1. Rule 40 (MTC to RTC) Provost vs. CA, G.R. No. 160406, June 26, 2006 Petitioners : Spouses Dolores Miranda Provost Respondents: CA ; Spouses Victor Ramos ; FE A. Ramos FACTS : Private respondents are owners of a parcel of land (Camiguin). The lot was donated to them by Yap adjacent to the land owned by the petitioner. The petitioner constructed a fence separating the two lots. The respondents, believing that the petitioners encroaches area but the latter refused. The respondents thus had a relocation survey and the relocation showed that the fence was indeed on their land. Petitioners denied alleging that the survey plan used had been disapproved by the DENR Regional Office for being defective and was replaced with a correction survey. Upon request of petitioners, another relocation survey was done using the approved cadastral survey. The survey showed that the fence was within petitioner’s property. Respondents filed a complaint for recovery of ownership and possession with damages and a prayer for preliminary injunction before the MTC. They alleged that petitioners encroached on 314 sq. meters of their lot. MTC DENIED and held that the respondents failed to prove their ownership and possession. On appeal, RTC AFFIRMED MTC’s decision saying that the respondent’s claim is only based on disapproved survey plan. Respondents appealed to CA. CA REVERSED RTC’s decision and ordered petitioners to vacate area, pay damages, remove fence. At the outset, we not that this case involves an error of judgment and NOT in jurisdiction. Petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is NOT PROPER. Nevertheless, we shall give due course to the instant petition as one proper for review under Rule 45. ISSUE : W/N RTC can decide cases brought on appeal from MTC even without jurisdiction over subject matter.
HELD : Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction over complaints for recovery of ownership or accion reinvindicatoria. Section 8, Rule 40 of the Rules of Civil Procedure nonetheless allows RTC to decide the case brought on appeal from the MTC which, even without jurisdiction over subject matter, may decide case on merits. In the instant case, the MTC Mambajao, should have dismissed the complaint outright for lack of jurisdiction but since it decided the case on its merits, the RTC rendered a decision based on the findings of MTC. Encarnacion vs. Amigo, G.R. No. 169793, September 15, 2006 G.R. No. 169793
September 15, 2006
VICTORIANO M. ENCARNACION, petitioner, vs. NIEVES AMIGO, respondent. FACTS Petitioner Victoriano M. Encarnacion is the registered owner of Lot consisting of 100 square meters and another Lot consisting of 607 square meters located at Cauayan, Isabela. Said two lots originally form part of Lot No. 2121, owned by Rogelio Valiente who sold the same to Nicasio Mallapitan. Mallapitan sold the land to Victoriano Magpantay. After the death of the latter in 1992, his widow, Anita N. Magpantay executed an Affidavit of Waiver waving her right over the property in favor of her son-in-law, herein petitioner, Victoriano Encarnacion. Thereafter, the latter caused the subdivision of the land into two lots and the issuance of titles in his name Nieves Amigo allegedly entered the premises and took possession of a portion of the property without the permission of the owner, Victoriano Magpantay. Petitioner demanded that the respondent vacate the subject property. The Municipal Trial Court in Cities rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff VICTORIANO M. ENCARNACION. On appeal, the RTC ruled that as the Municipal Court had no jurisdiction over the case, it (RTC) Court acquired no appellate jurisdiction thereof. Petitioner filed a petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court before the CA which promulgated the assailed Decision remanding the case to the Regional Trial Court. Issue Whether the RTC erred in dismissing the case. Held The RTC should have not dismissed the case. Section 8, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court provides: SECTION 8. Appeal from orders dismissing case without trial; lack of jurisdiction. — If an appeal is taken from an order of the lower court dismissing the case without a trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court may affirm or reverse it, as the case may be. In case of affirmance and the ground of dismissal is lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, the Regional Trial Court, if it has jurisdiction thereover, shall try the case on the merits as if the case was originally filed with it. In case of reversal, the case shall be remanded for further proceedings. The RTC should have taken cognizance of the case. If the case is tried on the merits by the Municipal Court without jurisdiction over the subject matter, the RTC on appeal may no longer dismiss the case if it has original jurisdiction thereof. Moreover, the RTC shall no longer try the case on the merits, but shall decide the case on the basis of the evidence presented in the lower court, without prejudice to the admission of the amended pleadings and additional evidence in the interest of justice. 2. Rule 41 (RTC to CA) Manila Memorial Park vs. CA, 344 SCRA 769 (2001) MANILA MEMORIAL PARK vs. CA, 344 SCRA 769 (2000) PETITIONERS: Manila Memorial Park Cemetery Inc
RESPONDENTS: Court of Appeals, Bernardo, Dominador, Hermogena Lucia and Maria Gatchalian and the Heirs of Gregorio Gatchalian, Rolando, Conrado and Arturo, all surnamed Gacthalian PONENTE: Vitug. J FACTS: Respondents = filed an action for reconveyance and recovery of parcels of land against petitioner and its co-defendants United Housing Corporation, Victorino Hernandez, Heurs of de Leon and Heirs of Nicolas Gatchalian. TC = through Judge Acosta, dismissed the complaint for lack of merit and habing been barred by statute of limitations and by laches. The counterclaim of the defendants were also dismissed for lack of evidence. Respondents = received a copy of the decision Private respondents = on the last of the prescribed 15-day period to appea, filed a motion for new trial and/or reconsideration. TC = denied the motion and order was received by the respondents Respondents = filed a notice of appeal TC = gave due course to the appeal and directed the transmittal of the records of the case to the CA. However, the records of the case was not transmitted to CA due to missing transcript of stenographic notes. TC = required the parties to appear in conference. **Almost a year had lapsed but the missing stenographic notes were still not submitted to the trial court. Respondents = filed a motion for new trial for retaking and presentation of testimonial and documentary evidence on the ground that the reconstitution of the missing stenographic notes was no longer possible considering that the court stenographers who had transcribed the testimony of witnesses by then since retired from the service, their whereabouts unknown. Petitioner = filed a motion to dimiss the appeal and an opposition to the motion for new trial contending that the appeal was filed out of time hence, remedy for new trial cannot be availed of. TC = motion for new trial is granted thus notice of appeal is declared mooted, motion to dismiss is denied. Petitioner = filed a Motion for Reconsideration TC = dismissed the same Petitioner = elevated the matter via petition for certiorari to the CA on the ground that the trial court had acted capriciously and whimsically, as well as with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in holding that it was barred from assailing the timeliness of the appeal and in granting respondent's motion for new trial long after the decision of the trial court had already become final and executory. CA = dismissed the petition on the ground that petitioner was estopped by laches from assailing the notice of appeal. Thus, “It is undisputed that petitioner filed the motion to dismiss appeal after almost eight years the respondent court gave due course to respondent's notice of appeal. Petitioner did not raise the issue of the timeliness of the appeal at the time the notice of appeal was filed by respondents. During the conference on April 23, 1996 for the completion of the record, petitioner remained silent on the issue. Instead, it voluntarily asked for time to locate the missing transcript of records to be submitted to respondent court, which petitioner never accomplished without explanation. It was only after respondents filed on February 28, 1997 a motion for new trial for the retaking or presentation of testimonial evidence that petitioner started questioning the appeal essayed by respondents. Obviously, petitioner is estopped by
laches from assailing the notice of appeal which has long been given due course by respondent court. The motion to dismiss appeal was filed too late.” ISSUE: WON an ordinary appeal from RTC to CA is suspended or interrupted by motion for new trial or reconsideration. HELD: YES RATIO DECIDENDI: General Rule: In Lacsamana vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, the Court has ruled that in an ordinary appeal from the final judgment or order of a metropolitan or municipal trial court to the regional trial court, and from the regional trial court to the Court of Appeals in actions or proceedings originally filed in the regional trial court, the fifteen-day period for appeal prescribed by Section 39 of B.P. 129 and Section 19(a) of the Interim Rules is interrupted or suspended by a motion for new trial or reconsideration duly filed. If the motion for new trial or reconsideration is denied, the moving party has only the remaining period from notice of denial within which to file a notice of appeal. No motion for extension of time to file such a notice of appeal is neither required nor allowed. This rule has been substantially reproduced in Section 3, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; thus: "Sec. 3. Period of Ordinary Appeal - The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order. The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed." Accordingly, when respondents filed their motion for reconsideration on the last day of the fifteen day prescribed period for taking an appeal, which motion was subsequently denied, they only had one (1) day from receipt of a copy of the order denying the motion for reconsideration, within which to perfect their appeal, i.e., excluding the day of receipt and including the next day. Since respondents had received a copy of the order denying their motion for reconsideration on 28 November 1989, the filing of the notice of appeal on 07 December 1989 came much too late for by then the judgment had already become final and executory. The perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional upon the court a quo, and the failure to perfect that appeal renders its judgment final and executory. A fundamental precept is that the reglementary periods under the Rules are to be strictly observed for being considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays and an orderly discharge of judicial business. The strict compliance with such periods has more than once been held to be imperative, particularly and most significantly in respect to the perfection of appeals. The finality of a judgment becomes a fact upon the lapse of the reglementary period to appeal if no appeal is perfected, and the court loses all jurisdiction over the case, and it becomes the ministerial duty of the court concerned to order execution of the judgment. After the judgment has become final and executory, vested
rights are acquired by the winning party. Just as the losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, so also the winning party has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of the case. Exceptions to the general rule: 1. In Ramos vs. Bagasao, the Court excused the delay of four days in the filing of the notice of appeal because the questioned decision of the trial court had been served upon appellant Ramos at a time when her counsel of record was already dead. The new counsel could only file the appeal four days after the presecribed reglementary period was over. 2. InRepublic vs. Court of Appeals, the Court allowed the perfection of an appeal by the Republic despite the delay of six days to prevent a gross miscarriage of justice since the Republic stood to lose hundreds of hectares of land already titled in its name and had since then been devoted for public purposes. 3. In Olacao vs. National Labor Relations Commission, a tardy appeal was accepted considering that the subject matter in issue had theretofore been judiciallly settled with finality in another case, and a dismissal of the appeal would have had the effect of the appellant being ordered twice to make the same reparation to the appellee. DOCTRINE: The legality of the appeal may be raised at any stage of the proceedings in the appellate court, and the latter is not precluded from dismissing the petition on the ground of its being out of time. A recognition of the merit of the petition does not necessarily carry with it any assumption or conclusion that it has been timely filed. Neypes vs. CA, 469 SCRA 633 (2005) FACTS: Petitioners Domingo Neypes, Luz Faustino, Rogelio Faustino, Lolito Victoriano, Jacob Obania and Domingo Cabacungan filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary injunction before RTC Oriental Mindoro, against the Bureau of Forest Development, Bureau of Lands, Land Bank of the Philippines and the heirs of Bernardo del Mundo, namely, Fe, Corazon, Josefa, Salvador and Carmen. Both petitioners and respondents: filed various motions with the trial court (1) the motion filed by petitioners to declare the respondent heirs, the Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of Forest Development in default and (2) the motions to dismiss filed by the respondent heirs and the Land Bank of the Philippines, respectively. TC: presided by public respondent Judge Antonio N. Rosales, resolved the foregoing motions as follows: (1) the petitioners' motion to declare respondents Bureau of Lands and Bureau of Forest Development in default was granted for their failure to file an answer, but denied as against the respondent heirs of del Mundo because the substituted service of summons on them was improper; (2) the Land Bank's motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action was denied because there were hypothetical admissions and matters that could be determined only after trial, and
(3) the motion to dismiss filed by respondent heirsof del Mundo, based on prescription, was also denied because there were factual matters that could be determined only after trial. 1 Respondent heirs: filed MR of the order denying their MTD on the ground that the TC could very well resolve the issue of prescription from the bare allegations of the complaint itself without waiting for the trial proper. TC: dated February 12, 1998, dismissed petitioners' complaint on the ground that the action had already prescribed. Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the order of dismissal on March 3, 1998 and, on the 15th day thereafter or on March 18, 1998, filed MR; On July 1, 1998, TC issued another order dismissing the MR which petitioners received on July 22, 1998. Five days later, on July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice of appeal and paid the appeal fees on August 3, 1998. Court a quo: On August 4, 1998, denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed eight days late. This was received by petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed MR but this too was denied in an order dated September 3, 1998. Petitioners: Via a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, assailed the dismissal of the notice of appeal before CA Petitioners claim: that they had seasonably filed their notice of appeal arguing that the 15-day reglementary period to appeal started to run only on July 22, 1998 since this was the day they received the final order of the trial court denying their MR; When they filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998, only five days had elapsed and they were well within the reglementary period for appeal. CA: On September 16, 1999, dismissed the petition ruling that the 15-day period to appeal should have been reckoned from March 3, 1998 or the day they received the February 12, 1998 order dismissing their complaint. According to the appellate court, the order was the "final order" appealable under the Rules. It held further that “petitioners' tardy appeal was correctly dismissed for the perfection of an appeal within the reglementary period and in the manner prescribed by law is jurisdictional and non-compliance with such legal requirement is fatal and effectively renders the judgment final and executory” Petitioners: filed MR of the aforementioned decision. CA: denied on January 6, 2000. Hence this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules. ISSUE: Period within which petitioners should have filed their notice of appeal. HELD:ESAIT Right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process. It is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. Thus, one who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must comply with the requirements of the Rules. Failure to do so often leads to the loss of the right to appeal. The period to appeal is fixed by both statute and procedural rules. BP 129, as amended, provides: Sec. 39. Appeals. — The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in all these cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from. Provided, however, that in habeas corpus cases, the period for appeal shall be (48) forty-eight hours from the notice of judgment appealed from. . . .
Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states: SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. — The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from the notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from the notice of judgment or final order. The period to appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed. (emphasis supplied) Based on the foregoing, an appeal should be taken within 15 days from the notice of judgment or final order appealed from. A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more for the court to do with respect to it. It is an adjudication on the merits which, considering the evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are; or it may be an order or judgment that dismisses an action. We thus hold that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the fresh period of 15 days, counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice denying their motion for reconsideration). This pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules which states that the appeal shall be taken within 15 days from notice of judgment or final order appealed from. The use of the disjunctive word "or" signifies disassociation and independence of one thing from another. It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies. Hence, the use of "or" in the above provision supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from the notice of judgment or within 15 days from notice of the "final order," which we already determined to refer to the July 1, 1998 order denying the motion for a new trial or reconsideration. Neither does this new rule run counter to the spirit of Section 39 of BP 129 which shortened the appeal period from 30 days to 15 days to hasten the disposition of cases. The original period of appeal (in this case March 3-18, 1998) remains and the requirement for strict compliance still applies. The fresh period of 15 days becomes significant only when a party opts to file a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. In this manner, the trial court which rendered the assailed decision is given another opportunity to review the case and, in the process, minimize and/or rectify any error of judgment. While we aim to resolve cases with dispatch and to have judgments of courts become final at some definite time, we likewise aspire to deliver justice fairly. In this case, the new period of 15 days eradicates the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be counted — from receipt of notice of judgment (March 3, 1998) or from receipt of notice of "final order" appealed from (July 22, 1998). To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the Regional Trial Court's decision or file it within 15 days from receiptof the order (the "final order") denying his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed of only if either motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory after the lapse of the original appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3. Petitioners here filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998 or five days from receipt of the order denying their motion for reconsideration on July 22, 1998. Hence, the notice of appeal was well within the fresh appeal period of 15 days, as already discussed. Petition GRANTED and CA decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Other important details:
PERIOD TO APPEAL; ORDER OR JUDGMENT WHEN DEEMED FINAL. — An appeal should be taken within 15 days from the notice of judgment or final order appealed from. A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more for the court to do with respect to it. It is an adjudication on the merits which, considering the evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are; or it may be an order or judgment that dismisses an action. ORDER DENYING THE PARTIES' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION CONSTITUTES THE FINAL ORDER WHICH FINALLY DISPOSED OF THE ISSUES INVOLVED IN A CASE; CASE AT BAR. — In the recent case of Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc., the trial court declared petitioner Quelnan non-suited and accordingly dismissed his complaint. Upon receipt of the order of dismissal, he filed an omnibus motion to set it aside. When the omnibus motion was filed, 12 days of the 15-day period to appeal the order had lapsed. He later on received another order, this time dismissing his omnibus motion. He then filed his notice of appeal. But this was likewise dismissed — for having been filed out of time. The court a quo ruled that petitioner should have appealed within 15 days after the dismissal of his complaint since this was the final order that was appealable under the Rules. We reversed the trial court and declared that it was the denial of the motion for reconsideration ofan order of dismissal of a complaint which constituted the final order as it was what ended the issues raised there. This pronouncement was reiterated in the more recent case of Apuyan v. Haldeman, et al. where we again considered the order denying petitioner Apuyan's motion for reconsideration as the final order which finally disposed of the issues involved in the case. Based on the aforementioned cases, we sustain petitioners' view that the order dated July 1, 1998 denying their motion for reconsideration was the final order contemplated in the Rules. RULE; DELAY IN THE FILING OF AN APPEAL; WHEN MAY BE EXCUSED. — In National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority and Authority v. Municipality of Libmanan, however, we declared that appeal is an essential part of our judicial system and the rules of procedure should not be applied rigidly. ThisCourt has on occasion advised the lower courts to be cautious about not depriving a party of the right to appeal and that every party litigant should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, free from the constraint of technicalities. In de la Rosa v. Court of Appeals, we stated that, as a rule, periods which require litigants to do certain acts must be followed unless, under exceptional circumstances, a delay in the filing of an appeal may be excused on grounds of substantial justice. There, we condoned the delay incurred by the appealing party due to strong considerations of fairness and justice. In setting aside technical infirmities and thereby giving due course to tardy appeals, we have not been oblivious to or unmindful of the extraordinary situations that merit liberal application of the Rules. In those situations where technicalities were dispensed with, our decisions were not meant to undermine the force and effectivity of the periods set by law. But we hasten to add that in those rare cases where procedural rules were not stringently applied, there always existed a clear need to prevent the commission of a grave injustice. Our judicial system and the courts have always tried to maintain a healthy balance between the strict enforcement of procedural laws and the guarantee that every litigant be given the full opportunity for the just and proper disposition of his cause. 15-DAY APPEAL PERIOD COUNTED FROM RECEIPT OF NOTICE OF JUDGMENT OR FROM RECEIPT OF NOTICE OF FINAL ORDER APPEALED FROM. — We thus hold that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the fresh period of 15 days, counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice denying their motion for reconsideration). This pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules which states that the appeal shall be taken within 15 days from notice of judgment or final order appealed from. The use of the disjunctive word "or" signifies disassociation and independence of one thing from another. It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies. Hence, the use of "or" in the above provision supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from the notice of judgment or within 15 days from notice of the "final order," which we already determined to refer to the July 1, 1998 order denying the motion for a new trial or
reconsideration. Neither does this new rule run counter to the spirit of Section 39 of BP 129 which shortened the appeal period from 30 days to 15 days to hasten the disposition of cases. The original period of appeal (in this case March 3-18, 1998) remains and the requirement for strict compliance still applies. The fresh period of 15 days becomes significant only when a party opts to file a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. In this manner, the trial court which rendered the assailed decision is given another opportunity to review the case and, in the process, minimize and/or rectify any error ofjudgment. While we aim to resolve cases with dispatch and to have judgments of courts become final at some definite time, we likewise aspire to deliver justice fairly. In this case, the new period of 15 days eradicates the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be counted — from receipt of notice of judgment (March 3, 1998) or from receipt of notice of "final order" appealed from (July 22, 1998). NEW 15-DAY PERIOD MAY BE AVAILED OF ONLY WHEN EITHER A MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL OR MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS FILED; CASE AT BAR. — To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the Regional Trial Court's decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the order (the "final order") denying his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed ofonly if either motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory after the lapse of the original appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3. Petitioners here filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998 or five days from receipt of the order denying their motion for reconsideration on July 22, 1998. Hence, the notice ofappeal was well within the fresh appeal period of 15 days, as already discussed. DOCTRINE: FRESH PERIOD RULE. — The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all courts. It has the sole prerogative to amend, repeal or even establish new rules for a more simplified and inexpensive process, and the speedy disposition of cases. In the rules governing appeals to it and to the Court of Appeals, particularly Rules 42, 43 and 45, the Court allows extensions of time, based on justifiable and compelling reasons, for parties to file their appeals. These extensions may consist of 15 days or more. To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Courtof Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution. Trans International vs. CA, 285 SCRA 49 (1998) TRANS INTERNATIONAL, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS; NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION; PERLA A. SEGOVIA and GILBERTO PASTORAL, respondents. D E C I S I O N MARTINEZ, J.: FACTS: Petitioner Trans International filed a complaint for damages against respondent National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR for brevity) and two of its principal officers arising from the rescission of a contract for the supply and delivery of woodpoles before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which
was
docketed
as
Civil
Case
No.
Q-94-20960.
On May 22, l996, the trial court rendered a decision sustaining the claim of petitioner. A copy of the aforesaid decision was received by respondents on June 6, l996. On June 19, l996, respondents filed their motion for reconsideration alleging in the main that certain facts were overlooked, ignored or wrongly appreciated by the trial court. An opposition to said motion was filed by petitioner on July 11, l996. On August 2, l996, the trial court issued an order denying the motion for reconsideration. A copy of the aforesaid order was personally delivered to respondent NAPOCORS office on August 23, l996 (Friday) and was received by Ronald T. Lapuz, a clerk assigned at the office of the VP-General Counsel. Considering that it was almost 5:00 p.m., Lapuz placed the said order inside the drawer of his table. However, on August 26 and 27, l996 (Monday and Tuesday, respectively) said clerk was unable to report for work due to an illness he suffered as a result of the extraction of his three front teeth. Said order was retrieved from his drawer only in the afternoon of the 27th and was immediately forwarded to the secretary of Atty. Wilfredo J. Collado, counsel for the respondents. At 3:10 p.m. that same day, respondents thru counsel filed their notice of appeal. On August 29, l996, petitioner filed a motion for execution before the trial court contending that its decision dated May 22, l996 had become final and executory since respondents failed to make a timely appeal and praying for the issuance of an order granting the writ of execution. On the other hand, respondents filed an opposition thereto alleging therein that the cause of their failure to make a timely appeal was due to unforeseeable oversight and accident on the part of their employee who was unable to report for work because of illness. On September 9, l996 petitioner filed a reply to said opposition. On September 11, l996 respondents counsel filed a supplemental opposition to the motion for execution attaching thereto the affidavit of Lapuz. Finally, on September 18, l996, respondents filed their rejoinder to said reply. RTC's
RULING:
On September 13, l996, the trial court issued an order denying respondents notice of appeal and granting the motion for execution filed by petitioner. On September 20, l996, respondents filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals questioning the validity of the issuance of the aforesaid order on the ground that the denial of their notice of appeal was on the basis of a mere technicality and that the writ of execution should not have been issued since there are strong considerations which militate the strict application of the rules on procedure. Petitioner corporation filed its comment to the petition dated September 25, l996 claiming that the event which happened in respondents office does not amount to an honest mistake nor an unavoidable accident that would legally excuse their neglect. CA's
RULING:
The CA granted the petition and annulled the order of the RTC. The RTC was ordered to give due course to petitioners appeal. The motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner corporation was denied for lack of merit. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess in jurisdiction when it gave due course to the petition of respondents considering their admission that the notice of
appeal SC's
was
belatedly
filed
before
the
trial
court. RULING:
NO. The general rule holds that the appellate jurisdiction of the courts is conferred by law, and must be exercised in the manner and in accordance with the provisions thereof and such jurisdiction is acquired by the appellate court over the subject matter and parties by the perfection of the appeal. The party who seeks to avail of the same must comply with the requirements of the rules. Failing to do so, the right to appeal is lost. In fact, it has been long recognized that strict compliance with the Rules of Court is indispensable for the prevention of needless delays and for the orderly and expeditious dispatch of judicial business. Nonetheless, the court has on several occasions relaxed this strict requirement. In the case of Toledo, et al. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., the Court allowed the filing of an appeal where a stringent application of the rules would have denied it, but only when to do so would serve the demands of substantial justice and in the exercise of our equity jurisdiction. Thus, for a party to seek exception for its failure to comply strictly with the statutory requirements for perfecting its appeal, strong compelling reasons such as serving the ends of justice and preventing a grave miscarriage thereof must be shown, in order to warrant the Courts suspension of the rules.[21] Indeed, the court is confronted with the need to balance stringent application of technical rules vis-a-vis strong policy considerations of substantial significance to relax said rules based on equity and justice. The case at bench squarely meets the requisites postulated by the aforequoted rule. If respondents right to appeal would be curtailed by the mere expediency of holding that they had belatedly filed their notice of appeal, then the Court as the final arbiter of justice would be deserting its avowed objective, that is to dispense justice based on the merits of the case and not on a mere technicality. In this case, the one-day delay in filing the notice of appeal was due to an unforeseen illness of the receiving clerk Ronald Lapuz in the office of the General Counsel of petitioner NAPOCOR. The delay was properly explained and sufficiently justified; considerations of substantial justice and equity strongly argue against a rigid enforcement of the technical rules of procedure, considering not only that the delay was only for one day, and the petitioners have pleaded an unforeseeable oversight and illness on the part of the receiving clerk, as an excuse. To insist that the one-day delay in filing the appeal despite the plausible reason adduced therefor is a fatal mistake due alone to the negligence of counsel is to insist on a rigid application of the rules, which as repeatedly enunciated by the Supreme court, should help secure, not override substantial justice. In essence, the court is convinced that the test for substantial justice and equity considerations have been adequately met by respondents to overcome the one day delay in the perfection of their appeal. Considering the factual and legal milieu obtaining in the case at bench, the petition must be denied. DOCTRINE: The rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid and technical sense. The rules of procedure are used only to help secure, not override substantial justice. The emerging trend in the rulings of the Court is to afford every party-litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities. The court may extend the time or allow the perfection of the appeal beyond the prescribed period if it be satisfactorily shown that there is justifiable reason, such as fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, or similar supervening casualty, without fault of the appellant, which the court may deem sufficient reason for relieving him from the consequences of his failure to comply strictly with the law. In such case the appeal is deemed taken and perfected on time, and the appellate court acquires appellate jurisdiction.
3. Rule 42 (RTC to CA) Ross Rica Sales Center, Inc. vs. Ong, G.R. No. 132197, August 16, 2005 ROSS RICA SALES CENTER VS ONG GR No. 132197 (August 16, 2005) PETITIONERS: Ross Rica Sales Center Inc and Juanito King and Sons, Inc RESPONDENTS: Spouses Gerry and Elizabeth Ong PONENTE: Tinga, J. FACTS: Petitioner = filed a complaint for ejectment against respondents before MTC- Mandaue City. In the complaint, petitioners alleged the fact of their ownership of 3 parcels of land. Petitioners likewise acknowledged respondent Elizabeth Ongs ownership of the lots previous to theirs. Atty. Joseph M. Baduel = representing Mandaue Prime Estate Realty, wrote respondents informing them of its intent to use the lots and asking them to vacate within thirty (30) days from receipt of the letter. But respondents refused to vacate, thereby unlawfully withholding possession of said lots, so petitioners alleged. Petitioners = acquired the lands from Mandaue Prime Estate Realty through a sale. It appears that Mandaue Prime Estate Realty had acquired the properties from the respondents through a Deed of Absolute Sale. However, this latter deed of sale and the transfers of title consequential thereto were subsequently sought to be annulled by respondents in a complaint filed on 13 February 1995 before the Mandaue RTC against Mandaue Prime Estate Realty. Per record, this case is still pending resolution. MTC = ordering respondents to vacate the premises in question and to peacefully turn over possession to petitioners. On appeal, RTC = affirming MTCs decision Respondents = filed a notice of appeal, and on the following day, they filed a motion for reconsideration. RTC = issued an order which concurrently gave due course to respondents notice of appeal, denied the MR and granted petitioners motion for immediate execution pending appeal. **In a Petition for Certiorari with Injunction filed with the Court of Appeals and treated as a Petition for Review, the appellate court ruled that the MTC had no jurisdiction over said case as there was no contract between the parties, express or implied, as would qualify the same as one for unlawful detainer. Thus, the assailed Orders of the MTC and RTC were set aside. Petitioners = filed a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. ISSUE: WON the RTC decision has already become final and executory at the time the petition for review was filed. HELD: NO
RATIO DECIDENDI: Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court governs the mode of appeal in this case. Section 1. How appeal taken; time for filing. -- A party desiring to appeal from a decision of the RTC rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction may file a verified petition for review with the Court of Appeals, paying at the same time to the clerk of said court the corresponding docket and other lawful fees, depositing the amount ofP500.00 for costs, and furnishing the Regional Trial Court and the adverse party with a copy of the petition. The petition shall be filed and served within fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision sought to be reviewed or of the denial of petitioners motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after judgment. Upon proper motion and the payment of the full amount of the docket and other lawful fees and the deposit for costs before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of Appeals may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to file the petition for review. No further extension shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days. Since the unlawful detainer case was filed with the MTC and affirmed by the RTC, petitioners should have filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals and not a Notice of Appeal with the RTC. However, we consider this to have been remedied by the timely filing of the Motion for Reconsideration on the following day. Section 3, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court allows the withdrawal of appeal at any time, as a matter of right, before the filing of the appellees brief. Applying this rule contextually, the filing of the Motion for Reconsideration may be deemed as an effective withdrawal of the defective Notice of Appeal. Perforce, the period of appeal was tolled by the Motion for Reconsideration and started to run again from the receipt of the order denying the Motion for Reconsideration. A Motion for Additional Time to File the Petition was likewise filed with the Court of Appeals. Counting fifteen (15) days from receipt of the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration and the ten (10)-day request for additional period, it is clear that respondents filed their Petition for Review on time. DOCTRINE: In the case at bar, a petition for review before the CA is the proper mode of appeal from a decision of the RTC. Since the filing of the notice of appeal is erroneous, it is considered as if no appeal was interposed.
Macawiwili Gold Mining and Devt. Co, Inc. vs. CA, 297 SCRA 602 (1998) Facts: Philex Mining Corporation filed a complaint for expropriation against petitioners Macawiwili Gold Mining and Development Co., Inc. and Omico Mining & Industrial Corporation. It was filed before the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet Based on 53 of P.D. No. 463, Philex Mining sought to expropriate 21.9 hectares of petitioners mining areas where the latters Macawiwili claims are located. Philex Mining likewise moved for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin petitioners from ejecting it (Philex Mining) from the mining areas sought to be expropriated. RTC denied the complaint of respondent and the writ of preliminary injunction. In Poe Mining Association vs. Garcia, the SC, recognized the possessory rights of defendants Macawiwili and Omico over their mining claims. Nevertheless, Philex asserts that its right to expropriate is distinct and separate from the rights of Macawiwili and Omico under the Supreme Court decision, anchoring said right on Section 59 of Presidential Decree No. 463 which states: SEC. 59. Eminent Domain. - When the claim owner or an occupant or owner of private lands refuses to grant to another claim owner or lessee the right to build, construct or install any of the facilities mentioned in the next preceding section, the claim owner or lessee may prosecute an action for eminent domain under the Rules of Court in the Court of First Instance of the province where the mining claims involved are situated. In the determination of the just compensation due the claim owner or owner or occupant of the land, the court shall appoint at least one duly qualified mining engineer or geologist to be recommended by the Director as one of the commissioners. SC:Expropriation demands that the land be private land. When the Supreme Court awarded the possessory rights over the land subject of this case to defendants Macawiwili and Omico, it has stripped said land of its private character and gave its private character and gave it its public character, that is, to be utilized for mining operations. Although property already devoted to public use is still or under a specific grant of authority to the delegate (Constitutional Law by subject to expropriation, this must be done directly by the national legislature Isagani Cruz, 1989 edition, page 64). Section 59 of Presidential Decree No. 463 is not a specific grant of authority given to plaintiff but a mere general authority which will not suffice to allow plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain. Philex Mining moved for a reconsideration, but its motion was denied. It then appealed to the Court of Appeals. Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal on the ground that only questions of law were involved and, therefore, the appeal should be to the Supreme Court. However, the appellate court denied petitioners motion in a resolution. Without filing a motion for reconsideration, petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari. Respondent Philex Mining seeks the dismissal of the petition on the ground that petitioner should have filed a motion for reconsideration giving the appellate court an opportunity to correct itself. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA commit grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners Motion to Dismiss Appeal. Ruling: YES, Judgments of the regional trial courts in the exercise of their original jurisdiction are to be elevated to the Court of Appeals in cases where the appellant raises questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. On the other hand, appeals from judgments of the regional trial courts in the exercise of their original
jurisdiction must be brought directly to the Supreme Court in cases where the appellant raises only questions of law. The question is whether the issues raised in the appeal of respondent Philex Mining are questions of law or of fact. [F]or a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. And the distinction is well-known: There is a question of law in a given case when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts; there is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged facts. The respondents arguments may be summarized as follows: (1) Section 59, in relation to Section 53 of Presidential Decree No. 463, expressly grants respondent the right to expropriate mining claims or lands owned, occupied, or leased by other persons once the conditions justifying expropriation are present. The power of eminent domain expressly granted under Sections 58 and 59 of P.D. No. 463 is not inferior to the possessory right of other claimowners. [12] 2) There is nothing absurd in allowing a mining company to expropriate land belonging to another mining company. Pursuant to the ruling laid down in Benguet Consolidated, Inc. v. Republic,[13] land covered by mining claims may be the subject of expropriation. Moreover, a general grant of the power of eminent domain only means that the court may inquire into the necessity of the expropriation. [14] (3) Respondent could not be held guilty of forum-shopping or subverting the Supreme Courts decision in Poe Mining v. Garcia.[15] Forum-shopping, which refers to filing the same or repetitious suits, is not resorted to in the present case since respondent seeks to expropriate petitioners mining areas, not as operator of the Poe mining claims, but as operator of the Nevada mining claims. [16] (4) Respondents expropriation of the land will not divide the surface from the subsurface for the reason that respondent seeks to expropriate all rights that petitioners, as well as the Pigoro heirs, have over the 21.9 hectare area.[17] (5) The trial court erred in disregarding respondents alternative cause of action, even on the assumption that respondent does not have the right to expropriate, for the reason that an alternative statement in a pleading, if sufficient, is not vitiated by the insufficiency of the other alternative statements. [18] The first four arguments advanced by respondent Philex Mining raise the sole issue of whether it has, under Presidential Decree No. 463, the right to expropriate the 21.9 hectare mining areas where petitioners mining claims are located. On the other hand, its final argument raises the issue of whether the rules on the allegation of alternative causes of action in one pleading under Rule 8, 1 of the Rules of Court are applicable to special civil actions. These are legal questions whose resolution does not require an examination of the probative weight of the evidence presented by the parties but a determination of what the law is on the given state of facts. These issues raise questions of law which should be the subject of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 filed directly with this Court. The Court of Appeals committed a grave error in ruling otherwise. Doctrine: Judgments of the regional trial courts in the exercise of their original jurisdiction are to be elevated to the Court of Appeals in cases where the appellant raises questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. On the other hand, appeals from judgments of the regional trial courts in the exercise
of their original jurisdiction must be brought directly to the Supreme Court in cases where the appellant raises only questions of law. [F]or a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. And the distinction is well-known: There is a question of law in a given case when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts; there is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or the falsehood
Ditching vs. CA, 263 SCRA 343 (1996) Petitioner: Cecile San Juan Ditching and Zonette San Juan Bacani Respondent: Adriano Motas and Vidal Batalla PANGANIBAN,
J.:
DOCTRINE: (Rule 42 Appeal from RTC to CA) – UNDER THE OLD RULES ON SUMMARY PROCEDURE ●
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Motions for Extension of time to file a petition should be filed prior to the expiration or lapse of the period fixed by law, and if the motion is filed after the expiration of the period sought to be extended, then there is no longer any period to extend, and the judgment or order to be appealed from will have become final and executory. A lawyer has the responsibility of monitoring and keeping track of the period time left to file and appeal. The miscalculation by counsel of the appeal period will not arrest the course of the same nor precent the finality of the judgment. Perfection of an appeal within the statutory period is a jurisdictional requirement The legality of the allowance of the appeal may be raised at any stage of the proceedings in the appellate court – the court is not precluded from dismissing the petition on the ground that it was filed late inasmuch as the recognition of the merit of the petition does not carry with it any assumption or conclusion that it was timely filed.
FACTS: ● ● ● ●
Petitioners were co-owners of a parcel of land in Barangay Pansol, Calamba, Laguna which was covered by various TCT. 1975– a contract of tenancy - “Kasunduan Buwisan sa Sakahan” was entered into by Motas and Dr. Eduardo San Juan (predecessor in interest of petitioners) 1978– Motas constructed a house in the said lot without the consent of petitioners. Upon learning of such construction, petitioners demanded that he vacate the property. The last demand was made in September 1988.
BARANGAY ● ●
Respondent's refusal to vacate upon the final demand, petitioner filed a barangay level. No amicable settlement was reached
complaint
at
the
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT ●
An EJECTMENT CASE filed in July 1989 with the Municipal Trial Court in Calamba, Laguna by herein petitioner Ditching and Zonette San Juan Bacani, seeking to eject herein private
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respondent Motas and another occupant named Vidal Batalla from the lot owned by the petitioner and her co-owners. Said case was tried under the old Rules on Summary Procedure. The MTC found that there existed a tenancy relationship under Section 24 of RA 3844 (the Agricultural Reform Code) - (t)he agricultural lessee shall have the right to continue in the exclusive possession and enjoyment of any home lot he may have occupied upon the effectivity of (RA 3844), which shall be considered as included in the leasehold. The court held that the house of Motas was within the leasehold hence cannot be ejected and that since it was a tenancy case it had no jurisdiction.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ●
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Petitioners APPEALED to the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna – affirmed the MTC's decision ○ Plaintiffs never denied, much less controverted the fact that defendants have occupied a much bigger parcel of land belonging to Dr. Eduardo San Juan as tenants of the latter. Neither did plaintiffs dispute the defendants' claim that the land in question was a part and parcel of Dr. Eduardo San Juans land being tenanted by defendants (As shown by the Contract of Tenancy) ○ There was sufficient and uncontroverted proof offered by defendants that they have been tenants of Dr. San Juans land since 1972; ○ Having succeeded Dr. Eduardo San Juan on the same property, they are bound to observe and respect the rights of defendants as tenant. Their claim that they never intended defendants to be their tenants cannot be given merit. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION BY PETITIONERS - Judge Eleuterio Guerrero set the case for clarificatory hearing on August 30, 1991, on which date a representative from the Register of Deeds of Laguna (Calamba Branch) appeared and testified on the records. The Motion for Reconsideration was granted and accordingly said Judge ordered: vacation of the premises and surrender possession of the land, Defendants to pay costs. March 9, 1992 – JUDGE FRANCISCO MA. GUERRERO took over JUDGE ELEUTERIO GUERRERO as presiding judge. Said judge REVERSE THE DECISION of Judge Eleuterio and ruled that Appellate Jurisdiction by Regional Trial Court mandates that cases appealed from the Metropolitan Trial Court be decided on the basis of the entire record of the proceeding had in the Court of origin and such memoranda and/or briefs as may be submitted by the parties – the setting for clarificatory hearing is beyond the purview of the rule. Affirmed the MTC's decision.
COURT OF APPEALS ●
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APRIL 13, 1992 – Petitioner filed a MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF 15 DAYS from April 18, 1992 up to May 3, 1992 within which to file a PETITION FOR REVIEW because: ○ March 5, 1992 – court issued an order adverse to petitioners ○ March 17, 1992 – petitioner received a copy of said decision ○ March 27, 1992 – Motion for reconsideration was denied ○ April 3, 1992 – order denying Motion for reconsideration was received by petitioners ○ April 13 – 1992 – Petitioner filed a motion for extension of 15 days ○ April 18,1992 – Petitioners have until this day to file a Petition for Review on Certiorari if the Extension was not granted The Court of Appeals granted the extension and they have until May 3, 1992 to file a petition for review
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Petitioner filed their petition on April 29, 1992 but the CA dismissed said decision because it was filed late. The CA Stated that 10 days have lapsed from March 17 when petitioner received the order to March 27 when MR was denied. Another 10 days have lapsed fro April 3 when MR order was denied to April 13 when petition for extension was denied. A total of 20 days had already from from the time petitioners received copy of the questioned order up the time they actually filed on April 13. For this reason, this Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for review except to dismiss it. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION was denied by the CA
ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal of the case on sheer technicality by the Court of Appeals notwithstanding its merit is valid (NO MERIT) HELD: ● ● ● ● ●
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This Court had set the allowable extension to file petition for review with the Court of Appeals at fifteen (15) days - If a motion for reconsideration is filed with and denied by a regional trial court, the movant has only (the) remaining period within which to file a petition for review The motion for extension of time must be filed and the corresponding docket fee paid within the reglementary period of appeal. In this case, it was not only the petition which was filed late, but also the motion for extension of time if the motion for extension is filed after the expiration of the period sought to be extended (i.e., the reglementary period to appeal), then there is no longer any period to extend, and the judgment or order to be appealed from will have become final and executory. The statutory requirement for perfecting an appeal within the reglementary period laid down by law, must be strictly followed as they are considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays and for orderly discharge of judicial business.Perfection of an appeal within the statutory period is a jurisdictional requirement. the delay incurred by petitioners counsel was simply inexcusable. As correctly cited by private respondent, this Court has already held that (a)n erroneous application of the law or rules is not excusable error. - the miscomputation by counsel of the appeal period will not arrest the course of the same nor prevent the finality of the judgment Where no timely appeal was taken, the judgment becomes final, and the legality of the allowance of the appeal may be raised at any stage of the proceedings in the appellate court. Further, the respondent Court was not precluded from dismissing the petition on the ground that it was filed late, inasmuch as the recognition of the merit of the petition did not carry with it any assumption or conclusion that it was timely filed. Under Section 1 (a) Rule 50 of the Revised Rules of Court, the Court of Appeals motu proprio or on motion of the appellee may dismiss the appeal for inter alia: (a) Failure of the record on appeal to show on its face that the appeal was perfected within the period fixed by these rules.
ISSUE #2:Whether or not respondent Motas is a tenant of the parcel owned by petitioners HELD:The determination that a person is a tenant is a factual finding made by the trial court on the basis of evidence directly available to it and such finding will not be reversed on appeal except for the most compelling reasons. 4. Rule 43 (Quasi-Judicial Agencies to CA) Fabian vs. Desierto, 295 SCRA 440 (1998) REGALADO, J:
DOCTRINE: ●
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Appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies are now required to be brought to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review, under the requirements and conditions in Rule 43 which was precisely formulated and adopted to provide for a uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial agencies The jurisdiction of a court is not a question of acquiescence (reluctant acceptance of something without protest) as a matter of fact but an issue of conferment as a matter of law. Section 27 of RA 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to the SC from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in the administrative disciplinary case – it consequently violates the proscription in Section 30 Article VI of the Constitution against a law which increases the appellate jurisdiction of the SC Transfer by the SC, in its rulemaking power of pending cases involving a review of decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary actions to the CA which shall now be vested with exclusive appellate jurisdiction thereover, relates to procedure only
FACTS: ● ● ●
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Petitioner Teresita G. Fabian was the major stockholder and president of PROMAT Construction Development Corporation (PROMAT) which was engaged in the construction business. Private respondents Nestor V. Agustin was the incumbent District Engineering District (FMED) Promat participated in the bidding for government construction project including those under the FMED, and private respondent, reportedly taking advantage of his official position, inveigled petitioner into an amorous relationship. Their affair lasted for some time, in the course of which private respondents gifted PROMAT with public works contracts and interceded for it in problems concerning the same in his office. Misunderstanding and unpleasant incidents developed between the parties and when petitioner tried to terminate their relationship, private respondent refused and resisted her attempts to do so to the extent of employing acts of harassment, intimidation and threats.
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE ● ●
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She eventually filed an administrative case against him in July 24, 1995. The said complaint sought the dismissal of private respondent for violation of Section 19, Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) and Section 36 of Presidential Decree No. 807 (Civil Service Decree), with an ancillary prayer for his preventive suspension. For purposes of this case, the charges referred to may be subsumed under the category of oppression, misconduct, and disgraceful or immoral conduct. GRAFT INVESTIGATOR/ DIRECTOR/ASSISTANT OMBUDSMAN: On January 31, 1996, Graft Investigator Eduardo R. Benitez issued a resolution finding private respondents guilty of grave misconduct and ordering his dismissal from the service with forfeiture of all benefits under the law. His resolution bore the approval of Director Napoleon Baldrias and Assistant Ombudsman Abelardo Aportadera of their office. OMBUDSMAN: in an Order dated February 26, 1996, approved the aforesaid resolution with modifications, by finding private respondent guilty of misconduct and meting out the penalty of suspension without pay for one year. RECONSIDERATION: Ombudsman inhibited himself since the new counsel was a classmate and close associate DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN: case was transferred to respondent Deputy Ombudsman Jesus F. Guerrero who, in the now challenged Joint Order of June 18, 1997, set aside the February 26, 1997 Order of respondent Ombudsman and exonerated private respondents from the administrative charges.
SUPREME COURT ●
Petitioner has appealed to us by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court from the "Joint Order" issued by public respondents on June 18, 1997 in OMB-Adm. Case No. 0-95-0411 which granted the motion for reconsideration of and absolved private respondents from administrative charges for inter alia grave misconduct committed by him as then Assistant Regional Director, Region IV-A, Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH)
ISSUE: Whether or not the Section 27 RA 6770 (Ombudsman Act) together with Sec 7 Rule III of Administrative Order no 07 (Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman) insofar as they provide for appeals in administrative cases are valid HELD: ●
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This court held Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to this Court from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law which increases the Appellate jurisdiction of this Court. No countervailing argument has been cogently presented to justify such disregard of the constitutional prohibition. Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the Court Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989), together with Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman), and any other provision of law or issuance implementing the aforesaid Act and insofar as they provide for appeals in administrative disciplinary cases from the Office of the Ombudsman to the Supreme Court, are hereby declared INVALID and of no further force and effect. Also, the very provision (Section 5.2 Article 8 of the Constitution) cited by petitioner specifies that the appellate jurisdiction of this Court contemplated therein is to be exercised over "final judgements and orders of lower courts," that is, the courts composing the integrated judicial system. It does not include the quasi-judicial bodies or agencies, hence whenever the legislature intends that the decisions or resolutions of the quasi-judicial agency shall be reviewable by the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals, a specific provision to that effect is included in the law creating that quasi-judicial agency and, for that matter, any special statutory court. No such provision on appellate procedure is required for the regular courts of the integrated judicial system because they are what are referred to and already provided for in Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution. The revised Rules of Civil Procedure preclude appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Supreme Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. (SECTION 1 . Filing of petition with Supreme Court. - A person desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgement or final order or Resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other court whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only question of law which must be distinctly set forth. (Italics ours)) This differs from the former Rule 45 of the 1964 Rules of Court which made mention only of the Court of Appeals. The instant petition is hereby referred and transferred to the Court of Appeals for final disposition, with said petition to be considered by the Court of Appeals pro hac vice as a petition for review under Rule 43, without prejudice to its requiring the parties to submit such amended or supplemental pleadings and additional documents or records as it may deem necessary and proper.
RATIONALE: ●
2 conflicting laws : legal consideration appear to impugn the constitutionality and validity of the grant of said appellate jurisdiction to the SC (RA 6770)
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1. the present appeal to this Court is allowed under Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act of 1987 (R.A. No. 6770) and, pursuant thereto, the Office of the Ombudsman issued its Rules of Procedure, Section 7 whereof is assailed by petitioner in this proceeding. It will be recalled that R.A. No. 6770 was enacted on November 17, 1989, with Section 27 thereof pertinently providing that all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to this Court (Supreme Court) in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. - this is being questioned 2. Section 30, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution that "(n)o law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without its advise and consent. we will merely observe and lay down the rule at this juncture that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 is involved only whenever an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 is taken from a decision in an administrative diciplinary action. It cannot be taken into account where an original action for certiorari under Rule 65 is resorted to as a remedy for judicial review, such as from an incident in a criminal action. Administrative liability of a public official could fall under the jurisdiction of both the Civil Service Commission and the Office of the Ombudsman. Thus, the offenses imputed to herein private respondent were based on both Section 19 of Republic Act. No. 6770 and Section 36 of Presidential Decree No. 807. Yet, pursuant to the amendment of section 9, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 by Republic Act No. 7902, all adjudications by Civil Service Commission in administrative disciplinary cases were made appealable to the Court of Appeals effective March 18, 1995, while those of the Office of the Ombudsman are appealable to this Court. Yet systematic and efficient case management would dictate the consolidation of those cases in the Court of Appeals, both for expediency and to avoid possible conflicting decisions. Under the present Rule 45, appeals may be brought through a petition for review on certiorari but only from judgments and final orders of the courts enumerated in Section 1 thereof. Appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies are now required to be brought to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review, under the requirements and conditions in Rule 43 which was precisely formulated and adopted to provide for a uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial agencies . Private respondent invokes the rule that courts generally avoid having to decide a constitutional question, especially when the case can be decided on other grounds. Here, however, the resolution of the constitutional issue here is obviously necessary for the resolution of the present case. As a consequence of our ratiocination that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 should be struck down as unconstitutional, and in line with the regulatory philosophy adopted in appeals from quasi-judicial agencies in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43. DOESN'T IT AFFECT SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT? REMOVES VESTED RIGHT? a transfer by the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, of pending cases involving a review of decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary actions to the Court of Appeals which shall now be vested with exclusive appellate jurisdiction thereover, relates to procedure only. This is so because it is not the right to appeal of an aggrieved party which is affected by the law. That right has been preserved. Only the procedure by which the appeal is to be made or decided has been changed. The rationale for this is that litigant has a vested right in a particular remedy, which may be changed by substitution without impairing vested rights, hence he can have none in rules of procedure which relate to the remedy.
Santos vs. Go, 473 SCRA 350 (2005)
G.R. No. 156081 October 19, 2005 FERDINAND T. SANTOS, ROBERT JOHN SOBREPEÑA, and RAFAEL PEREZ DE TAGLE, JR., Petitioners, vs. WILSON GO, Respondent. Facts : The petitioners are corporate directors and officers of Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. (FEPI). FEPI allegedly entered into a Project Agreement with Manila Southcoast Development Corporation (MSDC), whereby FEPI undertook to develop several parcels of land in Nasugbu, Batangas allegedly owned by MSDC. Under the terms of the Agreement, FEPI was to convert an approximate area of 1,269 hectares into a first-class residential, commercial, resort, leisure, and recreational complex. The said Project Agreement clothed FEPI with authority to market and sell the subdivision lots to the public. Respondent Wilson Go offered to buy Lot 17, Block 38 from FEPI. It is measured 1079square meters and the purchase price was agreed upon 4,304,000php. The Contract to Sell signed by the parties was the standard, printed form prepared by FEPI. Under the terms of said contract of adhesion, Go agreed to pay a downpayment of P1,291,200 and a last installment of P840,000 on the balance due on April 7, 1997. In turn, FEPI would execute a final Deed of Sale in favor of Go and deliver to Go the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT upon complete payment of the purchase price. Go fully complied with the terms of the contract. However FEPI failed to develop the property neither did it release the TCT to Go. Go demanded for the fulfillment but FEPI hesitated. FEPI explained that the project was temporarily halted due to some claimants who opposed FEPI’s application for exclusion of the subject properties from the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and there was as a cease and desist order from the DAR. Said order was the subject of several appeals now pending before this Court. FEPI assured its clients that it had no intention to abandon the project and would resume developing the properties once the disputes had been settled in its favor. Go was not satisfied by the statements made by FEPI so respondent made several demand to return his payment of the purchase price in full. FEPI failed to heed his demands. Respondent now filed a case before HLURB and a separate Complaint-Affidavit for estafa under Articles 316 and 318 of the RPC before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City against petitioners as officers of FEPI and stated that the owner of the land was FEPI. However, in the HLURB, FEPI denied ownership of the realty. Go alleged that the petitioners committed estafa when they offered the subject property for sale since they knew fully well that the development of the property and issuance of its corresponding title were impossible to accomplish, as the ownership and title thereto had not yet been acquired and registered under the name of FEPI at the time of sale. Thus, FEPI had grossly misrepresented itself as owner at the time of the sale of the subject property to him and when it received from him the full payment, despite being aware that it was not yet the owner. Petitioner challenged the jurisdiction of the City Prosecutor of Pasig because the contract was not executed nor the payments. Also they contended that none of the elements of Estafa were present. They averred that FEPI was not the owner of the project but the developer with authority to sell under a joint venture with MSDC, who is the real owner. Petitioners likewise insisted that they could not be held criminally liable for abiding with a cease-and-desist order of the DAR. Respondent stressed that the City Prosecutor of Pasig City had jurisdiction over the case. He argued that the Contract to Sell specifically provided that payment be made at FEPI’s office at Pasig City and the demand letters bore the Pasig City address. He averred that FEPI could not disclaim ownership of the project since the contract described FEPI as owner without mentioning MSDC. Additionally, the acts executed by FEPI appearing in the contract were the acts of an owner and not a mere developer. The city prosecutor of Pasig found no misrepresentation made by FEPI, that there was no Deed of Sale executed thus the parties are not bound to deliver, and that it is the HLURB that has jurisdiction over the case, so the estafa was dismissed.
Go appealed the City Prosecutor’s Resolution to the Department of Justice (DOJ), which, in turn reversed the City Prosecutor’s findings. It ruled that under the Contract, the petitioners sold the property to Go despite full knowledge that FEPI was not its owner. The DOJ noted that petitioners did not deny the due execution of the contract and had accepted payments of the purchase price as evidenced by the receipts. Thus, FEPI was exercising acts of ownership when it conveyed the property to respondent Go. Acts to convey, sell, encumber or mortgage real property are acts of strict ownership. Furthermore, nowhere did FEPI mention that it had a joint venture with MSDC, the alleged true owner of the property. Clearly, petitioners committed acts of misrepresentation when FEPI denied ownership after the perfection of the contract and the payment of the purchase price. Since a corporation can only act through its agents or officers, then all the participants in a fraudulent transaction are deemed liable. Accordingly, an Information for estafa was filed against petitioners and Federico Campos and Polo Pantaleon before the MTC of Pasig City. However, the arraignment was deferred since Campos and Pantaleon filed a Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause, which was granted by the trial court. Meanwhile petitioners herein filed with the Court of Appeals, a petition for review docketed as CAG.R. SP No. 67388. Accordingly, the trial court deferred the arraignment of petitioners until the petition for review was resolved. The appellate court disposed of CA-G.R. SP No. 67388, having no merit, costs against petitioner. Issue : Whether a petition for review under Rule 43 is a proper mode of appeal from a resolution of the Secretary of Justice directing the prosecutor to file an information in a criminal case. Held : NO. Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure clearly shows that it governs appeals to the Court of Appeals from decisions and final orders or resolutions of the Court of Tax Appeals or quasijudicial agencies in the exercise of their quasi-judicial functions. The Department of Justice is not among the agencies enumerated in Section 1 of Rule 43. Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius. We cannot agree with petitioners’ submission that a preliminary investigation is a quasi-judicial proceeding, and that the DOJ is a quasi-judicial agency exercising a quasi-judicial function when it reviews the findings of a public prosecutor regarding the presence of probable cause. As provided in the case of Bautista vs CA, a preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. He does not exercise adjudication nor rule-making functions. Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime and to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. While the fiscal makes that determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused, not the fiscal. The public prosecutor’s power to conduct a preliminary investigation as quasi-judicial in nature, this is true only to the extent that, like quasi-judicial bodies, the prosecutor is an officer of the executive department exercising powers akin to those of a court, and the similarity ends at this point. A quasijudicial body is as an organ of government other than a court and other than a legislature which affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule-making. A quasi-judicial agency performs adjudicatory functions such that its awards, determine the rights of parties, and their decisions have the same effect as judgments of a court. Such is not the case when a public prosecutor conducts a preliminary investigation to determine probable cause to file an information against a person charged with a criminal offense, or when the Secretary of Justice is reviewing the former’s order or resolutions. Findings of the Secretary of Justice are not subject to review unless made with grave abuse of discretion. In this case, petitioners have not shown sufficient nor convincing reason for us to deviate from prevailing jurisprudence. Doctrine : The DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body and it is not one of those agencies whose decisions, orders or resolutions are appealable to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43, the resolution of the
Secretary of Justice finding probable cause to indict petitioners for estafa is, therefore, not appealable to the Court of Appeals via a petition for review under Rule 43. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioners’ petition for review.
Fortich vs. Corona, 289 SCRA 624 (1998) FACTS: This case involves a 144-hectare land located at San Vicente, Sumilao, Bukidnon, owned by the Norberto Quisumbing, Sr. Management and Development Corporation (NQSRMDC), one of the petitioners. The property is covered by a Transfer Certificate of the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Bukidnon. Land was leased as a pineapple plantation to the Philippine Packing Corporation, now Del Monte Philippines, Inc. (DMPI), a multinational corporation, for a period of ten (10) years under the Crop Producer and Grower's Agreement duly annotated in the certificate of title. The lease expired in April, 1994. Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR): During the existence of the lease, placed the entire 144-hectare property under compulsory acquisition and assessed the land value at P2.38 million. NQSRMDC: resisted the DAR's action, it sought and was granted by the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB), through its Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) in DARAB Case No. X-576, a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction which ordered the DAR Region X Director, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) of Bukidnon, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) of Sumilao, Bukidnon, the Land Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank), and their authorized representatives "to desist from pursuing any activity or activities" concerning the subject land "until further orders." DAR Regional Director: (Despite the DARAB order) issued a memorandum, dated directing the Land Bank to open a trust account for P2.38 million in the name of NQSRMDC and to conduct summary proceedings to determine the just compensation of the subject property. NQSRMDC: filed an Omnibus Motion to enforce the DARAB order and to nullify the summary proceedings undertaken by the DAR Regional Director and Land Bank on the valuation of the subject property. DARAB: acted favorably on the Omnibus Motion by (a) ordering the DAR Regional Director and Land Bank "to seriously comply with the terms of the order" (b) nullifying the DAR Regional Director's memorandum and the summary proceedings conducted pursuant thereto; and (c) directing the Land Bank "to return the claim folder of Petitioner NQSRMDC's subject property to the DAR until further orders." Land Bank: complied with the DARAB order and cancelled the trust account it opened in the name of petitioner NQSRMDC. 7 Provincial Development Council (PDC) of Bukidnon: headed by Governor Carlos O. Fortich, passed Resolution No. 6, designating certain areas along Bukidnon-Sayre Highway as part of the Bukidnon Agro-Industrial Zones where the subject property is situated. What happened thereafter is well-narrated in the OP (TORRES) Decision of March 29, 1996, pertinent portions of which we quote:
"Pursuant to Section 20 of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, the Sangguniang Bayan of Sumilao, Bukidnon, on March 4, 1993, enacted Ordinance No. 24 converting or re-classifying 144 hectares of land in Bgy. San Vicente, said Municipality, from agricultural to industrial/institutional with a view of providing an opportunity to attract investors who can inject new economic vitality, provide more jobs and raise the income of its people which includes 1.Development Academy of Mindanao 2.Bukidnon Agro-Industrial Park 3.Forest development 4.Support facilities which comprise hotel, restaurants, dormitories and a housing project covering an area of 20 hectares. "The said NQSRMDC Proposal was, per Certification adopted by: DTI, Provincial Development Council of Bukidnon; the municipal, provincial and regional office of the DAR; the DENR, Office of the President — Mindanao; DILG, DECS, National Irrigation Administration, Provincial Irrigation Office etc However DAR: thru Secretary Garilao, invoking its powers to approve conversion of lands under Section 65 of R.A. No. 6657, issued an Order denying the instant application for the conversion of the subject land from agricultural to agro-industrial and, instead, placed the same under the compulsory coverage of CARP and directed the distribution thereof to all qualified beneficiaries. MR of the aforesaid Order was filed on January 9, 1995 by applicant but the same was denied (in an Order dated June 7, 1995)." 9 DAR Secretary: ordered the DAR Regional Director "to proceed with the compulsory acquisition and distribution of the property." 10 Governor Carlos O. Fortich of Bukidnon: appealed the order of denial to the Office of the President and prayed for the conversion/reclassification of the subject land as the same would be more beneficial to the people of Bukidnon. NQSRMDC:filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, PI Presidential Assistant for Mindanao Honorable Paul G. Dominguez, sent a memorandum to the President favorably endorsing the project with a recommendation that the DAR Secretary reconsider his decision in denying the application of the province for the conversion of the land. CA: issued a Resolution ordering the parties to observe status quo pending resolution of the petition. At the hearing held in said case, the DAR, through the Solicitor General, manifested before the said court that the DAR was merely "in the processing stage of the applications of farmers-claimants" and has agreed to respect status quo pending the resolution of the petition. OP: through then Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres, issued a Decision in OP Case, reversing the DAR Secretary's decision DAR filed a motion for reconsideration of the OP decision. NQSRMDC and DECS: executed a Memorandum of Agreement whereby the former donated four (4) hectares from the subject land to DECS for the establishment of the NQSR High School.
When NQSRMDC was about to transfer the title over the 4-hectare donated to DECS, it discovered that the title over the subject property was no longer in its name. It soon found out that during the pendency of both the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, with Preliminary Injunction it filed against DAR in the Court of Appeals and the appeal to the President filed by Governor Carlos O. Fortich, the DAR, without giving just compensation, caused the cancellation of NQSRMDC's title on August 11, 1995 and had it transferred in the name of the Republic of the Philippines under TCT No. T-50264 19 of the Registry of Deeds of Bukidnon. Thereafter, on September 25, 1995, DAR caused the issuance of Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) No. 00240227 and had it registered in the name of 137 farmer-beneficiaries under TCT No. AT-3536 20 of the Registry of Deeds of Bukidnon. NQSRMDC: filed a complaint with the RTC of Malaybalay, Bukidnon for annulment and cancellation of title, damages and injunction against DAR and 141 others. RTC: issued a Temporary Restraining Order on April 30, 1997 and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction restraining the DAR and 141 others from entering, occupying and/or wresting from NQSRMDC the possession of the subject land. Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres: denying DAR's motion for reconsideration for having been filed beyond the reglementary period of fifteen (15) days. The said order further declared that the March 29, 1996 OP decision had already become final and executory. DAR: filed on July 11, 1997 a second motion for reconsideration of the June 23, 1997 Order of the President. Writ of preliminary injunction issued by the RTC was challenged by some alleged farmers before the Court of Appeals through a petition for certiorari and prohibition, praying for the lifting of the injunction and for the issuance of a writ of prohibition from further trying the RTC case. Alleged farmer-beneficiaries began their hunger strike in front of the DAR Compound in Quezon City to protest the OP Decision. Persons claiming to be farmer-beneficiaries of the NQSRMDC: property filed a motion for intervention (styled as Memorandum In Intervention) in O.P., asking that the OP Decision allowing the conversion of the entire 144-hectare property be set aside. President Fidel V. Ramos: then held a dialogue with the strikers and promised to resolve their grievance within the framework of the law. He created an eight (8)-man Fact Finding Task Force (FFTF) chaired by Agriculture Secretary Salvador Escudero to look into the controversy and recommend possible solutions to the problem. OP: resolved the strikers' protest by issuing the so-called "Win/Win" Resolution penned by then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona, the dispositive portion of which reads: "1.NQSRMDC's application for conversion is APPROVED only with respect to the approximately forty-four (44) hectare portion of the land adjacent to the highway, as recommended by the Department of Agriculture. "2.The remaining approximately one hundred (100) hectares traversed by an irrigation canal and found to be suitable for agriculture shall be distributed to qualified farmer-beneficiaries in accordance with RA 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law with a right of way to said portion from the highway provided in the portion fronting the highway. For this purpose, the DAR and other concerned government agencies are directed to immediately conduct the segregation survey of the area, valuation of the property and generation of titles in the name of the identified farmer-beneficiaries.
A copy of the "Win-Win" Resolution was received by Governor Carlos O. Fortich of Bukidnon, Mayor Rey B. Baula of Sumilao, Bukidnon, and NQSRMDC on November 24, 1997, they filed the present petition for certiorari, prohibition (under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court) and injunction with urgent prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction (under Rule 58, ibid.), against then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona and DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao. Motion For Leave To Intervene was filed by alleged farmer-beneficiaries, through counsel, claiming that they are real parties in interest as they were "previously identified by respondent DAR as agrarian reform beneficiaries on the 144-hectare" property subject of this case. The motion was vehemently opposed by the petitioners. Petitioners: claim that the OP was prompted to issue the said resolution "after a very well-managed hunger strike led by fake farmer-beneficiary Linda Ligmon succeeded in pressuring and/or politically blackmailing the Office of the President to come up with this purely political decision to appease the 'farmers,' by reviving and modifying the Decision of 29 March 1996 which has been declared final and executory in an Order of 23 June 1997 . . ." Thus, petitioners further allege, respondent then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona "committed grave abuse of discretion and acted beyond his jurisdiction; They availed of this extraordinary writ of certiorari "because there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." They never filed a motion for reconsideration of the subject Resolution "because (it) is patently illegal or contrary to law and it would be a futile exercise to seek a reconsideration . . ." The respondents: through the Solicitor General, opposed the petition and prayed that it be dismissed outright on the following grounds: (1)The proper remedy of petitioners should have been to file a petition for review directly with the Court of Appeals in accordance with Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court; (2)The petitioners failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the assailed "Win-Win" Resolution before filing the present petition; and (3)Petitioner NQSRMDC is guilty of forum-shopping. Anent the first issue, the remedy prescribed in Rule 43 is inapplicable considering that the present petition contains an allegation that the challenged resolution is "patently illegal" and was issued with "grave abuse of discretion" and "beyond his (respondent Secretary Renato C. Corona's) jurisdiction" when said resolution substantially modified the earlier OP Decision of March 29, 1996 which had long become final and executory. In other words, the crucial issue raised here involves an error of jurisdiction, not an error of judgment which is reviewable by an appeal under Rule 43. Thus, the appropriate remedy to annul and set aside the assailed resolution is an original special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, as what the petitioners have correctly done. The Court resolve to take primary jurisdiction over the present petition in the interest of speedy justice and to avoid future litigations so as to promptly put an end to the present controversy which, as correctly observed by petitioners, has sparked national interest because of the magnitude of the problem created by the issuance of the assailed resolution. Moreover, as will be discussed later, we find the assailed resolution wholly void and requiring the petitioners to file their petition first with the Court of Appeals would only result in a waste of time and money. That the Court has the power to set aside its own rules in the higher interests of justice is well-entrenched in our jurisprudence. As to the second issue of whether the petitioners committed a fatal procedural lapse when they failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the assailed resolution before seeking judicial recourse, suffice it to
state that the said motion is not necessary when the questioned resolution is a patent nullity, 57 as will be taken up later. With respect to the third issue, the respondents claim that the filing by the petitioners of: (a) a petition for certiorari, prohibition with preliminary injunction with the Court of Appeals; (b) a complaint for annulment and cancellation of title, damages and injunction against DAR and 141 others (Civil Case No. 2687-97) with the Regional Trial Court of Malaybalay, Bukidnon; and (c) the present petition, constitute forum shopping. We disagree. The rule is that: It is clear from the above-quoted rule that the petitioners are not guilty of forum shopping. The test for determining whether a party has violated the rule against forum shopping is where a final judgment in one case will amount to res adjudicata in the action under consideration. A cursory examination of the cases filed by the petitioners does not show that the said cases are similar with each other. The petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals sought the nullification of the DAR Secretary's order to proceed with the compulsory acquisition and distribution of the subject property. On the other hand, the civil case in RTC of Malaybalay, Bukidnon for the annulment and cancellation of title issued in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, with damages, was based on the following grounds: (1) the DAR, in applying for cancellation of petitioner NQSRMDC's title, used documents which were earlier declared null and void by the DARAB; (2) the cancellation of NQSRMDC's title was made without payment of just compensation; and (3) without notice to NQSRMDC for the surrender of its title. The present petition is entirely different from the said two cases as it seeks the nullification of the assailed "Win-Win" Resolution of the Office of the President dated November 7, 1997, which resolution was issued long after the previous two cases were instituted. The fourth and final preliminary issue to be resolved is the motion for intervention filed by alleged farmer-beneficiaries, which we have to deny for lack of merit. In their motion, movants contend that they are the farmer-beneficiaries of the land in question, hence, are real parties in interest. To prove this, they attached as Annex "I" in their motion a Master List of Farmer-Beneficiaries. Apparently, the alleged master list was made pursuant to the directive in the dispositive portion of the assailed "Win-Win" Resolution which directs the DAR "to carefully and meticulously determine who among the claimants are qualified farmer-beneficiaries." However, a perusal of the said document reveals that movants are those purportedly "Found Qualified and Recommended for Approval." In other words, movants are merely recommendeefarmer-beneficiaries. The rule in this jurisdiction is that a real party in interest is a party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment or is the party entitled to the avails of the suit.Real interest means a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or a future, contingent, subordinate or consequential interest. Undoubtedly, movants' interest over the land in question is a mere expectancy. Ergo, they are not real parties in interest. Furthermore, the challenged resolution upon which movants based their motion is, as intimated earlier, null and void. Hence, their motion for intervention has no leg to stand on. ISSUE: Whether the final and executory Decision can still be substantially modified by the "Win-Win" Resolution. HELD: We rule in the negative.
The rules and regulations governing appeals to the Office of the President of the Philippines are embodied in Administrative Order No. 18. Section 7 thereof provides: "SEC. 7.Decisions/resolutions/orders of the Office of the President shall, except as otherwise provided for by special laws, become final after the lapse of fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof by the parties, unless a motion for reconsideration thereof is filed within such period. "Only one motion for reconsideration by any one party shall be allowed and entertained, save in exceptionally meritorious cases." (Emphasis ours) It is further provided for in Section 9 that "The Rules of Court shall apply in a suppletory character whenever practicable." When the Office of the President issued the Order dated June 23, 1997 declaring the Decision of March 29, 1996 final and executory, as no one has seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration thereto, the said Office had lost its jurisdiction to re-open the case, more so modify its Decision. Having lost its jurisdiction, the Office of the President has no more authority to entertain the second motion for reconsideration filed by respondent DAR Secretary, which second motion became the basis of the assailed "Win-Win" Resolution. Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 18 and Section 4, Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court mandate that only one (1) motion for reconsideration is allowed to be taken from the Decision of March 29, 1996. And even if a second motion for reconsideration was permitted to be filed in "exceptionally meritorious cases," as provided in the second paragraph of Section 7 of AO 18, still the said motion should not have been entertained considering that the first motion for reconsideration was not seasonably filed, thereby allowing the Decision of March 29, 1996 to lapse into finality. Thus, the act of the Office of the President in re-opening the case and substantially modifying its March 29, 1996 Decision which had already become final and executory, was in gross disregard of the rules and basic legal precept that accord finality to administrative determinations. The orderly administration of justice requires that the judgments/resolutions of a court or quasi-judicial body must reach a point of finality set by the law, rules and regulations. The noble purpose is to write finis to disputes once and for all. This is a fundamental principle in our justice system, without which there would be no end to litigations. Utmost respect and adherence to this principle must always be maintained by those who wield the power of adjudication. Any act which violates such principle must immediately be struck down. Therefore, the assailed "Win-Win" Resolution which substantially modified the Decision of March 29, 1996 after it has attained finality, is utterly void. Such void resolution, as aptly stressed by Justice Thomas A. Street in a 1918 case, is "a lawless thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head." WHEREFORE, the present petition is hereby GRANTED. The challenged Resolution issued by the Office of the President in OP Case is hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. The Motion For Leave To Intervene filed by alleged farmer-beneficiaries is hereby DENIED. DOCTRINE: The rules and regulations governing appeals to the Office of the President of the Philippines are embodied in Administrative Order No 18. Section 7 thereof provides: "SEC. 7. Decisions/resolutions/orders of the Office of the President shall, except as otherwise provided for by special laws, become final after the lapse of fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof by the parties, unless a motion for reconsideration thereof is filed within such period. Only one motion for reconsideration by any one party shall be allowed and entertained, save in exceptionally meritorious
cases." It is further provided for in Section 9 that "The Rules of Court shall apply in a suppletory character whenever practicable."
Lapid vs. CA, 334 SCRA 738 (2000) LAPID VS. CA - G.R. No. 142261, June 29, 2000 FACTS: On the basis of an unsigned letter allegedly originating from the "Mga Mamamayan ng Lalawigan ng Pampanga," the NBI initiated an "open probe" on the alleged illegal quarrying in Pampanga & exaction of exorbitant fees purportedly perpetrated by unscrupulous individuals with the connivance of high-ranking government officials. The NBI report was endorsed to the respondent Ombudsman. A complaint was filed charging petitioner Gov. Manuel M. Lapid, with alleged "Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service" for allegedly "having conspired between and among themselves in demanding and collecting from various quarrying operators in Pampanga a control fee, control slip, or monitoring fee of P120.00 per truckload of sand, travel, or other quarry material, without a duly enacted provincial ordinance authorizing the collection thereof and without issuing receipts for its collection. The Ombudsman issued an Order suspending petitioner Lapid for a period of six (6) months without pay pursuant to Sec. 24 of RA 6770. The DILG implemented the suspension of petitioner Lapid. On November 22, 1999 the Ombudsman rendered a decision in the administrative case finding the Lapid administratively liable for misconduct. The copy of the said decision was received by counsel for the petitioner and a motion for reconsideration was filed. The Ombudsman denied the motion for reconsideration. Petitioner then filed a petition for review with the CA praying for the issuance of a TRO to enjoin the Ombudsman from enforcing the questioned decision. The TRO was issued by the appellate court. When the 60-day lifetime of the TRO lapsed without the CA resolving the prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus was filed with the SC. The SC issued a Resolution requiring the respondents to comment on the petition. That same day, the CA issued a resolution denying the petitioner's prayer for injunctive relief. The following day, the DILG implemented the assailed decision of the Ombudsman and the highest ranking Provincial Board Member of Pampanga, Edna David, took her oath of office as O.I.C. — Governor of the Province of Pampanga. A Motion for Leave to File Supplement to the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus and the Supplement to the Petition itself were filed in view of the resolution of the CA denying the petitioner's prayer for preliminary injunction. The petitioner likewise raised in issue the apparent pre-judgment of the case on the merits by the CA. Petitioner alleged that the decision of the Ombudsman had not yet become final and argued that the writs of prohibition and mandamus may be issued against the respondent DILG for prematurely implementing the assailed decision.
The Solicitor-General and the Office of the Ombudsman filed their respective comments to the petition praying for the dismissal thereof: The Solicitor-General—maintains that the said decision is governed by Section 12, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court and is therefore, immediately executory. The Ombudsman—maintain that the Ombudsman Law and its implementing rules are silent as to the execution of decisions rendered by the Ombudsman considering that the portion of the said law cited by petition pertains to the finality of the decision but not to its enforcement pending appeal. They also stated that it has uniformly adopted the provisions in the Local Government Code and Administrative Code that decisions in administrative disciplinary cases are immediately executory. After oral arguments before the SC, the Resolution subject of the instant Motions for Reconsideration was issued. The OSG and the Ombudsman filed the instant motions for reconsideration. ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the Ombudsman finding herein petitioner administratively liable for misconduct and imposing upon him a penalty of one (1) year suspension without pay is immediately executory pending appeal. HELD: Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 states that all provisionary orders of the Ombudsman are immediately effective and executory; and that any order, directive or decision of the said Office imposing the penalty of censure or reprimand or suspension of not more than one month's salary is final and unappealable. It is clear that the punishment imposed upon petitioner, i.e. suspension without pay for one year, is not among those listed as final and unappealable, hence, immediately executory. It is clear that all other decisions of the Ombudsman which impose penalties that are not enumerated in the said section 27 are not final, unappealable and immediately executory. An appeal timely filed, such as the one filed in the instant case, will stay the immediate implementation of the decision. In all these other cases therefore, the judgment imposed therein will become final after the lapse of the reglementary period of appeal is perfected or, an appeal therefrom having been taken, the judgment in the appellate tribunal become final. It is this final judgment which is then correctly categorized as a "final and executory judgment" in respect to which execution shall issue as a matter of right. In other words, the fact that the Ombudsman Act gives parties the right to appeal from its decisions should generally carry with it the stay of these decisions pending appeal. Otherwise, the essential nature of these judgments as being appealable would be rendered nugatory. The general rule is that judgments by lower courts or tribunals become executory only after it has become final and executory, execution pending appeal being an exception to this general rule. It is the contention of respondents however that with respect to decisions of quasi-judicial agencies and administrative bodies, the opposite is true. It is argued that the general rule with respect to quasi-judicial and administrative agencies is that the decisions of such bodies are immediately executory even pending
appeal. The contention of respondents is misplaced. There is no general legal principle that mandates that all decisions of quasi-judicial agencies are immediately executory. Where the legislature has seen fit to declare that the decision of the quasi-judicial agency is immediately final and executory pending appeal, the law expressly so provides. Sec. 12 of Rule 43 should therefore be interpreted as mandating that the appeal will not stay the award, judgment, final order or resolution unless the law directs otherwise. Petitioner was charged administratively before the Ombudsman and accordingly the provisions of the Ombudsman Act should apply in his case. There is no basis in law for the proposition that the provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987 and the Local Government Code on execution pending review should be applied suppletorily to the provisions of the Ombudsman Act as there is nothing in the Ombudsman Act which provides for such suppletory application. The decision imposing a penalty of one year suspension without pay on petitioner Lapid is not immediately executory. 5. Rule 45 Nunez vs. GSIS Family Bank, 475 SCRA 305 (2005) FACTS: Petitioners are the heirs of Leonilo S. Nuñez (Leonilo) who, during his lifetime, obtained three loans from the GSIS Family Bank, formerly ComSavings Bank which in turn was formerly known as Royal Savings and Loan Association. On June 30, 1978, when the three loans were maturing, Leonilo purportedly obtained a "fourth loan" in the amount of P1,539,135.00 to secure which he executed a Real Estate Mortgage antedated June 28, 1978 over properties. On the maturity of the three loans or on June 30, 1978, Leonilo executed a Promissory Note 6 in the amount of P1,539,135.00, due and payable on December 27, 1978. More than nineteen (19) years after Leonilo's June 30, 1978 Promissory Note matured or on December 11, 1997, the bank undertook to extrajudicially foreclose the properties. In its petition for extrajudicial foreclosure, the bank alleged that Leonilo violated the terms and conditions of the loans secured by the Real Estate Mortgages since June 30, 1978 when he failed, despite repeated demands, to pay his principal obligations, and interest due thereon from December 27, 1978, up to the time that the petition was filed. Acting on the bank's petition for Extra-judicial Foreclosure of Mortgage, the ExOfficio Sheriff of Gapan, Nueva Ecija issued a Notice of Extra-judicial Sale setting the sale of the properties involved at public auction on January 9, 1998. The auction took place as scheduled, with the bank as the highest and only bidder in the amount of P33,026,100.00. A Certificate of Sale was thus issued in favor of the bank. On September 1, 1999, on petition of the bank, the mortgage over properties two of the six parcels of land which secured the "fourth loan" that matured on December 27, 1978, was extrajudicially foreclosed. At the public auction, the bank was the highest bidder and a Certificate of Sale dated February 18, 2000 was issued in its name. Leonilo later filed on June 20, 2000 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Gapan, Nueva Ecija a complaint against the GSIS Family Bank for Annulment of Extrajudicial Foreclosure Sale, Reconveyance and Cancellation of Encumbrances. In his complaint, Leonilo denied securing a "fourth loan" but nevertheless alleged that "for purposes of the action, the same shall be assumed to have been validly secured.” Invoking prescription, Leonilo contended that his first three loans and the "fourth loan" matured on June 30, 1978 and December 27, 1978, hence, they had prescribed on June 28, 1988 and December 25,
1988, respectively. When, on December 11, 1997 and September 1, 1999 then, the bank filed the Petitions for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Mortgage, Leonilo concluded that it no longer had any right as prescription had set in. Leonilo invited the attention of the court to the fact that although six titles secured the purported "fourth loan" of P1,539,135.00, only two were the subject of foreclosure sale on September 1, 1999 and the mortgage was not annotated on the four other mortgaged titles. Moreover, he pointed out that the record shows that the Real Estate Mortgage dated June 28, 1978 purportedly securing the "fourth loan" was annotated on NT-143001 and NT-143007 subject of the September 1, 1999 foreclosure only on August 31, 1999 or more than 11 years after the prescriptive period to foreclose had set in. RTC - RTC found for Leonilo who died during the pendency of the trial of the case, hence, his substitution by his heirs — herein petitioners, declaring that the bank's cause of action over the loans had prescribed and, therefore, the proceedings for extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgages were null and void. The bank filed a motion for reconsideration on September 20, 2002, the last of the 15-day period within which it could interpose an appeal, but it did not comply with the provision of Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court on notice of hearing, prompting herein petitioners to file a Motion to Strike Out Motion for Reconsideration with Motion for the issuance of a writ of execution. The bank filed an Opposition with Motion to Admit (the Motion for Reconsideration), attributing its failure to incorporate the notice of hearing to inadvertent deletion from its computer file of standard clauses for pleadings the required notice of hearing and to the heavy workload of the handling counsel, Atty. George Garvida. The trial court denied the bank's Motion for Reconsideration by Order of November 18, 2002 and accordingly ordered it stricken off the record. The bank filed a Notice of Appeal to which petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss for being filed late, which motion was granted by the trial court by Order of February 10, 2003. The bank, which is owned by the Government Service Insurance System, argued that too rigidly and strictly apply the rules of procedure would result to injustice and irreparable damage to the government as it stands to lose a substantial amount if not allowed to recover the proceeds of the loans. CA - it ruled that while the right to appeal is a statutory and not a natural right, it is nevertheless an essential part of the judicial system, hence, courts should be cautious not to deprive a party of the right to appeal; and in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, the trial court should have given the bank's Notice of Appeal due course to better serve the ends, and prevent a miscarriage of justice. ISSUE: Whether the private respondent could still appeal a judgment which has become final and executor HELD: NO. At the outset, clarification on petitioners' mode of appeal is in order. Petitioners and counsel confuse their petition as one Petition for Review under Rule 45 with a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. For
while they treat it as one for Review on Certiorari, they manifest that it is filed "pursuant to Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in relation to Rule 45 of the New Rules of Court." In Ligon v. Court of Appeals where the therein petitioner described her petition as "an appeal under Rule 45 and at the same time as a special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court," this Court, in frowning over what it described as a "chimera," reiterated that the remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative nor successive. To be sure, the distinctions between Rules 45 and 65 are far and wide. However, the most apparent is that errors of jurisdiction are best reviewed in a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 while errors of judgment can only be corrected by appeal in a petition for review under Rule 45. This Court, however, in accordance with the liberal spirit which pervades the Rules of Court and in the interest of justice may treat a petition for certiorari as having filed under Rule 45, more so if the same was filed within the reglementary period for filing a petition for review. The records show that the petition was filed on time both under Rules 45 and 65. Following Delsan Transport, the petition, stripped of allegations of "grave abuse of discretion," actually avers errors of judgment which are the subject of a petition for review. The explanations proffered by the bank behind its failure to incorporate a notice of hearing of the Motion for Reconsideration — inadvertent deletion from its computer file of the standard clauses for pleadings during the printing of the finalized draft of the motion and the handling counsel's heavy workload — are unsatisfactory. To credit the foregoing explanations would render the mandatory rule on notice of hearing meaningless and nugatory as lawyers would simply invoke these grounds should they fail to comply with the rules. As to the claim that the government would suffer loss of substantial amount if not allowed to recover the proceeds of the loans, this Court finds that any loss was caused by respondent's own doing or undoing. China Road and Bridge Corp. vs. CA, 348 SCRA 401 (2000) China Road and Bridge Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 137898, December 15, 2000, 401 PHIL 590604 FACTS: CHINA ROAD AND BRIDGE CORPORATION (CRBC) is a corporation organized under the laws of the People's Republic of China duly licensed by the Securities and Exchange Commission to do business in the Philippines. It was awarded by the Philippine Government the contract to construct the EDSA Shaw Boulevard Overpass in Mandaluyong, which it subcontracted to Hi-Quality Builders and Traders, Inc. (HI-QUALITY), a domestic corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines. Helen Ambrosio: President of HI-QUALITY, executed a Continuing Suretyship in favor of Jade Progressive Savings and Mortgage Bank (JADEBANK) binding herself to pay the "obligations of the Debtor (Hi-Quality) arising from all credit accommodations extended by the Bank to the Debtor . . . presently or hereafter owing to the Bank, as appears in the accounts, books and records of the Bank whether direct or indirect . . . " HI-QUALITY executed a Deed of Assignment in favor of JADEBANK with the approval of CRBC where it assigned to JADEBANK
"(a)ll monthly accomplishment billings, the sums of money, credit, or receivables assigned, be in the position (sic) of or due or to be due from China Road and Bridge Corporation, arising from the subcontract agreement in the construction of the EDSA/Shaw Blvd. Overpass Project . . . " JADEBANK released to HI-QUALITY: 1. P500,000.00 as part of the loan both parties earlier contracted. As security for the loan, HIQUALITY executed Promissory Note promising to pay the loan on 3 April 1997. It also indorsed to JADEBANK Check issued by CRBC on 31 March 1997 covering the amount released, drawn on United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), Mandaluyong Branch. 2. P250,000.00 for which HI-QUALITY executed Promissory Note No. JB BDO 181/97 payable on 18 April 1997 and indorsed to JADEBANK Check issued by Helen Ambrosio on 18 April 1997 covering the amount released, drawn on Allied Banking Corporation, Shaw Boulevard Branch (ALLIEDBANK). 3. P250,000.00 for which HI-QUALITY executed Promissory Note No. JB BDO 150/97 payable on 5 May 1997 and indorsed to JADEBANK ALLIEDBANK Check No. 0000126131 issued by Ambrosio dated 30 April 1997 for the same amount. 4. P400,000.00 for which HI-QUALITY executed Promissory Note No. JB BDO 162/97 payable on 5 May 1997 and indorsed to JADEBANK Check No. 214179 issued by Ambrosio dated 30 April 1997 for the same amount, drawn on Security Bank Corporation, Pateros Branch (SECURITYBANK). 5. Another P400,000.00 for which HI-QUALITY executed Promissory Note No. JB BDO 33/97 payable on 5 May 1997 and indorsed to JADEBANK UCPB Check No. 270144 issued by CRBC. 6. P350,000.00 for which HI-QUALITY executed Promissory Note No. JB BDO 45/97 payable on 5 May 1997 and indorsed to JADEBANK UCPB Check No. 270147 issued by CRBC. 7. Finally, on 21 February 1997 JADEBANK released P250,000.00 for which HI-QUALITY executed Promissory Note No. JB BDO 75/97 payable on 5 May 1997 and indorsed to JADEBANK UCPB Check No. 270551 issued by CRBC. All the promissory notes executed by HI-QUALITY provided for twenty-five percent (25%) interest per annum and a five percent (5%) penalty per month in case ofdefault. The amount of each check corresponded to the amount released to HI-QUALITY on the day the check was indorsed to JADEBANK. When JADEBANK deposited the aforementioned checks for payment, they were returned unpaid. The checks drawn on: 1.
UCPB were dishonored due to "Stop Payment" orders from the drawer.
2.
ALLIEDBANK checks were dishonored because the account was closed
3. The SECURITYBANK check was dishonored because the account had been closed since the second quarter of 1996. JADEBANK: filed a case for collection against HI-QUALITY, Helen Ambrosio and CRBC, with an application for a writ of attachment against their properties. The Complaint included as cause of action the first four (4) checks indorsed by HI-QUALITY to JADEBANK and alleging among others that the defendants conspired to commit fraudulent acts in order to induce JADEBANK to grant the loans to HI-QUALITY. Firstly, CRBC issued to HI-QUALITY the UCPB check for P500,000.00 dated 31 March 1997 without any intention of honoring the check. JADEBANK alleged that CRBC knew fully well that the check was to be used by HI-QUALITY as security for the loan from JADEBANK. However, in violation of the Deed of Assignment, CRBC gave to
HI-QUALITY sums of money without notice to or the consent of JADEBANK, thereby releasing funds supposedly already assigned to JADEBANK for the payment of HI-QUALITY's loans. Secondly, Helen Ambrosio, as President of HI-QUALITY, issued the checks drawn on SECURITYBANK and ALLIEDBANK after her accounts with these banks were closed, thus revealing a fraudulent intention not to honor her obligations even from their inception. She also executed the Suretyship Agreement in favor of JADEBANK without any intention of fulfilling her obligations. TC: issued a Writ of Preliminary Attachment. On the same day, a Notice of Garnishment was served on UCPB garnishing all the moneys ofCRBC in the bank. On 23 June 1997 CRBC filed a Motion for Discharge of Attachment. On the same day a Notice of Levy on Attachment was also served on CRBC. On 27 June 1997 the preliminary attachment was discharged after CRBC posted a counter-bond in the amount of P1,962,458.00. JADEBANK filed an Amended Complaint to include the loans contracted on 7, 17 and 21 February 1997 increasing the total amount collectible to P3,437,424.42. CRBC: filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action because the Deed of Assignment upon which JADEBANK based its cause of action against CRBC, was subject to the Sub-Contracting Agreement between CRBC and HI-QUALITY — Under these circumstances, until such time as Hi Quality is able to perform its obligations pursuant to the Sub-Contract Agreement thereby entitling it to payment for services rendered, China Road has no liability whatsoever in Hi-Quality's favor. Corollarily, until its happens, HiQuality has nothing to assign in favor of the plaintiff in the form of collectibles/receivables from China Road pursuant to the Deed of Assignment. 3 cDTaSH CRBC also denied that the issuance of the checks to HI-QUALITY was for the purpose of facilitating the loans in favor of the latter, claiming that the checks were for the use of HI-QUALITY alone, and not for any other purpose and it also denied that it had been releasing money to HI-QUALITY, claiming that the latter had failed to comply with its obligations to CRBC. TC: granted the MTD the complaint with respect to CRBC. Its MR having been denied. CRBC: filed with the Court of Appeals a MTD Appeal asserting that "the determination of whether the ultimate facts in a Complaint state a cause of action against the defendant is a pure question of law and does not involve any question of fact." because proper mode of appeal was not by way of ordinary appeal under Rule 41 but rather by way of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. CA: issued the assailed Resolution denying CRBC's Motion to Dismiss, finding the appeal involved both questions of fact and of law. MR denied hence, this petition. ISSUE: W/N CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying petitioner's Motion to Dismiss. HELD: A question of law exists when there is doubt or controversy as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, and there is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts, or when the query necessarily invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of witnesses, existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, their relation to each other and to the whole and probabilities of the situation. Ordinarily, the determination of whether an appeal involves only questions of law or both questions of law and fact is best left to the appellate court, and all doubts as to the correctness of such conclusions will
be resolved in favor of the Court of Appeals. However, in the instant case, we find that there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Court of Appealshence, we grant the petition. It is well settled that in a motion to dismiss based on lack of cause of action, the issue is passed upon on the basis of the allegations assuming them to be true. The court does not inquire into the truth ofthe allegations and declare them to be false, otherwise it would be a procedural error and a denial of due process to the plaintiff. Only the statements in the complaint may be properly considered, and the court cannot take cognizance of external facts or hold preliminary hearings to ascertain their existence. To put it simply, the test for determining whether a complaint states or does not state a cause of action against the defendants is whether or not, admitting hypothetically the truth of the allegations of fact made in the complaint, the judge may validly grant the relief demanded in the complaint. In a motion to dismiss based on failure to state a cause of action, there cannot be any question of fact or "doubt or difference as to the truth or falsehood of facts," simply because there are no findings of fact in the first place. What the trial court merely does is to apply the law to the facts as alleged in the complaint, assuming such allegations to be true. It follows then that any appeal therefrom could only raise questions of law or "doubt or controversy as to what the law is on a certain state of facts." Therefore, a decision dismissing a complaint based on failure to state a cause of action necessarily precludes a review of the same decision on questions of fact. One is the legal and logical opposite ofthe other. The test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation given to such question by the party raising the same; rather, it is whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise, it is a question of fact. Applying the test to the instant case, it is clear that private respondent raises pure questions of law which are not proper in an ordinary appeal under Rule 41, but should be raised by way of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. In a motion to dismiss due to failure to state a cause of action, the trial court can consider all the pleadings filed, including annexes, motions and the evidence on record. However in so doing, the trial court does not rule on the truth or falsity of such documents. It merely includes such documents in the hypothetical admission. Any review of a finding of lack of cause of action based on these documents would not involve a calibration of the probative value of such pieces of evidence but would only limit itself to the inquiry of whether the law was properly applied given the facts and these supporting documents. Therefore, what would inevitably arise from such a review are pure questions of law, and not questions of fact. It is apparent that JADEBANK, as well as respondent appellate court, confused situations where the complaint does not allege a sufficient cause of actionand where the evidence does not sustain the cause of action alleged. The first is raised in a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 before a responsive pleading is filed and can be determined only from the allegations in the initiatory pleading and not from evidentiary or other matter aliunde. The second is raised in a demurrer to evidence under Rule 33 after the plaintiff has rested his case and can be resolved only on the basis of the evidence he has presented in support of his claim. The first does not concern itself with the truth and falsity of the allegations while the second arises precisely because the judge has determined the truth and falsity of the allegations and has found the evidence wanting. AHSaTI JADEBANK's appeal having been improperly brought before the Court of Appeals, it should be dismissed outright pursuant to Sec. 2 of Rule 50 of the Rules of Court. DOCTRINE:
RULE 45 Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment, final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Court or other courts, whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition may include an application for a writ of preliminary injunction or other provisional remedies and shall raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth. The petitioner may seek the same provisional remedies by verified motion filed in the same action or proceeding at any time during its pendency. The test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation given to such question by the party raising the same; rather, it is whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise, it is a question of fact. 6. Rule 65 Day vs. RTC of Zamboanga City, 191 SCRA 610 (1999) Victoriano Day v. RTC of Zamboanga and Go Chu FACTs: In 1982, Petioner Victoriano Day, being reg. owner of his parcel of land at Tomas Claudio St., Zamboanga, asked respondent Go Chu to peacefully vacate and remove that portion of respondent’s building standing on former’s land. Respondent refused. So Pet instituted a formal complaint against respondent with the Office of the Brgy. Chairman, Zone 1, Zamboanga. No amicable settlement was reached and brgy chairman issued a certification that conciliation of the dispute at brgy level had failed (pursuant to Sec. 6,PD 1508). In 1984, Petitoner received from respondent P1,000 as rental for the use of his lot from 1979 to Dec. 1984. Based on this, respondent claimed the existence of a lease contract between him and petitioner despite absence of formal or even verbal lease contract. Petitioner made another demand on private respondent to remove latter’s building on his property. Respondent again refused. In 1985, Petitioner filed an action for unlawful detainer with application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction with MTC. Petitioner did not use his barangay certification to commence the suit. MTC ruled in favor of Petitioner. MTC ordered Respondent to: 1. Vacate and remove the portion of the building; 2. Pay P950 as compensation from 1986 till respondent vacates; and 3. Pay atty.’s fees P5,000 and cost of litigation. Without moving first for reconsideration, Respondent filed with RTC an original action for Certiorari. He alleged that the lower court “erroneously” appreciated facts and evidence, issued interlocutory order, and appreciated the issued. So RTC issued TRO pending hearing of application for writ of PI. Parties filed their respective pleadings. On May 27, 1986, after hearing of the application for PI, RTC issued decision in favor of Petitioner (so court denied PI. RTC explained that the “Certiorari was lacking in merit. Hence, it follows that where the petitioner is not entitled to primary relief demanded, he cannot likewise be entitled to ancillary remedy of injunction.However, there are still certain matters in the main petition that can only be completely respolved after hearing thereon.” So a hearing on CERTAIN MATTERS was conducted, but parties did not submit additional arguments and the case was submitted for decisions relying on the pleadings. On July 8, 1986, RTC reversed itself granting the Certiorari and thus setting aside MTC decision. In connection therewith, they were required to submit their dispute for barangay conciliation pursuant to PD1508.
So Petitioner Day moved for recon butt denied. So Pet. filed this Pet. for Review. Issues/ Held: 1. WoN court can modify or reverse May 27, 1986 Order by its July 8 1986 order even after the lapse of 15 days from issuance? Pet argument
Respondent
SC
May. 27 Order is final Order and all main issues in the case have been resolved therein.
May 27 Order is interlocutory. Hence, RTC is not precluded from further hearing the case after May 27 Order.
In favor of Petitioner. Test to ascertain whether interlocutory or not: Does it leave something to be done in the court with respect to the merits of the case? If it does-interlocutory; If it does not-final. In the instant case, it is evident that the respondent court resolved no new or other matter in the order of July 8. Thus, May 27 is final (but appealable.)
2. WoN Petitioner in an Unlawful Detainer case can apply for a writ of Preliminary Injunction Yes. An inferior court has jurisdiction to grant provisional remedies in proper cases 1.Preliminary attachement under Rule 57 provided rincipal action is within its jurisdiction; and 2. Preliminary Injunction under Rule 58 3. WoN barangay conciliation is applicable in unlawful detainer cases (such as in this case) No. See Sec. 6, PD 1508. The parties may go directly to court in actions coupled with provisional remedies AND DOES NOT REQUIRE CONCILIATION PROCEEDING AS PRECONDITION for filing in court. Action filed here is “Action for unlawful detainer with application for writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.” 4. WoN RTC can entertain petition for review on certiorari filed by respondent to appeal decision of MTC No. Applying Sec. 22, BP 129, decisions of inferior courts may be elevated to the RTC only by ORDINARY APPEAL, that is by filing a Notice of Appeal with the inferior court. Said provision does not allow other modes. 5. WoN RTC, in a petition for certiorari, may entertain question of facts, procedural or substance already decided by MTC No. In a certiorari case, RTC has no jurisdiction to Entertain such questions, because such questions require admission of evidence and admissibility of evidence is a matter that is addressed to the discretion of trial court (here MTC) 6. Won Writ of Certiorari can be granted other than the grounds mentioned under Sec. 1, Rule 65 No. Sec. 1, Rule 65 REDUCED THE office of the writ of certiorari to the correction of defects of jurisdiction solely and cannot legally be used for any other purpose. In this case there is neither grave
abuse of discretion nor excess of jurisdiction on the part of MTC when it held its decision. Plus the fact that MTC has the jurisdiction over unlawful detainer case.. Romy’s Freight Service vs. Castro, 490 SCRA 165 (2006) ROMY'S FREIGHT SERVICE, represented by Roman G. Cruz, petitioner, vs. JESUS C. CASTRO, DOMINADOR VELORIA and the FIRST DIVISION of the COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. [G.R. No. 141637. June 8, 2006.] FACTS: This case originated from a complaint for illegal dismissal filed jointly by private respondents Jesus C. Castro and Dominador Veloria against petitioner Romy's Freight Service, represented by Roman G. Cruz, its owner/sole proprietor, with the Regional Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in Baguio City. Private respondent Castro was hired by petitioner as a mechanic in April 1975. He was promoted to supervisor in 1986. On December 31, 1994, he suffered a stroke. On his doctor's advice, he took a leave of absence from work. Pending recovery, he extended his leave several times. While on leave, however, petitioner Roman G. Cruz sent him several letters first urging him to return to work. The succeeding ones assumed the nature of show cause letters requiring him to explain why he should not be disciplined for his prolonged absence. Cruz also filed complaints for estafa and qualified theft against him. Because of these, Castro was constrained to file a case for illegal dismissal against petitioner on the ground that Cruz's acts constituted constructive dismissal Labor Arbiter: September 15, 1997, executive labor arbiter Jesselito Latoja ruled that petitioner was guilty of illegal dismissal and ordered it to pay private respondents the total amount of P352,944.90, representing 13th month pay, backwages, separation pay, premium pay for work rendered on rest days and holidays, and attorney's fees.
NLRC: NLRC which, in its October 29, 1998 decision, reversed and set aside the labor arbiter's ruling. It found private respondents guilty of abandonment of work and dismissed their complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner CA:
Aggrieved, private respondents filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the Court of Appeals (CA). They ascribed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the NLRC for not finding that they were constructively dismissed by petitioner. On September 9, 1999, the appellate court granted the petition. It ruled that, since the findings of the labor arbiter were supported by substantial evidence, it should be respected by appellate tribunals. Petitioner failed to overcome the burden of proving the existence of just cause for dismissing private respondents, hence, it was guilty of illegal dismissal. The CA rejected petitioner's contention that private respondents abandoned their work. It held that their failure to report for work was for justifiable reasons and that they had no intention to sever their employment. As a consequence, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the NLRC and reinstated the September 15, 1997 decision of the labor arbiter as modified by the latter's October 1, 1997 order ISSUE: Whether or not petition for certiorari is valid, despite failure to to file a motion for reconsideration with NLRC HELD: NO. As a general rule, a motion for reconsideration is needed before a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 can be resorted to. However, there are well recognized exceptions to this rule. Private respondents' petition for certiorari before the CA was covered by the exceptions. The issue raised in the certiorari proceeding before the appellate court, i.e., whether private respondents were constructively dismissed without just cause, was also the very same issue raised before the NLRC and resolved by it. Moreover, the employer-employee relationship between petitioner and private respondents was impressed with public interest. Thus, it was proper for the appellate court to take cognizance of the case even if no motion for reconsideration had been filed by private respondents with the NLRC.
DOCTRINE: As a general rule, a motion for reconsideration is needed before a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 can be resorted to. However, there are well recognized exceptions to this rule. Other Issue: The other issues raised by petitioner, i.e., whether private respondents were illegally dismissed (as the CA and the labor arbiter ruled) or abandoned their work (as the NLRC held) and whether they were entitled to backwages, unpaid benefits, separation pay and attorney's fees, are not proper subjects of a petition for certiorari. They involve an inquiry into factual matters.
The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, more so in the consideration of the extraordinary writ of certiorari where neither questions of fact nor of law are entertained, but only questions of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. The sole object of the writ is to correct errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. The phrase 'grave abuse of discretion' has a precise meaning in law, denoting abuse of discretion "too patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty, or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or act in contemplation of law, or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and personal hostility." It does not encompass an error of law. Nor does it include a mistake in the appreciation of the contending parties' respective evidence or the evaluation of their relative weight. The Court cannot be tasked to go over the proofs presented by the parties and analyze, assess and weigh them all over again to ascertain if the trial court or quasi-judicial agency and the appellate court were correct in according superior credit to this or that piece of evidence of one party or the other. The sole office of a writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction including the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, and does not include the review of public respondent's evaluation of the evidence and the factual findings based thereon Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank vs. CA, 334 SCRA 305 (2000) FACTS: The General Banking Act regulates the number of branches that a bank may operate. In 1979, Banco Filipino had reached the allowable limit in branch site holdings but contemplated further expansion of its operations. Consequently, it unloaded some of its holdings to Tala Realty. Banco Filipino thereafter leased the same branch sites from Tala Realty which was conceived and organized precisely as a transferee corporation by the major stockholders of Banco Filipino. Banco Filipino alleges that a trust was created by virtue of the above transactions. Tala Realty was allegedly established to serve as a corporate medium to warehouse the legal title of the said properties for the beneficial interest of Banco Filipino and to purchase properties to be held in trust for the latter. However, sometime in August 1992, Tala Realty demanded payment of increased rentals, deposits and goodwill from Banco Filipino, with a threat of ejectment in case of failure to comply thereto. Due to Banco Filipino's failure to comply with Tala Realty’s terms, the latter carried out its threat by filing numerous ejectment suits against Banco Filipino. This prompted Banco Filipino to file, on August 16, 1995, an action for recovery of real properties before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 28, on the ground of breach of trust. RTC: the trial court dismissed the complaint on April 22, 1996 On June 27, 1996, the trial court denied Banco Filipino’s motion for reconsideration. Banco Filipino received a copy of said order of denial on July 5, 1996 but instead of filing an appeal, it filed, on July 24, 1996, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals. Banco Filipino alleged in its petition that the trial court’s decision was issued with grave abuse of discretion because it did not comply with the constitutional mandate on the form of decisions. CA: dismissed Banco Filipino's petition on the ground, among others, that the "[p]etitioner's recourse to Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court is patently malapropos." It reiterated the rule that a special civil action for certiorari may be resorted to only when there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Banco Filipino’s failure to appeal by writ of error within the reglementary period and its belated recourse to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 was interpreted by the Court of Appeals as a desperate attempt by Banco Filipino to resurrect what was otherwise already a lost appeal. Furthermore, the Court of Appeals debunked Banco Filipino's theory that the assailed order of the RTC did not comply with the substantive requirements of the Constitution, and was thus, rendered with grave abuse of discretion. On December 28, 1996, Banco Filipino received a copy of the Court of
Appeals’ decision dismissing its petition thereby prompting the latter to file a motion for reconsideration on January 10, 1997. The Court of Appeals denied the said motion for reconsideration on December 19, 1997 in a resolution, a copy of which was received by Banco Filipino on January 7, 1998. Banco Filipino then filed with this Court its subject petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court on March 9, 1998. ISSUE: WON the Banco Filipino’s filing a special civil action for certiorari instead of an ordinary appeal before this Court is correct. HELD: NO. Without need of delving into the merits of the case, this Court hereby dismisses the instant petition. 1. Banco Filipino's proper remedy from the adverse resolutions of the Court of Appeals is an ordinary appeal to this Court via a petition for review under Rule 45 and not a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Nothing in the record of this case supports Banco Filipino’s bare assertion that the Court of Appeals rendered its assailed resolutions with grave abuse of discretion. In other words, there being no grave abuse of discretion on its part, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed resolutions in the proper exercise of its jurisdiction. Hence, even if erroneous, the Court of Appeals’ resolutions can only be assailed by means of a petition for review. The distinction is clear: a petition for certiorari seeks to correct errors of jurisdiction while a petition for review seeks to correct errors of judgment committed by the court. Errors of judgment include errors of procedure or mistakes in the court’s findings. Where a court has jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter, the decision on all other questions arising in the case is an exercise of that jurisdiction. Consequently, all errors committed in the exercise of such jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment. 2. The availability to Banco Filipino of the remedy of a petition for review from the decision of the Court of Appeals effectively foreclosed its right to resort to a petition for certiorari. This Court has often enough reminded members of the bench and bar that a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 lies only when there is no appeal nor plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Certiorari is not allowed when a party to a case fails to appeal a judgment despite the availability of that remedy. The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive. In the case at bar, Banco Filipino has failed to show any valid reason why the issues raised in its petition for certiorari could not have been raised on appeal. To justify its resort to a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, it erroneously claims that an appeal is not a speedy and adequate remedy because further delay in the disposition of this case would effectively deprive Banco Filipino of the full use and enjoyment of its properties. However, the further delay that would inadvertently result from the dismissal of the instant petition is one purely of Banco Filipino's own doing. 3. Certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for the lapsed or lost remedy of appeal. Banco Filipino’s recourse to a special civil action for certiorari was borne not out of the conviction that grave abuse of discretion attended the resolution of its petition before the Court of Appeals but simply because of its failure to file a timely appeal to this Court. It is true that this Court may treat a petition for certiorari as having been filed under Rule 45 to serve the higher interest of justice, but not when the petition is filed well beyond the reglementary period for filing a petition for review and without offering any reason therefor. Concomitant to a liberal application of the rules of procedure should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to at least explain its failure to comply with the rules. In the case at bar, Banco Filipino’s petition is bereft of any valid reason or explanation as to why it failed to properly observe the rules of procedure. The record shows that Banco Filipino failed, not once but twice, and for an unreasonable length of time, to file an appeal within the period required by law. From the order of the
RTC, it filed its petition for certiorari some fourteen (14) days after the lapse of the reglementary period to appeal to the Court of Appeals. Likewise, when Banco Filipino filed its petition for certiorari before this Court, forty five (45) days have already passed since the end of the fifteen (15) day reglementary period for filing an appeal to the Supreme Court. Fajardo vs. Bautista, 232 SCRA 292 (1994) Fajardo v. Bautista G.R. Nos. 102193-97 May 10, 1994 DOCTINE: Generally, an order of dismissal, whether right or wrong, is a final order, and hence a proper subject of appeal, not certiorari. 30 The remedies of appeal andcertiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive. 31 Accordingly, although the special civil action of certiorari is not proper when an ordinary appeal is available, it may be granted where it is shown that the appeal would be inadequate, slow, insufficient, and will not promptly relieve a party from the injurious effects of the order complained of, or where appeal is inadequate and ineffectual. 32 Nevertheless, certiorari cannot be a substitute for the lost or lapsed remedy of appeal, 33 where such loss is occasioned by the petitioner's own neglect or error in the choice of remedies. 34|||
FACTS: Private respondents Isabelo Jareño and Purita Jareño are the owners and developers of a subdivision known as the Calamba Central Compound. They as SELLERS, and the petitioners as BUYERS signed separate contracts ,CONTRACT TO SELL, under which, for the considerations therein stated, they bound themselves to sell to the petitioners the lots subject thereof, and after the latter shall have paid the purchase price and interest, to execute in favor of the petitioners the corresponding deeds of transfer of title, free from any lien or encumbrance except those expressly provided for in the Contract to Sell||. On the other hand, private respondent Fernando Realty and Development Corporation (hereinafter FERNANDO) as SELLER, and petitioner Emily Yu Fajardo as BUYER signed on 22 February 1985 a CONTRACT TO SELL under which for the considerations therein stated, FERNANDO agreed to sell to Fajardo Lot No. 10, Block No. 3, also located at the Calamba Central Compound Subdivision, and upon full payment of the agreed price and interest thereon, to execute a deed of absolute sale in favor of Fajardo. cdll It appears, however, that on 18 October 1986, the JAREÑOS sold the aforesaid lots subject of the different contracts to sell to private respondent Ruben Habacon (hereinafter HABACON) under separate documents denominated as "Kasulatan ng Bilihan." On 18 February 1991, HABACON caused the cancellation of the certificates of title covering the said lots and the issuance of new ones in his name. When the petitioners learned of these, they filed on 21 June 1991 separate complaints( RTC OF Calamba) with the court a quo for annulment of the sales in favor of HABACON and of the new certificates of title issued to him, for reinstatement of the certificates of title cancelled by those issued to HABACON, and for accounting and damages.
MOTION TO DISMISS- filed by Habacon on the ground that the plaintiffs have no legal capacity to sue because they were not parties to the “ bilihan”
respondent judge directed the plaintiffs to show cause why their complaints should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to PD 957.
In their compliance with the show cause order, the petitioners maintained that it is the trial court, and not the HLRB, which has jurisdiction over the complaint. They contend that Solid Homes, Inc. vs. Payawal is inapplicable because in their cases: (1) the title of the developers, the JAREÑOS, had already passed to a third person, HABACON; (2) their action is for the annulment of the title of a third person; (3) HABACON is not a developer; and (4) Section 19 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129 vests upon the Regional Trial Court the jurisdiction to hear and decide all civil actions which involve title to or possession of any real property or any interest therein, except actions for unlawful detainer and forcible entry RTC- dismissed case for lack of jusridiction because the NHA now the Human Settlement Regulatory Comission has inclusive jusridiction to hear and decide cases of unsound real estate practices. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the order but the trial court denied.
Petitioners filed the instant special civil action for certiorari to annul the Orders of the trial court on the ground that the judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in dismissing their complaints and that they have no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The petitioners maintain that the trial court has jurisdiction over their complaints
ISSUE: w/n the remedy of certiorari availed of is correct.
HELD: Generally, an order of dismissal, whether right or wrong, is a final order, and hence a proper subject of appeal, not certiorari. 30 The remedies of appeal andcertiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive. 31 Accordingly, although the special civil action of certiorari is not proper when an ordinary appeal is available, it may be granted where it is shown that the appeal would be inadequate, slow, insufficient, and will not promptly relieve a party from the injurious effects of the order complained of, or where appeal is inadequate and ineffectual. 32 Nevertheless, certiorari cannot be a substitute for the lost or lapsed remedy of appeal, 33 where such loss is occasioned by the petitioner's own neglect or error in the choice of remedies The petitioners admit that they received a copy of the trial court's order dismissing their complaints on 4 October 1991. 35 The instant petition was filed on 24 October 1991 or beyond the 15-day period to appeal from the order. The petitioners have not even attempted to explain why they were unable to appeal from the challenged order within the reglementary period. This civil action then was resorted to as a substitute for the lost or lapsed remedy of appeal, and since none of the exceptions to the rigid rule barring substitution of remedies was alleged to exist in this petition, or even indicated by the pleadings, this petition must be dismissed.
Luis vs. Ca Facts: Private Respondent T.N Lal & Co., filed a petition for indirect contempt against petitioner Antonio San Luis who is the administrator of the Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA) before the RTC of pasay city. The action arose from alleged failure or refusal of petitioner to comply with an order directing the LRTA to immediately restore power supply of private respondent sound system in all places, sites and locations in its area of responsibility within 24 hours of receipt of the same. As such, petitioner filed to dismiss the petition for indirect contempt on the ground of NO CAUSE OF ACTION AND GUILTY OF FORUM SHOPPING The direct contempt case was received by branch 118 presiding judge Nelson Bayot, but he directed such matter to branch 111 who he believed was in a better position to determine whether or not the order had been violated. (since it was in branch 111 where the controversy started) After the transfer to branch 111, the petitioner therein moved to reconsider the order moving from branch 118 to 111, but Judge bayot already issued the records and transferred such to branch 111 and still firmly believes that the assiled order was correct and proper This prompted the petitioner to file with the CA a petition for certiorari and mandamus under rule 65 where he seeks to annul judge Bayots orders on the ground that the latter acted without or in excess of jurisdiction with grave abuse of discretion when he did not act on the petitions motion to dismiss and motion for reconsideration and INSTEAD TRANSFERRED THE CASE TO BRANCH 111. CA denied the motion, stating it has been filed out of time. Petitioner filed an MR and a motion to admit petition for certiorari and mandamus and to relax strict rules on procedure BOTH WAS DENIED BY THE CA. Issue: WON the CA is guilty of Grave abuse of discretion in denying petition for certiorari and mandamus and subsequently dismissed the case for failure to file on time overlooking such fact that failure was due to honest mistake and human error in the computation of the period of the instant case. Held: The court on the procedural aspect rules in favor of the PETITIONER. If the petitioner filed a motion for new trial/reconsideration in due time after notice of said judgement, the period herin shall be INTERRUPTED. If DENIED. The aggrieved party may file petition within
remaining period but which shall not be less than 5 days in any event, reckoned from the notice of such denial. NO EXTENTION OF TIME TO FILE THE PETITION SHALL BE GRANTED EXCEPT FOR THE MOST COMPELLING REASON AND IN NO CASE EXCEEDING 15 DAYS This was however amended wherein the new law states (rule 65, sec 4 as amended in the Court resolution in AM No. 00-2-03-SC which took effect on sep 1 2000) that the running of the 60 day period runs from the RECEIPT OF NOTICE OF THE DENIAL OF THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION. Hence making the last day on January 7 which was when the petitioner filed his petition.
