Salva v. Makalintal G.R. No. 132603 September 18, 2000 FACTS: • In 1998, the Sangguinang Panlalawigan of Batangas enacted Ordinance 05, which abolished Brgy. San Rafael and ordered its merger with Brgy. Dacanlao. • The Governer of Batangas vetoed the ordinance as it was not shown that it complied with the requisites in Sections 7 & 9 of the LGC. The governor’s veto was overridden by Resolution 345. • Consequently, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution 2987 to govern the conduct of the needed plebiscite. • The petitioners, officials and residents of Brgy. San Rafael, filed for the issuance of a TRO against the plebiscite with the trial court. The trial court denied their petition, claiming that it had no jurisdiction over acts, resolutions, or decisions of the COMELEC. The trial court directed the petitioners to bring the case to the Supreme Court. Apparently, the plebiscite was conducted during the pendency of the case. • The petitioners maintain that since their action is based on the validity of Ordinance 05 and Resolution 345 (basis of COMELEC Res. 2987) the trial court had jurisdiction. • They further maintained that the SC only had exclusive jurisdiction when COMELEC exercises its quasi‐judicial functions. However, when the COMELEC acts in a purely ministerial manner, the case may be subject to the RTC. ISSUE: WON the RTC has jurisdiction over the case. YES HELD: COMELEC Resolutions on the conduct of plebiscites are administrative in nature and subject to RTC Section 7, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution provides in part that: “SEC.7. xxx. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.” In the case of Filipinas Engineering v. Ferrer, it was held that what is contemplated by the term ‘final orders, rulings and decisions’ of the COMELEC reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court are those rendered in actions or proceedings before the COMELEC and taken cognizance of by the said body in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. In this case, Resolution 2987 was only issued after the COMELEC took cognizance of Ordinance 05 and Resolution 345. Resolution No. 2987 is thus a ministerial duty of the COMELEC that is enjoined by law and is part and parcel of its administrative functions. It involves no exercise of discretionary authority on the part of the respondent COMELEC; let alone an exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-
judicial power to hear and resolve controversies defining the rights and duties of party litigants, relative to the conduct of elections of public officers and the enforcement of the election laws. COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 which provides for the rules and regulations governing the conduct of the required plebiscite, was not issued pursuant to the COMELEC’s quasijudicial functions but merely as an incident of its inherent administrative functions over the conduct of plebiscites, thus, Resolution 2987 may not be deemed as a “final order” reviewable by certiorari by this court. Any question pertaining to the validity of said resolution may be well taken in an ordinary civil action before the trial courts.
Bulaong v. COMELEC 220 SCRA 745 G.R. No. 107987 March31, 1993 FACTS: • Petitioner Dr. Jose Bulaong, and private respondent Luis Villafuerte were both candidates for the office of the Provincial Governor of Camarines Sur in the May 1992 elections. • Bulaong was proclaimed by the PBC as the duly elected governor. Accordingly, Bulaong took his oath of office. • On July 9, 1992, Villafuerte filed an election protest questioning the precinct results of ten (10) Municipalities and the City of Iriga. Subsequently, on August 21, 1992, Villafuerte filed an Omnibus Motion praying that the venue for the ballot revision proceedings be conducted at the main office of the Comelec in Intramuros, Manila. Bulaong opposed citing the ballot revision proceedings need not be held in Manila since there was no untoward incident that happened during the canvassing of votes in Naga City. • In an Order dated September 9, 1992, the First Division of the COMELEC granted Villafuerte’s prayer for a revision of ballots to be held in Manila. This Order was received by Bulaong on September 16. On September 22, Bulaong filed his MR dated September 21. • On October 19, COMELEC thru its First Division denied his MR. On the same day, Bulaong also filed an Omnibus Motion praying that his 2 MRs (1st MR – on the order granting Villafuerte’s prayer, 2nd MR – denying Bulaong’s urgent motion for 1 day extension) be certified to the Comelec en banc pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 19 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure. • Later, Bulaong filed with the Comelec en banc a manifestation and motion praying that his MRs and his Omnibus motion filed with the First Division be ordered certified to it for resolution. The First Division denied Bulaong’s manifestation that its MRs be certified to the En Banc because the Order directing the Provincial Election Supervisor of Camarines Sur to immediately send the 649 ballot boxes to Manila is merely interlocutory. • Hence, Bulaong filed a petition for certiorati and mandamus with prayer for a TRO to enjoin the order to the First Division dated September 9, 1992. While Bulaong concedes that the order of the Comelec designating Manila as the venue of the revision proceedings is interlocutory, he nonetheless contends that a reading of Section 2 of Rule 3 in conjunction with Section 5 (c) of the same Rule would reveal that it is the duty of the First Division to refer his MR to the En Banc, since the matter concerning the venue of the revision of ballots is a substantial issue which the latter should review. • Bulaong prays that a writ of mandamus be issued directing the First Division to certify and elevate his MRs to the En Banc. ISSUE: WON the First Division of the COMELEC committed GAOD when it refused to refer Bulaong’s MRs to the En Banc
notwithstanding the mandate of Section 5, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules. NO HELD: SC dismissed the petition. It is not mandatory on the part of a division of the COMELEC to refer all pending MRs to the En Banc. Section 5, Rule 19 provides: “How motion for reconsideration disposed of – Upon the filing of a motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a Division, the Clerk of Court concerned shall within twenty-four (24) hours from the filing thereof, notify the Presiding Commissioner. The latter shall within two (2) days thereafter, certify the case to the Commission en banc.” For said the motion to be referred to the en banc, it requires the unanimous vote of the Members of the Division as mandated by Section 2, Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules. In the case at bar, there was an absence of such vote. COMELEC did not commit GAoD in refusing to refer petitioner's MR to the COMELEC en banc because it exercised its discretionary power under Sec 6 Rule 20 of the Comelec Rules. Instead of withholding its decision on such interlocutory matter, the First Division decided to exercise its power under Section 6, Rule 20 which states: “When the allegations in a protest or counter-protest so warrant, or whenever in the opinion of the Commission or Division the interest of justice so demands, it shall immediately order the ballot boxes containing ballots and their keys, list of voters with voting records, book of voters and other documents used in the election to be brought before the Commission, and shall order the revision of the ballots… … The revision of ballots shall be made in the office of the Clerk of Court concerned or at such places as the Commission or Division shall designate, and shall be completed within 3 months from the date of the order, unless otherwise directed by the Commission. COMELEC cannot be compelled thru mandamus where it exercises its discretionary power A mandamus proceeding involving a discretionary power of the COMELEC does not lie. A perusal of the aforecited section impliedly reveals the discretionary power of the Division or the En Banc to order a revision of ballots. This can be gleamed from the use of the phrase, “whenever in the opinion of the Commission or Division the interest of justice so demands.” Although in most instances the revision of ballots takes place in the office of the Clerk of Court concerned, revision of ballots may also be held in “such places, as the Commission or
Division shall designate.” Bulaong is to be reminded that mandamus, as a remedy, is available to compel the doing of an act specifically enjoined by law as a duty. It cannot compel the doing of an act involving the exercise of discretion one way or the other. Undoubtedly, the First Division was within its powers in designating Manila as the venue of the revision of ballots.
Soller v. COMELEC 339 SCRA 685 G.R. No. 139853, September 5, 2000
pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decision shall be decided by the Commission en banc.”
FACTS: • Ferdinand Thoms Soller and Angel Saulong were both candidates for mayor of the municipality of Bansud, Oriental Mindoro in the May 1998 elections. On May 14, 1998, the Municipal BOC proclaimed Soller duly elected mayor. • On May 19, Saulong filed with the COMELEC a “petition for annulment of the proclamation/ exclusion of election return”. On May 25, Saulong filed with the RTC of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro an election protest against Soller. • Soller filed his answer with counter-protest. He also moved to dismiss Saulong’s protest on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, forum-shopping, and failure to state cause of action. • COMELEC dismissed the pre-proclamation case filed by Saulong. • On October 1, 1998, RTC denied Soller’s motion to dismiss. Soller moved for reconsideration but said motion was again denied. He then filed with the Comelec a petition for certiorari contending that the RTC acted with GAOD in not dismissing Saulong’s election protest. • On August 31, 1999, the COMELEC en banc dismissed Soller’s suit. The election tribunal held that Saulong paid the required filing fee. It also declared that the defect in the verification is a mere technical defect which should not bar the determination of the merits of the case. The election tribunal stated that there was no forum shopping to speak of.
Thus, in Sarmiento v. COMELEC and in subsequent cases, SC ruled that the COMELEC, sitting en banc, does not have the requisite authority to hear and decide election cases including pre-proclamation controversies in the first instance. This power pertains to the divisions of the Commission. Any decision by the Commission en banc as regards election cases decided by it in the first instance is null and void.
ISSUES: 1. WON Soller properly filed the petition for certiorari before the SC. YES 2. WON the COMELEC committed GAOD in not ordering the dismissal of Saulong’s election protest. YES
Note: SC also ruled in this case that the RTC erred and committed GAOD in failing to dismiss Saulong’s election protest against Soller. SC reiterated that COMELEC en banc has no jurisdiction to affirm the refusal of RTC to dismiss Saulong’s election protest.
HELD: Procedure: MR of En Banc decision is a prohibited pleading, unless relating to election offenses. Under the COMELEC Rules, an MR of its en banc ruling is prohibited except in a case involving an election offense. Since the present controversy involves no election offense, reconsideration is not possible and Soller has no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Accordingly, Soller properly filed the instant petition for certiorari with the SC. COMELEC en banc does not have authority to hear and decide election cases in the first instance. This power pertains to the Divisions of the Comelec. Section 3 (c), Art. IX of the Constitution reads: “The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite the disposition of election cases, including
Soller’s petition with the COMELEC was not referred to a division but was instead submitted directly to the en banc. The petition for certiorari assails the trial court’s order denying the motion to dismiss Saulong’s election protest. The questioned order of the trial court is interlocutory because it does not end the trial court’s task of adjudicating the parties’ contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as regards each other. In SC’s view, the authority to resolve the petition for certiorari involving incidental issues of election protest, like the questioned order of the trial court, falls within the division and not the en banc. Note that the order denying the motion to dismiss is but an incident of the election protest. If the principal case, once decided on its merits, is cognizable on appeal by the division of the Comelec, then there is no reason why petitions for certiorari relating to incidents of election protest should not be referred first to a division for resolution. Clearly, the COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of Soller’s petition in the first instance.
Sahali v. COMELEC G.R. No. 201796 January 15, 2013 FACTS: •
Sadikul Sahali and Matba were gubernatorial candidates in Tawi-tawi during the 2010 elections; while Ruby Sahali and Usman ran for Vice Governor. Both Sahalis were declared the winners by the PBOC. • Alleging that the Sahalis rigged the election, Matba and Usman both filed separate Election Protests Ad Cautelam with the COMELEC, wherein they contested the results in 39 out of the 282 precincts. • Both their protests were raffled off to the COMELEC 1 st Div, who consolidated their petitions. It then ordered the retrieval of all ballot boxes and election documents of the 39 precincts. • Soon after, Matba and Usman filed a Manifestation and Ex-parte Motion wherein they prayed that instead of a mere recounting of the ballots, the COMELEC should order the technical examination of the ballots, the Election Day Computerized Voters List (EDCVL), the Voters Registration Record (VRR) and the Book of Voters. Technical examination: comparing the signatures and thumb marks on the EDCVL vs. the VRRs/Books of Voters, etc. • The 1st Div. granted the motion and ordered the conduct of the technical examination. Note: this Order is interlocutory. • Sadikul and Ruby filed with the 1st Div. a Strong Manifestation of Grave Concern and MFR, stating that such order by the COMELEC was issued without due process; that the 1st Div. cannot just order a technical examination in the absence of published Rules. • The COMELEC averred that it can order a technical examination as per Section 1, Rule 18 of COMELEC Res. 8804. • Sadikul and Ruby filed the present petition for certiorari before the SC, alleging that the COMELEC 1st Div. committed GAOD in promulgating the said order. ISSUE: 1. WON the petition for certiorari is proper. NO 2. WON the COMELEC can order the technical examination of ballot boxes. YES HELD: The COMELEC’s Order was interlocutory, and therefore not subject to review for certiorari. Sadikul and Ruby cannot resort to the extraordinary remedy of certiorari to assail an interlocutory order issued by the COMELEC First Division. A party aggrieved by an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC in an election protest may not directly assail the order in this Court through a special civil action for certiorari. The remedy is to seek the review of the interlocutory order during the appeal of the decision of the Division in due course.
Under the Constitution, the power of this Court to review election cases falling within the original exclusive jurisdiction of the COMELEC only extends to final decisions or resolutions of the COMELEC en banc, certainly not to interlocutory orders issued by a Division thereof. Here, the Orders dated March 5, 2012 and May 3, 2012 issued by the First Division of the COMELEC were merely interlocutory orders since they only disposed of an incident in the main case i.e. the propriety of the technical examination of the said election paraphernalia. Thus, the proper recourse for the petitioners is to await the decision of the COMELEC First Division in the election protests filed by Matba and Usman, and should they be aggrieved thereby, to appeal the same to the COMELEC en banc by filing a motion for reconsideration. Exceptions when SC can review interlocutory orders: Exceptionally, this Court may take cognizance of a certiorari action directed against an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC when the following circumstances are present: 1. First, the order was issued without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction 2. Second, under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the subject of the controversy is a matter which: a. The COMELEC en banc may not sit and consider b. A Division is not authorized to act c. The members of the Division unanimously vote to refer to the COMELEC en banc
Procedure: In election disputes, COMELEC not duty‐ bound to notify and direct a party to file an opposition to a motion filed by the other party; Sahalis’ right to due process not violated. The COMELEC, in election disputes, is not dutybound to notify and direct a party therein to file an opposition to a motion filed by the other party. It is incumbent upon the party concerned, if he/she deems it necessary, to file an opposition to a motion within five days from receipt of a copy of the same without awaiting for the COMELEC’s directive to do so. It should be stressed that one of the factors that should be considered in election protests is expediency. Proceedings in election protests are special and expeditious and the early resolution of such cases should not be hampered by any unnecessary observance of procedural rules. "The proceedings should not be encumbered by delays. Here, the Sahalis did not file an opposition to the said motion for technical examination that was filed by Matba and Usman on February 24, 2012. It was only after the COMELEC First Division issued its March 5, 2012 Order that the petitioners decided to register their opposition to the intended technical examination, albeit in the form of a motion for reconsideration of the said Order.
Procedure: the COMELEC has power to order technical examinations even in the absence Of published rules to the effect; exercise of quasi‐judicial powers While Section 1, Rule 18 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804 does not explicitly provide for the rule on the technical examination of election paraphernalia, it does not mean, however, that the COMELEC First Division does not have the power to order the conduct of such technical examination. The power of the COMELEC First Division to order the technical examination election paraphernalia in election protest cases stems from its "exclusive original jurisdiction over
all contest relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial and city officials". Otherwise stated, the express grant of power to the COMELEC to resolve election protests carries with it the grant of all other powers necessary, proper, or incidental to the effective and efficient exercise of the power expressly granted. Verily, the exclusive original jurisdiction conferred by the constitution to the COMELEC to settle said election protests includes the authority to order a technical examination of relevant election paraphernalia, election returns and ballots in order to determine whether fraud and irregularities attended the canvass of the votes.
