Cruz vs. Secretary of DENR (2000) Summary Cases:
Cruz v. Secretary of DENR, 347 SCRA 128
Subject: Supreme Court judgments, Regalian doctrine, Ancestral domain, National patrimony, Customary laws, Chilling effect syndrome Facts: Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa bring this suit for prohibition and mandamus, challenging the constitutionality constitutionality of certain provisions of the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 and its IRR. Senator Juan Flavier and the leaders of the 112 groups of indigenous indigenous peoples claim that the IPRA is constitutional. constitutional. The Commission on Human Rights joined in claiming that the IPRA is an expression of the principle of parens parens patriae and patriae and that the State has the responsibility to protect and guarantee the rights of those who are at a serious disadvantage like indigenous peoples. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the IPRA and its IRR on the following grounds: (1) they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain, as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article 12 of the Constitution; (2) that by providing for an all encompassing definition of “ancestral domains” and “ancestral lands” which might even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate the rights of private landowners; (3) the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP and making customary law applicable to the settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains and ancestral lands violate the due process clause of the Constitution, and (4) that Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, which provides that “the “the administrative relationship relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President is characterized as a lateral but autonomous relationship relationship for purposes of policy and program coordination” coordination” infringes upon the President’s power of control over executive departments under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution. As the votes among among the SC Justices were equally divided (7-7) and and the necessary necessary majority was not not obtained, the case was re-deliberated re-deliberated upon. However, after re-deliberation, re-deliberation, the voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is dismissed.
Held: Supreme Court judgments; judicial review 1. When the State machinery is set into motion to implement an alleged alleg ed unconstitutional statute, stat ute, the | Page 1 of 4
Supreme Court possesses sufficient authority to resolve and prevent imminent injury and violation of the constitutional process. 2. Where the votes in the Court en banc are equally divided and the necessary majority is not obtained, the case is redeliberated upon, but if after deliberation, the voting remains the same, the petition is dismissed pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Regalian doctrine 3. The “Regalian Doctrine” or jura regalia is a Western legal concept that was first introduced by the Spaniards into the country through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas. 4. In its broad sense, the term “ jura regalia” refers to royal rights, or those rights which the King has by virtue of his prerogatives. 5. The Regalian theory does not negate native title to lands held in private ownership since time immemorial.
Public land 6. The term “public land” referred to all lands of the public domain whose title still remained in the government and are thrown open to private appropriation and settlement, and excluded the patrimonial property of the government and the friar lands.
Ancestral domain 7. Ancestral domains are all areas belonging to Indigenous Cultural communities/ Indigenous Peoples (ICCs/IPs) held under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs by themselves or through their ancestors, communally or individually since time immemorial, continuously until the present, except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of government projects or any other voluntary dealings with government and/or private individuals or corporations. 8. Ancestral domains comprise lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein and includes ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential, agricultural, and other lands individually owned whether alienable or not, hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas, bodies of water, mineral and other natural resources. 9. They also include lands which may no longer be exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs but f rom which they traditionally had access to for their subsistence and traditional activities, particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic and/or shifting cultivators. Ancestral land 10. Ancestral lands are lands held by the ICCs/IPs under the same conditions as ancestral domains except that these are limited to lands and that these lands are not merely occupied and possessed but are also utilized by the ICCs/IPs under claims of individual or traditional group ownership. 11. These lands include but are not limited to residential lots, rice terr aces or paddies, private forests, | Page 2 of 4
swidden farms and tree lots. National Patrimony 12. Ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public domain. 13. The IPRA categorically declares ancestral lands and domains held by native title as never to have been public land—domains and lands held under native title are, therefore, indisputably presumed to have never been public lands and are private. 14. The right of ownership and possession of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains is held under the indigenous concept of ownership which maintains the view that ancestral domains are the ICCs/IPs private but community property. 15. For areas certified as ancestral domain, jurisdiction of the government agency or agencies concerned over lands forming part thereof ceases. HOWEVER, the jurisdiction of government agencies over the natural resources within the ancestral domains does not terminate by such certification because said agencies are mandated under existing laws to administer the natural resources for the State, which is the owner thereof. Customary laws 16. Customary law is a primary, not secondary, source of rights under the IPRA. In the absence of any applicable provision in the Civil Code, custom, when duly proven, can define rights and liabilities, and it uniquely applies to ICCs/IPs. 17. However, the use of customary laws under the IPRA is not absolute, for the law speaks merely of primacy of use. 18. In fact, customary laws, when specifically enacted to become part of statutory law, must first undergo that publication to render them correspondingly binding and effective as such. 19. The application of customary law is limited to disputes concerning property rights or relations in determining the ownership and extent of the ancestral domains, where all the parties involved are members of the same indigenous group. It therefore follows that when one of the parties to a dispute is a non-member of an indigenous group, or when the indigenous peoples involved belong to different groups, the application of customary law is not required. President’s power of control 20. An “independent agency” is an administrative body independent of the executive branch or one not subject to a superior head of department, as distinguished from a “subordinate agency” or an administrative body whose action is subject to administrative review or revision. 21. The NCIP, although independent to a certain degree, was placed by Congress “under the office of the President” and, as such, is still subject to the President’s power to control and supervision with respect to its performance of administrative functions. Chilling effect syndrome 22. Invalidation of the statute “on its face” rather than “as applied” is p ermitted in the interest of | Page 3 of 4
preventing a “chilling” effect on freedom of expression. 23. But the only instance where a facial challenge to a statute is allowed is when it operates in the area of freedom of expression.
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