VLASON ENTERPRISES CORPORATION v. COURT OF APPEALS and DURAPROOF SERVICES, represented by its General Manager, Cesar Urbino Sr. FACTS: Poro Point Shipping Services was then acting as the local agent of Omega Sea Transport Company of Honduras & Panama (Omega) when it requested permission for its vessel M/V Star Ace, experiencing experiencing engine trouble, to unload its cargo and have it stored in the Philippine Ports Authority compound in San Fernando, La Union while awaiting transhipment to Hongkong. The Bureau of Customs approved the request. Despite the approval, the customs personnel still boarded the vessel when it docked on the suspicion that it was the hijacked M/V Silver Med owned by Med Line Philippines and that its cargo would be smuggled into the country. The vessel and its cargo were seized. A notice of hearing was served on its consignee, Singkong Trading Co. of Hongkong, and its shipper, Dusit Internationa Internationall Co., Ltd of Thailand. While seizure proceedingss were ongoing, three typhoons hit La Union, and the vessel ran aground proceeding and was abandoned. A salvage agreement was entered into with the respondent Duraproof Services to secure and repair the vessel. The warrant of seizure was lifted upon finding that there was no fraud. However, the Customs Commissioner declined to issue a clearance and even forfeited the vessel and its cargo. A decision was decreed for the forfeiture and sale of the cargo in favor of the government. Seeking to enforce its preferred lien, the Duraproof filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before the RTC of Manila attacking the actions of the Bureau. PPA, Rep. Silverio Mangaoang and Med Line Phils. were named as respondents. Subsequently, Duraproof amended its petition as to include former District Collector Quiray, PPA Port Manager Adolfo Amor, Jr., Vlason Enterprises Singkong Trading Company, Dusit Internationall Co., Inc., Thai-Nan Enterprises Ltd. And Thai-United Trading Co., Ltd Internationa as respondents. In both its petitions, there was failure to allege against Vlason Enterprises or pray for a relief against it. Summonses for the amended petition were served to the respondents and their counsels. Summons by publication were allowed to be served upon the alien respondents who had no representatives in the country.
The cases against the other respondents were dismissed on the grounds of litis of litis pendentia and lack of jurisdiction despite Duraproof moving to declare them in default. Duraproof again moved to declare the other respondents in default. There was no record that these motions were acted upon. Thereafter, Duraproof amended again its petition with supplemental petition. The rest of the respondents were declared in default and Duraproof was allowed to present its evidence. With regard to Vlason Entreprises, it was alleged that it exhibited constant intimidation and harassment and incurred heavy overhead expenses causing irreparable damages. The trial court rendered a decision in favor of Duraproof. Vlason, by special appearance, filed a motion for reconsideratio reconsideration n on the grounds it was not impleaded, served summons or declared in default. It also filed a special appearancee before the CA praying that the levy be lifted off its appearanc properties, or a TRO be issued against the auction. Its motion was granted and the previous decision was reversed. However, Duraproof countered that although Vlason filed the motion for reconsideration in a timely manner, it has otherwise failed to include a notice of hearing making its motion a mere scrap of paper Duraproof filed a motion to file a supplemental petition impleading Vlason as one of the respondents. It was granted by the CA. Furthermore, it was able to obtain a writ of preliminary injunction against the respondents to prevent them from interfering in the transfer of the vessel and its cargo from the PPA compound. Hence, this appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not Vlason Enterprises was properly served with summons. RULING: No. A corporation may be served summons through its agents or officers who under the Rules are designated to accept service of process. A summons addressed to a corporation and served on the secretary of its president binds that corporation. This is based on the rationale that service must be made on a representative so integrated with the corporation sued, that it is safe to assume that said representative had sufficient responsibility and discretion to realize the importance of the legal papers served and to relay the same to the president or other responsible officer of the corporation being sued. The secretary of the president satisfies this criterion. This rule requires, however, that the secretary should be an employee of the corporation sought to be summoned. Only in
this manner can there be an assurance that the secretary will “bring home to the corporation [the] notice of the filing of the action” against it. In the present case, Bebero was the secretary of Angliongto, who was president of both VSI and petitioner, but she was an employee of VSI, not of of petitioner. petitioner. The piercing of the corporate veil cannot be resorted to when serving summons. Doctrinally, a corporation is a legal entity distinct and separate from the members and stockholders who compose it. However, when the corporate fiction is used as a means of perpetrating a fraud, evading an existing obligation, circumventing a statute, achieving or perfecting a monopoly or, in generally perpetrating perpetrating a crime, the veil will be lifted to expose the individuals composing it. None of the foregoing exceptions has been shown to exist in the present case. Quite the contrary, the piercing of the corporate veil in this case will result in manifest injustice. This we cannot allow. Hence, the corporate fiction remains. Petitioner claims that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over it, because the former had not been served summons anew for the Second Amended Petition or for the Second Amended Petition with Supplemental Petition. We disagree. Although it is well-settled that an amended pleading supersedes the original one, which is thus deemed withdrawn and no longer considered part of the record, it does not follow ipso facto that the service of a of a new summons for amended petitions or complaints is required. Where the defendants have already appeared before the trial court by virtue of a summons on the original complaint, the amended complaint may be served upon them without need of another summons, even if new causes of action are alleged. After it is acquired, a court’s jurisdiction continues until the case is finally terminated. Conversely, when defendants defendants have not yet appeared in court and no summons has been validly served, new summons for the amended complaint must be served on them. It is not the change of cause of action of action that gives rise to the need to serve another summons for the amended complaint, but rather the acquisition of jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants. If the trial court has not yet acquired jurisdiction over them, them, a new service of summons for the amended complaint is required. In this case, the trial court obviously labored under the erroneous impression that petitioner had already been placed under its jurisdiction since it had been served summons through the secretary of its president. Thus, it dispensed with the service on petitioner of new summons for the subsequent amendments amendmen ts of the Petition. We have already ruled, however, that the first service of summons on petitioner was invalid. Therefore, the trial court never acquired jurisdiction, and the the said court should have have required a new new service of summons for the amended Petitions.