Why was the Provisional Government overthrown by the Bolsheviks in October 1917? Arguably Arguably the ‘most important event in the political history of the twentieth century,’1 that wrought havoc on modern Europe leaving scars that can still be seen today. It is therefore crucial to understand exactly what led to the downfall of the rovisional rovisional !overnment. Its ultimate downfall was inevitable, as the name suggests the government was after all only supposed to be provisional. "owever, there is much historiography on the sub#ect of why the rovisional !overnment was overthrown overthrown in $ctober 1%1& and especially by a minority party li'e the (olshevi's. In August 1%1) *enin estimated party membership as something between )+,+++ and +,+++-"owever, this was probably an exaggeration.’ Although, /heila 0itpatric' identi2es ‘a total of )+,+++ members, including 3+,+++ in etrograd’ ) by $ctober 1%1&. Even in 1%1) the party’s numbers were minute in comparison to 4ussia’s entire population of an estimated 1++million. "ow then could such a small party gain mass support in little under a year to result in the upheaval of the rovisional rovisional !overnment5 An orthodox orthodox /oviet historian’s account, may suggest that the rovisional !overnment was overthrown because it was the right time for the !reat /ocialist 4evolution. (olshevism ‘pitted the bourgeois controllers-against the proletariat, the class destined to bring about socialism,’ 6 and had instilled a real understanding of the revolutionary process, furthermore placing state power in the hands of the wor'ing masses. 7estern historians however, would argue that the revolution revolution was a chain of unfortunate accidents that led to the (olshevi's becoming increasingly popular. After all the years of violence following the revolution suggests they did not have popular support, if this was the case why exactly did the rovisional !overnment collapse5 ‘
8he precise precise reasons reasons behind the the fall of the rovisiona rovisionall !overnment have been argued argued by many historians such as 4obert /ervice, Edward Acton and /heila 0itpatric' however, the debate now turns to whether this change in authority was inevitable or #ust an unfortunate unfortunate accumulation of events. Acton, for example suggests that ‘without the war-there would not have been a revolution in 4ussia9’ for there would have been few problems that highlighted the inner :aws of the governmental 1 7ood, A. The Origins of the Russian Revolution: 1861-1917, ;*ondon, 1861-1917, ;*ondon, 1%<&=, p.1. >li?, 8. Lenin 1: Building the Party, 189-191! , ;*ondon, 1%&=, p.1. ) 0itpatric', /. The Russian Revolution, ;$xford, Revolution, ;$xford, 1%<=, p.63. 6 Acton, E. ‘8he 4evolution and its "istorians@ the "riti#al "o$%anion in >ontext’ in "riti#al "o$%anion to the Russian Revolution: 191!-19&1, ed., E. Acton, .Iu. >herniaev, 7.!. 4osenberg, ;*ondon, 1%%&=, p.3.
system. 0or although, the war may not have bro'en out at such a delicate time in 4ussia’s modernisation, one must refute this by suggesting that the war was a mere catalyst and that revolution would still have been inevitable due to the brewing social unrest below the surface of the regime. It is vital to understand the context in which the 4evolution occurred. 0or instance when the rovisional !overnment too' over from the 4omanov dynasty the economic system was one of particular instability, which was further destabilised by 4ussian involvement in the war. In appearance and substance it was modern and capitalist with a large industrial labour force however eighty percent of the population still remained overwhelmingly agrarian. 3 As 7ood suggests, ‘this existence of a modern industrial society-with a large, land Bhungry peasantry whose economic interests were long neglected by the government is a 'ey factor in an understanding of the nature of the 1%1& 4evolution.’ & Another point to ma'e is the 'ey role the military played, in particular the 4ussian military was utilised in maintaining internal order. "owever, with continued involvement in 7orld 7ar $ne it could not be used for this purpose as it had previously for the tsar. 8herefore the rovisional !overnment, particularly Cerens'y, was careful to avoid outright unrest within the population by attempting to sate demands. According to 4abinowitch, ‘to understand the dynamics of the $ctober 4evolution, it is essential to ta'e account of the results of the 0ebruary revolution.’ < Especially signi2cant was the emergence of two potential governing bodies from the aftermath of 8sarism. $ne being the internationally recognised rovisional !overnment, initially dominated by liberals, although later encompassing a coalition between liberals and moderate socialists ;Denshevi' and /4 ministers=. 8he other, the /oviet, controlled by moderate socialists. 8he ual ower situation was instigated initially as a complementary system to stem political radicalism and it was hoped that the /oviet’s support would Fuell wor'er, peasant and soldier unrest and demands. % >onversely the ual ower led to increased friction as it became clear that the Cadets of the rovisional !overnment had expansionist war aims and the dual power only served to mas' a power vacuum. 0urthermore ‘the publication of a Acton, E. ‘8he (attleground’ in The Russian Revolution: the 'ssential Readings, ed., D.A. Diller, ;$xford, ++1=, p.%. 3 7ood, A. The Origins of the Russian Revolution, p.. & 7ood, A. The Origins of the Russian Revolution, p.. < 4abinowitch, A. ‘8he $ctober 4evolution’ in "riti#al "o$%anion to the Russian Revolution: 191!-19&1, ed., E. Acton, .Iu. >herniaev, 7.!. 4osenberg, ;*ondon, 1%%&=, p.<1.
note from the 0oreign Dinister, Dilyu'ov, assuring the Allies that 4ussia would 2ght the war to victory led to angry public protests.’ 1+ As a result of the collaboration between government and moderate socialists the (olshevi's were the only political party with an unswervingly antiGwar policy. Dost important to the collapse of the rovisional government was arguably the mista'es of Dinister for 7ar and rime Dinister, Alexander Cerens'y. Above all he was adamant that whilst (ritain, 0rance and the H/A continued to 2ght successfully then 4ussia should continue its 2ght on the Eastern 0ront and so uphold the Alliance. 8his fast became unpopular with the 4ussian population as it also had a 'noc'Gon e?ect whereby middling and wor'ing class people ‘shared the fear that bread and potatoes might soon become unobtainable.’ 11 Doreover the cost of living sharply rose as wage rises did not 'eep pace with in:ation. ue to foreign 2nancial support becoming increasingly harder to obtain Cerens'y was forced to raise money through circulating more ban' notes. 8his inevitably led to in:ation and peasant unrest as lower harvest yields led to peasants withholding more grain and a countrywide food shortage. It became increasingly clear to Cerens'y that if he was to begin satisfying demands 4ussia would need to withdraw from the war. erhaps his reluctance or lac' of clear strategy to do so led to the collapse of the rovisional !overnment. 7hite suggests that ‘most Dodern 7estern "istorians have agreed that the government could not have resolved social problems and won public con2dence without abandoning its own values.’ 1 Although, it could be debated that there may have been many times in history when a government has given up its values in order to retain power9 what was to stop them doing precisely that. 0or one the (olshevi' party according to Acton became immensely popular and ‘was con2rmed by explosive growth in the party’s membership-1+,+++ in 0ebruary to some +,+++-by $ctober.’ 1) "owever there were other factors that prevented the rovisional !overnment from retaining power, some in the form of political crises. % /ervice, 4. The Russian Revolution: 19((-19&7, /econd Edition, ;*ondon, 1%%1=, p.). 1+ 7ood, A. The Origins of the Russian Revolution, p.63. 11 /ervice, 4. ) *istory of +odern Russia: ro$ i#holas .. to Putin, ;*ondon, ++)=, p.. 1 7hite, " in ‘8he rovisional !overnment’ in "riti#al "o$%anion to the Russian Revolution: 191!-19&1, ed., E. Acton, .Iu. >herniaev, 7.!. 4osenberg, ;*ondon, 1%%&=, p.)%1. 1) Acton, E. Rethin/ing the Russian Revolution, ;*ondon, 1%%+=, p.1%).
$ne particularly notable political crisis came in the form of Cerens'y’s une o?ensive at !alicia. It was initially promising yet unsurprisingly transformed into another military failure after the 4ussian military was repelled by !erman forces and thousands of troops defected or deserted9 which conseFuently resulted in a disheartened population that was also mentally wea'ened. Cerens'y states that@ ‘0ellowGsoldiers- you must 'now that only by a stubborn struggle will you win Jielding before the troops of the !erman Emperor, you lost both your land and your freedom.’ 16 8herefore it may be due to the lac' of war morale that soldiers were encouraged to forgo commands from oKcers, (olshevi' support was bolstered and the danger of a counterrevolution appeared to be even increasing. 8he military catastrophe was matched by a fresh outbrea' of public disorders in etrograd in uly which according to 7ood was ‘the most menacing manifestation of popular discontent with government since the 0ebruary 4evolution.’ 1 8he uly days showed that ‘both in domestic eyes and in those of foreign powers that the rovisional !overnment’s power over 4ussia was seriously challenged and that 4ussia had become exhausted militarily.’ 13 8he (olshevi's managed to tailor a mass demonstration of strength by the /oviet leadership into an expression of underlying (olshevi' support by use of their slogans Leace, (read and *andMN, however it was decided that at this point a revolution would be premature. espite the government’s speed in arresting 'ey socialists such as 8rots'y and disbanding mutinous regiments, problems continued. 4ural revolt continued over low grain prices, ‘in $ctober the state was obtaining only 2ftyGsix percent of the grain produced.’ 1& In addition industry and the military began to collapse from lac' of foreign funding, which conseFuently led to rampant in:ation upon the government’s decision to circulate more ban' notes. 7ith the disbanding of regiments, fewer sections of the army were available to help contain internal unrest. >oupled with the reluctance to tac'le the land problem, to convene a >onstituent Assembly and to Fuestion the war led to the (olshevi's promise of immediate Leace, (read and *andN becoming increasingly popular. 1< 16 Alexander Cerens'y, Danifesto of 4ussian >ouncil of 7or'men and /oldiers, ) uly 1%1&, accessed via 2rstworldwar.com@ a multimedia history of world war one, primary documents,
[email protected] on
1 7ood, A. The Origins of the Russian Revolution, p.6&. 13 CochoG7illiams, A. 4ussia’s International 4elations in the 8wentieth >entury, ;$xon, +1)=, p.%. 1& /ervice, 4. ) *istory of +odern Russia: ro$ i#holas .. to Putin, p.. 1< 7ood, A. The Origins of the Russian Revolution, p.6<.
In addition the appointment of Cornilov was also one that bac'2red upon Cerens'y. Cornilov’s attempt to introduce martial law failed to resonate with a military tired of war and hungry to return home to the land promised to them. It continued to highlight Cerens'y’s poor decision ma'ing s'ills and his inability to #udge the mood of his people. Initially appointed to restore order in the Army, ‘reimpose the government’s authority in the towns at the front-PandQ to secure a more regular supply of food,’ 1% Cerens'y soon found however, that a coup from the right was upon him. Disunderstanding between the two men led them to distrust each other, especially on Cerens'y’s part who felt threatened by Cornilov. Cerens'y had released political prisoners in August 1%1& in order to protect etrograd from a rightist coup, amongst them were 'ey (olshevi' 2gures9 on the other hand Cornilov believed that Cerens'y had been 'idnapped by the (olshevi's and were forcing him to withdraw from the war and so sent troops to etrograd to protect it from a leftist overta'ing. + 8he (olshevi's part in defending etrograd was vital to them gaining strong support. According to 4abinowitch the defeat of Cornilov had ‘the dual e?ect of further enhancing the stature of the (olshevi's at a popular level and providing a powerful stimulus to the idea of all socialist groups banding together for the success of the revolution.’ 1 Cerens'y’s failures although damaging to the rovisional !overnment’s position could not alone have brought about its entire collapse. *enin’s personality and his eKciency on capitalising upon Cerens'y’s mista'es created legitimate opposition to the rovisional !overnment and provided the proletariat with a viable option of immediate action. ‘*enin predicted the /oviets-would be the 'ey institutions in transferring power from the bourgeoisie to the proletariat.’ 0urthermore 4abinowitch suggests that ‘*enin assumed that revolutionary 4ussian wor'ers, having helped bring down the regime of Richolas II, would instinctively see that a bourgeois government would do no more than the tsarist regime to ful2l their 'eenest aspirations.’ ) In e?ect they may have concluded that the rovisional !overnment was doing no better to ful2l promises than the late Richolas II and instead called for LAll ower to the /ovietsN in order to see change instigated. 1% /ervice, 4. The Penguin *istory of +odern Russia: ro$ Tsaris$ to the T0entyirst "entury, 8hird Edition, ;*ondon, ++%=, p.. + CochoG7illiams, A. 4ussia’s International 4elations, p.%. 1 4abinowitch, A. ‘8he $ctober 4evolution’, p.<). 0itpatric', /. The Russian Revolution, p.66. ) 4abinowitch, A. The Bolshevi/s "o$e to Po0er, ;Rew Jor', 1%&%=, p.xix
0urthermore *enin’s April 8hesis promised Leace, (read and *andN in essence he wanted power on the basis that ‘the war was brought to an end, private land ownership was abolished Pwith all land being distributed eFuallyQ, industry nationalised-and the groundwor' laid for socialism.’ 6 As such this gained a lot of support with a population tired of a failing and unpopular war. 8he (olshevi's appeared more organised and militant that other political parties, they had also consolidated their power by gaining support through the soviets through their main spo'esperson, 8rots'y. ‘7ith the P(olshevi'Q party’s encouragement, garrison soldiers Fuic'ly concluded that history was repeating itself-the government was once again bent on sti:ing the revolution.’ /o great was the mistrust of the rovisional !overnment’s intentions that the garrisons would not obey orders unless controlled by the etrograd /oviet9 and by default 8rots'y. 8rots'y further proved to be a great asset to the (olshevi's in overthrowing the rovisional !overnment as he coGordinated the Dilitary 4evolutionary >ommittee. ‘8his body’s P8he D4>’sQ in:uence of the capital’s garrison soldiers made it a perfect instrument to organise the armed measures for Cerens'y’s removal.’ 3 (y operating through the Dilitary 4evolutionary >ommittee of the >ity /oviet allowed *enin to ta'e control whilst avoiding 8he >ongress of /oviets who order a coalition be formed with the moderate socialists. In his >all to ower *enin suggests ‘that we are confronted by problems which are not to be solved by conferences or congresses ;even congresses of /oviets=, but exclusively by peoples, by the masses, by the struggle of the armed people.’ & It may suggest that *enin did indeed amass popular support from below to overthrow the rovisional !overnment, for example ‘in the factory committees of etrograd, the (olshevi's had assumed a dominant position by the end of Day 1%1&.’ < In conclusion as Acton so simply puts it ‘8he rovisional !overnment failed to solve the ma#or problems confronting the country and therefore forfeited much of the 6 Acton, E. ‘8he 4evolution and its "istorians@ the "riti#al "o$%anion, p.3. 4abinowitch, A. ‘8he $ctober 4evolution’ in "riti#al "o$%anion to the Russian Revolution: 191!-19&1, ed., E. Acton, .Iu. >herniaev, 7.!. 4osenberg, ;*ondon, 1%%&=, p.<<. 3 /ervice, 4. ) *istory of +odern Russia: ro$ i#holas .. to Putin, p.31. & *enin, >all to ower, 6 $ctober 1%1& accessed via 2rstworldwar.com@ a multimedia history of world war one, primary documents,
[email protected] on
support it had initially en#oyed.’ % 8a'ing a loo' bac' to the causes of the 0ebruary revolution, a pattern may be found which could explain why the government fell. 0or instance, Richolas II and the tsarist autocracy was replaced due to lac' of clear leadership and inability to lead in wartime, plus shortages of food, arms and ammunition helped to declare that 8sarism was no longer wor'ing. In comparison to that situation, by $ctober 1%1&, the provisional government had highlighted its inability to lead in wartime via Cerens'y’s mista'es, in addition to this food shortages were stri'ing the country and economic problems in the countryside had led a ma#oritively agrarian society to unrest. 8he rovisional !overnment’s minimal achievements against these problems perhaps suggest that it was more the leadership Fualities and successes of *enin and the (olshevi's that helped to overthrow the rovisional !overnment. 0or example Acton may suggest that liberal demands were satis2ed by freedom of the press, speech, association and religion )+ however, these were all overshadowed by military and social failures. "owever the problems they faced were neigh impossible to overcome due to the situation they bought into. /ince the fall of the 4omanov dynasty power had been drained from the government rendering them incapable of 2ghting o? mass demands. In addition to this ‘the duality of power-and the conseFuent anarchy prevailing in the country made its normal existence diKcult.’ )1 $ctober 1%1& and its revolutionary events were shaped by a long history of tension between the forces of authoritarian politics and opposition and resistance from below. As such this perhaps suggests that the rovisional !overnment were doomed to inevitable failure as their situation and structure made it hard to reach decisions and escape the war. $n the other hand pressure grew on the /oviet to ta'e matters into their own hands to combat the worsening economic and social conditions caused by the war that the rovisional !overnment were not openly tac'ling. In short the fall of the rovisional !overnment was inevitable due to the inherent situation. 8he fact that they were overthrown by the (olshevi's in particular leads something to sheer luc' and good timing on the part of *enin who capitalised on many of the rovisional !overnments mista'es. 0urthermore *enin and 8rots'y made sure (olshevi's were in positions in which they could alter the status Fuo Fuic'ly and eKciently when an opportunity presented itself.
% Acton, E. Rethin/ing the Russian Revolution, p.1%. )+ Acton, E. ‘8he (attleground’, p.)+. )1 Alexander !uch'ov on Dilitary and >ivil Hnrest in 4ussia, 1+ Day 1%1&, accessed via 2rstworldwar.com@ a multimedia history of world war one, primary documents,
[email protected] on
Bibliography Primary Sources Alexander Cerens'y, Danifesto of 4ussian >ouncil of 7or'men and /oldiers, ) uly 1%1&, accessed via 2rstworldwar.com@ a multimedia history of world war one, primary documents,
[email protected] on
all to ower, 6 $ctober 1%1& accessed via 2rstworldwar.com@ a multimedia history of world war one, primary documents, [email protected] on
Seconary Sources Books Acton, E. Rethin/ing the Russian Revolution2 *ondon. 1%%+. >li?, 8. Lenin 1: Building the Party, 189-191!. *ondon. 1%&. 0itpatric', /. The Russian Revolution2 $xford. 1%<. 4abinowitch, A. The Bolshevi/s "o$e to Po0er2 Rew Jor'. 1%&%. /ervice, 4. The Penguin *istory of +odern Russia: ro$ Tsaris$ to the T0enty-irst "entury . *ondon. ++%. /ervice, 4. The Russian Revolution: 19((-19&72 /econd Ed. *ondon. 1%%1. /ervice, 4. ) *istory of +odern Russia: ro$ i#holas .. to Putin2 Rew Ed. *ondon. ++). 7ood, A. The Origins of the Russian Revolution: 1861-19172 *ondon. 1%<&.
!hapters in eite collections Acton, E. ‘8he (attleground’ in The Russian Revolution: the 'ssential Readings, ed., D.,A., Diller. $xford. ++1. p.%G)+. Acton, E. ‘8he 4evolution and its "istorians@ the "riti#al "o$%anion in >ontext’ in "riti#al "o$%anion to the Russian Revolution: 191!-19&1, ed., E., Acton, .,Iu., >herniaev, 7.,!., 4osenberg. *ondon. 1%%&. p.)G1&. 4abinowitch, A. ‘8he $ctober 4evolution’ in "riti#al "o$%anion to the Russian Revolution: 191!-19&1, ed., E., Acton, .,Iu., >herniaev, 7.,!., 4osenberg. *ondon. 1%%&. p.<1G%+. 7hite, ". in ‘8he rovisional !overnment’ in "riti#al "o$%anion to the Russian Revolution: 191!-19&1, ed., E., Acton, .,Iu., >herniaev, 7.,!., 4osenberg. *ondon. 1%%&. p.)%1G6+).
