ELEAZAR P. QUINTO and GERINO A. TOLENTINO, JR. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
GR No. 189698
December 1, 2009
Nachur a, J.: J.:
FACTS:
On December 22, 1997, RA 8436 was enacted authorizing the COMELEC to use an automated election system from the following national or local elections onwards. On January 23, 2007, RA 9369 amended RA 8436 among other election laws. Pursuant to its constitutional mandate to enforce and administer election laws, COMELEC issued Res. No. 8678 prescribing guidelines on the filing of COC and nomination of official candidates of registered political parties. Alarmed that they will be deemed ipso facto resigned from their offices the moment they file their COCs pursuant to sec. 4(a) of the Resolution, Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. who hold appointive positions and who intend to run in the coming elections, filed this petition for prohibition and certiorari for the nullification of the Resolution. Quinto and Tolentino contend that advance filing does not automatically make the person who filed the CoC a candidate at the moment of filing. In fact, the law considers him a candidate only at the start of the campaign period. Meanwhile, COMELEC, in its defense, averred that it only copied the provision from Sec.13, RA 9369. However, the OSG representing COMELEC believed that there seems to be no basis to consider appointive officials as ipso facto resigned and to require them to vacate their positions on the same day that they file their COCs, because they are not yet considered as candidates at that time. Further, this “deemed resigned” provision existed in BP in BP 881, and no longer finds a place in our present election laws with the innovations brought about by the automated system. ISSUE:
Whether the filing of COC will automatically cede appointment of the candidate RULING:
No. The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a governmental position to promote one’s candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous or coercive influence of the electorate. The measure is further aimed at promoting the efficiency, integrity, and discipline of the public service by eliminating the danger that the discharge of official duty would be motivated by political considerations rather than the welfare of the public. The restriction is also justified by the proposition that the entry of civil servants to the electorate arena, while still in office, could result in neglect or inefficiency in the performance of duty because they would be attending to their campaign rather than to their office work.
Sec. 13, RA 9369 pertains to all civil servants holding appointive posts without distinction as to whether they occupy high positions in government or not. Certainly, a utility worker in the government will also be considered as ipso facto resigned once he files his certificate of candidacy for the election. This scenario is absurd for, indeed, it is unimaginable how he can use his position in the government to wield influence in the political world. The provision s directed to the activity any and all public offices, whether they be partisan or non-partisan in character, whether they be in the national, municipal or barangay level. Congress has not shown a compelling state interest to restrict the fundamental right involved on such a sweeping scale. Hence, the sec. 4(a) of the Resolution and sec. 13 of RA 9369 are adjudged null and void and this petition is granted.
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
February 22, 2010 Pun o, CJ.:
FACTS:
The COMELEC moved to reconsider the previous Supreme Court decision nullifying sec. 4(a) of its Resolution and sec. 13 of RA 9369 from which the former was copied. The nullified provisions provided that any person holding a public appointive office or position including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy. ISSUE:
(1) Whether sec. 4(a) of the COMELEC Resolution is constitutional (2) Whether the an appointed official will be deemed resigned upon filing of his COC RULING:
(1) Yes. The Court overruled its previous decision and strongly upheld the Resolution’s Constitutionality saying that contrary to the previous decision, it did not violate the equal protection clause. It is settled that the equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The test used is reasonableness which requires that: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purposes of the law; (3) It is not
limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. In the case under consideration, there is a substantial distinction between public and elective officials which has been rendered moot and academic by the ruling made in the case of Farinas, etl. al. vs. Executive Secretary, et. al. (2) Yes. Having held that sec. 4(a) of the Resolution is valid and constitutional, the candidate who is an incumbent appointed officer shall be deemed automatically resigned from his position upon his filing of his COC. The probable harm to society in permitting incumbent appointive officials to remain in office, even as they actively pursue elective posts, far outweighs the less likely evil of having arguably protected candidacies blocked by the possible inhibitory effect of a potentially overly broad statute. Therefore, the motion for reconsideration is granted and the previous decision of the Court is set aside.
