REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES OFFICE OF THE CITY PROSECUTOR X x x CITY X x x, Complainant, -
I.S. No. _______
versus -
For: ESTAFA
and
B.P. Blg. 22.
Xxx (Alias: x x x), Respondent. x---------------------------------x
COMPLAINT-AFFIDAVIT
THE UNDERSIGNED COMPLAINANT respectfully alleges:
1.
COMPLAINANT. – The complainant is x x x, of legal age , married, Filipino and, for purposes of this
criminal complaint, with postal address at: Xxx 2.
RESPPONDENT. – The respondent is x x x, aka, of legal legal age, married, xxx national, and with the
following three (3) addresses, where summons and notices may be served, to wit: X x x.
3.
NATURE OF THE CRIMINAL COMPLAINT. - This is a criminal complaint for ESTAFA and for violation
of B.P. Blg. 22 involving the sum of Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) arising from various checks issued by the respondent to the complainant. 4.
ULTIMATE FACTS.
X x x. 4.11.
For the record, and to form part hereof, by incorporation and reference, attached hereto are
copies of the following supporting documents, to wit: X x x. 5.
DISCUSSION.
APPLICABLE LAWS 5.1.
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code on deceit/swindling (estafa) provides any person who
shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned there in shall be punished by the penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if t he amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years; provided that the fraud be committed by any o f the following means: 1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely: X x x. (b) By misappropriating or converting, to the pre judice of another, money, goods, or any othe r personal property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such money, goods, or other property. 2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts execute d prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud: (a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar deceits. X x x. (a)
By pretending to have bribed any Government employee, without prejudice to the action for
calumny which the offended
party may deem proper to bring against the offender. In this case, the offender shall be punished by the maximum period of the penalty. (b)
By post-dating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had
no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of check. The failure of the drawer of the check to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within t hree (3) days from receipt of notice from the bank and/or the payee o r holder that said check has been dishonored for lack of insufficiency of funds shall be prima facie evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act. (As amended by Republic Act No. 4885, approved June 17, 1 967.) 5.2.
Article 316 (other forms of swindling) of the Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty of
arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods and a fine of not less than the value of the damage caused and not more than three times such value, shall be imposed upon “any person who, to the prejudice of another, shall execute any fictitious contract.”
5.3.
Article 318 (other deceits) of the Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty of arresto
mayor and a fine of not less than the amount of the damage caused and not more than twice such amount shall be imposed upon any person who shall defraud or damage another by “any other deceit not mentioned in the preceding articles of this chapter.”
5.4.
5.4.1.
Further, B.P. Blg. 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) provides:
Any person who makes or draws and issues any check to apply on account or for
value, knowing at the time of issue t hat he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such che ck in full upon its presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank t o stop payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more than one (1) year or by fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the check which fine shall in no case exceed Two Hundred Thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.
5.4.2.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who having sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient
funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank.
5.4.3.
Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the person or persons
who actually signed the check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable under this Act.
5.4.4.
The making, drawing and issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee
because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee.
5.4.5.
It shall be the duty of the drawee of any check, when refusing to pay the same to the
holder thereof upon presentment, to c ause to be written, printed or stamped in plain language thereon, or attached thereto, the reason for drawee's dishonor or refusal to pay the same: Provided, That where there are no sufficient funds in or credit with such drawee bank, such fact shall always be
explicitly stated in the notice of dishonor or refusal. In all prosecutions under this Act, the introduction in evidence of any unpaid and dishonored check, having the drawee's refusal to pay stamped or written thereon, or attached thereto, with the reason therefor as aforesaid, shall be prima facie evidence of the making or issuance of said check, and the due presentment to the drawee for payment and the dishonor thereof, and that the same was properly dishonored for the reason written, stamped or attached by the drawee on such dishonored check.
5.4.6.
Notwithstanding receipt of an order to stop payment, the drawee shall state in the notice
that there were no sufficient funds in or credit with such bank for t he payment in full of such check, if such be the fact."
5.5.
BP Blg. 22 enumerates the elements of the crime to be
(1) the making, drawing and issuance of any che ck to apply for account or for value;
(2) the knowledge of the maker , drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and
(3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not t he drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.
There is deemed to be a prima facie evidence of knowledge on the part of the maker, drawer or issuer of insufficiency of funds in or credit with the drawee bank of the check issued if the dishonored check is presented within 90 days from the date of the check and the maker or drawer fails to pay thereon or to make arrangement with the drawee bank for that purpose.
5.5.1.
The statute has created the prima facie presumption evidently because "knowledge"
which involves a state of mind would be difficult to establish. The presumption does not hold, however, when the maker, drawer or issuer of the check pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon or makes arrangement for payment in full by the drawee bank of such checkwithin 5 banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee bank. Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 c learly provides that this presumption arises not from the mere fact of drawing, making and issuing a bum check; there must also be a showing that, within five banking days from receipt of t he notice of dishonor, such maker or drawer failed to pay the holder of the check the amount due thereon or to make arrangement for its payment in full by the drawee of such check.
LATEST APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE: ESTAFA
5.6.
In PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VIRGINIA BABY P. MONTANER, G.R. No. 184053, August 31,
2011, the accused was convicted for the crime of Estafa as defined and penalized under paragraph 2(d), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. The Information alleged that on or about May 17, 1996 in the Municipality of San Pedro, Province of Laguna and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court accused Virginia (Baby) P. Montaner did then and there w illfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud one Reynaldo Solis in the following manner: said accused by means of false pretenses and fraudulent acts
that her checks are fully funded draw, make and issue in favor of one Reynaldo Solis ten (10) Prudential Bank Checks, all having a total value of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) and all aforesaid checks were postdated June 17, 1996 in exchange for cash knowing fully well that she has no funds in the drawee bank and when the said c hecks were presented for payment t he same were dishonored by the drawee bank on reason of “ACCOUNT CLOSED” and despite demand accused failed and refused to pay
the value thereof to the damage and prejudice of Reynaldo Solis in the aforementioned total amount of P50,000.00.
To exculpate herself from criminal liability, accused Virginia Baby P. Montaner denied the allegations that she issued ten (10) checks in private complainant’s favor claiming that the ten (10) checks w ere borrowed from her by one Marlyn Galope because the latter needed money. She gave the ten checks to Galope, signed the same albeit the space for the date, amount and payee were left blank so that the checks cannot be used for any ne gotiation. She further told Galope that the checks were not funded. When she learned that a case was filed against her for estafa, she confronted Marlyn Galope and the latter told her that money will not be given to her if she will not issue the said checks. She has no knowledge of the notice of dishonor sent to her by private complainant and claimed that her husband, who supposedly received the notice of dishonor left for abroad in July 1996 and returned only after a year, that is, in 1997.
In a Decision dated April 8, 2 003, the trial court convicted appellant for t he crime of estafa as defined and penalized under paragraph 2(d), Article 315 o f the Revised Penal Code and sentenced her to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from twelve (12) years of prision mayor as minimum to twenty-two (22) years of reclusion perpetua as maximum and to indemnify complainant Reynaldo Solis in the amount of P50,000.00.
Appellant elevated the case to the Court of Appeals but the adverse ruling was merely affirmed by the appellate court in its Decision dated February 12, 2008.
Hence, appellant interposed an appeal before the Supreme Court and put forth a single assignment of error: THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED I N FINDING THE ACCUSED –APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF ESTAFA UNDER A RTICLE 315, PAR. 2 (D) OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.
Appellant maintains that she entrusted the subject checks, purportedly signed in blank, to Marilyn Galope (Galope) out of pity in order for the latter to secure a loan. Thus, there is purportedly no
certainty beyond reasonable doubt that she issued the ch ecks purposely to defraud Reynaldo Solis (Solis) into lending her money. She further claims that no transaction had ever transpired between her and Solis. Admitting that she may have been imprudent, she nonetheless insists that her simple imprudence does not translate to criminal liability.
The Supreme Court was not persuaded.
The Court cited Paragraph 2(d), Art icle 315 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). – Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means me ntioned hereinbelow x x x:
xxxx
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
xxxx
(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein we re not sufficient to cover the amount of the check. The failure of the drawer of the check to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within t hree (3) days from receipt of notice from the bank and/or the payee or holder that said check has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds shall be prima facie evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act.
According to the Court, the elements of estafa under paragraph 2(d), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) the postdating or issuance of a check in payment of an o bligation contracted at the time the check was issued; (2) lack of sufficiency of funds to cover the check; and (3) damage to the payee.[1]
In the said case, the prosecution sufficiently established appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt for
estafa under paragraph 2(d), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. According to Solis’s clear and categorical testimony, appellant issued to him the 10 postdated P rudential Bank checks, each in the amount of P5,000.00 or a total ofP50,000.00, in his house in exchange for their cash equivalent.
From the circumstances, the Court held that it was evident that Solis would not have given P50,000.00 cash to appellant had it not been for her issuance of the 10 Prudential Bank checks. These postdated checks were undoubtedly issued by appellant to induce Solis to part with his cash. However, when Solis attempted to encash them, they were all dishonored by the bank because the account was already closed.
Solis wrote appellant a demand letter dated October 13, 1996 which was received by appellant’s husband to inform appellant that her postdated checks had bounced and that she must settle her obligation or else face legal action from Solis. Appellant did not comply with the demand nor did she deposit the amount necessary to cover the checks within three days from receipt of notice. This gave rise to a prima facie evidence of deceit, which is an e lement of the crime of estafa, constituting false pretense or fraudulent act as stated in the second sentence of paragraph 2(d), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.
As for appellant’s claims that she merely entrusted to Galope the blank but signed checks imprudently,
without knowing that Galope would give them as a guarantee for a loan, the Court viewed such statements with the same incredulity as t he lower courts.
Evidence, to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a cr edible witness, but it must be credible in itself – such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances. The Court has no test of the truth of human testimony, except its conformity to our knowledge, observation and experience. Whatever is repugnant to these belongs to the miraculous and is outside judicial cognizance.[2]
Appellant wished to impress upon the Court that she voluntarily parted with her blank but signed checks not knowing or even having any hint of suspicion that the same may be used to defraud anyone who may rely on them. Verily, appellant’s assertion defies ordinary common sense and human experience, the Court stated.
Moreover, the Court added, it is elementary that denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and co nvincing evidence, is negative and self-serving evidence which has far less evidentiary value than the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.[3] It agreed with the lower courts that appellant’s bare denial cannot be accorded credenc e for lack of evidentiary support. As aptly noted by
the trial court, appellant’s failure to produce Galope as a witness to corroborate her story is fatal to her cause. In all, the Court of Appeals committed no error in upholding the conviction of appellant for estafa. Hence, the Supreme Court AFFIRMED the two decisions of both the trial court and the appellate court.
LATEST APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE: B.P. BLG. 22
5.7.
In EUMELIA R. MITRA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and FELICISIMO S. TARCELO, G.R. NO.
191404, July 5, 2010, the petitioner Eumelia R. Mitra(Mitra) was the Treasurer, and Florencio L. Cabrera (deceased), Jr. was the President, of Lucky Nine Credit Corporation (LNCC), a c orporation engaged in money lending activities. Between 1996 and 1999, private respondent Felicisimo S. Tarcelo (Tarcelo) invested money in LNCC. As the usual practice in money placement transactions, Tarcelo was issued checks equivalent to the amounts he invested plus the interest on his investments by Mitra and Cabrera, were issued by LNCC to Tarcelo.
When Tarcelo presented these checks for payment, they were dishonored for the re ason “account closed.” Tarcelo made several oral demands on LNCC for t he payment of these checks but he was
frustrated. Constrained, in 2002, he caused t he filing of seven informations for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP 22) in the total amount of P925,000.00 with the MTCC in Batangas City.
After trial on the merits, the MTCC found Mitra and Cabrera guilty of the charges and ordered them to respectively pay the mandated fines for each violation and with subsidiary imprisonment in all cases, in case of insolvency and it furtheradjudged them c ivilly liable and ordered them to pay, in solidum, private complainant Felicisimo S. Tarcelo the amount of NINE HUNDRED TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P925,000.000).
Mitra and Cabrera appealed to the Batangas RTC contending that: they signed the seven chec ks in blank with no name of the payee, no amount stated and no date of maturity; they did not know when and to whom those checks would be issued; the seven checks were only among those in one or two booklets of checks they were made to sign at that time; and that they signed the checks so as not to delay the
transactions of LNCC because they did not regularly hold office there. The RTC affirmed the MTCC decision.
Meanwhile, Cabrera died. Mitra alone filed a petition for review w ith the Court of Appeals claiming, among others, that there was no proper service of the notice of dishonor on her. The Court of Appeals dismissed her petition for lack of merit.
Mitra went up to the Supreme Court on a petition for r eview and submitted the issues: WHETHER OR NOT THE ELEMENTS OF VIOLATION OF BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 22 MUST BE P ROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT AS AGAINST THE CORPORATION WHO OWNS THE CURRENT ACCOUNT WHERE THE SUBJECT CHECKS WERE DRAWN BEFORE LI ABILITY ATTACHES TO THE SIGNATORIES; and WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS PROPER SERVICE OF NOTICE OF DISHONOR AND DEMAND TO PAY TO THE PETITIONER AND THE LATE FLORENCIO CABRERA, JR.
The Supreme Court denied the petition.
The Court held that a check is a negotiable instrument that serves as a substitute for money and as a convenient form of payment in financial transactions and obligations. The use of checks as payment allows commercial and banking transactions to proceed without the act ual handling of money, thus, doing away with the need to physically count bills and coins whenever payment is made. It permits commercial and banking transactions to be carried out quickly and e fficiently. But the convenience afforded by checks is damaged by unfunded checks that adversely affect confidence in our commercial and banking activities, and ultimately injure public interest.
BP 22 or the Bouncing Checks Law was enacted for the specific purpose of addressing the problem of the continued issuance and circulation of unfunded checks by irresponsible persons. To stem the harm caused by these bouncing checks to the community, BP 22 considers the mere act of issuing an unfunded check as an offense not only against property but also against public order.[4] The purpose of BP 22 in declaring the mere issuance of a bouncing check as malum prohibitum is to punish the offender in order to deter him and others from committing the offense, to isolate him from society, to reform and rehabilitate him, and to maintain social order.[5] The penalty is stiff. BP 22 imposes the penalty of imprisonment for at least 30 days or a fine of up to double the amount of the check or both imprisonment and fine.
Specifically, BP 22 provides:
SECTION 1. Checks Without Sufficient Funds. — Any person who makes or draws and issues any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or c redit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not t he drawer, without any valid reason, ordered th e bank to stop payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more than one (1) year or by a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount o f the check which fine shall in no case exceed Two Hundred Thousand Pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who, having sufficient funds in or c redit with the drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check if pre sented within a period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing thereon, fo r which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank.
Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, t he person or persons who actually signed the check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable under this Act.
SECTION 2. Evidence of Knowledge of Insufficient Funds. — The making, drawing and issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after rece iving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee.
Mitra posited in the petition that before the signatory to a bouncing corporate check can be held liable, all the elements of the crime of violation of BP 22 must first be proven against the corporation. The corporation must first be declared to have committed the violation before the liability attaches to t he signatories of the checks.
The Court stated that it found itself unable to agree with Mitra’s posture. The third paragraph of Section
1 of BP 22 reads: "Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the person or persons who actually signed the check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable under this Act." This provision recognizes the reality that a corporation can only act through its officers. Hence, its wor ding is unequivocal and mandatory – that the person who actually signed the corporate check shall be held liable for a violation of BP 22. This provision does not contain any condition, qualification or limitation.
The Court cited the case of Llamado v. Court of Appeals,[6] where it ruled that the accused was liable on the unfunded corporate check which he signed as treasurer of the corporation. He could not invoke his lack of involvement in the negotiation for the transaction as a defense because BP 22 punishes the mere issuance of a bouncing check, not the purpose for which the check was issued or in consideration of the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. In this case, Mitra signed the LNCC checks as treasurer. FollowingLlamado, she must then be held liable for violating BP 22.
Another essential element of a violation of BP 22 is the drawer’s knowledge that he has insufficient
funds or credit with the drawee bank to cover his check. Because this involves a state of mind that is difficult to establish, BP 22 creates theprima facie presumption that once the check is dishonored, the drawer of the check gains knowledge of the insufficiency, unless within five banking days from receipt of the notice of dishonor, the drawer pays the holder of the check or makes arrangements with the drawee bank for the payment of the check. The service of the notice of dishonor gives the drawer the opportunity to make good the check within those five days to avert his prosecution for v iolating BP 22.
Mitra alleged that there was no proper service on her of the notice of dishonor and, so, an essential element of the offense is missing. This contention, the Court said, raised a factual issue that was not proper for review. It is not the function of the Court to re-examine the finding of facts of the Court of Appeals. Our review is limited to errors of law and cannot touch errors of facts unless the petitioner shows that the trial court overlooked facts or circumstances that warrant a different disposition of the case[7] or that the findings of fact have no basis on record. Hence, with respect t o the issue of the propriety of service on Mitra of t he notice of dishonor, the Court gives full faith and cr edit to the consistent findings of the MTCC, the RTC and the CA.
The defense postulated that there w as no demand served upon the accused, said denial deserves scant consideration. Positive allegation of the prosecution that a demand letter w as served upon the accused prevails over the denial made by the accused. Though, having denied that there was no demand letter served on April 10, 2000, however, the prosecution positively alleged and proved that the questioned demand letter was served upon the accused on April 10, 2000, that was at the time they were attending
Court hearing before Branch I of this Court. In fact, the prosecution had submitted a Certification issued by the other Branch of this Court certifying the fact that the accused were present during the April 10, 2010 hearing. With such straightforward and categor ical testimony of the witness, the Court believes that the prosecution has achieved what was dismally lacking in the three (3) cases of Betty King, Victor Ting and Caras – evidence of the receipt by the accused of the demand letter sent to her. The Court accepts the prosecution’s narrative that the accused refused to sign the same to evidence their re ceipt
thereof. To require the prosecution to produce the signature of the accused on said demand letter would be imposing an undue hardship on it. As well, actual receipt acknowledgment is not and has never been required of the prosecution either by law or jurisprudence. [emphasis supplied]
With the notice of dishonor duly served and disregarded, there arose the presumption that Mitra and Cabrera knew that there were insufficient funds to cover the checks upon their presentment for payment. In fact, the account was already closed.
To reiterate the elements of a violation of BP 22 as contained in t he above-quoted provision, the Court said, a violation exists where:
1. a person makes or draws and issues a check to apply on account or for value;
2. the person who makes or draws and issues the check knows at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the full payment of the check upon its presentment; and
3. the check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or would have been dishonored for the same re ason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment. [8]
The Court added that there was no dispute that Mitra signed the checks and t hat the bank dishonored the checks because the account had been closed. Notice of dishonor was properly given, but Mitra failed to pay the checks or make arrangements for their payment within five days from notice. With all the above elements duly proven, Mitra cannot escape the civil and criminal liabilities that BP 22 imposes for its breach.[9]
6.
PRAYER.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that after notice and hearing the respondent be indicted for ESTAFA and VIOLATION OF B.P. BLG. 22 to protect/preserve the right/interest of the complainant to recover his claim of F ive Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00), plus exemplary damages of P100,000.00, moral damages of P100,000.00, atto rney’s fees of P125,000.00 plus 5% of the recoverable
amounts, and costs of suit.
X x x City, October 18, 2011.
Xxx Complainant LTO Driver’s License No.
__________________ Expiring on _________
Assisted By:
LASERNA CUEVA-MERCADER LAW OFFICES Counsel for the Complainant Unit 15, Star Arcade. C.V. Starr Ave.
Philamlife Village, Las Pinas City 1740 Tel. No. 8725443; Fax No. 8462539.
MANUEL J. LASERNA JR. Roll No. 33640, 4/27/85 IBP Lifetime Member No. 1907 IBP Leyte Chapter PTR 1016909, 1/7/11, Las Pinas City MCLE Compliance No. IV-1326, 2/3/11
SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before in Muntinlupa City me this ___ day of October 2011, affiant/complainant showing his official identification document as stated above.
Administering Assistant City Prosecutor
Annexes: “A” to “L“, supra.
[1]
Cajigas v. People, G.R. No. 156541, February 23, 2009, 580 SCRA 54, 63.
[2]
People v. Garin, 476 Phil. 455, 474 (20 04); People v. Samus, 437 Phil. 645, 6 59 (2002).
[3]
Gomba v. People, G.R. No. 150536, September 17, 2008, 565 SCRA 396, 400, citing People v.
Magbanua, G.R. No. 133004, May 20, 2004, 428 SCRA 617, 630. [4] Lozano v. Martinez, 230 Phil. 406, 428 (1986). [5] Rosario v. Co, G.R. No. 133608, August 26, 2008, 563 SCRA 239, 253. [6] 337 Phil. 153, 160 (1997). [7] American Home Assurance Company v. Chua, 368 Phil. 555, 569 (1999). [8] Rigor v. People, 485 Phil. 125, 139 (2004). [9] In Gosiaco v. Ching, G.R. No. 173807, April 16, 2009, 585 SCRA 471, 483, we held an accused corporate officer free from civil liability for the corporate debt after the lower court acquitted the accused of criminal liability under BP 22. Note that this is a totally different case from the present case as the issue here is both criminal and civil liability.
