  to  an  account  that  explicitly  recognizes  their  historically  created,   mutually   evaluated,   and   always   revisable   nature.   This   is   what   it   means   to   recognize   substance  as  subject,  and  the  subject  as  substance.77       This   recognition   elevates   consciousness   to   the   last   shape   of   spirit,   absolute   knowledge,   which   provides   the   structure   of   mutual   recognition,   the   conditions   of   practical  agency,  and  the  justification  of  cognitive  authority  all  together  in  unity.    It   does   this   not   through   a   table   of   categories,   a   historical   narrative,   a   poetic   elegy,   or   a   religious   call.   Rather,   on   the   path   to   knowing   what   knowing   is,   we   have   been   forced   to  construct  the  universal  form  by  which  thought  and  action  can  account  for  itself  in   one   framework   of   understanding.   This   is     “is   spirit   knowing   itself   in   the   shape   of                                                                                                                  

74  PhG  §796:  “jenes  stirbt  seinem  Für-­‐sich-­‐sein  ab  und  entäußert,  bekennt  sich.”     75  PhG   §796:   “dieses   entsagt   der   Härte   seiner   abstrakten   Allgemeinheit,   und   stirbt   damit   seinem   unlebendigen  Selbst  und  seiner  unbewegten  Allgemeinheit  ab”     76  PhG  §796:  “Durch  diese  Bewegung  des  Handelns  ist  der  Geist  -­‐  der  so  erst  Geist  ist,  daß  er  da  ist,   sein   Dasein   in   den   Gedanken   und   dadurch   in   die   absolute   Entgegensetzung   erhebt,   und   aus   dieser   eben   durch   sie   und   in   ihr   selbst   zurückkehrt   -­‐   als   reine   Allgemeinheit   des   Wissens,   welches   Selbstbewußtsein  ist,  als  Selbstbewußtsein,  das  einfache  Einheit  des  Wissens  ist,  hervorgetreten.”     77  PhG  §797  

 

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spirit,  that  is,  it  is  comprehending  conceptual  knowledge.”78  This  kind  of  knowledge,   which   is   conceptual   in   the   world,   and   worldly   in   its   concepts,   achieves   what   Kant   argued   was   impossible.   Not   only   does   this   secure   the   transcendental   unity   of   apperception,   but   the   thing-­‐in-­‐itself   is   fully   transparent   as   well;   or   rather,   the   transcendental  unity  of  apperception  is  taken  as  the  structure  of  the  thing-­‐in-­‐itself.   This   “comprehensive   conceptual   knowledge”   accounts   not   only   for   the   world,   but   for  itself  in  the  same  movement,  or,  in  explaining  its  own  possibility,  it  explains  the   structure   of   the   world   as   well.   The   “form   of   objectivity”   [Form   der   Gegenständlichkeit]   having   become   “the   Concept”   means   that   we   are   now   able   to   grasp  the  essential  structural  identity  between  the  syllogistic,  or  what  is  the  same,   forgiving   dynamic   of   the   thinking,   acting   subject   and   the   nature   of   any   object   whatsoever.79  The  infinite  project  of  thinking  the  entire  wealth  of  spirit  within  this   conceptual  form  is  called  Science.     Now  that  Science  itself  has  appeared  within  the  development  of  knowledge  trying  to   account   for   its   own   relation   to   objects,   aren’t   we   done?   On   the   one   hand,   yes,   for   we   have   achieved   the   purpose   set   out   in   the   Introduction   of   developing   an   internally   generated  justification  of  the  standpoint  of  science  without  any  skeptical  rejoinder   possible.  But  on  the  other  hand,  we  are  not  yet  done,  for  this  justified  standpoint  of   science  appears  now  empty,  and  late  on  the  scene.  What,  in  other  words,  makes  up   the  content  and  trajectory  of  Science?       The  perspective  of  Absolute  Knowledge,  or  Science,  is  both  irreducibly  singular,  as   the  standpoint  of  a  free  individual  self-­‐consciousness  actively  thinking  from  within   its   own   unique   experience,   and   fully   universal,   as   mediated   by   universal   concepts   which   transcend   their   individual   source   and   are   free   to   be   shared,   appropriated,   applied,  and  rejected  by  all.80  Understanding  the  singular  freedom  of  the  I  within  the   universal   space   of   the   We   is   the   perspective   of   philosophy.   The   content   of   such   a   perspective  is  the  content  of  consciousness,  that  is,  experience  and  all  its  distinctions,   divisions,   and   relations.   The   I   is   the   movement   of   connecting   concepts   across   different   contents,   it   is   the   form   which   unifies   all   these   together;   hence,   in   knowing,   it  knows  itself  as  knowing.  In  short,  the  I  is  both  the  active  form  of  knowledge,  as  the   syllogistic,   structure   of   self-­‐mediation,   and   the   content   of   knowledge,   as   the   movement  of  experience.81         But  the  movement  of  experience  is  what  the  phenomenology  of  spirit  just  traversed,   so   how   is   science   any   different   from   phenomenology?   Both   are   investigations   into                                                                                                                  

78  PhG  §798  “es  ist  der  sich  in  Geistsgestalt  wissende  Geist  oder  das  begreifende  Wissen.”     79  PhG   §798:   “As   a   result,   what   has   come   to   be   the   element   of   existence,   that   is,   the   form  of  objectivity,   is  for  consciousness  what  the  essence  itself  is,  namely,  the  concept.”     80  PhG  §799:  “es  ist  Ich,  das  dieses  und  kein  anderes  Ich  und  das  ebenso  unmittelbar  vermittelt  oder   aufgehobenes  allgemeines  Ich  ist.”     81  PhG  §799:  “It  has  a  content   that  it  distinguishes   from  itself,  for  it  is  pure  negativity,  that  is,  it  is  the   act  of  self-­‐estrangement;  it  is  consciousness.  Within  its  distinctions,  this  content  is  itself  the  I,  for  it  is   the   movement   of   itself   sublating   itself,   that   is,   it   is   the   same   pure   negativity   which   is   the   I   [die   Bewegung  des  Sich-­‐selbst-­‐aufhebens,  oder  dieselbe  reine  Negativität,  die  Ich  ist].”  

 

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objectivity,   sociality,   nature,   consciousness,   reason,   agency,   history,   morality,   and   freedom,   but   the   difference   is   the   way   in   which   such   ideas   are   comprehended.   No   longer   are   these   separate,   independent   forms   that   confront   the   thinking,   acting   subject   as   objects   to   be   incorporated   or   rejected.   Rather,   the   content   of   science   is   spirit’s   own   self-­‐knowledge   being   made   explicit   in   the   shape   of   knowledge— concepts—known  as  historically  produced  by  people,  yet  completely  universal  and   accurate,   according   to   the   criteria   we   have   given   ourselves   to   judge   their   validity.   When  nothing  is  taken  as  a  given  anymore,  then    “within  its  otherness,  the  I  is  at  one   with   itself   [daß   Ich   in   seinem   Anderssein   bei   sich   selbst   ist],”   and   is   ready   to   comprehend  its  experience  anew.82       The  concept  of  science  is  possible  when  the  difference  between  consciousness  and   self-­‐consciousness  is  overcome,  when  the  objects  of  consciousness  are  taken  as  the   concepts  of  self-­‐consciousness.  But  this  general  comprehending  of  objectivity  does   not   become   Absolute   Knowledge   until   it   is   able   to   give   an   account   of   its   own   development,   its   own   basis   in   the   historically   generated   institutions   of   mutual   recognition   across   time.   Hence,   the   temporal   development   of   spirit   on   its   path   to   knowing  itself  is  also  an  object  of  consciousness  that  must  be  made  into  a  concept  of   self-­‐consciousness.83     Historically,  then,  the  representation  of  the  absolute  in  religion  occurs  much  earlier   than   the   form   of   the   concept   in   science.   Both   have,   on   a   certain   general   level,   the   same   content:   the   absolute   ground   of   truth   and   value,   substance.   Both   are   social   practices   in   which   communities   perform   the   justification   of   truth,   subject.   For   science,  however,  the  form  in  which  substance  is  grasped  is  explicitly  the  structure   of   the   subject—the   thinking,   acting   self,   the   dynamic   of   mutual   justification,   universalizing   particular   experiences   and   particularizing   universal   concepts.   For   religion,   substance   takes   the   form   of   a   representation—simple,   immediate,   whole.   Religion   is   not   wrong   here,   for   the   explicit   understanding   of   subjectivity   as   this   movement  of  conceptualization  has  not  yet  developed  in  time,  and  hence  cannot  be   taken   as   the   form   of   substance.   While   cognition   had   not   yet   achieved   the   self-­‐ awareness   of   its   own   conditions,   religious   revelation   had   developed   very   sophisticated  allegories  that  better  expressed  the  nature  of  objectivity,  the  grounds   of   truth,   and   the   legitimacy   of   moral   conduct. 84  The   revelations   of   religion,   nonetheless,   conceal   the   truth   of   substance,   for   it   depicts   the   absolute   not   as   the   self-­‐generated   social   practices   of   mutual   recognition,   but   as   a   “selfless   being”   [selbstlose   Sein].   The   revelations   of   religion   reveal   nothing   about   the   content   of   substance,  beyond  the  certainty  [Gewißheit]  that  we  can  know  it.85                                                                                                                   82  PhG  §799   83  PhG  §800   84  PhG   §801   “Because   it   is   spiritual   consciousness,   cognition   is   that   to   which   what   exists   in  itself  is   only  insofar  as  it  is  a  being  for  the  self  and  a  being  of  the  self,  that  is,  a  concept.  It  is  for  this  reason  that   cognition   initially   has   only   a   meager   object   in   contrast   to   which   the   substance   and   the   consciousness   of  this  substance  are  richer.”     85  PhG   §801:   “Die   Offenbarkeit,   die   sie   in   diesem   hat,   ist   in   der   Tat   Verborgenheit,   denn   sie   ist   das   noch  selbstlose  Sein,  und  offenbar  ist  sich  nur  die  Gewißheit  seiner  selbst.”  

 

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  As   cognitive,   self-­‐reflection   emerges   in   history,   its   first   contents   are   isolated,   abstract   thoughts,   separated   from   any   comprehensive   theory   of   objectivity   and   itself.  But  since  such  reflection  is  “free”  to  move  and  grasp  what  it  may,  it  is  not  long   before  it  goes  after  the  concealed  truths  of  religious  representation,  subjecting  them   to   conceptual   examination. 86  This   negative   posture   toward   what   is   given,   as   objectivity   or   substance,   is   also   a   positive   refashioning   by   self-­‐conscious   individuals   of   what   it   means   for   something   to   be   objective,   to   be   valuable   or   true.   Hence,   the   production   of   truth   by   the   critical   movement   of   cognition   slowly   builds   a   new   framework   for   the   understanding   of   objects,   relations   and   values,   which   incorporates   its   own   social,   historical   self-­‐activity   into   the   framework   explicitly.   If   we  call  this  fully  transparent  and  self-­‐aware  framework,  “the  concept,”  or  “absolute   knowledge,”   then   its   genesis   in   time   occurs   by   means   of   a   piecemeal   approach   of   investigation,   judgment,   inference,   even   though   the   framework   itself   is   not   piecemeal   at   all.87  To   non-­‐conceptual   consciousness,   this   picture   of   the   world   is   given   as   a   whole   at   once,   with   later   modifications   coming   as   time   goes   by.   This   movement   of   self-­‐discovery   of   spirit’s   own   conceptuality   within   the   realm   of   simple   consciousness  constitutes  Time.       Breaking   the   rhythm   of   the   text,   Hegel   writes   here:   “—Time  is   the   concept  itself   that   exists  there  and  is  represented  to  consciousness  as  empty  intuition.”88       To   unreflective   consciousness,   time   just   exists,   it   “is   there,”   as   an   empty   container   we  fill  with  our  experience.  But  time  is  the  concept  itself.  What  can  this  mean?  Here,   Hegel   is   contrasting   two   theories   of   time,   one   is   time   conceived   conceptually,   as   the   historical,   directional   movement   of   self-­‐discovery   of   spirit’s   own   conditions   of   existence,   and   one   is   time   depicted   non-­‐conceptually,   from   religious   ideas   of   the   present   time   as   nothing   but   the   waiting   for   a   future   redemption   to   Kant’s   idea   of   temporality   as   an   “empty   intuition”   filled   with   contents   of   experience.   To   Hegel,   these  latter  views  of  time  arise  when  spirit  does  not  yet  understand  itself,  and  hence   it   takes   itself   to   be   another   object   “in”   time   like   anything   else.   For   spirit   to   truly   grasp  [erfaßt]  time,  it  must  annul  [tilgt]  it.89       As  Malabou  and  Kojeve  see  it,  this  is  not  time  as  such,  but  a  particular  understanding   of  time,  an  understanding  which  takes  the  past  as  given,  the  present  as  empty,  and   the   future   as   out   of   our   hands.   To   annul   this   understanding   of   time   means   to                                                                                                                   86  PhG   §801:   “Hence,   initially   it   is   merely   the   abstract   moments   which   belong   to   substance’s   self-­‐ consciousness.   However,   since   as   pure   activities   these   moments   impel   themselves   forward,   self-­‐ consciousness   enriches   itself   until   it   has   wrested   the   entire   substance   from   consciousness   and   has   absorbed  into  itself  the  entire  structure  of  the  substance’s  essentialities.”   87  PhG   §801:   “In   the   concept   which   knows   itself   as   the   concept,   the   moments   thereby   come   on   the   scene  prior  to  the  fulfilled  whole,  whose  coming-­‐to-­‐be  is  the  movement  of  those  moments.”   88  PhG   §801:   “Die   Zeit  ist   der   Begriff  selbst,   der   da  ist  und   als   leere   Anschauung   sich   dem   Bewußtsein   vorstellt”   89  PhG   §801:   “deswegen   erscheint   der   Geist   notwendig   in   der   Zeit,   und   er   erscheint   so   lange   in   der   Zeit,  als  er  nicht  seinen  reinen  Begriff  erfaßt,  das  heißt,  nicht  die  Zeit  tilgt.”  

 

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reconceive   its   form   of   objectivity,   to   give   it   the   same   conceptual   shape   which   self-­‐ conscious  spirit  gave  to  the  rest  of  its  contents,  the  shape  of  the  self.  Time  is  different   than  most  other  objects,  though,  for  it  is  already  somewhat  conceptual  in  its  content.   As  an  immaterial  force,  time  requires  a  reflective  understanding  to  explain  it.  Hence,   time  already  appears  as  a  self,  but  externally   intuited  [äußere   angeschaute].  That  is,   time   does   not   appear   as   the   determinate   movement   of   people   coming-­‐to-­‐awareness   of   their   own   freedom   to   think,   act,   and   rethink   themselves   according   to   their   concepts,   but   rather   it   appears   in   the   image   of   an   other   self   that   does   this,   a   God   perhaps.     But,   when   this   concept   of   time   is   grasped   as  a  concept,   or   better,   as   the   structure  of  conceptuality  itself,  then  it’s  intuitive  form  as  the  empty  space  for  linear   chronology  is  overcome.  As  Hegel  writes  in  one  of  his  more  speculative  sentences  of   the  book:   Since   this   concept   grasps   itself,   it   sublates   its   temporal   form,   comprehends   the  act  of  intuiting,  and  is  intuition  which  has  been  conceptually  grasped  and   is  itself  intuition  which  is  comprehending.90    

One   way   to   understand   this   aufheben   of   temporal   form   is   to   see   it   as   an   overcoming   of   the   revealed   Religion’s   “waiting”   for   the   absolute.   By   opening   time   to   the   conceptual   grasp   of   spirit,   the   rigidity   of   time   is   loosened.     The   structure   of   forgiveness   elucidates   this   well.   Forgiveness   is   an   inter-­‐subjective   activity   in   the   present   which   releases   the   deeds   of   the   past   into   a   new   interpretation   so   as   to   change   the  conduct   of   the  future.  Forgiveness,  which  we  could  just  as  easily  replace   with   conceptualizing,   or   syllogizing,   reconceives   the   initial   intuitive   act,   and   in   so   doing,   is   a   new   form   of   intuition,   a   conceptually   mediated   intuition.   This     “comprehended  and  comprehending  intuiting,”  in  other  words,  does  not  even  let  the   past   stay   past.   If   the   framework   of   conceptuality   or   forgiveness   has   such   absolute   power  over  time,  that  is  because  it  is,  in  some  sense,  beyond  time.  Concepts  are  not   atemporal   or   ahistorical,   but   both   temporal   and   atemporal,   both   historical   and   transhistorical.  It  is  precisely  the  temporality  of  concepts  and  deeds  that  allow  them   to   be   reconceived   and   reevaluated   in   new   times,   with   new   contexts.   Specific   concepts   change,   but   the   form   of   the   concept   does   not.   For   even   if   the   form   of   the   concept  does  shift,  it  can’t  help  but  shift  more  of  less  conceptually.  In  another  sense,   practical   norms   change,   but   the   structure   of   normativity   does   not.   Rather,   it   becomes  more  or  less  coherent,  explicit,  understood.       To   the   un-­‐fulfilled   spiritual   community,   time   appears   as   fate   and   destiny;   but   this   is   nothing   other   than   the   religious   representation   of   logical  necessity.   There   is   nothing   destined  about  the  development  of  spirit,  but,  for  spirit  to  become  self-­‐aware,  there   are   conditions   which   must   be   realized.   From   this   perspective,   the   perspective   of   the   self-­‐conscious   development   of   rationality,   the   movement   of   spirit   appears   as                                                                                                                   90  PhG   §801.   As   A.V.   Miller   pithily   translates:   “When   this   latter   grasps   itself   it   sets   aside   its   Time-­‐ form,  comprehends  this  intuiting,  and  is  a  comprehended  and  comprehending  intuiting.”  The  German   reads   as:   “indem   dieser   sich   selbst   erfaßt,   hebt   er   seine   Zeitform   auf,   begreift   das   Anschauen,   und   ist   begriffnes  und  begreifendes  Anschauen”    

 

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necessary.91    This  movement  of  necessity  takes  two  forms  at  two  different  moments.   In  ancient  or  religious  contexts,  when  selfless  substance  is  taken  as  the  immediate   ground  of  spirit,  then  logical  necessity  appears  as  the  necessity  of  time  required  in   order  for  self-­‐consciousness  to  develop  the  space  of  conceptuality  from  within  this   immediately  given  whole.  In  the  context  of  modernity,  when  substance  is  emptied  of   its  given  contents,  and  the  ground  of  spirit  is  taken  as  pure  inward  subjectivity,  then   logical  necessity  appears  as  the  necessity  of  time  required  to  make  explicit  the  self-­‐ generated  norms  already  implicit  in  the  actions  and  relations  of  spirit.92       Because   of   this   necessity   for   spirit   to   find   its   own   normative   and   conceptual   basis   within   itself,   through   its   historical  development,   using   only   its   own   resources,   it   can   be   said   along   with   Kant,   but   stronger   now   and   for   different   reasons,   that   “nothing   is   known  that  is  not  in  experience  [Erfahrung].”93  The  religious  or  non-­‐conceptual  way   of   saying   this   is   that   the   true,   the   eternal   or   the   holy   must   be   felt,   inwardly  revealed,   or  believed  to  be  known  at  all.  Hegel  is  here  explicitly  equating  movement  of  spirit— experience—with  the  object  of  religious  consciousness.  As  opposed  to  Kant,  religion   doesn’t   come   from   the   limits   of   reason   but   from   squarely   within   it.     But   what   is   experience?  Or,  as  Pippin  would  say,  what  is  the  logic  of  experience?     Hegel  describes  this  logic  in  two  ways,  one  from  the  perspective  of  the  self  actively   experiencing,   and   once   from   the   perspective   of   what   is   experienced.   Spirit,   as   the   collective   name   for   anything   that  has  experience,  that,  as  Brandom  would  say,  “has  a   history,   and   not   a   nature,”   relates   itself   to   objects,   other   subjects,   values,   relations   and  structures  that  appear  to  be  given.  We  phenomenologists  now  know,  from  the   standpoint  of  Absolute  Knowledge,  that  all  these  contents  are  really  the  production   of   spirit   throughout   history,   reconfigured,   reconceived,   and   reevaluated   according   to  the  normative  demands  for  justification  which  a  reflective  community  gives  itself.   But   experience   is   just   this   process   of   making   this   knowledge   explicit.   For   Hegel,   this   process  is  the  logic  of  experience  for  an  individual,  for  a  collective,  for  the  readers  of   the   phenomenology,   and   for   the   development   of   history   itself.   What   starts   as   an   object   for   consciousness,   as   did   ‘the   absolute’   for   us   in   the   beginning   of   the   Phenomenology,  becomes  the  subject  of  self-­‐consciousness,  as  it  does  for  us  now.    This   reflective   movement   of   drawing   out   new   consequences   and   duties   both   conceptually  and  practically  from  the  norms  that  appear  to  govern  one’s  relations  to   others,  to  objects,  and  to  oneself,  constitutes  cognition,  and  the  task  of  justifying  this   practice   has   been   the   work   of   the   Phenomenology.   Summarizing   this   movement   of   experience  in  a  way  that  exactly  describes  the  development  of  the  Phenomenology,   Hegel  writes:   Spirit   is   in   itself   the   movement   which   is   cognition   –   the   transformation   of  

                                                                                                                91  PhG  §801:  “Time  thus  appears  as  the  destiny  and  necessity  of  the  spirit  that  is  not  yet  consummated   within  itself.”     92  PhG   §801:   “It   appears   as   the   necessity   to   enrich   the   participation   self-­‐consciousness   has   in   consciousness  and  to  set  into  motion  the  immediacy  of  the  in-­‐itself  –  the  form  in  which  the  substance   exists   within   consciousness   –   or,   conversely,   if   the   in-­‐   itself   is   taken   as   inwardness,  it   is   to   realize   and   to  reveal  what  is  at  first  inward,  that  is,  to  vindicate  it  for  spirit’s  certainty  of  itself.”   93  PhG  §802:  “daß  nichts  gewußt  wird  was  nicht  in  der  Erfahrung  ist”    

 

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that   former   in-­‐itself  into   for-­‐itself,  of   substance  into   subject,  of   the   object   of   consciousness  into   the   object   of   self-­‐consciousness,  i.e.,   into   an   object   that   is   just   as   much   sublated,   that   is,   into   the   concept.   This   transformation   is   the   circle   returning   back   into   itself,   which   presupposes   its   beginning   and   reaches  it’s  beginning  only  at  the  end.94  

  In  short,  spirit  is  the  movement  that  takes  given  objects  and  makes  them  into  free   concepts   by   means   of   acting   subjects,   concepts   which   themselves   express   this   dynamic  self-­‐reflective  movement.       This  explication  of  spirit’s  relation  to  substance  through  experience  was  intended  to   explain  the  relation  between  spirit  and  time,  and  it  is  only  now  that  Hegel  clarifies   this.   The   argument   goes   as   such:   the   “intuited   whole”   of   substance,   the   normative   order  of  the  world  that  appears  divine  and  natural,  is  confronted  by  the  emergence   of   a   self-­‐conscious   individuality   that   is   beginning   to   reflect   on   the   grounds   of   such   a   picture.   The   way   in   which   such   reflective   self-­‐consciousness   does   this   is   by   distinguishing,   differentiating,   or   discerning   elements   that   were   previously   seen   as   harmoniously  unified.  Here  is  where  it  gets  complicated.  This  critical  movement  of   distinguishing,  also  called  the  activity  of  spirit,  distinguishes  this  form  of  wholeness   itself  from  the  varied  contents  which  the  whole  unifies.  The  form  of  wholeness,  or   substance,  separate  from  all  its  contents,  is  nothing  but  the  empty  intuited  concept   of  time.95     To  “simple  self-­‐consciousness”,  in  other  words,  the  whole  of  reality  is  split  up  into   time,   and   within   the   movement   of   time   comes   the   contents   of   existence   which   spirit   learns   to   distinguish,   review,   and   eventually   re-­‐incorporate   into   its   self-­‐definition.   But  this  is  still  a  non-­‐spiritual,  external  way  of  “seeing  the  whole.”  What  Hegel  seems   to   be   saying   is   that   as   long   as   Spirit   has   not   fully   conceptualized   what   was   previously   taken   as   external   objectivity,   then   it   must   presuppose   the   idea   of   an   empty   time   through   which   it   can   fulfill   this   goal.   This   process   of   spirit   coming   to   realize  that  it  is  the  very  content  of  substance  is  taken  to  be  a  temporal  process  as   opposed   to   a   logical   process,   and   it   will   have   to   be   understood   this   way,   until   it’s   “objective  exhibition”  is  “consummated.”96  The  movement  from  selfless  substance  to   self-­‐conscious   subject   is   not   determined   by   the   movement   of   time,   but   on   the   contrary,   the   movement   of   time   is   determined   by   it.   This   knowledge   of   the   constitution  of  time  by  spirit  itself  cannot  be  practically  achieved  and  spirit  cannot   become   truly   self-­‐conscious   until   it   has   conquered   the   world   as   world-­‐spirit.     This                                                                                                                   94  PhG  §802:  “Er  ist  an  sich  die  Bewegung,  die  das  Erkennen  ist,  -­‐  die  Verwandlung  jenes  An-­‐sichs   in   das   Für-­‐   sich,   der   Substanz   in   das   Subjekt,   des   Gegenstands   des   Bewußtseins   in   Gegenstand   des   Selbstbewußtseins,  d.h.  in  ebensosehr  aufgehobnen  Gegenstand,  oder  in  den  Begriff.”     95  PhG   §802:   “Insofar   as   spirit   therefore   is   within   itself   necessarily   this   act   of   distinguishing,   its   intuited   whole   faces   up   against   its   simple   self-­‐consciousness,   and   since   that   whole   is   what   is   distinguished,  it  is  thus  distinguished  into  its  intuited  pure  concept,  into  time,  and  into  the  content,   that  is,  into  the  in-­‐itself.”   96  PhG   §802:   “Substance,   as   subject,   has   in   it   the  initial  inward  necessity   of   exhibiting   itself   in   itself   as   what   it   is   in   itself   as   spirit.   The   consummated   objective   exhibition   is   at   the   same   time   merely   the   reflection  of  substance,  that  is,  substance  becoming  the  self.”  

 

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means   spiritualizing   the   world,   making   explicit   its   self-­‐determined   rationality   and   reciprocally   recognized   normativity.   In   other   words,   this   is   science,   the   kind   of   cognition  which  no  longer  needs  the  motivational  force  of  time  to  drive  it  onwards   to  completion,  but  only  the  self-­‐determination  to  endlessly  explain  itself.97       Hegel   claims   that   the   work   of   the   actual   history   of   spirit   has   been   to   bring   forth   this   self-­‐knowledge   of   science.   This   “actual   history,”   which   Hegel   now   reviews   in   utter   brevity   as   though   sub   specie   aeternitatis,   turns   out   to   be   more   of   an   intellectual   history,   a   recollection   of   key   moments   in   the   development   of   thought   from   actual   shapes   of   spirit.     Nonetheless,   it   depicts   the   transition   from   medieval   Christianity   to   modernity   as   one   gigantic   philosophical   struggle   to   wrest   truth   for   the   crown   of   subjectivity  from  the  shackles  of  substance.98       The   first   setting   is   the   “religious   community,”   which   is   the   first   appearance   of   “absolute   spirit”   in   the   world   according   to   Hegel.   This   is   because   religious   communities   institutionalize   a   framework   for   legitimatizing   norms,   deeds   and   concepts   through   practices   of   mutual   recognition,   including   confession   and   forgiveness;  this  framework  justifies  a  form  of  life  wholly  internal  to  the  community,   making  it  absolute.  But  since  this  community  takes  its  own  activities  to  be  not  about   itself,   but   a   wholly   Other,   it’s   actual   existence   is   brutal,   violent,   and   unreflective.   Waiting   for   redemption   in   another   world   means   disregarding   the   essence   of   this   one,  and  hence  it  is  not  until  consciousness  overcomes  this  dependency,  and  takes   its   actual   social   relations   in   the   present   to   be   the   space   for   forgiveness   and   reconciliation   that   it   will   step   out   of   the   dark   ages   into   the   light,   or   out   of   the   theological  heavens  and  down  to  earth.99       We   emerge   from   this   religious   cave   into   early   modern   Baconian   science   and   philosophy,   where   the   standpoint   of   observing   reason   provides   the   light   out.   The   main   activities   of   self-­‐consciousness   in   this   mode   are   to   conceptualize   objectivity,   and  vice  versa,  to  objectify  conceptuality.    Having  grasped  a  certain  identity  between   the   structure   of   thinking   and   the   structure   of   being,   albeit   a   not   too   complex   one,   consciousness   then   takes   Spinoza’s   monism   of   being   and   extension   as   the   main   model  for  grasping  itself.    This  approach  is,  according  to  Hegel,  only  a  contemporary   form   of   the   eastern   philosophies   of   substance,   which   identified   the   luminous   essence   of   the   world   with   thought;   the   only   difference   is   that   this   modern   form   replaces   light   with   extension,   something   more   abstract   and   hence   purer   than   light   anyways.   Since   this   philosophy   removes   all   the   negativity,   individuality,   and   difference  from  its  picture  of  spirit,  since  it  removes  subjectivity   from  the  picture,  a   new  model  is  bound  to  emerge  which  affirms  the  utter  supremacy  of  the  individual   against   this   totalizing   substantiality.   Leibniz’s   embrace   of   the   individual   monad                                                                                                                   97  PhG  §802:  “Hence,  as  long  as  spirit  has  not  in  itself  brought  itself  to  consummation  as  the  world-­‐ spirit,   it   cannot   attain   its   consummation   as   self-­‐conscious   spirit.   For   that   reason,   the   content   of   religion   expresses   what   spirit   is   earlier   in   time   than   science   does,   but   it   is   science   alone   which   is   spirit’s  true  knowledge  of  itself.”   98  PhG  §803   99  PhG  §803  

 

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above  all  accomplishes  this,  and  in  so  doing,  forms  a  contemporary  equivalent  to  the   Greek  discovery  of  the  individual  with  Socrates  and  Antigone.100       What   Hegel   is   doing   here,   what   we  are   doing   here,   is   going   through   the   history   of   early  modern  philosophy  as  a  renewed  repetition  of  the  dialectic  between  substance   and   subject   from   oriental   religion   and   Greek   society,   but   this   time   in  thought;   this   is   historical   recollection   as   conceptual   appropriation.   Yet   Hegel   does   not   take   this   development  to  be  just  the  march  of  correct  ideas.  Rather,  the  philosophical  truth  of   individuality   re-­‐discovered   in   early   modern   philosophy   could   not   effectively   take   hold   until   individualism   as   a   form   of   life   had   been   affirmed   through   the   cultural   practices   of   a   given   historical   community.   Individuality   practically   arises   in   the   midst  of  a  spiritual  community  only  by  culturally  “emptying”  or  questioning  all  the   given  social  norms  of  their  authority;  historically,  in  the  development  of  modernity   from   the   17th   to   the   19th   century,   these   natural   norms   were   humanistically   replaced   with   the   self-­‐determined   and   earthly   values   of   utility,   absolute   freedom,   and   the   universal  will.  At  that  point,  when  the  value  of  the  world  is  seen  as  nothing  but  what   the   self   makes   of   it,   then   truth   of   subjectivity   can   finally   be   proclaimed   as   the   absolute,  transparent  ground  of  existence.101       Having  reviewed  these  key  moments  in  history  and  philosophy  which  also  formed   the   key   moments   in   the   sections   on   individuality   in   the   Reason   chapter   and   the   sections   on   Culture   and   Morality   in   the   Spirit   one,   Hegel   ends   up   at   his   most   immediate   predecessors:   Kant,   Schelling   and   Fichte.     The   transcendental   unity   of   apperception,   the   synthesizing   I   which   unifies   the   manifold   of   experience   into   its   own  conceptual  structure,  is  the  new  ground  of  spirit.  The  formula  I=I  stands  for  this   perspective,   a   formula   which   subsumes   the   infinite   differences   of   the   empirical   world   into   the   absolute   identity   of   the   transcendental   ego.   Although   close   to   the   perspective  of  Absolute  Knowledge  we  are  seeking,  it  nonetheless  strays  too  far  into   subjectivism,  and  loses  touch  with  the  world  it  seeks  to  explain.  For  spirit  is  not  only   determined   by   the   formal   self-­‐activity   of   the   subject,   but   by   the   wealth   of   content   which  this  subject  supposedly  unifies  as  well.       To   show   this,   Hegel   focuses   on   Kant’s   analysis   of   time   as   the   inner   sense   of   subjectivity.  The  problem  is  thus:  how  to  unify  the  diversity  of  experience  into  one   subject?   The   solution   is   to   say   that   experiences   can   only   be   experiences   if   I   take                                                                                                                   100  PhG  §803:  “When  it  has  itself  initially  and  abstractly  expressed  the  immediate  unity  of  thought  and  

being,  of  abstract  essence  and  the  self,  and  when  it  has  expressed  the  luminous  essence  more   purely,   namely,   as   the   unity   of   extension   and   being   –   since   extension   is   a   simplicity   more   in   parity   with   pure   thought   than   light   is   –   and   thereby   has   once   again   revived   in   thought   the   substance  of   the   easterly   dawn,  then,  at  the  same  time,  spirit  recoils  from  this  abstract  unity,  from  this  self-­‐less   substantiality,   and  affirms  individuality  against  it.”     101  PhG  §803:  “However,  only  after  spirit  in  its  cultural  maturation  has  emptied  itself  of  this  self-­‐less   substantiality  and  as  a  result  has  made  it  into  existence  and  infused  all  existence  with  it  –  and  after  it   has  arrived  at  the  thought  of  utility,  and  in  absolute  freedom,  it  has  grasped  existence  as  its  will,  does   spirit   at   that   point   thereby   put   on   view   the   thought   which   lies   in   its   innermost   depths,   and   at   that   point  it  articulates  the  essence  as  the  “I  =  I.”  

 

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them   as   my   own;   but   each   act   of   appropriating   would   then   produce   a   different   subject,   for   its   contents   would   be   new.   Hence,   time,   or   temporal   succession,   is   understood   as   the   form   in   which   the   diversity   of   objective   experience,   the   “pure   distinction”   according   to   Hegel,   is   brought   under   the   same   subject.   It   is   not   important  what  is  unified,  only  that  it’s  unified,  and  providing  a  temporal  form  for   all  objectivity  is  the  way  in  which  a  subject  can  do  that.102       The  problem  with  this,  according  to  Hegel,  is  that  it  doesn’t  understand  the  mutual   constitution   of   subjectivity   and   objectivity,   of   substance   and   subject.   For   it   fails   to   realize   that   the   objects   which   the   subject   subsumes   into   its   structure   of   time   are   already  sets  of  relations,  dynamic  concepts  or  norms  with  their  own  form  of  unity.   The  “content”  in  other  words,  is  already  temporally  and  dynamically  constituted,  for   it  also  has  the  conceptual  form  of  a  self.  Time  seen  as  “unresting  and  unhalting,”  is   still   the   unspiritual,   un-­‐self-­‐conscious   concept   of   time;   the   higher   idea   of   time   was   previously   shown   through   the   structure   of   forgiveness,   which   is   able   to   stop   time,   reconceive   the   past   and   change   the   future.   For   every   element   is   already   conceptualized,   temporalized,   or   subjectivized,   since   this   is   the   structure   of   substance  as  well  as  subject.103       If  we  take  substance  or  objectivity  as  already  the  absolute  in  this  sense,  it  still  does   not   achieve   our   goal,   although   it   pushes   it   farther.   This   idea,   perhaps   referring   to   Schelling,   of   the   “absolute   unity”   of  substance  which  can  only  be   intuited,   removes   the  diversity  from  objectivity,  placing  it  squarely  in  the  phenomenological  realm  of   the  reflecting  subject.  But  if  this  is  so,  then  substance  can  no  longer  be  the  ground  of   spirit,   for   spirit   is   this   differentiating,   reflecting,   conceptualizing   activity.   To   get   to   this  absolute  unity,  the   different   contents   of   experience   are  simply  dismissed,  being   nothing  more  than  perceptible,  secondary  qualities  of  substance.       This   movement   through   German   Idealism   raises   thought   to   its   peak   in   trying   to   grasp   the   unity   of   subject   and   substance,   albeit   in   a   still   too   immediate   way,   for   it   fails  to  maintain  the  differences  in  each,  collapsing  the  identity  of  the  two  into  one   side   or   the   other.   It   has   been   Hegel’s   project   through   the   Phenomenology  to   bring   us   to   this   point,   and   to   understand   the   movement   which   brought   us   here.   For   having   been   through   the   self-­‐education   of   consciousness   already,   up   to   the   forgiving   conscience   and   the   revealed   religion,   we   already   have   come   to   understand   the   form                                                                                                                   102  This  is  my  attempt  to  explain  this  incredibly  hard  sentence  of  PhG  §803:  “Dies  Ich  =  Ich  ist  aber  die  

sich   in   sich   selbst   reflektierende   Bewegung;   denn   indem   diese   Gleichheit   als   absolute   Negativität   der   absolute   Unterschied   ist,   so   steht   die   Sichselbstgleichheit   des   Ich   diesem   reinen   Unterschiede   gegenüber,   der   als   der   reine   und   zugleich   dem   sich   wissenden   Selbst   gegenständliche,   als   die   Zeit   auszusprechen   ist,   so   daß   wie   vorhin   das   Wesen   als   Einheit   des   Denkens   und   der   Ausdehnung   ausgesprochen  wurde,  es  als  Einheit  des  Denkens  und  der  Zeit  zu  fassen  wäre;”     103  And  again  PhG   §803:  “aber  der  sich  selbst  überlaßne  Unterschied,  die  ruhe-­‐  und  haltlose  Zeit  fällt   vielmehr   in   sich   selbst   zusammen;   sie   ist   die   gegenständliche   Ruhe   der   Ausdehnung,   diese   aber   ist   die   reine   Gleichheit   mit   sich   selbst,   das   Ich.   -­‐   Oder   Ich   ist   nicht   nur   das   Selbst,   sondern   es   ist   die   Gleichheit   des   Selbsts   mit   sich;   diese   Gleichheit   aber   ist   die   vollkommne   und   unmittelbare   Einheit   mit  sich  selbst,  oder  dies  Subjekt  ist  ebensosehr  die  Substanz.”    

 

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and  content  of  subject  and  object  in  their  mutual  relation,  and  we  have  grasped  the   dynamic  unity  of  the  two  as  the  true  ground  of  self-­‐conscious  spirit.         As   opposed   to   Fichte,   spirit   is   not   some   self-­‐conscious   pure   subjectivity,   and   as   opposed  to  Schelling,  spirit  is  not  a  subjectless  pure  substantiality.104  Rather,  spirit   is   the   movement   of   a   subject   emerging   out   of   substance,   and   reconceiving   its   own   substantiality   through   a   never-­‐ending   process   of   action   and   reflection.   In   non-­‐ Hegelian  terms,  self-­‐reflective  individuality  emerges  out  of  a  social  situation  of  being   embedded  within  practices  that  objectify  customs  and  norms  as  naturally  given;  as   these   customs   and   norms   fail   to   account   for   the   very   practices   which   people   perform,  subjects  begin  to  take  their  own  socially  instituted  normative  order  as  an   object   of   reflection,   changing   it   piece   by   piece,   emptying   all   its   element   of   any   ‘”natural”  authority,  and  reshaping  themselves  along  the  way  as  free,  cultured,  self-­‐ determining   subjectivities;   through   this,   such   subjects   construct   new   moral   institutions,   political   mechanisms,   and   historical   narratives   of   themselves   which   include   this   very   practice   of   self-­‐refashioning   into   it   as   an   essential   element;   the   result  is  a  normative  order  whose  authority  is  both  self-­‐made  and  really  objective,     and  which  is  known  to  be  both  at  once.105     Hegel   remarks   that   the   first   movement   out   of   “immediacy”—whether   for   us   individually,   for   modern   society   historically,   or   for   the   readers   of   the   Phenomenology—is   the   subject   distinguishing   itself   from   substance.   This   means   thinking,   the   act   of   separating   oneself   from   one’s   immediate   surroundings   and   reflecting   on   their   relation   to   each   other.   The   form   of   this   is   conceptuality,   the   universal   midwife   of   the   I,   which   holds   differences   in   unity,   separating   and   combining   them   according   to   the   free,   spontaneous   movement   of   the   thinker,   yet   within  the  constraints  of  logical  rules.106         The   individual   self-­‐consciousness   does   not   need   to   remain   trapped   within   its   own   thoughts  or  give  itself  fully  over  to  the  objects  which  it  is  thinking;  rather,  the  “force   of   spirit”   consists   in   being   at   home   in   another,   that   is,   being   able   to   think   something   across  numerous  domains  without  changing  its  overall  direction,  just  as  the  moral   self-­‐consciousness   is   able   to   act   across   numerous   situations,   without   changing   its   self-­‐identity.   The   I   is   not   the   beautiful   soul,   separate   from   world   and   its   culture,   fearful   of   alienating   itself   into   the   world;   universal   spirit   rather   exists   in   its                                                                                                                   104  PhG  

§804   “However,   spirit   has   shown   itself   to   us   to   be   neither   the   mere   withdrawal   of   self-­‐   consciousness  into  its  pure  inwardness,  nor  the  mere  absorption  of  self-­‐consciousness  into  substance   and  the  non-­‐being  of  its  distinction.”     105  PhG  §804:  “this  movement  of  the  self  [sondern  diese  Bewegung  des  Selbsts]  which  empties  itself  of   itself  [das  sich  seiner  selbst  entäußert]  and  immerses  itself  in  its  substance  [und  sich  in  seine  Substanz   versenkt],  and  which  likewise,  as  subject,  has  both  taken  the  inward  turn  into  itself  from  out  of  that   substance   [und   ebenso   als   Subjekt   aus   ihr   in   sich   gegangen   ist]   and   has   made   its   substance   into   an   object   and   a   content   [und   sie   zum   Gegenstande   und   Inhalte   macht],   just   as   it   has   sublated   this   distinction  between  objectivity  and  content  [als  es  diesen  Unterschied  der  Gegenständlichkeit  und  des   Inhalts  aufhebt].”   106  PhG  §804        

 

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particular   externalizations,   that   is,   its   continual   reworking   of   its   concepts,   norms,   and  ideas,  all  the  while  remaining  identical  through  this,  as  the  unique  history  and   self-­‐conscious  reflection  on  its  own  pathway  of  experience.107     The   thinking   self   is   also   not   the   absolute   mediator   which   is   unaffected   by   its   contents,   as   if   it   was   the   divine   screen   through   which   insignificant   distinctions   passed.  Rather  thinking  consists  in  the  contemplation  of  the  self-­‐differentiating  and   self-­‐unifying   movement   of   reality   which   is   also   the   self-­‐differentiating   and   self-­‐ unifying  movement  of  conceptual  thought.  Knowledge,  which  appears  as  either  the   unmoving   contemplation   of   the   self-­‐moving,   or   conversely,   as   the   self-­‐moving   contemplation  of  the  unmoving,  is  really  the  self-­‐moving  contemplating  of  the  self-­‐ moving.108       Knowing   the   form   of   objective   reality   to   be   identical   to   the   movement   of   thinking,   acting   subjectivity   in   its   dynamic   structure,   and   knowing   how   this   awareness   was   itself  achieved  historically  and  logically,  we  have  completed  the  journey  of  spirit  on   its   pathway   to   knowing.   The   “distinctions”   of   consciousness   are   overcome,   that   is,   nothing  distinguishes  the  object  from  the  consciousness  that  thinks  the  object  in  any   way   whatsoever.   Nothing   is   outside   the   realm   of   intelligibility,   and   nothing   is   outside   the   bounds   of   revisability   either.     Without   any   outside,   knowledge   has   achieved  an  absolute  status,  meaning  that  for  anything  to  be  at  all,  it  must  already   have   a   conceptually   intelligible   structure.   Given   that   the   task   set   out   in   the   Introduction   was   to   immanently   prove   the   legitimacy   of   conceptual   thought   to   adequately   express   objectivity,   we   can   reasonable   say   that   the   purpose   has   been   achieved.109         The  final  four  paragraphs  of  the  final  chapter  of  the  Phenomenology  introduce  what   can   now   be   done   with   this   form   of   knowledge   that   is   certain   of   its   truth   as   the   form   of  all  reality.    It  asks,  what  is  to  be  the  content  of  this  knowledge?  The  diversity  of   content  comes  from  out  of  the  process  of  spirit  reflecting  on  the  universal  forms  it   has  come  to  take  as  true,  gained  from  the  movement  as  a  whole.  The  freedom  of  self-­‐ externalizing  subjectivity,  in  thinking  and  acting,  moves  according  to  the  necessary   constraints  it  has  given  itself  in  order  to  fulfill  the  most  transparent,  comprehensive,   reflective  standards  it  knows.  In  this  process,  spirit  tries,  fails,  retries,  and  fails  again   to   understand   the   world   and   itself,   but   each   moment   pushes   itself   further,   and   forces  it  to  grasp  the  world  better.  This  is  the   experience  of  science,  or,  the  life  of  the                                                                                                                  

107  PhG  §804:  “The  I  neither  has  to  obstinately  cling  to  itself  within  the  form  of  self-­‐consciousness  in   opposition   to   the   form   of   substantiality   and   objectivity,   as   if   it   were   afraid   of   its   self-­‐emptying;   the   force   of   spirit   lies   to   a   greater   degree   in   remaining   in   parity   with   itself   in   its   self-­‐emptying,   and   in   its   existing-­‐in-­‐and-­‐for-­‐itself,  in  its  positing  being-­‐for-­‐itself  as  a  moment  as  much  as  it  posits  being-­‐in-­‐itself   as  a  moment.”   108  PhG  §804         109  PhG   §805   “Therefore,   in   this   knowledge,   spirit   has   brought   to   a   close   the   movement   of   giving   shape   to   itself   insofar   as   that   movement   is   burdened   with   the   insurmountable   distinctions   of   consciousness.  Spirit  has  won  the  pure  element  of  its  existence,  the  concept.”  

 

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concept.110       What  is  learned  in  the  process  are  not  models  of  the  relation  between  consciousness   and   objectivity,   or   self-­‐consciousness   and   subjectivity,   as   was   the   case   in   the   Phenomenology,   but   specific   concepts   and   the   systematic   relations   amongst   each   other.   What   is   gained   are   theories,   fields   of   inferences   and   syllogisms,   relations   of   consequence   between   universal   kinds,   particular   classes   and   singular   individuals,   and  more.  What  is  gained  is  the  Logic  and  the  Encyclopedia  of  Science.111      

Each   stage   of   the   Phenomenology   was   centered   around   a   specific   distinction   between   knowledge   and   truth,   and   the   movement   of   overcoming   it;   but   science   and   its   logic   does   not   have   this   distinction,   for   each   concept   is   both   objectively   and   subjectively   true   knowledge;   each   concept   is   freely   made,   but   objectively   constricted   by   rules   of   inference.   This   unity   of   self   and   world,   being   and   thinking,   ontology   and  epistemology  is  immediate  in  the  concepts  which  make  up  the  system   of  science.       Scientific  concepts  do  not  arise  out  of  the  back  and  forth  between  consciousness  and   self-­‐consciousness.   Rather,   concepts   and   their   development   depend   only   on   how   “determinate”  they  can  be,  that  is,  how  far  they  allow  us  to  grasp  the  living  reality  of   complex,   organic,   systematic   wholes   in   their   dynamic   movement.   This   is   determined,   or   judged,   by   the   concept’s   relations,   or   actions,   with   other   concepts,   not   by   the   given   external   world   or   the   immediate   self.   Hence,   science   only   relates   to   itself   for   its   logical   ordering   and   reordering   of   its   concepts,   which   as   a   whole,   constructs  the  living  grid  of  intelligibility  for  being  and  thought.  112     Yet,   there   is   a   correlation   between   the   shapes   of   consciousness   and   the   moments   of   science,   in   fact,   every   universal   scientific   concept   also   has   a   particular   phenomenological   reality   insofar   as   self-­‐conscious   subjects   actually   think  them.     We   can   call   this   the   “real”   side   of   the   existence   of   concepts.   When   we   grasp   shapes   of   consciousness   as   expressing   this   “real”   side   of   concepts,   as   their   essence,   then   we                                                                                                                  

110  PhG   §805:   “In   terms   of   the   freedom  of   its   being,  the   content   is   the   self   emptying   itself   of   itself,   that  

is,   it   is   the   immediate   unity   of   self-­‐   knowledge.   Considered   with   regard   to   the   content,   the   pure   movement   of   this   self-­‐   emptying   constitutes   the   necessity   of   this   content.   The   diversity   of   content   exists   as   determinate   content   in   sets   of   relations,   not   in   itself,   and   its   restlessness   consists   in   its   sublating   itself,   that   is,   it   consists   in   negativity.  Thus,   necessity,   or   diversity,   just   like   free-­‐standing   being,   is   equally   the   self,   and   in   this   self-­‐like   form  within   which   existence   is   immediately   thought,   the   content   is   the   concept.   Since   therefore   spirit   has   attained   the   concept,   it   unfolds   existence   and   movement  within  this  ether  of  its  life,  and  it  is  science.”     111  PhG  §805:  “The  moments  of  its  movement  no  longer  exhibit  themselves  within  that  movement  as   determinate  shapes   of  consciousness;   rather,  since  the  distinction  within  consciousness  has  returned   into   the   self,   the   moments   exhibit   themselves   as   determinate   concepts   and   as   the   organic   self-­‐ grounded  movement  of  these  concepts.”   112  PhG   §805:   “The   moment   does   not   come   on   the   scene   as   this   movement   of   passing   to   and   fro   from   consciousness,   that   is,   from   representational   thought,   into   self-­‐consciousness   and   then   back   again;   rather,   the   pure   shape   liberated   from   its   appearance   in   consciousness,   the   pure   concept   and   its   further  forward  movement,  depend  solely  on  its  pure  determinateness.”    

 

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are  no  longer  representing  thinking  as  a  “simple  mediation”  with  ‘reality,’  but  as  the   inner   opposition   of   reality   with   itself.   On   this   account   of   thinking   the   nature   of   thinking,   concepts   are   those   really   existing   forces   which   break   down   the   simple,   immediate   unity   of   appearances   into   their   universal,   particular   and   individual   elements,   showing   how   these   elements   dynamically   relate   to   each   in   systematic   and/or  contradictory  ways.113     A   scientific   standpoint   does   not   exist   universally   above   the   minds   of   people,   but   exists  in  all  of  its  “externalizations”,  that  is,  in  all  the  particular  subjectivities  which   constitute   the   community   of   self-­‐conscious   spirit.   This   is   the   philosophical   or   scientific   community   of   conscientious   individuals   bound   together   through   the   mutual   recognition   of   their   evolving,   self-­‐determined   standards   for   conceptual   adequacy  and  self-­‐grounding  norms  for  social  practice.  In  this  community,  each  self   is   assured   that   it   is   who   it   takes   itself   to   be,   no   matter   its   own   faults,   errors   and   finitude.  This  certainty  of  self-­‐identity  across  all  experience  allows  each  self  to  let  go   of  its  constant  attachment  to  itself,  and  to  finally  be  home  in  the  immediacy  of  sense-­‐ certainty,   the   beginning   from   which   we   started.   This   power   of   letting   go,   or   mourning,  is  the  “highest  freedom”  of  the  self.  114       But   how   did   we   get   back   to   sense-­‐certainty?   Let’s   try   another   route.   Self-­‐knowing   spirit  understands  its  own  concept  of  who  it  is  and  where  it  came  from,  and  hence,  it   is   identical   to   itself   throughout   all   its   differences.   This   absolute   identity   across   all   differences,  as  a  shape  of  consciousness,  is  sense-­‐certainty.  The  power  to  let  go  of  the   self  and  enjoy  sense-­‐certainty  is  the  highest  power  of  the  self,  for  it  is  freely  assured   of  its  knowledge  in  the  absolutely  other.  Sense-­‐certainty  is  letting  go  of  the  fear  of   difference,  for  letting  concepts  exist  outside  the  self  is  the  very  truth  and  assurance   of   the   self.   Or   perhaps,   in   one   more   try,   this   move   to   sense-­‐certainty   signifies   the   first   “eyes”   of   spirit,   which   through   the   concept   requires   something   like   sense-­‐ certain   beings   for   it   to   materialize.   For   with   this   consciousness,   it   can   begin   to   conceptualize  all  of  nature.       If  science  is  at  home  in  its  externalizations,  if  its  concepts  remain  universal  through   all   their   particular   forms,   then   it   is   still   not   empty   enough.     By   conceiving   every   object   as   related   to   the   self,   as   an   expression   of   its   pure   self-­‐certainty,   it   has   not   freed  objectivity  fully  to  develop  on  its  own  as   a  self.  That  is,  objectivity  as  a  whole                                                                                                                   113  PhG  

§805:   “Conversely,   to   every   abstract   moment   of   science,   there   corresponds   a   shape   of   appearing  spirit  per  se.  Just  as  existing  spirit  is  not  richer  than  science,  so  too  spirit  in  its  content  is   no   poorer.   To   take   cognizance   of   the   pure   concepts   of   science   in   this   form,   namely,   in   which   they   are   shapes  of  consciousness,  is  what  constitutes  the  aspect  of  their  reality.  In  terms  of  that  reality,  their   essence,  the  concept,  which  is  posited  in  that  reality  in  its  simple  mediation  as  thought,  breaks  up  and   separates  the  moments  of  this  mediation  and  exhibits  itself  in  terms  of  their  inner  opposition.”   114  PhG   §806:   “Science   contains   within   itself   the   necessity   to   empty   itself   of   the   form   of   the   pure   concept   and   to   make   the   transition   from   the   concept   into   consciousness.   For   self-­‐knowing   spirit,   precisely   because   it   grasps   its   own   concept,   is   an   immediate   parity   with   itself,   which   within   its   distinction   is   the   certainty  of  the  immediate,  that   is,   is   sensuous  consciousness  –   the   beginning   from   which  we  started.  This  release  of  itself  from  the  form  of  its  own  self  is  the  highest  freedom  and  the   highest  assurance  of  its  knowledge  of  itself.”    

 

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demands   to   be   thought   in   the   same   conceptual   terms   as   self-­‐conscious   spirit:   completely   free,   independent,   and   self-­‐determining.     Letting   go   of   this   last   attachment   means   “sacrificing”   oneself,   removing   oneself   from   the   picture   and   all   of   the  assumptions  that  go  with  it,  including  the  logic  of  necessity.  Since  the  pure  I  is   atemporal  and  non-­‐spatial,  letting  go  of  these  limits  means  thinking  the  self  as  if  it   was   a   “free   contingent   event”   developing   in   time   and   space,   the   former   as   history,   and   the   latter   as   nature.   Nature,   as   spirit   alienated   in   space,   is   the   completely   normless,  infinite  development  which  produces  subjectivity  as  such.115       If  nature  is  the  immediate  becoming  of  spirit  in  space  over  time,  then  history  is  the   mediated  becoming  of  spirit,  in  time  over  space,  “der  an  die  Zeit  entäußerte  Geist.”   That  is,  history  is  mediated  by  the  minds  which  it  is  producing;  it  is  knowledgeable   [wissende].  But  this  becoming  of  spirit,  through  emptying  and  externalizing  all  of  its   given  natures,  is  also  a  negative  process  which  determines  itself  over  time  through   discarding   its   limited   self-­‐conceptions   and   reworking   its   more   adequate   ones.   Through  this  process,  spirit  lets  go  of  its  own  initial  conditions  and  norms  in  order   for  them  to  be  reshaped  and  remade  anew.116     This  development  of  reflective  spirit  in  history  is  a  slow  process,  in  which  individual   selves   must   appropriate   all   the   substance—that   is,   the   wealth   of   ideas,   truths,   norms,  narratives,  and  concepts—of  a  given  epoch,  and  bring  it  into  their  own  self-­‐ identity.  This  is  the  Bildung  and  education  of  the  self,  which  absorbs  the  history  of   the   world   as   if   it   was   a   gallery   of   images   passing   over   its   eyes.   For   a   fully   self-­‐ conscious   spiritual   community   to   emerge,   it   must   know   its   own   conditions   and   history,   its   own   development   and   logic;   this   process   requires   one   to   forgo   immediate   existence   in   the   present   in   order   to   submerge   oneself   in   the   past.   This   mode   of   self-­‐relation   is   itself   a   shape   of   spirit,   the   shape   of   recollection   [Erinnerung].117       In   other   words,   history   as   the   mindful   mediation   of   spirit’s   externalization   is   a   slow                                                                                                                   115  PhG   §807:   “Nonetheless,   this   self-­‐emptying   is   still   incomplete.   It   expresses   the   relation   of   self-­‐

certainty   to   the   object,   an   object   which,   precisely   by   being   in   the   relation,   has   not   yet   attained   its   consummate   freedom.   Knowing   is   acquainted   not   merely   with   itself,   but   also   with   the   negative   of   itself,  that  is,  its  limit.  To  know  its  limit  means  to  know  that  it  is  to  sacrifice  itself.  This  sacrifice  is  the   self-­‐   emptying   within   which   spirit   exhibits   its   coming-­‐to-­‐be   spirit   in   the   form   of   a   free   contingent   event,  and  it  intuits  outside  of  itself  its  pure  self  as  time  and  likewise  intuits  its  being  as  space.  This   final   coming-­‐to-­‐be,   nature,   is   its   living,   immediate   coming-­‐to-­‐be.   Nature,   that   is,   spirit   emptied   of   itself,   is   in   its   existence   nothing   but   this   eternal   self-­‐emptying   of   its   durable   existence   and   the   movement  which  produces  the  subject.”   116  PhG   §808:   “However,   the   other   aspect   of   spirit’s   coming-­‐to-­‐be,   history,   is   that   mindful   self-­‐ mediating   coming-­‐to-­‐be   –   the   spirit   emptied   into   time.   However,   this   emptying   is   likewise   the   self-­‐ emptying  of  itself;  the  negative  is  the  negative  of  itself.”   117  PhG  §808:  “This  coming-­‐to-­‐be  exhibits  a  languid  movement  and  succession  of  spirits,  a  gallery  of   pictures,  of  which  each,  endowed  with  the  entire  wealth  of  spirit,  moves  itself  so  slowly  because  the   self   has   to   take   hold   of   and   assimilate   the   whole   of   this   wealth   of   its   substance.   Since   its   consummation  consists  in  spirit’s  completely  knowing   what  it   is,   in  spirit  knowing   its  substance,  this   knowledge   is   its   taking-­‐the-­‐inward-­‐turn  within   which   spirit   forsakes   its   existence   and   gives   its   shape   over  to  recollection.”  

 

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succession  of  shapes  of  spirits,  whose  fulfillment  is  in  a  self-­‐reflective  awareness  of   its   own   conditions   and   constitution;   this   inward   looking   gaze   “sinks”   its   actual   existence   into   self-­‐conscious   reflection,   erases   it,   but   erases   it   from   prior   actuality   while   preserving   it   as   a   created   object   of   knowledge   in   the   present:   this   “transcended”  existence  of  itself  is  a  new  spirit,  absolute  spirit.118       At  this  point,  having  baptized  oneself  in  the  waters  of  Absolute  Knowing,  the  world   appears   completely   open   again,   almost   blank,   ready   for   us   to   ingest   it.   Once   again,   it   seems   as   though   consciousness   must   take   the   journey   from   the   immediate   apprehension  of  the  world  to  an  educated  comprehension,  albeit  this  time,  with  an   understanding  of  what  it  is  doing  along  the  way.    But  this  is  a  deceptive  appearance.   In   fact,   the   activity   of   submerging   one’s   mind   in   the   phenomenological   project   of   conceptualizing   the   historical   and   logical   conditions   of   possibility   for   oneself   to   emerge   as   a   historical,   conceptualizing   being   has   put   us   into   a   new   position.   This   entire  project  of  “inwardizing  re-­‐collection”  [Er-­‐Innerung],  of  calling  forth  one’s  own   historically   produced   conditions   and   freely   recasting   them   into   elements   of   one’s   own  self-­‐identity,  retains  all  of  the  pain,  work,  failures,  and  truths  of  the  experiences   which   have   forged   one’s   spirit.   Recollection   “heals   the   wounds   of   spirit”   by   accepting   them   as   parts   of   one’s   constitution,   by   overcoming   their   specificity   in   time,   and   bringing   them   into   the   universal   space   of   forgiveness   in   the   present.   By   bringing   out   the   universal   truths   of   the   particular   experiences   of   singular   individuals,   recollection   proves   itself   as   the   adequate   method   for   absolute   knowing.119       This  recollection  refers  to  the  history  of  self-­‐reflective  individuality  as  it  came  into   being  over  millennia,  the  individual  development  of  one  mind  in  a  lifetime,  and  the   philosophical   education   of   self-­‐consciousness   which   comes   from   traversing   the   Phenomenology  of  Spirit  itself.  Each  historical  epoch,  each  individual  generation,  and   each  determined  soul  is  called  forth  in  the  task  of  recollecting  its  natural  appearance   as   historical   production.   Recollection   is   henceforth   the   active   mourning   of   the   dead,   the   inclusion   of   all   petrified   shapes   of   spirit   into   the   life   of   the   new   one,   forgiving   their  finitude  by  releasing  their  meanings  into  the  infinite  realm  of  reinterpretation   for  the  present;  or,  in  another  vocabulary,  recollection  is  the  work  of  justifying  one’s   normative  status  in  the  face  of  challenge  by  rationally  reconstructing  a  meaningful   pathway  of  legitimacy  which  shows  how  the  conditions  of  justification  arose  in  the                                                                                                                   118  PhG   §808   “In   taking-­‐the-­‐inward-­‐turn,   spirit   is   absorbed   into   the   night   of   its   self-­‐consciousness,  

but  its  vanished  existence  is  preserved  in  that  night,  and  this  sublated  existence  –  the  existence  which   was  prior  but  is  now  newborn  from  knowledge  –  is  the  new  existence,  a  new  world,  and  a  new  shape   of  spirit.”     119  PhG  §808  “Within  that  new  shape  of  spirit,  it  likewise  has  to  begin  all  over  again  without  prejudice   in   its   immediacy,   and   from   its   immediacy   to   rear   itself   once   again   to   maturity,   as   if   all   that   had   preceded   it   were   lost   to   it   and   as   if   it   were   to   have   learned   nothing   from   the   experience   of   the   preceding   spirits.   However,   that   inwardizing   re-­‐collection   [Er-­‐Innerung]   has   preserved   that   experience;   it   is   what   is   inner,   and   it   is   in   fact   the   higher   form   of   substance.   If   therefore   this   spirit   begins  its  cultural  maturation  all  over  again  and  seems  to  start  merely  from  itself,  at  the  same  time  it   is  nonetheless  making  its  beginning  at  a  higher  level.”    

 

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first  place.     This   does   not   only   describe   the   conceptual,   ethical   Bildung   of   individuals,   but   the   sequence   of   macro-­‐history   as   well.   Civilizations   succeed   each   other   in   time   by   appropriating   all   of   the   ethical   and   conceptual   knowledge   which   the   previous   one   has   objectified   in   their   institutions,   culture,   politics,   art,   religion,   in   short,   in   their   substance.120  If  the  movement  of  history  as  the  sequence  of  recollecting  spirit  can  be   said  to  have  a  goal  [Ziel],  and  perhaps  this  can  be  said  only  from  the  perspective  of   Absolute   Knowing   whose   task   it   is   to   give   history   this   goal,   then   it   is   the   “revelation   of  the  Absolute  Concept.”  This  concept  of  all  concepts  is  the  concept  of  the  concept   itself,   the   concept   which   reveals   the   structure   of   intelligibility   that   constitutes   our   world  and  our  selves,  our  time  and  our  space,  our  actions  and  our  judgments.  The   depth   of   the   world—its   inner   organization   as   conceptually   mediated,   rationally   structured,  and  ethically  binding—is  revealed  as  the  structure  of  ourselves  as  well.     The   absolute   concept   of   intelligibility   is   not   pure,   separate   from   the   finite,   contingent  becoming  of  the  world  and  its  thinking  individuals.  Rather,  the  realm  of   intelligibility   infuses   the   surface   of   existence,   allowing   us   to   meaningfully   grasp   nature  and  history  in  all  their  particularities  as  well.121           The   coming   to   be   of   this   absolute   knowledge,   released   from   the   depths   of   the   world   into   time   and   space   for   all   to   appropriate,   requires   an   incredibly   self-­‐reflective,   holistic   account   of   the   development   of   normativity   which   conditions   one’s   own   perspective.     This   account   must   be   told   from   two   perspectives   at   once:   one   particularizing,   one   universalizing;   one   naturalistic,   one   observational;   one   active,   one  judging;  one  finite,  and  one  infinite.  If  these  two  perspectives  are  familiar,  it  is   because   they   make   up   the   dual   perspective   of   the   Phenomenology   as   a   whole,   the   natural   consciousness   with   all   of   its   particular   faults   and   missteps   on   its   path   to   knowing,   and   the   observing   phenomenologist,   which   grasps   the   universal   lessons   within   the   experience   of   the   former   that   push   it   forward.   This   splitting   of   one   consciousness   into   two   recalls   the   splitting   of   the   beautiful   soul   into   transgressive   actor   and   universal   judge,   of   God   into   the   finite   son   and   infinite   father,   of   self-­‐ consciousness  into  master  and  slave,  of  the  ethical  world  into  divine  and  human  law.   Each  of  these  splits  in  the  fabric  of  consciousness  can  now  be  seen  as  the  means  by   which  spirit  accounts  for  itself  as  both  a  particular  being  and  a  universal  structure.   The  former  perspective  is  the  standpoint  of  history,  and  the  latter  is  the  “science  of   phenomenal  knowledge.”122                                                                                                                   120  PhG   §808:   “The   realm   of   spirits,   having   formed   itself   in   this   way   within   existence,   constitutes   a   sequence   in   which   one   spirit   replaced   the   other,   and   each   succeeding   spirit   took   over   from   the   previous  spirit  the  realm  of  that  spirit’s  world.”   121  PhG   §808:   “The   goal   of   the   movement   is   the   revelation   of   depth   itself,   and   this   is   the   absolute   concept.  This   revelation   is   thereby   the   sublation   of   its   depth,   that   is,   its   extension,  the   negativity   of   this  I  existing-­‐within-­‐itself,  which  is  its  self-­‐emptying,  that  is,  its  substance  –  and  is  its  time.  In  itself,   this  self-­‐emptying  empties  itself  of  itself  and,  in  that  way,  exists  within  its  extension  as  well  as  within   its  depth,  within  the  self.”   122  PhG   §808   “For   its   path,   the  goal,  absolute   knowledge,   that   is,   spirit   knowing   itself   as   spirit,   has   the   recollection  of  spirits  as  they  are  in  themselves  and  as  they  achieve  the  organization  of  their  realm.  

 

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  Together,   in   tension   and   unison,   these   two   methods   of   self-­‐reflection   provide   a   dynamic   understanding   of   the   self-­‐development   of   consciousness   and   thinking,   of   being   and   acting.   For   all   share   the   same   structure   of   intelligibility   which   only   a   “conceptually   grasped   history”   [die   begriffne   Geschichte]   can   reveal.   Each   side   is   needed,   the   finite   and   infinite,   the   particular   and   universal,   for   without   one,   the   other   lapses   into   self-­‐contradiction.   Holding   both   together   maintains   the   tension,   while   allowing   it   room   to   move,   that   is,   develop   itself.   This   recollective   activity,   as   the   ultimate   expression   of   the   substance   of   modern   self-­‐determining,   mutually   recognizing,   ethical   communities,   raises   spirit   to   its   absolute   form.   As   absolute   spirit,  we  are  completely  open  to  learn  from  the  infinite  possibilities  buried  within   our  own  finite  history,  and  to  endless  recreate  ourselves  anew.  123     IV.  Conclusion   This  kind  of  self-­‐relating,  transcending,  temporally  mediating  recollective  existence   captures   the   dynamics   at   play   in   the   ethical   work   of   mourning   as   highlighted   by   Bernstein   and   Comay,   the   historical   overcoming   of   time   by   Kojeve   and   Malabou,   the   normative  logic  of  experience  by  Pippin  and  Pinkard,  the  infinite  power  of  science  in   Miller   and   Hyppolite,   the   meaning   of   conceptual   content   in   Brandom   and   De   Laurentiis,   and   even   the   fear   of   finitude   as   worried   about   by   Marx,   Heidegger   and   Derrida.   The   reason   why   so   many   different   interpretations   of   Absolute   Knowing   have  arisen  is  that  its  universal  form  welcomes  this  very  self-­‐adapting  flexibility  of   its   particular   contents   to   the   various   philosophical   projects   which   seek   to   appropriate   it.   Each   of   these   different   interpretations   utilize   a   form   of   universal   emptying   toward   the   chapter,   externalizing   the   aspects   which   do   not   fit   and   including  the  one’s  that  do  in  a  reconciliatory  or  contradictory  final  judgment.  Each   interpretation   then   performs   the   mode   of   Absolute   Knowing   towards   its   object,   “Absolute   Knowing.”   Hence,   the   self-­‐relating   spiral   of   this   kind   of   knowing   which   appears  to  be  the  object  of  the  one-­‐sided  judges  and  agents  who  critique  or  defend   it,   but   in   fact   mediates   itself   through   the   very   response   it   provokes.   Perhaps   the   correct   question   to   ask   is   not,   Does   the   idea   of   Absolute   Knowing   make   sense?,   but   rather,   Is  there  any  non-­‐absolute  way  possible  to  engage  with  the  structure  of  Absolute   Knowing?  If  one  makes  any  serious  claim  within  the  realm  of  intelligibility  opened   between   two   mutually   recognizing,   self-­‐determining,   cultural   agents   who   agree   on   the   standards   for   making   legitimate   claims,   whether   to   critique,   defend,   dismiss,   relate,  reconcile,  incorporate,  divide,  unify,  or  agree  with  another  claim,  then  one  is   inherently   enforcing   the   epistemological   and   ethical   norms   of   Absolute   Knowing,   and  hence,  one  is  already  within  it.  In  that  case  then,  the  only  way  to  non-­‐absolutely                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             Their  preservation  in  terms  of  their  free-­‐standing  existence  appearing  in  the  form  of  contingency  is   history,   but   in   terms   of   their   conceptually   grasped   organization,   it   is   the   science   of   phenomenal   knowledge.”   123  PhG   §   808:   “Both   together   are   conceptually   grasped   history;   they   form   the   recollection   and   the   Golgotha  of  absolute  spirit,  the  actuality,  the  truth,  the  certainty  of  its  throne,  without  which  it  would   be  lifeless  and  alone;  only  –  ‘Out  of  the  chalice  of  this  realm  of  spirits  Foams  forth  to  him  his  infinity.’”  

 

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engage  the  absolute  would  be  to  disengage  from  thinking  altogether.  But  taking  that   step   is   historically   impossible,   for   the   event   of   history   itself   has   incontrovertibly   brought  mind  [Geist]  into  being.       Although  it  is  the  self-­‐emptying  [Entäußerung]  perspective  par   excellence,  Absolute   Knowing   is   not   itself   empty.   It   is   rather   constrained   by   all   the   logics   which   have   produced  it:  the  ethical  structure  of  forgiveness,  the  logical  annulment  of  time,  the   necessary   experience   of   finitude,   the   freedom   for   infinite   conceptuality,   the   self-­‐ assurance   in   mutual   recognition,   the   scientific   cognition   of   universality,   the   inevitable   misrecognition   in   particularity,   and   the   reconciliation   of   all   aspects   together   in   the   experience   of   the   impossibility   of   reconciling   all   aspects   together,   an   experience   which   drives   the   project   for   completion   onwards   infinitely,   in   the   self-­‐ conscious,  satisfied  recognition  that  such  a  project  will  never  end.                                            

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Bibliography   Hegel:   Phänomenologie  des  Geistes,  in  Gesammelte  Werke,  hg.  von  W.  Bonsiepen  u.  R.  Heede,   Bd.  9,  Meiner,  Hamburg  1980  (Hegel’s  Phenomenology  of  Spirit,  transl.  by  A.   V.   Miller,   with   analysis   of   the   text   and   foreword   by   J.   N.   Findlay,   Oxford   University  Press,  Oxford  1977)   Pinkard,   Terry.   "Translation   of   Phenomenology   of   Spirit."   Web.   12   Mar.   2012.   http://web.mac.com/titpaul/Site/Phenomenology_of_Spirit_page.html      

  Interpretations:  

Bernstein,   Jay   M.   "Hegel's   Phenomenology   of   Spirit."   The  Bernstein  Tapes.   Web.   12   Mar.  2012.  http://www.bernsteintapes.com/   Brandom,   Robert.   "The   Spirit   of   Trust."   UPitt.   Web.   12   Mar.   2012.   http://www.pitt.edu/~brandom/hegel/index.html   Comay,   Rebecca.   Mourning  Sickness:  Hegel  and  the  French  Revolution.   Stanford,   CA:   Stanford  UP,  2011   De   Laurentiis,   Allegra.     Absolute   Knowing,   in   K.   R.   Westphal   (ed.),   The   Blackwell   Guide   to   Hegel’s   Phenomenology   of   Spirit,   Wiley   Blackwell,   Malden   (Mass.)   2009,  pp.  246-­‐64.   Derrida,  Jacques.  Glas.  Lincoln:  University  of  Nebraska,  1986   Heidegger,  Martin.  Hegel's  Phenomenology  of  Spirit.  Bloomington:  Indiana  UP,  1988   Hyppolite,   Jean.  Genesis  and  Structure  of  Hegel's  Phenomenology  of  Spirit.   Evanston:   Northwestern  UP,  1974   Kojève,   Alexandre,   and   Raymond   Queneau.   Introduction   to   the   Reading   of   Hegel;   Lectures  on  the  Phenomenology  of  Spirit,.  New  York:  Basic,  1969   Lukács,   György.   The   Young   Hegel:   Studies   in   the   Relations   between   Dialectics   and   Economics.  Cambridge,  MA:  MIT,  1976   Malabou,   Catherine.   The  Future  of  Hegel:  Plasticity,  Temporality,  and  Dialectic.   New   York:  Routledge,  2005   Marx,   Karl.   Early  Writings.   London:   Penguin   in   Association   with   New   Left   Review,   1992.  

 

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