Kosovo knot Petar Grujic Preface I started writing the book some years ago, when the Kosovo crisis was not yet acute, but one had all reasons to expect it to become in a foreseeable future. This expectation turned out true and the writing soon took the form of a race between the accelerating series of events and the record about them. I was not sure that my concept of the approach would withstand the current going on, but I can now look with comfort back to the recent history in this respect, which made the Kosovo issue one of the central concerns in the last two decades, not only on Balkan and Europe, but even of the global extent. Being a naturalist, physicist, my approach was intended to reach the essence of the issue, which has escaped politicians to my knowledge. Whether this may be considered as a handicap or an advantage the readers are to judge. To paraphrase a politician – politics is too serious affair to be left to politicians. In fact, the most appropriate professional status for an author on Kosovo affair would be an anthropologist, even a biologist, like Richard Dawkins. (A possible title of the book might have been “Selfish gene – case study of Kosovo issue”). Besides the attempt to infer the crux of the mater at a deeper level, I have tried to put the entire affair in a much broader context. I do not consider that anything in Europe may be localized and isolated from the entire world situation and global politics. The Kosovo issue appears a paradigmatic case, with so many implications, that any attempt to fathom the essential features of the dispute over the region without putting it in a broader context would be doomed to failure. The book appears neither historical, nor political, nor ideological, nor anthropological, nor religious, nor .., but each of all these aspects. It is certainly not an academic work, since the latter imposes an analytical approach, which I leave to scholars. As a naturalist I experience the world in a synthetic way, which leaves no room to formal pedantry and elegance. I am indebted to a number of people who have helped the book to be written, though some of them not only were not in favour of my interpretations, but even took the opposite view. I owe much to Dejan Kosanović for his supplying me with relevant literature and valuable discussions. I have made extensive use of the original work of Vladislav Sotirović, who kindly provided me with other important sources. My gratitude goes to Simone Lefebre, who kindly provided me with many useful refeences and Aleksandar Loma for his valuable book on Serb archaic language and Kosovo myth.. My principal sources have been, however, public media, both Serbian and from abroad. They turn out to be a part of the affair and thus equally object of study, and not just a source of information. Last, but not the least, my deepest gratitude goes to my wife Ljiljana for her invaluable help, encouragements, patience and love, without which this book have never been written.
Prologue In 1912 Kosovo and Metohia became a part of Serbia again, after Ottoman Empire was pushed from the Balkan by the allied Serbian, Greek, Bulgarian and Montenegrin forces (First Balkan
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war). In 1918 Vojvodina, which was a part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, joined Serbia, which in her turn joined Yugoslavia, the new state of South Slavs. Kosovo and Metohia (KiM) brought in a sizeable Albanian population (Shqiptars in the following), whereas in Vojvodina lived an approximately equal number of ethnic Hungarians. But whereas the latter never caused serious troubles in the new state, Shqiptars became from the start disturbing element within Serbia and Yugoslavia. For the last two decades, since disintegration of Yugoslavia, KiM has become a hot spot on the globe. What makes the region of the size of Corsica and population of something over million so special that it forced first Serbia, and then half the globe, to engage in extinguishing the fire which threatens to endanger the entire world order? Kosovo region, the south-western part of Serbia, has been considered a “disputed land” for the last two centuries. The traditional western image of the issue has been that two competing populations, Serb and ethnic- Albanian ones are fighting for the dominance over the region. The actual argumentation for the present day deadlock is that two sides are claiming their rights according two distinct sources: Serbs referring to their “historical rights”, ethnic Albanians relying on their actual numerical preponderance. We show that the whole issue is set up upside down and that a number misconceptions, which has been developed and maintained up to the present, are to be rectified before a serious discourse on the matter can be carried out. We expose historical, political, demographic, ethical, and religious background of the issue and argue that the latter is predominantly of the anthropological nature, rather than of political one. We examine a number of possible solutions of the “dispute”, from an ideal to the realistic one, putting the whole issue in the broader historical and actual worldwide political perspective.
Introduction One picture says more than thousands words.
Figure 1. Ethnic Albanian refugees at the Lion airport, April 18, 1999.
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A French magazine published a couple of photos from the Lion airport on April 18, 1999, at the time when NATO bombers were pouring their lethal burden over Serbia (and partly over Montenegro), in the course of their “preventing humanitarian catastrophe” at Kosovo. One picture showed the French weaponry ready to be transported to Kosovo, the other presented an ethnicAlbanian family from Kosovo, refugees just arrived to France. The photo deserves well our attention, for it speaks very much indeed; it exposes vividly the very crux of the matter. Let us analyze this picture, presenting the unfortunate family of Kosovars (as the ethnic Albanians call themselves). First of all, it is a single family, consisting of three generations. On the left we see grandmother (with scarf), on the right father and mother of the children posing around. Evidently, it is the peasant family. Tough the children appear well dressed (probably by a humanitarian agency), the adults reveal their modest wellbeing. We notice first three daughters, the eldest (somewhat hidden behind the boy in the centre) and two twin girls next to her. Then we see two daughters in the front and two boys beside as well. The central figure appears the young girl, of about 8, who shows the V sign in a Churchill-like gesture. What is she trying to tell us? The family is hardly in a “victorious position”. Who is going to defeat whom? Who instructed her to pose before the cameras in that manner? These are the questions which come to mind when looking at this scene at the Lion airport. We shall come back to this photo many times later on, but here we need just to bear it in mind.
Kosovo in Serbia Kosovo is a part of the region on the south-west of Serbia, called Kosovo and Metohija, which was an autonomous region of Serbia from 1945 to 1989, designated by the postwar Serbian staterepublic by Kosmet, as the short name for Kosovo and Metohija. The very name Kosovo is a short name of Kosovo Polje, meaning in Serb language Field of blackbirds (kðs – blackbird in the Serb language). 1 To avoid confusion we adopt the standard rule for the terms we are going to use here and in the following: Serb(s) will designate the ethnicity and adverb Serb too, like Serb language. Serbians will mean citizens of Serbia (regardless of their ethnicity), and adverb Serbian also, like Serbian state etc. Albanians will designate ethnicity (regardless of their citizenship), and Albanian the adverb, like Albanian language. Ethnic Albanians who are citizens of Serbia will be designated by Shqiptars (Shqiptare, “sons of eagles”), 2 as they call themselves and were called in Yugoslavia until recently. Another interpretation of the term has been as stemming from shqipoj, “one who understands”. This interpretation appears in accordance with similar case of Slav – “one who speaks (slovi)”, as different from Nemac (German), “one who is mute (nem)”. We must mention, however, that most Serbian Albanians consider now the term pejorative, if used by Serbs, for historical reasons. 3 The principal reason is that many designations of the present-day Albanians throughout the history were, to many Balkan people eponymous to wild people, including Turks. In particular the name Arnaut, widely used during the Turkish occupation of Balkan, was synonymous to robber, highwayman, belligerent savage etc. 4 The name Shqiptar was in many respect similarly used by Slavic population. Modern equivalent to Shqiptar in our usage, Kosovo ethnic Albanians, is Kosovars, used by Albanians and some foreigners alike. The term appears misleading, however, for it implies “inhabitants of Kosovo”, what includes other ethnicities in the region, at least in 1
Amselfeld as Germans call it, after Amsel for blackbird... Derived from shqipojnë, which designates eagle, possibly totem of a tribe. 3 We note that Shiptar political leaders at the federal level, used to use this term freely, during Tito’s era... 4 By contemporary Balkan population Arnauts used to be experienced in a similar sense as North-American Indians by European population in 19-th century. 2
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Slavic ears. It is with regret that we will have to use this term, nevertheless, for the technical clarity and economy, without any pejorative overtones implied. We just mention that Shqiperia is the internal official name of the present-day Albania. Likewise, Metohija is a corrupt of Greek μετóχι, which designates a dependency of a monastery, usually allotted by the local ruler or the king. The name refers to the monasteries complex of the southwestern part of the region, bordering the Albania, which is crowded by the medieval Serbian monasteries. The same region is called by Albanians Dukagjin, Land of Duke. 1 We mention here that it designates generally a border region, which used to be under the military rule of a duke. The northern Serbian region, which was an autonomous province in the same period as Kosmet was (1945-1989) is called Vojvodina (the land of duke), for the same reason, since it was situated between Austria (Austro-Hungary) and the Ottoman Empire for centuries and was under the military rule as such. (We emphasize here that kos is a purely Serb name, as duka is corrupted Italian one). It must be stressed here that these details are not merely of linguistic nature, but bear a heavy weight when dealing with the essence of the issue, as we shall elaborate later on. Toponyms appear the most reliable identification of a region and at the same time evidence of the fact as to whom the region belongs. We shall devote some more space to this point here. We start with Kosovo again. 2 It is a pan-Slavic and pra-Slavic name of the kind of birds, which has about 300 subspecies, from the family Turdidae, derived from the Greek kopsihos. Kosovo field, where a number of important battles were fought, is situated northwest from the regional capital Priština.
Another interpretation of this toponym from Albanian side is that it was the land of the medieval family Dukagjini, but the latter, if ever existed, comprised much larger area than Metohija. 2 In this paragraph we are making use of the linguistic elaboration by Vladan Djordjević, published in the daily “Politika”, and geographical study by K. N. Kostić, Our New Towns on the South (Naši Novi Gradovi na Jugu, Srpska Književna Zadruga, Beograd, 1922.) 1
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Figure 2. Map of Kosovo and Metohija (KiM), as before 1999. Metohija is derived from Greek metohi as mentioned above, from meteho - to take part. It denotes a monastery estate.
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Priština, pan-Slavic and pra-Slavic term, derived from prysk, derived in its turn from the IndoEuropean (s)per, to become the verb prisnoti, meaning to spurt, to gush. In modern Serb prisht designates decease, boil (anthrax). An important trade and mine medieval centre, with a Dubrovnik colony. King Stefan Dečanski used to stay at Priština, while Tsar Stephan Dushan had his court here for some time. After Dushan Stephan Priština became the capital of Vuk Branković feud, and retained that position even after Kosovo battle. His wife Mara lived there with her sons, Grgur (Gregorie) and Djurdje (Georgie), as well as Prince Lazar’s widow Eugenia (tsarica Milica). Turks took Priština 1439, but Dubrovnik colony remains there. Priština had its flori in 17th c., as one of the most prominent towns in Serbia. In 1660 a catholic missionary mentions it as an important post between Novi Pazar and Constantinople (Carigrad). During Austrian-Turkish war 1689 the former had a small garrison there. According to their records there were about 360 villages around, some of which were sat to fire by Turks and Tatars and inhabitants slaughtered. At the beginning of 19th c. Priština appears an important trade town, with a famous fair, with 12.000 inhabitants. France established her consulate there 1812. According to some reports Priština had at the time about 7-9.000. inhabitants, mainly orthodox Serbs, but Arnauts and semi-Islamized Serbs too. In 1852 reports count 12-15.000 inhabitants, one third Serbs and Cincars, the rest Arnauts. After two big fires, 1859 and 1863 Priština suffered a considerable decline. Prizren, pan-Slavic and pra-Slavic name, from zreti, to see. Derived from the Indo-European gher, to flash, participle perfect zren. Prefix pri is the common pan-Slavic and pra-Slavic for besides, at. “Carigrad of Serbian tsars”, as it used to be called, was mentioned in the Roman time as Teraida. Turks used to call it Terserin and Perserin.. First mentioned as the episcopate 1019, subordinated to Ohrid archiepiscopate. St Sava subordinated it to his new Serbian archiepiscopate. Prizren developed as a trade town in 13th and 14th c., especially during king Milutin and tsars Stephan Dushan and Stephan Urosh, who had their courts there. Stephan Dushan built a monastery with the memorial church St Archangels (Michael and Gavril). After falling into Turkish hands monastery was demolished and no trace of the grave of Dushan has remained. It was an important colony of Dubrovnik, with two Roman-Catholic churches. Turks took Prizren 1455. During Turkish occupation Prizren lost most of its trade role. Never-the-less we have reports of a wealthy Turk Mehmed Hajredin Kukli-beg and his 117 shops (dućans), and 6 watermills and caravanserai. Arnauts appear there late, in the second half of 17th c. only. In 17th c. trade receives a new impetus at Prizren, with some 8.600 (1610) and 12.000 (1655) homes. Town was renowned for his fountains, watermills (600), nice houses and pleasant gardens. Craftsmanship was very developed, especially guns and sabers productions. Town was the largest Serb town in the region, second only to Skopje. The overwhelming majority of population was Serb Orthodox. Though there was a catholic episcope chair, there were 30-40 catholic homes only. In both 16th and 17th centuries Prizren was victim of ethnic-Albanian highlanders, mainly Mirdites tribe. Turkish taxes were sometimes extraordinary large and devastating, as a victim complained. At the end of 18th century many towns were devastated by Arnauts, including Prizren, mainly by krdžalije and other highwaymen. Father Sava reports how in 1795 Mahmud-pasha Bushatlija and his Arnauts devastated Prizren that only 7-8.000 homes remained, much less than there were in 17th c. In 1805 Pukvilj records that Prizren experienced a revival. Inhabitants were partly Muslims partly Orthodox, but both Serbs, as their (Slavic) language revealed. 19th c. witnessed further development of Prizren. According to J. Miller (1844) the following statistics was offered; 6.000 homes, with 18.600 Orthodox citizens, 2.150 Catholics, 4.000 Muslims (4/5 Serbs), 600 Tsigans (Roma). Trade was mainly in hands of Serbs. Town had many mosques (12 big, 42 altogether), many clock towers, one Orthodox and one Catholic Church. Trade was done mainly with Thessalonica, since the trade road to Skadar was insecure due to Arnaut highwaymen (kachaks).
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Mitrovica, after the Greek saint Demetrios, Serb Dimitrije. Demetrios itself means son of Demetre, goddess of fertility and agriculture. 1 When king Milutin donated (14th c.) to the St Stephan monastery at Banjska the church “St Dimitrije under Zvečan”, the new town founded in the vicinity obtained the name D(i)mitrovica, or Mitrovica. Renown traveler Evlia Čelebija mentions Mitrovica “on the border of Bosnian vilayet”, with the castle (probably Zvecan) abandoned but the town flourishing Father Jukic mentions (1852) 300 Muslim and 50 Orthodox houses. Unimpressive until 1871 Mitrovica experiences a fast development with railway. Zvečan was a Serbian castle set up in 11th century during fighting Greeks period. The castle served as a prison (something like London Tower), where many nobleman finished their life, including king- Stephan Dečanski brother, Constantine, and the king himself. Turkish rule was imposed already at the end of 14thc.. Certain “Feriz ćefalija (Z)večanski” 2 arranges an agreement with Dubrovnik 1399 and the latter donated 50 ducats to him in return. Zvecan used to be left empty for many periods. It suffered the most 1884 when the wall material was used for building casern and the bridge across Ibar in Mitrovica. As mentioned before, nearby Banjska was a village, which had a nice monastery, but was ruined after Kosovo battle. 3 But the place won it celebrity after the beautiful folk poem Strahinjic Bane, an epic Serb hero from the place. Turks seems to have founded a small town over the ruins of Banjska, with a mosque and sahat- kula (clock tower). At the hill foot there was a bath, 4 in use long time afterwards. At the beginning of 20th c. one could still see a remnant of minaret on the ruins of the old Serb church, converted into mosque in 15th c. Djakovica, from Greek diakonos, servant, pupil. The earliest record about the place came from 17th c. Original name Gjakova was given by Turks and Arnauts, and Serbs turned it into present-day Djakovica. 5 It was a small town, which started to be populated by Albanians after the Serb migration into Austria in 17th c. It was probably on that account that Serbs used to call it Arnaut-Pazar. According to Miller (18440 there were 1900 houses, 11 mosques, 640-650 shops. 18.000 were Muslims, 2600 Orthodox, 450 Catholics. As for the ethnical partition the same record provides: 17.000 Arnauts, 3800 Slavs (Serbs), 180 Turks, and finally some Cincars and Tsigans. However, statistics greatly differ from author to author and may be taken as a rough estimate only. Christians were engaged mainly in craftsmanship, with Catholics as goldsmiths and Orthodox saddle-makers and painters. Peć, pan-Slavic and pra-Slavic, from pekti, to roast. Pekt - peć means furnace. ‘ Cult place of Serbian people, the seat of Peć Patriarchy, in the nearby church, established under king Milutin (1282-1321). Besides spiritual importance Peć was the town with a lively trade, with Dubrovnik colony. Turks abolished Patriarchy in 1459, to be re-established in 1557 and ultimately abolished 1766 and subordinated to Constantinople Patriarchy. In 19th c. there was 2.000 houses with 7-8.000 inhabitants. Mainly Orthodox (Serbs). Town had 900 shops (dućans). Principal occupation was silk production and agriculture (fruit and tobacco). Despite its size, Peć was not able to develop trade, due to insecurity ”from (local) Arnauts”, who were “public highwaymen”. Uroševac, pra-Church-Slavic from Uroš, derived from ur, master, from Hungarian ursu for lord. Originally Turkish Ferizović, was a small Gypsy village. The railway made it a town and a trade centre of the region. Albanians called it Ferizaj, and Serbs ultimately named it Uroševac Lipljan, old-Serbian, probably from the Roman name for the nearby castrum Ulpijanum. Orahovac, pan-Slavic and pra-Slavic name; oreh for nut (orah in the contemporary Serb), derived from Indo-European ar and reks (to smash), something one eats skinned. According to Robert Graves, Demetre means mother of barley. It was probably after him that Ferizović (later Uroševac) got his name. 3 As we shall see, Slobodan Milošević’s family claims to have the origin from Banjska. 4 Banja in Serb means bath, spa. 5 Other variants are known, like Jakova, or Giacovo. 1 2
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Drenica, derived from pan-Slavic and pra-Slavic dren, dogwood, from the Indo-European root dher(e)ghno. Vučitrn, derived from Serb vuk, pan-Slavic and pra-Slavic vlk, for wolf, Indo-European ulkuos 1 and trn, Teutonic-pra-Slavic term for thorn (Indo-European (s)ter, for thorny plants). Built probably over the ancient Vicianum, is mentioned for the first time in 14th c. as a place belonging to Vuk Branković, who had his palace there too. Town was renowned for his trade activities, with Dubrovnik colony. Djuradj Branković used it as his seat too. In the vicinity there was a well known trade and mine town Trepča. Vučitrn fell to Turks in 1439 (or 1440) for the first time, then definitely in 1455. Some travelers mention it as an important trade centre. Evlija Čelebija counts 2.000 houses, then tekija, 2 schools, Orthodox school (bogoslovia), hamam, vineyards, orchards. In 18th c. Vučitrn appears an insignificant place, but becomes the seat of a sandžak. In 1894 one counts about 7-8.000 inhabitants. The main occupation was blacksmith and leather craftsmanship. Glogovac, pan-Slavic and pra-Slavic name from glog for hawthorn (from Greek glohiis – top of blade). Istok, from tok, pra-Slavic noun for flow (from Indo-European teq - to run (away), and iz as the perfective prefix for the verb teći – to flow, from Indo-European eghs. Gračanica, pan-Slavic and pra-Slavic diminutive of gord, initially any fenced settlement, later town, and castle, from Indo-European gherdh, to fence. 3 Kačanik. Turkish name, from kaçak, highwayman. Kachanik was notorious for its highwaymanship from the beginning of known history, which dates from 16th century. Situated at the entrance of the gorge Kačanik, made by the river Lepenac, it controled the passage through the gorge, the only possible between Macedonia and Kosovo. Report from 1573 warns people to guard themselves well in passing the gorge, for the denger from the local Arnauts. It was for this denger that Sinan-pasha built the small fortress at the gorge entrance, which was intended to protect travellers, mainly trademen, from the robbery and slaughter. Austrians under Piccolomini took the fortress in 1689, but after their retreat in 1690 Turks captured the fortress and slaughered the Ausrian garrison. It was not until 1807, when Reshid-pasha cleared Kačanik from highwaymen that the trafic through the gorge was resumed. Around the middle of 19th c. the town consisted of about «hundred miserable Arnaut houses», situated beside the ruined fortress. Before the Balkan wars town was renamed by Turks as Orhanije and at that time had about 250 houses. Names of rivers, mountains and other geographical entities are likewise Slavic. They are easily recognized by suffixes, like –va for river, -ica for rivers or settlements, We mention rivers Sitnica, Studenica, etc. Suffix -or for mountains is considered to be of Celtic origin, but mountains with this ending are scattered all around the Western Balkan. Some toponyms bear Turkish names, as expected after centuries of the Ottoman rule of this part of Balkan. We emphasize here that since the Kosmet used to be separated from modern Serbia for two centuries, its development was considerably retarded concerning the language and folklore generally. It appears today as a sort of reservation in this respect, as a relict of the ancient times, from the medieval Serbian state and Serb population in general. This is the case with other mountainous regions of Balkan, in particular Northern Albania, Montenegro and Herzegovina, who were on the margin of European civilization and culture. for centuries. We shall come to this point again, later on. As for the toponyms in Albania, many appear corrupted from of the original Greek or Roman, whereas some bear purely Slavic names. This applies particularly to the plane regions, which were settled by ethnic-Albanian montagnars only relatively recently. Ulk has been preserved in contemporary Albanian, as a common name, with the same meaning – wolf. In modern Serb Vuk appears a common name, too, in particular among Dinaroids. 2 Dervish house, after Turkish tekke (Arab täkyä). 3 Some toponyms Shiptars still call by Albanian names, like Ferizaj for Uroševac. 1
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As pointed out above these details are not merely of linguistic nature, but reveal the essence of the issue, as we shall elaborate later on. Unfortunately we have to dwell on the linguistic matters more. It concerns the question of “negative designation”. Ancient Greeks (and Romans as well) used to call other nations “barbarians”, meaning “non-Greeks”, “neither Romans nor Greeks”. It had somewhat pejorative overtones, which one could appreciate regarding their superiority over the surrounding nations, in particular those much less civilized, like Skits. 1 The same point appears with Israelites, who designate non-Jews as goyim, meaning (other, non-Jewish) nations. 2 Though no Jew would admit it, it has a pejorative meaning whatsoever, and this overtone can not be ignored. As we shall see later on, the Albanian issue (question) involves all nationalities in which ethnic Albanians are in close contact on Balkan Peninsular. Thus one faces the conflict Albanians versus non-Albanians, which places inevitably ethnic Albanians at a privileged position. This will sounds cynical when we compare civilization levels of both sides in conflict, as we shall see soon. Unfortunately term “non-Albanians” has been widely accepted by the international community, that even an eventual neologism which would substitute the unfortunate term “non-Albanian” would not do. In a sense this terminology would correspond to “non-sick” man (as compared to sick one), meaning “healthy man”. “Non-Albanian” implies inevitably the feeling of “something wrong” with those singled out so. Unfortunately, the story does not end here. Serbia used to have, during her recent history, two regions, which had privileged positions relative to the rest of the state. One was the autonomous province Vojvodina, the other the autonomous region (later to become province, too) Kosovo and Metohija (Kosmet, KiM). The problem is that “rest of Serbia”. Some call it “Serbia proper”, some “Central Serbia”. The first designation appears particularly unsuitable, for it implies that Kosmet is not ”proper Serbia”, thus concealing in the very name a political message. Kosovo issue It is clear from the previous chapter that Kosmet is an autochthonous Slavic, in particular Serb, land. How this region became the so-called disputed land, and what has it to do with ethnicAlbanians? In the following chapters we will consider this issue in more details, from the geographical, (pre)historic, anthropologic, religious and political points of view. We start with the geography, in particular physical geography of the Western Balkan.
Dinaric region Physical and mental structures of a particular population are determined by many factors, but mainly by the genetic inheritance and physical environment. The Western Balkan is characterized by the mountainous strip which goes from Istria peninsula on the North-West to the Northern Albania on the South-East, parallel to the Adriatic coast. This high-mountains region goes gradually into the Pannonic plane towards North, but goes down abruptly to the Adriatic coast, as seen in the Figure 3. This so-called Dinaric chain derives its name from mountain Dinara, in the middle of Herzegovina region. It comprises Montenegro and Northern Albania too. Some parts of the region are still woody, but mainly the wood was cut off many centuries ago and the land is almost bare, with stony and bushy surface. This fact, as well as the unfavorable geographical position, made the region cornered, mostly inaccessible and cut from the rest of Balkan and Europe for that matter. 3 It is cut from the sea and far away from the principal roads, which go along the Sava river on the North. These geographical features have shaped the mentality and history of the local population. Their principal occupations have been cattle grazing (sheep and goats) and plundering the surrounding regions. The latter meant first piracy on the Adriatic sea and second The anecdote on dispute between a bully Greek and philosopher Abaris, of Scythian origin, who exclaimed “My homeland is shame for me, but you are the shame of your homeland!” illustrates well the issue. 2 In modern parlance it renders gentiles. 3 As the old saying puts it “behind God’s back” 1
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robbing the plane people on the North. First inhabitants known from the historical records (mainly by Greeks), Illyrians were notorious for piracy, what was the cause of permanent conflicts with Romans. 1 The first known inhabitants of Dinaric land were Illyrians tribes, of Indo-European origin. Scattered all around Western Balkan, even in the present day Austria, these illiterate people left nothing of a historical value and records and appear known via testimonies of Greeks and Romans only. Whenever other people arrived to the Western Balkan, in particular Slavic tribes, they used to push the local tribes into the Dinaric chain. Those remaining in the less mountainous regions mixed with the incoming people, who gradually absorbed them. This process finally affected almost all Illyrians, except for the most inaccessible mountains, where the assimilation took the mildest form, as the case of Northern Albania was. Nevertheless, as we shall see later on, no pure Illyrian people have been preserved on Balkan, except in the nationalistic textbooks.
Figure 3. Balkan peninsular. Dinaric region begins with Dinaric Alps and extends up to Epirus. State borders refer to the situation before dissolution of Yugoslavia. Though generally Dinaroids have been known as warlike, violent people, their ethnical content appears varied, and no uniform form of their behaviour may be expected. In fact, this anthropological content has been changing for centuries, by the influx of surrounding people. The principal source for this influx have been those inhabitants of the surrounding states, who sought refuge in the inaccessible mountains, fleeing from the authorities, for various reasons. The principal source of those incomers was Bosnia, in particular during the rule of the Ottoman Empire, and later during the Austro-Hungarian occupation of the Bosnia and Herzegovina. Majority of those incomers fled from the law pursuit and this asocial selection contributed additionally to the toughness of the Dinaroids. Generally, Dinaric region appears retarded relative to the plane surroundings and the Adriatic coast for century or so, what has been a permanent cause of conflicts with the latter. It was for this retardation that Dinaroids were prone to change their religious 1
One of the contemporary Albanian tribes, Hots, derives its name from Dacian hot, highwayman and robber.
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believes, as various new religions arrived with new rulers. In particular, it was here only that the Muslim religion took root when the Turks arrived on the Western Balkan. In particular Western Herzegovina and Northern Albania adopted quickly new religion from the Turkish rulers. No autochthonous Serbian population accepted Mohammedism, although Turks used to rule Serbian regions from three to five centuries. The only Muslim population here are Shqiptars and Bosnian Muslims (called Boshnjaks) in the western Serbia, called Rashka by Serbs and Sandžak by Boshnjaks. 1 The rationale for this ”religious mobility” of montagnars was their provisional acceptance of the Christian faith, which never took roots firmly in those mountainous regions. It was for this reason that 70% of ethnic Albanians are now Muslims, the rest being Roman Catholics and Greek Orthodox ones. Homogeneous (on average) anthropologically, Dinaric region has been split into two principal areas; Slavo-phonic and Albano-phonic ones. That it often has nothing to do with the ethnical content is well illustrated by Montenegrin-Albanian tribes, still existing in the area. As the English traveler and folklorist Edith Durham found early the previous century, while touring around Northern Albania and Kosmet, four brothers arrived from Bosnia century ago, all of Slavic origin. 2 We quote the testimony she recorded from an old Albanian: “The tribe of Hoti,” said the old man, “has many relations. Thirteen generations ago, one Gheg Lazar came to this land with his four sons, and it is from these that we Hoti descend. I cannot tell the year in which they came. It was soon after the building the church of Gruda, 3 and that is now 380 years age. Gruda came before we did. Gheg was one of four brothers. The other three were Piper, Vaso and Krasni. 4 From these descend the Piperi and Vasojevichi of Montenegro and Krasnichi of North Albania. So we are four – all related –the Lazakechi (we of Hoti), the Piperkechi, the Vasokechi and the Kraskechi. They all came from Bosnia to escape the Turks, but from what part I do not know. Yes, they are all Christians. Krasnichi only turned Moslem much later.” Of these four large tribes, of common origin Piperi and Vasojevići are now Serbophone and Orthodox. Piperi threw its lot with Montenegro in 1790, but whether or not it was then Serbophone I have failed to learn. Half of Vasojevich was given to Montenegro after the Treaty of Berlin, the other portion still remains under Turkish rule. 5 Vasojevich consider itself whole Serb, and is bitter foe to the Albanophone tribes on its borders. Krasnich is Albanophone and phanatically Moslem; 6 Hoti tribe is Albanophone and Roman Catholic. Dinaroids As mentioned above, geographical position and the physical geography of the Dinaric region ha shaped the anthropological features of this quasi-isolated part of Balkan peninsular. To appreciate the issue, one may compare this kind of isolation with other similar regions in Europe. One, which might be taken as the closest to out subject, is the Basque region, shared by Spain and France. We will come to this parallel later on, when discussing the Albanian question. By probably the best parallel with the whole Dinaric area would be with Mediterranean islands, like Crete, and in particular Sicily, Sardinia and Corsica. Among them, Sardinia comes closest to our issue, in many respects. Sundžak means a county in Turkish language. Note that Muslims on Western Balkan are of Slavic origin, with Serb (or Croat) mother tongue. 2 E. Durham, High Albania, Beacon Press, Boston, 1987. Miss Durham testimony will be our principal source for the Northern Albania anthropology, ethnology and history. 3 Grud(v)a, Serb noun for lump; (of earth), block (of cheese); rodna gruda – native soil. 4 Vaso is the short form of Vasilije, the common pan-Slavic name, from Greek basileus (king); Krasni is pan-Slavic name. derived from krasan, krasni, meaning handsome, beautiful, common particularly among Czechs 5 It refers to 1908, when the travel took place. 6 Krasić is the common surname among modern Serbs. 1
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In all cases geographical isolations has resulted in forming particular intra-social structures. Generally, isolation implies conservation, even retardation, as compared with regions which maintain regular links and communication with the surrounding or neighboring societies. The case of retardation is, perhaps, the best illustrated by Tasmania, which in the early prehistoric epochs was a part of the Australian continent. Tasmanians hared with Aborigines the same culture and possessed the same civilization-technological features. When the Tasmanian peninsular separated from the rest of the continent, the isolation resulted in conservation and in many respect retardation of Tasmanian society. When the first Europeans arrived at the island, they found Tasmanians well retarded compared with Aborigines, in material culture in particular. 1 (In the extreme situations the isolation may result in biological extinction of a species, if the number of population drops below a critical value. Other undesirable, from the evolutionary viewpoint, effects are degeneration of the population, by intra-breeding, for instance, or intramarriages, as witnessed by many island populations in the Mediterranean region). From the purely sociological point of view, quasi-isolation results in conserving the ethos of traditional societies, formed in the prehistoric epochs in Europe. But before we go into these details, which peculiar features of this kind of society are preserved and how did they come about? What is the difference between the mountains, quasi-isolated region and plane people with its civilization? First of all highlander can not develop civilization in its strict sense, for they have no opportunity to develop cities and live in them. Their settlements appear scattered among mountains, with large mutual separations and very weak inter connections. What implies that their mutual communications are rare and feeble. Development of a civilization is based on two pillars: (i) advanced qualities of individuals and (ii) reasonably strong interactions among them, more precisely on the optimization of the balance of these two conditions. And it is here that the difference between the mountains and plane populations arises. The first one appears a collection of individuals, the second form a social system, with an intricate structure, which is subject to the social, technological and cultural development. Mountainous regions appear extreme cases of the rural societies and both owe their technological status to acquiring the achievements of the civilized, urban society. And, as we shall see later on, it is not only technology but the very living staff which highlanders “borrow” from the plane people. One may describe the situation in this respect as coexistence of two weakly coupled subsystems, each with distinct almost opposing features. 2 These features arise from different physical environments, of course. Plane people live in relatively fertile areas, which provide sufficient living support. Their principal occupation is agriculture and cattle cultivation. Highlanders live on cattle grazing and plundering the plane environment. This is the perennial story of tension between cattle grazing and agricultural societies, as described, albeit in an allegorical form, in the Books of Genesis, in the story about Cain and Abel. 3 (The story has been repeated thousands of time in Hollywood, of course, with the same “cast of roles”. Interestingly, the first people who were supposed to cultivate whit were Natufians, who lived in the present day Palestine, about 10.000 years ago. And if one seeks an equation of civilization it reads “whit = civilization”. The whit cultivation enabled homo sapiens to produce a surplus of food and thus open the gates specialization, which turned out to be essential for It was this “underdevelopment” which caused, in part, that newcomers from Europe exterminated Tasmanian autochthonous population in the second half of 19th century.
1
2
See, e.g. Dinko Tomašić, Personality and culture in Eastern European Politics, G. W. Steward, New York, 1948. Although the book is conspicuously biased against Serbs (the author manages not to mention Croat Ustashas, for instance, though the book was published shortly after WW2), it illustrates the essential difference between the mountainous and plane people.
3
That it is the farmer Cain who slays the shepherd Abel and not vice versa tells us only who wrote the Bible. See, in this context, the very revealing book by I. Finkelstein and N. A. Silberman, La Bible Devoile, Bayard, 2002, Paris. This episode appears a sort of “theological justification” of the highlanders’ plundering of lowlanders.
13
civilization as such. The irony of history is that the present day Israelis are farmers and Palestinians (post-nomadic) shepherds. We shall not dwell on it here, however, in particular in view that Palestine will be our principal point of reference later on, throughout the book). The severe living conditions have shaped the mental and physical structures of highlanders. In Dinaric regions it means the population tall, slim and bony, as a rule dolichocephalic (To fix an idea we note that almost all of Yugoslav best tennis players, like Ivanišević, Ljubičić, Djoković, Karlović etc are typical Dinaric people. In fact, it is due to the preponderance of Dinaroids in some sports, like basketball, volleyball, handball etc that Yugoslavia has proved so successful in these sports.) Their psychological construction contains many aggressive features, often combined with unscrupulous and violent behaviour. The severity of the physical environment has resulted in the warlike attributes of these people, as described by Dinko Tomašić, the Croat author who lived in USA from just before the WW2 onwards. 1 Many Yugoslav authors have devoted their attention to the character of Western Balkan population, as the case with Serbian geographer and anthropologist Jovan Cvijić, 2 and particular Vladimir Dvorniković in his monumental work, published just before WW2, Characterology of Yugoslavs. 3 Unlike the plane population, where the central unit of the society appears village or town, the social unit of highlanders is the extended family. In the Albanophonic regions it is called fis, in Slavenophonic zadruga. It comprises all descendants from a couple, sons with their families, and unmarried daughters, and their offspring too. It may amount up to few tens in the Slavo-phonic and even more in Albano-phonic populations. The structure within the zadruga appears strictly hierarchic, with pater familias as the supreme, unquestionable master of the community. The rules within this structure are very strict and the head of the house may even kill the disobedient. The rationale for this type of organization is the lack of the institution of state and its jurisdic role. The relationship between zadrugas is governed by the balance of force each of them can exercise in the case of disputes. The latter appear frequent and often unavoidable, mainly over pastures and women. The more guns a zadruga (fis) possesses, the more powerful and authoritative position of the family within the tribe is. The same holds for interrelations between tribes, which are composed from all families descending from the same ancestor (historical or mythic). Internal ethos within a family is composed of the archaic rules, imposed by the tribal, traditional society. In order to preserve the unity of the family the concept of levirate, 4 is retained. It means that if an adult member dies, his brother, if single and adult too, marries his widow. In fact, even if the first brother is still alive, his sibling possesses in part the bride, except for an outright sex. Contrary to this evidently endogamy rule, marriage is essentially exogamic in this traditional society, but it rarely extends beyond the tribal boundary. In fact, this exogamic feature has been one of the principal causes of disputes between families, resulting often on the blood feud. This typical remnant of the traditional society appears characteristic of the e entire Dinaric region. It imposes the obligation on the family whose member has been killed by somebody of other family, or tribe, to revenge the murdered member b killing an appropriate member of the killer’s family (or tribe). The duty of revenge falls on the closest relative of the deceased, like son, brother, etc. When the revenge has been realized, the family of the latest victim feels obliged to revenge itself and the vicious circle never ends. Some of these blood feud conflicts extend over many generations and even grand grandsons are not secure from the revenge. 1
Dinko Tomašić “Personality Development of the Dinaric Warriors”, Psychiatry, 8 (1945) 449-493; though his views on the Serbo-Croat disputes should be taken with a grain of salt, the general description of the “Dinaric paidea” is revealing.
J. Cvijić, Speaches and articles, I, Ch. Dinaric Serbs. (in Serb) ; see, also J. Cvijić, “Karst and Man”, Gl. Geogr. Društ. XI, 1925. (in Serb).
2
3
V. Dvorniković, Karakterologija Jugoslovena, Prosveta, Beograd, 1990. (in Serb)
4
known from the biblical times
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Blood feud has more or less disappeared from the Slavenophonic area, but not entirely, as some recent case in Montenegro show. On the contrary, in the Albanophonic regions, both in Albania and KiM, this devastating custom is still, unfortunately, present. Family of the killer (debtor) is confined to its house and may not appear in public, without consent of the victim’s family. According to latest polls, about 1.300 families in Albania live in the conditions of internal house prison. 1 If they manage to realize a public appearance it is due to the institution of besa, a sworn word that the “outlaw” will be spared for a definite period of time. It concerns walking to a town, working in the field, special occasions, like weddings and other feasts, etc. Besa is a peculiar Albanian institution and is strictly obeyed by the besa giver and condemned if the latter is breaking the word given. We shall dwell in some more detail on the psychological rationale of the blood feud, for this reveals the essence of the highlanders’ mentality and their sense of justice. When one reads the first paragraph of Andersen’s article (see Appendix 13),1 the first impression one gets is that of unnecessary bestiality from the murderer’s side. But every move he made was a carefully calculated gesture, and sends important massage to the environment, to the eyewitnesses and via them to the broader surroundings. The first message was directed towards potential informers “I am furiously angry and woe to those who try to report this to the police”. The very duration of the assassination and murder’s calm and slow departure from the spot means “I am not afraid”. (Incidentally, this appears the typical behaviour of mafia’s paid assassinators, as illustrated in a scene in now cult movie The Godfather by Copola). This gives to the murder a social character, as a sort of public execution. The principal aim is to intimidate the surroundings, especially potential avengers. The murder could have been executed in a less conspicuous manner, like an ambush around the corner, but the point would have been missed. The public execution means “I have the right to do this, my act is justified”. This is the message to victim’s family (tribe), otherwise this could be interpreted as an accident. And as the reporter emphasizes, the immediate witnesses got the message right. The parallel with (Sicilian) mafia, both in Sicily (and generally Italy for that matter) and USA is not accidental. In both cases those clashes reveal a sad fact - that of (co)existence of two states, one official one, the other hidden, but at the same time well present in the mind of ordinary citizens. The public murders, as described above, reveal the tip of the iceberg of the organized crime, or the “law” of the traditional societies. The parallel goes even further. Both institutions, mafia and blood feud, have arisen from the lack of the state. In Sicily, it was mafia who organized the resistance to the foreign rule (Spanish). In the case of Dinaric (and other semi-traditional societies) the absence of state as institution, under foreign rule (like Ottoman and Austrian Empires), shaped the autochthonous rules of behaviour, like blood feud. When Sicily got rid of Spanish rule, the clandestine movement, mafia, remained intact and continued to exist and operates, albeit in different direction. Likewise, when the indigenous people, like Dinaroids, got their respective ”national states”, they hardly noticed the change. We should make here a comparison between these traditional customs in Albania and non-Albanian regions, like Kosmet. In the former, local ethnic Albanians still experience the states they live in as foreign, even hostile, whereas those living in Albania have no such a resistance to the state, except to a state as an institution, as such. It makes dealing with “traditional law” even more difficult in the surrounding countries than in native Albania, as we shall elaborate later on. But even with this difference in mind, the rationale remains the same – counterpoint between the state and the traditional society. The message of the assassinator at Shkoder (Skuteri) described above to the surrounding was ”We are in conflict with each other, but we are “ours” and nobody, even the state and its law may be allowed to interfere with our own laws”. The victim’s relatives are thus The NATO aggression against Yugoslavia was over by that time, but it is difficult to estimate if an awareness of the West about the essence of the dispute over Kosmet would have changed the political decisions, had accounts like this been published before decisions were made.
1
15
reminded that they are part of the (traditional) sub state, as opposed to the state they live in. Testifying at the court against the killer means a betrayal of the “ancient laws” and is strictly forbidden. (In a sense, this unwritten law is a counterpart of mafia’s omerta, the rule of silence. Incidentally, this rule gave rise to naming a branch of mafia, Cosa Nostra. The anecdote of lethally wounded Mafioso, who revealed to the policeman the identity of assassinator as cosa nostra, 1 reveals the rationale for the naming. The policeman understood the message as indignant “leave me alone” and gave up further investigations. 2 ) Before we go on, a few words on a parallel between intre-tribal and inter-tribal implications of the murders like that at Skoder, described above. While in the former case it just reflects the nature of the society with such an ethos, since all people involved belong to the same ethnic (and national) group. Even if the murderer and murdered belong to different tribes, but within the same traditional society, it is still of local consequences. But if we now move to a society where the murder and the victim belong to different nationalities, one traditional the other standard, then the incident just described may have far reaching consequences. If somebody from traditional society revenge to somebody from his non-traditional environment, this is a signal for the most serious alert. Even if both persons involved are from the same traditional group, the act appears the most serious intimidation to the normal environment. The least one would do after witnessing (or hearing of) the accident is to mediate leaving the region. And that was exactly what non-Shqiptars did on KiM. Leka Dukagjini’s codex Since northern Albania was practically beyond the reach of state law, even the state itself, the traditional ethos had to be subjected to a number of regulations, so that the society retains some political and social stability. The serious crime, like murders, had to be sanctioned, in particular in view of the ensuing blood feud, discussed above. This has resulted in the so-called Leka Dukagjini’s codex. The origin of this collection of rules and regulations remains obscure. Albanians tend to ascribe it to a local ruler Leka Dukagjini, a contemporary of Skenderbeg. Albanians ascribe to him the codex known as Leke Dukagjini canun (or simply Canun). Another interpretation has been that in all probability Italian rulers in the late Middle Age composed the codex, Lex Ducagin, 3 which has been subsequently corrupted and converted into the name adopted today. 4 The principal aim of the Codex has been to interrupt the endless chain of blood feud revenges. It proscribed the procedures for settling the disputes and for preventing further murders. Financial or natural compensations for killed or wounded were determined and besa was required from the latest victim’s family that the blood feud is terminated. In modern times blood feud was tackled by forming so-called village councils, where old men with good reputation and high credibility were engaged in reconciliating disputed families. It is claimed by Kosmet Shqiptars’ politicians that these councils have succeeded in eliminating blood feud at Kosmet, but it has more a political propaganda background than actual facts. 5 It is worth mentioning that the same claim was made by the Enver Hoxha regime, though with probably more justification. As described in the book 1
Our business in Italian. The incident resembles much the famous affair between Ulysses and Polyphemus, with the former introducing himself to the latter as Nobody 3 From Latin dux for leader. 2
4
It illustrates, in passing, how the local (Dinaric) mythology becomes “historical fact”, as we shall see many times in the course of this book. 5 Sladjana Djurić, Osveta i kazna, Sociološko istraživanje krvne osvete na Kosovu i Metohiji, Prosveta, Niš, 1998. (in Serb). (in Serbian)
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Punishment and avenge,3 Yugoslav jurisdiction had to cope with Shqiptar ethos and adjust its punishment system to the ruling ethics. Even when the murderer is punished and imprisoned, the blood feud remains as the real threat. The prisoner has a leave of absence from the prison, when he is allowed to spend some short period at his place of living. However, the authorities must first make enquiries at the local village authorities as to the opportunity for letting the prisoner go to his place. If the local authorities conclude that it would be risky for the prisoner, he would be retained in prison. Of course, the problem remains what to do after the punishment is over and the convict must leave the prison. The point is that the Codex does not care about justice and social order. Blood feud rests on the wounded pride of people, individual or collective. The state punishment is of no concern of these proud and pathologically sensitive people, it does not relieve them from their feelings of being humiliated and their self-respect fatally damaged. In fact, the local surrounding blames the victim’s relatives for not taking steps for avenging the murdered member of the family, tribe, etc. They experience it as a common humiliation and encourage the relevant relatives “to take the blood for blood”. We mention also that the blood feud has been present for centuries at Sicily, Sardinia and Corsica, as another sign that these islands parallel our Dinaric regions in many respects. Mafia avenges have been notorious for that matter, even in USA, transferring thus the ethos of traditional societies to the modern state. We have dwelled on the blood feud in some detail not because it appears to the modern mind as a curious remnant of the ancient ethos from the traditional society. 1 It has the most profound effect on the present-day society in this part of Balkan, and has given rise to the most serious conflicts and atrocities in the region. In a sense the whole conflict between Shqiptars and Serbians, and generally between ethnic Albanians and the neighbouring peoples for that matter, may be regarded as the phenomenon of the collective blood feud. We shall elaborate this point later on, however. Here we just stress that the vanity pathologically developed within Dinaric region, coupled with an extreme sense of proudness, appear common both to Slavenophonic Herzegovians and Montenegrins and Albanophonic populations of Northern Albania, but in the case of ethnic Albanians it takes the form out of all proportions. It is for this reason that the latter do not mix with other nations, as we shall see in the following. Ethos and demography In remote mountainous areas, far away from law and state control, wealth and security of a family rests on the number of guns it possesses. Better to say on the number of people they are capable of shooting and fighting in general. Guns are needed for many purposes, in fact. First, it secures the house from the neighbours, from plunders, like highwaymen, from wild beasts like wolfs, jackals, bears, mountain lions etc. It enables the family to plunder its neighbours, plane people, to execute blood vengeance, etc. Finally, in the case a common threat from outside, like foreign invasion, join efforts of many families; tribes etc secure the successful defence. But the principal rationale for keeping the house well armed is imposition of blood vengeance and protection from the same. Strong family secures its authority and hierarchical position within the tribe and many guns deter eventual aggression from other fisses. Hence, it is imperative to have as many sons as possible and also as many guns as the family can afford. This condition sine qua non has imposed a particular social ethos among highlanders, both with respect to the outside and inside of the family. The response to this requirement has been simple: women are supposed to give as many births as possible. As a consequence highlanders’ women spend the best years of their life giving births and raising children. This phenomenon is particularly pronounced among Muslims, due to already subordinate position of women in the Islamic society in general. And when this anthropological affair is combined with political aims, as the case with Albanians is, then the high 1
As recorded, inter alia, in the Bible, as dictum “eye for eye, tooth for tooth”
17
birthrate passes into the demographic explosion. And here we come to the crux of the “Albanian question” in general and Kosovo issue in particular. Under primitive, poor conditions and lack of proper medical care, majority of births are either abortive or the babies fall victims of an improper care. As testified by Edith Durham, she was shocked by the treatment of Albanian babies, who were held in their cradles coved by blankets, so that babies could hardly breathe. All this resulted in a very high proportion of baby mortality. If we look at Figure 1, and recall that hundred years ago only three or four of those 8 children would have survived, we can understand the origin of the demographic explosion going on today with ethnic Albanians. For even under modern medical and other conditions the couple from Figure 1 would not stop at three children, since it was only after three daughters that the boy is born, and it is only males that matter in the rural traditional society, as explained above. Accidentally, Figure 1 reveals another peculiar feature of the ethnic Albanians breeding attributes – the first children are usually females, so that males appear minority within Albanians. This has given rise to a peculiar custom, known exclusively among Albanian Albanians. If the wife does not stop giving birth to daughters, all siblings consist of female offspring. Te farther feels humiliated, with grim prospects for his family. In that case one daughter, usually the eldest or boy-like one, 1 takes over the role of (unborn) son. She dresses as male, carries gun, and gradually becomes indistinguishable from males. It is her/his duty to protect the family, to exercise blood vengeance, if necessary. She/he is accepted by the whole community as male, never marries and dies as man. It is fair to say that the whole Dinaric region has been notorious for high fertility. This mountainous area appears the source of surplus population, which moves down to fertile planes and assimilates gradually into the indigenous people. All regions of Western Balkan are populated by a mixture of the autochthonous and incoming populations. If the migration is reasonably gradual, the process takes on acceptable socio-demographic forms. The problem arises in two cases: (i) the migration is massive, within a short period; (ii) the newcomers are ethnically different, speaking distinctly different language. The Kosovo issue belongs to the second, case, as we shall see later on. Highlanders and plain people As mentioned before, the physical geography conditions have shaped the mental and physical structures of these two distinct populations. In the fertile plane, which provides easily living goods, people tend to be mild, industrious, and not very cute. Their social motto is “Takes it easy” and tensions between members of kuća, the traditional counterpart of Dinaric zadruga (Slavo-phonic) and fis (Albano-phonic) regions, respectively, or between kuća, are rare and resolved in a reasonable manner. Though this kind of the old society has been largely disintegrated in modern times, the tame features of these rural people can still be recognized. On the contrary, harsh and strict rules governing internal and external relationship among highlanders are still present in Dinaric regions, especially Albanophonic. The severe living conditions, on the soil largely devastated by cutting woods, sheep and goats grazing etc, have shaped a tough and violent mental structure of these inhabitants on mountainous area. The ethos of these people might well be summarized by Hobbs’ homo homini lupus. Unlike the plane regions where the division on male and female is very weak and where the head of the (extended) family, elected regularly yearly, might be a woman, separation between male and female members of zadruga (fis) appears strong and strict. Generally, women constitute a subordinated part of the highlanders’ community, both within family and tribe. This is particularly pronounced among Muslim Albanians, where a female member of fis is regarded almost as domestic cattle. They live in separate parts of the house, never appear before a stranger, and go out only on exceptional occasions and even then under an attentive supervision of a male member. 1
In a Muslim society term tomboy would be inappropriate.
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Before the WWII women used to wear feredža, a kind of chador of the contemporary fundamentalist Muslim (Arab) women. The communist governments, both in Yugoslavia and Albania, managed with great difficulties to remove feredžas from Muslim women faces. Generally, in the urban areas situation is much more favourable, but in rural regions the old customs still prevail. Girls are married at an early age, for boy they sometimes never met before, al arranged by the older male members of the family. If a woman has to go to doctor, she is escorted by a male member of family, husband and like. The latter ensure that she will be treated by female doctor and even then the male supervises the examination. Marriage appears a business affair rather than a social event. Farther of the girl to be married gives to groom’s family a substantial amount of money and goods (usually in the form of cattle, eventually land). If marriage is to be broken for husband’s “guilt”, this money must be given back to the girl’s family, together with the girl herself. But what makes the life of Muslim women in general and ethnic Albanian in particular, often unbearable, is the pathological jealousy of husbands. It is sufficient to look at somebody’s woman to provoke a nervous reaction. Such sensitivity to women attraction provokes troubles, including murder. Almost all disputes and murders among ethnic Albanians are caused by “women affairs”, which usually triggers crime and the curse of blood vengeance. The same sensitivity prevents the disputed parties even to mention women at court and the disputes are regularly disguised as innocent quarrels over borders, trespassing and like. It should be stressed here that women themselves are never direct victims in these disputes. The common law strictly forbids killing female members of the society and if it does happen it is strongly condemned. This situation is further strongly aggravated by the institution of Gastarbeit, going to Western Europe, particularly to Germany, for work. While some other nations, like Turks, for instance, take along their family, ethnic Albanians never do that. They live in a foreign country and send home part of their earnings, visiting the family twice a year, in average. Upon arriving home, first thing to do is to make another child, leaving then the wife pregnant behind. Besides gaining another member of family, hopefully male, he secures that his wife will remain faithful during his absence. From her side, she is satisfied by the course of events, for new child means her bigger security in the family. Contrary to what we have described above, plane people suppress maximally their fertility. In order to preserve the family estate intact, the institution “one family, one child” has been practiced in modern time at Vojvodina, Slavonija, and even in the intermediate regions, like Shumadija, 1 Zagorje, 2 etc. The outcome of this suicidal practice has been the decrease of populations, at least of the autochthonous one, in these areas. The phenomenon has been dubbed “white plague”, for good reasons, for the rural regions of the non-Dinaric Balkan have been in the process of biological dying for the last century or so. (The process has been slowed down to some extent by the influx from Dinaric regions, as we shall see later). In view of what we have described above, no wonder that special relations between the highlanders and plane people have been developed during the history of Balkan and generally. This relation may be described by ”predator – pray” correlation, for good reasons. Highlanders have always looked down to planes as the “fertile soil” for robbing and plundering. It is this outlook that has prompted Hannibal and Bonaparte, to mention just two examples, to urge their soldiers, while looking at the reach Lombardi from the high Alps, to descend and “collect the harvest”. In the west Dinaric, during Ottoman occupation of Bosnia, Herzegovians regularly made guerrilla invasions to plane people and robbed them. These plunders were called uskoks, 3 and used to be highly valued by the local epic poets. The reason for the latter was that it was mainly Turks that were attacked and these exploits were painted by patriotic colours. The central part of Serbia, the core of the modern state, geographically, historically and ethnically. The Croatian counterpart of Šumadija. 3 Raiders, those who jump in. 1 2
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Two more phenomena of this kind must be mentioned in this context. They belong to the highwaymen movements and were common to Balkan generally. In Slavo-phonic regions these highwaymen were called hayduks, in Albano-phonic katchacks (from Turkish kaçak, highwayman). 1 Their common practice was to make an ambush and rob the trade caravans, usually killing the tradesmen and escorts. Since these movements were prominent during the Ottoman Empire, hayduks were considered heroes, almost freedom fighters. The best illustration of the last point is the epic poem Gorski vijenac, 2 written by Montenegrin theocratic ruler Petar PetrovicNjegosh (mid nineteen century). The political motivation for writing this poetic drama was the acute threat of bishop’s subjects converting into Muslims, under the pressure of economic poverty and famine. 3 The subject of the poem was “the extermination of poturice 4 ”, a sort of “religious cleansing”. In fact the event the poet referred to consisted of five families killing their Muslim neighbours (and relatives for that mater). The event was hardly noticed at the time it occurred. This point illustrated well another important feature of dinaric mentality – they are prone to the exaggerations out of all proportions. But it is the silent message of the legalized highwayman-ship (more precisely of uskoks’ practice) which is of a particular importance to us here. This aspect has never been exposed in the Serb/Montenegrin exegesis of this poetic drama, though the latter is extensively worked out at the grammar schools in Serbia and Montenegro. 5 Mountainous wreath has the reputation among Serbs of Serbian Iliad. (We note here that in all probability Troy was a pirate city and that this piracy was the cause of all-Greek massive assault on Priam’s town, with Hellene as an allegorical substitute of robbed goods and money, possibly as a tax. What makes the parallel mentioned even more appropriate.) In fact Turks themselves used to use this practice in well organized manner as a means to extend their state territory. Their bashibozuks, cavalry guerilla, who used to plunder areas across the borders by brutal and sudden assaults. This practice resulted in empting the ranger territories from the indigenous inhabitants, what enabled the Ottoman forces to occupy these areas easily when an official war was initiated. We mention this practice here because it was exactly the same tactics which Kosmet Albanians exercised after the UNMIK (United Nations Mission in Kosovo) occupied Kosmet and the local army control was handed over to ethnic Albanians. We shall return to this point later on. Here we mention raids made by Albanians from the newly founded state of Albania, after WWI. These raids into KiM become so annoying that Serbian army was forced to enter Albanian territory in order to clean the region from the aggressive montagnards. Albanian government then addressed the newly founded League of Nations for protection and the latter ordered Serbian forces to withdraw. Serbian government did not take it serious and newspapers commented the requirements by “Let us see who is stronger – Serbian army or League of Nation?” In fact, it was the first intervention of new international organization founded to ensure the world’s peace and it was important that the intervention succeed. Serbia had to comply and withdraw her forces from Albania. The practice of haydukship remained on Balkan even after the Ottoman Empire and was uprooted in Serbia only in late 19th century. On Kosmet this tradition has been alive even to this day. One of permanent testimonies of the practice of robbery is the gorge Katchanik (Kaçanik), between Serbia and Macedonia. The name of this unavoidable passage for those traveling between these regions has been derived from katchak, highwayman in Albanian. Only under a heavy armed escort was it possible and advisable for caravans to go through the gorge. Serb epic poetry has recorded this We mention here that Greeks had their armatolies, as counterpart of Slavic hayducs, who had reputation of freedom fighters too. 2 Mountainous wreath, in Serb. 3 A common phenomenon in Dinaric regions, practically absent among plane people. 4 The common (pejorative) name of all Slavo-phonic people who accepted Muslim religion, in particular those who did it for the opportunistic reasons. 5 Some people even know the poem by hart, as the case with the most famous of all Dinaroids, Nikola Tesla, was. 1
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usage of Katchanik, albeit in an allegorical form, in the poem on duel between Marko Kraljević (Serb epic hero, otherwise historic ruler) and Mussa 1 Kesedžija (his ethnic-Albanian counterpart). 2 The duel resembles that between Achilles and Hector and the (anonymous) poet showed equal sympathy for both adversaries, just as its famous Greek counterpart did the same regarding Greek and Trojan heroes. A very undesirable consequence of haydukship was that state allowed civilians to keep and carry guns, as protection from highwaymen. Even Turks tolerated this within Christian provinces. But state with armed civilians is not a state at all. It is well illustrated by uprisings within Ottoman Empire, which were successful, at least temporarily, just owing to the armed rebellious populations, as the case of Serb uprisings in1804 and 1815 shows. When king Milan Obrenović in the newly independent Serbia tried in 1883 to collect weaponry from peasants in the East Serbia, since he established the regular army, it resulted in an armed rebellion (Timochka buna), which the government suppressed only with great efforts. As we shall see later, this phenomenon will be the cause of many troubles with ethnic Albanian populations, both in Serbia and Albania. If one realizes that it is the highlanders who are troublemakers in Western Balkan, with their cult of weaponry, he can appreciate this devastating effect on the weakly civilized societies in the region. How much the guerrilla tradition is esteemed in modern Yugoslavia testifies the number of soccer clubs with name Hajduk (highwayman), including the most popular one in Croatia from Split. At Sinj in Croatia every year there is the festival called Sinjska alka, with competitors in the traditional military uniforms, trying to pick up a ring by their spears, riding horses, which commemorates the times of Uskoks and their raids across the Turkish border. An overwhelming majority of military leaders in the Serb uprisings in 19th century were actual or former hayduks, 3 including the supreme commander Karadjordje (Karageorgie) 4 . As we shall see later on, this guerrilla tradition was revived in Yugoslavia, first in Macedonia just before Balkan wars (1912-1913), during WWII (partisans and chetniks), then in the period of the civil wars (1991-1999) and finally at Kosmet (1998-1999). Who are Albanians ? Une nation est une societe unie par des illusions sur ses ancestres et par la haine commune de ses voisins. [Nation is a society unified by the illusions about its ancestors and common hatred toward their neighbours]. Ernest Renan In Europe 19th century has witnesses the rise of (romantic) nationalisms, which forged contemporary nations Many European states, based on the concept of ethnicity, have been founded at the time, including Serbia and Montenegro, Greece, Bulgaria and Romania. A number of contemporary (proto)nations remained without proper states, as the case with Slovenians, Croatians, Macedonians and ethnic Albanians was. Some of these solved their national aspirations via common states, like Croatians, Slovenians and Macedonians, at least temporarily. Balkan Albanians, who never had a national stat before, started their struggle fro national state rather late, relative to the other nations in the region, for understandable reasons. Unlike other nationalities Turkish transliteration of Moses, commonly used in Serbia for naming bulls. Kesedžija in Serb means purse (bag) cutter, highwayman. 3 Arabic for outlaw (pron. hidouc). Turkish haydud, haydut (highwayman). Hungarian hayduk, plural of haydu (soldier). 4 Black George in Serb. The nickname speaks about his character for himself. Contrary to popular believe it was Serbs who gave him this epithet, not Turks. 1 2
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mentioned, Albanians had first to forge the concept of Albanian nation, before attempting to found a national state. Since their homeland was much retarded in every respect, the initiative for the first stage mentioned came from Albanians living outside proper Albania. The first concrete action in that direction was made at Prizren, which lies on the traditional Serbian ground. The so-called Prizren League was founded in 1878, 1 the same year when Serbia and Montenegro were definitely recognized by the European community as sovereign and independent states. Prizren was not only in Serbia, but was her capital during the reign of Stefan Dushan, Serbian king (later tsar) (13081355). This status of Prizren implies, without checking the maps that it was at the core of Serbian territory. (We shall consider the ethnic distribution in the area in relevant periods later on.) While Serbs who lived on the territory of the present day Serbia had already achieved the national consensus of their identity, other South Slavic ethnicities were still striving for this end. In particular Slavo-phonic people living in then Austro-Hungary undertook steps to identify themselves and thus to gain some kind of autonomy or even independence. These efforts were partly in concordance with aims of Serbs, both Serbian and non-Serbian, but at some points in clash with them. In particular Croats were very eager to contrive their own nationality, for what they sometimes used a number of extreme arguments and means. Renowned Serbian linguist, ethnologist and historian, Vuk Stefanović-Karadžić used to say ironically, within the context, that Croats had everything, except land, people and language. Present day Croatia was under AustroHungarian rule, with land consisting of Croatia proper, Slavonia and Dalmatia, with a vague determination of the nationality of people living in these regions. The language was also poorly determined, and among several dialect option, Croat cultural leaders chose the so-called štocavic dialect, the variant of the Slavo-phonic language spoken in Serbia. 2 That nationalism often has nothing to do with anthropology and race shows the case of the most prominent leader of Croat cultural renewal, so-called Illyric movement. This leader, Ljudevit Gaj (Lyudevit Gay) was of German origin (both parents were purely Germans). The term Illyric deserves, however, our particular attention. Prehistory, history and mythology In attempting to define, or determine their national identities, the principal aim of nationalistic leaders is usually to display presumed antiquity of their presumed nation. Leaders of Illyrian (Croat) movement were no exception. (We note, in passing, that this passionate striving for antiquity was not the romantic era invention. Around the New Era, disputes between Jewish community in Alexandria and Greeks and Egyptians over “cultural supremacy” took the form of Jewish claims of their supreme antiquity. Jewish writer Joseph Flavius wrote the book entitled Jewish Antiquity (a kind of remake of the Old Testament), 3 and dedicated another treatise specifically devoted to the disputed “Jewish supremacy” regarding the antiquity of the nations in the region. 4 These claims appear conspicuous attempts to substitute present (feelings of) inferiority by alleged “past superiority”). Now, what was “Illyrian” in this Croat claims? It is generally believed that the coinage was aimed at disguising a genuine political ambition (as a part of a general nationalistic movement) in cultural clothing. But a more thorough analysis reveals that the matter is far from tactical moves. The temptations of the “call of remote past” was so appealing, that some historians took the “Illyrian hypothesis” for serious, claiming that all Slavs are of Illyrian descent. These claims were 1
After a meeting of Albanian leaders in Bajrakli Mosque at Prizren. We shall not dwell on this issue here, but direct interesting readers to the comprehensive article by V. Sotirović, “National Identity: Who are the Albanians?" The Illyrian Anthroponomy and the Ethnogenesis of the Albanians”, Liaudies Kultūra, vol. 3, No 84 (2002) pp. 31–43, Vilnius, Lithuania. 2
3
Flavius Josephus, “The Atiquities of the Jews”, in J. Flavius, Complete works, p. 27, Nelson & Sons, London, 1859.
4
J. Flavius, Against Apion, ibid, p. 784
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particularly popular among South Slavs at a time (16th to early 19th centuries), and even some authors from Poland and Russia accepted them for genuine historical records. According to these claims, the South Slavs were descendants of Balkan Illyrians and are thus autochthonous populations in the region. These Slavs were recognized by the surrounding nations. like Greeks, as Illyrians. In the early Middle Age one group of these Slavs migrated to Central Europe (Western Slavs), whereas one group moved to Eastern Europe (Eastern Slavs). According to some medieval authors, South Slavs descend from Illyrians, Thracians and Macedonians. Hence, Alexander, Constantine, Diocletian and St. Hieronymus were nobody else but Slavs. This line of thought was particularly popular among Renaissance, Reformation and Counter-Reformation South Slavs. Vinko Priboević from Dubrovnik (Ragusa) wrote that all Slavs speak one common “our”, “Illyric”, “Slavic” language. 1 Mavro Orbini, a renowned author of his time (De Regno Sclavorum, 1601) and Bartol Kašić (Institutionem Linguae Illyricae, 1604) also championed the thesis of Illyrian origin of all South Slavs. Count Djordje Branković (1645-1711), a Serb nobleman from Transylvania, 2 who was first accepted by Austria as the hair of Serb despots Branković, but when he tried to found an independent Serbian state on Austrian territory was dismissed as imposter. 3 Djordje wrote in 1688 a political programme for South Slavs unification into free, independent state he called Illyrian Kingdom. It is interesting to note that Orbini’s treatise was translated into Russian in 1722. Finally, as we mentioned above, the Croatian national renewal movement in mid-19th century was launched under the name “Illyrian movement”. 4 Before we go on with “Illyrization of Balkan” a few words on some features of the “Illyrian (hypo)thesis” are in order. What is the common characteristic of the claims just mentioned? First, the efforts to establish the South Slavs not only as autochthonous Balkan population, but also as the progenitor of all Slavs. Another important point is to be noticed. All authors mentioned did not belong to the core of the Slavic territories at the time, but came from its margins. All of them, in fact, were part of the surrounding, more culturally advanced regions, some of them at least partially foreign to the proper Slavic populations. As we shall see immediately, this pattern of “Illyrization” will be followed closely by ethnic Albanians, in their endeavor to establish Albanian nation and endow it with territory and language. Who were Illyrs? This Indo-European population inhabited Western Balkan and some regions to the north-west of Balkan Peninsula. 5 They never developed the letter and thus did not enter the history by their own means. Almost all we know about them came from Greek and Roman testimonies - names of tribes, rulers and kings and queens. They were regarded hardy and violent people, engaged mainly in plundering lowlands and Adriatic Sea piracy. The Romans raised several time massive offensives in order to suppress piracy. When they conquered Illyrians Roman emperors used to make use of them as military barrier against other barbarians. Thus the entire Illyricum served as a bulwark against attacks from Central and Eastern European nations. Because they played prominent role in the military sector of the Roman Empire (they were employed as praetorian guard, for instance), 6
V. Priboević, On Origin and History of the Slavs, 1532, Venice. He claimed to be the heir of the Branković dynasty, the last Serbian (vassal) ruling family, before the final fall of the Serbian State to Ottoman Empire. 3 It was at this time that Austria launched the false thesis that Vuk Branković, the progenitor of Branković dynasty, betrayed duke Lazar at the Kosovo battle (1389). 4 V. Sotirović, Liaudies Kultūra, vol. 3, No 84 (2002) pp. 31–43, Vilnius, Lithuania. 1 2
5
An Illyrian tribe occupied territory close to the present day Vienna On one of Albanian websites it is proudly (and out of context) stated that Albania provides military support to Americans in Afghanistan and Iraq.
6
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during turmoil times, when military leaders used to seize power, a number of these emperors, like Diocletian, were of Illyrian origin. 1 When in 6th and 7th centuries AD Slavs invaded Balkan Peninsular, they pushed local population into mountainous regions, we call today Dinaric area. Dinaroids, Slavo-phonic and Albano-phonic alike, are principally of Illyric origin, although it comes mainly by implication rather than by a direct evidence. In the absence of material artifact which may be attributed to Illyrians with certainty, what remains in making links with this ancient tribal population appears inevitably of conjectural nature. In particular the mental structure of modern Dinaroids matches closely the anthropic features one attributes to Illyrians. As we shall see many times during our considerations, language and religious differences among Dinaroids are of minor importance, compared with the principal common attributes we just mentioned. One of these features which are of a particular concern to us is their notorious stubbornness and inflexibility. As many psychiatrists testify, in particular those dealing with convicts, it appears practically impossible to “reach their mind”, unlike other patients. (We shall come to this point again, in particular when dealing with Slobodan Miloshević and other Dinaroids involved in the «civil wars» in Yugoslavia 1991-1995). 2 We quotesome additional features of Dinaroids, of importanc efor understanding events which occured on Balkan inthe last hundred years. Mixing of reality as it is and as they want tobe (as they fancy). One of ensuingeffects have been numerous demands in politics and otherwise, based on false images of history or actual political situation. The lack of appreciation of state as an institution. This has come as a consequence of their millennia of living at the margins of existing states, foreign or not. They never experienced states as their own and always tried to take advantage of its marginal position and profit maximally, without feeling any responsibility for the common welfare. An extreme impulse for striving for power. Since the male population of Dinaroids, as the dominant familiar and social factor, was never engaged in production and used to be engaged in plundering and steeling, they feel strong repulsion towards manual work and always try to rule the surroundings instead. Weaponry cult is strongly present among Dinaroids, and appears particularly prominent with ethnic Albanians. This cult is, of course, linked with the previous point. This cult of guns deserves our particular attention, for it will play a decisive role in the events which are of our further concern. We shall quote a few examples as illustrations of the point. When Serbian army, in its retreat from Serbia in 1915, 3 before the powerful German army, lead by marshal Makensen, was crossing Albania, 4 many of them lost their life because they carried guns. Not only they were killed by Albanians while the exhausted soldiers were crossing Albanian mountains, but some of them were assassinated while sleeping in Albanian houses. The latter instance bears particular weight to the point, bearing in mind the Albanian traditional hospitality, in particular their cult of protecting guests. 5 When receiving guns at the beginning of their military service in Yugoslav army, many ethnic Albanian conscripts used to kiss the rifle. 6 The rifle is considered by Albanians as a precious tool This situation will repeat many times during Balkan history, in particular during WWII and civil wars in Yugoslavia (1991-1995). 2 In fact, the persistence of blood feud rests on this feature of Dinaroids. 3 The estimate is that around 350.000 Serbians, soldiers and civil alike, lost their life during this retreat through Albania; the crossing was dubbed “Serbian Golgotha”. 4 With permission of Essad-pasha, a great friend of Serbs, whom the latter had helped in his political activities. 5 In some cases Serbian soldiers retaliated for these murders, like setting houses to fire. 6 When a captain asked such a conscript why he kissed the gun, he obtained this remarkable answer: “I will need it some day”. 1
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and almost the best friend. The same tradition was present among Montenegrins, as the many instances in the dramatic poem Mountainous wreath, mentioned earlier, testify. 1 When the scandal of the so-called pyramidal bank affair took place in Albania in 1997, it caused such a revolt of the deceived Albanians that the government of Sali Berisha was at the brink to collapse. The latter then decided to resort to the ultimate means in the attempt to save the government (and life, for that matter). The government decided to have the army magazines open and the crowd rushed in and took all the weaponry out. The regime was saved, and majority of the weaponry found its way to Kosovo. (We shall come to this point again in some more detail later on). 2 During these riots Albania was practically deprived of state as an institution for several days. After the riots were over, the state was reinstituted formally, but practically it has never recovered again Society with armed civilians can not have real state, for the government possesses no control over her citizens, particularly juristic order. As for the revolt of the gamblers towards their authorities, it was partly justified. For the latter not only knew what was going on with those “banks”, but in all probability was directly involved in the “organized robbery” of her greedy subjects. This was certainly the case with Miloshević's regime in Serbia, which played the role of the partner both to “Dafinment bank” and Jezda’s bank. The gray eminence behind Mrs Dafina Milanović turned out to be certain Clara Mandić, an obscure figure, 3 with close relation with Milošević family. She made company to Marko Milošević, son of Slobodan Milošević, when he was visiting Israel. It was surely a part of the whole scheme, for both Dafina and Jezda fled from Serbia to Israel, with the money, of course. 4 Albanians and Illyrs Ethnic Albanians did not emerge from the historical obscurity until 9th c. AD. Their ethnic origin remains still very vague and no historical consensus has been reached on the subject until now. As we mentioned before, Albanians became aware of “the importance of being nation” late, compared with other Balkan ethnicities. This handicap, however, Albanian nationalist leaders tried to turn into advantage. Since a number of European historians offered a variety of (hypo)theses on the subject, they could adopt those which suited their purposes the best. As we mentioned before regarding similar problems which Croat nationalists from19th century. Faced with the acute lack of relevant ingredients for forging the nation, what they needed were land, people and language. Let us consider each of the items separately. Land. Proto-Albanian populations inhabited unknown land before 9th c. AD. The present day Albanian land used to be part of many kingdoms during the previous historical periods, from Roman and Byzantine empires, to Serb dukes, Venetian and Serb kingdoms, Ottoman Empire, until the independent Albanian state was founded (practically) by Austro-Hungary in 1912, as a barrier between Serbia and Adriatic coast. Albanian nationalists had thus to resort to acquiring some historical state as their predecessor. Illyrians and their states seemed to be the best offer on the market, 5 for good reasons. They vanished from the historical scene long time ago, and thus could not complain. Second, their language was extinct and could be safely declared as proto-Albanian. The principal archeological find which is supposed to corroborate the claims about IllyrianAlbanian continuity is the so-called Koman Culture, which stretches from Skadar (Skoder) to Ohrid Lake. In order to dismiss claims of Yugoslav archeologists that this culture from 7th-8th c. AD is of Slavic or Roman-Byzantine character, Albanians wiped out all traces of Slavic presence in the The last chapter of the poem, which concerns the broken gun of Vuk Mandušić, is a true apotheosis of weapons. It has been estimated that about 700.000. weaponry was “taken over” by “revolting civilians”, with about a half of them sold to Kosovo “civilians”. 3 She turned out to be nymphomaniac. 4 They both returned to Serbia, and were arrested. D. Milanović died of cancer in 2008. 5 For the alternative offers, like Dacian one, see, e.g. V. Sotirović, ibid. 1 2
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area, mainly by Albanizing Slavic populations and toponyms in the area, during the rule of Enver Hozha (1945-1985). 1 (As we will argue later, this is what is actually going on in Kosmet, under the “protection” of UNMIK and KFOR (Kosovo Force). People: Ethnic Albanians used to present a tiny population, concentrated predominantly on the northern (high) Albania. The present day number of this population should not deceive modern historians and demographers, for the following reasons. First, there has been a demographic explosion of ethnic Albanians, starting at the beginning of 20th century, 2 which has dramatically changed the relative proportions of the existing ethnic communities in the area. Second, since the Ottoman Empire rule on Balkan, noticeable Albanization of the Slavo-phonic people has been carried out. This followed, in fact, extensive conversions of Albano-phonic population to Muslim religion, partly by force, partly voluntarily. This made Albanians more loyal and trust-worthy Turkish subjects, what provided the latter with a privileged position with regard to Christian population, Greek Orthodox and Roman Catholic alike. Here we quote an instance in point. At the beginning of 20th century a forced conversion of Kosmet Serbs was started. Serbs complained to Russian consulate and asked for help from Russia. The latter intervened at Porta in Istanbul, and the conversion was interrupted immediately. This resulted in situations that, for instance, half of a village was Serb and half Albanian, though the entire village was Serb in fact. Even after WWII there were families where grandfathers did not speak Albanian, but Serb only. The remnants of this shift from Slavic to Albanian ethnicity sometimes show up in strange phenomena. Many frescoes in Serb (Greek Orthodox) churches and monasteries at Kosmet have been damaged in a strange way. Namely, the eyes of saints and Serb kings (donators) have been dug out. The scholars have interpreted this as instances of wildness and vandalism of Shqiptars, but the explanation is much more subtle. It is widely believed by common people that the plastic from the saints’ eyes could help cure the blindness. But, at the same time, true believer would never commit such and act of primitivism in the holy places. Only those who believe the magic power of the fresco eyes, but are not committed to the relevant church, dare to commit such a superstition, blasphemous misdeed. These are presumably recent Muslim proselytes, former Greek Orthodox Serbs. 3 The situation just described resembles much similar one with Croats and their endeavor to form respectable nation. During the so-called Independent state of Croatia, a puppet fascist construction during WWII, Fascist nationalists Ustashas had plan as to how to strengthen the nation and state of Croatia. The plan consisted, as Mile Budak put it, in converting one third of Serbs into Roman Catholic faith (as the preliminary stage of Croatization), one third would be banished from Croatia and one third exterminated. The plan has been carried out with considerable success. The politics of Shqiptars at Kosmet followed closely this tactics, especially during WWII, when Kosmet was mainly a part of Greater Albania, protected by fascist Italy. 4 The irony of this enterprise was that majority of Serbs, victims of Ustashas slaughter and violence, were descendants of Serbs fled from Kosovo and Metohija centuries ago and settled in the western Balkan in Austria. And when in 1995 Croat government banished Krajina Serbs, about 200.000. of them, from Croatia, they arrived again to Serbia. Overwhelming majority settled in Vojvodina, a smaller number in Central Serbia and a small part at Kosmet. Reaction of local Shqiptars was so violent , that all refugees were to be withdrawn from the region and settled somewhere else. (We shall come to this point later, too). This instance resembles much that one from the anecdote about the numerologist, caught “on the spot” while cutting off the corner of the pyramid, which disturbed his numerical contrivance. 2 Since this point will be the principal subject in our further considerations, we will not dwell on it here. 3 However, the cases of Shiptar involvement can not be excluded. Ethnic Albanians, who were converted from Christianity centuries ago, still retain the memory of their previous faith, as a sort of archetype. 4 We mention here the case of a political leader from KiM, Ali Shukria, whose mother tongue is Turkish and Turkish language is spoken at his home, but who considers himself a Shiptar. 1
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Albanian language Albanian language appears a distinct part of the Indo-European family, as one of the Eastern branch, together with Indo-Iranian, Armenian and Balto-Slavonic (satem-group). 1 It has two dialects, Gheg (spoken on the North) and Tosk (practiced in the central and south Albania). It is an admixture of an authentic language and Italian and Slav (mainly Serb) ones. The claims of Albanian nationalists that their language is derived directly from the ancient Illyric one has never been supported by proper linguistic evidence. As the British linguist Potter put it: 1 “Some would associate it with extinct Illirian, but in so doing they proceed from little known to the unknown. As Andre Martinet has sometimes shrewdly observed, fashionable researchers into Proto-Indo-European favour either the Illirian or the laryngeals, and we really know precious little about either. Albanian has two dialects : Gheg in the north and Tosk in the south. As the result of successive domination by Venetians and Turks, its vocabulary is mixed. Unfortunately we know little about its history because, apart from legal documents, no literature survives that is older than the seventeenth century. In this respect Albanian presents a marked contrast to Greek or Hellenic which vies with Hittite and Sanskrit for the place as the most antique of all Indo-European tongues. Recent decipherment of Linear B Mycenaean script (page 93) has antedated the beginnings of Greek by three centuries back to a time long before the sack of Troy (1183 B.C.) described by Homer in his Iliad.” Since ancient Illyrs never left any trace of literacy, their language appears totally unknown. The claim of modern Albanians to have inherited Illyric language can be neither proved nor disproved. It can not have a scientific character therefore, for it does not satisfy the basic criterion of falsificability, in the Popperian sense. We quote another author on the subject:2 The picture which Albanian science makes about the early history of their own nation is simplified, uncritical and appears contrived. Linguistic proofs about Illyrian-Albanian kinship are almost absent. Potter’s comments were provoked by various hypotheses launched by some western authors. Thus, late 19th century Austrian philologist Gustav Meyer argued that the contemporary Albanian language was a dialect of Illyrian language, more precisely, its latest development. From a hypothesis to theory there is but one step, which modern Albanian nationalists were ready to make, linguists or non-linguists alike. If one may appreciate the motivation of the Albanian nationalists to project their newly contrived awareness of national Albanian identity, similar claims by nonAlbanian authors can not be considered by intellectual extravagances. Thus, the zealous communist leader, Montenegrin Milovan Djilas wrote: “The Albanians are the most ancient Balkan people – older than the Slavs, and even the ancient Greeks”. If these words by one of Montenegrins, who consider themselves (at least some of them) to be of Illyric origin, may be understood as claims for their on antiquity, thesis due to Andre Marlaux, who wrote : “Athens was, alas no more than an Albanian village”, 3 had surely different rationale. The author might have had intentions to chock readers, as the every title of his book corroborates, but one might think of more serious 1
The western branch consists of Greek, Italic, Celtic and Germanic. (centum-group)
2
P. Bartl, Albanien, von Mittelalter bis zur Gegenwart, Verlag Friedrich Pustet, Regensburg, 1995
3
A. Marlaux, Anti-Memoires, New York, 1968, p. 33.
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motivations, albeit subconscious ones. Athens meant something to European (and world) culture and civilization, what was bothering some Christian intellectuals, especially religious ones. The idea of an illiterate Balkan tribe to be progenitor of European culture could not be more cynical (and extravagant for that matter), though one can not exclude the possibility of self-irony. 1 The problem is that in the hands of frustrated intellectuals those extravagances are taken serious. If Albanians are descendants of Illyrians, why not of some even more ancient inhabitants of Balkan Peninsular? Since it is generally believed that the most ancient Balkan people were Pelasgians, some Albanian authors launched the thesis that both Illyrians and modern Albanians descend from of them. This claim nicely matches the Marlaux’s conjecture (sic) about Athens, since some scholars believe that Athenians were of the Pelasgian blood, as the latter were the indigenous population of Attica. 2 The Albanian “retrospective optimism”, as outlined above, is not a unique Albanian phenomenon. We saw above about the same Croat “project” of the Illyrian movement. In similar vain Serb nationalistic authors argued for the Serb antiquity. Book entitled as ”Serbs - the most ancient people” were abundant during Milošević’s era. One author from Chicago, Jovan Deretić, (not to be confused with professor Jovan Deretić from the Belgrade University) claimed in his book on the same subject,4 that it was Serbs who were the elite force in the army of Alexander and thus responsible for his victorious conquering the world (DZIVO GUNDULIC). The rationale of all those claims was the noticed similarity between modern Serb and ancient lexicons, like Greek, Sanscrite etc. But all this appears modest compared with fancies of some Albanian authors. According to them Alexander himself and his Macedonians were Illyrians, and thus Albanians. Aphrodite was spared neither (her name appears symphonic with Albanian mirdita, Drita etc). (Generally, the past appears very prosperous for some Albanians in that respect). The thesis of Illyrian origin has been seriously chalenged by a number of modern authors, in particular linguists. The most convincing of the alternative hypotheses was that of Dacian ethnical origin of modern Albanians. According to this theory, ancestors of ethnic Albanians came to the present day Albania from the Roman Province Moesia Superior (present-day Serbia), situated around the river Morava, around 1000 BC. At ancient times this region was the zone of Dacian ethnicity. Hence, modern Albanians can be of Dacian, but not of Illyrian origin. Linguistic support for this thesis comes from the terminology of Albanian language referning to littoral terms, which appears borrowed from the surrounding people, testifying that Albanians were not originally coastal people. 3 The same rationale applies to South Slavs, who borowed more (for sea) from Latin (mare), vino for wine as well, etc. As for the Greek language, it turns out that surprisingly few ancient Greek loanwords exist in modern Albanian language. Hence, the original homeland of Albanians should be searched in present day Romania or Serbia. According to these investigations, modern Albanian language is a semi-Romanized Dacian-Moesian tangue, just as Romanian language is Romanized Dacian-Moesian one. To speak Illyrian and not to speak Illyrian Why is so important to convince the world that present day Albanian tongue is Illyrian, or at least derived from it? As we have seen before, the whole Dinaric region appears of Illyrian origin, at least in part. Since ancient Illyrs were spread over a vast area of the present West Balkan, it is not only ethnic Albanians who may claim the status of «indigeneous population». There is a difference, however, between Slavo-phonic and Albano-phonic Diaroids in this respect. In the 1
We note here, in the same context, a statement of a Byzantine author, who claimed “Serbs are the most ancient people, I am quite certain about that”. Needless to say this statement has been very popular among some Serb scholars (sic). 2 See, e.g. Robert Graves, The Greek Myths, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1966. 3
As mentioned elsewhere, Dacian term hot designates highwayman.
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former the Slavic element prevailed, wereas in the latter Albanian language remains distinct from the surrounding people. The situation appears similar to the case of Basques, whose language is unique in Europe (and otherwise), as Gorgian turns out a unique tongue on the Euro-Asiatic continent. 1 Regarding the very term Illyrian one should note that during the time of Diocletian (284-305) the whole western Balkanwas organized as Praefectura Illyricum. It is mainly due to this administrtive name that the term Illyrians was preserved and given to people living tere, including South Slavs and Albanians. This name disappeared in the 7th century, in the time of Slavic migration to Balkan. As for the term Albanian it was derived from the name of one of Illyrian tribes Albanoi, which was subsequently ascribed to all Illyrian tribes. Albanian language, as spoken tangue, was, accordingly mentioned for the first time in a manuscript from Dubrovnik, as lingua albanesesca, in 1285. Some Bizantine sources from 13th century called the region between Drim River and Skadar Lake Arbanon (Arber). Both Turks and Serbs called people settled in Albania Arbanasi, or Arnauti. As for Albanians they called themselves, before subjugated to Ottoman Empire, Arbërësh/Arbënesh. Whether Albanian language is linked with IIlyrian or not, the fact that it is completely noninteligent to other neighbouring (and otherwise) people has resulted in further isolation of this mountainous community. This isolation has further accentuated the conservation of the traditional society character of Albano-phonic highlanders. It is worth mentioning here that their dialect, Gheg, is inteligible to the rest of Albanians, who speak Tosk, but with difficulties. The uniquness of Albanian language has promoted a number of features of this population which will prove of great importance to our issue. First, since very few of people outside Albanian community were ready to learn Albanian language, communication with the external world had to be made through those Albanians who spoke other languages, like Serb, Greek, Italian, etc. This gave Albanians an advantage of possesing «a secret code», which in some affairs, like smuggling, mafia-like activities, political movement etc, proved of crucial importance. It is partly for this effect that Albanian mafia appears so efficase and almost impossible to break. It compets succesfuly with Italian mafia, Chanise and other organised crime societies. The other important feature requiried from mafia to be unbrokable is the blood linkage of the members of a mafia unit. This prerequisit has been amptly provided by the fis orgnisation of the Albanian community, discussed before. One fis may comprise a hundered mambers, who can suply tens of guns and drug and weaponry smugglers, drug dealers etc. They may communicate among themselves freely, without fear that the business is broken. It is true that similar situation appears among Sicilians of the same trade, but Italians have been fully incorporated into American society and many FBI members are of the Italian origin. If we notice that this crimial business is almost inevitably associated with the political aims, and thus has a fasade of patriotism, then the inwardnes of the mafia organisation of Albanian diaspora appears quite natural and understandable. Greater Albania When at the Berlin Congress in 1878 Serbia and Montenegro were recognized as sovereign states, Albanian representatives tried to initiate the same for their own state. They founded League of Albanians at Prizren (Metohija), so-called Prizren League, mentioned earlier. This initiative failed, with Bismarck’s explicit rejection to speak about Albanian nationality as nonexistent. At the same time the national movement Rilindja was initiated, as an ideological support for the national striving. It was not insignificant that Rilindja meant Renaissance (Revival), suggesting that it was concerned not with forging new nationality, but just reviving an old one. At this instance the Albanian race for forging their own nation and consequently own state was trigged. With this justifiable aim came along, however, unjustifiable means, as consequence of insatiable thirst for acquiring the necessary prerequisites for a sovereign state: land, people and language (as the 1
Japanese language is likewise unique, though it has some resemblance to Korean one.
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landmark of an authentic history). Their leaders considered that this legitimate end justified any available means, as Machiavelli put it. 1 We saw this point when mentioning the case of Greater Croatia and shall return to it again in the case of Greater Serbia. As mentioned before, Albania was founded in 1912 after the First Balkan war, fought between Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria against the Ottoman Empire. Majority of Turks in those three countries left them for Asia Minor, some of them voluntarily, some expelled. A small minority of those Turks is still extant at Kosmet. Albania was founded on the insistence of Austro-Hungary, as a barrier between growing Serbia and the Adriatic Sea. As expected, the state borders could not delimit exactly the ethnical distribution, so that some Serbs, Greeks and Montenegrins remained in Albania and some ethnic Albanians were left in these countries too. When looking at the present day ethnic distribution one may have impression that these ”ethnic remnants” were unequally distributed and that too many Albanians were left outside the homeland. But this impression is not only deceiving, but points into the opposite direction, as we shall see later. Two decisive phenomena have contributed to this situation. We consider them now. Migrations. These can be split into two categories: anthropological and political. The first refers to the common tendency highlanders to move to lowlands, as mentioned in the general case of Dinaroids. North Albanian mountaineers used to migrate to the Albanian plane (Central Albania), but equally to Metohija and then Kosovo (proper), during the Turkish rule. Apart form the slow individual migrations, ever present in such situations, there is what Serb ethnologist and ethnographer Jovan Cvijić dubbed metanastatic migration. 2 Namely, ever after an abortive uprising or rebellion within Ottoman Empire (or elsewhere) people from the region used to find their escape from the certain retaliation by moving to more secure areas. It happened many time with Serbs from Bosnia and Herzegovina, who used to move to Serbia (independent or occupied alike), with Serbs and Albanians from Kosmet moving to north Serbia or Austria from Turkey, Serbs from the so-called independent State of Croatia (during the WWII), Serbs from Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina during the civil wars in Yugoslavia in 1990-thies, Albanians and non-Albanians from Kosmet during the NATO raids on Yugoslavia in 1999. In the case of rebellions on the smaller scale the very government moves forcibly some population, as many villages in the present-day Turkey, populated by Bosnians, testify. Political migrations are motivated by governments’ desires to expand its population into neighbouring areas so as to broaden its control and subsequently its state. Some of these controlled migrations appear counter-measures against the first ones, in order to balance the demographic disequilibrium. We shall come to this point when talking about Kosovo and Metohija. Demographic expansion. This time it concerns the misbalance in the birthrate of two populations in close contact, sharing the same territory. Ethnic Albanians have by far the biggest birthrate in Europe, matching those of Central Africa. This phenomenon has resulted in the demographic explosion, in particular in the non-Albanian regions, where a considerable number of ethnic Albanians live. It concerns Serbia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Greece. (We shall consider the question as to whether this demographic explosion is a natural process only, or if it is dictated and supported by political means and aims, later on). Both effects mentioned above have resulted in the misbalance in the demographic content within the areas bordering Albania, mentioned above. When the borders in 1913 were drawn, ethnic Albanians were but small part of the contemporary populations in western Macedonia, Kosovo and Metohija in Serbia, eastern Montenegro and north-west Greece (Epir, which Albanian Albanians call Cameria, with clear message to Greece). We note here that the meaning of his famous slogan “The aim determines the means” has often been distorted. Into “The aim justifies the means”. 2 From Greek μέτα (after) and ανάστασις (uprising). 1
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In view of all this claims of Albanian leaders on the territories where ethnic Albanians are majority now, reminds one of that appeal of a lawyer, who defends man accused of killing his parents, addressing the jury with “Gentlemen jury, will you really have hart to sentence this orphan?” To these two points one should add another, important for understanding the Albanian question. It is tightly linked with the issue of ethnic Albanians outside Albania and the project of Greater Albania. One of arguments for interpreting the present demographic distribution has always been the ethnical purity of the proper Albania. Namely it has been always claimed, and supported by statistical data, that this “purity” testifies the unjust drawing of borders between Albania and the neighbouring countries. The argument goes like this. Albania is founded on the ground where only ethnic Albanians live, whereas the bordering areas with mixed populations were delivered to the adjacent states. The statistic which should corroborate these claims is the following: In the presentday Albania live 95% ethnic Albanians, 3% Greeks and the rest go to Slavs and other minorities. 1 These data, however, are false. 2 According to Greek records, there are about 400.000. Greeks in Albania, what constitutes 12% of the overall population. As for the other minorities, situation is similar – their number is officially suppressed. We know that Slavo-phonic Albanians are not allowed to speak Slavic language (Serb or Macedonian), as Yugoslav journalist found many times while visiting Albania. The above estimate is further corroborated by the statistic of confessional distribution in Albania: 70% Muslim, 20% Greek-Orthodox and 10% Roman Catholics. Those 20% of orthodox confession are not allowed to declare themselves as non-Albanians, but nevertheless belong to Greeks, Serbs, Montenegrins and Macedonians. Roman Catholics are ethnic Albanians from Northern Albania. But this is not the end of the story. Practically all traces of the presence of non-Albanian elements have been wiped out in Albania, like toponyms, ethnological staff etc. This instance will be of utmost importance when considering the state of art at Kosmet and the foreseeable future of the province. Hence, we may summarize the stratagem for forming Greater Albania by the following: (a) The thesis of ancient Illyrian (Pelasgian) origin should provide ethnic Albanians with the right on any land they are occupying presently (or even in the near future), endowing them with the unique status as indigenous people on Balkan.. (b) The majorization of the mixed populated areas by migration and fast breeding should provide the young state with its Lebensraum (c) All non-Albanians within the projected state must be eliminated, either by expelling or by assimilation. These are, of course, harsh statements. We shall argue in the following they are realistic. Our testing ground is KiM, exactly.
Kosovo and Metohija We shall not dwell neither on the prehistory nor early history of this region. It used to pass from one state to the other, until Stephan Nemanja, a nobleman from Zeta (present-day Montenegro), founded the state of Serbia, whose center was exactly in today’s Kosmet. First a Byzantine vassal dukedom, Serbia became soon an independent state, to become an empire under the rule of Stephan Dushan, the first and only tsar of Serbs. 3 Nemanjić dynasty ended with Dushan’s son, Urosh, disintegrating into a number of kingdoms and fiefdoms. In the epic battle at Kosovo Polje, just west from the present-day Priština, Serb grand duke (knez) Lazar Hrebeljanović, who led the joined Christian forces, lost the battle (and life) to Turkish sultan Murad I. Murad I lost his life himself, killed by Serb nobleman Milosh Kobilić (later Obilić) and his son Bajazid I, who played 1
Data are from 1989. The latest statistics provides: Greeks 1%. We shall comment on the reliability of statistics when Albanians are concerned later on. 3 Apart from his son Uroš, whose reign was both short and insignificant. 2
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decisive role in the Turkish victory, took over the Ottoman throne at Istanbul. The center of gravity of Serbian state moved gradually towards north, away from the Turkish controlled lands, and when the last Serbian despot, Turkish vassal, Djuradj Branković succumbed to Turkish Porta his capital was Smederevo, at the confluence of river Morava and Danube. The long period of Serbian life in ”Turkish slavery” from 1459 to 1804 ensued. The importance of Kosovo Battle both for Serbs and Europe will be discussed later on. It could be compared with Battle of Hasting, or better at Poitie. The wheel of history stopped practically for Serbs in 1459, to be moved up in 19th century again. It was this subjugation to the Ottoman Empire which resulted in the retardation? of the whole area of Balkan for a few centuries compared with the Western Europe. There has been much controversy as to the real importance of Kosovo battle for the subsequent history of Balkan and Central Europe generally. Its importance is less of factual political history and more regarding the cultural and spiritual consequences for the Serbian population in the region. When the “Kosovo crisis” became acute, the myth of Kosovo myth was launched by some circles in the West, implying that Serbs have become obsessed by this alleged myth and therefore behave irrationally. We shall come to this point later on. Here we note that to the contemporary Serbia the lost battle was at the same time the loss of the social elite, Serb aristocracy. In fact, any immediate final outcome of the Kosovo battle had to be devastating to Serbia. The point is that by entering into the battle Serbia stretched her power beyond her manpower capacities. In a clash of a small country, as Serbia was at the time, and a large Empire like the Ottoman one, the larger adversary can not lose. Even if his army is annihilated in a single battle, with such enormous manpower resources, the larger partner easily recovers, while the smaller suffers of an irreparable loss. Kosovo battle annihilated the upper part of Serbian social pyramid, never to be recovered again. For four centuries Serbia will be a country of peasants and surfs, deprived even of the autochthonous bourgeoisie. 1 According to the popular opinion among Serbs, Serbia under the rule of Nemanjjic dynasty reached her apogee. This romantic feeling does not match the historical evidence. Coming from Montenegro these despotic rulers turned out rather narrow-minded. They relied heavily on the church, whom they supported lavishly. Their concept of ruling the country was predominantly theocratic, albeit indirectly. Their principal concern was building monasteries and churches and keeping strong army. In revenge, the church used to proclaim the kings saints and the principal duty of clergy was praying for their kings and their place on Heaven. 2 Similar situation was with duke Lazar, who came from Montenegro too, but his son despot Stephan Lazarević was much more enlightened. 3 Kosovo Field appears ideal ground for large-scale battles, just as gorges are convenient for stopping invading armies. The most celebrated case of the latter was the famous Spartan barrier to Xerxes’ army at Thermopiles, under the legendary leadership of Leonidas. Less known is a similar episode at the same place, when this time Athenians tried to stop a large Celtic army. 4 The history repeated and Celtics found the way to circumvent the Athenians via the path revealed to Persians by Ephialtes. But this time the Greek failure did not turn out as disastrous as with Persians, for Celts were interested in Delphic treasures, rather than in occupying Greece. There are some interesting parallels between Thermopile and Kosovo Battles, with moral of duty, sacrifice and treachery involved. 1
The later will consist mainly of Greeks, Cincars (Vlachs) and Jews in Serbian towns. In that matter Serbian rulers were following the tradition practiced by Byzantine emperors, see e.g. Guglielmo Cavallo, L'Uomo Bizantino, Gius Laterza & Figli S.P.a., Roma-Bari, 1992.
2
We note in passing that being from Montenegro, both dynasties turned out Dinaroids, and thus “Illyric”. Despotic tradition was retained in Montenegro until 20th century and was for many generations of rulers theocratic. 4 Pausanias Guide To Greece, Penguin Books, 1979, England 3
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As with Thermopiles, Kosovo Battle 1 was not the only fought at Kosovo Polje. In 1448 Hungarian duke Janosh (John) Hunyadi was badly defeated by Turks on the same field, which thus turned out fatal for the Christian world. 2 After this battle many ethnic Albanians moved from Albania to South Italy and Sicily, where they live still. 3 Another important date for Kosovo and Metohija was the war between Austria and Ottoman Empire in 1683-99, under the leadership of Austrian commander Margrave of Baden. He sent a force of 5.000 to KiM, under the command of count Eneo Piccolomini. Both Serbs and Albanians took part in this war, which turned out disastrous for the Kosovo inhabitants. 4 The turmoil raised by the Austrian invasion of KiM engaged all population, Serbs, Arnauts, Turks, Christian and Muslim alike. Piccolomini was initially successful, taking Novo Brdo and Kachanik. He soon died, from bubonic plague, and was succeeded by Duke Christian of Holstein. The latter sent a rather small force under the command of colonel Strasser, to release Katchanik from the Turkish-Tatar siege, despite the advice of the local Arnaut leaders. His campaign ended in the total disaster and the entire KiM affair came soon to end. Both Serb and Arnaut leadership was confused with the complicated situation, which involved not only Austrians, but Venetians, Crimerian Tatars, Russian court, Orthodox and Catholic churches, Muslims of all ethnical origin etc. Expecting a certain Turkish retaliation people from Kosmet (and Serbia generally), fled from the area, mainly across Sava river, for Austria. Led by the Serb patriarch from the Peć Patriarchia (the seat of the Serb Orthodox Church), Arsenije Čarnojević, a large part of the Kosmet population left thier homeland. 5 Much controvesy has arisen concerning the postwar events on kiM. While 19th century Serb historians tended to exagerate the case of Serb refugees, claiming that it was this abortive military campain that has depolulated KiM from Serbs, the Albanian modern historian are trying to minimize the demographc consequences in the region. The rationale behind the claims is the same: to prove that before the so-called Great Migration KiM was predominantly Serb, or that the migration did not afect the ethnic distibution noticeably, respectively. According to Serb sources, it was estimated that about 37.000 Serb families and 5.000. Albanians moved from the area towards north. Both figures appear overestimated and in all probability reffer to heads instead to families. Contrary to the popular opinion, this migration did not take place at once and was not so spectacular as the romantic paintings tend to show. Another wave of migration occured under the leadership of patriarch Šakabenda, 6 in 1737. The Albanian tribe which moved in part together with Serbs was Catholic Keljmendi (Klimenti). Some of these Albanians remained in nothern Central Serbia and there are extant Albanian graveyards in Shumadija, 7 called Arnautska groblja by the local population. Kelmendis were settledd down by Austrian authorities in two villages in Srem, Hrtkovci and Nikinci. 8 They gradually were associated into local Croat population and became indistinguishable by the middle of 20th c. Never-the-less an Albanian researcher from Kosovo heard an old woman in Hrtkovci reciting lullaby in Albanian. We shall denote the battle in 1389 as Battle, while the other, fought at the same spot, will be designated by lower case. (We note that Englishmen tend to call Hastings battle simply as Battle and even the very place where William the Conqueror defeated Anglo-Saxons is designated Battle). 2 We note here that some Albanian authors claim that Skenderbeg was engaged in some way in this battle, contrary to the historical evidence. 3 These Albanians in Calabria and on Sicily are called Arbanesi, as mentioned above. Their contribution to Albanian Rilindja movement was instrumental in forging the Albanian ethnicity and national awareness. We note, in passing, that both areas are strongholds of Mafia. 4 For a detailed account of the events see 5 Jovan Tomić, Srbi u velikoj seobi, Prosveta, Bastina, 1990., Beograd (in Serb) 1
6
We note that both Arsenije Čarnojević and Šakabenda were Montenegrins, hence of “Illyrian origin”. The core of the Central Serbia, between rivers Danube and Sava on the north, river Big Morava on the East and river Western Morava on the South. 8 N. Malcolm, ibid. 7
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Both migration waves depopulated Kosovo and Metohija and Turkish authorities settled there ethnic Albanians from Northern Albania. It was from this period that Albanian ethnicity started to prevail the Slavic one in the region, to become dominant in 20th century. Some Serbian historians blame both patriarchs for those migrations, which turned out fatal for the Serb presence at Kosovo and Metohija. The rationale for ascribing a particular imortance to Great Migration appears both understandable and false. Serb historians simply could not explain how from practically purely Serb region in 15th c. KiM became Shqiptar dominated by the end of 17th c. They simply did not dwelve into the anthropological and biological layers. It is this neglect, intentional or not, which turned out fatal for the present-day KiM issue, as we shall see later on. We emphesize here another point concerning the ethnical content of KiM. Though it was not Serbs only who migrated to the North (Southern Hungary), the population which replaced those various groups was almost entirelly Muslim, what could be taken as a first step toward «Albanization» of the region. This pattern of ethnical mixing and moves will show up many times again in Balkan history, in particlular in the »wars» in Yugoslavia (1991-5), as we shall see later on. Another miscoception should be rectified here. It has been alleged that Austrian emperor invited Serbs to come to Austria (Vojvodina) and settle there.In fact, Austria urged Serbs to stay in Turkey and form the barrier between two empires on the Ottoman soil, as could be expected. Serbs in Vojvoina were refugees, not imigrants. It has been frequently argued that migrations into KiM were frequent and involved many different ethnicities, including Serbs, Albanians, Bosnians, Montenegrins, etc, as well as it was not just Serbs who migrated from KiM. But this fact can not be taken as a proof that KiM was always with the same ethnical content. The argument, though correct in principle, involves, in fatc two different phenomena. One is qualitative, the other quantitative. The latter has ben operative for centuries and has turned decisively in favour of ethnical Albanians, as the present-day situation testifies. (As we have already noted, another factor, operative on large time scale, too, was the birth rate on the local population, in particular for the last century). An indicative testimony of the state of afairs from 18th c. came from Roman-Catholic Archibishop Mazarek, who himself was of ethnic-Albanian origin, from the well-known family Mazrrekus, imigrants to Kosovo also. In his report from 1760 he writes: All the time, many Catholic families come from the mountains of Albania; being hotnatured, arascible and proud, and ver ymuch given to murdering people, they refuse to be trampled underfoot by the Turks, as the holy Gospel teaches. Not submitting to the Ottoman taxes, they go around armed all the time, day and night, and indeed killl one another for the slightest affront in word and deed ...» These intruders usually convert into Islam, for utilitaristic reasons. As the same Mazarek testifies thirty years later, they had «filled and taken over» the whole of Serbia, commiting numerous outrages against Christians, Orthodox and Cathoic alike. Mazarek complained that they were «the race which breeds fastest», one family procreating «a hundred households» in a few years. Though this should be taken with a grain of salt, there is a general concensus that there was a steady flow of Albanians into Kosovo during these years. In his report from 1791 Mazarek ended that he would like to include into the liturgy an extra prayer: «Ab albanensibus libera nos Domine». What was the situation on KiM in the following centuries? We quote here some hisorical instances, as illustration of the general case. In the early 20th c., Serb historian D. Batakovic emphasized, the worst situation was at Metohija, at Pec and Djakovica. While Serbs around Priština, Skopje and Prizen could expect a support from the Serb and Russian consulates, people living in Metohija were left to the mercy of the local «Arbanas fisses».
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The law at Metohija was designed by heads of the local Arbabas fisses, whose will would determine the fate of the local Turkish officials. With the support of the local tribal «chetas», 1 they created a sort of the local parallel law, a mixture of the rules of Sheriat, 2 Arbanas common law and tradition of the highwaymen from the highland tribes. Such a parallel system of the local order , which in some cases, with «giving bessa», comprised the protection of life and goods of individuals and even entire fisses, did not hold for raya. 3 Therefore the Serb emigration was especially the most pronounced in Metohija. Before the choice to convert into Islam, 4 or to be victimized, they used to run away, individually or with families, to Serbia. In an application to Serb representative at Porta, Serb from Peg begged for protection from «the evil, enraged and lawless Arnauts, to whom we have been left at mercy, without anybody to take care of us, so that they have started to exterminate us and we have been their victims since». 5 It has been estimated that betwen 1876 and 1912 some 200.000 to 400.000. Serbs were subjected to ethnical cleansing (100.000?). When Serbian army liberated Kosmet from the Turkish occupation in 1912, they found there 40% Serbs and 50% ethnic Albanians. The latter never accepted the new state as their own and a strong tension between Serbian state and Kosmet Albanians has never seased since. Kosmet Albanians experienced the liberation from the Ottoman Empire as a mere change of foreign occupation and never practically recognized the state of Serbia. In order to remedy this situation Serbian prime minister Nikola Pašić decided to settle a number of Montenegrins from Montenegro on the deserted lands, left from the migrated Turks, mainly landlords begs. 6 The offician rationale for choosing Montenegrins was, as Pašić put it «They are much like Albanians». Whether he had in mind the presumed common (Illyrian) origin of all Dinaroids and thus counter-attacked anticipated Albanian claims for the unique indigenous status in the area, is difficult to judge now. These newcomers were regarded by the local Albanians as undesirable intruders. When in 1941 Kosmet became the part of Great Albania, a puppet fascist state controlled by Italians and Germans from September 1943, the first thing to do was to expel those Montenegrins from Kosmet. They mainly moved to the Central Serbia and Belgrade. During WWII non-Albanian population was subjected to persecutions, aimed at banishing all nonAlbanian elements from the area. Italian occupation forces tried to protect non-Albanians, 7 but never-the-less many of them fled the region. It has been estimated that in the period 1941-1944 some 70.000. Serbs left Kosmet (100.000-200.000?), with thousands other killed. On the other hand state border between Yugoslavia and Albania was wiped out and a regime of free crossing was established. Albanian population, mainly from the North, fully took advantage of this new opportunity and a massive migration from Albania to Kosmet was going on during the war time. Situation was not much changed after the war, as we shall see immediately. Ethnic Albanians at Kosmet readily accepted their new (national) state under the Italian patronage. They did not border much this kind of “presented independence”. After all, their first, original mother homeland, Albania, was a present from Austria. While the guerrilla war was going on in 1
Military unit, particularly used in guerilla warfare, comprising 50-100 armed fighters. Muslim juridical order. 3 A pejorative term in the Ottoman Empire, denoting a non-Muslim subject. 4 The actual term was ”to become Turk”, poturčiti se in Serb, what was considered the most shameful act for a Christian at the time. 5 Dušan Bataković, “Politika”, 29.04.2007., p. 31. 6 This land was distributed among local Shiptars who had been working on the land held by Turkish begs, and newcomers. 7 As they used to protect Serbs in Nezavisna Država Hrvatska (NDH) from the Nazi Ustashas regime persecutions and pogroms. 2
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Yugoslavia, especially in NDH, ethnic Albanians fully cooperated with the occupation forces. True, there were a few of partisan units (odreds), organized by the Albanian communists, under the Yugoslav communist party supervision, which were the principal target of the ethnic-Albanians (in)famous division “Skenderbeg”, the striking feast of the occupation forces. Generally, before the capitulation of fascist Italy in September 1943 the only ethnicity engaged in Yugoslavia in fighting occupation forces was, practically, Serbs, partisans and chetniks alike. The first were lead by communists, under the leadership of Josip Broz Tito. The other was organized and lead by colonel (later general) Dragoljub Mihailovic, who rejected the capitulation of Yugoslav army to German Wehrmacht and organized guerrilla in Serbia, NDH and Slovenia. When after Mussolini’s Italy capitulated became clear who was going to win the war, Croats and ethnic Albanians started to join the existing guerilla forces. According to a former partisan testimony, Shqiptars in Priština greeted enthusiastically Italians in 1941, with Viva Mussolini, then Germans in 1943, after Italian capitulation, by “Viva Hitler!”, and finally in 1944 partisans by “Viva Tito!”. 1 There has been a controversy as to the real motivation of ethnic Albanians in Kosmet for changing side and joining Yugoslav forces. According to some authors Tito promised to Albanians that after the war Kosmet would be allowed to join Albania. According to some other historians what Tito had in mind was a kind of Balkan (con)federation, which would consist of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania. 2 Most probably both options were on the market. What is of importance to us here was that until 1948 there was still no border between Yugoslavia and Albania and the free traffic between two states continued, as it was the case during the war. Yugoslav newspapers were full of photos showing Albanian peasants, with cattle and oxen-drawn vehicles, crossing the border, heading towards the “promised land”, Kosovo and Metohija. According to Serbian estimates, some 300.000. Albanian Albanians moved from 1941 to 1948 to Serbia. On the other hand Kosmet Albanians offer the figure of 326 immigrants. While the first figure appears probably exaggerated, the latter is surely ridiculously underrated. Altogether, immigrant waves from 1690-1737 and 1941-1948 radically changed demographic picture of Kosmet in favour of Albanians. Kosmet after the WWII Kosmet Albanian nationalists were disappointed with the final outcome of the war on Kosmet. They felt deceived by the Yugoslav authorities and adopted the same attitude towards the new Yugoslavia, as Tito designed it. Even before the war was over, in 1944 fierce fighting in Vojvodina were still going on (so-called Sremski front), a rebellion at the district of Drenica (which was notorious for the Albanian nationalism, if not chauvinism) took place. Tito engaged a large force, some 30.000 soldiers. A fierce fighting ensued and it was only in 1945 that the rebellion was crashed. The striking core of Drenica rebellion were so-called balists, nationalistic guerilla movement during the war, who in its turn was a continuation of kachacks, highwaymen mentioned earlier. After the war Albanian leaders Enver Hoxha and Koche Dodze came to Belgrade and offer Albania to join Yugoslavia, as the seventh republic. Yugoslavs turned them down and offer economic help instead. They dismantled a railway and a sugar plant and presented them to Albania. Moreover, Tito on his own waived the Albanian debt of $9 million. When a network of secessionist organization was discovered on KiM in 1956, Serb writer and politician Dobrica Ćosić suggested requisition of illegal arms in the provinced. He consulted Tito, who agreed, and the plan was aproved in the Politbirau and the Federal government. Shqiptar We witness similar behaviour in Albania, regarding their commitments, first to Yugoslavia, then to Russia, then to China and finally (?) to Americans. 2 This plan was shattered by Stalin, who did not like Tito to become so influential and prominent figure within his empire. 1
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leaders Fadil Hoxha, Dzavid Nimani and others agrreed as well. In the action some 26.000 rifles, hundreds of machine guns, bazookas, two artillery guns, thousands of pistols and a lot of amunition were collected from civilians. Of course, Shqiptar leaders did not like it, but they had no choice. When at the famous Brioni plenum in 1966 Tito decided to get rid of Aleksander Ranković, the most prominent Serbian political leader and until then the most loyal and devoted Tito's aide and the chief of the State Security Service, this arms collecting was taken as the crown proof that Serbs were ferocious with KiM Shqiptars. Arms collecting is, of course, a ferocious business, in paricular when the population considers weapons as personal property, like pocket watch or pipe. Situation was somehow settled down, at least temporarily. Serbia was partitioned into two autonomous provinces, Autonomous Province Vojvodina and autonomous Region Kosovo and Metohija (Kosmet) and the rest, so-called Central Serbia. In 1963 Kosmet became also Autonomous Province, to be further promoted in 1974 to a semi-independent entity, with its own Parliament, police, educational system etc. Formally it became republic, except for the right to secede. But before we consider further development in Yugoslavia, a brief overview of the situation in Albania is in order. Post-war Albania As in Yugoslavia communist forces, formed by the aid of Yugoslav communists and led by Enver Hoxha, took over the power in Albania. From 1945 to 1948 Albania was under the strong influence of Yugoslavia, both counties being under the aegis of Stalin. Yugoslavia lavishly supplied Albania with deficient material, mainly nutritious one, like whit. As testified by Milovan Djilas, one of the leading Yugoslav politicians at the time, and a member of Yugoslav delegation to Moscow, both Stalin and Molotov declared they would approve eventual swallowing up of Albania by Yugoslavia, at the utmost astonishment by Yugoslavs. 1 But when Stalin decided to get rid of Tito and strengthen his control over Yugoslavia, he initiated the so-called Informbureau Resolution, 2 by which Yugoslavia was excommunicated from the ”socialist community” and expose to the strong pressure. Albania quickly joined USSR block and demonstrated explicit hostility towards “treacherous Yugoslavia”. Being discarded from the Western Allies as the communist, totalitarian regime, Yugoslavia found itself a very bad, even disastrous situation. Enver Hoxha’s Albania turned out the most totalitarian and repressive state within the Soviet block, what could have been expected, knowing the general backwardness of the “Land of eagles”. In 1976 Hoxha banish religion and church altogether, Albania becoming thus the only officially atheistic country in the whole world. (In a sense, Hoxha’s Albania was a precursor of Pol Pot regime). After the split with Yugoslavia, finding that it was profitable to have a strong patron indeed, the land of proud montagnards sought the other “Big Brother partners”. After her idyll with USSR terminated in 1961, Albania entered an “asymmetric partnership” with China. Finally, Albania found strong patronage of USA, which is still extant and prosperous. In the Kosmet affair this patronage turned out more than paying-off, as we shall see immediately. In the communist era Albania isolated herself to an extreme degree, displaying xenophobia unknown in Europe. The whole country was covered with small, personal bunkers, hundreds thousand of them, called ironically Enver-Hodxa’s mushrooms, forming “everywhere dense set”, as mathematicians would dub it. A massive invasion on the proud “Land of eagles” was expected at any moment, and people had to be prepared for it. Today visitors can watch these remnants of the collective paranoia, abandoned and ruined, starring towards hostile distant horizon, just alike those mysterious Easter Islands figures are starring at the expected (beneficial) gods, whose arrival was imminent. In the retrospect of the following Soviet Balkan politics, those unprovoked declarations may have well been provocations from the Stalin side. (“Politika”, 31 December, 2008, p. 41) 2 The shorthand for Bureau of Information, actually a political organ for transmitting Stalin’s orders. 1
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This paranoid fear from the outlanders was certainly corroborated by the political aims, since it was the common feature of the communist countries to feel threatened by the external “dark forces”, what was found very beneficial to the ruling regimes. However, with Albanians we have another effect, that of the strong montagnard mentality. As we noticed before, the central unit of highlander society was the extended family, fis with Albanians, zadruga with Herzegovians. In fact, one may hardly speak of society, since that would imply a system. Highlanders’ society is more a collection of semi-isolated fisses, mutually weakly interacting, except in case of disputes, like the blood feuds. Perhaps the best representation of such a “society” would be by African lions, which live in small herds, with a dominant male (pater familias), young males (well subordinated), females and cubs. They have their own territory, which they protect by all means from the other herds and eventual single intruders. Albanian fis dwellings resemble small fortresses rather than resident houses. They are protected by high walls, with narrow windows adapted for firing. Every such a house can resist an assault of a brigade or so. It was for this reason that Turks did not border to control Albanian mountains. 1 In a sense, Hoxha’s Albania was a fis surrounded with hostile fisses, and the bunkers mentioned above served as loopholes of this gigantic fis-house. 2 This habit of building fortress-houses has been retained even after moving to lowlands, as we shall see later on, when considering demographic situation at KiM. It would be fair to note, however, that this “agoraphobia” phenomenon appears common for Muslim society, which is a paradigm of the “closed society”. The high-wall fancies are there to “protect” women from the undesirable “male watching”, even in the urban environments. But who was supposed to attack Albania? It was Yugoslavia, the same country which provided economic help after the war, not to mention the “ideological contributions”. Of course, you can not convince your subjects of somebody’s hostility, unless you convince them they are “bad guys’, who hate you. It was this infernal rationale which strengthens and cemented the hatred of Albanians towards Slavs, in particular towards Serbs. It is usually argued that an isolation “from inside” is dictated by tyrant’s desire to conceal the poverty of his country. The logic appears rather opposite – isolation comes first and poverty turns out the inevitable outcome. This logic will show up in an extreme form with Kosmet and its “eternal struggle” with external dark forces. This applies equally to the humiliating position of Muslim women, especially rural-Albanian ones. They are not hidden because they are uneducated, non-attractive etc. On the contrary, because they are kept isolated, they have attained such a state In 1991 the communist regime was finally overthrown, at least formally (as the case with Serbia and Montenegro was) and multy-party political system was implemented. The first “democratic” prime minister was Sali Berisha, from the Northern Albania, that is as healthy Dinaroid, just as Serbia got Slobodan Milošević, another healthy Dinaric (Montenegrin) element. Ties with Kosmet were strengthened even before the rise of “democracy” in Albania, but with Berisha’s and other subsequent governments these ties became particularly strong. The project of Great Albania, which, in fact, has never been abandoned, became acute and passed from the idealistic to realistic, political stage. We shall come to this point later on. New political “democratic regime” had to face even more pronounced “difficulties of transition” than the surrounding, less retarded societies. The episode of “pyramid system” appears very revealing fort hat matter. When the infamous “iron curtain” was finally (hopefully) lifted, East-European population was eager to benefit from the newly discovered “Western democracy”. Unfortunately, they soon discovered that along with economical prosperity and political freedom go some other, much less desirable things. One of them was the dirty capitalist trick of how to exploit the natural greediness Similar situation was with the entire Dinaric region, in particular Montenegro, whose inhabitants never miss the opportunity to boast with their “eternal freedom and independence”. 2 The shape and colour (white) of these bunkers resemble closely that of the traditional Albanian caps, ketche, what makes the whole affair even more a sign of the national autism, than a political need. 1
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of human beings. One of the most famous and effective schemes was the so-called pyramid scheme. It is based on the simple trick, which can be summed as the proposition: “How about robbing your neighbour?”. No honest human being can resist such a proposition and Serbians are surely among the most prominent among them. The scheme appears as simple as ingenious one. You found a “bank”, which keeps deposits of your fellow citizens, with the enormous interest, say 10% per month, what is for two orders of magnitudes larger that paid by “ordinary banks” You commitments might doubt about the “purity” of the business, but as the old saying says “You don’t check the teeth of a gift”. 1 The crucial period is, of course, the very beginning, say the first month. When the suspicious customers come to collect their “monthly earning”, they do get the interest they are eligible to. Some of customers are even so cautious that they take out all their deposits together with the interest. (After few months, having experienced no collapse of the “bank”, they usually redeposit their money). Then the next generation enters the business, taking out regularly their monthly gain and the game goes on indefinitely. Well, not for so long. The money does not go out of this circulus viciosus, it does not serve as a capital for doing real business. It is the closed system, which enlarges both the principal of the deposited money and the amount of money redistributed to the customers. The point is that the latter is part of their own deposit, not a surplus of the self-breeding capital, as in real banks. When the “mutual understanding” breaks, and the commitments try to draw their savings, the pyramid collapses and the fraud is revealed. Serbia witnessed two pyramid banks, “Dafinment bank” owned by Mrs Dafina Milanović, who used to call herself Serb mother and Mr Jezdimir Vasiljević (popular gazda-Jezda). 2 (As an illustration of the intellectual level of the customers engaged in this affair is the explanation of the “banks” as to the mechanism which provides such a fantastic gain. They are said that their money is used for drug smuggling and weaponry trade and it is known to be very profitable “business”, indeed). When the fraud was detected, they fled the country (with money, of course) for Israel. The good commitments were very disappointed, but took no action by themselves, expecting the authorities to take care of their lost money. 3 Their expectations came true and the government decided in 2005 to pay back the money “customers” lost in gambling. 4 The case of Mr Željko Ražnatović deserves, however, special attention. The «greatest» gangster in Europe in his time, who led his own paramilitary forces in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and in KiM, the principal figure of Serbian organized crime, broke «Dafiment bank» immidiately after Mrs Milanović left Serbia and took an amount of money he allegidly deposited there. 5 The readers may be suspicious about my dwelling on this issue, but if so then they do not get the point of pyramide system. We now pass to Albanian counterpart of this business and shall see that my blaiming Serbia is but an interest as compared with the principal in Albania. Namely the same pyramidal system was set up in Albania and after sufficiently long time (and sufficiently large ammount of money robed), the fraud was discovered. Of course, the swindlers fled the country and the deceived gumblers left alone. At least it was so interpreted by the authorities of Mr Sali Berisha's government. Up to this point it went the same as in Serbia, but here the parallel stops. Deceived gumblers took the whole game seriously and got angry indeed. The riots started in Tirana and other larger towns. We recall that Albania has no proper state, since her citizens are almost all armed. Hence, these riots were not inocent street demonstrations, but threat to the authorities, 1
It refers to the old habit of testing the age of a horse, by checking how much its teeth are worn out. Gazda – an old term for boss. 3 Both swindlers returned to Serbia after a number of years (and a number of millions presumably spent for bribery) and are free now. 4 The late prime minister Zoran Djindjić refused to meet their demands, but he was a statesman, not politician. 5 You can be sure, of course, he did not take a penny more than he had invested. 2
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which was not to be ignored. The government was about to collapse and resorted to the ultimate measure – it opened the army weaponry warhouses and magazines and the furious loosers grabed everything they reached. As mentioned before, it has been estimated that approximately 700.000 rifles, shortguns etc were taken away. In Albania arms are precious tools and also money. Since at the time KiM was aleady in turmoil, majority of these weaponry found their way to Serbia. The principal market for these arms was at Tropoja, in North Albania and near the Yugoslav border, which happened to be birthplace of Sali Berisha himself. (In fact it was a well organized requisition of weapponry from Albanian state, dedicated to arming the newly established guerilla UCK forces). When the unrest started Western journalists flooded the country. One of them, from Le Mond interviewed citizens of Skoder. One of the latter uttered angrily these remarkable words: «Nous ne voulons plus de montagnards ignores a la tete du pays», aluding to Sali Berisha and his (highlanders) government. Le Mond editors estimated this declaration signifficant enough to put this as tilte of the report. 1 The signifficance of this response of urban environment to the «Dinarization» of contemporary Albania can not be overestimated. As we shall see later on, it is exactly this «Dinarization» of Serbocroat-phonic part of Yugoslavia which turned fatal for her existance. Another important conclusion may be drawn from those riots in Albania. We mentioned above the concept of pyramidal system as a sort of gambling game. A bit of explanation seems in order here. Who are the partners in the game? Comitents are well aware that the system will inevitably collapse and they are going to be loosers. But what keeps them in the game is the hope (if not expectation) that they will be able to forsee the moment and thus withdraw their «savings» in time. Of course, they are equally well aware that those who will not do it in time will loose all their money. Loose to hom? To those who happen to take out their deposits in time and to the very owners of the «banks». And it was exactly like that that happened in Serbia and Albania. We saw what happened in Serbia, when the «banks» collapsed and te swindlers fled the country. In contrast, Albanians went to streets (and to army magazins) and threatened to devastate the country. The point is that they were sincerely angry, though they realized they simply lost the gambling game. This kind of rection speaks tellingly about their behaviour in the neighbouring countries, where the ethnic Albanians are fighting for their «political rights». The crux of matter has been captured by a Macedoniian journlist, commenting the ethnic Albanian riots in Western Macedonia, stressing the rationale for the Albanian demands: «They have taken their political aims for their poitical rights». That the emotional energy can be converted in political programme and become thus the decisive factor on a political scene has been masterly demonstrated by Adolf Hitler, indeed. What made him convincing, at lest for the »ordinary people», was not the content of his speaches, apart from its demagogy, but the shouting which they took for the proof he was sincere. And right, for that matter. He might well have argued that Jews were «Chosen people» and were entitled to rule Germany, with equal success. As a joke about jokes says, it is the way you tell the joke that matter, not its content, Autism as the political driving force Kosmet ethnic Albanians never accepted Yugoslavia as their own state, nor did they ever recognize Serbia as their homeland. Two points must be emphasized here, however. As we argued before, it is the common feature of highlander generally. Dinaroids never accepted fully any state as their own, for which they would feel any responsibility. It concerns Montenegrins and Ottoman Empire and Yugoslavia, then Herzegovians and Ottoman Empire, Austro-Hungary and Yugoslavia. Those nations who have been living in well organized states can not appreciate this facet of montagnards, but it is the natural consequence of their secular, even millennia long quasi-isolation and relationship bird of pray – pray, when the lowlands are concerned. It is this misunderstanding 1
«We want no longer ignorant montagnards at the head of country! », L'Mond, xx.
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which proved fatal for the Balkan and its disputes for last centuries. One may understand the inability of Western politicians and sociologists to realize that Albanian question is not a matter of standard politics, but is more submerged into the anthropology, if not biology. They can not force themselves to believe they have to deal with traditional society in very Europe. In his enlightening book an Italian author, journalist Paolo Rumiz, described the stunning feeling while visiting Dalmatian coast and Herzegovina, in 1990-ies. 1 Dalmatian place he visited turned out an almost replica of a typical Italian town across Adriatic Sea, in many relevant respects. Dalmatia is generally an integral part of Mediterranean region and its civilization and culture. Only dozen of kilometers far away, across the mountainous ridge of Dinaric chain, lies Dalmatinska Zagora, a typical Dinaric area in the Western Herzegovina. Few kilometers separate these regions in space, but hundreds years in time, as the journalist from Trieste, an expert of the Western Balkan, found. Though Dalmatians are of mixed ethnical origin (Roman, Illyric, Slavic, Italian etc), they belong essentially to the Romanic cultural milieu, whereas Herzegovians have retained much of the ancient Illyric inheritance, including their belligerent mental structure. It was them who started those bloody wars in Yugoslavia in 1991-1995, as it has been well described by the same author, Paolo Rumiz, in his revealing book Mascere per un Massacro. 2 Equally, it was NorthAlbania montagnards who settled the Central Albania, Kosmet and West Macedonia, who became the troublemakers in these regions and made Western Balkan the hot spot on the modern political global scene. As mentioned above, Dinaroids have never mixed with the lowlanders easily, but the case of Shqiptars and non-Albanians at Kosmet appears even more disturbing, in particular concerning relationship Serbs-ethnic Albanians. The difference between mentality of Slavo-phonic Dinaroids and Slav population in Yugoslavia has always been well hidden by the common language, but this façade is absent when considering ethnic Albanians and non-Albanians in the region. Hence, on the layer of historical memories one has to add another barrier, linguistic one. The latter has always made the indigenous population to experience ethnic Albanians as alien people, what made the latter even more reluctant to accept the relevant states as their own. This “conflict of interests’ has resulted in the rising animosities between Albanian and non-Albanian populations in the surrounding countries. The latter ended in armed rebellion in Serbia and Macedonia. Kosmet affairs As we saw above, the first serious challenge to new Yugoslavia was the rebellion of Shqiptars in Kosmet in 1944/5, started at Drenica. Next came the famous 1968, marked with students’ unrests all over Europe. These unrests started in West Europe, in particular France and Germany, and spread to Eastern Europe, but more as reverberations of the West-European students’ revolts. At the time I was in London, as the British Council scholar, and could read reportage of a Guardian journalist, who visited major Yugoslav university centers, including Priština. He was prepared to see students demanding more liberal way of life and study, liberal society etc, as it was the case in Europe at the time. Instead he found enormous crowd of young people, rushing through the streets and shouting for “liberation of Kosovo”, against the Serbian government, etc. He was astonished to see the (ethnic-Albanian) dean of the University whose appearance differed, as he put it, completely from faces he met in Belgrade, Zagreb and Ljubljana. What he witnessed was the attempt of Shqiptars politician to take advantage of the students’ mood in Europe to advance their political aims at Kosmet. The next major rioting took place in1981. The situation on Kosmet was unstable already during Tito’s authoritative rule, but when he died in1980, Shqiptars felt no further obligations towards 1
P. Rumiz, La Linea dei Mirtilli, Il Piccolo, Trieste, 1993.
2
P. Rumiz, Maschere per un Massacro, Editori Riuniti, Roma, 1996.
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their county. The riots engaged hundreds thousand of Shqiptars, mainly young, students, teenagers, led by skillful political activists. How that started? Before we consider the motivations, some elaboration of the demographic situation on Kosmet must be made. Kosmet populations, consisting predominately of Shqiptars, was undergoing a real demographic explosion, with the fertility rate about six time bigger than in the rest of Serbia (and Yugoslavia, for that matter). Incidentally, since the Kosmet population shared 1/6 of the total Serbian one, it meant that on every non-Albanian newly born child came one Albanian (Shqiptar). This fast-breeding effect resulted in Kosmet population Table 1. Demographic picture of Kosmet, from Ref. 1. _______________________________________________________ Kosmet Rest of Serbia _______________________________________________________ Age distribution (0-19) Average age (1991) Population density (1991)
48% 25 180/km2
26% 37 104/km2
__________________________________________________________________________________
Kosmet
Serbia
Illiteracy (1981) 27% (women), 9% (men) 17%(women),5%(men), _______________________________________________________ becoming ever younger. We present a table from S. Djurić, 1 which illustrates the demographic situation in Serbia. It is obvious that no state, however rich it may, is able to absorb such an influx of young people and provide them with jobs, among other things. What Kosmet politicians did was to let almost all kids who finished the secondary schools to enroll the university. Thus they created an enormous number of false students and consequently enormous mass of jobless young bachelors. The nominally poorest region in Europe had by far the largest percentage of students out of the overall population in Europe We shall come back to the role of overpopulation at Kosmet later on, but here we just consider direct causes of the riots in 1981. Those economically passive young people had to be materially supported, of course. This burden fell formally on Yugoslav federation, but practically on Serbia. Namely, Yugoslav government established a federal fund for supporting under-developed republics and Kosmet. Every republic had to contribute to the fund according to her economical strength and the overall sum is then distributed to the consumers. It happened that the amount allotted to Kosmet matched exactly the sum Serbia was depositing in the fund. Thus, it was Serbia who provided economical help to Kosmet alone. This contribution was use for building infrastructure, health service, educational system and the principal public needs in general. It included the material support for Kosmet students too. Well, one day in 1981 a Shqiptar student threw away in a student refractory his tray, shouting that he was no longer to stand such bad nourishing. Whether it was a spontaneous gesture or well prepared incident is still unknown, but is of minor importance here. What was important was that the rest of students accepted the challenge, went out to streets, shouting against the Belgrade authorities and their exploitation of Kosmet etc, etc. Slogans like “Kosovo republic” expressed the principal demands by the crowds, which poured into Priština streets as well as in other towns in 1
Sladjana Djurić, Osveta i kazna, Prosveta, Niš, 1998. (in Serbian)
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Kosmet. Thus the social frustration of the overpopulated youth has been cunningly channelled into political demands. But before we go on, a question as to why 1981 must be addressed. First, it was almost immediately after Tito’s death and the authority he possessed was no longer present. But one more acute reason prompted the rebellion, the planned census in Yugoslavia. It used to be carried out every ten years, first year in decade (1961, 1971). Why Shqiptars were afraid of the census in Kosmet? As mentioned earlier, the previous ones were practically improvised there and very unreliable, indeed. It left much room to playing with numbers, which used to be manipulated by local politicians. Their aim was to prove that Shqiptars constituted the overwhelming majority at Kosmet, what should provide them with right to rule and ultimately secede. Since the last official census in 1971 all statistical figures about Kosmet are but rough estimates, and should be taken with grain of salt. We must stress here that it concerns not Kosmet only and not ethnic Albanians exclusively. The same situation appears in Macedonia, where the official figure of ethnic Albanians percentage (1996) was 23%, whereas the latter claim 40%. Since the Macedonian Roma are estimated by 17%, if the ethnic-Albanian figure is taken serious, it turns out that Macedonia is populated by any nationality except ethnic (Slavo-phonic) Macedonians. Similar situation is with Roma in Serbia, who claim to be as numerous as 800.000, whereas the official figure provides half of that number. Of course, this “war by numbers” is not innocent as it might seem at the first sight, for behind the numbers march political demands. Why “Kosovo republic?” At the time Kosovo had already the status of republic, except for the right to secede. Hence this demand was interpreted as pushing towards independence via the formal rout. But there was another, perhaps even stronger motive for demanding republic status. As mentioned above, the federal fund was dedicated to “under-developed republics and Kosmet”, as it used to be repeatedly stated by the officials. Which republics it referred to? Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro. Serbia was, accidentally, within the average, neither developed nor under-developed, as a whole. It was the case with Central Serbia as well, with rich Vojvodina making balance for under-developed KiM. Neither of those republics was mentioned explicitly when referring to the federal fund, but Kosmet was. Kosmet Shqiptars, as all Dinaroids, are extremely sensitive and proud people (there are other terms, of course, from the sphere of psychology) and were much offended by being reminded that they depended on the rest of Yugoslavia. In particular those who were aware that the financial help was provided practically by Serbia alone, as we explained above. By acquiring the status republic, they would cease to be singled out explicitly, by name. Here it is the instance to ask why these riots appear so violent and what are real motivations, or causes, for being so frequent and insistent? After all Shqiptars are not the only “national minority” in Serbia. 1 In Vojvodina ethnic Hungarians were almost as numerous as ethnic Albanians at Kosmet in 1945. Two instances must be addressed here if one wont to make parallel between these two populations and there behaviour within the state they live. First, while Hungarians in Serbia diminished their number from about 500.000. in 1945, to around 400.000. at present, Shqiptars increased at the same period their population up to 1.700.000. (These are just estimates, used by officials, both Yugoslav and external. As for the reliability of these figures, when dealing with Shqiptars, we shall address this issue later on). Second, Hungarians appear typical central European population, civilized and loyal citizens. They are not, of course, quite satisfied by their position within Serbia and use every occasion to complain, but do it in a civilized, non-violent manner. Anyway they participate fully in the political life of Serbia and Yugoslavia. We note here that even the very term “minority” appears pejorative and humiliating to the sensible Shiptars ears. Even without referring to the political aims, the fast-breeding politics has the aim to eliminate this feeling, as a particular instance of inferiority complex. 1
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How did Yugoslav authorities, first of all Serbian ones, cope with this threat to the very state? They sent federal police forces to calm down the enraged Shqiptar demonstrators. The task turned out very difficult, indeed. Young people, frustrated and poisoned with terrifying hatred horrified even the skillful police forces. From central Serbia reserve police forces used to be sent to Kosmet, but they were able to endure a short time there and were regularly withdrawn to recover, to be sent back again. It was like sending troops to Eastern front in WWII. Young reservists were traumatized by the horrifying violence and hatred they witnessed. Long after the riots were surprised they kept the habit to take a seat in pubs or coffees at the wall, with their backs turned to the wall. Demonstrators beat everybody they met, journalists (domestic and foreign alike), photo-reporters etc It was more the expression of xenophobia than political demands. After some time the federal forces retreated and the battle ground was left to Serbians. 1 Demonstrations were finally brought to rest, but the riots reached their goal. Now, when looking back in retrospect, riots in 1981 marked the beginning of the end of Tito’s Yugoslavia. For good reason. Nobody felt comfortable in a state which contains regions like Kosmet. After those riots many non-Albanians left Kosmet and all republics apart from Serbia and Montenegro started to meditate of leaving the common state. If those bloody demonstrations delivered the serious blow to the federal state and Serbia in particular, coup de grace was carried out a few years later. It was in the army casern at Paraćin, a town in the middle Serbia, close to the highway E75 (from Belgrade towards Skopje and Athens). The garrison consisted of conscripts from all over Yugoslavia, as the general practice of Yugoslav army was. The rationale for this was, first, the intention to move conscripts far away from their homes, second to mix various nationalities as much s possible and third to enable young people to get acquainted with remote parts of their country. The second point was the most important, of course, and it worked well with all ethnicities in the multi-ethnic Yugoslavia. All except ethnicAlbanians. 2 Though Shqiptars shared about 7% of Yugoslav population, their share in Yugoslav army (JNA) was considerably bigger, probably about 20% (see Table 1), due to the demographic explosion we discussed above. And while all other conscripts were making company, Shqiptars always kept apart, mixing only among themselves. They communicated with others only exceptionally and with great reluctance. In the courtyard of Paraćin garrison, at free time, they used to gather in a corner and did not mix with the rest of garrison. One night in 1987, while all soldiers were sleeping one conscript Shqiptar on the corridor night-guard duty, Aziz Kelmendi, broke the weaponry room, took the machine rifle, rushed into a bedroom at 3 am and started shooting indiscriminately into the sleeping comrades (sic). He killed four conscripts, wounded very badly 6 other. Then he escaped from the garrison, running towards the highway, where his farther, a gastarbeiter in Germany, was supposed to await on him in a car. But the military police was faster and killed him before he reached the highway. 3 Paraćin massacre sealed the fate of Yugoslavia. In view of the general hostile attitude of Shqiptars towards Yu2, as illustrated by the fact that, according to the official record, between 1981 and 1988, some 241 illegal cells of Albanian separatists were discovered within the JNA, with some 1.600 members among the enlisted men and officers (Private Aziz Kelmendi was one of them), Yugoslav army was to be radically changed. The first step Yugoslav authorities took was to exempt ethnic Albanians from serving Yugoslav army. Not only for fear that the incident might be repeated, but it was definitely clear to the authorities that Shqiptars did not feel themselves Yugoslav citizens and moreover were hostile to Slovenians demanded to be paid additionally for taking part in dealing with demonstrations. We note here that the official language in Yugoslavia and the Army was Serbo-Croat, which was mother tongue for over 70% of the population. To Serbo-phonic population Slovenian and Macedonian languages were practically uninteligible. 3 According some officials he committed suicide. 1 2
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the rest of population. 1 Hence, to teach ethnic Albanians how to use weapons would mean the right-way suicide. But it was the psychological effect which was the most devastating. No Yugoslav mother would be willing any longer to send her son to serve in Yugoslav army (JNA). The road to disintegration was widely open, and when the joker in the shape of Slobodan Milošević appeared, he was readily put to use by other republics. They did not find it enjoyable to live in the state with the time-bomb ready to blast any minute. (Aziz Kelmendi was buried in his village with all dignitaries of the national hero. The whole incident was presented to the Kosmet public as another contrivance of Serbian authorities. The incident was not exploited in the Yugoslav public media posterior to its occurrence and it is still unclear to which extent the Serbian authorities were aware of its importance). The autonomous province Kosovo and Metohija Unrests which started in 1981 marked the way for secession of Kosmet, but it was clear even before what was the ultimate goal of Shqiptars’ politicians. When Kosmet became a federal unit, albeit within the formal status of Serbian province, by the constitution in 1974, Shqiptars’ concealed no longer their intentions. But the strategy for achieving secession from Yugoslavia was conceived long time ago. We shall sketch some principal means dedicated to this final end. The status of the autonomous province, allotted to KiM was meant to be the ultimate concession Serbia made to satisfy Shqiptars demands. But it turned out that for the latter it was but another step towards secession, which was conditio sine qua non for Shqiptar politicians. Europe experienced this syndrome with Adolph Hitler and his demands for “rectifying the history”. While West-European politicians, making concessions, expected (or at least hoped) that Hitler will be satisfied with the latest one, Adolph took every new concession as a sign of European weakness and encouragement for further pressing for new territories. When Chamberlain realized he was dealing with an insane person, it was too late and Europe was pushed into another bloody war. What made Hitler superior to his adversaries was his irrational obsession with his political goals, which he presented to the world (both in and outside Germany) as political and historical right of German people. (Whether he was sincere in this respect or not we may never know). But one lesson Europeans learned from Hitler affair – the driving force for his insane behaviour was his personal humiliation, which he skillfully projected onto the whole German nation. The Allies eventually won the war, but the final outcome, with tens million victims and devastated continent, proves that irrational may win in real terms. Land, guns and children Territory, people and army are the inevitable prerequisites for creating a state. Ethnic Albanians were at the beginning intruders into Kosovo and Metohija, who constituted a small minority there. How it happened they became the overwhelming majority at KiM? The promised land Whose sheep, his [is] meadow. Folk proverb As elaborated earlier migration of highlanders to lowlands appears a constant feature from prehistory to the present day. If both sides belong to the same ethnicity this phenomenon remains within the socio-anthropological sphere. But if highlanders are of different ethnicity, this otherwise According to the Yugoslav authorities between 1981 and 1988 some 241 illegal Shiptar cells were detected in Yugoslav Army.
1
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natural phenomenon acquires features of clash between nations. This clash may end in bloody fighting and state of war. Albanian presence at KiM during the Middle-age Serbian state, under Nemanjić dynasty, was virtually zero. In the famous Dushan Stephan juristic code from 14th century, they are not mentioned at all. A number of paragraphs are dedicated to the right of nomadic herdsmen, who are allowed to stay in a village for two days at most. These montagnards herdsmen were called Vlachs (svi stocari su “Vlasi”), who were supposed to be of Dacian (present-day Rumania) origin. Some of them might be ethnic Albanians, who moved their herds from highlands to lowlands and vice versa, according to the season. The first recorded presence of Albanians at KiM appeared in 1455, in Turkish cadastre, which gives the figure of 2% ethnic Albanians in the region . But afterwards numerous organized migration from the territory of the present-day High-Albania have been recorded, both towards inner Albania and KiM apart from the Turkish settling Albanians on KiM after the 1683 uprising, mentioned before, we note the record due to Roman-Catholic Bishop from Skopje Matija Masarek, who reported in 1764 to Vatican that brand-new colonies of Albanians from high-Albania were founded around Djakovica in Metohija. Serbian historian Jevrem Damnjanović finds that during Ottoman Empire members of the following tribes or fisses settled on KiM: Dukagjini, Bitiqi, Kriezi, Shop, Berisha, Krasniqi, Gashi, Tsaci, Shkrele, Kastrati, Shala, Hoti and Kelmendi. 1 We noted before the migrations during the WWII, when KiM were the part of “Greater Albania”, under fascist Italy and nazi Germany. Here is what P. Bartl writes on the subject: 2 Turkish conquests influenced spreading out Albanian settlements. In Turkish time an increase of the number of Albanian population was especially considerable at Kosovo and Metohia. Already by the end of 13th century begins immigration of Albanians from the surrounding mountainous regions to Kosovo. Among miners mentioned digging silver in the rich mines in Kosovo were also Albanians. During Turkish conquest (1455) Albanians comprised already 4-5 % of the overall population… This increase of the ethnic Albanian share of the overall population in KiM was followed from the beginning of 20-th century of the demographic explosion. In Figure 4 we show the birth rates of Albanian Albanians, KiM Albanians (Shqiptars) and KiM Serbs (including Montenegrins) as function of (historic) time. Data are taken from the book Serbs and Albanians through centuries, by Petrit Imami, a Shqiptar author, published in 1998 and transmitted in Belgrade liberal daily “Danas”, The Figure 4 deserves our close examination. We first notice that Albanian Albanians and KiM Serbs curves follow the same trend of decreasing, though they differ in absolute values. 3 The curve for Shqiptars behaves radically differently from both, however. It reaches maximum around 1960 (dip around 1955 appears probably due to inaccurate statistics), retains this maximum up to 1980 and starts falling down. Why 1980 was the “turning point”? Before attempting to answer this puzzle, a few preliminary words are in order.
We note that in Albanian “l” is pronounced as “ly”, as in William. Albanian language has no phoneme for “l”. Letter “q’ is pronounced as “ty”, as in Italian ciao. 1
2 3
We note that the KiM Serb birth rate is considerably higher than in Central Serbia.
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Figure 4. Birth rates at KiM and Albania Josip Broz Tito was seventh of 13 siblings, in a poor peasant family in Hrvatsko Zagorje, a rich Pannonic region in North-west Croatia. His youth was marked by poverty and he will suffer from a number of complexes in his later life. One of them was the lack of good suits. When he was a metal worker in Zagreb, he saved some money and managed to buy a new suit, he intended to wear while visiting his birthplace Kumrovec. Unfortunately, just before leaving for his village, he found his brand new suit stolen and gave up his visit. Upon seizing power after WWII he used to have his new suits made once a week or so, just to compensate traumatic experience from his youth. Equally, he was somehow ashamed of his numerous siblings, as a sign of poverty. Therefore he established the institution of awarding numerous families, by appointing himself godfather to every tenth and following child in his Yugoslavia. Of course, he delivered the award via his representatives, usually high rank officers and many families were proud of having Marshal Tito their godfather. Who were beneficiaries of this gratitude? By far the most frequent recipients were ethnic Albanians and Roma. There was some difference between these two groups, however. Roma children suffered from high mortality, for reasons we do not have to elaborate here. Thus, the enormous birth rate of Shqiptars not only was not put to a reasonable control, but was encouraged by the very state authorities. The result can be seen in Figure 4. This figure begs for further explanations too. One notices that Serbs had higher birth rates than Shqiptars before KiM were recovered by their motherland, Serbia. With joining Serbia came better medical care and the high mortality rate, present among all Dinaric highlanders, as we mentioned before, was drastically reduced. The response of Serb population to these better conditions and to rising level of civilization generally, was introduction of family planning. With Shqiptars it was the opposite case. They took advantage of better medical facilities to promote further the breeding rate. Another point to be made concerns the correlation between the economic conditions and fertility. Generally, high fertility signalizes
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the low economic status of a family. 1 Albanian Albanians were definitely below Shqiptars in this respect, but had lower birth rate than the latter. Obviously, other factors were in game, as we shall see soon. The same holds for Serbs, too.
Figure 5. Ethnic-Albanian and Serb populations on KiM during last century. We now turn to the crucial point of the entire “Kosovo issue”, to the ethnicity share on KiM from the early Serb state, through the Ottoman occupation to the present day. We note here that first record on the subject stems from 14th century, from the so-called Dechani hrisovulja (1330), 2 which contains a detailed list of houses in Metohia and north-west Albania. Out of 89 vilages 3 were Albanian. There were 2.166 agricultural households and 2.666 hauses in the cattle cultivating area. Out of this number 44 were Albanian (1.8%). The rest was recorded as Slavonic, that is Serb. 3 In Figure 5 we show the percentage of Shqiptar population in the region. Before discussing the data, a few words on their reliability are in order. The first point from 1455 was taken from the Turkish cadastral for tax-census (defter) (Original in Turkish is in an archive in Istambul). 4 The latter kind of record is notorious for its accuracy and scrupulousness, as Al Capone found to his misfortune. As for the 20th century data, oddly enough they turn out rather unreliable, for various reasons. First, when the KiM became “disputed land”, the sides involved started war by numbers”, producing them as they found convenient to their “just cause”. Second, since this region was We are referring here to the self-supporting families, in the bourgeois society. Cases as Maria Teresia, who had 13 children, who were taken care of by nurses and a host of other relevant servants, are out of scope of this analysis. 2 An official document with golden seal. Here it refers to estates given by kings to monasteries. 3 We owe these data to V. Sotirovic. 4 This is an estimate. According to the record for the Drenica region, where there were 1873 Serb and 10 Albanian households. 1
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outside civilized state for centuries, administrative control was very weak, if even not absent. As we mentioned before, Dinaric highlanders had never feeling for the state as an institution, nor felt they much responsibility towards the state and her authorities. In particular during census many numerous families, expecting to get help from the state, or at least to get some tax reduction, used to quote an excessive number of children. It is the notorious fact that Shqiptar population was greatly overestimated in these censuses. As mentioned above, when the Serbian state undertook the census in 1981, it was prevented on KiM by the local riots. Hence, every figure offered for the KM must be taken with grain of salt, indeed. Bearing the latter in mind, we comment the curve in Figure 5. What was the cause of this steady rise of the Shqiptar share on KiM? We already mentioned two principal effects; migration from Albania and the high birthrate, which passed into a demographic explosion in 20th century. This caused a “demographic pressure” onto the non-Albanian population, practically Serbs (including Montenegrins), who were forced in one way or other to move from the region, mainly to central Serbia. All effects combined gave rise to empting KM from non-Albanian populations and a steady increase of Shqiptar share, as the graph in Figure 5 shows. We devote now more attention to the demographic explosion on KiM. Gjep and land Chauvinist is a person you are having an argument with, and bloody racist is someone you are losing an argument with. An Afro-American activist Before we enter this delicate issue, a preliminary consideration, concerning the rationale of the whole point, seems in order. Are those phenomena described above from the standard anthropological lore, or we are dealing with deliberately controlled and channeled processes, with aims outside socio-historical realm? This is the most important question we must answer. If it turns out to be the common anthropological issue, we are faced with accusation of being chauvinist, even racist. In order to analyze the situation concerning the natality issue on KiM, we have to account for two parallel processes: (i) The spontaneous breeding in the population still tied by the traditional way of life. (ii) The attitude of the political leaders in view of their political aims. The first phenomenon can not be, in fact, separated from the later, but the link is not direct one. Albanians found themselves, at the time of their national revival, surrounded by more numerous nations, like Greeks and Serbs. They felt that a more balanced equilibrium will ensure the existence and grow of the Albanian state. This can be achieved by two processes: rapid increase of the ethnic-Albanian population and by collecting all Albanian-populated regions into a single state, Greater Albania. While these aims were more conceptual long-term project in Albania proper, ethnic Albanians outside homeland experienced this goal as an acute affair, to be achieved as soon as possible. The feeling of ethnic endangering may provoke two opposite responses of the population. pessimistic outlook – natality drops and the population diminishes in number. This case we have witnessed with North-American Indians, confined in reservations. 1 Optimistic attitude – natality rises so as to compensate the feeling of national minority, Note that to Dinaric ear “minority” sounds humiliating indeed.
1
To a much lesser extent we have similar effect with Vojvodina Hungarians.
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Albanians, both in Albania and surrounding countries opted for the second alternative. Giving birth to children has become an obsession. But this choice bears much risk, considering the nonAlbanian environment. It has to ensure an expansion space, both physical and political. Two stratagems have been adopted to this end: Never talk about natality Those non-Albanian who raise the issue are proclaimed chauvinists, obsessed by Albanian birthrate. The principal targets of the latter point are Serbs and Macedonians, whose populations in their countries are “losing ground” before the “biological tsunami” of the fast-breeding ethnic Albanians. Both above points have made the demographic explosion taboo. Anybody who wants to check what it means does it at his own risk. One should be aware, however, that there is essential difference between urban and rural areas in this context. Those living in towns are much better educated and practice family planning, whereas the peasants appear immune to any medical education. Since the urban population shares approximately 20% of the overall population at KiM and considering that an outsider is very improbable to meet a peasant (and if she does meet him to be able to talk to him), the natality syndrome appears well concealed for the “outside world”. Now we turn to non-Albanians “obsessed with Albanian natality”. Better to say, to those accusing them of this obsession. Instead of diving into statistics and sociological elaborations, we choose to quote a number of illustrative examples, aware that the latter are not proofs, of course. Here we quote testimonies of two Shqiptar families, which moved from KiM to Northern Albania, during the NATO assaults on KiM in 1999. First the excerpt from a comprehensive account by Antony DePalma, “From ‘Paradise’ to Horror: A Family’s Exodus”. 1 Knowing they would eventually arrive, he had loaded his wagon weeks before. Forced to decide what cherished parts of his life in Kosovo to take with him, and what to leave behind, Behrami had chosen carefully. He took what he thought would be useful things, like an axe, a small stove and a sack of flour to make bread. He took blankets and cushions for the 21 people in his extended family who would ride on the rattling wooden wagon. And Behrami brought along a small wooden cradle, called a “djep” (pronounced dyep). Not because he expected to need it the youngest of his 10 children is 9 years old. But because for him, as for many Kosovo families, the djep is a symbol of the future, wherever one might be. “If we left the djep, the Serbians would end up burning it, just like they have destroyed everything else,” he said. “Now they can’t.” 21.04.1999. http://www.nytimes.com/library/world/europe/042199kosovo-family.html The one-before-the-last paragraph deserves our attention, but the last one even more. Not only it reveals that Shqiptars experience their rebellion as a clash between two ethnicities (Serb and Albanian), but see Serbs as preventing their fast-breeding. They consider the whole affair as a biological warfare, conflict where those who outnumber the others will be victor. Here is another account, from the same period: 2 1 2
The full text is given in Appendix 2. Note that the village name Damjan is purely Serb.
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And so in Damjan, and the other villages, ethnic Albanians packed what they could -- wooden baby cradles elaborately painted in folk patterns were common -- and climbed into carts pulled by farm tractors. But can one build the thesis on a few examples? What we need is a public announcement of a particular political aim, what make distinction between selected cases and massive plans. The distinction between pogroms and Holocaust, between terror and genocide. After the abortive rebellion in 1981, majority of Shqiptars, in particular young ones, were very disappointed. They have realized they have no chance against the organized state. It was then that they launched the two-line strophe-slogan: 1 What we failed to accomplish by revolution, we shall achieve by penis! To someone it might sound as an act of consolation, but it was a political tool for appropriating the land they have found themselves to live on. That this is not a unique instance of using biological means for achieving political ends is perhaps the best illustrated by the famous sentence by Yasser Arafat: 2 “Our atomic bomb is the womb of Arabic woman!” But does it mean that if a population resort to higher fertility that its collective existence is endangered? In the case of North-American Indians such an attitude would surely gain support in South-American and European population. On the other hand Nazi politics of Arian-race fast breeding was motivated by aggressive attitude towards “lower-race” nations and had nothing to do with real national and political needs. It was obviously the product of a sick mind, a collective paranoia, initiated by the paranoid mind of a genius of evil, Adolph Hitler. One can not help recalling how he started with slogans of humiliated, endangered etc German Nation. The presentday (hypo) thesis about “Illyric origins” etc nicely match Nazi neo-Paganism. It begs no great imagination as for the Jewish counterpart in Kosovo issue, as far as the concept of “evil” is concerned. But we leave pursuing the parallel KiM – Middle-East crisis for the later considerations. Before we leave the subject of demographic explosion, a few words about the relationship poverty and education on one side and the fast-breeding phenomenon on the other, are in order. The issue is well understood and examined as a socio-economic phenomenon and here we shall just quote an instance from the KiM perspective. A journalist interviewed an elderly Shqiptar, who was looking after sheep on a high mountain in Montenegro. Although he was from Metohija, he hired the meadow in Montenegro, during the summer season, where his sheep were gazing, before going down to Metohija plane before winter. When asked how many children he had, the old man sighed deeply and said “Only one son”. But then he added, with greatest proudness: My son is the manager of a primary school at Dečani (Dechani) and has eleven children! (Dechani is a village in Metohija, famous for his monastery “High Dechani”, built by the king Stephan Urosh III, called Stephan Dechanski, c 1330. This is the largest Middle-Age Serb church, with the most abundant collection of the fresco paintings in Serbia.) 3 1
We note that the last words in two lines happen to rhyme. Note this is not a value judgment with regard to Palestinian cause. We shall have many instances later on of comparing issues, KiM and Palestinian ones. 3 Dečani was a tribe of Western Slavs, who lived on Laba river. 2
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We can only guess why the old man managed to have a single kid only, but his son evidently took it a family duty to compensate the father’s “failure”. Note that the son had at least a secondary school diploma and there is no chance to be an uneducated person. As mentioned before, the common case of Shqiptars family life since 1965 is the following: 1 The father (pater familias) works as the gastarbeiter in Germany or elsewhere, sends money home, visits home twice a year or so, counts the children and then returns to job abroad. The children are raised by his wife, frequently illiterate woman and children grow practically “in the lane”. An anecdote describes the situation as follows: Father visits the family and proudly shows his children to a friend of him, whom he brings from the host country. He lines all his 11 children and introduces them: “Shpresa, Violeta, Ahmeti, no - he is Tahiri, Goda, Dushi, no - Latifi, Drita – no she is Goda, but she is Drita, well something like this”, and gives up naming the offspring. Apocryphal as may be, the anecdote ketches the point of the fast-breeding population, never-the-less. Deprived of the proper family raising young children become easy pray to unscrupulous politicians. It has become obvious since long time ago, both to the domestic political leaders and politicians abroad that such a demographic explosion will give rise to an unstable situation, politically, educationally and economically. Within Yugoslavia those republics who used to provide the contributions to the federal fund became less and less willing to feed KiM gjeps. As we mentioned before, although KiM population shared les then 7% of the overall Yugoslav one, (33 – 38) % of the federal fund went to southern Serbian province. It has become clear since long time ago that it was family planning which could stop this demographic explosion only and balance the rate of growth and the economic welfare. Why it has not been undertaken? It has been. In 1970-thies a UN fund donated 100.000. $ to KiM for organizing family planning education. We note that at the time it was a large sum, equivalent to present-day amount of millions dollars. What happened to this money? Nothing. Nobody took a dollar from this fund. Was this an outcome of a deliberate keeping the natality rate as high as possible? Instead of attempting to answer this crucial question, we mention another instance of “channeled biology”. During the recent campaign in Serbia for preventing AIDS proliferation among youth, first of all students, the latter complained that although they had opportunity to make use of automats for condoms, the latter turned out often inadequate, since those imported from KiM were “too small”. How one is to interpret this? As a chauvinistic boasting of non-Albanian Serbians? Or somebody’s deliberate supplying ineffective condoms to Shqiptar youth? Whatever interpretation of the demographic explosion on KiM may be, it appears compatible with the political aims of Shqiptar leaders there. It is the common mantra of any international institution, individual or otherwise, when KiM issue is invoked, to stress from the outset that ethnic Albanians are overwhelming majority there. All other matters are then automatically subordinated to this point. Guns and power Beside gjeps weaponry is another obsession of Albanians, in particular Shqiptars (and Montenegrins etc.). As mentioned earlier, weapon smuggling appears one of three principal “economical branches” at KiM, two others are drug and people smuggling. But the main body of weaponry remains at KiM. The principal rout of weapon traffic goes from High Albania. Since the border with Albania is very difficult to control, going along mountain crests, it is very easy to transfer large quantity of weapons, from rifles, guns, bombs, machine guns, personal rockets etc. During the peak of fighting at KiM in1998, caravans of horsed used to carry weapons for KLA across the mountainous border. Yugoslav army use to intercept many of those caravans, but many managed to get through and deliver the burden to the ultimate destination. Which kind of activity it 1
It was since 1965 that Yugoslavs got the right to possess passports and could travel abroad.
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was is the best illustrated by the fact that many of those caravans were without man escort - the horses knew the rout “by heart”. As mentioned earlier, majority of Dinaric households are well equipped with guns. The KiM has been no exception in this regard. This time, however, the situation attains an additional dimension, apart from the weakening the state control of individuals. If those individual belong to a particular, distinct subpopulation, like a hostile ethnicity, the sociological disaster becomes political one. It was for this reason that Yugoslav authorities tried many times to collect the weaponry at KiM, but with little effect. In fact those attempts provoked even stronger hostility towards Serbia. The ministry of interior during Tito’s rule was Alexandar Ranković, Tito’s close crony, who was the most hated man in Yugoslavia among Shqiptars. The latter still deliver touching stories of being tortured by the Serbian police, under Ranković’s ministry. It is ironic to note here that the nickname of the minister was Leka, which coincided with name of Leka Ducagjini, mentioned earlier. The latter was presumably the “legislator” of the “Leke Ducagjini codex”, which dealt with the blood feud affairs. It was a part of the general common law, so-called) Canun, which provided rationale for the private possession of the weapons, as a substitute for juristic rule. As we mentioned earlier, hundreds of thousands of weaponry looted from the military magazines in Albania in 1997 we transported to KiM. When in 2005 KFOR ordered all weapons in private possession were to be surrendered to the authorities, out of estimated about 300.000. pieces only 1.700. were delivered (mainly old and obsolete ones). Here we note that arms collections were frequent at KiM from Turkish times onwards. Thus in 1910 Sefket Togut pasha collected 147.525 guns and even knives (except bread-knives) were demanded for surrender. How can a state run if her subjects are fully armed? Here we describe an incident at KiM from mid80-thies. We note first that at the time KiM had practically status of a republic within the Yugoslav federation, except for the right to secede. Among other things police patrols were strictly of mixed type, with equal share of Shqiptars and non-Albanians (usually Serbs). A certain Shqiptar from the village Gornji Prekaz committed a crime, 1 but police was unable to bring him to court. His house was close to the forest and whenever a police patrol came, he was warned in advance, run into the forest and after the patrol left the village, would return to his house and continued to enjoy the freedom. One day, however, he failed to run away in time and the police surrounded his house. As we mentioned before, Shqiptar houses in rural areas resemble small fortresses rather than dwelling places. Police did not dare to enter the house, surrounded by high wall and called the outlaw to surrender. After some negotiations the latter agreed, with proviso that they bring another police inspector, who happened to be Serb. This inspector came and when all seemed arranged a policeman shot a bullet and a fierce shooting started. The fire from the neighbouring houses joined that from the surrounded house and the scene looked more from a war movie than a police intervention. One policeman was killed, the outlaw too, and his father and daughter (who played an active role in the shooting, too) wounded. Finally, the battlefield was left with two corps, and two stretches.. Incidentally, we will have to deal with Prekaz a few times more, but here I shall recall my first acquaintance with this village only, albeit causal. In 1973 I was hospitalized for broken hip. One of the surgeons in the ward was Dr Neshović, the official doctor of the Red Star soccer club. In my six-bed room lied Ljuan Prekazi, player from the rival club, Partisan. A nice chap from Priština was rather worried for his shinbone, with a suspicious wound. He complained about the team coach demands: “I can not play every Sunday in top form” he told me. I remember his enquiry as to the kind of meat we were served for lunch, if it was pork or not. I was rather surprised he cared about nutrition religious regulations, since Muslims in Yugoslavia were generally emancipated about it, at least those from the urban areas. 1
Gornji means upper in Serb. There is another adjacent village, Donji (lower) Prekaz.
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About ten years later I heard on TV news that there was a traffic accident on the road from Pirot to Nish, with a car driving from Bulgaria to KiM. Among four badly wounded passengers was my Ljuan Prekazi. I immediately phoned to the Nish hospital where they were reported to be hospitalized, but the nurse on the phone new nothing about it. It was the last time I heard about Ljuan. He presumably came from Prekaz village, before joining a soccer club in Priština. 1 KiM from 1981 to 2000 This period was characterized by gradual by permanent alienation of KiM from the rest of Serbia and parallel making ever stronger bonds with Albania. These bonds were prominent even earlier, particularly in the educational domain. The reason for this particular kind of links is a radical disproportion in the economic sphere between KiM and undeveloped (post) Enver Hoxha Albania. Education and culture Books, text books and the literature generally used to be imported from Albania extensively. With them came well designed “Albanization” of Shqiptars, in particular the youth. University professors from Tirana became the frequent visiting staff at Priština university. The very main building of the latter was built by the money from the federal fund, which was practically Serbian donation, as we explained before. University staff from Serbia was gradually removed from KiM. Two of my classmate from Physics department in Belgrade started their work at Priština University, but soon learned they were persona non grata. One of them quickly got the message and moved to the Nish University. The other remained at Priština but not long since committed suicide. The political tension and mistrust was used to abuse the educational system. Lecturers from other universities engaged at Priština had to exam the students, who pretended not to understand Serb, in Albanian. They would ask a question in Serbo-Croat, then the Shqiptar assistant would translate it to the student. The latter then talks something in Albanian, the assistant turns to the examiner and says “He knew” and the student passes. All this made the educational level at KiM very low, making the university diplomas useless, even at KiM. By implication secondary and primary education was lowering down too, and the entire educational system practically collapsed. This passed unnoticed by external factors, but the most indicative sign of the state of art in this context is practically total absence of KiM science on the international scene, except for the Albanology. The local authorities resisted the educational curriculum prescribed by the republic institutions, as an attempt to “dealbanize” Shqiptars. In the literature subject they complained that too many Yugoslav writers were present in the textbooks at the expense of Shqiptar ones. Since those programmes were conceived by the federal boards and since Albanian literature appears poor compared with Croat and Slovenian (understandably), for example, this misbalance was simply a reflection of the actual situation. Besides, literature appears the best means to homogenize ethnically and culturally diverse population and provide a feeling of the common state. To be honest, the vice versa is true too, a greater presence of Albanian writers (particularly from KiM) would do the same service to the Yugoslav case. Already in 70-thies Shqiptar students used to prefer Zagreb and Sarajevo universities to Belgrade one. 2 On the other hand Belgrade used to host tens thousands of Shqiptars employed in the city public service. When the open hostilities between Belgrade and Priština started, those Shqiptar gastarbeiters silently disappeared from Belgrade streets. Some graduates from Priština did come to Belgrade for doing their PhD studies and Serbian university lecturers were employed at KiM university, as mentioned above, but gradually as the links with Tirana gained in strength Serbia practically became absent from her southern province. Students from KiM were very rare indeed in the rest of Serbia, in particular in Belgrade. Part of this 1 2
Surnames referring to one’s origin are common in Yugoslavia, among Slavs and Shiptars alike. Ljubljana was excluded for the language barrier, though not totally.
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absence should be explained by the low standard of the knowledge KiM students acquire at the local schools and university and were thus unqualified to enroll the Serbian universities. This absence of “youth intersection” broadened further the gap between Shqiptar and the other Serbian population. I remember a case from my study at the faculty of science in Belgrade. At the time (and it is still like that now) student from the midland use to accommodate either in private hired rooms or they got a room in the students hostels. The latter were heavily subsided by the state, and the residents paid a symbolic fee for the room and food there. It was, therefore very profitable, indeed, to get the room in the hostels. The room is allotted by the students’ organizations at faculties, with a number of criteria to be satisfied. Party membership was important, of course, but not crucial. The most important instance was the economic welfare of the student applicant. They had, therefore, to submit their local authorities certificate about the family income per capita, that it per the member of family. One conspicuously very wealthy Shqiptar student from KiM, who used to wear elegant suits, submitted, at he student meeting, his certificate, which was one order of magnitude less that the next competitor on the list. 1 Not realizing what was the point a female student made a comment “This is not enough even for hygiene needs” The point was that Shqiptar student had probably ten or so siblings. He got the place, of course. Five years later, 1967, I obtained the British council scholarship at the University College London. In the coffee room (reserved at the time for gentlemen only), saw two gentlemen talking Serb. Glad to hear my native language I took liberty to come across and introduced myself. One of gentlemen shacked the hand with me and introduced the other one. We exchanged some information and I went back to my seat. Next day I met the same gentleman, who happened to be at the department of history, and spent some time at Belgrade, Zagreb and Priština collecting material for his PhD. “Who was that gentleman from the other day” I asked. “He did not say a word while I was with you.” “Ah, fuck him off, responded my acquaintance. He is Shqiptar from Priština university. I am fed up with them!”. When the next year, 1968, those demonstrations at Priština arose, I realized better what happened the previous year in the incident I just described. If mixing of Serbia proper students and those from Priština was stronger such an animosity towards non-Albanians would have probably been less pronounced. At least the rest of Serbian population would have been aware of the hatred Shqiptars felt towards the rest of Serbians. Economy Statistics is like bikini, it reveals much, but conceals what is the most important. In the intense propaganda, skillfully controlled by Shqiptar politicians, KiM have been considered as very poor region by the international community. Is this picture realistic one, or is it the product of somebody’s wish to make political profit from this misconception? We shall argue that it is exactly the latter case, uncritically accepted by the external factors, to say the least. KiM possesses very fertile soil, almost as fertile as that in the Pannonic plane (Vojvodina and Slavonia). Since 4/5 of the population lives in rural area, this fact is of no small importance. However, in assessing the economic welfare of the province, one must account many relevant items. It is clear in the modern society that the reality is the information. That is why it appears so important to control public media, both In the liberal and autocratic societies. Normally all relevant parameters destined to characterize a country or a region, are expressed per capita. In the standard case (like European region) this parameters appear realistic indicators of the 1
Who happened to be a Montenegrin from Montenegro, later one of Milošević’s (who himself was a Montenegrin) striking fist and even managed to become dean of Belgrade university. (after October 5 he resigned from the post).
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true state of art. But in the situation of demographic explosion, two things must be born in mind. First, it is the item per family which is more relevant, for the entity per capita may be very deceiving. Second, in the same situation the temporal dimension must be accounted for. In the case of large natality rate, the usual quasi-static approximation is quite inadequate, as we shall demonstrate many times in this book. Another important distinction must be made in estimating the economic wellbeing of a region. As in any country there is always, apart from the official, legal economy, the unofficial, illegal one, usually called gray economy. Every state tries to reduce the latter as much as possible, if for nothing, then for the taxation purposes. State budget is filed by the legal economy and all public expenditures, army, education, health, infrastructure etc are taken from the budget. The problem with the gray economy is the same as with other illegal affairs, like drug smuggling, robbery, murders, corruption, etc. They may be just estimated, otherwise they are not illegal if a rigorous account of the money traffic is possible. Every region with a weak state as an institution is understandably suspect as subjected to illegal activities. This is exactly the case with KiM. But here we are not interested in the criminal side of the illegal things. The matter we are going to deal with are legal, but out of control of the fiscal authorities, at least to some extent. As mentioned earlier, KiM is characterized by a very high percentage of unemployment. The estimate goes to 50%, but the exact figure is of less importance here. This percentage appears a direct outcome of the youth of KiM population, that is the high percentage of teenage people (see, Table 1). This large share of unofficial economy makes the standard analysis of the state of art much inappropriate. As mentioned above, a large proportion of Shqiptars work in West and Central Europe. These industrious people save almost all they earn and bring it home. 1 This money is then used for the private welfare and business, including buying new land. Nothing of this private income goes to the state funds and is nonexistent for the state or regional budget. If one combines this effect with the population of Shqiptar rural families, one easily understand the failure of the official statistics to provide real state of affairs. When the open hostilities on KiM started in1987, London Economist published an article emphasizing the poverty of Kosovo, as an indication that Belgrade authorities did not care for this province. I sent a letter to the editor explaining that had they compared the average income per family in Kosovo and rest of Serbia, they would have found no difference in the average income. But the politics of the weekly, as it was the politics of other Western public means (and still is) that the Kosovo issue remains strictly controlled by the “high politics” and was not on the “public market”, my contribution was not published. Part of the gastarbeiters’ money is proliferated by financing criminal business. We have first of all in mind drug smuggling, which from the Middle East goes via KiM to the Western Europe. It is one of the principal occupations of the young population, for many reasons. Apart from their unemployment, money earned by this traffic is use for buying weaponry, which has always played a very prominent role in Shqiptars’ way of life. Shqiptars turn out ideal for playing the role of the main ring in the chain of smugglers from Middle East to Europe and USA. First of all, since they belong to the Muslim religion mainly, they have the easiest way to contact the producers and deal with them. Second, being of “European complexion”, they are much more suitable for smuggling drug across the Asiatic-European borders, unlike Turks, Afghans, Pakistanis etc, easily recognizable by the European customs. Generally, as mentioned above, the social structure of the Shqiptar (and generally Albanian) society, based on fis (or tribal) units, appear ideal for business of mafia type. A father earning money in Germany can supply his 4-5 sons (for instance) at home with the initial capital for this kind of business. Hence, this sort of “private initiative” business provides the KiM society with large capital, which is out of control and thus out of the public funds. It is never accounted for when estimating the 1
As mentioned earlier, they used to work in the Serbia proper, in particular the metropolis before the political clashes.
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regional incomes and when presented as the income per capita the official figures appear miserable indeed. As for the weaponry smuggling, guns etc end generally on KiM itself, as explained above. It therefore provides large earning for some families, but large expenditures for others, so that the net gain for the region cancels out. We mention also here the small business held by ethnic Albanians at green markets in Yugoslavia, as in Zagreb, for instance, where they hold monopole in many branches. Again, the ethnical tights are here of the utmost importance, since the business is tightly bound with the feeling of belonging to the same nation, “endangered by the hostile environment”. Generally, Albanian organized crime in Europe and USA has pushed down many “renowned” adversaries, like Italian, Chinese etc. We do not want to enter the question of corruption in this context, but can not avoid one issue relevant to the political problems related to KiM crisis. All wealthy ethnic Albanians, in particular Shqiptars, are supposed to contribute to the “common case”, that is to the creation of Greater Albania. While some of the gastarbeiters presumably donate the money voluntarily, it Is not difficult to imagine the money exhortations, made by criminal groups and organized crime. This phenomenon appears common to all “patriotic movements” outside the motherland, and evidently the passing from patriotism to crime requires but small step. Many murders reported among immigrants from various Balkan and Near-East countries are simply the outcome of clashes between various criminal gangs. We shall return to the issue of the organized crime and KiM later on, for this will be the crux of matter when considering the KiM “independence” Religion, church and politics In order to understand better political events in this and following period, we turn our attention here to the role of religion in Albania and surrounding countries. As mentioned earlier Albanian population consist of 70% Muslim, 10% Roman-Catholic and 20% Greek-Orthodox (consisting mainly of ethnic Greeks and some Slavs). Though it has been widely accepted that religious division are of no importance to Albanians altogether, divisions do exist. In particular regarding Christians and Muslim. The latter have a specific way of life and a distinct attitude towards women. Never-the-less Albanian leaders, from the Rilindja movement to the present have persistently tried to suppress religious differences, in favour of the national unity. One of the most prominent mottos of Prizren League was :”feja e shqiptarit asht shqiptaria”. 1 This is a remarkable slogan , widely ignored by the external factors, taking it as a mere rhetorical figure. However, with the present-day experience with ethnic-Albanian nationalism and its ferocity, parallel with religious phanatism imposes itself. One can not help recalling early Christianity in this context and the perplexity and animosity which the Antique world regarding its relentless marching through the Roman-Greek civilization and culture. Shqiptars at KiM are overwhelmingly Muslim, with small admixtures of Greek-Orthodox and Roman-Catholics. Of Muslim they belong almost entirely to Shiite sect, but in almost every village a family of Sunnites can be found. 2 As we shall see later on, the Muslim church will play crucial role in KiM issue. First mosques were built in 16th century, as compared with the earliest extant Christian churches and monasteries, which date from 9th century. These monasteries are scattered allover KiM. But the most ancient and valuable examples are concentrated in Metohija region, as one could infer from the very name Metohija (monastery estate), without further inquiries. The most important among them are: Visoki Dečani, already mentioned, Bogorodica Ljeviška (Prizren), Pećka Patrijaršija 1
Religion of the Albanians is Albanianism. It should be compared with Golda Meir’s answer to the question if she believed in God: “I believe in Jews, and Jews believe in God”. 2 Miss Durham was surprised, when managed to visit monastery Devič near Priština that the iguman was in fact a Shiptar, from a Christian family at Peć
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(near Peć) and Gračanica (near Priština). The latter church appears the perl of the Bzyantine'stile architecture, and is adopted to be one of the World Herritage, protected by UNESCO. It is in this church that the most (in)famous fresco eye digging occured. It concerns the figure of qween Jephimia, wife of king Milutin, who was one of monastery donator. Another signifficant (presumablyunique) figure among the frescoes is Eustahie, the famous gramaticiens and orator at Constantinopolis, from 12th century, later the archbishop at Thessaloniki. As a rule Turks did not destroy Christian churches, although there were occasionally exceptions. Generally, Ottoman Empire was rather tolerant towards ”infidels” and their shrines. Shqiptar themselves used to respect monasteries and even protected them from their compatriots. This protection has been widely used as proof that Shqiptars were friendly with Serbs who lived in their neighborhood, but this protection deserves some scrutinization. It concerns the nearby fis, which makes a deal with monastery. The latter pays for their protection and proclaims the master of the fis vojvoda, with meaning of duke, though of the local importance. Moreover, if the fis kills somebody in the course of “protection”, it is the monastery which “pays the bill”, that is pays to the family of deceased the amount prescribed by Canun (mentioned earlier). In fact, this kind of protection resembles very much similar institution widely practiced by Sicilians, in particular in USA. Obligation to reward the blood feud implies an incorporation of the monastery staff into the Shqiptar traditional society and its ethos. If we are aware that the said protection is from the same Shqiptars, the overall picture attains a cynical connotation (with the mild taste of blackmail). . Religion is tightly bound to “the soul of nation”, even if people happen to be emancipated from faith. Serbs are mostly identifying themselves with Serb Orthodox Church (SOC), even Gnostics and atheists. It was SOC which was instrumental in preserving Serb identity under foreign rule, be it Ottoman Empire, Austrian Empire, Austro-Hungary etc. Though a small number of Serbs have adopted Roman-Catholic confession, they consider themselves as Serbs, but the rest of their “tribal compatriots” regard them as ‘outcasts”. On the other hand, those who were converted into Muslim religion have been written off by the rest of the Slav population and do not consider themselves Slavs any longer. This concerns particularly Bosnian Slavs (Serb and Croat alike). The curious, if not tragic position those Slavic Muslims have found themselves after Yugoslavia was foudedin1918 has been vividly described by Mehmed Mesha Selimović, 1 Muslim Bosnian writer, presumably of Serb origin, in his highly acclaimed novel “Dervish”. Apart from the Turkish population on Balkan, Bosnians and Albanians are the only European whose ancestors (were) converted into Islam. Bosnian Muslims were on their way to return to the Slavic roots, under Tito’s rule, but this process has been abruptly interrupted by the secession of BiH in1991, and the strong islamization of the most of this population is evident now. Communist regime did not suppress any particular confession, but by very separation of church from the state and vigorous efforts to secularize the society, it uprooted the very rationale for religious fanatism, even ordinary practice. Most Muslims abandoned nutritious taboos, like no-eating pork etc, and used to name their children in neutral terms, like flower-like, tree-like etc appellations, instead of Arab, Turkish and Persian names. Now, the process has been reverted and Bosnia and Herzegovina have become Muslim springboard (Platzdarm) in Europe. We shall address this issue in more detail later on. Destruction of religious shrines appears one of the best signs as to the ultimate aims of adversaries in an armed conflict. Events in Croatia after 1991, but particularly in BiH illustrate very well this phenomenon. If a shrine in a village, or town is destroyed, this is a clear message to the inhabitants of the relevant confession – ethnical cleansing. 2 The rationale is obvious, since it is the shrine which is suppose to be maximally protected against demolition and thus remains as the clear testimony as to whom the land belongs (or belonged). The situation of KiM monasteries and churches is the case in point. Diminutive of Mehmed, in its turn corrupted Mahomet. The case in point is destruction of Ferhadia Mosque, a masterpiece of Muslim architecture, in Banja Luka, at present the capital of the so-called Republika Srpska in BiH.
1 2
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Here we quote a note in the Belgrade liberal daily “Danas”, by the columnist B. Andrejić, entitled «Church and Mosque» : In the “Kosovo indictment” at Hague Tribunal against Slobodan Miloshević there is a place, at first sight insignificant one, which hounts me for months. Without any wish to defend him whose, in the Indictment unmentioned sins are bigger than all of those accounted for, at least as far as I am concerned, I wished if many others give a thought about it. Both he and collaborators have been accused as responsible for demolishment of a mosque in a purely ethnic-Albanian village Bela Crkva. 1 Does it occur to anybody, in particular to those under the title of «international factors», this condensed history, those destinies placed into the civilization mismatch between the name of the village and the destruction of the mosque crime. (In other possible cases – destruction of a church). Those who do not appreciate this, will solve nothing. These appear to be the majority (for the time being?). (bold added) This short note is the essence of the crux of the matter (or the crux of the matter of the essence) of the “Kosovo issue”. It speaks eloquently more than all Security Council resolutions, all fables on the “Kosovo mythology”, all syntagmas like “actual reality”, all arguments like “Serb spiritual vertical”, all mantras like “the right of the majority”, “self-determination”, etc, etc Bela Crkva is a common toponym among Slavs (there are several other in Yugoslavia). Majority of newly built churches are white (fresco painted) and some villages or towns are recognized by their new church and the name is born out. Evidently Bela Crkva once was a purely Serb village. When ethnic-Albanians became first “the overwhelming majority” the mosque was built up, then as the time evolved the village was purged from “extraneous elements”, the church destroyed, but the name remained. (Those who worry about the latter “betrayal” should be calmed down – when KiM become “independent”, those mismatches will be rectified and no traces of the previous “extraneous elements” will be preserved. As we mentioned before, this actually has happened with the traces of Byzantine-Slavic region “Koman Culture” in Albania). When on March 16, 2004 an accident occurred on the bank of Kosovo river Ibar, next two days 29 orthodox churches were burnt allover KiM (see Figure 6). We shall come back to this “Kosovo Kristalnicht” later on, but here note the “even distribution” of the destroyed Serb shrines, as evident from Figure 6, which signals the well planned action of wiping out “non-Albanian elements” from KiM. That a “spontaneity” concerning these matter appears highly improbable testifies the “avenge” in the Central Serbia, immediately after the pogrom, when two mosques, one in Belgrade and one at Nish, were burned the next night. The perpetrators have never been arrested, but it was not difficult to trace the instigators of these misdeeds, the so-called Serb Radical Party (SRS), whose supporters come mainly from the refugees from Croatia and BiH, apart from the Serbian social losers (we shall return to SRS later on). Since SRS expected to be blamed for this crime, they quickly moved and presented to both Muslim communities in Belgrade and Nish with a PC, with a theatric manner, characteristic for this subversive social movement, disguised as a political party. 2 The government condemned the misdeeds, but did not pursue the case further.
White Church in Serbo-Croat. Mosque in Turkish is called jami, džamija (jamiya) in Serbo-Croat and MuslimBosnian alike. 2 The local Muslim communities were too weak and scared to press for a rigorous investigations and punishment. 1
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. Figure 6. Some of 29 Serb churches and monasteries set to fire on March 17, 2004 pogrom. Unfortunately we still don’t know how many mosques at KiM were really demolished by orthodox savages. In the course of “Yugoslav wars” (1991-1995) many shrines have been deliberately destroyed, Roman Catholic, Muslim and Orthodox. It is claimed by KiM Shqiptar leaders that out of 500 mosques on KiM only 300 survived the fighting (1998-1999). While this figure may be taken with the grain of salt, it deserves further considerations, as we shall make here. When “wars” became imminent many “external factors” considered they were entitled to “extinguish the fire” which was about to burn the unfortunate Yugoslavia. Some Arab countries, Saudi Arabia in particular were quick to support Muslims, first in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and then in Serbia, especially Shqiptars at KiM. Since they were rather short with water, they started pouring another liquid (they possessed in abundance) over the fire. Particularly worried for the fate of mosques in these regions were Wahabites in Saudi Arabia, not only for their destiny in the unstable region, but generally. Since they were the truest and even the only guardians of Mahomet’s faith and church, Wahabits strongly condemned the dangerous and treacherous deviations of some Muslim churches concerning the prohibition of visual decorations of mosques. Any diversion from the most abstract and decorative figures on walls of mosques were proclaimed as inappropriate, even blasphemous. Unfortunately, it turns out that many mosques on Balkan were subject to these distortion of the Prophet’s inheritance. And such spoiling of the pure Islam was intolerable, of course. There was only one inconvenient circumstance – the local fidels were reluctant to destroy their mosques, even for the sake of religious orthodoxy. Fortunately, the fate (or somebody else) showed grace and sent the “wars’ to Yugoslavia. Now the task was much easier – it was just sufficient that q mosque was damaged and new one was readily built au lieu the old
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one (properly destroyed for the purpose). A scratch or hole of a bullet, a crack on the wall (from the old age or otherwise), damaged decoration or something like that was sufficient to proclaim the building useless and erect new one, more beautiful and older that the previous one. According to a Cairo daily, hundreds of mosques in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo were thus destroyed and re-erected according to the strict Wahabite rules. The profit was multiple. Not only concerning Wahabism as such, but the Islam in general. The statistics of shrines destroyed by infidels greatly improves, the sympathy for the Muslim cause in Europe is raised, and the presence of fundamentalist Muslim countries is strengthened. The demolish-and-build stratagem appears beneficial to both sides. Local fidels get new shrines, Wahabits new (at least potentially) supporters. At the present it is not possible to estimate how many of those alleged destroyed mosques were victims of the “orthodox” savages (Vandals would not be an appropriate term), and how many fell victim for the “Wahabite cause”. In any case they have been victims of the religious conflicts, albeit in an indirect way.
Yugoslavia after Tito In order to appreciate situation and events leading to the KiM upheavals from 1980 onwards, we must make an overview of the general situation in Yugoslavia after the death of Josip Broz. He left no prominent figure on the political scene who would at least partially take over the stir of the Yugoslav boat. In fact it was not by accident that nobody was capable of ruling the country after a dictatorship. 1 In 1980-1989 period Yugoslav boat was moving slowly, by the force of inertia, almost floating. In fact, even before Tito’ s death the state was in a state of sleepy indolence, since Tito was old and could (would) not care for the domestic affairs, confining his attention to his international activities. The state economy was ruined, but this fact was not conspicuous since the state was heavily in foreign debts and lived “on credit’ Tito used to get for his “nonalignment policy”, but after his death donators started to press their debtors.. After his death the one-man rule was substituted by “no-man-rule”, by essentially “technical government”, where the principal concern of Tito’s descendents was to share everything in equal proportion and not allow anybody to become prominent. Yugoslavia was passing through economic crisis, with notorious shortages of many goods, like oil, coffee etc. In the period of economic difficulties those republics who used to donate to underdeveloped regions felt they were exploited by the rest of the state and started meditating secession. The first was Slovenia, and to a less extent Croatia. The question was mainly what will turn out to trigger secession. The first motive appeared in the form of KiM, better to say Shqiptars. The second was the pretext in the person of Slobodan Miloshević. Slobodan Miloshević. I What Miloshević is doing no peasant of Shumadia 2 would do. Only a stubborn Montenigrin can do it. Marko Vešović, 1996. 3 Son of Montenegrins from Montenegro (Lijeva Rijeka, Tuzi), whose farther was a secondary school teacher, was allegedly born at Požarevac (1941), 4 in Central Serbia, as the case was with his wife, Mirjana Marković. Though he grew up in Serbia, his mental structure was a typical
Spain turned out an exception, but mainly due to Franco “generosity” before leaving for the “other world” and the fact the King was accepted by the state and people. 2 The central region in Central Serbia 3 The Montenegrin writer who survived three-year siege of Sarajevo, in an interview to Belgrade weekly, NIN. 4 According to some sources Slobo was born in Lijeva Rijeka, too. According to the family tradition, Miloševic’s family came originally, like many Montenegrins, from KiM (Banjska). 1
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Dinaroid one. One of the principal features of the latter has been their notorious inflexibility. 1 He graduated Law at Belgrade University. He met his future wife, Mirjana Marković at the grammar school at Požarevac, and the romantic love was initiated, to be terminated by Slobo’s death in 2006, at Hague Tribunal. 2 Mirjana was a daughter of a medium-rang Serbian communist apparatchik, Moma Marković. Another story has been maintained in Serbia, this time about Mirjana’s biological father. Namely, when her mother was imprisoned as a communist, she was tortured and, accordingly, revealed her collaborators, who were caught and executed. Mirjana’s mother was spared since she became, the story goes, mistress of the commandant of the prison (who happened to be a Muslim). Mira (as she is called in Serbia) has suffered from these traumatic events her entire life. In particular, she used to wear a white flower in her hair (wig?), as a memory on her unfortunate mother. We are dwelling on these, otherwise bizarre, matters, since they have played an important role in the life of the couple who used to rule Serbia for 15 years. Mira was a devote communist and both Slobo and her were great admirers of Marshal Tito. Mira maintained her internationalism and never entered nationalistic disputes, as they started in Serbia when Slobo took power. We stress here that Milošević himself, as a good communist, was away from nationalism at the time, see the box. In fact, strictly speaking, accusing him of Serb nationalism is absurd, since he was neither Serb, nor chauvinist. 3 . Mira‘s belonging to the old Communist class (better to say – cast) helped greatly the promotion of her husband politically, at the beginning of his career. When in power, the couple acted as a formidable tandem, similar to the other famous Balkan couple, Nikole and Elena Ceausescu. If Mira secured Slobo’s place in the communist cast, it was his best man, Ivan Stambolić, who launched him into the highest political orbit. Milošević was first the manager of a big Serbian bank, then the Party secretary in Belgrade and finally at the Serbian level. As the first step to pay tribute to Ivan Stambolić, who became the president of Republic of Serbia, was to overthrow him from this position and wipe him out from the political scene altogether. 4 As the final gesture of thankfulness, Milošević had his best man and political mentor kidnapped and secretly executed, on the mountain of Frushka Gora, near Novi Sad. As the pressure from the other republics of Yugoslavia for democratization grew, Milošević decided to mock the multi-party concept, playing with formal political diversity. He merged the socalled Association of Socialist Working People of Serbia and the Association of Communist of Serbia, forming new party, the Socialist Party of Serbia. How much serious he was about the democracy is best illustrated that he did not border to consult members of neither merging associations, but nobody even noticed this illegal procedure. His wife, in revenge, founded her own party, so-called Yugoslav United Left (YUL), a ridiculous remnant of the former Communist Party. As Milošević’s party (SPS).was an organ for ensuring the continuation of the communist dictatorship, Mira’s YUL was a cover of notorious criminal activities, including political one. It was a group of unscrupulous corrupted people, who took control over state administrative and financial affairs. Mira’s influence was instrumental in personal promotion/degradation of prominent members of her husband’s SPS. The older daughter, Maria, was an irresponsible person, engaged in a number of illegal activities, including drugs, notorious for making scandals in Serbia, after divorcing. The younger brother, His farther, mother and uncle committed suicides, for various reasons. Milošević own death was practically the suicide, too. 2 When Milošević seized the power in Serbia, a story circled via Internet about Slobo’s first love, Maria, who after being abandoned, finally committed suicide. As the story goes, Milošević’s daughter Maria got her name after Slobo’s first love. 3 This would be as absurd as accusing Herod the Great of Jewish phanatism. Milošević never attacked, and even rarely mentioned, other nationalities in Yugoslavia, by the way. 4 Rumor was at the time that Milošević was somehow responsible for the death of Stambolić’s daughter. 1
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Marko, turned out a common criminal, who took advantage of father’s political position to develop many activities which are characteristic of organized crime (car steeling, extortion, etc) .Making use of state money, the family developed various kind of business. Mira run a pork farm, Maria a TV station, Marko a chain of duty-free shops, entertainment park (in the Disneyland style) etc. The whole family Milošević, therefore, turned out criminal one, in one way or other. It was the rationale for many in Serbia to demand bringing Slobo 1 (and his family) to the court here in Serbia, before even considering Hague Tribunal. This would not only clean up Serbia from this disastrous family, but even more importantly, spare Serbia of the International blame and humiliation, which Milošević put on her shoulders. We can not dwell here more on Milošević, but must stress one of his principal features of his mentality – an extreme rigidity (which he shared with majority of Dinaroids). His mind operated in terms 0 -1, without any shading or effort to compromise. As an elderly economist, Dr Dragoslav Avramović, (whom Miloshević had engaged to save Serbia from the hyper-inflation in 1993, with a great success), put it: “Milošević keeps on rejecting any negotiation with resolute NO, and then suddenly ”takes the pants off””. As we shall see later on, it was this rigidity which leads to the socalled Kumanovo agreement (sic) in 1999, when he delivered Serbia’s most sacred soil to the intruders. As with most Dinaroids Milošević’s mental structure was army-officer-like. He could recognize a hierarchical relationship only and was unable to communicate “horizontally”, on equal, footing. He started his professional career first as a bank manager, then as a chair of Party Committee, a chair of the Central part committee and finally the President of the state, first of Serbia, and then of Yugoslavia, without much experience with dealing with people. He expected a total obedience of those from the “lower level” and exercised the same to the upper one. But he always strives to reach the upper level and did not hesitate to overthrow all above himself, craving for power. His “political manners” are well illustrated when considering the KiM issue. 2 When he became the Serbian Communist party secretary, he summoned the local party leaders from allover Serbia, dictating instructions. A member of the KiM party team, Ms Katjusha Yashari, a robust, driving person (from the powerful Shqiptar clan Yashari), started criticizing the Belgrade policy towards KiM, Milošević got up, approached the window, and stared outside, smoking his cigar. “Comrade Milošević, asked Ms Yashari, you do not seem to be interested in what I am talking?”. “O, yes, I am very interested”, he replied and left the room. This anecdote illustrates also well his approach to the very delicate political situation on KiM, as we shall see later on. Kosovo and Metohija after Tito KiM has been subject to gradual but permanent change of its demographic content, as illustrated in Figure 5. As mentioned before, three principal factors were crucial to the demographic change in this Serbian province. First and the most important has been the demographic explosion, due to enormous birth rate of Shqiptars. In the situation when this trend on the global scale was in the opposite direction, with even African countries diminishing their birth rate, the only European regions with breeding out of all proportions, have been Albania and Kosovo. In an comprehensive article in Newsweek, 3 entitled “Demographic bomb is no longer as it used to be”, it has been estimated that by 2050 the only regions with more than 2 children per woman will be Caribbean Islands, Pakistan, Eastern Guinea, and African countries (except for northern and South Africa). And one region in Europe. Analyzing the world situation the author writes:
Diminutive of Slobodan, in a typical Dinaric manner. Milošević often acted as a supreme manager, since he did spend many years as the bank manager. 3 Translated from Courrier International, No 149, March 2005, p. 44. 1 2
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“If the figures are correct, they signify that almost half of the world population lives in the countries whose demographic regime is situated below the replacement level: comments Ebershtadt. Never-the–less there is noticeable exceptions. In Europe, Albania and Kosovo make ever more children. Asia has the pockets of the large natality, with Mongolia, Pakistan and Philippines… Saudi Arabia represents the birth rate largest in the world (5.7), after Palestinian Territories (5.9) and Yemen (7.2). However, some countries have some surprises in store: an Arab state Tunisia has fallen below the reproduction threshold” We notice, looking in Figure 4, that the birthrate in Albania is noticeably lower than on KiM. How to explain this, since in both regions ethnic Albanians constitute the overwhelming majorities? Albania is an independent state, responsible for her own wellbeing. The uncontrollable rise in population implies more hungry mouths, more unemployed, more public expenditures for the social needs, etc. But what is unfavourable for a responsible. sovereign state appears favourable for the society which relies on the rest of the state it lives in. The more populous the ethnic minority is, the more convincing demands for the financial and other supports are. The more children in the family, the less income per capita is, and again the more justifiable demands for the public financial help. But this can not continue ad infinitum, of course. Once the final goal has been achieved, the secession realized, the logic takes the opposite direction – family planning. The logic: ‘make children in the evening and submit the bill to the state in the morning’ does not work any longer, for this is your own state. That is exactly what is going on in the present-day Albania. We have already mentioned the influx of ethnic Albanians into KiM, both the migrant slow and steady and those termed as metanastatic movements. The first immigrant phenomenon appears slow and has effects which reveal along centuries, just like the high-rate natality effect. The second is noticeable and has profound psychological effects on the indigenous population, in this case Serbs. It provokes massive moving out of the autochthonous inhabitants, mainly into the Central Serbia. The rate of this migration deserves particular attention, for this reveals more than any of the political and demagogical “explanations”. It has been noticed, since his phenomenon has been observed and followed statistically that the rate of outflow migration appears constant in time. What this fact signifies? The Central Serbia outnumbers the Serb population on KiM by more that an order of magnitude. Equally, the area of Serbia is almost an order of magnitude larger than KiM. Now, suppose that all Serbs (and nonAlbanians, for that matter) were willing to quit KiM (voting by feet, as some Western political commentators were eager to emphasize while describing emigration from Milošević’s Serbia), their number on KiM would diminish exponentially, for the number of emigrants would depend solely of the number of the existing at the spot. But the number of emigrants depends on the possibility of the external reservoir to absorb the influx, too. The constant rate of emigration means that Central Serbia can not absorb the immigrants all at once, but only gradually, since its capacity is large, but finite. That is, had Serbia been many time larger, the number of non-Albanians on KiM would have been zero by now. The question arises naturally, question above questions, as legitimate as forbidden: which kind of people are those “suppressed” on KiM when the other population flees from them? Or put it in this way: who is really suppressing whom? So far we have analyzed the global phenomena, as the general frame for the depopulation of KiM from non-Albanians and overpopulation of the ethnic-Albanians (Shqiptars). We now turn to the mechanism which is responsible for this effect. We shall, for the sake of clarity, distinguish two principal stratagems, as used by the Shqiptars for taking over land and estate from the rest of KiM population.
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We start with quasi-violent tactics. In the villages with mixed population, non-Shqiptar houses, or families, adjacent to Shqiptar ones, are living under constant pressure, even fear from their neighbours. Any conflict, however innocent, may easily pass into dangerous one, regarding the nature of the Shqiptar ethos and their social units, fis or otherwise. Since the members of the latter outnumber the former, and Shqiptars are, as a rule, well equipped with arms, ready to use them, the neighbouring houses live in a permanent fear from eventual conflict. The later may arise for various reasons. Trespassing, livestock damages, “wrong look” at the Shqiptar’s wife or daughter, etc, as the case in any rural community may arise. Any serious conflict may initiate blood feud, as we elaborated before, and this may be resolved by leaving the area only. 1 Whatever the surface outlook may be, the relationship between populations who do not share the same ethos and are endowed with different mentality, is anything but relaxed. It is the neighbourhood where jokes have no place, since the sensitivity of Shqiptars, even regarding their own compatriots, is pathologically pronounced. 2 Many families, finding this environment unsupportable simply sell the estate and move away. If we find in the above example no bad intentions, the other causes of emigration are not that innocent. The most frequent cause of moving away is a combined physical pressure and financial “encouragement”. As mentioned before, many inhabitants of underdeveloped and even moderately advanced economically regions in the former Yugoslavia used to work in the Central and Western Europe, as gastarbeiters. If one is traveling through Serbian countryside, for instance, he will notice a high percentage of new houses, usually unfinished. They are property of the gastarbeiters, who plan to complete those constructions when returning definitely to the homeland. The rationale for this economic mismatch between the homeland and advance Western society is mainly the disproportion between the nominal and real values of the currencies. One Deutsche mark (now one Euro), values in Serbia, for instance, as five marks or something like that. This disproportion appears considerably more pronounced on KiM. Since the most vigorous members of nonAlbanian families have already left their homes, either moving to towns or simply to the Central Serbia, the remaining Serbs are not in position to compete with Shqiptar ones in financial terms. The general stratagem for overtaking non-Albanian land appears like this. Initial phase: If the village appears purely non-Shqiptar, several Shqiptar families join the money and offer to the most prominent house in the village a considerable amount, exceeding many times its economic value. The target family resists for some time, but after persistent offerings it usually gives up and sells the estate, moves to the Central Serbia and buys much bigger estate. The next target house is offered somewhat smaller amount and the procedure is repeated. Final stage: As the number of remaining families diminishes, the buyers offer ever less amount and the price goes below the economic one. In the final stage estates are selling for the symbolic prices and the village is empted from the “alien peasants”. In such way the larger part of KiM has been evacuated from the “undesirable inhabitants”. Needless to say that in the case of places with already mixed population the process is much easier and faster. In fact, in many cases it was a spontaneous leaving homes and moving away from the troublesome environment. It is the common case that when talking with Shqiptars, ordinary people and political activists alike, that the evacuation of KiM by the indigenous population is explained by the desire of the latter to move to the more prosperous regions, for purely economical reasons. In this way two aims are achieved. First, it implies the poverty of KiM, and second the free choice of those who leave the region. Since such an explanation has been on the market for decades, it obviously sells well among the “international community”. Otherwise such a cynical argument would be cut off by any serious interlocutor. As far as I know none of the latter has asked those In fact, many families in the Central Serbia have arrived there from Dinaric regions in order to escape blood feud, especially in the 19th century. 2 I have experienced this myself in a number of occasions. 1
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Shqiptars, who keep on blaming non-Shqiptars in Serbia for suppression, event torture, why don’t they leave KiM for a better place, like their country of origin, Albania? Of course, none has illusions that the attitude of the foreign leaders is based on insufficient acquaintance with the actual situation, but we shall come to this point later on. This stratagem has been applied not only on KiM, but everywhere in Serbia where Shqiptars are present in rural areas, including the so-called Preshevo valley (Bujanovac, Preshevo and Medvedja). All these counties were predominantly inhabited by non-Albanians, in 1945, when KiM was constituted as the autonomous region, but now only in Medvedja Serbs are still majority. The state of Serbia tried to prevent this illegitimate taking over of non-Shqiptars land by posing the law of non-transfer between different ethnic partners, but this measure has had little effect. Many non-Shqiptars simply take money without recording the transfer before the court. At the moment it is almost impossible to estimate whose legally is the land on KiM and in the Preshevo valley. Presumably, this domino effect is operative in other regions where ethnic Albanians live in a noticeable numbers, as in the Western Macedonia Persistent bargain offers combined with intimidations, like burning haystacks, killing live stocks, dogs, etc can not fail to produce desired effect – moving away from wild neighbours. Moving where to? Living in such an environment, isolated from the rest of world, including Serbia proper, those unfortunate people have acquired many attributes of Shqiptars themselves. Settling down in the central Serbia, by buying land, they find themselves apart from the local population, who treat them as alien elements. The principal effect was the isolation at KiM has been the conservation of the ethos and folklore. In fact, these Serbs represent the best preserved the traditional autochthonous Slavic population. KiM has proved the largest enervate of Serbian folklore and tradition in general. It is presumably this fact which makes local population in Central Serbia suspicious, concerning the manner of the KiM immigrants. As we mentioned above, this conservation phenomenon appears common to all Dinaric regions, but KiM is the core of Serbia and it was not for the physical geography that the retardation took place, but due to the human extraneous element, as mentioned above. We should stress here that this effect hits not only Serbs, but any non-Albanian ethnicity. As we shall see later on, the latter have been moving from KiM continuously, as well as from the Western Macedonia. Typical example is the village Janjina, very near to Priština and Gračanica, inhabited entirely by Croats. The later have completely abandoned the village at the beginning of Shqiptar rebellion in 1988 and have moved to Croatia. The same applies to Roma and other “ethnic minorities”, like the so-called Egyptians, 1 Ashkalias, Turks and Muslim Bosnians. 2 It is the xenophobia which is driving force of the Albanians (Albanian and KiM alike) feel uneasy in the close contact with other nationalities. Situation in urban areas is technically different, but equally uneasy. The older Shqiptar generations, aware of the historicity of their non-Shqiptar neighbours and cultural heritage it implies, are reluctant to mix with the human environment. The young generations, on their part, rising with meteoric speed in number, experience the rest of the non-Shqiptar urban population as unpleasant perturbation. It was a stunning impression for European visitors to KiM to see the segregation between Shqiptar and non-Shqiptar youth walking in the evening streets (so-called corso) in KiM towns, including very Priština. The same applied to cafes, pubs etc, where “ethnically pure public” was present only. As the number of non-Shqiptars decreased, the ever smaller communities in towns found themselves isolated and “stranger at home”. It was this psychological pressure which prompted non-Shqiptar youth to leave KiM, even before the open hostilities started in 90-thies. Links with the rest of Serbia What relationship is of this minority with the Egyptians proper is difficult to determine now, but this is of minor importance to us here. 2 Balkan is not only the melting pot of various ethnicities, but also the rich source of new ones, real and imaginary 1
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It has been the standard mantra of Shqiptar leading figures, political and cultural alike, that Serbians outside KiM showed little interest in the KiM affairs, despite their proclaimed worries for the non-Shqiptar population. In a sense they are right, but these claims reveal more the overall atmosphere on KiM than the real lack of interest from Serbian side. KiM officials, apart from politicians, did not encourage links with the Central Serbia, for reasons to be realized later, as the events evolved. Educational, cultural, economic and other links were gradually diminished, while the same were systematically strengthened with Albania. There were, of course, exceptions. Some top-rank Shqiptar intellectuals used to encourage cultural links, especially those who were educated in Belgrade. Theater performances, folklore groups etc were subject to exchange. The situation was, however, unfavourable in many respects. The KiM – Serbia relationship could be promoted and maintained via two principal channels. First, via the indigenous non-Shqiptar population, and second, by direct contact with local Shqiptars. In the first case situation was very unfavourable, due to the low human standards of the local inhabitants. As mentioned before, the most vital part of non-Shqiptars had left KiM, looking for the more favourable living conditions. What have remained are elderly people, in particular in the rural areas, who preferred to remain and die in their birth homes. They are, as a rule, the least educated people and uninterested for the “higher level activities”, like cultural ones. The only exception has been the folklore, which appears as real treasure of the traditional culture. Unfortunately, the officials in Belgrade and other cultural centers in Serbia did not exploit this possibility, better to say necessity, for the reasons to be explained later on. We only mention here that the anti-nationalistic mood, promoted by the communist Tito’s regime, was sufficiently short-sited, not to say primitive, to appreciate the issue. The KiM non-Shqiptars, in particular Serbs, have lived in isolation for centuries, due to the Shqiptar environment. The younger, more vital people, used to emigrate from the region, the elderly people, mostly peasants, were not much mobile and stayed at home, without going out of KiM. On the other hand, Serbians were reluctant to pay visit to them, abhorring from the dominant unfriendly Shqiptar surroundings. Situation appears similar to the Dinaric region, but for different reasons. While Dinaroids are leaving their homelands and migrate to lowlands, there is no move the other way round, since the region is poor and inhospitable. On the contrary, KiM is fertile and pleasant for living, but it used to attract the Albanian Albanians only, in particular when the domestic Shqiptar populations became dominant. With the feedback mechanism this asymmetric influx and outflow rose to an exponential rate. But the byproduct we are talking about here is the isolation of the remaining non-Shqiptar population, which has resulted in the preservation and even degradation of the anthropological features of the KiM population in general, particularly the nonShqiptar minorities. The folklore of KiM Serbs, the music in particular, appears somewhat strange for Belgrade citizen’s eyes and ears, even to the rural Serbian people, but it is exactly the value of the preserved national treasure. KiM tradition has been something like the Hellenic tradition for modern Greeks, or troubadour tradition to western Europeans. As the candle of KiM life is fading away, this tradition is going to be lost forever. As for the direct Serbians -Shqiptars channel of communications, situation has been definitely worsened to the point of extinction. Visits by cultural ensembles to KiM places became very unpleasant and even risky, as the quasi-independent status of the province continued. Due to persistent indoctrination of the youth, principally by educational, but mass media means too, the attitude of young Shqiptars towards anything non-Shqiptar has grown from boycott to outright hatred. The latter has grown on the trunk of under-education of the fast-breeding population, who had no time (and means) to shape personalities of kids and adolescents in a socially acceptable manner. The Shqiptar kids use to stone buses and trains passing through the province, even those who were carrying Shqiptars themselves. (Those kids will later, as adults, blast into air buses carrying non-Shqiptars visiting from the refugees camps their home villages and graveyards).
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For the majority of Serbians outside KiM the latter has always been the place for pilgrimage, in particular for the religious and educated people. The oldest and most valuable monasteries lie on KiM soil, for good reasons, for the present-day province used to be the core of the Serbian state for centuries, before Turks arrived on Balkan. This pilgrimage was practically stopped when the Shqiptar movement for secession took conspicuous form. It was exactly for this reason that sacral objects, like monasteries and churches have been especially chosen for targets of the secessionists, as we shall elaborate later on. Before the open secessionist movements local KiM political non-Shqiptar leaders used to be used as convenient links with the rest of the republic. It was them who used to plead for the ever more economical and financial help. From the present-day perspective they were, in fact, used as hostages, with their political career and posts depending on success in exhorting benefits from Serbian state. Once the “jar has broken”, as an old Serbian saying put it, these “respectable representatives of the non-Shqiptar population” left the province. There were parallel cases, too. Some Shqiptar leaders, like Mahmut Bacali, were eagerly promoting “Belgrade policy”, in fact party line, blaming Shqiptar nationalism etc. When the party U-turn in 1980-ieths occurred, they changed the tune, multiplying their previous assertions by (-1). 1 Mentioned should be made here of the links of KIM with other regions of Yugoslavia. As the time from the WWII was elapsing, number of KiM Shqiptar students studying in Belgrade (and other Serbian educational centers) diminished, with the rise of number of those going to Zagreb (and eventually Ljubljana). Zagreb was particularly a convenient destination. First, Croats speak the same language as Serbian Serbs, which KiM population spoke, so there is no language barrier. Second, the anti-Serb(ian) feeling among Croats was a very good springboard for Shqiptar own tribal and political aims. When the real troubles in Yugoslavia began in 1990 many Shqiptar will find pace in Croat military sector. Though the statistics of this kind has never been disclosed, presumably a great number of young Shqiptars took part in the so-called Domovinski rat (Patriotic War) during 1991-1995 period. Presumably, those instances when this engagements could not be concealed, as the case of the so-called Medački Džep will show (to be discussed late on), are just tip of iceberg. Another effect of these links with Zagreb will show up as Croat moral (and perhaps not just moral) support of Croatia for the “just case of Shqiptars under the cruel oppression by Serbs”. To Croat nationalists it was a great opportunity to prove the thesis that Serbia are oppressors “by nature” and that “Croat sufferings in Yugoslavia” were not the product of a Croat fancy. Book on KiM issue were published at Zagreb, showing sympathy with ”poor Albanians”. The case in point was the book by Zagreb economist, Branko Horvat (otherwise a politics adviser of a leading Croat non-communist leader at the time). Though he was not a historian, or a political analyst, he found profitable to present his picture of the region he was not familiar with. One particular link with state of Serbia as a whole was through the Shqiptar politicians engaged in the ruling structure at Belgrade. Some of them occupied very high positions in the Party (and thus in the state) hierarchy. The best, though somewhat absurd, example was that of Sinan Hasani, at the time the head of the state, elected after “the key”. The latter was used, after Tito’s death, to ensure “equipartition” in the ruling institutions at the federal or republic level. The equipartition aimed at he regional representatives, not ethnic ones. long after he left the temporary president position, it was found that he was not the citizen of Yugoslavia at all! This affair illustrates well the problem of evidence, even when the most important positions are concerned. As is well known a person non born in USA can not be even a candidate for the president, not to mention non-citizenship. The question arises: if it happened to the presidency in Yugoslavia, how much one may expect to control the origin and citizenship of thousands of immigrants from Albania, crossing the (nonexistent) borders between Serbia and Albania during 1999? This appears a general question of 1
Particularly nasty example was demonstrated by M. Bacali at the Hague Tribunal.
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the inference into the KiM situation, which has always been through the local Shqiptar institutions, never independently. 1 Another prominent case concerning Shqiptar attitude towards the common state has been Adem Vlasi. When teenager he was chosen to deliver the rally to Marshal Tito, on the occasion of his birthday, May 25. This ceremonial was taken over from the Old Yugoslavia (between WWI and WWII), when practiced for the King. 2 Subsequently, Vlasi became the top youth leader in Yugoslavia, the president of the Youth organization, a sort of Tito-Jugend. He used to be as close to Tito as possible, both symbolically and literally, buttering him up and securing his aimed highest rank position for the future. 3 Adem Vlasi will play a prominent role in Shqiptar secessionist movement, as we shall see later on. KiM in (1981-1989) – a silent secession This period was marked by powerless federal government, with all republics making their own politics and showed little care for the common cause. Non-Shqiptar population on KiM found themselves in an isolated position, without real political and physical protection. Belgrade Serbian government used to communicate directly with the local provincial officials, who ignored complains from the non-Shqiptar side, particularly Serb ones. Attacks on Serbs became ever more frequent and violent, that the insecure people were moving out at a constant rate. After many ignored complained peasants from the Serb village, Batuse, decided to move collectively. Immediately Adem Vlasi, who was at the time the KiM Party secretary, that is at no official state position, came on the spot and stopped the convoy on its way to Central Serbia. His explanation was telling even more than necessary: “You may move away, but one by one, not collectively!”. The president of Serbia, Petar Gračanin?, arrived too, but he was able just to watch indignant and bitter people returning to their “concentration-camp” village. It was sad indeed watching the president helpless in the country whose head he was supposed to be. Later on, when Milošević took power in Serbia, nobody cared to recall this paradigmatic scene as a possible explanation (if not necessarily justification) of the measures he took concerning KiM affairs. An unofficial delegation came from KiM to Belgrade, and was given opportunity to talk to the Federal parliament, presided by the Macedonian Lazar Mojsov. The most touching scene occurred when a middle-age woman stood in front of the microphone, and asked crying: “Nobody cares about us on KiM, nobody cares for us in Belgrade! Whom do we belong?!”. But both the federal and Serbian government could do anything, bound by the Federal and Serbian constitutions. The president of Serbia, Ivan Stambolić (who promoted his best-man Milošević to the post of Party secretary), went to Priština to try to settle the situation down, but in vain. Massive rallies started, with Kosovars gathering on the green area in front of the Belgrade municipal assembly building, asking for audience and help. But the Belgrade officials restricted themselves to the formal interventions to Priština official counterparts. Those futile efforts ended as expected – in blind alley. Then something happened, something that will decide the immediate history of Yugoslavia and Serbia. Something that will prove fatal for both. Serb inhabitants from a KiM village Zubin Potok (Zuba’s brook in Serb) invited Slobodan Milošević to visit them, so that they can complain to him directly about their situation. Why Milošević? He had no official state position, just like Adem Vlasi, but people knew who were bosses in the communist countries, like Serbia. Local communists arranged a closed meeting in the municipal building, to “discuss the issue”. Of course, the presence of the provincial boss, Vlasi, Recall the procedure of the oral examination by non-Shiptar professors at the Priština university, described earlier. A similar sort of ritual was practiced under Hitler’s Germany, for t he Nazi dictator. 3 This kind of entering under the skin behaviour will show up later in Shiptar securing American support, manners 1 2
which will, in the case of Bill Clinton, take grotesque dimensions.
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was inevitable. An all-night discussion, long and futile (as all party meetings are) was going on, when deep in the night cries from the outside were heard, calling Milošević out. When he appeared before the crowd, who was awaiting eagerly the results of the meeting, he saw police pushing away the inpatient people. Then somebody shouted the fatal words: We are beaten! And Milošević exclaimed equally fatal sentence, which will become the landmark of his carrier: Nobody may beat you! The meeting resulted in no immediate conclusions, but this incident marked the turning point of Milošević’s political career. If it was to be compared with a historical instance, perhaps the best point would be that from the Christian mythology, the moment when John Baptist baptized Jesus on the Jordan River, with Holy Ghost descending from Heaven and entering his body. According to some interpretations, particularly Gnostic ones, it was then that Jesus of Nazareth became divinity, transformed from one of many preachers around Palestine at the time into a prophet and Messiah. Religious fantasy apart, it was well possible that Jesus became aware of his “mission on Earth” and entered his short, but prolific liturgy in Galilee. 1 Whether Milošević’s “phase transition”, as theoretical physicists would call it, occurred at the very moment of this incident, or was a result of subsequent “inner working out”, is irrelevant to us here. 2 But, at any rate, this incident made him aware of the promising opportunity to base his political career upon the KiM issue, the real problem in real time. And he seized this opportunity whole-heartedly. For better or worse. His immediate aim was to lift from KiM the cover of an untouchable province, endowed with all rights of an independent state, except the right to secede. The decision was not easy to realize, both from the practical and ideological viewpoints. It is the traditional wisdom that one never deprives somebody from the rights, privileges etc already possessing, without compelling reasons. 3 Knowing the primitive mind of the KiM population, one could not expect much rational deal. The young, overcrowded population, unemployed and dissatisfied in every respect, brainwashed from the early youth with mantras like “Serbs’ hatred” etc, was like a wild animal to be tamed. And the dog was unlashed already, the movement for secession. The slogans like KOSOVO REPUBLIC were already in the air. On the other hand local nonShqiptar activists were on the move. Visits to the local provincial officials were frequent, with demands for better living conditions for Serbs and other non-Albanians in KiM. As expected, they turned out futile, since the Shqiptar leaders knew they possess legal rights, including those to ignore everything they dislike. More massive movements were planned and realized, with Serb Kosovars (Serbs from KiM) organizing massive meetings outside KiM, with the tacit approval of Belgrade party leaders around Milošević. Those who criticized his political promises, characterized as “easily promised speed’, were recklessly removed from the Party (and thus political) scene. Ivan Stambolić himself was overthrown on a (in)famous 8th Party meeting in 1987. He resigned his President position and withdrew to a bank business. 4 The first target was Vojvodina autonomous province, the northern Serbian counterpart of KiM. If the autonomous province KiM was to be abolished, it will hit Vojvodina for the sake of balance, though this multiethnic region was not a source of unrest and troubles. 5 Massive rally at Novi Sad, with Kosovars gaining much of the local population sympathies resulted in overthrowing province Party committee and establishing Miloshević decisive influence. Similar rally was planned for Slovenia, but was forbidden by Slovenian authorities in the last moment, for the big consternation of Serbian population, A more mundane comparison may be that with Robert Kennedy’s visiting to poor suburbs of New Orleans, when he saw the misery of black compatriots at t he spot. 2 One should not neglect the feeling of humiliation, for which every Dinaroid is especially sensitive. 3 It is this rationale that one rather underpays employees, than overpays them. 4 Before the general elections in 2000 he will be kidnapped and shot on the Fruška Gora Mountain, near Novi Sad. 5 It is to be emphasized that a substantial minority Hungarian population lives there for centuries. In 1945, when liberated from the German occupation Hungarians were almost as numerous as Shiptars in KiM. 1
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Milošević’s supporters and non-supporters alike. Finally, Milošević managed to pass legally through the Serbian parliament the abolishment of essential parts of the provinces autonomies and dismantling their assemblies. Serbia again became a unique compact state. At least it so seemed to Milošević and his supporters. The emotions apart, the ideological background for the reunification of Serbia as state was based on the “theory of conspiracy”. Serbia was divided under the Federal constitution into three parts in order to be weakened, as the largest and strongest republic in Yugoslavia. Demagogy apart, this division was not a splendid example of the political logic. By giving Vojvodina and KiM status of co-federal units, the federal constitution left the so-called Central Serbia with a vague, not to say incredible state. Serbia was a constitutive element of the Federation, but so were her two provinces separately. MPs of the latter were entitled to make decisions concerning the affairs of their provinces, but also of the republic of Serbia as a whole. At the same time, MPs from the Central Serbia could influence Central Serbia affairs indirectly only, but provincial ones by no means. They had no their own assembly. Thus, Serbia was not partitioned into three equivalent parts, but had both vertical and horizontal structure, where the hierarchy could not be established. It was mainly for this reason that the slogan of the time “O, Serbia of three parts, you will again be the whole!”, gained much in popularity, not only in Milošević’s quarters. 1 It was widely accepted, rightly or not, that such a division was a part of Yugoslav republics conspiracy against Serbia. The same rationale turned out operative in the case of the now famous Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Science and Arts (SANU), 2 in 1986. The principal authors were Vasilije Krestić (HDE 3 ), Antonije Isaković (HDE), Mihailo Marković (HDE), Kosta Mihailović, with the support of Dobrica Ćosić (a Serb writer) and a number of other academicians of SANU. This Memorandum was never accepted as an official document of SANU (it was, in fact, unfinished, when revealed illegally to public), but has been used subsequently as the crown witness of Serbian nationalism. Memorandum addressed the actual state of Serbia in Yugoslavia, arguing that Serbia has been endowed with an inferior position, particularly in the economic sphere. The tacit rationale for such an attitude was the feeling that other republics felt the Serbia too dominant and wanted to suppress her in every respect. In a sense this rationale was both true and understandable. (It was the quintessence, by the way, of the British stratagem regarding Continental Europe, which lead to Napoleon wars and both WWI and WWII wars too). The slogan “Weak Serbia – strong Yugoslavia!”, though never uttered publicly was in the air since the Yugoslavia was founded in 1918. When the restrictions on the provinces autonomies became operative, the struggle between the central government in Belgrade and Priština gained a new impetus. One of the first measures taken by Belgrade was the suppression of the educational propaganda, which had resulted, as we mentioned before, in an outright hatred young Shqiptars developed under the pro-Albanian and anti-Serbian school programmes. The immediate response of the Shqiptar leaders was withdrawal of the schools and the University from the official buildings. Lessons were held in private houses, and the whole image was intentionally suggesting the state of a foreign occupation One affair from the time gives the flavour of the nature of the conflict. Pupils in the primary and secondary schools used to share classes in the common buildings, irrespective of their ethnicity. Since the non-Shqiptar kids were tiny minorities in many common schools, 4 they felt uneasy in the Shqiptar immediate environments, as the latter did not mix with the rest of pupils. Any incident easily turned into serious one and Belgrade authorities decide that Shqiptar and non-Shqiptar pupils Oj Srbijo iz tri dela, ponovo ćeš biti cela! 2 Srpska Akademija Nauke i Umetnosti 3 Healthy Dinaric Element 4 Note that the Shiptar kids percentage greatly exceeded the average one for the entire KiM population, since the age distribution favours Shiptar youth even more, see Table 1. 1
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do not share the schools at the same time. The response of the local Shqiptars was astonishing, indeed. They declared that the Serbian authorities plan to poison Shqiptar kids, by depositing a deadly powder into schools (ethnic-discriminative poison, as non-Shqiptars called it ironically). Once this was announced, the Shqiptar pupils were collected and moved to the nearby hospitals, where the patients were evacuated for this purpose. The newspapers journalists, TV cameras etc were invited to witness this onslaught on the innocent kids, who were lying in their hospital beds, almost dead. When the cameras left the hospitals, kids were ordered to get up and go home. Many hints as to the real aims of this charade were made in Serbian public media. Apart from the propaganda motivations some more serious interpretations were offered. One was by an army high officer who suggested that he whole charade was in fact a dress rehearsal for the envisaged real situation of an armed rebellion and readiness of the medical institutions to accept and take care of the wounded rebels. Once the single-day disaster was over, the deadly powder suddenly lost its power and the innocent Shqiptar kids returned to their classes. The following charade, however, was much more serious. Shqiptar leaders organized a strike in the mine “Stari Trg”, 1 near Kosovska Mitrovica. Shqiptar miners descended into their shafts and refused to get out “Until Kosovo become republic”, announcing ”hunger strike”. Medical teams were fast to react, journalists invited, etc. Adem Vlasi, whom we met earlier, was quick to descend into the shafts and announce his moral support for the Shqiptar patriots etc. It lasted for several days, until the Belgrade government sent a special police unit, which pulled the miners out from their “striking positions”. Medical teams were ready at the exit and supplied the eye-covers for the poor miners, deprived of the light and endangered by the blindness, etc. It was amazing watching miners in obviously good conditions, who were not prepared for the scenario and mainly refused to take the precocious measures offered by the medical staff at the spot. After this incident situation on the Serbian political scene further aggravated. Belgrade “working class”, dissatisfied by their social position and wages, gathered in front of the Federal assembly building in Belgrade, in a resolute protest. After some negotiations and threats Milošević appeared at the entrance and addressed the crowd. He skillfully exchanged the thesis, 2 starting with the workers’ demands and complains, but then turned to the KiM affairs and the miners’ strike, promising to bring to court all politicians involved. It was a clear allusion to Adem Vlasi. Continuing along the same lines, Milošević made the workers forget their original complaints and demands. We note here that what Milošević did in this situation was exactly the same what KiM Shqiptar leaders did for decades - turning the real social and economic dissatisfaction of the overcrowded province into ethnical hatred, accusing Serbs and the central government for all troubles in the province. (Both maneuvers turned out successful). The worst thing was that he fulfilled the promise. Adem Vlasi was arrested and accused for “high treason” or something like this. He could not wish more and from a communist apparatchik became the national hero. Songs about him started circulating around KiM, while he was awaiting the trial. The latter did occur after a year of so, at Kosovska Mitrovica (inhabited mainly by non-Shqiptars). The judge was a Shqiptar, who after a long process released the accused as innocent. The whole charade was a mockery from the start. The point which Milošević had in mind was to remove a dangerous and popular political enemy from the scene. But the final outcome was counterproductive, as was expected. Adem Vlasi was made a national martyr, persecuted by evil Serbs. The whole affair exhibited the best Milošević political incompetence, which will ultimately cost Serbia her existence. By the time of these events the Shqiptar boycott of Serbia and her institution was already almost complete. Ordinary people, especially the youth, stopped communicating with non-Shqiptars, in particular Serbs from the Central Serbia. They refused to talk to journalists from Belgrade, turned their back to TV cameras, etc. The hatred could almost be The Old Square, in Serb. As a Belgrade university professor put it to a student: “I am asking you what is an elephant, and you say ‘elephant is not a cow’, and proceed describing a cow”.
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smelled in the air. The situation became a surrealistic one, with the actual situation grossly mismatching official, administrative one. It was in an appealing need for resolving this surrealistic situation. The resolution came, in two steps. The first was disintegration of Yugoslavia. The Fall of Titonic (Disintegration of Yu2) Those who do not regret the fall of Yugoslavia have no heart, and those who would like Yugoslavia to be restored have no brain. Zoran Djindjic In retrospect, one may state that creation of Yugoslavia was trigged by the bloody assassination at Sarajevo, on June 28th, 1914, when Bosnian nationalists killed Austro-Hungarian archduke Ferdinand and his wife. The massacre turned out to be a part of the project to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina to the kingdom of Serbia, designed in heads of a military circle in Belgrade and driven by desire of Serbs behind the river Drina to live in a Serbian state. The mastermind of the secret project, “Black hand”, whose slogan was “Unification or death”, was an officer in Serbian army, Dragutin Dimitrijević-Apis, who organized the infamous assassination of Serbian royal couple in Belgrade, in 1903. 1 This assassination triggered WWI, which costed Serbia half of her male population, but initiated what Serbian nationalist were up to – unification of all Serbs on Balkan into a single, common state, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenians, later named Yugoslavia. (One of prominent plotters in Bosnian movement was Vase Chubrilović, whom we shall meet again, later on.) Yugoslavia lasted 71 years, about the average age of her citizens. As mentioned earlier, her disintegration was trigged by another bloody massacre, that in the army casern at Paraćin, in 1987, committed by ethnic-Albanian Aziz Kelmendi. Contrary to buildings, which are difficult to erect, but easy to destroy, forming a new state appears easier than to dismantle it. Yugoslavia formed after WWI (Yu1 in the following) was created as an agreement between Slovenian, Croat and Serb populations, including Montenegrins (who have always considered themselves Serbs) and Macedonians, who were already absorbed by Serbia after the Second Balkan war in 1913. This fusion of various Slav parts of the Western Balkan was not an easy task, but was carried out without many troubles. At least, it seemed so after the constitution was effectuated. It is important to stress here that the initiative for forming a common state came from outside Serbia, in particular from Croats, who use to live in the former Austro-Hungary, having lost their independence as early as 1104. The advantage of the constitutive nations was they were all Slavs, except for ethnic Albanians at KiM and Western Macedonia, Hungarians in Vojvodina and some other “minorities”. Disadvantage was the numeric proportion, which was approximately like this: Serbs: Croats: Slovenians = 4:2:1. This appears the worst proportion, for the more numerous populations may treat the half numerous one either as “minority”, or “on equal footing”. Thus, no problems arose between Serbs and Slovenians, but Croat appeared “sandwiched” between both populations. The tension between Croats and Serbs will turn out a constant in the new state, both before WWII (Yu1) and after WWII (Yu2). Both king Alexander Karadjordjevic and Josip Broz tried to forge a new “Yugoslav nation”. The former coined the notion of “triple-one nation”, whereas Tito pressed for the ”brotherhood and unity” of all Yugoslav nations. The first approach was defective in the sense that the ethnical approach was obsolete and illegitimate (considering the presence of non-Slavic populations), whereas the Tito’s brotherhood was equally out of context, considering the ethnical mixture of the Yugoslavs. With nationalism one encounters the same problem as with religions. They help the same nationalities, or confession, Apis (who incidentally was a Vlach from East Serbia) will be accused of a plot against Prince Aleksander Karadjordjevic in 1917 at the Thessalonica front and executed.
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become more compact, but on the other hand create the feeling of alienation between different entities and ultimately bring about animosities and even conflicts. Yu1 was just about to disintegrate when WWII started, and the division of the occupied Yugoslavia made heterogeneous structure more than conspicuous. True, Tito succeeded to re-establish Yugoslavia, but at the cost of dictatorship. More over, he was able to keep his position thanks to his Croat nationality (and his Serb wife, to some extent), thus balancing the numerical predominance of the Serb population. Another important balancing factor was the economic strength of the leading republics, Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia, which appeared evenly distributed, owing to the different levels of civilization in these parts of the common state. Namely, the brut national product per capita was inversely proportional to the number of the respective republic. As mentioned before, Serbia was an average of the whole state and her contribution to the federal fund for the under-developed republics and KiM matched the donation from the Fund to KiM. (The other republics, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro were supported by Slovenia and Croatia.) A serous threat to the so-called centrifugal Yugoslav forces appeared in the late 80-thies, in the form of the Croat Ante Marković, elected for the prime minister of the Federal state. This capable executive, a manager of a successful Croat enterprise, managed to give a considerable impulse to the declining Yugoslav economy. He introduced convertible Yugoslav dinar, the first in Yu2 and the people managed to save a great deal of money in the local banks. He became ever more popular, at the consternation of the nationalists from Yugoslav republics. Ante Marković founded a new, so-called Reform Party, which threatened to marginalize all local republican political organizations, including Communist parties. The response of the latter and local politicians was quick and unscrupulous. Campaign against Ante Marković was open from all public means, in particular from Croatia and especially from Serbia. Serbia even did not hesitate to raid the federal fund and takes money for her own use. Various republics turned against Ante Marković for different reasons. Milošević saw in him his rival, somebody who would take the leading role on the federal scene. Croatia and Slovenia were afraid of his eventual successful preservation of the federal state and thus prolongation of their efforts to secede. Practical dissolution of Yugoslavia was initiated by Slovenia. It started by a seemingly innocent incident. A Slovenian journalist wrote an article sympathetic with ”Shqiptar cause”. 1 When he next day was entering his office, he was intercepted by a Shqiptar, who presented him with a bottle of “Skenderbeg” brandy, thanking him for the support. After that new articles on the subject issued and the Slovenian public was “Prepared’ for the Shqiptar cause. Soon a meting was arranged in the largest hall in Ljubljana, “Cankarjev dom”, when Slovenian and Shqiptar speakers accused Serbia of suppression o Shqiptars. The response from Serbia was as furious as superfluous, with the rhetoric of “ wounded national feelings”, “betrayal” etc. But the ghost was released from the bottle. Slovenia showed she was opting for secession. The lead was followed soon by Croat nationalists and the process was gaining an impetus. From the more “ideological side”, the division of Yugoslavian political scene was outlined by the speed of democratization of the society. In this respect Slovenia took the lead, with Croatia following. In Serbia it was Slobodan Milošević, and more importantly his Wife, Mirjana Marković, who obstinately tried to slow down the inevitable development of the Yugoslav society, from the autocratic to democratic one. They remained chained in their communist mentality, incapable to adopt a more flexible attitude. There were, moreover, serious indications that they dreamed to restore Tito’s Yugoslavia, with Milošević taking over the role of Josip Broz. When they realized the illusory character of their political intentions, the time was lost and Serbia was well behind the Slovenia and Croatia. As for other republics, their roles appeared marginal, as expected, since they Whether it was motivated by the fear from Shiptar violent political demands, in view of the Paraćin massacre, or was a genuine sympathy of the by far most advanced republic of Yugoslavia with by far the most retarded region in the same state, is a question, though interesting in itself, but outside the scope of our topic here. 1
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were even less advanced in that matter than Serbia. In Slovenia and Croatia political parties, different from the existing “communist party (the Party)” 1 In Slovenia and Croatia oppositional parties won the first “free elections”, whereas in Serbia newly founded non-communist (and “noncommunist”) attracted much fewer voters and remained marginal on the political scene. Thus, a serious division in Yugoslavia appeared – democratic west and communist Serbia. When the practical disintegration moves started, it was obvious who is going to gain sympathies from the West. Another important division between East and West Yugoslavia was confessional one. Slovenia and Croatia are predominantly Roman-Catholic, whereas Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia belong to the Greek-Orthodox realm. As for Bosnia and Herzegovina, their partition was the following: Muslim (50%) 44%!, Serb-orthodox (32%) and Croat Roman-catholic (18%) 17%! This proportion will turn out fatal for this republic, as we shall see later on. We turn now to two important aspects of the Yugoslav disintegration: (i) ethno-sociological diversity and (ii) formal frame for the dismantling a state which was existing for almost a century. The principal ethnicities in Yu1 were: 2 Serbs (Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, Macedonia) Croats (Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina) Slovenians (Slovenia) Muslims (Bosnia and Herzegovina) Macedonians (Macedonia) Shqiptars (Serbia, Macedonia) Hungarians (Serbia) Germans (Serbia) Roma (Yugoslavia, except for Slovenia) Principal languages: Serbo-Croat (Serbs, Croats, Muslims) Slovenian (Slovenians) Macedonian (Macedonians) Albanian (Shqiptars) Serbo-Croat region: (Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro) In the following we shall designate that part of Yugoslavia with Serbo-Croat native language as Serbo-Croatia, for the sake of simplicity, without any attempt to harm ethnic feelings of the people living there. As we shall see immediately, it was there that the most violent events occurred during the disintegration of Yu2. But the above division along the formal ethnic lines turned out less important in the issuing conflicts and massacres in the period (1991-1995). We need, therefore to reformulate the partition of the Serbo-Croatia, in order to understand properly the way the state disintegrated. We defined before the Dinaric region, which comprised Croatia south of river Sava, Herzegovina, Montenegro and Northern Albania. Pannonic region (Vojvodina, Slavonia, Northern Bosnia) were inhabited predominantly by lowlanders, whereas intermediate areas (Serbia south of river Danube, Zagorje in Croatia and Central Bosnia) are inhabited by the population whose anthropological characteristics lie between the hard and violent Dinaric highlanders and mild and civilized lowlanders. This simplified picture, however, may be misleading. Due to permanent migration Quotation marks are to indicate that the term “party” in a single-party state is contradictio in adjecto. In Yu2 the same ethnic content was retained, with the difference that Germans in Serbia (so-called Volksdeutschers, Vojvodina) have migrated to Germany, or have been banished there by the new communist regime; also a small Italian minority in Croatia (Istria and Dalmatia) has been banished, too. 1 2
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from the highlands towards lowlands, mountainous people have been present all over the SerboCroatia, in particular in towns. Apart from the steady individual/familial influx from the Dinaric region, plane people have been experiencing waves of migrations after some violent events, like war or uprisings (so-called metanastatic migrations, mentioned before). One of these waves took place in 1944/5, after the WWII, when a considerable number of Dinaroids moved to Pannonic plane and capital towns, like Belgrade and Zagreb. Since it was them who took the principal part in the partisan guerrilla during the war, these intruders occupied high state positions, both military and civic. With their pronounced tribal mentality, they took control over the surrounding population, mainly via Party membership, since they constituted the bulk of the Yugoslav Communist Party. This situation will prove instrumental in the events which ensued in the disintegration of Yu2. But before we enter the scene for this disintegration a few words of the organization of power in the state are in order. Two principal common sectors in Yu2 were the tools which Tito used for controlling the state (and society in general) and keeping all republics together. One was Yugoslav Communist Party, the other the Yugoslav Army (YA). The first sector was partitioned, however, into republican Parties and liable for mutual tensions and disputes, as it happened several times after the WWII. The Army, on the contrary, was unique and compact, fully devoted to Marshal Tito, who was considered semi god by the army officers, from corporals to generals. And whenever the state was in danger to disintegrate and the Party failed to ensure the absolute unity, Tito resorted to his YA, who was always ready to fulfil his orders. 1 When the multiparty system was introduced in Yu2 in 1990, first in Slovenia and Croatia, and then in the rest of Yugoslavia, communist parties transformed, at least formally, into other entities, suitable renamed. New parties were formed, lead as a rule, by the former members of the communist parties. 2 This turn was to be expected. First anybody with political affinities had to make a choice during Tito’s rule: either to suppress his ambitions or to join the Party. The former became apolitical, the latter (in)sincere party members. Some of the latter, unsatisfied with their position within the party hierarchy, founded their own parties, to satisfy their insentient craving for power. And in the latter respect Dinaroids had no match on the Yugoslav political scene. Except from Slovenia and Macedonia (which did not belong to Serbo-Croat region, anyway), almost all “oppositional parties” followed their Dinaroid leaders. In Croatia these were Tudjman and Mesić, in Bosnia and Herzegovina Alija Izetbegović and Radovan Karadžić, in Montenegro Momir Bulatović and Milo Djukanović and finally in Serbia Slobodan Milošević, as head of his Socialistic Party of Serbia (SPS), Vuk Drashković, leader of Serb Movement for Renaissance (SPO) and Vojislav Šešelj leading the so-called Serb Radical Party (SRS). 3 The only true oppositional party in Serbia was Democratic Party (DS), lead by Dragoljub Mićunović (spelt Mitjunovitj, who himself was in his youth a party member) and Zoran Djindjic (spelt Gjingjitj), a young liberal philosopher, who got his PhD in West Germany. Since these political leaders will play prominent role both in Y2 disintegration and later on, we shall devote some space to their personalities. Slobodan Milošević, II If you can’t beat them, you join them. We have already described to some extent his personality. Though of purely Montenegrin origin, he was, presumably, born in Serbia and was brought up within her cultural milieu. It was this This was the case in 1972, when first Croatian, and then Serbian parties exhibited some rebellious mood and Tito threatened them by the Army intervention. 2 The only notable exception was the Bosnian Muslim leader, Alija Izetbegović, who started (end ended) his political career as Muslim fundamentalist, and spent many years in prison. 3 Derived from sheshe – smallpox . 1
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dichotomy which shaped his manners and political career. He used to be rigid and stubborn, but could show a certain charm in the public appearing and personal contacts. When he became the president of Serbia, his principal concern was show to preserve this position indefinitely. Ones deciding to be a dictator, his political stratagem and tactics were determined. He was not ready to share the power with anybody, and behave as he was going to remain on the top forever. Once a dictator becomes dictator, he becomes aware, at the same time he will have no room for giving up. So, the more unpopular he is, the more strongly he sticks to the power. Dictatorship is a “river of no return”. His principal tools for preserving the power were the police, army, state banks and state public media. All four “columns of power” were in the hands of his Montenegrin (and in part Herzegovian) compatriots. As for the rest of media he did not care for them, making a tacit agreement in the Frederic II manner. 1 Similar attitude was towards the banks. In fact, those two pyramid scheme banks, mentioned above, were set up in collaboration with Milošević and it was this robbery which enabled him, under the cover of his son Marko, to acquire an enormous amount of money and transfer it to Israel, Cyprus etc. This money was used as an initial capital for starting private business of his son and later, when fled from the country his family to indulge in a luxurious life. In his public appearing he used to imitate Marshal Tito and the same ritual was designed for that matter. He practiced an apodictic style in public and at meetings, again imitating his political idol - Josip Broz. In fact, it was this ambition of substituting Tito on the Yugoslav political scene which caused first the animosity of the rest of Yugoslav republics, then open hostility, ending in disintegration of the state. 2 Formally, single-party system need not be taken as antagonistic relative to many-party states. Under a single party one may discern (or allow) many fractions, competing for influence, (ideological, political etc). In a sense such an organization may be considered as a many parties “under the same roof”. In fact, Tito and other autocrats used to defend their ruling positions by such a democracy, where antagonistic conflicts are suppressed. The idea of many parties in a single organisation was reflected in logic of federal state, like Tito’s Yugoslavia. In this respect, any Party member in a Yugoslav state who would complain about unitarism etc appears a hypocrite, for the very membership in a single party implies unitaristic inclination. Milošević’s unitarism was, therefore, nothing to be surprised (and objected, for that matter). The fact that, except for Croatia and partly in BiH, after elections in 1990 it was party bosses who won the elections, proves that the single-party mentality was well entrenched in the minds of Yugoslavs. In Serbia, it will take 10 years the non-communist parties to won the elections. Milošević was under a fatal influence of his ambitious wife, Mira Marković, 3 who founded her own political party, so-called Yugoslav United Left (YUL), with symbolic number of members, but with a strong influence, particularly in matters of personal politics. It was a counter example of the infamous Romanian ruling couple Nikolae and Elena Ceausescu, as popular in Serbia as the latter was in Romania. YUL was, in fact, a political cover for a number of illegal activities, like privatization of state money, blackmail, bribery etc. With SPS and YUL the organized crime entered the Serbian political scene, to step back never since. Vuk Drašković This graduated lawyer, was born in Vojvodina, in 1946, in the family of Herzegovian (partisan) settlers, but the family moved back to Herzegovina and it was there he was brought up as a dedicated communist. He graduated law and was employed as secretary to Mika Shpiljak, later to become the prime minister of Yugoslav government. Later he became a journalist, and was recruited for the state security service. He married an ambitious Montenegrin, Danica, from the “I have made a deal with my subjects – they may say whatever they want and I am doing what I want”. Ironically, in a sense, it was Tito who both rescued Yugoslavia and who dismembered it. 3 The very fact she retained her maiden surname speaks of her vanity and ambition. 1 2
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royalist (Chetnik) family, who soon converted him to a royalist too. Vuk founded a political party, Serb-nationalistic royalist Serb Revival Movement (SRM), strongly opposed to Milošević regime, better to say very eager to overthrow Milošević and take over the power. He adopted a traditional Serb image of a pious person, imitating first long-haired monk, then the duke Mikhailo (Obrenović dynasty), while opting for the restoration of the rival Karadjordjević royal house. His public style resembled much that of Hitler and his followers used to imitate fascist manners. He was under the influence of his tough wife Danica, even more than it was Milošević under his Mira. Unlike Milošević, Drašković was a person of modest capabilities, disguised behind an emphatic rhetoric in the prophetic manners. Vojislav Šešelj (Sheshely) If you can’t join them, you beat them. An extraordinary personality rarely met in European recent history. Coming from a humble social status, endowed with an infinite vanity and ambitions, intelligent, cunning, perfidy, primitive, imposing, treacherous, cynical, this Satanic character was a mixture of Athenian Kleon (as described by Aristotle in his Athenian constitution) and Roman Katilina (Šešelj was of enormous size), but with extremely base mental structure. He graduated law in his natal town Sarajevo, 1 where he got his doctorate too. He joined Party early in his youth, became an assistant at the faculty of law, but was soon expelled from the Party. He wrote an (17 page) appeal for reacceptance, but was rejected. Soon he was arrested and sentenced for 8 year hard-labour prison. His behaviour was of such manners that the prison authorities considered it better to get rid of him and he was released after two years and banished from Bosnia to Serbia. 2 Since his father was a Croat and mother Serb, he was at choice which nationality (and republic) to adopt. He opted for Serbian one and became a “great Serb”, learning first how to make an orthodox crossing. Members of his extended family, Šešeljs, all live in Zagreb and other Croatian towns. (His brother renounced him publicly as the family shame). Not willing to do any useful work in the new environment, Šešelj opted for the political career. Having nothing to offer, he based his political activities and ambitions on two main pillars; (i) anonymity and (ii) Serb nationalism. The first point was very advantageous, since nobody in Serbia new his previous CV and he was free to invent whatever suited him. As for the second point, this insistence, which grew to the point of chauvinism, was enforced to great extent by his Croat nationality, which he rightly considered as hindrance to his political ambitions. He joined first Vuk Drašković party, making Drašković his godfather at the same time. Since Drašković was a pro-Chetnik agitator, Šešelj engaged himself in playing role of a Serb chetnik nationalist. He used to visit North America, delivering talks to the local Serb immigrant population (charging each talk, of course). In Serbia Šešelj had him photographed for newspapers in Chetnik uniforms, with rifle or gun in hand. Seduced by such vigorous ”pro-Chetnik” activities, the old chetnik vojvoda (commandant in Serb tradition), a USA immigrant Momčilo Djujić, bestowed to Šešelj the rank of vojvoda. The honeymoon did not last for long, however, for when the old warrior realized whom he was dealing with, when Šešelj joined Milošević in 1998, he renounced Šešelj and publicly deprived him from his chetnik membership and vojvoda rank (Djujic je umro 1995. g.!): “[because] Šešelj has become the devoted collaborator and accomplice in all crimes and treachery which Slobodan Milošević is committing against Serb people”. As for the link with Drašković, Šešelj long ago concluded he needed Vuk any longer. He established his own party, Serb Radical Party (SRP), adopting the name of an ancient Serbian party (“Narodna RS”), His father, a railway worker, came from a Herzegovian village Orahov Do. There is another interpretation of this sudden release from prison, as a deal for ruining Serbia in return. This thesis has been widely corroborated by subsequent behaviour of Šešelj.
1 2
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who was very influential before WWII in Serbia and Yugoslavia. Cunningly engaging local Serbs as the cover, and with the help of his Herzegovian compatriots, Šešelj started his march for conquering and subduing Serbia. Free from any ethics, human or political, this unscrupulous creature uses any means to exterminate his opponents, political or otherwise. He managed to attract a number of Serbian populations, which consisted from three social sectors of Serbia: (i) Dinaric immigrants, either from the previous metanastatic migrations or recent ones, (ii) Roma and (iii) social outcasts and losers, the very bottom of the social pyramid. Each of those three sectors had its particular reason to join this party, which soon was recognized as a social movement rather than a party in a strict sense. But apart from the socio-psychological explanation of Šešelj’s behaviour, one must take serious the hidden project which lies behind the seemingly foolish rhetoric. His noisy announcement that his radicals strive to founder a Serb state, with the western borders along the now famous line: Ogulin, Karlobag, Virovitica (straight across the Croatia) nobody took serious, except for the propaganda reasons (from Croatian side particularly). Does Šešelj really believe in such a project? In no occasion he was willing to explicate what exactly he is going to do in order to achieve this goal. For good reason. His aim is not to start war, even less to do some thing himself for that matter. Then what’s the point? Those areas he is claiming to belong to Serbs are populated by Serbs, mainly as dispersed orthodox population. Two points enter the issue here. First, those Serbs should be instigated to rebel or become trouble makers anyway. Second, even without disturbances, the rest of the Croat (and Bosnian) non-Serbs citizens would feel insecure in the presence of the population which might start rebellion or other perturbation. In such situation a tension between the Serb and the other autochthonous population will be sustained, as Damocles sword. And when in 1991 the political turmoil in Yugoslavia started, it was Serbs in Croatia and BiH who were first engaged in rebelling, instigated by Šešelj. If one accounts that Milošević had similar project in head, the realization was ensured. The rationale of both leaders was simple: we can not control Serbs outside Serbia and they can not support us from there. We shall bring tem here to Serbia, what will be multiply profitable for us. These immigrants would be thankful to u for “saving” them and would be our political supporters. By these numerous intruders we will be able to keep our control over the local Serbian population (Serb or other alike). In fact it was the real (and realistic) content of Milošević’s slogan ”All Serbs in a single state”. The only difference between these two leaders was that each of them meant the newcomers to be his supporters, not of his adversary. As the subsequent events proved, Šešelj appeared more cunning and base rival and his demagogy turned out more effective. It should be noted here that those plans were at the same time at least wishful thinking of the Croat and nonSerb BiH local politicians, for such an evacuation of the potentially disloyal population would solve their problem, too. This point makes another interpretation concerning Šešelj activities plausible – a (tacit or secret) agreement between Šešelj and these leaders to carry out the migration project. (At this point Milošević’ and Šešelj’s tactics separate). Everyone who is familiar with Zionist movement must feel she has already learned this kind of reasoning and tactics. It has been most vividly explained by Ariel Sharon (see Appendix 1) The rising popularity of the SRP can be explained by the very social structure of the followers. Normally, a political party is lead by the most capable members of the society, who guarantee to the followers the prosperity of the state. The followers of Šešelj were well aware he was a scum, but it was just the rationale for following him. The logic was simple and devastating one: I am the social loser, but if we ketches the power, we shall compensate for all our humiliations. Our leader is spiting at the elite of the society and I enjoy it, as a revenge for my low social status. This elite is no better than I am, for we are humiliating them, covered by the facade of the freedom of speech. In fact, the stratagem and tactics of Šešelj and his followers resemble much those of early Christians, the social losers as they were. They could not be beaten, for they were already at the very bottom. The Romans and Greeks despised them, for good reason, but lost the war at the end.
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For they did not recognize the nature of their movement, just as today Serbian population does not recognize the nature and aims of SRP. We stress here, however, that whatever the stratagem of the “party” was, the leadership of the movement was Dinaric one and the whole affair took over tribal form. Being of a Satanic nature, Šešelj’s stratagem was complementary (better to say orthogonal) to the normal one, as expected in a civilized society. He is making use of a truly “inverse logic”, which to an outsider seems foolish and wrong. We shall not dwell here on it, but shall expose those parts of this logic as used in the ensuing “wars” in YU2. The main concern of Šešelj and his followers was the publicity. To this end they have adopted the same stratagem as used by Adolf Hitler at the beginning of his political career in early twenties. 1 “It makes no difference whatever they laugh at us or revile us, whether they represent us as clowns or criminals; the main thing is that they mention us, that they concern themselves with us again and again...”. Mein Kampf Publicity, publicity at any rate, no matter of which quality, political or ethical. When Yugoslav “wars” started Šešelj was eager to incite anybody to engage in atrocities, making sure not to be involved directly himself. Many atrocities perpetuated by his men in Croatia and Bosnia were not only publicized by his media, but even exaggerated (some even completely invented). The rationale for this kind of self-promotion propaganda was weird, but very cunning and effective. Those engagements, real and fictive, even if carried out by other paramilitaries, nobody would like to claim for himself, for obvious reason. Thus, by claiming atrocities for themselves Šešeljoids achieve at least two things: By systematically stressing they are Serbs, they demonize Serbia and thus promote her isolation from the international community. They promote their political presence and “patriotism” within Serbia herself, attracting further the low-level social strata people, mainly frustrated social losers, both autochthonous, from Serbia, and newcomers (refugees, immigrants, etc) from over-Drina regions. The long-term goal is to lower down the general civilization level of Serbian society, so that they can take over the power, making use of violent and illegal means. We shall meet many occasions in the following, where this stratagem is explicitly exposed. Another possibility, taken seriously by some Serbians, is that Šešelj is a foreign provocateur (probably of Ustashas, Croat Nazis). As we shall see later concerning KiM, this suspicion becomes very real, indeed. One particular distasteful and annoying face of this weird personality is his infinite thirst for publicity. The whole Serbia has been flooded by posters with his portrait, with “patriotic” slogans. His name is always mentioned by his followers with title Prof. Dr, though he does not hold any professorship at any faculty. Tens of books have been published under his name (with his portrait on the cover), although he has nothing to do with their content. Weekly magazine of his party contains tens of his pictures per issue (the record has been 57). His inferiority complex has no mach in any country for sure. According to the latest elections (2004) 30 % of voters found him Serb saviour (17 % of the total electoral body), 70 % experience him as a nuisance. 2 (We note that 50 % of the electoral body abstains from voting since 2000, but Šešelj’s followers vote 100 %). Politics and obsession 1
See, e.g. Ian Kershaw, Hitler, 1889-1936: Hubris, Penguin Books, 1998, p. 147.
2
Note that Hitler collected 30 % of votes in 1932.
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What makes a common divisor for these three is their frustration, mental hindrance which guides, better to say channels, their behaviour on the public scene. Milošević’s alleged nationalism appeared a mere compensation of his communist internationalism, particularly supported by his wife, Mira Marković. They were both raised within the communist regime. When Milošević became a local party activist, he was known to fight “Serb nationalism”, showing contempt for those who were “Serbing”. When he found, after “Kosovo experience” in 1987 that riding a “Serb tiger” could be very profitable, he abandoned internationalism, Tito’s “brotherhood and unity”, for fighting for “Serb interest”. He had to compensate for another “handicap” – his Montenegrin origin. Thus, he became “bigger Catholic than Pope”. One thing can not be imputed to him, however, chauvinism. In fact Milošević never mentioned other nationalities in his public appearing. His primary goal was acquiring dominant position within Yu2, as Tito, his idol, held. Vuk Drašković is similar story, though written in different language. Being a Party member, coming from a communist family, he was obsessed by getting rid of this phase of his life (mostly due to his wife of Chetnik provenience). As somebody said all communists are divided into two categories: communist and anti-communist. It was for this reason Drašković found it easy to pass from one camp to the other. In time when communism was falling apart, first in USSR and then in all satellite states, it was not difficult to Drašković to realize on which side of bread the butter was. The same holds for his sudden piety and devotion to the Serb Orthodox church, after his vigorous atheism as the Party member. These misgivings turned out driving force for his political career. Vojislav Šešelj appears particularly clear example of the interplay of psychological disturbances and public behaviour. If the two previous cases belong to the realm of psychology, his case is a pure psychiatric one. Born in a humble Bosnian family, rejected and punished by his immediate environment, he developed a conspicuous syndrome of misanthropy. When banished to Serbia and found himself rejected and despised by the new environment as well, his misanthropy turned into sadism, which he even has not tried to conceal. At meetings and mass relies, in the Parliament, at court (both domestic and at Hague Tribunal) he enjoys spitting at everybody and everything he considers the others value and respect. It was this kind of behaviour which has been attracting the bottom of the society, social losers and the like. He and his party have been ignored by Serbian society what makes them even more aggressive and imposing. His mental maturity corresponds to pre-school kids. Apart from these mental defects, his character appears a caricature of the Dinaric mentality and (anti) social attitude. Coupled with his intelligence, unscrupulousness and personal charisma, this creature turns out to be the enemy No 1 of Serbia, a truly national disaster. The political scene in Serbia (1990-2000) This tribal aspect of the formally political rivalry was the most prominent feature of the Milošević’s era (and is still present in the current affairs) in Serbia. Before we turn to this part of the modern Serbian history, we mention that some other parties were engaged in the struggle for the political influence on the newly acquired political space. In fact, when the first free elections after WWII were announced, numerous parties were formed, but the overwhelming majority of them was not serious political business, but rather irresponsible affair, even a mockery. Apart from the three Dinaroid parties mentioned, there was Democratic party (DP), led by the university professor Dragoljub Mićunović, a philosopher who spent some time abroad before engaging on the Serbian political scene. Another prominent figure, a young philosopher Dr Zoran Djindjic, was instrumental in strengthening the party, together with a number of leading Serbian intellectuals. Unfortunately, some of them were of Dinaric origin and they soon started seceding from the party, founding new branches, like Democratic Party of Serbia (DPS) lead by Vojislav Koshtunica, of a recent Dinaric descend. While DP was the party of the centre, DPS positioned itself on the right, conservative and nationalistic wing. Another party, Association of Serbian Citizens (ASC), lead by the sociologist Vesna Peshić, attracted the very top of the Serbian intellectual, liberal elite, but had a modest membership and little direct political influence on the current politics.
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Practically, the Serbian political scene at this period was marked by the antagonistic rivalry within the triangle SPS – SRP – SRM, three Dinaroid quasi-political organizations. The first, Milošević’s party was controlled predominantly by Montenegrins, the second, Šešelj’s party by Herzegovians and SRM by both Herzegovians and Montenegrins (following the leaders’ origins). SPS was tightly holding the power, ready to do everything physically possible to retain it. The other two players fought Miloshević in order to overthrow him (or at least join him). The difference in political programmes of all these rivals was of little importance, for it changed as the situation required. The only permanent motive force of their activities was the craving for power. Even their loud nationalistic rhetoric could not conceal the only driving force of their ambitions – a pathological power obsession. (Civilized people, in particular Westerners, appear incapable to understand this mental feature of Dinaroids, though some historians have not failed to recognize that almost all dictators in history were montagnards, from Pisistratus, to Vespasian, Bonaparte, Stalin and Hitler. In fact, highlanders have never been used to turn to industrious work, since they for millennia were engaged in plundering the lowlands or mutual robbery). Since they split, SRP and SRM entered an antagonistic struggle, with SRP ready to eliminate the rival at all expense, including assassinations. As for other parties mentioned, they cooperated occasionally among themselves and with SRM, but their influence in the Parliament was inversely proportional to the quality of their political programmes, that is meagre. Kosovo (meta)mythology In the struggle for gaining an international support or at least sympathy for their cause Albanians, Albanian and Kosovars 1 alike, have made an extensive use of the so-called Serb Kosovo myth. This insisting on the Serb obsession about Kosovo battle and its consequences have resulted in creating another mythology, myth about Kosovo myth, what may be called Kosovo metamythology. The rationale for creating this meta-mythology is simple. If they can demonstrate that Serbs look at their history in an irrational way, as the case with Kosovo myth shows, all other historical claims made from Serb side concerning Kosovo are equally mere constructs of Serb imagination, devoid of a real historical content. In particular Serb claims for the historical rights on Kosovo have no factual support. It is, therefore, of utmost importance to consider “Kosovo myth” in more details and then analyze the ideological background and political aims of the metamythology we mentioned above. Though many details on Kosovo Battle in 1389 are missing, the essential facts concerning this decisive battle between Turks and Serbs on Kosovo Field are well established. 2 Serb united forces were led by grand duke Lazar, 3 the most prominent Serb ruler at the time, while sultan Murat was at the head of the Turkish army. A military unit from Bosnia, under the leadership of nobleman Vlatko Vuković was engaged too, but it left the battlefield before the battle was over. Despite the claims of some Albanian authors no evidence for Albanian engagement on the Christian side has been recorded. As for the strengths of the clashing forces records disagree about numbers, but it has been generally agreed that Turks outnumbered Christians, though probably not so much as Serb romantic authors claimed, and certainly not as the folk poetry implied. According to Turkish records Murat lead about 37.000, whereas a rough estimate of Christian army was ten to fifteen thousands soldiers, including those from Bosnia. Bosnian king Tvrtko, who otherwise had a title of Terms frequently used for inhabitants of KiM. See, e.g. Noel Malcolm, KOSOVO, a short history, Harper Perennial, 1999, for the detailed historiography of the Battle.
1 2
Knez Lazar in Serb. In the folk poetry Lazar was called invariably emperor Lazar, for reasons to be explained later on.
3
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king of Bosnia and Serbia, did not send a large army, since he was engaged in a dispute with local Dalmatian cities and fiefdoms. It was, presumably, due to this fact that he withdrew his unit before the Battle was over, saving it for his domestic needs. Army centres were lead by Murat and Lazar. Serb left wing was under the command of Vlatko Vuković and the right wing by Vuk Branković. Turkish right wing was under the command of the elder Murat’s son Bajazit (Pajazit), while the younger brother, Jacub led the left wing. Vuk Branković overpowered the Turkish left wing, but Bajazid pushed Vlatko’s forces back. Majority of the latter retreated and left the battle and Bayazit crashed the Serb centre and presumably ultimately defeated the Christian army. Important role in the battle outcome was played by Yanichars, the elite Turk infantry, composed from the non-Turkish subject youth. Decisive move at the end of battle was made by Murat’s son Bayazid, who led the light cavalry charged at Gazimestan. Duke Lazar was captured and decapitated during the battle. Sultan Murat lost his life, too, but the historians disagree about the event. Both sides, Turkish and Serb, agreed that it was a Serb nobleman, Milosh Obilić (Kobilić) who assassinated Turkish sultan, but they disagree on the way it was done. 1 While Serb tradition maintains that Milosh Obilic approached the sultan during (or before) the battle, under the pretence of joining Turkish side and then slaughtered him in his tent, the Turkish interpretation greatly differs from this. According to the latter, it was after the battle was over, when Murat was inspecting the field covered with dead bodies, when Milosh Obilic, who was pretending to be dead, jumped suddenly up and fatally wounded the sultan. There was another tradition of twelve “sworn nights”, lead by Milosh Obilic, 2 who paved their way through the Turkish lines, broke the camels circle around the Murat’s tent and slaughtered the sultan. All variants appear rather suspect. In any case, Milosh Obilic has been regarded by Serbs as the greatest hero, comparable with Leonidas and Mucie Scevola. It is interesting at this point to mention that Albanian historians used to claim that Milosh Obilic was an Albanian, in fact. It is even more interesting, in this context, to note that after NATO and Albanian forces occupied KiM, one of the first demonstration of the new situation was to remove the Monument erected to Milosh Obilic at the Priština centre and to replace it with the monument of Skenderbeg. 3 (Myths come and go, as the needs require.) As for the real historical importance of the battle, or its consequences, historians disagree. According to the traditional interpretations, in particular Serb ones, it was a battle for Christian Europe, whose positive outcome might have saved the latter from Turkish invasion. Modern historians prefer to give much less importance to the significance of Kosovo battle, arguing that even the Christian victory would be of a transient consequence and would not change the history in the long terms. 4 The truth lies, probably, somewhere in-between. Eventual Christian victory might have triggered a coherent response of the European states to the Turkish threat. The very fact that the immediate response of the Christian Europe to the (false) news that Christians prevailed, was the ringing the bells across the Continent in celebration proves that the contemporary Europe put much weight on the Battle. Turks did not exploit immediately their military success, since the new sultan, Bayazid, after having had his brother Jacub killed, 5 hurried to Anatolia in order to secure his new position in the See, e.g. A. Loma, Prakosovo, Slovenski i Indoevropski koreni srpske epike, SANU, Balkanoloski Institut, Beograd, 2002 (in Serb). (Prekosovo, Slavonic and Indoeuropean roots of Serb epic) 2 The story resembles too much the famous “Theban sacred regiment’, which was broken by Alexander at the Cheronea battle, to be taken seriously. 3 As mentioned before, Skenderbeg never stepped on Kosovo Polje soil. 4 This view is supported in a sense by the possibility that Turks were really defeated on Kosovo Field, but if it did happen, it was a Pyrrhic victory, judging from the consequences. This outcome might explain the king’s assertion that he won the Battle, since he was the only king who survived it (though he did not take part in it). 5 This custom was practiced in Ottoman Empire, for obvious practical reasons, thus avoiding struggles over the throne between the sultan’s sons. 1
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state. Serbian lands east from river Drina continued to exist as Turkish vassal states, until they were totally subjugated with the fall of the new capital Smederevo in 1459, six years after the fall of Constantinople. From then on, Serbs were to live in the “Turkish slavery” for the next four centuries. Turkish occupation put an end of the development of Serbia in all respects and isolated her from the rest of Europe until the middle of 19th century. The aristocracy was extinguished, the middle class, which hardly existed before the occupation, was annihilated too. The only national institution which remained, though in a very restricted extent, was Serb Orthodox church, which was identified with Serb nation and was instrumental in preserving national identity. One may think of the present-day Serbian Orthodox Church, (and the Greek Orthodox Church in general, for that matter), obsolete as she is, whatever she likes, but her role in preserving the European civilization on Balkan during the Ottoman rule, can not be overestimated. It is important to note that during almost half millennium life under the rule of the Muslim empire not a single Orthodox Serb was converted into Islam. This fact should be paralleled with Bosnia and Herzegovina and Albania, where the convertites have made the majority of the overall population. What the latter fact has been giving rise can be judged when comparing the civilization levels of these Muslim regions with the surrounding Christian population. Among other things, clergyman was the only literary sector of the entire Serb society, which was restricted to rural area only. Towns were populated almost exclusively by Turks, Greeks, Jews and Cincars. 1 The lack of laic educational system and schools has resulted in developing an oral poetry, which turned out to achieve an unprecedented value, both in the extent and quality, almost comparable to that of Homeric Greek. And as with Homer the Troy episode became the central point of Hellenic tradition and ethos, so the Kosovo battle occupied the most essential part of the Serb literary tradition. The so-called Kosovo cycle became Serb Iliad, though it was a collection of poems composed by various folk poets. 2 It is of interest here to point out hat no poetry dealing with events before Kosovo battle have been recorded. The explanation by Vuk Karadzic, the leading Serb linguist and folklorist, was that Kosovo battle so much perturbed the national memory, that this traumatic experience wiped out everything that was done in the field before. Now, we come to the “Kosovo myth” proper. But before doing that, a word of comparison with Homer’s Iliad is in order. Whatever we know today about siege of Troy is based on Iliad solely, since no historical records on the event have been preserved. Contrary to that Kosovo battle is a historical event, despite the differences concerning details of the battle. We are, therefore, in position to compare the poetic tradition and the historical facts and examine the way the myths are created. Indeed, the Serb poetry has been used as an instructive tool for studying mythology in coming into being. And as in the case of Iliad one may reconstruct real events from the poetic presentation, so we could pull out actual (or at least probable) facts from the Kosovo cycle, even without resorting to historical records. Of course, as the case with Iliad (and the Bible, for that matter) is, the poetic evidence appears a resourceful, though not reliable, record. Kosovo Myth Trauma which Serbs after the fall of Serbian state and Turkish occupation experienced can be compared with that felt by Palestinian Jews after the fall of Jerusalem and destruction of Temple in 70 AD. Since Serbia soon found herself well within the Ottoman Empire and the European Christian states were on defence from the victorious Turks, no light at the end of the historical tunnel was seen and the whole nation sank into a deep despair. In a sense, nation may be regarded 1
Cincars (Vlachs) appear a specific Balkan ethnicity, of rather obscure origin, speaking an original language, as an amalgam of various Balkan tongues. 2 We mention here that Iliad and Odyssey were, in all probability, a collective work and Homer only made a final touch, albeit a genial one, to the already existing oral tradition. (As it was the case with the Gospels, by the way.).
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as an extended individual, with similar suffering of the wounds and defeats. And as an individual compensate for its personal defeats by pushing her traumatic memories into the subconscious, so a nation builds up a fictitious history, trying to justify her failures and construct a fictitious world without unpleasant reality. Subjugated Serbs were no exception (as Jews, Germans etc were neither). This is evidenced mostly from the folk epic poetry. The latter was resting, as far as the Kosovo battle was concerned, on two principal pillars, one ideological, the other quasi-historical. The essence of the Kosovo cycle centres on the so-called “Prince (Lazar)’s supper”. This is composed, in its turn, mainly on the New Testament myth of the “Last Supper”, with an admixture of the Homeric plot from Iliad. On the ideological side the whole Kosovo issue is presented as a collective Crucifixion. Being aware of the superiority of the Turkish army, duke Lazar was put before two alternatives: (i) surrender and the “Earthly kingdom” or (i) fighting and “Heavenly Kingdom”, with the obvious allusion to the Jesus’ choice. Of course, the Christian prince chose the second alternative. Hence, it was just God’s will, an inevitable outcome of the choice, which resulted in the bloody defeat. As for the very plot, the scenario at the “Prince’s supper” had Jesus in the image of Lazar, while the role of Judah was allotted to the nobleman Vuk Branković. 1 . The latter accused Milosh Obilic of treacherous intentions, and it was for that reason that the latter decided to kill Murat as the proof of his loyalty. (The parallel with Achilles before the Troy is conspicuous). Hence, even ignoring the ideological religious background mentioned, it was this treacherous behaviour of Vuk Branković, who allegedly passed during the very battle on Turkish side, which turned out fatal for the Christian cause. This betrayal has never been corroborated by historical records and was in all probability invented later on, for a number of political reasons. Never-the-less, Vuk Branković has remained in the popular Serb memory as an epitome of a traitor. Apart from the folk epic cycle mentioned, many Serb poets used to make use of the Kosovo battle as a poetic inspiration. A cycle by poet Dragoljub Filipović about Serb Kosovo heroes can move anybody but serbophobs. A renown Serb poet from the end of 19th and beginning of 20th century, Milan Rakic, wrote a poem entitled “On Gazimestan”. 2 When in 1912 Serbian army reached Kosovo Field, a commander lined up his unit at the spot on Gazimestan and asked if somebody could recite the poem before the line. A soldier stepped ahead and did it, in a solemn silence of moved comrades. Then another soldier stepped ahead and asked commander if he is aware that the author of the poem is present in the line. Surprised commander then asked Milan Rakić to step ahead, but the latter was so timid that he did not obey the order. The commander then ordered the unit to salute their comrade, what they did proudly. Gazimestan means to Serbs the same as Golgotha to Christians, and West Wall to Jews. There is no Serb kid who has not red the entire collection of the Kosovo cycle poetry, folk or otherwise. KiM may be torn out from Serbia (and Serbs), just as the Temple has been destroyed and Jews banished from Palestine. But just as after every feast meal Jews hit glasses after a toast onto floor and cry : “Jerusalem, let my right arm dry up if I forget you!”, so Serbs will yearn for the lost homeland. Jews have returned to Israel and recover Jerusalem and West Wall. . Kosovo meta-mythology Kosovo-battle memory, both historical and poetic has been used by those Serbian politicians who referred to national sentiments, as an easy means to achieve Serbian collective support for their running politics. In fact this refers mainly to Serbian quasi-intellectuals, who were educated in the traditional manners. This instance has been vastly exploited by those who found their interests in tearing KiM from Serbia. It concerns both Albanians (from Albania and KiM) and their patrons. 1 2
The very battle was fought on his land, in fact. Where the decisive Turkish cavalry charge took place, as mentioned before.
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Since this instance appears of great importance for the propaganda war going on about KiM, it deserves our particular attention here. One of main stratagem in winning a case has always been to attack an adversary at the point one feels to be the weakest with himself. We saw how the mythology about Illyrian origin has been developed by Albanian historians and politicians, what should lend support for their claims on almost any West-Balkan territory, including that a the present-day Austria. Hence, the principal target of the same circles has been to convince the world public opinion that Serbs’ claims on KiM are a product of pure phantasm, an irrational construction of Serb history regarding their presence on KiM. If they prove that a part of this construction is false one, a pure myth, then it should be much easier to convince people that the rest is false altogether. The stratagem is like this: Serbs claims regarding KiM history are as realistic as their poetry is historically supported. In order to illustrate the point, let us turn for the moment to Israel, his ancient and recent history. We know from the Old Testament Jewish clergy has claimed the historicity of the ancient fables. Including Exodus, pastes sent on Egypt by Jehovah, parting the Red see, slaughter by Joshua of Canaanites, etc. Since we are aware these are but irrational fancies, it follows that nothing in the Bible has historical support. Hence, the claims of Jews that they used to live in the present-day Israel, including Palestine, are mere fictions, not worthy serious considerations. And, as the logical consequence, the existence of the state of Israel is the result of European colonization of the Arabic national territory, a pure act of aggression and violence. Likewise, due to Zeus’s interventions at Troy, Trojan War never took place, since we know that Olympian gods were Greek inventions. The Kosovo meta-mythology has been, therefore, contrived like this: Serbs claim that their poetic memory is history, and since it is untrue, any further claims from their side appear likewise false. The trouble with this construct is that Albanian patrons, like USA, have accepted this metamythology and do not hesitate to express this in public. It is the background of their frequently repeated demands that Serbs should be realistic, to accept the reality etc. It never occurred to them that it is exactly one may have expected from them to give the advise to Albanians, Albanian and non-Albanian likewise, to accept the reality that not all Albanians live in the same state, as not all Kurds, Serbs, Roma, Armenians, Jews, Basques etc do. But, of course, it is no the matter of logic, but of interests and power. If one may forgive those involved who are trying to secure their interests, national or otherwise, by referring to irrationality of their adversaries, as ethnic-Albanians do, behaviour of some others selfappointed advisers and/or referees can provoke dismay only. Indeed, those who go around and talk about somebody’s obsessions at microphones or in front of TV cameras, and then go to church and listen to Judeo-Christian myths, (not to mention those of Islamic provenience) deserve nothing but compassion (and there are other terms too). To call historical facts myths and kneel at the same time before religious effigies deserve attention of a particular branch of human professions, indeed. Here it is interesting to note that the Vidovdan cult was introduced much later from the time of Battle. Even more interesting is the fact it came from the west, albeit in an indirect way. Namely, the original cult was that of the Roman Catholic saint St. Vit (Vitus), who was executed on 28 June, 303 AD. His day was celebrated on that date, together with the seer Amos. Vit’s name entered the Serbian Orthodox ecclesiastic books via Roman Catholic and Russian sources and he was never considered a Serb saint. On the other hand, the Old-Slavic god Vid (Svevid) 1 was venerated by ancient Slavs as the god of light and welfare, but a god of war as well. Sacrifices to Vid were carried out at the end of the yearly harvest, in shrines dedicated to him, all over the Slavic world. Only after the famous Kumanovo battle in 1912, when Serbian Army decidedly defeated Turkish one, at the beginning of the First Balkan war, the slogan was launched FOR KOSOVO
1
One who sees everything.
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KUMANOVO, and Vidovdan (The Day of Vid) came into prominence and entered the Serbian church calendar by red letters, as one of nine most important state official festivities. 1 The irony of history is that the visit of the Prince Ferdinand to Sarajevo was scheduled for Vidovdan and was experienced by Serb part of the organization Mlada Bosna (Young Bosnia) as a provocation to Serbs and their Kosovo cult. Whether the conspirators were aware that it could have been interpreted in another way, as linked with St Vit, is not known. Whether the occurrence of the Great War depended on the (wrong) interpretation of the significance of June 28 could be a matter of speculations, but the historical reality remains the only certain fact at present. The collective memory on Kosovo battle has produced some other side effects, which will play a remarkable role in the subsequent Balkan history. Two points are to be made her, as two sides of the same coin: first, the frustrating feeling of the (national) defeat and second, the heroic assassination of sultan Murat by Milosh Obilic. The first element of the memory has resulted in the impulse for retaliation, as mentioned in connection to the abovementioned slogan. The second aspect is an almost archetypal link of the Vidovdan day to the ”heroic assassination” within the patriotic impulse in Serbian nation. The assassination in Sarajevo was but one instance of the ”Vidovdan mythologema”. When in 1921 regent Alexandar Karadjordjević (practically the absolute ruler of Yugoslavia at the time) declared the so-called ”Vidovdan constitution”, on Vidovdan day, the same day an attempt was made to assassinate him and the prime minister Nikola Pashić (who was accompanying the regent in a coach). Nikola Pashić was the target of another attempt of assassination in 1923 (on Vidovdan, of course). The myth of Great Serbia Much space has been devoted in the recent history of Western Balkan, and in particular in the latest political upheavals, about the alleged project of Great Serbia. The issue must be, however, considered together with its counterparts from Croatia (Great Croatia) and Albania (Greater Albania). Were all these projects serious and what was the origin of this maximalist concept of forming national states in the otherwise ethnically mixed area? Whose interests were involved and to which extent the interested were ready and capable of realizing such megalomaniac ambitions? We shall argue here that these projects were devised (better to say dreamt) not in Belgrade, Zagreb or Tirana, but somewhere else. Of course, neither of the latter capitals would mind if somebody offered the “Greater Entity”on a tray. But reasonable politicians normally take into account the price for such gains, which would be high indeed. In fact, Serbia and Croatia did achieve the desired goals, but as collateral gains. Yugoslavia after WWI gathered together all (except those in Albania and Rumania) Serbs living on Balkan peninsular. But the state was devised after the wishes of Slovenians and Croats, as well as by Serbs. Similarly, Croatia obtained all desired regions from former Yugoslavia during the WWII, under the name of Independent State of Croatia (ISC), which was, in fact, a puppet state, under the patronates of Germany and Italy. It acquired Srem from the present day Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. In a sense, this state had a formal ethnical justification, since Croats constituted the simple not absolute majority there??? (ima statistike koja kaze da su Srbi bili prosta vecina!). The latter was further consolidated by the Croat claims that Muslims were in fact Croats. 2 An interesting episode in this context was the appearance of the book Greater Serbia, 3 by a Serb historian Vladimir Ćorović, (needless to say he was Dinaroid). Despite the title, there is nothing about Greater Serbia in the book, which appears a concise, historiography account of the Serbian state, from Nemanjić dynasty to the present. But why then such a title? Was the project concealed in the very title, as a hint for others, to think on the subject (in a testimonial sense)? The author 1
We note that there is a confusion in the literature with Slavic god Vid and Catholic saint Vit. As a high-rank Ustasha stated, Muslims were “flower of Croatism”. 3 Vladimir Ćorović, Velika Srbija, Kultura, Beograd, 1990. 2
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lived in Serbia and it was possibly meant as a memorandum for the future generations, but we have no clear indications in the book itself. The case illustrates how the hot topics may be complex and vague, and if taken for granted, ideas may become the cause of conflicts. One may imagine an Albanian author quoting the book as an evidence for Serb expansionism etc. (The case illustrates well the general symptom of “Serbing” and Serb nationalism expounded by Dinaric newcomers. The rationale for such inclination has been twofold. First, they come from the regions with mixed population, where the nationalistic feelings are strong and serve as a dividing line between nationalities (which reduces, in fact, to the confessional divisions). Second, when arriving to Serbia, Serbing has become an entrance ticket for those newcomers. It holds for politics, history, science, literature etc. Serbia and her history appear the most frequent topic of Dinaric scholars, unlike the autochthonous cultural milieu, which is oriented towards more cosmopolitan subjects and the future.) As for the Greater Albania the idea came from Prizren in KiM (the so-called Prizren League, 1878), hence outside Albania. Generally, all three ”projects” originated from the regions of mixed population. The centres for Greater Serbia projects should be searched at Knin (Croatia) and Pale (near Sarajevo in BiH) and Priština (KiM). For good reasons. Serbs living in Shumadija, for instance, had no compelling reasons to fight for a Greater Serbia, as those Croats living in (Slavonian) Zagorje felt no need for a larger Croatia. Similarly, Albanians in Albania had no particular need to join KiM Shqiptars, in particular in view they were physically disconnected from the area across the massive mountains like Prokletije. But those living outside the main body of their nations, mixed with the people of different religion, race or culture, felt it would be better for them to live in a common state with their akin people. And it was them who initiated the disintegration of Yugoslavia (with exception of Slovenia, but this was a particular case of running away from a country facing an unpredictable turmoil and disaster). The situation was a phantasmagorical one, since the burden of the trouble makers was transferred from those retarded regions, populated by belligerent montagnards, to the mother states. And the trick has proved very successful indeed. In order to detect the trouble makers, one first looked at the capitals of the existing states, Belgrade, Zagreb (Tirana is still hardly suspected). In Belgrade, it was Šešelj who stirred the interference into Croat and BiH affairs, not Milošević. Similarly, it was gen. Gojko Shushak, minister of defence, a notorious Ustasha from Herzegovina, who was the principal dog of war in Croatia. We still do not know many details concerning the links TiranaPriština, but the rationale for the connection should not be much different from those mentioned above. As we know, the project of Bosnian Serbs, led by Radovan Karadzic, has been to integrate Serb regions into Serbian state. In such an enlarged state they would not feel national minority and would even be dominating population, considering the difference of mentalities between Serbian and over-Drina Serbs. In order to prepare the fusion, Karadzic initiated passing from the local, ijekavian dialect to the Serbian ekavian one. The official dialect of Bosnian Serbs radio and TV stations (identical with the Croat and Muslim in BiH) became ekavic. The uniform of Republika Srpska army has been a copy of the traditional Serbian one, as used in the WWI and abandoned in Tito’s Yugoslavia. The army, whose commandants used to be Tito’s officers, that is atheists, became of the sudden devoted Christians, good members of the Serbian Orthodox Church. The overall stratagem has been standing on three pillars: 1. ”Serbing”, 2. ”Serbing” and 3. “Serbing”. It is this term which the political (sic) tool of those former ijekavians in Serbia (Šešelj’s radicals) keep on repeating like parrots: ”We Serbs”, ”Our Serbia”, etc. Vuk Drašković and his followers started with the same slogans, but reversed the tactics when rupturing with Šešelj and adopted the politics of a moderate conservative nationalism. As for Milošević, his principal concerns were staying in power, and all other issues were subordinated to this objective. He did not support the extremist politics of Croatian and Bosnian Serbs, and at the end of the wars of (1991-5) adopted a critical attitude towards the maximalistic
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demands of the local leaders over Drina. When he was in a straight conflict with Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, there was even a feeling among some observers, particularly from abroad, that Karadzic was up to replacing Milošević as the “leader of all Serbs”. (That neither of them was actually Serb, but Montenegrin, nobody cared) dakle Crnogorci nisu Srbi!?. Hence, although the decisions were proclaimed from Belgrade and Zagreb, the real initiative and control came from the ”disputed lands”, where the time for settling the old scores was felt coming. Only people living side by side can feel such a mutual hatred. The trouble has been that they were able to pull in the rest of their kins into the “final clash” (one of many).
Disintegration of Yugoslavia and KiM As mentioned above, there is no “natural” procedure for dismantling state, particularly multiethnical one, as Yugoslavia was. When Milošević exposed himself as the candidate for new Tito, with all his rigidity, to other party leaders from Yugoslav republics were not difficult to make up their minds concerning the common state. Apart from Slovenia and Macedonia (non-Serbo-Croat regions), it was again the Dinaroid sectors in Serbia, Croatia and Bosna and Herzegovina, who took the initiative in the ensuing struggle for the political influence, first within Yugoslavia, and then their respective republics. The beginning of end started at the All-Yugoslav Party Congress in Belgrade, 1989, when first Slovenians and then Croats angrily left the Congress. The only chance to save something was the possibility Serbian communist to get rid of Milošević, but they failed to do that. The rout for state disintegration was traced. What follows was a mere technique. But this technique was simple by now means. As we saw before KiM played a decisive role in destabilizing Yugoslav federal state. To understand this fact, we must go into some details of the processes going on in Yu2, following the fall of the communist dictatorship and introduction of the multi-party system. The latter took different forms in Yugoslav republics. In Slovenia and Macedonia, who, as we argued before, had rational rationale to separate from Yu2, this process turned out peaceful, though not without internal political conflicts. Slovenia was first to separate, taking over the border from the Yugoslav Army. Ante Marković, Croat prime minister of Yugoslav Government sent some army units to recover the border posts, but they were badly beaten and majority of new conscripts surrendered to Slovenian Territorial Defence (practically Slovenian army). Rumours have been heard in Serbia that this dispatcher of weak and unskilful unit was deliberate, to humiliate YPA, but this has never been proved. YPA was subsequently withdrawn from Slovenia under an agreement between Slovenian and Federal governments and Slovenia continued its existence as an independent state and Serbia took it as a reality. Not so peaceful and smooth was separation of Croatia. YPA had there her garrisons, as in other parts of Yugoslavia. Following the call from Croat government Croat officers and conscripts left the army and the rest was put to siege. How the situation was weird concerning the ”rules for separation” is best illustrated by the now famous case of Varaždin garrison, in Slavonia, which was under the command of Serb general Trifunović. Left with large amount of weaponry, but with the decimated manpower, who deserted, he tried to hold, demanding the help from Belgrade. But units ordered to reach Varaždin and defend the garrison (and eventually rescue the staff), refused to do so. Found himself in a desperate situation general ultimately Trifunović surrendered. Later he was sentenced in a Croat court (in his absence) for “war crimes” etc. But it was not the end of the story. Yugoslav authorities accused him for treachery and sentence him to prison. It was after a long and hard struggle for justice that the unfortunate general was released from the accusation. 1 Unfortunately, he had no courage to surrender, after being accused in Serbia, to Croat authorities and serve his sentence there, in defiance of his stupid compatriots.
1
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In Montenegro, which was predominantly with Slavic population, these conflicts were mainly of political nature, since one half of the population was procommunist, the other anti-communist (as the situation during the WWII was). Since the old communist regime did not support Milošević’s politics regarding KiM, the latter initiated its substitution with pro-Serbian factors, even before the founding new political parties. Political scene of Serbia after the formal introduction of multi-party system was characterized by fierce struggle for power between Dinaric factors, Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), Serbian Renewal Party (SRP) and Serbian Radical Party (SRP), with an admixture of weak democratic parties, like Democratic Party (DP) and later Democratic Party of Serbia (DPS), which was derived from DP, and a number of small parties. Since the rivalry between Dinaric parties reflected their leaders’ craving for power, the political fighting assumed antagonistic characteristics, what included physical violence itself. Hence, a political triangle formed, with SPS holding power and SRP and SRP trying to overthrow it, fighting between themselves, with occasional collaboration. It had nothing to do with political programmes, which remained on the rhetoric level anyway, but a pure struggling for power. It provided Milošević an opportunity to play with the other two parties separately and take advantage of their mutual antagonism. As we saw before, SPS was more or less continuation of the former Communist party of Serbia, SRP played on the Royalist card, whereas SRP adopted fascist strategy and tactics, combining demagogy with physical violence. As we saw earlier, in Serbo-Croat part of Yugoslavia disintegration did not work, not in a peaceful manner. In Croatia Serb rural population, supported by the former Yugoslav People’s Army (YPA), rejected the declaration of independence of Croatia, partly fearing from the fascist rhetoric of Franjo Tudjman’s Croatian Democratic Unity (CDU), partly encouraged by quasi-nationalistic rhetoric from Dinaric sector in Serbia. Commander-in-chief of the General Staff of YPA, General B. Adžić made public this remarkable announcement: “As long as I am in this position not a single hair will be missing to any Serb in Croatia”. The point was that Nazi Ustashas during so-called Independent State of Croatia, have slaughtered 32 members of his family. A comment from a publicist from Sarajevo was: ”We appreciate his tragedy, but people like him simply can not hold decisive posts”. Cynical as this comment was, it never-the-less reflected how much the situation weird was in the process of Yugoslav disintegration. Following this and having the support of YPA rural Serbs declared their own state in Croatia, so-called Republic of Serb Krajina (RSK), with the Knin as capital (Kninska Krajina). The new state territory divided the Croatia into three regions which were hardly connected mutually. If nothing else, this “topological defect” was the sufficient reason not to accept the new ”state”. New state of Bosnia and Herzegovina was even in a more weird situation. Serb population opted for remaining in Yugoslavia, while Muslims and Croats voted for the independence. But even before the referendum it as clear that the political scene in BiH was determined not by political programmes of the parties involved, but by mere ethnical division, better to say confessional one. With the tacit support from Serbia and Croatia for their “compatriots”, the struggle for tearing BiH apart and attaching Serb-Orthodox part to Serbia and Roman-Catholic to Croatia began. The central problem in this game was, of course, the region inhabited by Muslims. In fact the population was so much mutually entangled, that even with eventual consent of all parties involved, division of the territory would be Heracles’s task. (It is believed that Milošević and Tudjman made a “gentleman agreement” to divide among themselves Muslim territories). But the drama in BiH in 90-ies was much more complicate that these “political” projects. The interplay between “cabinet high politics” and the actual happening at the spot made the whole affair complex beyond any imagination. We turn therefore to this point, which will turn out very important for understanding KiM issue in general and particular events in particular. We begin with “high politics” level. Many interpretations of the disintegration of Yugoslavia, and particular of bloody fighting in BiH, have been on the market, from “civil wars” to “forming national states” on the Yugoslav soil. Projects like “Greater Serbia”, “Greater Croatia” have been
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invoked to describe possible rationale for the ensuing wars within Serbo-Croat regions (as defined before). Bur whatever interpretation one adopts, it can not explain the bloody atrocities committed by all sides involved. We must, therefore, turn to a deeper level of explanation, the ethno-historical one. But this level has not been reached at once and we go from the formal-political down to the anthropological levels. Incidentally, this approach follows more or less the historical order of events. YPA versus federal republics As we mentioned above, it was the Army which represented the state of Yugoslavia 2 at the beginning of its disintegration. It found itself in an awkward position to fulfill its reason d’ etre, which was according to Yugoslav constitution to protect the state borders and the institutional order. The trouble with borders was that it did not specify protection from whom – external or internal danger? As for the constitution it was not clear whether the right of federal units to secede was already consumed by the republics (as federalists claimed) or they were entitled to make use of that right whenever they want, irrespective of the will of the rest of the state. The issue was an old (Aristotelian) dilemma: is the whole merely a collection of its parts? Hence, at the beginning separatist republics confronted the federal army as an external enemy. Since the army was the only remnant of the federal state, there was nobody to decide on the juridical matters and everything was reduced to the level of the political will. The fierce fighting then inevitably issued. But the juridical aspects aside, what was the real position of YPA with respect to the federal and subsequently republic states? The command was carefully controlled, during Tito’s time (and even before WWII) as to ensure the ethnical balance. Although majority of conscripts were ethnical Serbs, the command staff was gradually composed ever on the representative base, so that at the highest level, general staff, no ethnical dominance was possible. As we saw, the real dominating factor was the Party, and when the federal Party disintegrated, Amy was left to politicians at Belgrade. And here Milošević was the boss. The struggle with YPA was conceived, thus, as fighting against Milošević, who himself was experienced as a Serb (though he was a typical Montenegrin, as we used to emphasize frequently before). Apart from this ethnical distinction, command staff, particular low- and medium-level was composed mainly by Dinaroids, especially Montenegrins, for the reasons elaborated above. So it will turn out after the civil wars (1991-1995), as well as during the rebellion war on KiM, it will be those Dinaroid factors involved in the bloody atrocities from all sides. As for the paramilitary aspects, situation was even clearer from this viewpoint. Hence a tragic-comic situation arose: YPA considered the republics eager to separate as “internal aggressors”, while the republics in questions treated the army as an external danger. External factors The so-called international community responded at first cautiously to the first demands for seceding from the rest of Yugoslavia, by Slovenia, Croatia and then BiH. It concerns first of all European states, like France, Britain, Germany, Italy etc. They were aware, from the previous experience that the Balkan affairs may be tricky and of the danger to be pulled in into internal quarrels in the region. Their primary concern was their own interests, of course. And the latter demanded that the less the state of affairs is secure, the better. They did not bother about such things as historical rights, political justice, genuine feelings of the people etc. Hence, their first reaction was the request for status quo. But when some republics pushed the matter further from mere demands and started separating from the rest, European countries accepted the logic of fait acomplie. This was an overall picture, but certain states took active, though not conspicuous role, encouraging some republics to secede. It refers, first of all, to Germany, whose minister of foreign affairs, Hans Genscher, played decisive role in the affair. This role was acknowledged, albeit
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implicitly, when the secession was finally accomplished. Mobs in Croatia, particularly in Zagreb, danced in the streets, singing newly composed song with leitmotiv Danke Deutschland. 1 But apart from the jubilant Croats, many Yugoslavs, in particular Serbs in Croatia, this scene reminded of another similar one, that of April 1941. After bombing Belgrade and thousands dead, April 6, Zagreb citizens made ovations to Germans entering Zagreb on tanks, greeting them as liberators. (That the same crowd did the same when partisans entered the city in 1945 speaks about the anthropological quality of the people involved, but it is of little relevance to our subject here). With Franjo Tudjman’s jubilant declaration about “the fulfilment of the thousand-year Croat dream”, and the role of Germans who helped that dream to come true, the parallel with the “Independent state of Croatia” and Ante Pavelić, was more than conspicuous. After that it will not be hard to encourage the local Serbs in the new “independent state” to try to separate from it. Put into the situation of fait acomplie, other European states and USA accepted the new state of affairs and recognized all newly formed states. Their rationale was as simple as wrong – they expected that the new borders will be recognized by all former Yugoslav republics as state borders. In other words, they took the division of Yugoslavia, made in 1943 at Jajce, by Tito and his communist cronies, 2 as definite solution on the matter. In other words, they implicitly took that formal administrative division was superior to ethnical composition and striving of the people within these states. What turned fatal in the ensuing series of events. As we shall see later on, some of these states, especially USA, will be directly involved in the coming events. Before we proceed with disintegration of the state which lasted for 71 years (an average span of life of her citizens), we mention an incident, which shows clearly both the logical impasse of the process and the hypocrisy of some of the principal players in the event. In March 1991, when the disintegration of Yugoslavia was in the air, Serbian opposition, led by Vuk Drašković and other parties, organized demonstrations in Belgrade against Milošević’s regime and his misuse of the state-owned public media. Unable to deal with a crowd of about 100.000 demonstrators, Milošević called the Army to intervene. For this he needed the approval of the Presidency of Yugoslavia, whose chairman at the time was Stipe Mesić (HDE), Croat from Lika region. 3 Since the consent on the matter was urgent, members of the Presidency were consulted by phone. S. Mesić gave his approval Army to intervene, tanks flooded Belgrade streets and the revolt was broken. (Vuk Drašković was arrested, together with other protest leaders, but was soon released under the students’ pressure). When the final act of disintegration was accomplished, S. Mesić proudly declared that his role as destroyer of Yugoslavia has been fulfilled completely. At the time of this declaration he was still formally the president of Yugoslavia. 4 But the point to be made is the appealing discrepancy in the logic behind the disintegration. When the interest of Croatia was to support Milošević in Serbia, 5 Army could be employed within the state, to protect the “constitutional order”. But when the same Army was used to prevent the disintegration of the state, it became an alien, hostile element, without right to interfere affairs in Croatia and elsewhere. Topology versus ideology That the up-down and down-up “cosmologies” are not equivalent is well illustrated by the interplay between “right” and “feasibility”. The case in point is the very disintegration of Yu2. Suppose Croatia decides to secede, but Slovenia wants to remain as an apart of Yugoslavia. As a glimpse at the map shows Slovenia would thus be cut off from the rest and the new state would Thanks Germany. So-called Anti-fascist Council of People’s Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ). By the way, no Serbian representatives were present at that meeting, considered as constitutional for the new state of Yugoslavia. 3 Born in Stajnica, near Velebit (Dinaric) mountain. 4 Stipe Mesić turned out the most unscrupulous politician on the Yugoslav scene, second only to Šešelj. 5 The logic was simple: the stronger (communist) Milošević, the weaker Serbia. 1 2
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consist of two separate parts, as it was the case with Pakistan, before the separation into presentday Pakistan and Bangladesh. Another possibility appears even more warning. When the federal state was formed after WWII BiH was without access to sea. In order to remedy this handicappe, Yugoslav authorities decided to allot to BiH a narrow strip at the Adriatic coast, with a single, small port, as a symbolic friendly gesture. This had little practical importance and one may well imagine the situation that BiH was left without the access to sea, since it was a friendly republic (Croatia) who would provide the exit. Now, suppose BiH decides to secede, but none of the other republics would follow. In a supposedly tense atmosphere BiH would find herself surrounded by hostile neighbours and thus would be prevented to exercise her right to become an independent state. In a similar situation was Croatia during 1991-1995, when her territory was torn apart into three quasi-separated regions, by the so-called Krajina Republic. It was clear that even without appealing to any state right, such a situation was not sustainable. Right is right, but topology is a brute fact, in this situation. Beginning of armed conflicts Much has been written about the military activities during the “wars’ in 1991-5 period in Yu2. We are not going to describe all those activities, but shall confine ourselves to a few cases, which will illustrate our point of view concerning the deeper level of describing and understanding the nature of conflicts and its anthropological background. We shall make, to this end, a few case studies. Borovo Selo This village on Danube River, in Eastern Slavonia, near the border with Serbia, witnessed the first armed clash between Croat and Serb population in the newly proclaimed Croat state. When Croat police unit was sent to the town to settle some unrest, it was ambushed by Serbs, who killed majority of this regular police force. This was done presumably by the local Serbs, organized around Territorial Defence, we described before. (The claim of Šešelj that it was his men that did this “heroic exploit” should be taken with a big grain of salt, as usual, as we argued above). Between Borovo Selo and Vukovar is situated small town Borovo, with a plant for tires and footwear. (Before WWII the plant was named “Bata”, a famous shoes factory). Vukovar This town on Danube was destined to play a prominent role in disintegration of Yu2, which fell victim of the savage animosities and insanity of the ensuing armed conflict. Its guilt was that it was situated between the southern and northern parts of the so-called Eastern Slavonia, which was the most eastern part of the self-proclaimed Serb state (sic) Republic Serb Krajina (RSK). As the town controlled by Zagreb, it prevented communication between those parts mentioned and Belgrade decided it was to be captured by all means. The town was surrounded and besieged by Yugoslav Army and heavily bombarded. But before we go into some detail, a few words of the town are in order. The town consisted of the old centre, surrounded by newly built residential buildings. The centre was densely packed with old private, single-floor houses, whereas the suburbs consisted of large, many-floors buildings. The downtown was inhabited by Croats and Serbs, approximately by equal proportions. To stress that both populations lived in peace and with normal communications should appear unnecessary and it is indeed. Unlike this autochthonous population, the outer suburban circle was populated by newcomers, mainly from Bosnia and Herzegovina, who were employed at ”Borovo” plant at Borovo. The proportion of Serb-Orthodox and Croat RomanCatholic was again approximately fifty-fifty. But the similarity with the downtown stops here. When the bombardments of the town started, it was only the autochthonous centre which was the target, whereas the surrounding huge buildings, though easy targets, were spared, as noticed by
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Paolo Rumiz. 1 What was the point? The suburbans were all Dinaroids, as the commanders of Yugoslav Army were, too. The latter spared their com-tribesmen, but were eager to destroy the downtown, as a bad example of “peaceful coexistence” of Croats and Serbs. At the same time, it was destruction of a city, polis, by the rural population, a paradigm of the “civilization clash”. We shall see in the following that Vukovar siege could be taken as a paradigm of the anthropic background which lied behind the political, ethnical, ideological etc façade, painted by officials, nationalists, cabinet-intellectuals, nationalists, patriots etc, etc. It was the clash of the uncivilized, frustrated, violent highlanders, with the lowland civilization. A number of foreign observers, first of all Paolo Rumiz, have already noticed this point, but it has never been presented to the Yugoslav public explicitly. Even now, it is a taboo, at least in Serbia. For reasons which will come to light gradually, as we progress with our story. Vukovar has been not only a paradigm of the above mentioned phenomenon, but deserves our attention for a number of other points to be pointed out. First, it was a conspicuous case of the Serbia envolvment in the armed conflict outside its proper boundaries. Zagreb authorities made devastating propaganda of this point. First, although it was obvious from the start that the town could not be defended and was doomed to be destroyed, the order was that the local defenders fight to the last survived. Highly motivated local defenders resisted fiercely the attacks of the much more powerful forces, fighting for every house, cellar, etc. On the other hand Yugoslav Army proved shamefully inefficient and corrupt. For good reasons, which we are going to discuss in more detail now. Apart from some short-term episodes in her history, Serbia never fought on foreign soil. When the conflict became imminent in 1991, and Belgrade authorities ordered (concealed) conscription, majority of the conscripts avoided it, hiding, leaving the country, etc. Those recruited were confused, lacking any motivation for fighting, since the war they were going to fight was never proclaimed, even defined. Young conscripts found themselves in a schizophrenic situation, split between the feeling of being aggressors and patriots at the same time. Many touching situations have been recorded, from comic to tragic. Since the fighting prolonged much more than envisaged by the military leaders (sic), solders became frustrated to nervous breaks. One took a tank and drove it from Vukovar to the Federal Assembly building in Belgrade, without being stopped by the police or the like. But the case of a young conscript we are going to describe was not that funny, indeed. Many of conscripts were not willing to fight and command decided to let them go home. A unit was lined and the captain ordered that those who want to go home step forward, the rest to step backwards. When it was done, a soldier who could not make his mind remained in-between. In the tense situation of waiting his next move he drew the gun and shot himself. The Army command turned out drastically incompetent. According to testimonies of the conscripts, 80 % of the soldiers killed around Vukovar fell victims of their own artillery fire. Although part of this mesh could be ascribed to inexperience, normal for the beginning of any war after a long peace period, and to the disturbance made by non-Serb deserters, the lack of motivation was surely the most decisive factor. The latter did not lack Vukovar defenders, who fought heroically, though in vain. As turned out later, they were sacrificed to Zagreb need to get world’s sympathy for Croat cause. During the prolonged siege a petition signed by hundred world’s top intellectuals, including Nobel-prize winners, condemned the Serbian aggression. This petition has remained unknown to the wide Serbian public, even among the most vigorous Milošević’s adversaries within Serbian opposition. Now we come to the most dramatic and tragic episode in this infamous siege of unfortunate Slavonian town. When Yugoslav Army finally occupied the entire town, after a fierce fighting for 1
P. Rumiz, Maschere per un Massacro, Editori Riuniti, Roma, 1996.
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every house, those of defenders who survived took refuge to the town hospital. Army forces took 200 civilians (more precisely, men in civil clothes) from the hospital, despite the fierce opposition of the hospital staff, as prisoners of war. And here they made a fatal error. One of the officers, major Veselin Šljivančanin (Shljivanchanin), Montenegrin, 1 handed the prisoners over to the local Territorial Defense forces. The latter took them to a nearby state farm, Ovčara (Ovchara), and shot them all. Šljivančanin was taken to court in Serbia in connection to the massacre at Borovo, but released as innocent. However, at the request of Hague Tribunal he was processed at the Tribunal and sentenced to 5 years of prison in 2007. An attentive reader might have a feeling she has already learned something very similar to this misdeed. Yes, it happened 9 years before this event, in Lebanon. When Israeli forces occupied the southern part of Lebanon in 1982, in the pursuit of Palestinian freedom-fighters, they occupied two principal Palestinian refugee camps Sabra and Shatilla, at the outskirts of Beirut. The commander, Ariel Sharon, handed the camps over to the Lebanon Christian militia (a sort of the local Territorial defence), who killed between 300 and 2.000 civilians, depending of the source of information. The parallel, however, stops here. When Ariel Sharon was accused before the Hague Court (not to be confused with the Hague Tribunal) few years ago, the lawsuit was withdrawn after the hard pressure from USA. (All criminals are equal before the international justice, but some are more equal than others). Dubrovnik This medieval Mediterranean town in Croat Dalmatia (former Ragusa) is arguably the most famous place in Yugoslavia (Yugoslav Athens), at least to the tourist part of the world. When hostilities started in 1991, Yugoslav Army put a siege on the town from the inland side. The army consisted mainly of Montenegrins, who started bombing the centre of t town, which happened to be under the UNESCO protection, as a part of the world cultural heritage of special importance. Among the most valuable buildings Is the International University centre, where each year many international meetings, symposia, conferences etc are held, gathering international elite from all over the world. Naturally, it was chosen as the principal target for Yugoslav artillery, which will promote the most the military glory of Serbo-Montenegrin nation. Other valuable building were damaged or burnt too, but the Centre bombing rang the bells all over the intellectual world. And it was not the end of the story. The hinterland of Dubrovnik, Konavlje, was occupied by Montenegrin Territorial Defense forces. This region of Herzegovina has been famous as inhabited by the “anthropic elite” of the South Slavs. In particular its women are notorious for their grace and beauty. 2 Montenegrin “patriots”, eager to protect Montenegro from Ustashas (sic), devastated Konavlje, plundering everything of value, including household technique (refrigerators, TV sets, washing machines, etc). To modern European ear it might sound strange, but in fact what those highlanders did was just a continuation of the centuries’ long practice, when lowlands used to be plundered, as a part of the montagnards’ “economy”. Actual Montenegro politicians, like Milo Djukanović, took active role in organizing those “patriotic forces” and sending them to “Dubrovnik front”. (Recently, negotiations between Croatia and Montenegro have been arranged in order to settle those robberies and Montenegro has agreed in principle to compensate the damage made by its citizens at Konavlje). Some of Yugoslav army commanders have been brought to Hague Tribunal for their activities in this infamous siege of Dubrovnik and some of them have been already sentenced for their command responsibility.
1
HDE, born at Žabljak (Montenegro),
Though born in Belgrade, Serb tennis player Ana Ivanović appears a splendid illustration of the beauty of “Konavoke”, as they are called..
2
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Sarajevo We have seen in the cases of Vukovar and Dubrovnik the pattern of the clash of the highlanders with plane people, of mountains with polis. The siege of Sarajevo (1991-1995) has nothing to do with Serbia, strictly speaking, but we can’t avoid mentioning it, if nothing but for the sake of completeness concerning the pattern mentioned. The principal “heroes” of this infamous affair were Radovan Karadzic and especially general Ratko Mladic. Karadzic was the president of the so-called Republika Srpska, self-proclaimed Serb state in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and thus the most responsible for what was going at “the front”, at least formally. Born in Montenegro (HIDE), on Durmitor mountain, in the same tribe as Milošević’s one (they were relatives, in fact), this psychiatrist was a proud Montenegrin in Sarajevo, until the disintegration of Yugoslavia started and political parties were found in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Finding that being Montenegrin in the region with few compatriots, Karadzic decided to become Serb, moreover a “great Serb”, like his compatriot Milošević in Serbia. He founded Serb party and became the president of the newly established Serb entity Republika Srpska (RS), as the new state within the state was called by the international community, not being able to contrive a better term for this bastard state. General Ratko Mladic, the chief commander of the RS military forces. Born at Kalinovik, the central part of the “Old Herzegovina”, this highlander appears the extreme case of the Dinaric type – stubborn, violent, intelligent, and unscrupulous. He laid siege on Sarajevo for several reasons. First, being the largest city in BiH, Sarajevo was the most powerful potential resource of Muslim soldiers (city was initially populated mainly by Muslims and Serbs). By encircling them Mladic made the city an enormous “prisoner of war camp”. The city quickly found itself divided into Muslim and Orthodox parts and both were objects of artillery fires from the respective adversaries. During the siege Sarajevo lost about 10.000 inhabitants, mainly civilians. Another rationale for keeping Sarajevo under the siege was of a tactical nature. While world public attention was concentrated onto the unfortunate city, Mladic felt free to fight Muslims all over Bosnia (Herzegovina was the “department of Croats” under Tudjman’s “supervision”.) As it was the case with Vukovar, Muslims and Serbs use to live together in the downtown for centuries. When the disintegration started, both sides suddenly realized they are different and should become even more so. And bloody animosities and fighting began. Again, politics apart, the siege was a clash of montagnards against city. During the siege a great deal of the autochthonous downtown inhabitants escaped from the hell of bombing and starving, not to return ever since. Their place has been taken over by highlanders from all over BiH, changing drastically the demographic content of the old city, with much of the oriental spirit. The ferocity of fighting among Muslims, Serbs and Croats, 1 illustrate the best the warlike character of Dinaroids, for here one witnesses a pure internal struggle. (If there was interference from outside, it was done by montagnards again, be it from Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia, Afghanistan, etc). One of the most conspicuous outcomes of war in BiH has been the revival of the Muslim way of life in this unique region of Europe. Muslim population under Tito’s rule was gradually losing its religious designation, becoming atheistic, or at least less and less interested in religious matters. 2 With war starting and under the strong influence of Arabic countries, Muslim religion has come back fully to BiH, and now Islam has got a very prominent stronghold in Europe. As a collateral gain (or damage, depending on the perspective of looking), Muslims have won a wide support from the Western states, in particular USA. The reason for this, at first sight strange, sympathy lies outside Bosnia, even outside Europe – at the Middle East. We shall elaborate this point later on in more details, when considering the international outlook of Kosovo case, but here we just draw readers’ attention to the role of religious aspect of the whole Balkan affair.
1 2
The percentage before the war was: 50 % - 32 % - 18 % respectively. It concerns, primarily, urban population.
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Military and para-military forces In previous considerations we have seen how the warlike mentality of Dinaroids has shaped the local history of the region. In particular, we saw how the patriotism and the like were used as cover for plundering the nearby lowlands, what was the core of the economy of the highlanders for centuries. We now consider what was the role of these regions and their people (including those settled down at lowlands) during the Yugoslav crisis. We are going to show how this transient regime, without proper control of state, has unleashed the old demons of killing and robbery, irrespective of the formal status of the armed conflicts on the Yugoslav soil. As expected, at the beginning of conflicts YPA was confronted by local, republic armies, organized around the so-called Territorial Defence (TD), established during Tito’s era. Though one might call the ensuing conflicts as “continuation of politics by armed means”, and even talk about frontlines, the conflicts soon rose to clashes across dispersed regions, with TD playing the roles of ”national forces” fighting for freedom etc. This feeling of “just cause” gave them the sense of vast liberty concerning the means and manners used to achieve their “patriotic aims”. This factor showed up even before the large-scale clashes started, when Yugoslavia was still kept together, as the case of the so-called Split strangler illustrates well. 1 As the conflicts spread out and the fighting advanced, paramilitary units started to appear. They were led, as a rule, by Dinaroids, mainly Montenegrins (Serbia) and Herzegovians (Croatia and BiH). These units were tolerated by army officials, partly because the latter had no other choice, partly because these para-militaries were employed in carrying out most risky and dirty actions. 2 The paradigm of this species was Zheljko Raznatovic-Arkan, a Montenegrin from a Priština Montenegro family, son of an army officer, born at Maribor (Slovenia). Natural born leader, he would surely have become a harambasha, 3 three/four centuries ago. First rank criminal, employed occasionally by the state security, for dirty work abroad, Arkan founded his own private army, socalled Tigers, consisting of a few thousand men, artillery, armed transporters etc. The selection of the conscript was severe, with psychologists and other experts in the jury. His unites used to travel across Serbia, bringing fear and terror wherever they passed. In particular, their principal terrain was KiM, the restless southern province, and Arkan was supposed to “keep rebellious Shqiptars calm”. When the Yugoslav wars started, Tigers’ role had the following principal aspects: (i) to help the YPA “liberating’ Bosnian towns (with a considerable rewards in cash); (ii) to plunder the same towns, after “liberations”; tracks and lorries were following Tigers and after an occupation of the town “white technique” etc was collected and transferred to Serbia; (iii) collecting young people from the refugees camps in Serbia and forcing them to engage in fighting on their (former) native soil; (iv) forcing the military units in Bosnia to withstand the pressure from the other side, even killing those who tried to retreat and abandon fighting. (After a serious incident of this kind, the government of Republika Srpska banished Tigers from their territory.) By these activities and the common crime in Serbia Arkan accumulated considerable wealth and used to behave as a real ruler of the state. He even founded a political party (sic), so-called Party of Serb Unity (PSU), and used the Serbian Parliament as the cover for his criminal activities. 4 Interestingly, Arkan’s activities at KiM after Shqiptars’ rebellion in 1998 are little known. The stories go of his selling the arms to KLA (Kosovo Liberation Army), but these rumours have not It concerns the Croat nationalist strangling a conscript on the tank in a Split street. Another case from the same town concerns a Macedonian conscript shot before the military barrack, while he was guarding the building. 2 USA hypocrites should not be consternated by this kind of fighters, since they used to employ their militia in similar situation, along with the regular army. Thus, in 1832 during the war against Black Hawk chieftain, 300 children, old men and women were slaughtered at the Mississippi River, by the militia squadron, with 7 militias lost. Abraham Lincoln was one of the militia staff. 1
Turkish term for a leader of a highwayman unit. In fact it was not his “party” only which is using the Parliament as this sort of cover, which provides them with MP immunity, badly needed by any decent criminal.
3 4
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yet been confirmed. Arkan was ultimately assassinated at a Belgrade hotel in autumn 1999 (January 2000), presumably by a rival criminal group. 1 Arkan has committed grave war crimes. In a case some of his men were killed during a “liberation action”, he would have killed a number of local civilians, with women and children sent across Drina to Serbia. 2 These civilians were used later for exchange for his captured men. In practice many of these intended hostages joined refugees’ camps in Serbia, to be dispatched later to refugees’ centres abroad. Te case of Arkan, though the most prominent, is by no means unique. Before we continue in that direction, we shall use the shorthand HDE (healthy Dinaric element) to mark Dinaric persons, both Montenegrins and Herzegovians. SRP of Vuk Drašković (HDE) organized so-called Serb Guard, lead by certain Smajlović (HDE), who was operating in Krajina. Smajlović was killed in an action, but Drašković accused Milošević to have ordered this killing “from the back”. (Drašković has been notorious for such “conspiracy accusations”.). Vojislav Šešelj (HDE) organized his supporters to engage in this “marauding war”. He himself used to pose before cameras in mask uniform, threatening Croats to be “pushed up to Zagreb”. But he was wise enough not to form distinct units under his name and his men usually followed other paramilitaries, mainly Arkan’s Tigers. When the latter collected the loots in a place and left the scene, Šešeljoids would come from behind and pick up the fall out, just as hyenas follow tigers. (Boasting of some of his “warriors” to have “skinned a balija” 3 should be taken with a big grain of salt). Another prominent paramilitary was that of Bokan (HDE), so-called White Eagles. Other engaged sides were doing similar things, as expected. From Muslim side the most prominent was certain Juka Prazina, but many of these leaders were incorporated into seemingly regular forces, as the case with Naser Orić was. Similarly Croats had their paramilitaries tightly linked with regular troops. This was to be expected since “national armies” were themselves “irregular forces”, at least from the point of view of Belgrade authorities. In both cases it was Dinaroids who lead those units and who committed war crimes in the name of their “just cause”. We mention here a number of cases, less prominent in the media abroad, for the reason to be detailed later on. In Sarajevo, after an agreement between YPA authorities and Bosnian Muslim leaders, the YPA garrison was leaving Sarajevo, when the paramilitaries attacked it in the very town and killed a number of soldiers. Even worst case happened in Tuzla, mainly Muslim town in the north-east Bosnia. Yugoslav Army 92 brigade (disarmed under an agreement with local authorities) retreating from the town was ambushed and at least 92 (200) conscripts were killed and at least 33 wounded and a number of ambulance vehicles.4 But the gravest massacre was done from the side of Croat forces in Lika, a midland Croat region. Since it had serious consequences on the Kosmet affairs, we shall dwell on it in somewhat more details. It is the famous “Medački džep” affair, 5 which took place in September 1993. This UNPROFOR protected area was approximately 5X6 km and consisted of three Serb villages. The assault was lead by brigadier Rahim Ademi (born at Karač, near Vučitrn, KiM), Shqiptar who deserted YPA in 1991, and joined Croat forces. Ademi was accused in 1986 for forming an illegal Shqiptar group within YPA engaged against the state and sentenced to 3.5 years of prison (the sentence was reduced later to 10 months). He was engaged in many battles in Croatia and BiH and was promoted to the rank of general for his activities. During the operation 74 (72) civilians were killed (mostly women, children and old people), 14 were counted as «missing», many wounded. Although the Another interpretation on the market was that it was done by Milošević, eager to remove an inconvenient actor in the previous wars, just accused by the Hague Tribunal for his misdeeds. If true this would parallel the story of Apis, who organized Ferdinand’s assassination in Sarajevo, liquidated by Serbian government in 1917. 2 Particularly infamous are massacres at Bijeljina (north-east Bosnia) and at Zvornik (on the river Drina). 3 A pejorative name of Muslims. 4 Iliija Jurišić, who ordered the umbush, was arrested at the Belgrade airport in May, 2007 and charged by Serbian authorities for war crime. 5 “Medački pocket», like that at Kursk, where the famous battle in 1943 was fought. 1
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trust was signed, Canadian forces were prevented to enter the incriminated area. In a clash with UN forces 27 Croates were killed or wounded (unofficial reports quote even higher figure). 1 (At the later trial at Zagreb, a protected witness will testify that among the dead bodies of the civilian victims, those without traces of mutilation were separated and delivered to Serbs, whereas the rest were distroyed). All houses in the area were set to fire and leveled to the ground, lifestock killed. About thousand Serbs fled to Serbia and BiH. Colonel Mirko Norac, the chief responsible for the operation and Rahim Ademy, the immediate executor, have been charged at Hague Tribunal for war crimes, but the case has been passed to Croat justice. The operation has been described as exceptionally fierce and Ademy particularly blamed for the cruelty exercised. (It is not clear whether Ademi was the only Shqiptar involved in this infamous operation). Now, we proceed with a brief analisys of the event. Why there and why then? We note first that that the so-called Republic Serb Krajina was proclaimed in 1991, hence about two years before. We recall that the final asault of Croat forces onto the Serb «state» was well planned, with a full collaboration with USA and took place almost two years afterwards, in August 1995. 2 Hence, the «kill and burn» operation was not a planned start of a wider operation. It was obviously a message to the local Serb population what they should expect when «the moment arrives». This massage was fully undestood by the Croat Serbs and when the so-called Operation Flash in West Slavonia started in 1995, the resistance there was very weak and the population was quickly moved to the southern parts of Krajina, south of river Sava. 3 This will repeat again with the so-called »Storm» operation of the final assault onto the entire Serb creation, 4 on a wider scale. Hence, if Serbs are to get the message, it will be by a scene of outmost cruelty. And the choice of Shqiptar Ademi could not be made better for that purpose. His soldiers were ordered to kill everything which moves, and set to fire everything which remains after the fleeing of the local populaion, which started immediately after the operation, leaving the area for Bosnia and Serbia. Not all of them were «inocent civilians» and many of them were subsequently recruited by Serbian authorities for military service. If we notice that this reqruitment started even before establishing Republic of Serb Krajina (RSK) and that the entire region south of Sava was populated by Dinaroids, we shall better appreciate what was to happen 9 years later on KiM. If one reads the testimonies of those involved in the Medački Džep afair, 5 from very Croat perpetuaters, Canadian soldiers and civil victims, one gets feeling he has already read such stories. Yes, we shall meet the same patern on KiM, 9 years later. This time with roles interchanged. (Except that in both cases perpetrators have been HDE people). As an appendix to the main indictment Hague Tribunal quotes 29 civilians and 5 soldiers and the nature of wounds. Victims were first beaten, and then shot, stubbed, slaughtered or burnt alive. Some of them were found castrated, some with three fingers cut off. 6 Besides killing civilians in such a cruel manner, Croat forces robbed all three Serb villages and some smaller groups of houses and levelled them by mines. Later evidence from Croat sources quotes 76 victims. In the same year 51 corps were delivered to Serb side.2 We note here that most of those atrocities were committed after the trust has been achieved and before the Canadian battalion, from UNPROFOR, arrived on the scene. As we shall see later on, it was exactly the same “arrangement” at KiM after signing ”Kumanovo agreement” in 1999. Later at the trial in Zagreb, Ademi and Norac tried to deny their direct responsibilities, by claiming that there were two parallel commanding lines and each of them was alternatively avoided during the operation. 2 In fact, NATO bombed air-defense posts in Krajina immediately before the assault of the Croatian land forces. 3 As a revenge for this operation Milan Martić will rocket Zagreb, when 9 civilians were killed. 4 We note in passing the “inventiveness” of Croat authorities concerning the dubbing of their operations, mere imitations of USA nicknames of their operations in Iraq. 5 See, e.g. Zagreb weekly Globus, No 872, 22.08.2007. 6 Serb Orthodox make cross with three fingers, unlike Croat Catholics who do it with the palm. 1
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Shocked by what they saw when arriving on the spot, officials of UNPROFOR sent a report to UN Security Council, who set up a commission to examine the affair Canadian monthly Saturday Night described the situation as this: When Canadian light infantry pushed Croats from this region, it found that the Shushak’s 1 military unites blasted 300 houses, poisoned wells, and killed the livestock and at least 80 civilians. Some of them found beneath the burnt cattle, with a number of corps removed. It was not evidently done by enraged soldiers: destructions of this kind must have been planned in advance. It required engineers to destroy houses by anti-tank mines, so that nothing remained. Afterwards they removed the evidence by rubber gloves; gloves of this sort were found by Canadians all around”. The Croat authorities tried hard to conceal the atrocities. Minister of defense deputy Drago Krpina (HDE) even after 5 days did not allow reporters to visit Medački džep, allegedly “for security reasons”…. Tadeusz Mazowiecki was explained that the reports about atrocities were not based on facts, that all executed were in fact “killed in battle” etc. Urged by the publicity given to the affair Croat government carried out an investigation. The head of the general staff, gen. Janko Bobetko, who presumably designed the whole operation, turned out not to have signed any of the orders. It was gen. Rahim Ademi who did it. Under the public pressure the latter was dismissed, but subsequently “rehabilitated” and taken back to the Croat Army (HV). When departing to Hague Tribunal for his engagement in Medački Džep operation, he complained that he will no longer take responsibility for war crimes and that it was because of his Albanian origin he has been chosen as scapegoat. 2 The latter statement should be remembered, for it has been the rationale of all Shqiptars accused for various crimes and illegal activities under Milošević and even after him, in Serbia. Before we leave Medački Džep operation, a few words on the role of Rahim Ademi seems in order. The operation was publicized later as a notorious case of cruelty and war crime. What Ademi’s real role in that affair was is surely important to the Hague Tribunal, but is much more relevant to the later events to unroll at KiM. What mattered was that the story, when publicized, that a Shqiptar was massacring Serbs in Croatia could not pass unnoticed to Serb ears, in particular those coming from those regions to Serbia, as refugees, immigrants etc. Many of the latter will be engaged in KiM operations in 1998/9, as parts of the Army, or the police forces, but especially in paramilitary units. And when we learn of atrocities committed by Serbian side, both by legal forces and paramilitaries (including civilians as well), we should recall the prehistory. Serbia and the fall of RSK As noted before the existence of Republika Srpska Krajina was incompatible with the normal functioning of Croatia, irrespective of other implications and conequences, if nothing then for the topological reasons. Croatian economy was badly damaged, in particular tourism, one of the principal resources of national income. 3 4 The Croat state started preparations for recovering the lost territory, with help of some states, in particular USA. The latter provide help in the training instructors (usually retire officers), survey of the occupied territory, etc. When the final assault on RSK started in August 1995, USA provided the air support and other necessary assistance. The Serb state (sic) collapsed within 48 hours, like a card tower. The population was on move as soon as the offensive started, and within few days the
Gojko Šušak (HDE), ministry of defense, the chief hawk in the in the Tudjman’s government. Another interpretation comes to mind here. Ademi might have realized it was because he was Shiptar he was chosen to do dirty work for Croat Army. 3 We quote the cynical remark by Milan Martić, one of the leading politicians of the self-proclaimed state in the state: “I am the minister of tourism of Croatia”, referring to the absence of foreign tourists on Dalmatian coast. Internal transport was practically blocked up, etc. Martić will be sentenced to 35 years in prison by Hague Tribunal in 2007. 4 NATO air forces bombed Serb AD locations before the start of the Croat offensive, 1 2
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Krajina was emptied from its belligerent citizens. What happened? In order to understand this we have to go back to the prehistory of these events. Political ambitions of Slobodan Milošević underwent a gradual, but steady decline. His first project was to replace Josip Broz at the head of Yu2. Whether he was a person entitled, or capable to do that is the matter of opinion. Anyway, this initial project of Belgrade communist leader badly failed. When the state he was supposed to rule started falling apart, he reduced his project to a more modest one, which could be the best illustrated by the slogan proclaimed (unofficially, of course) within the political elite in Belgrade: “All Serbs in one state”. The slogan was, in fact, a brief description of the Serbs’ desire when the WWI started (initiated by Bosnian Serbs, by the Sarajevo assassination). 1 Although the formal initiative for founding Yu1 came from Croats and Slovenians from Austro-Hungary, the realization of the project was carried out by Serbia, which paid for that by one quarter of her population (50 % of mail citizens). With Yu1 Serbs did achieve this goal. After WWII Tito remade Yugoslav state (Yu2) and Serbs found themselves in a single, though federal, state, again. With disintegration of Yu2, Serbs found themselves scattered all around former Yu2 territory, living in four stated predominantly: Serbia, Croatia, Montenegro and BiH. Milošević’s next stage of the initial project reduced to assuring to all Serbs living in these states to form their own “sub-states”, like RSK, RS, with the help, or guidance at least, of the mother-state – Serbia. But he was aware that the project was unlikely to realize. His next phase was to collect all Serbs who could not (or would not) live in their newly proclaimed states, to move to Serbia. Cynically, this solution could by covered by the same slogan (All Serbs in a single state), but this time this unique state was Serbia. Whether Serbians would like it or not, he neither asked them nor cared about it at all. On August 19, 1994, Milošević addresses representatives from Banija, Lika and Kordun, 2 with this remarkable offer: “After all, there is room for all of you here”. 3 Hence, there are serious indications that he made a tacit agreement with Franjo Tudjman that the troublesome Krajišniks (inhabitants of Krajina) leave Croatia and move to Serbia. 4 This operation was carefully planned (and well hidden from the Serbian citizens). Since the prime minister in Milošević government, Mirko Marjanović (HDE), was from Krajina himself, he took care that the move was going on smoothly. But before going on with this operation, we must sketch the demographic situation in Serbia and the consequent distribution of power in the Republic.
Dinarization of Serbia Serbia has been the attractor for Serbs living in other parts of Western Balkan for centuries, for many reasons. Generally, as we saw it earlier, highlanders move gradually to lowlands, with a steady rate. Serbia proper (south from rivers Sava and Danube) appears a hilly land, a sort of transient region between mountainous dinaric and plane Pannonic areas. It appears a convenient refuge for highlanders from Herzegovina and Montenegro. After WWI Vojvodina was joined to the rest of Serbia (and Yu1) and thus became a target for the incomers from Dinaric regions too. Apart from steady drift, metanastatic (Greek meta-anastasis, after-uprising) migrations populated Serbia by massive immigrations. These newcomers joined as a rule police and army, what was to be expected, considering their tradition and belligerent mental structure. Usually, Montenegrins used to join army, whereas Herzegovians preferred police. (As mentioned earlier, it was their inclination to police which made them so unpopular among Croatians. In particular in Yu2, when the state and its institutions were identified with the 1
In fact, organization which was behind the assassination, Mlada Bosna (Young Bosnia) comprised Serbs, Muslims and Croats. 2 Counties in Croatia, then within RSK. 3 V. Djurić Misina, Republika Srpska Krajina, Dobra Volja, 2005, Beograd (in Serb), p. 40. 4 We stress again, it concerned Serbs from the rural compact regions where Serbs were the dominant population. Those living in urban areas were left practically untouched and still live there as the loyal Croatian citizens.
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communist repression, whose principal tools were police and army, Serb Dinaroids had a very bad reputation indeed among Croatian citizens. Similarly, ethnic Albanians, Arnauts, were synonymous with Turkish repression on Balkan during the Ottoman Empire). The infiltration of Dinaroids into Serbia was intensified particularly from 1991 onwards, as the turmoil of forming new states started in Yu2. Many young people moved to Serbia in order to escape the draft. On the other hand Serbian youth was engaged across river Drina, either as Serbian conscripts in YNA, or as members of paramilitaries. When Arkan’s Tigers started forcibly collecting those immigrants from RSK and RS and brought them forcibly to their region of origin, to fight themselves for their homeland, situation turned from absurd to tragic. Here, two points are to be made. First, the overwhelming majority of these immigrants are supporters of Šešelj and his SRP. They usually fall for his demagogy and boasting with being “great Serb”, who would make of all regions west from Drina a part of “Greater Serbia” and thus enable refugees (sic) to return to their land of origin. Second, irrespective of these promises (and other wishful thinking), sticking to their co-tribal well established in Serbia, they have been expecting their share when Šešelj finally takes power in Serbia and establishes his dictatorship there. Hence, the professional army forces in Serbia have been populated by Dinaroid radicals. 1 Apart from this, when a member of Milošević government Šešelj ensured that these followers infiltrate police, secret police, juridical web, local county offices, educational system, etc. And when the war criminals, like Ratko Mladic, find refuge (sic) in Serbia, they will come to the land already occupied by their “avant-guard”. And when the armed conflicts at KiM start in 1998, it will be Dinaroids from both sides, who will initiate and carry out bloody fighting, as we shall see later on. Now, we go back to Croatia again. Refugees, immigrants, invaders When the final assault on RSK started on August 4, 1995, political leaders of Krajina, like Milan Babić, then the President of RSK, 2 were already with families safely in Serbia. Town Serb inhabitants were ready with their cars (mainly Mercedes), while peasants had already put their most necessary household staff on tractor trailers, and the “exile” could begin. But before we go on, we quote an interrupted conversation between Milan Martić, mentioned before and Vojislav Šešelj: 3 Šešelj: You know, Zagreb must be bombarded, but not as before, but by Lunas. Martić: Yes, yes, by atomic bombs. Šešelj: There is no place for mercy here. Martić: Yes, yes, Vojkane, you send volunteers. (If there will ever be a trial to Šešelj for all damage he made to Serbia, this testimony of his almost explicit role as an Ustasha provocateur ill be one of principal proofs). In the armed clashes about 130.000 Croatian soldiers were engaged, against 30.000. Krajina Serbs. The resistance was symbolic, in fact fictive. On the same day of the attack, August 4, Milan Martić proclaims the overall retreat. During few days “fighting” about 100 soldiers were killed altogether
1
At this moment (2007) the head of the general staff in Serbia is gen. Zdravko Ponoš (HDE), born at Knin (1962), who graduated military academy at Zagreb. His immediate predecessor was gen. Krga (HDE too). We have already mentioned gen. Adžić (HDE himself) 2 Former dentist; he was sentenced to 13 years in prison by Hague Tribunal, after he confessed (sic) majority of indictments. Expecting further reduction of the sentence he testified against Milošević in 2006. Despised by other prisoners (including Croat ones) he committed suicide. 3 V. Djurić Misina, Republika Srpska Krajina, Dobra Volja, 2005, Beograd (in Serb)
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(mainly on Serb side). Considering the overall number of engaged forces, it corresponds to casualties in massive military maneuvers. To the real civilians many soldiers dressed in civilian clothes joined the “refugee” columns (in the following, we drop the quotation marks on refugees, for the sake of economy). Both parts of refugees carried out weapons with them. Few of them settled in RS, but the overwhelming majority came to mother-Serbia. The movements of those columns were well organized and controlled. Regardless of that whether they moved through Croatia (Slavonia) or Bosnia, they were well supplied at gas stations with water, fuel etc. Croatians were eager to assist the exile of the disloyal, rebellious citizens and were very helpful indeed. 1 We note here that both mock-states collaborated closely while fighting their central government state forces. Thus, the premier of Krajina Republic, Milan Martić, was commanding the forces which were instrumental conquering Brčko region, the narrow strip of land separating eastern from western parts of Republica Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina, populated predominantly by Muslims. When this task was accomplished, he was met at a triumphal parade at Banja Luka, as the war hero. Never-the-less, when those fugitives from Krajina came to Republica Srpska, they were just forwarded further east, to “the mother of all Serbs”, Serbia, who has been supposed to receive everybody who declares himself a Serb, irrespective of his (mis)deeds made in his homeland. And Serbian tax payers are obliged to support any such refugee, as long as he is crying “I am a Serb martyr!! The same scenario repeated in the case of BiH. Joined Muslim-Croat forces pushed Mladic forces all over BiH, and approached Banja Luka, the capital of the Serb mock-state. They stopped before the town, at the insistence of the Western Allies. Another wave of refugees followed, who poured into mother-Serbia. The latter used to support their fighting for four years, supplying those rebellious regions with 30 % of their “needs’ in arms, ammunition, food, etc. After the collapse of both “states” situation considerably improved for both sides: Serbians did not have to send support to the remote regions, but could to do that at Serbian soil. The incomers were released of fear of the non-Serb hostile environment, since they were now “among their kinsmen”, who were supposed to continue to feed them, provide with refugee camps, flats, etc. With three-year long life under severe international sanctions, because of her support of «brother-rebels» in Croatia and BiH, Serbia had now to withstand additional burden of about 500.000. incomers. When in 1999 the latter were joined with about 200.000. «resettled people» from KiM, it will add up to700.000. incomers to settle and feed. Apart from KiM region population, this figures amounted to almost 10 % of the overall autochtoneous population of Serbia, the burden a much richer and bigger state could hardly withstand. But the biggest gain went to Dinaroid politicians in Serbia, who got at hand a considerable number of devoted voters. If we note that majority of them were well equiped with arms, the picture of Serbia occupied by Serbs (sic) is complete. (The latter fact will prove fatal for Serbia when the cases of war criminals at Hague Tribunal from over-Drina regions become actual, as the case of Ratko Mladic illustrates.) At the beginning, the overall support of those refugees was covered by the international humanitarian organizations by 15 %, whereas the rest of 85 % was deposited on the shoulders of Serbian citizens. Gradually the international help faded away to zero and Serbia remained on her own. With her «brotherly burden». But let us go back to those imigrant columns. They were met at Serbian borders and escorted to the previously determined spots. They were not allowed to stop in Belgrade, for instance, or any other Serbian town. Media reporters were not allowed to talk to them, or take pictures of the unfortunate people. They were distributed all over Sebia, so that their presence could be conceiled from the public attention as much as possible. If we note that the same «conspiracy of silence» was practiced In fact they rightly experienced this move as the completion of the ethnic cleansing carried out by Ustasha regime during WWII.
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in Croatia and BiH, as well as in the world public media, the overall ignoring of the massive movements within former Yu2 was almost complete. 1 But the most interesting and important response to the massive imigration into Serbia came from KiM. A part of those incomers was destined by Belgrafe authorities to KiM. The reaction of Shqiptar leaders was severe, even histeric. They raised such noisy protests against «changing the ethnical content» of the province, that the Serbian government stoped the settling in the region. Majority of those who were settled on KiM never-the-less moved from KiM to the rest of Serbia, mainly illegally. The Shqiptar reaction to the refugee problem deserves some special consideration here. In general, when refugees are concerned, as a part of humanitarian question, anybody who can help the unfortunate people is supposed to do that, irrespective of their nationality, political and other «colours». But when non-Albanians are concerned, this kind of logic stops at Shqiptar thresholds. Everything that is hindrance to their long-term project of ethnically clear KiM has been regarded as an outrigt assault on their natural right «to be alone». (When the ethnical cleansing starts in 1999 from »both sides», 2 the ugly face of nationalism and chauvinism will appear in «ful glory», as we shall see in the following.) The other point to be made concerning the Shqiptar reaction was the outright cynism. In the light of what we have seen regarding the permanent influx of incomers from Albania into KiM, which ocasionally took form of massive invasion, this reaction proved that the local leaders were deprived of minimum sense of ethical as such. Or, the supremacy of ethnical over ethical, to put it into more general terms, has been confirmed once again. The final irony of the whole situation was that many of those to be settled on KiM were descendants of ancient refugees from KiM who took refuge in Austria during the Ottoman rule, and were settled down at today Krajina region in modern Croatia. With their attempt to settle down finally on the land of their ancestres the full circle of Balkan migrations has been closed. Or almost so. Serbia Occupied The political disturbancies and military conflicts in Yu2 have resulted in massive moves and migrations witin the Serbo-Croat regions. Serbia (and partly Montenegro) were the only (former) republics which suffered not only net influx, but no emigration into other Yugoslav regions took place from Serbia. (We do not consider her emigration abroad, which was caused first directly by Milošević dictatorship and indirectly by the same but due to the influx of refugees and others into Serbia). Since the incomeres were (or at least decleared themselves) Serbs (Orthodox) situation in which the autochtoneous Serbian population found itself has been most unusual and weird, to sy the least. The incomers, mainly Dinaroids, differed greatly from the indigeneous Serbian population, both Serb and others (Hungarians, Slovaks, Rumenians etc). First they came from rural regions far away from Serbia, carryng with themselves distinct sense of ethics, different folklore, tradition etc. Even their language was different, though inteligible by local Serbs. In fact, apart from the (Orthodox) church confession, these peope from Croatia and BiH were more akin to Croats than to Serbian Serbs. 3 Retarded in all aspect of civilisation these incomers brought with them the spirit of 18th – 19th century. Coupled with their violent and stuborn mentality, their presence in Serbia has been experienced by the local population (Serb and non-Serb alike) as a sort of occupation. Insisting all the time on their Serb ethnicity, many of them behave as Ottoman Turks. A sort of predator-pray relationship has been established in Serbia now. Since this situation The attentive reader might have noticed I avoid making use of the term ethnical cleansing, as inappropriate in this context. It will be different with events in BiH and KiM, at the local level, as we shall see later on. 2 Quotation marks refer to as yet undefined term “side”. 3 An overwhelming majority of over-Drina Serbs and Croats speak the so-called ijekavic (pronounced iyecavic) dialect, unlike Serbian Serb who speak ekavic one. A tiny minority of over-Drina population speaks icavic, mostly in Dalmatia. 1
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has proved essential for understanding and monitoring the ongoing events regarding KiM, we devote next chapter to the prehistory of Serbian demography. Colonization of Serbia In the last century the first wave of Dinaroids came after the WWI, when moving within the same state was easy and over-Drina population took advantage of it to settle in Serbia. In the following, to avoid possible misunderstanding, we shall call this population Ijecavians, bearing in mind that it will refer almost exclusively to the Orthodox part of the Serbo-Croats. 1 This sort of imigration took the form of a drift and the indigeneous population was able to absorb the influx and the newcomers were assimilated gradually into the new environment. The quality of these imigrants was resonably high and they contributed considerably to the overall economic and cultural life in Serbia. At the beginning of WWII on Balkan and the founding of the Nazi state Nezavisna Drzava Hrvatska (Independent State of Croatia, ISC in the following) and the ensuing pogroms of Serbs, Jews and Roma, many Serbs crossed river Drina to find refuge in Serbia. The latter was under the protectorat of Third Reich, with a quisling government and soon after the German occupation two independent guerilla movements were formed: royalist Chetniks of Dragoljub (Draza) Mihajlovic and partizans under the communist leadership, headed by Josip Broz, known as Tito. Those partizans were mainly newcomers from ISC and they constituted the core of partizan forces. Both movements started fighting German forces, jointly or separatelly, making umbushes, what was a sort of continuation of hayduk tradition. Germans responded quickly to this theat and imposed the occupational law that 100 hostages were to be killed for every German soldier killed and 50 for a wounded. Chetniks therefore stopped fightening Germans, restricting themseves to sabotaging German transport and similar actions, under the aproval of the Yugoslav government in exile in London and the help of British diversants. Partizans continued to kill German soldiers, for they did not feel themselves as Serbian citizens and did not care much about the civilian victims. Never-theless they were finally pushed across Drina into ISC, where the cruel occupational rule was not introduced, so that Serbia was left with Germans and Chetnicks, in a sort of tacit seasefire. Though Germans continued to chase and fight Chetnicks, no serious battles have been fought in Serbia until 1944. In the spring of 1944 Tito's forces started invading Serbia, expecting the near arrival of Red Army, preparing the ground for the final take over of power and communist dictatorship. Those invading communist forces consisted entirely from Ijekviens. Thus the communism has been brought to Serbia on the bayonets of Ijekavians, predominantely Dinaroids. When the war was over, these Ijekavians stayed in Serbia, mainly as army officers. It was on them that Tito and his communists relied on during the following decades of communist rule. Moreover, the new regime settled down hundreds thousands of Ijekavians, mainly in Vojvodina, having banished German population from the region (about 400.000, so-called Volksdeutschers). Since the newcomers took all dominant positions in politics, army, police etc, Serbia was faced with a true collonization, not to say occupation. But it was not the end of the story. 2 Of the former Yugolav army, which capitualed in April 18, 1941, all Serbs in the army were taken to Germany and Austria as prisoners of war. Croats, Slovenians, Macedonians, Albanians, Hungarians etc were exampt from this. Since a great deal of those prisoners of war did not return to Serbia under the communist rule, Serbia thus was deprived of her most vital part of population. And even this was not the end of the story. Those eminent citizens who did not join the Communist party, or simply were considered as unrelible, were persecuted. All these effects turned out fatal
Three dialects are defined according to pronunciation of some vowels. As an illustration, for the English milk, one has mleko (ekavian), mlijeko (ijekavian, pronounced iyekavian) and mliko (ikavian). This situation resembles very much division of Albanians into Gegs (Northern Albanian highlanders) and Tosks (central and south Albania, with lowlanders) and the corresponding dialects. KiM Shiptars are Gegs, of course. 2 See P. Grujic, Boromejski Čvor, ATC, Belgrade, 2006 (in Serb). 1
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for Serbian demographic picture after the War. The overall level of civilisation was lowered down bellow a level of tolerance, never to be recovered since. And it is not yet the end of the story. As we mentioned before, the influx of Ijekavians started with disintegration of Yu2. Not only refugees (real or fictive), but many simply for convenience, flooded Serbia, as a sort of Promised land, obliged to accept everybody who finds it conveniant to settle down here. Was there any reistance to this colonization? Not at all, for good reasons. First, the ruling class (better to say rulling cast) was already Dinaric in Serbia. 1 Since all public media are in their hands, there is even hardly the awareness of the autochtoneous Serbians concerning the extent and seriousness of the colonization phenomenon. Second, the international community appears very sympathetic with the refugees as such, for understandable reasons. Third, as the experiance has proved, it turns out impossible to explain the difference between Dinaric refugees in Sweden and Serbia, for instance. Among other differences, Serbs in Sweden, for instance, try to conceal their ethnicity (for good reason, Serbs being demonized for the last two decades or so), whereas their principal argument in favour of their privilegies in Serbia has been that they are Serbs, what they never fail to emphasize in public or in private. In fact, if one hears somebody «Serbing» in Serbia, he can be prety sure he is listening to a Dinaric person. Every two sentence from Šešelj and his followers, in the Parliament, before TV camera etc starts with «We Serbian Radicals ...». Any unexperienced listener would interpret it as a sign of «ethnical obsession», and that is exactly what Šešeljoids want to achieve. Where exactly these newcomers settle in Serbia, more precisely what are their social targets in the new land? Before considering that, we first turn to the political environment in Yu2 when the disintegration crisis started around 1990. One of the first steps international community took in the Yugoslav issue was an embargo on arms import into belligerent republics. The principal benefactor of this embargo was Serbia, since it was her who inherited Yugoslav Army and its weaponry. This initial advantage was the main cause of the Serb military successes in Croatia and BiH. Of course, other republics used to import the arms illegally, what was tacitly tolerated by the international community, for obvious reason. 2 But it was not the end of the story. In order to prevent or at least reduce the armed conflicts, restrictions on the size of the republican armies was imposed, by limiting the number of soldiers etc. This was as much reasonable move by the outside world, as naïve one. The response of Milošević, for instance, was an enlargement of the police forces, both in number and equipment. In fact he set up his private army, which he controlled and which formally was not comprised by the international restrictions. The gain was multiple. First, since at the time he was not president of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY, Yu3 in the following), he was not thus the supreme commander of the Army. As president of Serbia, however he was in a position to control the police, and thus he enlarged its forces which were in fact a para-military army. Second, he was now in a position to choose (recruit) new policemen. The best choice for him would be to have loyal men, who were not engaged in the internal political conflicts. His choice was, you guess, to take Ijekaviens. For many reasons. First, they are “born policemen” ,considering their employment in the regions of origin. Second, they are supposed to be grateful to Milošević for receiving them in Serbia. In a sense, it was Milošević’s “Praetorian guard”, or “League of foreigners”. Third, they were not supposed to feel sympathies for Milošević’s adversaries in Serbia, even not for the Serbian citizens. Since two previous points should be obvious, we pay attention to the third one. When the massive demonstrations and rallies started in Serbia from 1990 on, Milošević engaged his riot police, which showed such ruthlessness in dealing with demonstrators, that Belgrade citizens, for instance,
Term Ijekavians would be inappropriate here, for these newcomers accept the local ekavic dialect and are hardly distinguishable from the indigenous population for that matter. 2 It was revealed recently that Slovenians were selling weaponry to Croatia and BiH in 1991, under the guidance of Janez Janša, then the minister of interior. 1
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could not believe they belonged to the same nation. A Belgrade university professor 1 came across to the lined heavily armed police units, which was placed in front of the National Theatre building, situated at the very beginning of Vasa Čarapić street at the very core of the Belgrade centre (with the University centre, where a number of faculties, including that of the professor’s mentioned, and the central university building, like London Senate House) are placed, and asked “naively’ where that street might be, he got this remarkable reply “I don’t know it”. 2 And that is not the end of the story. When the non-Shqiptar police forces were withdrawn from KiM in 1999, they joined the Milošević’s police, and were engaged in beating Serbian citizens all over Serbia. (This remarkable behaviour explains in retrospective a lot of things when we come back to the KiM fighting in 1998/9). Before we go on with the arrivists’ settling in Serbia, we stress it started even before Dayton agreement and ceasefire in 1995. After Dayton, Serbia experienced a proper invasion of Ijekavians. Entire para-military units moved in and were accepted as parts of regular police forces. When we talk about atrocities in 1999, in particular those committed by the infamous Scorpions, we shall devote more attention to this aspect of armed fighting in Serbia. We now spend a few words on the “nonmilitary sector” of the incomers. Majority of these immigrants were poor people, who were accepted as refugees, and supported by Serbian state, as mentioned earlier. Some of them found it very convenient to have the refugee status, as a case with Mile from Benkovac illustrates. 3 When in 1996 Belgrade journalist visited a refugee camp near Niš (south-east Serbia), this healthy young man in his 30-ies complained (as many others did) about the food, with these remarkable words: “How they will feed us in five years, when they are feeding us like this now(!?)”. Many of the refugees turned down offer to do some season work, like agricultural one, preferring to live bad without labouring. Those who brought considerable amounts of money engaged in various business enterprises, from legal to criminal ones. Some of them opened small firms, usually mini-markets, cafés, restaurants, etc, non-productive, servicing enterprises in general. They employ, as a rule, their compatriots as “black market”, without registering them to the state administration and without paying the social, health and other insurances, and tax of course. The so-called grey economy is held in Serbia mainly by these newcomers. Needles to say that people employed illegally are paid miserably by their “compatriotic” bosses. Those with large amount of money invested it in the most profitable business – drug smuggling and dealing. Around large towns, in particular Belgrade and it outskirts, new satellite quarters have been built by these “refugees”, with luxurious parts which appear to be the centres for criminal business. When Šešelj’s radicals took over Zemun and other towns and villages in Serbia, they started distributing the municipal land to the refugees, as part of their colonization project. The price was symbolic, of course, but the “internal division” was the most interesting, indeed. Those from BiH had to pay double price compared to those who came from Croatia. The rationale for this discrimination is simple. People from RSK have been moved to Serbia, by a planned operation, as explained before, whereas those from BiH have been considered as “civic deserters”. In the long run they are supposed to return to BiH and strengthen the “Serb element” there, so that the area could be easily joined to Serbia (or vice versa). In any case looking at hose new settlements at the outskirts of Serbian towns and as new villages, one witnesses “kasabization” of
Late Milan Kurepa, one of the fierce adversaries of Milošević’s regime, who retired prematurely because of that and died after a heart attack a few days after the October 2000 dismantling of Milošević’s regime, as a consequence of his political engagement. 2 “Ne znaam ti ja!”, with the best Montenegrin’s accent. 3 A town in Western Herzegovina, to be mentioned again later on, on a different occasion. 1
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Serbia in real terms. 1 These settlements have been dubbed by (autochthonous) Serbians “Šešeljugas”, for obvious reasons. In 2002 there were 450.000. Ijekavian refugees in Serbia (apart from 200.000 from KiM). Out of them 170.000 gained SRJ (Yu3) citizenship, with 60.000 - 80.000 with right to vote. 2 The latter are sure Šešelj’s supporters. Generally, these newcomers made a tremendous pressure on the Serbian labour market, which already was saturated (with 22 % officially unemployed, as a very conservative figure). These newcomers are ready to take any job on the market, regardless of the economic logic and labour ethos. They appear sure strike-breakers, as primary and secondary school teachers have experienced many times in their struggle for better working conditions and higher salaries. As a rule these people are reluctant to return to their homeland in Croatia, partly for understandable reason, but mainly for convenience. Those who do return are elderly people, who want to end their earthly live “at their-home threshold”. Of course, Croatian authorities have already managed to discourage return, otherwise the whole project of cleansing the state of the disloyal, rebellious population would have been in vain. Serb house were either burned or levelled to the ground, as we saw in the case of Medački Džep, or occupied by Croat refugees from other parts of Croatia. All these problems appear common instances with refugees as such, but now we come to the most serious of problem Serbia has been facing since 1991, and especially after Dayton agreement in 1995 – the war criminals. Many of those Ijekavians engaged in war atrocities, Serbs and Croats alike, started finding refuge in their “mother-states”, Serbia and Croatia, respectively, even before Dayton agreement and ceasefire. In Serbia those started arriving ever since 1991, but after the agreement signed by Izetbegović, Milošević and Tudjman, majority of these criminals moved out of BiH. Since Croatia was in the same situation as Serbia concerning occupation by Dinaroids, we shall not dwell on Croatian affairs and turn our attention to demonized Serbia. Why demonized? We shall se it even more clearly after considering the question of war crimes, both in BiH and Serbia (including KiM). But before go on, we emphasize once again the generic case of Dinaroids. One important point concerning Dinaroids must be stressed here. It is not the overall number they appear in the new environment, not even the percentage within the over all population. They have a tremendous impulse to stick together and form a sort of personal union within each community. 3 They concentrate geographically in selected areas, as the case of numerous settlements in Serbia show. In particular we mention the case of Novi Sad, the capital of Vojvodina, the town with the most advanced culture in Serbia (Serbian Athens). When the influx of Ijekavians started in 1991, the population of Novi Sad rose in 15 years from 210.000 to 340.000. As the first consequence, the town renown for his liberal atmosphere and democratic orientation, turned into the bastion of Šešelj’s radicals, who rule the town now (2007). In fact, all places where radical have won elections are populated mainly either by Ijekavians or Roma. The same applies when we come to employment, sport, entertainment places etc, where the “call of the blood and homeland” gather Ijekavians, making of some firms and organization impenetrable fortresses. In the family life they do not mix with the local population, including inter-marriages, mainly because of their complex of inferiority, often disguised in the clothes of arrogance. In fact the principal obstacle for the latter is that they have different ethos, that of a traditional society, what makes common life with the modern environment very difficult indeed. (The case of Mirko Marjanović, the prime minister in Milošević government, mentioned earlier illustrates the best the sort of ethos one meets in Dinaric regions. He was a best man in a wedding, what did not prevent to
Kasaba, Turkish name for a provincial town or small city, after Arab qasaba. It appears eponymous for the oriental, disordered, dirty place, with poor logistic. 2 At present (2007) these figures have raised, of course. 3 This appears, of course, a common case with people in diaspora, but here we have the peculiar case of “diaspora in the akin people”, what makes the situation very weird indeed. 1
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grab the bride and run away with her. In Serbia, the status of best man appears very respected and dignified, indeed, even higher than the status of brother, for instance). The recent cruelty and fierce fighting in the 1991-1995 period have demonstrated what sociologists and historians have noticed long time ago, the fact that Dinaroids appear neither Serb nor Croats (and even Slavs). As one picture says more than thousand words, so one graphite speaks better than elaborate analyses. In 1992 one such graphite appeared on the walls of the Slavonian capital Osijek, populated by Croats and Serbs before the “war”, but emptied from Serbs when fighting started: GIVE US BACK OUR SERBS, TAKE BACK YOUR HERZEGOVIANS. Common people have better understood the crux of the matter than majority of professionals. 1 When the autochthonous local politician Kir, Croat, started visiting Slavonian places arguing for tolerance and peaceful coexistence, he was assassinated, on the order of higher rank politicians, probably from Zagreb. Highlanders from both sides were on the same task – divide et impera. When Sarajevo writer (who happened to be Montenegrin himself) in the interview to Belgrade weekly expresses the same point (see page 50 xx), it could appear in Serbian press as a part of the interview of a stranger only, since in Serbia opinion on the subject are absolute taboo. Zagreb citizens, just like Belgrade ones, look with contempt at those violent and rough intruders, but the latter have successfully manage to settle down the issue, like young Bonaparte promised to that French general on the Italian front. 2 When the first immigrants from RSK started arriving to Vojvodina in Serbia, by car with the plates KNN (designating Knin, the capital of the selfproclaimed republic), feelings of the local, autochthonous population was the best illustrated by their comments of the acronym as “Kanda Nisu Naši” (They seem not to be of ours). An episode from the NATO aggression in 1999 illustrates well the crux of matter. As soon as the raids began, the window of the USA Cultural centre, situated in the very centre of the Belgrade centre, in Knez Mihailova Street, was crushed by angry demonstrators. Instead of the posters usually found in the window, the (framed) portrait of Radovan Karadzic was deposited there. Who did it? Surely not autochthonous Belgrade inhabitants, but Dinaroids from those regions. The message was twofold. One was aimed at Allies, to irritate them, the other directed towards Serbians: We are here! 3 A few years ago I was invited to attend a PhD oral defence at the faculty of Philosophy, Belgrade University. The candidate was a colleague of mine, who is taking part in the seminar on the epistemology and history of science, I am running at my Institute of Physics. He came from Bosnia and graduated philosophy (and chemical physics) at Belgrade University. His brother was a general in Republika Srpska, who died there. On the blackboard , in the left upper corner, we could read СВЕ ЗА СРПСТВО, СРПСТВО НИЗАШТА (Everything for Serbism, 4 Serbism for nothing). (I could not help asking if it was a part of the defence or a slogan, but restrained myself.) The chairman of the jury emphasized at the opening of the defence he was glad to learn that the candidate was his compatriot from Bosnia. When on our way out after the defence my wife and I entered the escalator, we saw a large poster of Radovan Karadzic in the cabin, reading СВАКИ СРБИН ЈЕ РАДОВАН (every Serb is Radovan). I couldn’t help writing on the poster А СВАКИ РАДОВАН ЦРНОГОРАЦ (and every Radovan is Montenegrin), but it would not be technically feasible. We knew that this department was infiltrated by Dinaroids, but never-the-less were chocked by the aggressive Dinaric nationalism. The point was to persuade Serbians to accept Radovan Karadzic, wanted by Hague Tribunal, as a national hero, by accepting him as a Serb, and thus as a Serbian. The message was: Serbia must stand behind him (and all other accused).
Or at least they were more sincere, like that kid in Emperor’s new clothes. “General, you are for the head taller than me, but if you are not obeying my orders, I shall deprive you of this advantage!” 3 We shall meet this fellow Karadzic many times in this book. 4 Like Judaism, Germanism etc 1 2
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Dinaric saga The relationship Dinaric highlanders – plane population has many aspects, which show up in various socio-political situations in different forms. These aspects have been described by a number of authors, but have never become a topic significant enough to draw attention of the sociologists as a principal target of investigations. This fact reflects more the positions Dinaroids hold in the society (and their control over public media), but also within the cultural sector, then the genuine neglect by the leading intellectuals. Never-the-less, when one focuses the attention on the issue, she will find a lot of relevant material, which illustrates, albeit indirectly, the essence of the ”Dinaric question”. Some two decades ago Zagreb TV released a series entitled ”Beggars and sons”. TV spectators enjoyed the plot, but few realized the point was less in the events as much as in the review of the mentality of the heroes. The story evolves in the western Herzegovina, with the Catholic and Muslim population, still under the Turkish rule.. The principal hero is a sort of montagnard Jeff Peters, a boy living in a mountainous village, whose inhabitants live mainly from begging in the lowland surrounding areas. They gather regularly and organize ”legal plundering” of the naive peasants in the plane. Simulating cripples, suffering debility, mental disability etc, these “beggars” appear a sort of tax collectors, taking advantage of the naivety of the religious compassion. They do not make difference between Christians and Muslims, diving as birds of prey on the industrious plane people victims. Our young hero accompanies his grand father, the leader of the ”plundering squadron” and learns the “craft”. When he grows up and his grandfather dies, he takes over the ”business” , but this time within the Austro-Hungarian society. He organizes a group of small dealers, selling smuggled stuff, like lighter flints and similar small goods, in Croatia, Czechoslovakia etc. The audience did enjoy exploits of our hero, who even succeeds to outwit the local usurer, by not paying his debt. The latter episode resembles much a folk story of west-Serbian peasant, eponymous Era, who cheats a Turkish couple engaged in ploughing and robes them for money and the horse. Yugoslav readers (the story aims at the school children) enjoy the plot, of course, since they experience it as a Slav serf outwitting Turkish masters. The point staying in the hind-side has never been discussed in the school, for obvious reason. The story appears an allegory of the relationship montagnards lowlanders, just as the famous biblical narrative of Cain and Abel does. In a sense, the TV series appears an extensive elaboration of the sociological issue we discuss here. As we mentioned, the series comprised two periods, marked by the beggars and smugglers. While enjoying the plot no one of us could foresee that the third-generation episode was about to arrive. And it did arrive in 1991. This time without begging, without smuggling, but with a rightway armed plundering and killing, from all sides, Serb Orthodox, Roman Catholic and Muslim (Slav and Albanian alike). New heroes now are named Zeljko Raznatovic-Arkan, Ante Gotovina, Naser Orić, Ramush Haradinaj, etc, etc. All disguised by the most sacred patriotism, freedom fighting etc. In fact, our TV series might well have started from the precursors of those beggars, the Medieval highwaymen (zero phase), who came to light once again in 1991, when ”ideological preconditions” (in Marxists’ parlance) were realized. Serbia before Shqiptar rebellion in 1998 With the ethno-social silent colonization of Serbia in the hind-side, Serbian political scene in late 1990-ieths was the subject of severe political and social turmoil. Two Dinaroid political Parties, Those of Šešelj and Drašković, struggling for power, were engaged in fierce mutual fighting, but at the same time used to make “seasonal agreements” with Milošević, when he found advantageous for him to offer them a piece of power. The proper political, bourgeois parties, like Democratic Party, (lead by Zoran Djindjic), Democratic Party of Serbia, (lead by Vojislav Kostunica, of the Montenegrin origin), Association of Serbian Citizens (lead by Vesna Peshić), were engaged in overthrowing Milošević’s dictatorship. Unfortunately, the latter had to make deal with Drašković
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party, otherwise being too weak they had no power to achieve their political goals alone. This spoiled, of course, the ethos of their policy, but those compromises appeared inevitable, never-theless, at the time. On the other hand Šešelj’s stratagem for quenching his pathological thirst for power was different. 1 He used to sling mud at the opposition altogether, and accusing Milošević and his regime for dictatorship and crime. By doing the first, he let Milošević know he is not part of the real opposition, and by the second he was blackmailing the regime. How the later looked like we illustrate with debate at the Federal Parliament within the period 1991-1995, when fighting in BiH was going on, with Serbia explicitly accused by the external factors for interfering BiH affairs. Serbian authorities, of course, were denying it, for obvious reason. Then a Radical MP stands before the parliament microphone and TV cameras, during a debate which had nothing to do with BiH, and reads certificates, issued allegedly by YPA, that Šešelj’s paramilitaries were given a particular amount of weaponry and ammunition and that the former were given back later on to the same military magazine. The massage was multiple. To the followers it said “We are patriots, fighting for Serbian cause!”. To the external world: Serbia has been engaged in interfering Bosnian fighting. To Milošević: we are compromising Serbia and your regime, and we shall be doing that until you accepts as partners in dictatorship. After a long resistance, Milošević gave in. He accepted Šešelj into the government, allotting to him the position of deputy prime minister and a number of other minister chairs in the government. With the tacit agreement, which might be formulated like this: You are scum, but I am unable to resist you. You will be in my government and may proceed with slinging mud at the opposition (which, you scum, used to belong to until recently). You may lie, steal and do other things like this, but not more than us. And don’t you ever fancy you have been accepted as a true partner, for I am a gangster, and you are the scoundrel. It was for the last point that Šešeljoids continued to be after Milošević, but with more sophisticated means. For their explicit and final goal was an absolute power. 2 Those readers who happen to be familiar with Hitler’s rise to power may feel they have already read these points. Yes, it was exactly Hitler’s stratagem for taking power in Germany. I happen to be unaware of anybody who has realized that it was the same tactics of blackmailing German government (and official authorities in general) which was instrumental in forcing Hindenburg to give the mandate to that lunatic, as Ludendorf described Hitler in his famous letter to the president of Reich 3 . Hindenburg naively thought lunatic will stop blackmailing and will behave himself when attaining his goal. He mistrusted, unfortunately, Hitler’s sincerity in those matters, (as the entire Europe did, for her misfortune). This parallel with Hitler career is not accidental. For Šešelj has studied Hitler’s stratagem in details, as part of his MSc and PhD studies, as his behaviour clearly reveals. He has been following Mein Kampf scenario meticulously, including his well planned visit to the Hague Tribunal. Both Hitler and Šešelj were outcasts of their respective societies, both took refuge to the neighbouring “brother-land”, coming from highlands. Both started their political careers fighting communists. But while Hitler copied Mussolini’s fascistic rituals in stabilizing and promoting his movement, Šešelj has been very careful not to reveal any sign of his fascistic strategy, being well aware of the anti-fascist feelings both in Serbia and Europe. We shall come back to this point later on. Which, in its turn, is but one of remedies for his inferiority complex, greatly enhanced in Serbia, which first rejected him and then ignored him and his followers completely. 2 It is for these points that the set of those who realize it was Šešelj who put Milošević at the Hague Tribunal is virtually empty. 3 See the excellent and detailed account in I. Kershaw, Hitler, 1889-1936: Hubris, Penguin Books, 1998. 1
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Milošević was eager to come to terms with Shqiptar leaders, for many reason. First of all, he was a president of the state and was careful in maintaining the country running as smoothly as possible. It is true Serbia was under an international pressure to come to terms with Shqiptars and their demands, but it would be a gross simplification to ascribe to Milošević deal with KiM affairs as a simple consequence of the international pressure. He did offer to KiM political leaders talks on the province problems, but this offer badly failed. A high-rank delegation was sent o Priština to arrange a meeting with regional leaders, but after three-day stay no Shqiptar representative appeared. The only representatives (true or self-appointed) came from the so-called national minorities: Roma, Muslims, Egyptians and Ashkalias. It was this failure which has finally convinced Milošević and everybody else that Shqiptar boycott of Serbia (not Milošević) was total and final. KiM is not the only province in the world which has difficulties in the relation with the metropolis. As well as miners are not the only branch of the society who have difficulties in relation with the government. But in either case, it is one who complains who approach the relevant source of trouble (real or alleged), not vice versa. Everybody who wants an amelioration of the situation tries to cooperate on the matter. On the contrary, once one decides to cut off the relations with somebody or something chooses the option of making things worse. In the long run it presents the situation nonamenable to any improvement and the demands for the total cut -off seem justified to any uninformed, but interested observer. And it has been just the stratagem of KiM Shqiptars – the worse, the better. By sending government representatives to rebellious Priština, Milošević put all cards on the table. Shqiptars’ rejection to play showed Milošević that his risk did not pay off. He was humiliated (together with the rest of Serbia) and when he thought it was his move, this humiliation played a role in the way he chose to deal with rebels. This does not justify, of course, many of his actions in 1998-1999, but it does explain them, albeit not in political-opportunistic terms. From Shqiptar side, the stage for the final clash has been ready. Now, we come to the “rest of world” in this context. But before we consider the “world stage”, we analyze briefly the meaning and nature of KiM boycott.
KiM and world KiM and boycott of Serbia During the post-war period (that is in Yu2), KiM put itself in an ambiguous position concerning its relationship with the rest of Yugoslavia, in particular Serbia. From one side Shqiptar leaders joined the rest of communist dictatorship within the federal state, and played the same role as the leaders of other republics, stressing the ideological and social supremacy over nationality. On the other hand they used to stress the particular situation of KiM, demanding the federal help in all respects (except in family planning, of course). They did not bother with the conflict between the bad economic and all other aspects of human life in the region and the cause of it - the demographic explosion. That is why family planning has always been taboo on KiM. Direct consequence of the enormous birth rate at KiM has been the increase of the young nonproductive population. It was this non-productivity which has been the real side of the political and ethnical boycott regarding the rest of Serbia. When the Shqiptar leadership decided to press for political independence and separation, it still stuck to the federal budget and fund for undeveloped republics and KiM. When the separatist move became explicit and put on the table, one of many cynical justifications for their demand was the claim of being economically exploited. The financial help from the rest of Serbia was explained as a mean of further exploitation of Kim. In particular, this claim asserts that the investment was into KiM mines, and other primary resources, so as to exploit them and use them as resource of welfare of the rest of Serbia. One of slogans current
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during the peak of the crises in1980-thies was TREPCHA RADI – BEOGRAD SE GRADI (Trepcha works, Belgrade is built). 1 But in reality, what was the contribution of KiM to Yugoslavia and Serbia? As mentioned before, the principal income of KiM has been the earnings of their workers in Western Europe (Geistarbeiters). These earnings were private income and the state did not benefit from it, neither by taxation, nor by any other gain. The money has been spent on private welfare, not on any public need, like infrastructure, hospitals, schools etc. But the economic relation does not exhaust the overall relationship between the whole and its parts. What’s about the cultural, scientific and other sectors? Being a relatively small community, with poor tradition in the cultural field, KiM could but poorly contribute to the Yugoslav culture, not to mention European one. Their cinema production, theater performances etc were very dependent on the rest of Yugoslavia, especially Serbia. The overall artistic production, anyway, was confined to the regional, better to say national compartment, which was of little interest to other cultural centers in Yugoslavia. The language barrier was another formidable obstacle of any serious impact on Yugoslav cultural scene. The science has been a theme for itself. KiM contribution to hard science has been virtually naught, though number of Shqiptar students did study at Belgrade and other universities at the postgraduate level and some even got their PhD degrees there. We mentioned before the educational situation there, with the enormous influx of young people to the university, which produced thousands of diplomas and nothing substantially useful concerning the final outcome. As for the humanitarian sciences, the overwhelming majority of scientific work has been concentrated on the national history, prehistory, linguistic and folklore, what has been of interest to these disciplines in a wider context of European milieu. Researchers from the latter did not have to travel far away from Europe to study traditional societies, since they could benefit from the Albanian region on Balkan. (In this context, it is fair to say that much of Serbo-Croat and Macedonian region artistic and humanities output deserves world attention mainly due to the exotic nature of these traditions. In particular, the most acclaimed films from Serbia deal with Roma and highlanders). Hence, when making statistical analysis of the artistic and scientific production of Serbia, KiM appears black hole for that matter too. It contributes almost 20 % of the overall population, but essentially less in the cultural output in general sense. Therefore, when speaking about boycott, the terms assume somewhat cynical overtones, from a general viewpoint. KiM and world A glance on the Globe reveals a striking contrast between the size of this troubling region and the troubles it has been causing on the global world scene. What makes KiM so important that much of the global political energy has been investing into such a small area on Balkan? What interests world has in dealing with the KiM issue and what makes the latter so unique, as many politicians involved claim to be the case? In trying to answer these questions, we shall first make an inventory of the KiM surrounding, local and global, geographical and political alike. We start with the close environment, that of Serbia. Vojvodina We try first to answer the “uniqueness question” by putting it in the concrete context: Why KiM and not Vojvodina? This northern province of Serbia has about twice larger surface area than KiM, but the same number of inhabitance (about 2 M). It appears richer in the quality of soil than that in KiM, but KiM is still a very fertile land. Vojvodina was a part of Hungary (Austro-Hungary) since early Middle Age, and has joined Serbia in1918, at the end of WWI, and thus became a part of Yu1. Her main population was Hungarian?, with the substantial share of Germans and Serbs. Other “national minorities”, as shall be called later, are Romanians, Slovaks, Rusins, Roma, Croats, etc. 1
Trepča is the biggest lead mine in Yugoslavia, one of the biggest in Europe.
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After the WWI the demographic picture has been changed drastically. First, German population (Volks-Deutschers) has been expelled (in fact, half of them has moved from Serbia voluntarily), and a large number of Orthodox Serbs from the western part of Yugoslavia (Ijekavians) has been moved into the province. When constituting the new Yugoslavia, Vojvodina was allotted the status of Autonomous province while KiM obtained the status of the Autonomous region. (Later, these two statuses will be equated and both regions had the status of autonomous provinces within Serbia). What has been the attitude of Vojvodina inhabitance with regard to the republic of Serbia? Her politicians has always claimed that Vojvodina deserves better position in Serbia, that she has been exploited by Belgrade government etc, as one could well expect from the local leaders with respect to the state. It is of interest here to note that those accusations came usually from the incomers from western Yugoslavia, not from the autochthonous population, like Hungarians and Serb aborigines, 1 who both were of the gentle Pannonian type. 2 The animosity toward the central authorities was particularly pronounced during Milošević’s rule, as a response to his authoritarian centralism. The latter, in its turn, was his response to KiM Shqiptar leaders request for secession, so that Milošević abolished Vojvodina autonomy for the sake of “symmetry’, and thus it was Vojvodina who will become the first to suffer from KiM rebellion. But the point to be stressed here is that despite their endemic dissatisfaction, which has been partly justified, people of Vojvodina never reached for violent, uncivilized means to attain their political demands. As we elaborated before, Serbia contributed to the Federal fund almost exactly the same amount as the same fund returned it to KiM. Since the Central Serbia was with an average national income per capita as the entire republic (much as Serbia was on average typical for the entire Yugoslavia), it was Vojvodina who financed KiM via the Federal fund for “undeveloped” regions of Yugoslavia. In the light of this brute fact, the comparison between the real positions of the two provinces in Serbia and their demand and behaviour in general appears more than of cynical nature. It will turnout even more cynical if we recall that Vojvodina is demographically on her decline (both autochthonous Serbs and Hungarians undergoing the so-called ”white plague”, with the rule “one family, one child”). But this is not the end of the story. Vojvodina fertile soil has always made it the breadbasket of Yugoslavia, later of Serbia. After the communist take-over in 1945, the Yugoslav government adopted the Soviet stratagem for reaching the ”Paradise on Earth” – Industrialization (urban area) and robber (rural regions). That is, the industrial products were expensive, while the agricultural were cheap, almost symbolic. In particular, bread and milk, the principal food of poor people, have always been subsided by the communist regimes, so as to satisfy the “broad people’s masses”. Therefore, those families with a single child used to feed those with numerous family members, as the case with KiM was. Hence, Vojvodina fell victim of Serbian state in two ways. First as a province and second as an agricultural region. Never-the-less her inhabitants never reached for guns to rectify the injustice they felt. Before we leave Vojvodina, a few words on the historical aspects regarding this province are in order. Hungary has always felt, after WWI to be robbed by Serbia, by taking over Vojvodina. The agreement between Allies at Versailles which allotted Vojvodina to Serbia, as a compensation for her enormous suffering and contribution to Allies’ final victory, has always been called by Hungarians Trianon shame. 3 Never-the-less the state of Hungary has never made irredentist claims for recovering the lost territory and has never interfered with Yugoslav, or Serbian, internal affairs We recall that the latter came from the Southern and Central Serbia, especially from KiM, within meta-nastasian movements. 2 There has been no bigger contrast in Yugoslavian population than that between the autochthonous Serbs and the Dinaric incomers, so-called dodjoši (arrivists) in Vojvodina. 3 After the name of hotel at Versailles, where the agreement has been signed. 1
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regarding Hungarian “minority”, 1 apart from general care and attention for Hungarians in Yugoslavia. And we come to the case of the state of Albania, in this context, we shall see what the “political cynicism” can be. Albania The state of Albania appears one of taboos in the context of KiM crisis. For good reason. While the interference of Serbia into Croatian and Serbia and Croatia into BiH affairs has been the subject of thorough investigations of the international community, in particular at the Hague Tribunal, the interference of Albania into the affairs of Serbia and Macedonia (and Greece for that matter, but we shall not learn the lesson in advance here) has not drawn any particular attention of the “external factors”. The reason for this “lack of interest” appears manifold. First, Serbia has been already demonized for her activities in Croatia and BiH and it has been taken just to punish her by the same means. Second, it has been assumed that Albania has the right, at least moral, to help her compatriots in other surrounding regions. The last but not the least, many factors on the global political scene have been involved in directed KiM affairs toward pro-Albanian solution, as we are going to demonstrate later on. We shall divide the issue of Albanian interference into several parts, for the sake of clearness. The Greater Albania This project has never been announced officially by Tirana authorities, but has been the subject of interest of many Albanians, in particular those living outside Balkan. The maps of “Greater Albania” do appear on various web-sites, but this very fact should not be taken too seriously, at least in practical terms. If one looks at one of those maps, it becomes obvious that they represent more wishful thinking than serious planes. Some of them include areas where not a single ethnicAlbanian lives and has never lived. As we have already seen, whence imagination takes over the common sense, the victims are not only the history, but geography, too. This game with “creating the world” is not unknown in recent history of the Balkan. Serbs used to draw their “optimal solution” for Serbs on Balkan, Croats too. Te latter almost realized it during WWII, but as the very name Independent State of Croatia indicates, it was nether state nor independent, but a puppet construction for the immediate needs of Third Reich. In this sense KiM will never be independent, for the independence is conquered, not served on a tray. Serbs contemplated on the subject of “purely Serb state” during WWII, as ideas of some politicians close to gen. Dragoljub Mihailovic did, but it never took a serious form. (Tito had other plans in store for Serbs). In passing to the Albanian case, a few words of terminology are in order. We have been reading and listening all the time about negotiations between Belgrade and Priština, where both capitals are invoked as metaphors. Technically, however, it is nonsense. There can be no negotiations between a whole and its part. One may talk about talks of the central government and representatives of a province, but not about negotiations. The latter presuppose two sovereign states, what in this context would be “jumping the secession”. We now come back to Albania. It will sound absurd, but the problem with Albania has been not for interfering with Serbian (or Macedonian) affairs, but for not interfering with the internal affairs of her neighbours. More precisely, for Tirana not be engaged in external business. The point is that the state of Albania appears more a fiction than the real entity. What makes the entire Balkan situation even more complex and unmanageable. The crux of matter is the fact that Tirana has no control over Northern Albania, where highlanders have been living in their state-independent region for millennia, before, 1
Quotation marks allude to the cynical connotation of the term in this particular context.
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during and after Ottoman Empire. The central and southern parts of Albania have been victims of the belligerent Albanian Dinaroids themselves. That the highlanders have taken control over the rest of Albania, just as Yugoslav Dinaroids have done over Serbia, BiH and Croatia, makes the whole situation even more weird. When the highlander Sali Berisha took control over Albania after the “democratic election”, the crime followed (as the case with Yugoslav regions was), and the state became the region deprived of law and civilization. When the most conspicuous crime in the form of pyramidal banks caused the state to collapse in few days, it signaled the absence of a state itself. The foreign journalists reported that the state “had a lacuna” for some time, but the implication that it recovered should be taken with the grain of salt. State is like a building. It takes few minutes to destroy, but months or years to rebuild. 1 The immediate consequence of this situation has been that Tirana does not have to worry about KiM and Serbian Albanians, since it is the compartment of her northern highlanders. In other words, the interference with Serbian business appears automatic, spontaneous. Even if wanted, Tirana could not stop that interference (see Figure 7).
Figure 7. From wishful thinking to reality. 1
We refer to the very institution of state, of course..
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What was actual involvement of Tirana government in the KiM affairs is to be revealed by history, if ever, as we witness the Yugoslav affairs revealed at Hague and elsewhere. What is evident is the moral support and encouragement which Tirana provides Shqiptars at KiM with. But it does not restrict the overall Albanian support of KiM rebels. The military training camps have been organized in Albania, with the material and training support from the external factors, primarily USA. The extent of this activity is still to be estimated, but some causal evidence is indicative of this international involvement in Balkan affairs. It is known that at one of those camps near Drach about 11.000. Albanian voluntaries have passed their training. The president of Democratic Party of Kosovo at KiM, Hashim Tachi, 1 (HDE from Drenica, the core of the Shqiptar nationalistic upheavals) is known to have spent two years 1991/2 in such a camp in Albania. As we shall see later on, during the NATO campaign in Yugoslavia 1998/1999 the entire territory of Albania has been turned into a military camp, with USA military bases and recruiting centers. When the refugees (including “refugees”) from KiM started crossing the Albanian border, KLA activists exerted big pressure to recruit people from the unfortunate refugees for KLA. 2 (In fact, many of civilians in the columns passing to Albania were members of KLA, moving to Albania, to military camps). (All said refers to pre-war situation, before 1998 open rebellion at KiM. We shall come back to this when the war starts. As for the cultural influence which Tirana exercised during the full KiM autonomy, we have already discussed it previously). Before we leave Albania we mention one of the frequently expressed views in the West that Tirana has no interest in accepting KiM (after an eventual secession), since KiM appears definitely richer than Albania and would become dominant factor in the new, greater Albania. This view, even if taken sincere, “does not keep water”. It assumes the real Tirana control over the affairs and standard logic which guides European affairs. KiM has always been out of control of any state, as we already mentioned, and so Northern Albania was neither. What the near future has in store for KiM inhabitants is risky to predict, for the standard logic of historical society does not apply. Macedonia The easiest way to get rid of a temptation is to succumb to it An elderly actress. The former republic of Yugoslavia Macedonia (Macedonia in the following, for the sake of brevity), appears in double position concerning KiM issue. From one side she is the victim of ethnic Albanians demographic explosion, like Serbia. From other side she will certainly, just because of this fact, play a remarkable role in resolving KiM crisis. The latest census has recorded 23 % of ethnic Albanians, and 17 % of Roma. Separating from Yugoslavia Macedonia has found herself in an even more difficult position than Serbia, squeezed between advancing Albanians and Bulgaria, who has always claimed that Macedonians are ethnic Bulgarians. As always with statistics when Albanians and Roma are involved, any figure should be taken with a grain of salt. Albanians in Macedonia claim to comprise as much as 40 % of the overall population. 3 If this turn out to be true, then the Slav element in Macedonia has already succumbed to the fast-breeding ethnicities, as Albanians and Roma are.
Who has just won the elections for the KiM parliament (November 2007). See the report from Kathimerini, in Appendix 5. 3 This refers to the latest census. Meanwhile, this percentage has surly risen up, in view of the birth of rate of ethnic Albanians generally. 1 2
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When the NATO assault on Yugoslavia was over, and KiM occupied, and the ethnic Albanian rebels started another armed rebellion in the western Macedonia, as a reprise of 1988 in Serbia, the intimidated Slav Macedonians succumbed to the internal threats and external (mainly USA) pressure and agreed with almost everything ethnic Albanians demanded. 1 Waiting another, but massive reprise of the rebellion Macedonia is flooded by influx from Albania, with Skopje becoming the largest concentration of ethnic Albanians, second only to Tirana. Macedonians are well aware that they will not have to wait for long after an eventual KiM secession from Serbia, for the secession of north-western Macedonia, already heavily populated by ethnic Albanians, of whichever origin. USA The involvement of USA in KiM affairs appears complex and heavily burdened by the ambiguous status of USA herself. From one side, USA appears the superpower, the last remnant of the Cold war and Great powers from the time. On the one hand, USA is actually a vassal state, whose politics, both internal and external, is tightly bound with her patron state, Israel. We shall, therefore, consider USA role within both contexts separately. Israel and Serbia Why Israel? This state does not appear an explicit player on the KiM playground on which many other states have been involved, either explicitly or less directly. This fact requires, therefore, much more elaborate and subtle approach, than one would expect from a small state from Near East to deserve. In making parallel between these two states, we are aware, of course, that comparison with other states and Israel may be invoked, in particular those which belong to the Judeo-Christian world. The present parallel appears acute one and deserves therefore our particular attention. We start with a comparison with the Old Testament fable and Middle Age Serbian state, that of the progenitor of the Nemanjic dynasty – Nemanja. 2 His son Sava, 3 took refuge from the father’s court to join the Hilandar Monastery on Athos, in Greece, to become later on the first Serb archbishop and founder of the independent Serbian church (now the Serb Orthodox Church). If Nemanja was the first of his dynasty, Sava, who was later canonized as St Sava, has been rightly regarded as the founder of the Middle Age Serbian state. Not only by founding the state church, an indispensable prerequisite of a sovereign state at the time, but by stabilizing the very state, via diplomatic actions and personal influence in the courts in Serbia and abroad alike, as well by reconciliating two brother of him, Stephan and Vukan, who competed for the throne. He crowned Stephan for the first Serbian king, what gave to the latter the title “First crowned” (Prvovenchani). As a monk he wrote the monastery canon, so-called Krmchia, which set the rules for the monastic life and liturgy at Hilandar monastery and otherwise. It was mainly for this document St Sava has been regarded as Serbian law giver. 4 He setup a number of hospitals, mainly at monasteries, which his father, who after retiring joined his son at Hilandar as a monk, built in great number in Serbia. Since the monasteries were the only place for literacy, St Sava has been regarded as the founder of Serbian educational system and venerated in the contemporary school system in Serbia as the school saint. St Sava has been regarded by Serbs as the greatest personality in the Serbian nation. His cult was so influential among Serbs under the Ottoman rule, that the local ruler, Sinan Pasha, had his remains dug up from Mileševo monastery (West Serbia) and burnt on a hill Vračar, now in the Belgrade centre. Of course, this act only further promoted the cult, just as the alleged crucifixion set up the cult of Jesus from Nazareth. After the so-called Ohrid agreement, a milder kind of Kumanovo “agreement”, which we shall consider later on. Slavic version of the Jewish Neeman. 3 Old wise man in Hebrew. 4 The canon was not original, but mainly rewritten Greek one, but Moses’ Commandments were original neither. 1 2
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We dwelled in some detail on the case of Sava Nemanjic for he evidently has been playing the role of Serbian Moses. Now, we proceed with another parallel, that of the so-called Kosovo Myth and the New Testament fable. As elaborated before, Kosovo Myth has been devised on the Last Supper fable. But unlike the St Sava case, which rests on the historical evidence, Kosovo Myth has been derived on the mythpoetic cycle on Kosovo Battle. It has as much to do with historical reality as Homer’s Iliad with Trojan War, or New Testament fable with historical Jesus. But it remains in the field of literacy and any attempt to explain actual Serbian politics by this myth as an ideological guide or otherwise can be described as fancy at best. Now we come to the crux of the matter and compare the relationships (Jewish) Israelis – Palestinians from one side and Serbs – Shqiptars from the other. We shall see that the parallel runs very close, up to the point of resolving the conflict, when the parallel becomes anti-parallel, as we shall see now. Israelis and Palestinians If one wanted to follow the logic of Kosovo Meta-mythology, as elaborated earlier, one could equally justly ascribe the present-day conflict between Israelis and Palestinians as a continuation of the biblical struggle of Hebrews with Philistines. (Who in the contemporary history is playing the role of David and who of Goliath will be seen later on). When Theodore Herzl initiated so-called Zionist movement, Jews from Europe started drifting towards “the Promised Land”. By financial support of wealthy Jews all over the world, in particular from USA, they started buying land from the local population, Palestinians, as the soil for the future state of Israel. During the Hitler’s time and after WWII this drift became migration, massive settling on the new land where Palestinians have been living for millennia. Many pre-State Jewish settlements (kibitzes), so-called Yishuvs, were founded. In 1945 newly founded UN became protectorate of the Palestine, with Great Britain playing the role of a direct protector. Zionist activists were impatient to establish the state of Israel and started their terrorist activities against the UN and GB officials. The crown of these was the blasting of the Jerusalem hotel King David, where GB authorities had their head quarters, with 91 officials killed. 1 After that, realizing they could not prevent the Zionist from achieving their goal, GB announced her Balfour Declaration, arguing for establishing two separate states, Israel and Palestine. Israelis were not prepared to wait to the UN plan to be realized, but started armed intervention, shaping their envisaged state according to their plans and wishes, enlarged grossly the initially allotted territory and declared their state. UN complied with the fait accompli, and the newly formed state of Israel was born One of the co-founder of UN was Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia was one of the first states to recognize Israel. Serbia was the principal republic of Yugoslavia at the time and equally deserved the role of co-founder of Israel. But the story does not stop here. The final aim of Zionists was the restoration of the biblical Israel, as Old Testament prophets required, Eretz Yisrael. It should include the entire present-day West Bank, so-called Occupied Territories, 2 at present “occupied” by Palestinians. Hence, the conflict between the arrivists and the aborigines has continued, with Palestinians rejecting to fulfill the Holy Scriptures prophesies. In 1967 Israelis provoked another war, with well planned military operations and occupied West Bank, and Golan Heights (strategic highlands between Israel and Syria. During this so-called Six-day war, 3 entire Sinai was occupied, too, but later it was returned to Egypt, under a bilateral agreement between Golda Emir and Anvar el Sadat, after an abortive Egyptian attempt to retake the lost territories in the so-called Yom Kippur war. The leader of the action was Menachem Begin, later Prime Mnister of Israel. Territories, as Israeli dub it euphemistically. 3 Note the “biblical connotation” of God’s six-day creation enterprise. 1 2
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During these wars, heavily supported by USA, both in money, weaponry, manpower, intelligence, etc, and in-between, Israelis have managed to enlarge their ownership over the Palestinian soil, by buying the land, forced banishments, terror, etc. According to Palestinian sources, this enhancement of Jewish property over the Palestine land can be illustrated by the map, as shown in Figure 1 in Apendix 7. 1 According to the latest estimate (June 2009) about 280.000 Jewish “settlers””, live in the West Bank territory, dispersed over 121 settlements, with another 200.000 inhabiting East Jerusalem. (In his latest offer prime minister Netanyahu suggested that the future Palestinian state can not have army, air-space control and possibility to smuggle weaponry. And for the settlements, no further increase in number, but a natural growth of population within them would be allowed. As for the refugees, he was clear – their problem can be solved outside Israeli borders only. 2 ) Readers might ask themselves what all this has to do with KiM? We shall come to this later on, but here we just mention that similar maps can be made for the occupation of Serb land by Shqiptars, within last two centuries, by similar means. Now we turn to the role of Yugoslavia in all these events unrolling at Near East. Since the 1967 war Yugoslavia was engaged in full support of Arab cause. It was within Tito’s Non-alignment project, in which Egypt (and some other Arab countries) played prominent roles. Yugoslav Jews were not happy about that, but did not dare to raise their voice in complaint. Here we note that Yugoslav Jews have been reduced to a small community, after the Nazi extermination program during WWII. Those who survived mainly moved to Israel, still keeping close connections with their first homeland. It includes those who emigrated to the West, mainly from Serbia during the crisis under Milošević’s rule in1990-thies. During the 19911995 period of open armed conflicts, Jews in the troubled regions were supported by the international Jewry, materially or otherwise. Jews in the besieged Sarajevo were quickly rescued. Of all Serbian Jews only the intellectual elite has chosen to stay in Serbia. Their contribution to the cultural life in Serbia can not be overestimated and greatly exceeds their numerical presence. Serbian travel agencies organize frequent tours to Israel, in collaboration with the Israeli ones. These tours comprise both Judaist and Christian sightseeing’s and are very popular among Serbian tourists. 3 But the relationship between Serbia and Israel has had dark side too. As mentioned before, both pyramid schemes in Serbia were organized by Israelis and the money stolen from the naive (and there are other, less euphemistic terms) has found its end in Israel. Comments by pro-Israel Jewish authors in Serbian press and media generally appear frequent, with Palestinian response rarely published. Some of the former regularly argue in favour of abandoning the KiM issue and let the province secede. They never venture to parallel the case of Palestine and KiM, which impose itself to anybody familiar with the contemporary world political scene. It is interesting here to mention the “promise” of a Serb (more precisely Serbian Montenegrin) Aleksa Djilas, 4 quoted in the preface of Noel Malcolm monograph Kosovo : “We shall give to Shqiptars everything that Israelis have given to Palestinians”. The interesting thing here is that the author of otherwise excellent book, made no comment on the “promise”, as if it was utterly nonsense. Now we pass to the most delicate part of out intended comparison – that of the treatment of Palestinians by Israelis, both within and outside the present borders of the Jewish state. In fact, we have to consider three categories of Palestinians: (i) those who have remained in the Israel proper
A word of caution is appropriate here when making use of the Internet data. That USA and EU promptly supported Netanyahu’s proposals (better to say plan) is not to wonder, considering respective status of these entities vis-à-vis Israel. We already discussed the status of USA, whereas the flag of EU with 12 stars designating 12 tribes speaks for itself. 3 Marxists would surely consider this as a (mis)use of religion to the tourist end, or tourism for ideological aims. 4 Son of the later Tito’s collaborator and later dissident Milovan Djilas. 1
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(that is not including Occupied Territories); (ii) Palestinians in the West Bank and strip of Gaza; (iii) refugees in the neighbouring countries, mostly in Lebanon. They constitute 20 % of the overall population and are formally citizens of Israel, with representatives in Knesset. They are considered as nuisance, and the latest pool among Israelis proper, that is Jewish ones (in the following, simply Israelis) shows that majority of the latter would like Israel to get rid of them. The principal concern of Israelis in this context is Palestinian high birth rate, which greatly exceeds the Jewish one. It is for this reason that Israeli authorities invite all Jews from the world, except from USA, to settle in Israel, in order to improve the demographic picture of Jewish state. It is for this reason that thousands of Soviet Jews have been accepted in Israel for the last two decades, including those who just pretended to be Jewish, taking advantage of the opportunity to get out of USSR (and move to the “West”). We have seen earlier how the KiM Shqiptars reacted to the Serbian intention to settle some of refugees from Croatia on KiM, not to mention the case of “colonization” of KiM between two World wars, discussed before. The point here is that the “world opinion” (whatever it means) remained silent on the issue, or simply blamed Belgrade for “changing demographic picture” of the province by “illegal means”. It is clear that the final target (set up by Zionists already) of Israeli authorities is the all-Jewish state (or ethnically pure state). As it is clear that the final aim of Shqiptar authorities is a pure Shqiptar KiM, independent or not. That the later project is not a fiction is testified by the fact it the project is closed to its final end, already now, and will be sealed by the day of “independence”. That the Palestinians in Israel 1 are treated as second-rank citizens is admitted by the very Israelis, including the authorities. Everything is arranged that they should feel as “surplus” on ”Jewish soil” and are encouraged to leave the country. Before we pass to the next category of Palestinians, we mention here that there is no evidence, up to now, that these Arabs have been engaged in “terrorist acts”. What could not be said, of course, for the West bank Palestinians. As a glance on the map and distribution of the so-called Israeli settlements in West bank shows, 2 this occupied territory has been turned into enormous concentration camp. The “settlements” have been distributed in such a manner, that they form a sort of “everywhere dense set”, as mathematicians would call it (see Figure 8 from 2007).
1 2
Euphemistically called Arabs by Israelis, for reasons to be explained later on. These are, actually, military strong-holds, Israeli garrisons.
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Figure 8. Jewish settlements in Occupied territories, with Palestinians inhabited lands in green. Lands west from the Wall have been practically annexed. With those aligned along the river Jordan, and the recently erected Wall (not Berlin one, but another wall), the territory appears a gigantic prison. But who are the prisoners? As Israelis admit themselves, Palestinians in occupied territories have been treated as cattle, or prisoners of war, at best (see Appendix 2). They are subjects of frequent raids by the so-called IDF (Israeli Defence Forces), they must ask for permission for moving inside the country, even for reaching their land for cultivating, annoyed at every check points, densely distributed all over the country, humiliated, intimidated, in a word, treated worse that animals. Any expression of revolt, as during the latest two uprisings (Intifada), has been crashed with utmost cruelty. Abandoned by the international community, including UN and even their own Arabic countries, Palestinian shave resorted to individual acts of terrorism. The latest version of the so-called suicide bombers has been accepted from the Palestinian side as the last resort of freedom fighting, while the USA guided part of the world has cursed it as insane terrorism, or l’terrorism pour l’terrorism. But even inside the latter, individual voices of contempt have been rising, including the liberal press in the very Israel (but not in USA). Generally, elite intellectual Jews all over the world condemn the Israeli policy concerning Palestinians, but majority of them confine their criticism to USA authorities, as if USA are patron of Israel, and not the vassal state of the latter. We shall come to this essential point soon. Before we consider the terrorism in the current context, a word on the very concept of terrorism seems in order, unfortunately, since to a sane mind this issue should be clear without much elaboration. Every terrorism is an act of violence, but the opposite is not true. Only those violent acts, which cause deaths of civilians (we avoid terms like “innocent” etc, since they imply value of
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judgment), and even soldiers, which are not done for the sake of achievement of a well defined political aim, may be designated as terrorism, or as made for the sake of hurting people only. There is no way to prevent the “pure terrorism”, for there is no demand to satisfy in return for the “ceasefire”. But politically motivated acts of violence are something quite different. To fix the idea, we make here a brief regression, and consider briefly the notion of genocide, much exploited after WWII and Nazi regimes. What is the difference between persecution, pogrom, massacre and genocide? The first is an isolated, or irregular maltreating a definite group of people. Pogrom appears a stronger form of the latter, with killing or banishing. Massacre is a massive killing, usually accidental, in the sense not preconceived. And finally genocide is a systematic extermination of a well defined subpopulation in a wider region, for the reasons which are not under control of the subjects of persecution. To fix idea we consider the violence exercised by Ustashas in Croatia during the WWII, under the puppet regime of Ante Pavelic. As part of Third Reich, Croatia was the subject of racial persecution, as required by Nazi regime at Berlin. Three categories of persecution targets must be distinguished here. (i) Serbs. They are racially identical to Croats, differing only by their church (Greek Orthodox, instead of Roman Catholics). As Croatian nationalists were eager to enhance their population, and thus strengthen the Croat state, they decided to force a conversion of Serbs into Croats. This was not to be expected achievable 100 %, of course. As Mile Budak put it (that is foresaw it) “We shall convert one third, banish one third and kill the rest”. 1 Hence, Croatian Serbs had a chance to remain alive, accepting the requirement of the oppressive regime. This chance Jews and Roma did not have. Being racially distinct, they were to be exterminated for this difference and it was beyond their power to escape. Hence, in Ustashas’ Croatia, only Roma and Jews suffered from a pure genocide. 2 The same applies, by the same token, to Europeans during the Nazi rule, including Germany herself. We go back to the “Palestinian terrorists”. The question is whether they are proper terrorists or freedom fighters? In other words, are there any political demands behind their activities and if there are, are they achievable by the civilized standards? What Palestinians really demand from Israel and world community? Or, is there any way out from this Palestinian knot? So far two principal alternative demands from the Palestinian side have been crystallized: Israelis to evacuate all Palestinian territories, West Bank and Gaza strip, Eastern Jerusalem and let Palestinian people decide their national destiny by themselves. Israelis accept Palestinians as equal-rights citizens of the joint territory with Israel proper and both Jews and Palestinians live together in a democratic state. (After all, they all happen to belong to the same, Semitic race). So far, Israelis have rejected both propositions. They have left Palestinians to the only choice – fighting for freedom. The means they are choosing to this end depend on many factors. From diversions, bombing, suicidal bombing, killing, rioting, demonstrations, appeals to the international community, UN, humanitarian organizations, political struggle, together with friendly counties, like some Arab and Muslim states, etc, etc. So far they have achieved very little, next to nothing. Why? A superfluous reader will have, certainly, an immediate answer – Israel has been protected by USA. And she is damned wrong! USA is not in a position to do anything for that matter, for they are not an independent state, but Israel vassal. And that is the beginning and end of the story. Proof? After founding UN in 1945, many vetoes in Security Councils (SC) have been made. The only vetoes made by USA concerned Israel, better to say preventing SC from blaming Israel for its politics concerning Palestinians. Since 1982 USA vetoed 32 SC resolutions critical of Israel, more Mainly realized during the Pavelić regime. We are aware that our definition of a genocide (that is pure genocide) differs from the widely accepted, which in our opinion appears inadequate and subject to numerous misuse. 1 2
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than all other members together. It is out of question it had anything to do with opinion of Washington on the matter. It was as if it was Jerusalem voted in SC, not Washington. And practically it has been the case indeed. But the story does not stop here. UN charter allows that even SC decisions may be overruled, in particularly grave and important situations. And it did happen that Palestinians, helpless before SC, put their cause before General Assembly. The latter decided by an overwhelming majority in favour of the oppressed Palestinians. What happened then? Nothing. USA (sic) prevented any action on the matter. Rules are for weak, choice for strong. (That already Charles Darwin knew). We go now to the third category of Palestinians: (iii) During and after formation of Jewish state, particularly after six-day war, more than million Palestinians left their homes and fled outside Palestine, 1 what makes about one quarter of the overall population. They have settled in the concentration camps, euphemistically called refugee camps, mainly in Lebanon. From there they continue their struggle for homeland, making raids to Israel and provoking ruthless retaliation from the Israelis. Since the local population suffers these counter-actions from Israel, Palestinians are not welcome in any of these states, except in those remote from Near East, like Magreb countries. It was for this reason Lebanon military Christian police massacred those refugees in Sabra and Shatilla in 1982, after Ariel Sharon handed the camps over to the local paramilitaries, as mentioned before when talking about Vukovar massacre. Generations of Palestinians have been born in tents of the refugee camps. Palestinian youth has found itself hostage of the “high politics”, between the cruel Israelis and corrupt Arab governments, which find it convenient for their long-term strategy not to allow the refugees to settle down in the Arab countries and assimilate themselves into the local population. Thus, unfortunate Palestinians have been awarded the status of “professional refugees”. Particularly appealing is the case of the Gaza strip. According the data from 2006, in the area of 365 km2, live 1.3 milion Palestinians, 3.376/km2 , what makes the strip the most densily populated in the region. It comprises 8 refugee camps, with 471.555. refugees. In 2007 Israelis have evacuated the strip, but the latter is stil heavily dependent on Israel, which supplies it with water and electricity. The popualtion lives mainly on the international humanitarian help, in the state of an enormous concentration camp. With the split of the local authorities between Hamas and less belligerent Al Fattah, heavily raided by Israeli forces, Gaza appears a sore on the Palestinian body. *** The freedom fighting of the Palestinians may be divided into three categories. First are the raids, mainly by rockets, on Israeli military points and settlements close to its borders. Second are the terrorist acts within Israel proper, lately exclusively by suicide bombers. Third are attacks on the Israeli occupation forces in the West Bank. We first discuss briefly the second way of fighting for freedom. The rationale for terrorizing Israelis is obvious – to draw attention of the world community on the Palestinian issue. If the placing and activating bombs in public places may be designated as terrorism in its proper sense, the suicidal bombing has shifted the issue to the more profound sphere of the political struggle. If those who activate mines from the distance, killing people (civilians and non civilians alike) can be considered fighters who want to achieve a political goal, young people blasting themselves together with their enemies are doing it because they have nothing to lose. The first kind of terrorism may be classified as insane or heroic act, depending on the side which interprets it, but the second appears evidently acts of desperation, pure heroism. Those youth sees no perspective in the further life as Palestinians. By blasting themselves they send message to the world that they defy it, for its indifference to their destiny. (It holds for private suicides, too). But 1
About 900.000 in 1948.
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before we pass to the third category of fighting, a word on the “heart-tearing” terms like “innocent civilians”, women, children etc. There is no difference between civilians and non-civilians in Israel. Civilians are just soldiers temporarily not on service. It comprises women as well as men. (If the Occupied Territories are a concentration camp, Israel appears a military camp). As for the children, they are future adults, future soldiers and occupiers. Cruel logic, as it is, but the life and death in Palestinian camps and Occupied Territories are cruel too. Many words in the West have been spent in ”explaining” the fanatics of suicide bombers, in particular via the Muslim faith. What one chooses to overlook is the earthly part of the issue. Young people, who are satisfied with their life, in particular those who see its improvement in the foreseeable future, would not opt for the life in “other world”, on the contrary. Religion appears here a compensation, not an option. The latter has been dictated by Israelis, not by Al Fattah or Hamas. In judging the role of religious fanatics one should bare in mind that the Palestinians appear to be the best educated people among the entire Arab world, perhaps among all Muslim countries. As for the attacks on the Israelis occupying forces in the West bank, they appear more frequent for two orders of magnitude than terrorist acts within Israel. Although they consume considerably more victims, mainly Palestinian ones, these clashes are hardly publicized by Israelis and hence by the world media. The retaliations of the Occupation forces appear cruel, as expected, and we shall compare these with similar clashes on KiM, later on. By erecting “Israel wall” between Occupied Territories and Israel the number of suicide bombing has considerably decreased, as well as reports on the clashes within Occupied territories. No doubt, by empting West bank (as well as Israel proper) from Palestinians these incidents will further decline, though perhaps not to zero. United States of America In the following we will make use of USA, not of Americans, for at least two reasons. First of all, Americans are inhabitants of the continents of America, both Northern, Central and Southern ones. Second, we shall refer to the USA administration exclusively, not to the ordinary USA citizens. If the first restriction concerns the formal designation, the second bear the full weight of the relationship between the internal and external USA policy, better to say between the Washington policy and the feelings of the ordinary citizens. Regarding the relationship with the present day Israel and Jewry in general, USA history may be divided into two distinct periods; after WWII and the previous one. By founding the Jewish state on the Palestinian soil, status of world Jewry has undergone radical change. After the Shoah and subsequent Israel foundation, every Jew in the world has gained a double citizenship – domestic and Israeli, though not in an official sense. In a sense, Israel has become the largest state in the world, with metropolis at Israel proper and Jerusalem as the capital. The distribution of these Israelites (to make distinction from Israelis) appears roughly like this: 5 M in Israel, 5 M in USA and the rest (approximately 3 M) all over the world. Our distinction between pre-war and post-war USA may be contested, but before going into further elaboration, a few words on the religious status of USA seem in order. It is widely accepted that USA are the Christian state. Really, the overwhelming majority of her citizens are Christians, but of particular kind. As we know from the history of Christianity, Christians rely almost exclusively on the New Testament, as the source of their faith. In their mind the Old Testament appears just historical (sic) support of their faith, ideological background. It is not so in USA. Christianity there is based on the Old Testament, at least on the public scene. From the “all-seeing eye” on the dollar banknotes, 1 to the public prayers in the White House, only Jewish part of the Bible has been invoked. At Hollywood, prayers are always directed to the God (that is Yahweh), never to Jesus
That the pyramid with the eye is a symbol of Free Masonry does not make difference here, since the latter appears irrevocably a Jewish societe initiatique, though not exclusively, of course.
1
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Christ. Presidents of the states where more than 90 % of the population are allegedly Christians are very careful in public appearance not to mention Jesus Christ. Why? Jews share 1.7 % of USA population. The latest pool reveals that 34 % of the citizens hate Jews (Jews-haters), 1 what amounts to 20 people on a single Jew. Before we go on on the matter, a few word on semantics are in order. We shall not use the term anti-Semites, for it is both misleading and even wrong. It has been derived from anti-Semitism, which has been used inappropriately since it appearance in the second half of 19th century. First, Semites are all Arabs and some other nations, including Pharaohs’ Egyptians. Second, anti-Semitism can be derived from Semitism only, otherwise it appears an etymologically (but not historically) empty notion. Is there such an entity like Semitism, in the current context? Jews deny it vehemently, at least those who have never read Holy Bible. The first Semitic book has been written in 7th BC and is called Torah. In the 19th century Semitism has been defined as a cultural notion. It would be an utter injustice to such proponents of anti-Semitism, like Karl Marx and Richard Wagner, to identify their ideology on the matter with the notion of Judenfeind. 2 Now, we age going to see how these figures reflect on the intellectual, economic and political sector. The intellectual elite in USA appears almost exclusively Jewish one. 3 As for the other two, we illustrate both by a single fact. When Bill Clinton started his campaign for the first term presidency, 30 % of financial donation came from the Jewish circles. No wander that his government consisted almost exclusively of Jewish members (not to mention Monica Lewinski). It is the rationale for the candidates and presidents strongly support Israel policy, to the extent of making USA Israeli vassal state. This makes the political situation in USA weird indeed. From one side the anti-Jewish sentiment appears strong indeed, so strong that no Jewish candidate has ever won the presidency race, as the case with A. Stevenson was. On the other hand USA has been pursuing pro-Israeli policy since WWII. It shed a very strange light on the meaning of the much promoting “American democracy”, indeed. It is this schizophrenic state of Washington policy, which makes the Palestinian issue so complex and hopeless (for the time being). But it concerns not the USA external policy. Everything related directly or indirectly to the Israel has been put under government control. In the press, any critics of Israel has been banished, revealing the state of the much advertised “American freedom of press”. The same applies to other media, first of all to TV. Even the educational system has been put under control, for that matter. Few years ago a circular has been sent to all USA colleges, requiring that any critics of Israel should be treated as a disguised anti-Semitism and must be duly suppressed (by withdrawing research grants etc). The information on this circular has never seen “public light”, but has been revealed by Internet. It is true that some USA Jewish intellectuals, like Noam Chomsky, do criticize Washington policy towards Israel, by accusing it to provide unconditional support to Jerusalem. Such pleads make impression that USA is a patron of Israel, concealing the fact that USA are the vassal state, which has no other choice for that matter. Indirectly, they are blaming USA taxi payers for the cruel policy of Jerusalem towards Palestinians. And that is the cynics par excellence. We can not help drawing a parallel between Israeli intellectuals and those in USA. While the latter remain silent on Israeli policy concerning Palestinians, the former frequently venture to criticize severally Israeli government, proving the real democracy in Israel. One further remark on the Jewish attitude in Diaspora with regard to Palestinians. Many of critical assessments to the Near East crisis appear genuine feeling on humanitarian grounds, but one can not help feeling that the rationale for this criticism lies in the concern that Israeli policy will further enhance anti-Semitism in the world. That Judenfeind, in German, where the modern anti-Semitism started. Marx turned to be a descendant of a long-term rabbi family, while Wagner (possibly of Jewish origin himself) used to collaborate with Jews in promoting his music)
1 2
3
It is sufficient to count the Nobel Prize winners, for that matter.
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this concern is not groundless, is shown a few years ago, when European Union made a pool on the states who represent the greatest danger for the World peace. On the top of the list found USA and Israel. But it was not the end of the story. After the pool followed a harsh intervention from USA, who objected to the pool itself. EU authority pleaded guilty and promised never to do similar things. The incident revealed what we already know – that Europe was still the USA vassal continent. Hence, the vassal of the vassal. Another interesting point is to be made here. It has been constantly argued that the number of stars on the EU flag does not correspond to the number of member states (27 at the moment), but has been kept 12 for the special significance of the latter number. The latter is explained as the number of months, the number of Heracles exploits (sic), the number of Israeli tribes, the number of constellations of Zodiac, 12 Apostles, etc. All explanations are “for the laughing of chicken”, as a Russian saying says. All, except one – the Number of Israelis tribes. For some of the European states (or their governments) EU is supposed to incarnate the Old Testament mythology, as a superIsrael state, or at least her dominion. That this guess is not a fancy, testifies the weird fact that Israel is member of European zone in all sports, despite the fact being in Asia. USA and World We now pass to some other relevant aspects of USA foreign policy, which are not coupled straightway with USA-Israel relationship, but are indirectly to Israel and KiM. One of great myth concerning the so-called Cold War has been that USA fought the oppressive communism in USSR in order to promote freedom and humanitarian aspects in their principal rival after WWII. To this end USA encircled Soviet Union with her satellite states, from Western European states, to Turkey, Iran, South Korea, South Vietnam, Japan, etc. The principal ally in this chain has been Turkey, for strategic reasons. USSR has been the largest country in the world, with the longest seacoast, but has remained the isolated continental state, owing to his r very inconvenient geographical position. Its access to Atlantic Ocean has been controlled by the Baltic straights, Skaggerat and Kattegat, to the most important world sea, Mediterranean, by Bosporus and Dardanelles. 1 How important the latter strategic straights are is the best illustrated by that infamous Allies failure to capture them in 1915, what cost the Allies and Turkey more than 300.000. causalities. When Turkey joined the NATO, she became the principal USA ally in this part of world, holding the key of Mediterranean sea vis-à-vis USSR. Believing the wide spread myth of the ideological content of the cold war, one might expect that after the fall of Berlin wall and “Soviet Empire”, there would be no more reason to confront Russia any longer. The role of Turkey in USA world strategy proves the opposite. We enumerate a few instances as illustration. (i) Armenian massacre in 1915, which has been designated by the world jurisdiction as genocide (about 1.500.000 victims). USA never condemned officially Turkey for this crime.(ii) Sacrificing of Asia Minor Greeks to Turkish slaughter and expulsion, in 1922. The blame was to all Western Allies, of course, but USA never showed signs of remorse. (iii) Invasion of the Northern Cyprus by Turkish Army, what followed by establishing a mock-state of Northern Cyprus. 2 Kurds. These people live in the mountainous area at the triple border between Turkey (15 M), Iran (506.5 M) and Iraq (4-6 M). Autochthonous population, with their own language, folklore, history, never had state on their own. They constitute about 20 % of the overall Turkish population, but are not allowed even to express their national identity. Between 1984 and 1999 there was a massive 1
How important the latter strategic straights are is the best illustrated by that infamous Allies failure to capture them in
1915, what cost the Allies by hundreds thousand lives. 2
I don’t know which nation hates USA the most, but I believe on any list Greeks would not be at the bottom.
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uprising against Turkish rule, and the army retaliated severally, wiping out about 3.000. villages, with 380.000 people displaced (“Armenian case”) and 30.000. missing (“Argentinean syndrome”). USA and Western Europe never raised voice against this violence. Similar situation has been in Iran and Iraq. When Sadam Husein was sentenced to death, it was not for his suppression of Arab subjects, but for Kurds. It is “interesting” that USA never tried to make use of Kurds to “destabilized” their arch-enemies, Iran and Iraq, although they had all reasons for that . Except one – Turkey. Better to say – Bosporus and Dardanelles. They could not support Iranian and Iraqian Kurds, without threatening their most precious ally – Turkey. Two myths The Turkish case demonstrates the best the nature of the USA animosity toward USSR – state rivalry, or the struggle for the world supremacy. All ideological, humanitarian and other connotations go to the second plane. This myth has been shattered already by not dismantling NATO, after the Warsaw pact has fallen apart. We now pass to the other myth – that of the world terrorism. We have seen how the terrorism was used by Jews in order to establish Israel. This was not the precedence in the area, since terrorism was the principal means of Israelis under Roman occupation to get rid of the occupiers. As many analysts from the time testify, 1 the extremist Zealots called sikarii, 2 used to carry knifes hidden under clothes and stub the Romans (or Jewish collaborators) and disappear in the street crowd. As we mentioned above, when the British governor stopped the illegal immigration of Jews into Palestine, the office was blasted with 91 killed and the hotel King David destroyed. 3 The terrorist act proved very successful, indeed, since Great Britain gave up and the green light for the Jewish state o Palestinian soil was given. Both kinds of violence described above can be taken as a pure terrorism. As we argued before, suicide bombing does not belong to the same basket. But before we dwell in some detail on it, we mention here two other famous kind of terrorism: assassins and thugs. First were Muslim boys, persuaded to commit murders (politically motivated). They used to be given a small dose of hashish, just to get an idea how nice it would be for them when, after doing their duty, they reach the Paradise. On the other hand, thugs were Indian religious fanatics who worshiped the goddess Kali and in her name used to kill and rob caravans. The case of suicide bombers resembles that of assassins, whereas sikarii have much in common with thugs. All four have a religious background. Terrorism has bemused for achieving political or other goals by millennia. The negative connotation which has been develop in human mind concerning violence in general, and terrorism in particular, has been misused by those opposing those political or other goals, for millennia too. Taliban fighting Soviet troops in Afghanistan were freedom fighters for the West, including USA, but the same Taliban fighting the present-day puppet government are terrorists, by the current Western vocabulary. As we shall see later on, main Shqiptar guerrilla forced were designated as terrorist by USA officials, but have been adopted meanwhile as parts of the current security forced at KiM. Of course, not all political, religious or otherwise goals are acceptable by humanity. Some of them appear just set by insane people, lunatics and fanatics. Moreover, in extreme cases violence has become both the means and goal, in which case one speaks about l’violence-pour-l’violence, or pure terrorism. And here we come to the latest twist in the Palestinian fight for freedom: any violence from their part has been characterized by terrorism. What is tantamount to say that any violence from Israeli side is just counter-terrorism, justified by the right of Israel to exist etc, etc. At this point we reach a situation which Karl Popper has characterized as non-falsifyability, in the 1
See, for instance, J. Flavius, Jewish war, in Complete works, Nelson & Sons, London, 1859.
2
From Greek sikari for knife.
3
When I stayed at the hotel in 1989, (enjoying kosher meals), I was unaware of the event.
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domain of science. Once the political goals are pushed behind and the very struggle for achieving them is declared terrorism, anything appears justifiable. That is unjustifiable. That is beyond the good and evil, in Nitschenian sense. What are the consequences of this attitude, adopted by the “ruling states”? Which kind of the counter-terrorism measures have been adopted? The precaution measures within the traffic all over the world, in the air, trains, buses, etc appear such a nuisance that travel has become a martyrdom, rather than necessity or pleasure. In fact, the world has been put under the permanent terror, has become the victim of Israeli terrorism. As soon as you decide to travel, you are reminded that Palestinians are terrorists and you are obliged to suffer from that. An insane, inverted logic? Not so insane or not more insane than the decision to rob Palestinians of their land. Too harsh statement? May be, but shared by the overwhelming majority of the present-day world community. Including USA, y compris their governments, what those 32 vetoes in SC testify. There is no misunderstanding on that matter, only a mismatch in military power. And when we come back to KiM issue, we encounter the same logic of the omnipotence. Israel-USA-Serbia – a Boromean triangle. Though vastly separated, geographically, demographically, historically and politically, these three state have something in common, what will turn out to be of utmost importance for our KiM issue here. We shall first enumerate differences and similarities between Israel and Serbia. Israel vs Serbia : Two untypical states, in many respects. Borders: Neither has well defined borders. Israel consists of Israel proper plus Occupied Territories, including Golan Heights. Serbia has no definite borders, not only concerning NATOoccupied territory (KiM), but so-called Republika Srpska (RS) and Montenegro. The latter has about 600.000 inhabitants, but the same number of Montenegrins live in Serbia. Majority of the latter occupy ruling positions in Serbia. Traffic across the border is practically free, with illegal carriage, tobacco and other smuggling practically undisturbed. Many vehicles in Serbia have Montenegro license plates, although own by Serbians, for the benefits of low tax in Montenegro. In many Serbian newspapers weather broadcasts maps include Montenegro. Montenegrin students study in Serbia with all benefits of the domestic students, practically free of charge. Similar situation is with RS, where the border is river Drina. Though RS is officially a part of BiH, it is tightly bound (better to say, the opposite is true) with Serbia, in every respect. Serbia has become the refuge for many Bosnian Serbs, including war criminals, as mentioned before. She continues to support RS to such an extent that one may well consider two entities as a single state. Bosnian Serbs occupy a great deal of military and police position in Serbia, that they share with Montenegrins the overall occupation of Serbia. The traffic across Drina is also practically free, with a massive smuggling of all sorts of goods, including weaponry etc. Visas are not needed for passing from Montenegro and RS in Serbia. Border with KiM is a special story. There are checkpoints for traffic and passengers, but they must apply for permission to enter the province from the rest of Serbia. On the other hand border between KiM and Albania is practically nonexistent and hundreds thousands of Albanians have settled down in KiM since the NATO occupation. 1 Plan has been made for constructing electric power line from “Kosovo” energy plant to Tirana, since Albania appears in a bad need for the electric energy. KiM possesses coal reserves (mainly lignite) for centuries to go, and it has been one of the principal motives from Tirana to support KiM independence (sic). Although according to Kumanovo agreement (sic) in 1999, to be considered later on, Serbia was entitled to keep a contingent of police and army on KiM this has been never realized, and Belgrade has no control whatsoever over her border with Albania. As for the administrative border with the rest of Serbia, it 1
For the last eight years the population of Priština has increased from 230.000 to 500.000/600.000, for instance.
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appears semi susceptible, allowing relatively easy access from KiM to the rest of Serbia, but not vice versa. Evidently, there is no problem for non-Albanians to leave KiM, but the other way round is practically impossible. Population: Israel proper has about 6 million inhabitants (20 % Palestinians), and 3.5 million Palestinians in Occupied territories. Serbia without KiM has approximately 8 million population, 6.5 million Serbs (not including “refugees” and “displaced people”). Serbian diaspora consists of 4.5.-5.5 million people. They are bound with homeland by weakly bonds, mainly via folklore and national tradition. There is a strong tendency to strengthen these bonds recently, including the citizenship for everybody outside who declares to be Serb. This comes mainly from the Serbian nationalistic political (sic) parties, like Šešelj’s SRS and Vuk Drašković’s SPO, for the sake of internal political gains. Since the propaganda from the two among diasporas was very intensive during Milošević era, diaspora is considered to be predominantly SRS supporters, since they had no idea who was talking to them at hundreds meetings in USA, Canada, Australia etc. Serbian diaspora appears of very mixed quality, from those descendents of former prisoners of war, to the recent émigrés leaving the country suffering from “Yugoslav wars” in 1990-thies. The later population is predominantly young and promising, whereas the former appears very conservative and retarded in many respects, including the strong nationalistic feelings. Their financial engagement in Serbia and other former Yugoslavia regions appear meager, despite the efforts of Serbian governments, from Milošević on to attract their capital here. Many of the young émigrés are army deserters and are facing punishments if they appear in Serbia, but this will likely change soon for better or worse. As mentioned before, out of 13 million Jews, 5 million live in Israel, 5 in USA, and the rest all over the world, mainly in Russia, Western Europe and Argentina. About 650.000 Israelis live outside Israel and the latte makes considerable efforts to bring them back. 1 As for the rest of Diaspora, Israel runs a differentiated politics. USA citizens are encouraged to stay there, for it is them who provide the overwhelming support to Israel state, regardless of their personal (dis)approval of the current politics of Jerusalem. This support spans from political, moral, propaganda, financial, etc. On the contrary Jews outside USA are encouraged to move to Israel, so as to strengthen its efforts to survive and prosper. To this end, Israelis have managed to convince USA Evangelists that the only prerequisite to the ancient announcement about Jesus’ return to this world is that all Jews in the world have to return to the Holy Land. Hence, these good Christians have been collecting hundreds million dollars for this sacrosanct purpose and have already financed many Jews to return to the Promised Land (Promised Return for the Promised Land), mainly from Argentine. Recently Israeli government has allotted a piece of land in the Holy Land to USA Evangelists, who are going to build a church there, so that their pilgrims will have their own shrine, when visiting Israel (and leaving there money to Israeli tourist agencies). 2 If the first half of the 20ieth century has witnessed the Jewish “Reconquesta” of the Holy Land, as a remake of Joshua’s invasion of Palestine, according to Bible, 3 the call for returning to Palestine of the world Jewelry may be considered as a repetition of the Exodus, this time not from a particular country, but from the Diaspora, as announced in Isaiah, 32-XII, 6. This appears a final Exodus, Exodus, as a “final solution” of the “Jewish question” (whatever it means). Jews represent the intellectual elite in USA, financial and mass media upper class, deeply entrenched in every pore of the USA society, including military, intelligence, academic, research, industry ( in particular informatics sector), etc. Their influence on the government can not be 1 2 3
The recent estimate is that 18-21.000 Jews leave the country yearly. Jesus was a fake, but dollars are genuine.
We ignore here the question of the veracity of this particular biblical story, see, e.g. Israël Finkelstein, Neil Asher Silberman, La Bible Devoile, Bayard, 2002, Paris; The Bible Unearthed, The Free Press, New York, 2001. .
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overrated, both by a direct membership or via financial and mass media sectors. Many of the top rank intellectuals are very critical about USA Middle East policy, as mentioned before, but not to the extent to recognize USA as Israeli vassal state. Similar situation appears in the case of Europe, including Eastern one, but to a much lesser extent. To summarize, both Serbia and Israel suffer from emigration, but are subjects of intensive immigration too. The reasons for that are different in two cases. Israel serves as a racial and religious focus, an attractor par excellence for the Jewish Diaspora, whereas Serbia is a victim of a true invasion of the Dinaroids, who find her a convenient land to exercise their militant impulses and pathological craving for power. Those who are poor and inferior in every respect expect to be fed and supported at any rate by the autochthonous population. Israeli newcomers become militant by the requirements of the Israeli government, whereas Serbian immigrants impose their militant impulses to the local population. Equally, Israeli émigrés are fed up living in the state of a besieged country, in a gigantic military camp, with everyday threats by “terrorists” Israel is producing itself, whereas Serbia autochthonous population is leaving the country in a state of a permanent deterioration in every respect. In both cases it concerns young people, seeking the better life conditions in the West, particularly USA. Equally, in both cases these émigrés are substituted by immigrants, so that a steady turnover is going on in Serbia and Israel. The essential difference is that in the case of Serbia the deterioration mentioned is caused primarily by the newcomers, from Trans-Drina region. The latter has a devastating effect in both direct and indirect ways. First, it is the pressure they are exercising in very Serbia on the local population, even by their mere presence. Second, it is the ‘’exploits” of these Dinaroids in their native regions which made Serbia suffer from Sanctions, which have never been lifted completely, despite the reassurance of the international community and very Serbian officials. As we will see later on the notorious affair of Ratko Mladic is the case in point USA and Israel This is a strange story, in many respects. The story began long before modern Israel came to being. The prehistory of this relation is coloured by the Jewish settling down in the New World. This starts with Spanish Reconquista in 1492. Two remarkable events marked this year, of utmost importance for the Western World: expulsion of the Jewish population from Spain and discovery of America by Christifor Columbus. Though these two events were not directly related in the causal sense, they appear strongly correlated, as we shall see immediately. As we know, Southern Spain, under the Mavars’ rule was a Muslim-Christian-Jewish commonwealth, prosperous in many respects. After the Reconquista not all Jews were subject to banishment, since a great deal of them wee converted into Christiana, at least formally (that is superficially). The latter continued to live in Spain as crypto-Jews, and one of the first and principal aims of the Inquisition under Ignacio Loyola’s supervision was to detect those crypto-Jews. The irony of the situation was not that too few Jews converted into Christian faith, but too many. To find those who pretended to be converted, like certain Miguel Cervantes, and punish them, was a sure mean to prevent too massive mock conversion. From that moment on Jews continue to exist in Spain as a race, not as a religion. Those who left Spain settled down in the rest of Europe, including Eastern one, y compris the Ottoman Empire. This Sephardic branch of European Jewelry will play a very prominent role in the later European history, in particular cultural one. Now we come to the person of Christifor Columbus. Little appears certain about his origin and early life. According to the prevailing view, he was born in a Genovian family, and later moved to Spain. Many data point to his Jewish origin. The fact that at the end of his life Columbus bequeathed large amount of money for rebuilding the Temple at Jerusalem, indicates that he was a crypto Jew. Thus, a most comic situation arose.
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A Jew, with cynically sounding first name, Christifor, and an indicative surname, Columbus (dove), 1 sails on the board of the caravel Santa Maria, with another, el Nino, 2 trailing behind (together with Pinta). In retrospective, on may imagine a Jew from Spain heading for the Promised Land. Indeed, though Columbus’ expectations (real or pretentious) to reach the rich India were dispersed upon arriving to Caribbean, his efforts were awarded even better, by a virgin land of American continent. True, this land was inhabited, not by Indians (as expected), but by some other (red skin) Indians. And just as Joshua slaughtered (as the Bible claims) Canaanites so as to gain the Promised Land, so Columbus’ followers, from Pyrenean Peninsula and the rest of Europe devastated the indigenous population (less by the mere gun powder but more by deceases and reservations). Climate conditions arranged the partition of the newly discovered (sic) continent, allotting the central and southern parts to Spanish and Portuguese (Latin America) and north part to Western and North Europeans. It is the latter which will play the dominant role in the story which follows. Eastern cost of the North America (simply America in the following) became fast an urban region with many Jews to attract, as notorious for enterprising people. New York will in the course of time become the city with the largest Jewish population in the world (1.7 M at present). But the inland, the “most virgin land of all”, will witness the arrival of Jews in a more organized form. The arrangement for acquiring new virgin (sic) land was via “run for land” races. Usually, about 20 wagon cars were competing for the parcels for farming, with one wagon for the local traders and shop keepers. The later were, as a rule, Jewish ones. Thus, Jews were scattered al around the new territory in “an everywhere dense set” manner, as mathematicians would designate it, 3 forming a sort of a continent-bound Diaspora. But prior to this occupation of arable and pasture soils, a military control over the Indian lands was imposed by the European newcomers. Strongholds in the form of military garrisons were established well inside the traditional Indian lands. As the massive moves towards West progressed, the pattern of military bases develop all over present day USA territory, making “everywhere dense set”, we met before. This sort of European enclaves, surrounded by autochthonous Indian population will in the course of time develop into an inverse picture – enclaves of the reservations for Indians, surrounded by “white” environment. It is this pattern which will show up in the process of creation of new Israel on the Palestinian soil. Is it by accident? The Judeo-Christian archetype has surely played an important role in conquering the new Promised Land. It can not escape to an attentive history reader the analogy between American Indians and present day Palestinians from one side and USA state and Israel from the other. Evidently, a mechanism governing the same pattern of behaviour appears operative in both cases. As we shall see later on, it is the same pattern which governs USA behaviour on the global world scene. In words of James Carroll: 4 So Jerusalem would feed the fantasies of English settlers in the New World. When John Winthrop decreed in 1630, from the deck of a ship in what would become Boston harbour, “that we shall be a City upon Hill, the eyes of all people are upon us,” he was envisioning the American self-image as a New Jerusalem. As history shows, that Which reminds us of the Baptism scene on the river Jordan, with the Holy Spirit descending from the Heaven on the Son of God. 2 Infant in Spanish. 3 On Balkan, it was Vlachs (Cincars) who would play the same role, as the traditional shop keepers, besides Jews and Greeks. 4 James Caroll, Constantine's Sword, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 2001, p. 254. 1
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has, in turn, been overshadowed by the image of America as, in Walter McDougall’s phrase, the “crusader state”. Crusaders fought Muslims, not Jews (accused to be responsible for Jesus’ crucifixion), accepting thus the ideology of Old Testament as the source of the Christian faith, and consequently Jews as Christian progenitors. The present day Middle East situation shows a further development of the pattern of religious hierarchy – Israelis fight Muslims via their vassal state, USA, in order to preserve their modern resurrection of the Old Testament Jewish community on the Palestine soil. Christian played active roles in both cases, but unaware of the real significance of their involvements. This blindness will show up in its most remarkable (though not conspicuous) aspect of the entire Kosovo issue, as we shall elaborate later on. USA and Serbia We have already considered some aspects of the relationship between these countries, but this time we restrict ourselves to the Boromean knot pattern. USA have a strong particular interest in the Middle East, if for nothing else, than for the presence of the world richest oil resources. This aspect could provide an independent interest of USA in the region, regardless of the Israelis ones. But once one accepts the patron-vassal relationship, there is no room for the independent interest interpretation. Never-the-less the richness of the Arab states can not be ignored when dealing with the Middle East crisis (whatever one means by that). Arab states have found them in an awkward situation, to say the least, concerning the Palestinian issue. They are rich, but military weak, in many aspects. Apart from Syria, Egypt and Magreb states, oil rich Arab states can hardly be considered true states at all. Excluding the exceptional case of Lebanon, all Arab oil-states have been drawn into corruption with medieval social structures, including juristic aspects. These despotic societies, wit half of population (female one) kept in slavery, by European standards, appear artifacts, fairy-tales mushrooms growing on the oil (underground) lakes. They hate Israel, mainly for the religious reasons, but are incapable to do anything on the subject of Palestinian cause. They provide financial support to the Palestinian refugees and Occupied Territories, but refuse to settle them down in their states for good, since it would close the Palestinian issue for ever. The most persistent opponents to Israel have been Syria, but she achieved almost nothing in practical terms. The other opponent was Iraq, under Sadam Husein, who use to donate 20.000 $ to the families who lost their members as suicide bombers. Saudi Arabia turned into USA ally, more precisely vassal, for the sake of keeping alive under most disgusting yoke of Sheriat law, a fossil remnant from the dark Middle Age. Smaller oil-rich states and emirates have given up interfering with the regional affairs, satisfied with 1001 night luxury. The most serious opponent to USA-Israel axis has been, of course, Iran, under ayatollahs’ rule, but her military capacity has never a real threat to Israel, at least up to know. Jordan has long ago renounced her Palestinian subjects, leaving them to their own destiny. Lebanon, after the long, bloody civil war, has remained a quasi state, incapable to settle down her own domestic affairs. Besides, with militant Hezbollah Palestinian paramilitaries, Lebanon has been the subject to both Palestinian nuisance and Israelis terror. As for Egypt, after concluding her conflict with Israel, after three humiliating defeats, she has played a role of a moderator in the Middle East affairs, for good or worse. The long-term USA strategy in the Middle East has by now shaped into two principal pillars: (i) fight the Palestinian freedom fighters all around the globe, as terrorists (guerrilla affairs) (ii) form concentric protection rings around Israel (frontal defense). We first comment the former pillar. (i) Since Palestinians and their Arab sympathizers appear Muslims, bombing (suicidal or not) has been invariable linked by USA propaganda as an intrinsic feature of the Islam as a religion. But this propaganda has never been raised to the official level, on the contrary. White House never fail to emphasize her respect for Muslims and their religion, supporting her claims by experts’ opinion
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about the intrinsically peaceful character of Islam, in agreement with the same claims by Muslim scholars and politicians. Never-the-less the mass media in USA, and some in Western Europe, keep on asserting the public with claims of the opposite. This schizophrenic attitude has resulted in blocking the USA citizens of considering seriously the policy of White House. This situation appears very beneficial for the latter, and Israel too. The president can always claim that he is running pro-Muslims politics, despite the opposite feelings of his subjects, thus pretending to be wise and benevolent. The terrorism has been raised to the level of a sin, a pestilence or like, a decease the world should uproot etc. What is worse, after a long period of the misuse of the term, terrorism has been accepted as a mean for achieving their political goals by other freedom fighters, like those within Kurd population in Turkey. What is even worse, many irresponsible, even insane people have started exercising it almost “for fun”. A serious analysis would probably reveal a social component in this outburst of dissatisfaction, like the feeling of being marginalized etc. Suicidal bombings appear a specific kind of suicide, a message to the environment that the society has been guilty with regard to the victim. But in the case of suicides politically motivated, as the case with Jan Palach was, this message has a clear aim – to make the world aware of the burning problem and force the former to take some action in this respect. And here we come to the crux of the matter when speaking about Palestinian freedom fighters. The crucial question is: has the World acknowledged their message? The answer is: yes and no. Ordinary people all around the world have shown sympathy with their fighting for freedom and desperate attempts to get rid of Israelis and their occupation. Proof? When European Union (EU) organized a pool a few years ago with the question who was the country which threatened world peace the most, on the top of the list two countries appeared: USA and Israel. And then a remarkable action from the USA side followed quickly: they criticized strongly the pool and EU official immediately subordinated and begged for excuse, promising never to do similar thing again. And this affair answers the second part of the answer to our question. European governments, under the pressure from Washington dare not to follow the attitude of their citizens. They have joined the USA position of accusing suicidal bombing as a pure terrorism, as le terrorism-pour-le terrorism, despite the obvious fact which points to the opposite direction: the Israeli’s terrorism. The latter has two aspects, strongly connected. One part of this terrorism concerns Israelis’ action within occupied Territories, the other cover the entire Glob. The former has been well documented to be repeated here, but it is the later which deserves out attention. In order to prevent high jacking, the strict precautions have been introduced by Israelis in their ELAL air company. These measured have been subsequently adopted by all air companies in the world. Passengers are subjected to a number of humiliating and most inconvenient searches and checks, which comprise their baggage, including hand baggage itself. Every passenger is made feel as a potential criminal, or assassin. What is even the worse bus, railway etc wardrobes have ceased to function, for fear of hidden bombs. The entire mankind has been put on alert, because Israel does not want to renounce her Occupied Territories. The issue has a significant point in itself, that of the logic of ethos as such. If two violent actions, causally connected, follow each other, which one should play the role of a reference point? In the particular case, should Intifada be blamed, without considering what initiated it, or should it be regarded as a mere response to the Israeli occupation? If any terrorism is striped of its causes, then any kind of violence would gain the “civic right”. This issue will show up in the KiM case, as we shall elaborate later on. We mention here only that one usually define state violence as state terrorism, but we shall distinguish between terrorism as a mean for achieving political goals “from below”, from the state organized violence. By terrorism we mean indiscriminate killing of people, in the no-war situation. Now we come to the second pillar of USA (read - Israel) strategy concerning the security of the state of Israel. Apart of direct military help, Washington has been trying to form successive rings
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around Israel, subordinating the surrounding states in one or other way. As mentioned before, Lebanon, Jordan and Egypt have been neutralized. Syria is under permanent threat to be “neutralized” too, as well as Iran. Iraq has been attacked and practically destroyed, so that it presents no real threat to Israel. It is other Muslim states, both Arab and non-Arab, which are at stake now. And here we come to the crux of matter, when the USA attitude towards Serbia (and Serbs in Yu2) is considered. But the issue was open before the KiM crises entered it most acute state, that from 1998 on. When Yu2 disintegration started in 1990, the first military conflicts began in Croatia, but quickly ceased, to be finished in 1995, by Dayton agreement. The real fighting was initiated by Serbia and Croatia, in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), to be finished by Dayton agreement too. Unlike the Croatia case, when two opposing sides were engaged, Croats and Serbs, in BiH we had three sides in the mutual conflict: Muslims (44 %), Serbs (32 %) and Croats (17 %). Although Muslims and Croats (Roman Catholics) were forced later by the external factors to join their forces in fighting Serbs (Greek-Orthodox), their mutual animosities could not be concealed by diplomatic cover. From the very beginning Muslims have been favourites of the Western community, although all logical reasoning should point in the opposite direction. They were compact Muslim population in the middle of Balkan, not far away from the centre of Christian Europe. Many Muslim militant fundamentalists, like Mujahedins, joined the Bosnian Muslims, from Arabic countries, Afghanistan etc. Also, massive weaponry traffic from the Arab country has been present during the conflict, although a strict embargo has been imposed by the Western countries, who showed a blind eye concerning this violation. Yet the sympathies of the Western governments and media were on the Muslim side, against Croats and particularly Serbs. Why? The answer lies not at the spot, but far away in the Middle East, in the outer protection ring, mentioned above, Arabic peninsular states, Turkey, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Indonesia etc. The rationale is as simple as cunning: we don’t hate Muslims, to the contrary, we protect Muslims everywhere in the world (provided it does not endanger Israel security). In the case of KiM this attitude has been exposed to the utmost clarity, except for those who do not want to see it. The overwhelming majority of KiM population is Shqiptar (exact figures have never been known, and will be never, perhaps). About 95 % of them are Muslims, with a tiny Roman Catholic minority and symbolic number of Greek Orthodox. Expecting support both from the Western Christian world and Eastern Islamic communities, Shqiptars’ politics has adopted two principal stratagems: Turning to the Western broad public, they expose their Christian, Roman-Catholic face. Arguing via public means, newspapers, TV, INTERNET, etc, they have always been good Catholics, despite the fact they happen to be Muslims (for historical and other reasons). When they present visually their politicians, for example Ibrahim Rugova, there is as a rule a Catholic church shown in the background. As for the Western governments, being aware of the “Israel syndrome” elaborated above, they stress their Muslim identity, as a warning (with a mild taste of blackmail). The same goes, of course, when turning to the Islamic world, expecting a generous help of the religious brothers, in their fight with the unfaithfuls. In the context of the latter, one point must be stressed here. Bosnian and KiM Muslims are not the only Islamic people in Europe, but their position differs greatly from that of Muslims in France, Germany, Great Britain etc. These latter are dispersed geographically, with eventual ghetto settlements, but have never formed a vast compact society. They speak different languages and the only matter of concern regarding their position within the Western society is the Muslim religion versus the prevailing (still) Christian environment. It is true that Muslim religion does not recognize nationality, or at most consider it a secondary aspect compared with the faith, but nevertheless there is nothing compared with the fanatic nationalism of
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Albanians, both in Albania and in neighbouring regions. The case of Bosnian Muslims falls inbetween, since they are a part of the Slavic tribe and can communicate easily with the Christian environment. The difference between European Muslims and Bosnian and particularly Shqiptar ones is very remarkable, when we come to the external interference, in particular from the Arabic countries. Supporting French Muslims, for instance, means interfering into the internal affairs of a sovereign state. On the other hand, the interference into Serbian internal affairs when Shqiptars are concerned appears motivate by the same rationale – denying the right of Serbia for instance, to consider Shqiptar issue internal one. To the contrary: by defying Serbia the right to control her own territory, they press for making the political demand their political right. It is, of course, a bluff, but a gigantic one. As we know, gigantic bluffs have a large probability to succeed, as the case with Sudetian Germans show, for instance. 1 Why such a difference in the Muslim distribution in Western Europe and Balkan? Muslim came to France by boats, trains, airplanes, gradually and individually. Albanians came to Serbia on foot, crossing the border. It was a clear case of migration, followed by the demographic explosion. Magreb Arabs sought the permission from the French authorities to enter the country, whereas Albanians did not ask Serbian state to come and settle on her soil. They have no feeling to be guests, but rather conquerors, occupying their Promised Land. Albanians and the World In the previous chapters we have seen how the politics of USA concerned with Israel security has been trying to make an image of USA protecting Balkan Muslims, especially Albanians in Albania and particularly in the disputed neoghbouring regions, like KiM. Now we turn to a broader issue, that of the relationship of the world, in particular the West, when the KiM issue is concerned. It is generally believed that the world opinion is sympathetic with Shqiptars demands for secession from Serbia (and possibly from the neighbouring countries, like Macedonia and Greece). Although this belief appears justified, it is neither completely true, nor is easy to comprehend. We shall try to elaborate this issue in some detail here. If the political support from USA is base on the Muslim faith of Albanians, this rationale does not hold for the world in general. There must be something else, or something more, which stirs world sympathy for the Albanian cause. But before we enter this issue, a word of caution seems in order here. We must distinguish between the feeling of general public and the politics of governments and relevant authorities in general. As we shall see later on, governments and senates etc tend to shape their policies according to the reports of their envoys who are in contacts with the regions in question and prominent people there. The latter tend to support their demands by both legal and illegal means, including bribery etc. KiM Shqiptars are no exception from the rule, as USA senators and government officers are neither. We shall come to particular cases, like that of senator Bob Doll, for instance, later on, but here we just mention this dark side of the international diplomacy and politics in general. Besides, many prominent actors in KiM issue, like UN officials, tend to differ greatly in their estimate of the nature of KiM crisis and the situation on the spot when thy leave the official post and express their genuine opinion without constraints, as the case of the Canadian general Mackenzie was, for instance. The corruption linked with the international interventions in various world regions is well known and it is, unfortunately, an inevitable part of external interventions, but we must be aware of this fact when trying to pass a judgment on the KiM issue.
If Serbia is to sign an agreement with the international community on the KiM issue, she should insist to do it at Munich.
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Now we come to the “popular feelings” concerning Albanians and KiM issue. There are two competing images which world general public has about Albanians. One is the image provided by very Albanians, both from Albania and neighbouring countries, the image of a normal civilized people, well immersed into the modern, advanced society, within the European standards. This is the picture which official propaganda offers, supported partly justly by the picture of the urban population at Tirana, Skodra, Priština etc. The other image concerns the rural population and their way of life, in particular their folklore, ethos, mentality etc. This picture has been provided by ethnologists, journalists, and generally by unofficial researchers and observers. And this picture differs grossly from the former one. It is the picture of a predominantly traditional society, retarded from the rest of Europe, and even rest of Balkan, by centuries, if not millennia. It appears as a reservation, a tribal society conserved in the heart of Europe. Is this an advantageous fact to Albanians or a handicap? And we come here to the crux of matter. If one comes to the issue of accepting Albania and Albanians into the contemporary Europe, this backwardness appears surely a clear disadvantage. After all, many Balkan states which want to join European Union have been kept before the gate for the reason of incompatibility with the Union, for good reasons. It is the famous issue of standards. And these countries are well ahead of Albania and KiM in particular. On the other hand, this disadvantage turns surprisingly into an advantage, when the more profound level of the modern society is dug up. It concerns the ecological issue, which to some circles in the West constitutes the essence of the modern society. Saving the species, the environment in general, adoring the virginal nature, vastly spoiled by the modern industrial society, has been the credo of an influential section of the Western world. But is it the matter of flora and fauna only? And here we come to the crux of matter. Many tribes of traditional society have been “discovered” by Europeans, including vast populations of the Northern and South America. These have been decimated by the “civilized intruders”, intentionally or by diseases, alcohol etc 1 . As the welfare of the industrial society has grown, intellectual elite, in particular scientific and humanistic ones, has been occupied by protecting and preserving the Nature. At first, it concerned flora and fauna, but gradually the scope has broadened and human species have been included into the general agenda of “save the Nature”. Hence, “retarded” humans have become the concern of the ”advanced” part of the civilized society, which has been making great effort to study, protect and preserve these “homo sapiense relicts”. Even the USA and Canadian Indians may be grateful to this new move in their environment for the renewed care of the people who used to slaughter and confine them into reservations, just as animals were confined and protected in ”national parks” all over the world now. The case is a particular instance of a broader issue, that of small and large differences. Rivalry and even antagonism starts with a threshold difference, then rises as the difference rises, but not indefinitely. After some ”critical value” antagonism disappears and distinctly different species can coexist. More advanced society feels sympathy, even compassion, with the “retarded” one. As the overall world civilization advances this effect becomes ever more conspicuous. The case with Australian Aborigines from one side and Tasmanians from the other, illustrates well the difference in treating “traditional society” 150 years ago and now. But probably the best example of the syndrome of small difference has been the case of Israelis and Palestinians. It is the most advanced part of Israel which is concerned with the fate of people in the Occupied Territories, who press the government to ease the terror on the subordinate Palestinians. They consider them as an endangered human species, just as USA treats now their Indians, Eskimos etc. But let us go back to our KiM issue. One of the features which distinguishes advanced European societies and less advanced ones, like those on Balkan, is the comparative difference between the rural and urban populations. In England, for instance, this difference appears hardly noticeable, whereas in Bosnia this is very 1
It has been estimated that about 20 million of North-Americal Indians have fallen victims to these disasters.
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pronounced, for instance. In general, all towns in the world appear similar, but it is the village which determines a country, as distinct ethnical and cultural entity. The greatest difference between peasants and citizens in Europe is present on KiM. One of the best instances which illustrates this enormous gap is the rate of birth. In the urban areas it is 2.7 per family, whereas in the rural area it amounts as much as 6.7. The point is that more than 80 % of KiM people live in villages. What makes the KiM issue unique, very distinct from the general case we considered above, is that the traditional society there is not an “exotic minority”, but the overwhelming majority within the overall population. Hence, no “ecological syndrome”. To the contrary, an inverse situation appears present, which has no precedent in Europe. Similar situation was present in colonial Africa, but with an important difference: Europeans, who were “civilized minority”, were newcomers there, whereas on KiM the situation appears the opposite: Shqiptar population has grown in couple of centuries from a small minority to the overwhelming majority, in one way or another. Thus we come to something we call Christian syndrome: the more the KiM population appear remote from the present-day cultural standards, the more sympathy it gains from the Western World public. The political issue thus has turned into ecological one. But the issue is not that simple nevertheless. The indifference of the West as to the actual situation in situ stems from the comfortable fact that Europeans are not going to live in KIM. The only trouble they are, or should be, concerned with is that KiM is coming to them (in fact it has already arrived there). Drug smuggling, arms traffic, human traffic etc have become the standard feature of the move “KiM meeting Europe” (and USA too, for that matter). Based on the “blood ties”, much more that it is the case of Mafia, Albanians appear ideal for criminal activities, much more so than any other population in the world, in particular concerning their unique language spoken by themselves only. The movement for the national independence, quite legitimate, otherwise, gave the decisive impetus to the illegal activities, like dealing with drugs, but this has escaped from the political motives and has grown into an independent sector of the KiM economy. 1 The ecological syndrome may be considered a special case of a wider issue, that of compassion. In this context the attitude of the world public towards Serbia (and Serbs to some extent), must be considered. For it is the comparative behaviour in respect to two conflicting parts which matters. Serbia under Milošević’s rule was condemned and even demonized, partly for good reasons. This has been skillfully used by Albanian leaders as the trump card in dealing with the international society. It is here that he public feeling with regard to Serbia enters the game. As in the case of Albanians just discussed, these feelings appear dichotomy too. Governments of some countries, not favouring Serbia for various reasons, still treat Serbia as Milošević’s state, although Serbia has managed to get rid of a great deal of Milošević’s heritage. As for the feelings of the general public towards Serbian population, it acquires a schizophrenic character. A part of world public opinion has accepted that it was primarily Serbian Serbs (and non-Serbs) who suffered from Milošević communist dictatorship, and therefore should deserve compassion themselves. The other part, to the contrary, considers all Serbian Serbs as guilty for what Serbia has been accused of, rightly or not. 2 And here we come to the point which might, at first sight seem absurd, that both parts mentioned above feel compassion for Serbian Serbs. If for the former, who do not blame general population for what the leaders did, this sounds reasonable, for the latter, who consider Serbs guilty, this appears unexpected. But here the Christian syndrome pops in. Serbs are guilty, they have sinned, and world should forgive them, just as that biblical father forgave his sinful son. Both syndromes, however, are operative at different levels of the world collective consciousness, but the practical finale effects appear the same. Although this might seem favourable to Serbs, but the overall outcome appears to put Serbia in an inferior position, just as the healed patient, suffering We recall that Mafia started as a nationalistic movement in Sicily, too. That this attitude has been present outside Serbia was confirmed by the propaganda of Montenegrin nationalist separatists, during their campaign for the “independent Montenegro”, who claimed that all Serbs were pro-Milošević, even those who fought to overthrow him.
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from a mental decease finds himself, after a successful treatment, at a more comfortable, but inferior level within the immediate environment (no free lunch in this world). Another phenomenon must be invoked here, when considering the Western response to the Yugoslav crisis in general and that concerning KiM issue in particular. It concerns religious similarities and differences. Though never recognized as important, even as present, the sympathy of the West has been shaped to a large extent according to the religious similarities and vice versa. Serbs are Greek Orthodox, Croats Roman Catholics. Linked with the fact that Russians, still considered by the West its archenemy, are Greek Orthodox too. On the other hand, in Bosnia and in KiM Serbs were in conflict with Muslims, who appear of a benign (neutral) importance to the Christian world here in Europe. This twofold effect will play also role in shaping the sympathy of the West with regard to the conflicting sides on Balkan. In summary, the general attitude of the international public has been determined by the interplay of the syndromes of small and large differences. The advantage of Albanians in this context has proved evident. With this backstage, the violence on KiM may start.
Shqiptar rebellion We have analyzed above the general background of the KiM crisis in the acute form, namely at the dawn of the armed rebellion. We shall divide, in the following, the crisis periods into three stages: (i) preparatory (1995-1998), (ii) NATO intervention (1999), (iii) KiM occupation. Preparing the rebellion (1995-1998) During the “wars” in Yu2 (1991-1995) nothing exceptionally happen in KiM. This fact came as surprise to many Yugoslavs, who remember the unrests from 1968, 1981, 1988. One of reasons of this calm was the presence of the paramilitary forces of Zeljko Raznatovic-Arkan, who used to wander around the province threatening and intimidating the local population. (Arkan himself came from KiM, from a colonist family in Priština???). But it would be naive to assume that nothing was going on beneath the KiM political surface. The later events would corroborate fears of many Serbians that his calm surface was the bonanza before the storm. After Dayton agreement Serbia came out drastically weakened, both materially and morally, in both principal senses of the latter notion (ethos and self-confidence). She was demonized as a whole, although her own autochthonous population was the first victim of the repressive Dinaric rule. But in understanding actual, practical moves of the International community (IC), some other elements of shaping the practical measures are to be accounted for. The rationale for IC interventions all around the world can be divided into two distinct parts. One concerns European affairs, the other the rest of the world. The former has always been shaped by one imperative: peace and order, the latter by justice and humanity. The latter have never been considered as a direct threat to world peace and all sorts of interventions have been envisaged for settling down local disputes, without much pressing for the quick solution(as the cases of Rwanda and Sudan illustrate). Some of these unrests have been even simply ignored, as the case with Algeria was. In the latter case, when the KiM crisis was progressing in 1996/7, atrocities done by the frustrated Muslim extremists (who, by the way, were formally right in that particular case) achieved such a level, that in a single massacre more victims (men, women, children) were slaughtered than were the overall causalities at KiM for a year. Yet, Europe, France in particular, did virtually nothing to stop atrocities, for the simple reason: these were internal, local affairs, which did not threaten European security. It was different with KiM. First of all, because the issue has been tightly linked with the international politics, in particular that concerning Middle East, as we elaborated above. Second, the stage for violent conflict was set up almost in the middle of Europe, and armed fighting could be easily spread to the rest of Europe, which has always been considered the most civilized continent (with the most uncivilized atrocities committed in the last century). Western Europe
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could not afford armed conflicts before the door. At least, it has been offered as an explanation of the proclaimed attitude: We care. But the practical steps were a bit the opposite ones. After Dayton Serbia was recovering from the (partial) lifting of IC sanctions, for her engagements in Croatia and BiH affairs. Parallelly, the political scene was burdened by fierce struggle for power between Milošević and then oppositional Dinaric parties, SPO and SRS, lead by Vuk Drašković and Vojislav Šešelj, respectively. In 1997 oppositional front made of SPO, Democratic Party (lead by Zoran Djindjic) and Association of Citizens of Serbia (lead by Vesna Peshić), won the elections for the municipal governments, but Milošević regime denied it and did not allow the results to be realized. For thee months that frosty winter one to two hundred thousand Belgrade citizens demonstrated along the city streets, demanding the local governments. Police used tear gas, fire brigade hose-pipes, buttons, etc but the revolt would not stop. EU sent an envoy, the former Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzales to mediate, who finally persuaded the dictator to give up. Milošević ordered the Parliament to issue lex specialis so as to provide a formal cover for admitting the falsifying the elections. Opposition in Belgrade and tens of other Serbian towns took over the municipal governments and it was the first victory of the democratic part of the Serbian society over the despotic rule of the Montenegrin from Lijeva Rijeka in Montenegro and his criminal family and cronies. The very evening of the Supreme Court decision that the Belgrade (and other cities) local government were to take over the municipal offices, Zoran Djindjic took down the communist star from the city municipality roof in the Belgrade centre, with the wild joy of the supporters. The communist dictatorship was beginning to crack. Signs of Serbia resurrection were appearing and the citizens felt the brighter future was smiling at them. But it turned out to be an illusion. During all this time of turmoil in Serbia, when Milošević attention and police were turned towards the political opponents, an underground Shqiptar state was being taking shape at KiM. A clandestine army was formed, under the name of UÇK (Kosovo Liberation Army). Preparing the secession Parallel to the political demands and unrest, KiM leadership was preparing the aimed rebellion. Of course, not all political parties opted for violence, as the case of Ibrahim Rugova Democratic Party illustrates, but the common denominator of all party politics has been secession at all costs. This political platform has never been questioned and all activities, including “negotiations” were a mere cover for the stratagem adopted by the most militant sectors of the Shqiptar political organizations. Hence, one could see two parallel movements, aimed at the same ultimate goals – secession from Serbia. Military preparations have been organized with the help of various external factors: (i) Albania, (ii) USA and Germany, (iii) Islamic counties. Albania provided the platzdarm for the external interventions, as well as the weaponry and other facilities. As mentioned before, a number of USA organized training camps have been set up in Albania, like that near Drach. The collapse of the state in 1997, mentioned before, resulted in an enormous traffic of weaponry from Albania into KiM. But surely these instances of Albanian interference into Serbia internal affairs are tips of an iceberg. The real extent of this interference will be disclosed probably only after the KiM affair has been “settled down”, as the actual events taking pace in Bosnia, for instance, are being revealed after Dayton and at Hague Tribunal. For the time being, we may just make guesses as from the real development behind the scene. The significance of the military supports goes, of course, beyond its face value. It implied the political support, insurance that USA will advance and protect Shqiptar cause. On the other hand Milošević politics (sic) has been burdened by the lack of initiative. In fact, it may sound absurd, but even in dealing with the internal opponents, within Yu2 and later within Serbia, Milošević exposed such a passivity and indolence, that no wonder he found himself the ultimate loser. The trouble is that Serbia found herself the loser, following willingly or not his “leadership”.
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Te Shqiptar question was not a fictive one, it was a genuine move for the independence (whatever it meant or implied). By reducing Serbia’s response to mere defense, Milošević was doomed to failure. No fortress can be defended for indefinite time. The old wisdom has always advised that attack is the best defence. In this case the former implied an initiative concerning Shqiptar demands, within Serbia and IC. The tragedy of Milošević and Serbia has been that they always were late for one step or more. Serbian state has made a number of failures, which have turned out disastrous to the KiM issue. We shall number them in the following. Milošević failed to detect the clandestine preparation of forming Shqiptar state at KiM. When he finally moved in, Serbian police found a state in the state, with bunkers, training centers, propaganda offices, hospitals, military magazines, logistic, heavy weaponry (except for tanks), uniform producing plants, schools, even faculties. Two latter institutions were known, in fact, to the state and IC. In fact it has been negotiated, with the mediation of an Italian official, that Shqiptar pupils and students should move back to the previous buildings, but this agreement has never been fully realized, for various reasons. The Shqiptar side has always claimed that the Serbian authorities prevented that, but within the overall context, this claim should be taken with the grain of salt, knowing the long-term strategy of the KiM leadership. Any sign of improvement of Shqiptar conditions would push them further from their ultimate goal. Milošević should not have used paramilitaries in dealing with rebels. This use provided quick results, but in a longer run it was counterproductive and gave an impression of a clash between two savage sides. Serbia should have avoided at any cost internationalizing KiM issue and allowing external institutions to interfere with her internal business. 1 Serbia should not have engaged in negotiating with rebels, particularly outside her territory. Serbia should not have allowed the KiM issue to be dealt with outside UN, whose member she was. Any envoy outside UN should have been rejected. At first sight one might claim that these steps were inevitable, but we shall argue in the following that this was not the case. Which state forces have been used in dealing with rebels? The official state which Serbia was a part of was Union of Yugoslav Republics (UYR), consisting of Serbia and Montenegro. The army of UYR (Army in the following) was engaged in safeguarding the border with Albania, the supply of the border staff, and the principal roads and crossroads in the province. The latter included the use of heavy weaponry, like tanks. The rest of forces were Serbian police and paramilitaries. As we mentioned Milošević has managed to form large police forces, well equipped with armed vehicles, and other military equipment, like personal mortars and the like. Air forces have not been used from Yugoslav side in KiM operations, unlike NATO engagements in the area. Although the hard times from 1992-5 of the IC sanctions on URY were over in 1998, the shortage of many goods in Serbia was still actual. In particular gasoline was a deficient item and steeling from parked cars was a common practice at the time. When two empting of the reservoir of our car, parked before our building, occurred in a fortnight, my wife went to the police station at Zemun, asking the police to protect us. My wife explained to the officer in charge that it concerned a handicapped person car, and that she had to drive me to my job, since I am using a wheelchair. The policeman was kind, but he made my wife understand the police was not going to engage on the matter. My wife went out of the building, furious for such an attitude, when she accidentally had a look at the official panel besides the entrance. It was densely packed by portraits of the staff officers from the station, who lost their life at KiM. My wife suddenly realized what was going on and felt ashamed for her petty complaints and requirements, in view of the tragedy of the state police which was going on at the time. True, the government organized a referendum in April 1998, with 97% of votes against an involvement of the international community into Serbian internal affairs.
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Killing a policeman has been considered an utmost crime in all states, for good reasons. In fact, the only crime in Great Britain for which a death penalty was prescribed was killing a bobby, who at the time I was in England did not carry weapons. Forces of order are not only representative of state, they are state. When the Serbian communists, the future partisans, killed two kvisling policemen in 1941, what was proclaimed subsequently as the beginning of the resurrection in Serbia against German occupying forces, it was an act against the state as such, not just against a particular regime, as the communist propaganda used to assert. Somewhen at the same time we were attending a private commemoration at a Belgrade cemetery, when a funeral of an army conscript took place. The young soldier was at his military service and was killed by KLA at KiM (probably in an ambush on an army vehicle carrying supplies to the border guards). I tried to image the feelings of his parents, who send (probably the only) 1 child to the military service, killed by a young Shqiptar rebel (probably one of three or four sons of the local family), shooting him into his back. Fighting for village after village Serbian police forces discovered that almost half of the province was in the hands of rebels. The fighting was running with the following pattern: a police patrol is passing a village, when a sudden fire is open and some policemen killed and wounded. The police returns the fire and the further development depends on the strength of the rebellious unit engaged. If the village appears well protected and risky to attack by the ordinary units, the latter stops fighting and calls for additional support. It arrives usually as a paramilitary unit, which launches a fierce onslaught. But before we go on, a few words about paramilitaries are in order. Ordinary police forces consisted of the standard policemen and reservists, 2 called to reinforce the permanent staff. The former could be considered second-rank forces, not much capable of fighting guerrilla forces. In fact, KLA was not an ordinary guerrilla. Balkan wars, particularly in the WWII were mostly fought by guerrilla attacking occupying forces, Germans in particular, so that this kind of military actions was well known in the area. But there was a substantial difference between guerrilla of Draža Mihailović (so-called Chetniks) and KLA tactics. The former used, particularly in 1941, to ambush Germans from woods or outside inhabited areas, otherwise the nearby villages or towns would suffer terrible retribution from the occupying forces. As is well known the occupation rule in Serbia (and in Serbia only in the whole Europe) was hundred of hostages for a killed soldier and 50 for wounded. It was for that reason Chetniks ceased to kill Germans in an organized manner, after the first few months of resurrection in 1941 (unlike Tito’s partisans, for the reasons to be understood immediately). 3 Chetnics’ tactics (approved by the Allies), was to reduce their activities to sabotages and diversions, until the Allies begin their final offensive against the Axes, and thus spare the civilians of the massive massacres. The rationale for this tactics was simple. Yugoslavia (and Serbia for that meter) was one of many countries involved in military activities in Europe, tightly controlled by the occupying forces (German, Italian, Hungarian, Bulgarian etc), both in the military and informational sense. News about civil victims could only discourage both local population and Allies. On KiM logic of the Shqiptar rebels was the opposite one. In order to win world sympathy for their cause, massacres were more than welcome. 4 This tactics rested on two principal facts. First, KiM was in the focus of IC attention, due to extensive Shqiptar propaganda. Second, KiM provided a massive human resource for victims of the war KLO started, due to the overpopulation of the area. Hence, the tactics of KLA was to provoke fighting within the inhabited places, like villages and towns, making use of the civilians as a shield and their corps as a proof of “Serb brutality”. The Families with single child are the most frequent in Serbian towns, especially in Belgrade. We note that the lower-rank commanders of those reservist forces were mainly immigrants from Dinaric regions, who joined the Army as professionals, in an old good, centuries-long tradition. 3 See. e.g. P. Grujic, Boromejski Čvor (Boromean Knot), ATC, Belgrade, 2006 (in Serb). 4 To paraphrase the famous Voltaire’s dictum, if massacres of the Shiptar population were absent, they should be invented. 1 2
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insistence on the adjective “Serb” was both intensive and consistent. The whole affair was to be presented as a clash between two nations, not between a rebellious subpopulation of a state and the state herself. How effective this approach has been the best proof is that it has been adopted by the very Serbian officials, what we are going to discuss later on. Another point is to be made here. Not all of KLA consisted of the indigenous population, but many came from outside, mainly from Albania. Those had no particular feelings towards the autochthonous people in KiM, in particular those who were engaged as mercenaries. Suffering of civilians meant little to them, as it is generally with all “dogs of war”. By the same token those Serbian paramilitaries which consisted of Ijekavians, felt no compassion with the KiM civilians either. We note here an interesting parallel with the guerrilla fighting in Western Serbia during the early days of the resurrection against the German occupation in 1941. Majority of the partisans, members of Tito’s communist controlled forces, came from across Drina, as immigrants from Bosnia who escaped Ustasha terror and massacres over Serbs. They used to kill Germans, mostly by ambushing military convoys, irrespective of the expected reprisals of German forces over the civilians, either from nearby villages and towns, or hostages. It was this ruthless tactics employed by partisans which caused the final split between Chetniks of Drazha Mihailovic (besides the ideological motives) and Tito’s forces, after a few months of joined actions against the occupying forces. In the following we are not going to describe and interpret numerous clashes between the state police, paramilitaries and army reservists from one side and KLA and Shqiptar civilians from the other. Rather, we shall concentrate on a few paradigmatic cases in order to illustrate the complexity of the situation, from both factual and information-propaganda aspects. But before we do that, a few words about the state forces engaged are in order. As mentioned before, Army was not directly engaged, for the reasons explained, except for the reservists, called to help the police forces. The most important issue here is that of the infamous paramilitaries. Rumour was going on in Serbia that they consisted of common criminals, released from prisons. This allegation has never been confirmed officially, but the very fact it was considered possible, speaks for itself. We mentioned before how dangerous and traumatic was engagement of ordinary police, especially reservists, on KiM, when we discussed the earlier unrests on KiM, like that from 1981. It is reasonable to take that only rough people like criminals would be willing and capable to match the determined Shqiptar rebels. Arkan’s “Tigers” mentioned earlier were ones of those paramilitaries, but not the only one. Among the other one deserves our particular attention, the so-called Scorpions. Founded in BiH at the start of “Bosnian war”, its original role was to protect state electrical installations (power stations, electric cables etc). But only when the “war” was over and the Hague Tribunal started processing the war crimes, it has become obvious what the real purpose of this paramilitary was, or at least one of the most important. The movie showing shooting 6 Muslim civilians from Srebrenica (Trnovo, 1995) was shown at the Tribunal, which shocked the world for its brutality. We can not dwell on the interesting questions as to who and why made this movie and how it reached a NGO to be passed to the Tribunal, especially since nothing appears clear and definitive, when these bloody events are concerned. Here we just note (and repeat once again) that the unit consisted exclusively of the local Bosnians, more precisely Herzegovians (HDE) and had nothing to do with Serbians (except that the latter has been forced to accept the guilt for Ijekavians crimes, as we shall elaborate later on). This unit will play a prominent role in KiM affairs, as we shall see immediately. We mention here that four members of the incriminated group were sentenced by the court for the war criminal in Serbia for 53 years of prison. (Why they were brought to a Serbian court for crime which they committed outside Serbia, as citizens of BiH and why they were not transferred to a Bosnian court, is the most crucial question, but we shall not dwell on it here). It is of an utmost importance here to stress that the regular police forces contained a large portion of newcomers from across Drina, that is of the first generation of Dinaroids. It is of the equal
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importance to note that the majority of KLA consisted of Albanian Albanians, specially trained for the “job”, as mentioned before. Since those Albanians (not Serbian Shqiptars) are mainly from Northern Albania, that is are belligerent Dinaroids themselves, we have a clash of Slavophonic and Albanophonic Dinaroids over the “disputed land”, the unfortunate KiM and their autochthonous population. Besides, many Shqiptar warlords, like Agim Cheku, 1 a prominent politician in KiM today, were engaged in other parts of Yu2 during 1991-5 “wars”, exclusively against Serbs, what testifies the amount of hatred toward Serbs as a nation. Agim Ceku was the leading warlord during Croatian offensive against Republica Srpska Krajina in 1995, which resulted in expulsion of 250.000 Serbs from Croatia (see Appendix 3). When the offensive against KLA started in 1998, many of Serbian warlords certainly had in mind what happened to their kin during the “Oluja”operation in Croatia, what could, at least partly, explain a number of cruelties seen on KIM at the time. Internationalization of KiM affairs We enumerated earlier a number of flagrant mistakes made by Yugoslav authorities (mainly by Milošević) concerning KiM issue. Internationalization of a Serbian internal affairs has been the most fatal for Serbia. Why and how it happened? Two principal reasons stood behind this blatant error. Milošević underestimated the role of IC and overestimated his own reputation with the latter. He played prominent role in shaping Dayton agreement, what made him believe IC accepted him as a partner on equal footing. In fact, he was used (as Franjo Tudjman too), to help settle down the BiH knot and stop the bloody, senseless fighting among the local parties. Both foreigners were engaged as men of influence on the local leaders rather than as men of respect and honest reputations. When their roles in that respect were over, both Milošević and Tudjman became candidates for Hague Tribunals. Tudjman’s death saved him from this humiliation, but Milošević (better to say Serbia) was less lucky in that respect. Second, as elaborated before, the mental structure of Dinaroids appears very rigid indeed. Milošević demonstrated this peculiar feature many times in his political career. He rejected any correspondence with IC on Serbian matters and then succumbed to the threat of NATO intervention and allowed the so-called verifiers to supervise events going on in KiM, after UN resolution from 23 September, 1998. It was exactly what KLA and Shqiptar political leaders hoped for. The stage for drama, in both senses, as a tragedy of people and as a theater performance before IC, was set up. The performance could start. In April 1998 EU and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) started exerting a strong pressure on Serbia to accept their mediation in Belgrade – Priština negotiations. Miloševićć first resisted these demands, but finally gave in. In October 1998 Milošević agreed for the partial withdrawal of forces of the FRY and Serbia from KiM and that NATO and (OSCE) deploy and the Milošević-Holbrooke agreement stipulated the deployment of 2.000 OSCE verifiers in the province. (By the end of 1998, 1.400 of them were deployed), under the command of Ambassador William Walker, USA general. We note here that FRY was not at the time (and is still not) a member of NATO. The role of Richard Holbrooke in the whole KiM affair appears more than interesting. This member of Bill Clinton’s administration has exhibited remarkable activity, siding KiM rebels in the most arrogant and ruthless manners. He used to wonder freely through the “liberated territory”, meeting armed rebels as if it was a USA territory. The picture of Holbrook in a Shqiptar house, seating on a carpet in sockets (complying with the Muslim rules not to enter house, or mosque, in shoes), with armed KLA soldiers in uniform siding him, has circulated around the world. Holbrook’s personal recollections on that trip, how he was not aware where he was brought along and whom he was going to meet etc, appears as cynical as naïve, in view that it was USA who took an active role in organizing KLA. In fact, it was when USA appointed Ambassadors 1
We met Rahim Ademi before when considering the “Medački Džep massacre”.
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Holbrooke and Gelbride as special envoys for the southern Serbian province, their direct contact with “KLA” headquarters started. Encouraged by this U.S. behaviour, Klaus Kinkel, German foreign minister at the time, called “all European countries to follow the American example and make contact with the KLA”. Meanwhile extensive clashes between KLA and the state police were going on. According to the state records (see Appendix 4), at the time (mid-July, 1998), the KLA controlled over 50% of Kosovo-Metohija territory, including all the routes from Kosovo into Metohija, except for the Uroševac-Štrpce-Prizren highway. The size of KLA forces was estimated at some 25,000 wellarmed rebels, 1 concentrated around Drenica, Mališevo and Jablanica. The highest concentration of rebels was in: Shalja (ca. 2,500 armed rebels), EService (2,000), Drenica (3,500), Suva Reka (3.000) 2 , Orahovac, (1,500), Glodjane (3,000), Junik, (2,000), Zur (1,500), Jablanica (3,000) and Rugovo (1,500). In each one of those towns the “KLA” had a headquarters that directed terrorist actions and the arming of local villages. There were three regional HQs (Drenica, Jablanica and Malisevo), and the KLA general HQ was in Malisevo. In all areas under its control, the “KLA” had (a) territorial units, mostly village watches and village militia that would control villages and hold conquered territory, numbering some 15,000 men and (b) mobile forces, organized in companies, numbering about 10,000 men. The mission of mobile forces was to attack police checkpoints, VIE units, strategic buildings and government officials. This component of the KLA also had squads of raiders, military police, and other specialized units. Following the decision of the Supreme Defence Council, the Pristina Corps launched comprehensive counter-terrorist operations, which lasted a total of 65 days (July 25 - September 29, 1998). Battle action reports estimated that over 20,000 rebels were neutralized during the operation, as shown in Table 2. Table 2. Casualties of KLA, according to the official Serbian reports. Killed Wounded Escaped from KosovoMetohija Surrendered or disarmed Killed at the border Wounded at the border Captured at the border
3,500; 5.000-6.000, 4.000-5.000, 6.000-6.500, 666, 856, 822.
Generally, the media cover of the fighting in KiM in FRY was very poor, and under the strict censure. Details of the fighting were missing in the world media too, although for different reasons. In the former case, one could estimate a rough number of the police casualties, what would be discouraging information for the Serbian public and revolt against Milošević regime. As for the IC cover, these numbers would signal the character of the whole situation and divert the attention from the much publicized civilian casualties. Those who spent some time at KiM at the time, like police reservists, were no willing to talk about the details of the operations either, what made the KiM as mysterious as ever, considering the overall information cut-off of the province, as described earlier. In the mind of the Serbian population KiM resounded always in a tragic way, from Kosovo battle up to the present day. One may compare this psychosis with the Eastern Front fear in German Term “rebels” is inappropriate in this context, since many of KLA members were not from KiM, but came from outside Yugoslavia. On the other hand, the official terminology “terrorists” appears appropriate neither, in particular in view of the misuse of the term in the Palestinian and other cases. 2 We shall meet this village again later on. 1
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minds during the WWII, or with the trauma of Auschwitz in Jewish hearts. Generally, KiM in 1998 appears a black box, as physicists would call it. Only tips of iceberg, like that panel in front of the police station at Zemun, mentioned above, signalled something morbid was going on inside the cursed KiM region. If the general public was not informed (or was ill informed), there were, of course people who did not suffer from this handicap. First of all, these were Yugoslav intelligence service, but those ”verifiers” should not be underrated either in this context. Majority of them were in all probability, members of various intelligence services too, in particular of CIA. The latter used to send reports of military importance to their centres, what will prove to be of invaluable importance when the NATO raids start in 1999. The logic of guerrilla fighting The most “mysterious” of events which were going on during the undeclared war between Serbia and a part of the world, were atrocities and massacres which all sides involved committed in the fighting. There were no “front lines”, semi-guerrilla warfare only. Paramilitaries from the state side, KLA from the rebel side, used to behave against the international war regulations and good manners, what appears an inherent feature of all guerrilla warfare. On the top of this came the low level of civilization pandemic for this part of Balkan, and the individual consciousness of the moral which coloured majority of the clashes between semi-regular and irregular forces. KLA controlled at the beginning a rather compact territory, but as the fighting advanced, this compactness gave grounds to the dispersed, irregular points of control. In the absence of regular juristic organisation, prisons, etc the notion of prisoner of war loses sense. All state fighters captured were executed for this reason, some of them after a cruel questioning and torture. Some of atrocities committed by KLA saw day-light at the Hague Tribunal, in particular those attributed to Ramush Haradinaj, later the KiM prime minister. Generally, all candidates for Hague Tribunal will take prominent political positions after NATO occupation in 1999, thus gaining the protection of the political immunity. 1 Majority of the atrocities reported were committed by paramilitaries from both sides, if we accept that KLA was paramilitary organization itself. Irregular units, as mobile ones, are practically impossible to control at the spot. Their behaviour depends on the civilisation background from one side and the circumstances at the spot on the other. In the absence of a hierarchical command structure and well established communication and logistic network, individual qualities and behaviour appear crucial. If the civilisation background is high, the factor of the accidental situation need not be crucial. The case in point was that famous episode from Xenophon’s account in Anabasis, when Persians treacherously murdered the complete command staff of the Greek 10.000 men unit, in the very middle of Persia. Xenophon took over the command and succeeded to bring safely Greeks to their homeland. If we have in mind that the paramilitary leaders were mostly gangsters and even common criminals, we should not wonder about the atrocities which took place at KiM fighting from 1997 onwards. If we accept that the clashes started with ambushes of KLA, one would not expect a cavalier combat afterwards. This sort of fighting was common on Balkan for centuries. Highwaymen did it to trade caravans, Dinaroids to the Ottoman tax collecting or other regular state forces. Serbian Chetniks and Bulgarian units did it on the (Skopje) Macedonian soil, which was before Balkan wars another “disputed land” in the region. During the WWII it was a common practice of Yugoslav guerrillas, Mihailović’s Četniks and Tito’s partisans alike. And finally, the recent fighting in BiH exposed the best the ugly face of the “warfare” of the loosely controlled (or uncontrolled) mobile units. It was one of atrocities, that committed at Sarajevo street Vase Miskina, which was decisive in deciding to end the “war” at any cost, what brought the sides This was not a Shiptar invention, however. After “wars’ in Croatia and BiH many of paramilitaries from Serbia became MP at the Serbian Assembly, gaining thus MP immunity, as the case of the gangster and war criminal Arkan illustrates.
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involved, better to say their leaders, from the inside and outside alike, to Dayton in 1995. Since the later incident proved paradigmatic, we describe it in some more detail. In fact, we can not do it properly, and that’s the crux of matter in affairs like this. The fact everybody acknowledges was that a shall fell on a crowd queuing for bread in the Sarajevo street Vase Miskina. Many people were killed and wounded. Muslims claimed that the shell was fired from the Bosnian Serbs’ side (who kept the unfortunate city besieged for three years), whereas Serbs 1 denied it claiming in their turn that it were Muslims themselves who did it as a provocation. The latter assertions have been accepted even by some international observers (or commentators), but generally Muslim claims have gained the international support. This point illustrates how much the propaganda interferes with the facts, when the sides in clash do not enjoy the trust of the external world. The KiM affairs will expose this point even more clearly, as we are going to see. The accident helped the IC concerned to decide to intervene, and this has been the only matter which really matters. It was obvious that the details, as to who did the misdeed, were of no crucial value concerning the decision to stop the fighting, though the ethos involved remains to be clarified. Another point to be made concerns the question of the completeness of evidence, not only from the facts details, but the general setting for the accidents considered. More precisely, we refer to the prehistory of the atrocities reported. As revealed at Hague Tribunal, the indictments have been concentrated on the very atrocities, without going into the question what provoked them. Here we encounter a “hidden conspiracy” between the prosecution and the accused. Namely, the latter never raise the question of prehistory of the alleged massacres. Why? Their strategy for defending themselves has always been to deny their direct involvements in the event. This stratagem rests on the “0 – 1” logic: defendant hopes to be relieved completely from the guilt, unless he is sentenced maximally. The logic is simple: by introducing extenuating circumstances, he admits implicitly his involvement in the affair. On the other hand, patriotic (sic) supporters, usually state background sectors, do discuss these “extenuating circumstances”, but the latter are aimed at the “patriotic supporters”, rather than at the IC and the Tribunal. This “all or nothing” stratagem will appear very much present when the picture of the KiM fighting emerges on the IC scene. Another paradigmatic case for illustrating the “undeclared wars” is that of (in)famous massacre at Srebrenica in 1995. It illustrates several important points to be made. First, the prehistory effect. The Srebrenica enclave was considered untenable by the military experts and gen. Morion, whose headquarters were at Zagreb, was explicit on that point. Second, encircled Muslims used to go out from the besieged town and plunder the neighbouring Serb villages,2 killing many people in these raids. Third, while the military unit situated at the town was a numerous and very strong, when gen. Mladic entered the town not a single Muslim soldier in uniform was found. The last point bears the most profound consequences: by replacing the uniforms by the civil cloths the soldiers saved themselves (better to say hoped to do that), but exposed their civil compatriots to the enemy’s retaliation. As it did happen with the Srebrenica civilians, unfortunately. Generally, no accident of the kind we just considered has proved fully cleared and understood, neither in BiH nor on KiM. We now pass to the actual warfare on KiM in 1997/1998. 1997-1998 armed conflict Preparations for the secession started long time before the open outbreak of the armed rebellion in 1997, 3 but in the latter years they took an explicit rebellion character. Before we follow the gradual increase of the violence, we first make distinction between the urban and rural areas guerrilla tactics. We note we are using commonly accepted terminology that militaries engaged in BiH fighting were Muslims, Serbs and Croats, but in fact many of “Serbs” were ethnic Montenegrins, as the case with Radovan Karadzic was. 2 This instance is, of course, linked with the first point. 3 USA was engaged in preparing it from 1993. 1
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In towns, armed actions used to be undertaken mainly during the nights. Members of KLA or otherwise take hidden arms and go out for attacking police stations or other state institutions. In the first phase of rebellion these guerrillas wore no uniforms and their actions had purely terrorist character. When the NATO actions in 1999 ended and reportages on the guerrilla warfare were made by the western journalist, one could get some taste of the character of these actions. In one of these reports a boy of some 16/17 years described his action in Priština. He took a bomb at midnight, sneaked to the window of a café where Serb (more precisely, from the boy’s viewpoint non-Albanian) young people were seating and threw the bomb through the window. Then, narrates the boy with a “mischievous smile”, after the detonation he run around the corner, bought a hamburger at the kiosk, and when the police car arrived he calmly passed by eating his hamburger. What one strikes the most with this exploit is the “naughty innocence” of the boy’s narrative, as if he was watering somebody or like. It will be such an innocent behaviour of his elders in the following demands and “negotiations” with Serbian officials which will seduce the mediators dealing with KiM issue, as we shall see later on. In the rural area tactics was similar at the beginning, but later, when the more massive engagements started, KLA fighters wore uniforms. They started with night actions, and when the action was over, before the dawn they would return home and change the uniform by the civilian one and behaved as innocent civilians. In towns they used to go to work in the morning, after night actions. A case in point was that of Adem Jashari, the strongman and gangster from Drenica village Prekaz. 1 We recall that Drenica region has always been the core of Shqiptar rebellions against Yugoslav state. Known as gangster, Jashari’s house was under the police surveillance for six months, watching how cars depart during night and return at dawn. Tomorrow a terrorist action was reported from the direction of the night journey. Here is the official report about clashes with Jashari’s men: 2 Terrorist attacks in the region of Srbica, which for many months have endangered the security of several roads, led to numerous civilian casualties, and jeopardized the safety of citizens of all ethnicities, created a need to re-establish full control of the roads in this area through the use of police outposts. Adem Jashari’s terrorist group tried to interfere with this operation on February 28, attacking police patrols and killing four, while wounding two officers. Sixteen terrorists were killed in a battle with this group. In the early morning hours of March 5, a terrorist group attacked another police patrol near the village of Donje Prekaze. After police returned fire, the terrorists retreated to their base and dug in at the Jashari family farm in that village... engagement with the terrorists lasted for 27 hours, with a total of 51 casualties. Unfortunately, it was later established that Jashari family members were among them. Terrorists physically prevented them from leaving the farm, despite the police invitation. The Interior Ministry expresses regret and bitterness that these victims were a direct consequence of cruelty and ruthlessness of Albanian terrorists. The police could not have known how many, if any, civilians were detained by the terrorists, since dozens of civilians did respond to the police invitation to evacuate the village. The fact that he personally shot his nephew to prevent him from surrendering testifies to Adem Jashari’s cruelty. Two officers lost their lives in this action, and seven were seriously injured. March 5: At dawn, in the village of Lausa, a group of terrorists attacks a police patrol, wounding two officers. Reinforcements arrive and the battle moves towards Donje Prekaze and Gornje Prekaze. Women, children and the elderly villagers are evacuated. 1 2
Readers may recall the episode from 70-ies which occurred in that village, as described earlier. See Appendix 12.
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Terrorists are forced to scatter, carrying off their dead and wounded into the nearby woods. Two officers are killed and four injured. Twenty terrorists are killed. Eight terrorists surrender, emerging from a well-camouflaged bunker. Three large bunkers are discovered overall, two with medical equipment and one filled with ammunition, weapons and demolition explosives, which also served as the command center. Among the terrorists killed in Donji Prekaz are terrorist leader Adem Jashari (age 43) and Rexhep Sellami (age 29). Both had been sentenced in absentia to 29 years imprisonment. Year 1998 was crucial for the KiM fate. It was this year when Milošević agreed to allow the international surveyors to come to KiM, as verifiers. This mistake will prove fatal for Serbia. First, in letting the foreign inspectors to enter the Serbian soil Milošević internationalized Serbian internal affairs. We note here that Serbia was not for the first time in such a humiliating position in her history. After the Sarajevo assassination in 1914, when the Austro-Hungarian prince Ferdinand and his wife were assassinated by BiH nationalist Gavril Principe, Austro-Hungary delivered an ultimatum to Serbia. Belgrade accepted all demands, except that the Austro-Hungarian police runs the investigations in Serbia, since this would imply a lost of sovereignty of Serbia. As the result Austro-Hungary attacked Serbia and the Great War started. (Serbia lost a quarter of her population in the ensuing war.) Before we go on with KiM issue, a parallel between 1914 and 1998 situations seems in order here. In 1914 it was an act of terrorism committed in a foreign country, by a foreign citizen, who happened to be a Serb. 1 Knowing now what the outcome of this Serbian refusal was, it is easy now to be wise and consider that it would have been much better if Serbia had forgotten her national pride and fulfilled all demands. But such a subsequent wisdom is of little help, of course. In 1998 the state of Serbia (as an institution) struggled with the internal unrests and armed violence. True, many of those rebels were not rebels at all, by mercenaries from abroad, mainly from Albania, USA and Germany. If one had to internationalize the KiM issue, she should have accused the external factors for interfering Serbian internal affairs, just as Serbia herself was accused (and sentenced) for her engagements in Croatia and BiH. Letting foreign verifiers into Serbian soil, Belgrade have made the first step towards losing KiM. Was Milošević aware of this? Yes and no. First, he was an optimistic politician, always expecting the most favourable (for him or Serbia) outcome of his political acts. As a Dinaroid, his mind was sclerotic one, working on the principle “all or nothing”. He would not bend before reality, but somehow expected that the latter complies with his wishes. If the reality turns out different from his imagination, he would simply turn away from it, better to say from this sector of the real world and ignore it. Second, Milošević was not in an easy situation. He was well aware of the reputation he had before IC, after Vukovar, Serbian Krajina Republic, Republic Serbian and nasty events ascribed to him and Serbia, rightly or not. By allowing the IC to interfere into Serbian domestic affairs, he (semiconsciously) wanted to compensate for the previous misdeed. Unfortunately for Serbia, his influence on the Serbian domestic political scene was so strong that his personal misgivings were imposed as an unbearable burden to the entire state. What was really the purpose of those verifiers? When one sets up a commission, for example, he prescribes the rules the latter employees, then the way the findings are verified and put into operation and finally the possible verdicts concerning the faults when they are detected. The official explanations have been that the verifier should observe the clashes between the state forces and the rebels and see that the state response to the guerrilla violence is not “unproportional”. What the latter meant was left to the judgments of the verifiers at the spot. Further, which extent of violence exerted by rebels was tolerable from the verifiers and what would be the measures to be 1
Though the organization which organized the assassination was multiethnic, comprising Serbs, Croats and Muslims.
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taken if these were “unproportional” or simply intolerable? From the present day perspective, one can contrive a model which has been designed for Serbia, doomed to be accused for violence and inhuman behaviour. In the situation of fighting against guerrilla forces which nobody controlled or accepted political and humanistic responsibility, one could expect any kind and any magnitude of atrocities committed on the spot. Within any realistic distribution of these atrocities one can always expect to single out at least one, which fulfils the demands of “unproportional response”, as it turned out to happen soon after the verifiers were distributed over KiM area. The Shqiptar rebels were, of course, aware of that. What they needed was just one case of an “unproportional response”, and it was not hard to produce among hundreds of clashes with the state forces, regular or paramilitary ones. Hence, one would not wait long for Račak. The martyrdom syndrome Martyrdom as a stratagem of overpowering a superior adversary has been used by many nations, movements, especially religious ones, etc. The most prominent case in the western world has been that of Israelis in Palestine during the Roman rule, as described by Joseph Flavius in his capital work Jewish War. 1 This stratagem was subsequently widely used by early Christians all over the Roman Empire, until the final victory under the Constantine’s rule. The same tactics will prove a very successful means for attaining prominence within the Christendom, by the so-called heretics, many of whom became saints later on. 2 In a somewhat milder form the martyrdom stratagem has been used by many political and social leaders, like Mahatma Ghandi. Shqiptar moderate political leader, Ibrahim Rugova, arguing for purely political, peaceful means in attaining the secession of KiM, appears another example of the logic: victory via suffering. He used to wear kerchief around his neck, as a token of the “Serb strangling Shqiptars”, declaring he would take it off once the secession has been achieved. Unfortunately his approach was overpowered by the militant rebels, like Hashim Tachi, Haradinaj, Cheku etc. 3 He died before he would witness the victory of the rival approach in 2008. Before we go back to the KiM situation in 1997/8, a few words and insightful inspections into the Flavius’ account of the Jewish martyrdom are in order. Herod the Great, Joseph’s hero, took great efforts to uproot the criminal activities in Israel, in particular that of the robbers. Here is an account of one of his expeditions on the matter: 4 [so] Herod willingly dismissed Silo to go to Ventidius; but he made an expedition himself against those that lay in the caves. (310) Now these caves were in the precipices of craggy mountains, and could not be come at from any side, since they had only some winding pathways, very narrow, by which they got up to them; but the rock that lay on their front had beneath valleys of a vast depth, and of an almost perpendicular declivity; insomuch that the king was doubtful for a long time what to do, by reason of a kind of impossibility there was of attacking the place. Yet did he at length make use of a contrivance that was subject to the utmost hazard; (311) for he let down the most hardy of his men in chests, and set them at the mouths of the dens. Now these men slew the robbers and their families, and when they made resistance, they sent in fire upon them, 1
Joseph Flavius, The Jewish War, Dorset Press, New York, 1985.
2
Walter Nigg, Das Buch der Ketzer, Atremis-Verlag, Zürich
3
At Hague Tribunal process against Milošević, a Shiptar serving in the State Security Service at the time, claimed as the protected witness K6 that KLA planned to assassinate Rugova. 4 Flavius Josephus, Complete Works, Nelson & Sons, London, 1859, p. 567.
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[and burned them]; and as Herod was desirous of saving some of them, he had proclamation made, that they should come and deliver themselves up to him; but not one of them came willingly to him; and of those that were compelled to come, many preferred death to captivity. (312) And here a certain old man, the farther of seven children, together with their mother, desired him to give them leave to go out, upon the assurance an right hand that was offered them, slew them after the following manner: He ordered every one of them to go out, while he stood himself at the cave’s mouth, and slew that son of his perpetually who went out. Herod was near enough to see this sight, and his bowels of compassion were moved at it, and he stretched out his right hand to the old man, and besought him to spare his children; (313) yet did not he relent at all upon what he said; but over and above reproached Herod on the lowness of his descent, and slew his wife as well as his children, and when he had thrown their dead bodies down the precipice, he at last threw himself down after them. As we will see this episode of the Herod’s doing “ethical cleansing” of his state, bear a strong resemblance of the Milošević’s “ethnical cleansing” of KiM (alleged or real). We note some characterising features of the case. First, the rabid defiance of the robbers of the highest stat authority need not necessarily be motivated by august feelings, but the criminals may make use of the latter as a cover. In the case of the old man just described above, his ideological, no to say ethical, justification was the fact that the king was not a pure Jew, 1 what made the robber superior to him. This nationalistic argument will turn decisive in the KiM disputes between the claims over territory. Incidentally, just as Herod was quasi-Jew, Milošević was quasi-Serb (being a Montenegrin). Incidentally also, Serbs in Serbia never used the nationalistic arguments in fighting Milošević and his autocracy in 90-ies (see page xx Vešović). Our hero Herod the Great is a paradigm for our next example concerning the use of the nationalistic pathos, albeit implicitly. It concerns the myth of Massada. 2 This fortress was built by the Israeli king as palace, close to the Dead Sea, well equipped and fortified, on a practically inaccessible top of a mountain. At the end of the revolt against Romans (Jewish war), 73 AD, a group of the militant wing of Zealots, sikarii, mentioned earlier, occupied the place and used it as their stronghold. They used to make raids to the surrounding areas and rob local people, Jews and nonJews alike. Vespasian sent a legion there to conquer the fortress at any price. The siege lasted for three months and after an extensive preparation to make the access to the fortress, Romans entered the place. According to Joseph Flavius (the only source of information on the matter) they found all defenders dead and two women with children alive. These women testified that the men slaughtered the women and children and then committed suicide themselves, after a moving speech of their leader Elazar Ben-Yair, on the Passover eve. 3 Those two women hid themselves and managed to survive. In the period of founding the new state of Israel, both within the preparatory ideological (mythological) period and during the forming of the actual state, this episode was made a nationalistic myth, were the event was described as a paradigm of a heroic exploit, of the national martyrdom etc. The new conscript unites used to swear on Massada their devotion to Israel and readiness to sacrifice their life, with words: “Massada will never fall again!” When the state has been fully established and consolidated and no real threat for her existence was imminent, the bright side of the story was forgotten and the fact that the event referred to robbers, not to heroes, has been let apparent. New state ideology required the sense of strength and vigour, not of passive martyrdom. It was in this direction that some modern Israeli commentators express doubts about Josephus’ veracity. According to them, what really happened was that Romans, upon conquering His father was an Idumaean, his mother Nabatean. See, e.g. http://www.dudi.tripod.com/massada.html, for a brief overview. 3 Obviously the date (real or invented) was meant to provide the act a sacrificial nature, just as 19 centuries later the same will be ascribed to Shoah (Holocaust) by some modern interpreters. 1
2
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the fortress, slaughtered all inside it, and then contrived the story of the collective suicide. Joseph, according to this interpretation, was eager to conceal the cruelty of Romans, who were his patrons and protectors at the time he wrote his Jewish War. 1 Interestingly, when reading Massada story with the mix of heroic and criminal, one can not help recalling the Gospels account of Jesus from Nazareth suffering and martyrdom. In fact both accounts were written at about the same time, in 70-ies AD. But the parallel goes even further. Massada robbers were proclaimed, though temporarily, national heroes. Jesus was, presumably, crucified together with robbers, who flanked him on crosses at Golgotha. True, these fellowsufferers were described as thieves, but if anything appears realistic with this story, it is highly improbable that common thieves would be punished in such a cruel manner. We have dwelled in some details on these instances from Palestine history, 2 for KiM issue abounds with the myths and martyrdom syndrome. In fact, any movement of the national emancipation, or liberation, involves inevitably the martyrdom syndrom. On KiM we have seen how Serb and Shqiptar martydom impulses alternating in time, depending on the circumstances. When the region was under the Ottoman rule, it was Serbs (and Christians generally) who considered themselves victims, while ethnic Albanians were considered the privileged people and tools of the oppressive Muslim regime. When KiM was liberated from the Turkish occupation, the parties exchanged sides. From 1912 onwards, Shqiptars claimed to be oppressed by Serbian authorities, but when from 1974 KiM became practically republic, that is semi-state, it was non-Shqiptar inhabitants who felt underrated and complained for suppression. After Milošević banished much of the KiM (and Vojvodina) autonomy in 1989, Shqiptar population resumed their complaining against Serbian rule, forgetting that what Milošević did was nothing but a response to the previous misuse of the KiM autonomy. Finally, after NATO occupied KiM in 1999, under the reluctant cover of UN (sic), both parties exchanged the sides once again. 3 How KiM region has been somehow bound to resort to the martyrdom, we saw already in the Serb mythopoetic image of the Kosovo-battle issue and the imitatio Christi syndrome. In fact many of the Serb allegations against Shqiptars during the KiM autonomy were at least expressed in the form of victim-oppressor relationship, that is as martydom. As we shall see later on, Serbian politicians continued with this trump of “eternal victims”, unlike Israelis, who finally got rid of this humiliating approach to their political destiny. The episode with Adem Jashari resembles much the Palestinian robbers’ issues, as mentioned above. 4 Kosovo Roshomon – the Račak case As mentioned before, whence the KiMisue was internationalized, the case was lost for Serbia. In a multitude of clashes and incidents, real or fictive, one inevitable encounters «crucial one», needed for making radical decisions concerning further treatment of the issue. This case occured at the village of Račak. The incident served for the verifier Walker as the crown proof that the Serbian forces employed «disproportional response» to the rebels' actions. As in the »crown case» of Markale at Sarajevo, mentioned before, the incident served as a turning point, beter to say point of no return for deciding onfurther actioons by IC. In the Serbian oficial file one reads:
The original text of the book was in Greek (as other Flavius’ works were) and the influence of the Stoic philosophy on the martyrdom interpretation of the event can not be overestimated, in this context. 2 We take the meaning of the term in its original, Herodotian sense. 1
3
How easy is to pass from a victim to an oppressor we witness these last decades at the Middle East.
4 The protected witness K6, mentioned above, confirmed at the Hague Tribunal the official story about Adem Jashari. In particular, he threatened his family with killing all who try to surrender. Never-the-less K6 considered Jashari hero.
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Expert reports on the Markale massacre were thus hidden in the files of the UN Security Council, just as the Finnish forensic experts’ report on Racak was hidden in the vaults of ICTY. European Commissioner for foreign relations Chris Patten thinks that the Finnish autopsy report according to which the “Serb forces did not commit a massacre in that Kosovo village,” should not be made available to the public, in order to “avoid direct interference in the ICTY’s investigation”! So what really happened in Račak on January 15, 1999? We quote again the official report: A routine police patrol was ambushed by the “KLA” terrorists on January 14, killing officer Svetislav Prsic. The following day, January 15, 1999, a reinforced unit of the Serbian police followed the terrorists’ trail and launched a successful operation that inflicted great casualties on the terrorists. The unit had previously infiltrated the empty KLA fortifications (capturing the terrorist guard and obtaining from him all the warning signals), thus establishing a great advantage over the terrorists. Firing from up close, from the well-prepared entrenchments, they prevented a group of some 40 armed terrorists from deploying into the trenches from a nearby farmhouse, where they had slept to avoid the cold night temperatures. However, the police could not remain in the village due to heavy fire from terrorist positions on the nearby hills. William Walker and Pristina district attorney Danica Maksimovic came to the village the following day. Walker immediately made a statement (January 16, 1999): “From what I personally saw, I do not hesitate to describe the crime as a massacre, a crime against humanity, nor do I hesitate to accuse the government security forces of responsibility.” This “verdict,” before any of the experts could investigate the scene, was followed by the decision of the U.S. government and NATO to attack the FRY. Maksimovic’s report was completely different. However, none of the world leaders paid it any heed. She said that a massacre of civilians in Račak was out of the question. At first, she was not even allowed to survey the scene. Following Walker’s scenario, the dead terrorists were not buried the same day (as Moslem custom calls for) but were dressed in civilian clothing and set on display in the nearby mosque, in order to send the images of “massacred civilians” to the world. Still, because of the obvious discrepancies between reports on what happened in Račak, a “neutral” group of Finnish forensic experts was formed to conduct autopsies on the bodies and establish if they were civilians or “KLA” combat casualties. Though the Finnish experts’ report denies any massacre in Račak, Walker and his superiors managed to extort a statement from their leader, Dr. Helena Ranta (probably with a sizeable payoff), that the victims were “probably” civilians. A full report was classified – just like the one about Markale in Sarajevo – and stored in the vaults of Secretary Solana and General Clark. Those who ordered the criminal bombardment of Yugoslavia made the fabricated massacre in Račak into a pretext for their already planned aggression. Only in early February 2001 did the Finnish experts’ report reach the ICTY. Its conclusions were printed in Forensic Science International, (quoted by the Berliner Zeitung of February 16, 2001), saying, among other things, that one cannot make a conclusion that security forces massacred Albanian civilians in Račak, as Walker had claimed. If, at the tie the Indictment was put together, its authors could possibly have believed Walker’s statements, they cannot continue to treat them as key evidence now that the entire fabrication has been exposed. Cannot, that is, if they care for their reputation and
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integrity. Also exposed was the criminal character of U.S. Ambassador/General William Walker. The weak point of the report is the “lacuna” in the form of the night between January 15 and January 16, when the dead were left without control. The explanation for withdrawing the police units from the village because of the intense fire of KLA from nearby hills appears plausible, but other explanations come to mind too. Could the policemen retaliate for their dead and wounded, killing civilians? On the other hand why would they leave unprotected these corps, as proofs of the massacre, since the arrival of verifiers was to be expected as imminent? Did KLA take advantage of the absence of the police to gather all those killed in action and deposit them into that gully? Were all those exposed bodies civilian victims or KLA fighters reclothed into civilians? If all those killed were villagers from Račak, how that happened that no local villager was witness of the alleged massacre? At Hague Tribunal Milošević skillfully exposed the weak points of the prosecutor’s model of the event and demonstrated the unreliable nature of the testifiers brought to Court by the prosecutor. In particular he pointed out the unnatural positions of many of corps, which could not be attained if the victims were executed on the spot. On the other hand, no proof has been offered that the victims were killed first, and then reclothed into civilian clothes. But equally strange was the fact that almost no cartridge shells were found on the spot, making the case for massacre very improbable. It is very strange also that no testimony from the side of the police unit has been asked and offered. It seems that the syndrome “all of nothing”, described earlier concerning the testimonies of the accused at various courts, local and Hague alike, has been adopted. In the absence of reliable records, we take liberty to offer a plausible explanation of the event. The fighting which developed that day engaged not only KLA (who probably had nothing to do with Račak, as usually those KLA units came from afar, possibly from Albania), but the local villagers. We encountered similar case in that episode at village Prekazi (Drenica), when a Shqiptar criminal was to be arrested in 1970-ies. Another case was that concerning Adem Jashari, mentioned above, too. As stressed many times, in the affairs concerning guerilla fighting, there is no essential difference between fighters in uniforms and in civilian clothes. Civilians at KiM, Shqiptar and nonShqiptar alike, are well equipped with arms. In fact, Shqiptar villages needed no support from KLA to resist police actions. Hence, when the police unite withdraw, all villagers killed were collected and deposited, whereas the KLA dead were taken along outside Račak. We have dwelled on this case more in order to show how difficult it was to get a reliable record in general and in this particular case especially. But it was on this case that William Walker contrived his accusations, with the far reaching consequences. On the other hand it appears obvious from the above details that the general decision concerning KiM issue was already made and the Račak was just waited to corroborate the USA political attitude. The prompt verdict William Walker made after a glimpse at the corps corroborates the feelings of a prefabricated verdict.1 According to statistics of the Serbian Interior Ministry (MUP), between February and June 1998 there were 409 registered KLA attacks in KiM – over 80 attacks per month, an average of about three per day. It is worth pointing out that of those attacks, 261 of them targeted civilians and civilian buildings. In this period, the rebels killed 35 and injured 50 non-Albanians (29 seriously); 143 of their victims were non-Serbs (among them 26 killed and 43 injured Albanians). Serbian police forces were targets of 148 attacks, suffering 18 dead and 67 injured. An eye-opener is that the KLA killed more Albanians (26) than Serbian police (18), with a similar proportion among the injured. From Rambouillet to Paris 1
The case of the Anglo-American aggression on Iraq amply illustrates the point.
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When the Serbian authorities realized what was the real role of the “verifiers”, they decided to banish them from SRJ. But the damage was done and it will prove an unrepearable one. The invitation of the external surveyors was a bad mistake, but banishing them even worse. From then on, the road to national disaster was paved up. Before we go on, a few words more about the logic of rebellion seems in order. Depending on the overall situation, the tactics adopted by rebels varies from one extreme to the other. In the case of Slovenia and Croatia secession, women and children were used as living shield against the state army. The later consisted of all Yugoslav nationalities, including regional ones, so that it was not expected that the soldiers would shoot the civilians, thus protecting the rebels behind them. Situations like this used to occur during the “Alicia-like” sieges in Croatia. Usually a local army garrison was besieged by the secessionist fighters, and the Yugoslav army besieging them. With the powerful artillery Army could easily destroy the towns, but declined to do that and the besieged army garrison surrendered to the rebels instead. 1 At KiM one should distinguish two phases of the KLA tactics. The first one, before the external verifiers were employed, the tactics was to use the civilians as shields, but in a restricted, passive manner. Too many civilian victims would discourage the people and loose their support for the rebellion. Contrary to that, when “verifiers” appeared, civilian victims not only were of no importance for the domestic scene, but very “convenient” concerning the IC public. In fact, if somebody was to blame for civilian casualties it was the very verifiers, ready to expose any civilian victim as a proof of the Serbian cruelty etc, inviting the public media to call for the world sympathy. And it was just this point which happened. We note in passing that Shqiptar sources and propaganda in general never talk about Serbia and Serbian forces, but exclusively about Serbs. Interestingly, the world public media accepted this denomination generally, depicting the whole case as an inter-national clash (between Shqiptars and Serbs). It appears as adequate as if one would call the Falkland issue in 1982 as a clash between Englishmen (not Britons) and Argentineans. In fact it has become clear what was in store for Serbia in a retrospective only. In view what was going to happen in 1999 it is obvious that Serbian government could play better cards at the time, but of course, it is a subsequent wisdom, when everybody may be a general after the battle. Neverthe-less a lesson from history would not harm Milošević, when making political decisions concerning the relationship with the “external factors”. At the Hague trial to Milan Milutinovic, former President of Serbia during the NATO aggression, British military attaché John Crosland stated that the principal concern of western Allies, first of all USA, was an overthrow of Milošević. According to him, President Bill Clinton, state secretary Mad lain Albright and the chief negotiator Richard Holbrook made decision that the best way to remove Milošević would be by making use of KLA. Thus, the organization which was proclaimed terrorist at the time, was adopted as an ally under the circumstances. In the early 1941 Yugoslavia was subjected to enormous pressure from the Hitler’s side, to sign an alliance with Germany and Mussolini’s Italy. All responsible politicians in Yugoslavia, except the fascist Ustashas in Croatia, were against the signing that humiliating alliance, with the consent of the overwhelming majority of the Yugoslav population. But the situation was very difficult, indeed. Western Allies were on defense, Britain fighting her battle for survival, France defeated and divided, USSR was a formal ally of Germany and much in the same situation as Yugoslavia, expecting Hitler’s assault any time. All Yugoslav neighbours, except Greece, of course, were already under the Hitler’s control, ready to join German assault. Regent Paul was trying to get the time and postpone the crucial decision as long as possible, but had to succumb finally and Yugoslav government signed the Triple Alliance on March 25. Next day majority of Yugoslavs went to streets to demonstrate their dissatisfaction with the move of the government. The following night a group of high rank officers made coup d’etat and formed a new government. The new government incorporated many of the old members, in order to convince Hitler in her good 1 What would happen in the opposite case was demonstrated at Vukovar battle, which started as fighting for the besieged army garrison.
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intentions and in sticking to the signed Alliance. But alea iacta est was done. Hitler attacked Yugoslavia on April 6, 1941, without formal declaration of war, and crashed the Yugoslav army, with the help of his vassal states around Yugoslavia and his fifth column inside the state, in 10 days. Here we note a point which will gain its full significance very soon as the Balkan drama was evolving. It has become evident that it was the British government who stood behind both Yugoslav moves, that of signing the Alliance and of breaking it. It was designed as the best means to involve Yugoslavia into the European conflict and thus ease the pressure on the Western Allies, in particular Great Britain. In passing a value judgment on moves like that one must account for the historical and global context of the entire situation. Great Britain was a true ally of Serbia in the Great War, and helped much in liberating Balkan from the Germans and Austro-Hungarians, what resulted in founding Yugoslav state. The sacrifice which was expected from Yugoslavia turned out decisive for the final outcome of the WWII. Couple of months Hitler lost for his action against Yugoslavia turned out instrumental for German defeat before Moscow in1941, because of the overall delay of the planned “Barbarosa” plan.1 We have dwelled upon this instance because a similar situation arouse in 1998, with Serbia playing the role of the former Yugoslavia, USA of Hitler’s Germany and USSR of Great Britain, mutatis mutandis. Just as Hitler required Yugoslavia to surrender her sovereignty by signing a humiliating alliance, which obliged Yugoslavia to allow for the unrestricted and uncontrolled transport of army and military equipment through Yugoslavia, needed for fighting Greece and Allies in Northern Africa, USA put Serbia before a choice: either the restricted loss of sovereignty and practically complete loss of KiM, or the complete loss of KiM. The plan was as follows: Demanding from Serbia the first alternative, expecting her rejection, and then taking KiM from her by force. In order to simulate the just and formally correct procedure, they needed Shqiptar as a mock negotiating side. Hence, a meeting was arranged at Rambouillet, with Serbians and Shqiptars participating in mock negotiations, under the strict supervision of the Western states. What really western allies expected from these negotiations (sic)? They were well aware that Shqiptars rejected any negotiations with Belgrade, as the recent history clearly demonstrated. Hence, formally, both sides were put before the choice “take or leave it”. But the choice for Serbia was of the sort “You can’t lose more than everything”. As for Shqiptar side, they were offered with a sure outcome, (provided they play appropriately): You don’t get everything you want at the first instance, but since Belgrade will surely reject the agreement, you will get the rest you demand for. When I visited in1997 the official summer residence of the French president, it was a high summer and Rambouillet palace was bathing in July son. The very palace was closed for the visitors, but the “tourist hordes” as Steven Hawking would term it, were all around the well maintained park. My wheel chair could hardly move over the loose gravel and I stayed in a lane, while my wife walked around with a couple of friends. I was watching the palace not knowing that the place will in a year be the stage of meeting as important for Serbia as it was that at Trianon palace in 1918. How the meeting was envisaged by the Western Allies? It is interesting to compare the arrangement with that at Dayton in 1995. There all sides involved were gathered together, but only Bosnian Muslims, Serbia and Croatia were taking active parts in negotiations. These sides were represented by the actual political leaders, Alija Izetbegović from the Muslim, Slobodan Milošević from Serbian and Franjo Tudjman from Croat sides, respectively. All sides were convinced by the USA hosts that they are not going out from the summit before signing an agreement. Muslims, Serbs and Croats from Bosnia were consulted, but excluded from direct negotiations. The final agreement was imposed by the Allies and the Bosnian war was finally stopped. Rambouillet was preceded by a meeting of the so-called Contact Group in London, (January 29, 1999), which had previously discussed conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, though lacking any 1
There have been some other interpretations concerning the real cause of that delay, but we can not dwell here on it.
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mandate to do so. Acting on behalf of the IC, this soi-disant organization created the list of ten principles for resolving the crisis in Kosovo-Metohija: Contact Group Non-negotiable Principles/Basic Elements, 30 January 1999 General elements • Necessity of immediate end of violence and respect for a cease-fire • Peaceful solution through dialogue • Interim agreement: a mechanism for a final settlement after an interim period of three years • No unilateral change of interim status • Territorial integrity of the FRY and neighbouring countries • Protection of the rights of members of all national communities (preservation of identity, language and education; special protection for their religious institutions) • Free and fair elections in Kosovo (municipal and Kosovo-wide) under supervision of the OSCE • Neither party shall prosecute anyone for crimes related to the Kosovo conflict (exceptions: crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other serious violations of international law) • Amnesty and release of political prisoners • International involvement and full co-operation by the parties concerning implementation Governance in Kosovo • People of Kosovo to be self-governed by democratically accountable Kosovo institutions • High degree of self-governance realized through own legislative, executive and judiciary bodies (with authority over, inter alia, taxes, financing, police, economic development, judicial system, health care, education and culture (subject to the rights of the members of national communities), communications, roads and transport, protection of the environment • Legislative: Assembly • Executive: President of Kosovo, Government, Administrative bodies • Judiciary: Kosovo court system • Clear definition of competencies at communal level • Members of all national communities to be fairly represented at all levels of administration and elected government • Local police representative of ethnic make-up with coordination on Kosovo level • Harmonisation of Serbian and Federal legal frameworks with Kosovo interim agreement • Kosovo consent required inter alia for changes to borders and declaration of martial law. The formulation of the above non-negotiable points deserves serious attention. The very term nonnegotiable puts formally both sides into a passive, even humiliating position. But in fact this arrogant attitude refers only to Belgrade side. The very fact that both sides are treated on equal footing indicates that the final solution will favour the rebellious province. It has the form of an arbitrage between two states in war, not a help to solving problems a sovereign state has with a part of her territory. Even by mere considering such an ultimatum-like propositions Serbia would renounce her sovereignty. And she not only did it, but accepted the ultimatum. Why? The tacit official explanation was that the government wanted to save the nation from the threatening NATO aggression. If it was a real rationale, it was wrong. It was obvious that Serbia had no choice, as Czecko-Slovakia had no choice before the Hitler’s demands. By accepting humiliating conditions, one anticipates his total defeat. As after Ruhr and Anschluss it was obvious that Sudetian Germans were a mere excuse for further aggression. After General Walker and Račak, Contact group was just another step towards the final solution – KiM secession. Chamberlain did not (want to) realize that (unlike Churchill), Milošević perhaps had no illusions, but under the pressure of the previous misdeeds, both inside and outside Serbia, we mentioned
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above, he thought such an gesture would provide him with good excuse for the following anticipated disasters for Serbia. Majority of the above points were already part of the KiM autonomy before Milošević abolished it. But some points are just unacceptable, even disgusting. Consider the two last above. • Harmonisation of Serbian and Federal legal frameworks with Kosovo interim agreement It amounts to dictating to SRY her legal system, via imposing the rules through KiM legal structure. Even worse – KiM now appears superior entity relative to the entire state. Normally a part of a state adjusts its legal system to that of the hole, not vice versa. • Kosovo consent required inter alia for changes to borders and declaration of martial law. KiM obtains the right to block any step taken by SRY concerning the security, even her existence. Martial law is imposed under well defined circumstances, like an attempted coup d’ etat. In principle, KiM authorities might plan such a coup d’ etat and could prevent the state to protect herself. When after the assassination of Zoran Djindjic, the prime minister of Serbia in March 2003, government declared the martial law, it prevented the coup d’ etat planed by assassins and their political patrons, as it clearly turned out to be the case. As we shall see in the following, the so-called Kumanovo agreement (capitulation in fact) was a direct outcome of this fatal mistake by the SRY government. Succumbing to humiliating demands invites for the final execution. At Rambouillet, Shqiptar delegation included the principal political and military leaders from KiM, including Ibrahim Rugova, but the actual chief was the KLA leader Hashim Thachi (Taqi). From Serbian side delegation was lead by the president of Serbia, Milan Milutinovic, Milošević’s crony, though the official head was Professor Ratko Marković (another Milošević crony). Te rule has been imposed on both sides that nobody would leave the place during the negotiations, so as to prevent both sides to consult the ”base” at home. Specifically, the intention was to prevent Milošević from influencing the negotiations. Neither side complied strictly with the requirement and Milutinovic visited secretly Belgrade during the meeting. Looking in retrospect now, it seems incredible that Serbian side agreed on these humiliating conditions. Taking an unofficial delegation (as the Shqiptar representatives were) for irresponsible interlocutors could be somehow swallowed, but to treat representatives of a sovereign state as SRY was, as hostages, was a sign of arrogance par excellence. And it worked. After that, everything was possible to impose. Why Serbians from Belgrade allowed this kind of treatment? They felt well the prehistory of the “Yugoslav wars” and bad conscious about misdeeds attributed to Serbian actors, rightly or not. KiM was lost for Serbia not at Rabouillet, but at Vukovar, Zvornik, Knin, etc. Though it had little to do with Serbia, the shadow of Dubrovnik, Srebrenica etc was over Serbian heads all the time. At Rambouillet KiM rebels won the psychological war even before the negotiations (sic) started. One might be tempted to conclude that had the meeting taken place two years later, after overthrowing Milošević, the final outcome would have been different. But Milošević was overthrown by Rambouillet and NATO aggression in 1999 exactly. New political leaders who emerged after October 5, 2000, were still in opposition, without influence on the political course of Serbia. As for the Priština delegation, this consisted solely from Shqiptars, though the principal claims from Priština have always been that KiM will be multiethnic, with all citizens with equal right etc. In order to emphasize the mockery of this sort Belgrade incorporated in his delegation ”national minorities” from KiM (Roma, Muslims, Egyptians, Gorans etc). It was the same mixture as it was contrived for the abortive negotiation at Priština a few years ago and in both cases it turned out pathetically naïve. In fact, even worse than that – it was counter-productive. By trying to play on the all-ethnicity state, Belgrade even more exposed the entire issue as inter-ethnical conflict. This was an expected outcome of the structure of Belgrade ruling establishment, which reflected well in the content of the Belgrade delegation (apart from the mock minorities members) – all members, except Milan Milutinovic, were Milošević’s Dinaroids.
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In fact one could hardly call this meeting negotiation at all. Both delegations were separated all the time at two rooms and their requirements, wishes and proposals used to be transmitted by the host administration. The irrational fear of Shqiptars to face other Serbians at the table has proved stronger than demands for the normal negotiations. But there was another, more rational, rationale for evading facing the other side. The only chance for Shqiptar side to get what they demanded was to avoid any argumentations. For good reasons. It would be an easy task to expose their demands to a devastating critics, since their only argument was their hard resolution to make use of their political claims as their political rights, as a Macedonian commentator put it (in another context). In fact they left the entire job to their patrons, USA, more specifically to the USA state secretary, Madeleine Albright, 1 who even did not bother to conceal her Serbophobia. 2 Serbian delegation offered the return of the former KiM autonomy, abolished foolishly by Milošević, whereas Shqiptars did not want to consider anything less than the secession. Since the gap turned out unbridgeable, Western allies contrived a resolution which practically guaranteed Shqiptar demands, but in a foreseeable perspective. Even that did not satisfy their delegation, in particular in view that they were under great pressure from Priština not to give in to the western allies. Madeleine Albright was furious about that and she resorted to the ultimate trump: You sign and we shall start bombing Serbia! This was an offer which no decent Shqiptar could turn down. At the next Paris meeting Shqiptars finally signed the agreement proposal, Belgrade did not, and the USA steamroller was charged with fuel. USA envoys demanded from FRY practically to surrender to NATO (that is to USA). As their envoy Nicolas Burns recalls, when he put his demands to the Serbian president Milan Milutinović, the latter did not take it serious and suggested that if this is what is required from FRY “then we better join NATO” . ”Look Milan, replied Nicolas, you don’t understand – we age going to attack you!” And they did attack. But before we begin with NATO humanitarian bombing, we first set the stage and describe the principal players. Hostile sides Washington These are led by USA, who first tried to instrumentalize (with a restricted success) UN for their political aims, and then NATO. We have discussed some of the possible motives for this American attitude towards Serbia and Albania, including the delicate question of the Israel-USA entanglement. As the time evolved from Rambouillet on, it has become increasingly clear that USA have already made decision to deprive Serbia from her southern province and deliver it to Shqiptars. This decision meant automatically the complete ethnical cleansing of KiM from all nonShqiptar population. From Shqiptar side it was the only ultimate solution to their problem, which was more of the anthropo-psychological than a political nature. For Americans achieving this Shqiptars’ goal meant that the permanent peace (sic) in the region was ensured. This assumption, however arrogant was, was a paradigm of unrealistic optimism, as we shall see and elaborate later on. But it fitted the (unproclaimed) slogan of USA global strategy: Better peace than justice! The eventual awareness of Serbia that USA themselves were but a vassal state (not present in Serbia) would not help the Serbian case, in all practical matters. The only change that would arise out of this awareness would the exchange of the hatred towards USA for the feeling of compassion 3 Though never mentioned in the world public media, this plan will turn out to be a dress rehearsal for the principal USA (sic) occupation – that of the absolute ethnical cleansing of Palestine from non-Jewish element, as we shall elaborate later on. The shadow of Israel security has been over Balkan for a long time, but nobody mentions it (at least not in public). Two points must be stressed here in this regard. First, the complete Washington administration at the time, from Madeleine Alias Marie Jana Korbelová As a middle-European Jew she spent her youth in Serbia, what might explain her animosity towards Serbs. 3 The same situation will repeat with now the notorious case of Iraq, cleary revealing the pattern of the strategy of the global military dominance, as a prerequisite for the ideological one. 1 2
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Albright, Richard Holbrooke, Gen. Wesley Clark, down to the Monika Lewinsky, was Jewish. Second, not unrelated with the first point, the entire “ideological” background of the American politics has been based on the ethnical rationale. USA officials keep on talking about Serbs and Albanians, never of Serbia and Albania, pretending all the time the issue to be of ethnical nature, not of political one. This is the same logic as applied to the Middle East crisis, where one keeps on talking about Jews and Palestinians, pretending the issue to be of an intertribal conflict, thus reducing it to the Biblical background (where Israelis enjoy an archetypal advantage). With not too much imagination one may view the American-Jewish involvement into the Kosovo issue as a sort of an echo from the biblical times. One may even define a Biblical Background Radiation (BBR), as a counterpart of the well known Cosmic Microwave Background Radiation (CMBR). Phenomenon of a people of unknown origin, unique language, stepping down from a mountainous wild regions into fertile lowlands, which they claim to be their ancestral soil has surely resounded in ears of Madeleine Albright and Wesley Clark as familiar biblical myth, with Northern Albania as Judah and KiM as Israel. The entire NATO campaign was experienced by some as an imitation of the conquest of the Promised Land by Hebrews. When Wesley Clark boasts, after devastating raids by NATO airplanes from the 10 km height of the night sky: “They must have felt that it was God who struck them”, 1 he was more than explicite on whom he was imagining to represent. And when P.S.V. Blacket referred to the “Jupiter Complex, the nation of the Allies as righteous god’s retributive thunderbolts on their wicked enemies”, 2 he almost directly alluded to Wesley Clark’s boasting. In fact, the entire affair resembles much the biblical narrative of Exodus. But if Clark imagined himself God and his guided missiles and bombs as thunderbolts, who was Moses and who Pharaoh? Those roles were assigned to Holbrook and Milošević, of course. The analogy runs up to the final point, when the parallel fails: Hebrews did not return to the Egypt, whereas Shqiptars were back almost immediately after their exodus to Albania and partly Macedonia. Te full analogy would be if Hebrews returned to Egypt and then seceded with a part of Pharaoh’s land, say Nile delta. For their troubles with Egypt, according to the biblical story, was caused by the same effect as Shqiptars’ troubles with Serbia: due to enormous birth rate and the resulting demographic explosion. We note that, according to Bible, Hebrew women were notorious for their easy giving birth, without help of midwifes. Albanian women are also famous with this faculty, which appears extraordinary with respect to the surrounding European nations. 3 Thus the KiM crisis in its most acute form, beginning with the NATO bombing Yugoslavia up to now, appears an integral part of the application of Middle East mythology, better to say Biblical one. Here we just recall the Shqiptar remake of the Zionist syndrome, which surely has resonated with Israeli ideology and the corresponding feelings of their kinship at Washington and New York. Just as Hebrews’ regained of the ancestral land, after Exodus, which was a Promised land according to the biblical narrative, so Albanians felt entitled to regain their land, occupied by their ancestors, Illyrs, according to their recent national mythology. And just as in the first case there is no archeological, historical or any other record of the presence of Hebrew ancestors in Palestine before the time of Saul, 4 there is not a single artifact which would testify a presence of Albanian ancestors on KiM (or any other Balkan region) before the Slavs arrived in 7th century. In a recent TV reportage from Georgia Michael Wood tells us that prior to his visit to this mountainous Caucasus country, he was advised to observe strictly some local rules, otherwise he 1 2
See the citation on page 125 xx, from J. Caroll, Constantine’s Sword, p. 254. Ibid
This peculiarity may be taken as another proof that the ancestors of Albanians came to South Europe from a remote region 4 See, e.g. I. Finkelstein, N. A. Silberman, The Bible Unearthed, The Free Press, New York, 2001. 3
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would run into troubles. First, he was advised not to look at his interlocutor’s eyes too long. And not to look at women at all. And not to display a gun or any other weapon, for this would be considered a straight threat to the others. He then observes that the region has been densely populated by private towers/castles, which were built up to protect, not the region from the outsiders, but the neighbours from each other. When one listens to this story, one immediately recalls the North-Albanian Dinaric people and their customs. Indeed, as some anthropologists, linguists and historians claim, the modern Balkan Albanians came from Caucasus. Belgrade Yes, the role of Belgrade politicians (sic) in ruining the Serbia, especially concerning KiM issue, can not be overestimated. These contributions to the devastation of Serbia can be divided into two principal categories: Intentional and naïve (and there are other terms). The curse of naivety. Belgrade officials keep on claiming two main stands about KiM: First, it is an integral part of the state of Serbia, and second, Serbia will do everything to protect Serbs on KiM. That these two claims stand in appalling contradiction never occurred in the heads of these people. They first announce their devotion to the right of all citizens, irrespective of …, and then ignore all except Serbs. How is it possible? The answer lies in the ethnical origin of Belgrade contemporary politicians, better to say rulers. They come predominantly from the Dinaric highlands, where the social structure and ethos still retains the principal features of the traditional society. To them, KiM issue is not an internal affair of Serbia, but the clash between Serbs and the rest of Serbian population. It should be noted that this applies not only to KiM, but to other regions of Serbia, in particular to Vojvodina, an ethnical mix par excellence. A notorious case was that of the Vojislav Šešelj, the leader of the nationalistic (sic) party (sic) Serb (not Serbian!) Radical Party (SRP). When visiting a town Kovačica in Banat (Vojvodina), populated almost entirely by Slovaks (who settled down there two centuries ago), he sent a message from the local radio station: “We shall give Hungarians a sandwich and to Slovaks two sandwiches …!” 1 Enraged local people surrounded the radio station ready to lynch the rogue, and he managed to escape by the extensive use of his numerous bodyguard suites. Reader might wonder who is here naïve, politicians or the author, but we shall not dwell on it here. If the above classification may be put to question, the following is surely an outstanding example of stupidity. It has been the rule since the first unrests on KiM started, with Shqiptar demands for the republic, to term these demands as irredentist ones. It took a long time before somebody explained the essence of the term. KiM has never been a part of Albania and the term irredentism, originating from the Italian struggle for unification in 19th century, under the leading role of Piemont, was shear nonsense. Unfortunately, even more than that. Calling the rebellious population irredentists was clear playing cards into their hands. 2 That the stupidity of some politicians has no limits we witness even today, listening to the fierce opposition of Belgrade to the Shqiptar drive for independence. Instead to term the move as a clear case of secession, what it actually is, they accuse the secessionists of having a wrong impulse for independence. Serbians themselves strove for independence for centuries, until they fought it up in 19th century. Independence sounds sympathetically to any ear, unlike secession. In particular, to USA citizens, who are well aware of the civil war in 18-thies (Secessionist war), secession will well resonate with their patriotic feelings. Belgrade officials never raised the issue of the KiM overpopulation as the real cause of the rebellious feelings of the local population. In particular the problem of the demographic explosion has been considered as a taboo, exactly what Shqiptar politicians wanted. With these failures and The difference in numbers makes allusion to the distance from Vojvodina to Hungary and Slovakia, respectively. True, this term was used by Shiptar political leaders in 1970-thies, like Mahmut Bacali, while criticizing (sic) the movement behind the term.
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guffs one justly wonders whose interests those politicians are really protecting. In fact if the term naivety is to be applied, it should refer to the ordinary Serbian citizens, who do not see what is going on around them. Obstruction. If the above considerations of the failures of Belgrade officials to appreciate the nature of the KiM issue and apply proper means to protect the interests of the state they are supposed to lead, the following instances clearly point to the case of deliberate destruction of Serbia. In 1998 Serb Radical Party (SRP) joined Milošević government. After the fierce fighting with Milošević and his regime, Šešelj finally succeeded in his efforts to come to power at any rate. The tactic was as simple as follows. By compromising Serbia within the Yugoslav decay affairs, he forced Milošević to reconsider his attitude toward SRS. When the Bosnian war was going on and Serbia was accused of interfering with their internal affairs, SRS Federal MPs would demonstrate their own engagements in Bosnia, as volunteers from Serbia, armed and equipped by the official army sectors. All in front of the TV cameras, so that the entire world can see that Serbia is involved in the affair. Since those interventions of SRS MPs were mostly out of the context of the current parliament discussions, it was clear they were deliberate compromises of the state and thus a sheer blackmail. Attacking at the same time unscrupulously his former oppositional partners, like Democratic Party, lead by Zoran Djindjic, he offered to Milošević a tacit deal: You let me share with you the power (that is your dictatorship) and I shall stop attacking you and compromising Serbia, and I shall in addition help you to cope with the opposition. The pressure on Milošević was not rhetorical, even not political one, but it was literary a series of brutal, primitive physical attacks. SRS leading MPs used to pour water on heads of the Federal assembly chairmen, or to spit at him during meetings, etc. Finally, Milošević gave in and let the SRS enter the government. The deal was something like this: “OK, I will let you join us, but you should not fancy you will share really the power. You may insult, you may steal, and you may cheat (but not as much as we are doing it). You may spit at your former oppositional partners and you will be tolerated for the time being.”1 For the time being. But Šešelj wanted the power just for himself and not just for the time being. The first thing he did as the vice-premier was to silent the public media, by imposing severe penalties for articles which criticized the government and ruling parties officials. Next move was to abolish the University autonomy, the fist such a case in the one-and-half century history of Belgrade University, by abolishing the right of the University to elect the dean and the right of faculties to elect deans and their stuff by themselves. The reason for this move was that Šešelj tried desperately to be elected at a number of the Belgrade faculties, for the full professorship, although he did not have a single scientific paper published in his field. The first outcome of this abolition was that Milošević’s crony Jagoš Purić, who himself tried two times unsuccessfully to become dean, was appointed to this position by the government. Then Šešelj quickly followed by appointing himself to the full professor position at the faculty of law. 2 While the tension about the imminent NATO attack was rising and Serbian citizens waited frustrated before the approaching the danger they could not avert, Šešelj, in the capacity of the vice-premier, called, in front of TV cameras, president of USA, Bill Clinton, “that perverse maniac”, referring to the infamous affair with Monika Lewinsky. We now turn to this issue, not because it is of a great importance by itself, but since it sheds some light on the entire entanglement around the Kosovo issue.
An attentive reader will notice the similarity of Šešelj’s tactics with that used by Hitler before coming to power. Indeed, Šešelj studied Hitler’s carrier carefully (unlike his adversaries, in Serbia and elsewhere), and his MSc thesis was dedicated to the fascist tactics. 2 When Milošević was overthrown in October 2000, Purić resigned, and Šešelj’s election was canceled, as unlawful. (Šešelj threatened the minister of education, Professor Gašo Knežević, to have him killed.) 1
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In assessing the meaning and importance of the case, we go back to the infamous Nixon affair, which resulted in his impeachment, the only one in the history of USA. Frankly speaking, Europeans never appreciated fully the point and wondered why the president had to be dismissed. The only positive aspect of the entire affair was the demonstration of the working of the mutual independence of the three pillars of the modern democratic states: legislative, juridical and executive sectors. The case of Bill Clinton turned equally unfathomable for the European watchers, for many reasons. President first declined to admit his affair with a low-rank White House secretary, Monica Lewinsky, than admitted he had sex with her, and finally found it convenient to reduce the affair to an oral sex. If the first two instances were unacceptable, the third one appeared abominable. After the confession, one rightly expected Clinton to abdicate. Since he did not, the next step expected was that the impeachment would follow. It failed to happen. Why? The answer lies in the structure of the USA electoral system and the distribution of the financial power in the state. Jewish community in USA constitutes 1.7 % of the overall population, but provides 30 % of the financial support to the Democratic Party, for instance. That is why Clinton administration turned out almost completely Jewish. Of course, the president can not be Jewish, for the reason one need not explain. This is not a handicap to the Jewish community, on the contrary. President must rely on the government members, and thus has little choice to make by himself. He takes, on the other hand, full responsibility for the government decisions. In fact, the president appears little but a puppet in the hands of powerful financial and military lobbies. By passing through that humiliating affair, Bill Clinton was even more vulnerable and put in a really inferior position. His cooperativeness after that affair was expected to be absolute. And it was. Having in mind what has been just said, it is tempting to consider the possibility that the entire affair was a set up, in particular considering the race of Monika Lewinsky. But we shall not dwell on it here, and we return to our hero, Vojislav Šešelj. His cynical comment, made at “the right place, at the right time” could not fail to invite the most powerful (and most arrogant) power in the world to smash Yugoslavia, that is Serbia. And it did not. But just as Clinton affair called for an explanation, so does this Shehelj’s scandalous behaviour. What was the point? Šešelj has come as an intruder from Bosnia, and has never been accepted by the Serbian society, for his primitive manners and scandalous behaviour, his demagogy and “Serbing” aggressively, his treacherous character and unscrupulous attacks ad hominem on everybody whom he considers a convenient target at the moment. Since the most prosperous targets appear the people from the middle and higher class of Serbian society, this continuous series of raids could not fail to attract the bottom of the Serbian society pyramid. The latter consists mainly from the society losers, including Roma, ijekavic immigrants/refugees, grey economy criminals, etc. The latter find it convenient to have political criminals at the head of the state, whereas the society losers find an emotive satisfaction in watching how SRP people spit at the upper part of the society. However, with supporters like these Šešelj could not hope to achieve his goal – the total power, by legal means. His only chance has been to destroy Serbia sufficiently, so that in the social turmoil, when the cards are shuffled again, he seizes the power by a brutal force. Hence, what he needed was a devastated state, as the principal prerequisite to his ascend. His slogan has been therefore: The worse, the better. It was exactly the rationale for Hitler’s stratagem in Germany, devastated and frustrated after the Great War. Šešelj has copiously studied Hitler’s career and fascism in general. But, unlike his great hero, Šešelj had to create postwar situation himself, that is to initiate the war in Yugoslavia. Fortunately for him, he was not alone with this problem and he found very convenient that Milošević undertook the same task. After the Dayton agreement Serbia came out devastated indeed, but not sufficiently for Šešelj’s purpose. First of all, Milošević survived and was still a formidable adversary. As we saw above, Šešelj managed to force Milošević to accept him as
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a partner, at least formally. But fortune has something more in store for the imposter from Batajnica, 1 KiM. Soon, an informal axes Priština-Batajnica will become operative, as we shall see. Engagement of Serbia, under Milošević rule in other Yugoslav republics affairs, was a very convenient rout to gaining power by Šešelj and his cronies. KiM issue was the other opportunity to dismantle Milošević, as his principal adversary in the race for the absolute power. Both affairs resulted in the indictment against Milošević and removing him from the Serbian political scene. Šešelj found not only profitable to send Milošević to Hague, but even followed him there in order to prevent him to make use of the Tribunal for raising his political influence in Serbia. His testifying “in favour of Milošević” was a clear case of disservice. In fact, both Milošević and Šešelj did not address the Court at all, but made use of the process for strengthening their political influence in Serbia. To an uninformed watcher, Šešelj’s behaviour while testifying ”in favour of Milošević” looked suicidal indeed. Whenever Indictment charged Milošević for some misdeed in Croatia or BiH, Šešelj would declare that Milošević was innocent in that matter and it was his followers who did it in fact. Keeping on mentioning he was Serb, concerned with the fate of Serbia etc, he would send message to Serbian Serbs: I am the true Serb, ready to scarify myself for your good. At the same time he would ridicule the Court, in particular the prosecutors, making his followers in Serbia enjoying in watching what he was doing abroad, that is the same what he used to do in Serbia on the public scene. Cheap tricks like this: We announced we had 30.000 our men in BiH, but it was only for the propaganda reason, for we had only 10.000 volunteers. In fact, they hardly had 1.000 men, but the trick served its purpose at home at Serbia, contributing to the feeling of his supporters about the power of SRP and the superhuman ability of their Führer. With all experience with Šešelj one could bet if one imagines at a moment the most devastating move concerning the welfare of Serbia, Šešelj will not fail to do that. Cheap insults as the Lewinsky affair mention was, it was not sufficient to Šešelj to stir the storm against Serbia. In the eve of the NATO raids, while Serbia was in the state of the worst expectations, the vice-premier appears before TV cameras and made this remarkable declaration, at the party rally at Zemun, on February 28, 1999: I am warning them that if NATO bombs us or if American aggression is made, we Serbs will suffer, but there will be no Albanians on Kosovo! Empty rhetoric? Yes, but not futile. It is this declaration which will provide the meaning of a state project of ethnical cleansing, when the numerous atrocities take place on KiM. The curse of Serbia was that Albanian side had no their Šešeljs. On the same occasion the leader of SRP declared that any neighbouring country allowing attacks from its territory will find her in a war with Serb people. In particular he warned Macedonia that if this happens from Macedonian territory “nothing will remain of the Macedonian state”. In fact Šešelj is not addressing his formal addressees, but the domestic audience. The point is in the syntagm “we Serbs”, meaning “I am Serb”. The significance of this declaration will be appreciated soon, as we shall see later on. But here, we make a digression, which will put the entire affair in a wider historical and political context. We return, therefore to the Vaso Čubrilović affair. Who was Vaso Čubrilović? Vaso Čubrilović affair Majority of the members of the Bosnian patriotic organization ”Mlada Bosna” (Young Bosnia) were adolescents. One of them Vaso Čubrilović (1897-1990) was 17 when Gavrilo Princip assassinated Archduke Ferdinand in Sarajevo on 28 June, 1914 (Vidovdan, the day of Vid, an ancient Slavic god). Čubrilović was sentenced to 16 years of hard prison, but was released in 1918 1
A town close to Belgrade, where Šešelj lives and has his headquarters.
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with the collapse of Austro-Hungary and then he passed to Belgrade. He became member of the Serbian Cultural Club, a nationalistic club acting in favour of Serbs living across river Drina (that is supporting interests of Serbs ijekavians). In 1937 Vaso wrote a memorandum entitled “Expulsion of Shqiptars from KiM” (see Appendix 4). Memorandum was offered to Yugoslav government, but the text has never been used as an official document. Never-the-less, Albanian propaganda made an extensive use of the Memorandum as the crown proof of a plan to banish Shqiptars from KiM. Memorandum can be found on almost every Albanian web-site, with comments like: Serbian plans for the “Final Solution of the Albanian question”, with obvious allusion on Holocaust. Vaso Čubrilović attained a prominent position within Belgrade establishment, as a university professor and member of the Serbian Academy of Science and Art (SANU). In view of the latter, one is entitled to wonder what was the point of Memorandum. But before we dwell on the Memorandum, a few words of recalling some facts are in order. First, Vaso Čubrilović was a newcomer from Bosnia, eager to establish himself into the new environment. As we have been seeing it in many occasions, the best way to achieve this goal has always been to promote oneself as “Great Serb”, i.e. to ”become greater Catholic than pope”. Second, as a typical Dinaroid from Herzegovina, Vaso was ready to turn the inter-tribal disputes into the fighting for extermination. Third, he considered Serbia Promised Land which is destined to accept his country-fellows from across Drina River. Hence, he found it of a vital importance to clear the ground in Serbia for this purpose. As we shall see immediately, it was exactly the same rationale for Vojislav Šešelj and his “Serbing”. As one could expect, the Memorandum has found it place in many other web-sites of western Balkan countries. Croatian anti-Serbian propaganda reproduced their own version of the translation from Serbo-Croat into English. An interested reader may find it instructive to compare both translations, but we shall analyze briefly one from an Albanian source (see Appendix 4). We first note that the original term Shqiptar never appears in the text, but Albanian has been used instead. As we emphasized before, Albanians use this term, Shqiptar, by themselves, but consider it a pejorative expression in Serbs’ mouths. This frustration has been so strong that the very veracity of a document must be sacrificed to it. But if this can be taken as a matter of psychology, the following systematic transliteration of the KiM homonyms appears less innocent, indeed. Namely, all names on KiM have been quoted first in Albanian, and then in the original, Serb lettering. As if Memorandum was offered to Tirana government, not to Belgrade one. But these are points of little material value. We now turn to the actual content and aim of the Memorandum. The text appears complex and multilayered. The author offers an interesting analysis of the sides involved (better to say he would like to involve). It concerns first of all the anthropological characteristics of Shqiptars from one side and Montenegrins and Herzegovians from the other. Vaso does not conceal that the common characteristics of all sides are tribal features of the traditional society. The only difference to him is that Albano-phonic and Slavo-phonic people belong to different nations. Since Shqiptar appear disloyal to Yugoslavia and are troublemakers, they should be eliminated from the Slav State (as simple as that!). The sincerity of the analysis and the ensuing proposals appear chocking, indeed. (Those hypocrites who find it disgusting, rightly, should bear in mind the present-day Palestine!). 1 Never-the-less one can hardly believe that in a European country like Yugoslavia, such projects could be even considered. But it demonstrates the best the difference between the Dinaric ethos and the civilization standards of the rest of Yugoslavia. The pattern we are going to meet soon with regard to the Šešelj’s party appears like this: one vigorous Dinaroid attains a prominent position in the Serbian state and then initiates interDinaroid clash, at the expense of the host population and country. The latter proved to be unable to resist this kind of the imposed situation, as the recent history has testified.
1
North-American Indians should not be forgotten in this context, either.
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But this is not the end of the story. Vaso Čubrilović wrote a similar memorandum for the new communist authorities in Belgrade, dated 3 November 1944. We note here that Belgrade was liberated from German occupation on October 20, 1944, so Vaso submitted his ”Solution for the problem of the national minorities in Serbia” only a fortnight after the liberation. We note also that the war in Yugoslavia was still going on and was terminated in June 1945 only. Evidently, Vaso Čubrilović had already his Memorandum ready for the new state and new communist regime. 1 He was obviously obsessed by the ethnical cleansing, as his Dinaric ”descendant” Šešelj has been. But one can learn something from those Memorandums. As we know, Tito’s new communist regime pretended to be free of the nationalistic animosities and based on the internationalism and brotherhood. In fact, this was Tito’s principal weapon against the Royalist movement of Draža Mihailović, allegedly Serb-nationalistic. It was the principal point used to cut off the Allies from Chetniks and thus to seize the power at the end of war. How, then, one explains the appearance of the second Memorandum and the later career of Vaso Čubrilović? His initiative was simply ignored, nobody took it serious. Exactly as the government of Stojadinovic did it in 1937. It was considered as an extravagant suggestion of a Dinaric intruder, alien to the civilized state. And they all were wrong! The impulse behind the Dinaric aggressively appears a part of the general syndrome of xenophobia, which is but an expression of the inferiority complex. The assassination of Archduke Ferdinand was motivated by a patriotic feeling, but the common background for all the conspirators, Orthodox, Catholic and Muslim alike, was xenophobia. It was a common response to a civilized state, with conspicuously higher cultural and technological level. This contributed to the feeling of the external aggression to Bosnian people, civilizational attack on a country retarded for centuries with regard to the immediate environment, like Dalmatian coast and Croatia. In the Shqiptar case one can not speak of the feeling of inferiority from Dinaroid side, but the general syndrome of xenophobia remains. In addition, the exposed aggressively of Vaso Čubrilović rests on the subconscious awareness of guiltiness. Being aware he came from the same retarded, traditional society, Vaso tried to get rid of this by getting rid of the population with the same traditional ethos, that of KiM Shqiptars. By doing this he felt renouncing his original background, playing role of a member of an advanced society, that of Serbia. In a sense, this was his ticket for the new homeland. And by saying that, we come back to Šešelj affair The announcement of vice-premier of expulsion of Shqiptars was not an impulsive rhetoric of an irresponsible Milošević crony. Šešelj has based his entrenchment into Serbia on “Serbing” since he stepped onto the Serbian soil. In an interview to the state TV in 1990 (shown at his Hague trial on April 24, 2008), he described vividly what one should do with KiM Shqiptars in order to make their lives unsupportable in Serbia, cynically offering them emigration to Croatia and Slovenia, since the latter expressed concerns about Shqiptars’ position in Serbia. Among other measures Šešelj envisaged constructing coal-based energy plants on KiM in the midst of the Shqiptar densely populated regions, 2 so that the ecological pollution makes the life there unsustainable. He also suggested that all public buildings, like the University and schools, which were built up by the federal (mainly Serbian) fund, should be empted from Shqiptar students and pupils and the latter should be left to build their institutions by their own means. This proposal will acquire a real meaning later on, when Milošević did realize them. With a difference that Government required that Shqiptars accept the educational programmes conceived in collaboration with the relevant institutions in Belgrade. The point was to reduce as much as possible the anti-Serbian propaganda (alleged or real) , by which the regional educational system was contaminated. Since the local KiM authorities refused that, they moved students and pupils out of the state buildings and continued Vaso Čubrilović will hold high positions in the new regime, including the ministry of forest in the Serbian government. 2 KiM possesses in abundance (low-quality) coal reserves to be exploited for centuries to go. 1
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their educational activities in private houses. This conditional demand for the Shqiptar use of the state facilities makes the borderline between Šešelj’s proposals mentioned above and Milošević’s political moves. Never-the-less Shqiptar politicians cleverly ignored this difference and claimed that Milošević simply followed Šešelj’s plans. The latter were thus realized, albeit in an implicit manner, as a nice disservice to the Serbian actual political rulers, with irrevocable damage to Serbia. Šešelj’s plans were advancing well. (We recall the ”sandwich offers” to Hungarians and Slovaks by Šešelj a few years later, mentioned earlier, which might be taken as a continuation of ethnical cleansing threats ”by metaphorical means”). That Shqiptars were not the only Šešelj’s target testifies his initiation and organization of banishing citizens of Vojvodina of the Croat origin. This is known as the (in) famous Hrtkovci affair, mentioned briefly earlier. On 7 May, 1992, Šešelj organized a rally at Hrtkovci, inhabited almost exclusively by Croats, as autochthonous population. In his presence a local party activist red the name of those to be banished as ”Ustashas”. From that moment on, intimidations, beatings, even murders, began all over Vojvodina. As the results some 35-40.000 Croats left Serbia for Croatia, fearing for their life. The most active in this persecution were the refugees/immigrants from Croatia and BiH, who wanted to usurp Croat houses and land. We shall come back to this demonic character many times more, but here we point out the crux of the matter regarding his activities. Neither he nor his close followers take real actions. They simply incite others, usually set one against the other, without ever involving themselves in risky operations. That is why Šešelj felt comfortable by surrendering himself to the Hague Tribunal, claiming he could be blamed for verbal offenses only. But in 1998 and 1999 Šešelj (and some other paramilitary leaders, like Arkan), were running a parallel war on KiM. While the Belgrade government and Army tried to suppress the rebellion and re-establish the previous state of affair, those Dinaroids were aiming at ethnical cleansing and making room for their compatriots from over-Drina regions. It was this parallel war that made the entire affair out of control of the central government. Particularly so since Šešelj was the vice prime minister! In fact, his tactics resembles more that adopted by Israelis when dealing with local Palestinians (see Appendix 1). In this respect one may talk about axis Tudjman-Šešelj, which turned out very efficase in moving Serbs from the over-Drina regions into Serbia. In the eve of NATO raids As the USA ultimatum deadline approached, the political activities became more and more hectic and many players were engaged in resolving the imminent conflict before it starts. All relevant and irrelevant institutions were engaged, all except UN, the only one eligible for the case at hand. USA was aware that Security Council was not a proper instrument to carry their political demands, because of Russian (and possibly Chinese) veto. 1 Instead, American officials pressed Russians to stay aside and not interfere with their own duties (at least within the ethical sphere). So Madleine Albright paid a visit to Moscow and Russian minister for foreign affairs Igor Ivanov to give up protecting Serbian interests. The crucial “meeting” took place in a loge at Bolshoy Theatre. As the story goes, Ivanov became very annoyed by Mrs Albright’s insistence and gave up his resistance, exchanging the fate of Serbia for the enjoying the performance. 2 After the last attempt by Russian envoy Chernomidin to persuade Milošević to give in failed, NATO attacks seemed inevitable. After Milošević refusal to succumb to American demands for capitulation the war machine was put on alert. In his latest meeting with western envoys, Milošević pledged for sympathy, making pathetic declarations like “We are small country, but we do not want to humiliate ourselves and are ready to suffer unjust actions …”. How much the archetypical ”mage of Serbs fighting on Kosovo Field for ”Heavenly Kingdom” played the role 1 2
The same USA used veto 38 times to avert UN sanctions against Israel, as we noted before. Some cynic noted that it was not the first instance that matters of political importance were settled down in lo(d)ge.
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while Milošević made his decisions (and declarations) is hard to judge, but Kosovo myth surely influenced the “heroic choice” between the profitable kneeling and unreasonable defying NATO threats. (That the role of Ottoman Empire was played here by NATO might seem exaggerated, but the parallel appears more than formal). Looking backward from the present-day situation, declarations like this seem pathetically naïve. But Milošević’s stratagem was not irrational, as it might look at the first sight. He relied on the world sympathy for the small weak country, as victim of the powerful alliance, in particular USA, as the most unpopular state at the time. His misjudgment was not of the logical, but technical nature. He imagined air raids with vast demolition of the populated areas, thousands of dead and wounded, pictures of the innocent civilians going around the world etc. But he turned out wrong, better to say uninformed. The technical reality will disprove him tragically. The Merciful Angel A terrorist is someone who has a bomb, but doesn’t have an airplane. Anon. March 23, 1999, evening I was in a taxi heading from “Beogradjanka” palace in the Belgrade centre, to my home at Zemun, the adjoining town north from Belgrade. I delivered my last lecture at the Alternative Academic Educational Network (AAEN), within the course” Cosmology and Mythology”, as a part of the set of courses under the common title” History and Epistemology of Science” I conceived for the Network. The latter was set up as a liberal college, alternative to the state university. As mentioned above, when Šešelj abolished the university autonomy, many of the University staff left their positions, in response to the humiliating rules imposed on the highest academic institutions in Serbia. One of them was an obligation of signing the paper of loyalty to the state, practically to the ruling parties. 1 One of those who chose to retire instead was professor Milan Kurepa, from the Faculty of physics, who was very active in fighting Milošević’s regime, in particular within the youth movement “Otpor” (Resistance), whose activities turned out instrumental in overthrowing Milošević. It was Milan Kurepa who engaged me for participating in AAEM. (Although my Institute of Physics was formally a part of the Belgrade University, we were not obliged, fortunately, to sign the loyalty contract). 2 This was the last day of the AAEM activity, for the next day the NATO ultimatum deadline expired. 3 While crossing the Belgrade largest bridge “Gazela” the driver said ”My brother in law, a colonel, told me we have so powerful antiaircraft defence that only one of 100 airplanes will break through”. I could not help commenting that such a confidence was based on the knowledge of our own technical capabilities, but the advance of the other side in that matter might prove it too optimistic. My reservation was wrong however – we turned out completely and tragically inferior before the latest sophisticated war machine of our adversaries beyond any reasonable fear. Tomorrow evening, at 20.00 exactly our building trembled and then the air chock from a nearby blast followed. Our next door lady neighbour rushes into our flat very excited and proposes us to spend the night together on alert. We did not accept the suggestion and went to bed as usually. 4 I just did not want to believe that in the middle of the Europe, in 20th century, we had to hide and fear, as if there was a Third World war going on. From that day on, for 78 days, every evening at 21.00 h. air-strike alarm used to warn Yugoslav citizens on the imminent attacks from the air. We Rules known from the fascist dictatorship, in Italy for example, when many professors, like the famous mathematician Vito Voltera, resigned from their posts. 2 Sadly M. Kurepa died 10 days after Milošević’s regime was wiped out from the political scene, October 5, 2000, after a successful heart operation. 3 At 8 h p.m. exactly. 4 I could not stay in my wheelchair the whole night anyway. 1
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got used on it that when these failed to sound, we just could not get asleep. From time to time we heard explosions of the bombs, teleguided from the height of 10 km or so, from close vicinity or far away, reading the next day which objects were the targets and what damage was done. Large residential buildings in the towns were supplied with the air-raid shelters, usually in the form of cellars, but majority of them were unusable. People used to bring along improvised beds and would spend the nights in cellars and the like shelters. In the neighbouring building there was a true shelter, but its residents refused to share it with the residents of other buildings, included our one. One resident from the latter, a former police worker, threatened them with the rifle, but in vain. 1 Majority of our building residents used to stay in their cellars regularly in the beginning, but encouraged by the example of my wife and me, many of them ignored the warnings and stayed in their flats. Unexpectedly, air raids were confined to night attacks. This was the case of the WWII bombing, but there was a striking difference in the defence tactics of the country subjected to bombing. Unlike WWII war rules, when there was a strict blackout, Yugoslavia in night was fully enlightened. The reason has become clear soon. NATO tactics for forcing Yugoslavia to surrender was based on the technological capabilities of their war machine and on the international political situation, which had two main components: a) USA military dominance, b) Serbia as demonized country and Serbs under Milošević as demonized people. In retrospect, one sees that the overall stratagem was conceived in three stages: (i) Devastation of the country by destroying the industrial, logistic and communicational system. (ii) Occupation of the country by land forces, mainly from Albania, employing Albanian and KiM Albanians as the infantry forces. (iii) Forcing Yugoslavia to accept whatever she will be required of. The first stage was conceived to be carried out with the minimum of civilian causalities. That it was possible to achieve Yugoslavs became aware after first several days of the intensive air strikes. It was exactly what Milošević and Yugoslav army did not expect. Who was to blame for this tragic miscalculation has never been reveled afterwards, but this failure to appreciate the technological advances in military affairs turned out to be instrumental for the political stubbornness of the Yugoslav authorities, whoever these were at the time of decisions. The laser or otherwise guided bombs and missiles were capable to hit the target with an incredible precision. Milošević’s residence was hit into the bedroom (he was absent of course), and the private wing of the Zeljko Raznatovic Arkan, at the hotel “Yugoslavia” across the river Sava, were hit too, with the rest of the hotel intact. Soon when this was realized, the authority decided not to impose the blackout, since the enlightened inhabited areas were better protected from the bombs in that way. In order to prevent windows breaking by the air shocks, people paced the ribbons across their windows, usually in the form of Andrea cross X, what inspired some people to call those windows “Yugoslav Windows X”. Immediately after bombing started we start to receive e-mail letters of compassion from our relatives and friends from abroad, who were concerned for our life. Many colleagues physicists from allover the world sent their messages of sympathy, and consternations regarding the brutal attacks of NATO on Yugoslavia. A young friend of us from Greece phones to us and offers her hospitality at Aeginion, a village near Thessalonica, we visited several times on our way to Athens. (My wife’s voice trembled while conveying the conversation). A colleague of mine from Athens University sends his letter of sympathy with his Serbian colleagues which we post on the poster board in the Institute. Soon a journalist from Corriere dela Sera, Mara Gergolet sends her letter of sympathy and proposes to people in Yugoslavia to write letter of their personal experience during the raids, since she has set up a column in the daily dedicated to NATO raids. I 1
Our building, like the other in the entire quarter, is inhabited by lower-class (second generation) Dinaroids.
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wrote a number of letters, as some other people here did. But we shall come back to this subject again when talking to the war propaganda later on. Free world media We shall come to the Western propaganda machine later on, but here we shall mention an example of the highly acclaimed freedom of press in the western democratic societies. Few days after NATO aggression started, I wrote a note about the ethos lying behind the official justification of the military action against Yugoslavia. I sent it to London Times, but it even did not border to acknowledge the receipt of the note. Sine I forwarded the letter to friends of mine abroad, a colleague of mine from Athens University forwarded it to Greek daily Kathimerini, which has a part published in English, distributed together with the International Herald Tribune in Greece. They published it immediately (see Appendix 5). Obviously, Serbia was put in an informational vacuum, a sort of black hole, with informations going in, but not out. (As we shall see, one of the first victims of the “free information exchange world”, will be TV tower emitter on Avala mountain, near Belgrade, destroyed in order to prevent “Milošević’s propaganda”.) Destruction of Yugoslavia As mentioned above, the NATO plans were to start gradually destroying the country, starting from military and industrial targets. Army headquarters and other buildings in towns and otherwise, radar and anti-air defense posts, garrisons and similar targets were under attacks from the beginning. Oil refineries and plants, strategic military objects, command posts, police stations etc were subjected to severe raids too. The official explanations run as follows: these are objects which have served Milošević to suppress Albanians on Kosovo and therefore must be destroyed. Ridicule as those explanations were, it seemed they served the purpose. At least with a particular ”TV population” of some parts of the globe. It was with the same “rationale” that many bridges were destroyed, so as to prevent Yugoslav army to concentrate and deliver supplies to KiM forces. Thus bridges over river Danube at Novi Sad, the capital of Vojvodina province, were destroyed soon after the raids started. Rumour were spread that NATO planned to destroy Belgrade bridges too, but the French president Jacque Chirac was strongly against and the connection of Central Serbia with Vojvodina was not cut off. Never-the-less my wife never crossed river Sava from our Zemun during the aggression, fearing that the bridges might be destroyed in her absence and I would be let alone at home. Bridges were indiscriminately destroyed, without paying attention if vehicles were crossing them or not. As we shall se later on, many trains and vehicles which happened to be moving over bridges were hit, with much causality. Milošević organized countermeasures so as to prevent destruction of Belgrade bridges, gathering his supporters on the bridges during the nights. This had more a propaganda effect than practical values, but never-the-less exposed the weird nature of the war against Serbia. Normally, one makes use of artifacts, like shelters, to protect ”live force”, whereas here one puts people as a shield of the material structures. Of course, since these political demonstrations of the Serbian patriotism did not prolong during the entire bombing period, and the bridges were spared from destruction, NATO demonstrated that he did not plan the raids. In view of the overall unreal atmosphere around the aggression on Yugoslavia, it is the matter of taste and political attitude to interpret those “human sacrifice” offers as a mere propaganda, defiance of the powerful enemy, or a suicidal impulse. We mention that frequently some demonstrators during the aggression used to carry large panels with marks of targets drawn on them, as invitations for NATO airplanes to bomb them. These demonstrations might be considered as pathetic surrogates of those graphite’s in the ruined Berlin
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streets with inscriptions like: “You may kill us, but not our souls”. But as Bonaparte remarked after his (in)famous return from Russia in 1812, “[from] grandiose to silly there is but a single step”. Plants, military and others were systematically destroyed, but the worst situation was with oil refineries. The largest one at Pančevo near Belgrade was bombed seven times and was burning continuously during the raids period. With those at Novi Sad and other places, the whole Serbia was in flames, causing an enormous ecological catastrophe. The fear was present al the time that chemical plants might be the target too, what would results in such an ecological disaster similar to that at Bhopal in India, since many of the plants were situated around Belgrade. But though the Central Serbia was the target of daily raids and was burning, the principal target of NATO bombers was KiM, where the strongest concentration of Yugoslav forces was present, for the reasons explained earlier. Yugoslav Army (JNA) was exposed to fierce attacks from the air, unable to protect herself from the high-technology raids. Tanks and armed vehicles were stuck to the woods, since every appearance on the open ground was followed by an air attack in 20 minutes. JNA managed to a great extent to mock the aggressors by making use of pneumatic tanks, 1 logs stretching out of haystacks, mimicking concealed artillery guns, used to attract the fire from the air, too. Generally, JNA preserved the overall majority of the weaponry and the losses of the manpower were relatively small considering the amount of ammunitions and the number of air raids employed during the 78 day aggression. Reality and surreality NATO aggression on Yugoslavia was a new experience not only for Serbia, but for the entire world. New, hitherto unknown technology, coupled with an irrational rationale for the aggression, produced new unprecedented psychological effects. Reality of everyday bombing going on almost around every citizen and the confidence one will be spared from the worst, produced a surrealistic feeling that what was going was somewhere else, on TV or like. This impression was strengthened by the detailed TV cover of the bombing and devastations of the country at the face of the world community. That the latter did not take any action to stop the aggression, as UN did not, further strengthen the feeling of the overall unreality of the aggression. The air strikes were made from the NATO air base at Avian,2 in a traditionally friendly country Italy, what further contributed to the sense of unreality. The taking off of the airplanes heading for Yugoslavia was shown on TV, so that Serbian citizens knew when the planes would arrive here and discharge their “merciful burden”. 3 In order to let the Serbians became aware it was not a manoeuvre, but real war, NATO command decided to cut off the energy supplies to the ordinary citizens. To this end airplanes used to drop tinfoil strips on the transformation stations, which would make shortcuts. When the local workers remove the bands, and made the station operative again, the later were destroyed by bombs. Obviously it was better not to remove the staff and loose the electricity supply (without loosing the ”hardware’), but it took the authorities some time to realize the new logic of war, which the new sophisticated technology advanced. When the Novi Sad bridges 4 were destroyed and that part of Vojvodina Bačka was cut off from Srem and Belgrade, a joke was spread about Lala, 5 asked how he would reach from Srem to Novi Sad.
Supplied from Italy before the raids, according to some officials. The name curiously matches the French (as well as Serb) term for an airplane – avion, which is, in fact an international term. 3 This refers to those who had access to the satellite or cable TV net. 4 One of them was constructed by a firm which employed Hans Albert, the elder son of Albert Einstein, whose first wife Mileva was from Novi Sad. 5 Common nickame of the local inhabitants of Srem region, notorious for his wit and naivety. 1 2
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Well, I would take a bus to Belgrade, then a train from Belgrade to Bar, then a ferryboat to Bari, then a train to Avian, and from Avian there is a plane to Novi Sad every fifteen minutes. The overall weird and surreal situation is best illustrated by the response of Yugoslav, in particular Serbian population, to the aggression on their country. Those responses varied greatly according to the ethnical designation of the Yugoslav population. Citizens of Montenegro were somewhat apart from the rest of Yugoslavia, for understandable reason. Montenegro had already taken a distance from Milošević and his “nationalistic great-Serb” politics. Although it was Milošević who put the actual rulers in Montenegro into power, when he was demonized and his politics did not sell any longer, majority of his Montenegro compatriots turned their back to him and his politics. Majority of Montenegro Montenegrins considered the KiM issue as a purely Serbian one and tried not to be involved into the conflict. In fact, Montenegro was at the time mainly out of Milošević control and some of adversaries of the latter took refuge in Montenegro, like Zoran Djindjic, Vuk Drašković and others, to save their lives, as we shall see later on. As for the common people, one should bear in mind that out of all Montenegrins in the former Yugoslavia, one half lives in Serbia. Montenegro came under fire never-the-less, and airfields, garrisons, infrastructure etc were subjects to air raids. When citizens of Nikšić, an inland town, noticed that their place was spared, complained, shouting “We are not pestilent! “ and, the story goes, Nikšić was bombed next day. In fact, one of the most spectacular actions against the aggressors was carried out from Montenegro. An escadrille of fighter bombers took off from a Montenegro airfield and flying at a low-level height attacked from the sea an USA air base in Albania and destroyed a number of Apache helicopters on the ground. 1 Now we come to the Serb part of the Serbian population at the time of NATO aggression. Their feelings may be best described as mixed and confused. Those supporting Milošević and Šešelj experienced the aggression as an unprovoked attack of a military organization on a sovereign country, because the latter dared to defy the external pressure on Serbia in favour of Shqiptars. In fact, practically only Milošević supporters took active part in the political activities corroborating the official attitude, while those Šešelj’s followers restricted their role to making much noise and joining paramilitaries on KiM. The internal activities of Milošević’s followers consisted in participating in those rallies mentioned above, but the police took advantage of the war to liquidate some of the most prominent opponents of the regime. A renowned newspaper owner and journalist, Slavko Ćuruvija, was assassinated at the very beginning of the aggression. (Though it was clear that it was done by the State Security service, the actual perpetrators have never been disclosed and sentenced for that murder). One of the opposition leaders, Vuk Drashković, was the target for assassination twice, ones in Serbia and when he found refuge in Montenegro (where his wife comes from) he was almost killed once again. But in the most complex, indeed weird situation found themselves those who used to fight Milošević and his regime before the Aggression. The official propaganda made by Western Allies was that they fought Milošević, not Yugoslavia and hence the internal opposition should have considered NATO raids as a part of a common struggle against a dictatorship. But it was Yugoslavia which was subject to destruction, not Milošević. The NATO logic was like killing an animal in order to relieve it from its parasites. (This weird logic will be exposed to the extreme in the later aggression on Iraq.) In fact, the internal opposition was forced to feel more and more patriotic than opposition, contrary to the external expectations. But the help to those put unwillingly in such a schizophrenic state came from (whom else) Milošević. What the dictator did during the NATO raids? He took refuge in the military shelters and never visited spots subjected to the fierce bombing. In particular he never visited KiM, where the attacks were the most numerous and devastating. Nor he paid visits to wounded in the hospitals, not to 1
The operation resembled much that of Israelis sudden attack on Egyptian airfields in the Six-day war in 1967.
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mentioned families of the aggression victims, civilian and army alike. But what made the Serbian citizens furious was the misbehaviour of Milošević family. The latter was engaged in all sorts of illegal activities, like smuggling, bank transactions etc, that it offended the taste of every ordinary citizen. The behaviour of Milošević son, Marko, was particularly disgusting. Although physically fit, he avoided serving military service. While his young compatriots were fighting at KiM, subjected to deadly attacks from a powerful enemy, he was parading in his town Požarevac in a camouflage uniform. As his mother Mira used to stress it before TV cameras, or to journalists, her son was ”protecting his young family”. (Marko was recently unofficially married and had a son with a girl of dubious previous profession.) In fact his family left Yugoslavia soon after the beginning of the Aggression, and spent most the time abroad. But the affair with the Moscow patriarch exceeded the worst expectation of the domestic public. Milošević invited him to visit Belgrade during the bombing and then put Marko and his family on the same plane for Moscow with the patriarch, using him as a live shield for his son-criminal. It was the scene in the White Palace in Belgrade (formally the residence of Yugoslav Royal family), the official Milošević residence, when Marko was introduced to the Patriarch which was shocking the Yugoslav public the most, with its banality and diabolic overtones. One may have various attitudes towards dictatorship and dictators, for there are all sorts of the latter. Stalin had nothing with state belongings and lived by his official earnings. When his son Jacob was the prisoner of war Josip Visarionovich did nothing to rescue him. He turned down German official offer for release Jacob for the exchange of a number of German generals, with words : “I do not change privates for generals!”. That is why Soviet citizens trusted Stalin despite his cruel dictatorship and finally won the war. Generally, situation in which Yugoslavia, in particular Serbia found herself during the NATO aggression resembled much that described by Joseph Flavius in his Jewish Wars, 1 , more precisely the siege of Jerusalem by Vespasian and Titus. 2 The overcrowded Jerusalem was under the brutal control of Jewish criminals, who used to torture the unfortunate citizens, robbing their food etc. The latter were dying of starvation and deceases, but were not allowed to leave the city. Finally Titus conquered Jerusalem, what was interpreted by our writer as liberation from the cruel phanatic criminal defenders. NATO was likewise ”helping liberating Yugoslavia” from Milošević, under the formal justification of protecting KiM Shqiptars from ”Serbian oppression”. This instance deserves further considerations, for it bears very much the burden of the current international affairs and the international law (whatever the latter means). The logic of foreign intervention Whatever proclaimed aims of the external intervention, the latter must be carefully analyzed, before passing judgments on the justifiability of the interfering into domestic affairs of a sovereign state. In most cases these interventions were provoked, at least formally, by one of two (or both) reasons: (i) liberation of the people from an oppressive dictators, (ii) protection of a minority of the population from the oppression from the rest of the population. In the case of KiM crisis, it was mainly the latter rationale, while the former was use as an additional excuse for NATO intervention. But before we pass the judgment on the NATO intervention on Yugoslavia, a few fords on the logic of an intervention as such seems in order. Whether there is an oppression of the people in a country is the matter of opinion, or estimate from an outside community or organization. Contrary to that, a military attack on a sovereign country is a fact. This leaves plenty of room for misuse of the foreign intervention for the sake of gaining 1
J. Flavius, The Wars of the Jews in Flavius Josephus Complete works, Nelson & Sons, London, 1859, p. 543.
We do not take Flavius’ testifying for granted, given the circumstances of his writing about the War, but refer to the situation as a model paradigm.
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control over a state, for various reasons. The Iraq case clearly illustrates the point. The same applies for the point (ii), with the famous Hitler’s misuse of the Sudetian Germans as an excuse for subduing Czechoslovakia. As we have seen similar paradigm was conspicuous in attempts to do the same with Yugoslavia, specifically with Serbia. Formally, when the conflict between the sovereignty of an independent state and the human rights (individual or collective alike) arises, it is the interest of the stronger partner which gains the upper hand. Formally also, if the state in question is a part of an international organization, which obliges its members to a particular sort of behaviour in the relation with the rest of the organization, the state must subdue itself to the common rules. In the case of FSY, the only organization which should be invoked to interfere was UN. However, after the dissolution of YU2, the formal position of FSY was unclear at least, since it claimed to be the legitimate successor of YU2 and thus an automatic member of UN. The latter never denied this claim officially, tough occasionally questioned the Yugoslav interpretation regarding the formal position on that matter. Anyway, UN did nothing to prevent the NATO aggression on FSY, but accepted a posteriori the role of NATO as approved by UN. All these circumstances caught the anti-Milošević Serb population in Serbia in a schizophrenic situation of the hatred towards the autocrat and the patriotic feeling of citizens whose county was the subject of an unprovoked attack. The combination of these opposing feelings caused apathy of this subpopulation, which was forced to wait that the events resolve the conflict by themselves. The only reasonable attitude was to expose the devastating effects of the destruction of the Yugoslavia on the particular sectors of the Yugoslav country. The state in an undeclared war Yugoslavia had already the tradition to be attacked without declaration of war. It happened in April 1941 when Third Reich launched a devastating assault of Yugoslavia, declaring the state of war during the very attack, by the radio. 1 In fact, after the experience of the so-called Gulf war, when USA attacked Iraq, and after the attacks on Afghanistan and Iraq again, by the same states (with some other states involved on the attacker’s side) it has become clear that an attacker will find unnecessary to declare the war at all. All military operations will be considered as “preemptive strikes”, “restricted operations”, ”humanitarian actions” etc. The world has been deprived of the wars, but not of the ” war criminals”, as the Hague Tribunal has been demonstrating after the ”nonwars” in Yu2. The modern military operations allow for this hypocritical interpretation of the armed attacks on sovereign countries. No “carpet-bombs” as practiced in WW2, no nuclear bombs like those over Japan in 1945, no massive killings and no world compassion. If a massive killing does happen, it will be considered as “collateral damage” (whatever it may mean). We quote here some of planned or unplanned incidents, which happened during the “humanitarian actions” by war “heroes from 10 km altitude” or like. Cassette bombs. On the soil of Yu2 first used by Milan Martić from Krajina republic, against Zagreb (as a “retaliation” for Zagreb conquering the part of Krajina in the Western Slavonia), this weapon, forbidden by the international law as targeting exclusively ”living forces”, was employed during the NATO aggression a number of times. As we mentioned before NATO planes used to fly over Yugoslav territory feeling safe against the air defence. But occasionally some of them were shot down, and immediately attacks by cassette bombs were launched as retaliation against the nearby town, as the case with market at Niš was, with many civilian victims. 2 According to NATO 1.080 1 2
It was the first time in history to make use of radio for such a purpose. Incidentally, in an undeclared war, there is no distinction between civilians and non-civilians.
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cassette bombs were dropped altogether on 218 points in Serbia. What was the most humiliating (and disgusting at the same time) was the feeling of the attacked population that they were regarded as the clay pigeons (sitting ducks), who are supposed to remain passive and wait their fate, determined either by the “merciful angels” or by the ”general chance”. Obviously the “life sparing ideology” was designed for the propaganda reasons only, and if the situation requires, humans appear as legitimate targets as any other . To illustrate the point, we quote reports from April 6, 1999. 1 In the NATO raid on the town Aleksinac (near Niš) 7 people were killed and 26 wounded by cassette bombs, with one quarter of the town destroyed. Two days earlier Vranje was bombed and two people killed and a number of them wounded. The same town was attacked a day later. At the same time rockets hit Prizren and Gnjilane (both on KiM). During night between Monday and Tuesday many TV emitters and relays have been rocketed, so that to a number of regions TV signals can not reach TV audience. Priština airport “Slatina” was rocketed again, as well as caserns “Car Dušan”at Prizren. Niš, Kraljevo environments, Kragujevac, Loznica, Jagodina, Zlatibor region etc were rocketed as well … On April 27, 1999, casern in the centre of the town Surdulica was bombed, with 17 people killed, 11 wounded and 300 buildings destroyed or damaged. (Thanks for asking, caserne remained intact). Casualties like these were not much publicized at the time, either from Belgrade or NATO sides, for different reasons. Milošević did not wont the people to be fully aware of the scale of destruction going on , so as not to be put under pressure to succumb to the aggression, whereas to NATO civilian casualties would spoil the image of a “pure bombing”, without people suffering. The axis Belgrade –Washington was running nicely, with Yugoslav citizens as spectators (those who survived, of course). Surdulica, like many other towns in Serbia, is accustomed to massacres. Under the Bulgarian occupation during WW1, a few thousands people were killed and thrown into a pit Duboka Dolina (Deep Valley). When Bulgarian troupes occupied the town again, during the WW2, they demolished the monument dedicated to the previous victims, with another contingent of civilian victims at the suburb Masurica. On May 31, 1999 NATO finally finished the job at Surdulica, what cost the unfortunate town another 15 dead, mainly in the local hospital. Depleted Uranium This substance, widely used by USA in several conflicts she was engaged in recently (Gulf War, BiH), is strictly forbidden by the international law. It is, in fact, U238, the principal raw material for extracting U235, used for the nuclear bombs and nuclear reactors. Since it is radioactive, this nuclear waist appears dangerous contaminating material, not easy to get rid of. But when it was found convenient for the military purposes, it found its way into the war arsenal. Since almost twice as heavy as lead, it makes the bullets pass through the tank shields as a knife through butter. During the last 60 years about 700.000 tons have been accumulated in USA. Bullets and grenades made of this material appear cheap and the very convenient way to discard this dangerous waist to non-American recipients. According to NATO sources at least 10 tons of DU has been dispatched on 95 locations in Serbia by 112 air strikes in 1999. This amount corresponds to 437 atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima. The damaging effects on the population have been undeniably demonstrated not only on Shqiptar and non-Shqiptar inhabitants in KiM, but in all staff which was engaged in the military presence after the NATO occupation of KiM (mainly Italians and Germans). In 2004 an increase of 40 % of the cancer cases has been recorded in Serbia compared with 1999. In Prizren and the surroundings Incidentally, on that day in 1941 German Luftwaffe attacked Belgrade (an “open city”) early in the morning, starting the (undeclared) war against Yugoslavia. More than 2.000 citizens were killed and about 12.000 wounded, with entire quarters destroyed, including the National Library with hundreds thousand books and documents of invaluable value.
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a noticeable increase of deaths within Shqiptar population (mainly children) caused by malign deceases has been reported too. In particular, cases with osteocancer at children below age 11 have been recorded, undetected hitherto. The principal means of exposing to the contaminated powder is by inhalating this radioactive dust. Since the half-life time of U238 is 4.5 billion years, those areas in Iraq, Kuwait, BiH and KiM have been contaminated “for life”. The latent carcinogenic period goes from 5 to 50 years. What is worst, the damaging effect affects the progeny as well and an increase of children with body handicaps has been reported among American soldiers’ families, as well as among other NATO staff engaged in the areas where DU was used. We note that an Italian soldier, who was employed in Somalia and suffered from carcinoma afterwards, charged his state for sending him to the region known to be contaminated by DU, without proper uniform. It is interesting to note, also, that DU was never used at the KiM region later to be used for constructing USA base, Bondsteel. Further, during their stay on KiM USA troops are supplied by food and drinks (including water) directly from USA, never from the local sources.. Many Shqiptars from Peć and Djakovica have fallen sick after bombardments,2 and they appear the most frequent victims of DU, after the Italian soldiers, (who stayed at KiM the longest). A number of the international commissions were engaged to assess the damage due to DU mainly via UN organizations, but their reports appear either poorly publicized, or mainly formal with evident political overtones. (We shall return to this point when talking about the propaganda war). Collateral accidences Understandably, KiM was the principal target of NATO air strikes in 1999. Though theoretically the aims were strictly army and police targets, the rest of populations fell inevitably victim, understandably too, to the ”discriminate” bombing. It has been estimated that 47% Albanians and 59% Serbs fled Kosovo in 1999. The main Shqiptar destinations were Albania and Macedonia, from the geographical and ethnical reasons, while non-Albanian citizens fled to the rest of Serbia: about 200.000 Serbs and 20.000 Roma (unofficially 40-50.000), 1 and Montenegro (20.000). The estimate for the Shqiptars goes up to 640.000, but these figures should be taken with a grain of salt. According to Vladimir Putin this figure should be reduced to 25.000 – 40.000 refugees. But whichever figures one prefers, the massive exodus during NATO airstrikes was both evident and understandable. The fleeng on non-Shqiptars was caused by the people desire to move out of the war zone, whereas the rationale for Shqiptar exodus was more complex and varied. Majority of them wanted to move out of the NATO reach too, but a part was banished by force, as we announced before. This was done mainly by the paramilitaries, Arkan's and Šešelj's (Dinaric) units, but local militia was not innocent in many cases. Testimonies by Shqiptar families maltreated in some case have been recorded and widely publicised by the world media during the NATO agression. As in the case of BiH what the public could learn about these attrocities was just the half of the story, with the prehistory involved missing. A part of the exile population was forced for the exodus by very KLA, for various reasons. First, every refugee column was recorded by the world media, justifying NATO attacks and a posteriori KLA actions in 1997/8. Second, with the civilian refugees many KLA fighters smuggled into Albania. Third, when passing the border, male refugees capable for fighting were recruited, by force or otherwise, to join KLA. There was another less conspicuous motive for entering refugee columns. This motive was also present in Croatia and BiH among Serb, Muslim and Croat population displaced or banished from their homelands. Namely, emigration impuls has always been present among poor population in Balkan and drifts towards the more prosperous regions have always been part of the Balkan Officially, out of all those ”displaced people” 16.000 would later return to KiM, but this figure should be taken with the grain of salt too.
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folklore. In the case of uprisings, rebelions or like, so called metanastatic movements, mentioned before, have moved a large proportion of the local population towards more prosperous, secure etc regions. In the case of Serb population, the point of attraction has always been Serbia, as discussed earlier. The same aplies to moves from KiM into the rest of Serbia. In the cae of KiM Roma situation appears even more transparent. Coming to Belgrade or other large urban places, the status of refugee (or displaced) person, has been very promissing to Roma people, for they expect to be taken care of by the state even more radically than in the normal situations. In fact a great deal of the so-called Roma refugees from KiM are not from KiM at all, but pretend to be victims of the NATO and Shqiptar violence. 1 Never-the-less Roma case illustrates the best the faulcity of Shqiptar claims that they expelled non-Shqiptars as the oppresors, what in the Roma case appears not false, but ridiculous. But for many Bosnians and Shqiptars, the status of refugee meant the possibility their dreams to come true. The latter moved from KiM to Albania and Macedonia, and from these countries to the West Europe, Canada, USA etc. True, refugee status is far from ideal state somebody would like, but graually they are assimilated into the new society, which is by all standards infinitely more desirable than their homeland. It would be certainly cynical to call this syndrom »a collateral gain», but this effect illustrats perhaps the best the famous Bismarck's remark at the Berlin Congress in 1878, that Balkan people produce more history than they can swallow. After the above general remarks, some particular instances of the KiM events in 1999 will illustrate the complexity and horrifying aspects of the time of disorder and violence. We start with a proper colateral damage (beter to say attrocity), which drew attention of the public media. A column of Shqiptar refugees was moving toward Albania, when an Alliance airplane attacked it from the usual safe altitude of 10 km. Acording to the (British) pilote, he saw a couple of vehicles in the column, what was suspicious to him and dropped guided bombs, causing a havock on the ground. TV equipes quickly arrived and the refugees masacre was duly recorded. The case was firmly confirmed, with the running report by the pilote (recorded by the military reconnaissance) what was going on during the incident. The response to the incident by the officials and victims were more than revealing the local mental complexity of the situation. While the case was fully publicized by the Serbian media as another proof of the lack of care of Allies for the human liifes, Shqiptars from the column (those who survived, of course) denied it was due to an attack from the air and accused the Serbian forces for the massacre. The point was not the misunderstanding but a deep psychological selfdenying. Those people did not want to believe inconvenient facts, which went against the prevailing thesis that it was Serbia which was the only cause of their misfortune. In fact, no Shqiptar ever admited that they moved from KiM because of bombing. Before we move to other instances of collateral damages, a few words on the war incidents seem in order. During WW2 Allies used to bomb Yugoslav territory many times, in particular in 1943 and 1944, mainly at he request of Tito. Thus Belgrade was bombed twice, once on the very (Orthodox) Easter day. The overall number of victims turned out to be larger than the number of Belgrade citizens killed during the Luftwaffe airstrickes on April 6, 1941. No aimed military target was struck during those two «friendly bombing», but this is the logic of «bombing from the sky». 2 In fact, Tito's requests for bombing Yugoslav towns (not only Serbian ones) was multiply motivated. Beside convincing Allies he was military strong and cooperative and the domestic public that he was an integral part of the Alliance, another psychological point must not be ignored. It was the western Allies who killed innocent Yugoslav civilians, what should those who survived take into account when after the war was over, where their sympathies should go - to the West or to the Soviet Union (that is to Tito and his partizans). Although in 1999 in the majority of cases the Serbians fell victims of the nonintentional accidents, Milošević and his propaganda machine did What explains partly the difference in number of Roma refugees quoted above. My later wife with her family made a narrow escape, but the house was destroyed and the grandmother killed on the occasion.
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not fail to accuse Allies for inhumanity. The next incident will illustrate the logic of war propaganda even better. Who killed these people? - The case of RTS station TV media appear the most influental means for information and formation of the public opinion. They are threfore the most important tool for supporting the oficial politics, particularly in the situation of a state of war. The principal Serbian TV tower, situated on the top of Avala mountain near Belgrade was one of the first targets of NATO airstrikes and was destroyed after several attacks. Yugoslav government, of course, had auxiliary emiters available in the extraoridnary situations and state programmes continued to present offical image of the state in an undeclared war. The ministry of information was in hands of Šešelj's party, for good reson. Šešelj and his close cronies were very skilful in propaganda and demagogy and it was their unscrupuulous attacks on their adversaries, including Milošević and his party at the time, which earned them the place in the Serbian government, as described earlier. The most agressive and cunning among them, (after Sheshlj, of course), was the young general secretary of SRP, Alexandar Vučić, who was appointed to be minister for information in the government. His capacity to lie has been unsurpassed until now in Yu2, and thus in Serbia, what earned him the title of Yugoslav Goebels. Except for the very SRP supporters he was the most hated politician in FSY (second only to Šešelj). He was able to incite hatred towards innocent people, and as for the Yugoslav enemies like NATO, it was a piece of cake for this demagogue, of course. Hence, no wonder Allies decided to get rid of him. The following plan was contrived for that end. CNN arranged an interview with Serbian minister for information, at 02.00 h local time (that is at 08.00 h pm New York time). The plan was to bomb the Belgrade TV station during the interview. The plan was as simple as naive. Vučić did not appear in the TV station and when at 02.15 h the spot was hit, he was awaiting around the next corner. What was the point? When the ”war” started government gave orders that all official governmental institutions were to be evacuated, expecting them to be the targets. The same applied to the TV stations, in particular official ones, like RTS. But for that particular night the TV staff was ordered to be present in the building. When the station was hit, 14 staffs were killed and many other injured. Immediately after the attack minister Vučić appeared and TV equips recorded the demolition of the building and suffering of the staff. But the story does not end here. After the fall of Milošević and his regime in 2000, relatives of the staff victims raised their voices against the TV management, who evidently disobeyed the war regulations concerning work of the official services. The manager managed to flee away, but was finally caught hiding in Montenegro (he was, of course, a Montenegrin) and sentenced to 10 years in prison. But interestingly enough nobody even mentions the plot designed by Vučić and his cronies. A journalist even wrote a book describing meticulously all details of the case, but the role of the minister in the entire affairs has been ignored completely, though he was mentioned several times. How much cunning the entire plan was contrived is the best illustrated by the story which was released by Šešelj’s cronies. Namely, mother of minister Vučić Angelina was employed in the same TV station 1 and allegedly was present in the building at the time of the air strike. Allegedly, immediately after the attack, people started shouting ”Where is Angelina?”. The story resembles much the standard trick from detective stories, when the suspect at the time of the murder asks his immediate surrounding what the time was, so that he gets a perfect alibi. Hence, whenever one raises the question of the deliberate set up, he gets the answer that Vučić would never sacrifice his own mother etc. Do people believe it? You would not believe, but they do! The picture of killed and wounded TV staff has gone around the world, as it was planned. Every year on the day of the accident relatives and friends of those killed gather before the memorial plate
1
Not uncommon case of corruption in Yugoslavia
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in front of the TV building and protest against the Milošević regime. Nobody mentions Vučić and nobody explains whom the title inscription on the plate WHY? is addressed to. Strikes and counter strikes Principal targets of NATO air strikes were command points, air defence stations and radar equipments, garrisons, military plants and similar strategic objects. In fact any significant plant was bombed, as of a potential military use, like the car factory at Kragujevac, metal plant at Čačak etc. One of the most attacked targets was the central command underground headquarters at Straževica, near Belgrade. Entrenched deeply into the hill, the centre resisted successfully systematic bombing almost every night. Finally, Allies succeeded in destroying the command. Namely, when the Russian envoy Victor Chernomyrdin came to Belgrade on April 22, Yugoslav anti-air defence was switched off for the security reason. Expecting this NATO sent an F-16 fighter to follow the Russian plane and use it as an antiradar shield. Dropping a 3 tone bomb on Straževica the airplane destroyed finally the command place. 1 Yugoslav response was both quick and unexpected. Three days later, pilots from the airfield Golubovci, near Podgorica (Montenegro), without knowledge and approval from the Belgrade central command, carried out a sudden air strike on the airfield Ramas near Tirana (Albania). American combat group “Hawk” with 24 Apache helicopters was stationed there, as well as parts of 82 parachute division from Fort Brag, Northern Caroline. Early morning on April 26 six fighters F-4, from the acrobatic group ”Flying stars”, flying about 3 m above the sea surface, reached the airfield Ramas in 20 minutes. Their first concern was the training camp for KLA, destroyed by bombs and rockets, and then American helicopters were hit. Nine “Apaches” were destroyed and three seriously damaged. Italian state TV reported the raid, but only once and the news was not repeated any longer. Neverthe-less Italian air force brigade general Giusepe Marani did mention the raid and praised Yugoslav pilots. Next day, April 27, NATO ferociously attacked airfield Golubovci and destroyed all G-4 fighters. The mission was never publicized from either side, for understandable, though different reasons. Never-the-less one of the pilots said at the decoration ceremony he was awarded for an action in a secret mission. The story appears as a good scenario for a war action movie, but to us here another aspect is interesting to point out. To those acquainted with the military affairs it seems incredible such an action could be carried out without approval of the highest authorities. It illustrates, however, another side of the Balkan affairs. An immediate question which comes to mind is: If a regular army may behave like this, what is to be expected from the paramilitary units, widely operating in Yugoslavia after the beginning of her disintegration? And thus we come to the infamous ”Podujevo incident”. Scorpions in action – Podujevo massacre This paramilitary unit we mentioned before was formed in BiH, and after the ”Bosnian wars” were over, moved to Serbia (where else to?). It was incorporated into the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) forces as an antiterrorist (sic) unit, under the command of Slobodan Medić. On March 28, 1999, four days after the NATO aggression started, five members of the unit (30-40 members), immediately upon arriving at KiM, shot from automatic rifles 14 Shqiptar civilians (families Bogujevci, Durici and Lugaliju), mostly women and children (five children survived), in a courtyard of family Gashi at Podujevo, a town on the north-east of KiM, close to the KiM administrative border. Commander of the unit Spasoje Vulević testified at the court that he arrived upon hearing the fire and helped the wounded children to be transferred to a Priština hospital. The unit was the same day withdrawn from KiM. One member of the incriminated group, Saša 1
M. Lazanski, “Politika”, March 24, 2007, p. 11.
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Cvjetan, 1 was brought to Serbian court for taking part in this crime and sentenced for a mild sentence. The process was renewed later on and in 2007 the sentence was raised to the maximum period of 20 years. Upon hearing the sentence, Cvjetan kicked by leg the desk of the (female) judge, with the words “You are dead!”. 2 Incredible as it sounds, but this sort of behaviour appears common to all ijekavian paramilitaries (and not only paramilitaries). They behave as if they did not come to Serbia for shelter or as immigrants, but as occupiers, what they in fact are, indeed. In 2007 four other members of the group were arrested and brought to court, too. A year later the first accused Željko Djukić was brought to court, but he denied any involvement in the massacre, as expected. (At a trial at Belgrade court in June 2009 three members of the Scorpions unit were sentenced to the maximum punishment of 20 year prison and one to 15 years.) As in other cases we met before, all members of the group denied their taking part in the event. We thus do not know what provoked such a bestial behaviour, for it is hard to imagine that it “just happened”. The system “0/1” , without details of the story, appears universally operative when this sort of crime is involved. We mentioned the massacre done by a British jetfighter on a moving column of Shqiptars. One may interpret such an assault as a collateral damage, as it has been adopted by the Allies media. But one may go beyond the obvious picture and contemplate the possibility that it was a planned operation, aimed at giving publicity to the case of the refugees, as part of an alleged ethnical cleansing project. The touching scenes of massacred civilians, with the ”collateral damage” explanation, testify the cruelty of the conflict, with ensured “Ideological background” that it all was caused by Milošević regime and, albeit indirectly, by (Serbian) Serbs. But even if one adopts the official Western interpretation in that particular case, how one can explain the “accident” which happened with (international) train, passing through the Grdelička Gorge, along the South Morava river, by plane daylight. It was attacked by NATO airplanes, destroyed while crossing the river by a bridge with many passengers killed and wounded.. The only explanation might be the possibility that it was the bridge which was the target and that the train found itself at the wrong place at the wrong time. Unfortunately, even with such an explanation those killed victims would not feel better indeed. On May 5, 1999 a bus liner between Djakovica and Podgorica, was attacked by NATO bombers, between Peć and Rožaje, around 11.50 am. At least 17 passengers lost their life after two hours bombardment by rockets and cassette bombs. Twenty-three passengers were wounded, 23 badly, including women and children. Two policemen who arrived to help were wounded two, during the second wave of raid. A car which was moving in front of the bus was hit and burnt together with the passengers. How to explain such an attack? By a disinformation? Or as a military exercise, with vehicles as a suitable moving sitting ducks? The following accident bears much the mixture of the politics and warfare. One night the Chinese embassy at Belgrade quarters New Belgrade, was rocketed and the building badly damaged with a number of the Chinese staff killed and wounded. Rumour went through the Belgrade that the building was hiding TV station “Košava” (owned by Milošević’s daughter, detested even by Milošević’s supporters) and that it was the reason the embassy was hit. Chinese government was furious and made a severe protest to USA, who apologized, with the “explanation” that it was done by mistake. Allegedly, the pilots had an obsolete map of the city, so that they were unaware of the function of the hit building (sic). Of course, it was clear that nobody would swallow such a lie, but this was just another exercise of the supremacy of the superpower. USA compensated the material damage, of course, but the exact deal was never revealed, just as the case with the Kennedy – Born at Benkovac in western Herzegovina. Incidentally, this episode explains the best why almost all judges presiding criminal courts in Serbia happen to be female.
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Hruschtchov deal during the Cuban crisis in 1962 was. The massage sent to China was to show who was the boss on this globe, whereas Milošević was expected to realize there was nobody in the world he could rely on. Of course FRY was densely packed by NATO, more precisely USA, informers. Even the slightest move of military vehicles, for instance, was reported and the air attack followed immediately. The markers for locating the air strikes targets were dropped from the air, and these were removed after the raids were over. (Rumours were spread in Serbia it was Serbs from Republica Srpska who collected those markers for USA forces.) The massacre at Suva Reka 1 This village near Prizren town at Metohija was the place where a massacre of 48 Shqiptar civilians took place in March 1999. According to a witness from the Special unit from Nil, at the trial at Belgrade in February, 2007, the whole area of the Prizren region was after the beginning of NATO raids full of military units and a chaotic situation prevented a strict control of what was going on in this area. According to him a large number of UKL fighters were present within the region Suva Reka-Orahovac-Mališevo-Prizren. The witness declared he heard about massacre for the first time following the Milošević trial at Hague. At the time he saw long columns of Shqiptars moving from Djakovica, Suva Reka and Prizren. When asked why they were moving, some of the refugees did not respond, some said it was because of bombardments, and some because they were ordered to do so. At the trial at Belgrade (April 2009) seven members of a “special police unit” are being prosecuted for that massacre) Propaganda and meta-propaganda Traditional truth is that it is the truth which is the first victim in a war. NATO aggression on Yugoslavia was no exception in this respect. The propaganda war follows its own logic and it is necessary to make a few preliminary remarks before starting the actual situation in 1999. Milošević and his regime were notorious for making use of propaganda for his own use. At least it was the image of Serbian regime at the time. But this image was grossly simplified. In fact, whatever was said for his propaganda refers to the state-owned media, in particular TV. But in Serbia there were numerous private and local TV stations which were out of the state control. The situation with press was even more favourable, since there was no official paper, except for the party-owned ones. Radio stations were spared from daily politics and they could be ignored in this context. Generally, there was a freedom of expression during Milošević era, in particular comparing with the time of Josip Broz Tito, when the control was absolute and strict. In fact, Milošević adopted the famous dictum of Frederick the Great ” I have made a deal with my subjects - they may say whatever they want and I do whatever I want”. As a result, many papers used to misuse the situation and to publish such a rubbish of articles directed against the regime, that it was counterproductive. Moreover, this freedom of expression resulted in the undermining the importance of written word. What was even worst, it lowered the level of the professional written word, with the strength of the expressions (including curses) tending to compensate the lack of persuasive power. The situation changed when Šešelj’s radicals joined Milošević’s government, with Aleksandar Vučić taking over the official propaganda via the Ministry for information. Regime started to pursuit the newspapers and their managers for the articles critical to the regime. The managers used to be charged for articles similar to those published in Šešelj’s media before he joined Milošević’s regime. This restriction of the free speech was one of the first signs that the fascization of the Serbian society was going on. But globally, the logic of the political propaganda was not that 1
Dry River in Serb.
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simple, in the ”western movies manners”, like ”good guys” versus ”bad guys”. We discuss now the western side of the coin. That the propaganda preparation for war is as important as military one, has been clear since Adolph Hitler started to liberate Europe in 1936. The quintessence of any propaganda may be put into the traditional cry “Catch the thief!”. Preparing the ground for attacking Yugoslavia, western Allies made first a loud propaganda about Serbian propaganda (what might be called metapropaganda). It runs in two stages. Fist demonization of the Serbian public media, as a sheer propaganda and then suppressing the latter as much as possible, both at home and at the international level. Hence, those attempts in Serbia to defend publicly Serbian national interests were qualified as a part of Milošević propaganda machinery. At the (western) international level all news found inadequate for demonizing Serbia were suppressed. Of course, when a state is in state of war, many regular rules might be suppressed, including the freedom of press. It refers to both sides of the military conflicts, in this particular case NATO allies and Yugoslavia (Serbia). But one can not overlook the asymmetry of the situation. Serbia was attacked by a mighty power, which was determined to achieve his political aims by military actions. Though the final aims of USA were well publicized, nobody in Serbia was sure what the ultimate purpose of the aggression would be, and this uncertainty still holds. To Serbia the attack threatened the very national existence and her propaganda means were justified. On the other hand USA was not endangered by Yugoslavia in any respect and the military actions were just “continuation of the politics by armed means”, as Klauzewitz would put it. But the most important lesson to learn from the NATO intervention was of a more general nature. The Western, as geographically-ideological metaphor, keeps on boasting with the freedom of expression and liberal public media. With the suppression of that freedom at the time of NATO intervention it has proved that this freedom has been of a provisional nature. Freedom with exceptions is not freedom, but opportunism. One can not help recalling the famous episode from Hruschtchov’s visit to USA in 60-ies. At the end of his tour he had a meeting with USA businessmen in California. The atmosphere was friendly, even cheerful, when a businessman stood up and asked the Soviet prime minister: “Mr. Premier, why Soviet authorities prevent broadcasting of The Voice of America over Soviet Union?”. The silence issued and then Nikita Hruschtchov replied by a counter question: ”Mr., what is your favourite dish?”. ”I don’t see the relevance of the question, but my answer is beefsteak”. “Well, replied Hruschtchov, you see, my favourite dish is schtche, and soviet people will eat schtche!”. 1 Hence, the first step to be taken against Serbia was to put it under an information siege. It comprised the following measures: (i) suppression of the newspaper articles from Serbia in the western press: 2 (ii) selection of the reports from the “war zone”, including falsifying some of them; (iii) suppression of the INTERNET connections of Serbia; (iv) Destruction of the principal Serbian TV relays, including that on Avala mountain near Belgrade (200 m high) . We shall comment these points one by one. The old dictum says Audiatur et altera pars. By depriving the other side of his right of expression, the first side acknowledges, albeit implicitly, she is wrong, or at least incapable to fight on an open arena. We mention here that the USA press did publish articles of American origin critical to the USA government on the matter, as the example of The Boston Globe illustrates. A queue at CNN quarters in New York waiting to be called and deliver their information from the KiM area and the vicinity. One of witnesses listens how his predecessor testifies how in a column of Shqiptar refuges before the crossing to Macedonia a young woman feels bad and a Yugoslav soldier come across and helps her to reach the ambulance car. The translator (sic) renders the story as a Yugoslav soldier maltreating the unfortunate Shqiptar victim. 3 Schtche is the traditional Russian dish, with various vegetables and meet. I happen to have personal experience on that matter. 3 Italians have the dictum tradutore – tratore (translator – betrayer). 1 2
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USA government ordered 11 May, 1999 all owners of the satellite relays of INTERNET to disconnect Yugoslavia. On May 26 European consortium of the EUTELSAT satellite cut off all transmissions of the Serbian state TV, as a “powerful media weapon” of the Serbian government. 1 After an initiative of the German minister Schröder many European countries strongly recommended the operators of the Consortium to cut off transitions of the Yugoslav TV, what included France Telecom, Deutsche Telekom, Telecom Italia and British Telecom. Later, after the destruction of the WTC towers on 11 September, the joke was running around Yugoslavia concerning the Avala exploit of NATO air forces. In the Underworld the Avala tower meets Sabra tower (one of the twin World Trade Centre towers in New York) and asks her ”Where is Shatilla [the other twin tower]”? ”Forget about that, says Sabra, the plane was late”. Thus by eliminating the adversary from the propaganda arena USA lost the propaganda war, what might be considered the only Serbian victory in the entire conflict. As another example how the socalled great countries appear not just as great as they pretend, illustrates the case of much praised stealth fighter F-117A, which was shot down by the 250 rocket brigade (equipped by Russian rockets Kub and Neva) over the Srem region (Budjanovci). The pilot was rescued by USA rescue unit, but the wreckage was collected by Yugoslav forces. Rumour was running around Yugoslavia that the latter was delivered to Russians for inspections, but it has never been proved. Anyway, these remains have been exposed at the casern of Brigade at Belgrade, where they can be seen now. USA never reported this lost of the “invisible fighter”, the pride of their air forces. In a series of documentaries on the military aviation on the Discovery channel, much room was devoted to the stealth “super fighter”, but it’s shooting down during the NATO campaign in Yugoslavia was not mentioned at all. 2 (This exploit was paid by a loss of 28 staff of Brigade, that 27 March 1999, but this loss was publicized in Serbian media neither).
Figure 9. Wreckage of F-117A at Budjanovci, shot down on March 27, 1999. In order to counter the ”Serbian propaganda” Allies arranged to install an emitter on board the airplane C-130 Hercules, baptized ”commando solo”, which broadcasted programmes in Serb, within the Serbian official bands of wavelengths. Also, NATO airplanes used to disseminate millions of leaflets in Serb Cyrillic over the Serbia, appealing to the Serbian population to renounce P. Lasalle, “Kosovo: la propaganda aux multiples frappes”, June 16, 1999. (In the following of this section we shall make an extensive use of this article. (Unfortunately, we can not quote the source). 2 Milošević’s supporters organized a public performance at the Belgrade square, with a transparency SORRY “INVISIBLE”, WE DID NOT KNOW YOU WERE INVISIBLE” 1
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their president Slobodan Milošević, announcing an intensification of the air strikes if the latter does not succumb to the demands of Allies. These leaflets were particularly densely distributed over KiM, inciting Serbian soldiers to desert. But the crown of this propaganda offensive came in the form of a leaflet with the photo of an Apache helicopter ready to destroy an armoured vehicle, with a remarkable subtitle YOU REMAIN ON KOSOVO AND YOU FACE A CERTAIN DEATH. Though this massage was addressed to the military presence of the state of Serbia on the soil of Serbia, the ultimate goal can not be overlooked – we are going to deprive Serbia from her southern province. (We shall return to this point later on). In order to direct the public opinion towards proper conclusions, Alliance founded immediately after the beginning of NATO campaign an information bureau (one can not help recalling the famous INFORMBUREAU, used by Stalin against Tito’s Yugoslavia in 1948), headed by Jamy Shea, an American expert for the propaganda war. The attempt badly failed, for the product of this propaganda unit turn out to be a mixture of transparent lies, nonsense and counterdictions. Irritated by such an amateurism British premier decided to constitute another propaganda unit, equipped by British experts, like Alastair Campbell and the editor of Bill Clinton speeches Jonathan Prince. The point was to include the propaganda into the current electoral campaigns and to account for the proper approach regarding each of the western target population, which requires specific kind of argumentation (and facts, for that matter). In particular, it was important to meet the Green opposition in Germany, whose slogan ”Never more Auschwitz” was particularly devastating to Schröder’s role in the affair. One of particular targets were NGO in the relevant western countries (and in Yugoslavia, for that matter), as relays for the Allies’ propaganda. 1 As M. Lasalle noted, many journalists accepted the role of forging the evidence, in particular the fact that it was NATO intervention which provoked the violence of Serbian police at KiM and which silenced Serbian opposition after the aggression started. The principal tool for demonizing Serbia vis-à-vis KiM affair was to make use of the terms which provoke in European ears (and minds) well entrenched adversities. Thus German minister for defence, Rudolf Scharping and Joschka Fischer, minister for the foreign affairs, made extensive use, when talking about Kosovo, of terms like genocide, camps of concentration and deportations. This misuse of the historical facts for the immediate political benefits was relayed in France by Daniel Cohn-Bendit and media. Generally one meets the situation here when the internal needs dictate a distorted picture of events going on in another region, with latter being of the profound importance for the existence of a state, Serbia in this case. What illustrates the thesis there is no regional problem in the modern world, but each perturbation in one region bears consequences to others and vice versa. (As we shall see later on, this effect will show up in all its grandeur when reflecting the Middle East problems and its European, more precisely Balkan, reverberations). Besides organizing their ”Ministry for truth” in an Orwellian sense, western allies did not spare efforts to silence voices of dissidence. Thus, the BBC correspondent from Belgrade, John Simpson, was accused by Tony Blair’s cronies for “lacking objectivity” and by Robin Cook for offering to British citizens ”pro-Serb viewpoint” of the current events. 2 Similarly, Ennio Remondino, from RAI, was accused to be philoserb, for his critics of bombing TV Belgrade. Contrary to this attitude 1
Spanish daily El Mundo and French weekly Marrianne published excerpts from NATO reports concerning the use of NGO and journalists for the propaganda purpose.
2
One can not help making parallel between the European trio Cook – Cohn-Bendit – Fischer from one side and the American one
Rubin – Albright – Holbrook from the other.
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those reporters who were operating under the control of KLA were never mentioned as controlled, unlike those from Belgrade, who were accused to be under Serb control. Also, testimonies made by Kosovo Shqiptars were transmitted without verifications, unlike non-Shqiptars from KiM, whose voices were never heard in the West. Maltreatments by the Serbian police were well publicized, all 300 % of them, whereas those committed by KLA were absent from the western reports. The later failed to mention forced recruitment of the young refugees for KLA, or the kidnapping young Shqiptar girls for prostitution. According to M. Lasalle, Albanians writers, immigrants in France, like Ismail Kadare, never failed to accuse the collective responsibility of Serbian nation concerning the KiM issue, following the demonization of Serbs from 1991. At an instant death of the chief editor of the Priština daily Koha Ditore, Baton Haxhiu, was reported, while the latter was collecting donations for his journal in Paris. (We shall meet this gentleman again later on). Before we leave the subject, a question: ”How much the Serbian public was informed with the events going on on KiM and around?” seems in order. Generally, those who had an INTERNET access were in a better position from one side, but handicapped from the other. Namely, they were more informed about the details the official Belgrade media avoided to describe, but many of those reports were a part of the propaganda we considered above. Some of those reports, however, were evidently favourable to ”Serbian cause”, of course and one was able to get a more or less balanced picture about the overall situation by making his own inference into different, even conflicting, views and news. Generally, those opposing Milošević’s regime were more inclined to accept the western viewpoint and vice versa. To some of them, on the other hand, Milošević and Allies were two sides of the same coin, acting against the interest or even the existence of the Serbian state. In any case, any particular viewpoint could find a support in the flood of ”news and views ” from the INTERNET or otherwise. Those supporters of Milošević were either cut off from the external informations, or unwilling to listen to the opposite news and views. But generally the patriotic feelings prevailed, as expected. Milošević was a dictator, but he spoke Serb, unlike Bill Clinton and Tony Blair. This rationale will find an a posteriori justification, when many of the cards are sorted out, in particular after Afghanistan and Iraq USA interventions. The power of propaganda has been exposed in such a vivid light in those cases, that retrospective reinterpretations concerning the KiM news and views appear inevitable. Incidents, coincidences and accidents To superficial eye historical situations appear a set of accidental events. The other extreme would be to consider every event as a part of a scheme or long term project. For the precedent events the first way of looking at what is going on on the spot appears natural one, but if a precedent can be found, one may contrive a scheme lying presumably behind the apparently random happening. KiM issue appears full of examples of both kinds. We consider some of them here. The university professor Dr Ibrahim Rugova (1944-2006), the leader of the moderate Democratic League of Kosovo, was a respectful interlocutor of Belgrade. His Gandhi-like strategy for attaining KiM independence was in such a contrast to other political movements of KiM, that no wonder he was the target of KLA, who tried to kill him at several occasions. When NATO intervention started Rugova was put into home confinement, for the sake of protection. But during a transfer to another place, his political adviser, academician Fehmi Agani, was kidnapped and presumably murdered by Serbian police. After NATO occupation, Rugova will play a secondary role on KiM political stage and will die two years before the Kosovo independence declaration in 2008. During the 78 day NATO campaign several thousand KiM people were reported missing. What happened to them? As with all cases like this, one may just make a guess on the final destiny of these people. Some of them surely were genuinely missed in the turmoil, like accidental deaths without record and something like that. Some of them presumably chose to vanish and live
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incognito for one or other reason. But two categories of missing people are of a particular interest to us here, and we shall devote some space to consider them in more detail. Kidnapping has been found a very convenient way to get rid of persona non grata in modern society. This has been amply practiced by Argentinean Junta, though it was not surely their invention. A straightforward murdering of a caught adversary or like appears rather inconvenient, for many reasons. Murdering may be promoting the victim into a martyr, with all accompanying consequences. That the very execution does not solve the relevant issue is the best illustrated by the (alleged or real) crucifixion of Jesus of Nazareth. Contrary to that a kidnapped person appears neither dead nor alive – she is just a “pending case”. Nobody is accused for murder (habeas corpus) and all one has to do is to wait until the case is forgotten The victim is in the meantime executed and the body destroyed in one way or other. Family of the victim is, of course, still hoping the missing relative to appear and is not pressing for charging the officials or others for doing justice to the victim’s close relatives, friends etc, for the missing person is alive and dead at the same time, like the famous Schrödinger’s cat. Bitici brothers’ affair is not just the case in point, but illustrates the complexity of the KiM issue. Those three ethnic Albanians, American citizens, were members of the so-called Atlantic Brigade, which had a few hundred Americans of Albanian origin. It is not clear yet whether this brigade was involved in the actual fighting on KiM, or was just prepared to join the other infantry forces when the ground invasion from Albania should have started. Anyway, after the Kumanovo ”agreement”, they crossed the line dividing the KiM territory from the rest of Serbia and were arrested by Serbian police. Since they possessed no visa (USA citizens must have it for Serbia), they were sentenced for 15 days imprisonment. After the sentence was over and presumably after the pressure from USA authorities, these Americans were released and a police patrol was in charged to deliver them to UNPROFOR at KiM. But they never appeared there and were declared missing persons. Later, when a number of mass graves were revealed in Serbia, with hundreds corps of civilians, presumably Shqiptars, bodies of Bitici brothers were identified. Those policemen in charge of delivering the brothers were taken to court and sentenced. The case of Bitici brothers illustrates many aspects of the KiM affairs. Firstly, the direct involvement of USA in interfering the Serbian internal affairs, by organizing American units for fighting in Serbia. Second, the mass graves found later in Serbia (mainly near Belgrade, but also in refrigerator trucks drowned in Danube River), testified that some civilians killed during the fighting were collected and buried secretly outside KiM. Those people were recorded as missing too, for obvious reason. Both kinds of the missing people syndrome appear particularly grave from the purely ethical reasons. It is the fundamental human right to be able to burry a dead person, regardless of the eventual crime ascribed to him. Every human being has the right to have a grave, if it is feasible. The mass grave (or no grave) deprives the dead of this fundamental aspect of the social life. It also deprives the kinship of his right to pay a tribute to dead and express their appreciation for the bad luck and misfortune. The relatives and friends are even deprived of the genuine feelings, since for them missing persons are simply outside their emotional horizon (what the point of kidnapping is, o course). Now we come to the third case of KiM missing people, which appears as much incredible as horrifying. This is the case of the alleged kidnapping people for the sake of selling their (according to some sources it concerns Yugoslav soldiers, see Appendix 8). This affair was first mentioned by Karla del Ponte in the book The Hunt (in Italian), published after her retirement from the position of the chief prosecutor of Hague Tribunal. According to her testimony, hundreds of Serb civilians were kidnapped, brought to Northern Albania and there used as living sources of human organs, to be sold for transplantations to some foreign clinics. Del Ponte even points to a building near the border with Serbia, which was presumably equipped with instrumentation necessary for extracting human organs. The investigations of the affair were initiated, but the final outcome is still to appear. It is interesting here to note that a similar affair happened in 1992 in
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Bosnia, when Croatian forces intercepted in Bosanski Brod four buses with Roma refugees from Srebrenica. Together with Bosnian Muslim forces they took the refuges out, liquidated them. Victims from one of buses were burred in a nearby village Sijekovac. The mass grave was unearthed in 2004 and 59 skeletons, 19 of them children from 6 months to 14 years are dug out. Rumours went around that the organs were taken from the dead bodies and sold for 20.000 to 25.000 DM. These accusations, however, have never been confirmed. The Serb Bosnian forensic experts testified that it was not possible to state whether or not the organs were taken. After every large action of the Yugoslav army and police (including, presumably the paramilitaries) the terrain was cleared up from the dead bodies. State causalities were collected and buried appropriately, whereas Shqiptar victims (both military and civilian) were either buried on the spot or move from the KiM, depending on the circumstances. Later it will turn out that some of the latter were put into refrigerator tracks and moved to the Central Serbia, where they wee thrown into rivers or possibly lakes. One of these trucks will be recovered from the Danube river near Djerdap dam, whereas other buried under soil will be unearthed during the beginning of Djindjić government mandate in 2001, as we shall see later on.
Epilogue ? NATO campaign lasted 78 days (24 March – 9 June). During the campaign alliance of 19 states, with population of 700 million, were attacking the state of 10 million people. Making use of almost all types of weapons available, including atomic ones (DU bullets and shells), testing new weapons, etc NATO killed about 2.500 civilians (89 children). Altogether 1.002 soldiers and policemen lost their life, with about 12.500 wounded. The overall material damage has been estimated to be $30 billion. Before we go on, a few questions seem in order. First, why it lasted for such a long time? NATO expected that Yugoslavia will be on her knees a few days after the beginning of the attacks. This expectation was natural one, considering the relative strengths of the sides in conflict. 1 The attack was planned just to warn Yugoslavia they meant their threat serious. Once started, the campaign was expected to end quickly and Yugoslavia to succumb to a powerful adversary. Yugoslav authorities, first of all Slobodan Milošević and Serbian government, expected that the world would not tolerate the campaign and UN would intervene. Both sides turned out wrong. The campaign turned quickly into the war of nerves. Awaiting the other side to stop (NATO the campaign, Serbia to defy), Yugoslavia suffered losses and damages unprecedented in the time of peace. With UN kicked out of game, Russia and China passive, Yugoslavia found herself isolated and left to the mercy of the powerful adversary, determined to achieve its ultimate goal. With human losses steadily increasing and expecting the ground troops attack from Albania any minute to start, Serbia finally decided to give up. On June 9 an “agreement” was signed at Kumanovo between Yugoslav and NATO military forces. The capitulation (for it is the right term) was operative from June 10. Why Kumanovo? We mentioned before that in 1912 a decisive battle was fought at that Macedonian town near the present Serbian border. Serbian army defeated Turkish one and from that battle on the final outcome of the First Balkan war was ensured. Hence the slogan, mentioned above FOR KOSOVO KUMANOVO. The Kumanovo choice for signing the capitulation was not chosen by chance. It was meant to additionally humiliate Serbia and Serbs. The same slogan gained again its importance, but this time with a reverse meaning. In the first instance Kosovo meant defeat and Kumanovo victory. This time both places implied defeats. Should one really believe it was done by
An additional hope, if not expectation, was that Serbians will get rid of Milošević, as the principal actor in confronting USA and her allies
1
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Americans on purpose? The only thing one can say now is that if it was not done intentionally, Serbian adversaries appeared more stupid than fearsome. What was the reaction of Yugoslav, particularly Serbian population? The general response was a feeling of relieve. In Serbian towns, in particular those with a noticeable immigrant population, the news about the agreement were met with firing guns and all weaponry available. In fact, it was the reaction of the Serbian youth, who was afraid during the whole campaign, of being engaged in deadly affairs. But the very shooting revealed the presence of the ijekavic (immigrant) population, for they all came to Serbia well equipped with weaponry. (Possessing arms without authorization is strictly forbidden in Yugoslavia, as in any other state, of course). The additional argument in favour of this interpretation is the fact that those over-Drina immigrants mainly joined Yugoslav Army and police and were thus the principal actors in the military operations.
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Figure 7a. NATO devastation of KiM in 1999 campain. (courtesy of V. Sotirović) Kumanovo “agreement” and SC resolution 1244 As always when Milošević is involved in defending Serbia, the final outcome was the worst possible for Serbia. She was badly damaged materially and military emotionally and nationally humiliated and yet forced to succumb. The terms for the agreement were now worse than at the beginning, for this time Allies dealt with a defeated state. Hence, the agreement meant surrender, a
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capitulation. True, even an early giving up would not be a true agreement, for the latter would be signed ”under the pressure”, what makes any agreement euphemism only. On June 6, 1999 a meeting of western allies and Russian authorities took place at Moscow, when the ceasefire agreement was outlined. The agreement envisaged three principal points; (i) NATO will stop air raids; (ii) Serbian forces will evacuate KiM to be replaced by Allies, including Russian troupes; (iii) Russian forces will guarantee Serbian interests and sovereignty. On the same day of signing Kumanovo agreement (sic), June 10, 1999, UN Security Council issued resolution No 1244 (Resolution). The resolution provided, first of all, UN cover for the actions of NATO, carried out without UN approval. It adopted NATO forces as UN ones, while providing UN administration for KiM, until a final status of the province is negotiated. Resolution demanded that KLA forces are “demilitarized” (whatever it meant). The sovereignty of Yugoslavia (Serbia) over KiM was recognized explicitly, what will make Resolution the pivotal point in Serbian claims in the later negotiations and demands. Under the terms of Kumanovo Agreement (KA) Yugoslavia was obliged to remove all her military, paramilitary and police forces from KiM. It was envisaged that later he could implement a symbolic army force (counted in hundreds, not thousands), but it has never be realized, even never tried from Yugoslav side. KiM would be put under the protection of UN (UNMIK), with NATO troops in charge of implementing UN decisions (KFOR). A demilitarized zone was set up along the administrative border between KiM and the rest of Serbia, 5 km wide, and 25 km “air protected zone” which was not to be flied over by Yugoslav air forces. But the worst element of KA, which was not even mentioned explicitly, was that Yugoslavia lost control over her border wit Albania. True, a control over principal check points was envisaged, but even that was never implemented. After that KiM became a part of the Albanian state, better to say the first annexed region for the planned Great Albania state. The first direct outcome of this consequence will show up soon. Why Yugoslav authorities gave up control over her borders appears a mystery. It was this failure to protect her borders which meant the surrender KiM to Albania, not the acceptance of the foreign forces on the Serbian soil. As long as a state has definite borders, it is a state; otherwise it dissolves into a vague geographical entity. The border control need not necessarily imply the right to rule, but if one loses the right to record what is going on on the borders, the notion of a state become devoid of any realistic meaning. NATO could have decided and implemented to settle ten million of foreign people on KiM, but one would at least know 10 million intruders are imported by known agent into Serbia. One might be subject to a mock court process, but as long as there is a proper record of what was going on on the trial, elementary human and civilization rights are preserved. Reality is information – no record, no event, and no history. Obviously behaviour of Yugoslav delegation at the Kumanovo “negotiations” was in the stile ”No, No, and then taking off the underwear”, as somebody put it, describing Milošević’s ”tough” manners in negotiations. It is hard to believe that the delegation with high rank officers could not negotiate out this minimal interest of Yugoslavia. Another failure to make KA as precise as possible will result soon in disastrous situation. Namely, the timing of NATO taking over the control of KiM was not worked out. This failure will turn out fatal for the non-Shqiptar part of KiM population, as we shall see immediately. We mention here that SC resolution 1244 did envisage (Point 2 of Annexe B) Yugoslav presence on main border checkpoints, but this has never been implemented. KA envisaged demilitarization of KLA and other armed forces on KiM. In annex B it was envisaged that KFOR will secure fulfilment of the duties after the return of allowed FSY staff on KiM. Resolution 1244 envisaged security for the return of refugees and displaced people. As it turned out, the latter was fulfilled, but only for Shqiptars, not for the rest of the KiM population. As for the KLA disarmament, it never happened. It was estimated that there was about half million weapons with KiM Shqiptar population. When later KLA was transformed into Kim security force,
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the farce with the KA was completed. The situation greatly resembled that at the end of WW2 on Yugoslav soil, when Nazi Croat Ustasha forces, responsible for the genocide of NDH Serbs, Jews and Roma, was joined to the so-called Domobran army (a benign quisling forces), and thus escaped the punishment for the war crimes. Parallel with KA a secret KFOR agreement with KLA was made. Also a common commission, comprising representatives of Yugoslav Army and Ministry for the Internal Affairs of Serbia and KFOR and UNMIK was formed. Beginning of KiM occupation Yugoslav surrender KiM to NATO did not mean automatically an absolute surrender. Any force occupying KIM would by taking over control would at the same time take responsibility for the region, including the safety of the inhabitants. What happened to the latter after the KA became operative, on June 10, 1999? Did NATO forces enter the Occupied Territory (OT)? 1 Yes, they did, but not in hurry. Between Yugoslav forces leaving the OT and NATO coming in, there was a gap of three days. What happened in the interregnum? KLA from Albania and Macedonia, as well as local one at KiM entered the scene and started immediately ethnical cleansing, banishing nonShqiptar population form KiM. When NATO forces came in this task of KLA was more or less completed. More than 200.000 non-Shqiptars, Serbs, Roma, Croats, etc found shelter in the rest of Yugoslavia. At the same time those refugee who found themselves in Albania and Macedonia, started their return to KiM. (See Figure 10). After that first wave of proper refugees came a constant influx of Albanian Albanians into OT, to be continued up to the present. The lack of border control, discussed above, made it not only possible, but desirable. Both instances mentioned (lack of border control and banishing the autochthonous population from KiM) reveals the best the entire rationale for NATO engagement, better to say for USA intervention. But before we go on with the NATO occupation, a brief digression concerning the role of Russia in the entire affair seems in order. Russia and FRY Serbs and particularly Montenegrins have always considered Russia as their principal friend and protector. Russia did help Serbs on many historical occasions, in particular when Serbs and Montenegrins were engaged in liberating themselves from the foreign occupations, like those of Ottoman Empire, Austro-Hungarians and Germans. It was Russia who declared the war to AustroHungary in 1914, siding Serbia, what resulted in Great War. Russia has always been interested in Balkan affairs, since, except for Greeks, Rumanians and Albanians, the peninsula was inhabited by Slavic population. Beside, since the continental Russia was cut off from Mediterranean Sea by Bosporus and Dardanelle straights, it had an indirect access to Adriatic Sea via Bulgaria, Serbia and Montenegro. The traditional pan Slavic sentiment was another strong link with Balkan, in particular with the Greek-Orthodox population. Under the rule of Slobodan Milošević FRY relied heavily on Russian support in many respects. One particularly strong link was the ideological on, since it was Serbia (with Montenegro) which was the last to accept the linearization in Eastern Europe. This fact proved to be the most disastrous to Serbian state when the dissolution of Yugoslavia started. Not only the communist character of Serbia was used as a pretext for separating from Yugoslavia, but it was this ideological colour which made the West to side Croatia and Slovenia in 1991 and support their secession. (The role of Catholicism in the latter states was not to be underestimated either, of course). Slobodan Milošević was a good communist, but even a better opportunist. But his wife, who came from a prominent communist family, did believe in the communist ideology and being capable to 1
Not to be confused with Palestinian land.
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exercise a strong influence on her husband, influenced the state politics to a considerable extent. It was probably her who instigated Milošević to make a blunder in 1990, which will prove badly damaging to Serbian cause later on. Namely, when Russian colonels attempted a military coup d’etat in Moscow against Gorbachov and the new liberal Soviet government, Milošević sent a message of his support to the old communist guard. The attempt badly failed, thanks to the Yeltsin’s brave intervention, and Serbia found herself isolated from her principal foreign friend. Later on the relationship improved, but Yeljtsin, who became the president of the new Russian state, after dissolution of Soviet Union, never forgave Milošević his blunder. When KA became operative, somebody from the Russian military quarters gave order to a Russian military unit in Bosnia, who was engaged there as a part of the UN security forces, to move to KiM. The unit arrived quickly to Kosovo Polje, a town right to the north of Priština and was met enthusiastically by the local Serbs, who expected to be protected in the ongoing turmoil. But the attempt badly failed. First, Russians had no food supplies and found themselves in an awkward position. It was British forces who intervened and provided them with food, unlike local Serbs who did not managed to meet properly their presumed friends and protectors. Meanwhile Yeljtsin intervened and the unit was withdrawn to Bosnia quickly. This instance in KiM turmoil was the best illustration of several important aspects of the Serb community there – their naivety, their despair and their incompetence to deal with their own interests. Later on Russia turned down the offer to send a unit to KiM as a part of the international security forces. One may meditate on possible reasons for this rejection, but the abovementioned Milošević’s blunder must have been at least a part of the reason. Generally, Russian position and behaviour regarding KiM crisis has been ambiguous from the beginning, for various reasons. In this particular instance, she did not want to join the western occupation forces and thus provide an additional legitimacy to the NATO intervention. In addition, since Russia was not a member of NATO she had to support herself the costs of the peace operation, what she was not willing to do. Never-the-less Russia felt doublecrossed byte West, and from now on, Yeljtsin will be considered as the culprit, what will turn out the beginning of his political decline and the rise of Vladimir Putin.
Figure 10. The zero-sum game. Non-Shqiptars move to the rest of Serbia, while Shqiptar refugees return home. Note the ”victory sign” one of Shqiptars shows to the outgoing former compatriots. Hence, it was from the beginning clear what the final aim of NATO intervention was. We discuss it now in some detail.
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Kosovo - the final solution As demonstrated before and after Kosovo affair, the ultimate aim of USA has been to establish the maximum stability in all world regions where they can do it. The issue of ethics, justice, rightness etc appears to Americans of secondary importance. This has resulted in the international policy which is hard to understand on any of instances mentioned, except for the request for the stability. USA supported Sadam Hussein when he attacked Iran, but intervened when Iraq occupied Kuwait. They supported Talibans in Afghanistan when fighting Russians, but smashed them for there support of Bin Laden and the Palestinian cause. USA was very cooperative with Slobodan Milošević when they needed him to settle the Bosnian issue, but took him to Hague Tribunal when the former affair was over and the new one KiM was to be settled down. It has been obvious to all world politicians that KiM Shqiptars are resolute to secede from Serbia, at any price. This resolution was sufficient to USA to side their request. It has become clear to the world, at least after the NATO occupation that the only arrangement with Albanians, all over the Balkan, is to let them live on an ethnically pure land, without mixing with non-Albanian population. It concerns Yugoslavia, Macedonia and Greece. The only stable KiM is KiM without Serbs, Roma, Croats, Muslims etc. All arrangements which have been made since the beginning of KiM crisis, better to say since that crisis took on an acute form, have been made in view of the “final Albanian solution”. The ultimate solution will be, of course, founding of Great Albania, with purely Albanian population. All actions of Shqiptars become immediately transparent, when viewed through the Great Albania project. The principal goal for achieving the latter has been via defining the Albanian archenemy, the already demonized Serbs and Slobodan Milošević in particular. That this stratagem can take on a comic form was demonstrated during the ethnic Albanian rebellion against Macedonian state, right after the KiM was occupied. While Macedonian government accused KiM Shqiptars for inciting the Macedonian Albanians, the latter accused the same government that her actions were monitored from Serbia, that is by Milošević. The point was not just an immediate gain, but it concerns the entire rationale for Albanian troublemaking on Balkan. If it turns out that Albanians have troubles with everybody they come in contact with, the logical question would be which is the source of trouble? If it is a single villain, Serbia, all accusation against Albanians would be covered by a single response: we are victims of the Serb conspiracy against Albanians. No doubt when the final step in forming Great Albania is taken, with the rebellion of ethnic Albanians in North-West Greece, Epir (Cameria, as Albanians call this region, “which has always been a purely Albanian land …”), Serbs and Milošević will be invoked again. The immediate goal at KiM is now to banish from it as much as possible non-Shqiptar population and to wipe out any trace of their former presence in the region. All events from the beginning of occupation have been envisaged through this final goal, as we shall see in the following. KiM as occupied territory The administrative side of the occupation was supposed to be run by UNMIK (United Nations Mission in Kosovo), until the ”final solution” has been reached (whatever it meant). The purpose of introducing Kosovo Forces (KFOR) has been manifold. First, they were sent there to prevent any military intervention from Yugoslav side. Second, they are supposed to protect non-Shqiptar population who remained there from eventual Shqiptar massacre. The occupation personnel, both military and civilian, were supposed to run the province on a temporary basis. They had no police forces, no juridical system, no courts etc. KLA was transformed into the local police, so that the abovementioned ”demilitarization” of the rebellious forces meant merely their changing uniforms. This “solution” reminds one of the similar transformations of Tito’s partisans into Yugoslav People’s Army (YPA) after the civil war in Yugoslavia was over by the end of 1945. This turnover was recognized by Allies just as the latter recognized KLA as the regular force. Thus Shqiptar rebellion has been recognized as a regular
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movement, though in the beginning of the rebellion USA proclaimed KLA to be terrorist force. Another parallel to be made here seems in order. At the end of the civil war between Royal forces of Mihailovic and communist Tito’s forces, Allies sided Tito and helped him materially decisively to win the war. Likewise USA helped KLA to organize and equipped it with arms, making themselves not only patrons to one of sides in conflict, but a direct accomplice in the rebellion at KiM. There was a juridical vacuum, since the Serbian laws were not abolished and new ones did not exist. The population, both Shqiptar and non-Shqiptar, was left without juridical protection. Though formally in the same position, those two populations were in radically different situations. Shqiptars continued to live as before the occupation (liberation from their point of view), whereas the rest of inhabitants found themselves left in a vacuum of all kinds. As we mentioned before majority of non-Shqiptar population left KiM in hurry while the occupation forces advanced. But there was a marked difference in the character and extent of these movements. Roma left KiM almost completely, while one third of Serbs (c. 120.000) remained there. The reason for this difference is manifold. First, Roma are generally easily movable, considering their nomadic character, though they usually adopt the sedentary way of life of their surrounding. Second, turmoil like that was a good opportunity to move to the rest of Serbia, practically towards Belgrade and larger towns. In fact after the occupation the number of Roma wild settlements in and around Belgrade has been increased by an order of magnitude. It has been estimated that about 20.000 (40-50.000 unofficially) Roma fled from KiM to the rest of Serbia. By acquiring the status of refugees (more precisely of the displaced people) paradoxically their material status improved. Contrary to this, Serb refugees found themselves in a desperate position. They were distributed in concentration centres all over Serbia, waiting their destiny to be shaped by someone else. But first we move back to those who remained at KiM. These KiM inhabitants faced their destiny according to the size of the group they belonged to. Three categories of ”Serb remnants” can be distinguished here. The first, and the largest, inhabits the northern part of KiM, mainly north from the Ibar River (northern part of the town Kosovska Mitrovica and the adjacent rural area). They found themselves cut off from the rest of KiM, but being close to the Central Serbia managed to continue more or less supportable way of life. The second category was formed by larger concentrations of Slavic population within the rest of KiM, the so-called Serb enclaves. These rural regions are also cut off from the surrounding areas, populated by Shqiptars and are put under KFOR protection. But in the worst situation are small communities, consisting of a village or a group of houses. They have been encircled by barbed wire and are not allowed to go out of their ”village confinement”. Better to say, they dare not to leave their confinement. If the second category may be considered to be “Serb reservation”, the third groups of people are practically imprisoned in their own homes (house confinement). Generally, non-Shqiptar urban population has been completely banished from KiM. For instance, out of 40.000 Serbs in Priština only some tens former inhabitants remained. In Kosovo Polje, while before 1999 intervention 90 % of the population was Serbs and 10% Shqiptars, now 100% are Shqiptars. Etc. In the enclaves, population could still work on land, but is confined to the enclave and only guarded visits to or from enclaves are possible (or allowed). As for the third category, those imprisoned peasants can not reach their fields and are bound to live on the humanitarian help and support from Central Serbia. They are unemployed, but those who had an employment before the occupation receive from Belgrade government their salaries. In order to keep them remain at KiM these salaries are twice as large as in the rest of Serbia. The same applies to the northern KiM, although they live more or less under supportable conditions. What happens to those unfortunate hostages if (or when) they leave the confinement on their own? They are shot by the first armed Shqiptar. Serbs are considered by the latter as free targets, which are free to kill outside their confinements. The following incident illustrates the point.
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In 2000 a crowd is cueing for bus in a Priština street. A Bulgarian civil officer from UNMIK had a look at his wrist watch, when the neighbour in the queue asked him in Serb what was the time. Of course, all UNMIK personnel from Slavonic countries were strongly advised not to speak their mother tongue, so as not to be confused for Serbs. But the poor Bulgarian responded a tempo in Bulgarian, which is almost identical with Serb. 1 The Shqiptar chap drew the gun, shot him on the spot and then calmly disappeared in the crowd. If, on the other hand, they are killed while within confinements, the Shqiptar KiM police intervenes and pursues the killers. Interestingly, so far no murder of this kind has been resolved by the local police, what means a clear message to the remaining Serbs: they are persona non grata on KiM soil. But before we proceed with particular instances illustrating the situation, a comment concerning the global rationale for the overall attitude toward non-Shqiptars is in order. Why the IC allows such repression in the middle of Europe? We have seen that during NATO intervention there was a massive exodus from KiM, and numerous refugee columns were reported moving towards Albania and Macedonia. We discussed the veracity of those reports, as well as motivation for people moving from their homes. Despite the massive character of the exile, it does not prove to be a deliberate ethnical cleansing. One need a clear case of a deliberate official policy which provides the rationale for making such a strong interpretation. And it is here that Vojislav Šešelj jumps in!. Whenever you need a support for ruining Serbia, you may rely on this ”great-Serb politician”. When he announced at the dawn of NATO intervention that ”no Shqiptar will remain on KiM if NATO comes”, this could be interpreted as a mere demagogical deterrent to the possible threat to the state he was a vice-premier of. But when the Shqiptar columns started heading to Albania, Albanian politicians obtained the trump card in their hands. Threat without refugees, or refugees without threats, are coincidences. But taken together, they are parts of a deliberate scheme for banishing Shqiptar population from KiM. Coupled with two previous schemes by Vaso Čubrilović (Šešelj’s compatriot from Herzegovina, discussed before), the plan for the ethnical cleansing, even genocide, was in hands of Albanian (not only Shqiptar) politicians. And they used it abundantly. The axis Batajnica (where headquarters of Šešelj’s party SRP are) - Tirana functioned marvellously. And world followed the pattern. With the record of those atrocities committed by over-Drina Serbs, it was not an impossible task to make picture of “genocide-prone Serbs (this time in very Serbia)”. From now on, anything what happens to them will be justified. To be a free target appears now “God’s punishment”. But who are those “clay pigeons” in KiM? Peasantry and the country All luxurious hotels in the world are the same, as all cities are. Country – that’s countryside. The nature of state is determined by her rural areas. This fact is well known to politicians and they are eager to keep the rural areas prospering and ethnically proper. The latter means that it is the ethnical content of the countryside which determines “whose land it is”, or more precisely, which nationality determines the state and nation. Citizens come and go, but peasants stay. At least under normal circumstances. As mentioned before, during the Turkish occupation Serbian towns were inhabited by any nationality, except Serb. After Ottoman Empire left Serbia (and Balkan), majority of those Vlachs (Cincars), Turks, Greeks, Jews, etc vanished from towns and Serbs returned to their urban centres. True, Cincar population remained numerous, including those shop keepers in villages, while Jewish population was a prominent part of the Serbian urban population until WW2. In Serbia still peasantry comprises half of the overall population, despite the extensive urbanization after WW2. As we described earlier the process of leaving KiM countryside by Serbs was steady and selective. Those young and vital used to move towards the Central Serbia, usually finding jobs in the towns, while elderly people remained at home. They are unable to accommodate themselves in new 1
Contrary to common belief, even among Serbs, Bulgarian language appears closer to Serb than Macedonian.
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situations and are unwilling to leave their ancestral habitats, inhabited for millennium or so. This selection has further accentuated the asymmetry in the average age of two populations, Shqiptar and Serb, owing to the demographic explosion of the former and advance age of the latter population. When the conflicts due to the demographic, and ensuing political pressure, from the Shqiptar side became acute, the misbalance in the strengths of two ethnicities will prove fatal for the Serbs on KiM. Majority of homes in Serb villages appear more like retirements of the old people, than normal habitats. In many villages schools have a handful of pupils, often one or two. Helpless as they appear, all these people have been protected by KFOR, at least in principle. Protected from whom? This is the question not to be posed to UNMIK, or NATO, or European Union. It is, in fact, a taboo question. Even posing it would endanger the UN mission on KiM. To admit the protection of old women and men from the local Shqiptar population would be tantamount to confess the utterly senseless operation, hiding behind the facade of humanitarian action. This would be an almost explicit recognition that the rationale for NATO (better to say USA) intervention was misdirected. As a Canadian general admitted after he left the KFOR post on KiM, “we attacked wrong people”. The village population in the Serb enclaves has been kept as hostages by both sides. Priština is determined to make their life unbearable there and so encourage them to leave for the Central Serbia (or otherwise). Serbian government insists they should stay there and thus symbolize a presence of Serbia on KiM, thus attributing to them a status of ”national prisoners”, living under prison conditions. They have no choice but to accept the situation as inevitable. No more Milošević to come and shout ”Nobody will dare to beat you!”. Occasionally, Serbian TV reporters come, make interview and release it on Belgrade TV. People feel compassion and do nothing. But the situation of these “prisoners of politics” is even more tragic than one can imagine. Poorly educated, ill informed, scared, they are forced like a drawing man to “grasp at any straw”, as the Serb proverb says. When voting they unmistakably used to choose the worst option. When Milošević was in power, voting for him had some sense, for majority of Serbian population, much better informed, did the same. But when other political parties appeared on the scene, except in the one before the last election (in 2007), KiM Serb gave their votes nationalistic parties: to Šešelj’s and Kostunica parties, and to the Socialist Party of Serbia as well (the only parties which contain the adverb Serb in their titles). The only criterion for these miserable KiM remnants of Serbs appears the ”Serbing” rhetoric, what those parties used to take advantage of abundantly. To vote for the party whose leader has been accused for war crimes, for the party whose boss announced the ethnical cleansing just before the NATO intervention and at the same time to expect compassion from the IC, it can be done by infinitely naïve people. Their political (sic) rationale appears like shooting their own leg. In the latest elections (2008) Democratic party won a tiny percentage of votes, which went exclusively to SRP, DPS and SSP. The irony is that it was SRP and SSP who delivered KiM to the project of Greater Albania, whose first stage has been the so-called independence of Kosovo. The only excuse for these miserable Serbs at KiM is that they have not been the only Serbs in Serbia who have fallen for this demagogic rhetoric (as the latest elections in Serbia showed). Situation in the northern KiM with the Serb majority is somewhat different, but not better for the Serbian cause. The political leaders there are unscrupulous careerists, who are taking advantage of the situation. They are direct exponents of the Belgrade politicians, who rely on their electorate votes. In the situation of the electorate body levelled, even a small percentage of votes can move the balance. In one of elections during Milošević’s rule, Vojislav Šešelj beat Milošević’s candidate Milan Milutinovic by a marginal majority, with the decisive contribution coming from KiM. Milošević proclaimed false results, which meant his crony won. Šešelj proclaimed his victory, but for some reason gave up further defying Milošević and Milutinovic served as Serbia’s president until 2001, well after the fall of Milošević. (He surrendered to Hague Tribunal as soon as he lost
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the “presidential immunity”). The reasons for such Šešelj’s behaviour were unclear, but in all probability he made a deal with Milošević. 1 Generally living in the compact Serb region at KiM, these Serbs exert a noticeable influence on the KiM political situation. This shows up as an obstruction of the Priština politics, in a manner known at Belgrade from Šešelj’s troublemakers. Lacking the national strategy concerning KiM in general, what will be our subject later, Northern KiM appears partly a nuisance to Belgrade, but also an object of manipulation, in particular by those ”Serbing” parties, in their struggle for power. We now pass to other players on KiM ground. Which kind of IC personnel, military or otherwise, has been engaged in ”bringing stability” (if not peace) to KiM? Are they representative, in a sense of typical civil servants and soldiers, of the countries they come from? We start with KFOR. These army units from various countries appear a pendant of the French League of Foreigners, mercenaries who serve for money. It is clear which kind of young people choose to serve in military organizations like this. In fact all those soldiers collected under the NATO cover, are hardly more than paramilitaries. They are unwilling to fight in a risky situation, as the case with infamous Dutch unit supposed to protect Srebrenica in 1995. But generally, under more or less secure conditions, these units do protect Serb enclaves, especially those around the monasteries. (We shall come to this later on, when describing the ”KiM crystal night”.) People serving under the UN banner appear mainly unemployed youth, prone to adventurism. They are poorly educated and ignorant of the local situation, apart from conspicuous staff. As for the civil part, UNMIK, much of that said for KFOR applies to this administrative body. Ina sense, it consists at higher levels of responsibility of ”political losers” in their own states. It includes the chief administrators appointed by UN, who are in charge of running the entire KiM business. It is believed that many of those officers, in particular at lower levels, are prone to corruption, what has been abundantly used by the local Shqiptar politicians. This can be evidenced (what is not a proof, of course) by their behaviour in contact with Shqiptar officials, which appears as a rule a rather tasteless charade. With incompetent Serb counterpart , non-Shqiptar population (those who remained on KiM) appears a predestined victim of the nationalistic phanatics and unscrupulosity. And of their own political misery. (see Appendix 10) Serbs living (sic) in the enclaves are deprived of the most standard rights and needs. They are not allowed to visit their graveyards, which are usually outside the protected zones. During religious feasts they may visit graves of their relatives under KFOR protection only. This means they are supposed to apply for this in advance, making of a normal civilization custom a project. Those graveyards outside the enclaves are demolished by the local Shqiptar population. The reason for this vandalism of a kind is obvious. Graveyards are witnesses of somebody’s long term presence and are therefore to be wiped out as such. This rationale applies even more to churches and monasteries. Being built up by Serbs centuries before any Shqiptar appeared on KiM soil, they present a formidable burden to the newcomers’ conscience, making them feel intruders. Principal churches and monasteries have been protected as well, but in the long run they have been doomed to perish. Life on the edge of sword As we mentioned before the medium-term goal of Shqiptars is to get red of any non-Shqiptar population on KiM. Since this appears the only way to stabilize KiM, 2 Allies, and Americans in particular have been supporting this politics, either actively or just by passive attitude concerning the violence exerted on the non-Shqiptars. We shall describe number of illustrative cases. After evacuation of KiM by Yugoslav armed forces, Shqiptar took immediate measure to ensure that the remaining Serbs and other non-Shqiptars realize they were undesirable at KiM. Many There is another interpretation. Namely that he was afraid of taking over the responsibility, what would involve a more serious psychological-anthropological analysis, but this would lead us beyond the scope of the book. 2 We shall discuss other motives later on. 1
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massacres were reported later, some of them surely still unrevealed. The case of Gnjilane illustrates well the case in point. A dead squadron of Shqiptars of some 100 OVK fighters from the SouthEast Serbia (Preshevo and Bujanovac) and from outside Yugoslavia (mainly from Macedonia) was formed, who collected 159 non-Shqiptars and confined them in the building of the local pupil hostel, where KLA headquarters were placed. Fifty-one of the prisoners were tortured, raped and finally killed, in front of the other detainees. Some of the victims were tied by their legs or arms to two vehicles, which would then separate and torn the victims apart. Some of them were chopped to pieces and the parts buried at various places. The survived detainees were then released so as to spread the message to other non-Shqiptar inhabitants in the areas of what they may expect if remain in KiM. Nine years after the crime (December 2008) 9 of the perpetrators visited their homes at Preshevo for Christmas holiday and were arrested by Serbian police. In 17 houses searched a large quantity of weaponry was found, including Kalashnikovs, rifles, bombs, explosive etc. Three of the leaders of the group remained outside the reach of Serbian police, since they live at Gnjilane, in KiM. After the arrest a large crowd of Shqiptars started gathering at Preshevo, demanding an immediate release of the arrested. Gnjilane massacre was a sort of “KiM Medački Džep” we described before, which happened in Croatia in 1992. It is very probable that some from Gnjilane group took part in that massacre too. Some of them took part in March pogrom in 2004, what makes them a sort of dead squadron. It is interesting to follow the response of the Shqiptar media to the arrests. KiM newspapers expressed a harsh protest against Belgrade action, accusing Serbia to follow Milošević’s politics of suppressing Shqiptars. Not a ward of caution, not to say taking distance from the crimes involved. KiM authorities consider Shqiptars to be at war with Serbia, what makes the prospects of any peaceful settlement dubious indeed. But even more discouraging is the response of common people, both at KiM and at Preshevo. They sincerely expect any crime from Shqiptar side to be forgotten, or ignored. Their representative at the Serbian Assembly, Riza Halimi, rejected all accusation in general, accusing the police for action out of all proportions and demanding the international forces to take over the control of the Preshevo valley. What would be, of course, a first step to joining the region to Kosovo newly proclaimed state. In the village Staro Gracko (Old Gracko 1 ) near the town Lipljan 2 a group of Serbs is harvesting, when suddenly a group of people in KFOR uniforms comes out of the wood and starts shooting. All 14 harvesters are shot down, including a 14 years boy. The perpetrators have never been identified. The point here is not so much the atrocity itself, but the fact that the murderers worn KFOR uniforms. Since it is highly unlikely that the killers were from KFOR personnel, it was Shqiptars disguised in those uniforms. Presumably, somebody from KFOR provided them with these masks, which enabled them to approach the victims freely and commit the collective murder. The moral of the story, which non-Shqiptars are supposed to learn, is evident: nothing can protect you on KiM. And this massage is not a mere bluff. 3 KFOR forces number 40.000 men and are well equipped with weaponry and auxiliary equipment. But they are well aware they are very vulnerable on KiM. Shqiptars can easily raise an army of an order of magnitude more numerous than KFOR. They would be equipped mainly by light weapons, but in the situation like that on KiM, heavy weaponry provides no easy advantage, as Serbian army found to her misfortune. Of course, if one does not discriminate between civilians and armed adversary, heavy arms provide an advantage, but in the KiM case, such a fighting would annulated the very reason for engaging on a sovereign state territory, as NATO did. In case of an dissatisfaction by UN presence, KFOR would be able to protect itself for a limited period, but nothing more. Hence, their passivity is more a necessity than matter of choice. Gracko is derived from Serb grad (city), but it refers to town at this particular occasion. Derived from Serb lipa (lime tree). 3 The village had 500 inhabitants at that time, while now (April 2009) only 250 have remained. 1 2
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Those Serbs who escaped from KiM occasionally visit their deserted homes and grave yards, usually on special religious occasions. The same procedure prescribed for going out from enclaves, applies to collective visits to KiM. In principle KFOR provides armed escorts as protection. One such convoy, consisting of a bus with Serb refugees, with KFOR cars ahead and after the bus, was moving on February 16, 2001 for Gračanica. When passing over bridge on a municipal road near Podujevo, the bridge was blasted and 11 people inside the bus were killed and more than 10 wounded. 1 The massage to non-Shqiptars was clear: don’t try to return to KiM. The massage was well understood: the number of returnees appears symbolic. Technically, it is Serbs to blame. They should have insisted that KFOR personnel join them in the bus. The incident proves that the terrorist acts are planned in cooperation with KFOR. This does not necessarily mean that the latter sides the Shqiptars, but that escorting Serbs is risky and hence appears nuisance to KFOR. Generally, the sooner the KiM region is ethnically cleansed thoroughly, KFOR and IC will relax and leave the troubled area. And that is exactly what Albanians, Albanian and KiM Shqiptars alike, want. The international court at UNMIK found Shqiptar Fijorim Ejupi guilty for this crime in 2008 and sentenced him for 40 years of prison. In March 2009 the same court found Ejupi not guilty and relieved him from the sentence. On August 13, 2003, a group of Serb youth was bathing in the Bistrica River, 2 at the village Goraždevac, 3 near the town Peć, in Metohia. Suddenly, a machinegun fire came from the nearby wood, from the direction of a Shqiptar nearby village. Two boys (12 and 19 years old) were killed and four wounded 4 (12, 13, 14, 20). The perpetrator has never been revealed by KiM police, although both UNMIK and the local police were engaged. A 5 million € reward was offered for the information, but it was done merely “for the sake of completeness”” of the investigation. Nobody really expected that anybody from Shqiptar side would “betray” his people for any amount of money, and thus expose himself and his family to the many generation long avenge. Whether the murderer was not detected, or was identified but not persecuted, or was persecuted but not publicly, one may just make conjectures. All variants appear equally probable, particularly first two. The local Shqiptar police would have no motivation to search for the killer, on the contrary. The UNMIK administration, if willing, would not be able to do the job, for it would require a close and sincere assistance of the local police, what brings us back to square one. Even if caught and punished, nobody among Shqiptars would dare to disclose it, for it would trigger an avalanche of violence among the Shqiptar population. That this is not just a mere conjecture illustrates the following “incident”, which we are going to describe now. KiM crystal night All those terrorist acts mentioned above appear but small incidents, compared with “KiM crystal night”, trigged by an incident on March 17, 2004. Since it is the pogrom which illustrates the best the nature of the conflict and the overall atmosphere in the Occupied Territory, we shall devote some space to this violent irruption the Shqiptar hatred towards non-Shqiptars on KiM. River Ibar flows in Northern Kosovo from the West to East, and after a sudden bend is heading towards North and joins West Morava River near the town Kraljevo. Passing through Kosovska Mitrovica, it divides this town into the Southern (inhabited almost exclusively by Shqiptars) and Northern Mitrovica (populated by Serbs). Upon imposing the UNMIK control, the bridge on Ibar becomes the division line, controlled by KFOR. Ibar separates generally the Northern Kosovo, populated by Serbs, from the rest of KiM.
The number of wounded varies from 12 to 45, depending on the source. Clear (transparent) river, in Serb. 3 Forest village, in Serb. 1 2
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On March 17, 2004 near village Čabra, 1 three Shqiptar boys drowned in Ibar. Other boys of the group accused Serb boys to have set their dogs on them and it was accordingly this incident which caused the death of the other members of the group. Upon learning about the incident the entire KiM was on alert and the massive assaults on Serb population took form of a real pogrom. Number of recorded dead was 19 (11 Shqiptars, fighting KFOR, and 8 Serbs), wounded (Serbs, Shqiptars, KFOR) 954, 4.012 Serbs banished from KiM. Serb houses were set to fire (561), with additional 218 heavily damaged, 35 churches and monasteries burnt up, including Bogoslovia (theological school) and Episkopat (bishop seat) at Prizren. Pogrom lasted for three days - (17-19) March. It covered evenly the entire area of KiM (see Figure 6), what shows that it was well organized and coordinated. The estimate was that about 50.000 Shqiptars participated in it. Since it has been dubbed Kosovo Kristalnicht (crystal night), we describe briefly the latter, so as to make parallel. Kristalnicht. Early 20th century Germany witnessed rising prosperity of her Jewish population in every respect. From the cultural and scientific point of view Germany was undergoing a noticeable “semitization”, but this process was particularly evident in the economic sector. The presence of a tiny minority (about 0.8 %) was particularly conspicuous by numerous synagogues, scattered all over the country, which by their huge dimensions and peculiar architecture became annoyingly prominent, particularly in eyes of “good Christians”. This general background, coupled with the prominent role German politicians of Jewish origin played, after the German debacle in the Great War, in the Weimar Republic, enable Adolf Hitler to play successfully with the anti-Semitic mood in Germany, while building up his political career. 2 His anti-Semitic propaganda took am unprecedented intensity and form in already long European anti-Semitic tradition. Jews were subjected to various forms of suppression, with an open aim to be banished from Germany. The tension was gradually rising and Germany reached what physicist call a metastable state, when even a small incident can trigger a massive disaster. And it happened. On November 9, 1938, a Jewish student from Poland, Herschel Grynszpan, dissatisfied with the German treatment of Jews, assassinated German ambassador Ernst von Rath. The response of nonJewish German population was horrifying. All over the country synagogues were set to fire (over 1000 were burnt), 7.500 Jewish houses looted, 91 Jews killed and 30.000 Jews arrested. Later evidence revealed that those actions were well coordinated by the Nazi regime, but the truth remains that without the widespread anti-Jewish feelings the pogrom would not attain such a massive scale. The message sent to German Jews was clear: you are not welcome here. Many took it seriously and left Germany, but many remained, to end at Auschwitz or elsewhere. As for the evidence of Kosovo pogrom coordination this has never been revealed, as expected. The difference between the German and Kosovo pogroms lies mainly in the technical possibilities to prevent the “spontaneous revolt” of the majoritarian population. In Germany, the police could have prevented synagogue burnings, at least, whereas at KiM KFOR was obviously unprepared and unable to do much in this respect. There were some exceptions, as the case with Gračanica monastery shows.
Derived from the noun čabar (chabar), used in Serbia for a kind of barrel. Interestingly, this English term has been abandoned in moden English. 2 More precisely Judenfeind, the hatred towards Jews. 1
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Figure 11. Monastery Gračanica, near Priština, memorial church of king Milutin (1283-1321). This masterpiece of Serbian medieval ecclesiastic architecture, see Figure 11, situated near Priština city, is under the UNESCO protection. Expecting the worst Serbs alerted KFOR forces, who set up a three-line defence in front of the village Chaglavica, situated 2 km south from Priština and inhabited by about 200 Serb and 10 Roma families. On March 17, according the KFOR report, (see Appendix 11): [more] than a 1,000 Albanians, many of them students, broke through KFOR lines, overturning and burning seven jeeps, and marched on Čaglavica. Before KFOR reinforcements could stop them, the Albanians chanting “KFOR GO HOME” burned ten Serbian homes, and forced many inhabitants to evacuate to other nearby villages. “The battle eased off about 1:30 this morning,” the CO said. “But we lost one armored personnel carrier and had about 30 soldiers injured.” The last defence line was held by the Swedish unit. Their commander was well aware of the importance of the task and the possible consequences if the defence failed. He new that Gračanica church was to Serbs as important as the Western Wall was to Jews and that the failure to protect the monastery would mean the beginning of a large scale war in the region, possibly even the WW3. The defence stood up and the worst was avoided. Now we come to the most important part of the Pogrom. On March 21, 2004, the burial of drowned boys was organized at Čabra. A large crowd of Shqiptars attended the funeral, giving to the event a
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national importance. Two remarkable declarations were made on the occasion, so remarkable that they deserve our utmost attention. Mother Sevdija Deliju declared: ”I gave birth to him after seven daughters. He was the greatest joy in my life.” Her cousin Sail Deliju gave even more remarkable declaration: “Serbs have killed Egzon, but the Deliju family won’t revenge for that. We leave it to the authorities to impose the law.” Both declarations deserve our comments. Egzon was born after seven “unsuccessful births”. It is the rule with Shqiptars that their women give birth to several daughters before delivering boys (see, e.g. Figure 1). It explains, among other things, the high birthrate in this patriarchal, traditional society, where male children are the only to count. (We mention in passing here the case of a Bosnian Muslim of Albanian origin, whose wife gave birth to seven daughters. Suspicious that his wife was unable to produce boys, he tried with another girl. But when the latter delivered a girl too, he realized it was his fault and gave up further attempts to get a male hair.) To declare in the presence of her daughters that it was her son she loved the most might sound cruel to European ears, but not to those acquainted with the local ethos on KiM. Those girls were already aware they owe their lives to the late appearance of their brother. Their role of secondary members of the society has been deeply rooted into their mind, after centuries, even millennia of the social practice. Comments What the story of 16/3 (we designate the event by the date, just as 11/9 designates the destruction of the twin Towers in New York.) (i) First, we try to answer the question as of the actual content of the incident, which triggered the pogrom. The possibilities go from the story the boys delivered to the investigators (at least as the official statement goes), to an invention of the incident. The latter would imply that the group was swimming in the river, and three members drowned, as it sometimes happens with bathing in a river. Fearing of the blaming from the elders’ side, the rest of the group invented the story of Serb boys setting their dogs on them. (We recall here similar story recorded in Sweden during the time of witch hunting, when a boy invented the appearance of devil, who helped the girl, who was looking after sheep with him, to return the run-away herd across the river.) Before we proceed, an answer to the question of the official report and the subsequent investigation seems in order. Why the final outcome of the investigation has never been revealed? But, in fact, this was exactly what was expected (not) to happen. For whichever alternative was found true, an official pronunciation would cause further disasters. In the case of confirming boys’ story, this would provoke further riots and massacres. Not only as an immediate consequence, but in the eventual future accidents of similar nature. In the case of the invention, however, the official would not now what to do. The damage was done, and the response of the Serb (and Serbian) part would only further deteriorate the already disastrous situation. The best response, hence, has been to forget the incident. But the story for us is far from finished. The incident and the subsequent pogrom signal clearly the metastable state of the “multiethnic KiM community”, the IC advocates, with the Shqiptar authorities joining in. But if the peace depends on the absence of accidents like this, real or invented, this means that the coexistence of Shqiptar and non-Shqiptar population turns out impossible. With the Shqiptar finger on the trigger, this kind of disaster will be pending all the time and fear of its happening won’t surely encourage non-Shqiptar population to stay on this “barrel of powder”. The pogrom demonstrates that no investigation could
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ensure the peace, since the response to the “news” appears instantaneous, and has nothing to do with a “posteriori truth”. Sail Deliju’s declaration: “Serbs have killed Egzon, …” deserves further comments. Let us suppose that the first news, which triggered the pogrom, was a correct account of what really happened in the incident. Further, let us assume that it was not children accused for murder, but adult Serbs. How many Serbs? Let us assume there were dozen of them who took part in the murder. Technically Deliju would have been right (those who allegedly killed Egzon were Serbs). Let us go a little back in time and space, to the first century Palestine, under Roman occupation. According to the New Testament those who instigated Jesus‘ death and were therefore responsible for his crucifixion, were Jews. Which Jews and how many Jews? Let us assume there were hundreds of them in Jerusalem streets on that fatal day. 1 We recall now the millennia long reverberations of the account of the alleged event, in the minds of faithful Christians “Jews have killed Jesus”. Though not stated explicitly, but reading at it stands, it reads “All Jews have participated in killing Jesus Christ”. The message was clear: “All Jews are guilty”. And the European history has witnessed the fatal consequences of this seemingly innocent paralogism. Čaglavica battle demonstrates many things to consider with an utmost seriousness. First, why the Shqiptar police did not intervene? We know it consists mainly of the former KLA fighters. This does not inevitably imply they are not reliable security service, even when the Serb interests are involved. Unfortunately, the situation is much worse. Though they are under the formal control of the central authorities, the factual control comes from the rest of the patriarchal population, bound by the Leka Dukagjini cannon (The Cannun), we considered before. An involvement of Shqiptar forces would imply killing Shqiptars by Shqiptars. In the atmosphere of the ”national resurrection” out of the ”Serbian repression” etc, such killing would be interpreted as antinational crime. It would provoke the most disastrous response – that of blood feud. In fact, the entire pogrom was the collective blood feud. The slogan KFOR GO HOME launched during the assault on the Gračanica defenders, speak by itself about the real relationship on KiM, and what would happen if KFOR fails to fulfil Shqiptars’ expectations. Equally, it reveals clearly what will happen when Shqiptars conclude they do not need KFOR and any other international protection or control. Better to say when they start experiencing the presence of the international personnel as another occupation, as many do already. Now we make a test for not much attentive readers. By reading the report on the clash between Shqiptars and KFOR forces, what provoked in you the most astonishing feeling? I suggest the readers to pause before attempting to answer (to themselves) this question. Those thousands attackers were all armed. Is it expecting in a civilized state that civilians possess arms? Are you already recognizing the right of KiM population to possess arms, as their “natural tools”? We discussed before the various sources of Shqiptar weaponry. True, other Dinaric regions after the former Yugoslavia dissolution were will equipped with arms, but those arms came from the arsenals of the Yugoslav Army, in particular when Serbs in those regions are considered. Since many of them passed to Serbia with the armament and retained it, Serbia has been occupied by those incomers. The consequence of this “arms to people” syndrome has been disastrous. Neither of the ensuing states, except Slovenia and Macedonia may be regarded as states. This includes also Albania, as discussed before. This applies particularly to KiM, as an extreme case of the Balkan stateless conditions. Country where the central government does not control her population is not state at all. This “armed country” syndromes not a specialty of Balkan region, but it is within the European community. In the Middle East it concerns Lebanon and Israel, but in the later case situation 1
We emphasize again, we are considering the nonhistorical account here, not real events.
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appears unique and opposite to what e have just said. Israel owes her existence to the armed population, what makes it the fourth military power in the world. Lebanon civil war was the best, (and most horrible) example of the ”armed state” without state. We mention here, in passing, the case of Afghanistan, which may be considered the closest case to that of KiM before occupation. The position of the rebellious Taliban’s vis-à-vis USA administration was changed several times, depending on the political interests of USA (at least as judged from the White House). They were first fanatical Muslims, then freedom fighters (against Soviet supported central government), then terrorists while fighting USA puppet government at Kabul. Similarly, KLA was proclaimed by White House first terrorists and fanatical communists, and then the freedom fighters, when realized they can be used to overthrow Milošević at Belgrade. That the White House politics has little (if any) to do with justice and ethos is well illustrated by the cases of Iraq and Serbia. While Sadam Hussein was attacking Iran, he was a good guy, but when he was threatening Israel, he was to be smashed as a satanic figure. Equally, while Milošević was cooperative over Bosnian wars, restraining Serbs there and trying to bring them to their minds, he was an acceptable partner, until he lost control over Bosnian Serbs and thus became useless and bad guy. (iii) Though formally expressions of understandable grief, declarations from the family of one of drowned boy are more of a political appeal than private sorrow. The message of those two declarations mentioned can not be misunderstood: out with Serbs who are doing to us things like this. We notice the formal correctness of the Egzon’s uncle: the boys who allegedly caused the death of thee boys were Serbs, hence “Serbs have done that”. The ”Christian” forgiveness to his enemy, Serbs, further strengthens his cause, contrasting his generosity (and sticking to the law) against Serb cruelties. We recall here that episode with Aziz Kelmendi killing his army mates at Paraćin caserne in 1987. Now imagine burial of those four victims at their home places, with family declarations like: “Shqiptars have killed my son …!”. At the time many Shqiptars were working all over Yugoslavia, particularly at large cities, like Belgrade, Zagreb, Ljubljana, etc. Imagine the similar response to the Paraćin massacre, with Shqiptar shops set to fire, their owners killed. In Belgrade almost the entire low-rank personnel in a number of municipal services, like the city cleaning service, consisted of Shqiptar (and Roma) ethnicity. And while nobody tried the raise the tension on that occasion, Aziz Kelmendi had a massive burial at his home village on KiM, as a national hero (with slogans like “Serbs have killed our Aziz!”). Just as the unfortunate Egzon had at Čabra. This incident (or accident) illustrates well the situation when there exists an ethnical tension in a society. Those who are eager to make use of any kind of dissatisfaction among a population against a particular institution (like the very state) or a particular nation, can always turn a social dissatisfaction, or some other cause of it, into their political goals. KiM Shqiptars never even tried to explain the bad economic situation on KiM by the enormous birth rate, but persistently channeled the dissatisfaction towards Belgrade (Serb) “suppression” etc. It was infinitely easier and more profitable, while the family planning has always been among Albanians a taboo theme. Serbia after Kumanovo capitulation As mentioned before, the place to sign Serbia’s capitulation was not chosen by accident. The decision to humiliate Serbia maximally followed Hitler’s logic: Kumanovo became Serb Compiegne Forest. The rationale was the following. By humiliating Serbia, we humiliate Milošević (or vice versa) and Serbians will stick guts and get rid of their loser-leader. Next period of a year or so was critical for Milošević indeed. Although he tried to present the Kumanovo “agreement” as an agreement, the coffins of those killed by Allies in Serbia and particularly o KiM were pointing in different direction. But, to the surprise of many, Milošević announced elections for September 2000. What was the reason for this gambling is still unclear. This autocrat did take some measures to ensure a favourable outcome of the elections. He had the opposition leader Vuk Drašković killed
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(twice, but the assassinations badly failed). The most dangerous journalist Slavko Ćuruvija was killed at the start of NATO intervention, Zoran Djindjic frightened (at least thought to have been). Not long before the election the principal political opponent, Ivan Stambolić, was kidnapped (his remains will be excavated in 2003, after the assassination of Zoran Djindjic). The irony was that it was Ivan Stambolić who was Milošević’s political patron, who launched him into “political obit” in 1987 (the move which will prove to be most fatal to Serbia). But the most probable source of this miscalculation should be looked for in Šešelj’s quarters. Here is how the master-mind of ”the greatest of all Serbs” (second only to Ante Pavelic) 1 does it. We saw how Šešelj invited USA (via Bill Clinton) to attack Serbia, and how he provided trumps to those claiming Serbia planned a massive ethnical cleansing by declaring, in the capacity of the Vice-premier, that after the NATO intervention there will be no Shqiptars on KiM. When the Kumanovo capitulation was signed, Šešelj withdraw his ministers from the government, as a sign of his “strongest disproval” of this “treachery act”. But, what a misfortune, Milošević did not accept the resignation and Šešelj and his cronies remained in the government, as a proof of their patriotic sentiment, in the time of the national disaster etc. Thus, as the Serb proverb says, the wolf was fed up and sheep were in full numbers. This theatrical performance was aimed at keeping the control over the government, without compromising himself with the losers. Šešelj’s expectation was that with the loss of KiM Milošević will lose the power, and there will be no further obstacles to his gaining the upper hand. Two questions concerning Šešelj’s announcement of KiM ethnical cleansing come to mind. First, what was his real intention and second – was he capable of realizing his threats? We mentioned many times before that those Dinaroids often mix their wishful thinking with reality. If the latter does not conform to their fancies, so worse for it. This weird sense of real world has produced some of best Serbo-Croat epic poetry, with meager events becoming happening of global importance. In the realm of politics such a sense of reality has often lead to megalomaniac projects. (We already mentioned Vaso Čubrilović “projects” for “cleaning” Serbia.) In fact something similar did happen in Serbia in 1944/5, when German population in Vojvodina was expelled to Germany. About 200.000 went there voluntarily, while 200.000 were banished from Serbia. All of them were replaced by Dinaroids from over Drina River. Ethnical feelings apart, from an anthropological viewpoint, 400.000 high quality population was replaced by poor, lowquality (and low productivity) people from the western part of Yugoslavia. As for the feasibility of the alleged project, the example of Folksdeutschers is of little help. They were civilized inhabitants of the rich Pannonian Plane, whereas Shqiptars are a paradigm of warmongers, explicitly supported by USA and Germany, among other western Allies. Even if successful in carrying out the alleged project at the start, nobody could expect such a massive forced migration would end in a stable, from IC accepted, status of KiM. But this does not make the alleged Šešelj’s intentions improbable. Here is the report from a press conference, held in Belgrade on August 8, 1998, on the occasion of the promotion of a book entitled EXODUS, dedicated to the fate of Serb refugees (entitled “Serbs are paid to commit atrocities on Kosovo”): 2 Bishop Zahumsko-Herzegovian Atanasije declared:” Now on Kosovo fight tramps, and the most numerous are refugees from Krajina”, who - as the bishop said – ”are paid by one thousand DM, and they commit crimes and whatever else …”. ”What is going on on Kosovo is a disaster and I fear that another national shame will come out of that”, said bishop Atanasije, taking part in a conversation about the book “Izgon” [Banishment],
The infamous Croat fascist leader (Poglavnik), who was at the head of the equally infamous Nazi puppet state Independent (sic) State (sic) of Croats (1941-1945), responsible for exterminating hundreds thousand of Serbs, Roma and Jews. 2 “Danas”, August 8, 2008. 1
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which describes the exodus of Serbs from Krajina. As ”Pobjeda” 1 reports, bishop Atanasije said that ”Serb people in Croatia and BiH appear victims of a big treachery”, pointing out that the suffering of Serbs there in the latest years is the consequence of the politics which – as he stressed – “run criminal and irresponsible people at the alienated Belgrade”. Making remark that the wife of the president of FRY is “a psychopath” and ”of an evil blood”, bishop Atanasije added: “While Kosovo is bleeding, she holds the congress”. We note here that the bishop Atanasije is a high-rank cleric and his diocese is the core of the Dinaric region. The report appears significant in many respects, but we have quoted it here to illustrates the thesis that the atrocities committed as a means to realize the ethnical cleansing were done mostly by people alien to Serbia, brought in as mercenaries to accomplish the political goals of the same intruders, but who came before and acquired high political, military, police and other relevant positions, as the case with Šešelj was. 2 One of his favourite political (sic) project has been extending Serbia towards western regions, with the famous border line Karlobag-Ogulin-Virovitica, passing through the Croatian mainland. The rationale (sic) for such a project has been the claim that all Croats are in fact Serbs, although unaware of this. This thesis is not original, in fact, and such claims used to be announced by Serb nationalistic linguists, for instance, particularly those from Dinaric regions. 3 But the more mundane reason for playing with such a phantasmagoric plan is that Šešelj’s farther was a Croat, and Šešelj himself has been expelled from his homeland. Thus, his Great Serbia would serve a double purpose: his ethnical origin would become irrelevant and his banishing revenged. Nobody sane would support such a project, except, of course, his Dinaroids. Since his alleged victims should be ethnic-Albanians this time does not change much the original rationale – they were supposed to be replaced by Dinaric population, just as the original suggestion by Vaso Čubrilović was. Thus we have the complete picture of the ”anti-Shqiptar conspiracy” – the prehistory, and the almost official announcement which fits the alleged plans. The additional burden is, of course, the recent ethnical cleansing in Croatia and BiH, with number of displaced and banished (or at least transferred) people of the order of million. Within this context, any proclamation like that made by “Great Serb” Šešelj, sounds realistic. Šešelj’s plans could not fail, at least he thought so. If his phantasmagoric project of replacing Shqiptars by his Dinaroids comes true, he will have a sufficient number of supporters and thus the absolute power in Serbia. On the other hand, if this fails, KiM will be lost, and so will be Milošević, his principal adversary in the long run. Hence, as a Croat peasant said to his sons, whom he sent one to Ustashas, the other to Domobrans 4 : My sons, this war we can not lose! General feeling of Serbians (at least those who were Serbs) after Kumanovo capitulation was similar to that of Germany’s Germans after the capitulation in 1918. Humiliated, with the economy and infrastructure badly damaged, and isolated again from the IC, a sense of despair was in the air. It was exactly what the Allies expected by NATO intervention. As already mentioned Milošević felt it was just the right moment to check his popularity in Serbia. It was a risky move from his side, but presumably encouraged by Šešelj, for the reasons mentioned. The latter played on the feeling of the humiliation and his ”taking distance” from the Kumanovo capitulation. The opposition formed a unique front (without Vuk Drašković, who thought by his Dinaric optimism he could win the race alone). The principal oppositional figure, Zoran Djindjic, had been the target of a most brutal campaign from Milošević’s side, that he was demonized to such an Daily at Podgorica, Montenegro. We shall meet those tramps when discussing attrocities on KiM, in particular the Podujevo massacre by the socalled Skorpions unit from Bosnia. 3 Needless to say those Croat nationalists did not fail to proclaim similar theses, with the subjects interchanged. 4 Nazi and nationalistic Quislings, respectively, during the WW II. 1 2
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extent that he felt his unpopularity would be the obstacle for winning the election. He thus proposed that the campaign, which the opposition was to carry out under the name of Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS), should be lead by Vojislav Kostunica, leader of the conservative nationalistic Democratic Party of Serbia (DPS). The electoral campaign was fierce. Milošević played with the cards of patriotism, accusing DOS of treachery. But he overcalculated himself, since it was not difficult to Kostunica to prove his patriotism expounded during the NATO aggression. With the coffins of those killed in fighting the overpowerful enemies at hinder mind, the electoral body gave a clear preference to Kostunica for the president of Serbia. The next fortnight or so revealed the essence of Milošević’s image of democracy. Up to this moment Milošević’s SPS used to win all elections since 1990, when the formal manyparty system was inaugurated in Serbia. It took some time the former members of the Communist Party of Serbia (so-called Association of Serbian Communists), who voted for the same party under the new name (SPS), realized that there were new options to try and started to join newly formed parties, like democratic Party (DS) under the professor Dragoljub Mićunović leadership, and rightwing parties like those lead by Vuk Drašković and Dr Vojislav Šešelj. As a result, the number of SPS used to decline gradually, but remained still the largest in Serbia. As long he enjoyed the majority support, Milošević did not bother about the election results and played comfortably with the formal democracy. The problem arose in 1996, when the opposition won the local municipal elections. Faced with losing control over local institutions, like public media and services in Belgrade, with powerful propaganda capabilities, Milošević resorted to forgery, declaring that his SPS candidates won in those towns, including Belgrade, instead of the oppositional ones. Massive demonstrations, lead by DS, Serbian Movement of Restoration (SMR) lead by Drašković and Association of Serbian Citizens (lead by Dr Vesna Pešić), organized massive demonstrations all over Serbia. Lasting for three months, they forced Milošević, under the international pressure, to give in and the opposition took over the municipal administration in almost all larger towns in Serbia, including Belgrade. The elections in 1996 revealed that Milošević recognized the manyparty system as long as he has the majority support. When he lost it, he forgot the rules and simply grabbed the votes. This time the active resistance to the autocratic regime was well organized and persistent. A student organization “Otpor” (the resistance) was founded and active all over Serbia. Rumours were going around that it was supported by ”foreign agencies”, but it has never been proved. Nevertheless the regime took brutal measures against the movement, which gathered not only students, but youth in general. Members of the movement were arrested, interrogated, beaten and intimidated, but they withstood the persecution. The activity of ”Otpor” was instrumental in raising and keeping the antiregime atmosphere and feelings. Many university professors, like Srbijanka Turajlić (Faculty of Electrical Engineering), academician Milan Kurepa (Faculty of Physics and Institute of Physics), Belgrade, were active within the movement and otherwise. We note here that, since his autocratic regime provoked much of the antagonism within the Serbian political scene and he was aware of the hatred toward him, Milošević’s staying in power was no longer a political choice, but the matter of survival, not only political, but physical as well. It is the fate of dictators to have no choice but to remain dictators. Losing the elections was too much to him to allow to be overthrown by voting ballots. And he grabbed the straw. The elections on September 24, 2000 put Milošević in a position similar to that in 1996, but this time even more serious, for now it concerned his own reputation of the national leader. The elections marginally passed the minimum census and Milošević declared that the elections failed and new ones were to be run. But the opposition did not give in. Next fortnight turned out to be decisive to Milošević and Serbia. This time the initiative was in Djindjic’s hands. This middle aged philosopher who did his PhD in Germany, where he spent a number of years working there, turned out to be an exceptionally brilliant politician, one that appears in a state once in a century or so. He
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first ensured that the police and Milošević shock force, the Red Berets, 1 lead by the former member of League of Foreigners, Milorad Ulemek-Legia (HDE), 2 promised not to interfere with the political struggle. On October 5, a massive rally was organized on the square in front of the National Assembly building. It gathered around half of million people, from all over Serbia. The police tried to disperse the protesters by the tear gas, but the people withstood the attacks. 3 The principal propaganda centre of the regime, Radio TV Belgrade in the nearby street, was successfully attacked and occupied, as well as the municipal TV Studio B, with the help of a certain captain Dragan, a former military instructor at the Republica Srpska Krajina (otherwise a citizen of Australia). 4 A number of armored vehicles from Red Berets squadron did appear on the stage, but did not take action. The crowd crashed into the Assembly Building and the police forces gave in. Upon crashing into the building a number of young demonstrators set some offices to fire. More over, they took a number of paintings from the walls as well as a few pieces of furniture and carried them away. Considering the nature of demonstration and the cultural profile of the demonstrators, it was highly unlikely that those misdeeds were done by the authentic protesters, but rather by external provocateurs. This assumption was further corroborated at the first (improvised) meeting of the new Federal assembly, in another building at Belgrade. The first sentence uttered by Šešelj against the overturn of the old (including his own) regime, was directed towards “vandalism” of the new rulers etc. One of the principal tricks used by Šešelj and his supporters is the slogan “Catch the thief!”. (This method was applied during the Vuk Drašković’s demonstration in front of Federal Assembly building in 1990-ies, after Šešelj’s MP, a former boxer, badly hurt SMR MP, Mihajilo Marković, at the very entrance of the assembly hall. One of ”protesters” drew the gun and shot at the spot a policeman on the Assembly staircase. This was taken as a pretext to arrest Vuk Drašković and his wife, although they had MP immunities and they were released later, under the international pressure, in particular from the side of president Chirac and his wife. In all probability the incident was designed by Šešelj and his party, to remove Vuk Drašković and his party from the political scene. (The project will turn out successful). Milošević asked the head of the Army General quarters, general Pavković to intervene, but the latter turned him down. Pushed to the wall Milošević gave in and made a solemn declaration he lost the elections. The power passed to the opposition, tough it still had to be verified by the state administration. Next day general Pavković, brought Koštunica to Milošević’s residence, where the autocratic leader presumably recognized his defeat, in a closed meeting, without witnesses. It has never been revealed what happened at the meeting, but after the opposition took over the power, many things started to reveal themselves. Presumably, the conversations run like this. I can prevent you taking over power, but I shall not do that. You will rule formally the country, but do not fancy you will be the boss. I shall retain the control over police, army and secret services and you shall run the finances. I know I have no credit with west, but you will get financial support from them…. You will take care that I am not persecuted … . After taking over control at the federal level, Djindjic pressed further for the Serbian sector and very soon the elections at the Serbian level were carried out, with the expected result: DOD won comfortably and new republican government, headed by Djindjic, was formed. Two things were surprising in the event: (i) why Milošević supporters, who were still holding power in Serbia In fact Milošević’s praetorian guard, consisting of mercenaries from Dinaric regions. His surname Ulemek points to his Muslim origin, whereas the nickname Legija refers to his former service at the League of Foreigners (Legija Stranaca in Serb parlance) 3 My wife and I found the shelter, together with a number of other protesters, in a nearby building of Belgrade municipal assembly. 4 He will be accused by the Hague Tribunal later on, but managed to avoid the suit. 1 2
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agreed so readily for new elections, which were not imminent according to the constitution and (ii) why the old regime lost catastrophically the elections. The only explanation of both points may be found in the above mentioned presumed agreement Milošević-Kostunica. The general public was perplexed by Kostunica’s retaining Milošević’s administration, which runs in fact the state. In particular NGO were very loud in demanding a total dismantling of the old regime. It seems that nobody understood the real significance of the turnover. We go back, therefore, to the Rumanian overthrowing Ceausescu, in 1989. The couple Nikolae & Elena run Romania as efficiently and brutally as Serbian tandem Slobodan & Mira did Serbia. But the state was in a very bad condition, especially since Ceausescu chose to pay off all state foreign debts and thus emptied the state coffins. He was not able any longer to pay Army and, especially, the police, including Securitatea (the secret service). It was the later who let him downstream, as foreign reporters, who were there at the moment of the coup d’état, noticed. Without Securitatea’s consent, the opposition would have never seceded in getting rid of the dictator. Generally, dictator who is kicked of by voting bullets is not a true dictator, but even a coup d’ etat can not be carried out without support “from within”. In the case of October 5, the restrained behaviour of the Army and Red Berets was instrumental for the success. Djindjic contribution to the coup d’ etat by neutralizing Red Berets, via Ulemek-Legija, can not be overestimated. It was a gambling, of course, but it paid off. In a sense, Djindjic’s coup d’ etat resembled much that of Dimitrijević-Apis in 1903, when the army got rid of the incapable king and his ambitious and pretentious wife Draga Mašin (the couple corresponding to those two in Rumania and later Serbia). The state, run by incompetent people, simply could not pay the army. Post-October Serbia In a sense October 5 marked the Serbian history in almost as significant way as the so-called October Revolution was the turning point n Russian modern history. There have been, however, some important differences. First, Russian October revolution was a misnomer, much exploited by the Bolsheviks, for obvious reasons. In fact it was not a revolution, but counter-revolution. The revolution was carried out by Kerensky and others in March, 1917, when Tsar Nicolas II abdicated and the Russian middle class took over the power. What happened in October the same year was that tsarist autocratic regime was replaced by Bolshevik dictatorship, led by Vladimir Ilich Lenin. After October 5, Djindjic was facing a number of big tasks to carry out. He had: (i) To ensure an essential control over the state after the turn-over. (ii) To get rid of Milošević and his remnants in the state services and administration. (iii) To get support of the international community, particularly of the West. (iv) To protect the state from the Dinaric menace, that Damocles’ sword hung over the head of Serbia since late 1980ies. As we have seen there were in fact two Octobers in 2000: October 5 and October 6. The following year in Serbia will witness the struggle between these two landmarks, epitomized by Djindjic and Kostunica, respectively. In a sense, this rivalry resembled much the struggle between Karageorgie Petrovic and Milos Obrenovic, leaders of the First and Second Serbian Uprising, respectively. (In fact some people call October turnover Third Serbian Uprising.) Karageorgie was an extraordinary charismatic man, very capable military leader, a remarkably honest man, but a hot blood personality. Contrary to him, Milos was a cunning person, calm and calculated, a brave military leader but always ready to negotiate and gain a profit via agreements, even humiliating ones. His craving for power and money was notorious. He crowned his political career by having beheaded Karageorgie and sending his head to the Sultan in Istanbul. As we shall see, the Djindjic-Kostunica rivalry will end in a similar way. Soon after October 6 it became clear that Kostunica wanted to get rid of Djindjic and remain alone on the top of power. Djindjic put Kostunica before the choice: he will become the Serbian prime
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minister or he will leave the scene to Kostunica and retire. Since the presidency was just a first step towards taking over the power and he was aware that without Djindjic he would never make it, Kostunica receded and the republican election, scheduled for the beginning of 2001 was led by Djindjic, as the prime minister candidate. The overall atmosphere was very favourable for the opposition side, that it won the election comfortably. Not only Milošević disappointed supporters deserted, him but even the Šešelj’s party lost many votes. It was rather surprising phenomenon, but can be explained by the following ”radical formula”: Lunatic Bosnian fukara 1 + confused Serbian bagra 2 = SRP 3 Fukara voted for Šešelj, of course, since they experience him as their Dinaric leader, hence more as a racial protector than a political option. On the other hand, bagra (as such) voted for the winning side, of course. But Šešelj will turn out the ultimate winner, as we shall se later on. His principal rival at the time, Milošević, was removed from power, his party practically destroyed not to recover any longer. Djindjic and his DP were gaining power, but he had something in store for them, too, as we shall see later on. Even before the elections were carried out, the victorious democratic opposition entered informally the Serbian government, with deputies in all ministries. After the elections the new Serbian government was formed, with Djindjic as prime minister and Goran Svilanović as minister for foreign affairs. The latter was a brilliant young man, from the Association of Citizens of Serbia party, led by Vesna Pešić. Kostunica provided the government with few ministers, but it soon became clear that his intentions were more of a destructive than constrictive nature. One of his ministers started soon to obstruct the government and was removed from it. Generally the government gathered the most capable, mostly young, people available in Serbia. Djindjic also invited a young financial expert, well affirmed at the international financial organizations, Božidar Djelic, who made an extensive use of his connections with those organizations to ensure the influx of capital from abroad. The president of Serbia, Milan Milutinovic, kept his position until the end of his mandate. His was a rather harmless Milošević crony, who did not interfere into his own affairs even during Milošević era. Being accused by the Hague Tribunal for ”KiM crimes”, he will surrender voluntarily to the Tribunal after his mandate was over. This task was anything but easy. In fact, majority of these communist services and administrative personnel stemmed even from Tito’s time and were deeply entrenched into the state body. One part of those structures was those who helped Djindjic in overthrowing Milošević, or simply did not interfere during the October turnover. Djindjic felt obliged to retain them, at east for the time being. Other segments of the old state sectors, like the army, police, security services etc remained almost intact too, for it would be unadvisable to try to turn over the entire state sector within a short time period. But this tolerance will prove fatal for Djindjic and Serbia, as we shall see late on. Before we continue to discuss the political scene of Serbia, a few words on the character of the political parties involved are in order. Milošević’s SPS was a direct heir of the former Association of Communists of Serbia. It comprised almost all layers of the social and professional structure of Serbia. Contrary to general opinion, shared even by majority of Serbians, it was not a nationalistic party and Milošević himself was not a nationalist (at least not Serb one). His sticking to the nationalistic sentiment was provoked by Shqiptar nationalism (better to say chauvinism) and was used consequently as a vehicle for the political promotion. Many members of the high ranks were, nevertheless engaged in criminal activities, especially during the sanctions (1992-1995). His wife and her mock party United Left of 1
Scoundrels in Bosnian/Turkish parlance. Scums in Serbian colloquial parlance. 3 The formula alludes to a Sebian proverb, not to be quoted here. 2
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Yugoslavia, were particularly notorious in this respect and made considerable damage to Milošević’s party and himself, concerning public opinion, domestic and abroad. The leading members of SPS were Dinaroids, including Milošević himself. Djindjic’s DP gathered Serbian intellectuals, gaining support at the upper middle class. It has been the party of the centre, with democratic internal functioning and structure (it was the only significant party who changed her leaders by voting!). Her nationalism has been confined within the stable patriotism. Vesna Pešic’s ACS was a small but highly intellectualized party, situated somewhat to the left from the centre. It gathered mainly leftist intellectuals and may be considered to be the party of the upper class . Kostunica’s DPS may be located at the lower middle class and has been strongly and genuinely nationalistic and conservative. Their members, following the leader, did not suffer from any genuine idea, nor exhibited any political initiative. Lacking the latter, their political activities consisted, first, in obstructing not their own initiatives, and secondly in manoeuvring within the current political disputes to make profit of these at any rate. Kostunica’s attitude towards DP and their leaders, especially Djindjic, could be described by an obsession, carried out by pathological vanity and envy. Although he was Serbian by several generations, his character could not conceal his recent Dinaric origin. (His proper surname has never been revealed to the Serbian public, for his current surname Kostunica came from the village Kostunica, in the west Shumadija, where his grandfather moved from Montenegro). There were some small parties, organized by war criminals, to cover their activities and enjoy the MP immunity, like Arkan’s Party of Serb Unity, 1 but they usually lasted for a short time. This is a brief overview of the Serbian political scene when new democratic regime took the power at the beginning of 2000. The attentive reader will be perplexed by my not presenting Šešelj’s SRP, and will ask ”What’s about that Party?”. And it is a wrong question. Since it is the crux of the matter concerning Serbia’s troubles, we shall dwell on it with some details. Serb Radical Party SRP is like the English horn: it is neither Serb, nor radical, nor party. As we emphasized before, Šešelj’s ”Serbing” has been aimed at two targets: first, since he is (half) Croat, the best way to conceal such a handicap is to attack Croats as frequently as possible, while keep on Serbing. Second, since he came to Serbia from outside, Serbing was the best ticket for intruding deeply into Serbia, by buttering Serbian Serbs up. Hence, his Serbing was a compulsory reflex of an intruder, rather than a nationalistic sentiment. 2 Further, by calling his newly formed movement «radical» he refered to the Radical party of the pre-war Serbia, one of two most significant parties between two World wars. 3 The most prominent leader of the original party was Nikola Pašić, probably the best Serbian politician of all times. He was prime minister many times, both during the Obrenovic and Karageorgievich dynasties, what testifies for his extraordinary political capabilities. In order to intrude into the former Radical party image it had in Serbian memory, Šešelj chose to found his mock party at Kragujevac, at the same spot where the original Radical party was founded. This trick, naïve as one might think, did not fail to attract many naïve Serbians, who did believe the newly found party was a genuine continuation of the old one. We note, in passing, that the new Democratic Party of Dragoljub Mićunović was built up on the same political programme, mutatis 1
Zeljko Ražnatović – Arcan was a paradigm of the Montenegrin highwayman criminal, a late remnant of the medieval highway robbers. He will be killed at the end of 1999 and will not play any role in the October turnover.
How much "Serbing" has been instrumental for his ”political strategy” illustrates his demand to Serbian Academy of Science and Arts (SASA) to ”provide a proof” of his purely Serb origin. Since SASA has been well occupied by Dinaroids, it was not difficult to get such an outstanding historical document.
2
3
The other was Democratic Party.
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mutandis, of the pre-war DP of Pašić and his heirs. The only radical thing in the behaviour of Šešelj’s new party has been the extreme violence and permittivity in the most ordinary sense. As for the party, this new organization, though registered as a political party, has very little to do with ordinary political organization and her methods of promoting her ideas. It has been rather a social movement, movement of the social losers, at all strata of the social pyramid, but mostly the lowest ones, lower and lower-middle class. As we mentioned above, majority of those losers came from the West, after WW and as refugees in 1995. Majority of the latter were from rural areas, which formed the lowest stratum in Croatia and BiH. It is interesting to note that although Šešelj made every effort to attract Roma (general ”professional losers”) into his party, this he achieved with a limited success only. SRP appears more a satanic sect than an ordinary political organization. Two points must be emphasized here. First, the structure and strategy of Šešelj’s sect resembles very much that of Hitler and his NSP. For good reason, since Šešelj did study Hitler and his political career and follows closely his hero in almost every detail. Of course, considering that Nazi and Hitler have been demonized in European history, and especially in Yugoslavia, he has been very careful not to reveal any resemblance, in whatever manner, with Nazi ideology. There is, however, one important distinction. Whatever we think of Hitler and his party, they were sincere nationalists and patriots. Unlike them, Šešelj’s only ideology has been personal frustration and ensuing misanthropy. Not only that he is not a nationalist, but he could not be even if he wanted, for he is half-Croat halfSerb. Šešelj’s strategy before NATO aggression was to devastate Serbia as much as possible, so that it matches him and his followers in their primitivism and incompetence. Only maximally degraded Serbia could be occupied by the most primitive population. Sociologically speaking, Šešelj was aiming at kakocratia, the rule of the worsts. The help which NATO aggression provided him inadvertently can not be overestimated. As we know, the principal carrier of Hitler’s stratagem was German frustration after the defeat in the Great War. True, to Serbian nationalists, particularly those from the non-Serbian regions, dissolution of Yugoslavia was a sort of national defeat. But after NATO aggression, the parallel with post-war (both WW1, WW2) Germany appears almost perfect. It is that situation which SRP will have made use of maximally. Not just it was a good opportunity to play with nationalistic cards, but above all to conceal the fact that it was SRP which contributed the most to the NATO aggression and the loss of KiM, as we described above. Once again, we have the operative tactics ”catch the thief!”, which has been used so successfully by Šešelj and his followers. The rationale for such a choice is simple. Šešelj could not expect to control KiM (as nobody from Serbia could either). On the other hand, loosing KiM would cause further frustration among Serbians (outside KiM), what would further advance the cause of SRP, the best described by the slogan “The worse the better” (provided that their own contribution to this loss is well hidden). The first victim of this strategy should be Milošević, as the head of the defeated state and the principal rival to SRP for the absolute power over Serbia. As the immediate events will show, this strategy turned out fertile indeed. The West was eager to show his support to the new government, for various reasons. First, they helped democratic opposition to get rid of Milošević and considered partly responsible for the prosperity of the new government and the state of Serbia. Second, members of NATO, who took part in the Aggression felt misgivings concerning their role and tried to compensate it by pouring financial investments and loans into the devastated country. This financial input was in a sense “war reparations” to the exhausted state. If the former rulers and present opposition considered this help as kind of ”retrospective bribery”, they had much of the arguments in favour of such an interpretation. Majority of ruined objects, which NATO raids either leveled to the ground, or damaged beyond repair, were intentionally left intact and can be still seen in Belgrade and other cities and towns.
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Nobody ever dared to demand NATO or USA to compensate for the devastations. Unlike post-war Germany, NATO had no Marshal plan for Yugoslavia. Instead West showed a generous readiness to help by financial aid, through the international funds, like International Monetary Fund etc. These loans and other financial facilities helped from one side Serbia to recover partly from the suffering of NATO aggression, but on the other side gave Serbian population a wrong feeling that they could live on loans, just as it happened during the last decades of Tito’s rule. This artificial situation helped the reality to be concealed and people to live beyond their productivity and real earnings. In a sense, it was a counterproductive service, which new authority accepted in the lack of better choice. But the story does not end here. West expected the new regime to fulfill its obligations, first of all concerning those towards Hague Tribunal. They expected, rightly, that the resistance among the Serbian population would be strong in that respect, and the bribery interpretation was not far from the reality. Besides, ”bringing war criminals to justice” was not only a matter of ethos, but a retrospective justification of the military interventions and general involvement into the Yugoslav affairs during the process of her dissolution. The more war criminals at Hague, the more justified the West interference would have been. Since it was Serbia who was considered the most responsible for the Yugoslav ”wars”, it was expected that Serbs should be the most represented population at the International Court. But beyond this “reasonable expectation” stood the hidden reality of the West Balkan state of affairs, which West never understood. Their expectations were based on the false notion they were dealing with normal ordinary states, with government which controlled their respective territories, with or without “foreign help”, as in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina was. Their superfluous political logic, which could be applied in the initial phase of dissolution of Yugoslavia, turned out futile in the ensuing armed conflicts within Serbo-Croat regions, as explained before. Just as the belligerent montagnards controlling republics involved could not manage to reach a reasonable political agreement on the future of their common state, they were the leaders of the military actions which followed the political failure. It concerns both regular army and actions and paramilitary and straightway criminal units and armed groups. And after the armed fighting stopped in 1995, their control over the newly established stated was instrumental to the ensuing political conflicts, both within the republics and between them. We now examine this issue in more detail in Serbia. Governments and state control One whom man has not yet got to know. The answer of a gymnosophist to Alexander’s question as to the most cunning animal. A state is defined as a geographic unit with definite borders, and a government which controls the territory within these borders. The control appears rarely absolute and majority of state governments share their control with other, formal or informal partners. The most common of those partners is the so-called organized crime. The most eclatant case of this “partnership” is Sicily, and to some extent Italy as a whole. Even USA can not escape this dichotomy of state within state, as far as the mafia is concerned. But the story with USA does not end here. There is another informal structure within USA which controls the society at all levels, controlled by a specific ethnic population, which forms the third sector. If the organized crime infiltrates the state administration and political institutions, like government, Supreme Court, Senate and Congress, one speaks of a corrupted state of state. But in the case of the third sector we mentioned situation appears much more subtle and evasive. This subpopulation controls all the institutions, governmental and nongovernmental, like financial, military, economic, scientific etc sectors. The only attribute which
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links the members of this subpopulation is the awareness of belonging to racially distinct ethnicity. That some of them believe in the special mission they have in USA (and in the entire world) is of no mean significance, but this is of no primary importance to us here. We have dwelled in some details over USA for several reasons. First, the control issue in USA appears relevant to the relationship of the state with other countries all over the globe, and in particular when Serbia is concerned. Second, the situation there parallels well that we meet in Serbia. Parallel, of course, does not mean equality, even not necessarily similarity. In fact situation in Serbia appears much more involved and considerably less apprehendable, as we shall see immediately. First, both informal sectors in Serbia are coupled mutually, for they are determined by the same ethnicity. As for the latter, unlike those two subpopulations which are easily discernable, both mutually and vis a vis the rest of the (Anglo-Saxon) population, which is to be considered the core of the USA society. To make the Serbian issue even more perplexing, it appears that the controlling sectors consist of the ethnicity which at the first sight appears indistinguishable from the autochthonous Serbian population. At the first sight only, but upon a more close observation one finds a striking difference in the anthropological, mental and cultural attributes. The situation is further complicated by the resolute denial of this intruding population to be different from the autochthonous citizens in Serbia. To the contrary, any attempt even to speak on the subject they experience as directed towards cleaving an edge between Serbian (ekavic) and non-Serbian (ijekavic) Serbs. After reading the above assertions readers might pose a question of the syndrome of a ”conspiracy theory?”. Instead of discussing it, I shall mention an instance from my correspondence with Ms Mara Gergolet, the editor of Corriere dela Sera (Milan). She asked Serbians to communicate their experience during the NATO raids in 1999 and I responded to her appeal. She was much suspicious about my claims that Serbia was, in fact, an occupied country. Instead of arguing with her, I asked her a simple question: ”Suppose Mafia takes over all control in Italy? Would one recognize it?” For the complete control means control over public media, which are supposed to alarm the situation. Similar situation was in the countries under totalitarian systems, dictatorship, for instance. Yugoslavs under Tito’s rule were not aware they lived in a totalitarian state, for no public media even discussed the issue, no mention stated the actual state of affairs. No news, no event. The occupation of Serbia by Dinaroids is a taboo theme and no newspaper would publish any comment on the subject, as I have experienced myself many times. The (private) comments by those who come to Serbia and expel (or try to do it) non-Serbs from their own native country, like Hungarians, Croats, Slovaks etc has been that I am a chauvinist! But what’s about other (autochthonous) Serbians? When the multy-party system was introduced in 1990 an Association of Autochthones Serbians (AAS) was founded. The founder of the AAS was invited once on TV, subjected to derision and no further news about the Association has ever appeared in the public media, both governmental (Milošević’s) and oppositional. The movement has been sentenced to damnatio historiae. When somewhen in 1992 a local activist from Democratic Party (whose members were my wife and myself at the time) visited me at home, I mentioned with sympathy AAS. He never visited us again. 1 Those ijekavians have infiltrated the Serbian society at all levels. This phenomenon has been present continually for centuries, since Serbia, even under Turkish rule herself, was a permanent attractor for the Serbs (and to a less extent to other ethnicities). Politically Serbia was considered ”mother country”, and after liberation from the Ottoman Empire, a sort of Serb Piemont. Economically Serbia was attractive as well, first of all as a fertile land, with a favourable geographical position, unlike Bosnia and particularly Herzegovina. Both circumstances have He turned out to be Dinaroid himself. Later he became during Djindji’s mandate the Belgrade major (very good, in this respect) and died, unfortunately, a year ago. 1
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resulted in a considerable retardation of those ”over-Drina regions”, relative to Serbia. This very fact, apart from the other mentioned, has been sufficient to maintain a steady influx into Serbia, particularly from the Dinaric regions: Montenegro, Herzegovina, and from Croatia (Banija, Lika, Kordun etc). One should distinguish, however, two kinds of those migrations: (a) the spontaneous (gradual) and metanastatic 1 (massive moves). 2 Two latest of the latter occurred in 1991 (at the beginning of falling apart of Yugoslavia) and in 1995 (after Dayton agreement). It is those two massive influxes which have changed the demographic (and social) structure of the host country. Serbia was not prepared to withstand such extensive perturbations. To make the situation even worse, the incomers tend to infiltrate in particular sectors of the host society: army, police, politics and organized crime. First two sectors are understandably attractive, considering the belligerent mentality of Dinaroids, who served in these services in Austro-Hungary for centuries, except for Montenegrins. The latter, however, lived to a large extent from plundering neigbouring regions and are thus equally prone to fighting. (We should mention, however, that Montenegrins from Montenegro did not join metanastatic migrations, but came from other regions, where they settled before, like Bosnia and Herzegovina). Hence, this particular occupation of the army and police did not come from an intentional project, but rather as a ”natural” consequence of the status those populations had in the regions of origin. The case of the organized crime appears founded on the same grounds (affinity towards arms and nonproductive jobs), but stems also from another circumstance. Many of the so-called refugees from the western regions came with a significant amount of money. Some of them invested it in small or medium size private business (mainly restaurants, cafés etc), but some preferred to invest their capital in the most profitable business: drug dealing and weapons trade. They did not find, of course, the host country free of these crimes, but considering their “common origin” links and affinities, together with pronounced ability to make use of violent means, they quickly acquired top positions within the organized crime. The very ”political party” Šešelj’s SRP has been designed as the “political cover” for the criminal activities and even on the very political scene makes use of criminal violence and other crimes. We shall return to this point soon. Paramilitaries in Serbia We have already signaled the presence of Dinaroid paramilitaries in Serbia, like those of Zeljko Raznatovic-Arkan (”Tigers”), Milorad Ulemek-Legija (“Red Berets”), “Scorpions” etc. In 1999 Arkan was killed, and ”Scorpions” dismantled (after that massacre at Podujevo, we described earlier). But the role of ”Red Berets” gained in importance, to become the principal obstacle for normalization in Serbia. Formed in “Krajina Republic” as a special police unit, it passed after Dayton agreement to Serbia, to be proclaimed anti-terrorist unit. The overwhelming majority of its staff was Dinaroids, many of them having served in League of Foreigners, like their leader Legija (League in Serb parlance). (Their first commandant was Simatović, a Croat). Equipped with the most sophisticated weaponry and other military means, with heavy arms like artillery guns, helicopters etc, the unit represented a formidable military force. In fact, it was this unit Milošević relied on during his autocratic rule. Cynically enough, the designation ”anti-terrorist” was only partially wrong – the unit turned out to be a terrorist force, for the personal Milošević use. There was only one military unit in the Army which could cope with Red Berets, the 73 parachute brigade, stationed at Niš. To understand further events, we stress again that the tops of both army and police pyramids were occupied by Dinaroids. (From 1990 out of 5 chefs of the General Staff only one was not a Dinaroid). Similar situation was in police, where, unlike army, Montenegrins were the dominant staff. When Zoran Djindjic was preparing Milošević overthrow he was aware 1 2
Migrations after (abortive) uprisings. One should add two massive influxes from 1941 and 1945.
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that without help of the Army and Police he could not make it. Legija himself invited Djindjic and offered a deal, which was accepted. General Pavković, chief of the General Staff (a Serbian) gave signal Army would not interfere. Thus, the green light was given. After October 5, Red Berets remained as Damocles’ sword over Dindjic’s head. We do not know exactly what the deal was, but the striking hammer of Slobodan Milošević was not dismantled. When Djindjic arrested Milošević at his residence in Belgrade, he did not dare to make use of the unit, not even of a police, but engaged his own bodyguard and similar unofficial people. The whole operation looked more like a kidnapping, than an official legal arrest. The delivery of the former president to Hague Tribunal was approved by the government, but it seems that the delivery was carried out a few hours before the official decision. President Vojislav Kostunica was reluctant to admit the delivery, but gave in under the pressure, both from Djindjic’s side and the foreign insistence. The opposition claimed that the delivery was an act of national treachery. Formally, it was. Ina sense, this episode resembles strikingly that of the Georgie Petrovic (Karageorgie) murder in 1817, when he was decapitated treacherously by Serbian ruler Milosh Obrenovic and his head was sent to Porta at Constantinople (Istanbul) as token of Serbia’s submission to the supreme Turkish authority. 1 The impression of the injustice towards Serbia was particularly pronounced in view that Milošević was a partner to the West when he was used to settle the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, although it was just there he interfered with internal affairs of an internationally recognized country. The cynicism was that he was accused for his dealing with KiM rebellion, that is for his interfering his own business, as the president of state. Shortly before the arrest and (immediate) delivery to Hague, a part of Serbian media revealed the discovery and excavations of a few massive graves in Serbia, where bodies of Shqiptars were buried. This step was taken by Djindjic as a preparation for arrest of Milošević. Although one may argue that it was a humane gesture, from the point of view of the state interests, it could be considered as a short term pragmatic move of a politician, not a statesman. (As we shall see later on, when talking about the kidnapping of nonShqiptars by Albanians and killing them in northern Albania for selling organs to (western) hospitals, Albanians both from KiM and Albania demonstrated the absolute solidarity in concealing the affair, not bothering much about humanitarian aspects). Said as above, it would be fair to note that expounding the misdeeds of the overthrown autocrat Djindjic opted for a moral gain in the eyes of IC. The latter would be much helpful in defending interests of Serbia, from the standpoint of a fair politician, who disproved the behaviour of his predecessor. With such an ethical capital Djindjic thought to be in a much stronger position. Unfortunately, he was not given opportunity to exploit this advantage, as we shall see later on. Generally speaking, the fate of overthrown dictator is sealed by his own dictatorship. Dictators never abdicate by there own, for good reasons. Even with good will, the state does not know what to do with him. He will be a permanent threat to the state, as a potential claimer for restoring the previous state of affair. In a sense, this situation resembles, mutatis mutandis, that of the biblical figure of Jesus from Nazareth, after being arrested. Having turned down his claims to be son of God, he had to be eliminated from the society, otherwise the state would not know what to do with him. 2 Milošević at Hague It was for the first time that a former head of state id brought to court for his political activities. As w mentioned above, the perverse aspect of the case was that he was not accused fro interfering foreign affairs, but for state activities within its own borders. The ideological background of the A Montenegrin bishop-ruler, poet Petar Petrovic-Njegoš, put it: ”Your head was doomed to be sold for its wreath”, with wreath symbolizing Serbia’s (restricted) freedom. 2 Such an outcome appears independent of the case whether Sanhedrin believed his claims or not. Even a son of god has nothing to do on earth, among mortals. 1
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indictment was a humanitarian aspects of the operations against the rebels in KiM, including not complying the rules of war, ethnical cleansing, disproportional us e of response to rebellious misdeed by excessive force etc. Milošević insisted to defend himself, what was accepted after a strong resistance by the Court. It gave to the process more a political than a criminal motivation, what was exactly what Milošević wonted. Milošević’s position was very strong, within this framework, for he was well acquainted with the situation, both on the spot and around. Being an able lawyer and politician, he had no difficultly in demonstrating the weak points of his indictment. Since his trial was public, and the audience in Yugoslavia was much interested for various reasons in the trial, Milošević defence was more a political tribunal directed to Yugoslavs, than a defence of a war criminal. Paradoxically, his political, but even more human image rose day after day as the trial proceeded. He skillfully made many of the prosecutor’s witnesses to look miserable, even when they did appear victims of violence. On the other hand the trial exposed vividly the mental structure of a Dinaroid, self-confident, emotionless, stubborn, intelligent, nonflexible, and emotionally untouchable. To those unacquainted with this ethnicity, trial should have helped to appreciate the problems Serbia is having under the rule of those montagnards and why the autochthonous population has been helpless on that matter. The trial was a unique opportunity to see the details of the KiM drama in 1997-1999 period, with details never revealed before in Serbian media. 1 The picture has been, of course, one-sided, for the complete inference into the nature of the conflict and the atrocities committed would have been obtained after a counterpart trials of Shqiptars involved in similar activities. The opportunity aroused when the then prime minister of Kosovo provisional government, Ramush Haradinaj, was brought to Tribunal, but this attempt badly failed, as we shall see later on. Finally Milošević died before the verdict was reached and the entire business turned out abortive. Of course, all sides involved, directly or indirectly, claimed victory. Milošević’s sympathizers claimed even that he was murdered, whereas some who new his mental structure believe he committed a kind of suicide, by failing to take drugs. Milošević did submit an appealing letter to Russian embassy in Hague, claiming that he was going to be liquidated by the Tribunal authorities, day before he died. We recall that his family already had a rich record on the matter: his parents and uncle all ended their lives by their own hands. Anyway, Milošević was exposed to such a pressure for six years that it was an exploit from his side he even managed to survive that long. He was buried in the courtyard of his house at his birthplace Požarevac, thus imitating the eternal home of his great predecessor, Josip Broz Tito, whom he admired very much. 2 In many respects such an end turns out be the best outcome of an extraordinary trial, unprecedented in modern history. Any verdict would have provoked violent responses, from all sides involved. To his followers Milošević remained martyr, a victim of the international anti-Serb conspiracy. As for the serbofobian side, like Shqiptar, Croat, American etc they pretend to be disappointed by the unexpected end of their demonized enemy, convincing themselves he would have been, otherwise, sentenced to the most severe punishment. To majority of Serbians, including some of his victims, Milošević remains a martyr. To those who are true Christian believers, the entire case, from the arrest in Belgrade, to the trial and the sudden death resembles much the Christ’s passion, with Djindjic playing the role of Judah and the Tribunal of Sanhedrin. Milošević’s trial was a complex enterprise, with many aspects deserving to be analyzed separately in details. Since the trial was never brought to its end, final political conclusions would be superfluous at least. In particular it did not resolve the principal issue as to the guilt of Belgrade side, since the Priština side has not been put to the equal examination and a possibility of an eventual verdict. What the trial did achieve was to reveal the nature of the conflict and the character of the actors involved. It exposed vividly the inhuman character of the modern warfare, where these Though, of course, widely publicized by the western media, the press particularly. As it is known, Tito’s grave is in Belgrade, in the courtyard of the so-called House of Flowers, visited by a vast number of people, both from Yugoslavia and abroad (not necessarily all admires).
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are civilians who suffer. The testifying of ordinary people subjected to brutal force of armed adversaries reveals the truth we know from many wars in the last centuries, from World wars to Vietnam, Iraq etc - the safest way to survive is to take a gun and join an army. Modern wars are not fought between armed adversaries, but between army and civilians, with the obvious outcome. The trial exposed the low civilization level of the local KiM population, who behaved at the Court as coming from another planet. But the most distasteful behaviour was that of the local politicians, from all sides. It was sad to watch how Milošević forced Shqiptar politicians, like Mahmut Bacali, to compromise themselves on the open scene. The same communist activists who were good members of the political forums, both Serbian and federal and very active in running the common politics on KiM during Tito’s time and later, made a U-turn when they found more profitable to become Shqiptar nationalists and defy their entire former political credo. Even citing from the press their own speeches could not make them admit that their former political activities were contrary to the latest one. They obviously considered their just cause was a just justification of self-denials, lies and denials. But one may find an excuse for such a behaviour, for it was done for the sake of achieving national political gains, and Machiavelli’s logic allows for making blind eye on the ethics. But by far the most disgusting scene were played by ijekavic Serb witnesses against Milošević. Their strategy was to present their own roles as of victims of Serbia’s aggression, hegemony, etc, which they had to comply reluctantly. They wanted to shift the entire burden to Serbia, as if they were prisoners in their own countries, Republika Srpska and Srpska Krajina. The case in point as the testifying of Milan Babić, former prime minister of Republika Srpska Krajina (in Croatia). He moved with his family to Belgrade one week before the operation “Storm” was launched, evidently being informed about the action about to take place. That he did not take any measure to help the defence of the ”state” he was the head of corroborates well the fact that the entire operation was well planned by Zagreb and Belgrade, with the agreement of the Serb leaders in Republika Srpska Krajina. It was a massive migration of rebellious Serbs form Croatia to Serbia, plan which may be considered good or bad, but plan which had nothing to do with Serbian citizens, who have not been 1 aware of the agreement and the nature of the ensuing massive transfer. (According to the testimony of the chief of the UN civil mission in Croatia at the time, Hussein alAlfi, Knin authorities asked UN representatives on August 4, 1995 (that is a day before the ”Storm” started, for the help in evacuating people from Krajina to Bosnia. They informed the Mission they had imposed marshal law in Krajina, so that civilians were removed from the streets before the expected onslaught from Zagreb side. Serbs demanded 70.000 l of gasoline, and 500 trucks for the evacuation. The report was forwarded to UN headquarters at Zagreb, with the demands for the help in evacuating 32.000 civilians from Knin, Obrovac, Benkovac and Gračac, towards Petrovac and Banja Luka in Bosnia.) Milan Babić was sentenced by The Hague Court to a long term prison, even though he expressed his ”deepest repents” for what he did to non-Serbs during his reign. Obviously he expected much milder sentence, for his ”cooperation” with the prosecution, for when he was invited to testify against Milošević, he accepted it eagerly, hoping to improve his position by supporting the prosecution as much as possible. He appeared at court as a protected witness, whose identity was concealed. His testifying was a paradigm of cowardness, dishonesty and treachery. Of course, it was not difficult to Milošević to reveal the true identity of the “witness” and expose his human misery, what made Babić to reveal his identity himself. Being defied on the open scene in all his bare misery, despised even by his prison mates (both Serb and Croat), he chose the only way-out of his selfhumiliation – a suicide. (Later, in the Serbian Parliament, the Šešelj’s MP scum would count both Milošević and Babić as martyrs, “murdered by the Tribunal”).
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The present perfect tense is not used by mistake here.
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With the arrest of Milošević and particularly after his death, his Socialist Party of Serbia declined rapidly, to become marginalized on the political scene, hardly achieving the census for the Parliament. Among other things, this lost of the supporters exposed clearly the fact that under communist dictators election results had no realistic content. Parallel to this dissolution of his party, his family dispersed too. A few days after loosing the MP immunity hi wife, Mirjana Marković, fled to Russia. His daughter Marija fled to Montenegro, with nasty comments about Serbs and Serbia. His son, Marko, who had an unmarried wife and a son, a common criminal, fled to Russia too. Rumours spread that the family got hold of an enormous amount of money, which Milošević had it transferred from Serbia to foreign banks, mainly Cyprus ones, as a measure of countering sanctions in 1992. Since Milošević’s brother, Borivoje Milošević, a former Yugoslav ambassador at Moscow remained in Russia, it was not difficult to ensure the wellbeing of Milošević family there. All attempts to bring Marko and his mother to court, accused of criminal activities in Serbia have failed, since the Russian government turned the demands down. As for the so-called United Yugoslav Leftists, mock party of Mirjana Marković, it disappeared without trace, since it was a fictive quasipolitical organization, which gathered hard line communists (sic), ready to engage in any sort of political criminal, that is in criminal activities corroborated by their political positions in the state high-level structure. Members of the Socialist Party of Serbia dispersed into all other parties available on the political market of Serbia, testifying that the membership in the ruling party was just an opportunist attitude, without any ideological or political content. In fact many of the present day leading politicians in various parties used to be good communists, who took advantage of the unique position of the Party to build their career. The political changes on the Serbian scene just described do not mean that Milošević (and communist in general) heritage vanish from the Serbian society. As mentioned before, the second state level, that of the administration, professional services like the state security organizations, police, army, etc, remained still full of the ”old guard” people, devoted to the interest of their former bosses and politics. With the subsequent infiltration of the ijekavic newcomers, this structure gradually turned into a parallel state, what has had a devastating effect on the Serbian society, as we are gong to describe now.
Two Serbias Raping of Serbia After Dayton agreement in 1995 almost all those among Serb population, who committed crimes during the armed conflict in those regions, took shelter in Serbia. 1 Many of them already had a double citizenship, and many obtained upon arriving to Serbia. Those who feared of the hand of justice, like those already accused by The Hague Tribunal, managed to get hold the forged identity and started their illegal life in Serbia. Since their compatriots from the region of origin already took influential posts in Serbia, it was not difficult to establish a parallel state within state, ruled by the old and new newcomers. As we shall see immediately this hidden state turned out not only to be stronger than the official one but has been able and ready to exercise a real terror over the Serbia. The principal causa efficiencis of this terror has been the Hague Tribunal and his demands to Serbia to deliver all those accused for war crimes or misconduct of any sort during the fighting in (1991-1995) and (1998-1999) periods. This situation resembles much that of the post-war Germany, when people from one of the allies occupied zone moved to another, expecting to hide there more successfully. In the same vain Hague Tribunal was a copy of the Nürnberg Process and the other subsequent trials, carried out in the occupied Germany, as a part of the denazification of Hitler’s state. After Dayton agreement 1
The same happened to Croatia and Montenegro, where the corresponding perpetrators found shelters.
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those with bad conscious from Bosnia and Herzegovina flew to Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro. But the similarity with the post-war Germany stops here. In addition to those individual escapees, there were two massive migrations from Croatia and BiH to Serbia, as metanastatic movements. Altogether Serbia and Montenegro were the only regions which were only recipients of migrants and escapees. In particular, Serbia has become a refuge for the war criminals. But what sort of refuge? Unlike post-war Germany which was occupied and controlled by Allies, the newcomers to Serbia were both fugitives and occupiers. Not only many of them occupied high-level positions in the state, but majority of those 400.000 were well equipped with weaponry, with the four-year training in using them in the regions of origin. They were ready to make use of them in the host country as they were in their original areas. The Serbia thus became a victim of a hidden occupation, unknown in the modern history. Her citizens are partly aware of the new state of their state, but nobody fully understood the extent of the control which the Dinaroids got hold in the host country. But the coming events spoke for themselves. Red Berets are riding again He, who plants gourds with Devil, got them at his head. Serbian folk saying Serbia was obliged to cooperate with the Tribunal, under an agreement signed by Milošević himself. It meant that every person accused for war crimes and similar misdeeds was to be arrested and delivered to the Tribunal. When police got information in 2001 that two brothers from Bosnia were seen on a market in the western Serbia (that is close to BiH), they sent a unit from Red Berets brigade to arrest them, expecting an armed resistance. Brothers were arrested, but soon the government had good reasons to regret her action. Red Berets brigade came in November 2001 from their base in Kula, northern Vojvodina and blocked the traffic on the highway through Belgrade, fully armed. Their chiefs declared the protest for making use of the Unite in arresting Hague accused, as a misuse of their patriotic duties. They convinced the rest of the unit and relevant circles in Serbia that government was preparing sending all of them to Hague. It was not difficult to be convincing on the matter, since, as we mentioned before, majority of the brigade staff were good candidates for Hague. All eyes were turned towards the heads of the state. And what followed revealed to those who do not mind making use of their minds who the bosses of Serbia were. President Vojislav Kostunica declared, when asked by journalists at the briefing, that it was all right for rebels to block the traffic, since ”everybody strikes in his uniform” (like medicines etc). It was clear that the move was supported (if even not initiated) by the president of state, as a part of his fighting for the state control. Prime Minister Djindjic summoned the government and asked the heads of the army if the state had a force which could cope with Red Berets. The answer was as discouraging, as illustrative – NO. This response deserves some comments. First, it is hard to believe that the Army could not overcome the rebellion, since it was rebellion indeed. There was the elite 63 parashoot division, which is supposed to be capable of a decisive strike in such a situation. The fact, further, that army people even did not consider any kind of response to the challenge, was very indicative indeed. Djindjic became aware of the situation and had to make important decisions, similar to that president Kennedy was facing at the beginning of Cuban crises. It was the question of the sovereignty of the state of Serbia. Succumbing to the challenge would have far reaching consequences. An opposite decision would initiate, presumably, a civil war, with unpredictable consequences. And Djindjic made his mind – he succumbed.
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He went to the Red Beret base at Kula, with his right hand man, Čedomir Jovanović, whose assistance in overthrowing Milošević (as well as in arresting him) was instrumental. When they arrived, the hosts separated them and Djindjic was left alone to negotiate. It became immediately clear the he was not treated as the premier, but as a prisoner. We do not know what exactly the agreement was, but a couple of points did emerge after the “negotiations”. Djindjic had to renounce making use of the Unit in arresting Hague fugitives. Second he promised to post a number of Legia’s men on important places in the police and army. The latter will play a decisive role in Djindjic’s assassinations, as we shall see later on. But here we shall dwell somewhat more on the event which turned out to be a turning point in the Serbia’s life. The interpretation of the response of the authorities to the Red Berets and their demonstration of power has been only partly correct. We first note that Red Berets was a sort of ”League of foreigners”, as existed during the colonial France. With the difference that Dinaric members of the unit possessed no feeling of duty and honesty, unlike standard members of the League. We must, however, make an important distinction between Montenegrins and Herzegovians in this respect. The former did have a feeling of honesty, despite their highwayman “job”. The case in point was Zeljko Raznatovic-Arkan, mentioned before, who did hold his word and kept his promises. With those highwaymen coming from Herzegovina (especially western one) one could never trust them, since they had no respect towards their own self-respect. When Milošević planned to make use of Red Berets as his praetorian guard, he was “riding the tiger”. Legia turned his back to his employee during the 5 October 2000, as well as at the arrest in June 2001. Now he turns his back to Djindjic, this time not for a profit, but from the fear. If Djindjic was ready to deliver Milošević to Hague, he would not hesitate to do the same with him and his comrades. But even this is just a part of the story. The rest (the principal part) is called Ratko Mladic. Ratko Mladić & com The former general and chief commandant of Republica Srpska army, Ratko Mladic, comes from Kalinovik, the core region of Herzegovina (as he used to state proudly). In 1995 his army surrounded the UN protected enclave Srebrenica, which lies within the Serb controlled Eastern Bosnia, connected by a corridor to the rest of the Muslim territory. Encircled by Serb forces the town Muslim forces, under the command of Naser Orić, made frequent raids into the neighbouring Serb vilages, plundering and killing the local population. When general Mladic occupied the town, he found there a Dutch unit in charge of protecting the town. But the Dutch colonel did not find it possible (or convenient) and gave up any resistence to the Serb forces. All male inhabitants (both those who were soldiers and were wearing civilian clothes) and true civilians were taken away, some 7.000 men, and shot not far away from Srebrenica. It was this massacre which urged the Bosnian war to be stopped and provoked Dayton agreement, signed by Alia Izetbegovic (Muslim), Slobodan Milošević and Franjo Tudjman (Croatia). When the Hague Tribunal for Yugoslavia was set up, Mladic appeared the principal accused to be brought to trial, beside the former president of the so-called Republika Srpska, Radovan Karadzic. The latter was a Montnegrin, born on mountain Durmitor in Montenegro (from the same tribe as Milošević), a psyhiatrist and the leaderof the Serb political party. He was imprisoned before the war for embezzlement. 1 When the war atrocities became intolerable, Milošević took him to Athens, where he was forced tosign a seasefire agreement. But when the Serb assembly was to endorse the agreement, Karadzic distancezed himself from this and neither Milošević, who attended the meeting with the Greek prime minister, was able to convince the assembly to aprove the act, which was thus rejected.
It was in the prison where he met Momčílo Krajišnik, another later Serb political leader, who would become the prime minister and sentenced to a long prison by Hague Tribunal.
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When Allied forces tried to inforce Serb cooperation concerning the settlement of disputes, making raids on the Serb positions around besieged Sarajevo, Mladic orderd that soldiers of the international forces, in charge of monitoring the seasefire, to be tied to electricity posts along road, as the living shields against the air strikes. Milošević sent immediately his envoz, Stanišić, who succeeded to persuade Bosnian Serbs to release the foreign soldiers. Episodes like these illustrate both the character of the people involved in the armed conflict and the relationship between Serbia and Bosnian Serbs. Near the end of military actions in Bosnia, enraged by Bosnian Serb treacherous and stuborn beahaviour, Miloseic closed the border of Bosnia and stopped every aid, except the humanitarian one, what provoked a wild reaction from Bosnian side. Seselj and his followers in Serbia and Bosnia proclaimed Milošević a traitor. At Dayton, Milošević showed sympathy with Bosnia Muslims, particularlz those in the besieged Sarajevo. As is known now, about 10.000 citizens (including 1.500 children) were killed during the siege, mainly by mortars and snipers. (Serbs in their part of Sarajevo fell victims of fighting too.) Even before the Dayton agreement Mladic sent his family to Serbia. His daugter committed suicide during a touristic trip to Russia (she presumably was a drug consumer). His son founded a firm in Serbia, which will turn out to be instrumental in securing the financial support for hiding general Mladic. The latter became a Serbian citizen by illegal registration. While Radovan Karadzic was supposed to hide somewhere in Montenegro or/and Bosnia, it has been a general belief that Ratko Mladić found the shelter in Serbia. He obtained a pension as army general, under a previous agreement that all officers of the former Yugoslav army (Serb, of course) be payed by Serbian military funds (better to say by Serbian taxi payers). Needless to say Serbian citizens (Serb or non-Serb) have never been asked if they aproved such an arangement. Anyway, family of Mladic has been receiving the pension regularly in Serbia, despite the fact that it was(officially) unknown where he is, or even if he is alive at all. According to unofficial statements by Serbian officials, Mladic used to hide (sic) in the Serbian military objects, like army garrisons etc. He would threat to uproot families of eventual «»traitors» up to the fourth generation (an obvious allusion to the biblical Fourth Commandment). Since he had a vast military support by his compatriots from Bosnia and Herzegovina, who, as elaborated before, held the top positions within Serbian establishment, this threat has not been taken as a mere bluff, to the contrary. Serbia and her citizens have been scared to death. Man who slaughtered 7.000 unarmed men, can be expected to do any crime for sure. And a number of causal incidents remind the Serbians of their slavery in their own country. On 5 October, 2004 two conscripts went out to the guarding duty at a casern at Topcider, in Belgrade. As soon as they went out, they were shot. The army ivestigation was quick and gave this astonishing conclusion: The guards killed each other!. Just like that. 1 There was a clear indication that somebody from the building appeared in the courtyard, somebody who was not supposed to be seen at all and that his body guards killed the undesirable witnesses. At the demands of conscripts families and the public media, an independent invtigation was carried out, who found the incident a clear case of murder by third person(s). This finding have been ignored by the army jurisdiction however. The only thing they did was to transfer the case to civil court, washing the hands like Pontie Pilat. The case is still in process, without any prospect to finish in a forseable time. This was not the only incident of this kind. A guard in a casern at Nish was similarly found dead on duty. The official explanation was - suicide. By tracing these incidents one may follow with certainity the «hiding rout» of Ratko Mladic in Serbia. But he was not he only fugitive to be caught and deliverd to Hague. The latter put on the list some 45 people suspected for war crimes. Except for 5 high rank officers from Serbian army, almost all the rest were from over-Drina regions. Up to now, almost all have been arrested in Serbia and delivered to Hague. All except Ratko Mladic and Goran Hadzic, former prime minister of Republika Srpska. He was under surveyence of the 1
Later, the findings were obliterated, by stating that one guard killed the other, and then committed suicide.
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Tribunal and when spotted, the Serbian government was alarmed on Friday and the hiding house indicated. Immedaitely afterwards the surveyance watched how Goran Hadzic was packing into car and flew away. When on Monday officials arrived there, the flat was empty. The film was shown to Serbian authorities, but in vain. The game of hind and find continued. When Vojilav Kostunica forme his government in 2003, he declared that no one will be arrested and delivered to Hague, unless he volontarily surrended himself. After a long persuasions, those five officials from the Army did surrende themselves and went to Hague. They were all accused for the trocities committed in KiM, during 1998/9 campain. They are regularly released for a temprary freedom and taken back again. 1 When this spring (2008) a new Serbian government was formed, a coalition betwen the Democratic Party and Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) was made, since it was the only way to prevent Šešelj's radicals to siese the power. Ivica Dačić from SPS was appointed the new minister of the intrnal affairs (police). It was certain he would not have those fugitive arrested and Boris Tadic, 2 the president of Serbia, had Radovan Karadzic arrested during «ïnterregnum», before the new ministry was settled down. The arrest of Radovan Karadzic contains some interesting instances, both comic and tragic. He was cought during night on his way from New Belgrade quorters to Batajnica town, near Belgrade. 3 He presumably was warned about the imminent arrest and tried to escape, moving to the strongold of SRP. With a big beard and coloured long hair he was unrecognizable. The investigations revealed he was living in a flat in New Belgrade suburb, under the fauls name of David Dabic, with the regular identity card. 4 He was employed in a small medical firm, as an expert for alterntive psychiatry and was a regular contributor to a journal of a similar profile. He used to take part i numeous round tables, book promotions etc. Karadzic frequently visited the nearby cafe, held by a Dinaroid, where he would enjoy playing gusle, a primitive Dinaric istrument with a single string and bow, which is used to accompany oral presentation of the folk epic poetry. On the walls of the cafe posters of Milošević, Mladic and Karadzic are to be seen. Under investigations no one of those who contacted allias David Dabic, admitted they recognized him as Radovan Karadzic. During his stay in castody in Belgrade large crowds of his supporters demonstrated in front of the prison. SRP organized after his delivery to Hague a protest meeting, which turned out illegal and a mere provocation, in order to incite radicals to make havock and thus draw attention to the SRP and their «patriotism». Many policmen and young demonstrators were injured, with one of the latter dying a fourtnight after the unrest. At the first hearning at the Tribunal Karadzic protested the arrest and complained he was arrested three days before the official date. At the place of the arrest police found a laptop, where presumably Karadzic held files with his preparations for the eventual trial. At the hearing Karadzic complained that many files were destroyed etc. Equally, he stated that Richard Holbrrok promised him in 1996 he would not be persequted provided he withdraw from any political activity. According to him, it was his fear from USA, who were after him, he had to hide. The trial is still in due course. The Karadzic case reveled what one has always suspected – the centre of the fugitives is at New Belgrade, a huge modern suburb of Belgrade across River Sava, built in 1950-thies for the Tito's partizan officers, now inhabited by their ofspring. It has a distinct mixture of nouvaurich and Montenegrins and Herzegovians, a kind of highlanders colony. Many fugitives found shelter there, since former Ijekavians have established a state in a state there. Being well off, with enormous »war pensions» and salaries deserving the descenders of partisans' colonels and generals, who have well paid posts in the state administration and equivalent jobs, these people do not mix with Their trial has not yet started. They are all autochthonous Serbians. Montenegrin, born in Sarajevo. 3 It is the town where Šešelj’s headquarters are situated. 4 A person with this identity did exist, in a town in Srem (Vojvodina). 1 2
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the rest of Serbian population. Inside this communist ghetto, Karadzic & com do not have to hide, in fact. If Ratko Mladic is ever arrested, it would probably happen at New Belgrade, among some 200.000 compatriots. Many explanations conserning the unseccesful hunting Mladic have been offered on the Serbian and international market. It has been suggested from the Tribunal that Serbian government is reluctant to arrest and deliver him, since he would reveal at the Court how Serbia was involved intoBosnian afairs, particularly into Srebrenica masacre. Interestingly, the same rumour is circling around Serbia, whose sources are not difficult to locate. If the Hague strategem is to force Serbia to do what they demand, Mladic and his cronies are blackmailing Serbia straitway not to touch fugatives for her own benefit. The interesting point is that the Tribunal took for granted that Mladic would betray his host country and expose her to the international condamnation to save his own skin. What further implies they are aware which kind of scum they are dealing with. We note here that «to reveal» may well imply «to invent», for the same purpose of getting rid of the guilt «in favour of others». Hague Tribunal and Serbia As mentioned before, many sectors of the Serbian society were against delivering those accused by Hague Tribunal (HT). But motivations for such an attitude differ greatly. We divide all accused into two large groups. One consists of Serbian autochtoneous citizens, the other of Ijekavian fugitives, who found illegal (sic) refuge in Serbia. But there is another important dividing line among all of them. This separates those who committet presumed crimes outside Serbia and those who are accused for their improper behaviour within their own state (including those who came from across Drina River too). The latter category refers mainly to those engaged in the military actions at KiM, but not exclusively there. For instance, Vojislav Šešelj has been engaged in intimidating and even maltreating non-Serbs in Vojvodina, not to mentioned those announcements of banning Shqiptars from KiM. HG demanded that all accused should be delivered to the court there, but this requirement can hardly stand a reasonable justification. We shall discuss the issue in more detail. Citizens of Serbia, accused for misdeeds perpetrated in Serbia should be persecuted at the domestic courts. This is important for many reasons. First, it is the duty of a state to bring justice to hercitizens, exibiting at the same time her sense of justice and moral responsibility. It should at the same time raise the selfrespect in the eyes of the IC, and compensate as much as possible the lost of respect before the public abroad. Finally, it would strengthen considerably her sovreignity. In this respect, a few words of comparison with the case of Gavrilo Princip and the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand and his wife seems in order. Gavrilo Princip was not Serbian citizen, and what he did that tragic day happened outside Serbia. It was duty of Serbian side to help maximally the investigation, but to allow for foreign investigtors would mean loss of sovreignity. (Of course, had the Serbian political leaders known what would follow, thay should have allowed such a humiliation). On the other hand, had the perpetrator been located in Serbia, he should have been delivered to Austro-Hungary without hasitation. Those non-Serbians (Serbs or non-Serbs alike) who are accused for cimes in Serbia should be persecuted in Serbia and banished after serving the sentence. Finally, those fugitives who were not Serbian citizens and were accused for crimes commited outside Serbia should have been delivered, but not to HT, but to the state where they parpetrated the crimes. Which way they are to be further treated there was the responsibility of their county of origin. Whether they meanwhile got hold of Serbian citiznship is of no value, for the crimes committed are of such a weight, that formal shields should not be recognized as a protection. The only thing which should be of importance is the legality of these registrations, which displays well the cowardnes of the perpetrators, at the expence of the refuge-country. Those cowards should be accused for damaging the host country, brought to trial and sentenced according to the domestic
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law, but the sentence should be made operative only after the accused, prosecuted by HT, serves his/her eventual sentence from HT. Otherwise, one may expect mock trials, which would serve as a protection by smaller crimes at the expence of more serious ones. For instance, Radovan Karadzic would be sentenced for indefinite prison, where he would spend his life in arbitrary comfortable conditions, not much different from the free life. Here we can not avoid mentioning the case of Biljana Plavšić, former president of Republica Srpska, one of the most arrogant and militant political leaders during the Bosnian wars. Prior to being arrested she used to live in Serbia, were she took refuge before HT accusations. Promised to get mild sentence if she is cooperative, she read at the HT a heart-breaking repent, admitting her unreasonable persecuting non-Serbs etc. She got, never-the-less a severe sentence of 11 years in prison. She then asked if she could serve the sentence in Serbia – nota bene not in Bosnia, the country of origin, where she committed the crimes and where she was the boss!. Why? For the same reason she flew to Serbia. It was important first of all to link Serbia as much as possible to Bosnian affairs, as an accomplice, if even not the only perpetrator! By accepting to provide her the prison Serbia would, albeit implicitely, admit her active role in interfering the Bosnian afairs, if not even as an instigator. From this there would be just a single step to claiming that it was all Serbia's business and they were but innocent tools used in building the project of Great Serbia Empire. Besides, all those criminals from over-Drina regions would be much safer in Serbia than in Bosnia. There they would be watched closely by the international authorities and by the families of their victims. Last but not the least, the wishful thinking that their compatriotes, like Šešelj, will some day take over the power in Serbia, and they be released from prison, can not be overestimated. Of course, the expences for keeping the alliens in Serbian prisons would be put on Serbian tax payers shoulders (the same holds for the trials to those intruders held at Serbian courts). We note, in passing, that according to Carla del Ponte, Jeffrey Nice try to convince the Tribunal in 2002 that it had no valuable proofs that Milošević was responsible for the genocide and crimes at Srebrenica and Sarajevo. Assassination of Zoran Djindjić When a badger wants to get rid of fleas, it adopts the following tactics: bites clump of lawn and enters slowly backwards a pool, first by trail, then by rear legs etc, until only the clump remains above the surface. Fleas move meanwhile from the rear parts towards the nose and gather ultimately on the clump. Badger then discards the clump and moves away clean. While the Third Balkan war was approaching the end (sic) all those Serbs (sic) from over-Drina regions who had bad conscious moved to Serbia and after Dayton remained there hiding (sic) from the authorities (sic). Croatia and Bosnia & Herzegovina turned out thus a big badger, with Serbia playing an honorable role of lawn clump. And when the Hague Tribunal was set up, a tragic-comic drama started. Some of those criminals came individually before the ceasefire, some mixed with the refugees, but the process has never stopped. With their compatriots already settled down in Serbia, some of them occupying high positions in all sectors of Serbian society, as we mentioned before, and with 400.000 immigrants well equipped by weaponry, these fugitives felt secure in the Serbia as the “promised land”. Hence, when HT officers, like the chief prosecutor Carla del Ponte, started pressing the Serbian authorities for delivering the wanted, they faced a conspiracy of silence. True, out of 45 wanted, some small fishes were arrested and delivered, but the main perpetrators remained well hidden. The incident with those two brothers mentioned before has clearly shown who the boss in Serbia was. It is hard to believe that HT was not aware of the actual situation, but it was itself under the pressure, first of all from USA, to collect as many wanted as possible, particularly from Serb side. As mentioned before, the Serbian president Kostunica was reluctant to cooperate, for good reasons. The hot potatoes were in Djindjic’s hands.
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(On February 4, 2003, Yugoslavia changed her constitution and became the federal state “Serbia and Montenegro”. Vojislav Kostunica lost his post of the president of the state). The prime minister, presumably, tried to convince madam del Ponte that he was not the boss, but in vain. Finally, he lost the nerves and put at one of meetings with her the cards on the table, declaring something like this: “I can not arrest Ratko Mladic, since there are 200.000 Bosnian refugees here, and they are well armed!” Whether this appeal fell on deaf ears or not is not easy to infer, for very prosecutor was not the boss and the drama took form of two fighting puppets. The only difference was that del Ponte was playing for career and honour, whereas Djindjic’s stake was his life. He was many times warned from various sides about the risks, but he decided to retain the image of a boss, thus bluffing the potential murderers. This situation continued for a year or so, but Serbian March Ides were approaching. It is still unclear when the decision was made to assassinate Zoran Djindjic, or what trigged the ultimate decision, but in retrospect, by the end of 2002 somebody (in all probability Ratko Mladic himself) said Alea iacta est. But before the final stage was reached, a few words on the preliminary setting the stage seem in order. Serbian Kennedy [Therefore] don’t ask the state what she can do for you, but ask yourself what you can do for her. J. F. Kennedy I can work for me, I can work for you, but I can’t work instead of you. Z. Djindjic After Djindjic was assassinated, majority of Serbians called him Serbian Kennedy, with good reason. Djindjic was a handsome, charismatic, brilliant, well educated person, well devoted to politics as a vehicle for his political ideas. He was particularly popular with Serbian middle class, which was eager to regain the previous status of the driving force of the society, the role it used to play before the war and which role they were deprived of by the communist regime. During 1990iest the latter was epitomized by Slobodan Milošević and this autocrat was aware of the danger Djindjic and his DP to his rule over Serbia. The state controlled media did not spare time in demonizing Djindjic. Their dirty slander did not hesitate in accusing him of treachery, “western puppet” etc. In the latest electoral campaign they even accused him to be from an Ustasha family, although his family (from his mother side) turned out to be victim of Ustasha regime in Bosnia. But while those accusations came from the side of his adversaries, some of his political rivals “from the same side of the barricade” filled the press pages with subtle or less subtle allusions to the alleged links with the criminal underground etc. Djindjic was well aware of the weird situation he found himself after gaining power in 2001 – he had yet to gain popularity. Apart from the purely politically enforced moves, like that of corroborating the Church (the same as Tito did just after the war), tolerating the Milošević’s infrastructure in the state administration, tolerating the immigrants parallel state, etc, Djindjic was yet to win the soles of majority of Serbians. It was for that reason he used to put much weight on the publicity of his person and his activities. His frequent t appearance on TV, for instance, was a double edged sward, however. By taking part in popular TV programmes he did gain popularity of the ordinary citizens, but the price to pay was a loss of authority. It was just the opposite of what Milošević did. The latter rarely appeared in public and kept himself ”above all these ordinary matters”, but every appearance of him was carefully arranged by his cronies and Party. 1 By creating the feeling of familiarity with “ordinary He was following, in fact, the manners of Tito, his idol, whose appearances in public were experienced as sort of epiphany.
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people” Djindjic at the same time allowed the criminals to come close to him in a “psychological space”, what will turn out fatal at the end. But within six months or so before the assassination, Djindjic concluded that the preparatory period of strengthening the position of the new government was over and it was time to act as a statesman and start to pull the state train forward. In addressing the ordinary people he did not fail to stress that it was not just the obligation of the ruling parties to work hard for the common goal, but every citizen must be doing his best if the society is to move faster and compensate for the large retardation accumulated during the previous regimes. At an occasion before the Parliament he was explicit, if not harsh, criticizing the MPs for their indolence (it turned out to be his last appearance at the Assembly). Faced with the protests from the juridical sector, which was pressing for higher salaries, Djindjic one morning suddenly appeared at a local Belgrade court, where he found almost empty building and judges offices locked up. The juridical sector took it as an offense and vigorously defended its independence. Generally, Djindjic was moving too fast for the corrupted and indolent society, as Serbia was (better to say, has been). (The parallel with John Kennedy appears here more than handy and appropriate). Djindjic made a mistake common to many extraordinary personalities, who fail to adopt/appreciate the attitude that it is not that the others are worst than them, but they are better than the rest. That is, it is more profitable to exert an influence by example than by criticizing. After that incident with the Red Berets, the tensions with police and Milošević’s infrastructure continued. Legia started to provoke the government by making incidents at pubs etc, challenging Djindjic and the state police. After one of these incidents, he resigned from the state service, handing over the command over Red Berets to some of his cronies. In the retrospect, this move was probably a step in preparation for the assassination. That spring Djindjic visited a police unit on the Kopaonik Mountain in the central Serbia, which is a big winter Serbian resort, close to KiM. He played soccer with the policemen and was badly hurt by one of players. 1 As it turned out later, it was planned to assassinate him on his way to Belgrade, in an ambush down the mountain road, but the plan was abandoned in the last moment. Djindjic’s leg was immobilized and he could move only slowly, by the aid of invalid sticks. He has become thereby an easy target. Soon afterwards, he paid a visit, despite advice of his environment, to Banja Luka in Republika Srpska. On his way to the Belgrade airport another attempt of assassination was made. The plan was to stop Djindjic car by a van, just purchased for the occasion, and to shoot the car by bazooka and other rifles from the other side of the highway. The attempt to stop the convoy failed, since the driver managed to avoid the van and did not stop. The police from the escort stopped the van and driver was delivered to the local court. Driver, to be identified later as a dangerous criminal, called Bagzi, was held for a day in custody and then released on his claims to have a family to support. The name of the judge who let him go has never been disclosed. Instead of retaining the suspect in custody for the assassination attempt, until the case is definitely settled down, state administration displayed a suspicious indifference. In retrospect, it may well have been the part of an assassination plan. At Banja Luka, when asked about the incident, Djindjic laughed and claimed the driver was learning driving on the highway and not much attention should be attached to the case. Whether he was serious we do not know (in all probability it was his wife who could tell the truth). Anyway, after his return to Belgrade, the galley loop was squeezing around his neck. Deputy president of Serb Radical Party, Tomislav Nikolić, declared before TV cameras that Djindjic should mind his steps, for he would not be the first to have problem with leg before dieing, a clear reference to Tito’s last days. About the same time rumour was circling around Serbia that Vojislav Šešelj promised a reward of 5 million DM for assassinating Djindjic. The green light for the execution was on. 1
Interestingly, the name of that officer was never revealed.
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Both “declarations” from SRP side deserve our attention. Who was the person in whose name Nikolić was talking? Somebody from the organized crime? But no politician would allow to be linked with crime, in particular somebody from SRP, which was very loud linking their political adversary with criminal organizations. On the other hand, SRP did not hide her links with Hague clients, in particular with Ratko Mladic. It was the public secret that SRP was a political exponent of the Bosnian and Croatian refugees, including those wanted by the Tribunal. During the period they held the power at Zemun (the town adjacent to Belgrade) Šešelj used to sell municipal barren soil to the refugees, for symbolical prices. (The latter were for Bosnians twice as large as those for Croatians, since the former were considered to have fled their own land). Obviously, Nikolić was talking in the name of Ratko Mladic, whose arrest and delivery was considered imminent. As for the reward announcement, it was a gesture of instigation, rather than a serious offer. First of all, SRP had no such money and even if they were serious about the matter, they would never announce that publicly. On March 5, 2003, Šešelj took a plane and left for Hague, accepting the pending invitation by Carla del Ponte, whom his radicals used to call “whore del ponte”, an allusion to the Turkish practice to execute prostitutes on bridges. 1 Explaining his unexpected move (which is still mysterious to those in Serbia who consider their heads nice embellishments only) he declared: “It is better I go there by my own will, than to allow Zoran Djindjic to deliver me by force.” His allusion to whom his followers are to be after was more than transparent. Smiling while saying bye-bye to his followers, with comment they should not worry about him, since he was an old prison customer, Šešelj took off and left the political scene before March Ides arrived. He gained an alibi par excellence. Fourteen days afterwards Djindjic was assassinated. Serbian March Ides It was a sunny spring day, March 17. I was working at my desk, when a neighbour of mine, came as usually for coffee. On the coach besides me I had put a piece of newspaper with a brief biography of Šešelj, I intended for my file on Serbian political situation. When he saw the newspaper with the cartoon of Šešelj, my good Dinaroid said: I see you keep record of Šešelj, but I must confess I prefer Šešelj to Djindjic. I did not response. My attitude concerning Šešeljoids was like this: You ignore them, you eliminate them, but you never comment them! An hour later my neighbour came again and said to me: I know how much you value Djindjic. I have just heard on radio he was assassinated. I understood there was an attempt to assassinate Djindjic, for the other interpretation was beyond my emotional capacity. But soon I heard the assassination was confirmed by foreign media. Prime minister of Serbia was murdered. Serbia was shocked and stunned. The assassination was well planned and executed. Djindjic rout to the government building was carefully supervised. One from his gate guards gave the signal Djindjic left his residence for the government building. Two snipers were posted in a building about 150 m away from the entrance into the building, from the courtyard side, used by prime ministers. Djindjic got out of the car and approached slowly the door. It is still unclear whether the door was open or not. Rumors even suggested it was locked up? Presumably Djindjic came to the door and turned towards the car, when he was hit by bullet into the heart. Another bullet was shot, which hit the bodyguard, Veruović. (Later, the same bodyguard would claim he heard another, third shot, but this testimony has never been corroborated by others present on the spot). 2 The government was paralyzed for a moment, but quickly recovered and the state of emergency was proclaimed. Mr. Zoran Živković (who was the minister for the internal affairs at the federal There is still a bridge at the Kalemegdan ramparts in Belgrade called rospi ćuprija (rospija – prostitute, ćuprija – bridge) in Turkish. 2 Interestingly, such a claim would provide grain to the mill of those claiming that there was another sniper, who actually shot Djindjic. 1
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government at that moment), took over the position of prime minister. The police reacted quickly and efficiently and the murderer and some of his accomplices were arrested. Two principal accomplices Dušan Spasojević “Shqiptar” 1 and Milorad Lukić “Kum” 2 were killed while running away. The massive campaign for uncovering the conspiracy, which pointed towards attempts to overthrow the government and coup d’etat, was successfully accomplished. About two thousand people were interrogated, hundreds detained in custody. The murderer, Zvezdan Jovanović, turned out to be deputy of the Red Berets chief commander and the close crony of Milorad Ulemek. Te latter was accused to be the organizer of the coup d’etat, but he escaped the pursuit and went to hiding for the following year. In the course of interrogations, the murderer confessed his involvement to minute details, which fitted well the later overall evidence of the organization of the assassination. He identified the rifle he used and places he and his accomplices used in the course of preparations and assassination. One his declaration, aimed at his family and friends appears very significant to us here. He declared:” I have not done it for money, but as a patriot!”. It is not a declaration of a common criminal, but reveals well the political background of the entire affair. It shows that the murder was a continuation of the actions started with that mutiny by Red Berets, we mentioned earlier. Patriotism means here – Ratko Mladic & com. Two questions concerning the assassination are in order here. First, how it happened that the assassination was not foreseen and prevented? Second, how to explain the quick and efficace intervention of the police? Two issues are, evidently, interrelated. In both affairs police (both regular and secret) was involved. It was not the issue of the state against her criminals (ordinary or political), but the state as an institution was involved on both sides. The assassination was the most convincing proof that Serbia has been occupied. Djindjic was well aware of that (a she told that Carla del Ponte), but could do very little, except to pretend to be a real boss of a real state. On the other hand, the fact that those sectors supposed to protect the state were engaged in the criminal activities, helped to catch the perpetuators (except the chief ones). It was, in fact, a clash within the complex occupation forces – organized crime, where one part attacked the other. The scenario of Rumanian coup d’etat from 1989 was repeated, mutatis mutandis, in Serbia in 2003. What have remained undisclosed are the names of the political instigators of the attempted coup d’etat. Here the parallel with John Kennedy assassination appears very indicative, indeed. And as in Kennedy’s case the political background of the assassination will in all probability remain well buried into the corruption of the USA administration at the time, so the case of Djindjic assassination will probably be never clarified. It was indicative that president Kostunica strongly criticized the extent and harshness of the police action, as if he was afraid that the involvement of the political sector would be disclosed. (The investigations would find out that the direct orders for the assassination came from Milorad Ulemek and Dušan Spasojević. The latter was the chief of the Zemun criminal clan, dealing with drugs, extrorsions, kidnapings etc. The assassiantion was planned as the beginning of coup d’etat, with bridge and power station destructions, occupation of airports, etc). The funeral of the assassinated prime minister, regularly elected for the first time since 1940 was magnificent. But the very ceremony revealed the political tension behind the assassination. The liturgy was held in the (unfinished) church St Sava, 3 by the archbishop Amfilohije Radović, 4 the hawk among the Serbian Orthodox Church establishment. Serbians were surprised that the service was not held by the patriarch Pavle, who otherwise was very active on that matter, serving in local The nickname reveals he came from the South Serbia where he used to smuggle drugs, in cooperation with the local Shiptars.
1
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“godfather”, in the best Sicilian tradition.
Djindjic, though not a believer, gave much support to the construction of the church, the largest (apart from Aya Sophia) on Balkan. 4 Montenegrin, who lives in Belgrade. 3
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churches at Belgrade once a week. But when Amfilohije started his preach it became clear that the choice was deliberate, for he almost openly said that Djindjic got what he deserved, alluding to the accusations of Djindjic’s political adversaries about his treachery etc. Those present and TV watchers were astonished by this kind of preach. The funeral was a magnificent manifestation of the sympathy of many Serbians with the dead prime minister. Even those who were skeptical about his politics were deeply moved, that the number of participants at the funeral matched that of the meeting Djindjic organized on October 5, 2000, when Milošević was finally overthrown, was a part of a general symbolic parallel. The poet Petar Petrović-Njegoš wrote in his celebrated poetic drama The wreath of Mountains about the Serbian leader in the first Serbian Uprising against the Turkish rule Karageorgije Petrovic: Tvojoj glavi bi sudjeno Za vjenac se svoj prodati. 1 Only after Djindjic was assassinated many Serbians became aware of his significance for Serbian free society project. In fact, only with the sentimental background after the cruel murder, Serbian authorities managed to protect the state against the cout d’etat and the return to Milošević era. Without the state of emergency the state would have collapsed. Djindjic left wife, Ružica and daughter and son. And Serbia with KiM mortgage. KiM under the UN protection Djindjic government did not last long after his death. Under an unprecedented pressure from the opposition, including the former political partner DPS, lead by Kostunica, Prime Minister Živković scheduled elections for the end of 2003 and his party passed to opposition to the newly elected government, lead by Kostunica. KiM hot potato was now in the hands of the latter. Engaged with internal struggles and external pressure from the Hague Tribunal, Djindjic had little room and time for dealing properly with the KiM issue. Somewhen around his visit to Banja Luka he declared that if KiM claimed to have the right to secede, the same right should be recognized to Republika Srpska. It was not an offer for exchange, as some interpreted it, but rather preparing the ground for the struggle on the international scene. Never-the-less this declaration was later used by his internal opponents to launch the fantastic thesis of western organization of the assassination, allegedly as a prevention of making use of arguments like this. Of course, nobody took it serious. The point of such accusations was the same as that of alleged links with the organized crime in Serbia. Accordingly, all those dirty happenings were nothing but clash among criminals (common and political ones). Although formally under the protection/control of UN (UNMIK), KiM has remained what it has been for centuries- no man land. Border with Albania has been under no control and about 400.000 Albanians moved into KiM, mainly to Priština. The province capital enlarged its population from 230.000 to 500.000/600.000 in 8 years. The monument of Milosh Obilic, Serb hero from the Kosovo Battle, was pulled down and replaced with Albanian medieval hero Skenderbeg, showing clearly what Albanian leaders are up to. Huge buildings have been constructed at Priština. The capital for those new structures did not come from newly discovered oil fields, but from drug traffic, which has been flourishing since the occupation. Oil stations along, otherwise modest, roads appear every few kilometers, but with almost no customers. The explanation for this anomaly is simple – these stations are for cleansing money rather than for delivering petrol. (See Figure 12 and Appendix 3). KiM appears ideal drug traffic
1
Your head was destined to be sold for her wreath [freedom for Serbia].
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Figure 12. Tomorrow a narco-state on Kosovo? station on the rout from the Middle East to Western Europe. First, Albanians are not as easily recognized as intruders, since they appear (approximately) like ordinary Europeans, unlike Afghans, Iranians etc. Second, a large Albanian gastarbeit population already exists in Western and Central Europe, what appears very convenient for the organized smuggling and distributing morpheme, hashish and other hallucinates. Since they are organized on fis scale (extended family), it is virtually impossible to break in, particularly considering the language barrier. As Tirana streets are name after the living American presidents, one of the main streets in Priština bears the name of Bill Clinton. On one of the tallest Priština buildings a huge poster of Bill Clinton is displayed, expressing the gratitude of Shqiptars for the American role in separating KiM from the rest of Serbia. 1 In fact relatively little is known in (the rest of) Serbia about actual KiM situation. Even before the secession Belgrade showed little interest in the life of the southern province, partly for psychological reasons, experiencing a collective trauma for ”the open wound” of the state body. After the occupation in 1999, situation even acquired an absurd turn that foreign media covered KiM situation infinitely better than it was done by Serbian press and TV cover. The reason for such an anomaly may be ascribed partly by the restrictions imposed by KiM authorities to Serbian media presence there. On the other hand reports from the western media appear very critical as a rule when describing the actual situation. There are at least two motives for such a critical approach. One is a common one – media live not on the news ”a dog has bitten a man”, but on the opposite arrangement. Good news is hardly news at all. Media live on reporting problems, even inventing them. The other rationale may be classified as collective misgivings. Before the occupation western media followed the campaign, monitored from the political centres of power, in favour of Interestingly, Kosovska Mitrovica Serbs have not (yet) found it convenient to take counter measure by naming a street Monica Lewinsky.
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KiM Albanians, for general reasons, which call for no explanation. After the strategic political aim has been achieved, journalists found, first, that many of premises for taking Shqiptar side were false and second, that the roles of oppressors-victims were exchanged in the new situation. But apart from these understandable (U)turns, journalist started to disclose many hitherto unknown facts about the strategic preparations for tearing Serbia apart. In particular the ugly face of German diplomacy concerning the international engagement over KiM issue has been disclosed by many analysts (see Appendix 6). There have been dozens of reasons why KiM should be taken out of Serbia. We mentioned some of them before and here we shall deal with the economic gains. KiM appears a rich region, with a fertile soil and abundance of mineral resources. In particular lead and silver mine at Trepča near Kosovska Mitrovica with the (floatation) separation plant, one of the biggest in Europe (owned by a British firm before WW2), appears a strategic gain par excellence. Another precious resource is the rich deposit of coal. Though not of a high quality, the lignite deposits has been estimated to last for centuries of exploitation. On the other hand Albania is notorious for power deficit. Except for few water power plants, Albanian power supplies strongly depend on the import from the neighbouring countries. Hence it was no surprise that immediately after KiM was occupied, plans for exporting electric power from KiM to Albania saw the daylight. In Figure 13 we show the project made by an international consortium, published in a professional journal.
Figure 13. Energy drain from KiM to Albania. Stability and prosperity of a country depend crucially on the balance between the state control and freedom of exchange of people, goods and ideas. Sanctions and prohibitions turn out devastating to the isolated or overcontrolled state. First what comes in is the corruption and organized crime, as
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the cases of Serbia during the 1992-95 sanctions and USA under the prohibition illustrate. Occupied KiM illustrates, on the other hand, what happens when an artificial state is formed, without proper administrative and political control. The region which was notorious for illegal traffic of all kinds has become the Mecca for legalization of the social evils. The same mechanism which enabled KiM politicians to achieve their separatist goals is now used by criminals to get rid of any serious legal control. Two aspects of this situation must be considered here. The local police are well aware that not only criminals are well equipped by all sorts of weaponry, ready to use to secure their business, but the general population is armed and ready to intervene. We described a typical situation when a criminal was to be arrested at Prekazi village before. As for the UNMIK presence, it appears of no threat to the local crime. Not only it is unable to intervene without the technical and implicitly political support by the local administration, but the foreign staff is well aware they are experienced by the local population as intruders, as somewhat less intolerable strangers than Serbian administration. Any conflict of the crime with the legal forces is experienced as an attack on the Shqiptar independence and liberty. In other words, any conflict situation is easily turned into ethnically-politically assault on the Shqiptars and their freedom. This mechanism operated very well in the struggle with the state of Serbia, cunningly presented as a fight against Milošević, who has still remained the trump whenever a tension on the line Belgrade –Priština is strengthened. Not only the UNMIK and any other international organization are aware that the official relation with the local administration is one thing, but that the general feelings among the local population are quite another matter. They know that he local politicians can easily turn the existing “peaceful coexistence” into a fierce conflict, which would end in expulsion of the foreign presence on KiM. 1 In all probability this will be how the UNMIK and other mandates will end on KiM. Though not much publicized, there are already organizations which demand the immediate evacuation of the international presence from KiM. They organize from time to time protests at Priština and other towns, just to remind the officials of all kind of their presence. KiM officials minimize their presence and influence, but keep one eye on their activities and monitor appropriately the demonstrations and protests. From the more general viewpoint the animosity towards the foreign presence stems from the ancient autistic mental structure of Albanians (and Dinaroids in general for that matter). They feel uneasy in the presence of aliens and tend to separate maximally from the rest of the surrounding population. In fact, they experience the presence of UN staff as they did the Turkish presence during the Ottoman rule and Serbian presence after 1912. (It is for that reason, without further elaborations, that Albanians want to live in a common, ethnically pure state. But this goal must be kept hidden well, as Koha Ditore chief editor, Baton Haxhiu, warned his compatriots, who started publicly pushing towards Greater Albania. He appealed to the media not to run before the events, after some newspapers started commenting the status of Greek North-west Epir, which Albanians call Cameria, with aspirations to annex it to the future Albanian state.) It is for that general motivation Shqiptar are wiping out the historical and actual presence of all other ethnicities on KiM. The process of annulling the history and ethnical cleansing runs along many parallel lines. The later takes generally a spontaneous course, and appears mostly of the criminal character. One of the most frequent actions is devastation of the Serb graveyards. As these are generally situated outside inhabited areas, like villages, they are unprotected now and local peasants are unable to prevent demolishing graves by the local Shqiptars, mostly young ones. When the Serbs come to their graveyards on religious occasions (protected by the local UNMIK 1
A parallel with the present (2008) situation in Iraq is more than appropriate here.
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forces), to pay tribute to their dead, they find the tombstones turned over and demolished. Frequently the fence is destroyed and local Shqiptars look after sheep and cattle there. Some tombs are even desecrated. Churches in abandoned villages and towns are demolished or/and desecrated. Even in places where Serbs are still present their shrines are targets for demolition. In some case these vandalism acts are really of vandalism nature, that is, the motives for demolitions are really the inferiority feelings of the local Muslim population. Muslim shrines, mosques, are rarely of any cultural value, either from the esthetic or spiritual point of view, though some of them may be nice architectural pieces. Like the Ferhadia mosque at Banja Luka, we mentioned before. As it is well recognized shrines and graveyards are of the most precious objects to the autochthonous population and it is not by accident they are the objects of demolition and destructions. 1 Without them local population sees no reason to endure under the oppressive environment and it exactly the rationale for wiping them out. It was a kind of pilgrimage to their graveyards which those unfortunate refugees made when their bus was blasted at Podujevo, as we described earlier. 2 As for the more ambitious plans to wipe out the presence of non-Shqiptar population on KiM, it requires organized and long-term activities. Even after the Belgrade abolished KiM (and Vojvodina, for that mater) autonomy, local municipal administrations were found with the new names of the millennium old places, who bore Slavic names. At the moment these plans are pending, waiting the status of independence to be fully recognized. Names of streets are already changed, but the wiping out the old ones will be complete when the last non-Shqiptar leaves the province. The most obvious evidence whose KiM is really, the KiM toponymy, will be lost and new past of the province is going to emerge from the future. Even European settlers did not care/dare to change the original Indian homonyms, as names Saskatchewan, Connecticut, Potomac, Appalachia, Massachusetts, etc testify. 3 Ramush Haradinaj and Vojislav Šešelj trials Ramush Haradinaj Ramush Haradinaj was one of the prominent commanders in KLA, a Shqiptar counterpart of Zeljko Raznatovic-Arkan, whom we met before. In this capacity his unit committed a number of atrocities during 1998/9 fighting. After the occupation he was appointed to the position of prime minister, primarily as an immunity shelter from the expected accusations for the war crimes. Under his command 40 civilians, Serbs, Roma and Shqiptars, were tortured, raped and massacred. Out of all witnesses planned for the Tribunal 9 lost their life before appearing at the court. Five of them were killed, the rest died under suspicious circumstances. No witness dared to appear before the Tribunal and Haradinaj was released, since the Court was unable to precede the trial. The affair well illustrated the impossible task of the Tribunal facing the ethos of a traditional society. While one need not search for the motives for killing Serb prisoners, but Roma and Shqiptar victims invite explanations. Some of Roma were used by paramilitaries for burying the dead bodies, but generally, they are even less welcome on KiM than Serbs or Croats. As for the Shqiptar victims, they were presumably employed in the local administration, including military one and thus considered traitors by KLA. However, the blood feud must not be ruled out. It is for the latter Haradinaj’s release from Hague trial need not necessarily mean a favourable solution for Haradinaj. Those who watched him while the verdict was pronounced at the Court could not help noticing his unhappy face. In fact, a moderate sentence of prison would be most desirable from Haradinaj point of view. First, he would be under prison protection for period sufficient emotions on KiM to settle down. Second, by suffering because of Serbs, he would acquire an image of a During the “wars” in Croatia and BiH shrines were the first to suffer, from all sides. If the suicide-bombings in Israel (and even at New York) appear heroic acts of desperation, these tele-massacres are nothing but cowardice crimes by sons of bitch. 3 Conversions from New Amsterdam to New York etc appear of a somewhat different kind. 1 2
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martyr, freedom fighter and hero. Anyway, he was appointed, after the release, to a political positions gain, as an additional protection from further pursuits, both from the local and external factors. Vojislav Šešelj What Devil likes the most to hear is that he does not exist. The Haradinaj story, however, is not an exception, but more the rule on the Western Balkan, as we are going to illustrate by the case of Vojislav Šešelj. As we mentioned before, he went to Hague voluntarily, 12 days before Djindjic assassination, for various reasons. One is deeply rooted into his subconscious and he appears intimately aware of this. He feels in the bottom of his soul (sic) his place is not in a society, but behind the bars. This complex stems surely from his childhood, considering his humble social origin. His visit to Hague detention was fourth accommodation behind bars in his life. Second, a layer of his devotion to Hague is linked with his political strategy. We shall not dwell on it here, but shall postpone the issue for later occasion. Here we mention only that Šešelj has studied Hitler’s career in details, and the political confinement is an essential part of the scheme. Moreover, he has a clear advantage over his political hero – TV cameras. Šešelj did not fail to notice the increase of Milošević popularity, both at home in Serbia and BiH and worldwide, defending himself and Serbia at the Court. In fact, it was exactly for this reason Šešelj thought an urgent matter to appear at the Court and turn the trial into political meting. His strategy comprised many aspects. One was propaganda for the domestic audience, when he tries to present himself and his movement as the only genuine patriotic (great-Serb) party. He is therefore exaggerating his engagements in Croatia and BiH, even inventing carefully atrocities over Croats and Muslims. On the other hand, when coming to the particular events, which would be crucial for the verdict, his tactics is to deny it, usually by reinterpreting data. Since the burden of indictment lies mainly on eye witnesses (written records are almost impossible to provide by the Court in majority of cases), the crucial task for Šešelj’s supporters in Serbia, Croatia and BiH has been to eliminate them. This has been done in various ways. Once a witness has been detected, one of the following procedures followed. The potential witness is approached and convinced that it would be in his (and his family) best interests to forget about that. If the arguments appear unconvincing, the next steps follow: The victim is offered a reasonable amount of money or some other equivalent favour for abstaining. The same or more for testifying in favour of Šešelj. The victim is offered a murder or equivalent favour if he/she is not cooperative. That the last point is not just an empty intimidation has been illustrated by several murders of potential (noncooperative) people. On one of recent sessions a witness (a former general secretary of SLP) on the video-link from Belgrade denied everything he declared and signed, even when his signatures under every paragraph have been shown to him. One of his confessions he denied was that he was to leave the SLP in 1994, but changed his mind when Šešelj threatened to have him killed. Fertile as they are, all those procedures require time and money and must be repeated all the time. The heinous radical leader therefore decided to annul the very institution of testifying his deeds by witnesses. He designed and performed a sketch at a session, which certainly deserved the ID designation. 1 It runs like this: Incidentally, ID supporters might be right, in the end, but with the proviso the I not to be specified as Divinity, but rather as Satan.
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An eyewitness clamed he saw Šešelj at a place in Bosnia, on a specific date. That was not possible, retorts the accused with satanic smile, I was in an official visit to Moscow on that day, as can be verified by consulting the press reports at the time. Are you sure? asked the judge the witness. The latter could reply something like Well, I am not quite sure, but it was somewhen about that day .. But no, the “witness” insisted it was that very day he saw accused there. What sort of liars are you bringing here for testifying against me, asked Šešelj triumphantly the judge? Bribed, intimidated or like is of no importance here. The point that Šešelj’s supporters obtained another proof that their idol was a victim of a mock trial, which is generally designed against Serbs, etc, etc. Turning to Haradinaj’s trial, one concludes that only one thing is worse than a dead witness, a counter-witness (mock witness). Generally Šešelj has turned the entire process into an alternating series of farce and tragedies, as expected by those who already had experience with him and his followers in former Yugoslavia. As for the court they feel as an old woman from Serb folk story, who gave a coin to get in a chain dance, but would give two to get out. The ultimate losers are Serbs as a nation, for Šešelj keeps saying “We Serbs” etc. That Serbia (and Serbs) is the principal victim of this heinous creature nobody is aware, or if she is, does not care. (Threatening or bribing witness or victim is not the exclusive department of Hague customers only. Milošević’s son Marko was accused of torturing a member of the local movement Otpor and after he flew away after October 5, 2000, presumably to Russia, he dared not to appear in Serbia. A year ago a minister in Kostunica government, Velimir Ilić, pressed the victim at Požarevac to withdraw the charge. What was the amount in question is not known, but must be considerable). Hague and the Serbian farce As we mentioned before, Carla del Ponte and the Tribunal were well aware that the delivery of accused who were presumably within Serbian borders was not a matter of the good will or abilities of the Belgrade government. 1 Serbia being occupied by Dinaroids, any government’s hope could just to survive until the Tribunal expires. With this “” boundary conditions”” the political stage was setup for a gigantic farce which has been played by Hague and Belgrade officials. This tragiccomedy consists of successive acts, whose actors are government officials, first of all the sectors charged with the “”cooperation with the Tribunal””, police officers, etc from Serbian side and the chief prosecutors from Hague. The latter are regularly visiting Belgrade, listen to the well learned text of utmost dedication to fulfilling Serbian duty in this respect, and information of what the government is planning in the immediate future to do in this respect etc, etc. The Hague officials know these are lies, the Belgrade officials are aware of that, people from the Tribunal are aware of the fact that those are aware, etc, etc. At the departure the visitors express a he briefing that they have noticed some progress in the affair, but it is not sufficient and they expect (sic) more concrete results, etc. Those concrete results are plans of actions, which are ever and ever improved, and as soon as the hiding places of the accused are detected, they will be arrested and delivered to Hague. Once the performance of the lest act is over, the officials return to Hague, report that the comedy is still going on and the deadlock remains firmly stabilized and recognized. There are two exceptions to this game of cat and mouse (sic). First that of Radovan Karadzic, we described earlier and of (former) general of Republika Srpska army, Tolmir. Two year ago he was arrested, transferred secretly to Bosnia, where it was arranged to be re-arrested by the local police 1
Presumably situation in Croatia and BiH was not much different.
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and delivered to Hague. The case of Tolmir appears more significant than it seems at the first sight, for it illustrates the thesis I exposed before, that the best way for Serbia is to arrest the intruders and deliver them to their country of origin. Tat it is by far the most convenient way to get rid of intruders has been appreciated by the very accused themselves. When appeared at the first hearing at the Tribunal first thing Bosnian hero uttered was to deny he was arrested in Bosnia, but stressed it was Serbian police who did it. Such a declaration aimed at two points. First, it had to discourage Serbian authorities to do such a maneuver, for it would enable Serbia to get rid of the intruders, and second to blackmail Serbia by threatening to testify at the Court against her. This point points well towards the ethos of those Dinaroids, who did what they did, and then transferred all guilt to Serbia, as innocent victims of her hegemonistic aggressivity etc. (Similar case with Milan Babić has been already described earlier). Serbia was caught in the disastrous position to fight on (at least) two fronts. First, she has had KiM amputation, and the millstone of the Hague war criminals. As it happens as a rule, these two fronts appear well entangled. Even if the IC were sympathetic to Belgrade cause, the Hague accusations hang as Damocles’ sword over her head. There is no doubt that KiM politicians are making extensive use of the Belgrade commitments to the Tribunal and her failure to fulfill her obligations, as another proof that Serbia is a black sheep of the European community. So much is the Mladic hiding favourable to KiM politicians’ cause, that I have meditated of writing a play (or a satire), with gen. Mladic hiding on KiM, with KLA. Of course nobody would publish it. And even if published I certainly would not have opportunity to see it (at least not in this world). Talking about political fiction, it would be fair (though not advisable) to mention USA role in this context. As the Florence Hartmann, the speaker of the Tribunal declared 08.08.2008, Karadzic, Mladic and Hadzic were located many times by Hague Tribunal service, but their arrest was prevented by USA and GB. What means that their hiding was necessary for depriving Serbia of right to keep KiM. Hence another possible hiding place could be Bondsteel USA base near Priština. The latter information explains also why Hague Tribunal has been so tolerant with Belgrade officials: they all have been blowing different trumpets, but the same tune – Requiem for Serbia. As we mentioned before, the general Serbian public had little opportunity to infer what has been going on on KiM. Therefore, and I am not in a favourable position to describe the situation and relevant events on KiM, for the same reason. Two reasons are present here for the informational lacuna on the subject. Belgrade government, being unable to influence the course of events in her southern province, did not find it profitable to keep the general public informed about KiM reality. The KiM officials hold the same attitude concerning the domestic and international public scene, understandably for different reason. Serbia has thus found herself in the course of sinking into the moving sand, without possibility even to cry. In the worst position are the remaining Serbs on KiM, whose desperate situation has been ignored publicly by all sides. Belgrade does not want to present their situation for two principal reasons. First, it would be a clear sign of its impotence and second, not unlinked with the first, this would trigger the final exodus of the non-Shqiptar population. The only sector active in the context is Šešelj’s SRP, which makes as much noise as possible about the difficulties of Serbs there (they never mention Roma or other ”endangered species”), as a part of their critics of the government, and as a means to cease the power in Belgrade. It is for this reason the poor KiM Serbs vote for radicals, expecting to gain something from the empty propaganda. In fact, it is the electoral results which doom the KiM Serbs to failure in the medium run. Behaviour of this retarded population illustrates best the difference between the rest of Serbia from one side, where the democratization has made a considerable advance and European spirit has gained some ground and the KiM reservation from the other, with two retarded populations, who were grasping each other at throats. Serbia has to cope with two retarded populations, one as KiM victims and the other as unscrupulous intruders. In a sense, the case with Serbia and her Dinaroids resembles much that episode from 1001 Nights, Sinbad the Sailor, who responded favourably to plead of that dwarf
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creature for help to cross a brook, to be caught in his deadly grip over neck and served as living carrier. Radicals use every occasion to instigate Serbs to unrest and provocations, as a rule at their own loss. To make the situation worse, Serb population as dispersed all over KiM has been split into many local political and administrative organizations. All of them appear in the permanent quarrels, and even antagonistic clashes, usually under the influence of the political factors at Belgrade. The absence of any, even rudimentary project for resolving the KiM knot, has resulted in the feeling of desperation among KiM Serbs and the indolence of the Belgrade officials. The latter has been epitomized by the “politics” of Vojislav Kostunica, whose indolence has been well masked by his alleged ”conservativist” outlook. Generally Belgrade has remained passive on KiM agenda, despite the permanent noise in the form ”Serbia will never renounce KiM …”. The empty rhetoric of the sort ”We will never …” is the best signal to all sides involved that the officials have no idea what to do with KiM. 1 The incapable Belgrade government (and politicians in general) has been adequately matched by the Serbian population. Those reservists who were engaged in protecting “the most precious Serb word – Kosovo”, 2 have been protesting for years before the government for not being paid sufficiently for their patriotic service. (We love Kosovo, but we love money even more. With citizens like these, Serbia needs no intruders). The tray independence Sjaši Kurta da uzjaši Murta. 3 Serbian proverb The pending declaration of independence was finally declared on February 17, 2008. (See Appendix 7). The date was surely determined by USA and Allies, as all other important moves by KiM officials. The latter circumstance makes the Declaration doubly ridiculous. First, you never obtain independence, you fight and win it. The independence as a gift is a change of the muster rather than a real change of status. Second, USA being itself an Israeli vassal, is not in position to endow anybody with independence. It is the fact which has never been noticed by Belgrade officials. Not that they were supposed to make a statement of this sort, but the politics of a country is the result of many factors, including the public media. The latter could well discreetly place the point to the world public, without endangering the government position. Media could expose the decisive role of Israel in the entire affair, making use of the same tactics which the very Israeli employ. A clear parallel with the Palestinian case and Serbian Shqiptars would force the world bosses to think about possible consequences of their double standards. The fact that Israel and Serbia are not in the same position on the international scene should not be considered crucial to the strategy. The difference in applying ”international rules” in two cases, in particular the role of UN, when suitably exposed, would force UN officials to reconsider their ”well controlled passivity”. The stratagem is risky, of course, but Serbia has nothing to lose. 4 Just how it is used by the press is well demonstrated by the very Israeli sources, as shown by the following citation: 5 Talkbacks for this article: 0 It was this sort of rhetoric by Gamal Abdel Nasser & com. which prompted Israel in 1967 to launch ”the preemptive strike” on the ”belligerent” Arab neighbours. 2 The famous syntagma of the (Montenegrin born) Serb poet Matija Bećković. 3 Dismount Kurta so that mounts Murta. 4 As a graphite in London tube reads ”You can’t lose more than everything”. 5 Caroline Glick, Jerusalem Post, Feb. 21, 2008 1
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Kosovo’s US-backed declaration of independence is deeply troubling. By setting a precedent of legitimizing the secession of disaffected minorities, it weakens the long-term viability of multiethnic states. In so doing, it destabilizes the already stressed state-based international system. States as diverse as Canada, Morocco, Spain, Georgia, Russia and China currently suffer problems with politicized minorities. They are deeply concerned by the Kosovo precedent. Even the US has latent sovereignty issues with its increasingly politicized Hispanic minority along its border with Mexico. It may one day experience a domestic backlash from its support for Kosovo independence from Serbia. Setting aside the global implications, it is hard to see how Kosovo constitutes a viable state. Its 40 percent unemployment is a function of the absence of proper economic and governing infrastructures. In November, a European Commission report detailed the Kosovo Liberation Army’s failure to build functioning governing apparatuses. The report noted that “due to a lack of clear political will to fight corruption, and to insufficient legislative and implementing measures, corruption is still widespread... Civil servants are still vulnerable to political interference, corrupt practices and nepotism.” Moreover, “Kosovo’s public administration remains weak and inefficient.” The report continued, “The composition of the government anti-corruption council does not sufficiently guarantee its impartiality,” and “little progress can be reported in the area of organized crime and combating of trafficking in human beings.” Additionally, the prosecution of Albanian war criminals is “hampered by the unwillingness of the local population to testify” against them. This is in part due to the fact that “there is still no specific legislation on witness protection in place.” The fledgling failed-state of Kosovo is a great boon for the global jihad. It is true that Kosovar Muslims by and large do not subscribe to radical Islam. But it is also true that they have allowed their territory to be used as bases for al-Qaida operations; that members of the ruling Kosovo Liberation Army have direct links to al-Qaida; and that the Islamic world as a whole perceived Kosovo’s fight for independence from Serbia as a jihad for Islamic domination of the disputed province. According to a 2002 Wall Street Journal report, al-Qaida began operating actively in Kosovo, and in the rest of the Balkans, in 1992. Osama bin Laden visited Albania in 1996 and 1997. He received a Bosnian passport from the Bosnian Embassy in Austria in 1993. Acting on bin Laden’s orders, in 1994 his deputy, Ayman Zawahiri set up training bases throughout the Balkans including one in Mitrovica, Kosovo. The Taliban and al-Qaida set up drug trafficking operations in Kosovo to finance their operations in Afghanistan and beyond. In 2006, John Gizzi reported in Human Events that the German intelligence service BND had confirmed that the 2005 terrorist bombings in Britain and the 2004 bombings in Spain were organized in Kosovo. Furthermore, “The man at the centre of the provision of the explosives in both instances was an Albanian, operating mostly out of Kosovo... who is the second ranking leader of the Kosovo Liberation Army, Niam Behzloulzi.” Then, too, at its 1998 meeting in Pakistan, the Organization of the Islamic Conference declared that the Albanian separatists in Kosovo were fighting a jihad. The OIC called on the Muslim world to help “this fight for freedom on the occupied Muslim territories.” Supporters of Kosovo claim that as victims of “genocide,” Kosovar Muslims deserve independence. But if the Muslims in Kosovo have been targeted for annihilation by the Serbs, then how is it that they have increased from 48% of the population in 1948 to 92% today? Indeed, Muslims comprised only 78% of the population in 1991, the year before Yugoslavia broke apart. In recent years particularly, it is Kosovo’s Serbian Christians, not its Albanian Muslims, who are targeted for ethnic cleansing. Since 1999, two-thirds of Kosovo’s Serbs - some 250,000 people have fled the area.
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The emergence of a potentially destabilizing state in Kosovo is clearly an instance of political interests trumping law. Under international law, Kosovo has no right to be considered a sovereign state. Even UN Security Council Resolution 1244 from 1999, which the KLA claims provides the legal basis for Kosovo sovereignty, explicitly recognizes Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo. For Israel, Kosovo’s US-backed declaration of independence should be a source of alarm great enough to require a rethinking of foreign policy. Unfortunately, rather than understand and implement the lessons of Kosovo, the Olmert-Livni-Barak government is working actively to ensure that they are re-enacted in the international community’s treatment of Israel and the Palestinians. Today, Israel is enabling the Palestinians to set the political and legal conditions for the establishment of an internationally recognized state of Palestine that will be at war with Israel. By accepting the “Road Map Plan to a Two-State Solution” in 2004, Israel empowered the US, the EU, Russia and the UN, who comprise the international Quartet, to serve as judges of Palestinian and Israeli actions toward one another. In November 2007, at the Annapolis conference, the Olmert-Livni-Barak government explicitly empowered the US to “monitor and judge the fulfilment of the commitment of both sides of the road map.” That these moves have made Israel dependent on the kindness of strangers was made clear this week when Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni instructed Israel’s ambassadors to launch a campaign to convince the international community that Israel and the Palestinians are making great strides in their negotiations toward the establishment of a Palestinian state. Livni’s move was precipitated by growing European and US dissatisfaction with the pace of those negotiations and by reports from the meeting of Quartet members in Berlin on February 11. There all members voiced anger at the slow pace of negotiations and opposition to Israel’s military actions in Gaza, which are aimed at protecting the western Negev from rocket and mortar attacks. Reading the above lines one wonders if the author is a Serbian or Israeli citizen. Or put it more dramatically: is there any Serbian of Jewish origin that would be able or willing to write such an analysis of the state affairs which appear crucial for her existence? What was the response of the European Union members to this unilateral (sic) decision? (see Appendix 6). Out of 27 member states only five declined to recognize the new “independent” state immediately. The support, albeit implicit, by the remaining members, had, however, little political weight. Those states: Slovakia, Spain, Rumania, Cyprus and Greece, had already their Kosovo (Eastern Slovakia populated by Hungarians, Western Rumania with large Hungarian population, too, Spain with Basque and Greece with the North-west Epir, which Albanians call Cameria and consider their land). Besides, Serbia has a considerable Hungarian ”national minority”, as well as Romanian and Slovakian ones, though in much less proportion. Greece has but a small Albanian community, but it has proved a reliable friend of Serbia and her case stays somewhat apart. But the closest case to Serbian KIM was that of Cyprus, whose Turkish population may well have sent a Caesarean message to their homeland: We came, we multiplied, we separated. As for the practical consequences of the formal change of status, they appear of minor importance. KiM authorities wisely found profitable to ease the communications with the Serbian media, which were allowed an easier access to the region, not only to Serb enclaves. The most severe response came from the North Mitrovica region, populated almost entirely by Serbs, but this was mainly instigated by Šešelj’s radicals, who appear the favourite party (sic) of Mitrovica citizens. Even b fore the declaration of independence, Serb population was divided with the respect to the acceptance “the new reality”, as the Shqiptars and their patrons put it, whenever they find themselves pushed to the ethical wall. This ambivalence comes out first regarding the involvement in the elections. Generally, Belgrade has no clear strategy when the elections for the KiM parliament are announced, for any choice appears bad. Boycott means the total rejection of “the reality”, whereas joining the parliament and government would, in principle, provide an
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opportunity to protect Serb cause. 1 On the other hand, the later decision would be interpreting as the recognition of the ”reality” in the region. The immediate gains which might be available in the transient period could be, surely, annihilated once the new state gains in strength. For it is clear that the ultimate goal of the KiM leaders is the ethnically pure region and founding the Great Albania. As for the local elections situation appears less controversial. In the areas where Serbs are majority, it is important that hey hold the administrative control. If for nothing else, but to monitor the ”humanitarian help” from the rest of Serbia, which appears instrumental for their (biological ) survival. All Serbs on KiM, besides, receive double salaries compared with those in Central Serbia, while those who are jobless receive permanent financial and other help. For non-Shqiptars KiM turns out an extended prison. With KFOR as prison guards, but with the inverse ”criminal distribution”: those who are socially dangerous are outside the walls (barbed wire) and vice versa. Without a clear long term perspective local non-Shqiptar population live on the day-to-day. They provide a member of the Priština government and a few MPs. Thus they fulfil the requirements of the IC for the multi-ethnical society, although it is obvious to everybody acquainted with the KiM reality it is nothing more than a wishful thinking. We mentioned above the ”Mladic farce” going on in the Serbia. KiM has it own theatrical performance, this time concerning the multi-ethnicity issue. Local Shqiptar politicians go around, delivering new houses to those attracted to return from exile, with utmost publicity. At one occasion show like these turn out cynical, even grotesque. When the Prime Minister Hashim Tachi visited a Serb village and asked a local peasant how he was going on, the latter quickly complained had an obsolete tractor. Hashim Tachi promised to help him and soon brand new tractor appeared in front of the house and TV cameras. But the highlight was just to come. With the tractor arrived a rather large, new trail wagon. TV cameraman did not fail to expose it several times, in the front perspective. The massage was more than obvious: the entire family will be able to accommodate, when the time comes, and even some households could be carried out. 2 When the new police forces were founded, consisting mainly from the former KLA, Serbs who served in the previous police rejected to be subjected to the new command and generally left the police. But the decision was not unanimous, as usual, and the Serb population found itself split up. The Belgrade government has turned out incapable to cope with gradual losing the province, step by step, since every step could be tolerated to some extent. It is the old story of a frog boiled gradually until it dies. The overall strategy of Allies (USA) has been to replace gradually everything under the auspices of UN and substitute it with any other cover, like EU. The last move was replacement of a part of a KFOR by the so-called EULEX administration. The point is the formal jurisdiction of UN specifically the Security Council, which is responsible for the KiM status, according to the Resolution 1244. Any change of the status should pass through SC, but it appears impossible, under the actual circumstances. The tactics adopted by USA looks like this: They propose a resolution, which would replace that of 1244. The content of the new resolution is of little importance, the point is just the actual one, which guarantees the KiM status as an integral part of Serbia, to be removed from the table. Russia then objects and the new resolution is not submitted to SC. Then Americans offer a somewhat milder variant, still unacceptable for Russians, but negotiate with the latter that the new proposal is implemented, without going to SC. The gain is mutual. USA proceeds with its (sic) politics, whereas Russians are spared of another veto and pretend to protect Serbian interest. Game like this has been played for the last 20 years, since Gorbachov was deprived of power.
We note that though the non-Shiptar non-Serb population still present in the region, its political influence appears of marginal importance and nobody even mentions those minorities in this context. 2 One of the famous remarks by Zoran Djindjic was that wherever Milošević’s tanks entered in, Serbs with tractor trails came out. 1
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In summaryy, USA first put a choice to Serbia: you succumb or else you are destroyed. When the destruction was well advanced, new choice was put now to Russia: you do not veto a SC resolution, which will legitimize a posteriori our aggression, and we stop bombing. The Resolution will contain a few concessions to Serbia, which will never be realized. And Russia agreed. 1 International law – a juridical interlude When the war starts the law stops. No matter how one defends an armed aggression, it always reduces to the simple formula – I can do it and I do it. The USA agrees ion on Yugoslavia in 1999 raised, never-the-less the perennial juridical question concerning the relationship between the state sovereignty and the international community right to interfere into domestic affairs. In particular, if a part of a state wants to secede, what are the rules to comply? Generally, there are three principal streams regarding this issue. (i) Domestic constitution has the preference to the international regulations and nobody should interfere into the state affairs. (ii) International law should be considered the supreme rule and any domestic affair should be valued via this common regulation. (iii) There are no rigid rules and the behaviour of the international community depends on the specific situation. In particular, the clash between a minority and the rest of a state should be resolved by internal negotiations. Of course, if the point (i) is adopted by the minority, point (iii) becomes pointless. The secessionist side will never negotiate and will demand for the external intervention. It was exactly what happened to Shqiptar secession movement in Serbia. 2 The danger with the point (ii) is that it may be misused by more powerful state to subjugate a weaker one. The case in point was the Sudety (Sudetenland) Germans in Czechoslovakia in 1938, who were used by Hitler as a pretext to occupy a sovereign state. Point two was an ideological background of the so-called Brezhnev doctrine, what became conspicuous during the Warsaw Pact (sic) intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968. On the other hand point (i) interpretation of the rules regulating the international community was the basis of the so-called Monroe doctrine. True, this concerned not single states, but the entire (American) continent, but the principle was the same. Balkan history has been plagued with external interventions, made with or without referring to the formal regulations. Formal juridical ground for point (i) has been (or better was) Westphalia agreement, made in 1648, which stated that nobody should interfere with that what a sovereign state does on her own territory. The conflict appears on the line sovereignty – individual rights. Vestphalia agreement allowed an individual to address the international community, with proviso that the state agrees with this. Yugoslavia did not agree with such an intervention, and the NATO attack was a break of the Vestphalia agreement. Of course, all these considerations appear a sheer scholastic, in the face of the political, better to say military reality. It has been stated over and over by USA that Kosovo issue is a special, unique one, that is not to be subdued to any formal international regulations, even not principle. Translated into common parlance it means: “We are powerful and everybody must obey our rules, or comply with our will”. Hence, Shqiptar may demand secession, but Kurds may not. According to some Russian sources, the Russian mediators in KiM affairs were, in fact, fifth column, who did well their job for USA. 2 And to Macedonia, though with different outcome. 1
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Tibetans may, but Basques may not. Chechens may, but Abkhazians may not. Etc. In the KiM case, the “rule” reads: Shqiptars may, but Kosovska Mitrovica region may not. What’s wrong with such an approach? Nothing, except for mentioning law, rights, principles and other fictions. Any formal rule may be misused and abused, regardless of the actual sense of justice. USA did intervene in Croatia siding Zagreb against Knin, but in the case of KiM they chose to side Priština against Belgrade. The humanitarian aspect may equally be misused, if somebody is eager to achieve his political goals. It is not inconceivable to imagine that Shqiptar rebels intentionally provoked the Serbian paramilitaries to commit killings, even massacres, so as to make appeal to the international community to intervene. In fact, it is obvious that they were well aware of the impossibility to achieve their secessionist goals by normal armed uprising. They evidently did not count on it, but had in view the armed rebellion just as a trigger of the foreign (that is USA) intervention. And it what actually exactly what happened. In a sense, paramilitaries did Shqiptar job, and they did it very well. All courts of god Janus Year 1982 witnessed two remarkable events in the Middle East. One was the air raid of the Israelis on Iraq, when the Iraqian nuclear reactor in the course of construction was destroyed and Iraqi nuclear programme put out of agenda. The attack was not sanctioned by UN or any other international organization, though it was a clear case of an unprovoked aggression on an independent state, member of UN. We note here that Israel probably had already its nuclear reactors and nuclear bombs, though it has been neither confirmed nor denied by the Israeli authorities. Both Israel and USA remain silent on the matter, leaving the world under impression that the nuclear arsenal exists and thus warning the potential Israeli enemies against any hostile action. Since it is an obligation of any nation to state publicly its (non)possessing nuclear arms, not to mentioned the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, this situation has put Israel above the IC, in particular UN. The other event was part of the massive assault of Israel on the Lebanon in the same year. Annoyed by permanent incidents which PLA used to provoke from the Lebanon territory, Israel invaded Lebanon and reached the southern outskirts of Beyrouth. In those years Lebanon was in the state of total disorder, mainly due to the presence of the Palestinian armed forces, who controlled much of the state, particularly the southern region, which was effectively occupied by Palestinians. Israeli forces occupied two of the biggest refugee camps in Lebanon, Sabra and Shatilla, and after retreating left them to the Lebanon Christian paramilitaries, known as fierce adversaries of Palestinians in Lebanon. As result, paramilitaries slaughtered some 300 – 800 refugees (depending on the sources of information) in two camps, including women and children. Some years later, Ariel Sharon, responsible for the incident, was accused before the International Court of Justice at Brussels. 1 Israeli citizens were enraged with the indictment and a severe campaign against the Belgium, host country of the Court, was launched, including a call for boycott of Belgium products. The indictment was withdrawn, but not because of the boycott, but at the USA intervention. UN did not intervene on the case, owing to USA veto, of course. In 2006 Bosnia and Herzegovina accused Serbia (and Montenegro) at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), for alleged genocide, referring principally to Srebrenica massacre. Since this case appears an extraordinary example of the ethos as conceived by some Balkan population, we shall consider it in some detail.
A counterpart of the Hague Tribunal for the war crimes, founded specifically for the crimes in Rhuwanda and Yugoslavia.
1
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BiH after Dayton agreement in 1995 was left in a state of undefined attributes, like a raw stately material rather than a proper state. ”Great Powers” had concluded long time before that those (Dinaric) people involved in their secular disputes, fighting and atrocities could not be managed by any civilized standards and therefore decided to leave them alone, provided they are no longer trouble makers. BIH consists now of two parts of different character and status: (i) Federation, which comprised formally Muslims and Croats (Roman Catholics) and (ii) so-called Republica Srpska. The latter is called by the rest of BiH simply Entity, for the following reason. If accepted as republic, its citizens (predominantly Serbs) could claim the status of a state and that would be just a step toward demanding secession. So the Serbs claim to have a state, the rest consider them as BiH citizens like the rest of the overall population, and as a Serb proverbe says: ”The wolf is fed up and the sheep are in number”. In fact, Republika Srpska (RS) appears tigthtly bound to Serbia (perhaps as tightly as tick is with sheep) and this makes, in its turn, Serbia status vaguely determined, too. The mutual border (River Drina) appears very soft and majority of RS citizens have double citizenship (BiH and Serbian). Army officers in RS are paid by Belgrade funds, including retired ones. Many MP at Belgrade parliament came as refugees from BiH (as a rule, they have joined Šešelj’s party), and protect RS interest, even at the expense of Serbian ones. In the central political institutions of BiH both parts, Federation and RS have equal saying and a common senses must be reached for any federal political decision. Now we come back to the BiH accusation before the Brussels court. As we emphasized earlier, majority (if not all) of the prospective war criminals, including Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, fled after Dayton to Serbia, hiding at the expense of Serbian being prosecuted by Hague Tribunal and European Union. The latter has clearly stated that Serbia can not hope to join EU before delivering the last accused. Now, what happened? BiH accuses Serbia for genocide on Bosnian Muslims, practically for the Srebrenica massacre, committed, according to the generally accepted evidence, by Bosnian Serbs, more precisely by the RS army, lead by Ratko Mladic and approved by Radovan Karadzic. Representatives of the same RS Serbs seat in the federal political institutions which have pressed charges against Serbia for genocide, committed by the same Bosnian Serbs. The amount of compensation demanded from Serbia was claimed as much as xx billion Euros, what would mean that generations of Serbians would pay for misdeeds committed not by Serbian citizens. Moreover, if paid, this money would be shared by all citizens of BiH, including their Serbs, who ”earned” the money at Srebrenica etc. How Serbia responded to this accusation? She denied the eligibility of the Court for the matter, but sent a delegation to protect her interests. Could she do anything worse concerning her interests? No. By denying the legitimacy of the Court she recognized, albeit implicitly, her guilt. By sending her delegation she accepted in advance any decision to be reached on the matter. Serbia behaved as if she was RS. In a sense, she was, for it was Dinaric Serbs who made decision on the matter, and not only on that matter. We note only here that the actual president of Serbia, Boris Tadić, is a Montenegrin born in Sarajevo. (Unlike USA, Serbian president need not be born in Serbia, with the consequences just mentioned). What the Brussels court did? It was court in an awkward situation to decide on an idiotic case and not lose its credibility. It made a compromise therefore, with the verdict which left that wolf and sheep satisfied. It found that there was no proof Serbia was an accomplice in the alleged genocide, but concluded at the same time that Serbia was guilt for not preventing the genocide. Serbian citizens relaxed after leaning that they (and their descendents) are not going to pay somebody else’s bill and the affair was quickly forgotten. Only Dragoljub Mićunović, a founder and former leader of Democratic Party and member of Serbian delegation at the Court, commented, with a charming smile, before TV cameras, the weird logic of Bosnian accusation and it was that. We don’t know what the judges had in mind when considering the charge against Serbian citizens, but at least some of them may have imagined a postman delivering to a former RS fighter, who
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shot hundreds of Srebrenica Muslims, a part of the sum Serbian citizens, majority of whom never heard of Srebrenica before the war, would be paying for his crime. We dealt already wit the Hague Tribunal, but here another case came up with Serbia decision to put her case before the Hague Court for the International law, in 2008. The Court has an advisory character, but Serbia authorities considered it of some help concerning the Kosovo issue, at least from the viewpoint of a possible moral gain. After an extensive diplomatic offensive from the Serbian side, the vote turned out a marginal approval of the positive declaration. Interestingly some states which had already recognized KiM independence voted in favour of the resolution, while some abstained from voting. Such an outcome, calls, however, for a few comments. First, some states. like USA and to demonstrate they were not going to obstruct Serbia’s efforts to consult the Court and thus allow for a free decision of the Court. But more probable is the interpretation those state already knew the final decision and were just playing cat and mouse game with Serbia. But the real explanation came the next day after General Assembly voting – Montenegro and Macedonia (Former Yugoslav Republic) declared their recognitions of KiM independence. Why just next day and why such a synchronized action? Obviously, the Boss thought it would be too much for Serbia to enjoy the UN support on the matter, what could encourage her for a more resolute demands and steps. Besides, by forcing those two states to slap Serbia, these ”independent” Serbia’s neighbours and former partners in Yugoslavia, would further lose their selfrespect, what would make them even more obedient. Irrespective of the political implications and real significance, these moves of all three states involved could not be described otherwise but miserable. But the story does not end here. Croatia had accused Serbia for the same crimes and at the same court. What was the response of the Serbian authorities? Instead of denying her alleged involvements in Croatian internal affairs, they made the worst possible reaction – counteraccusation. They chose to accuse Croatia for the same crimes committed against Croatian Serbs, particularly during the ”Storm” action in1995. What amounts to confess the accusations about the interference into internal affairs of an internationally recognized state. The logic is as simple as idiotic: “You have maltreated your citizens, and we are going to protect their interests before their own state”. Croatia needed no better support for her accusations. Why Serbian authorities did it? The answer is as simple as devastating: Serbia is not ruled by Serbians, but by the Dinaric newcomers. The latter prefer their own interests to Serbian ones and want to involve their host country as much as possible in their own affairs. The implicit slogan runs like this: The worse for Serbia, the better for us. And here the circle closes: four columns have been marching towards Serbia (Croatia, BiH, Macedonia and Montenegro), and the fifth is already in Belgrade. Finally we mention the latest (February 5, 2009) voting at the European Parliament, which recommended all European states to recognize KiM independence. Though this declaration had no executive power, it never-the-less was another slap into the face of Serbia. What did Serbian delegation do during the debate? Nothing. For the simple reason – it was absent at the meeting. Why? In the Serbian Parliament, which elects the state delegation members, Šešelj’s MP obstructed the session and the delegation was not formed and sent to defend Serbian interests. No public media even discussed this failure. For good reasons again: they have been controlled by the same intruders. And here we back to square one.
KiM - What solution? What would be solution of the question of X? There is no question of X. There is no solution of the question of X.
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Though linguistically different, the answers on the question are, in fact, the same, though not identical. To illustrate the point, suppose somebody asked a German in 1930ies: What about the Jewish question? The answers might have been: Which Jewish question? (from a Jew) There is no solution to the Jewish question (from a non-Jew). The second answer probably would not have been given, but a dozen of various answers instead, which put together could be subsumed as quoted above. After these preliminary exercises, we now ask the most crucial question linked with the KiM issue: What about Albanian question on Balkan? Which Albanian question? (from an Albanian). There is no solution for the Albanian question (response from a Macedonian, Serb, Greek and Montenegrin). Though only indirectly related to our topic, we add for the sake of comparison and completeness the Roma (Gipsy) question. If asked, a Central-European and South-European subject would certainly respond by: Yes, there is the Roma question. If it happens to be a Roma, he would state: Yes, there is the solution to Roma question. In the case of non-Roma subject, the answer would be: No, there is no solution of the Roma question. If one sums up all variants of solutions suggested by Roma subject, the interrogator would conclude that both sides agree: there is no solution to Roma question. As in the above case of Jewish question in Germany, we shall here consider possible answers, which would be subsumed as the joint ”solution”, the negative answer. We now reformulate the question in a number of various forms: What would be an ideal solution? Which solution would suit the most a particular side involved? Which instance, or institution, would be entitled to decide on the matter? Global solution What is the nature of the question, or problem involved in the Albanian question? We argued in the previous considerations that the crux of the Albanian question lies in the anthropological sphere. (See Appendix 9). It is a part of the tension which arises due to the historical and anthropological retardation of the Balkan Albanian population, which has been linked with distinct anthropological features of this ancient Balkan population, as compared with the neighbouring population. The problems Balkan non-Albanian countries have with Albanians appear similar, though not identical, with those central-European countries had with Balkan (nonAlbanian) people two centuries ago. Albanians have arrived at the national(istic) table too late, for a century or so. With an important difference: the advances of the medical care and material welfare have resulted in an unprecedented demographic explosion of the Albanian population, unknown in the European history. This fact has been instrumental in making Albanian issue, otherwise political one, an anthropological problem. The persistency of the Albanian question has
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been the direct result of this shift of the playground from the political to biological sphere. Albanians have skillfully made use of the ”logic of numbers” as their invincible weapon, which has been proclaimed taboo, so that one has even no opportunity to put it on the table, not to mention to discuss it. One may not recognize, or admit, there is an Albanian question, but one thing is sure and not negotiable: KiM issue is just a part of the general Albanian one, whatever one means by that. Albanian population has been flooding the neighbouring areas, occupying gradually new territories, and then claiming their ”ethnical rights” on the same land. It may be seen as a tide, or a tsunami, depending on the intensity of the advance of this domino effect. Two things should be noted here. Not all neighbouring non-Albanian populations have met this Sturm und Drang with the same response and vitality. Macedonians have quickly succumbed to the Albanian aspirations (and USA pressure), based on the drastic change of the percentage (true or invented) of the non-Slavic people in formerly purely Slavic country. Greeks have not yet responded to the discrete announcements concerning the Western Epir, claimed to be Albanian Cameria. Montenegrins are trying to ignore the issue, particularly since they have taken distance from Serbia, long before separating officially. Their position is specific in this context, since they belong to the same Dinaric race as the Albanians and do not feel much disturbed by the presence of the population still partly in the state of a traditional society. Serbia has found herself in a particularly difficult position, since KiM appears like a knife penetrating the national body. In fact, KiM is not even the most dangerous part of the problem. Since after founding KiM autonomous region (later province), some adjacent parts of the mainland, with a small Shqiptar population, have gradually become the Shqiptar regions, with Albanians as majoritarian population. Now that KiM has become independent (sic), their demands to join in have been strengthened. It is the best illustration of the domino effect, as the victorious stratagem of the population which proliferates at the African rate. If Cuba was “the gun aimed at USA stomach”, 1 Shqiptar KiM is the knife in Serbian stomach, indeed. With no man’s strip around KiM of 10 km, where Shqiptars make regular raids, what has resulted in evacuation of the non-Shqiptar population from the area, the inflation of the new “free country” territory may be taken for granted. Serbia has been affected by another anthropological phenomenon, that of the occupation by highlanders from the western Yugoslav regions. Though these ”refugees” constitute only 5% of the overall Serbian population (without KiM), their presence is felt to a much greater extent, since they appear a ruling class in Serbia, populated formerly by plain people. The state politics concerning KiM has been run and directed by these Dinaroids, as we discussed before. This will become crucial when we talk about Serbian interests and ensuing politics regarding KiM crisis. All together, the surrounding countries appear affected in different ways, what makes a common approach to Albanian question difficult indeed. On the other hand by letting the events go on unchecked, each country will find her in the situation which Serbia faced, with the same outcome. In particular difficult position appears Macedonia, which is threatened to be swallowed by the Albanian demographic inflation. With a large Roma population, she will soon become a non-Slavic country. Therefore we start first by considering the scheme of a sustainable overall regional solution. But before doing that a few words of the methodology seems in order. The nature of the problem requires global approach, but this is not the only specific feature of the issue. In dealing with systems, physical, chemical, biological, social etc one first starts from a stationary model. System is supposed to change only slowly, if any, so that number of approximate methods may be applied (quasi-stationary hypothesis). Fast changing systems require, however, time-dependent description and relevant methods for solving the problem. Normally, human societies are supposed to change slowly, if they are fixed at a particular land or region. The only fast moving changes have been considered up to now in context of migrations, but the demographic explosions have never 1
John Kennedy’s declaration in 1962.
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been considered by politicians. We mentioned some places in the Bible where these processes, real of fictive, have been recorded, as in the case of the so-called “Egyptian slavery”, before the Exodus. Consider a particular region populated by a number of ethnicities (including a single one). What can cause a noticeable ethnical change within a prescribed historical period? Two factors may play remarkable roles: (i) the influx from outside (migration from the neighbouring area(s)); (ii) misbalance in the reproductive rate between the ethnical components. This may result in a drastic perturbation of the ethnical balance within the region. If the region appears large enough, a part of it may become a strong resource of “human surplus”, as the case of Dinaric region on Balkan appears. The density of population in the latter case remains the same, at the expense of the neighbouring regions, which are populated by newcomers from the (usually highlanders) demographically over'productive areas. The trouble with the latter effect is that he demographic invasion appears sufficiently fast to result in misbalance, but not sufficiently noticeable to politicians. The latter think in terms of years, rarely decades, whereas the ethnical change due to “birth rate invasion” is measured by centuries. Only statesmen of high intellectual capacity and good knowledge of history keep these changes within their horizon and take measures whose effects will be harvested by their descendents, or later generations. Ordinary politicians, even if their attention has been drawn to the phenomenon, take it fatalistically, as an elementary disaster, going beyond their capabilities, competence and responsibility. They experience the situation as a snapshot picture, static and fixed. Fast changing anthropological situation in the area where Albanians are present requires a timedependent methodology, as a prerequisite to searching any sustainable solution. In this context not only the entire geographical region must be considered, but the evolution of the anthropic content of the region. Without accounting for the time component, any particular solution will become obsolete in a short time and the procedure must be repeated again. In physical science there are many situations when the static picture appears insufficient and even useless. Physical phenomena where the external influx and the internal change must be combined in order to describe the system and predict its further development abound. We mention, as an example, the heat examination in a substance, when an external heat flow imports the external thermic energy, but the latter may be produced by chemical reaction inside the determined volume of the substance too. In our case, the heat transfer appears analogous to the massive migration from, presumably neighbouring, surroundings, whereas the heat production to demographic increase of a particular population within the region. The problem with the above analogy comes when one starts to meditate about solutions, if they are considered necessary from a point of view of a particular side involved. The migrations are usually stopped, if necessary by force, what as a rule provokes wars. As for the demographic expansion the remedy appears even less agreeable, if not inapplicable. Chemical reactions are rarely conspicuous, as the birth rate are neither and the ensuing demographic explosion. The principal problem is the implicit shift in the field of examination. In the case with the heat, we have two distinct fields: physics and chemistry, whereas in the demographic case we face the political issue mixed with the anthropological (biological) one. However, while in the natural science application of different models and theories appears normal and causes no ethical or other embarrassing, introduction of the anthropological aspects leads inevitably to a moral resistance of the external witnesses. Chauvinism, racism, misanthropy etc are terms first to come to mind. At this point we note an interesting parallel with the ecology, where it appears normal, and at least fashionable, to talk (and work) about protecting a particular species, or reducing the number of another, etc. Ecology thus appears a sort of meta-ethics, with human playing the role of gods. In fact, this issue may be pushed even to an absurd, regarding our battle with microworld - bacteria, viruses etc. We do not consider making use of antibiotics as bactericide, pesticides as insecticides etc. On the other end of the rod
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lie extreme religious dogmas, like that of ahimsa in Jainism, which strictly forbids killing (and eating) any living creature. 1 Though I am pretty sure my readers do not appear hypocrites, never-the-less I shall dwell in some detail on the issue of mixing political with anthropological aspects, for the sake of completeness. It concerns the concept of eugenic, practiced by many nations, under various disguises. The strict diet prescriptions by the biblical authors, iconoclastic commandments etc are really meant to prevent mixing with ”nations” (goyim), in order to preserve the “purity” (that is ”superiority”) of the Jewish race. When Hitler adopted the same politics, (Nürnberg racial laws etc), such racism became Racism with the negative, even disgusting connotation. Eugenics was practiced by Spartans, but it was a sort of “internal racism”, which provoked no antagonistic response from the external people. Family planning, abortion etc are aimed at the same target – an improvement of the quality of population. We add here that there are various forms of indirect eugenics, like the immigration rules. You can not settle in USA if you suffer of a genetic or other incurable decease. If one adds the mental ability, professional skill, etc, selection, which apply equally to the immigration candidates, USA appears real racial state, if not society. 2 In the same vain, though not so conspicuous, are the immigration rules concerning Israel, disguised by the “ethnical purity” restrictions, which in themselves are based on eugenetics. In fact Israel is a good example to illustrate our model of coping with the ethnical diversion, we discussed above. Facing the big fertility of the local Palestinian (euphemistically called Arabs) within the ”proper Israel”, and not daring to expel them rightway, authorities are encouraging Jews from Diaspora, to come and settle in Holy Land. Particularly this policy was conspicuous in the case of Soviet citizens, who were eager to emigrate from USSR and applied for Israel visas, on the ethnical grounds. Majority of them were not Jews at all, but the Israel authorities turned blind eye and accepted the influx of immigrants, which were about to balance the high birth rate of the Palestinians. Thus, in the Israel case we have both effects of external influx and internal demographic explosion, but unlike KiM issue, these effects are to cancel each other, not to add up. It is the demographic misbalance which Israelis are afraid of and state explicitly that a common state with Palestinians on the occupied territories is out of question. Contrary to that, the principal argument of KiM occupiers, USA&com, for an “independent Kosovo” is that it is a nice example of “multiethnic society”. (Of course, when Serbia comes to consider, the same states run out of arguments of this kind). We shall come back to this point, which is central to our approach to KiM issue, later on. Before passing to the particular KiM issue, a few words about other aspects of the demographic processes seem in order. We have seen how the enormous, uncontrolled (sic) demographic explosion, on KiM and in Albania alike, has caused ethnical and political turmoil, to give rise to drastic social and ethnical disturbances in the area. Fast growing population in an underdeveloped society, with poor economy inevitably gives rise to uncivilized behaviour of the young, uneducated generations, whose general economic, cultural and other deficiencies are easily turned into interethnical divisions and hatred. The new nonproductive population means jobless young people, unemployment, despair, violence etc. To channel this dissatisfaction towards their own state and home country can be done only by extremely unscrupulous politicians (sic). What scrupulous politicians do is best demonstrated by the Chinese authorities, who have imposed the law of a single child per family. This has drastically decreased the natality of the most numerous population of the world. The direct consequence of this measure is the enormous rise of the rate of the economic development of about
Interestingly, though unaware of the existence of microcosm, like bacteria and viruses, the latter were also protected by the dogma, since we can not eat viruses, for example (the opposite does not hold, of course). 2 The eugenetic issue in USA has been brought inadvertedly to light by a recent incautious statement by Watson about Africans. 1
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10 %, which appears the largest in the world. Considering the overall population of the China, such an increase appears a miracle, indeed. It is interesting that nobody mentions the cause of this development. Another effect, not independent of the first, is the improvement of the overall quality of the Chinese population, in every respect, from the health, education, initiative, self-confidence, etc. Parents now can care of their offspring, dedicating to the kid their attention and love. In the family of 8-10 children, which resembles more a kindergarten than the most important social unit, family, kids are left to themselves, rising as members of a flock And when brought to streets and set on an external enemy, the troubles come inevitably. It was exactly like that with Hitler and Nazis, and mutatis mutandis with Iranian Khomeini followers. An ideal solution [For] solutions come and go and the problems remain. H. Höffding. After these preliminary considerations, we ask the crucial question: what would be the optimal solution for the Albanian question. But before attempting to answer the question, we must address the prerequisite question as to the definition of optimal. By this we mean the most socially desirable solution from the widest point of view, that is considering the benefits it would bring to the world society. Of course, one need not agree with a particular solution offered, but if the premise of the overall benefit is turned down, then there is little point in considering the issue, this particular concerning KiM affair or any other. It is with this premise we propose that the KiM affair should be treated within the broader issue of the Albanian question. What is the aim of such a solution, whatever it may be? We state it here rightway: to prevent the expansion of the Albanian population on Balkan, at the expense of the surrounding population. (See Appendix 10). In principle, one may envisage two ways of achieving this goal. One is to prevent the current rapid proliferation via uncontrolled birth rate, by adequate technical means; the other would be stopping the very fast breeding and reducing the birth rate to an adequate level. Neither of these tools could be achieved without cooperation of all countries involved, in particular Albania herself. What brings us to the organization of an international conference, we argued for before, under the auspices of a broader international institution, like the European Union (EU). The conference would have two principal agendas: (i) family planning and (ii) settling the interstate borders, which in the case of the failure of (i) would prevent in a long term the future change of the Balkan borders, except, of course, under mutual agreements between states involved. Ideal solution I Now we come to the particular measures necessary to realize one or both of the above goals. We start with (i). The most effective measure would be reducing the number of children to one per family, just as the case with China is. This would in a medium term reduce the Albanian population to the level it had before the demographic explosion, two centuries or 150 years ago. It would reduce and stop the demographic pressure from Albania on the neighbouring countries and result in a great relief among the latter concerning the threat of losing territories. In the neighbouring countries, like Macedonia (FYRM) and Serbia, where the misbalance has already made havoc among the autochthonous population, the shrinking of the Albanian subpopulation would result in the peaceful coexistence, which in the medium term run would end in a civilized ay of life, deprived of inter-national tensions and animosities, which are present today in the area. We mention here that the non-Albanian population in the regions involved, has already very low birth rate, between one and two children per family.
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To be honest, talking about demographic expansion and family planning, Albanians are not the only perturbative agent in the area. The problem with Roma, not only on Balkan, but in the Eastern and Central Europe appears as serious as in the Albanian case, but the consequences of this uncontrolled proliferation differ substantially from our issue here. First, Roma are almost impossible to handle in a regular way, since they appear mostly people without (administrative) identity. Second, although they present even a greater problem to host countries, the Roma issue belongs exclusively to the social sphere, mainly since they live scattered within the host countries. We shall address this issue later on, for it is impossible to avoid the general issue of the family planning, as a general world problem. At the moment we just stress that although Roma are present on the area we are dealing with, their demands are restricted to the social aid requests, what makes the problem essentially different from the Albanian one. The case in point is Macedonia, where there are almost as many Roma as Albanians. It is interesting that the latter never raised the Roma question, neither in Macedonia nor in Serbia, proving that their cries about “humanitarian catastrophe” are mere demagogical means for achieving political goals. We do not deny, of course, both Albanians and Roma have problems, but hey are their own, which they should solve themselves, with the help of the ambient society. But unless they admit they should not behave as irresponsible citizens, their problems will stay for long. Ideal solution II Now, we come to the point (ii), as a way to solving the Albanian problem. If Albanians turn down the variant (i), then the neighbouring countries will be put into position to try to solve their problems by negotiating with Albania and Albanian population outside their country of origin. This sort of solution will by necessity be of an administrative nature, and thus less sustainable. Solving anthropic problem by political means is like curing a malign decease by cutting off an organ. As we saw before the domino effect makes the final solution practically impossible. Even a small community left outside the encircled area becomes in due course a large population, which starts with his political demands for secession and so long. Ideal solution would be drawing a line between the Albanian ”mainland” (whatever I would be) and the rest of the region, with the latter completely evacuated from the Albanian population. This sort of solution, of course, is not only possible, but has been realized already elsewhere. We refer, of course, to the Israeli (in)famous wall, which separates ”Israel proper” from the ”Occupied territories”. 1 As we mentioned already, this kind of solution can never be taken as permanent. In particular, it is dubious to expect that such an arrangement would inevitably force Albanian authorities to adopt the strategy of family planning. In most probability the fast increase of the population inside the walls would find another ventilation, this time towards the Mediterranean Sea, first of all towards Italy. The latter has already experienced this sort of immigration, as the large Albanian population in the South (mountains) Italy testifies. In any case a massive population displacement would be involved, if a solution of this kind is accepted. What would happen to Greeks, Macedonians, Serbs, Montenegrins and other citizens of Albania would be surely the subject of negotiations. If somebody objects such a solution as improper or impractical, we remind these skeptics that it was exactly what Greeks and Turks did after 1922. Now Turkey is devoid of ethnical Greeks and Greece of ethnical Turks. Their mutual relations are still bad, but disaster has been definitely put out of the agenda, concerning ethnical conflicts and hatred. Finally, massive migrations, expulsions, displacements etc have been carried out recently within the area, from Croatia, KiM, and BiH. Those who gained territories by these displacements consider the latter as definitive solutions, regardless of the ethical, political, historical, cultural implications. They call it ”real politics” (or political reality), as those external factors involved in one or other way, do. But when one tries to point to the future and propose similar solutions, they 1
As the wall appears a very unpopular border, we may take the term as a metaphor for an impenetrable border.
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consider it unrealistic from the start, that is postulating, albeit implicitly, a number of taboos, which some country, in this case Serbia, must be burdened by. How to achieve a sustainable solution As mentioned above, this kind of solution must be searched for by a consensus of the countries involved, either explicitly and acutely, as Serbia, or Macedonia (presently in a metastable state, ready to explode), or in a apparently safe position, like Greece and Montenegro. The country which should initiate the conference should be Greece, for many reasons. One of these is the fact that it is the oldest country the region, a stable ally of the West. It has an experience, albeit indirect one, with the immigration and secession on Cyprus. The memory of ethnical separations and redistributions, from 1922 is still present in the Greek minds. Greece has enormous number of Albanian gastarbeiters (about 800.000 in the season) and Greeks are well acquainted with Albanians and their mentality. A conference on the subject would, in passing, help a number of the local controversies solved, like that of the name of the Former Yugoslav Republic Macedonia. As for the external factors they should be kept aside, for many reasons. First, as the recent history has shown, they do not appreciate the crux of matter and their interference has turned out fatal for the region, creating more problems than solving them. In particular USA must be excluded from any interference. Since it was USA which was most directly involved in KiM secession, their presence in the Conference would be an act of cynics, if not of grotesque. An involvement of USA would bring in a much broader interference from the sides which have strong interests in Balkan affairs, but not as conspicuous as USA. Balkan affairs are sufficiently complex to allow for further complications. The only international institutions whose help would be positive are UN and EU. But neither of these organizations should include in its delegations those country members who were involved in one or other way in the NATO aggression in 1999. EU would be welcome, at least since the entire Balkan region is expected to join it in a foreseeable future, and it is the right position of the EU to be an observer in the process of negotiation. But only as an observer. The conference should be left to the countries involved, as numbered above and no mediation, interference, control, supervision and like should be allowed. As we have seen in the previous cases, like that at Rambouillet, a country which has a support from somebody else side, never negotiate. The Conference should promote the independence of the Balkan countries, which is incompatible with the institution of patron. Such a meeting, even if unsuccessful, would put on the agenda the most serious problem World is facing today – the problem of overpopulation. More precisely, the issue of the family planning should become the primary concern of the present day politicians, better to say statesmen. The uncontrolled natality in some parts of the World, in particular in Africa, South Asia and Latin America, present a real threat to the welfare of the mankind and can not be avoided to consider by the most responsible decision making people. There is no need to dwell on this subject here, for it is too well known. Once the psychological barrier is broken, the issue will get the visa for the most serious considerations on the global level. The case of the European singularity in the form of the Albanian population with the natality which surpasses that of the neighbouring population (and European standards on the matter) by factor 5 would be the best occasion for initiating the issue of the world population growth. Once a particular case has been solved, the general approach would be made much easier, than by starting with academic discussions. How realistic all this is? Politics is an art of possible. What are real chances solutions like those discussed above to materialize? Next to nothing. Why? Albanian question has long ago become a part of the global game, the struggle for power, better to say for domination in the world. Two principal players appear on the stage, or behind it: Muslim part of the world and USA as the world super power (sic). We comment briefly both parts.
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Muslims are coming Despite the claims of Albanians they are ”above religion”, that their religion is “Albanianism”, etc, their way of life has been mostly determined by the Muslim religion. Those smaller parts of the overall Albanian population, Greek orthodox and Roman-Catholics, appear considerably less troublemakers. First of all their birth rate is reasonably lower than that of their Muslim country fellows. Muslim counties, first of all Arab fundamentalists, like Saudi Arabia, have been engaged in the entire Yugoslavia affairs since late 1980ies, with the rise of the political freedom and liberal democracy, after Tito’s death. For these states BiH, KiM and Macedonia appear a very convenient platzdarm of Islam in Europe. We note that although there is a large Muslim population in Western Europe, as more or less recent immigrants (Gastarbeiters), they are not concentrated in particular compact regions and are not yet threats for the host countries as possible agents of secession. Their interference with the domestic way of life and culture generally appears mainly restricted to the social domain. The problem with Muslim population in Europe is less in the very religious sphere, but predominantly in the way of life their religion imposes. Moreover, the latter is less determined by theological dogmas, but by the physical environment in the region where the new religion arose. This happened to be the Arabic peninsular, which in its turn happened to be a semi desert. Islam appears essentially nomadic religion, originated and practiced in tents, rather than in houses and towns. All religious rules are determined by this circumstance. To get an impression of this way of life, one best imagines the Gypsy (nomadic) population in Europe until recent times (say, second half of the last century). The poor health and bad educational conditions dictated the high birthrate, otherwise the population would have disappeared for the high morality. When the overall conditions improved, (mainly due to the Western advances in the medical care sector), this advance has resulted in the overall demographic explosion, we witness in the Islamic countries today. One might argue that the Albanian high birth rate was caused by their historical isolation and ensuing retardation, but this has been caused, in its turn, by the difference in religious practices and accompanying way of life. Though rarely discussed openly, the issue of the ethical questions related to the abortion, have little to do with religious dogmas, but much more with the struggle for dominance, between the world churches. All controversies concerning the exact instance of a fetus becoming a (human) being and thus acquiring the right to live, are only masque for much more mundane background: the struggle for proliferation of their own flock. Holy Father would have nothing against abortion among Muslims, for instance, on the contrary, but forbids strongly this practice within his congregation. And vice versa. It is for these religious reasons western governments are suspicious regarding their Muslim citizens. They are well aware it is a biological warfare that is going on, but nobody dares to admit it openly. In the face of the religious and cultural inferiority of their Islamic followers, Muslim leaders, particularly the clergy, resort s to the only weapon where they appear superior - to the human proliferation. Whence outnumbered by the domestic Muslims, the western countries will succumb to the human tide. USA respond If the Islamic offensive appears slow and behind the scene, USA response is both explicit and hypocritical. Appearing as an Israeli vassal for all practical purposes, USA government is eager to convince the Muslim part of the mankind they have nothing against Islam as such. They are siding Israel just for the sake of its right to exist, not because they prefer the Israelis to Arabs. And the best (if not the only) proof of this assertion is USA support for the Islamic population on Balkan. 1
1
As on would put it, USA appear a blood donor volunteer of somebody else’s blood.
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First in BiH, and then on KiM. As a result, Balkan countries, like Serbia, will pay the bill of the Israel protection by USA. Of course, there are other motives for supporting Albanians on Balkan, first of all as servile population, ready to sell the independence and national pride for supplying USA with military bases. Albania and KiM have become USA sea carriers on the European ocean. True, USA have already put the foot on European land via NATO, but with counties like Albania, they do not have to worry about the domestic resistance to USA march for domination. Albania and KiM has thus become a stronghold of the USA world strategic web. In this respect, Albanians turn out a Trojan horse within European fortress (sic). Hence, one may well expect a most fierce resistance to solving Albanian question from USA side. It is for this reason, too, that the interference of the external factor should be kept at the minimum. One of the potentially most effective way would be to direct the prospective ”advisers” and ”patrons” to the Middle East and propose that these peace-giving friends prove themselves in resolving the Palestinian question, that is the regional crisis caused by founding the Jewish state of Israel. When affirming themselves by providing the durable peace in the Middle East, USA and any other peace-bringing candidate, may expect to be invited to interfere the Balkan affairs. The role of Albania This will surely be both decisive and abstinent. Albania has been keeping low profile ever since the KM crisis arose in its acute form, pretending she had nothing to do with the Shqiptar dissatisfactions and rebellions in Yugoslavia. Her role resembles much that played by USSR during the World War 2, when Stalin turned down all proposals from the west allies to help settling down the Yugoslav disputes, that is the mutual animosities and fighting between Draža Mihailović’s chetniks and Tito’s partisans. Allies were well aware that Tito was an exponent of USSR in Yugoslavia, whose role was to impose communist regime after the war. Tito used to send daily reports to Stalin on the Balkan situation and after Red Army pushed German Wermacht from Yugoslavia, Tito took over the control over the country, never to abandon it. As we mentioned before, Albania used to supply the KiM rebels with all necessary equipment, including four buildings where Albanian surgeons used to take out organs from Serbian captives, to be sold to foreign clinics (mainly in Turkey). Albania provided ground for the military training camps for KLA (organized and supported by Germany). The affair with the organs trade was one of rare occasions when the Albanian involvement was explicate and, what was even more important, recognized by the IC, in particular by the Tribunal officials. This involvement will show up in ever more details, but at the beginning the fact already revealed were sufficient Serbia to accuse Albania for interfering her internal affairs. We note here that BiH officials accused Serbia for the same interference, although they had no hard evidence for that. But the IC was rightly convinced, by the circumstantial evidence, Serbia was engaged on the side of Bosnian Serbs during the fighting there. By the same token, Serbia should have made use of the occasion of Albania being caught in flagranti to expose the international engagement over KiM, in particular that of USA and Germany. Albanian leaders restrict their involvement to giving occasionally moral and political support to their compatriots living in the neighbouring countries, but never admitted they were engaged themselves in the Albanian activities outside Albania. All this is, of course, understandable, even acceptable from a general point of view and every other country would do the same in such a situation. What makes the Albanian question essentially different from other disputes in the region, however, is not the momentous situation, but the process which is going on, as we have been elaborating above. It is the role of time bomb which makes the question both important and acute. In such a situation no player in the region may expect to be ignored, or excused. Hence, one may expect that an axis Washington-Tirana will try to block any attempt to resolve this abnormal and potentially disastrous situation. What are the chances this expected hindrance to be
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overcome? From the Albanian side one may surely expect to push further the politics of the demographic expansion. This syndrom of “nation in nascent state” has been well known in the region. We mention the case of Croatia, which has been desperately trying to increase the number of Croats in the region, so as to match the Serbian rival. This increase was realized partly during the regime of Ustashas in the World War 2, when a large number of Greek Orthodox Serbs was forced to convert into Roman-Catholic, that is into Croats. Another rout to the “big nation” was proclaiming Bosnian and Herzegovian Muslims as Croats. We mentioned similar politics adopted by Albanians in Albania and the surrounding regions. All national minorities in Albania have been proclaimed Albanians and practically deprived of their native language in public. Conversions of Serbs on KiM into Muslims, practically into Albanians, during the Turkish rule, have been already considered earlier. Albania evidently seeks to catch up with the neighbouring countries, Serbia and Greece in particular, at least as the population multitude is concerned. The peculiarity of this endeavour is not in its motivation, but in means. The battle field has been shifted from warfare to bed. The stratagem: make the child in the evening and submit the bill to the host country in the morning, has been so far very successful, indeed. Now that the goal has been almost achieved (hopefully), Albanians want to harvest the fruit of their battles. They require the territories they inhabited with the majoritarian population. Albania turns out to play a domino game with the neighbours. One by one, at the time. It is that stratagem which will determine the tactics of avoiding any considerations concerning the national expansion at the expense of the neighbouring countries. And it is USA Albanians rely on the most in this enterprise. The question arises: is it a winning strategy? Not necessarily. The power of powerless There is always a priest above priest. Serbian proverb We have seen that KiM issue has much broader implications from a local dispute over land. It appears a generic polygon for a number of far reaching projects. The focus of these projects lies in Israel. Albanian case, in Particular KiM affair, turns out to mirror the more dangerous Middle East crisis. It is for that reason the Albanian question must be resolved in a sufficiently just manner, for any solution will have serious, perhaps fatal, repercussion on the global stage and in the near future. KiM issue complicated as it is will never give rise to World War 3, but Middle East crisis might do. One the world becomes aware of this, it will look at the Balkan with different eye. To occupy a land and deprive the local inhabitants from their rights would be a very dangerous precedent indeed. The role of USA, as a shock force for somebody else interests, has already been recognized by her citizens. It is the tension along the line USA government (including other representative institutions) from one side and the USA taxi payers, which will turn decisive in getting free USA of her vassal status. And when this has been achieved, USA citizens will have the final word about foreign politics of their officials. When the humiliating status of vassal state becomes public in USA and world, USA citizens will realize that their officials have no power to provide independence to any country in the world, as a gift, since USA themselves are not independent. They may occupy Afghanistan, Iraq, KiM etc but all they can do is to impose quisling governments there, and pretend they have made service to the world justice, peace, etc. At the moment, USA is just another state of the Greater Israel, together with the “Occupied Territories” (Cisjordania, Gaza and Golan Heights). The Israelis refer to Americans with derision, with good reason. Sunday, 01 February 2009 ”Another Israeli spokeswoman, Tzipora Menache, stated that she was not worried about
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negative ramifications the Israeli onslaught on Gaza might have on the way the Obama administration would view Israel. She said ‘You know very well, and the stupid Americans know equally well, that we control their government, irrespective of who sits in the White House. You see, I know it and you know it that no American president can be in a position to challenge us even if we do the unthinkable. What can they (Americans) do to us? We control Congress, we control the media, we control show biz, and we control everything in America. In America you can criticize God, but you can’t criticize Israel.” As simple as that. Hence, the difference between West Bank Palestinians and USA citizens is that the former may state they have been occupied, whereas the latter may not. Serbia and local KiM solution It may seem absurd, but the local solution appears more complex to achieve than the regional one, considered above. For many reasons. We shall elaborate this point in some detail now. Which Serbia? One of the necessary prerequisites for a state to solve a problem is that the state exists. Is this premise met by what is called now Serbia? We shall argue that there is no such an entity as State of Serbia. As we have elaborated before, Serbia has not met three essentially important qualities to pretend to be a state. First, it has no definite borders. Her border with BiH, more precisely with Republika Srpska, along River Drina, appears a formal line of division, with more geographical than administrative significance. People cross the border without any control. It was across that “border” that some at least 30.000 rifles have been carried in 1995, during the “refugees” wave from Republika Srpska Krajina and Republika Srpska. Border with Montenegro is equally “soft”, though a sort of custom control does exist. As for the line dividing KiM from the rest of Serbia, it has been from 1999 onwards a strange hybrid of an interstate and intrastate boundary. People from the Central Serbia cross the boundary freely when going to the Northern KiM, inhabited and controlled by Serbs. Similarly, Shqiptars form the South-East Serbia move more or less freely to KiM and vice versa. Altogether, Serbia remains just a geographical entity, as far as her boundaries are concerned. The most crucial border line appears that between Albania and Serbia. Since the later has no control over the border, and the Belgrade government pretends that the line between KiM and the rest of Serbia is just of provisory administrative boundary and is thus ill controlled, a strange situation may be envisaged regarding the penetrability of the Serbian territory. Namely, somebody may enter Albania via the Adriatic Sea, cross the border with KiM, and then easily reach Belgrade without being checked for visa and passport at all. Second, each state must have her citizens, with a definite citizenship. Who are these in Serbia? The autochthonous population has been pushed down by the western incomers, as described earlier. The latter have occupied the most important positions in the state and society, by “serbing”and other demagogic means. Many citizens of Republika Srpska are at the same time citizens of Serbia (the opposite does not hold). They are even MP in Belgrade Assembly, protecting interests of Republika Srpska vis a vis Serbian ones. Situation with Montenegrins appears even weirder indeed. The notion of Montenegrin is fluid in many respects. He/she is a Montenegrin in Montenegro (unless he appears to be a member of the Serb party in Montenegro), Serb when in Serbia (possibly Croat in Croatia) etc. For some Montenegrin is not an ethnical designation, but merely a geographical (regional) origin. If the latter definition I adopted, then it is estimated that there are more Montenegrins living in Serbia than in Montenegro (c. 600.000). In particular there are more Montenegrins in Belgrade than in Montenegro capital Podgorica. Since they occupy high positions in the Serbian society, in all sectors, no wonder they protect Montenegrin interests whenever they collide with Serbian ones. For instance, Montenegrin students, very numerous in Belgrade, are
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exempted from paying university fees, unlike students from other countries (the same holds, of course, for the students from Republika Srpska and Serbs from Croatia). When Montenegro separated from Serbia two years ago, the question of the university fees was raised in Serbia, but was played down by officials quickly. Many Serbian citizens register their cars in Montenegro, where the taxes are symbolically low and thus avoid paying tax to Serbia, whose infrastructure they are using. This criminal situation was brought to the public attention, but has not yet been resolved. The point is that many of the members of government are Montenegrins, at least of the second generation. On the other hand, after the separation (and even before) Serbs found they were not persona grata in Montenegro. Many sold their property in Montenegro for that reason, at underrated price. Serbia found herself to have a substantial proportion of citizens who are not loyal to her, but prefer their tribal kinship interests. When we consider the interest of Serbia concerning KIM and Albanian question, this circumstance will prove of utmost importance. We pass now to the third state prerogative, the sovereignty of the country. This is the question of the existence of the control over territory and population in it. Who controls Serbia? That Belgrade government was not in control of KiM longtime before the occupation in 1999 was an evident fact, which calls for no explanation. But the situation is even more complex than the mere lost of a territory. As we mentioned before, when the so-called refugees from BiH and Croatia came to Serbia in 1995, they brought in with them an arsenal of weaponry, rivaling the equipment of the regular Serbian army. Those Ijekavians constitute, together with their compatriots in filtrated into each pore of the Serbian society, a state in a state. It is for that reason Mladic and other war criminals from over Drina would never be arrested and delivered to the Hague Tribunal. Murder of Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic was a telling warning what will happen if somebody attempts to interfere with the Ijekavian affairs in Serbia. Note that an army of around 30.000 armed newcomers can easily withstand a conflict with the armed forces of the host country, even if we disregard that the officers of the latter are predominantly Dinaroids themselves. We note that it is not just the matter of numbers and mentality. Those Dinaroids have their own political party, disguised as Serb Radical Party of Vojislav Šešelj. Well organized, strongly motivated, aggressive, violent, imposing, ruthless, those Dinaroids appear like a predator among the host prey. The latter appear defenseless against these highlanders, determined to make of Serbia their new homeland and turn the country which hardly managed to achieve the European civilization level, into Bosnian-Turkish casaba. What they are doing successfully, indeed. Before passing to the KiM issue and Serbian interests involved, we note, in view of the above situation, that in retrospect one can appreciate better the recent history of the intra-Yugoslav conflicts, in particular in Croatia and BiH. Not only that Serbia interfered with the business of regions which were populated by Orthodox population, but this interference was unavoidable, regarding the ethnical constitution of the Serbian rulers. But most importantly, the above considerations shad the light on the mutual relations along the line Serbia-Orthodox population over river Drina. The orthodox opinion that it was Serbia who controlled Serbs in those regions outside Serbia appears not only false, but cynical. It was those Dinaroids there who controlled Serbia and who dragged her into their regional disputes with Muslim and Croat neighbours. Now that they lost the battle, they have moved to Serbia to compensate their loss by subduing country they used to make use of for the last two decades. And when (former) Gen. Mladic lines up the staff of a caserne in Serbia he used to “hide” in, and threatens to exterminate potential traitors “up to fourth generation”, the humiliation of former proud state of Serbia is complete. Finally, we note that non-Serb citizens in Vojvodina appear a civilized, loyal population. 1 As for the Shqiptars living in those counties adjacent to KiM, their behaviour becomes ever more arrogant as the KiM slips away of the Belgrade control. Their local leaders, including Serbian Assembly 1
Hungarian population just after WW2 was almost as numerous as was Shiptar population on KiM.
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MPs, keep USA flag, together with Albanian one, on their desks, without the flag of Serbia. When asked in an interview in which country he lived, Riza Halimi, Shqiptar MP, replied “In Preshevo Valley”. 1 What to do with KiM? This has been the pending question since Serbia regained KiM in1912. It was clear from the beginning that with the territory, which used to be the core of Serbian nation, Serbia got a numerous unfriendly Shqiptar population. Many plans to sole the problem have been proposed since, including a preliminary agreement with Turkey to accept this Muslim population, which Turkey herself settled onto KiM. Some less human solutions have been put forward by (nonSerbian) individuals, likeVaso Čubrilović, as discussed earlier. With the rapid increase of the Shqiptar population, the crisis grew to the proportion that slipped from the control. The question arose then: what are realistic interests of Serbia regarding KiM? Which one of many possible options are the best for the Serbian state? Let us enumerate some of them, before considering the optimal choice, from the Serbian point of view. But before we start rolling uphill Sisif’s stone, let us see if there has been precedence to the KiM issue in the Western history. And we turn again to the case of Israel. Palestine and Kosovo – a parallel As we noted before, there are many striking similarities between Israel and Serbian history, including overtones, that it pays off to make an overview of Palestinian and Shqiptar issues. Although the question as to the origin of Jewish nation has not yet been answered satisfactorily, 2 some of convincing explanations do emerge after many scholars have studied available evidence. Proto-Israelis seem to have been a highlanders population, inhabiting what is today Cisjordania, where Palestinians live today. Somewhen around 13-th c.BC they occupied somehow the lowland, to be called later Israel. Proto-Palestinians seem to have come from Greek regions to Gaza strip, known in the Bible as Philistines. What happened to the autochthonous Canaanites and the neighbouring Phoenicians is still a mystery, in particular to concerning possible mixing with protoIsraelis. After the destruction of the Second Temple (70 AD) and particularly after the abortive rebellion under Bar Kosba (132 AD), Palestinian Jews migrated towards West, mainly to Europe, forming what is called today Diaspora. At the end of 19th century, following the founding of the Zionist movement, world Diaspora started to realize the great national project of returning to “Holy Land”, that is then Palestine. By buying land, pressure, terrorism and other legal and illegal means, Jews managed to acquire a big part of the former Israel, which is now the state of Israel, with the Occupied Territories. Ironically, Palestinians proper and Israeli Jews have exchanged their territories, relative to what they inhabited in the past. Though condemned by UN, Israel retains the lands she occupied in 1967. Palestinians have been pushed to refugee camps in the neighbouring countries, and inhabited also the Occupied Territories. Since then they are under control of the Jerusalem and by their quisling governments. Israel wants neither to annex the occupied territories, nor to let them free. The reason for the first rejection is the high birth rate of (Muslim) Palestinians, who would soon outnumber Jewish population in a state which has been from the start declared to be exclusively Jewish. In fact, together with Albania, Israel is the only racial state today. In order to prevent terrorist actions for liberation of Palestine, Israel has erected the wall delineating the Palestinian and Jewish inhabited lands. Both Western Coast and Gaza appear today as two enormous concentration camps, despite the revolt of the world public and UN decisions on the matter. 3 The name given by Shiptars to the entire region. See, e.g. Israël Finkelstein, Neil Asher Silberman, La Bible Devoile, , Bayard, 2002, Paris; The Bible Unearthed, The Free Press, New York, 2001 1 2
3
We note that SC accepted mentioning Palestinian state, besides Israel, on March 12, 2002, on the USA initiative!
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When Slavs moved into Byzantine controlled Balkan lands inhabited mainly by Illyrs, the latter retreated to the Dinaric mountainous region and the lowland of modern Albania. Those of Illyrs living on what is today Montenegro and Herzegovina were assimilated by the Slavs and become Slavo-phonic, whereas those in Albania retained, presumably, Illyric language, though there is no reliable evidence for this claim, as we mentioned before. In 17th century Albanians moved from the mountainous Northern Albania into today KiM. This process resembled what was described in the Bible as Joshua’s conquest of Canaan, followed by later gradual infiltration into the Canaanite society. Now, in view of the current political demands and conveniences, both Albania and Israel strive to (re)interpret the (pre)historic events. Albanians claim to be the most autochthonous population in this part of World, rejecting any possibility to have come from the other areas, like Dacia or Caucasus Mountains. Similarly, Israelis renounce those parts of the Bible, which describe their occupation of Canaan, like the Book of Exodus. Albanians do not recognize the migration wave from Albania to KiM following the abortive uprising against Ottoman Empire in 1690, just as Israelis deny Joshua’s exploits after Exodus. There is no archeological evidence of Hebrew presence in Palestine during the “biblical fathers” period (Abraham, Isaac and Jacob), as there is no archeological evidence about Illyric presence on KiM before Slavs arrived in 7th century AD. But the similarity stops here. Israelis did have their state in Palestine, what has been substantiated by the historical and archeological evidence. Contrary to that, Albanians have nothing to do with KiM land, which has never been a part of any kind of Illyrian state in the known history (even if one accepts the claims for the Illyrian origin). Their claims on ”ancestral soil” has as much meaning as eventual Europeans’ claims on the South African lands, which is considered to be the cradle of Homo sapiens. At present, Israelis have no insurmountable troubles with West Bank Palestinians, but they do have an unsolvable problem with the Palestinians who have remained in the Israel proper. Similarly, those Shqiptars who inhabit Serbia outside KiM appear the principal concern to Serbia, though it does not seem Belgrade politicians are aware of that. We mention here that just as Serbian government tried at time to settle “Shqiptar question” by making an agreement with Turkey, as we mentioned before, Israel is trying to solve the “Palestinian question” by moving them from Palestine to the neigbouring countries, like Egypt, as noted above. 1 Which solutions? The [W. Pauli’s] idea is crazy, but not sufficiently crazy to be true. Niels Bohr After this digression, we return to the Gordian knot of KiM. Which one of many possible options are the best for the Serbian state? Let us enumerate some of them, before considering the optimal choice, from the Serbian point of view. Doing nothing This the strategy Belgrade authorities have pursued vigorously for the last half century or so. In fact, on a broader scale, faced with the task of solving nonpolitical problem by political means, Belgrade policy oscillated between two extremes: radical (unrealistic) projects and laisser pass. After Tito’s death, no Belgrade politician felt obliged or strong enough to opt for a sustainable solution. It used to be left to the next generation and so on. KiM was considered rightly to be a time We note here how by a twist of history Israelis have turned the perennial “Jewish question” into the present day “Palestinian question”. 1
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bomb and one just expected it to explode after his mandate was over. The point was that that bomb was in the courtyard of Yugoslavia and the first steps the other republics took were to abandon the federal state. The last to do so was Montenegro, two years ago, without providing any reasonable explanation for that move. Thus the bomb was left to Serbia to cope with. And after a couple of dress rehearsals in 1968 and 1981, the bomb blasted in 1998. After the occupation in 1999 and independence declaration in 2008, with the quisling local government at Priština, Belgrade continued to mock the diplomatic activities, appealing to other states not to recognize Kosovo state. But this activity has been more devoted to the domestic stage, where the mock-patriotic ultra-right parties {sic), like SRP are trying to cease the power via the loss of KiM. The latter tactic is not unreasonable, since it was after Kumanovo capitulation Zoran Djindjic threw down Milošević the Loser. The pivotal column of the Belgrade strategy (sic) has been the famous SC Resolution 1244. But even this has never been used as a practical tool for achieving a measurable result. According to Resolution, Serbia had right to implement a restricted army force into KiM, what has never been done, not even attempted to. Further, according to the same Resolution, the final status of KiM was to be decided by ”the free will” of its inhabitants. This referendum has never been carried out, not even mentioned by either side involved. The reason for that lays in the fact that such a referendum would reveal the singular situation on KiM, where not even the most fundamental attributes of a civilized society were present, like the census. After the road to the secession was adopted, EU and other institutions declared the sacrosanct rule: first standards and then status. The declared goal was to make of KiM a civilized society, which would provide a reasonable security to all ethnic groups within the region. One of the most conspicuous sign that such a state has been achieved would be the absence of barbed wires, surrounding non-Shqiptar enclaves, then the free movements of all population etc. It became clear, however, from the very start, that such a state belongs to the realm of political fiction, and not to foreseeable reality. Once this has been realized, it was clear that fulfilling standards before status would mean an indefinite prolongation of the “transient state”, and thus freezing the problem. Hence, the demand “standard before status” has been vigorously forgotten and the declaration of independence promulgated and accepted. Thus, the tactics of “doing nothing” has been accepted by all sides involved: Belgrade, Brussels and Priština. KiM has been left as wreckage floating on the Balkan pond. (b) Doing something That KiM is a time bomb has been used as a trump by all sides involved, but different solutions have been offered in order to dismantle it. This was a very convincing arguments, forwarded by Priština politicians, albeit implicitly, in dialogue with Belgrade. The enormous birthrate has been used, almost openly, as blackmail, arguing that it would be in the interest of Serbia to get rid of KiM. Cynical as it may sound, but the same argument was adopted by a number of Serbian prominent individuals, as a sign of desperation. The arguments go as follows: It has been estimated that by 2030 Shqiptars will constitute over 50% of the overall population (7.200.000 Shqiptars, versus 6.300.000 Serbs). If Serbia pretends to be a democratic society, with one person one vote rule, then by the middle of 21st century the country will be controlled by Shqiptars. The argument appears sound, but the numbers must be taken with caution. 50 % of population does not imply 50 % of votes, in the situation when enormous majority of the fast proliferating population appears adolescent. 1 In mid 90-ties the president of Serbian Academy of Science and Arts, Aleksandar Despić, proposed a debate on the KiM, suggesting that Serbia better let Shqiptars swallow KiM, but the rest of Serbia would escape this fate. Nobody in Serbia lifted that glove Despić threw to the public scene. After that the former president of Yugoslavia in 1992, the writer Dobrica Ćosić, proposed a division of KiM. He was criticized by some circles in Serbia 1
It was partly for this fact that the Referendum mentioned before has never been carried out on KiM.
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for trading the ”sacred land”. The problem with this kind of solution appears not so much psychological, but technical. There is no way to divide KiM into two “natural parts”, since the population appears strongly mixed. The irony of the plan like this is that that part of the KiM, namely Metohia, which appears densely packed with Serb orthodox shrines is predominantly populated by Shqiptars. This region adjacent to neighbouring Albania, which was first occupied by the Albanian immigration wave since 1690, has been densely packed by monasteries, churches etc (as we mentioned before, the very name Metohia means monastery estate- metoh in Greek). With Pećka Patrijaršija, Prizren and other medieval religious and historical places, Metohia appears the core of the hart of Serbia. Within this frame of division ideal solution from Serbian point of view, would be an evacuation of Shqiptar population from Metohia. Not only the historical sites would remain in Serbia, but the rest of Shqiptar population would be cut off from their homeland and thus better controlled. Another subproject within the division stratagem, which was put forward by Nebojša Čović, former chairman of a board for KiM in Belgrade governments, was based on non-compact ethnically pure regions. Those parts with majority of non-Shqiptar population would be run by Belgrade and the rest by Priština. But such a solution would not last for long. In a short time Shqiptar population will become majoritarian one in every place and one thus returns to square one. KiM would be a collection of small KiM-s, but the geometrical delineation never solves human problems. No separation without “ethnical cleansing” can provide a long-term stable situation. Doing Something In a case when situation on the spot changes significantly, doing nothing is the worst of all approaches. Radical solutions, like those enumerated above, would solve, a least partially, the problem, but they appear unrealistic. Here we consider some even more radical approaches. The standard wisdom that if less radical solution are unrealistic, the more radical seem to be the more so. But politics is not, unfortunately or fortunately, pure logic. Let us start from the ideal state (from Serbian vantage point): that is KiM without Shqiptars. (Nota bene – not without non-Serbs). This could, in principle, be achieved by massive exodus. We make parallel here again the Hebrew syndrom, more precisely with Exodus. 1 Hebrews came to Egypt as guests, multiplied and then ran away without Egyptian land. Albanians came to Serbia, multiplied and then ran away, but together with the Serbian soil. After 1948, more than million Palestinians ran away from Palestine soil and are still in the status of refugees. Those Shqiptars who ran away from KiM in 1999 were returned to KIM by force, escaping, unlike Palestinians, the fate of refugees. In both parallel situations, it was the extraordinary birth rate which caused massive perturbations within the areas. If this phenomenon could be suppressed to a reasonable level, not only the fair solution could be reached, but the situation would be improved to the level when there will be no ethnical tension. The technical tool would be, of course, the family planning. If the number of kids per family is fixed to one, as it is the case with China, then in a reasonable time the negative natality would automatically remove all troubles linked with the demographic misbalance. Whether this planning should be imposed to all ethnical groups in KiM, or just to those fast-breeding subgroups, depends on the willingness of non-Serb population to be subjected to this “demographical remedy”. (We note that on KiM it was Roma population who participated in the uncontrolled growth, too). But the strict, ethnically neutral regulation would be more acceptable to the world opinion. Once Shqiptar population reaches it previous demographic level and become minoritarian group, all troubles with such a population will be reduced to the normal level (as Serbia has with other minorities). Not only they would be automatically discouraged from violence, but within the 1
As usually, we refer to the biblical narrative, not to the history.
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normal population growth young generations can be made civilized and satisfied. This in its own turn will make young Shqiptars feel on equal footing with the surrounding nations and eliminate to a great extent the inferiority complex, which lies at the bottom of all troubles Albanians experience with their neighbours (on Balkan and elsewhere). What implies in its turn, that such an approach must be agreed by all sides involved on the spot, without interference from outside. No imposed solution will ever be operative, as the case with BiH illustrates. Since the “Albanian question” is biological one, the solution must be found within the game-theory, rather than by standard political means. Only counter-biological measures can stop biological aggression. But to implement any kind of measures, one must first have a political control over the disputed territory. And it is the political problem. Everything we considered for the sustainable solution on KiM was based on the “initial conditions” which existed before the NATO aggression. One of the most natural approach to assessing the KiM problem would be to restore the situation which existed, say, in1997, that is even before the international “supervoisers” stepped on the Serbian soil. At that time Serbia regained control over her southern province. No massacres, no exodus, no forced massive movements etc. But, the question arises, who should restore the previous situation? KLA was shattered by Serbian forces and there was nobody to be a serious threat to the legal state authorities. With KLA turned into a legal military and police forces, re-establishing the previous state would imply bloody fighting. Serbia already lost many lives of her citizens in 1997/8 fighting the rebels, organized and supported by western allies, in particular USA and Germany. The latter fact offers the answer itself: it would be the task of the same, now occupying forces, to disarm and dismantle present illegal Shqiptar forces. This would not be an easy task, for sure, but it is the price to pay for interfering somebody else’s affairs. Not improbably, KiM would turn into Balkan Iraq, or rather Afghanistan. One additional gain of such scenario would be the experience the present KiM occupiers would gain in fighting guerrillas forces, the experience Serbians already had. The forces which make use of the civilians as a shield against legal state police. After cleaning the area from the illegal forces, and restoring Serbian control, the next step would be “Palestinization”of KiM. That is, an impenetrable border around KIM, both from central-Serbian and non-Serbian sides. In the case of the West Bank, it consists of the Wall (of separation) and the strongly controlled border with Jordan (along Jordan River). The role of the present occupation forces would be the same as the role of Israeli forces in the West Bank – to ensure the peace and order on the spot, until the normal pre-was situation is achieved. The present day UNMIK military spots would serve as Israeli “settlements” in West Bank, with a number of them placed within the non-Shqiptar enclaves, as the primary protection forces. To make the parallel with West Bank situation complete, KiM could be treated under circumstances as a separate state. Thus, the Province could have her representatives at the Olympic Games and sport organizations in general. UN humanitarian organizations would be engaged in helping the citizens emancipate, in particular concerning family planning, women rights, blood feud, the rule of law, etc. After this transient phase, once the normal, pre-war situation is achieved, all non-Serbian military presence would cease and Serbia would regain KiM as the integral part, as before the rebellion. What is of even greater significance, this would restore the UN as an international organization in its full, original capacity of keeping piece and order within its international community. At present, UN appear nothing but an occasional tool for Western Allies, lead by their (Near East) boss. Before we move on, another alternative solution should be mentioned, at least for the sake of completeness. Instead of forcing the family planning and reduction of the fast-breeding population, one may try with the massive displacement. As in the case of Palestinians in Cisjordania, an agreement with Albania may be offered to accept a substantial part of Shqiptars and make Albania, their county of origin, their home, just as Israel is considering “selling” Palestinians to Egypt, for instance. Such a solution (or “solution”) suffers, however, from a number of deficiencies. One is of
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the ethical nature, for surely such massive moves invoke the cursed “ethnical cleansing”, understandably unpopular among politicians. Second, more practical reason is the material compensation for the estate the displaced population would leave on KiM. Since it is quite improbable that USA taxi payers would finance such an exodus (unlike that proposed by Israeli government), and in the absence of an organization like USA Evangelistic church, which finances settling Jews from allover world into Israel, it would be Serbian government responsible for compensating the Shqiptar material losses. But another instance, pertinent to this kind of solution, appears even more important, that of the responsibility of Serbia herself. We considered above the vagueness of determining Serbia as a state. Our “ideal solutions” refered not only to the reality of achieving a particular solution, but also to the mess which Serbia has found herself in, regarding her sovereignty. We emphasized the presence of the tribal mentality and ethics which Dinaroids have brought in, which precludes every civilized resolution of the KiM issue. Banishing Shqiptars from Serbia would prove, in retrospect, that Serbia never accepted Shqiptars as her proper citizens. In fact, current Belgrade politics (sic) proves it on a daily scale. Belgrade officials keep on demanding that “Serb rights” (note been, not Serbians’ rights”) are to be protected, as if Shqiptars are not Serbians. Stupid? Not necessarily. More probable is interpretation that it is that dinaric tribal mentality, which has not superseded the tribal world outlook. They can thing only in terms of “ours” versus “theirs”. The bloody fighting in Croatia and especially in BiH, where this mentality has expressed itself without any restrain, illustrates the fatal nature of the traditional society mind. Mentality from the prehistoric phase of “hunters and gatherers”, who had no permanent settlements and therefore did not need the concept of state, but only the concept of blood kinship. It is this attitude which enabled the Shqiptars (and Albanians altogether) to impose their interpretation of the KiM issue as a fight of two ethnicities over a territory, and not as rebellion of a subpopulation within a sovereign state. Tat makes the case of Serbia doubly handicapped. A unique case in the history that a state, internally occupied, fights for liberating a part of her territory from an external occupation. The only consolation to the autochthonous Serbian population is that the external occupation was done by a vassal state, which made of KiM her own vassal territory, with the quisling government. The central figure of this entire mess is USA taxpayer, who, in all probability, will never become aware of this. And thus we return to square one. The preference of the family planning scheme over displacement variant has much greater significance than the mere technical advantage. In the former case it would mean solving an “uncivilized” problem by uncivilized means. In the case of family planning the “prehistoric issue” would be resolved by the historical (civilized) means, what would, at the same time, mean a cultural advance within the region, which could not be overestimated. Otherwise, the ”displacement solution” would reduce to one retarded population (Illyric part of the Slav Balkan population) pushing out another Dinaric population (Albanophonic Illyric part) in their perennial struggle over Lebensraum. 1 World overpopulation But solving KiM (and Balkan) fast-breeding problem would have much broader significance from the mere local population misbalance. For the question of the world over-population has been on agenda for centuries, but has been ignored by the decision making political establishment. Not only the misbalance in the natality has already been at the root on the most serious world disturbances, but even under assumption that this has been solved, the overall population rise remains the Damocles sword over the world neck. Many areas of the world have been populated to such extent that according to standard of a century ago, or of some at present reasonably depopulated areas, the world has already crossed the line of human tolerable conditions. To a European around the turn of 1
See our elaborations on Vaso Cubrilovic and Vojislav Šešelj cases above.
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18th century present day living conditions would have certainly appeared intolerable, just it is to us the near-future foreseeable situation, as epitomized by the cult movie “The green Sun”. When crossing the KiM border from any direction, one immediately becomes aware of the overpopulation. To a Japanese Great Britain, an overpopulated country, looks almost like desert. To a Sibiriak, New York with his termite-hive like sky scrapers looks as from other planet. Why is that so? The point is that those decision-making politicians do not live in such human ant-hives, but rather in villas well far away from the crowd (as well illustrated in the already mentioned movie “The green Sun”). To hypocrites who play the role of philanthropists an unpopular family planning regulation appears less profitable than letting things go by themselves. Had they accepted the obligation that every kid in Africa, for instance, must be ensured by the same standards, in every respect, as those Swiss or New Zeeland have, they would surely take a risk of imposing the appropriate measures. The case of China is the case in point. Reasonably educated population will accept any profitable measure. The point is, however, not so much along the line industrialized versus undeveloped country, but essentially male versus female part of the mankind. It is women who suffer from the uncontrolled proliferation of children, women who spend the best part of their life raising children. If one speaks on ”humanitarian catastrophe” in KiM, it can refer of Shqiptar (Muslim) women only. It is this hypocrite cynic that women are “human” when they can serve as a political trump, but not when they are object of male lust and pleasure (not to mention producers of new guns). Ideal solutions 1 – Albanian variants Up to now we have considered possible resolutions of the KiM affairs from the Serbian point of view. We now turn to Albanians and their ideal solutions concerning the Serbian southern province. Solution I. KiM remains under Albanian control and after a transient period all international forces are withdrawn, except, of course, USA military base (Bondsteel). Non-Shqiptar population is expelled from the province and with the Albanians from Albania settling in, KiM becomes ethnically pure. Te next stage will be “Albanization “of the province. Two ways for achieving it may be envisaged. Orthodox churches and monasteries are destroyed. This may be accomplished in a number of ways, each secure from the IC resistance. Incidents, like that of March 17, 2004, may be arranged or provoked and a “spontaneous revolt” of Shqiptars would wipe out any historical presence of nonAlbanians on KiM. We note that such an “historical cleansing” need not necessarily be carried out before the ethnical cleansing, since Shqiptars outside KiM, like those at Preshevo Valley would do the job equally well. Orthodox churches are destroyed, by monasteries (some of them being under the UNESCO protection) would be “Albanized”. Gračanica, Dečani, Bogorodica Ljeviška etc would be proclaimed to be built by Albanians, not by Serbs, and thus part of Albanian history. All toponyms on KiM, villages, towns, rivers, mountains etc would be rebabtisized and given Albanian (“OldIllyric”) names. As for the Preshevo Valley, two possible solutions may be foreseen. Shqiptars from this region adjacent to KiM might be exchanged for non-Shqiptars who still remained on KIM, in the process of ethnical cleansing of KiM.
1
In the sense of maximalistic solution.
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Better solution would be, however, to keep Shqiptars outside KiM, and that successively join those parts with Shqiptar majority to KiM, with the rest waiting the majority to be yet achieved, and the process proceeded (domino effect). Solution II. The present mock independence abolished, KiM joined to Serbia. In 40-50 years Shqiptar become electoral majoritarian population in Serbia, and take over the control over Serbia by voting ballots. We note here that the assumed period of 60-70 years, in fact, conservative one (from the nonShqiptar perspective), since it assumes a passivity of the non-Shqiptar environment in the region. As we saw in the case of the regions where Shqiptar population is already majoritarian one, as on KiM, when the Albanians’ presence becomes noticeable, the neighbouring people start moving away and the process is speeded up, up to the final exponentially fast evacuation. When this is achieved, the entire procedure carried out within the present KiM would be repeated and in a short time Serbia will become ethnically pure, without non-Shqiptars. This solution, of course, takes some time (probably 40-50 years), but, combined with the same strategy relative to the other neighbouring regions in Macedonia, Greece and Montenegro, would eventually bring Albanians to completing their final solution. (Needless to say that the retrospective Albanization of the relevant history of those regions would be carried out, too, just as described for the case of KiM). Now we come to what one might dub realistic solutions. But before starting considering them, let us first make a quick overview of the present day situation in situ. “Independent” Kosovo What the declaration of independence means in political and statistical terms? Out of 192 UN members, 54 states have recognized “Independent Kosovo”. Out of 6.750 million 5.850 of the world population does not recognize Kosovo independence. UNMIK and KFOR, who control at present the region, do not know how many inhabitants there are on KiM. Estimates go from 1.8 to 2.4 million. On the other hand, it has been estimated that (UNDP at Priština) that 460.000 Shqiptars possess weapons on KiM. More than 23.000 Shqiptars are in prison now in 27 states of EU, for dealing with drugs (Interpol, 2008). For the last two years more than 40 fields with marihuana have been detected and destroyed. Priština officials confirm that about 95 % of goods are imported to KiM (valued $3 billion). Unemployment has been estimated to be 72%, with the average wages of €150, and €1.100 GDP. According to UNDP chief Freddy Moring in 2008 “On Kosovo every tenth inhabitant goes to bed hungry”. According to the same source, 53% Kosovo population is poor (about million people), of which 14% extremely so. The standard of Kosovo population appears the same as in African state Togo. 1 After the organization ”Transparency” (Berlin, 2008), KiM occupies fourth place on the list of the world most corrupted states, after Cameroon, Myanmar and Albania. For the last 10 years about 6.880 tombs have been destroyed in Serb graveyards, and 155 churches and monasteries too. About 80 % inhabitants do not pay the electric power, which is more often cut off than not. The traditional electric power exporter, KiM imports it today. (It produces 600 MW, but needs 900 MW). According to reports from October 2008 (OEBS, UNMIK) 88% of counties suffers from the lack of water. Out of over 30 Albanian parties neither has non-Albanian members. 2 What makes a country state is not just the territory, hymn and flag, but the attitude the inhabitants have regarding the overall community On KiM people do not pay tax, water, electricity etc. Only 1 2
This is not surprising, since both states, in all probability, share similar birthrate. All data taken from “Politika”, March 27, 2009.
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20 % of the electric power used is paid (mainly by the big organizations, like UNMIK), whereas the rest is used freely. Out of those 80 %, 6 % goes to Serbs. The latter justify there nonpaying by the lack of income, since they have lost their jobs. But the Shqiptar response to the demands to pay appears illustrative. Nonpayers from Mileševo surroundings sent the message to the bill collectors from Prizren: “If you come, we will kill you like rabbits!”. Those from Drenica (notorious core of the Shqiptar nationalism), put it in a somewhat more subtle form: “Don’t do that, or else you will remain on the posts!”. All attempts to impose paying the electricity, including power cut-off, have failed. Serbs rely on the Belgrade help and interventions, whereas Shqiptars on their weaponry. We finish this account by reviewing the situation in the so-called “free (buffer) zone” around KiM, wide 10 km. It has been exposed to permanent raids from KiM side since the very beginning. As a consequence, the local Serb population leaves the area and moves further away. In a recent report from a county 6 villages have been totally abandoned, with the rest in the state of being evacuated. Organized wood cutting has been reported by the local police. Shqiptars come in from KiM, with armed escorts, and when the police appears either run away, or open fire on the Serbian police. The entire area appears devastated by this way. That this happens with (tacit?) agreement with the KiM police is evident from the lack of any cooperation from KiM side. One has to be naïve indeed to consider all this a spontaneous series of events, in particular knowing the famous Turkish tactics of bashibosuks, who used to make permanent raids across the borders with Christian states. Having devastated the land and expelled the local population, Turkey simply moved her borders forwards (domino effect). It is exactly the tactics KiM Shqiptars are employing in banishing the local nonShqiptar population from KiM, as we elaborated before. As for non-Shqiptars within the KiM borders, there is no need to rush. They have been squeezed in their enclaves and deprived of the production possibilities condemned to die out. Situation resembles the python encircling the pray and squeezing his deadly grip makes the victim lose its breath and die. Those who do not want to wait for such an end sell their estate and move away. Cynical solution 1 Of that even gods are deprived - to make not to have happened that has happened. Agathon Many observers or participants, who otherwise are sympathetic to “Serbian cause” or pretend to be so, usually refer to the famous “political reality”. Shqiptars are there, Serbs have lost the battle and that’s it. Any attempt to change the situation, what they see as a return to the previous one, would be, according to them, a trial to turn the wheel of history back, and that’s impossible. But even if this interpretation is correct, would something like this be really impossible. In particular, even if we recognize that to turn the history back, does this prevent the other side to make use of the same tactics to recover the previous status of KiM. Of course, this would not turn the history back, but would retrace the same logic by which KiM was torn out from Serbia. The scenario would be the following. Non-Shqiptar part of KiM population performs an insurgence, with a help from outside (mainly from the rest of Serbia). Women, children, elderly people are killed, massacres are reported by the world media … Humanitarian organizations are stunned, they appeal for stopping the humanitarian catastrophe (in particular Shqiptar NGO are prominent in that), UN send first supervising teams, lead by some expert for ethnical cleansing, like gen. Walker 2 and then peace forces. Finally, since the latter appear incapable of stopping the massacres, international forces are brought in and they occupy the province. The latter is then 1 2
Cynical parts of the scenario are written in italic. Note that the original meaning of walker was a traveling cloth cleaning man.
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returned to the mother country, Serbia. Serbian forces push the remaining Shqiptars out, return nonShqiptar back to their homes on KIM and add those Dinaroids recently arrived to Serbia 1 . So the ethnical balance is again restored as it was before the Albanian invasion 4 centuries ago. What’s wrong with a solution like this? Nothing, except it would be favourable to Serbia. Just solutions What are, in principle, just solutions and who is entitled to determine, in a concrete situation and impose them? Is it possible to achieve it in KiM affairs? These are the questions one has to tackle before considering particular proposals. In principle, just solution is that which both sides are equally (dis)satisfied. What are criteria for the latter resolution? Both sides sign agreements and then an everlasting peace pops in and everything is fine and durable. But agreements are signed at a particular instance, under a concrete situation. During war in BiH (1991-1995) many agreements were signed and then quickly broken. Dayton agreement turned out more durable, but at present neither side appears satisfied by the arrangement, made under strong pressure from the external agents. There were the layers of agents, acting at Dayton. First USA exerting enormous pressure on Serbia and Croatia. Then the latter forced their representatives to sign the formal agreement, together with Bosnian Muslims, who were considered to be the principal victims in the affair. It is important to note that no permanent international organization like UN appeared as a sponsor of the meeting at Dayton. What implies that the longevity of the agreement depends on the (accidental) external factors. The agreement was imposed, not reached by the sides in conflict. It is the external pressure which will keep the present arrangement last for some time. But even with the proviso that the agreement lasts for a reasonably long period, it can not be taken as an ansatz for solving KiM crisis. In the case of BiH conflicts, one had three sides, whose conflict was based on religious differences. It was not an inter-racial antagonism. Besides, there were sides, that is, conflicting parts of the intra-state population, which were to be treated on equal footing. The later should not be understood as a value judgment, but as the fact that the conflicting sides had different juristic nature (state and a part of state). But even more significant is the fact that the case goes out of a political sphere and appears essentially anthropological issue. In such a case, with heterogeneous participants both regarding the status and nature, any juristic logic (and code) fails. The solution must be sought at a meta-juristic level. That is, must be imposed by force. Whose force? The immediate answer is: by the most powerful external agent. His immediate instrument is USA. But only immediate. The complete command line structure is this: Israel → USA→ EU → Serbia. 2 The external evidence for this command line augments while going from left to right, as indicated by the length of arrows. Hence, a realistic solution reduces simply to the most probable one, under the circumstances. Vae victis (realistic solutions) Predicting is difficult, especially future. N. Bohr. The real question is: What’s the probability that a political action recognizes the biological background of the problem and adopts appropriate measures to resolve the long-standing conflict? We mention that it would not be the first time in history that such an approach was adopted. Two most recent ones, albeit very different, have been witnessed on Euro-Asian continent: By Hitler and Their ancestors came from KiM anyway. Readers will probably find such an explicit subordination chain too risky to display, but after an objective consideration they will find them right.
1 2
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by Chinese leaders. The former concerned Jews and Gypsies (the famous “Final solution”), the latter internal “family planning solution” (which turns out successful, for the time being). We mention one North-American “solution”, that of the “Indian question”, “solved” almost completely by extermination of the endogen population. Of course, one can always find “reasonable solutions”, “common sense solutions” etc. These appear, as expected, more like cosmetic interventions, than durable solutions, which appreciate the essence of the problem. (See, for instance, AppObeg_Kosovo.html). They are concerned more with the peace, rather than with justice and historical logic. But could, in principle, the latter be restored at the present day circumstances? Hardly. For the simple reason: one would have to restore Serbia and then her territorial integrity and historical being. As we have seen above, not only KiM has been occupied, but the rest of Serbia has undergone the same fate. The problem is that these two tasks are mutually entangled. The “internal occupiers “ have been using the KiM issue to fasten their domination over the autochthonous population, by keeping the KiM problem fresh and intact. KiM issue appears a reliable trump in the hands of unscrupulous incomers, just as the case with socalled refugees from the western Balkan, who have long before ceased to be refugees, but have already acquired the status of Serbian citizens., beneficing still the advantages of being “refugees”. With the NGO as the fifth columns and the unofficial army of hundreds thousand armed Ijekavians, Serbia not only has no chance to restore anything she lost, but to restore herself as a political entity. In this respect the KiM issue becomes almost irrelevant. It is a rare instance in the history that a country has lost its identity, without even noticing it. The (imposed) battle between Albanophonic and Slavophonic Dinaroids has been settled down with the former occupying KiM and the latter the rest of Serbia. Concerning the latter we note once again that when Šešelj was incorporated into Milošević’s ruling establishment there arose two parallel policies, including that toward KiM affair. While Milošević was trying to settle the troubles by making use of the legal forces and by calming down the international factors, Šešelj was pursuing exactly the opposite policy. His irregular forces were engaged in a number of atrocities, but even worse was the inspiration his public propaganda made on the local people, who were encouraged to commit atrocities themselves. Realistic solution reduces thus to the laisser fair from Belgrade side and let the time bomb clock ticks, from the Albanian side. Belgrade’s “choice” has turned out a fighting for formal postponement of the recognition of the actual secession, while not taking any real action to recover its sovereignty over the lost province. Surrealistic solution - The myth of eternal return One of the greatest and the longest standing riddles in mathematics was the so-called Fermat last theorem (FLT). The great French (amateur) mathematician (17th century) Pierre de Fermat considered the so-called Diophantine equation, in Arithmetica by Diophant: an + bn = cn, a,b,c, n – natural numbers and stated (1637) that he proved that the equation has no solution for n>2, but he had no space on the margin of the page to prove it. For n = 2 it is Pythagoras’ theorem, of course, with many solutions. After him many most famous mathematicians tried to prove the theorem (some suspected Fermat proved it himself either). Many solutions offered by contemporary mathematicians turned out wrong and the theorem resisted the attacks until recently, when an English mathematician Andrew Wiles claimed he solved it (1995). His claim was disapproved but he managed, with help of some other colleagues, to provide the correct solution, which has been accepted today as the final one. No the question arises how it happened that much more capable predecessors could not do what Wiles succeeded? 1 The answer is: Wiles did not tackle the Fermat last theorem. What he did was considering another more general issue, that of the so-called Taniyema-Shimura conjecture 1
We note here that the greatest of them, Gauss, rejected to tackle the problem.
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about a class of mathematical objects – semistable elliptic curves. The solution came as a collateral gain. The moral is – never tackle a long standing problem, for the solution will come from another, unexpected direction by itself, if ever. What all this has to do with KiM issue? Before attempting to answer the question, we note that the period relevant to FLT approximately matches the KiM crisis span. We notice that many attempts to resolve the KiM problem have been made within the KiM region and all failed. The “solution” came from outside, as a collateral “gain” of solving another, more important question – that of Israel security. It was imposed via USA power, in a manner of cutting off the Gordian knot. The parallel - Israel security and Taniyema-Shimura conjecture – appears appropriate, for the former does involve much wider region (both geographically and politically) from the mere Palestine, the entire globe, in fact. But there is a difference in the final outcomes: Wiles solution has been accepted as final one, that is correct, whereas USA “solution” is still to prove itself. Of course and that’s the point, the meaning of “correct” appears quite different in mathematics and politics. What is correct for one side need not be correct for others. In fat, in politics “correct” appears synonymous to durable, for all practical purposes. And here we come to our final “solution”(no historical reminiscences, please). To Balkan “Taniyema-Shimura conjecture”. KiM affair looks like an incurable decease, though those knot-cutters have different impression (at least they pretend so). Mircea Eliade had an idea that the traditional societies used to try to overcome difficulties in their societies by attempting to return the current state to the initial one, displaced remotely in time. 1 Then, by starting again from new initial conditions, they expected to avoid the path which led to the current disfunctioning of the social organism. In fact this stratagem has been employed often unintentionally, by many other agents in various disciplines, including medicine, politics etc. Breuer’s method (adopted by Freud) of making the patient to return to the previous (usually adolescent) state, where the trauma took place, is nothing but the particular variant of the general concept of repeating the history via alternative paths. The syndrom appears the psychological background of many so-called heresies within Christianity. 2 (In fact the very Christianity appears another manifestation of the syndrom within the Judaistic world). But what has it to do with KiM issue? Very much. We already saw the Albanians revolving their history to prehistory, to the age of Illyrs, when everything on Balkan was Illyric, y compris Alexander the Great, Pelasgians etc. And since they are heirs of Illyrs, everything on Balkan this day belongs (or should belong) to Albanians. Similar situation appears with the other eminent (though not prominent) actor in the game – Israel. We already mentioned Jewish reconstruction of the ancient Palestine, which once was exclusively Jewish, from the time immemorial (if even not earlier). The very God (Yahweh) was Jew, as the Jewish Bible modestly testifies. But what’s about Serbs? They tried to join the party, by referring to the monasteries and churches on KiM, built by Serb rulers from 10th century onwards. And since KiM appears (particularly Metohia) the Holy Land of Serbs, it can not be torn from them, just as Holy Land of Palestine can not be torn from Israelis. Clever enough? Yes, but not sufficiently. Both claims, Jewish and Albanians’ refer to the ancient, pagan ages, before Judaism and Christianity. Serbian Orthodox Church is an offspring of Byzantine one, who in her turn, was a bud of the Hebrew tree. Serbs, as all Slavs, had their own, autonomous religion, Old-Slav mythology. Unfortunately it did not occur to them to proclaim their mythology a religion, unlike Hebrews. But this can rectified now. And it is here again that Eliade enters the scene.
1
Mircea Eliade, Cosmos and History, The myth of the eternal return, Harper Torchbook, New York, 1964.
2
Walter Nigg, Das Buch der Ketzer, Atremis-Verlag, Zürich
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When South Slavs stepped on the Balkan Peninsular they were descendants of Perun, Vid, Vesna etc just as Illyrs were of their “pagan” gods. Like xx. True, no material record on KiM was found from that time, but it holds for Illyrs too. Hence, if we start from the “beginning”, all pretenders are on equal footing. What Serbs need to do now, is to discard the alien religion and return to their authentic one, the faith of her primordial pantheon. By doing this she will get rid of the Christian chains, and get free from the “monastery obsession” concerning KiM. KiM is part of Serbia not on the ideological grounds but as a historical fact. Moreover, by returning to the faith of her fathers, Serbia will at the same time emancipate from religion itself, what the Jewish intellectual elite has already done, together with Marx, Freud, Einstein etc. Thus, Serbia may won understanding from the world elite, and not mingles with the retarded parts of the mankind. As a collateral gain, this turn will help Serbians get rid of Ijecavians, who are the leading part of the clerical influence on the current politics on the Western Balkan. They hold dominant positions in the Serbian Orthodox Church. Šešelj’s MPs make oath in the church and have a tacit support of the Church on the present day political scene. Another important gain would be deprivation of the western claims (and Albanian propagandists) about “Serb obsession of the Kosovo myth”, and the underlying religious connotations. This emancipation from the Semitic mythology and its European “fifth column” in the form of Christianity, would reshuffle the cards again. It is this “eternal return” which would put the entire historical and ideological situation into a new framework, much more general than the current one. It is this generalization of the KiM issue, which would allow a durable resolution of the Kosovo not, just as the Taniyema-Shimura conjecture opened the door for resolving hitherto irresolvable Fermat Last Theorem.
Concluding remarks I have used throughout the book the term Shqiptar, to designate ethnic Albanians living in former Yugoslavia. It is the appellation used by ethnic Albanians themselves. On the other hand many of the latter find this appellation used by non-Albanians pejorative. This attitude stems from the time when Albanians used to be underrated and the term has acquired non-friendly connotations. Similar situation appears with Roma, who used to be known within European regions as Gypsies. They too dislike being called Gypsies and in official communications they are now entitled Roma. 1 The difference is that Roma do not call themselves Gypsies, but Roma. I am using the term Shqiptar just to distinguish Albanians from Albania from those from (former) Yugoslavia. The issue goes beyond the linguistic. Insisting to be called Albanians implies that they adhere to the project of Greater Albania, and want the world to get accustomed to the idea. We mention in passing that other names by which they used to be known in history, like Arbanases, Arnauts etc are also considered by ethnic Albanians as pejorative. By the way, ethnic Albanians also have pejorative names for other ethnicities in the region, including Serbs, but nobody makes case of it. (One may recall the terms used by Allies soldiers for Germans in the WW2, or USA soldiers for Japanese, USA soldier for Vietnamese, etc, but it belongs to another anthropological sector). My insistence on designation KiM (Kosovo and Metohia), instead of the widely accepted Kosovo goes along the same line. Serbians call this region so for millennium and there is no valid reason to abandon their right to entitle their territory as they want. The issue, also, goes beyond the mere linguistic and is to remind the broader readership whose land it is.
Epilogue 1
The term is derived from Egyptians, as Roma used to pretend to be originally.
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Sir I am submitting this paper, which solves everything. The next paper is following soon. Erwin Schrödinger
Summary Could you say it in one sentence? Socrates to sophists The view I have been offering about Kosovo issue may be summarized as follows. Illyric population on Balkan was pushed by the Slavic migration into the mountainous Dinaric regions. This population then mixed with the Slavs, producing Slav Dinaroids on one side, whereas Albanians retained their Illyric features almost intact. The difference in ethos of both populations from one side and the rest of Balkan population on the other has resulted in the clashes the Western Balkan has been experiencing for the last two centuries. The initial handicap of the Albanian population, as a lake adjacent to the Slav sea, appears a hindrance to their, otherwise legitimate, strive for the national promotion. This handicappe has been abundantly tried to eliminate by making use of wombs of Albanian women, which has resulted in an unprecedented proliferation of the ethnic Albanian population in the region. By exerting demographical pressure Albanians have already acquired much greater territory than they used to occupy in the known history (KiM and Western Macedonia). The Shqiptar unrests and rebellions have initiated the decay of Yugoslavia, though it was KiM who separated from the original country the last. Though the clash between Shqiptars and the rest of Yugoslavia was controlled by politicians, at least initially, it was the ethos of Dinaroids, both Slavophonic and Albanophonic, which gave the bloody character to the clash. The international environment reacted to the Balkan turmoil as an elephant making order in a glass shop. But from a deeper insight, the USA intervention (and Western European to some extent too), has been directed by two principal motives: first (subconsciously heeling their misgivings) remaking the invasion of the biblical Canaan, (but this time “in reverse”), and second making use of the conflict to convince the Muslim part of the World (by siding Muslim Shqiptars) that USA has nothing against them. From the technical side NATO aggression may be viewed as a massive war exercise (maneuvers with real ammunition) in order to test the latest military technical advances. The military base established on KiM appears a collateral gain, but it is of a marginal importance here, since this is a common case for USA striving to dominate the Globe, albeit as a vassal state. We note here a striking parallel between the founding of the so-called Independent State of Croatia (ISC) in 1941 and the independent Kosovo state. The former was established by Nazi Germany, the latter by USA. Hitler posted in ISC the quisling government of Anta Pavelić, George Bush did simiar thing with KiM, posting Shqiptar quisling government. The first thing Ustashas regime did in ISC was to exgerminate Serbs (as well as Jews and Gypses), whereas Shqiptars banished all non-Shqiptars from KiM, leaving only those people in enclaves, which do not differ much from the concentration camps. There are some diferences, however. Jews and Gypses were persecuted by the state of Germany, that is by the official istitutions, under the strict orders and rules, whereas non-Shqiptars on KiM has been left to the mercy of the local population. What it means we saw in the case of the pogrom of March 2004 (KiM Crystal night). The case of the KiM secession closley resembles the procedures already witnessed in Afghanistan and Iraq, so that a rather clear pattern of seting up USA colonies emerges. But while Afghanistan and Iraq have been
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«pacified» as the enemies of Israel, Muslims in Bosnia, Macedonia and Serbia have been supported so as to «tame» those muslim countries around Israel and prevent further deterrioration of Israel position in the region. Symbolically, Balkan Christian shrines have been sacrified in order to secure the existence of a wall in Jerusalem, a remnant of Jewish shrine desroyed two millenia ago. Some readers might wonder about my involvement of Israel into KiM issue, but I can’t help them. Anyway, if the resolving of the Kosovo knot continues along the presently drawn line, KiM will in all probability become Western Wall to Serbs. Unless they return in the meantime to their fathers’ faith, as I suggested, or begin believing in Nothing (which some call God).1
APPENDICES
APPENDIX 1 Leh leha. “…we must appear to be as mad dogs…to create worldwide hatred for the Jewish Diaspora to force them to flood to Israel…”
1
As Jewish intellectual elite has already done.
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“Even today I am willing to volunteer to do the dirty work for Israel, to kill as many Arabs as necessary, to deport them, to expel and burn them, to have everyone hate us, to pull the rug from underneath the feet of the Diaspora Jews, so that they will be forced to run to us crying. Even if it means blowing up one or two synagogues here and there, I don’t care. And I don’t mind if after the job is done you put me in front of a Nuremberg Trial and then jail me for life. Hang me if you want, as a war criminal. Then you can spruce up your Jewish conscience and enter the respectable club of civilized nations, nations that are large and healthy. What you lot don’t understand is that the dirty work of Zionism is not finished yet, far from it. True, it could have been finished in 1948, but you interfered, you stopped it. And all this because of the Jewishness in your souls, because of your Diaspora mentality. For the Jews don’t grasp things quickly. If you open your eyes and look around the world you will see that darkness is falling again. And we know what happens to a Jew who stays out in the dark. So I am glad that this small war in Lebanon frightened the Yids. Let them be afraid, let them suffer. They should hurry home before it gets really dark. So I am an antiSemite? Fine. So don’t quote me, quote Lilienblum instead [an early Russian Zionist - ed.]. There is no need to quote an anti-Semite. Quote Lilienblum, and he is definitely not an anti-Semite, there is even a street in Tel Aviv named after him”. Quote from Ariel Sharon:
APPENDIX 2 Jerusalem Post November 19, 2007 When I first moved to this country, I was prepared to play my part by enlisting in the IDF and serving in the West Bank. While there, I saw for myself the effect my mere uniformed presence had on the Palestinians I encountered on a daily basis. Every interaction took place with me holding all the cards - it was me with the loaded gun in my hands; it was me barking instructions to "stop or I'll shoot", "lift up your shirt", "don't come another step closer"; it was me playing with my quarry as though they were puppets on the end of short, taut strings. However, I still believed that we "did what we had to do", since it was a case of us or them, and we could never ease up in our actions for fear that the next Palestinian we encountered was the one with a bomb strapped to his chest. And so it continued, bursting into buildings to round up the residents and lock them in their own basement, so that we could take over the house and grab a few hours' sleep in the middle of a mission - and all perfectly acceptable in the context of war. But that was when I saw the wide, silent eyes of the families' children as we screamed at their father - their hero, their protector - and wrested from him the reins of power inside his own house. And that's when it started to dawn on me just what kind of effect our actions were having on the next generation, who were guaranteed to end up hating us when all they saw was us herding them like cattle and imposing our will on them through the sights of our guns. Once I left the army, my forays into the West Bank were on more equal terms, as I sought to meet the very people whose towns I'd previously patrolled, to hear their stories about life under military rule. From Jenin to Bethlehem to Ramallah and beyond, the extent of the suffering and the depth of the torment was exposed to me time and again. There was no doubt in my mind that our mere presence in their daily routines was twisting the knife every time they encountered a soldier - and breeding extremism and radicalism all the while.
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The unspoken truth that every Israeli knows, uncomfortable as it may be to admit, is that occupation breeds terror. Every incursion, every raid, every curfew and collective punishment, drives the moderates into the welcoming arms of the militants, who promise to return their honour and their wounded pride by fighting the oppressors' fire with fire of their own. And that fact alone should be enough to shake Israelis awake and realise that the occupation has to end, as much for our own security as for the sake of the Palestinians that we're subjugating. Even those who only care about the safety of the Israeli people, and to hell with the Palestinians, should be backing the withdrawal of troops to the Green Line. They should know that the labyrinthine network of checkpoints is not actually making them safer, but is there just to make the Palestinians' lives a misery, thus endangering Israeli lives further in the end. And they should recognise that while Israel's presence continues to fester in the Palestinian territories like an open sore, there is little to no chance that the Palestinians will seek rapprochement and dialogue with their neighbours. And that means that any coexistence projects - such as those promoted by OneVoice, the Clubhouse network, and so on - are doomed to fail while the occupiers refuse to acknowledge the plight of the occupied. Israel has the upper hand whichever way you look at it, and to treat the situation as somehow balanced is to overlook totally the sheer injustice of it all. Of course, the Israelis have suffered decades of terrorism at the hands of extremist Palestinian groups, and as such have every right to demand their government protects them from similar atrocities in the future. But, for all that Israelis have had it bad, they haven't seen every facet of their lives systematically destroyed at the hands of an uncaring occupying force. They haven't seen their economy run into the ground by crippling border closures and sanctions, they haven't been denied freedom of movement between their homes and farmlands, and they haven't had to beg soldiers to let their wives through checkpoints in order to give birth in hospital. At the same time, the settlements are as much of a problem to a viable Palestinian state as anything, thanks to the watertight security their presence demands from the army, restricting Palestinian movement and cutting the West Bank into tiny ribbon-like strips. As one Palestinian said, in Emma Williams' essential book on the region, "thanks to the settlers and their infrastructure, we're locked so tight into the State of Israel we're like a bug in concrete." But still the expansion continues, and still the stranglehold on the Palestinians persists. While the Israeli public stays silent, while their taxes swell the government's coffers, they are tacitly aiding and abetting slow torture on a national scale. On top of the sporadic killing that the occupation inevitably causes, the killing of an entire people's hopes and dreams takes place 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. And it has to stop. Even though it's no doubt too late to pull many of the current generation back from the brink of hate and enmity, there's still time to ensure that today's resentment doesn't have to be instilled into the children of tomorrow. Playing the "fighting terror" card might win Knesset votes, but it doesn't push things forward nor work out how to pave the way towards long-lasting future peace. Israel must leave the territories, and they must do it soon - whether accompanied by concessions on the Palestinian side or not. The occupation is illegal, it is abhorrent, and it is utterly counterproductive if its aim is to bring security to Israelis. Anyone who ventures into the Palestinian towns and cities, who witnesses the devastation for themselves and hears the tragic tales
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from the horse's mouth, knows this. And anyone who prefers to cover their ears or avert their eyes is only doing damage to both sides in the long run. Israel will never have peace whilst it crushes Palestinian aspirations - and both sides deserve far better lives than those they are being forced to endure at present. Seth Freedman APPENDIX 3 Nagoya, Japan, November 22, 2007 The soon-to-come tragedy called Kosovo - caused more by international than local factors News media cover violence rather than underlying conflicts. That's why you hear so little about the soon-to-be-again tragedy called Kosovo. There is growing risk that, in a few weeks, we shall witness another round of violence, repression and other human misery. And then the media will be there. Since 1991 TFF has analyzed and predicted developments in former Yugoslavia. Thirteen years ago we began publishing ideas, models and plans for a peaceful solution to the Kosovo+ conflicts. If the above prediction comes true, it will neither be the fault of the Serbs nor the Albanians. It will be caused by the international so-called community (IC). It did nothing to prevent violence or negotiate peace when both were possible, i.e. in the early 1990s. See TFF's books and reports about former Yugoslavia, including ovo is only the stage on which a much larger drama is played out. It ignored the immense complexities of the Yugoslav conflicts as well as the unique potentials for a nonviolent solution to this conflict. It used violence in a fake "humanitarian intervention" the consequences of which now threatens to blow up the region once again. And it put the UN on one of the saddest mission thinkable - UNMIK in Kosovo. In 1998 the war between the Kosovo Liberation Army, KLA, and Serb forces broke out because the US, Germany and others had equipped, trained and armed KLA over several years. NATO bombed Kosovo and Serbia in 1999 based on a diagnosis so deficient and false that, had it been a doctor before surgery, the patient would have died. Few listened - and those who did, including top-level UN diplomats in New York, could do nothing - the member states were engaged elsewhere or pursuing their own narrow national interests in the tragedy of the Balkans - including oil and gas pipelines through the region, selling arms and building basis to "contain" Russia. The Clinton administration - with Al Gore, the Nobel Committee's bizarre choice this year as Vice-President - was behind most of it, the EU being as split as ever. Why did the recent elections in Kosovo not cause massive concerns? Although aspiring to independence in a few weeks, only about 45% voted and the Serbs boycotted the recent elections. It bodes ill for democracy and human rights. Even worse, its victor Hachim Thaci is a former KLA warlord, likely to replace the present warlord prime minister and KLA architect Agim Ceku, who also was a leading general in the Croatian Army when it ethnically cleansed 250 000 Croatian Serbs out of Croatia in 1995 with the substantial support of the US and European governments. In short, he is our warlord and, thus, OK. In addition, Kosovo is a place with extremely little production and the more (black economy) trade and a crime structure reaching from Afghanistan deeply into Switzerland, Brussels and major cities in the US. Unemployment is about 70 % and the place is a series of segregated communities, minority Serbs and others living in ghettos.
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Kosovo's Albanian leadership has by no means satisfied the criteria long ago set up by the IC or secured the return of the 150 000 or so Kosovo-Serbs who saw it best to leave when KLA's political and military leaders did reverse ethnic cleansing in autumn 1999 under the very eyes of tens of thousands of NATO, EU, OSCE and UN staff - the largest ever peace mission per square kilometre. In summary, when the Kosovo-Albanian leadership will declare independence in December, presumably supported by Washington, it is for all practical purposes a segregated community, a predominantly black economy, a state run by Western-supported, non-convicted war criminals - in short, failed state before declared a state. In spite of the billions of dollars poured into it since 1999. Independence? Perhaps but not in this manner Does this mean that Kosovo should not become an independent state? Eleven years ago, TFF published a blueprint for a negotiated settlement - still the only document at the time given wide publicity on both sides based on hundreds of hours of conversations in Kosovo and Belgrade. More here. Much indeed speaks in favour of independence. I for one would not be against it and have never been - because: The basic concept of independence for Kosovo was developed in 1991-1994 by intellectuals and politicians around Dr. Ibrahim Rugova in consultation with teams of TFF experts. The idea was a democratic, lawful state, with open borders, no army, no future integration with Albania and good relations to all sides - brought about through negotiations. (Italics because there are still people who believe that the present author and TFF is anti-Albanian and pro-Serb - which has never been true - and thereby avoid a serious discussion about mediation and conflictresolution options. That was also politically convenient to 95% of the world's media). Today's Serbia has made up the account with its war-time leadership. Today's Serbia refuses total independence for Kosovo but proposes uniquely high autonomy and points to models such as Hongkong and the Åland Islands. It is time to reward Serbia's new maturity and lawful approach by at least giving it a fair media coverage and a fair hearing. But who dares to break with the old black-and-white media image of the Balkans? For instance, did it ever occur to you that Serbs were consistently called "nationalists" while others who worked for only their own nation and independent states insisted to get it by violent means and were treated as friends of Western democracy? (Pro-Serb again, right? No! It is a matter of politics and media distortion - naturally, none of those responsible for it at the time willing to admit it). Conclusion - it's the 11th hour to prevent a new tragedy If in contrast to spin and propaganda, knowledge still matters, this e-mail/homepage articles can be your guidance to a more comprehensive understanding of the very dangerous developments in Kosovo - and Bosnia - in the wake of the thoroughly failed peace-making of the international community. There is no way things can go well in the region the next few months, and you may want to know why when the IC will blame either the Serbs or the Albanians but never themselves. The future requires one thing before anything else: A recognition by the international community itself that it is co-responsible for the terrible situation in Kosovo and Bosnia and that it has basically put itself in a political prison there. A new beginning Based on a series of open, honest lessons learned is an imperative. I fear it will not come... If the highest goal of the European Union is peace, it is the 11th hour to show it. But how could it with "foreign minister" Javier Solana being personally so responsible for the destruction of the region? In 1999 he was NATO S-G and the highest civilian responsible for NATO's bombing. After this moral, legal, intellectual scandal he was rewarded by his peers and kicked upwards to the top level of the EU. It is conveniently forgotten today that peace-making EU is lead by a nonconvicted war criminal... And this in a world that desperately needs an alternative to reckless divide-and-rule and occupation/independence US policies.
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The tragedy of our international times all comes together in Kosovo. Will anybody be able to change course and prevent utter chaos? Jan Oberg APPENDIX 4 Vaso Cubrilovic, 1937 : The Expulsion of the Albanians - Memorandum "The Expulsion of the Albanians," is a memorandum prepared and written by the noted Bosnian Serb scholar and political figure Vaso Cubrilovic (1897-1990). As a student in 1914, Cubrilovic had participated in the assassination in Sarajevo of Archduke Ferdinand of Austria-Hungary, the event which precipitated the First World War. Between the two wars, he was professor at the Faculty of Arts in Belgrade. A leading member of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Art, Cubrilovic also held several ministerial portfolios after World War II. Among his writings is the monograph "Istorija politicke misle u Srbiji XIX veka," Belgrade 1958 (History of political thought in Serbia in the 19th century). The Expulsion of the Albanians The problem of the Albanians in the life of our country and people did not arise yesterday. It played a major role in our life in the Middle Ages, but its importance only became decisive towards the end of the seventeenth century, at a time when the masses of the Serbian people were displaced northwards out of their former ancestral territory of Rashka / Raška, supplanted by Albanian highlanders. Gradually, the latter came down from their mountains to the fertile plains of Metohija and Kosovo. Spreading northwards, they continued in the direction of southern and western Morava and, crossing the Shar mountains, descended into Polog and, from there, towards the Vardar. Thus, by the nineteenth century was formed the Albanian triangle, a wedge which, with its Debar-Rogozna axis in the rear, penetrated as far into our territories as Nish / Niš and separated our ancient land of Rashka from Macedonia and the Vardar Valley. In the nineteenth century, this wedge, inhabited by wild Albanian elements, prevented the maintenance of any strong cultural, educational and economic links between our northern and southern territories. This was also the main reason why, until 1878, Serbia was unable to establish and maintain continuous links with Macedonia through Vranja and the Black Mountain of Skopje and thus to exercise its cultural and political influence on the Vardar Valley, to the extent that one would have expected in view of conducive geographical factors and historical traditions in these regions. Although the Bulgarians began their life as a nation later than the Serbs, they had greater success initially. This explains why there are permanent settlements of southern Slavs from Vidin in the north to Ohrid in the south. Serbia began to slice off pieces of this Albanian wedge as early as the first uprising, by expelling the northernmost Albanian settlers from Jagodina. Thanks to the wide-ranging national plans of Jovan Ristic, Serbia sliced off another piece of this wedge with the annexation of Toplica and Kosanica. At that time, the regions between Jastrebac and southern Morava were radically cleared of Albanians. From 1918 onwards, it was the task of our present state to suppress what remained of the Albanian triangle, but it did not succeed. Though there are a number of reasons for this, we shall examine only the most important of them.
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1. The fundamental mistake made by the authorities in charge at that time was that, forgetting where they were, they wanted to solve all the major ethnic problems of the troubled and bloody Balkans by Western methods. Turkey brought to the Balkans the customs of the Sheriat, according to which victory in war and the occupation of a country conferred the right on the victor to dispose of the lives and property of the subjected inhabitants. Even the Balkan Christians learned from the Turks that not only state power and domination, but also home and property could be won and lost by the sword. This concept of land ownership in the Balkans was to be softened somewhat by laws, ordinances and international agreements brought about under pressure from Europe, but it has, to a good extent, remained a primary instrument of leverage for Turkey and the Balkan states up to this very day. We need not evoke the distant past. It is sufficient to refer to a few cases which have taken place in recent times: the transfer of Greeks from Asia Minor to Greece and of Turks from Greece to Asia Minor, or the recent expulsion of Turks from Bulgaria and Romania to Turkey. While all the Balkan states, since 1912, have solved or are on the point of solving their problems with national minorities through mass population transfers, we have stuck to the slow and cumbersome strategy of gradual colonization. The result has been negative, as evident from the statistics of the eighteen districts which make up the Albanian triangle. These figures show that the natural growth of the Albanian population in these regions is still greater than the total increase in our population from both natural growth and new settlers (from 1921 to 1931, the Albanian population increased by 68,060, while the Serbs showed an increase of 58,745, i.e. a difference of 9,315 in favour of the Albanians). Taking into account the intractable character of the Albanians, the pronounced increase in their numbers and the ever-increasing difficulties of colonization will eventually put in question even those few successes we have achieved in our colonization from 1918 onwards. 2. Even the strategy of gradual colonization was not properly applied. Worse still in a matter of such importance, there was no specific state plan for every government and regime to adhere to and implement. Work was intermittent, in fits and starts, with each new minister undoing what his predecessor had done and himself creating nothing solid. Laws and regulations were amended but, weak as they were, were never implemented. Some individuals, especially deputies from other regions, who could not manage to secure a mandate at home, would go down south and butter up the non-national elements to gain a mandate there, thus sacrificing major national and state interests. The colonization apparatus was extremely costly, inflated and loaded with people who were not only incompetent, but were also frequently without scruples. Their activities are indeed a topic in itself. Finally, one need only total up the huge sums this state has invested in colonization and divide them by the number of families settled to prove how costly every new household established since the war has been, regardless of whether or not this expenditure was met by the settlers themselves or by the state. Likewise, it would be interesting to compare the amounts paid out for personal expenditures and those for materials needed for colonization. In the past, Serbia went about this matter quite differently. Karageorge, during the first uprising, as well as Miloš, Mihajlo and Jovan Ristic had no special ministry of land reform, no general land inspectors, or costly apparatus, and still, they managed to purge Serbia of foreign elements and populate it with our own people who felled the endless forests of Shumadia (Šumadija), transforming them from the wild state they were once in to the fertile Shumadia we know today. 3. Even those few thousand families who were settled after the war did not remain where they were originally located. There was more success in Kosovo, especially in the Lab / Llap valley, where the Toplicans penetrated of their own accord from north to south. Our oldest and most stable settlements there were established with elements from various Serbian regions. In Drenica and Metohija we had no success at all. Colonization should never be carried out with Montenegrins alone. We do not think that they are suitable as colonists because of their pastoral indolence. This
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applies to the first generation only. The second generation is quite different, more active and more practical. The village of Petrovo in Miroc north of the Danube, the most advanced village in Krajina, is inhabited exclusively by Montenegrins. In Serbia today, there are thousands of other flourishing towns, especially in Toplica and Kosanica, which were established by Montenegrins of the first generation who mixed with more advanced elements. The foregoing consideration, nonetheless, still applies in Metohija where, since the settlers are on their own ancestral lands, old customs still abound. A visit to any coffee-house in Peja / Pec is sufficient proof. This is why our colonization has had so little success throughout Metohija. It must be admitted, on the other hand, that these colonies were poorly situated on barren, scrub-covered land, and were almost totally lacking in basic agricultural equipment. These people should have been given more assistance than other colonists because they were among the poorest Montenegrin elements. 4. Without doubt, the main cause for the lack of success in our colonization of these regions was that the best land remained in the hands of the Albanians. The only possible means for our mass colonization of these regions to succeed is for us to take the land away from them. This could have been achieved easily during the rebellion after the war, when the insurgents were active, by expelling part of the Albanian population to Albania, by refusing to legalize their usurpations and by buying up their pasture land. Here, we must refer once again to the gross error committed in our post-war strategy, that of the right to own land. Instead of taking advantage of the strategy used by the Albanians themselves for ownership of the land they usurped (scarcely any of them had deeds issued by the Turks, and those who did, got them only for land purchased), we not only legalized all these usurpations to the detriment of our state and nation, but worse still, we accustomed the Albanians to western European attitudes to private property. Prior to that, they could never have understood such concepts. In this way, we ourselves handed them a weapon with which to defend themselves, keeping the best land for themselves and rendering impossible the nationalization of a region of supreme importance to us. It is apparent from the above that our colonization strategy in the south has not yielded the results which ought to have been achieved and which now impose themselves upon us as a major necessity of state. We are not criticizing this strategy merely for the sake of criticism, but so that, on the basis of our past experience, we can find the right way to solve this problem. The Problem of Colonization of the Southern Regions Reading the first part of this paper and comprehending the problem of colonization of the south, one realizes immediately that the primary issue at stake are the regions north and south of the Shar mountains. This is no coincidence. The wedge of Albanians on both sides of the Shar range is of great national and strategic significance to our state. We have already mentioned the way the population structure came into existence there and the importance of these regions for links to the lands of the Vardar Valley, which are firmly within the limits of our ancient territories. The strength of Serbian expansion ever since the foundation of the first Serbian state in the ninth century has lain in the continuity both of this expansion and of the expansion of ancient Rashka / Raška in all directions, including southwards. But this continuity has been interrupted by the Albanians, and until the ancient link between Serbia and Montenegro on the one hand, and Macedonia on the other, is re-established along the whole line from the River Drin to southern Morava, we will not be secure in the possession of our territories. From an ethnic point of view, the Macedonians will only unite with us, if they receive true ethnic support from their Serbian motherland, something which they have lacked to this day. This can only be achieved through the destruction of the Albanian wedge
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ns In view of all that has been said, it is no coincidence that in our examination of colonization in the south, we ew that the only effective means of solving this problem is the mass expulsion of the Albanians. Gradual n has had no success in our country, nor in other countries for that matter. If the state wishes to intervene in ts own people in the struggle for land, it can only be successful by acting brutally. Otherwise, the native, who has n his place of birth and is at home there, will always be stronger than the colonist. In our case, we must keep this much in mind, because we have to do with a hardy, resistant and prolific race which the late Cvijic described as most expansive in the Balkans. From 1870 to 1914, Germany spent billions of marks on the gradual colonization rn territories by purchasing land from the Poles, but the fecundity of Polish women defeated German organization . Thus, Poland regained its Poznan in 1918. Our above-mentioned statistics of the 1921-1931 period show that it cundity of Albanian women which defeated our colonization policy, too. We must draw our conclusions from this, st do so quickly while there is still time to correct matters. urope is in a state of turmoil. We do not know what each new day and night will bring. Albanian nationalism is on our territories, too. Should a global conflict or social revolution occur, both of which are possible in the near ving the situation as it is would jeopardize all our territories in the south. The purpose of this paper is to avert such nce. Dr Vaso Cubrilovic (signed)
he memorandum attaches to the document a detailed map of the region to be cleared [editor's note]. avanje Arnauta. Manuscript in the Institute of Military History of the Yugoslav People's Army (Vojno Istorijski hives of the former Yugoslav Army (Arhiv Bivše Jugoslovenske Vojske), Belgrade, 7 March 1937, No. 2, 9 pp. Retranslated from the Serbo-Croatian by Robert Elsie, on the basis of an existing English version. First sie, Gathering Clouds: the Roots of Ethnic Cleansing in Kosovo and Macedonia, Dukagjini Balkan Books -130.]
Vaso Cubrilovic, : 1944 The Minority Problem in the New Yugoslavia: Memorandum "The Minority Problem in the New Yugoslavia," is a second memorandum on the Albanians (and other minorities) written by the noted Bosnian Serb scholar and political figure Vaso Cubrilovic (1897-1990). As a student in 1914, Cubrilovic had participated in the assassination in Sarajevo of Archduke Ferdinand of Austria-Hungary, the event which precipitated the First World War. Between the two wars, he was professor at the Faculty of Arts in Belgrade. A leading member of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Art, Cubrilovic also held several ministerial portfolios after World War II. Among his writings is the monograph "Istorija politicke misle u Srbiji XIX veka," Belgrade 1958 (History of political thought in Serbia in the 19th century). Reasons Why the Minority Problem in Yugoslavia Must be Solved Quite aside from the disloyalty of the minorities, there are other important interests of state which compel us to take advantage of the current war to solve the problem of minorities by
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expelling them. Our minorities, as we have previously stressed, do not constitute a danger to us because of their numbers but rather because of their geopolitical position and the ties which they maintain with the neighbouring peoples to whom they are related. It is because of such ties that the neighbouring peoples have been able to use them to wage war against us. At present, the minorities are nothing more than stumbling-blocks in our relations with these neighbouring states. The democratic federation of Yugoslavia will only achieve peace and ensure its development if it can be made ethnically pure and if, by solving its minority problems, it can remove the causes of friction with neighbouring states once and for all. Taking a look at the relevant charts and maps, it can been seen that our minorities occupy very important positions in our country, both from an economic and from a strategical point of view. The Vojvodina on the banks of the Danube, for instance, is Central Europe's gateway to the Balkans. In geopolitical terms, it is the strategic key to the peninsula. Without it, the nations of Yugoslavia, i. e. Serbia and Croatia, would lose their control over the Drava, Sava, Danube and Morava rivers and would once again become the backwater of a new Austria or of a new Turkey. The Vojvodina is the breadbasket of all of Yugoslavia and, even if not a single Serb or Croat lived there, we would still have to fight to keep it in order to feed millions of our citizens in the poorer regions to the south of the Sava and Danube. Devising a plan for the economic future of Yugoslavia would be senseless without the Vojvodina and its grain reserves. The regions to the south of the Sava and Danube with their mineral resources, forest reserves and hydroelectric potential provide all the prerequisites for modern industry, but this industry can only be set up if the plains of the Vojvodina provide the working masses in these new industries with food. We Serbs and Croats, however, make up only a relative majority of the population in the Vojvodina. It could happen, as a result of the war, that the Hungarians take over Backa and the Germans, with their people in the Banat, set up a miniature Reich there. The situation is similar in the area around the Shar mountains, inhabited now by an overwhelming majority of Albanians. This region is the watershed of major Balkan rivers which flow into three seas. Because of this, Kosovo and Metohija have always been considered a strategic area in the Balkans. By occupying the central part of the Balkans, Kosovo and Metohija separate Serbia from Montenegro and these two, in turn, from Macedonia. The countries of the Yugoslav federation will never be strongly attached to one another so long as they have no direct ethnic border with one another. This matter is of particular concern for Macedonia. The upper reaches of the Vardar river are held by the Albanians whereas the lower reaches of the river are in the hands of the Greeks. We southern Slavs hold only the middle portion. Our position is too weak not to be challenged, as Italy did when it ceded to Albania not only Kosovo and Metohija but also Dibër / Debar, Kërçova / Kicevo, Gostivar and Tetova / Tetovo. We must have no illusions about what the future of Europe may bring. This horrendous war will certainly not be the last. We will find ourselves at the crossroads again and will once more be exposed to attack in some new war. It is therefore the duty of those who hold the destiny of this country in their hands to be prepared for all eventualities and to ensure that events we have lived through in this war never occur again. The statesmen of the old Yugoslavia never considered this in 1918 when they agreed to incorporate the national minorities within the borders of the newly-created state. For political reasons, they even gave their support to the minorities, and we are the ones who have had to pay the price, sacrificing tens of thousands of lives. Such a calamity must never be repeated. The fertile valleys of Polog, Kosovo and Metohija are important in economic terms. Surrounding them are our wretched lands: Montenegro, the Sandjak of Novi Pazar, the areas to the north of the Shar mountains and the destitute Macedonian settlements to the south of the Shar. These people rightfully demand that the lands from which they have been driven by the Albanians over the last 150 years be returned to them. ……………………………………………………………………………………………….
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Conclusion This memorandum on the minority problem may have turned out a bit long, but the issue is of such importance to the future of our country that I was, more than anything, concerned about having omitted something. We may never again have such an opportunity to make our country ethnically pure. All other problems our country is currently facing, be they of a national, political, social or economic nature, fade in comparison. If we do not solve the minority problem now, we will never solve it. It is my hope that the leaders of the national liberation movement will assess this issue as I have, and will approach the problem with the same energy and self-sacrifice they exhibited when, in 1941, they plunged into the terrible war of liberation for the creation of a new, democratic and federal Yugoslavia. If this report can contribute even modestly to this lofty objective, its aim will have been fulfilled. Belgrade 3 November 1944 Vaso Cubrilovic [signed] University Professor
[Taken from the typescript Manjinski problem u novoj Jugoslaviji. Retranslated from the SerboCroatian by Robert Elsie, on the basis of an existing English version. First published in R. Elsie, Gathering Clouds: the Roots of Ethnic Cleansing in Kosovo and Macedonia, Dukagjini Balkan Books (Peja 2002), p. 149-170.]
APPENDIX 5 Sir The currеnt attacks bу NATO forces on military and related targets raise many questions. ones that should have been clarified long before the decision was made to enforce an agreement on Kosovo status. A number of points appear in order here, concerning the legitimacy and consistency of the whole approach. When Croatia became an independent, sovereign country a decade ago, a rebellious Serbpopulated region separated from the new state by force. Inspired and helped by then president of Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic, it declared itself an independent state (Serbian Krajina). In 1995, Croatia regained that territory, again by force end expelled the rebellious population (who moved mainly to Serbia). No sanction whatsoever was taken against Croatia, though some international institutions raised their voice on behalf of the people banished in that way. In 1992, Serbia was punished by international community, mainly via the UN for interfering in the affairs of another independent and sovereign state, Bosnia and Herzegovina. Severe sanctions, many of them still operative, have been imposed on Serbia, for helping separatists in Bosnia. A year ago the ethnic Albanians population detached about two thirds of the Kosovo region from the control of the state of Serbia – inspired and helped by Albania, which supplied a considerable number of fighters to the KLA. The ethnic Albanians` goal is clear to all except those who do not want to see it – merger with Albania. That no one either from Albania or from Kosovo
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ever mentions this aim (which is natural after all), corroborates this assertion. A large part of the 700.000 weapons “stolen” from military magazines two year ago in Albania have found their way into Kosovo – a fact well known to everybody, including NATO and his members. Kosovo Albanians are trained in Albania and then sent to Kosovo. Without going into further details, ethnic-Albanians have formed practically their own state within Serbia. All those requests for independence, the mock meeting in France etc., cannot conceal this political reality. Thus, when compared with the irredentism mentioned above, the parallel is clear. One has again the external interference, separatist movement, etc. But the similarities stop there? For now it is the state that is the victim of foreign interference that is being punished, not the homeland of the rebellions population, not the intruders. Evidently, the prehistory of these last troubles have made Serbia an easy target to those who consider it is time to take advantage of demonized Serbs, and their self-appointed leader (who by the way comes from Montenegro). In case of Croatia and Bosnia it was the UN who took the matters in their hands, not NATO. But NATO rockets and bombs started dropping on Yugoslav territory, without any decision from the Security Council. Does this mean that from now on the UN will be just a mock institution as turned out to be the case with the League of Nations? As we know the later collapsed just before the Second World War. What does the present beginning of the UN collapse signify? Yours Sincerely, Petar Grujic, Zemun, Serbia, Yugoslavia
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APPENDIX 6 The Trumpet
Misreporting Kosovo, March 26, 2008 , December 13, 2007 How the mainstream press has missed the single most important angle to what’s happening in Kosovo. Brad Macdonald On back-to-back days in December 1991, the New York Times published two separate articles highlighting Germany’s alarming and audacious decision to recognize and legitimize the efforts of Slovenia and Croatia to break away from Yugoslavia. Both articles (you can read them here and here) are refreshingly honest and hold little back in their analysis of Germany’s seminal role in the violent fragmentation of Yugoslavia. In this article, Paul Lewis cites European diplomats who warned that Germany’s decision to support Croatia and Slovenia, despite opposition from virtually the rest of the world, “underscored Germany’s growing political power in the 12-nation European Community.” Germany’s incursion into the Balkans, wrote Lewis, “has worried many in Europe who see it as an attempt to re-exert traditional Germanic influences over this area of the Balkans” (emphasis mine throughout). Lewis exhibited little reticence in exposing the German undercurrent gushing beneath what was unfolding in Yugoslavia, even when it meant connecting Germany’s decision to recognize Croatia and Slovenia in 1991, to its sordid history with these entities during World War ii. Moreover, in its unusual assertiveness in moving ahead with a plan to extend diplomatic recognition to the breakaway Yugoslav republics of Croatia and Slovenia, Germany has stirred troubling historical associations …. Nazi Germany dominated the two Yugoslav regions during World War ii, absorbing Slovenia into the Third Reich and creating a puppet regime in Croatia. Then there’s this piece from the Times a month later: “Germany’s decision to press for quick recognition of the two republics, disregarding appeals from the United States and the United Nations, marked a new assertiveness that some Europeans find disconcerting” (Jan. 16, 1992). The point? In 1991-92, a mainstream news organ like the New York Times was not afraid to confront the reality that Germany was manipulating the Balkans in an effort to “re-exert traditional Germanic influences” over the region. A willingness to analyze the Balkans through the German prism was plainly evident. How times have changed. On Monday, the deadline for a mutual solution to the Kosovo dilemma expired, and Kosovar Albanians, led by former terrorist leader Hashim Thaci, said they would immediately start
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finalizing their declaration of independence from Serbia, which they will likely announce within the first two months of 2008. The subject of Kosovo’s independence does not lack coverage. What it lacks is the kind of fresh, up-front, in-depth reporting practiced by the likes of the New York Times when it covered Yugoslavia’s dissolution in 1991-92. When Croatia, Slovenia and Bosnia broke away from Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, the Times didn’t hesitate to declare Germany’s pivotal and alarming role in the crises (though later, when the U.S. and British governments switched sides, so too did the Times). Now Kosovo is about to erupt, and few people, certainly not the mainstream press, are talking about Germany’s fundamental role in this crisis! Why not? It’s a blockbuster angle! What’s happening in Kosovo is covered with German fingerprints. It was Germany (and the Vatican) that first legitimized the dissolution of the state formerly called Yugoslavia. The day Bonn threw its weight behind Croatia’s and Slovenia’s decision to break away in 1991, every republic in Yugoslavia that was thinking about breaking away, including Kosovo, learned that it could do so and have the support of Germany and the Vatican. But Germany’s intimate relationship with Kosovo runs deeper than mere ideological support. The involvement in the province by Germany, one of Kosovo’s most important and long-standing supporters, has manifested itself in very practical-and dangerous-ways. The German government has been closely linked to the Kosovo Liberation Army (kla), a terrorist organization that during the early to mid-1990s was linked to the mafia in Kosovo and other Islamic terrorists in the region. In 1996, the German foreign intelligence service (bnd), established a major outpost in the Albanian city of Tirana, where kla terrorists were trained to fight against Serbian authorities. According to Le Monde Diplomatique, “special forces in Berlin provided the operational training and supplied arms and transmission equipment from ex-East German Stasi stocks as well as black uniforms” (May 1999). Here’s what Trumpet editor in chief Gerald Flurry wrote in July 2002: Kosovo’s “internationally unrecognized government-in-exile” had a prime minister who was based in Germany and operated freely with the blessing (perhaps even the direction) of the German government! So Germany recognized Kosovo’s government-in-exile when nobody else did. But the international community submissively followed Germany’s lead. The kla guerrillas didn’t just happen. They were essentially raised up and directly supported by Germany-the powerhouse of Europe. How many analysts, when they consider Kosovo’s independence today, are factoring in Germany’s central role in the growth and expansion of the kla? How many wonder why Germany would be so interested in, and go to such great lengths to secure, Kosovo’s independence from Serbia? What’s in it for Germany? These questions lie at the heart of analysis on Kosovo-but few are asking them!
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The Trumpet has explained how, under the umbrella of the United States and nato, Germany and Europe have, since 1991, dramatically increased their influence in the Balkans. By employing a subtle diplomatic divide-and-conquer policy, Germany has precipitated the systematic and violent fracturing of Yugoslavia. It was Germany, through cunning use of exaggerated and inaccurate claims and emotive language, that in 1999 stirred nato, predominantly comprised of U.S. troops, to bomb Serbia. In March 1999, German Defense Minister Rudolf Scharping said in a television interview on zdf that “genocide is starting” in Serbia. His alarmist vocabulary turned the collective Western mindset against Serbia. The Australian reported on April 1, 1999, “With thousands of refugees continuing to stream out of the war-torn province, German Defense Minister Rudolf Scharping claimed in Bonn last night that evidence had emerged of concentration camps being set up by Serb forces.” “People watched television and saw the streams of Albanian refugees,” wrote Gerald Flurry at the time. “Then they totally blamed the Serbs. Most knew very little about Kosovo, yet spoke of ‘genocide’-the deliberate and systematic destruction of a race. Then came talk about ‘concentration camps.’ Genocide and concentration camps-words introduced by the German defense minister” (The Rising Beast). Are Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic’s supposed atrocities against Albanians the real reason America and nato bombed Belgrade into submission? During the 1990s, actual genocides were occurring in Rwanda and Sierra Leone-not to mention the slaughter of Serbs by Croatians and the Kosovo Albanians themselves-and the Clinton government did little to intervene. Why was America prepared to bomb Serbia into submission, but not the evil forces killing hundreds of thousands of innocent victims in Rwanda or Sierra Leone? Because America was pressured into bombing Serbia! Germany and Europe convinced all of nato to fight for their Balkan cause! From the very beginning, Germany and Europe have been determined to conquer the Balkans, be it by force or in a web of diplomatic maneuvers. In 2003, EU Commission President Romano Prodi promised that all Balkan countries-if they danced to the EU’s tune of course-could “become members of the EU one day.” While they might not necessarily become members on the same day, and each would have to follow its own course, he said, nonetheless, “in the long run, [the] Balkans belong strictly to the EU” (EU Observer, Jan. 10, 2003). Out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaks! This is why Germany wanted Serbia, its historical enemy and counterweight in the region, destroyed by nato. Germany and Europe believe the Balkans belong “strictly to the EU.” Without the pesky Slobodan Milosevic around to interrupt their plans, Germany and Europe could more easily conquer the Balkans! Any in-depth analysis of the events unfolding in Kosovo must account for this history. The International Herald Tribune reported yesterday on a plan concocted by Slovenia (which will likely be holding the EU presidency when Kosovo declares its independence) by which the European Union will embrace Kosovo when it declares statehood. Europe is prepping itself for action in Kosovo.
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The Tribune quoted one diplomat who said that if violence breaks out in Kosovo, Europe’s response must be “fast and decisive because the EU is showing it’s boss in its own courtyard. We want to show we don’t need Washington or Moscow to tell us what to do.” Considering the history we just covered, against whom do you think Germany and Europe will take action? On Monday, the Itar-Tass news agency reported that Wolfgang Ischinger, the German diplomat representing the EU in the group of three international mediators (Russia, the United States and the EU) at the talks that were held between Serbia and Kosovar Albanians, told Radio Berlin Brandenburg that the EU would soon be in agreement on the Kosovo issue. Ischinger’s interpretation of what Kosovo’s independence will look like was intriguing. “It will be a state entity,” he said, “which will continue to be under broad international observation. The nato troops will continue to be deployed there. A further international presence of the UN and, consequently, of EU, will be ensured.” Germany and Europe are making plans to cement their control of Kosovo via the UN and nato! In 1991, both Germany and Europe as a whole were significantly weaker, less unified and less defined than they are today. Germany was a newly united, largely inward-focused state in the early stages of resurrecting itself as the leader of Europe and on the global scene. Europe was even more amorphous than it appears today. But this seemingly innocuous appearance didn’t stop a major newspaper from ringing alarm bells when Germany boldly announced it would support Croatia and Slovenia in their quest for independence, a decision that many knew would set a dangerous precedent and likely cause Yugoslavia’s dissolution. At that time, even a mainstream news source analyzed the breakdown of Yugoslavia in the context of German ambition in the Balkans! Today, we don’t see any such analysis in the news media. Germany and the EU are widely embraced as legitimate and influential global powers with a formidable economic, military and geopolitical imprint. Europe, with Germany at its vanguard, has become a respected and increasingly powerful geopolitical force motivated by lofty ambitions of becoming a united superpower. Still, the mainstream media today refuse to analyze the Balkans in the context of what’s happening in Germany and Europe, and of Germany’s history with the region. This is the most dangerous and ominous angle of the story, and the most underreported one! In time, this shameful ignorance will prove to be an expensive mistake. APPENDIX 7 Jerusalem Post, December 30, 2008 The US representative at the Quartet's meeting, Assistant Secretary of State David Welch, reportedly told his colleagues, "First, we must not allow the suicide bombing in Dimona and the shooting on Sderot to affect the negotiations."
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Welch reportedly added, "It is also important to us that neither the Palestinians in Gaza nor the Israelis in Sderot are hurt. Also, we must continue to strengthen Mahmoud Abbas and Salaam Fayad." Moreover, Ran Koriel, Israel's ambassador to the EU, reportedly warned Livni that the Russians are pushing for the re-establishment of a Fatah-Hamas government. Several EU states, including France, are reconsidering their refusal to recognize Hamas. If Israel had not empowered the Quartet generally and the US specifically to determine whether the PA and Israel are behaving properly, a European or Russian decision to recognize Hamas would have little impact. But given their role as arbiters, Quartet members can take punitive action against Israel if it fails to comply with their wishes. The Quartet can replace international law in determining who can assert sovereignty over Gaza, Judea and Samaria and how Israel can exercise its own sovereignty. And so, Livni is reduced to begging them not to recognize Hamas. Once the US decided in 1999 to commit its own forces to NATO's bombing of Serbia and subsequent occupation of Kosovo, the jig was up for Serbian sovereignty over the area. The fact is, NATO forces in Kosovo were deployed for the express purpose of blocking Serbia from exercising its sovereignty over Kosovo, not to prevent violence between the Kosovars and the Serbs or among the Muslims and Christians in Kosovo. That is, NATO deployed in Kosovo to enable it to gain independence. And if US or NATO forces are deployed to Gaza or Judea and Samaria, they will not be there to protect Israelis from Palestinian terror or to prevent the areas from acting as global terror bases. They will be there to establish a Palestinian state.
Failing to understand the meaning of Kosovo, the Olmert-Livni-Barak government refuses to understand this point. Indeed, the government is actively lobbying NATO to deploy forces in Gaza. Just as it wrongly hoped that UNIFIL forces in south Lebanon would fight Hizbullah for it, so today, the Olmert-Livni-Barak government insists that NATO forces in Gaza will fight Hamas for it. If applying the lessons of UNIFIL to Gaza is too abstract for the Olmert-Livni-Barak government, Israel has experience with EU monitors in Gaza itself to learn from. Wrongly assuming that the Europeans shared Israel's interest in preventing terrorists and weapons from entering Gaza, Israel requested that EU monitors set up shop at the Rafah terminal linking Gaza to Egypt after Israel withdrew from the border in 2005. Yet whenever confronted by Fatah and Hamas terrorists, rather than fight the EU monitors flee to Israel for protection. And its monitors' experience with Palestinian terrorists taking over the border has never caused the EU to question its support for Palestinian statehood. Then, too, since the US, EU, UN and Russia all consider Gaza, Judea, Samaria and Jerusalem to be one territorial unit, it is not surprising that Israel's request for NATO forces in Gaza has been greeted by a US plan to deploy NATO forces in Judea and Samaria. If NATO forces in Gaza would do nothing to secure the border with Egypt or to fight terrorists and would scuttle Israeli operations in the area, NATO forces in Judea and Samaria would not simply prevent Israel from protecting its citizens who live there. They would also prevent Israel from taking action to prevent the Palestinians from attacking central Israel and asserting control over the border with Jordan. And
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yet, as The Jerusalem Post reported this week, Israel is conducting talks with the US regarding just such a NATO deployment. What the Serbs made NATO fight its way in to achieve, Israel is offering NATO on a silver platter. Not surprisingly, Abbas's adviser and PA propaganda chief Yasser Abd Rabbo reacted to Kosovo's declaration of independence by recommending that the Palestinians follow the example. Abd Rabbo said, "Kosovo is not better than us. We deserve independence even before Kosovo, and we ask for the backing of the United States and the European Union for our independence." For its part, the Olmert-Livni-Barak government has responded to Kosovo's declaration of independence with customary confusion. But the lessons of Kosovo are clear. Not only should Israel join Russia, Canada, China, Spain, Romania and many others in refusing to recognize Kosovo. It should also state that as a consequence of Kosovo's independence, Israel rejects the deployment of any international forces to Gaza or Judea and Samaria, and refuses to cede its legal right to sovereignty in Judea, Samaria, Gaza and Jerusalem to international arbitration. Caroline Glick
Figure 1. Palestinians’ owned lands are in green.
APPENDIX 8 Kosovo
At family farm, grim claims of organ culling from captured Serb
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soldiersInvestigator to re-examine allegations of war crime by Kosovan Albanian guerrillas Paul Lewis in Burrel The Guardian, Tuesday November 25 2008 Article history Paul Lewis travels to a house in Albania at the centre of allegations of organ harvesting during the Kosovan war Link to this video Seven members of the Katuci family sat silently in their living room, hands on knees, as rain tapped at the window. They had been asked if they hosted one of the most macabre war crimes of the 1999 Kosovo war. And they did not want to talk. It was to their country house in northern Albania's mountain region that Kosovan Albanian guerrillas are believed to have brought hundreds of captive Serbian soldiers to cull their organs in the aftermath of Nato's bombing. "I did not do it," said Mercim Katuci, the 50-year-old head of the family, breaking the silence with a shot of liquor. "That is why I am angry. Shame has been brought on us. People in the village tell us: 'You killed the Serbs. You are evil people.' We are poor people - how could we kill hundreds of soldiers in this house?" The spotlight will soon fall on the house again when a fleet of 4x4 vehicles brings Dick Marty - a special investigator mandated by the Council of Europe to re-examine the case - and his team up a crumbling dirt track, seven miles south of the town of Burrel. There have been calls for an investigation into the Burrel "house clinic" since April, when the ex-chief prosecutor for war crimes in the former Yugoslavia, Carla Del Ponte, said there had been "credible" reports about the fate of Serbian soldiers held there. Del Ponte said her investigation was shelved because of lack of evidence and resistance from senior UN figures. However, the Guardian has obtained the report of a UN forensic examination of the Katuci house, commissioned by Del Ponte. The report, by a UN expert, José Pablo Baraybar, was previously believed to be missing. Though not conclusive, it mapped traces of blood that could have been human in two downstairs rooms. Discarded in a nearby stream, the report said, was material "consistent with surgical overalls", syringes, a handgun holster, pill containers and bottles, and four empty drug containers, including one that contained a muscle relaxant. Asked about the traces of blood found by the UN forensic team, Katuci said it originated from when his wife gave birth. The discarded medical
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equipment, he added, was used by his family to self-administer drugs because the nearest hospital is several hours' walk away. But Baraybar, the former director of the UN's missing persons and forensics unit in Kosovo, said his team found "highly indicative evidence" that pointed to organ removal at the Burrel house, and prosecutors received testimony from eight witnesses. They comprised "foot soldiers" who claimed to be present during the surgery, he said, and a driver who claimed he brought small groups of Serb soldiers to the house from across the Kosovo border. The driver then described taking conspicuous packages to Tirana airport, bound for flights to Turkey. The surgeon conducting the operations was identified as a Kosovan doctor from Pec, Baraybar said. 'Slaughterhouse' "What the sources indicated was it was almost like a slaughterhouse," Baraybar said. "People came in alive, then things happened inside the house, and the people ended up dead. But certainly they were not just killed. The reference was of organs of some kind being taken out." Angry villagers prevented Baraybar and his team from conducting exhumations at a nearby cemetery where the bodies are said to have been buried. At the Katuci house - where Del Ponte is known as "the witch" the family of subsistence farmers show letters requesting compensation for the UN investigation, which they complained was intrusive. "They wanted to get under the floor with pick axes," said Katuci. "What I want is for light to be shed on this case so my family's innocence can be recognised." Marty's investigation could gain additional impetus from the recent discovery of an illegal organ transplant clinic in neighbouring Kosovo. Police there raided a clinic in the suburbs of Pristina three weeks ago, arresting two doctors and the country's acting permanent secretary at the ministry of health, Ilir Rexhaj. Interpol is helping to search for a third doctor, Yusuf Ercin Sonmez, a notorious Turkish surgeon who they believe was behind the operation. The investigation was opened after a 23-year-old Turkish man was found at Pristina airport with scars from an operation to remove his kidney. At the clinic police found a 74-year-old Israeli man who had just received a kidney transplant. Although there is no evidence any of the individuals connected with the Pristina clinic worked in Albania, Marty is now expected to travel to Kosovo amid claims that the two cases could be linked. Serbian war crimes prosecutors, who were denied access to the Katuci home last month, said they handed over evidence about organ trafficking networks in Kosovo to Marty's investigation.
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Speaking at the weekend for the first time about his organ harvesting investigation, Marty said: "I have started gathering data from all quarters for my inquiry, and hope to visit Belgrade, Pristina and Tirana soon for further leads, including information from the Serbian prosecutor's office." Baraybar said information gleaned from the Pristina clinic could be crucial. "If police have cracked a network of organ harvesting linking Kosovan Albanian doctors with individuals in Turkey, that is a potentially huge development for solving the Burrel mystery," he said. For Marty, though, the focus is likely to remain on the Katuci house, where there are no obvious signs of the alleged horror story. Young children chase chickens around the same yard where, according to Del Ponte, Kosovo Liberation Army guerrillas herded their prisoners. The shed where Serb soldiers were allegedly held captive is now filled with cows. Thick Albanian coffee simmers on a stove in the room where Baraybar discovered blood stains. "Do we look like a family that would do this stuff?" said Katuci's nephew, Defrim Kadiu, 32. "Does this house look as if it's been treated as a hospital for 300 people? If it's true, then my family needs to be hanged in front of everyone." Backstory Of all the many atrocities that human rights groups want investigated from the 1998-99 Kosovo conflict, the alleged harvesting of organs from Serbian soldiers by ethnic Albanians is one of the most gruesome. Hundreds of Serbian families have for a decade been demanding what happened to those who disappeared during and after the war. In April, Carla Del Ponte the former UN war crimes prosecutor, gave greater credence to suggestions of a macabre operation, in which as many as 300 Serbs were allegedly abducted and transported to Albania to have their organs removed. In a memoir, she wrote: "Victims deprived of only their first kidney were sewn up and confined again inside the shack until they were killed for their vital organs." APPENDIX 9 Times Saturday, March 22, 2008 The West-East conflict in a microscope
Kosovo & the population imbalance In a recent article in this column the importance of the Kosovo precedent was discussed, from the point view of the international law as it has been exercised for the past generations. Certainly the new
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situation arising from the unilateral Kosovo declaration of independence shapes a new reality that will have multitude and mostly negative consequences for countless nations across the globe. It is important also to illuminate around the existence of the Kosovo issue as a demographic one, shaped by the expansion of one group of people (Albanian Muslims) versus the other one (Serbian Christians). Moreover the existence of facts on the ground as resulting from the population growth of the former, signify a real precedent for other regions in the world. In 1913 when Kosovo & Metojia became a part of the Serbian state the population of Christians exceeded 50% , whilst the Albanians counted around 350,000 souls, approximately 40%, the rest being occupied by Roma, Bosniaks, Turks and people of mixed origin. A generation later in 1948, after WW2 that resulted in the killings of 20,000 Serbs and the expulsion of some other 150,000 by the Nazi Albanian collaborators, the balance tilted in favor of the Albanians. On top of that, the Tito administration willingly opened up the border up to 1949 and accepted 150,000 illegal immigrants in order to deliberately change the population makeup of the province as a counter-measure against the Serbs. Tito’s motto was “For a strong Yugoslavia we need a weak Serbia”. Thus, in 1961 the Albanians numbered 650,000 people, and the analogy was 65% Albanians, 28% Serbians. From that period onwards a dramatic –And basically unexplained- population expansion derived from the Albanian community. In the mid-60’s the Albanian population had a 6.5 children per woman ratio, whilst the Serbians around 2.5. Although the second number is enough to replace the previous generation, it was much less and that resulted in a virtual takeover of the land by the Albanians. In 1981 just after Tito’s death and the start of the first rebellions in Pristina, the Albanians numbered 1.2 million, a 100% increase in less than 20 years. The pressure exercised by them against the Serbian farmers that took the form of homicides, arsons, rapes and vandalism obliged to an exodus a considerable part of the Christian populous. Nowadays the Albanian population is estimated at around 1.8 million people, and one has to consider that a part of the population immigrated to Western Europe and Northern America during the past 15 years. In short the demographic imbalances altered the established order and of course the international intervention took advantage of this fact by initiating a round of land take over from the Serbian state. The message that a neutral observer can get is the following: Population imbalances endanger national sovereignty therefore measures have to be taken to ensure that the Kosovo precedent does not apply to them. In simple terms no prudent government would let its minority citizens reproduce to a pace that will ultimately lead them to declare themselves independent, or even worse form a state that will constitute a real threat against them. The intervention in Kosovo instead of making a positive contribution to the world stage will certainly raise the above issue and result to future minority massacres, forced abortions and ethnic cleansing of a grand scale. For the policy-makers who conduct their profession based in a pragmatic approaches of every day life it is a notion perfectly understandable. Unfortunately modern day diplomacy seems to be hijacked to an extent, by radical elements that lead each and every nation towards a new age of barbarity. In Kosovo the 1,500 Churches, Monasteries and pilgrimages constitute one of the “Holy places” of Eastern Orthodox Christendom on par with Mount Athos, Meteora, Constantinople (Hagia Sophia), Alexandria, Jerusalem, Ohrid and Mystras and other important regions. A 350 million strong Eastern Orthodox population is being subject to a humiliation of historical proportions, similar to that of the Ottoman conquest with two major differences: The Turks were far more tolerant and respectful towards the Christians than the modern-day Albanians and secondly the role of the West has been a total disappointment, to say the least. The rest 1.2 billion Roman Catholics, Protestants and the Jewish communities are also negatively
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affected judging by the demise of their numbers in the world stage and the re-emergence of two cultural and social giants; the Arabic-Muslim one and the Confucian-Chinese one. Of course there are quite a few analysts that do not conform to the notion that the world was, is and will be divided in ethnic-cultural zones on which religion often plays a decisive role. It seems the everyday news and special broadcasts from the Middle East, Africa or East London- (-istan) haven’t still grasped their attention. Human history is a spiral never-ending procedure. On that basis everything is possible and nothing can be excluded in the end of the day. Since 13/06/1999, 350,000 Serbians, Roma, Gorani and other were forced to flee from Kosovo. It was a flight of survival, considering the 1,500 homicides against Serbs in the coming months, up to early 2000. Around 80 UNESCO “protected” Christian monuments were blown up by the Albanians in front of the eyes of 40,000 KFOR personnel. It has to be stressed once more that even during the days of the Ottoman Empire and the numerous battles in the eparchy, nowhere close did the destruction of shrines came that close. This constitutes another issue having to do with the psycho-synthesis of the nationality that committed these acts and has a specific modus opperandi from the medieval ages and onwards. Another 1,300 Serbs were killed up to 2003, 80,000 houses and estates were grabbed by the Albanians along with 20,000 automobiles and 15,000 shops, barns and commercial property. Some other 30,000 houses were burned to the ground in well-organized arson a campaigns another method regularly exercised by Kosovo-Albanians over the 20th century. It is also interesting to point out the situation in Pristina, the capital of Kosovo. Until 1999, Serbians constituted some 20% of the population. Nowadays there is a mere 0.1% having being entirely wiped out. The declaration of Kosovo’s independence as a multicultural state-Without minorities- is one of the worst public relation campaigns that someone would advise the Albanian leaders in Kosovo. Certainly it is something that only certain State Dept. officials could explain. In 2004 the last phase of the most recent genocide in a European soil (By Muslims against Christians) took place. In a space of 2 days, 27 Churches were burned to the ground, 7 Serbian villages, 40 people dead, 1,000 wounded and 4,000 refugees on their way to Serbia. The 17th of March 2004 constitutes a stigma for the United Nations and marks the imposition of the will of the fanatics that control Kosovo. A state that is much interested in the Kosovo precedent and history is Israel. Up to 1987, Tel-Aviv controlled the situation in the West Bank and Gaza, having being victorious in five consecutive wars against its Arab neighbors. The start of the first Indifada, the population explosion of the Muslim Arabs, the dramatic appearance of international Jihad, and the relative decline of the Western (European) support to Israel poses a strategic-survival dilemma to the Israeli policy makers: Should they try to push towards a conciliation approach towards the Palestinians and decide for a low key strategy against them, or to oppose all calls for bargain and form a strategy of a total war. That was the same dilemma the Serbians reached in the early ‘90’s. The firstly used the tactic number one and it failed. The second option was barely begun to be implemented in late 1998 and would have yielded total success bar the NATO air campaign in 1999. Note however the Kosovo is a province of the Serbian state therefore in contrast with the Israelis the Serbians are not in fear of “Being driven to the sea”. One certain conclusion is that countries such as Israel will invest considerable intellectual capacity in making concrete analysis based on Kosovo’s recent history. The present day situation in Kosovo will lead ultimately to a division between the Serbian-controlled North and the rest of the province. That means that the multiethnic concept is dead and a new Christian-Muslim division line will be established. The only hope for the region is the assistance of the EU in creating the necessary conditions for an overall security framework for the Western Balkans. It is a gigantic task that has to face the USA-Russian antagonism, the internal EU differences, moves towards a “Great Albania”, the widespread poverty & corruption, and the presence of active Islamic groups. If there was a bet most would choose the option for another conflict in these lands. The Kosovo issue will soon become another frozen conflict that will erupt from time to time in accordance to the local geopolitical balances, the demographic shifts and the
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various economic interests. What will remain though is that Kosovo marks the first definite victory of the European Islam since the occupation of Crete by the Ottomans in 1669. The difference was that then all the major European powers fought in unity. NOTE: The role of religion is often omitted by many analyses on the issues of regional conflicts. By itself any religion cannot ignite a war, but one has to take into account that any religion is simply the outer appearance of a whole system of beliefs, norms and mentalities of particular groups of people that have been molded by historical events and have constructed collective archetypes and cultural icons. The mistakes made by Western policy makers will come to haunt sooner than latter, even if they aren’t aware of the stakes involved in the first place. Ioannis Michaletos
APPENDIX 10 The Spectator, February 27, 2008 | Is this crazy, or is this crazy? The decision by Britain, America and certain other European countries to recognise Kosovo as an independent state is mind-blowingly stupid and suicidal and of a piece with their obvious determination to capitulate in the war for civilization. It is a rotten decision for the following reasons: 1) It endorses a breach of a country’s right to maintain its own integrity. Serbia is a properly constituted democratic country. To recognize the validity of such a secession is to undermine the principle of a country’s right to determine its own composition. It puts up two fingers to international law, which explicitly recognizes Serbian authority over Kosovo and upholds a state’s right to its own sovereignty. It opens the way for any other breakaway movement to do the same, both in the Balkans and around the world. So Tamils can now claim a precedent for seceding from Sri Lanka, Corsicans from France, Basques from Spain. And after Kosovo, can Scotland be far behind? 2) It asserts that religion matters more than nationality. This is multiculturalism taken to its lunatic natural conclusion. It says in effect that nationality is not the glue that must bind people of different creeds together, but religion or ethnicity can be allowed to break the nation apart. Every nation with restive ethnic minorities will now be undermined by this endorsement of illegal Balkanization. Serbians will now find themselves foreigners in their own country. And as Eldad Beck applies the same thinking to Israel – whose kamikaze government is said to be ‘thinking about’ recognizing Kosovo too — a horrific potential scenario presents itself: In contradiction to all the pessimistic predictions, Israel and the Palestinians are able to successfully conclude negotiations on a final-status agreement, among other things based to incentives provided by the European Union. In the final stages of negotiations, Israeli representatives cave in to international pressure and waive the demand to recognize Israel’s unique Jewish character. A short while after the agreement is signed, an uprising breaks out in the Galilee, in the Triangle area, and in the southern Negev desert, with Arab Israelis demanding a cultural and political
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autonomy that would enable them to manage their own lives while disconnecting from the State of Israel’s ‘Jewish’ institutions. The bloody clashes between the sides prompt the United Nations to call on Israel to restrain itself and consider the deployment of multinational forces to serve as a buffer. The European Union threatens to renounce Israel’s special status if it fails to act immediately in order to meet the demands of the minority living within it. Israel’s dependence on the EU is so great that it is forced to capitulate and turn into a ‘greater Tel Aviv’ shtetl. 3) It gives victory to the forces of ethnic cleansing. Although the Serbs under Milosevic committed atrocities, the Kosovars started the killing in their revolt against a sovereign country and drove out between 150,000 and 200,000 Serbs. In the past eight years 1,248 non-Albanians have been killed, with many more kidnapped, now presumed dead. 151 spiritual and cultural monuments in Kosovo have been destroyed by Albanians and 213 mosques built with money from Saudi Arabia. Eighty per cent of graveyards have been destroyed or desecrated, with no response from the international community. The Albanians have turned Christian graveyards into car parks, playgrounds and rubbish dumps. Anything relating to Serbia or Christianity libraries, public records, books, names of places and even towns have been wiped out. 4) Most important of all, an independent Muslim Kosovo is a beachhead for radical Islam in Europe. Al Qaeda has been operating in Kosovo since the early 1990s. Jihadis from Yemen and Chechnya have been fighting with the Kosovo Liberation Army and Saudi is pouring money into the Kosovo mosques thus turning them into Wahhabi hotbeds of radicalism. Caroline Glick notes in the Jerusalem Post: In 2006, John Gizzi reported in Human Events that the German intelligence service BND had confirmed that the 2005 terrorist bombings in Britain and the 2004 bombings in Spain were organized in Kosovo. Furthermore, ‘The man at the center of the provision of the explosives in both instances was an Albanian, operating mostly out of Kosovo… who is the second ranking leader of the Kosovo Liberation Army, Niam Behzloulzi.’ It was at the Battle of Kosovo in 1389 that some 70,000 died to keep the Islamic Ottoman Empire from advancing further into Europe. What is the point of fighting the jihad in Iraq when we are cheerfully opening the door to it in that very same place? Russia’s President Putin has warned that recognizing Kosovo will rebound very badly upon the countries who have blundered into endorsing it. The fact that this outcome is merely the inevitable consequence of the war so unwisely prosecuted by those countries against Serbia does not soften its deeply alarming implications. Putin is warning only too correctly of the dangers to the west of this development and the supreme folly of endorsing it. For once, Putin is on the right side and Britain and America are utterly wrong. That is the measure of this debacle.
APPENDIX 11
Battle at Caglavica
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The prettiest view of Pristina, the regional capital of Kosovo, is from the top of a hill, a kilometer south of the city on the highway to Macedonia. But today that hilltop has become a battle ground with local Kosovar and ethnic Albanians fighting NATO troops and UN police. “These are not peaceful demonstrators seeking independence,” the KFOR commanding officer on the front line told me. “Last night they shot at us and we shot back. It was a heavy gun battle. I estimate we killed about 10 Albanians. If they had broken through our lines they would have cut the throats of everyone in the village behind us.” That village is Caglavica, two kilometers south of Pristina, home to about 200 Serbian and 10 Romani families. Yesterday more than a 1,000 Albanians, many of them students, broke through KFOR lines, overturning and burning seven jeeps, and marched on Caglavica. Before KFOR reinforcements could stop them, the Albanians chanting “KFOR GO HOME” burned ten Serbian homes, and forced many inhabitants to evacuate to other nearby villages. “The battle eased off about 1:30 this morning,” the CO said. “But we lost one armored personnel carrier and had about 30 soldiers injured.” Today the “demonstrators” are back on the hilltop with about 1,300 blocking the highway into Pristina. KFOR troops have formed three defensive lines with a company of Norwegians forming the first defensive line. Half a kilometer behind them is a contingent of Indian, Irish and Finnish soldiers. The last line are all Swedes from Got land. “We expect them to attack sometime this evening,” the CO said. Asked if he would fire on the Albanians if they broke through the first two defensive lines, the CO said: “I wont hesitate to order my men to fire. If the Albanians break through they will massacre every Serb and Rom in the two or three villages behind us.” The last defensive line consists of 150 Swedish soldiers with 14 APCs. Although most have been up all night, they still looked determined as they strapped on their body armor and cleaned their weapons. Making up their right flank protecting the town of Grachanica is a company of Czech soldiers. “I’m pleased to have them with us,” the CO said. “They are good soldiers, well-trained and are doing a good job.” As two NATO helicopters circled overhead relaying information on the Albanians confronting the first line of KFOR troops, the CO admitted there had been many casualties already today. “The helicopters have reported several ambulances coming and going. The Albanians know we are not here to play games with them.” Although dozens of Serbs gathered on the knolls behind the KFOR soldiers as if watching a soccer match, their numbers have been dwindling fast since 1999. In fact, so many Serbs have left Caglavica for the city of Nish that there is now a neighborhood in that Serbian city called Caglavica. Although some vow they will never leave the village of their Serbian ancestors, many admit that if NATO forces ever leave Kosovo, the Serbs will have to leave with them. As for the Roma, who are too frightened to watch the battle, they are already packing their bags. “We’re going to Germany,” their leader said, “to join relatives. We’ve already paid the smugglers to take us.”
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After interviewing the KFOR commanding officer, I drove over to the nearby town of Kosovo Polje where Albanian demonstrators yesterday burned down the former Russian KFOR hospital. Although a Kosovo police car with two officers was parked across the street they were not stopping looters from taking an ambulance and other vehicles from the parking lot of the destroyed hospital. The police did stop me, however, when I got out to take photos. Although I showed them my KFOR press pass, they still detained me until they called headquarters and were told to let me go. But they warned me, no photos of the looting, no photos of the burned down hospital, no photos of the burned down Serbian restaurant where they had parked their car, and no photos of the many houses being burned today in Kosovo Polje on this second day of the Albanian uprising for independence from their UN and NATO saviors of 1999. Paul Polansky March 18, 2004 Paul Polansky is the author of 14 books, four on Kosovo. .
APPENDIX 12 One of the first major engagements between the Serbian police and the so-called KLA was in securing the villages of Lausa, Gornje Prekaze and Donje Prekaze, in March, 1998. A terrorist group led by Adem Jashari had attacked police patrols on February 28, killing four officers and injuring two. While the Serbian MUP forces dealt with this terrorist situation in the Drenica area, focusing on the villages of Prekaze and Jablanica and the road to Kalausa, the Pristina Corps HQ monitored their activities, documenting them in command reports of March 5 and March 6, 1998. In these reports, the Corps’ commanding officer indicated some problems created by the MUP forces’ actions, such as the use of combat vehicles that were not painted blue or clearly marked. This could have created the impression that VJ units were involved in the operation, which was not the case (classified order 78-18 of March 9, 1998). This report also noted that the terrorists were using civilians as human shields when confronting the police, a practice which caused a number of unnecessary, civilian casualties. Civilians who defied terrorist orders to remain in the combat zone were nevertheless organized in a refugee column, to create the impression of expulsion or exodus. This practice, which was part of the standard tactic employed by the “KLA", will be discussed separately. Terrorist attacks throughout Kosovo-Metohija did not spare the VJ, targeting its units, command facilities and outposts, especially along the border with Albania. A coded report from the Pristina Corps HQ to the Security Directorate of the VJ General Staff, dated April 28, 1998, cites the number of killed (19) and captured (2) terrorists, as well as the precise quantity and composition of weapons and equipment captured around the border outposts, “Morina”, “Gorozup”, “Kosare”, “Cestak” and “Orgusa”: 169 assault rifles, 67 rifles, 4 anti-tank guns, 7 machine guns, one RPG, 6 machine pistols, 164 RPG rounds, 18 boxes of ammunition, 27,163 bullets (7.62 mm), etc. Operational logs of the Pristina Corps HQ also show that on April 24, 1998, one group of “KLA” terrorists attacked a unit belonging to the 52nd Military Police Battalion from the position of Suka Vogelj, while on the same day the border outpost in the village of Babaloc came under fire.
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Responding to the terrorist attack, units of the 52nd Military Police Battalion attacked Suka Vogelj and killed seven terrorists. The following day, VJ border patrol units engaged a terrorist group attempting a crossing from Albania near the border outpost, “Kosare,” killing 16 terrorists and capturing large quantities of weapons and ammunition. In April 1998, Albanian terrorists launched 11 attacks altogether against VJ units and positions. Only three and a half months after these initial terrorist attacks on the VJ did the Army begin offensive, counter-terrorist operations. This ought to be enough to unequivocally answer the question of who initiated the use of force in Kosovo-Metohija. Attacks on VJ units apparently had the goal of forcing and accelerating its logical response, which was to be used by separatist and Western propaganda as evidence that a “mass Albanian uprising” was underway in Kosovo-Metohija, which “rightfully expected NATO aid.” Therefore, in the first half of 1998 (from the end of February to mid-July), the VJ did not take offensive actions against the “KLA,” nor did it have paramilitary formations under its command, then or ever. The Army’s general position on volunteers and possible emergence of militias was clear in the Directive of the Joint Command for Kosovo-Metohija of July 1, 1998. Among other things, it prohibits “enlistment of volunteers on any basis or ethnicity, into these units,” meaning the units belonging to the Joint Command for Kosovo-Metohija. Finally, we point out that federal police never took part in fighting the Albanian terrorists, contrary to allegations in the Indictment. Paragraph 26 of the Indictment says: “In response to the intensifying conflict, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed Resolution 1160 in March 1998 ‘condemning the use of excessive force by Serbian police forces against civilians and peaceful demonstrators in Kosovo,’ and imposed an arms embargo on the FRY. Six months later the UNSC passed Resolution 1199 (1998) which stated that ‘the deterioration of the situation in Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, constitutes a threat to peace and security in the region.’ The Security Council demanded that all parties cease hostilities and that ‘the security forces used for civilian repression’ be withdrawn.” COMMENT: In responding to this Paragraph, we cited the numbers of “KLA” attacks on Serbian police forces, the VJ and civilians (on an average, three attacks per day) during February and March 1998, resulting in dozens of killed and wounded among civilians, police and military personnel. The extent of these attacks is convincingly documented by the Interior Ministry’s report to the Serbian government on March 10, 1998, on the topic of counter-terrorist activities in KosovoMetohija, stating, among other things: “Terrorist attacks in the region of Srbica, which for many months have endangered the security of several roads, led to numerous civilian casualties, and jeopardized the safety of citizens of all ethnicities, created a need to re-establish full control of the roads in this area through the use of police outposts. Adem Jashari’s terrorist group tried to interfere with this operation on February 28, attacking police patrols and killing four, while wounding two officers. Sixteen terrorists were killed in a battle with this group. In the early morning hours of March 5, a terrorist group attacked another police patrol near the village of Donje Prekaze. After police returned fire, the terrorists retreated to their base and dug in at the Jashari family farm in that village... engagement with the terrorists lasted for 27 hours, with a total of 51 casualties. Unfortunately, it was later established
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that Jashari family members were among them. Terrorists physically prevented them from leaving the farm, despite the police invitation. The Interior Ministry expresses regret and bitterness that these victims were a direct consequence of cruelty and ruthlessness of Albanian terrorists. The police could not have known how many, if any, civilians were detained by the terrorists, since dozens of civilians did respond to the police invitation to evacuate the village. The fact that he personally shot his nephew to prevent him from surrendering testifies to Adem Jashari’s cruelty. Two officers lost their lives in this action, and seven were seriously injured.” Here is a calendar of the “KLA’s” terrorist attacks on Serbian police in late February and early March 1998: February 28: in the village of Liposane, around 12:30, terrorists ambush an MUP vehicle and open fire with assault rifles; several kilometers ahead, terrorists ambush the backup MUP force, shooting up a “Lada-Niva” 4x4 vehicle; two officers are killed, two injured. Around 14:00, MUP special forces arrive, extracting the wounded officers and pursuing the terrorists. After the ambush, the terrorists retreat towards Gland Selo, battling the MUP, which is in pursuit. Three terrorists are killed, and three more wounded. For many hours, terrorists retreat towards the villages of Poljanci, Sirez and Gradica, where the battle continues. After a battle with the terrorists, MUP forces capture three Albanians in camouflage uniforms. In the village of Vrbovac, they find a vehicle used to transport weapons and ammunition to terrorists in boxes marked “humanitarian aid.” Fighting goes on throughout the night of February 28-March 1. One police officer is wounded and later dies. Terrorists open fire on an MUP observation helicopter with automatic weapons and a “Zolja” RPG launcher. One officer is killed, another injured; March 1: Police force the terrorists to retreat towards Poljance, with sporadic fire by the fleeing terrorists; March 5: At dawn, in the village of Lausa, a group of terrorists attacks a police patrol, wounding two officers. Reinforcements arrive and the battle moves towards Donje Prekaze and Gornje Prekaze. Women, children and the elderly villagers are evacuated. Terrorists are forced to scatter, carrying off their dead and wounded into the nearby woods. Two officers are killed and four injured. Twenty terrorists are killed. Eight terrorists surrender, emerging from a well-camouflaged bunker. Three large bunkers are discovered overall, two with medical equipment and one filled with ammunition, weapons and demolition explosives, which also served as the command center. Among the terrorists killed in Donji Prekaz are terrorist leader Adem Jashari (age 43) and Rexhep Sellami (age 29). Both had been sentenced in absentia to 29 years imprisonment. March 6: Terrorists retreat towards the Albanian border, into Klina and Djakovica municipalities. They attack another MUP patrol near the village of Josanica. Before the first significant counter-terrorist action by security forces in the villages of Lausa, Gornje Prekaze and Donje Prekaze (March 5, 1998) neither the U.N. Security Council (UNSC), not any other international body acted in any way to stop the terrorist acts of the “KLA.” All attempts to have the Security Council issue even a formal communiqué condemning “KLA” terrorism, or declare this paramilitary wing of the Albanian separatist movement a terrorist organization, were systematically blocked by the United States (three times in one month, in one instance). This impotence of the Security Council before American obstruction was publicly called a disgrace by the chairman, Brazilian Ambassador Salma Amorim. Nor did U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan
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ever bother to visit this region and personally ascertain which side was responsible for the “intensifying conflict.” As soon as the terrorists suffered their first crushing defeat at the hands of the police, however, (in the battles of Lausa and Prekaze), a Security Council session was called immediately and the UNSC Resolution 1160 “condemned the police for excessive use of force,” against, as the Indictment alleges falsely, “civilians and peaceful demonstrators in Kosovo.” The only civilian casualties in those battles were those kept by Adem Jashari’s terrorists as human shields in their fortified compound. APPENDIX 13 The New York Times Magazine December 26, 1999.
The Curse Of Blood and Vengeance In remote northern Albania, communal life is governed by ancient codes of honor unchanged by modern notions of rights or the rule of law. That's why Shtjefen Lamthi was gunned down in broad daylight -- and why his killer's family will probably get theirs, too, someday. By conservative estimate, at least 200 people witnessed the murder of Shtjefen Lamthi in Shkoder, the northernmost city of Albania, early on the afternoon of Aug. 3, 1998. The 43-year-old farmer was walking south along Zyhdi Lahi Street, one of the main thoroughfares of the Rus marketplace in downtown Shkoder, his hands weighted down with plastic bags filled with his day's purchases. Just in front of a small tobacco kiosk at the northwest corner of Rus Square, a burly man who looked to be in his mid-30's suddenly stepped into Lamthi's path, brought up a Kalashnikov assault rifle, shot him 21 times and walked away. None of the witnesses came forward to identify the killer. Instead, a wall of silence immediately descended. Today, 16 months later, Lamthi's murder remains officially unsolved, despite the fact that almost everyone knows exactly who killed him. A strange event, but not in Albania. Albania was largely forgotten during the war in Bosnia, and only talked of indirectly during the war in Kosovo, as those driven out of the province by the Serbs were of Albanian descent. But the tiny nation of 3.5 million, tucked between the former Yugoslavia and Greece on the Adriatic coast, was high among the concerns for the Balkans at the beginning of this decade. Intent on transforming the poorest land in Europe into a free-market economy, on building a democracy atop the ashes of one of the world's most repressive Communist dictatorships, Western nations poured untold millions in aid into Albania in the early 1990's. For a time, all seemed to go well -- and then it all blew apart. Today, Albania is an economic ruin, its government is largely theoretical and the frequency of murders like that of Shtjefen Lamthi makes it one of the deadliest "at peace" nations on earth. What is it about the Balkans that so defeats all efforts to calm them? In searching for an answer, observers have naturally focused their greatest attention on the succession of conflicts that have torn apart the former Yugoslavia. And in so doing, they have tended to conclude that the Balkans are singularly riven by centuries-old ethnic and religious hatreds -- that these are people, or better, groups of people, who simply can't live together.
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"Ethnic cleansing" and concentration camps are strong evidence of this assessment. And yet from my own travels through the Balkans over the past two decades, I've never found that explanation wholly convincing. How, for example, to reconcile the "centuries of hate" with the historical cosmopolitanism of places like Sarajevo and Belgrade? How to account for the high degree of intermarriage in cities between "enemy" groups like the Muslims and Orthodox Christians? What to make of a man like Radovan Karadzic, the Bosnian Serb leader whose genocidal pogroms against Muslims have earned him an indictment for war crimes, but who once routinely treated Muslim patients in his psychiatric practice and, by all accounts, got along with them very well? And how does this theory explain Albania, a corner of the Balkans that, despite its mix of Christians and Muslims, is relatively free of ethnic or religious tensions, but where people still die violently in appalling numbers? I have come to believe that a key ingredient of the Balkan poison -- perhaps the key ingredient -is a different kind of schism, one that largely disappeared from the rest of Europe a half-century ago: that between urban and rural, between village and city. In contrast to all but the most isolated pockets elsewhere in Europe, the gulf of experience between the city and the village in the Balkans represents an awful chasm. The cities of Sarajevo and Belgrade are -- or were, until only yesterday -- emblems of European sophistication and cultural fusion. The typical Balkan village, on the other hand, has always been a hard and pitiless place, one where ancient feuds are nursed and passed on for generations, where change and outside influence is deeply mistrusted. What's more, so ingrained is the Balkan village's medieval code of honor and loyalty -- and this is true for Muslim and Christian villages alike -- that even many of those who have escaped its grip and become city dwellers seem to return to its thrall in moments of crisis. This was true, I think, of Radovan Karadzic, a university-educated psychiatrist -- a Modern Man -who grew up in a tiny mountain hamlet so grim and remote that it essentially consisted of his own extended family. Only slightly larger was the home village of Karadzic's military commander -and fellow indicted war criminal -- Gen. Ratko Mladic. Indeed, when looking at the backgrounds of those most responsible for the Balkan slaughters of this decade, including both Serbia's Slobodan Milosevic and Croatia's Franjo Tudjman, who died earlier this month, you can't help noticing that all of them came from villages or small towns. When crisis came -- and the economic stagnation and political fracturing that befell Yugoslavia in the 1980's was surely a crisis -- it was to the primitive laws and passions of the village that these men reverted. This past autumn, I set out to explore the nature of the Balkan village -- its codes and violent means of enforcing them. I chose to avoid the recognized battlefields of Bosnia and Kosovo and to journey instead to a corner of the Balkans that is officially at peace, but where the ancient ethos of the village has now resurfaced to deadly effect: northern Albania. The story of how Shtjefen Lamthi came to die in the streets of Shkoder, of who killed him and why, affords a glimpse into a world where old offenses are never forgotten, where no easy mechanism exists to break a murderous cycle of vengeance. n a different part of Europe, Shkoder would be a tourist resort. A city of some 80,000 in northernmost Albania, it spreads gracefully over the plains beside Lake Shkoder, surrounded on all sides by rugged mountains. On its southern edge, a great medieval castle overlooks the confluence of the Kiri and Drin Rivers, the country beyond giving over to wheat fields and forest. Rather than a tourist resort, though, Shkoder today is pretty much a ruin, its lake thoroughly polluted, most of its old factories crumbled to dust, the rows of drab high-rise apartments on its outskirts seemingly ready to follow suit. Most of all, Shkoder suffers under the reputation of being one of the most dangerous places in a very dangerous country.
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Testament to the level of violence in Shkoder is that the junior prosecutor assigned to solving Shtjefen Lamthi's murder has trouble recalling much about the crime. At the moment, he is juggling some two dozen criminal cases, almost all of them murders, and the killing of Lamthi in the summer of 1998 is basically ancient history to him, the details growing indistinct. "It did have one unusual aspect," he finally offered, when I sat and talked with him in a quiet cafe about 100 yards from where the killing took place. "To do it in public like that, with so many witnesses, that is not normal. It means the killer wanted to send a message." As for what that message might be, the prosecutor was unwilling to even hazard a guess. On at least two points, there is no dispute: the end of Shtjefen Lamthi came very quickly and was very ugly. Before Lamthi had time to react, he was felled by several shots to the chest; his attacker then stood over him on the sidewalk and emptied the 30-bullet Kalashnikov clip into his body. When the firing finally stopped, the killer calmly slipped the assault rifle into a plastic bag and went on his way. Brazen even by the standards of Shkoder, the murder in Rus Square seemed to underscore just how deeply a climate of mayhem had taken hold in Albania, and how little Shtjefen's killer had to worry about consequences. When the police arrived at the murder scene, they simply loaded his body for the trip to the morgue, not even bothering to question any potential eyewitnesses to the attack. A young girl who had been wounded in the fusillade of bullets was taken home rather than to a hospital, her parents apparently wanting no association with the event. Even Shtjefen's brothers, who had accompanied him into Shkoder that day, were tight-lipped. When they came to the morgue to collect his body, they professed to have absolutely no idea who might want their brother dead. "That's how it works in Albania," the junior prosecutor said that afternoon in the cafe. "No one talks." lbania has never registered very high in the average American's consciousness -- and for good reason. For 40 years following the end of the Second World War, the small mountainous country was hermetically sealed from the outside world by its Communist strongman, Enver Hoxha, its inhabitants existing in an isolation rivaled by only that of North Korea. What news did filter out tended to fit neatly into the "News of the Weird" column: the hundreds of thousands of tiny concrete bunkers -- Hoxha's mushrooms" -- being built to repel some phantom foreign invasion; the fact that in the entire country there were only 700 television sets and 400 cars, all in the hands of the state. With the end of Communism, the world saw fleeting images, but they still tended to be odd and decidedly un-European: impoverished Albanians crammed shoulder to shoulder on rusting freighters pulling up on Italian beaches in the early 1990's, gunmen and looters taking to the streets in 1997 after vast pyramid schemes had bankrupted the economy. For such a small country -- roughly the size of Maryland -- Albania has very large problems. Along with being the poorest nation in Europe, it suffers the highest infant mortality rate and the lowest life expectancy. With virtually all its Communist-era factories in ruins, it has an unemployment rate well over 30 percent. It is also an environmental disaster zone, without a single waste-treatment plant in operation, and with huge tracts of the countryside now little more than toxic waste sites as a result of Hoxha's reliance on heavy industry. Two years ago, both the national economy and the government collapsed, and looting was rampant. A special target of the looters was the police and army arsenals conveniently located outside nearly every town, so that Albania was suddenly awash in high-powered weaponry. Ever since, the central government in the capital, Tirana, has struggled to re-establish its legitimacy and some semblance of order.
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While that campaign has had some success in Tirana, it has had little in the countryside. With whole towns controlled by heavily-armed smuggling mafias or mini-warlords, and ambushes frequent, travelers race to be off the roads before nightfall. In the northern district of Tropoje, several relief workers have been murdered by bandits, and the humanitarian organization, Doctors Without Borders, has had so many of its vehicles stolen that it has won the local nickname Doctors Without Cars. The rise of organized and semiorganized crime is not the whole story, however. In fact, it has served to mask a deeper, darker truth about Albania. Communism never actually modernized Albania, but merely put the old ways, the village ways, in a kind of deep freeze -- much as Tito did in Yugoslavia following World War II. The collapse of the state and the national economy has led many Albanians to once again openly embrace the traditional laws and loyalties of the village. These are spelled out in the kanun (pronounced ka-NOON), a book of rules and oaths. By the dictates of the kanun -- there are actually several versions, most of which came into being centuries ago -- one's primary allegiance is to clan and community, not to the state. In accordance with this allegiance, taking revenge in order to defend the honor of one's family is not only permissible but also a sacred duty. Of course, unlike medieval times, now that duty can be carried out with modern weaponry like assault rifles. The most enduring of the kanuns, and also the most severe, was that formulated by a 15th-century nobleman named Leke Dukagjini. For centuries, the horrifically bloody vendettas sparked by his kanun in the northern mountains of Albania was the stuff of Balkan legend, until the practice was largely stamped out during the country's Communist era. Now, with the flood of weapons into the streets following the 1997 crisis, his edicts have been resurrected to deadly effect, claiming lives all across Albania. Dukagjini's base of power was a narrow rugged valley in northern Albania that now bears his name; not coincidentally, the Dukagjin Valley was also the original home of Shtjefen Lamthi and of the man who killed him. That man's name is Leka Rrushkadoli, and on Aug. 3, 1998, he stalked Shtjefen through the Rus marketplace to take revenge for an incident that had occurred 13 years earlier in their home village, Thethi, 50 miles northeast of Shkoder. That incident began with an overturned dinner table. But in murdering Shtjefen Lamthi, Leka Rrushkadoli had set into motion one of the trickier tenets of the Dukagjini kanun. By atoning one blood debt he had given birth to a new one. Now it was his family's turn to be hunted, the Lamthi family's turn to take vengeance. estled in the uppermost reaches of the Dukagjin region, the vale of Thethi is imbued with a mournful kind of beauty, its spectacular setting tinged with a claustrophobic, end-of-the earth feel. Closed on all sides by sheer limestone cliffs of several thousand feet and cut through by a glacial blue river, its 500 or 600 inhabitants -mostly subsistence farmers and shepherds -- receive only a few hours of sunlight a day, and for centuries their only way out was the narrow river gorge cutting south into the rest of the Dukagjin Valley. Today, a rugged and rarely used dirt track leads over the mountains to connect Thethi with Shkoder, three hours away. So isolated and poor was the Dukagjin that the Islamic Ottomans who ruled Albania for 400 years barely bothered with it. As a result its inhabitants, mostly Catholic, lived out an existence little changed from medieval times. And rather than submit to any concepts of Ottoman or Western law, they continued to govern themselves accordingAt the south end of the Thethi vale is a reminder of the kanun's power, a three-story stone tower known as a kula . In old times, the males of a family involved in a blood feud would gather in a kula to await a peace settlement or to learn the terms of the vendetta, a wait that could last months or even years. Testament to the frequency of such feuds
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is that at one time nearly every Dukagjini family had a kula. While today most of the kulas are gone, the mentality that they represent is not. At the northern end of the valley, a narrow path leads over open fields to three stone houses. One belongs to Leka Rrushkadoli, the killer of Shtjefen Lamthi. Since the murder, his house has sat empty. Just up the slope from Leka's house is that of his 35-year-old cousin, Martin. Martin and I sat on his stone terrace one afternoon, eating olives and sipping raki, the homemade Albanian version of grappa, as his half-naked children scrambled about in the warm sunshine. But every few moments Martin turned to glance down the path. Caught in the act, he gave an embarrassed smile. "Even sitting here," he explained, "sometimes it makes me nervous." He grabbed the arm of his youngest child, a 3-year-old boy. "Even this one, he has to worry, because after all this time we still don't know the terms of the blood." Since the murder in Rus Square, Martin and all the other males of the extended Rrushkadoli family -- some 50 just in the Thethi environs -- have been "locked," confined to their houses as they wait for the Lamthi's to take their revenge. In that time, Martin has barely left his tiny patch of land; when he does, he always carries his Kalashnikov assault rifle with him. "We are all afraid, just waiting for the peace to be done or. . . . " He glanced down the path again. "Well, if they come for me and I kill them first, then I am free. By the kanun, they can't come for me a second time." Taking in the limited view from the terrace -- a few fields and then the enclosing wall of cliffs -- I tried to imagine what it would be like to stare at that, and little else, for more than a year. When I brought this up with Martin, he seemed puzzled. "It's dull," he finally managed, "but I am luckier than most. My relatives in Shkoder, they can't even go outside their houses." Despite a life that amounts to a form of captivity, one in which death may be just around the corner, he has no anger toward Leka. "Leka had to do it to restore the family honor," he said. "He had no choice." More than a mere set of laws, the kanun of Leke Dukagjini is a meticulous blueprint governing all aspects of communal life, with rules set in place for everything from how to bury the dead and conduct a proper wedding to what happens when one person's bee swarm ventures onto another's property. Even in the settlement of simple disputes, the logic can, at times, be elusive. If, for example, a neighbor's pig is marauding your property, it can be killed so long as it is not wearing a verze, or restraining collar; if it is wearing a verze -- which presumably should have kept it from wandering off in the first place -- and you kill it, the pig's owner has to be compensated. But it is in the area of criminal law where matters become the most exacting -- and the most exotic. At its core, the kanun is all about defending one's honor, since "a man who is dishonored is considered dead." While lesser offenses to one's honor can be settled through apologies or giftgiving, higher offenses mandate the taking of bBy the dictates of the kanun, a murder is the ultimate affront to a family's honor, the family existing in a limbo state of disgrace, essentially "owned" by the killer, until they "take their blood back" -- and the most respectable way to do that is to kill the killer. Of course, once this is done, it means the other family is in disgrace and needs to take its blood back. If it sounds like a recipe for slaughter, it gets worse. Since the kanun of Leke Dukagjini was not written down until the beginning of this century, its precepts were passed down orally -- which meant they mutated. In the original edicts, for example, only the actual murderer was targeted in a "blood," or a kanun-sanctioned vendetta, but those parameters gradually expanded over time to include all his male relatives. In some villages, certain crimes were judged so heinous that they
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mandated a 2-for-1 or even 3-for-1 payback. A result was bloods that ranged over entire regions and for generations -- the longest reportedly lasted 240 years -- and left scores dead. They also had a devastating economic impact. Since a home could never be invaded in order to carry out a blood, the males of an entire extended family on the wrong side of a feud could spend years "locked" inside their houses or kulas. It was not until the rise of Enver Hoxha and his particularly vicious brand of Communism in 1945 that the cycle of vendetta in northern Albania began to be broken. In his fanatical pursuit of transforming the nation into a Red beacon, Hoxha immediately set about crushing anyone or anything he deemed counterrevolutionary -- and he took special aim at the kanun. In the Dukagjin, the kulas were razed and the authority of village elders subsumed by party commissars. For those caught in possession of a book of kanun, the sentence could be years of hard labor in the prison camps and the banishment of their families to the opposite end of the country. An especially ghoulish end was said to await those found guilty of committing a blood killing; according to folklore, Hoxha ordered the killers to be buried alive in the coffins of their victims. Not surprisingly, overt adherence to the kanun all but disappeared in the Dukagjin during the long Communist era. But the kanun was not eradicated. It survived quietly, beneath the Communist state, and it was a collision of these two forces -- the laws of the village and those of the state -- that ultimately set the Lamthis and Rrushkadolis of Thethi at war with each other. ix miles north of Shkoder is a grim patch of wind-swept farmland, remarkable only for the rounded tops of a half-dozen old bunkers of the Hoxha era rising out of the earth. Just beyond is a decrepit, three-room farmhouse held together with wood scraps and plastic sheeting. For eight years, this has been home to Shtjefen Lamthi's older brother, Preka Lamthi, his wife, and their three daughters and two sons. Preka Lamthi, 52, has the unmistakable air of a mean drunk, the sort who can slide from macho joviality to offended rage in a flash -- and on the day I visited, Preka had been drinking a lot. As we sat in his dingy living room, he brought out a bottle of homemade raki and filled the shot glasses he had set before us. He began with a rambling, 15-minute disquisition on the evils of Communism, the horrors inflicted on Albania during Hoxha's rule. Then he suddenly stopped, raised his raki glass and waited until I raised mine. "When the Communists came to Thethi," he said slowly, in broken English, "I was the first person they asked to join the party. I didn't have to join. It was not required." He broke into a mirthless grin. "I joined." In the next instant, the grin was gone, replaced by anger. "And what do I have for my years of service?" he sneered. "This place. One cow, seven sheep, two pigs. That is all. I swear to you, that is all. That is what serving Hoxha gave me." In the collective memory of his people, Enver Hoxha lives on as a malignant ghost. From the end of World War II until his death, in 1985, he ruled Albania with all the capricious cruelty of a Stalin, combined with the paranoid xenophobia of North Korea's Kim Il Sung. For the slightest sign of disobedience to the Great Leader, an Albanian could be denounced as an enemy of the state and sent to one of the country's myriad prison camps; given the all pervasive security apparatus and the handing out of medals to schoolchildren who detected subversive tendencies in their parents, Hoxha was assured a steady supply of victims.
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Maintaining this "workers' paradise" required constant vigilance against all taint from the outside. The few Albanians allowed to possess radios or televisions, mostly the party elite, were constantly watched by the secret police; those found to have rigged homemade aerials to pick up transmissions from nearby Italy were sent to the gulags. In the 1970's, even as the horse-drawn cart remained the chief source of transportation in his impoverished nation, the Great Leader embarked on a fantastically expensive project to ring Albania with his reinforced concrete bunkers, not stopping until some half-million of his "mushrooms" dotted the landscape. Perhaps most crucially of all, his rigid control of internal migration ensured that Albania remained a largely village society. But of course, there is really no such thing as one-man rule; like despots everywhere, Hoxha sat atop a great pyramid of capos, each level of the pyramid lording its power over those below and at the mercy of those above. In the village of Thethi, Hoxha's man was Preka Lamthi. First recruited into the party as a teenager in the 1960's, Preka steadily For the next hour, leka rose through the ranks until he was named the secretary general for the Thethi region in the late 1970's. As such, he was one of the most powerful matter-of- factly explained why he killed men in the Dukagjin, with virtual life-and-death control over everyone shtjefen lamthi. 'by the else. To the Rrushkadoli family, a clear sign of Preka's omnipotence was kanun, any of the what occurred inside his house on the night of Jan. 13, 1985. lamthis were equal, just so long as one of them Both the Lamthi and Rrushkadoli clans had been in the Thethi area for paid. i saw shtjefen first centuries -- in fact, given the degree of intermarriage over the years, it so he paid.' was difficult to determine where one family ended and the other began -and one of Preka's closest friends since childhood was a neighbor named Noue Rrushkadoli. As men, and as fellow members of the Communist Party, the two frequently got together in the evenings to socialize, which usually meant playing cards over glasses of raki. So was the plan on the night of Jan. 13, 1985, when Noue dropped by the Lamthi house in Thethi; already gathered in the living room was Preka, his younger brother, Shtjefen, and two or three other men. While accounts differ on specifics, all agree that a lot of drinking ensued. "For a time," Preka recalled, "everything was fine, all having a good time. But then Noue lost his temper over something -- and he had a bad temper when drinking." According to Preka, the argument culminated in Noue's overturning the dining-room table, one of the gravest insults that can be committed in an Albanian home. When Preka ordered him from the house, Noue instead went for his knife, stabbing Shtjefen six times before being overpowered. Then, either there in the living room or in the corridor leading to the front door, someone stabbed Noue once in the chest. The blow hit his heart and he fell dead. "It was all a stupid, tragic thing," Preka says, "because Noue was a good friend of mine. But you have to say he brought his end on himself by taking up the knife." The authorities agreed. At an official inquest into the incident, a tribunal ruled that whoever struck the death blow -- it was never determined which of the men in the room stabbed Noue -- had acted in self-defense, and the case was dropped. Dropped but not forgotten. To Noue Rrushkadoli's two teenage sons, Leka and Angelo, then 19 and 16 respectively, Preka Lamthi had escaped justice because of his high position in the Communist Party. Even more to the point, he had violated one of the most solemn covenants of the kanun.
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"The house of the Albanian belongs to God and the guest" reads the kanun of Dukagjini, and so sacred is this notion of hospitality that a homeowner is expected to lay down his life for it. For the woman of the house, says the kanun, churlish behavior toward a guest deserves the same punishment as adultery: a cut locket of hair for a first offense, a bullet in the back for a second. There have even been cases of killers finding protection in the homes of their victims, for, as the kanun states, "If a guest enters your house, even though he may be in blood with you, you must say to him, 'Welcome!' " While Preka Lamthi had clearly failed to maintain these high standards, to Noue Rrushkadoli's two sons that wasn't the half of it. By officiating over the death of their father inside the Lamthi house, Preka had committed a crime explicitly listed in Chapter 157 of the kanun as mandating the "firetorch and ax" punishments: "If someone commits these crimes, he is executed by the village, his family is fined, his house is burned, his trees are cut down, his garden and vineyards are destroyed, and his survivors are expelled from the country with their belongings." If the Rrushkadoli brothers couldn't restore their family's honor so long as Preka was the Communist Party boss in Thethi, they were willing to wait. In 1988, with Hoxha dead three years and the Communist apparatus in Albania disintegrating, Leka made his first strike. Ambushing Preka in a Thethi lane, he managed to stab him several times before being pulled away. According to Preka, it was his first indication that the Rrushkadoli boys considered themselves "in blood" with him. "And that is not the way of the kanun," he told me. "You must inform the other side immediately that a blood exists. I had gone to their father's funeral, I had shaken their hands, so to attack me years later, this was a violation of the kanun." Not seriously injured in the attack, Preka declined to press charges against Leka. For the next several years the two families maintained a wary vigil -even as the society around them came apart at the seams. When Communism finally collapsed in 1991, it was as if Albania had awakened from a 46-year slumber. For the first time, Albanians saw both the cruel hoax they had lived in Hoxha's "paradise," and the comparatively fantastic wealth of their capitalist neighbors. Almost overnight, the face of the country changed. Tens of thousands of young men streamed for the borders, becoming the new "guest labor" of the continent, while mountain villagers who had been barred from moving in Hoxha's day poured down into Tirana and the coastal towns. With land ownership and free enterprise having been banned for nearly a half-century, everywhere a mad scramble was on to stake a claim or start a business. Amid the tumult, backwaters like Thethi quickly emptied out -- and among the first to leave that isolated village was the Lamthi family. By late 1992, nearly all the extended clan, including Preka and his five brothers, had gone over the mountains to resettle on the wind-swept plains north of Shkoder. If no longer enjoying the relative privilege they had known with Preka as party boss in Thethi, the six Lamthi brothers were at least able to get by on their Shkoder farmsteads. Gradually, with the Albanian economy coming to life under a succession of nominally democratic governments, they could even afford a few simple pleasures: radios, televisions, a battered old Mercedes for running errands into town. As for the old blood feud with the Rrushkadolis, most of the brothers barely gave it a thought.
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"We would watch if someone approached the house," Preka said, "maybe look around a bit when we went into town, but nothing more than that. It was a new time, so those things were over." Life slowly improved for the Rrushkadoli boys, too. In 1996, they also abandoned Thethi, moving together into a small apartment on a back street of Shkoder. If the living quarters were cramped -both Leka and Angelo were now married -- they were earning enough from short-term jobs to keep things together and at least imagine a better future. The feud with the Lamthis, now living six miles away, seemed all but forgotten to Leka and Angelo as well. For all, the brighter future ended very abruptly in early 1997, when Albania was felled by one of the most outlandish financial swindles the world has ever seen. By the mid-1990's, so-called investment banks had begun popping up in Albania and promising remarkable returns on client's deposits, often 200 percent to 300 percent annually. With little understanding of how capitalism actually worked, and with the Albanian government doing little to monitor the banks, Albanians began selling everything they had to cash in on the gold rush. As the deposits grew, so did the competition among the "banks"; by late 1996, several were advertising returns of 40 percent per month. In truth, the investment opportunities were nothing more than pyramid schemes, and when they started to collapse in February 1997, Albania exploded into violence. The riots seemed to release a collective rage that had been held back since Hoxha's time, and the mobs turned their wrath on any symbol of authority they could find: police barracks, town halls, even the old state-run factories. They also turned their attention to the weapons arsenals that Hoxha had built outside almost every town. By the time the government was brought down and more than 6,000 mostly Italian peacekeeping troops arrived in April of that year, Albania had been transformed into a very scary place; there were now an estimated 650,000 modern weapons, mostly Kalashnikov assault rifles, in the hands of people largely ungoverned, destitute and steeped in the notions of blood and vengeance. One person that the collapse deeply affected was Leka Rrushkadoli. Now 35 and unemployed with a young son to care for, he seemed to remember suddenly his old blood feud from the Dukagjin. Buying a Kalashnikov assault rifle in the Shkoder market, he set out to find one of the Lamthi brothers. The first one to cross his path, on the early afternoon of Aug. 3, 1998, was Shtjefen. Of course, the 1997 crash had also profoundly altered the Lamthi family's lot in life, leaving them little incentive to ignore the "in blood" demands placed on them by the kanun for the murder of one of their own. lesh Prela clearly subscribes to the best-defense-is-a-good-offense theory. A "cousin" of Leka Rrushkadoli, in the elastic way that term is used in the Dukagjin, the 71-year-old shepherd has made a number of preparations around his little stone house in the back reaches of Thethi should one of the Lamthis come calling. When asked what those preparations consist of, the elfin old man smiled mischievously. "Well," he said through an interpreter, "all of us who are related to Leka have guns in our houses, of course, but maybe we also have them buried in the fields for when we are working. Maybe some of us have grenades, even rocket launchers. The situation in Thethi today requires it."
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For seven months after the killing of Shtjefen Lamthi, Llesh Prela never left his property. He now feels emboldened enough to venture a little farther afield, usually to visit with other Rrushkadoli relatives in Thethi who are similarly "locked." With evident amusement he told of a cousin who lived in Canada for 10 years, but who returned to Albania the previous summer. "Bad luck," he laughed, "because now he is locked, too." The Lamthi-Rrushkadoli blood feud is, in fact, just one of two currently taking place in Thethi. The other is so bizarre that Mark Shyti, a wizened man who fixed his age at "about 80," can barely bring himself to speak of it. "It is within one family," he whispered with incredulity, "one set of cousins against another. This is something I've never heard of before, against everything in the kanun." This blood is such a disgrace and blot on Thethi's reputation that the old 'Well, all of us who are man became fretful at the mere suggestion of my meeting the family. "But these people are very low," he said, "not worthy of being spoken to. related to Leka have guns in our houses, of It could cause problems for you." The implication was that my own status course, but maybe we as a privileged guest in the valley would suffer should I pursue the matter. also have them buried in the fields for when As a lifelong resident of the Dukagjin, Shyti has tremendous experience we are working. . . . with bloods; he estimated that, in this region of some 13,000 inhabitants, The situation in Thethi there have been at least 200 blood killings in his lifetime. "Very many today requires it.' when I was young," he said, "then very few during the dictatorship. Now it has come back again, and new ones are starting all the time." As one of the elders of Thethi, Shyti is occasionally called upon to mediate in local disputes and, with luck, forge a peaceful resolution. He also represents a vital bridge over the Hoxha interregnum, drawing on his knowledge of earlier bloods to set precedents -- and limits -- for those occurring now. Late into one night, we sat with half a dozen other men in the living room of his son's home as he described noteworthy bloods of the past and their legalistic peculiarities. The conversation eventually turned to a very recent incident, one that revealed both the complexity of the kanun and the slipperiness with which it can be applied. Six days earlier, a married couple from the Dukagjin had been stopped on the road to Shkoder by four bandits. The woman had a pistol hidden in her purse and, when the bandits' attention was diverted, used it to shoot two of them dead; the other two bandits then returned fire, killing her and wounding her husband before fleeing. For the next half-hour, Shyti was silent as the other men in the room offered theories as to where the blood lies in this case. Most eventually decided that the dead woman's family -- that is, her father and brothers -- should now take revenge against the families of the two surviving bandits, until Shyti raised a dissenting finger. "By the kanun," he intoned, "banditry is permissible if it is to feed one's hungry children. If that can be proved in this case, then it is the families of the dead bandits who have a blood with the woman's family, because it was she who started the shooting." The others in the room nodded solemnly at this pronouncement, but I couldn't recall ever having come across the "hungry children" clause in the kanun. When I politely pointed this out, the old man shrugged and said, "It is a local interpretation."
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efore setting out for Shkoder, Albanian journalists in Tirana had warned me of a city under virtual siege, its streets cleared by early afternoon, the nights given over to shootouts between local mafias and the mountain clansmen who have come down in recent years and brought their blood feuds with them. The reality was not nearly so dire. Shkoder residents this past autumn didn't begin to head indoors until 4 or 5 in the afternoon, and an elite, well-armed police battalion trained by the Italians was manning roadblocks on the edge of town, conducting spot checks of travelers from behind black ski masks. The heavy police presence was clearly having an effect; as the United Nations noted about Shkoder in one of its weekly security reports: "The situation is calm, with only two reported murders on the 19 Oct." One of those responsible for Shkoder's incremental return to civility is a dapper 41-year-old man named Emin Spahia. A former hospital barber, Spahia is now the general secretary of the AllNation Reconciliation Mission, a grass-roots organization dedicated to ending the blood feuds in Albania through mediation. This is no simple task, since arranging a peace can take years of negotiations with the warring families and then, if a peace is achieved, a mass gathering of all the extended relatives must be organized for a ceremony. "You must get them all to gather for the ceremony," Emin Spahia told me. "Otherwise, someone can decide they are not bound by the peace, and the blood will start again." Spahia came to his current vocation after his own family was involved in a blood. In 1987, his uncle was killed in a dispute with a neighboring family, and five years later his cousin took revenge. While the feud was eventually settled, Spahia spent eight months "locked," long enough to persuade him never to be involved in another blood and to work toward ending others. By his account his work has been remarkably successful. With virtually no outside funds (the Soros Foundation did donate a computer and two-way radio system this year), he and his mediators -usually elderly men respected in their communities -- have met with more than 2,000 Albanian families "in conflict" in the past two years. In the process, they have managed to head off some 350 disputes before they reached the killing stage -- even divorces and car accidents can spark bloods -and brought an end to more than 600 active feuds. As Spahia proudly pointed out, that translates into more than 10,000 people being freed of their "locked" status, including more than 1,000 children now able to return to school. At the same time, with an estimated 2,700 feuds still active in Albania and more starting up every day, Spahia suspects he won't be out of a job any time soon. "Most of these go back to the land ownership disputes of '91," he said, referring to the national scramble for property after the collapse of Communism, "but then when all the guns came out in the '97 crisis, that's when the killing really started. The big problem now is a lack of government, so it keeps spreading. Before, the Dukagjini kanun was only in the north, but since '97 you are seeing it in Tirana, in the south, even in other countries." According to Emin Spahia and others, there have been several cases of Albanian emigres in the United States and Western Europe being killed as a result of homeland feuds; there have also been cases of emigres returning to Albania in order to take revenge. By coincidence, the headquarters of the All-Nation Reconciliation Mission -- a windowless secondfloor cubicle donated by a local merchant -- is a mere 40 feet from the spot where Leka Rrushkadoli gunned down Shtjefen Lamthi. That blood feud is one that Spahia and his mediators have been trying to end. Over the past year, the general secretary has paid a number of visits to the
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Lamthis on their farmsteads north of town, as well as to many of the Rrushkadolis who are "locked" in Shkoder. "I'm optimistic about ending this one," Emin Spahia said, "because the Lamthis seem ready to negotiate. The big obstacle, though, is Leka. His relatives are still too nervous to arrange a meeting with him, and until we speak, it's very difficult to negotiate a peace." When I mentioned that I'd heard Leka was living as a fugitive in the hills above Thethi, Spahia smiled. "Yes," he said, "that is what families like to say in these situations, but it is possible that he is still here in Shkoder." That night an intermediary with extensive contacts in the "locked" community of Shkoder led a rambling tour through the town's deserted back streets. It turned out that Shkoder's "locked" inhabitants, estimated to number about 1,500, maintain an informal network among themselves; after knocking on the doors of half a dozen homes, and staring down the barrels of several guns, we were directed to an address near downtown. After a brief discussion with a woman at the building's entrance, we were told to come back in the morning, that someone who might know Leka's whereabouts would meet with us. he metal door opened a few inches, and a heavily-built man quickly looked me up and down. I noticed he had worried eyes and was very pale. After a moment, he pushed the door open and ushered me inside, into a tiny living room adorned with old family photographs and Catholic icons. As we sat, the man continued to study me, seeming both timid and wary. "I am Leka," he said finally. A few minutes later, we were joined by Angelo, Leka's younger brother. He, too, was very pale, but he had used his 14 months of house imprisonment to learn rudimentary English from a textbook. For the next hour, Leka matter-of-factly explained why he killed Shtjefen Lamthi, starting with how his father came to die in Preka's house 13 years before. Interestingly, his account of that first death differed very little from Preka's, and he readily acknowledged that his father had escalated the argument by going for his knife. When I suggested that this act made his father more culpable in the tragedy, and the Lamthis less so, Leka simply shrugged. "That doesn't matter in the kanun," he replied. "By the kanun, the very worst crime is to kill someone inside your house, no matter the circumstances or how it started." "That's right," Angelo chimed in. "For this, the Lamthis should have left Thethi. By the kanun, Preka should have been executed, his house destroyed and all his family made to leave the valley and never show their faces again." Leka nodded. "But we didn't ask for that. All we wanted was for Preka to come to us and ask for our forgiveness. But he was the big party boss for the district, he knew he couldn't be touched, so he treated it like nothing. For 13 years we waited for him to come to us, and finally I could not wait any longer." Throughout the brothers' tale ran a deep current of animosity for Preka. For Shtjefen, on the other hand, there seemed no rancor and even a measure of sympathy; after all, both Leka and Angelo recognized that he was the first victim in the whole case, stabbed by their drunken, knife-wielding father. It prompted me to ask an obvious question.
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"Rather than kill Shtjefen, why didn't you wait for the chance to kill Preka?" Leka pondered. "But it made no difference" he said eventually. "By the kanun, any of the Lamthis were equal, just so long as one of them paid. I saw Shtjefen first, so he paid." What the Rrushkadoli brothers wanted now was a peace settlement with the Lamthis so that they could venture out their apartment door and return to the world. The score has been evened at one death apiece and, as Emin Spahia had earlier pointed out to me, it is always easier to broker peace when the score is tied. Except this blood feud doesn't quite have a tie score, as Angelo reminded his brother: "There is still the time you stabbed Preka in Thethi." "That's right," Leka conceded. "That will have to be negotiated." ater, when I told Emin Spahia of my meeting with Leka, he was pleased. "This means he is trusting now," Spahia said, "maybe even a bit desperate for it all to end. I'm very confident that we will have a peace here very soon." He may be right, but I can't say I share his confidence. I remember sitting across from Preka Lamthi, his look of feigned amazement when I asked about the ongoing blood feud between him and the Rrushkadolis. "Blood? But we have no blood with them. That is all in the past now." At that, his two grown sons had exchanged sly glances and smirked. I also remember what the Rrushkadoli brothers said as I left them. Perhaps emboldened by the presence of a visitor, they had stepped across their apartment threshold to stand on the landing and gaze out at the sunlit street. "The Lamthis should give us peace now," Angelo said, "because technically they still owe us. We are not asking for anything more but, by the terms of the kanun, for killing our father inside their house, they owe us three deaths." "That's right," Leka had nodded, blinking furiously against the sunlight he had barely glimpsed in 14 months. "Three of theirs." Scott Anderson
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CONTENTS
Preface …………………………………………………………………..……….……1 Prologue …………………………………………………………………….…..…….1 Introduction …………………………………………………………………..……. 2 . Kosovo in Serbia ……………………………………………………..…………… 3 Dinaric region
……………………………….………………………..………..… 9
Dinaroids ............................................................................................................. 11 Who are Albanians ? …........................................................................................20
Kosovo and Metohija ……………….………………………………………..….30 The autonomous province Kosovo and Metohija ………………………………44
Yugoslavia after Tito ……………………………………………..…………..…60 The Fall of Titonic (Disintegration of Yu2) ……………………..….…………..…….72
Disintegration of Yugoslavia and KiM ……………………….…………..88 Dinarization of Serbia …………………………………………………...........100 KiM and world……………………………………………………………………111 Shqiptar rebellion ……………………………………………………….……...138 The Merciful Angel ………………………………………….……………..……....167
Epilogue ? ………………...………………………………….………………..…..186 Two Serbias ……………………………………………………………….….…. 218 KiM under the UN protection …………………………..…………………….…….229
KiM - What solution? ………………………………………..……..……….244 Concluding remarks ……………………………………………..………..….269 Epilogue ……….……………………………………………………………….….269 Summary .........……………………………………………………………………270 APPENDICES ……………………………………………..……………………271 APPENDIX 1 ……………………………………………………………………..…271 APPENDIX 2 ………………………………………….…………………..………..272 APPENDIX 3……………………………..…………………………….…………. .274
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APPENDIX 4 ...........……………………………………………………………… 276 APPENDIX 5 ……………………………………………………………………….281 APPENDIX 6 ….…………………………………………………….……..……….283 APPENDIX 7 …...………………………………………………………………….286 APPENDIX 8 .......………………………………………………………………….288 APPENDIX 9 ……………………………………...........………………………………….291
APPENDIX 10 …………………………………………………………………… 294 APPENDIX 11 .....................................................................................................................296
APPENDIX 12 ......….……………………………………..……….…..………… 297 APPENDIX 13 ……………………..……………………………..……….………………300
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