Risk Watch: Nickel ore

Volume 18:Number 1

March 2011

RISK WATCH

The Britannia Steam Ship Insurance Association Limited

CLAIMS AND LEGAL

a supplement for Members’claims handlers and legal departments

Containers and car cargoe goess 1 Nickel ore 5 Sampling risks

Nickel ore

Risk manage management ment 6 Technical seminars 7 Root cause analysis (RCA)

Navigation and sea seaman manship ship 8 Losing control of a ship whilst berthing:: poor judgement berthing judgement or poor planning? 9 Weighing the alternatives to monkey’s fists

Safety 10 Death of a tank cleaning contractor

Miscellaneous 10 Publications

In the last three months months of 2010, three bulk carriers loaded loaded with nickel ore sank with a tragic loss of 44 lives (none of the ships were entered in Britannia). All three cargoes had been loaded in Indonesia and were destined for China.The common perception is that the cargo was loaded in wet weather and excess moisture in the cargo led to liquefaction. Nickel is a major component in the manufacture of stainless steel and other corrosion resistant alloys.The addition of  nickel to alloys substantially increases their corrosion resistance and and strength, and these alloys are widely used in the aerospace, chemical and vehicle industries. Nickel is also used in coins, coins, batteries and armour plating. A decline in stainless steel production led to a fall in nickel prices and production in 2006 – 2008.However 2008. However,, an increasing global demand, particularly from

China and India, resulted in an increase in nickel prices and a consequential higher demand for nickel ore in 2010.  Typically the ore comprises a mixture of fine clay-like particles and larger rock sized particles, and it is the former which is prone prone to liquefaction.The mined ore is usually stored in large open stockpiles before being transported to a ship,so that any drying of  the ore depends largely on the prevalent conditions.

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Britannia RISK WATCH

Volume 18: Number 1: March 2011

Containers and cargoes

Nickel ore (continued)

 The certificate of moisture content must certify the moisture content of each type of  finely grained material loaded into each cargo space,however if the sampling indicates that moisture content is uniform throughout the consignment, then one certificate or declaration of average moisture content for all the cargo spaces is acceptable.

• Section 4.3.3 states that separate testing and certification is required for ‘each type of finely grained material loaded into each cargo space’. The Code goes on to state that ‘any substantial portions of material which appear to be contaminated or significantly different in characteristics or moisture content from the bulk of the consignment shall be sampled and analysed separately. Depending upon the results obtained in these tests,it may be necessary to reject those particular portions as unfit for shipment’.

 The shipper must identify the laboratory used to conduct the tests.The shipper must identify the stockpiles from which the cargo is to be loaded and confirm in writing that the samples tested - and in respect of which certificates have been issued/declarations made - originated from those stockpiles.

• Section 7.2.3 states‘Some cargoes are susceptible to moisture migration and may develop a wet base even if the average moisture content is less than the TML. Although the cargo surface may appear dry, undetected liquefaction may take place, resulting in shifting of the cargo’.

Flowmoisture point and transportable

Sampling

Sample testing

moisture limit

Due to the non-homogeneous nature of  nickel ores, preparation and testing of  samples can be a lengthy process. Determination of the FMP requires samples of a relatively uniform size and composition, and the moisture content of the samples being tested can vary depending on the proportion of clay or rocks in the sample.

 The IMSBC Code requires that the properties of a solid bulk cargo be determined in accordance with test procedures approved by a competent authority in the country of  origin or,if such procedures do not exist,in accordance with the test procedures prescribed in Appendix 2 to the Code.

Regulations

 The International Maritime Solid Bulk  Cargoes (IMSBC) Code became mandatory on 01 January 2011, superseding the IMO’s Solid Bulk Cargo (BC) Code.The Code is fully integrated with, and has the same legal and regulatory status as, the International Convention for Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Regulations,1974,as amended.  The IMSBC Code stipulates certain guidelines and tests for mineral ore cargoes which are prone to liquefaction, a category which includes nickel ores. In particular, the Code notes that ‘such cargoes may appear to be in a relatively dry granular state when loaded, and yet may contain sufficient moisture to become fluid under the stimulus of  compaction and the vibration which occurs during a voyage’.

In order to determine whether a solid bulk  cargo is safe for shipment, the cargo’s flow moisture point (FMP) has to be ascertained.  The transportable moisture limit (TML) of the cargo is then calculated as 90% of t he FMP, and as long as the moisture content of the cargo offered for shipment is lower than the  TML, the cargo can be accepted for loading. Shippers of a solid bulk cargo are obliged to: ‘Provide the Master or his representative with appropriate information on the cargo sufficiently in advance of loading to enable the precautions which may be necessary for proper stowage and safe carriage of the cargo to be put into effect’ (Section 4.3.2.1). Section 4.3.2 of the IMSBC Code goes on to state: ‘When a concentrate or other cargo which may liquefy is carried, the shipper shall provide the ship’s Master or his representative with a signed certificate of the TML,and a signed certificate or declaration of the moisture content.The certificate of TML shall contain, or be accompanied by, the result of the test for determining the TML.The declaration of  moisture content shall contain, or be accompanied by, a statement by the shipper that the moisture content is, to the best of his

knowledge and belief, the average moisture content of the cargo at the time the declaration is presented to the Master’.

Marine experts Minton Treharn & Davies note that it is crucial to ascertain the moisture content of the particular portion of  the nickel ore cargo that liquefies – i.e. particles smaller than 7mm, – for comparison with the TML.The larger stones have significantly lower moisture content and their inclusion in the samples can make it appear that the cargo is below the TML, whilst in fact the liquefiable portion of the cargo is actually above the TML. Section 4.5.2 of the IMSBC states: ‘Sampling and testing for moisture content shall be conducted as near as practicable to the time of loading. If there has been significant rain or snow between the time of  testing and loading, check tests shall be conducted to ensure that the moisture content of the cargo is still less than its TML.  The interval between sampling/testing and loading shall never be more than seven days’.

Determination of the FMP of samples of  nickel ore in a laboratory should be done in accordance with one of the three recommended methods in the IMSBC Code listed below: Flow table test (drop test)

Suitable for concentrates or fine material of  grain size 1mm (up to 7mm for some cargo types). Penetration test (vibration test)

Suitable for mineral concentrates, coals, etc, up to 25mm. Proctor/Fagerberg test (compaction)

Suitable for fine and coarse grained ore concentrates up to 5mm.  The flow table test is the method of  choice for testing nickel ores. However, best results are generally obtained when testing homogeneous samples of cargo.

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 The Code cautions that the flow table test may not give satisfactory results for some materials with high clay content and this, along with the non-homogeneous nature of nickel ores, is why the test should ideally be performed by experienced technicians.Full details of the test equipment and procedures are given in Appendix 2 of the Code.  The samples being tested are also often laid out on a flat surface for sorting, and moisture loss can take place in these circumstances.This could result in the test not accurately reflecting any propensity for the cargo to liquefy.Testing of samples should therefore be carried out by a properly equipped and competent testing facility/laboratory.When assessing whether a nickel ore cargo complies with the IMSBC Code, it is not usually possible to determine from a visual inspection or simple test on board the ship whether a cargo has a moisture content above or below the TML.We can reasonably conclude that a cargo that is visibly wet or saturated is unsafe,but the reverse i s not true. Cargo sampling/discharge after loading

If a potentially dangerous cargo has been loaded, the actual moisture content of the cargo will need to be ascertained.Sampling should only take place after the cargo has been trimmed reasonably level in the holds.In a bulk carrier with hopper type holds, sampling in the centre of the stow can be carried out with grabs, however sampling in the wings or overhangs may only be possible using excavators.

Marine experts Brookes Bell advise that individual spot samples should be obtained in each cargo hold on the basis of one subsample for every 500MT,as specified in the IMSBC Code.The samples would normally be collected from five separate sampling pits, at a range of depths in each pit.  The cargo in each hold would be considered acceptable as long as the average moisture of all sub-samples in each hold is below the  TML, and there are no more than isolated individual moisture results (say, one or two per hold) above the TMP. In particular, the moisture content of samples taken from the tanktop should be below the TMP. If the cargo already on board is found to be unsafe,it is often difficult to discharge this potentially unsafe cargo because of the lack  of discharging equipment at the load ports. At intermediate ports Customs may not allow the discharge. Shippers often suggest the possibility of  leaving some unsafe cargo on board and overstowing it with fresh safe cargo.This practice is not in compliance with the IMSBC Code, as highlighted above. Master’s obligations

 The Master has an overriding authority under SOLAS not to load the cargo and/or to stop the loading of the cargo if he has any concerns that the condition of the cargo might affect the safety of the ship.

 The Master or his representative should monitor the loading operation from start to finish. Loading should not be commenced until the Master or the ship’s representative is in possession of all requisite cargo information in writing as described above.Masters should be wary of moisture content certificates provided by the shipper’s laboratory and moisture content percentages that are very close to the TML.If there is significant rainfall between the time of testing and the time of loading the shipper must conduct further sampling and testing. If in any doubt of the moisture content, ‘can’ tests should be conducted, particularly when rainfall has been experienced.The ‘can’ test is described in section 8 of the IMSBC Code as a spot check a Master can conduct if he is suspicious of the condition of the cargo, and is not meant to replace or supersede laboratory testing. Section 8 states that if  the sample shows signs of liquefaction – i.e. flat surface with evidence of free moisture,arrangements should be made to have additional laboratory tests conducted on the material before it is accepted for loading. Nevertheless, cargo should never be accepted on the basis of  the ‘can’ test alone.The test may indicate if  cargo is unfit for shipment but cannot determine if a cargo is fit to be loaded – this can only be determined by laboratory testing.

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Britannia RISK WATCH

Volume 18: Number 1: March 2011

Containers and cargoes

The‘can’test

Place approximately 1 kg of cargo in a tin can of 0.5 to 1 litre capacity

Slam the can against a hard surface from a height of about 0.2m

Repeat 25 times at 1 to 2 second intervals

It should be possible to see if cargo displays free moisture or fluid conditions, if so, arrange for laboratory testing of  samples of the cargo before loading

Nickel ore (continued) It is recommended that Masters check with the local Correspondents/  appointed surveyors to ensure that the laboratory is reputable and competent.The number of such laboratories is currently limited. If the Master or his appointed surveyor is presented with any document seeking confirmation that the cargo is safe to carry they should refuse to sign it.The obligation under the IMSBC Code is on the shipper to declare that the cargo is safe to carry and signing such a document could prejudice a Member’s rights of recourse against a shipper in the event of a subsequent casualty.

P&I surveyor

Summary

Members intending to load nickel ore from ports in Indonesia, New Caledonia and the Philippines are advised to contact the Managers and the Association’s local Correspondent at the earliest opportunity, in order to arrange for guidance and expert assistance to be provided.Many of the l oad ports in the countries specified are in remote areas which means that a cargo surveyor or expert will require plenty of time to travel to the port and carry out the required investigations and tests. It should be made clear to the port and competent authorities, shippers and charterers that the appointment of a surveyor by the ship is not intended to and does not relieve the shipper of his obligations under the IMSBC Code or local regulations.

Cargo documentation provided for nickel ore cargoes is often deficient and may not alert the crew to the potential danger of the cargo liquefying. It is essential for the safe operation of the ship that the officers on board fully understand the characteristics of the cargo to be loaded.  The cargo should not be accepted for loading if any of the above conditions are not met or if there is any doubt about the cargo or the test certificates.The Master has the authority to reject any cargo, or to refuse to sail with the cargo on board, if he reasonably suspects that there is a risk that the aforementioned requirements are not being met.

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Sampling risks Sampling is an important part of the bulk liquid cargo custody transfer process and can help in protecting the ship’s interests in the event of disputes over cargo contamination. Precautions should be observed in taking and keeping appropriate and representative samples.

Surveyors appointed on behalf of cargo interests will take samples for their principals, but are not required to supply a set of  samples for the ship’s retention. It is advisable for the ship’s crew to take samples to protect the ship’s interests. Any sampling should be undertaken according to standard industry practice as described in various guidelines and standards published by American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM), Institute of  Petroleum (IP),the American Petroleum Institute (API) and British Standard (BS) for example.The following guidance,supplied by Messrs CWA International Ltd, consultants, addresses some of the deficiencies observed when crew have undertaken sampling. Generally a running sample taken using bottle and sample cage is preferred for taking samples in a homogenous cargo.If the cargo is not homogeneous then sampling from various cargo zones should be carried out e.g.upper, middle lower tank samples or changeover of shore tanks during loading. Cleanliness of both sampling equipment and sampling ports or manifolds is important to avoid inadvertent contamination of the sample with extraneous dirt, water or previous cargo.All containers used should be clean, dry and appropriate for the type of  cargo being sampled.Clear glass bottles are

generally acceptable for most chemical or petrochemical products, but there are some exceptions,including caustic soda or potash cargoes,which should be stored only in plastic bottles.Lacquer-lined cans can be used for most petroleum products but are not appropriate for many chemical cargoes. Poor sample labelling can lead to a sample being rejected for analysis if there is lack of  identification or doubt over its provenance. Information on labels should include date and time,vessel name,port, location (e.g. cargo tank, manifold), description of cargo, type of sample (e.g.first foot,composite, running,‘Upper,Middle, Lower’), identity of  sampler,and seal number.  The use of seals or at least tamper-proof  self- seal lids will help to maintain the integrity of the samples and should be applied if available. Samples should be taken after completion of  loading and prior to commencement of  discharge from ship’s cargo tanks, and at the manifold at the start of loading and discharge. Occasional manifold samples should be taken, especially during discharge. First foot samples should always be taken. If possible, samples from shore tanks before loading and after discharge should also be obtained.

Contamination allegations can often be resolved by reference to samples of previous cargoes and not just samples of the cargo in question. Further, allegations of  contamination can be made some time after discharge. Accordingly samples need to be retained for some time. Although space is limited for sample storage on board ships, samples should be stored in cool, dark  conditions and retained where possible for a minimum of 12 months especially if the cargo is known or suspected to be the subject of a dispute.If samples are sent for storage at, for example,surveyors’ premises or a local laboratory, ensure that the storage facility’s initial instructions are for indefinite storage as otherwise samples are usually disposed of after a maximum of three months.A log should be kept of samples with details as per the sample labels and seal numbers. Finally, many cargoes may be flammable or toxic,so it is vital that appropriate safety precautions are taken during sampling procedures and also on storage of such samples.If samples are not required, they should be disposed of by appropriate procedures:the services of local cargo surveyors or testing laboratories who are familiar with the correct disposal methods available may be used.

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Britannia RISK WATCH

Volume 18: Number 1: March 2011

Risk management

Technical seminars Britannia’s technical seminar programme is now a well-established item in the Britannia calendar and during 2010 the risk management team has hosted 16 separate seminars in five countries, attracting over 1,000 officers and crew.  The programme is part of the Club’s risk  management activities designed to provide a forum for serving officers and superintendents to hear from fellow professionals about current topics in the marine industry relating to safety and best practice.Audience participation is encouraged and the format of the day’s programme provides plenty of  opportunity for discussion within the allotted time for the presentations, as well as during the coffee breaks and lunchtime when a buffet is provided for the delegates. Subjects covered in 2010 included: Bulkcargocare

A primary aim of this session was to reinforce the overriding obligation of owners/  operators/Masters to ensure that cargoes to be carried comply with SOLAS and the IMSBC Code which became mandatory on 1 January.The talk addressed typical problems encountered with the carriage of a variety of  bulk cargoes, namely iron ore fines,nickel ore, direct reduced iron (DRI),coal and seed cakes. Mindful of the catastrophic loss of three ships loaded with Indonesian nickel ore which sunk  with tragic loss of life in 2010,delegates were reminded of the importance of ensuring that nickel ore is safe to load and were made aware of the dangers of liquefaction. Attention was also drawn to the safe shipment of iron ore fines from Indian ports. Delegates were reminded that in 2009 two ships – the ASIAN  FOREST and the BLACK ROSE(neither of which were entered in Britannia) – capsized and sank  following liquefaction of iron ore fines at the Indian ports of Mangalore and Paradip.

ECDIS

 The ECDIS presentation reviewed the basics of the ECDIS system,including a study of the relevant rules and regulations, together with the challenges presented by transferring from paper charts to ECDIS.Practical problems and potential pitfalls were dealt with by reference to recent incidents. Oily water separatorand oilrecord book 

 The oily water separator and oil record book  presentation highlighted Marpol violations in USA, reviewing the US legal framework  and providing guidance for crew.The talk  also addressed Port State Control inspections exploring what the inspectors are looking for and how crew can best prepare for these inspections.The session provided vivid examples of poor environmental practices on board ships, and the severe financial consequences arising from them, encouraging Members to ensure their environmental compliance programmes are rigorously enforced onboard all their ships. Collisions

 The collisions presentation used a Britannia case to highlight common communication and bridge team management faults which led to an increased risk of collision.The presentation was supported by a computer simulation based on the actual VDR and audio recording of the collision incident.The presentation also drew on the salient points made in the complementary presentations given on the topics of Risk Assessment & Safety Culture and Bridge Risk Management.

 The format of the collision presentation is always popular with delegates and a lively debate is guaranteed. All the presentations were based, in part, on actual claims handled by the Club, and incorporated photographs, video clips and simulations.  The location of the seminars has been influenced by the responses received from Members to our enquiry requesting up-todate data on manning arrangements.The technical seminar ‘road show’ visited India, Indonesia, Philippines, South Korea and  Taiwan with Indonesia, South Korea and  Taiwan being new locations for the seminars in 2010.  The locations and dates for the 2011 programme will be posted on the Club diary page on the Britannia website as early as possible.The first seminar in 2011 is scheduled to be held at the Radisson Blu Hotel, Szczecin,Poland on Tuesday 5 and  Thursday 7 April 2011. It is anticipated that the road show will also visit India, Philippines, South Korea and Taiwan during the year.  The feedback has been very positive from those attending the seminars and it is hoped that the practical and technical information imparted will enhance the Members’own training programmes.We hope you will continue to support the Club in its efforts to assist Members and their Manning Agents to raise safety awareness on board by sending delegates to these seminars.

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Risk management

Root cause analysis (RCA) A central activity of the risk management team is its liaison with, and support of, the claims and underwriting teams within Britannia.

The research

Risk Managers monitor a continuous flow of information on individual claims and series of claims which could trigger a RCA. In addition, statistical analysis of the Club’s claims data is used to identify trends of poor performance in all types of claim which may also lead to a RCA. In the majority of  investigations,analysis shows that the safety culture of an organisation, or the absence of such a culture, lies at the heart of the problem.In most cases, a visit to the Members’organisation would be required in order to observe both the relationship and communication between management ashore and crew on board the ships. A RCA conductedfor a Member

At the request of a Member with concerns over two dock damage incidents involving the same ship within a calendar year, the Association instructed independent consultants to conduct an investigation.  Their remit was to sail with the ship for a two week period to observe the shipboard navigational practices and bridge resource management.The consultants also reviewed the earlier incidents and were asked to comment on whether the observed practices on board the ship may have contributed to either of the incidents. During the two week period the consultants were able to observe many day and night time berthing, un-berthing and anchoring operations,as well as a night time transit of  the Dardanelles Strait under pilotage.

 The report contained advice for the Member concerning information flow between its port agents and the port authorities to ensure best possible levels of support from the port authorities. Recommendations were also made for the Masters in terms of pre-arrival and pre-departure briefings,planning and assertiveness in dealing with port authorities and pilotage services.The report made observations on the bridge team, focusing on attention to detail with regard to conduct of navigation and ensuring the team had shared situational awareness.Finally, the report addressed current manning levels and the bridge team organisation.The Member implemented all the recommendations into operational procedures for the ships engaged in the particular trades identified. Lessons learned for Britannia Members

 The RCA highlighted a number of  observations which are helpful for all Members: Bridge resource management (BRM)

• The bridge team must understand their individual and collective responsibilities and they must be able to communicate clearly and effectively their observations on the ship’s progress and contribute to any decision made by the team. • Voyage planning must be from berth to berth. A full appraisal of the traffic density, navigational hazards and statutory requirements should be conducted for the route, together with a risk assessment and contingency plan for any unexpected incidents.

• Comprehensive pre-arrival and pre-departure briefings should be conducted to raise the level of attention in the team and refresh their shortterm memories for instant recall and action. • When a ship requires inbound pilotage it is essential, particularly with respect to any berthing manoeuvres, that the Pilot is on board early enough to conduct a proper and thorough Master/Pilot exchange.Bridge teams need to be aware that Pilots in certain ports tend to want to embark much later and much closer to the intended port than the declared boarding position on the nautical chart. • When a pilot is on board, the bridge team must ensure that the pilot’s knowledge and experience of local conditions is clearly communicated to them and integrated into the bridge team’s information flow and passage plan. • Standard procedures should be adopted to ensure that everyone executes orders in the same agreed way and that there is consistency in approach. • The bridge team must monitor the voyage and remain alert to everything happening around them (situational awareness).This should include a comparison of what is actually happening to what should be happening at any given time or position en route. • Assertive error spotting by the team should be encouraged to combat complacency or distraction. • Fatigue in crew should be monitored.  The bridge team should have adequate rest periods to avoid any potential failure in planning, communication and situational awareness which is the result of short and long term tiredness. • Teamwork is essential to ensure the bridge team is working together towards the common goal of a safe and successful voyage.

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Navigation and seamanship

Losing control of a ship whilst berthing: poor judgement or poor planning? Accidents during berthing operations are common. Errors of judgement in handling the ship are often the cause but the risk of some such errors can be reduced. A Member’s ship recently approached Fukuyama during daylight and, being a regular caller at the port, a pilot was not employed.The Master held a pilotage exemption certificate.The Master’s intention was to berth starboard side alongside and as the ship moved towards the quay a forward line was sent ashore and secured.The line of  the berth runs 210/030 degrees and with a northerly wind gusting at over 40 knots the ship’s stern was being blown away from the berth.The aft mooring gang could not heave their heaving lines ashore. As no tugs were in attendance (as they had not been ordered) and the ship was not fitted with any bow or stern thrusters, the Master was unable to exert any effective control.Difficulty was experienced in attempting to let go the single mooring line forward and the ship remained attached,the bow acting as a pivotal point. Consequently the stern quickly spun through almost 180 degrees.Whilst spinning uncontrollably the stern made contact with a buoy and several vertical silt protector screens positioned in close proximity to the berth due to an ongoing land reclamation operation.  Two of the screens became fouled on the ship’s propeller and as a result they were

heavily damaged together with associated apparatus including floats, sinkers and anchor chains.Fortunately no contact was made with the quayside gantry crane during the incident.  The incident can be attributable to the Master's failure to understand properly the limitations of his own ship’s capabilities and manoeuvring characteristics in such weather.Berth-to-berth risks were not properly identified in the passage plan and the appropriate safeguards were not implemented. Effective execution and monitoring of the passage plan requires that it should be continually assessed and updated accordingly for the purpose of  ensuring that proper consideration is given to changing circumstances including the weather. Although the ship was a regular caller at the port and had berthed without incident on previous occasions it is important that officers and crew, and particularly bridge watch keeping officers,do not become complacent in relatively familiar surroundings.The appropriate state of  alertness was not maintained during pilotage and berthing/un-berthing operations.

It is considered good practice for pre-arrival briefings involving the bridge, engine room, and deck crew to be undertaken both before the end of the sea passage and prior to sailing from a port or anchorage.Such meetings ordinarily prove to be invaluable in ensuring that various issues surrounding the pilotage period and the berthing/unberthing are fully discussed and it is an ideal opportunity for possible concerns to be raised and addressed.Any formal requirement for such meetings should be incorporated within the ship’s own Safety Management System (as required by the ISM Code) and Members should routinely check  their ship’s records for compliance. Ultimately,the decision not to employ tugs could be described as poor seamanship on the part of the Master.Good bridge management would have resulted in the Master receiving input from others (if only via the passage plan) which would perhaps have raised awareness of the increased wind and provided the opportunity for the Master to consider employing a pilot and/or tugs.

Britannia RISK WATCH

Volume 18: Number 1: March 2011

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Weighing the alternatives to monkey’s fists We have previously published articles on monkey’s fists but make no apology for doing so again following a recent incident when a Member’s ship berthed at a British port. During the course of sending the heaving line to the aft tug it was reported that the monkey’s fist impacted heavily with the tug’s bridge window and search light causing damage and prompting the tug’s master to cut the monkey’s fist from the heaving line.  The tug’s master noted that the monkey’s fist was heavier than expected and on examination found that the inner core contained a ball made from industrial packing tape with several nuts and a bolt inside.

Ships have increased considerably in size over the last few decades and the horizontal and vertical distance that crews are expected to throw heaving lines has probably also increased as a result.It is often not an easy  job to get heaving lines across to a tug or to the berth, especially in strong winds.This can prompt crew to insert heavy materials into the monkey’s fist so that better distances can be attained when throwing the heaving line from the deck.

 The practice of adding weight to monkey’s fists is well publicised and the Master and Chief Officer said they were aware of the relevant part of the Code of Safe Working Practice for Merchant Seamen which states at para.25.3.2: ‘to prevent personal injury, the fist should be made only with rope and should not contain added weighting material’. This incident, along with others reported to the Association,indicates that what is done is practice is often far different from what the regulations require.

 The inherent dangers of throwing heaving lines increases proportionally with the weight of the monkey’s fist.The force from a weighted monkey’s fist is more than sufficient to kill a man or cause serious injury. A safety helmet will offer only limited protection and the linesman’s body remains unprotected.  There is also the risk of damage to the tug’s less robust superstructure, linemen’s cars and other equipment on the berth.

 The aforementioned incident did not result in any injury and no formal action was taken against the Master.Indeed, despite the initial anger of the tug master at the damage to his tug and the potential danger to his crew,he subsequently assisted the ship’s Master by introducing him to a solution to the conflicting demands of weight and safety.  This ‘heaving line weight’, pictured above left, is a short fabric sleeve filled with granules which provide weight but also a softened impact. It is available in two weights, 0.75kg and 1kg,from: email: [email protected] www.cosalt.com

10 Britannia RISK WATCH

 Tindall Riley (Britannia) Limited New City Court 20 StThomas Street London SE1 9RR  Tel +44 (0)20 7407 3588 Fax +44 (0)20 7403 3942 www.britanniapandi.com

RISK WATCH is published by The Britannia Steam Ship Insurance Association Limited, and can be found at www.britanniapandi.com/en/publications  The Britannia Steam Ship Insurance Association Limited is happy for any of the material in Risk Watch to be reproduced but would ask that written permission is obtained in advance from the Editor.

Miscellaneous

Safety

Publications

Death of a tank cleaning contractor

Piracy: BMP3

Following on from our article ‘Working at Height’ (Risk Watch November 2010), we draw attention to an incident which occurred last year and which has recently been reported upon by the UK  Marine Accident Investigation Bureau (MAIB).

Members are reminded that BMP3 was published in June 2010 and is available to download free from the following site: http://www.britanniapandi.com/download. cfm?docid=8838B55F-72DC-4D97-BF2841 A5865A7DAF

 The ship concerned, an oil/chemical tanker, was in the port of Hamburg when a local tank-cleaning firm was contracted to clean empty tanks.The company sub-contracted the work to three cargo‘sweepers’ and while exiting one of the tanks,one of the ‘sweepers’ fell back into the tank,a ver tical distance of  18 metres,sustaining fatal injuries.The post mortem disclosed that the worker was under the influence of a variety of prescription and illegal drugs, which would have caused severe impairment. It appears that he lost his grip on the slippery surface of the vertical ladder. He was not wearing a safety harness or fall arrestor when he fell.

 The purpose of the booklet is to assist ships to avoid, deter or delay piracy attacks off the coast of Somalia, including the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea area.The booklet sets out the Best Management Practice (BMP) and updates the guidance contained in the second edition of the BMP document which was published in August 2009. Experience, supported by data collected by Naval forces,shows that the application of the recommendations contained within the booklet can and will make a significant difference in preventing a ship becoming a victim of piracy.

 The management and supervision of the contractors should,most likely,have fallen upon the Chief Officer but the boundaries of these responsibilities were confused by the presence of the charterers’cargo superintendent who was also involved in the management of contractors. A brief  explanation of the sweeping aspect of the  job,was given by the cargo superintendent, including the slippery nature of the tank  surfaces, but no safety briefing or other information was passed on.The effectiveness of the supervision was further questioned in the MAIB report, as crew members were aware of the strange behaviour of two of  the ‘sweepers’but no action was taken.

Although not causative, the atmosphere in the tank was tested for oxygen levels, but the equipment to test for other gases only reached half way down the tank. Further, the subsequent retrieval of the body was delayed because the ship’s recovery equipment was unsuitable for the task.The MAIB concluded that while there is a clear responsibility for a worker to take reasonable care for his own health and safety,there should be clear guidance in the ship’s safety management system regarding ship’s staff responsibilities for effectively controlling and managing contractors.

Members are also reminded that the latest piracy attacks can be viewed on the IMB Live Piracy Map at: www.icc-ccs.org/livepiracymap

Editor’s message We are always looking for ways to maintain and increase the usefulness, relevance and general interest of the articles within Risk Watch. Please forward any comments to: [email protected]