"The Use of Artillery by Philip II and Alexander the Great", Ancient World 25.1 (1994) 27–59

The Use of Artillery by Philip II and Alexander the Great

I. Introduction "From the fourth century B.C. onwards, Greek states large and small regarded artillery as a valuable subordinate arm and considered the production of catapults and the training of catapeltaphetai essential." So Marsden,l but is it in fact so clear? The extant technical writers on artillery have been often edited, most recently by Marsden.2 These are: the little-understood Biton (ca. 240 or 150 B.C.),3 Philon of Byzantium (ca. 220 B.C.),4 Athenaios Mechanicus (ca. 30 B.c.),5 Vitruvius (ca. 25 B.C.), and Heron (jl. 62 ± 7 A.C.).6 All technical writers are

lOCD2, s. "Artillery" (128) adfin. zAn important early edition is C. Wescher, Poliorcetique des Grecques (paris, 1867), with the MS drawings: Athenaios, Biton, Heron, and others (note that later editions cite these writers by Wescher page and line number). The most recent edition is E. W. Marsden, Greek and Roman Artillery: Technical Treatises (Oxford, 1971): Heron, Biton, Philon and Vitruuius, but containing only modem drawings. On this unfortunate tendency see A. G. Drachmann, Ktesibios Philon and Heron: A study in Ancient Pneumatics (Copenhagen, 1948), = Acta Historica Scientiarum Naturalium et Medicinalium 4, pp. 41-2: "such [modem] figures are just .. a translation ... and no edition of a technical manuscript is complete unless it gives also the figures in facsimile for control". This is because "there is [much] to be learned from the figures themselves:" A. G. Drachmann, The Mechanical Technology of Greek and Roman Antiquity (Copenhagen, 1963) 3. On artillery in general see E. Schramm in J. Kromayer and G. Veith, Heerwesen und Kriegfohrung der Griechen und Romer (Munich, 1928), = Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft 4.3.2, pp. 209-247 with 20 pp. of figures; R. Schneider, RE 7 (1912) 1297-1322, "Geschiitze;" and W. Soedel and V. Foley, "Ancient Catapults," Scientific American 240.3 (March 1979) 150-60, 174. 3A. Rehm and E. Schramm, Bitons Bau von Belagerungsmaschinen und Geschiitzen (Munich, 1929) = Abh. der Bayer. Akad. der Wiss., Phil. -Hist. Abteilung (2) no. 2, with the MS drawings and modem drawings. On the difficulty of editing and comprehending Biton, see U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, "Lesefriichte," Hermes 65 (1930) 255-7 and Drachmann (1963) 11, who concludes that "he is no use for us in the study of ancient technology." Contrast the relative confidence of Marsden (1971) 61-3. 4H. Diels and E. Schramm, Abh. der preussischen Akademie der Wiss. zu Berlin, Phil. -Hist. KI. (1918) no. 16 (with MS drawings and modem drawings, reprinted with their edition of Heron [below, n. 6]: Leipzig, 1970); and in Yvon Garlan, Recherches de Poliorcetique Grecque (Paris, 1974), = Bibliotheque des Ecoles Franfaises d'Athenes et de Rome 223, pp. 279-404. On the date of Philon see Marsden (1971) 6-9 (technological approach) and Drachmann (1948) 41. SR. Schneider, Griechische Poliorketiker III Athenaios (Berlin, 1912) = Abhandlungen der kOniglichen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Gottingen, Philologisch-Historische Klasse 12, no. 5, with the MS drawings. 6H. Diels and E. Schramm, Abh. der preussischen Akademie der Wiss. zu Berlin, Phil.-Hist.

repro with their edition of Philon (above, n. 4): Leipzig, 1970. The Ancient World, 25.1 (1994)

27

Kl. (1918) no. 2;

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PAUL T. KEYSER

hard to date, and only Heron's date is now really secure.7 The approach of editors has been, quite rightly, to seek to understand these works as the technological treatises they are. Likewise, Tarn has commented on the development of the military technology.8 Aside from such studies, few authors have considered the use of artillery and its effect on warfare in the fourth century B.C., and the treatments are partial and primarily technological, following the early lead of Berve and the more recent technological studies by Marsden. 9 This study suggests that not all Greek states in the IV B.c., but only Macedonia, "regarded artillery as essential" and pursued a policy of extensive and deliberate use of artillery. Although artillery seems never to have been decisive for Philip or Alexander, it did contribute to their success and distinguish their efforts at large-scale conquest from other or previous attempts, as we will show herein. In an investigation which proceeds from a primarily technological outlook, details such as the shape and position of the arms of the bow, the origin of the propulsive force, and other matters of mechanics, are of significance and relevance. Here, the only technical development which is of significance is the surpassing of previous missile weapons (slings, bows and the like) in range and power. Thus, this study examines primarily not the growth of technical expertise, but the attested uses of artillery during and before the time of Alexander. In light of these results, I attempt to draw conclusions about the reception of artillery by his predecessors and by Alexander. To the extent that from the evidence for systematic development, procurement, and use, one can infer policy, it then becomes sensible to speak of the policy of the Hellenic states of the IV B.C. Only Dionysios I, Philip II, and Alexander can be said to have had an artillery policy. I consider first the "Pre-history" of artillery (the period before 399 B.C.) in which the classical siege-techniques were developed, and then the developments in the use of artillery from its invention to the age of Philip (i.e., 399 to ca. 355 B.C.). Philip's use and failures are considered in some detail before turning to Alexander's more successful uses.

70n the dates of Biton, Athenaios, Vitruuius, and Heron see Drachmann (1963) 9-12. The approach of Marsden (1971) 5-6, 78 is technological: he dates Biton to 240 B.C. on the basis of the stage of development of artillery attested in his work, yet he acknowledges that such technological considerations are groundless in connection with dating Heron (pp. 1-2). For Heron's date, see Paul T. Keyser, "Suetonius Nero 41.2 and the Date of Heron Mechanicus of Alexandria," CP 83 (1988) 218-20. ~.

W. Tam, Hellenistic Military and Naval Developments

(Cambridge,

1930) 101-21.

~elmut Berve, Das Alexanderreich auf Prosopographischer Grundlage 1 (Munich, 1926) 155: half a page on Wurfmaschinen, followed by a discussion of the Technische Truppen who built them (156-8). E. W. Marsden, Greek and Roman Artillery: Historical Development (Oxford, 1969) 99-104, and idem, "Macedonian Military Machinery and its Designers under Philip and Alexander" Ancient Macedonia I (Thessaloniki, 1977) 211-23 is very speculative and like Berve concentrates on the technological developments. Garlan (above, n. 4) 212-25, 239-44 is similarly speculative but with a focus on siege tactics. J. R. Hamilton's inattention is typical: he alleges that Alexander was the first recorded to have used field artillery (Alexander the Great [pittsburg, 1974] 48): contrast Polyainos 2.38.2 of Onomarchos ca. 20 years before. G. Cawkwell, Philip of Macedon (London/Boston, 1978) follows Berve (silently) on the technische Truppen (pp. 160-3) and states "Philip succeeded because his engineers were so efficient at doing what was being and had been done before" (p. 162). G. T. Griffith, A History of Macedonia v. 2 (Oxford, 1979) 444-9 ("The Siege-train of Philip") follows Marsden's lead. N. G. L. Hammond devotes less than 3 pages to Alexander's artillery: Alexander the Great: King, Commander and Statesman (Park Ridge, NJ, 1980) 81-3 (p. 82 is a modem figure).

THE USE OF ARTILLERY

29

II. "Pre-history" of Artillery Marsden and Schramm briefly and Garlan more extensively treat the period before the invention of artillery (in 399 B.C.) under Dionysios I of Syracuse. 10 The essential point is that there were numerous sieges in which artillery would have been used had it existed. The Persians brought none with them in 490 B.C. or 480-79 B.C. (Herodotos). The Periclean siege of Samos (441 B.C.) involved only rams and tortoises (D. S. 12.28.3, Plut. Periel. 27.3, cpo Thuc. 1.115-7). In the numerous crucial sieges of the Peloponnesian war, often described in detail, artillery is unknown, as is sufficiently proved by Plataea (429-7 B.C., see Thuc. 2.75-8, 3.20-3,3.51), the Boiotian siege of Delium (424 B.C., see Thuc. 4.100, cpo D. S. 12.69-70), the Athenian siege of Syracuse (416-3 B.C., see Thuc. 6.96-7.118 and cpo Aristoph., Aues 363) and the siege of Mytilene (407 B.C., see D. S. 13.78.4-79.7,97.2-3, 100.5-6, Thuc. 8.22-3). Nor did the Carthaginians or the Syracusans employ artillery in the Sicilian war (before 399 B.C.): not at Selinus or Himera in 409 B.C. (D. S. 13.54-6 and 13.59-62.2) nor at Acragas in 406 B.C. (D. S. 13.85-6, 88).11 Finally Cyrus' abortive attempt to gain control of the Persian Empire (401-0 B.c.) involved no artillery on either side (Xen., Cyrop. 6.1.52-5 mentions only towers). In summary, the combined effect of the complete absence of any mention of artillery in any of these sieges, some (e.g., Plataea, Syracuse) described in great detail, is rightly held by commentators to be evidence against the existence of artillery at this time. 12 Older commentators sometimes assumed the Assyrians had artillery, based either on II Chron. 26.15 ("machines ... to hurl missiles and large stones") which was composed long after the invention of artillery and anachronisticly retrojects it, or on the claim in Pliny NH 7.201 (inuenisse dicunt ... Pisaeum ... in tormentis scorpionem, Cretas catapultam, Syrophoenicas ballistam) which properly belongs to the protos heuretes literature. Marsden and Garlan agree

that these are late and unreliable, and certainly not convincing in the face of the negative testimony noted above (the Assyrians did make use of rams, tortoises, towers, amd mines)Y Moreover, we have (as will be seen in § III) an explicit statement, probably from an eyewitness, that artillery was invented in Syracuse in 399 B.c. (D. S. 14.41-3). Schramm and Garlan describe the classical siege techniques developed before 399 B.C., the essential goals being (1) to isolate (i.e., surround, invest) the besieged, and (2) to penetrate their defenses. The latter might be accomplished by treachery, exhaustion (or starvation) leading

IOSchramm (above, n. 2) 216-7, Marsden (1969) 48-52 (primarily a search for references to artillery), Garlan (above, n. 4) 19-153.

and

11See the Appendix for discussion of the sources of Diodoros of Sicily here and in other passages cited. 12See Marsden (1969) 49-52 and Schramm (above, n. 2) 213-6. 13See Marsden (1969) 52-3 and Tam (above, n. 8) 105-6 on II Chron., dating the work to ca. 250 B.C., and Marsden 53-4 on Pliny. The LXX of Ezek. 4.2,21.22, which have {3eAOUTCX.(}V; = artillery-platform in error for "rams," contributed to the error. Tam 102-3 suggests Dionysios got some help from Carthaginians, who themselves learned from Assyria via Tyre, in spite of his recognition that II Chron. is late. The fullest discussion of the nonexistence of mid-Eastern (i.e., Semitic) artillery before 399 B.C. known to me is in Garlan (above, n. 4) 164-5. On the change in terminology here, part of Pliny's point, see n. 14 below. Fpr photographs of reliefs from Nimrud showing Assyrian rams, tortoises, towers, and miners in the reign of Ashur-nasirpal II (883-59 B.C.), see Pierre Ducrey, Warfare in Ancient Greece, tr. Janet Lloyd (New York 1985) 168-71, pll. 119 (BM 124536) and 121 (BM 124554).

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PAUL T. KEYSER

to surrender, or storm. Treachery was uncertain~ exhaustion lengthy, and storm seldom successful (plataea being a notable case). The advantage lay with the defense, and this contributed to the centrifugal tendency of Greek politics.

III. Invention to the Age of Philip Diodoros of Sicily 14.41-43.4 (probably following the eyewitness Philistos, directly or at some remove) is the locus classicus for the Syracusan invention of the catapult, under Dionysios 1.14 A well-funded governmental research program in weapons technology, instigated by the Carthaginian aggressions on Sicily, resulted in the development of artillery in the form of very large bows firing very large arrows. The first recorded use of artillery, at Motya in 397 B.C. (D. S. 14.49.3-51.3), soon followed. Dionysios built moles to reach Motya, situated on an island, fought off relieving Carthaginian sltips with his navy and with land-based catapults, and battered the walls with rams while keeping the defenders down with catapult fire. The effort met with great success (Motya was taken by storm)Y This was followed by two other similar (though less dramatic) successes at Kaulonia above Locri (398 B.C., see D. S. 14.103.3-6) and at Rhegion (388/7 B.C., see D. S. 14.106.1-2, 108.3-6, 111-12.1). About Kaulonia we are sparsely informed; Rhegion held out for eleven months (unrelieved by sea: cpo D. S. 14.107.4, 14.111.1) and offset the effect of Dionysios' artillery by heroic sallies to destroy the machines, until they were starved into capitulation. If artillery was so successful under Dionysios I at Motya at least, why did it not spread rapidly and widely? That the devices functioned, there is no doubt; that their deployment was, at least in some cases, effective (and was hardly a liability) seems as certain (compare the accounts of Dionysios' sieges). The evidence is fragmentary and scattered but suggestive: although travelling artificers and political alliances spread the technology, a variety of social factors impeded its use. Ancient technology sought simple and efficient methods which depended crucially on training and skill,16 a synthetic approach to which contrast modern technology's analytic approach, which depends on "Macht". Artillery could not be transmitted by models or plans alone-the accompaniment of trained artificers was crucial. The earliest writers to describe the construction of artillery are said to have been Diades the Thessalian and Charias (both of whom worked for Alexander): see Athenaios Mech. 5.11-6.2, 10.5-13 W.

14See also Athenaios Mech., 10.5-10 W., who only speaks of siege-engines generally (10.10-11.1 W.), and whose work describes no artillery. As noted in the Appendix, Diodoros here follows Philistos probably via Ephoros or Timaios. On this event in 399 B.C., see Marsden (1969) 48-64 and Brian Caven, Dionysius I: Warlord of Sicily (New Haven/London, 1990) 94-5. The Greek term is mTO:7rCiATYJC; (Lat. catapulta), and the projectiles are distinguished by specifying o~u{3€A~C; (arrow-shooting) or 7r€Tpo{36AoC; (stone-throwing) of the projector. The ballista is the palin tone catapult. I follow the Greek terminology. The words altered their sense after ca. 100 A. C.: see G. P. Shipp, "Ballista," Glotta 39 (1969) 149-52; Marsden (1969) 188-9; Ph. Fleury, "Vitruve et la Nomenclature des Machines de Jet Romaines," REL 59 (1981) 216-34. lSSee A. M. Snodgrass, "Metalwork," 128-131 in B. S. J. Isserlin et alii, "Motya, a Phoenician-Punic site near Massala, Sicily," Annual of the Leeds University Oriental Society 4 (1962/3) 84-131, at 130 for possible archaeological evidence of catapult bolts. Garlan (above, n. 4) 167, n. 2, accepts this. Cpo also Caven (above, n. 14) 1035 on the siege itself. 16Apoint lowe

to Werner Krenkel (Rostock).

31


Thus, up to that time, however artillery technology could have spread, we have reason to believe it was not transmitted in writing. I? For example, Biton writes that Zopyros of Tarentum constructed artillery for Miletos and for Cumae in Italy.18 This fits the 1111B.C. and so Zopyros has been identified with Zopyros the Pythagorean who is dated to 400-350 B.C.19 If correct, this travelling artificer may have learnt his trade at the court of Dionysios I. Archytas, the Pythagorean ruler of Tarentum at the time, was indeed allied with Dionysios 1.20 Vitruuius, De Arch. 7.pr.14, lists Archytas with eleven other mechanici, six of whom are known to have been artillery engineers (Diades, Ktesibios, Phi10n of Byzantium, Charias, Po1yidos and Agesistratos) . Indifference to artillery is sufficiently demonstrated by the case of Xenophon, who never mentions it, though his Hellenica takes us to within a few years of Philip's accession (i.e., to 362 B.C.). Similarly his near-contemporary (fl. ca. 358 ± 2 B.C.) Aeneas Tacticus, the earliest Greek military writer known to us, mentions artillery only briefly (32.8). However they got there, there seem to have been two boxes of catapult bolts in storage at Athens in 37110 B.C. (IG 112.1422.8-9): awpaKoL rO~Evµ]arwv [0]6[0]/ awpaKOL Kara?r]aArwv OV[0],21 but 25 years later Athenians were still amazed and amused that Philip II would use the stuff.22 (See below for further on the Athenian case.) What caused this conservative reaction? We can only speculate as no extant source offers any explanation. One possibility might be an attitude in military policy more conservative than in Sicily, proverbial in the case of Sparta, but present elsewhere in Greece. Examples of this attitude may be found both in strategic thinking and in the provision of war materiel. Athens

171think Vitruvius 7 .pr.14 in calling Polyidos a writer has misunderstood Athenaios (cp. Schneider [1912] 3-4), who describes Polyidos as the teacher of Diades and Charias, but does not say he wrote anything. P.Berol.P. 13044 lists this Diades and a Polyidos as "mechanici": see H. Diels, Antike TechniJ! (Leipzig, 1924; repr. Osnabriick, 1965) 30-1. Vitruuius only cites Diades: De Arch. 10.13.3-8. See Fr. Hultsch, "Charias (11)," RE 3.2 (1899) 2133; E. Fabricius, RE 5.1 (1903) 305 and W. Kroll, RE S. 6 (1935) 25-7, s. "Diades (2);" and K. Ziegler, "Polyidos (6)," RE 21.2 (1952) 1658-9. 18Biton, Belopoiika 61-2 W. = Marsden (1971) 75, and Belop. 65 W. = Marsden (1971) 77. These defensive devices are essentially the same as the offensive sort: mechanically-augmented bows. 190n Zopyros, see Diels (above, n. 17) 22-3, and Eitel Fischer, "Zopyros (19a)," RE S.15 (1978) 1556. :)JOn Archytas see: Eduard Wellmann, "Archytas (3)," RE 2 (1896) 600; Pierre Wuilleumier, Tarente, des origines ala conquete romaine (Paris, 1939) 192,580-1; and M. I. Finley, Ancient SicilY (Totowa, NJ, 1979) 9192. Garlan (above, n. 4) 166 emphasizes the importance of Archytas, Tarentum, and the Pythagorean school, without connecting Zopyros. On Tarentum's alliance with Dionysios I, see J. B. Bury in CAB 6 (1927) 130, with map facing p. 109, which = J. B. Bury and R. Meiggs, A History of Greece4 (1975) map 31 p. 402; and Wuilleumier 71-2. 21For the date of IG Ir.1420 and the fact that these items were in storage, see IG U2.1421. Marsden (1969) 65-6 connects these to Dionysios I, but the evidence for his alliance with Athens is all later, and there is reason to 2 think that at this time Athens was not allied with him (n. 36 below). Penny J. Cole, "The Catapult Bolts of IG n 1422, " Phoenix 35 (1981) 216-9 argues that Dionysios and Athens cannot have been allied at this time, citing Xen., Hell. 6.2.33-6 and D. S. 16.57.2-3 (from Ephoros). 22See below, n. 43, Mnesimachos,

Philip fr. 7.10 K.

__

n

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PAUL T. KEYSER

did not unanimously accept the Periclean policy of city before land,23while the acceptance of the "post-Periclean" strategy of compromise ("defend city and land") was only gradually diffused through Greece. 24 In arms and armour Greece tended to this same conservatism as compared with Sicily or Macedon.25 Cost is also a consideration-Dionysios spared no expense (D. S. 14.41.3 µeyaAOLC; µ[aOOLC;, 14.41.4 owpEac; µeyaAac;, 14.42.1 µE'Y€OOC; 1'WV µwOwv ... 7rAr,OOC; 1'WV ... &OAwv ... owpEaic;), and the Phokians (see below) obtained artillery only after greatly enriching themselves. As late as the mid-first century A.C., Onasander 42.3 lists the wealth of the besiegers, with their luck and power, as a factor in any decision by them to use siege engines (including artillery). Yet, as will be seen, two allies of Dionysios probably obtained artillery from him (thus expense was not here the issue) yet are not attested ever to have used it. Nor are we told that Philip II had greatly increased his wealth just before he obtained artillery (see below). On balance I would suggest that it was the attested conservatism, rather than the supposed poverty, of Greek states which is probably a large part of the explanation for their apparent hesitation to adopt the new technology. I return to this in the Conclusion, § VII. The two main import routes of artillery (from Sicily) to Greece and Macedon were Sparta and Epeiros, allies of Dionysios I. Sparta's alliance predates the invention of artillery and is attested throughout the rule of Dionysios 1.26 We have explicit testimony that artillery first arrived in Greece from Sicily (i.e., from Dionysios) in the record by Plutarch, Mar. 191E = 219A, of the remark which Archidamos III made on seeing a catapult bolt shot for the first time (in a demonstration of Sicilian artillery): "Herakles! Man's arete is destroyed (or: made worthless)." This must have been before he was king, probably between 380 and 370 B.C.27 This 23See Garlan (above, n. 4) 53-61. city before land (44).

Pre-Periclean

strategy defended land (19-21), Periclean strategy defended

24Garlan (above, n. 4) 82-4 on the strategy, 66-79 on the diffusion. 25See A. M. Snodgrass, Arms and Armor of the Greeks (Ithaca, NY, 1967) 99 on the value of missile weapons (comparing Greece unfavorably with Syracuse), 103 on hoplite tactics, 105 on shieldforms, 106-7 on the value of mercenaries (comparing Greece unfavorably with Syracuse), 110-1 on the retention of hop lites by Sparta and Thebes in the face of peltasts, 111 on cavalry reforms (in Sicily, not in Greece), 112-3 on hoplite versus phalanx (comparing Greece unfavorably with Macedon and Sicily), and 117 hoplite shield still in use, significantly, by the defenders at Olynthos (Philip's first attested artillery-assisted siege: see § IIll below). To the seeming conservatism of Aeneas Tacticus (ca. 358 ± 2 B.C.) compare the sparse treatment given artillery even in Onasander, Strat. 42.3, some four centuries later. Onasander wrote ca. 54 ± 5 A.C.: see W. A. Oldfather, et aI., Aeneas Tacticus, Asclepiodotus, Onasander (London/Cambridge MA, 1923) 347-8. 26D. S. 14.10 (404 B.C.) Sparta helps Dionysios; D. S. 14.62.1,14.70.1-3 (396 B.C.) Sparta helps Dionysios; D. S. 15.23.5 and Isola., Panegyr. 126 (380 B.C.) Sparta and Dionysios allied; D. S. 15.47.7 (373 B.C.) Dionysios sending help to allied Sparta; and Plut., Agesilaus 33.3, Xen., Hell. 7.1.28-32,7.1.20-2 (369/8 B.C.) Dionysios helps the Spartans.in the "tearless battle" (see also J. B. Bury in CAB 6 [1927] 93-4). On the last event, Marsden (1969) 65, followed by Griffith (above, n. 9) 445, cites D. S. 15.72.3-4, in which the oracle of Zeus at Dodona in Epeiros prophesies that the battle is to be "tearless" for the Spartans (see n. 28 below). A. Momigliano and A. G. Woodhead in OeD2 s. "Dionysius I," 350-1 refer to "interventions" of Dionysios in connection with Sparta in 373 B.C. (see above) and 387 B.C.: is this latter the restoration of Alketas I (n. 31 below)? The six dates given are on the average 7 to 8 years apart: perhaps a regularly-renewed treaty? 27Plutarch only says the artillery came from Sicily, but this must mean Syracuse and Dionysios 1. Marsden is surely right when he insists that Archidamos' reaction is more comprehensible if he saw not just the bolt, but the (continued ... )


33

anecdote reveals Sparta's conservative reaction. It has been alleged that Sparta used this artillery in the "tearless battle" (hence the result)-a victory of Sparta in which she lost no men28-but the sources do not mention artillery and there is no other evidence that she used this fruit of her alliance with Dionysios I. Yet artillery was known in Greece, and after the Phokians enriched themselves by their sacrilegious sack of Delphi and began the Third Sacred War (355-47 B.C.) they were able to procure artillery with the help of Sparta.29 And with it in 354/3 B.C. (polyainos 2.38.2) Onomarchos defeated Philip II on the field. This marks the earliest attested use of field artillery: i.e., mobile artillery used against troops in the field. Onomarchos also used what seems to have been a new form of artillery: the stone-throwing catapult; but the deployment and effect do not seem to have depended on that difference.3o Thus slowly the new technology diffused from Syracuse into Hellas, with some states (Phokis) more rapidly adopting it than others (Sparta). This introduction was not wasted on Philip II of Macedon, but where was he to obtain this new technology or from whom hire an artificer? Scarcely from Phokis or Sparta. Independent development would have been difficult and would cost money and time: probably more time than Philip was willing to devote, since money may not have been the critical path, given his Pangaion gold mines. Philip had a number of allies, but only one with any connection to artillery. I mean Epeiros (with which both Macedon and Syracuse had alliances), although weak connections are also attested between Macedon and Syracuse directly. Alketas I of Epeiros had been restored to his throne ca. 385 B.C. by Dionysios I with the help of Sparta thus inaugurating the alliance with Syracuse.31 Some years later Alketas' younger son Arybbas or

27( ... continued) bolt shot. Had the catapult been in Greece, but not yet in the Peloponnese (or Sparta), it is likely that it would not have surprised Archidamos, and it is likely that Plutarch would have said so. Since catapults were known in Athens in 37110 B.C. (see above, n. 21), and to Aeneas Tacticus in 360-56 B.C. (32 and 38.1), and since Archidamos was king from 36110 B.C., the remark must predate his kingship. This is not contradicted by Plutarch, who includes the remark in "Sayings of Kings and Commanders" (i.e., those who had imperium). Archidamos is known to have commanded already in 371 after the battle of Leuctra (Xen., Hell. 6.4.18, or just before the battle: D. S. 15.54) and at the "tearless battle" of 369/8 B.C. (see above, n. 26). 28Marsden (1969) 65. If so, and if my suggestion on the connection of Epeiros with the introduction of artillery to Macedon (see below in text) be granted, the prophecy of the oracle of Dodona in Epeiros that the battle was to be "tearless" for the Spartans (see n. 26 above, adfin.) would gain point. 29Cp. D. S. 16.24.1-2, Justin 8.1.11, A. W. Pickard-Cambridge in CAB 6 (1927) 213 ff., Griffith (above, n. 9) 269-70. That Phokis got help from Sparta is stated by the sources and commentators, but they do not quite say that Phokis bought (or begged) artillery from Sparta. I suggest they did, and that Sparta had no qualms about dispensing with the to-her-useless artillery. Cpo Marsden (1969) 66 on the Phokians and "Sparta or Athens" as helper, and on Philip and Onomarchos. 3OJ: suggest that the advantage of this innovation was lower cost. Stone-throwers use cheaper ammunition, which can more easily be replenished in the field, and the construction of the stock would be somewhat simpler and hence also cheaper. 310n Alketas I see D. S. 15.13.3, Xen., Hell. 6.1.7, 6.2.10, N. G. L. Hammond, Epirus (Oxford, 1967) 551, n. 6, 523-4, 543, 545, J. R. Ellis, Philip 11 and Macedonian Imperialism (London, 1976) 61-2, Bury-Meiggs (above, n. 20) 402-3, and Bury in CAH 6 (1927) 130. A. G. Woodhead, "The Adriatic Empire of Dionysius I," Klio 52 (1970) 503-512 is sceptical of any influence after 383 B.C.

34

PAUL T. KEYSER

Tharybbas II became sole ruler (360 B.C.) and Philip II of Macedon married Tharybbas' niece and sister-in-law Olympias (357 B.C.).32 It was a few years after this, in 354/3, that the importance of artillery was driven home to Philip (see above). There is another more tenuous yet more direct connection between Philip II and Syracuse: Philip II was a drinking-friend of Dionysios II the then-ruler of Syracuse (Plut., Timoleon 15.4).33 This is not proof, but the outline is clear, and all alternates seem less likely. The Athenian connection with Syracuse is instructive by contrast, because barren or latefruiting.34 We have already noted the presence of artillery (bolts anyway) in Athens (in 371/0 B.C.) before their alliance with Dionysios I, possibly from war booty.35 The catapult bolts may, I suggest, have been captured a few years previously when the Athenians defeated some triremes of Dionysios I (D. S. 15.47.7,373 B.C.). Whether or not, Dionysios I would scarcely send catapult bolts to the Athenians so soon after they had captured his ships. They probably did not hire traveling artificers to obtain it, as that would be expensive, and there is no evidence that Athens sufficiently appreciated the value of artillery. A few years later, we have evidence that Dionysios I did conclude an alliance with Athens (368/7 B.C.),36 and he then may well have supplied more artillery. Almost two decades later, the same items of artillery were still in storage in Athens.37 Yet there is no evidence it had ever been used, despite the fact that artillery was used against the Athenians at the siege of Samos (356 B.C., the Social War): Plut.

320n Tharybbas' career and Philip's wedding to Olympias see Justin 8.6.5, D. S. 16.72.1, M. N. Tod, GHI v. 2 (Oxford, 1948) no. 173, Hammond (above, n. 31) 517-8, 533-4, 545-6, Griffith (above, n. 9) 305-6, Ellis (above, n. 31) 90-1, 156-7,262 (n. 4), A. W. Pickard-Cambridge in CAH 6 (1927) 248, and Cawkwell (above, n. 9) 115-6. 3~hat we do not know when they were friends does not obviate establishing a connection. In addition, it may not be without significance that Plato (a) visited Dionysios I and Archytas of Tarentum: Finley (above, n. 20) 91-3, and (b) was the teacher of Aristotle, himself a Macedonian whose father Nikomachos was court physician to Philip II's father Amyntas II: see W. D. Ross, in OCD2 "Aristotlte," 114 (Aristotle joined Philip's court only in 342 B.C.). Archytas of Tarentum has met us before (see n. 20 above) as a Pythagorean mechanicus, and it is perhaps not without significance that Philip was educated as a Pythagorean: D. S. 16.2.3. The rule of Dionysios II was disputed at this time (i.e., 354/3 to 348 B.C. when we know Philip had artillery), but Dionysios II did not abdicate till 34514: see, e.g. Finley (above, n. 20) 88-93, A. C. Woodhead, The Greeks in the West (New York, 1962) 94-8, and R. Hackforth in CAB 6 (1927) 272-85. And when he abdicated to Timoleon in 34514 he still had "all sorts of engines of war and a great quantity of missiles" (see Plut., Timoleon 13.3, to which cpo Diodoros of Sicily's phrases at 14. 41.3, 42.2, 43.3). 34Contra Marsden (1969) 67-73. 35Above,

n. 21.

36SeeTod (above, n. 32) no. 133, 136, and his discussion with ancient references. been any previous alliance. 7

See

IG IF. 120.36-7 (362/1 B.C.):

There does not seem to have

aw]paKo, TO~€Uµ,aTWI-{ ... a)WpaKOt KaTWraATWv II; the items in storage lines 12-3; and IG 112.1440.48 (350/1 B.C.): awpaKOt To~€uµ,
xaAK08~K€L,


35

Pelop. 2.3, Mor. 187C.38 (D. S. 16.21-2 following Diyllos omits artillery: as noted in the Appendix, this is characteristic). In summary we note that six or seven Greek states (certainly Syracuse, Miletos, Cumae in Italy, Sparta, Athens, Phokis, and probably Epeiros) used or had access to artillery in the first half of the fourth century. In all cases this seems to have originated, directly or indirectly, from Syracuse. In Sparta and Athens it does not seem to have required a large expense, there is some suggestion that it did require a large expense in Phokis, and we have no information in the other cases. That is, money does not seem to have been the critical path, despite the fact that artillery was expensive to develop or build. Only in the case of Syracuse is there any evidence to suggest that it affected their warfare (the famous victory at Motya-see above), and then only under the first ruler to use it (i.e., not under Dionysios II). Why was this? As suggested above, it was probably that they did not realise the potential usefulness of the new weapon (certainly the problem in the case of Sparta). We will return to this question in the Conclusion, § VII.

IV. The Artillery of Philip That Philip obtained artillery we know (how and in response to what prompting we have suggested above). What use he made of it we will now discuss. Although Philip knew the power of field artillery from personal experience (polyainos 2.38.2: Onomarchos defeats Philip in 354/3 B.C.), he is not attested ever to have employed it. Philip's first recorded siege (Amphipolis 357 B.C.) involved rams and treachery, but no artillery (Theopompos FGrHist 115 F 30); he gained the city and the Pangaion gold mines.39 The next two sieges are without artillery (i.e., before his introduction to it). They were at Pharkedon (356 B.C.) in W. Central Thessaly, where only ladders are mentioned (but our evidence is fragmentary),40 and at Methone (ca. 354 B. C.) on the Thermaic Gulf, which capitulated after a long and unrelieved siege (in which Philip lost his right eye to an arrow). 41 An incident in Polyainos 4.2.20 belongs to this time or a little before. Philip had been unsuccessfully besieging the town Karai for a long time, and determined to dismantle his machines and leave. He fooled the defenders

38See Karl Klee, "Timotheos (3)," RE 6A.2 (1937) 1324-9 at 1329 (cp. Nepos, Timoth. 3). He was also at the siege of Samos in 366 B.C. (Klee 1327; Isokr., Antid. 111), but the three sayings Plutarch records seem all to derive from his trial (on which see Klee 1329) which had to do with the later siege: note that Plut., Pelop. 2.3 makes the occasion of Timotheos' remark to be a boast of Chares, one of the other two generals at Samos 356 B.C. On the second siege of Samos, see Graham Shipley, A History of Samos 800-188 BC, (Oxford 1987) 156-7. 3~. S. 16.8.2 uses the words µ1/Xavil and 7rPO~{30A~ in addition to the expected KpioC;. But Diodoros of Sicily is careful in his terminology and a catapult is KaTa7rEATrj, O~V{3€A~C;, 7rHpo{36AOC; or op-yavov (while its missiles are (3€AW). At any rate Philip's surprise in 354/3 B.C. sufficiently demonstrates his unfamiliarity with artillery. See Pickard-Cambridge CAB 6 (1927) 207-8 for a full account of Amphipolis.

4Opolyainos 4.2.18 = Theopompos FGrHist 115 F 82. See the discussion at Griffith (above, n. 9) 271. Pharkedon, see Ernst Kirsten, "Pharkadon," RE 19 (1938) 1835-8.

On

410n the siege of Methone see: Polyainos 4.2.15, Justin 7.6.13-6, D. S. 16.34.5, and the discussions by A. W. Pickard-Cambridge in CAH 6 (1927) 219 and Griffith (above, n. 9) 254-8, with further ancient references. Griffith rightly rejects the late and unconfirmed account of Strabo 7,jr. 22 adfin., in which Philip lost his right eye to a catapult bolt: rijv €KK07r~V TOU O€~WVix/>6aAµou KaTa7r€AnKC; {3€AH in favor of Theopompos FGrHist 115 F 52. The site has recently been surveyed: M. Hatzopoulos, D. Knoepfler, and V. Marigo-Papadopoulos, "Deux sites pour

Methone de Macedoine,"

BCH 114 (1990) 639-668.

36

PAUL T. KEYSER

into thinking that he was making new machines so they wasted time and effort to strengthen their gates. His machines are rams and this siege is without artillery. Philip's first artillery-assisted siege was Olynthos (348 B.C.), which he allegedly took by treachery, whence arose his belief and policy that cities were to be taken by gold if possible (D. S. 16.53 and 16.54.3-4, following Diyllos). We know of the artillery only from archaeology-large three-fluted bronze arrowheads, up to 7 cm long, with shafts ca. 1 cm in diameter, far too large and heavy to be anything but catapult bolt-heads.42 As noted in the Appendix, the Athenian Diyllos consistently suppressed mention of artillery. Philip's next campaign-season was apparently not till 340/39 B.C., but his actions had already won him fame in Athens (which as we saw above did not seem to make much use of artillery). Philip became the object of comedy: Mnesimachos, Philip fro 7. 10K records his preparations for war, his crowning glory being catapults.43 Note that Philip had apparently used his artillery only once before 340 B.C., at Olynthos, and apparently its effect was unremarkable to the Athenian Diyllos at least (D. S. 16.53-4). This and the other preparations Mnesimachos lists indicate that he must be reacting to a widely-known systematic policy. Philip is recorded as using artillery twice in 340/39 B.C., and in one other event of this time or a little before, his allies presumably did. Philip had been seeking to extend his influence into Euboia, and had succeeded in detaching it from Athens in 348/7 B.C.44 But in 340/39 B.c. Phokion of Athens returned, drove out Kleitarchos (Philip's man) from Eretria, and captured booty,45 probably including catapults: with characteristic insight, they were stored. 46 That Philip had supplied his southernmost allies with catapults again indicates a systematic policy of use. Philip's next, and last, two sieges were Perinthos (D. S. 16.74.2-76.4 from Ephoros) and Byzantium (D. S. 16.77.2-3 from Diyllos)-two failures.47 Both cities are located in defensible

42See Pickard-Cambridge in CAB 6 (1927) 228-33 on the Olynthian war. The archaeological evidence is in D. M. Robinson, Excavations at Olynthus v. 10 (Baltimore, MD, 1941) 382-3, plate CXX and see Snodgrass (above, n. 25) 116-7 and idem, review of Marsden (1969), CR n.s. 21 (1971) 106-8. They cannot be spear-heads, which are flat and leaf-shaped. 43See J. M. Edmonds, Frag. Aft. Com. V. 2 (Leiden, 1969) 368-9, Mnesimachos, Philip fr. 7.10 K (ca. 345 B.C.), KOI'TOI7r€A'TctLm 0' €Cf'Tf;c!>OIJlWµe()OI. Philip is an object of concern not imitation. Later, ca. 341 B.C., Timokles, Heros fr. 12.5 K (340-38 B.C.), describes Philip as "Briareus eating catapults:" Bpthp€we;/ 0 'TOUe; KOI'TOI7r€A'TOIe; nic; 'TE AOYXOIe; eCJO[wJI (see Edmonds, pp. 610-1). CatapaItophagy is I take it a reference to Philip growing strong on catapults.

44plut., Phokion 12-3, D. S. 16.74.1; see Pickard-Cambridge

in CAB 6 (1927) 231-2, and Griffith (above, n.

9) 318-9. 45See Pickard-Cambridge in CAB 6 (1927) 253, Marsden (1969) 58 both briefly, while Fritz R. Wiist, Philipp II. von Makedonien und Griechenland (Munich 1938), = Munchener Historische Abhandlungen 1. Reihe, V. 14, pp. 108-13 is fuller and Griffith (above, n. 9) 547-54 follows P. A. Brunt, "Euboea in the time of Philip II," CQ n.s. 19 (1969) 245-65 for the period Brunt covers (357-42 B.C.). 4&Jbe evidence for the catapults is given in Marsden (1969) 57-8 = IG 112. 1627B.328-41 (330129 B.C.), which inscription also informs the reader that the catapult pieces have been in storage. See below, n. 52, for further on

this inscription. 47See D. S. 16.74-6, Pickard-Cambridge 123-32, and Griffith (above, n. 9) 566-81.

in CAH 6 (1927) 254-6, Marsden (1969) 100-1, Wiist (above, n. 45) My discussion is derived from these, esp. Griffith. Marsden's con(continued ... )


37

coastal sites (D. S. 16.76.1-2 on Perinthos), and this is not without significance as Philip's fleet was inferior to the Athenian fleet.48 At Perinthos was the first attested artillery duel (both Philip and his opponents used artillery). After a lengthy siege using rams, mines, and towermounted catapults, Philip penetrated the outer wall of Perinthos only to find further barriers. Perinthos was being supplied by Byzantium and the Persians (already nervous?), and with no end in sight, Philip attempted to draw off some support from Perinthos by attacking Byzantium. Although D. S. 16.77 following Diyllos records no artillery either for Philip or Byzantium, Diyllos seems to suppress artillery (see the Appendix), and given the overall tactical situation here, plus the known presence of artillery in Philip's train and in Perinthos the ally of Byzantium, I suggest that artillery was used at the siege of Byzantium. In any case, the result of Philip's attack on Byzantium was to gain Athens' support for Byzantium. Unable to blockade either city from the sea, Philip gave up the dual attack as a bad job. In summary we note that Philip was never able by the use of his artillery to take a city by storm. They either capitulated (as at Methone, prior to artillery) or were betrayed (as at Amphipolis without and Olynthos with artillery), or they withstood (Perinthos and Byzantium, both with artillery).49 Those which capitulated or were betrayed (Methone, Amphipolis, and Olynthos) might perhaps have been taken by storm in time (but we do not know). We may at least ask why Perinthos and Byzantium did not fall to the experienced besieger Philip. Commentators vary, but none compare Dionysios' three great successes in siege warfare (Motya, Kaulonia, and Rhegion). All three of these had defensible coastal sites, Motya's being particularly good, 50 and Dionysios' artillery was not more advanced than that of Philip half a century later. I suggest that the difference, a difference perhaps grasped by Philip after Perinthos-Byzantium, was naval power. Philip could not prevent maritime relief from reaching these besieged coastal cities, while the excellence of Dionysios' fleet is almost proverbial (see D. S. 14.41.3, 42.2-3, 42.5, 43.4), and Dionysios' efforts to prevent relief (at least in two of three cases) are known (D. S. 14.50 Motya and 14.107.4, 111.1 Rhegion). Hence coastal towns besieged by Philip if relieved by allies withstood. It is also instructive that these two sieges involve the first attested artillery duel: the defender's use of artillery must have partially offset the advantage given by artillery to the offense.

47(... continued) clusion is that "it may be ... that the available siege-appliances were not yet efficient enough," while Wiist concludes (130) that it was a combination of the "Tapferkeit der Bewohner, die giinstige Lage and die Befestigungen sowie die Hilfe von Byzanz und Persien." Griffith is similar (579): "coolness at one and heroism at the other, together with the still imperfect development of siege apparatus was the cause of failure. " 48See Griffith (above, n. 9) 567-8. 49por other towns besieged by Philip there is no evidence of artillery. Pharkedon (above, n. 40) and the town in Polyainos 4.2.20 are without artillery. We are simply not informed about artillery at Amphissa-on which see Aeschines 3 Ktesiphon 115-29, Demosth. 18 de Corona 143-59, and Peter Londey, "The Outbreak of the 4th Sacred War," Chiron 20 (1990) 239-6O-and Naupaktos-on which see Theopompos FGrHist 115 F 235, and Irwin L. Merker, "Achaians in Naupaktos and Kalydon in the Fourth Century," Hesperia 58 (1989) 303-11-both of which fell to Philip just before Chaironeia. SOOn the siting of Motya, see Finley (above, n. 20) 65, and D. S. 14.48.2.

38

PAUL T. KEYSER

I have suggested that Philip pursued a deliberate policy of large-scale use of artillery, unparalleled since Dionysios 1. He was aware of the potential of field artillery (the Onomarchos episode, mentioned above § III, in Polyainos 2.38.2), but he is not attested to have used it. In sieges, we may ask: was artillery used to provide covering fire to enable penetration of defence (as stated above) or was it used for sharpshooting to pick off defenders? The latter may have been true in later warfare (cp. Caesar, BG 7.25.2-3, the siege of Auaricum, Josephos, BJ 3.245, the siege of Iotapata),51but contemporary accounts suggest only covering fire (D. S. 14.50.4, 14.51.1 from Philistos via Timaios or Ephoros; D. S. 16.75.3 from Ephoros; and cpo Aeneas Tacticus 32.8). Philip used artillery to provide covering fire in order to enable his men to penetrate a city's defences (by rams or ladders or gold), but he was unable to surround coastal towns due to his lack of adequate naval support, indicating an inadequate naval policy. One technological innovation probably occurred during the era of Philip (though we do not know where): the development of torsion-powered catapults. 52 If they were invented under Philip II before 340 B.C. (as Marsden believes) they were not much better than the earlier stuff, as the experience of Perinthos and Byzantium proves. Early catapults were large bows; later the propulsive power was stored not in the bent bow but in a pair of twisted bundles of fibers (hair usually) which when allowed to untwist flung a pair of arms (and the attached string) forward, propelling the projectile. The reason for this invention is likely that which later motivated the experiments recorded in Philon, Belop.: a desire to ensure that the aiming of a catapult would not be affected by unpredictable alterations in the bow-material (which might alter the range, or if asymmetrical fire the projectile off true). In a torsion-catapult, adjustments to the tension of the two fiber bundles would allow adjustments to the range, and the two fiberbundles could be tuned to ensure true aim.

v. Alexander's

Use of Artillery

Before considering Alexander's use of artillery, a brief note on artillery in Athens in the age of Alexander is in order. Before and during the age of Philip, artillery was available in Athens, but not apparently much used. Beginning ca. 335 B.C. (possibly ca. 345 B.C.), there is some evidence of three kinds that the Athenians saw the importance of artillery.

51

1 am indebted to Werner Krenkel (Rostock) for the reference to the siege of Auaricum. He also tells me that at the first demonstration of one of Schramm's modem models of an ancient artillery-piece, the first shot was a bull's-eye, and the second shot split the first bolt. We do not know if this accuracy was obtainable at the time of Philip (they had perhaps not learned enough about air-resistance and gravity yet). Note that Josephos tells the story to prove not the accuracy but the force of the stone-throwing catapults. 52Marsden (1969) 56-9 has shown that by 330 B.C. torsion-based artillery was known. This is based on IG 2 II .1467B (ca. 332 ± 6 B.C.), col. ii, lines 48-56, mentioning Kam[7raAm\;] rptxoro[POV\;] and IG If. 1627B (330/29 B.C.), lines 328-41, mentioning 7rAaicTLa (frames) of catapults, which are probably the frames which hold the fiber-bundles. Marsden cites Athenaios 10.5-10 W. to support his thesis that this was developed under Philip II of Macedon, but he neglects to note that Athenaios goes on to speak of siege-engines generally (10.10-11.1 W.) and his work describes no artillery. This suggests that Athenaios refers to the invention under Philip II of other sorts of siege-engines than artillery (e.g., improvements in towers or ladders). As D. Baatz, rev. of Marsden (1969), Gnomon 43 (1971) 257-60 has pointed out (esp. p. 258), we do not know where or when torsion-based artillery was invented (though under Philip II is not a bad guess).


39

First, the Athenians constructed at least one and probably several artillery towers. The one dated tower is at Aigosthena (at the Eastern end of the the gulf of Corinth, in the Megarid), built ca. 343 B.C. according to Ober, but ca. 300 B.C. according to Marsden. 53 Given the Athenian reaction even to the artillery of Philip, and for the following reasons, I would prefer ca. 335 B.C. Both Ober and Marsden adduce the towers at Messene and Siphai, which are similar in design to Aigosthena, and which date to ca. 365 ± 4 B.C.54 But Marsden also cites several towers of similar design from ca. 335 ± 5 B. C. or later: the lower section of Tower 6 in the north wall of Paestum ca. 330-300 B.C., and two towers at Tithorea in Phokis, ca. 340-35 B.C.55 So the dates of ca. 365 ± 4 B.C. for the towers at Messene and Siphai do not preclude a date of say ca. 335 B.C. for the more or less similar Aigosthena tower. Another five Attic artillery towers seem similar and are plausibly but not certainly dated to the same era: at Gyphtokastro on the border with Boiotia (the Kaza pass, the most important western road between Boiotia and Attica), at Mazi (5 km east of Gyphtokastro), two places 1 km apart in the Vathychoria (6 km SE of Aigosthena), and at Phyle (20 km NNW of Athens).56 Second, two passages in Aristotle from ca. 335-325 B.C. make it clear that ephebes were regularly trained by the KCX7CXc/>EA7CXc/>€7T]<; in the art of artillery. Aristotle, NE 3.2.17 (l111alO11), refers to someone OE'i~CXL {3ovA6µElIO<; ac/>E'illCXL ... 7'011 KCX7CX7rEA7T]1I, and a little later, Ath. Pol. 42.3, states that those instructing the ephebes ... KCXt 70~El}Etll KCXt aK01l7itEtll KCXt 57 KCX7CX7reXArrl" ac/>L€lICXL OLO&O'KOVO'LlI. This training continued into the III B.c., as shown by IG II2.665 = CIA II.316 = Ditt.3 385 (283/2 B.C.), lines 27, 66-70, relating to the training of the ephebes by the KCX7CX7r]CXA[ TCX]c/>€7T]<;. 58 Third, two inscriptions suggest that the Athenians invested more heavily in artillery, or at least possessed more, at this time: IG II2.1467B (ca. 332 ± 6 B.C.), col. ii, lines 48-56 and

53Josiah Ober, "Early Artillery Towers: Messenia, Boiotia, Attica, Megarid, " AlA 91 (1987) 569-604 @ 586-9, following the historical arguments in his article "Two Ancient Watchtowers above Aigosthena in the Northern Megarid, " AlA 87 (1983) 387-92, pl. 56, @ 391. Ober (p. 391, n. 17) cites Plut., Phokion 15, the rebuilding of Megara's long walls 343 B.C., as a parallel to the building of long walls at Aigosthena (which were built contemporary with the tower); but the walls at Aigosthena are only ca. 250 m long (Ober, map p. 388), and hence are not parallel to the multi-kilometer-long long walls of cities such as Athens or Megara (which as Ober admits, p. 391, n. 16, all belong to the era ca. 459-417 B.C. anyway). Marsden (1969) 134-8 argues for the later date because the tower is taller and is from a later stage (post-320 B.C.). ~e towers at Messene and following Ernst Meyer, of ca. 360 ± 6 B.C. As for are to be dated to the Theban 1981) 69-70.

were built in 369 B.C. according to Ober (1987) 572-3, citing D. S. 15.66.1,67.1, "Messene (3)," RE S. 15 (1978) 136-55 @ 140-2, who compares the walls of Pagasai Siphai, Ober connects it is to be connected with nearby Khorsiai, whose fortifications hegemony, ca. 371-62 B. C., following J. M. Fossey, et. al., Khostia 1980 (Montreal,

55Marsden (1969) 127-34. 560ber (1987) 582-5 Gyphtokastro, 589-91 Mazi, 591-5 Vathychoria, and 596 Phyle, respectively. For a locator map of these sites, see J.-P. Adam, L'architecture mi/itaire grecque (paris 1982) 214 (fig. 125). 57The NE is ca. 335/4 B.C.: see R. A. Gauthier and J. Y. Jolif, L'Ethique a Nicomaque :f (Louvain/ Paris, 1970) table following p. 62. The Ath. Pol. is ca. 327 ± 2 B. C.: see J. E. Sandys, Aristotle's Constitution of Athens (London,

1893) xxxix-liv.

58Cp. Marsden (1969) 71-2 on later evidence.

40

PAUL T. KEYSER

IG II2.1627B (330129 B.C.) recording numerous torsion-catapults,

in storage.

Perhaps others

were in use? Alexander's use is better-attested and more extensive than Philip's.59 The table lists all attested cases of artillery use by or against Alexander, in chronological order. The "F" (Taulantians (1), Scyths (7» indicates the use of field artillery (by Alexander); see below on Persian Gates (5). Italic names (Miletos, Halikamassos (2), Tyre (3) indicate coastal sieges (in the case of Tyre the * indicates that the defenders made significant use of the sea). Italic numerals (Halikarnassos (2), Tyre (3), Gaza (4), Persian Gates (5) indicate the use of artillery against Alexander (in the case of Persian Gates (5), Alexander apparently was without it). The system of references follows; abbreviations are standard save Q. C[urtius] R. and Poly[ainos]. Lacunae (in Curtius and Diodoros) are indicated #, while a blank under Polyainos indicates that he does not include any Strategemata relevant to the event. Because Diodoros gives tables of contents to each book, we know that he included some story about Nautaka (8) and Massaga (9), which is indicated by "TOC" following the #. The X indicates that there is no reference to the event in that author (e.g., with the lacuna in Curtius, we know about the Taulantians in detail only from Arrian). References in parentheses indicate that the author refers to the episode, but does not mention artillery. I consider first the two or three uses of field artillery (including the Persian Gates (5), as the use of artillery there is similar to field artillery), and then the other seven or eight sieges in which artillery is attested. Field artillery was known to Onomarchos and introduced to Philip II (above, § III). Alexander is known to have used it at least twice. The first use (Taulantians (1» is recorded only by Arrian 1.6.8 (lacuna in Curtius; brief reference in D. S. 17.8.1 and Plut. 11.5). During his Illyrian campaign, Alexander had advanced on Pelion to besiege it and had shut up its defenders inside, but the city was relieved by Glaukias and his Taulantians (Arr. 1.5.1-8).60 Alexander chased off some of the relief and retreated across a river; to cover his retreat he used his archers and artillery (Arr. 1.5.9-6.8). Alexander probably had these artillery-pieces with him for the siege of Pelion,61 and they were rapidly pressed into service. The need for haste

59Jt is perhaps not without significance that the fullest discussion of Alexander's use of artillery, by Garlan (above, n. 4) 214, omits both instances of the use of field artillery (his topic is Poliorretique). Marsden (1969) 1014 treats only Halikarnassos (2), Tyre (3), and Gaza (4), and with similar brevity field artillery at 164-6: Taulantians (1) and Scyths (7). One expects that Alexander would have learned from Philip, but would not be content with emulation: E. A. Fredericksmeyer, [no 'e'] "Alexander and Philip: emulation and resentment," CJ 85 (1989/90) 300-15. tiOSeeA. B. Bosworth, A Historical Commentary on Arrian 's History of Alexander 1 (Oxford, 1980) ad 1.5.5 and map p. 53. On the campaign, see J. F. C. Fuller, The Generalship of Alexander (London 1958) 219-226; N. G. L. Hammond, "Alexander's Campaign in Illyria, " JHS 94 (1974) 66-87, pll. IX-XI, @ 77-87, who says little about the use of artillery here. Willy Clarysse and Guido Schepens, "A Ptolemaic Fragment of an Alexander History," Chronique d'Egypte 60 (1985) 30-47, publish a II-B.C. papyrus (P. Brit. Libr. 3085 v.) which gives a tactician's account of another part of this campaign (and does not mention artillery); N. G. L. Hammond, "A Papyrus Commentary on Aristotle's Balkan Campaign," GRBS 28 (1987) 331-47 shows that this is a fragment of Strattis' Commentary on Alexander's Royal Journal (FGrHist 118) of ca. 270 ± 20 B.C. 61Bosworth (above, n. 60) ad 1.6.8 is certain.


41

can be seen in the narrative (Arr. 1.6.7-8): aVTE7rflECJCXV ... €KOE'i ... TOV~ To~6TCX~ Op6µ~.62 The deployment was a great success and not a man was lost (1.6.8). Alexander returned a few days later and took Glaukias by surprise, inflicting a crushing defeat. The second use of field artillery was circa six years later on the river Tanais (Scyths (7». While Alexander was founding a city, he was harrassed by Scyths on the other side (Arr. 4.3.64.3; Curtius 7.8.8-30 an embassy from the Scyths tells Alexander not to cross the Tanais and Curtius 7.9.1-2 he prepares to cross; Plut. 45.4 gives a one-sentence summary).63 He crossed the river in the van of his army with catapults firing on the Scyths (fired before he crossed, from the near bank Arr. 4.4.4-5; fired as he crossed, from rafts constructed for this purpose Curtius 7.9.3-8). This covering fire enabled him to land in good order (Arr. 4.4.5-6, Curtius 7.9.9) and the Scyths were routed (Arr. 4.4.7-9, Curtius 7.9.10-6). Arrian makes the crossing an ad hoc affair using inflated hides, while Curtius describes a well-planned attack with catapults mounted on well-built rafts. Such a naval device seems unlikely: note that the men on the rafts could not aim their javelins (Curtius 7.9.6-7), so how could the catapults have been stable enough to aim? Both Curtius (7.9.7 tormenta saluti fuerunt, quibus in confertos ac temere se offerentes haud frustra excussa sunt tela) and Arrian (4.4.4) as much as say the catapults' accuracy was not great (even from land), though the distance was small (across a river). This artillery was the arrowshooting variety (Curtius 7.9.7 tela, Arr. 4.4.4 ot2x TOll "fEPPOU TE KCXt TOll OWPCXKO~ OWµ7ra~ 7('A"""fEi~); that shot, killing one of the best Scyths, made them retreat a bit." The episode of the pass to Persis (Persian Gates (5» may be considered a case of the use of field artillery. The difference is that Ariobazarnes the satrap of Persia had blocked the pass with a wall (Arr. 3.18.2): the artillery in use does not seem to have been mobile. The Persians fired on Alexanders's troops to fend them off the wall (Arr. 3.18.3) with such success that Alexander was forced to find a way around (which he was fortunate enough to do) and take the pass from the rear (Arr. 3.18.4-9). Only Arrian includes artillery, though four other writers treat this episode. Justin omits the Persian Gates, while Polyainos 4.3.27, Plut. 37.1-2 and D. S. 17.68 tell a brief story involving no artillery and similar in many details (probably from their common source Kleitarchos).64 The Persians repulse the Macedonians with missile fire, so the Macedonians withdraw 300 stadia (so D. S.; 30 stadia in Polyainos; not in Plutarch). While in despair of what to do, Alexander is approached by a bilingual Lycian, who had been captured by the Persians (a gloss to explain his presence), and who made his living as a shepherd (his living not in Plutarch). His help had been prophesied by the oracle at Delphi (not in D. S.). He offered to guide Alexander around by a path hidden by plant growth, and Alexander and some troops took this path by night, thus executing a pincer movement on Ariobazarnes (this

62Contrast Marsden (1969) 164-5 who alleges that "Before ... about 100 A.D., it appears that neither the Greeks nor the Romans possessed any pieces of artillery mounted on mobile carriages. They transported their catapults on ordinary carts in a more or less dismantled state." After emphasizing that (pre-l00-A.C.) artillery could not be rapidly deployed, he cites this passage as proof. 63In addition, Diodoros probably had this story in the lacuna of 17.83/4: see the table of contents, third entry after the death of Bessus (83.7-9): 0 {jaCJLA€V~ bTL Eo-yoLaJlovc:; KaL EKvOac:; €crrpo-:r€VCT€JI. See Fuller (above, n. 60)

236-9 on this campaign. 64Unless {jf.A'T/ .•. a¢u:VT€~ in Polyainos means artillery, which I doubt. On the engagement, n. 60) 226-34.

see Fuller (above,

42

PAUL T. KEYSER

last whole sentence not in Plutarch). The Persian artillery was therefore not mobile, or the pincer movement would have been futile. The same artillery-less source was used by Q. C. R. 5.3.16-4.34 (who includes all these details and much excess rhetoric). In Arrian the enemy does have artillery, and Alexander is led around the pass by his prisoners (with no trace of the Kleitarchan Lycian).65 Arrian does not note that Alexander was caught by surprise (cp. D. S. 17.68.2-3, Curtius 5.3.17-23), and Bosworth intelligently compares the Onomarchos episode.66 I suggest that Kleitarchos colored this episode in this way for just this reason-the demoralisation of Alexander's troops in defeat. To be defeated by an enemy without artillery is more surprising than to be defeated by an enemy with artillery, hence the presence of artillery was suppressed. Arrian retains the official account (from Ptolemy) but not surprisingly omits Alexander's surprise and despair. Miletos was the first Persian-held city to be besieged by Alexander (Arr. 1.18.3-19, D. S. 17.22.1-3, Pluto 17.2). The walls were knocked down after numerous assaults and the city taken. Later Miletos was retaken by the Persians and then again by Alexander's forces (see Q. C. R. 4.1.37,4.5.13). There is no attested use of artillery, although Miletos had long since had artillery,67 because our sources here simply omit to inform us that artillery was used. First of all, D. S. 17.22.2 following Diyllos refers to the Milesians having {3EAwv .... O(X1lltA~ oP'YCl.vov: Diyllos suppressed all reference to artillery (see the Appendix) and this is the residue of the Milesian artillery in Diyllos' account. Second, note that Plut. 17.2 closely links the sieges of Miletos and Halikarnassos, and at the latter artillery was used. Third, according to D. S. 17. 24.1, Alexander had his 7rOAWPKTf'TLKO: 'TWV oP'YcY.vwv conveyed by sea from Miletos to Halikarnassos, and oP'YCtvoC; ("instrument") is one of the regular words for artillery, though it can also refer to other siege-engines, such as rams.68 Alexander's first siege at which the use of artillery is explicitly attested was at the important seacoast city of Halikarnassos (2), where the defenders also had artillery/9 and we

65See Bosworth (above, n. 60) ad 3.18.1-9 with map. 66See Bosworth (above, n. 60) ad 3.18.3. 67See at n. 18 above. Note also that in the Social War, Miletos was allied with Samos, and at Samos artillery was used, against the Athenians (above, at n. 38). 68Cp. e.g. Ktesias fro 81, D. S: 17.43.7 oP'Yapo7rOtOC;, Onasander, Strat. 42.3 oP'YaPtKac;, Heron, Belopoiika 73.10,12,74.3,5,12,75.1,3,81.3,85.7,86.4,88.2, 90.3,4, 113.2W. (where heis using it specifically of artillery, but perhaps only due to the context); and specifically of artillery already in Biton 43, 44bis W., and Philon, Belopoiika 49.6,12 W. Marsden (1971) 157, n. 8 cites Strabo for the use of oP'Yapo7rotta for artillery, without any exact reference: Strabo uses the word twice, and means the building of war-machines in general (Strabo 4.1.5 at Massilia, 14.2.5 at Rhodes). Arrian does not use the word in the Anabasis; his word for artillery is µ1fXavij 40 times, KaTa7r{).;T7IC; once (2.27.2), while aKpo(3oACtoµm means "shoot at long range" without regard for the type of projector (nine times): see J. Bolter and P. E. Stadter, A Concordance to Arrian (Chapel Hill, NC, 1978). Nor

does Curti us use the Latin translation organum in his work; his word for artillery is the generalising machina twice (4.4.10,8.10.31) or tormentum nine times (twice of other siege-engines, Jean Therasse, Quintus Curtius Rufus: Index Verborum (HildesheimlNew

and 14 times of devices of torture): see York, 1976) = Alpha-Omega A 21.

69Jfow they obtained it no-one seems to know: probably a traveling artificer like Zopyros (see n. 19).


43

find one of the first attestations of stone-throwing catapults in antiquity. 70 These stone-throwers were almost certainly very similar to the earliest attested stone-throwers, those used by Onomarchos in 354/3 B.C. (polyainos 2.38.2): at any rate, here they are not said to have done anything other than what Onomarchos' stone-throwers did. Alexander used arrow-shooting catapults in towers for covering fire (Arr. 1.20.8) and battered the walls with rams (Arr. 1.20.8, D. S. 17.24.4). The defenders made a night sally and torched the siege engines (Arr. 1.20.9, D. S. 17.24.5), supported with covering fire from arrow-shooters on their walls (D. S. 17.24.6). (Two drunk Macedonians start a battle beneath the walls: Arr. 1.21.1-3, D. S. 17.25.5-6.) The defenders construct inner replacement walls (Arr. 1.21.4-5, 1.22.1, D. S. 17.25.2,26.6). Once or twice more engines were advanced by Alexander and torched by the defenders, who were then driven back into the city (Arr. 1.21.5-6 and 1.22.1-7 twice, D. S. 17.26.1-7 once). In Arrian (1.22.2) stone-throwers help drive the defenders back, while in Diodoros (17.26.6-7) the defenders support their sally with arrow-shooters. The leaders of the defence meet and agree to abandon the city by night for the acropolis and at daybreak: Alexander occupies the city and leaves the acropolis to the Persians (Arr. 1.23.1-5, D. S. 17.27.4-6). Although Alexander had disbanded his fleet (Arr. 1.20.1, D. S. 17.22.5-23.3) prior to Halikarnassos,71 there is no indication that any relief was effected by sea, which was open to the Persians (they left by sea for Cos: D. S. 17.27.5). Where was the Persian fleet? Arrian here suppresses the enemy use of artillery (neither D. S. 17.24.5 nor 26.6-7 is paralleled in Arrian). Bosworth notes that Arrian's account generally depicts the siege as a smooth progression toward success while Diodoros represents it as nearly a failure.72 Once again Arrian gives at least an official color to his account while Diodoros again provides at least a rhetorical slant to his account. The two accounts agree in many details where they overlap, so that both writers may have used Kleitarchos, but if so Arrian then gave his account an official tendency. In any case, the siege shows that the advantage of artillery could be offset if the defenders also possessed it; here the victory went to Alexander probably only because the Persians were not relieved or supplied by sea. Alexander's greatest siege was at Tyre (3) where the control of the sea was of sufficient importance that Alexander felt compelled to levy a new fleet, and where the enemy made great use of artillery. 73 Justin 11.10.10-4 alleges that Tyre was taken per proditionem, and Polyainos primarily only concerns us at the close of the siege. Arrian, Curtius and Diodoros connect the inception of the siege to the Tyrians' refusal to allow Alexander to sacrifice to Herakles in Tyre (Arr. 2.15.7 + 16.7-8, Curtius 4.2.2-5, D. S. 17.40.2-3). In addition, Plutarch and Arrian more reasonably add that taking Tyre was an important step in the strategy of the war (Plut.

7ITfheearliest archaeological evidence for (much larger) stone-throwers is at Rhodes, besieged by Demetrius in 305-4 B.C. (D. S. 20.85-8,91-9): see L. Laurenzi, "Projetti dell' artigliera antica scoperti a Rodi," Memorie dell' Istituto storico-archaeologico di Rodi 2 (1938) 31-6, and Garlan (above, n. 4) 376. Contrast arrow-shooters, for which we have archaeological evidence from their first use attested in literature, at Motya: see n. 15 above. Concerning the date of the first use of stone-throwing catapults, and their use as wall-destroyers, see below, n. 81. 710n

the cause for which see Bosworth (above, n. 60) ad 1.20.1.

12Bosworth (above, n. 60) 1.20.8-10,21.1,22.2

and 22.7.

See also Fuller (above, n. 60) 200-6.

730n the siege see Fuller (above, n. 60) 206-16; Patrick Romane, "Alexander's Siege ofTyre, " AncW 16 (1987) 79-90.

44

PAUL T. KEYSER

24.2, Arr. 2.17). All three also include a story that after it had been decided to take Tyre, Alexander dreamt that Herakles stretched out his hand to him (Plut. 24.2 during the siege; Arr. 2.18.1 and Curtius 4.2.7 before the siege). When the siege began, Tyre was an island and the Persians controlled the sea, so Alexander built a mole out to the island (Arr. 2.18.2-4, Curtius 4.2.6-12, 16-21, D. S. 17.40.4-41.2, Plut. 24.5). The workers are harassed by the Tyrians in ships, so Alexander erects protective towers on the mole, which are then burned by the Tyrians using a fireship, and the mole is damaged by bad weather, so Alexander improves his mole (Arr. 2.18.5-19.6; Curtius 4.2.22-2,4.3.2-9 the mole comes from a different direction; D. S. 17.42.12, 5-7). Because he cannot take Tyre without control of the sea, he reconstitutes his fleet from Cyprian, Phoenician, and other sources (Arr. 2.19.6-20.3 deliberately; Curtius 4.3.11-12 by chance he gets some naval reinforcements), confines the Tyrians to their harbor and sinks three of their ships (Arr. 2.20.6-10; Curtius 4.3.12; and D. S. 17.42.3-4 without mention of the reconstitution of the fleet, though he did tell of its dispersion). Now he is able to bring shipborne rams, arrow-shooters, and stone-shooters up to the seaward walls (Arr. 4.21.1-2,22.623.1 with an intervening naval battle won by Alexander; Curtius 4.3.13-5 with a later naval victory = 4.4.6-9; D. S. 17.42.7,43.1-5,45.2,4). In response, artillery and a wide variety of incredible countermeasures (some unparalleled) are used by the Tyrians (Arr. 2.21.3 only artillery, Curtius 4.3.24-6, D. S. 17.41.3-4 artillery and other engines, 17.43.1-2, 43.7-44.5, 45.3-4 incredible devices).74 Finally in an all-out attack the walls are brought down and the city is penetrated at several points (Arr. 2.22.7-24.2 first on the south side; Curtius 4.4.10-4, D. S. 17.46.1-3). In Plutarch (25.3) and Polyainos (4.3.4) the taking of the city is told very simply (no naval assaults, no artillery). The siege of Tyre is revealing. Bosworth correctly notes that the mole was a colossal waste (since the walls were too thick to be battered down) and that the city fell to a naval attack.75 The importance of seapower in besieging coastal cities was apparently not fully realised in spite of Philip's experience at Perinthos/Byzantium (above, § III), or perhaps Alexander's own experience at Halikarnassos (above) had lulled him. Once again Arrian modifies his account to throw Alexander in a favorable light by omitting set-backs: as Bosworth notes, Arrian's account does not contain sufficient detail for a seven-month siege.76 The agreement of Curtius and Diodoros in some details of the events not in Arrian tends to confirm that such details were in an earlier source.77 Note that as at Halikarnassos Arrian suppresses

7"The tridents and nets of D. S. 17.43.7-10 are likely enough in themselves. The use of hot sand (and feces) in D. S. 17.44.1-3 = Curti us 4.3.25-6 is ascribed to the siege of Apollonia in Illyria by Philip V in 214 B.C.: see Vitr., De Arch. 10.16.10. The pads of D. S. 17.43.1,45.4 might work (a similar device was recently used on the Mostar bridge, Bosnia), and are attested elsewhere: Aeneas Tacticus 32.1-3 (versus rams and (3€A1]), D. S. 20.91.6, Caes. B. Civ. 2.9.4. 75Bosworth (above, n. 60) ad 2.18.3. 76Bosworth (above, n. 60) ad 2.20.7. I compare Arr. 2.18.5 with D. S. 17.42.1-6 fire-ship and failure of the first mole, and Arr. 2.21.3 with D. S. 17.43.6-45.7 Tyrian counter-measures. That some are not believable does

not explain the omission of all by Arrian. See also Bosworth ad 2.22.6. TIE.g. destruction of the first mole by rough seas, after the fire-ship attack, leading to Alexander's discouragement D. S. 17.42.5-6,45.7 = Curti us 4.3.6-11,4.4.1; and Tyrian hot sand in shields and various grappling hooks Curtius 4.3.24-6 = D. S. 17.44.1-5. See Bosworth (above, n. 60) on the second comparison, ad 2.21.3.


45

the use of artillery by the enemy, probably again to depict the siege as a smooth progession to success. Arrian is following the "official" line of Ptolemy, Diodors and Curtius the "journalistic" account of Kleitarchos. Arrian, though apparently trying to cast Alexander in a favorable light, omits to mention a brilliant "innovation", allegedly used by Alexander here (for the first time in history) according to both D. S. 17.43.1,45.2,4 and Curtius 4.3.13. I mean the destruction of walls by use of stone-throwing catapults (the earlier uses of stone-throwers never included destroying walls). However, both Diodoros and Curtius, after stating that Alexander used these, describe the collapse of the walls as due solely to rams (D. S. 17.46.3, Curtius 4.4.12) implying that the effect of these stone-throwers was negligeable. That stone-throwers of the III B. C. and later were sufficiently powerful to damage walls is not doubted: writers ofpoliorketika in the III B.C. recommend building walls so as to minimise such an effect. 78 Artillery towers in Greece of the IIII B.c. were not built to withstand stone-throwers;79 the earliest evidence of construction to withstand wall-destroyers is ca. 297 ± 3 B.C.80 The earliest archaeological evidence of wall-destroying stone-throwers nearly coincides with the earliest literary testimony: first by Demetrios Poliorketes at Cyprian Salamis 307 B.C. (D. S. 20.48) and 305/4 B.C. at Rhodes (D. S. 20.86-88, 95), compared to finds at Rhodes, and the inscription at Athens (lG II2.1487B.8491) 306/5 B.C.81 But even such later 7rE7po(36AoL never replaced rams, as they would have done had they been comparably effective, since one could then batter down a wall from a safe distance. I suggest that the common source here of Diodoros and Curtius wrote after the time of the first archaeologically-attested use of wall-destroying stone-throwers (in the last decade of the IV B.C.), misunderstood what was done there, and simply invented Alexander's wall-

78The evidence is conveniently collected by Marsden (1969) 89-91 (where his physics is wrong) and 113-5 (remarks by Philon on walls). But Phil on is much later (ca. 220 B.C.) and we do not know that early stonethrowers were this powerful. Marsden uses the projectile energy (MV2/2) which he treats as a vector in the direction of the projectile velocity, as the indicator of the destructive power of the projectile. One should use the projectile (or ram) momentum (MV), which is a vector in the direction of the projectile. The force applied to a wall tending to destroy it (by dislodging or fracturing its composite stones) arises (by Newton's Laws) from the change in momentum of the striking projectile (or ram) which occurs during the collision. Note that because a greater change in momentum results from hard collisions than from soft collisions, padding the target thickly will reduce the damage done by thrown stones (but will not much impede the penetration of bolts), as was realised by the ultimate source ofD. S. 17.43.1,45.4. Because the damage done is proportional to the initial momentum (MV) of the projectile/ram (the change in momentum is roughly proportional to the initial momentum, all other things being equal), it is quite possible that a heavy ram would do more damage than a swift stone. 790ber (above, n. 53). SOp. Krischen, Die Befestigung

von Herakleia am Latmos (Diss. Greifswald, 1912) 53-9 and idem, Die Befestigung von Herakleia am Latmos = Milet m.2 (Berlin/Leipzig 1922) 49-52 for date. Krischen (1912) 34-6 and (1922) 30-40 gives the architectural details. Str. 14.1.8 mentions the site, which is south of Miletos about 18 km along the coast. 810n Rhodes, see n. 70 above. These devices probably did not exist before 307 B.C.: cpo D. S. 20.46.5-7 in which this same Demetrios attacks Mounychia with only ordinary stone-throwers which clear the walls of men: odx

TW" 7rnpo(3o'Aw" EpTfµ.w8EVTOr:; TOU T€ixovr:;.

46

PAUL T. KEYSER

destroying stone-throwers. 82 In the absence of these artillery-pieces, the only attested use of artillery here is for covering fire, by the Tyrians (D. S. 17.41.3,42.1, Curtius 4.2.12) and by Alexander (Arr. 2.23.3, D. S. 17.42.7,45.2, Curtius 4.3.15). The siege of Tyre demonstrated once again that sea-power was crucial to the siege of a maritime city. Although Tyre is not attested to have received any relief (cp. D. S. 17.40.3, Curtius 4.2.11, 4.3.19 on the expected but unfulfIlled help from Carthage), yet the Tyrians controlled the sea at first, and they prevented the successful completion of the mole: Arr. 2.18.2, 5. Then Alexander decided he needed a fleet (Arr. 2.19.6-20.3), Tyre feels the pinch of Alexander's new fleet (2.21.8), and when Alexander controls the sea, the siege advances (2.22.6-7). Following this great seven-month effort, Alexander besieged land-locked Gaza (4), and took it in only two months. Diodoros (17.48.7) is brief as are Strabo (16.2.30) and Polybios (16.22a.5-6), while Plutarch (25.3-4) is interested only in demonstrating the veracity of Aristander's predictions, which were based on an omenY In Curtius Alexander at first digs mines and tries to send towers against the walls, but they founder in the sand (4.6.7-10) while in Arrian he begins with a mound and successfully advances towers (2.26.2-4). Then the pious story of the avian bomber (Arr. 2.26.4, Curtius 4.6.11-3 and Plut. 25.3, the last following on the heels of a fulfilled omen at Tyre). Alexander was struck by something dropped by the bird, as he was on the point of consecrating the first victim for his sacrifice, and the bird flew off to entangle itself in a nearby piece of siege machinery (tower with bitumen and sulphur Curtius;84

EJI

TWJI µr/xCXJlTJw:X.TWlI .•. EJlOXElJE'ir; Toir; JlEupiJlOLr; KEKpu¢aAOLr;, oir; 7rpOr; Tar; E7rWTpO¢ar; TWlI OXOLJliwJI EXPWlITO Plut.-see below; not in Arr.). Aristander interprets this to mean that

Alexander will take the city but will be wounded. So Alexander hangs back (Arrian) or orders a retreat (Curtius), which results in a sally (Arr. 2.27.2, Curtius 4.6.13-4, 17).85 Curtius here has the more credible story (retreat results in sally) as compared to Arrian (Alexander's absence causes sally). Alexander enters the battle, saves the day, but is seriously wounded (by a catapult bolt through shield and corselet Arr. 2.27.2-3; by an arrow through corselet Curtius 4.6.17-20). Now Curtius tells of mounds (4.6.21, with towers 22 and mines 22-3) while Arrian has Alexander building a mound, deploying siege engines (rams and tortoises) to batter the walls, and digging mines (2.27.3-4, cpo 2.26.2-4). The wall is brought down and the city is taken (Arr. 2.74.4-6, Curtius 4.6.23, Plut. 25.4 no details).

82If this common source be indeed Kleitarchos, he must have been writing ca. 300 B.C. or later: consistent either with Hammond's early date (by 295 B.C.) or Pearson's later date (post 283 B.C.): cpo Appendix, nn. A28-9. 83See Bosworth (above, n. 60) ad 2.25.4-27.7 (p. 257) for other minor ancient testimonia. On the siege, see Fuller (above, n. 60) 216-8; Patrick Romane, "Alexander's Siege of Gaza-332 B.C.," AncW 18 (1988) 21-30. 84J. C. Rolfe, Quintus Curtius 1 (London/Cambridge, MA, 1946) ad loco (p. 218) rightly queries the historicity of this detail: "this is hard to understand, since bitumen and sulfur are inflanunable," and J. E. Atkinson, A Commentary on Q. Curtius Rufus' Historiae Alexandri Magni Books 3 and 4 (Amsterdam 1980) ad 4.6.11 (p. 338) notes that the words "bitumen" and "sulphur" are repeated from the siege of Tyre 4.3.2. "Sulphur" only in these two

passages in Curtius, "bitumen" elsewhere only in 5.1.l6bis, 25, 29 (the bitumen 'spring' near Babylon and the use of bitumen in cementing Babylon's wall). 85

1 omit the story in Curti us 4.6.15-6 of the attempted assassination: cpo Atkinson (above, n. 84) ad 4.6.10-20 referring to the parallel version in Hegesias FGrHist 142 F 5.


47

The siege is anticlimactic. Artillery is attested only in Arrian's story of Alexander's catapult-bolt wound (2.27.2) though its presence could perhaps be inferred from Arr. 2.27.1 or Arr. 2.27.4 (cp. Curtius 4.6.23). Bosworth notes that once again Arrian exaggerates the difficulties in order to glorify Alexander, 86 and that Arrian describes the same siege twice by a confusion of sources. 87 In Plutarch, in what is the bird entangled? Atkinson says only "the ropes of a siege engine, ,,88which is uninformative but safe. Others take the Greek to refer to a torsion-catapult,89 or to a "battering-engine. ,,90 But the twisted ropes which store the propul-sive power of a torsion-catapult are too tightly twisted to entangle a bird (and Plutarch never elsewhere in Alexander refers to artillery), while "battering-engine" is simply a guess. I suggest that this refers to some form of (protective?) "fibrous netting" hung on a siege-engine of an unspecified type (perhaps a tower, cpo Curtius), and that the relative clause ok ... EXPWVTO is a guess at a gloss by Plutarch, 91and not evidence for a torsion catapult. In any case, the city was taken not due to artillery it would seem, but due to a concentrated effort on an isolated, land-locked city; and the final blow was the use of mines to undermine the walls (Arr. 2.27.4-5, Curtius 4.6.21-3) as in Aeneas Tacticus 37. Alexander's remaining four uses of artillery (in sieges) are during his Bactro-Indian campaign of ca. 329-6 B.C. The last siege (Aornos [10]) is in some ways comparable to the Tyrian siege. In these four cases he had the advantage that his opponents were not yet familiar with artillery, which suggests that it was not generally available in the Persian empire, though it was available in the western regions: at Halikamassos (2), Tyre (3), Gaza (4), and Persian Gates (5). The first of these last four is the Sogdian Cities (6), on the Tanais River, the border between Scythia and Sogdiana, where Alexander puts down a revolt. 92 There is a lacuna here in Diodoros (the Table of Contents mentions three Sogdian revolts, this is the first), Justin 12.5.12-3 mentions only that Alexander founded cities at this time, so our chief sources are Arrian (4.2-3) and Curtius (7.6.13-23). The similarity of their accounts is probably due to Curtius' use of Aristoboulos (cp. the Appendix). Craterus is ordered to besiege Cyropolis while Alexander attacks Gaza (city unnamed in Curtius) during which attack (Arr. 4.2.3) he uses artillery for covering fire with great success, and the townspeople are slaughtered (Arr. 4.2.4,

86See Bosworth (above, n. 60) ad 2.26.1, 2 (p. 258) and ad 2.27.3 (p. 259) for the exaggeration. 87See Bosworth (above, n. 60) ad 2.26.3 for the doublet of 2.27.3-7 (paralleling Curtius) and 2.26.2-27.2, and so also P. A. Brunt, Arrian I (London/Cambridge, MA, 1976) 216, n. 1, both following Gerhard Wirth, "Ptolemaios I. als Schriftsteller und Historiker," RE 23.2 (1959) 2467-84 at 2472.39-54. 88See Atkinson (above, n. 84) ad 4.6.11 (p. 338). 89See 1. Scott-Kilvert, The Age of Alexander (Penguin, 1973) 280 and 1. R. Hamilton, Plutarch Alexander: A Commentary (Oxford, 1969) ad 25.4 (p. 65). Compare the description of torsion catapults above, at n. 52. 90See B. Perrin, Plutarch's Lives VII (London/Cambridge,

MA, 1919) 297.

91 "Fibrous net(ting)" renders VEVPLVOt<:; K€Kpvcj>aAoLC; (cp. Lsf s. vv.), and in such a net a bird might easily be entangled. It is impossible that such a net was "used for the turning-back of the twines" (whatever that means) as it could not turn anything. Note that fTXOLVLOV has a diminutive connotation (or even denotation): cpo Lsf S.V. Plutarch knew the word KaTa7r€ATT/C;: Mor. 191E = 219A, e.g.

9'2Qn this campaign, see Fuller (above, n. 60) 235.

48

PAUL T. KEYSER

Curtius 7.6.16). Cyropolis is taken (Curtius 7.6.20-1; by sneaking in along the river outlet Arr. 4.3.2-3) as are the other cities: only one other in Curtius, that of the Memaceni (7.6.17-9, 22-3 by mining); six others in Arrian, five taken very rapidly (4.2.4-6), the last also without difficulty (4.3.5). Alexander is wounded in the neck by a rock (Arr. 4.3.3 at Cyropolis his sixth siege; Curtius 7.6.22 at his third siege). Again we note that Arrian emphasizes the ease with which Alexander dealt with the revolt, and he exaggerates the extent of it (three cities become seven). Somewhat later, Nautaka (8), the stronghold of the satrap Sisimithres (Chorienes in Arrian) revolted, was besieged and was cowed into submission. The lacuna in Diodoros covers Nautaka, which is listed by name in the table of contents ("those called Nautakes") after the third Sogdian revolt, and also covers the capture of the Sogdian rock. Plutarch (58.2-3) tells only that he took the site by frightening Sisimithres. Alexander puts down the Sogdian revolt and takes the Sogdian rock by a ruse involving "flying soldiers" (Arr. 4.17.4-19.4; Curtius 7. 11.1-29), then takes Nautaka (Arr. 4.21.1-9; Curtius 8.2.19-33).93 Arrian tells that at Nautaka Alexander bridged a ravine thought impassible, using wood, willow-mats and earth, and thereby cowed the satrap into submission, and in Curtius he does the same but adds to the effect by firing catapults (8.2.26). This is more or less covering fire. Here alone Arrian suppresses Alexander's artillery, alluding to it only as 7o~Evµa7a (4.21.6). Perhaps Arrian did so because making the satrap submit to a show of roadbuilding makes the enemy seem less formidable than were he to submit only when shown artillery. I would compare Halikarnassos and Tyre where Arrian suppresses the enemy artillery, and the effect is again to make a strong enemy seem less formidable. In Indian territory Alexander's first attested use of artillery is at Massaga (9) (probably the name of the land). The lacuna in Diodoros ends just after the capitulation of the city, and Polyainos 4.3.20 tells only of this aftermath (see below). For the siege itself we rely on Arrian (4.26-7) and Curtius (8.10.22-36) once again.94 The topography in Curtius is similar to that at Nautaka as are Alexander's tactics: he fills in the ravines with an assault mound (8.10.30-1) and menaces the defenders with artillery (8.10.32). Terrified especially by the moving towers (8.10.32) the defenders capitulate (8.10.33-6). In Arrian, Alexander first defeats a body of troops outside the city (4.26.1-4) and then directly attacks the walls with rams and makes use of artillery for covering fire (4.26.5). The defenders resist until their commander is killed by a catapult bolt whereupon they capitulate (4.26.6-27.2). One is reminded of the Scyth killed at the river: Arr. 4.4.4 (see Scyths (7) above under field artillery). Curtius' version of the means of victory at Massaga (fear of artillery) is paralleled in and probably borrowed from his previous account of Nautaka: both are probably following Kleitarchos. Alexander's last recorded use of artillery follows immediately on Massaga, and occurs at Aornos (10).95 For this ~iege we have testimony in most of our sources though only two mention artillery. Plutarch (58.3) merely gives an anecdote from the siege concerning the valor 930n this siege, see Fuller (above, n. 60) 243. 940n this siege, see Fuller (above, n. 60) 245-6. 95Por the geography of this most impressive site see Sir Aurel Stein, On Alexander's Track to the Indus (London, 1929) 113-59, with maps at end, or P. H. L. Eggermont, "Ptolemy, the Geographer, and the People of the Dards, " Orientalia Lovaniensia Periodica 15 (1984) 191-233 at 191-202 who identifies Aornos as Mt. Ham (72° 20' E, 34° 37' N). On the siege, see Fuller (above, n. 60) 248-54.


49

of another Alexander (also in Curtius 8.11.10, 15), and Justin (12.7.12-3) gives only the origin of Alexander's persistent desire to take this fortress. This story is also found in Diodoros (17.85.2), Curtius (8.11.2) and Arrian (4.28.1-2,4): Herakles was unable to take it, compelled by an earthquake to abandon siege. Alexander is at a loss until an old man and his two sons offer to lead Alexander up to a position of advantage by a secret path (D. S. 17.85.4-6, Curtius 8.11.3-5), or natives surrender and lead him (Arr. 4.29.1-2). This results in a battle on two fronts, but the defenders hold their ground (Arr. 4.29.3-6). Alexander builds up an assault mound and advances siege engines including artillery onto the fill (Arr. 4.29.7-30.1, Curtius 8.11.7-9, D. S. 17.85.6-7). At this point an attempt is made to scale the heights by Alexander and a chosen band (Arr. 4.30.3; Curtius 8.11.9-19 with much rhetorical elaboration; not in Diodoros). In Arrian the attempt is successful and is implausibly made to rout the retreating barbarians, while in Curtius it is part of a failed attempt to take Aornos, from which attack Alexander retreats. In Curtius, the siege ends when the Indians, worn down by Alexander's persistence, decide to sneak home and are routed and slaughtered during their night withdrawal (8.11.20-4), while in Arrian the Indians had decided to depart when the ravine was full (Arr. 4.30.2), and this rout follows on Alexander's successful scaling (see above). Diodoros agrees with Curtius: the Indians worn down by Alexander's persistence leave secretly, without rout or slaughter (D. S. 17.85.7). Strabo (15.1.8) describes the siege as successful in one assault. Arrian records artillery on the mound used for covering fire (4.30.1), while Curtius records no artillery and Diodoros (17.85.7) agrees with Arrian. The accounts generally agree but it can be seen that Arrian minimizes Alexander's failures (the scaling attempt) and avoids the probablyjournalistic account of the old man and his two sons. Curtius omits the artillery, but the agreement of Arrian and Diodoros tends to confirm the use of artillery here for covering fire.

VI. Summary of Alexander's Use of Artillery We note that our sources have their limitations. Justin and Polyainos are careless and unsystematic excerptors, and contain no information on Alexander's use of artillery. Plutarch is anecdotal, and covers a lot of ground, if incompletely (7/10 episodes represented), but does not mention artillery, probably as it provides no biographical insight or encomium. Among the better sources (Arrian, Curtius and Diodoros) who do treat artillery, caution is required. All three lack artillery at Miletos, but this is probably an omission (as noted above, under Miletos). Only at Halikarnassos (2), Tyre (3), Scyths (7) and Massaga (9) is there agreement among these three sources (so far as they are extant) as to the presence of artillery. Curtius and Diodoros are silent on artillery together twice against Arrian who explicitly includes it: Gaza (4) and Persian Gates (5). Source-critical reasons have been given for thinking that Arrian is right to include artillery. At Aornos Curtius inexplicably omits artillery, against Arrian and Diodoros who probably correctly record its use. At Nautaka (8) Arrian probably suppresses the presence of artillery. 96 Finally, at the Sogdian Cities (6) it is more likely that Curtius omitted artillery than that Arrian included it falsely. In summary, Arrian omits artillery incorrectly at Nautaka 96Curtius could be including artillery here at Nautaka (8) as part of a doublet from Massaga (9). As noted there, Curtius' descriptions of the two sites are very similar, but his description disagrees with Arrian's at Massaga (9),

not at Nautaka (8): i.e., if he has a double it is likely Massaga (9) and not Nautaka (8). On balance it is more likely that Arrian omits artillery at Nautaka (8).

50

PAUL T. KEYSER

(8) and probably at Miletos (i.e., in 2/11 cases), Curtius does so at Gaza (4), Persian Gates (5), Sogdian Cities (6) and Aomos (10) (4/8 cases), while Diodoros omits artillery at Gaza (4), Persian Gates (5) and probably at Miletos (3/6 cases). None of these three is completely reliable, but Arrian is to be preferred in regard to coverage. Arrian tends to glorify Alexander beyond the historical (see Halikarnassos, Tyre, Gaza, Persian Gates, Sogdian Cities, perhaps Nautaka and Aomos). Diodoros tends to introduce later technological developments into his narrative (see esp. Tyre). Artillery is used by Alexander invariably for covering fire (on the specious walldestroying stone-throwers at Tyre, see the discussion of Tyre). Despite the lesson of Perinthos and Byzantium, the initial absence of a fleet impeded Alexander's progress at Tyre. In four significant cases (Halikarnassos (2), Tyre (3), Gaza (4) and Persian Gates (5» his opponents had artillery, and the three of these four which were sieges were Alexander's most difficult and lengthy. This is not due solely to a lack of naval power, for at Halikarnassos he had his fleet but the Persians did little by sea but escape, while Gaza is landlocked; but the combination of enemy artillery and absence of naval power resulted in one of his most contested sieges, Tyre. In the fourth case (Persian Gates (5» his opponents had artillery while Alexander did not. Here he was caught off guard just as Philip II had been a quarter of a century before and the effect on his troops was similar: cpo D. S. 16.35.2 Onomarchos' defeat of Philip with D. S. 17.68.1-3 = Curtius 5.3.17-22 Ariobazarnes' defeat of Alexander. The difference is characteristic-Philip ran away to fight another day (Polyainos 2.38.2) while Alexander found another way to defeat his opponent then and there. The only technological innovation attributable to Alexander (or his engineers) is the use of rams and ladders from ships (at Tyre). The engineer Diades is described as the man who took Tyre with Alexander,97and these are probably his work.

VII. Conclusion From its invention to its adoption by Philip II (399 to ca. 350 B.C.) artillery diffused slowly through the Hellenistic world. A number of states had some artillery, only a few used it: a paradox (see below). No-one seems to have had any systematic policy on artillery after Dionysios I, except perhaps a policy of ignoring it. But it did not go away, and part of Philip's effect on his contemporaries is traceable to his systematic policy of the use and diffusion (to his allies) of artillery, a policy not dissimilar to that which Dionysios seems to have followed. Artillery was used to provide covering fire during sieges, to allow the attackers more easily to penetrate the walls while less molested by defenders. After Dionysios, the importance of naval support to block relief in a maritime siege was not appreciated. The use of artillery by the defenders in a siege may have been able to offset the advantage gained by the offense in using it. Alexander followed his father's lead and made systematic and frequent use of artillery in sieges and in the field. No technological advance in artillery of significance is attested for the time of Alexander, and Alexander's use of stone-throwers at Tyre was probably similar to his use of arrow-shooters, as wall-destroying stone-throwers probably did not exist before ca. 307/6 B.C. (first used by Demetrios at Cyprian Salamis). Alexander's perception of the importance of naval support was not clear. His experience at Halikarnassos and Gaza (if not also at Tyre)


51

shows that the use of artillery by the defenders in a siege could still offset the advantage gained by the offense in using artillery. Alexander used artillery only to provide covering fire (the few cases of sharp-shooting seem all to be fortuitous). It has been claimed that artillery contributed to the rise of large empires and the consequent broad diffusion of the ruler's culture (i.e., to the rise of Hellenism).98 But large empires (Egyptian, Assyrian, Babylonian, Persian) existed before this time in the Eastern Mediterranean, and the wars of the Successors prove that no new tendency to unification existed. Furthermore, the expedition of Cyrus in the pre-artillery age (401 B.C.) nearly succeeded in conquering the Persian empire,99 which shows that artillery was not necessary for the task. Finally, the resistance of Peri nthos and Byzantium to Philip, of Tyre to Alexander (or of Rhodes to Demetrlos in 305-4 B.C., or of Syracuse to the Romans in 213-1 B.C.) shows that the advantage did not necessarily lie with the offense.tOO A well-prepared coastal city possessing artillery and naval power could resist the most determined siege (Tyre fell when she lost control of the sea). What then did artillery accomplish? It gave those who had it a small but important edge over those who did not (all else being equal), and it contributed to a trend away from the importance of individual prowess in war, as Archidamos had seen.101 I have suggested that some form of social conservatism impeded or delayed the adoption of artillery by states other than those of Dionysios I, Philip and Alexander. It is possible to be more precise, and the reaction of Archidamos to the effect of a catapult bolt (Plut. Mor. 19lE = 219A) plus a fragment of Ephoros (preserved in Polyb. 13.3.2-4 and Strabo 10.1.12) show the way. Ephoros invented a prohibition of missile weapons in the already legendary Lelantine War of three and one-half centuries before, in order to provide an exemplum of 'honorable' war in protest against the destructive catapult.loz Archidamos ca. 375 B.C. and Ephoros ca. 365335 B.C. provide two revealing contemporary reactions to technological innovation in warfare: I argue that they were not unique.103 Since Achilles, Greek soldiers had sought to prove and win their arete in melee, i.e., in face-to-face, hand-to-hand combat (Iliad 11.385-95, Eur. Herald. 151-64, 188-205); catapults precluded that view of war in a unique and novel way. Aischylos Persae 348, Agesilaus of Sparta, Plato Leges 6 (778D-9A), Aristotle Pol. 7.10.6 (1330b35-1a2), and even Demosthenes (as late as 330 B.C.) de Corona 299-300 insisted that a

~.g. Soedel and Foley (above, n. 2) 150, 160 specifically; Garlan (above, n. 4) 277 generally; Cawkwell (above, n. 9) 160-1: "... the catapult .... was revolutionary and greatly helped to inaugurate the new age of warfare . ... The end of the independent city-state was in sight. " WXenophon, Anabasis. The attempt of Agesilaus in 396 B.C. (without artillery) is also relevant: Xen., Hell. 3.4-4.1, Plut. Ages. 15-6. Cyrus died in a cavalry battle at Cunaxa-artillery would not have mattered; Agesilaus was recalled but had he not been, lack of naval power would have defeated him. looAs Marsden claims it did: OCD2 987, s. "Siegecraft, Greek," stating "after Alexander, besiegers generally had the whip hand;" see also Marsden (1969) 113. On Rhodes, see nn. 70, 81, and Marsden (1969) 105-8; on Syracuse see Marsden (1969) 108-9 following Livy and Polybios. 101Plut., Mor. 191E

=

219A, see on n. 27 above.

Cpo Garlan (above, n. 4) 277-8.

HlZEverettL. Wheeler, "Ephorus and the Prohibition of Missiles," TAPA 117 (1987) 157-82, a reference lowe to Frances Skoczylas. On the quasi-mythical Lelantine War, see Klaus Tausend, "Der Lelantinische Krieg-ein Mythos?," Klio 69 (1987) 499-514. On the date of Ephoros, see Barber (below, n. A6) 1-3. lO3DiylIos the continuator of Ephoros went so far as to suppress artillery (see the Appendix).

52

PAUL T. KEYSER

city of men of arete should need no walls; by the time of Plutarch the notion was attributed to Lycurgus (plut., Lye. 19): OVK all €i11 aTELXUJTOC; ?rOALC; &nc; &lI0paaL ov 7rAill()otC; EaTEcPallwTcxt.104 Therefore the upper (hoplite warrior) class was conditioned, or even fated, to reject catapults.105 Parallels from other societies confirm this social motivation. The mediaeval prohibition of artillery (crossbows) almost 1500 years later was also class-based. The prohibition applied only to the use aduersus Christianos et catholicos (Second Lateran Council, A.D. 1139, Canon 29),106 while it is specifically clerics who are prohibited from using such devices two generations later (Fourth Lateran Council, A.D. 1205, Canon 18).107 The chivalric knights are depicted in the literature they patronised as disdaining and discouraging any form of missilery, so deadly to their mounts and class. 108 Although Mamluk Egypt adopted the cannon for sieges by ca. 1370 A.C. shortly after Europe had, they consciously resisted the arquebus and field artillery until 1490 A.C., realising that either would destroy their position as elite cavalry and the ruling class.109 In Shogun Japan, Tokugawa Ieyasu by ca. 1616 A.C. arranged a ban of guns and gunpowder (which endured until 1854 A.C.) in order to maintain the prerogatives of the samurai warrior-class.110 This was not because guns lacked power or because the shogunate did not know their power: quite the opposite. In 1575 A.C. at Nagashino, some 33 years after the Portuguese had imported gunpowdei technology to Japan, the general Oda Nobunaga had used muskets to terrible effect. Seven years later Hideyoshi Toyotomi used artillery to take Kanki Castle, and thereafter cannon were used in all sieges. These events resulted already by 1587 A.C. in the decree "that all non-samurai were to hand in all weapons-

lO4Plato claimed that walls made men soft; Aristotle concedes that, although it is more honourable to defend one's city without walls, because artillery is now so accurate, a city needs walls to survive. Plutarch records that Agesilaus (early IIII B.C.) remarked that only women lived in walled cities (Apophth. Lacon. Agesilaus 55 [212E]); the same remark he also attributes to numerous earlier or minor figures: Panthoidos (230C), Agis (II: perhaps really Agis III?) 6 (215D), Theopompos of the VIII B.C., Apophth. Reg. (190A), and even Lycurgus, Apophth. Lacon. Lycurgus 25 (228D-E). The same Agesilaus is also recorded to have remarked that Sparta is defended not by walls but by her hoplites' arete: Plut. Apophth. Lacon. Agesilaus 29-30 (21OE), to which compare Aischylos a century earlier: Cxvopwv 'Ya.p OVTWV €PKOC; €CTTLV CxI1¢aA€c;. losMechanics were of low social class: Plato, Gorgias 512B. lO6Emil Friedberg, ed., Corpus [uris Canonis (Graz 1955), v. 2; C. J. Hefele and H. Leclerq, Histoire des Conciles 5.1 (Paris 1907) 733. lO1JIefele-Leclerq (above, n. 106) 5.2, p. 1348. lO8A.T. Hatto, "Archery and Chivalry: A Noble Prejudice," Modern Language Review 35 (1940) 40-54; see esp. 41: missile weapons "inevitably threatened their cavalry and hence their supremacy as a caste." lOOOavidAyalon, Gunpowder and Firearms in the Mamluk Kingdom (London 1956) 1-4,46-7,61-3,82,86-97. 1lOJohnKeegan, A History of Waif are (New York 1993) 42-6 (a reference which lowe to Adam P. Condron); he follows Noel Perrin, Giving up the Gun: Japan's Reversion to the Sword (Boston 1979). See also Delmer M. Brown, "The Impact of Firearms on Japanese Warfare, 1543-98, n Far Eastern Quarterly [now = Journal of Asian Studies] 7 (1948) 236-253. I cite Japanese names with family name first in accord with Japanese practice.


53

swords and guns alike" to the shogunate.l1l There are modern parallels as well: first chemical weapons, and more recently biological and nuclear weapons, have been banned (or at least restricted); and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty intends that the nations already privileged to own this latest military technology remain an exclusive club. War is a prerogative of the ruling class, who will act to preserve that prerogative.112 The introduction of artillery to the Hellenic world in 399 B.C. resulted in a crisis for the hoplite warrior-class Gust as gunpowder did for the samurai warrior-class in 1575 A.C. in Japan). Archidamos the Spartan predictably laments that this TEXP'Y'J will destroy &p€T~, and Greeks at first generally hesitated in, or recoiled from, the adoption of such a technology. Philip and Alexander did not feel this way, but, almost uniquely in the IV B.C., employed the innovation. Their use gave them a small but important edge, indeed destroyed the old hoplite warrior-class, and led, in the period following Alexander's death, to a wider use of artillery and further technological developments. Culture was and is more persistent than politics, even in warfare.ll3

1llKeegan (above, n. 110) 43; Brown (above, n. 110) 253, n. 85 dates the decree to 1588 A.C. Perrin (above, n. 110) 25 notes "no true soldier-that is, no member of the bushi [warrior] class-wanted to use [guns] himself;" for comparable European reactions to guns, see Perrin 32-33 quoting Luther Table-Talk and Shakespeare Henry IV, Part One (1.3.63-4). ll~. Meselson and J. P. Robinson, "Chemical Warfare and Chemical Disarmament, " Scientific American 242.4 (April 1980) 38-47, 178; and Coit D. Blacker and Gloria Duffy, edd., International Arms Controf (Stanford 1984) 140-3 (areference I owe to Adam P. Condron).

11Ths paper originated in a seminar in 1987 by E. A. Fredericksmeyer, [no 'e'] from whose critical reading it and I have benefitted.

54


Table: Alexander's Use of Artillery

Justin

Plutarch

# Event

Arrian

Curtius

Diodoros Book 17.

IF Taulantians

1.6.8

#

(17.8.1)

x

(11.5)

(1.19.1-5)

#

(17.22)

x

(17.1)

2 Halikarnassos

1.20.3-22.7

#

24.4-27.6

x

(17.1)

3 Tyre*

2.18-24

4.2-4

40-46

4 Gaza (Palestine)

2.26-27

(4.6.7-24)

(48.7)

x

(25.3-4)

5 Persian Gates

3.18.3

(5.3.16-4.34)

(68)

x

(37.1-2)

6 Sogdian Cities

4.2-3

(7.6.13-23)

#

x

x

7F Scyths

4.4.4

7.9.3,7

#

x

(45.4)

8 Nautaka (Nautakes)

(4.21.1-9)

8.2.19-33

#TOC

x

(58.2-3)

9 Massaga (Mazaga)

4.26-27

8.10.22-36

#TOC

x

x

10 Aornos

4.28-30

(8.11.2-25)

85

Miletos

(11.10. 10-4)

(12.7. 12-3)

(24.3-25.2)

(58.3)

ltly. 4.3.

(3-4)

(27)

(29)

Appendix: The Source Problem Acute in any discussion of Philip or Alexander, and always a mare's-nest of tidbits and guesses, the problem must be faced. But I do not here propose any new solution, rather I wish to summarise the state of the discussion for the purpose of this paper. Our principle sources for Alexander's campaigns are Arrian, Curtius, and Diodoros 17; for Philip's campaigns the principle source is Diodoros 16; and for Dionysios I the principle source is Diodoros 14. Also of importance will be Diodoros 13 on Sicily in the late V B.C. The danger for a work of this sort is that an author may have a concealed systematic bias. For example, it appears that Plutarch, Alexander, omits artillery, and he himself tells us in the oftquoted preface to Alexander that he omits much and focuses on what reveals character. A fortunate side-effect is that secondary authors such as Polyainos, whose principle focus is neither artillery nor one of the rulers here considered, are relatively unlikely to conceal a systematic bias of the sort to inquinate this study. Fortunate because such authors' sources are difficult securely to divine. For the three principle sources here in view, there seems to be a rough scholarly consensus if not as to the precise source in any given passage, at least as to the range of possibilities. In Diodoros 13-14 on Sicily and Dionysios I, there seems to be general agreement that Philistos (FGrHist 556) was the ultimate primary source, whom Ephoros (FGrHist 70) and Timaios (FGrHist 566) followed (possibly with additions), and that Diodoros made use of one or more of these three. Zoepffel and Sanders have gone so far as to suggest that parts of Diodoros 13 are directly from Philistos,Al but few have followed them.A2 Most scholars follow Eduard Schwartz, who argued that Diodoros 13-14 copied out Ephoros with insertions from Timaios.A3 On the other hand, a strong argument has been made for the reverse case, already by Volquardsen and recently by Pearson.A4 It is revealing that two scholars whose focus was Ephoros (E. Schwartz, R. Laqueur)A5 found Ephoros, while two scholars whose focus is

AI Renate Zoepffel, Untersuchungen zum Geschichtswerk des Philistos von Syrakus (Giessen 1965) 74-189, 20 Ill: parts of 13.1-28; L. J. Sanders, "Diodorus Siculus and Dionysius I of Syracuse," Historia 30 (1981) 394-411, and Dionysius I of Syracuse and Greek Tyranny (London 1987).

A2Apparently only Garlan (above, n. 4) 157 and Marsden (1969) 52. The consensus that Philistos is known only indirectly is already stated by R. Laqueur, "Philistos (3)," RE 19.2 (1938) 2409-29 @ 2417-21. AJEduard Schwartz, "Diodoros (38)," RE 5 (1905) 663-704 at 679-81; R. Laqueur, (1936) 1076-1203 at 1100-24 (D. S. 13) and 1124-48 (D. S. 14).

"Timaios (3)," RE 6A.1

MChristian August Volquardsen, Untersuchungen aber die Quellen der griechischen und sicilischen Geschichten bei Diodor Buch Xl bis XVI (Kiel, 1868) 72-107: oddly, scholars often cite Volquardsen as agreeing with Schwartz and Laqueur; Klaus Meister, Die Sizilische Geschichte bei Diodor, von den Anfiingen bis zum Tod des Agathokles: Quellen-Untersuchungen zu Bachern IV-XXI (Miinchen, 1966) 77-99; Lionel Pearson, "Ephorus and Timaeus in Diodorus: Laqueur's Thesis Rejected," Historia 33 (1984) 1-20 at 4-15; idem, The Greek Historians of the West: Timaeus and his Predecessors, = Philological Monographs of the APA 35 (1987), 135-91: see below for details. ME. Schwartz, "Ephoros (1)," RE 6.1 (1907) 1-16; R. Laqueur, "Ephoros," Hermes 46 (1911) 161-206,32154. 55

56

PAUL T. KEYSER

Timaios (K. Meister, L. Pearson) find Timaios.A6 Philistos might be expected to glorify Dionysios, Timaios to despise him but glorify Sicily, and Ephoros to moralise accounts known to him only at second hand.A7 But there is no reason to suspect any systematic bias in reporting on artillery; Ephoros at least seems to have been interested in matters military, though he standardises the descriptions of the course of battles.A8 In D. S. 16 on Philip, one almost immediately thinks of Theopompos. Scholars following Hammond seem to be agreed that such was not Diodoros' thought;A9 rather he continued to use Ephoros, now also adding his continuator Diyllos (FGrHist 73).AIO Some are skeptical of the claims of Diyllos, whose work is known through three fragments only, though Hammond's arguments as to the corresponding character of Diyllos and Diodoros' "second source" they do not refute.A11 For the historians of Alexander, far more work has been done. As Justin and Plutarch do not happen to provide any information on the use of artillery, let us examine them first. Scholars seem agreed that Plutarch was widely read but in Alexander relied mainly on Kleitarchos,A12 with insertions from others.A13 Few have considered the sources of Trogus

A&fhe exception is G. L. Barber, The Historian Ephorus (Cambridge, 1935) 167-70, who finds Timaios behind D. S. 13-14 and 16 (though at p. 166, n. 3, he seems to assign D. S. 13.97 to Ephoros). A7For characterisations of these historians, 1990) 68-9, 131-6, 85-90 respectively.

see Klaus Meister, Die griechische

Geschichtsschreibung

(Koln,

A8Barber (above, n. A6) 143. Ephoros thought artillery unmanly: cpo § VII, Conclusion. A%ough he may well have used Theopompos, Philippika 39-41 for Sicily: H. D. Westlake, Books of Theopompos' Philippica," Historia 2 (1953/4) 288-307.

"The Sicilian

Al~. G. L. Hammond, "The Sources of Diodorus Siculus XVI," CQ 31 (1937) 79-91 and 32 (1938) 137-51. Volquardsen (above, n. A4) 107-118 was uncertain about D. S. 16. Schwartz (above, n. A3) 681-3 and Laqueur (above, n. A3) 1150-61 also favor Ephoros as the principle source for D. S. 16 (Laqueur would allow insertions from Timaios). Neither are precise. Marta Sordi, Diodori Siculi Bibliothecae Liber sextus decimus (Firenze 1969) XI-XXX argues that Ephoros is the principle source of D. S. 16, XXX-XXXIII follows Hammond on Diyllos as the second source, and XXXIV-VI argues that Ephoros is the source in particular ofD. S. 16.74-6 (cp. Hammond). A11Prior to Hammond there were also skeptics: Edw. Schwartz, "Diyllos (2), " RE 5.1 (1903) 1247 is skeptical in principle: ·Ob und wie Diyllos die Tradition beeinflusst hat, lasst sich nicht ausmachen." Walter Schwahn, "Diyllos," Philologus 86 (1931) 145-68 considers Diyllos to be the source for D. S. 18-20 (Macedon and Greece); but not for D. S. 16: p. 166 (refuted ad loco in a note from the editor A. Rehm!). Recently, Meister (1990) (above, n. A7) 126-7 has again expressed skepticism. A12E.g. J. R. Hamilton, Plutarch: Alexander (Oxford, 1969) XLIX-LXII. He does not discuss any of the passages which describe or report military engagements in which artillery was used according to other sources, except 37.1-2, but that he specifically assigns to Kleitarchos. AlJArthur Friinkel, Die Que/len der Alexanderhistoriker (Breslau 1883) 296-328 assigns most passages in detail, selecting from a wide variety of sources (see the summary table, p. 327-8); for the sieges he assigns as follows: Plut. 11 from Aristoboulos; Pluto 17 from Kallisthenes and Letters (imprecisely); Plut. 24 from Kleitarchos; Plut. 25 from Kallisthenes, Chares, and Letters (imprecisely); Plut. 37 Kleitarchos; Plut. 45 from Kleitarchos + Aristoooulos; and Plut. 58 from Onesikritos (only in the summary table). N. G. L. Hammond, Sources for Alexander the Great (Cambridge 1993) 45, 49 assigns the sieges of Miletos and Halikarnassos to Kleitarchos; 55-8 assigns some of Alexander's dreams at Tyre to Ptolemy and Aristoboulos, and some versions of the avian bomber at Gaza to Ptolemy and Aristoboulos; and 70 assigns the report of the Persian Gates to Kleitarchos.


57

whom Justin epitomated, but it seems little doubt exists that he too followed Kleitarchos.Al4 That result leads one naturally to consider Diodoros and Curtius, who are also usually believed to have followed Kleitarchos in the main. AI5 For Curtius, the problem is exacerbated as his date has been long disputed-it now seems most likely that he wrote ca. 48 ± 6 A.C.AI6 At such a date, using the then-popular Kleitarchos does not surprise, and that is the conclusion of the most recent study.Al7 There seem to have been insertions from other sources as well: Hegesias FGrHist 142 F 5 at Gaza (4), Aristoboulos in the Sogdian Cities (6), and Chares FGrHist 125 F 16 at Aornos (10) at least;Al8 possibly also Aristoboulos for parts of the description of Tyre. AI9 The case for the last point is as follows: the decription of Tyre in Q. C. R. 4.2.7-9 follows the scheme: geographical obstacles, defences natural and artificial, Alexander's military problems; which sequence is also seen in Arrian 1.20.3 (Halikarnassos (2», 1.26.5, 1.27.1-2, 1.27.5-6, 1.29.1-2, and 2.25.4 + 26.1 (Gaza (4». In Arrian this is likely to be due to Aristoboulos, oft cited for matters of topography (FGrHist 139 F 20, 28, 48, 56), and who is credited with a description of Tyre (FGrHist 139 F 12). This source, if real, is alleged to exaggerate the obstacles which Alexander had to overcome.A20 Indeed, as becomes apparent in the main paper, Curtius (for whatever reason) exaggerates the Tyrian defences. For Diodoros, the most recent studies have returned to the early consensus that Kleitarchos is the principle source. A21 Hamilton has argued for some specific insertions from Diyllos (the continuator of Ephoros already encountered in D. S. 16): the notice of the Balkan

AI4N.G. L. Hammond, Three Historians of Alexander the Great (Cambridge 1983) 86-115 seems to be the only investigation worth considering. He concludes that the report of Tyre is from Kleitarchos (pp. 98-9) as is that of Aornos (pp. 104-5); cpo the summary, pp. 113-4. AI5Already Frankel (above, n. A13) 387-95 assigned D. S. 17.19-63 to Kleitarchos; while Edw. Schwartz (above, n. A3) 683-4 assigned more or less the whole of D. S. 17 to Kleitarchos. Similarly, Frankel 395-422 connects Curtius with Diodoros, specifically for the Persian Gates (pp. 400-1), and the attack on Aornos (pp. 4056); and Edw. Schwartz, "Curtius (31)," RE 4.2 (1901) 1871-91 @ 1872-86 assigns nearly all of Curtius to Kleitarchos (e.g. Aornos, 1876-7). AI6J.R. Hamilton, "The date of Q. Curti us Rufus," Historia 37 (198S) 445-56; T. R. Martin, "Quintus Curtius' presentation of Philip Arrhidaeus and Josephus' accounts of the accession of Claudius," AJAH 8 (1983 [1988]) 16190. AI7Hammond (above, n. A14) 116-59; he specifically assigns all incidents considered herein (i.e. # 3 to # 10 in the table) to Kleitarchos, except Sogdian Cities (6), which he assigns to Aristoboulos (p. 142). See pp. IIS-9, 123-5 for Tyre (3); 123-8 for Gaza (4); 131 for Persian Gates (5); 143-4 for Scyths (7); 146 for Nautaka (S); 148-9 for Massaga (9) amd Aornos (10). A18Hammond (above, n. A14) 127-8; 142; and 149 respectively. AI9J.E. Atkinson, A Commentary on Q. Curtius Rufus' Historiae Alexandri Magni Books 3 and 4, = London Studies in Classical Philology 4 (Amsterdam, 1980),315-9 (see pp. 64-7 for Kleitarchos in general). AzoSummarising Atkinson (above, n. A 19) 315-9. A21SeePaul Goukowsky, Diodore de Sidle: Biliotheque Historique Livre XVII (Paris 1976) XI-XXXI, who reviews various attempts to argue for other sources. The case against Kleitarchos is strongly stated by E. N. Borza, "Cleitarchus and Diodorus' Account of Alexander," PACA 11 (1968) 25-45, the case for by J. R. Hamilton, "Clei-

tarchus and Diodorus 17," Greece and the Eastern Mediterranean in Ancient History and Prehistory (Festschr. Schachermeyr),

ed. K. H. Kinzl (Berlin/New York 1977) 126-46.

58

PAUL T. KEYSER

campaign, Taulantians (1), and the accounts of Miletos, and of Gaza (4).A22 Here we may note an interesting and important systematic bias: Diyllos the Athenian (writing ca. 270 B. c., generally accurate, and well-read) has apparently suppressed all reference to artillery. A23 According to Hammond, Diyllos is responsible for D. S. 16.21-2 on Samos (Social War), 16.534 on Olynthos, 16.77 on Byzantium, 17.8.1 on the Taulantii, 17.22 on Miletos, and 17.48 on Gaza.A24 As appears in the main paper, archaeology shows that there was artillery in use at Olynthos; Arrian records it for the battle with the Taulantii and at Gaza (and is likely to be accurate: see below); Plutarch records it for the siege of Samos (356/5 B.C.); and there are good reasons for thinking it was in use at Byzantium and at Miletos. It is appropriate here to remark also on the bias of Kleitarchos: he did not write to praise Alexander, and he is not considered especially accurate. A25 Finally there is Arrian, who himself claimed to follow Ptolemy and Aristoboulos (praef 1): no-one has raised serious doubts. The most recent study argues the case in detail and concludes that Ptolemy was usually the principle source, and that he probably relied heavily on the authentic Royal Journal, in his possession.A26 Although only Frankel has been specific about any of the passages here considered, there is no reason to think that any are insertions (Arrian's AE'y6µEVCX: praef 3).A27 The chronology of Ptolemy, Aristoboulos and Kleitarchos is relevant, and it has been argued that Aristoboulos and Ptolemy wrote partly to correct the biases of Kleitarchos.A28 The alternate view is that Ptolemy wrote his History shortly after Alexander's death as a propaganda piece, and that Kleitarchos wrote after Ptolemy's death.A29

A22Ifammond (above, n. A14) 28-31,38, and 43 respectively (cp. p. 51 table). For all the other passages here relevant, Hammond assigns Kleitarchos as the source: Halikarnassos (pp. 39-40), Tyre (p. 40), Persian Gates (p. 56) and Aomos (p. 53). A230n Diyllos, see Hammond (above, n. A14) 81-2. A24SeeHammond (above, n. AIO) 83-4, 89-90, 150 on Diyllos in these passages of Diodoros. A25Lionel Pearson,

The Lost Histories of Alexander the Great,

=

APA Monographs

20 (1960), pp. 212-42.

A26Hammond (above, n. A13) 189-333. On the Royal Journal, see N. G. L. Hammond, "The Royal Journal of Alexander," Historia 37 (1988) 129-50, and idem, "Aspects of Alexander's Royal Journal and Ring in his last days, " AlPhilol 110 (1989) 155-60. Friinkel (above, n. A13) 256-84 assigns most passages of Arrian specifically to Ptolemy and Aristoboulos: 258, the Taulantians (1) from Ptolemy; 263, Miletos from Aristoboulos; 263-4, Halikarnassos (2) from Aristoboulos; 267-9, Tyre (3) from Aristoboulos; 270, Gaza (4) from Aristoboulos (cp. pp. 1768); 272-3, Persian Gates (5) from Ptolemy (or at least not Aristoboulos); 276, Sogdian Cities (6) and Scyths (7) from Aristoboulos; 279, Nautaka (8) cannot be decided; 279-80, Massaga (9) and Aomos (10) from Ptolemy. A somewhat different view of the source question, more agnostic, is held by Ph. A. Stadter, Arrian of Nicomedia (Chapel Hill, 1980) 66-76 and A. B. Bosworth, A Historical Commentary on Arrian's History of Alexander (Oxford, 1980) 16-34. Se also Hermann Strasburger, Ptolemaios und Alexander (Leipzig 1934). A27Friinkel (above, n. A13) 293-6 lists the insertions he detects: none in any of our passages. A28Hammond (above, n. A13) 195-8, dating Kleitarchos 320-295 B.C., Aristoboulos 295-89 B.C., and Ptolemy 288-3 B.C. A290n Ptolemy see R. M. Errington, "Bias in Ptolemy's History of Alexander," CQ ns 19 (1969) 233-42 at 2412, arguing for ca. 321 B.C.; followed by Bosworth (above, n. A26) 23; and by Stadter (above, n. A26) 68, who prefers that Ptolemy wrote ca. 318-1 B.C. Pearson, (above, n. A25) 226-36, dates Kleitarchos after ca. 283 B.C., and P. H. L. Eggermont, Alexander's Campaigns in Sind and Baluchistan (Louvain 1975) 65-7 argues for a terminus post quem of 258 B.C.


59

Whatever the chronological relation, scholars seem agreed that as Ptolemy and Aristoboulos were with Alexander on his campaign, they should be accurate where not biased. The one bias detected in Ptolemy is that he suppresses the role of Perdikkas (and a few others) to magnify his own. A30 Aristoboulos has been described as a technical expert and reliable for descriptions, A31 who may have exaggerated the obstacles faced by Alexander (above). Others deny any special technical function, but allow for a fascination with botany and a suppression of hardships on the march. A32 Therefore, the summary for the sources on Alexander is as follows: Arrian used mainly Ptolemy and Aristoboulos, while Trogus, Diodoros, Curtius, and Plutarch used mainly Kleitarchos. Ptolemy suppressed the role of Perdikkas, but was accurate on matters military and probably himself made use of the Royal Journal of Alexander, while Aristoboulos (though lacking that source) is reliable because well-informed. Both were on the whole favorable to Alexander. Kleitarchos was known as an inaccurate and rhetorical writer of marvelous tales (Cic., Brut. 42, Quint., Inst. 10.1.74, etc.), and seems not to have intended praise or accuracy (cp. e.g. Strabo 11.5.4). But there is no evidence of any systematic bias with respect to artillery per se (some of the devices alleged to the Tyrians must be inaccurate). Finally, the lone example of a systematic bias is the Athenian historian Diyllos, who seems to have suppressed all references to artillery in the period he covers. Diyllos' bias is noteworthy not only for being apparently unique in a historian, especially one of his era (ca. 270 B.C.), but also because he was from Athens. As noted in the main paper, there is good evidence that the Athenians were, like the Spartans, reluctant to adopt artillery before the age of Alexander. Perhaps indeed that conservatism persisted for several generations thereafter? Moreover, he was the continuator of Ephoros, and Ephoros is known to have protested against the destructive catapult as a dishonorable device. Perhaps some of Ephoros' ideas persisted in his continuator? The state of the source-critical question allows a fair degree of confidence that an investigation of the use of artillery in the IV B.C. will not be seriously inquinated by some hidden bias.

Paul T. Keyser Cornell University Ithaca, NY

A30Errington (above, n. A29) 233-41; cpo Pearson (above, n. A25) 188-211. AJlpearson (above, n. A25) 150-87. AJ2Bosworth (above, n. A26) 27-9; Stadter (above, n. A26) 68-9.

"The Use of Artillery by Philip II and Alexander the Great", Ancient World 25.1 (1994) 27–59

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