JOHN J. DRUMMOND Georgetown University
HUSSERL O N T H E W A Y S TO T H E P E R F O R M A N C E OF T H E R E D U C T I O N
In the Cartesian Meditations, Edmund Husserl identifies the phenomenological reduction as a "fundamental form" of transcendental phenomenology's method.1 Since phenomenology's transcendental attitude can be clearly understood only when we have departed the natural attitude and assumed the transcendental attitude, mere recitation of the differing characteristics of these two attitudes is not sufficient to explain to one who remains in the natural attitude why he should abandon it when doing philosophy. Husserl, therefore, must provide a further account of how we are motivated to perform this reduction. In other words, he must prepare the "way" to such a performance by showing that the very idea of philosophy requires it. Iso Kern has distinguished, within Husserl's philosophy, three types of ways to the transcendental-phenomenological reduction, namely the Cartesian way, the way through intentional psychology and the way through ontology3 In so doing, Kern employs a structural analysis of the different ways, and, although admitting that Husserl's idea of the reduction and of the ways to its performance assumed many different forms, he argues that a clear understanding of these three ways can be achieved by focusing on modifications.3 Kem's methodology, however, conceals important historical developments in Husserl's conception of the reduction and, consequently, of the ways to its performance. This paper will sketch that historical development in order to provide a framework for challenging two of Kern's theses. The first of these theses is actally an assumption concerning the homogeneity of the three ways. This paper will argue that there are properly only two ways to transcendental subjectivity, namely, the Cartesian way and the ontological way. In other words, only these two ways contain their own motivating questions for the performance of the reduction. On the other hand, the way through intentional psychology does not contain a motivation proper to itself; its function vis-a-vis transcendental subjectivity is of a different order. 47
JOHN J. DRUMMOND The second thesis is Kern's explicit conclusion concerning the primacy of the way through ontology, which, according to Kern, yields '*the sense of the phenomenological reduction.., which Husserl ultimately always intends. ''~ This paper will argue, on the contrary, that the Cartesian and ontological ways are individually necessary, but only jointly sufficient, to determine the sense of the phenomenological reduction. This last point becomes clear only when it is understood that the purpose of the reduction is the determination of an absolute starting point for philosophy. Such a starting point must be one that is absolutely indubitable, apodictic. Mere apodicticity, however, is insufficient to fully determine this starting point as starting. There could be a variety of apodictic truths, all of which would qualify as possible starting points. Therefore, the starting point must also be determined as absolutely prior to and independent of all other possible starting points. These two requirements jointly determine the sense in which the phrase "absolute starting point" must be understood.~ The Cartesian and ontological ways each respond to only one of these senses of "absolute." Kern, in failing to realize the importance of both senses for Husserl's conception of the reduction, is led to assert the primacy of the way through ontology. I
The first detailed exposition of the methodological technique of the phenomenological reduction appears in The Idea o] Phenomenology of 1907. 8 These brief lectures call for the demarcation of a new dimension in which philosophy, as a radical science which must concern itself with the possibility of cognition, can grow. This new dimension demands a new starting point, entirely different from that of the natural sciences which merely assume the possibility of cognition. This starting point will be found through a critique of cognition in the Cartesian tradition. Husserl's "Cartesianism," therefore, from the beginning is concerned with the establishment of a cognition which is absolutely evident, which does not presuppose the possibility of the very cognition to be investigated. In order to find such a cognition, Husserl systematically subjects all cognitions to doubt, thereby placing the possibility of cognition itself in doubt. However, in calling all cognition into doubt, it is immediately seen that "not everything can be doubtful to me, for while I so judge that everything is doubtful, it is indubitable that I so judge. ''v Thus, the immanent act 48
HUSSERL ON REDUCTION of doubting, of judging, is revealed as indubitably given, as "adequately self-given. ''8 Opposed to it is the transcendent object, which is not beyond doubt. The reduction, then, is the exclusion of transcendence in favor of what can be immanently seen in a pure intuition. "Every intellective experience (Erlebnis) and every experience whalever.., can be made into the object o] a pure 'seeing' (Schauens) and 'apprehending' (Fassens), and, in this 'seeing,' it is absolute givenness. It is given as an existent, as a this-there, and to doubt its being makes absolutely no sense. ''~ The theme presented here concerns the nature of the evidence which attaches to such intuitions. Transcendent objects are apprehended only in intuitions which are susceptible to doubt. Every cogitatio, however, is indubitably seen. This question concerning the degree of evidence achieved by an intuition determines the Cartesian way as Cartesian. The Cartesian motif seeks an indubitable, evidential "seeing" as the absolute starting point of philosophy. Ideas 1~ is also primarily determined by the Cartesian way to the reduction. Husserl is again concerned with establishing a new attitude in which to do philosophy as a rigorous philosophy and with discovering an absolutely evident starting point. In this sense of an absolute starting point, therefore, the task is to discover a being or sphere of being which is indubitably and completely given. To accomplish this task, Husserl performs the reduction, the "disconnection" (Ausschaltung) or "bracketing" (Einklammerung) ~1 of all transcendents. Thus, the sphere of immanent objects, the cogitationes, remains as the desired sphere of being. Husserl distinguishes transcendent from immanent objects by means of a "fundamental difference in the manner of givenness. ''12 A transcendent is presented in adumbrations, in partial disclosures. The fact that a transcendent object is so presented, that it is never presented completely, signifies that any given presentation of an object might be nullified by a succeeding presentation of the same object from another perspective. In other words, the possibility of doubting the perception of transcendent objects always exists. Therefore, the evidence for transcendent objects cannot provide an absotute starting point for philosophy. On tlae other hand, immanent objects are not so presented. Immanent perception grasps its object completely, adequately,la and thus no presentation of an immanent object can be nullified by a subsequent presentation of the same object. Furthermore, immanent perception guarantees the existence of its object 49
JOHN J. DRUMMOND since this object belongs to the same unity as the act of perception itself, namely, the stream of experience. The world and its existence are dubitable, in the sense that a doubt is thinkable, 14 but it is absolutely inconceivable that the ego and its life not exist. Thus, the evidence for transcendental subjectivity and its stream of life is "absolute." The second sense of the "absolute" starting point for philosophy becomes more explicit in ldeas. When the mode of givenness of transcendent objects is opposed to that of immanent objects, another important distinction must be noted. Not only are immanent objects given indubitably and completely, whereas transcendent objects are not, but it is also conceivable that consciousness be given as a self-reflective sphere apart from any reference to a reality independent of it, whereas it is inconceivable that reality be given apart from its relation to consciousness. Thus, consciousness is absolute in this second, ontological sense as well. Consciousness is "a self-contained system of being.., a system of absolute being. ''15 This self-containedness, however, is not proper to transcendent being which "according to its sense [is] mere intentional being, therefore a being which has the merely secondary, relative sense of a being for a consciousness. ''16 Thus, the sphere of immanent experience is given independently of and prior to all other being. It is these two senses of "absolute," absolutely evident and absolutely prior, which determine the two genuine ways to the reduction. The Cartesian and ontological ways are both motivated by the search for an "absolute" starting point for philosophy. This starting point must be an indubitable existent which is absolutely prior to all other actual or possible existents. The Cartesian way is concerned with establishing the indubitability of the perception of this existent, while the ontological way is concerned with establishing its priority. These two themes remain, throughout Husserl's philosophy, the codeteminants of the full sense of the reduction, and, although more clearly isolated from one another and although significantly changed in exposition, so do these two ways to the reduction remain central to Husserl's discussions. II The middle period of the development of Husserl's thought on the reduction includes important developments in his conception of the ways to the reduction. Chief among these are the elucidation of his theories 50
HUSSERL ON REDUCTION of reduction and evidence in the light of his discussions of time-consciousness and the discussion of psychology as a relevant theme vis-a-vis the ways to the reduction. We shall trace these developments in First Philosophy~7 and Formal and Transcendental Logic ~s in order to establish the framework for understanding HusserI's later expositions of the ways to the reduction. Husserl's mature view of the constitution of inner time-consciousness, developed in the years 1909-1911, l~ contains a view of the nature of absolute consciousness which will significantly alter the sense in which the "absolute" starting point of philosophy is to be understood. Although his views on the temporal structure of consciousness were developed before the appearance of Ideas, the problems raised for the themes of reduction and evidence were only marginally considered there, s~. It was not until the 1920's that Husserl began to make revisions in related concepts, revisions necessitated by these reflections. The structure of any given phase of absolute consciousness is characterized as "primal impression, retention and protention, through which phases of the immanent object are experienced in the modes Now, past and to come."~l Thus, Husserl distinguishes, within consciousness, the ultimately constituting, unchanging form of the consciousness of inner time and the constituted temporality of immanent objects, for example the perceptions of transcendent objects?:2 Any given momentary phase of absolute consciousness intends a phase of the immanent temporal object, including not merely the N o w but also the just past and the yet to come. If it did not, there would be no consciousness of a temporal object. However, this awareness, in the momentary consciousness, of the just past as past is possible only by virtue of the retention ~ h e preceding momentary phase of absolute consciousness including its moment of retention. 2~ Husserl's early formulations of the reduction, however, considered the nature of the subjectivity acquired by the reduction to be merely "consciousness of." Now it can be seen that absolute consciousness involves a "double intentionality, T M namely, the direction to an immanent object and the direction to absolute consciousness itself, especially retention. Since retention also entails the "retention of retentions, ''25 absolute consciousness constitutes itself as a flow. The absolute flow always transcends itself in an infinitude of retentions and protentions. However, as these retentions 51
JOHN J. DRUMMOND sink back into consciousness, they are lost to the present consciousness. They are no longer retained; they must be remembered. Since the absolute flow is more than what is immediately perceived, retained and protended in the momentary consciousness, absolute consciousness can never be presented in its entirety; it can never be adequately, apodictically given as a whole. It is with these considerations in mind that we now turn to the Cartesian way of First Philosophy and examine the question of an "absolute" starting point for philosophy. Husserl commences First Philosophy with a consideration of the nature of evidence and the problem of the beginning of philosophy. The beginning philosopher possesses no cognition which can claim to be perfectly evident, where "perfectly" is understood as "adequately."26 The beginning philosopher, then, must seek such a self grounding, adequate evidence upon which to ground a rigorous science. Adequate evidence, or complete givenness, guarantees itself by its ability to withstand all doubt and negation. In the attempt to doubt or negate an adequate evidence, the evidence reaffirms itself as indubitable. Thus~ adequate evidence is characterized by its apodicticity. Conversely, every apodictic evidence is adequate. 2v Husserl here explicitly indicates the equivalence of adequate and apodictic evidence. The reduction, therefore, must seek, as a starting point for philosophy, an evidence which is perfectly fulfilled and indubitable. This evidence is sought first through the critique of mundane experience. Perception, the primordial form of world-experience, although grasping its object in the latter's bodily presence, does not grasp this object completely. Perception apprehends its object in spatial variations, with horizons which must later be brought to fulfillment. "The" world exists only as an ideal which must be grasped in successive acts. The proposition "The world exists" is therefore dubitable, since this world is never completely presented and since our anticipations of it may be nullified in subsequent perceptions. Outer, mundane experience always has a presumptive character. 2~ Thus, the critique of mundane experience has a negative result - - the exclusion of the world as the adequate, apodictic starting point for philosophy.~~ Its positive result is the disclosure of the transcendental life of subiectivity as a field of experience, a~ A critique of this transcendental field of experience is required in order to determine whether or not it is presented in an adequate evidence. It should be noted that this critique is an exten52
HUSSERL ON REDUCTION sion of the Cartesian motif, which is primarily concerned with apodicticity and adequacy. In performing this critique, Husserl does not explicitly employ the results of the reflections on time-consciousness. Rather, he commences with the examination of the nature of this transcendental life, so that the "ego cogito does not remain an empty word for us. T M Husserl argues that the reduction leads not only to the transcendental life of the present but also to the transcendental life of the past and future. The argument is based on the natural human phenomena of memory and anticipation. He shows that every memory, for example, admits of a "double transcendental reduction, ''s2 the first of which yields the transcendental subjectivity of the present, namely, the present memorial act with its object as remembered. The second, beginning with the remembered object, discloses a part of a past transcendental life, namely, that act which was contemporaneous with the original presence of the object. In other words, both the present memorial act and the past perception on which the present act is based are revealed by the transcendental reduction. Likewise, acts of anticipation disclose a possible future transcendental life. Thus, the endless horizons of the past and future are uncovered and transcendental subjectivity is seen as a temporal being? ~ Given the temporality of consciousness, adequacy and apodicticity have not yet been achieved, for "no temporal being is apodictically knowable. T M The Cartesian way, therefore, must be extended to include an "apodictic reduction. ''35 At any given moment, only a core part of the ego, the ~living present," is experienced. 36 This living present can be understood in two senses?7 First, it appears as streaming, as the temporal moment "Now" between the just past and the yet to come. As such, however, it is itself a moment of an immanent temporal object, for example a perception, and cannot be adequately or apodictically known for it is presented with endless horizons of the past and future; it is presented in temporal adumbrations. On the other hand, the living present discloses itself "as the simple and pretemporal 'there' of my vitality in general. ''aS This pre-temporal "there," the abiding character of the living present, is the static form of consciousness, which form has the structure of primal impression, retention and protention. This form, as seen above, so constitutes itself as a flow, and insofar as the ultimate glow is more than what is immediately present ih the momentary phase, the absolute flow cannot be given adequately or 53
JOHN J. DRUMMOND apodictically. The absolute flow as a whole, therefore, cannot be the absolute starting point of philosophy. However, the invariant form of this absolute flow is given apodictically, as theself-constituting form which is "there" in any given phase of the absolute flow and which constitutes the immanent flow. Thus, the apodictic reduction to the living present is neither the abstraction of the Now from the just past and the yet to come nor the abstraction of the primal impression from retention and protention. 4~ Rather, it is the reduction to the adequately and apodictically knowable form of absolute consciousness. 41 Originally, therefore, the turn to psychological phenomena appears as a clarification of the Cartesian way by means of the clarification of the nature of subjectivity. 42 Only after Husserl has employed psychological themes in his Cartesian search for an adequate, apodictic evidence does he develop the way through psychology as an independent way to the reduction. The need to clarify the nature of subjectivity in working out the Cartesian motif has revealed that pure subjectivity is an important theme for philosophy. Thus, psychology presents itself to the beginning philosopher as a field through which he might move to philosophy. The way through intentional psychology begins with an abstraction of the psychic from the world and a reduction applied to this abstracted psychic domain. For psychology to be a universal science, this reduction must be universal. This universality cannot be accomplished through an infinite series of individual reductions applied to individual psychic acts, for such individual reductions presuppose the validity of the horizons of an act. Rather, the universal reduction must be accomplished in a universal willing which supersedes and replaces all individual reductions. 48 The psychologist takes no interest in the existence of the object of any psychic act; he refuses to participate in such positings. The psychologist focuses instead on the phenomenologically pure act, wherein the object to which the act is directed is included as a mere phenomenon. 44 Thus, the performance of the universal reduction yields the pure psychic and its correlates and intimations. In other words, it reveals the intentional and temporal structures of consciousness. However, the psychologist, in reflecting upon the psychic in the world, still presupposes the validity of the world in which he works and in which the reduced empirical acts of consciousness occur. .5 The survey of the psychologist is an act which can itself be further reduced, thereby yielding the pure transcendental subjectivity of the present 54
HUSSERL ON REDUCTION with all its intentional intimations and correlates. Now the study is no longer directed to a phenomenon in the world, but to the universal life of consciousness and its correlate, the experienced world, which includes both the constituted psychic life and its object. 46 Thus, phenomenology's concern becomes the unfolding of transcendental subjectivity by means of an apodictic self-critique.4v This middle period of Husserl's development also contains a discussion of the second sense of an "absolute" starting point. Although Husserl had isolated this theme as a separate way to the reduction as early as 19104s and, more importantly, in his Introduction to Philosophy lectures of 1919/ 1920, 49 Formal and Transcendental Logic contains the first published discussions of this way. All objectivities, including the ideal objectivities of logic, are given to subjectivity. Insofar as logic is concerned with judgments, the acts of judging in which these judgments are constituted must be examined. These acts, as do all acts of consciousness, contain within themselves intentional implications, especially those of retention. For example, predicative judgments presuppose positing perceptions of the subject of the predication. From this, it can be concluded that "jddgments as senses accordingly have a sense-genesis. ''5~ Therefore, the concern for the mode of givenness of logical objectivities leads to the awareness of a temporally-structured subjective genesis of the judgment, or, in other words, to an awareness of the temporal structure of constituting consciousness to which all objectivities are relative. Formal and Transcendental Logic also contains the first published occurrence of the distinction between adequate and apodictic evidence. A single perception, throughout its duration, has an "apodictic uncancellableness.T M However, since it has such temporal duration, it is "never a complete evidence. ''52 Thus, neither a perception nor its object is presented completely or adequately, although the act of perception, while we are perceiving, is indubitable. This indicates that Husserl no longer considers "adequate" and "apodictic" to be equivalent terms. We shall see the significance of this distinction in types of evidence when we return to the Cartesian motif in our discussion of the Cartesian Meditations. We have now seen that this middle period contains discussions of both senses of an "absolute" starting point. Further, psychology has been introduced in an attempt to darify the nature of the subjectivity acquired in 55
JOHN J. DRUMMOND the Cartesian way. This was necessary in order to lay a framework for the apodictic critique of subjectivity. We shall now turn to the later Husserl and trace the final expositions of these themes. III Kern considers the exposition of the Cartesian way in First Philosophy to be its purest form, 5a but, he argues, the transcendental ego is not adequately, apodictically given. Thus, Husserl abandons the Cartesian way in favor of the way through psychology and, finally, for the ontological way. Kern is then forced to attribute the appearance of the Cartesian Meditations, and its inclusion of the Cartesian motif, to Husserl's infatuation with this motif and his submersion in the Parisian environment.54 Likewise, Landgrebe would be hard pressed to explain the appearance of the Meditations, since he claims that First Philosophy is the beginning of the realization that the execution of the Cartesian search for an adequate starting point is impossible, a realization which culminates in the Crisis where phenomenology is grounded as an historical necessity. Thus, h e cites the famous quotation: "Philosophy as science, as serious, rigorous, indeed apodictically rigorous science - - the dream is over. ''5~ But this passage clearly refers not to Husserl's goal, but to other philosophies of the day, espedally historicist, existential and positivistic philosophies, which, according to Husserl, have lost sight of the true meaning, the true telos, of philosophy. Rather, First Philosophy indicates only the beginning of a revision in the Cartesian motif, a revision which is finally worked out in the Meaitations. Nor can Husserl's citation of the ontological way as another way to transcendental subjectivity and his references to the difficulties in the exposition of the Cartesian way in Ideas ~6 be taken as an abandonment of the Cartesian way in favor of the ways through ontology and phenomenological psychology, as David Carr takes them to be.,57 The fact that Husserl never released the German edition of the Meditations for publication does not indicate abandonment of the Cartesian way as a "definitive" introduction to phenomenology. Husserl is notorious for the continual questioning of his own positions - - this is the very meaning of a presuppositionless philosophy - - and this continual questioning led Husserl to new tasks, rather than to the editorial revision of previously delivered lectures. 56
HUSSERL ON REDUCTION Our view, on the contrary, is that the Cartesian Medit~ions and the Crisis jointly represent Husserl's final conception of the ways to the reduction. Thus, contra Kern, the Meditations presents the "purest" and the most complete account of the Cartesian way, one which integrates the discussions both of time-consciousness and of psychology. The Cartesian turn to subjectivity is accomplished by the me~od of doubt. This systematic doubting of all experiencing life seeks an evidence which does not afford any possibilities of doubt. 58 The spirit of Cartesianism is marked, therefore, by its concern for evidences which "are recognizable as preceding all other imaginable evidences... [and which] must carry with them a certain perfection, an absolute certainty,''"9 and this quest for radical apodicticity "indicates one of the ways that has led to transcendental phenomenology.''"0 However, it must be noted that "on more precise explication, the idea~y demanded perfection of evidence becomes differentiated. T M One sense of perfect evidence is that evidence which contains no unfulfilled moments, no unfulfilled horizons. This type of perfection is called adequate evidence. The second sense of perfect evidence is apodictic evidence, that is evidence which is absolutely indubitable. In cases of apodictic evidence, it is absolutely inconceivable that the object of the evidence could not be. The Cartesian motif commits Husserl to find an apodictic evidence. However, since apodicticity "can occur even in evidences that are inadequate, ''62 Husserl is no longer committed to the establishment of an adequate starting point. .3 In the order of evidence, the "absolute" starting point will be an apodictic starting point. The evidence for the existence of the world does not provide the required apodictic evidence. Particular encounters with the world may be illusory; they can be the products of dreams. Likewise, no science based upon these encounters can serve as the apodictic groundwork for philosophy. The critique of perception of the world and the sciences based thereon discloses transcendental subjectivity as the activity present in all perceptual encounters with the world and all the judgments of science. However, our reduction to transcendental subjectivity does not leave us with only the ego. The world remains as phenomenon, as the intentional correlate of the naive belief in its existence. It remains exactly as it was except that we no longer naively accept the validity of its existence. We withdraw our partidpation in this naive belief not from sceptical motives, 57
JOHN J. DKUMMOND but only in order to step back and reflect. In this reflective attitude, we are no longer concerned with the factual existence of either the belief or its object; they are to be investigated only as correlated phenomena which possess certain necessary structures to be determined. We are, then, confronted with concrete transcendental subjectivity, the ego and its objects purely as meant. However, at any given moment, only a part of the ego, the living present, is experienced, while other parts of the ego are necessarily meant as absent. We have already discussed the living present, ~4 but we must return to it in the light of our discussions of evidence. This living present was viewed as both the static form of consciousness and as a streaming moment of consciousness. As streaming, it is an immanent temporal object and cannot be adequately or apodictically given. Earlier, Husserl had claimed that the living present was, as the unchanging form of consciousness, given adequately and apodictically. However, the discussions of time-consciousness had revealed that this form was also a streaming, which, by virtue of the retention of retentions, constituted itself as a stream. Thus, "my apodictic 'I am' has the essential form of a streaming. ''65 Therefore, the living present necessarily intimates the entirety of the absolute stream of consciousness and this stream, as a stream, as more than what is contained in the living present, cannot be adequately given. Having divorced adequacy from apodicticity, Husserl can still claim that this living present, as the static form of consciousness - - primal impression, retention and protention - - and what is immediately present in it, can be grasped as that form which is indubitably given in any moment of consciousness, e6 The living present is the absolutely evident starting point for philosophy. It is apodictically given and ultimately constituting. However, explication of the structure of the living present necessarily leads back to the immanent acts of consciousness and their objects, which immanent acts are constituted by the absolute flow. Thus, an apodictic explication of transcendental subjectivity with all its temporal and intentional intimations is necessary in order to determine what further apodictic truths can be founded upon this starting point. Thus, the reduction, in addition to defining an absolutely evident starting point for philosophy also determines a field for research, namely, transcendental subjectivity, and defines a task for the philosopher, namely, the apodictic self-critique of concrete transcendental subjectivity with a view towards the infinite ideal of adequate knowledgeY 58
HUSSERL ON REDUCTION Kern's analysis of the Cartesian way focuses primarily on the two early formulations of The Idea o[ Phenomenology and Ideas and that of First Philosophy. He discusses three major deficiencies of the Cartesian way, 68 the first of which is that the reduction has the character of a forfeiture, of a "disconnection," of the world. Correlatively, consciousness appears as something which has withstood the reduction, as somethnig left over, as a "residuum." On this view, the validity of the world must be reestablished, and consciousness appears without content. Kern points out that this criticism rests upon a misunderstanding, 6~ for Husserl has indicated that every cogitatoi has its cogitatum. Kern further argues, however, that this fact cannot become clear in the Cartesian way, and, thus, the criticism maintains some validity since this way to the reduction is shown to be incapable of adequately determining the sense of the reduction. It must be noted, on the other hand, that the purpose of the way to the reduction is to achieve a starting point, not to explicate the subjectivity achieved. This latter task belongs to phenomenology proper. Husserl himself, Kern admits, was aware of the difficulties this kind of language presented. It could lead to the impression that the world does not belong to the domain of transcendental philosophy and that the cogito is merely the psychic abstracted from the material worldF ~ Furthermore, it can lead to the impression that the ego is "seemingly empty of content. ''vl However, Husserl's criticisms are directed only to the two early, misleading expositions and they do not affect the validity of the later expositions. It should be noted that First Philosophy and the Cartesian Meditations only rarely use these misleading expressions and that the turn to psychology in the former work is designed to "fill in" the content of subjectivity. The second defidency of the Cartesian way is that it cannot arrive at a complete concept of subjectivity, in the sense of intersubjectivity. Although the theme of intersubjectivity has not been explicitly raised here, it can be preliminarily seen that the "disconnection" of the world includes the "disconnection" of the animated corporeal reality through which the Other is appresented. Since this corporeal reality is unavailable to us, so too is intersubjectivity unavailable. This criticism, therefore, rests on the misunderstanding found in the first criticism. The non-Cartesian ways to the reduction, Kern argues, can include intersubjectivity within the primary field of transcendental phenomenology. 59
JOHN J. DRUMMOND However, they can do so only by virtue of the fact that they commence with the objective world, which is a world for "us." But this inclusion occurs only at a stage of the reduction wherein the reduction has not been completely effected and wherein a comprehension of intersubjective givenness requires a further reduction to the "primordial ego. ''~ Any complete performance of the reduction, whether motivated by the Cartesian or ontological way, must disclose the primordial living present as the starting point. Kern again asks a way to the reduction to do what phenomenology proper must do, namely, account for the constitution of intersubjectivity. The Cartesian way, according to Kern, also cannot attain a complete subjectivity in a second sense, that of an ego which includes both its past and its openness toward the future. The temporal structure of consciousness and the consequences of that structure do indeed present serious problems for Husserl, ones which are not well treated in the early formulations of this way. In Ideas, he only hints at the problems time will pose, for example when he indicates that even an experience (Erlebnis) is never adequately or completely perceived. All experiences flow in time out of the past and into the future. This inadequacy, however, is essentially different from the inadequacy of the evidence of transcendent (spatial) objectsY~ Kern's formulation of this criticism again rests on the misunderstanding found in the first criticism and, therefore, does not affect the structure of the way but only its misleading expositions. Kern claims that in First Philosophy Husserl reveals the temporal structure of consciousness by means of the grasping of consciousness' past horizon. Thus, a remembered object intimates an act of the ego's own past which was contemporaneous with that object's presence. The ego, therefore, constitutes its own past and, analogously, on the basis of antidpations, its possible future. However, Kern continues, such a constitution, in order to be valid, demands as its condition a valid past and future world through which we can intimate the temporal life of the ego. But this valid world has already been "disconnected," "forfeited," in the Cartesian way, and the constitution of the temporal life of the ego becomes impossible. The reduction, however, does not remove the world from the phenomenological field; it remains as phenomenon, as constituted in transcendental subjectivity. And it is the phenomenal (intentional) past and the phenomenal future, the remembered object as remembered and the anticipated object 6O
HUSSERL ON REDUCTION as anticipated, which serve as transcendental "clues" for the analysis of the
constitution of the ego's temporality, and not, as Kern argues, the objective time which exists in the world and whose validity is naively accepted. The results of Husserl's reflections on inner time-consciousness affect the structure of the Cartesian way because they reveal an egological structure considerably different from that found in his early works. The explication of this structure raises serious questions concerning the possibility of achieving a perfectly evident starting point for philosophy and this leads to Kern's third criticism of the Cartesian way to the reduction. The Cartesian way, Kern claims, does not reach its goal of an "absolute" starting point. However, our discussion of the MeditationF 4 reveals that the exposition of the Cartesian way there takes into account the consequences of these reflections for Husserl's theory of evidence. Thus~ having distinguished adequacy and apodicticity, Husserl can admit that the temporal flow of immanent consciousness and the pre-temporal stream of absolute consciousness are neither adequately nor apodictically given. Yet he can still argue that the living present, as the form of the absolute streaming and what is immediately present in this form, is apodictically given and, thus, the Cartesian requirement of indubitability is satisfied. Therefore, contra Kern, the Cartesian way does attain its goal. However, this apodictic evidence is an attainment of only one sense of the "absolute" starting point for philosophy. Husserl himself recognizes this when he remarks that this way to the reduction "lacks the apodicticity of the precedence belonging to transcendental subjectivity. ''7~ IV The way through ontology isolates the second theme involved in the search for an "absolute" starting point. The Crisis contains the clearest' exposition of this way, explicitly employing the theme of the Lebenswelt as the primary basis for all objectivities. The way through ontology is determined by the inquiry into the mode of givenness of all objectivities. Thus, as Kern points out, the way through ontology has a variety of points of departure, for example formal logic or ontology, material or regional ontologies, which form the basis for the natural and social sciences, and the life-world.76 When the way through ontology begins in the formal sciences or in the material ontologies or the positive sciences, it occurs in stages, the first of which is the reduction to the life-world, which is the "meaning61
JOHN J. DRUMI~OND fundament" of all objective sciences.77 Further inquiry into the mode of givenness of this pre-given life-world, the world given first of all through simple perception, reveals that this world is relative to a subject. Objects given in perception are given to a subjectivity; they are objects for a perceiving consciousness. The life-world and the structures built upon it, in fact all objectivities, are revealed as being essentially related to consciousness. However, this consciousness is an intersubjective consciousness; the life-world is given as a world for usd 8 But this intersubjectivity can be nothing other than mankind, which is itself a constituent of the world. The question then arises as to how a part of the world can constitute the world. T9 Upon reflection, however, it is seen that this intersubjectivity is itself a constituted objectivity. Human intersubjectivity is in the world, and by virtue of the reduction, it appears as a mere phenomenon to me, the primordial ego. Thus, all constituted objectivities, including intersubjectivity, are relative, that is intentionally related, to the absolutely unique transcendental ego, 8~ the "medium of access''81 to all objectivities. Therefore, Husserl has now achieved the second sense of "absolute" starting point, an existent which is prior to and dependent on no other possible existent. But apodictidty is still a concern. Indeed, Husserl tells us that "in the entry to the epoch6, the ego is given apodictically. ''82 However, the way through ontology is incapable of establishing this apodicticity, just as the Cartesian way is incapable of establishing its precedence. Therefore, we must conclude that the two ways are individually necessary and only jointly sufficient to achieve the performance of the reduction in such a way that the full sense of the "absolute" starting point will be won. The way through ontology has revealed that the world belongs to concrete transcendental subjectivity as intentionally related to it. Thus, the world is seen as an origin of analyses which will aid in the explication of the concrete ego. This is especially true of the subjectivity which exists in the world, namely, human subjectivity, the objectification of transcendental subjectivity. Therefore, Husserl again turns to psychology, as the empirical study of human subjectivity, to find an ontological point of departure and "clue" for the analysis of transcendental subjectivity. Empirical psychology is inadequate for the study of subjectivity because it presupposes both the validity of the methods of objective science and the validity of the world from which it abstracts the psychic. In our analyses, 62
HUSSERL ON REDUCTION we must abstain from the employment of these objectivist methods and depart from "the manners in which souls are pre-given in the lifeworld. T M It should be immediately noted that the way through psychology is thereby determined with respect to its motivating question as an instance of the way through ontology. Psychology as a science has the pre-given lifeworld as its basis and the way through psychology isolates for its analyses one of the abstract regions of this given world, namely, the psychic and its intentional correlates. This focusing on the structure of the psychic and its mode of givenness, the phenomenological-psychological reduction, establishes the phenomenological psychologist as a "disinterested spectator, T M whose universal interest in the psychic includes an interest in the intersubjective, not as externally juxtaposed minds, but as an internally unified psychic framework. However, the psychic and the intersubjective are objects of study; they are in the world. When we inquire about the mode of givenness of this objective, constituted framework, we must further reduce to the absolutely unique ego which is prior to intersubjectivity, s.5 This is the "apodictic ego, T M although this way cannot establish that apodicticity. It can only establish, as an instance of the way through ontology, that human subjectivity is intentionally related to an absolutely prior transcendental subjectivity. Thus, the radical inquiry concerning the psychic as it is given in the world leads to the disclosure of transcendental subjectivity. However, transcendental phenomenology and phenomenological psychology may still be distinguished. For the psychologist, interested only in the psychic in the world, the phenomenological-psychological reduction is sufficient,8z whereas the transcendental phenomenologist, the philosopher, must completely effect the reduction. V At the outset of our paper, we claimed that any way to the reduction, properly speaking, must possess a motivation for the performance of the reduction. We then claimed that this motivation was the attainment of an "absolute" starting point for philosophy, an "absolute" which was understood in two basic senses. The first of these senses to become an explicit theme was the "Cartesian" search for an absolute evidence. We have seen that Husserl's view concerning the nature of what would qualify as such absolute evidence changed signifi63
JOHN J. DRUMMOND candy from adequate and apodictic evidence to an evidence which was apodictic but need not be adequate. Apodictidty is a constant theme in Husserl's philosophy, since it is apodicticity which certifies a troth as an essential truth. The Cartesian way asks the question concerning the apodicticity of the starting point and the living present of the transcendental subject is shown to be given in such an evidence. The second motivational theme was the attainment of an absolute existent, that is one which is not relative to any other. Again, the determination of founding relationships is a constant theme for phenomenology and the way through ontology asks the question concerning the ultimate founding moment. Thus, all objectivities are disclosed as moments relative to transcendental subjectivity's living present, which, in turn, is absolutely prior and relative to no other moment. Taking these two ways to the reduction together, therefore, we have discovered the absolutely evident and absolutely iorior starting point of philosophy. Kern's claim that the ontological way is the one Husserl ultimately intended is only partially correct. Husserl certainly did finally intend this as a way to the reduction. However, he always intended the sense of absolute evidence as well, as his concern with apodicticity in the Crisis shows. Thus, Kern's claim that Husserl's distancing himself from the Cartesian way represents an abandonment of the goal of absolute evidence for the starting point of philosophyss is also only partially correct. Husserl does distance himself from the view that the starting point must be given in an adequate evidence. However, this does not affect the basic train of thought found in the Cartesian way, namely apodicticity, that type of perfect evidence which has the "higher dignity.''89 Thus, the Cartesian Meditations and the Crisis, as presentations, respectively, of the Cartesian and ontological ways, must be considered together in order to understand the full sense of the "absolute" starting point of philosophy. The way through intentional psychology, on the other hand, does not contain within itself any proper question which might motivate the performance of the reduction. Rather, the way through psychology appears as a special and most significant example of the way through ontology. Psychology can be considered as an objectivistic empirical science or as a regional ontology determined by an abstraction of a region from the 15regiven life-world, that is as phenomenological psychology, wherein the phenomenological-psychological reduction has been effected?~ In either of 64
HUSSERL ON REDUCTION these cases, an inquiry back from these sciences to transcendental subjectivity would be characterized as an example of the way through ontology.~ But Husserl has good reason to speak of this way through intentional psychology as a separate way. Psychology is the "decisive field ''~ of subjectivity in the world and although the way through psychology provides no motivating question peculiar to itself, intentional psychology serves to clarify the nature of transcendental subjectivity by providing a model for transcendental analysis. This view explains why Husserl, in both First Philosophy and the Crisis, introduces the psychological themes after transcendental subjectivity is attained by, respectively, the Cartesi~m and ontological ways. If the way through ontology were the "ultimate" way to phenomeno!o3y, as Kern claims, there would seem to be no explanation for the fact that the way through psychology appears after the way through ontology in the Crisis. Thus, Kem's criticism of the way through intentional psychology on the basis that it rests on an abstraction is misdirected? 3 First of all, such an abstraction is not analogous to the talk of the "disconnection" of the world in the Cartesian way. The latter is a misleading use of language in an exposition and not a necessary feature of the structure of the Cartesian way. The way through psychology, on the other hand, necessarily involves the isolation of human subjectivity in the world as a theme through the abstraction of the psychic from the world. Secondly, Kern's criticism is bas6-d on the view that the way through psychology is intended to provide its own motivation for the performance of the reduction. However, this, as we have argued, is not the case. Rather, the way through psychology derives its major importance from the fact that it bids us to pay attention to the analyses of intentional psychology, which analyses will function as models for the phenomenologist's analyses of transcendental subjectivity. Since we are c~ncerned with transcendental subjectivity, it is natural that our analytic model be the analyses o.f human subjectivity, namely, the psychological analyses of human subjectivity in the. life-world. This "propaedeutic" utility of psychology manifests itself in the fact that the theoretical results of intentional psychology may be transformed into philosophical insights by means of the transcendental turn : a radical, psychological unfolding of my apperceptive life and of the world appearing at any given moment therein in the how of its momentary appearing (therefore of the human "world-image") - - this would surely have 65
JOHN J. DRUMMOND tO attain, in the transition to the transcendental attitude, immediate transcendental significance, as soon as I now, at the higher level, constantly take into account the performance which gives sense to the objective apperception. ~ These considerations of the ways to the reduction certainly do not begin to answer all the questions concerning Husserl's conception of the transcendental-phenomenological reduction. By careful reflection on the ways to the reduction, however, the groundwork is laid for the detailed clarification of such questions as the proper determination of the philosophical attitude, the stages in the performance of the reduction and the relationship
of phenomenological psychology and transcendental phenomenology. The resolution of all these questions is crucial to an - - I use the word cautiously - - adequate understanding of the phenomenological method.
NOTES 1 Edmund Husserl, Cartesianische Medltationen und Pariser Vortriige, ed. S. Strasser, Husserliana I, and ed. (The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff, ~t96~), p. ~to6. Cartesian Meditations : An Introduction to Phenomenology, trans. Dorion Cairns, 4th impression (The H a g u e : Martinus Nijhoff, i97o), p. 72. (Hereafter referred to as Cart. Med., followed by the page reference to the German edition and, in parentheses, the page reference to the English translation.) 2 Cf. Iso Kern, "Die drei Wege zur transzendentalph~nomenologischen Reduktion in der Philosophie Edmund Husserls,'" Tijdschrift voor Filosofie, XXV (i962), 303-349 and Kern, Husserl und Kant.: Eine Untersuchung iiber Hus~erIs Verhi~ltnis zu Kant und zum Neukantianismus, Phaenomenologica 16 (The H a g u e : Martinus Nijhoff, ~t964), pp. ~95-238. (All of my references to Kern will be to the latter work.) 8 Cf., e.g., Kern, pp. ~t95, I96. 4 Ibid., p. 235. g Cf. Robert Sokolowski, The Formation of Husserl's Concept of Constitution, Phaenomenologica I8 (The Hague : Martintls Nijhoff, zt97o), pp. ~zl-33. Sokolowski cites the Cartesian and ontological ways as the most important of Kern's three ways. The argument of this paper, simply stated, is that they are so because they are the only two ways in the genuine sense; cf. p. 132, n. I. 6 Edmund Husserl, Die Idee'der Phllnomenologie : Fiinf Vorlesungen, ed. Walter Biemel, Husserliana II, znd ed. (The H a g u e : Martinus Nijhoff, I973); The Idea of Phenomenology, trans. William P. Alston and George Nakhnikian, 4th impression (The H a g u e : Martinus Nijhoff, 197o). (Hereafter page references, in parentheses, to the English translation will follow the reference to the German edition.) 7 Ibid., p. 3o (z3). My translation. 8 Ibid., p. 5 (5)o Ibid., p. 3I (24). My translation. 10 Edmund Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Ph/tnomenologie und phiinomenoIogischen PhiIosophie. Erstes Buch : AIlgemeine Einfi~hrung in die reine Phiinomenologie,. ed. Walter Biereel, Husserliana n I (The H a g u e : Martinus Nijhoff, 595o); Ideas : General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, trans. W.R. Boyce Gibson, 5th impression (London : George Allen and Unwin, Ltd.. and New York : Humanities Press, Inc., 1969). (Hereafter referred to as Ideen I,
66
HUSSERL ON REDUCTION followed by the p a g e reference to the G e r m a n edition and, in parentheses, the p a g e reference to the English translation.) 11 Ibid., p. 73 (~I4). 12 Ibid., p. 96 (~34)- M y itranslation. 13 H u s s e r l c a m e to realize that the g i v e n n e s s of an i m m a n e n t act of consciousness w a s not complete, although in a f u n d a m e n t a l l y d i f f e r e n t sense f r o m the incompleteness of thingperception; cf. ibid., p. ~o5 (~40), H o w e v e r , the consequences of this realization for the C a r t e s i a n w a y to the reduction w e r e not fully w o r k e d out until Cart. Med.; cf. below, p. 58. 14 Ideen I, p. lO 9 (145). 15 Ibid., p. 1~7 (x53).
16 Ibid. 17 E d m u n d H u s s e r l , Erste Philosophie (I923/24). Zweiter Tell : Theorie der phlinomenologischen Reduktlon~ ed. Rudolf Boehm, H u s s e r l i a n a V I I I (The H a g u e : M a r t i n u s N i j h o f f , 1959). (Hereafter referred to as Erste Phil. II.) 18 E d m u n d H u s s e d , Formale und transzendentaIe Logik : Versuch einer Kritilc der logischen Vernunfl ( H a l l e : M a x N i e m e y e r Verlag, 2929); Formal and Transcendental Logic, trans. D o r i o n C a i r n s (The H a g u e : M a r t i n u s N i j h o f f , x969). (Hereafter referred to as Form. u. trans. Log., followed by the p a g e reference to the G e r m a n edition and, in p a r e n t h e s e s , the p a g e reference to the English translation.) 19 Cf. John Brough, " T h e Emergence of an Absolute Consciousness W r i t i n g s on T i m e - C o n s c i o u s n e s s , " Man and Worlts V (~972), ~1~. 2~0 Cf. above, p. 49 and n. I5. 21 }~rough, ,p. 3x5. 22 Cf. ibid., p. 314. 28 Cf. ibid., pp. 317-22. 24 lbid.,:p. 3~7. 25 Ibid.,)p. ~ 9 . 26 Cf. Erste Phil. II, p. 35. 27 Cf. ibid., p. 35. 28 Cf. ibid., lecture 55. 29 Cf. ibid., lecture 36. 80 Cf. ibid., lecture 37. ~;1 Ibid.; p. I26.
in H u s s e r l ' s
Early
~2 Ibid., p. 85. 33 Cf. ibid., p. 86. 84 lbid.~ Appendix XIII, ,p. 398. ~3 Ibid.~ p. 80. ~6 Cf. ibid., lecture 40 and Appendix XXVIII; cs also Cart. Med., p. 62 (22). 37 }:or this discussion, cf. Klaus Held, Lebendige Gegenwart : Die Frage nach der Seins-
weise des transzendentalen Ich bei Edmund Husserl, entwlckelt am Leitfaden der ZeitprobIematik, P h a e n o m e n o l o g i c a ~5 (The H a g u e : M a r t i n u s Nijhoff, 1966), pp. 73-75. ~8 Ibid., p. 73; cf. also Brough, p. 3~6. 30 Cf. p. 9. 4o Cf. Held, p. 21. 41 W e shall see that this f o r m u l a t i o n is provisional and that it will be modified w h e n H u s s e r l d i s t i n g u i s h e s between the t y p e s of perfect evidence. 42 Cf. L u d w i g Landgrebe, " H u s s e r i ' s D e p a r t u r e f r o m C a r t e s i a n i s m , " in R.O. Elveton, trans, and ed., The PhenomenoIogy of HusserI : Selected Critical Readings (Chicago : Q u a d r a n g l e Books, 197o), p. 278. 43 Cf. Erste Phil. II, A p p e n d i x II, pp. 3~6-~7. 9 4 Cf. ibid., lecture 46. 45 Cf. ibid., A p p e n d i x XXIII, p. 445. 46 Cf. ibid., lecture 5~. 47 Cf. ibid., ~.ecture 52. 48 Cf. ibid., p. 2~5, n.. I (editor's note).
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JOHN J. D R U M M O N D 49 50 51 52 53 54 55
Cf. ibid., p. 2x9, It. x (editor's note). Form. u. trans. Log., ~p. I84 (207}. Ibid., p. 25~ (285). Ibid., p. 252 (285). Cf. Kern, p. 2ol. Cf. ibid., p. 236. Edmund Husserl, Die Krisis der europiiischen Wissenschaflen
und die transzendentale Ph~inamenologie : Eine Einleitung in die phiir~omenologische Philosophie, ed. Walter Biemel, Husserliana VI, 2nd ed. (The H a g u e : Martinus Nijhoff, 1962), Appendix XXVIII, p. 5o8;
The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology : An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy, trans. David Carl (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, ~07o), Appendix IX, p. 389. (Hereafter referred to as Krisis, followed by the page reference to the German edition and, in parentheses, the page reference to the English translation.) 56 Cf. Husserl, Krisis: sec. 43. 57 Cf. Cart's Krisis translation, p. 255, n. x (translator's note). Cf. also Cart, "The 'Fifth Meditation' and Husserl's Cartesianism," Philosophy and PhenomenologicaI Researcht XXXIV (x973-74), 14-25. O u r claim here is that the only extent to which Husserl is a "'Cartesian'" or " n e e - C a r t e s i a n " is in his quest for an indubitable, evidential starting point for philosophy. And it is precisely this theme of apodicticity which determines the Cartesian way as Cartesian and from this he does not depart. Also note that Husserl does not criticize the Cartesian way of the Cart. Med. as Carr implies. Husserl criticizes only the earlier formulations which did not incorporate the findings of his discussions of psychology and of time-consciousness, which formulations were misleading because of their language and incompleteness. The fact that Husserl does not again use the Cartesian way in the Krisis seems, to me, irrelevant. 58 Cf. Cart. 7Med., p. 45 (5). ~ Ibid., p. 55 (x4)... Cairns' translation modified. 6o Ibid.~ p. 48 (6); cf. p. 237, critical remark to this passage, a reuxark incorporated in Cairns' translation.
61 Ibid. 62 Ibid. (~5). 6~ This is Landgrebe's error. He does not recognize the importance of this later distinction between adequacy and apodicticity in his discussions of Husserl's rejection of the Cartesian motif. Such a recognition, however~ leads to the view that what is involved is merely a change in the sense of Husserl's " C a r t e s i a n i s m " and not a departure from it. Cf. Landgrebe,
p. 267. 64 Cf. above, pp. 5x-53. 65 Edmund Husserl, Ms. E III 9, P. z4 (2953), as quoted by Held, p. 75. 6.6 Husserl, at one point, indicates that this moment of the living present is experienced adequately, although his immediately subsequent descriptions indicate that he does not claim that it is completely given hut only indubitably given. Cf. Cart. Med., p. 62 (22-23), 67 Cart. Med., sec. 22. 68 Cf. Kern, pp. zo2-a3. 69 Cf. ibid., p. 204. 7o Cf. ibid., p. 204; cf. also Erste Phil. II, pp. 432-~. 71 Krisls, p. 258 (255). T2 Cf., e.g., Cart. Med., Meditation V; Krisis, sec. 54b and pp. 255-5Q (252-55); Form. u. trans. Log., sec. 96 for evidence that Husserl consistently held this position throughout his writings. 73 Cf. Ideen I, p. zo 3 (24o). 74 Cf. above, pp. 57-59. 75 Cart. Med., p. 259, marginal note to p. 6~, lines z2ff. (2x, n. 4). 76 Cf. Kern, p~. 218. ?7 Cf. Krisisj secs. 9h and ~4-3578 Cf. ibid., p'. :t75 (I72). 79 Cf. ibid., p. x83 079).
68
HUSSERL ON REDUCTION 80 Cf. ibid., secs. 54-55. 81 A r o n G u r w i t s c h , The FieId of Consciousness, D u q u e s n e Studies, Psychological Series 2, and i m p r e s s i o n ( P i t t s b u r g h : D u q u e s n e U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1964) , p+ I66. 82 Krisis, ,p. 191 (187).
8a Ibid., p. 2~5 (a,l). 84 Cf. ibid., sec. 69. 85 Cf. ibid., p. 260 (256). s6 Ibid. 87 Cf, ibid., sec. 72. 88 Kern, p. 237.
89 Cart. Med., p. 55 (1~;). 9o Cf+ Krisls, secs. 66 and 72. 0 1 Cf. above, p. 6:t. 9a Krisis, sec. 58. 93 Cf. K e r n , pp. 2,6-,8. 94 Krisi~, p. 2~o (206). M y translation.
Cf.
also
Edmund
Husserl,
Ph/inomenologische
Psycholagie : Vorlesungen Sommersemester 19a5, ed. W a l t e r Biemel, H u s s e r l i a n a IX, and ed. (The H a g u e : M a r t i n u s N i j h o f f , 1968), pp. 295-96, 344-49.
N o t e : I should like to acknowledge my gratitude to Professor John Brough of Georgetown University who, in the course of conversations with me, has clarified a number of the points discussed in this paper.
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