Hazop Study Template

Hazard & Operability Assessment (HAZOP) Process Unit: Ammonia Separation and Storage P&ID No. Section/Node:

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Study Date: Property Pressure

Process Parameters: Pressure Guide Word No More of Less of Part of 

Deviations No Pressure More Pressure Less pressure

Consequences

Causes

Suggested Controls

Causes

Suggested Controls

Causes

Suggested Controls

Process Parameters: Temperature Property Temperature

Guide Word No More of  Less of  Part of 

Deviations

Consequences

Process Parameters: Flow Property Flow

Guide Word No More of  Less of  Part of 

Deviations No Flow

Consequences

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Process Parameters: Level Property Level

Guide Word No More of  Less of  Part of 

Deviations

Consequences

Causes

Suggested Controls

Causes

Suggested Controls

Process Parameters: Concentration Property Concentration

Guide Word No More of  Less of  Part of 

Deviations

Consequences

Team members:

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Scope of work 

The HAZOP study will be carried out on area 5. The HAZOP study should consider the following: 1. Initial start-up 2.  Normal operation 3. Maintenance shut down 4. Emergency shut down 5. Start up after shut downs

Evaluating causes and consequences (Chevron) Causes Brainstorm all possible causes related to human factors and equipment performance Don’t analyse during brainstorming Stay within section during brainstorming ( Special note: feed nodes from off-plots, it is acceptable to identify causes from the node) Don’t criticize during brainstorming Discuss all realistic causes in detail

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Develop Consequences Without Safeguards Check that all consequences take system out of design envelope, i.e. outside the intended range of operation Must identify ALL consequences (immediate and delayed both inside and outside section of  analysis, injury, fire, damage, environmental or economic impact), eg compressor failure will result in shutdown of plant will eventually result in total facility shutdown  Note how consequences develop, ie how how deviation will trigger alarms/ trips, etc, to trigger  operator intervention Considerations: Operator is not available or is not paying attention Control valve are in manual Alarm and safety interlocks do not function Procedures are not followed or are not understood

Part of “ only some of the design intention achieved”

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