ly (Jchclon3 • •• t 0800 hour:J, the un~my 'lndc -mcth0r '.ttl;~.:. ; to cut our L of' C '::hich he ['"tt:lck~d \~'ithb.nk::;, ~il· gUhs :mtl im'\~,ntr·y; th,;:-;· ','Cl'(j uascd on the I-illlJ.DND --:ro!". in ",'ihic:h it -::"f', rCI)ortcd. th" t th<.: e'.. . n·'.l bn.nkG WGrc L1cing rnined, thcl'cb~' shc)\'}in th:·t the enc-my "..'~:' llcto:Clll:i.nccl to del ,,;y tr.c ::wcuring of' thQ rJG 1 f1·m.'lc hy 8 Co .T'" r!t: lon,;.' 0 po r:tdblo. This ,'1tt:tck c:\w::;ec1 furthc1' elel.:..'!, rmd ,mt".il\ (1 r~r, of.'!":·lOiscd ':1.tt·\ck by 501 ReT '\ssistL:u. l)y 15/19 J ~ Lt.4. n.oy,.I, 'i'i·N\ .... , ,.mY ~'~n'!. ;:!'L1.n Corps Ht!(\c1q'U.'lrte·~3 bc:inr:' l·ut in to cl,,':',,-' 'onc1 rc-o.lH.:n tho 1"f1in :L):is thi3 they did succc-scrully 'nd hy 1100 lO1.l1'C, thl.,; flo',:: o' t.r~~'f ic \"1_ g able to continue. Tho E;i tu" tion '.3 l' f;' ,'nb rru- ~ra.s il.~' I ()1)r"n. Div:i n1 on ,nd 43 Divinion -::'l;': th'tt thi1 ("lll'/1:";, 1 '::;:0 th~ir '1 i:o.tr t·v.:., :.clJnlons, ""·cr.,) concnnt.r:.tc:d in'l'J. ~'OT'l'!T of NI .TG.' r (Olli. CO'iIP' .;: ~:;t (::otor) Jl'\tt~'llior.l Ghl':N,\Dn: ' \ '-;IT l( ,--) 1-:'wj\1!" ;"'~"~"::~"'..'I1·IJ:,-- l'JOVll lll! tho Fost Ofi'j,cf: 'j
•
11 ' ' ."",
•• , ".:: 1J.ctl1
,,,~""
- 49 which \"f.'.$ bridgos), up to tho to tn.king
beIicV0d to cont:i,in ,M, Sy/i tchbox for' the d(~l""Oli t ion of the ',vhil:,;; 13C Inf:-:.ntry ..~riJ"..dc of 4-3 Division \':~
GROlJ.ND TROOP-:';
28. Th0 l~ncn,y bri 1E.~<)h,-,,'\c. in FI,nr~GEN, \".'hich w"..s subsequently prov0d to h:-.v:;; b-..;<.;n in o. vcry ..);l.'CC''.rious sb.tc on tho pr,;vious night, we-.S reinforced, ;.l.ri!1? tho hout's of dc_rknocs by ::is troops f:'om lillNHEM. They took up stron.r~ gos:i.tions in the hou;.~cs, :::nd notably in the old fort just SOUTH of tho :1'0:: d bricle',c,' which, together with
:',. t i'ir::ot li~bt, 5 Gu: reb \rrwu!'c:d Briw:.de with under comrn.md . 2 Bo..tLlion, :)05 m3 F£'.rr..chut<: Inf,.ntry R~6iJ~cnt, ,~3=--',um(;d rosponsibility for Clc2,rinr: 'HIJ~,fEGElr prcp:,r:LtC'l'y to Gcizin r : tho bridge. At the Sf\me time, ·~hl. C,OLD:.3TRE.!' r (;1. !.I{D~':; r:,t~O'JP of 32 (',u'U'd.:.1 B:l'i!!aclc lrDvcd over to support 82 tiS 'irbornc r i.vb.i-a;-} on- t! , m"'riT flonk.
504-
.
\','''..6 thu:~ freed to undcr at' th(: .i,vor l::!-:.L, ',-,'F:ST of l'lI,J}h:EGEN in f\rCCl 6864. The :lXtil 1 iJry support -.n(l. t:L;\ing~; of both f'01:CCS 'Nero co ordin::.ted so tInt ~hu bric1v.,;; ;,·:(~~)t be ~tLckcd simult;:'.J180usly frOl!l
ta.kc
US l->'~.l' _chute Ir;J': I1+'l'Y TIc ir:iCmt
Dr. ~13sault
~
cro,~sin8
both 3i.cles of the; rivl.:r.
At fir~t light, 1 ';10to' l;·ttt·'_lion mE LDI::.m r.lI,\RD8 with in 3UppOl-t t'-yoks of 2 "l'F..ourc,Ci. D .tt.. ,lion GRENiIDIE GH,\RJ)S ~nd ~nipers of 2 lh t.t::tlion, 505 "; ~""'r"':l ute -If'l,try Rt; in:ont oper:1.t i.ng l'1rgely frem roof-top::;, prOCL' <.lc.·d with thu lc.borio~ t,':\.sk of dc;~rino: the. town to\'r.:,rds the ~~outhc;rn 8nd of '.loth brid~u~. 'Sefor.::: fierce enemy resist nce, the' . . . :1v·-,ncc.. proeocclvd fror:. hOUGCl to house, sloY;ly but ste~dily. ?::u~nwhil0 504 U3 .t :\:'"~ich\lto Infn.l1try r~u!}im8nt..to~cth(;r'with two squlldrons 2 i,rr:lourcu i,'.l.ti;'~lion THISH CD ,lIDS vlho \'!orc to support them from the SOUTH of' the; river, wc:rc preparing for the lnzn.rdous task of ;m n.s~3a\.ll t crossing in d"..yli?ht. ~t1.'1,ny 1"lctors were ,'\gn.inSt them. The enemy h:~d cxccl1"nt ooscrv... ..,tion from the NORTH bnnk, nnd, even at thv hour St;l<)c b:icl, th. cm"'cnt. did no t tlrop belo'w threu knots.
At 1500 hourc th\.J
''.S:;~lu.lt h'-',~:m.
In ord'l}:' to prevent
aimed fire durinl3 the l;\tlnchin~ :Lwl c:::"os:_:in~, the limited. ;;.rtillcry support \W13 n.ur,mentccl by intonr-c 1,'; t.\i1d :::,', firo from the IRISH GU1JU)S k,nks, which ''.150 . ,.ttC) ,ptcrl :, 31r.okl.,) ~;crccn. O\"!in,~ to tho \'le"ther, ho-..·/Ovc:::l', the I'.ttor \'I:'~ not 01';' JctiV0 '1nu on flppro',ching the oncmy bank the ,'\ss~ultinr, troops \'lcru lJ,t ,,'rith hvvy fire • . This Ofluscd
very h~nvy c:J.su:ll ti ..,;:; ':nd unly -~ 1-";'.7 of the It,·:,1ing ':!:1.ve re:"l.chcd the f·"\r hN1k, some in bo' ts 'mJ ::;0. ,<.: ..;\':1...! :irlr. Dl3spi to this, :, footing W.1S o'bt:l.inod GIld ,":. :3,,"1) 11':'L,; ~'h\;,':(1 7C() y" 'fls wi,1c :11l
,~t ;').l•..?roxir,:'~tcly
. . •/rhis
- 5c'-
,
ThiD subsequent~y turned O~lt to be tho '('ail':,Tly bridge but it sCr\red '\8 a sign£.l for tho ~P=lt_D'::"r(;, ','iho ";O",C by then f'if:hting on the ! .ppro[~chcs to t'~iC ):'0'10 hTi(l:-~" to ilttorr~t Tu.s11 t1.cties.
Jci: 1950 ho'-<.1':'; .~ '11,' 11 fore.:.:, incluclin..,:' Cf:l'J:-s 'lnd i.nf::-~ntry of the GF..::l':", L';'~3, ,:i t~ "CFC > ~Cl ti-b.nk Guns ·',!1:i.>:.ppcrs of 1~ Field . 'quadron, cros:.;C'cL tne 600 :. ,1'. r: s.l)'1.."1 of the bri&ge "..n d Joined. up yri th the: liS r-~.rC\.troops.
'l'he :rani tioD ,i",-~ :lOon :~ "b.'Ll!lf:.thLn(;c) by the !"tcl.cli tion of tf..11ks and inf~llltry frOT, tJL IRt..., T (m, 1 S ~roup, " .n(~ ty 2815 hOUl'G elos", "bridgcho;l.d. \:')p, fi:!.'I~l.ly ,.-::: t--,'b1if'hcd.
il . ...
1": r into th,<.; ni ~ht 3_,or::vlic fightin~ c()l't~.nui.;rl on both banks, ". d '.1.,;0 on thu briclgu it:se:lf r:hero .;nip -rs ',';'_'"C'C :.;t::.ll firing frOP"1 the (~',,-llcrs :)..t the.: ::~ !!1~:'3, ':,Iho ':,- 're h(!I'ricdly removing the ::unplc ,~U!)pl'y ai' .dvir.olition ere.!" .J::.I,' '.jhioh !'lJ'lturiou::;:ty, h·d n ;v:Jr boer. f'i:r(;cl. Und.:.r:-..'··, ~h -tl <.; .co ,0::::1. • l.n ti, piurG thr.:n1:Jc:l v s, 80 Gcr~ Cl!l prison"r ... '::or:,; ".,( ~;\. l'y thu 0"..lJ )'.J:-:'. r·:r.y.. \ th~1~i.X, rlucc of hi<1in~ in thlj d·. :.oE ti ·n e;] .. 1 t ..'·::;,
~t ,',~l'
cJ';Lr th·.t a COl ::;id-.; ":.' 1·,; ~~.n\lrt of mop, inJ up Y!mild 111Ci.'ll.' n'. oi' '<1 : )('l... t";JI~bGl' b ...:f02.'0 thli to"lm of NIJj',mr,.E1', co' 1:1 b ~ e011;,,: ir r..;;'·;': (:10' I.' 0f' '0:1<.; ;../c 11t une of' th,..; mast importc..n t :j.0..~ -::: ~ ..n l~,,'.roJ."" h' ,l ":.; . (:' 1 ti"U.'<.;r j L·':'J.(,·-!~ ~_~- tn.,,; ;f·'\C0 of have te be dono on the
"-cr.)' (-,t !":'lil1\J. llL.;1;1Y, '.-~~".i.~., ,,' q",::\ ['t brotJl"J t '~b ,'t 1 Y the. '.c::.. __(;) ;:;0 brilli ":.1":'-:1 .. co-ordin" ted '1.nL!. :,;XI;C',J,t,;(, nf ",1, _ (:11" rrl:~ ",l'H~OU::''':cl ··..1l'1 l.l~ 13:-) ,d.C'bOl' 1 '
d.cs_ t.-:rr-..tc r' nisi;' nc': bjT m'1.~!'l.ific:,:;n~~ :~Ch::'\~'t,.. /lILl'
Divbions.
On tl'v .J '; :. i' ' j . 'Y." ~ 1,01' !.irborn l:; J J:i '.; .i." ~_Ul:, the end;\{ <:
~:tr ..;nrri';h,
JYtC
In ",hI.; '.EK 7560 735(;1) - -/J+(')GO?
"
',:.L.l~,
}1'.<.I.
';:.
l.Ju';" ~ ';
:
'u'
b;:
/J.
:i..:,·i~ ;
~J~/
82
u~,;
t ~ ': cl:cd in
. '.J r ,
til·
, lY (lelLl t~ lG lin\.; of 729628
h:'tt·~li. of' ~rJ' ntry, so_" in :'rlll :; lP lO:rt'J'.~ hy t· :!("l ·,'}:;o aUf!; in. "u l: of 8) J .~ !' Jll:.i. • ;t.i.-:;~l ,<.;con 1,' i...; "~ncl.; h ,'. th·:t Eh.' '.v ".~ 1 O"l,; .,r:~rr.y (lir'g.',j1·(~ i,n in the HEICl!, ,Tl .'(lRI';:";l\ ',i'l;:' 7f?:.:,2~ ; '.c: it '.:'.:; ')' r:W·.l:3 th~t tl e .~n0:".Y '::,,",; 'hli!l~''1'" u thu.c, , ',',itL' 'fl,: ~v ~.+ ,...-ill[' :. count(;r ... t1;",Cl':- ','r·Ii:" .. our' .1.<; . 1' ..:'. • ,<;'.rL "-Jy ::;OJ. jmL:nt. 0111'..11 P'''.'l.'t'.i. ;:: of tL: \~n\Jl,y '11.:.;() ·'.tt·.c:~·J" r·\)..J l' .' nc;nt ·1.t (;{Ql~:jl':l,.K, \:hill: :;03 " \ J ""Llnl.ml:··~ (' ~'Il t "',;:.,1 ',-' ; ·~tt·. "!-:Lo. by ::n:nll !;·:rtic.:, ()l t1 \.; 0l. :lY O~'l,i" '::~j f~'..:>r. ,OOK'~ 72~1. ·....I t]H 11" th..:: ·.ti;·.ck,' '.'~;r, 11 J.'L, tlt0Y :·."l:t'\,,; 'lrol.ll.ilcGo no owin' to the: clo~;l~ n'd:') 'IJ of' .:;:..~<..; cu mtr..; "nc ·t l'., f ;lct 't '. t, 01
~'!Jr' '. 1urn't r. r0lJor:'tl~J'
l'ihOJ
,.;'x'CL:jlt
n
:i~h
·.oout
iUIT
for '" .ct.ip'.J
";'.·CO ·1l1:I.i:·c:·, WI',
;'he
r .,.
'~J/J 'l'o·'cht..:::>
to
Il."i l"i fJ;: ,T . 1'\,:. T':'j. . ... Jl.... .' t '1il'/ic 1 t .1'01' 01.,1' ttJ'ols to "(~ out "ll\l 01J1.;t:i.li ir:t1·Ql'l. ,tj Oll. r'm·th 'r ~'()llr 1 ',~ 1'1" L:.: n J. :~;cribud ',bOVt:, .~ :l!L;.lj' ",l:,c "ulll ',iOOI~ .t \·,·l.~.ch. ''',:'',; l·L:portl.Jd to 1) . ',;l~ .(;',t~~ oc-' t.:') (;t:.CU'll Rv"JiJ~nt:]. it '::··j· . .'O l;lJ rt .. tl t;1. c ',~H' il-f' ':.,:.; bl.il'1" huilt ·1.t cn . . Iii.I.') -:'ld.all ·.:Oll 1 jlL'o'rl\·lJly 'e: 1 ;',i, ,i'o: ".!'(; '!~:fO"Cil r, the ''; G'.. t'Ol:'GC,; , \ l~r co nentr' .. tdl 'i. the. ·;iCI1'.:,]]) :u' .r., 7852 • tl u 1
•. . /It
- 51
It W!1.S oStiD"..t0C. thflt t\s the two villagus of ?100K r. 7251 and CUTIC E 714-9 In.y "1t the ana of the throe rnt:i.:in reinforcclfcnt routes from GEEl00 that the enemy would reinforce in this ~rGt:!. anel hold on to these points, and this 8ubsoqucmtly proved to bo correct • . To meet this thre:,t, COLDSTREAl" GUARDS Group froJj) the Gu.nr<..Ls Arlllou't"Gd Division \,![\[J put under Calm' .nel of 82 us Airborne Division. ',rhis Divi.Dion Vf::l:::; 1::.1so further rcinforccc1 l:Jy th<) rJlo~s{;;l of the po.r:cchutc infentry regiment which h~:d been rru'1.rdin[~ the NIJ:'iEGEN bridge which i:;.3.S now in process of' being t ken over by 130 Inf3ntry . Brig:l.de of 11-) Divi[;ion.
(b)
1 Britisri .Ll.irbornc Division In the j\HNHS'.: DrCfl., 1 British Airborne Division were continuii r, tcr holL1.'~ .sr-n] 1 llivision:'tl perimoter which controlled ' '.. portiol'. 01' the NORTH h-:.r1k: of the NEDER RIJN nef1.r the: II8\fE,illOHP Ferry 6..."'377 :nd the wooded area round OOSTERBEEK E 697.7. The ~ i ttntion Yf"'.S becO!:linl: (tcute :lS the enomy had reinforcoll during thcpaet t\'l0 d:'.ys :!.nd i t was o.pparent from prinon
Cilsual til)S of' tho hir Lrmlling Brig;:tuc Cill
101 US ;"irbornc Divi;.; ion
The Division continued. to n'tL'cint,l.in its hold on nodal points .:lIang }U Corps L of t;. i.t ZON the enemy had A.ttncked uut h~.ll 1')(;,.. 11 repulsed. • •• /Thc sit~'ltion
situ', tiO~l "~~ ru": xJs :my r.)~'.;jor onomy thJ:,~,t t to th) r',):cps ".xi..; ".nrl L of C \'.' \..~ not ,~t thic strqe i~fP"~rcnt, , ... thO'.l[L :\ t '.',,:; knoY,'i" th-. t "l con::; iclcr:-..lilo force of the Gno); 1','.~ cst''.__~li;-·:l0d to thu ':,':E0'£ of the ,1...xis. Thb tl'J.I'(V!,t, bo\;cvc2.',. it ','l:'3 hope '.7ould be Jot by the t\'i0 ,.1 "'.r in r fm.'m,~·Hons, 8 ",nc1 1? Corps )YI':king r:::. thor ~ .. .t'0 :c'er'Vl.' pro: ,~,-'." t111".n they h~\'.l in the p~.st. ,'.'hich 1no. be0n slol'! O\':i1"n t,. tl e
~'},o
AIR SUrl'ORT
30.
Ti;(,", \il)"d;h... l' ",P('. t;1.C :'-'li~.tL;n::mcc lift fo).' ru,,:,'nu,pply of 1 Bri ~:i.3h ;~~:cborn;~ )' v·",:./"OY' h,1:'t tl16' nunlbcX' of 30ri.;ios do,m to 259 of which 1 B-t were _J1.\' _'ly ~·:!.;'ht,Lr op<.r·~(tion::;, :-.ir covor c\,nd C,...' TOUpS.
1". ti "1, P-CO·"l. ~ r~'·',n('.,) _ roducoC li ttlo of vc,luQ both of ktll V:1 ::::~;. ':U:i.ty "r~d th:; ~')rchi1.,ition on flyinB rLlring l.irbo:mo .bop'''> J:,tcr tr\'.i~ L"d its G'i'C'oct, :~~i it on:l.blod the oner:iY to conccntr'.t;:; forc,,~j F. :../2 -.ILl ':rE~''I; of the ::.xis of:;.dve.ncc vlitb ~. vi .. .- to ·_'. tt'.ckin· "mel Ui,j,('uptin,r; tr~,ffic on it.
bcc:->.U:~u
If,.
A0'"
ll:..(
kJ l,) f-
--I j, J ('C'
IIf
I /
~
,
31. On tho hI(~m" 8 Co:qJ::; l!:."l G<.;cUl'cd ;LCI-11;L K 4297 ::;LTld Hh!-10NT K 4797 l'oth of '.dtic:h \':01'(; A,~hort of the DUTCH frontier. Opi)osi tion by the enemy \'i:.lC .-~tu:'l,orn) m 1.1; "•.:.,~ tho '-'ht th-.. t IrEU,tOND wus held in :; trGn -:'th »)' t:..nku ;.inc15:Lpp0l'a who W0rc- 1 '~\Jmin.g the E.il3T b' nk of tbl,; C:m::,l. On t!lC .. EFT. 1i~~ Coq)" i1 I l [","in8G. t~l(, line of tho rO.'1.d ·)et'.. .c en 3(\1 ~, :,n,1 )010~ t. - h-~Il ~"ul'ortl;,l ctiff o}'!posi tion from the ;',' ST in th0 :;1.',. '. ".!E:)T of 3002. LlJr- cr
I
~
(L,
"r
y" {I
c
1
'0/1
i
4
It. LlUno.! r
I(.
;; ,
-(/.
(rf.
- Y3
SECTION )0 CO
G
(3
OPER~TIJNS
21 SEPTE.1DER
GENERAL SITU! TION '.'i th the. C':'.pb.lr C'; of' the 1..:I,) " ;1;N briclge int:ect :;.nd a onG!l\Y n.et.ivi-:y s;:; t' N' :r.1~CEl\"! E 7062, it ,'fEW hoped that '1 quick brc::\k, out f'rc)·. U, lir:it () hY'idpchu:ld ".crO$O tho l'!}3DT~R HIJN would be :.lchievcd.
32.
decre~lsc of'
The lJII.:;uit:,.'hili<;::. c-:' tne; countl-y l;ct\'!c(m the rivers~, ',8 und r'1EDER HIJN for t'''1k~' ll~'.~.i.·t :ir:pu~·~,·tiV8 t}-w.t :llorc inf
The th-r-c:d.: to -C:',<,; (;01"';);', .. of C ':r. not .. t this st"gl'; sorious, ;:;1 thol\~h i~. c(\n:Jid'~T:-:'l.,:J.C for,::<; of" th",: remru t[; of the 1 5 C-ernnn 1\rmy were tLa'OE, teni.nc; ,;,. t l.':.:-o;r. ·ci~-.; ;,J..;"T. TASKS
33. Tho t· .G.i{~i i;!l".t \',"l;X'n r:iven to forll'l.tion=> of' 30 Corps units under comnnn 1 for 0pOro. tionfl '.':Ore '.,3 follo',:.r~; : Gu:-,rl:::; Jd'flour;,;-c1 -
Di'/~L~ion
..
_-.--
(i) En[jurc sccuri ty ~)'l'
rna
(ii)
~nd
:,:,o·:c1••
iJri GO over l~ '::l,.i-L at
(."',(~EN j<~ 70U~.,-
;.;;V:l~1C':; ,,;:,rlil:,j~ ~)\)c.,;il~le
21 r:uptcrnbor .:..t IDiXimum spceJ. to i r . . . '\ LRN(I""t 1': 7575 continuing ':.ri th t'lsk given in 3G Corp:oi ' Lrn:~:i..u:;. Instruction 1-!ur.'lbcr 2L;-, ville '0: -""'c'r 8 I\ "".,.... \ 171 .,p+ T '-·nd:o.l .:,. ·_··l.i . .. n' • .• ) . _ ..~n bril~r'inrf At;:. ~,,-~ist.. ,'1nee to'! jrl.J rnt; 'T)~vi,,' 011. :'~.in Fl..Xi~ of ,"'..c1vance r NI.JI1J~GFi\'i J~ '!06 ., J6.~'J·~T~ ,r 7167 - i:.llNHEM ~ 7575 j opct':-.tic)l)'·J. t·," £,":i.(; 'iF'c' r~ldO u:)C ro;'u }"!I,r1EGEN 7062 - Ji:r:--,':, 7070,. If stronJ opposition l.ct, r.- nl' t,; \!':~O v' ui':.i.:;:i.on wilJ. H::lkc Gvcry ~ffort to fon
~
:>,-<
.. ~
..,;I
>.1
( iii)
COI1);~TR.B'':" ,'f...PD, , ':(,OU1) rCl 'tin i!'l. "'u: port 82 US ;.irl)r!'110 l):2}:: ·,.~nn 'ntil roll;:\,-;ull 'ty Corll !j';'ld'lun.rters.
(b) 43 DiviGi n
( i)
.T{el.i., : fr.. ',:m ;-;1 ': C;-F \ -:, J~ r,::;' on~; i l:oiJ. i ty 1:Jrj c1r'(;,'3 .',[;, "oon t.2~13 "ni (7(0 ..J ,rl~c~;t l'O::,":i.1,lc. ;!,qn o'2'r7 ~~ .) ~J
(:i.i.)
lren . : l.'
j
{~(' HU.:'~'·:;· •
'l.(',n t.o opor- ,tc :, ·';-;T
GH~_VE
,,\ ~.v:~ih\.ble, from GP...:,VE
.,
.-;Gr'il 'c.\'.'O 1J"\:';. 1::J):_~ 13Cl :-:r~.,,- .r.C to . ~':~":lt ru~rc1s .:v'::.. . I.:Jy.,.~. ,li,r:if:'r:m to (:l":~\l~ up ,i1.::;T 1·8,··.; of' NI,JJ.,TI!:G:EN i:; 7'. t:~: 'u' i. l.,) ;"\, :~'1.L'l; ~', .:iJ.\'l:'1Y ; rtllf',(: 7063
CO,·,',.i r q-l';:;t, ;I·~ to 'l~j!~ist thiR 1.1y CH' ,-,~, ,v,)' 1..'ln,· 'en :.; ~i7,U t!')l(1'H end of this 1iri,lg,c.
,:.:
(iii)
.~.
r'j
G
JC,.1V'Ul"·;·:·
Divi:jion
po,,:;il'lc ',,'i;:;-;'£ of (~U"r ':", nl'!LOlJrCQ JEDER l\lJN to . J. ist 1 J'jrbornl) Division•
'WOll .• "
'~o·.,. ,1,;
. . . ( i v) /Boun l:~ry
- 54
( iv)
BO\mcbry bc-nvcen Gu''..rds J\rmourccl Division ,-end 4-3 Division, when the l[~ttcr :,.(lv, nce, wiJ.l be., inclusive 43 Division, line of r~ilwQY from NIJ}~C~ to NEDER RI.JN ::\.t 7176 subject to :-cris rights mentioned p~ragraph (a) (ii) ~bove.
( v) Concentr:ato
rer.;~inder Division, n.s it --,rrives, in o.rea Qstride road from bridge 6760 - i~lusivc
GR.:JlE.
GROUND 'rROOPS
34. By the morning of ,21 Soptcm)cr, elemonts of the 5 Guards ;.rmoured Brigo.d.o less ',','3L:::r-f GU;',JIDS Group, which wc:.s still gu~>.rc1ing the GRieVE bridge, were ':lcll. csto.blishcd on the NORTH bank of the R Vl.t,lJ" and were prcp:u-cd to push on \':i th ffi..'UCimwn spaec1 to .!JlliHE'Ui in relief of 1 Airborne Division.' To ensuro LEFT fl~~~ prot~ction, 2 HCR sent out po-troIs to OSS E 4754 - s'HERTOGENBOSCH E 324-6 ~d also from Glli\VE - UDEN. Thoso putrols reported th~t the enemy were passing throu::;h TIEL 4268 and thc.t they were withdrawing EAST .liong the NORTH bank of the R 'iiIJJ.J. It ~'ns, no.,. Ll.pparcnt th.::\.t the enemy were well cst~hlished in the urea NORTH and SOUTH of ELST, which they appe~red to be holdinrr in strength. About 20 t~nks h~d been reported by T~ctic~l Reconn~iss~ce to be rrovinr in a southerly direction in tho direction of i~M. ~ prisoner of w~r fro~ the P~zer Jaeger Battalion ~tated that they h~d no orders to att.3.ck but merely to (lig in in the ELST CU'0o., ,?..nd i t ,y,% now apparent thf'..t the enemy ~·l8.s determined to prevent us reqching , ....'lliHEjf. • .4n added difficulty was th~t o.lthough it h,·.c1 been confirmed the rQilway bridgo ',':1:,8T of the NIJI,iEGEN ron.J. brid~c was rl Cla.ss 40 bridge, owing to cnel Y ::l.C tivi ty directed 'c,z;l.ins t i t from the NORTH b~nk, it was L~os8iblc to zet tr\ffic on to it. The, pproClches were weakened and blocked by disablcd·ta.nks and vehicles; ~ considerable Cl...rrx:nmt of work would have to be done before tanks could be got n.cross. This was ·undertaken by Corys 'l'roops RE. th~t
Durin13 the morning, 130 Inf2ntry Brig["',do of 43 Division h
By 1230 hour:::;, 130 Infrmtry Brigadc of 43 Division, less tyro companies of 4 DORSETS, h:Lo. ttl.ken ovor tho NIJ1.IEGEN bridges from 5 Gu.'I.rds .r'.rrr.ourccl Brig:'\dc Group. The t'.isposi tion 'of 130 B:ciga
By 1300 hours, thc IRISH GU.·JiDS Group of 5 G-uD.rds ,\I'If'.ourod Brig.'1.de W[tO deployed ~LS fully rlS the cOl.mtry would permit, :tg,'\.in$t m enemy vlho \'/:"\.8 firht.ing 3tubbornly in thc~:.rcl"'... SOUTH of ELST (mel who ht\d sited :."I. stron?, nnti.-bnk scroen just NORTH of th
- 55
Pro;rcss by the armour ',Hl.3 slow :\5 it r.r~s compellec1to keep to tht~ :cowl which iJapoGG
AIRBORNE TROOPS
35.
(['..)
1 Dri tish ;.irl-'Q':'llC Division 1'hcrc Y,'
In luT)"NHE;.:; i belf, ,".'hich by this th,:
. •. /.-.t
1714. hour::;,
,~t
171J.. h0tl.!3,
pliO
Eri~·.lt~ '.>,' ,. LrO_) C
t
- ~6 ".:a ·l,hir·"i.3. On the Poli:..;r. Pf'_r~chute 1:1 the .~;x,-,.::, 1:,.' ·~d'ClU. NOHT': of EL:1'
7070. !It; LJ'Op took l?l~.oe l1(.; ..... rer to :LLST, ::nd hCt:lcQ the L.'ncny posi tionn, th'~n ·,'.'.S intended owin:; tel hcf'.vy e:nO!"y fl~. Thu r(;~ul t of thi:=: \'1',,:, trnt the Polish P:~r-:\ehutc Br.i::~..lc " suffcru~ ~ nwnDcr of c~~u~lticn ~d'it took' time to ~olloct ~-...nc.l concuntr:'.tG thcr~ :i.11. the ~r{J, froT': which they WGre to c1'o;:;r. to rGinforce 1 Briti::;h ;~irborne Divi.,ion. i;.s h s ~.lrG·'.J.y b0:m n~.rr~:te(1) the ;·.djut:mt ROy:tl En":ineors 1 Airbornl; Di.v".Gicn hr.!.. G~~iu. th:it help munt rc' ch the; diviaion \'Ii thin t\,u n·:.:xt ~4. i ow':::; othcr"'lise he; fe::.rccl th"lt ."..:.1 !\ fi!.;htin? T'or!·.:'1tion it \'!oul~l cC['.S(;t-O exi:.3t. Food .:'.11el ~\rm;\uni t:Lon ':J(;;ru .-.~r.in in sr.ort supply due to the clifficul ty of :Iropyi.w~ th\JSC: con ;:ou.i tius into C\. clroppi)"l-G zone which, of l"'..CC(;;::; <.ty, ly.c1. tn be: :::ib..:<.l i~'1 :en unsuit'l.ble c..rcc. -:::i thin tho much con t-..~"ctCJ,:I. Di vi~; ion:\J. porilf0tc:r.
(b)
<32 TJS .',hhornl;
DiviG~.on
of 352 Glider Inf.:1.ntry This '\:~~3 't cr'use for ;mX:LE:ty, ',; :'~lthol~gh th0rc: '.'.",S I'.. lull in this 'tro .. follow'inS onaT.'j.- .. ti:.. cks on 20 ;-cl?tc17I'ber, (;v' u.onc(; froJ c:-..ptured n:'p3 '1l11': uOCw,0nt::o ::;hO\'iC<1 u~:- t i t Y:.".G evident th:~t t:. ') enemy hr-.d ::~pI>l:oxij.:·_tely th'~ [-)ouiv:.lont oJ:' tno Hor:\o G-u,.rcl.. Divisions in the REICH,,' LD FOreST 'rc".. ThU'j. ',.1 th.ou<~h thoso "ore Nar f.Lrst cl::'3'~ troOrl
Owi..'1[' to the :riv'i;--:o . t h' J.
:'.oj ;'1'.';:t t.hor, i.2;
the
l'~n(jins
n. to be poctpon .(!.
The u:lvi~ion continue·rl. to c:'1.rry out i t~; t;-,sk of lJrotecting the L of C. 'rhc 15/19 H rt;v-;rtoLL to th,:,: cO!l'jl"..nc1 of 11 :'.ruourcl ])iv.~ .... ion. t:nclLly ly,-trol::; '"roro 'l.Otivu turin::, the (hy ."ml m'.ny l ..inor (;ncount~:r8 h'~,l t:~
AIR SUPPORT '''iau.thor ·~.na necei;E;it~! for :d.r lift "gL'..in kept the number of sorties doY.'l1 and 'l tota.l of 259 y.:ere flo\:n of \':hich '181 wer' purely fighter operntion3, :-ir cover ::nu. ;::upplios. The ,~tctiviti0f: of T..ctic'1.1 Rcconn~iss9.nce \'!cre: limit 'd 0 ;·i.n~ to b:,d vi...ibili ty ::md bccaust.; further impending '1.irbornc opcr~tio~ pl~ced .\ savarc restriction on their u~c. Throueh l~ck of TL'ct:i.C·..J. ~ocolln.:I.ise:~ncc, the.: enemy's tCInf,'rtry cut to tho n"~ill £'-xis in tho VEGHj~L E 4737 'll'U"-l Y:i..:c, not spotted beforeh.:::.nd. hben the cut ~.G spotted, 30 Corps ~rrccd to the unusu 1 procc~crc of strnfin on recognition Yilthin thL; bomblinc. 'Phis \iUS 3UCCCGsi'ul nnd only one vehicle c~3u~lty of ovrs ~~s r~portud.
36.
ENE1:i.Y ACTIVITY
37. f:.. con~idGr~~bre number of i·ic 109~.; :md FE 190c opur·-~t,,;d ov,r the NIJ},'lEGEH 'lrea. durin,... the '\i' tornoon (1' '::hich . "'::0 W';Jrr; ~; ho t down, ono being clai.med by 30 Co~r>~; Light j\.nti-: . rcrrtft Guns.
38. .•. . /to
- 57 _. to a line roughly EAST and WEST of EINDHOVEN. Reports from both indicated that the enemy "~s fighting vary h~d) and th~t he was defending every important to"n ·xnd villaGe, ,~d ~~G ~ofusing to give ground unless pushed out. Thi~, coupled with the 1 ck of ro~ds, blo~~ bridges and restricted oreas for de;ployrnent, h'td made the role of flank protection to 30 Corps difficult.
SECTION 3
30 CORPS r;SNERAL SIT1LTIOH
39. It ',.-"3 nO\<;' '-'pp-lrCl.t th;~t once ~ junction hoto. beop. )C c10 with 1 British Airborne Divinion :121 :'.~~':ul t cro;3'''ing O'~ ~~ 1£ rge sClle would hCl.ve to be undcrt"..kcn. The: G'xiGting In''ic1,rehc~).d, :'.3 hole:. b~' 1 Bl"i t:Lsb :. irborne Division, WI".8 sr,,rlll. Ii..lthour:h it -.Ti ...1 hoped. to' ferry reir.:forccments :Lnd sup"lics :::l.cros~~ to tho f irbornc Divi~ion uT:. the ni[~}~t 0:' 22/23 September J i t \-;r~n rno\·.'1'l th{;~t gr-rl.t dif'ficul ty \mul(~ 'be 0xparionced. getting up :'\.nd l:::lunchin~:. either ;,;torr:-: bO':lb, 'l;:,,'"'\ult cr~.ft or fllTI<:.'!s. Thus the nunbar of rr:im"orcer.-,c:n.b tt~:t could 1:Je put acros '::'1 -the houl'G of d"\.rk ness Wfi."!." 1 imitcd by tht.:· difficu1tics of l::\1.Zlching ::r:d b.ck of crFlft. The; turn ;;.round. for or;lft hc·t\',recn the NORTH o.nd SOUTE he,nk was hG.lf nn hour. T~kir!p into F.cCcount :..11 the::;;.; f<"'cctors, H 1.'L;~ Dpp;.~r0nt that an ~3sault cros~inL in -:..nothcr pl['.('\J and. out of :t'~n[~o from the enemy fire might have to be; unc1.c;rb.kcn. The or:;-r.jn:.~~ em'ps p1m of securing the ;J(NHE~,l bridge:: ".nd usinV :i_t::. ,;nvirol11'1cnts for n quick broeck-out could not now bo uml. rt·:k..:Jn, :':.1 thL <.:l1CI:,y ' ....01·0 ;;.":i.r~].y 08 to.blished in i®:m:,,; itself, :ena th "round to the ~rORTH '~ncl I'lL 0,( i J,;. 'Accoru.i~·lC-:'l.:" the o:cie:Ln'l.1 Corps directive: to th.-.:-ust right through to the ZUIDETI Z.EJ~,. ':'ith tbo Guards .,rr.0'J~'ji.l D'i..·lL,ion. In:::.dinr, 5.n('t 43 .:md 53 Divisions holdi!l(~ tl: ).i~h ~round 1.;0 the ;~IYR~.1 of ;·~RNHEr.i, h3.d of neces3i ty to 1:.c ::·Ddif'icu.. ..rho (;orj,):'; 'Ii:':::; ncr'.'r orclercd not to l;st~.J.blish i bdf HOnTH of' ;:2ELDOOr;,! Z 7803, ,C'l'l(l ·~hi.; . .·:.::l,S to be held by tho Gu.'-J.:rus .'i.rrr.our::o. 2Jivision ':i-;;h 4-3 Divisicn obt.~d.ning ~1 fir:.:b:cidgohoad bn.~od 'on lJlliHE]i. In "'en()r"l, the citun'i:ion \'i'l,~~ -i;:l~'..t the On0lT,y '.'1',\3 dE;terr.iined to pr0Vl::nt our rcinfoi.·ciIY~· 1 Britinf. ,.irl)orne Divi:;;ion J ".net {\.t thi; snrnu time ...; ould prob',bly contin.lc to r"'r~.'is 1::10 Corps Ir of C, thcrc;1)y proventing T::uoh noodcd rcinf'orcc~cnt~ :Uld !::,intcm~:mcc roquirements fraT:', being brot~ht up.
T.i.SKS
4-0. wore
:~s
( rt)
The tasks f0110\..-s :
r~llottccl
to 30 Corps I'o:;:':'ttiO:13
:'01'
22 ':)uptel,lbur
Gu.:~rd:J .',.rr:ourod 1)ivi:; ior.
( '1) ( ii)
'JE:~T of th,.: rO'ld to -t2.:~'{tIt::"'J -::n..:.. in the HEf{TOGEi' O("::CH "l.~(;' _. ~1vcr::c .:.;~::, .';.180 t;() l,c unc1ert:'.kcn fro:. the (·:-R,I.VE '·'rC"l. on both t~idc~: of tho i"tin axis of
To rccc(;
.) I
:~clv').ncc•
(b)
43 Divi:;ion ( i)
brid[::c
( ii)
(Hi)
~'h(; ;~OY,',L l"CTIIKI}i, ,im~:
",nd
r ..
Dri,(.'/lUO to 1:'1~: oVG:r close }:>m:j::,tlt';r (lci'"nC0 of t1Je HJ.'j·:l~(~P.N 'h.!.:.iil.~., 11l1CkJ.' co.!u,:nd 69 J 1 L,i. .J.... ,) flu. t}j(;
.. 5:;1 '.
(c)
69 Inf2...ntry Bri~·.-~'d.c.: Group (50 (N) Divisio~.:_
(i)
To relieve 130 Infantry Brig:-d.;::- Gro'.lp~ 4-;5 Division, of 0.11 brid[;o :c:3sponsibili tics of '..:rc:'j~;i:lgs between NI,Ji,lEGEN ;1nd GRAVE.
(ii) To "-ssumc C0r;121~,n(i of the HOY'\.!J NETHEnIamS Brig:~d0 for t;'\~~ks 2.hO\vn iTl (b) (iii) 0,b~vc, (d)
Rt\ was to be grouIX!c.l on
COrp3
lovel in suppurt ot 4S Division
opcr:),tion. ~,-nd borr:bcrs '.::-.3 to ~w i'..:'::"3'.Jtcd llgainst the cnClny on the ,l)OUTH bllnk of t~w 2":SD:IC IlI.m Y.'BST of !·,p.m!EH.
( is) f.ir support by Typhoons
GROUND TROOPS
4h
At first lL ,ht,
p'''.~.:ro18
of 2 HCR
('~'. ;.'~':".:".:
(, en th.")
';.'E~"T
fln.nk of
our forces cst'~1.hli8h(;d ir, th,] llliEK E 5851 'll'.-... :"''' (,1 :,0. -!;!ic SOUTH bank of the NEDER RIJN in at·(;L'.. 6876 ~md 1Jy 0800 hC·J.'G t.ld·' '.i:n:<<.;(l up \';'i th elements of tho.; Polish Parachute l~ri8-'ldc~ ':,ho '.:C1.-U I:: 1:,-- '.'1' ~.,l the rtrC2. 6775 In c3tc~blishin; ther,;~olv~;s in this :·,,:r-c'l.: :r't.,.:~ ewe 0{ the r:l.:'crly 6774. morning mist h~.l.c!. be
:,'~e::m,vhilc, ·,t 0830 hom'_' L:.3 Divis:i.on ~,tt;--c'";.,:d "::;',;h 2'14 Infcmtry v:i th th() o'b,4 cet of ~)r:]:,kini' ,)ut frOfit tho ('x: .:,'1-) :::-; . r~i(l(!eho~,d .. 08t:.. . b lisheu. ove.. . . tho R ,-,,"'.1, ; ouIJ.scr:uun.tly ',L, ':/ '::0:,',--, ·~o ',~c-"J.r·., tho rOA.d leading from NLJ>!EGEN to ,;",l'TI:JHE'{ vi~ EL··;T. .:;; ~''-.,:,::t o:)l.'o;.]~.1;ion I':,~.S ' sli·ght, and no fire SUP!)Ol-t '::'1.3 ncco~',:;: .ry, ljut Goon ;:,:'::v:,c',',l ~'':l{J::,Y positions were encountered in the ,".l'G:'. 686'; "'...V'I("1 pr0.,:rC5£: ... ~ ,'Jlc,v'( '[':..::.'1 rC'~chod thB 67 griJ. line by 1600 Loux'::; t'h),,' ho",'1j' f'"i~,i~~in':'J in ,:: icll tho encrey had rcfu5c;d to I"iv<.; '::round unl,;<:>" '.·~t~okQ(~ i~1 /0'(:",> : ;1U. , rivC:":1 out .. "t ;,bout this til;JC, it ':;....." il'-:o:'I.\:1>..:(l. to Pllfih :.' "''lbU~'- ..::.:,l'J';Ii'1 G::>li.~,i~ting of the 5 DeLI, with ,'~ ~C]Uf~dron of ~~/7 DG- unuur (".'. ,::,),':L ";-- ~:l"':-:: up ,:;i.-th the Palco in the :',XV,"'. of Dl·U:FL :,rv'l, .-;::> t',hli;)l~ tllv ,~:(':~," ;:.; J:' .:-:~;; :':,OUTH b~'.nk of th8 I<1EDER PJJN. Ir. order to b,ri..' : throu fY . , r:: I'C" 0 1 : 1". • :.; .....b:u1u.onod 311d tvJO CCl!tlpllnies of il'lj"'-Tctry ;::C 1.' 0-; mOl.U14.:l:'1. ,m thu L: .rL\(:J ;:-,n,i '-'.11 ':11c other fightinc vehiclas ,"l.v',.H~cbl,,;. Tan]<::i 1"c1 th:i-:1 C:::-!.~ ..iit.l1 ; t thtJir oest speed whilst the sccund col',JJnn ,t r~cot.chod 11.--''' Qr ·Chi.,;· ". ll;0', ;lG 11..1" nkly 'lS p03siblo. By 1915 h01.n-:;, ~,; ;(:y 1:' '.',:t p' ,:::;.,cc:. ";1l'c..',) ". Vi_I, tL'} J~ 6670 .'wd \vi th the '..xcuption of fivu 'rj.,:,:;'I' t"")'lk:~ j'l',; 1L~L1,~: t"·.,;ir C':::Jlurr.n jl.Wt \:'EST of ELST, they r0'cch,xl til:" !'1J~TJEr 1(f,J ..T wi thou i; 1'1);' the::c o:u]?'.l..:i ~.;,icn "md. linked up ..d. th thG .l: oles. 1 ':.rOhC .~: ,'J'J;H;; clo[JI';d. up hub:i.ll
-
bU
°
129 InfCl.ntry Bri~,~ '8 C~roup ·\dv. mciI1f TH up the main NLT);:I::GSN - "·..Rt'~HE~· ro·'..(l h".d do little rro:;ress ,.;( inst strong opposition, ?.nd O'.;inC to th...; diff iClll ty of dcployin£ off tho ro"\d. By lnst li",ht tho.)' ",'iere h-lltl,;cl on tho line of tho 675 ~!orthin~. "'i. t 1300 hours the cne: jT cut the. Corpn L uf C rO.:l.d-lin.1<: \':i th t
r"
Durinc, the co~se of the ~~y, 69 Bri~nde,le33 one b~tt~ion hOod relieved 130 Info·mtry G·roup of tl:c re:sponsibility for the protection of the IHtP..J
DurinG the nizht 21/22 ;-;'";lrtcTlber, ,m :·.ttunrlt h;'.d been made by the Divi.odo1'1 to rL:r··.:i.n til.:; furry ~.\t HEVE,illOHP, 30 that it could be UGod fc,r fcrr'y:Ln:~ ;lcraos supplies nnJ. reinforcements. This ftttompt '\,'::.::, unsuccf:,"
(b)
101 US ~irborne Divi~ion
;\t 1200 hours thLJ ii.ivi"ion co:.sed to be und;:;l' con; :In<:1 30 Corps A
82 US !.irbornc Division Tho itCT::; of thi::; divj [dol" continue\.: to exton:l. their flnnks ::md h:ul to und,rt:-.ko oper·,.tions :lgo';irst the (malny who were loc:\ted ~Lt :';;OOK E 72:,1 ;:nL1 ERL':KO~' E 7862. It 1'1».5 now app'lrent th,:t til'_ enOl: ':s ·.uilclin{" up } . Z strcncth in the HErcm.I.LD li'o~m:~m . .T · , 1'. th.".t this wot.:ld prov\:; "\ very clcfini te thc(;,,\t to our i IGJ l'l fl.'U'l.k. • •• /J\.IR SUPPORT
'.
- 61
AIR SUPPORT 4-3. Fl.yi~ condihonS wore much improved mld 500 sorties were flown in the gener:1l I),ree:t N1.1 of i.RNHEH. 104 of those were o.rmcd . roconnaissLmces in the general area. N'il of ARNHEM clown to vENLO E 9109.
Tactical Reconnaissance h~d reported on the eyenin~ of 22/23
Septernber t thD.t there wns a oolwnn of 100 mixed vehicles- in VENLO itself,
and tho.t the enemy were dir,g:j.ng-in in that arcn. o
Attacks were ID-'l{le in support of 1 British Airborne Division on
a big factory in the ~'lRNHEH arc!,'.. fro:-:: which tho cnorw \,'fero sniping Md
observing the Airborne defence perimeter. The f'a.ctory '"fUR effectively
attacked by 24 Typhoons and enemy activity from this ~0~ ceased.
TD.rgets moving up to D.ttC\cK the rnn.in Corps ;;x::.;, wore nlso
atta.cked.
FLANKS
On the LEFT, 12 Corps hf'.d their fOr\'!w.'d elcumts im of EINDHOVEN whilo 8 Corps continued to push slowl;)' :forw:i.n~ towarcl.:; HEIJ.~(lND 5522'. On both fronts h:.1rd filrhting h'ld to..kcn pl::wc, ''..:1tl it '::as D.pparont th2,t the onemy, helped by ·tho cOtmtry, w~s cap~b10 of 3ti~1 ~~~osing considerable dolay on tho ftdvn.ncc of both Corpso Thus the on('rr~y 1"rm<'d be "ble to continue to hare-53 30 Corps L of C, particulnrl,y f"'c'!j\ the E.AST flF.'J'lk, until such time ~s 8 and 30 Corps clements COtud link up.
44.
·. 62 - . :3'::CTION 8
GENER':.L SITULTION
45.
The :--iroblc:" no\".- confrontir.: thIJ Corp~ ':".s, f irs'bly to continue o,t,'Gr,,-tions to SCCl.1rG ARNI:!'::, :.:;c:ccncll:/ to ~,;ct r>2i:nf'orC8;nents I".ncl :mppl ies to 1 British .:'~irborne Div:Lsion, thi:z:dly to ole..r ',T),cl. th';,1 koep open their L of C. Finally, ~,S tt18 cnc":..:y .:;';::;, rGportcd t" 'Lc; ll:r'inEine: bnks SOUTH fro;r, .~i1J.\lJm~:!, i t \':'10 os~-;cn,t;i'\1 to Gn~tJr(; the 38Q"l.1'-:i ty .)1' the: HIGHT flt'Jlk of the '::,:';.L bri 'gchc<"ll...
,LS r0g~"'.r(b P'otcction of tbc 1.: of. C, ,"',econcl. ;,-~" ,y 1".... d dircctc(1 thD.t 8 Corps W'~S tf) roli.;ve 3CJ Corps of '~h:is r(;:..;::.)(){l..li1..... ].ity mJ to C~R:~VE;. The hcCtvy artillery zUPPol,tin ~-ro9'n:,~,c , hich ":,:\S TL\Jcc':>::':lry to support the 1 ldrborne Division, "mo. the 5 DeLI. f',crry:lnr:, '1.0,"('os:.) !~~\jl<1 "to ,?;ivcn to the move for:,-rlrc1 of c~~ ~":unition ochclon£\. '1'he ':ossibil i ty oJ:' hD.ving to cctrry out t,n rt,33::'u1 t croGsin[', further to '~hc ,,},ST of l'jmHl'~:~:, no\\" t~t the enc!ny co·,:Jletely cont!'ollGd .dJ~Iill: \ :~l::;o !"X:;F~_lt th'.t the I'"QVO fOl:"''-''1.rcl of bridr~inv wquipr:kmt ha
.'
The flocc~;;'ity for (",o8Y0.r..ing Nor thw."I r(1,:l the c:·::i.stin::! d1~t11ow fully .':'.pprE;ci~,;,tGd ,ltd further) th,;"t the r,...:uu for c,G.c.itionCLl infantry '..:~s 'vit:tl,::tn the: country l·TOr;~Th, :)f i\:IJ:,lf'~GEN l,',-.".S ontirely unsuit~blc f:)r' ClqJloy-in;-:>: ".r:'our <.',... ins:: (.!.u~'-'r '
-bric1g(;hc~.d :·;<\S
....... ,
1lr, rC:fl.rds tho cncr-:Y,hc ';/ :;" ~,·.'..u~cd ';,::J! ·w:l.l'~.!, i;,,:o ,:nifl objects in viGC':; fi+stly,. to co~t:imle h_lI'~\.ss:i.nr; our r. of' C "11(. s..-::,condly, to dinin"\.te the pc::rb ,Gt<:;r hcltl by 'lfri'tish'ciY'1JCJrn,) ;:-jvision.
tr:
46.
Tho
t;~sks
oper:::.tions on 23
th'\t \":(,)1'<:: Siven to 30 C.Ol":!)R i.' .)),' . < :i.
.;50j(tc;;,li (;1'
,r~;
,'0:-:
\'ier0 :::.3 f'bllO\lG
(:-...). Gm-rds .:'r;:-:ourcd DiVi3ion
Hrivo ano ,,~L: ur.;d w:'in:mt '~v. _il~:J
729658,
Op(.;r~,-t(; '.':i th l)ntJrcGL~<,jnV!-l
I'roup in
:,,:,",-;)<1.
v"~~uUt':j.J
- TJDEN,
Corps rlxit cIa-,r. 'ct;,:in 1'U;')_: >r, It,l ~r(lup ~l.S "t ;')rcncnt dis' 'osuCt SOl :'l'h Ol~ GJ...V~ '.;·h:i.c\1 ';i;,;) not to
to
kc',:~)
be 1,~6V;)Ll ~~OlJTI-I 1~nic:;s Divir',:ir'l,::J.
("'>!l'i'j',n(-'I"l:'
co~:-:i(1cre::l
n0cc~s~Lry..
(iii) Rct:d.n t',:o ::J<)u't(ll'on~, HCn OJ h:.r:'ti21,.: N'\RT.: 01'.' 'J u',L 1wir1:r,dl()'\cl, :11:30 recco ,,~:;T fror.'l GI(,WI~; tU'.i·\,l',b ,"'Ie;:::; B !~7'3i.j. mCl. ;.~ 1Jl?,~T( )(~,; !RO~CH ]i;
321,.6. '/1.3 ,"\ . . .
• • " (1 ) ) ; _'+_J..}_' ~~ 13 lon
- 63 (b) 43 Diviston (i) Retain one briG~dc ~ro~) in ~rGa R Dj~ bridgohend, enlilrging this tow
Capture ELST
(iii) Secure and strengthen junction with 1 Airborno Division (iv)
Recce ';'lcstvJ[',rds betl'/een l.'fAAL nnd NEDER RIJN.
(v) Send Corr~dcr 129 Brigade earliest to visit Commander 5 GtL'"l.rds /,rmoured Brigade. (c)
69
Bric~dc Group
Carryon with prcnent t~ks including rccce ·::'EST between MAI;.S and YiMJ, lUld EAST fror" GRAVE towD.rds CUYT. (d) SRY remain under COl'rllTlJ:md 82
us
Airborne Division.
OPERATION ON 30 CORPS L OF C At first light, 32 GUD.rc~ Br~0~do bernn oporQtibns in conjunction with 101 US Airborne Division to clear the Corps axis SW from UDEN. Cont0.ct vias Tl',,"..de with enemy tanks ::-...nd infantry in the area. of VOLKEL 564.0, md Qstriclc the roO-d in tho areo. 5140. 44 Royet.l T,'lnks were also co-opcra.ting NE of VEGHEL and by 1300 hours they rod joined up with 32 Gm.rds i,rm:.mred Bri}:acle.
47.
At 1530 hours, the axis wn.s rc-opened und blocks of ten vehicles thro~1h every thirty minutes. From then on) traffic continuod to flow through stec.dily subject to occ.'lsiono.l interruptions from enemy shelling, bazookcring and smull ~rms fire. Nevertheless, the three.t to the axis continued, .?no the cneI:1Y appe,lred to have in this nrcc. c.bout 300 infc.ntry nnd ,~ number of tc..nks and SF guns.
were being sent
GROUND TROOPS, A.RNHEH - NIJ1t,1EGEN n1"Oo.•.
48.
As has alrcn.dy been s tntcc1 i t h:\d not been possible to got supplies across in DUK':IS on the previous night to 1 :,irborne Division. fJ.ccordingly, OC 5 DeLI asked tho.t ::"Issn.ult bo::\.ts be sent up to him so that he could ~~ke usc of them fqr Getting both Polish reinforc~ments D.nd supplies across on the night 23 September. . Con~der 43 Division also asked for a smoke detachment to be made av~il~ble so ·th~t such oper~tions would not be limited to the hours of ~~rkncss. hS regards current opcr.'ltions for that d..'ly, tho :n.:'\in objoct of' 43 Division was to strengthen nnd deepen tho existing bridg0hend GO th~t a link up with 1 ,\.irbornc Division could be achieved that night.
By 1230 hours, 5 DORSETS ho.
. .. /By 1l!'30
hours
By 1430 hour~-;, h'o t,~'.tt~:lionG of 130 Inf'lntry -'ricrule \"lere
just Ghort of' the SOUTH h'1.11k of' the lfEDER RIJN ·-:-..nd 11-3 DivisirmnJ.
ReconnaissD..nce [L\";r;i;ncnt v;,s cff(;ctivcly screenin:' thQ CorPs J.EFT flnnk
betwoen tho Hivcr3 NEDE~ ruJK~w-.cl '".t'_·c1,. ;~t 17QO hours, 214 Infc.ntry
Brigp..dc h'.'l.d. lL';.unchcd . ,n c~ tt;:.ck em ~1:.JT from tho '!"LEST rmd by 2200 hours
they h~~c.l re:\.chec1, '~,nd '."orv fichtir..r: .iIi, the '-Jestern outskirts of the
vill~gc. Here ~ housc-t0-house D,ttle took pl~cc D..nd before ~y
progross could be ~~".c.c it \\,:18 Ll e'-~sc of clc;Cl.rinr the villr~gc hOt:G<3 by
house.
During the d:1.y, the ;,'EL:·,H GUliill)S Group h~c1 rr':-'.de littlo
progress and .by 1:'..3t li;"Tht h~"'..cl l'v".chcc1: ·'.re,\ 7265, but :".3 on tho
previous d"ly, the country OV(;:::' \';h:ich they hr:.d to fit:;ht ,,:I\S idcCl.lly
sui ted. for defence 'mG. the cm.:r.ty .,,:cl.[;; not slo\'.. . t:i >::dr..pt his mothods
accordin'-"ly.
/l.t 1600 hours, the l{oY.•L r:bT1IEHLJIJDS BriC·cd.c, now undor cDrrun:>.nc. 1 JSrb::>rnc COr"j!s, r~::;sumo\l rUDpoi1sil~ iIi ty f or the GRi.VE bridge ffi1d the bridge just :NE of it. 43 Div:i.::;).,)n's hold on the SOUTH bonk of the R NEDEH rtIJ}T in the ~)E.EL ~ ':"~;':'l. h'-1.(-:' boen m~int,inod. Movement WD.n still uncleI' con:>t::Lnt obscrY,-'..tion <:::.ll.':1 hc:'..vy firo from the enemy, end therefore nc :Lttcmpt coulcl. bo r,:<~c to cross the rivero, The pl:>..n for th0 ni·:ht 2312.1+ Septcr.::.1)er to bril1r, ~ssist:mce to the Airborne Division '''I~'..S to P'l3~j ovor "3 m.~my of tho Polish P:lr::1.chutc Bri~ade as ?ossiblc, pos.::;ibly two c:);:ii?~~niIJ3 of int'rmtry, plus essential supplios, l))E.inly nl:1lmni tion. h.:: c~l1. for anu'1lUlition by iLirl~ornc }'orccs was :\n urgunt one c'..s they il~L: !let 1 oen ".~_c: to be rc-supplied the d.'l.y before by ~~ir o\'lin[~ to l:',cl ':;,:,";,ther conui''.;ioT"is. Thorefore, no F.l8.jor .:l.ssnul t crossin.:' could -t'..'..k0 rl':c;, ':'..3 the .. 33::.ul t cr:\ft "tere requirod for carryin[; :~crOG~ ~1..Lir.I.uni.tion; eventually, 250 roles of the Polish P,"l.rn.chutu Ilri" ,
AIRBORl\'E COUPS
'49.
(.:I.)
1 British il.irbornc Divi:3ion By r~idc:-'1.y 23 ~'-'rtc..i!'l]-'Cl.', 1 ,',it'borno Divbion h·,cJ. beun further reduced, ,clthou['h i t 1".' ,~. bc(;n rcinforcud on th0 night 22/23 September r'y : ,bout 50 11 :(",nk3 of tho 250 l'~en of 1 Polish r"l.r~~chutQ Brip·:·~l_:.... dl0 h' '. (Ji·j;;:i.n.. ,ll::J' been f€ r ricd ·'..cross. The Div:i.si0n' B pc'r:!.!:,ot;. ::. ~1a:,', ~,;till..llndor contin,uQJ.).R_ haayy. eneQY rrnrtar {\.nll shell 1':;';;-,. f~:()l:' thv :NE. ;\nl!auni tiDn flnd me<1icn..l f:~.cilitiG~ '::(;re in ',;'!cn nhortcr GUPIJly th,'~n on the previous dc-yo ThL: food. c,it·.jr.. "Li,;;n ':;~l::; ',cuto~ Thur0 \,;,\5 still no news of 1 P;lrn.chutG "'jr::-nu--:'c, ~md fro:'! :stn(;E;L;ent3 r.:~,ae by prisoners of \','''.1', i'l; ',","'..3 ",J'-,,',rcnt th":t ~.3 Cl forrcntion it h::.(1. cv,scc: to exi,1t,
(b) On the RIGHT fl·..nk, '--".:}';1 dyt::.; fY!' thi::; DiviGi()n hnu clo:~.:rc,l tho enonlY frol~ the :re.·3.. 1.1: tl'(; [,cm of t.he R .:-
,;.-:.
c::..· t'_(:: lJ,f:,ntry ~(t~gir:tcnt ".ncl the renv.:'.indcl' of the rolish P·:.r"C1 1Ut. ·..d,' " ~ '.'.crt; (1.r0) 0<1 in the NORTH D' ~ro '.n • th I.".;XCC•• 11" J,".·l.·'tf:. n.,·" r'lXtiti,~s to both _,('Y,lid.ors o f G'I.ii.V.c, ,en c r:-w. nn,l pc.rfjonnGl '0'.',..;1:'0 VIJ':::'Y li,·nt.. • .• (c)/101 U:)
r'. t 1600 hcur::; J 352
- 65
(c)
101 US ~irbornG Division This Division continuod to be F>.ctivcly enployucl in decline 'Nith tbe t.;nc,mw "cut" to the Corps L of C ~md its subsequent di3ruption ::tC".i'J. ".ftor ropair•
.h IR SUPPORT
50. The we'lthcr \'r"s ~.g;dn cloudy, ~\ncl this, couplo,} "-lith the landing of the r;liClGI' c;lmilcnts of 82 US Air1)orno Divi::>ion ~nc.. th() Poles of' the Poli3h P:.r'-:..chutc Bri~·iHlo, inturfcrc
51. Both 8 ,c1 '12 Corps continued to meet ::.;tiff opposition, but both h:'..u m:uH':'c';)(!. to rr".kc 30mc progrcs~, 0..nU it WE,G hoped th::.t 11. Armour(;d Divisbn of 8 Cori)s would soon link up with 30 Corps F~trols on the Ei·.sT fL·.nk.
- 66
30 CORFS OFm1..I;.TI0NS 24 SEPmmER
52.
The eneqy had continued in his
attei.~pts
to cut the Co,rps
L of C and to climinato the perll.let~r held by the British .ii.irborne ' In addition, the enen;y was trying to DivisilY'l the previous d~. reinforce the iJmHEM area from the El',ST and WEST, using the railway
trm UTRECHT to E},ll,!ERICH E 9700. Tanks had been seen moving along the NuRTH bank of the R NEDER RL.TN from the 'direction EiiST of illiENEN E 5175 so' as to counter any attel':1.pt that ;.light be I~ade to cross the NEIER RLrN. Cyclist troops ...ere reported to have been moved SvUTH to the :area 5£576. The enewy had thickened I,lp his resistance to the EAST and he was also diSt';ing-in on th0 N0RTH bank of tne NEDER RIJN in the vicinity where the rivers NlIDER RLJN and NEDER WlJ.L approach each other.
TASKS
53.
The tasks for opera~~ions on 24 September as allotted by 30 Corps are as shown at A..ppendi:v; 'u l "
GROUND TRlJOJ:S BET'I'{EEN
6~HNtIFl,~
-_._--
lJ'l'D ---- N!Jl;[EGl!:i
54. 43 Division continued its ~fforts tu drive the enemy out of ZLST, but he had reinforc.:::d 'tr..is 3.l'0a 'in th both tanks and infantry fran JffiNHEM. So fierce 'iro.s the f"ighting in t'lis area. that 214 Brigade group did not reach the centre -of the villabc until 1400 hours. By this time they Vlere ncor the I,1air. rond NuRTH and SlJUTHthrough ELST itself and had elements a.crOS:l i t~ Dy 18.st light, the greater part of ELST had been cleared ~JY 2'l4 nri;~ade, and 7 SUi LI had secured ELST railway station and 1 WLJRCESTERS on the LEFT was estaulished just SOUTH of ELST. There ~e~e, however, still elaoents of the enemy clinging on to the NE end of the 'Tillage. The rJain opposition was f'rClil snipers ana Spand.aus, who· wer0 '\7011 concealed. in alL10st every house. The glider el~aent of the ?Glish Parachute Brigade, which had landed in the GRAVE area on tho afternoon of 23 Septel~ber,.:V7,~re taken up to 130 Infantry Brigade's a.rea by 1600 hours 24 September, so that they could be ferried across that night to reinforce 1 Bri tish Airborne Division. Un the S~UTH bank of the NEDER RLJN, . the enemy's reaction on the front of 5 DLI· wa.s c")nsid3rabl~,. n.s ·he was prllsumably apprehensive of· '-,ur hlakin[; an at.tenp-t tn estalJ1ish a bridgehead in this area. The capacity of the rO~3 leading to 5 teLl area was very limited, in full view of the cnc,'\Y, and only narro.... crossings existed; thus it was difficult to set the assault boats and DmGVs required to terry rein.fr)rcements and. sup:,.,lics down to the river side. If' any orossing was -1;0 ~\e a';;ter.\pted in daylight, Comrilander 43 Division asked for a full allotment of m:ioke to cover such en operation.
At 1600 hours, the
~IELSH GtLJIDS
Group a.ttempted to take The enel:\y was Ill0St deterr,lined'in his'resistance, and by last light, the VIELSH GUlJIDS Group were short of' their obj \;'Cti·... e ant! were established in, the area 730665 to 720695, and SlJUTH of !3E',2'i:c.L 7367.
BEMMJiL 7367 but found it strongly held-:-
GRvUND TRWPS 0PElu~T:ING uN 'l'HE L' LJ~..Q
55.
The enany again O\.lt the Corps Main axis SUUTH of VEGllEL at 1630 hours and all traffic CCt-l3i..:d... This tir,le the attack came in frol:\ tho WEST of- the axis and .....':\..'3 uade lJy elOl,lcnts of 6 Parachute Regiment, which had b6en by-passed in th~ ori~inal drive for NLThiIi.GEN. Tho eocll\}' aeain cr.lp10Yod. tanks and infantry and a few SF guns. . ••• / DurJ.ng
J
DurinG t;1C nil:ht l! urtarc:d. .3 nil 'r,
56.
(c.)
C1'
- 67 2j /24 ~3el:-t';j ll.,c.;r th-..: rve.a ..-ms again sholled end
;\[\.J.rtT~-
of \lECFEL.
1 Dritish ~.h..1Joi.'n':: :-Ji,risinn 1 British J~-l.l'l:)(·,rnc ~)i vision hud c~ntinued to ~ndure heavy canunltics ,~'.l1d t.:ncJ.\y att::l.ck~ v/hich i t h~.j been vii thstanding fQr the./; ast wcek. Their Divisional peri,,1<.;tcr hed by now been r;luch rrl\luced ~...nd \'l'.',L~ contred on 1-L'.l1TES1'EIN 6978. The cnt1r.\y kept up ,'). st,,;n.d.y stt'o::r,l of l~:ortal' nnd. SP fire. Uur trovp3 had dug thu:.:sclvcs 'nd \oI~crl:: £\.lso !loWin.:; SOIllC houses, but these ';/ore rn.:::,idly ')0in.~ dest:coycd by encl:1Y E\J!lfire {ro,.l t!lnks •
in
..:.1 thou:~h they h ...1 r(Jceived c. 1'0"/ Pc,lish r"infor(;(;1I1cnts, about 150 all ranks, :~nd supplies, th', SU9'tl1y and n. _.luoition situation 'ji' the :::hV:ifjiorl \"l~;j yrecarious. The situation wns ag;:::~re_vut.;::d by thu fo.c t thi.~ t the:: en cr:LJ \/::I.S in C:J!1 trol of the ferry at 6f!.·76 , ';;hich m~de tl.,~ senjin[; over of supplies even l:lo:ce difficult. C'.su:?ltit;s ·.., ert; ht:'\vy, crld th0 £.'ielcl Dressing :3tl1tion c.5·~2,blished in the c~ntrc of the Divisional .l~ar:d.r.istr:l.tivo ... rG!t 'rIas gr,,::ttly ovcr10c.d.::d wii;h C:,\5e3, includin; G.D.!~·~J%. _ :.:3 t "~i:x.'bljrnc DivisiOli z'eportcd. that GEm·~..l'IS ',;ere novi evc.cuC:ltin~ all ,;ound.ed. to .JHHE).i.
(b)
82 US ~~L'borne Di vinion The Division C" ntir,ued. t-::· ",cn.L out p~trols t:. tho Ei~;:)T
Cl..I1.J. to .HOP u> enel.iY str,:,n.:; oints whicn h~..l l.l0en established
in the ,·iuUil ,::.rva. Durin~ the cc/ursa (".If their ::'!ltro1ling)
some of thG/:w ~::.::-:.tro1s, -,;;:..rkins in c::.njuncti;:;1': I,n th n.
sClu'llr'J(J ,)f' the SHY, crGs.jed the GErliuJ' bordt::!'.
T~lU
cncE(r" cor.ti!1ue] t-:. l>t:."c._u u~' his ~tr 'nzth in thl,.) ::-.r ~D., a.,: ~".. r.u.. :ber clf to.nks ' rd. :l1::;0 ',)een i' 8:?ort c.'Ii there. ,'32 US i. oj l'borne Division had ho·....ovcr a .:..::,00. !inti-tank obstacle in th..:; for:: Jf n. r . lilway rLUming i.hr~u';:h "the fr;Jnt i-,f their aren., and i:l ajui tion, th(J SRY, lesti Orl0 fiqu~dron, ~up~licd the ar.~ourca 5U)~ort if required.
REICH.~,,;.L,)
(c)
101 US _-:"irl.lorne Di visirln The ::..cti viti (;;.3 i)f tIll::; Di visifjl1 ill the VEGHEL ar
57.
ElieDY posi tions r·Jund. the "":..il'bc,rne periJ:lde:c ',,'0rc very :::tr·-.f",d. ;..0 ::,o:30rvcr, "...h-) "':,.tchoJ fro!., thu ~3UU1'~{ -lJ::l.Tlk :::,1' th~ ':.!,jl < l
e:;.rl
(\i.'t
T-"..cti '''..1 'CUl)nl':.i.i;;s<.\ncc :->.Lvlu(;uJ J~'" ti () _t.:; Lu'~ n"Uinl.~ vi' : ...:..·..t
;3{", .. X;
inforJ.l;l.tion in the
::;j."}lific~lCC;.
- 6el 1l. co"sidern.ule fDrGe of l:lt::diu.;;l bombers attacked t::J.rgets in the ;•.RNHE2:'l area.
:ENEMY
58.
..:~CTIVITY
The NIJ1:iEGIiN bridge \i£tS covurcd by S~i tfires and these provided a lone and spirited series of do~ fiGhts over the NLn,iaGEN uroa where they ~et a 8tron~ f8rce of ~v 1908 and Me 1095. Several en~;w aircraft were seen to go devm. '
- 69
GEj'IEiLL
Sn'U~~TIuN
59.
,iy 0(1';; it ',{<::':3 ,_ ,p.J.l';"cnt th:"t the CCi:ctlS L Df C ax:is '.;;auld
cantiime t;) 0(; cut until:) Cc.r:s coul:'! t':tKe Dver offoctive c-:'~1trol.
This c',,-ulc1 i,ruT be 'Lne until ~t.t.,; cne .'j" '::0.3 eVictcJ. frOD TlRLdIJl'iI)
E 5522, which 8 Curps 'I/(;l"~ hJ.·v:J.ng dil'ficLllty in r(;Ciching. Until,
tnoi:C;fore, }ffiUlvNLJ cCiuE, '0<,; cle~rci, ''';fj~;(;ntia.l tra.ffic such as ._~,
In(·ro infC\ntry and nintt:~l cc vuhinlc:,; '''::'''lld '.:>0 vLry 51(/.-:.
j
~,f
The sit ·;.ti.:.'l
1
I
i tF:h ... irbornc Division './as little
changed. DUr1l1" the; )r~,viou::; ni~h·c., tho int9.l1try of the 43 Division had :t0rc~;cl D.. Cl'~J:>3in~ c:;'" -.;nc '.-··).~l{ JUJN: e,n::':' eventually succeeded. in linkinc Uj '-'iit', tiJJ: hc'rd [n'(;~~.3a;~ n.irl)Orn8 troops :In thb Northern 1) DJ1 k. Sr)I,1C su?;:lics hr~'i 0,-.m f::lrl'ied l1cr03S "'.Jut this had to cease at first li,'3ht orlln~ t:, '~h'3 C;\i} ..Y' ~ ('.,:-;,lplctc iO,.linatiJn by fire of the SuUTH ban!~ ot' the }~i VC:!',
The: a1C::,y h.s.. ri',·.'. iv~ 1 l<' d l i.-jea of rctakin(3 };LJ~~.EN, t:lcticul rec~/nn3.i";~t,ncc r"4)Ort3 it ',;as cvi:iunt that he \iM rLc:rou~)in[ h~(J. in tl:0 "',JnW; n.r0:'lo 1'0 tho 8uUTI-i of the :.:,iAS he m.J.s Lein~ (;raduc:.lly push r ,.1 E.::.st';·:.J,:ds, ;->r.:1 i t ','/a,; hG9Cd that 3') and 8 C01'1)5 ....r()Llld. link up bc.:fol.'c rd.i)"\t 2)/26 S :l)tul..bcr.
uut
f'rCll,l
T~:3KS
60. vero
f:y:c f"rr,~"r\''ir)I1f:;
Tasks B-S
of jO i';0rps opGr'Ltions on 25 Septer,;bt:I',
fnllOHs:
GU~:',,:,J$ Brit· -Ie ('.untinuu ,...ith Feason"\; tasks, )o3i ti:,)11 :i.n or:. (; rCc·,i.L'.cm tal i~roup in areo. i+ ;~1i les
(i) 32
~3ii C")f
(ii)
if'i?O"'~ :)').04
Contimh~.1it~·· pr'~s{;:. ~ J~-Y.sk .:;,1' prutcctin
~..ST fbnk of ·IJrid,..:uhcaa, I) V "':::' 1;>-W ~-{ "",;.L, Gxt.(;r:lint~ this by .r~licvinc 4j Divi~ion of rus~on3ibility for inclusive
l':L:>T, ( iii)
GJ.LoVE
·./ilC~J
c:\~,tt...;;-'d.
Con tinu(; ~Jr(;scn.l.; r -'f : iJrtnc'..i :J :JLUlC':': t tI.::;k::;, includinc taf:ks tc. E...ST and. ',;~:;::)'i' ~>~...;' i G1LV.l!:, :3,_,UT){ frrjLi H L:.A.S, unti 1 r·Jli Gvcd ~JY "'.r.'l'ivr.. l 5;~ Divi siDn ieoe~, :nt\is sane,) Regil..en t.
(b) 43 Divi:Jion
( i) (
.. ,
\ ~~)
( iii)
:C":1:'0,;<..1'o 'L~, '):, ~3)Li.sl.:. co. '.-'l·:i:l, cht.;al Dver the; NED.l:Sl~ :i.LJN :i 11 [":t.'Ci~ •. ~~YJ' of ~\E'l\!JJL'~6276 (),s soon us ~jQs::iilllo. C:)ntillUL: Fe ;~'r;nt r~~(:':',nn::d :.•."Itmcc t'1.3ks '-.• E;:j1' h .. t';'uen tlHJ :rF.:.J.,;:,( IH.I ~ roi~~ ,I~"J..
Protect
E.,f;~L'.L '1<
aft,.,. u'T
CUi."
u.: )0 0,':;:,:<;
'J t~, K... :J ,~...h ,( ..T;''[ :i.n
fl')", 8..1'--;;1:'.
0xclusiv0 ZLST,
6976.
'fh0 JccisiC"Jt\ t,·, ,.i.ti1dc." ..... 1 _.riti~.ih .·.. il"l)"lrn...: Divioion ni!{.ht 25/26 f:k):;r.;.. "J''':::' ".m,·. ',:' .h.;n ,~, :,ill; !;l"trj u::,rnin::.:., Ll-nd th0 [\.LlOVC " In;'; 1'1' :'. tLi:: '.-rj, th-h' "',,:.~l, :::.n,:~ th' r cvisod tasks canccll ~'l. l'n".---: t~,:'cs for fr,l.'l.l:t ti Gil;:, ._ hr' .. :t(:· _ ~,<)' )0 C Jr' p , r~r(j S:lO'.,1I1 at . pponclix 'pl.
GRuUND TRUufS 61. J~t 03 L..5 hour::;> 130 J:riL:t.L of 45 Division r~l,)orted that tho; I'.0RSETS had fore t::(: a Gr03Gb ,. OV
62. SliUTH or" the 7.UG ':.:rr..tlE:.>'S v. >ol~l'l' C\.l.nal, th,~ Corps l:a.in axis was s-t;ill NlJT cJ.i~aroJd, u.r.d n r, tr:'::!.~f~iG h.3,.:1 llc;on aole to 80t through durin£; the past 24 110Ur;..i~ )0 (I ) D:i.vlcicn rv[Jort<:,,(} that thu)' considered. that th~ r('l~·l ::il1r)ul Ov ')1:-'0': 'u)' th0 morning of' 26 Septerl:bor. ~:..t 1/00 Hour", ,ut.:ob .,f the 2 HCR roported that 32 Guards Bri[;adc h:.J:l est~l ... 115h(;d Gl",!1 tact ,,-1 th 29 .~ruoureJ. Brigade of 11 .~ri!ioured Divis.ion 'Vi~,::' lti.'..d :L,,~(lchcd S'i' ;.J~TEONIS 7238. Durinf~
the
beer: built in ca;.;o
u: h
J:;~10
i....
an",,-.,!
C : ... ~, i.d-;.f.l.r.7
~'-l
cln.ss 40 bridl3e, which h,?..J
.t:lcJ. ':0[,11) the GRoNE brilge,
"-:<15
com)letcd. ~ ..LWLJRN.E
TKvUIS IJr:::·l~;..T1i f'J:·' --_._----_.
63. .Du:l:'in:~ t'l-w ni~~~it 25/2; ~·k;;?te,J):.Jr, 130 Infantry bril~D.dc, (4 DU~{~ET3), of' It..j Div':bic;:-), c· t'l.'·i.uu out ,1]?,,;r':tti.-Jn;1 for the.l'i thdravro,l of 1 ~~irborne Div:i.s:i.:;I) ir. ~~;3[l·tlt U.~" .tn. '1'he:~e operati"-,n3 c-,ntinued until 0600 h"jur~ .k,':::n inten,.;le . ;n...::\,/ ,'ire J ,,-,-,1,.1 :further crn:1sings il.1,JoGsi;Jlc. T~;ccc 0, l' j;i0ns" ~7J.':'d1 il.::'!"<.. c~~rl'i<::d Jut i'li th the greatest :jo.l1;,;J1-::;ry all·t ..>kiJ I ~J1 flll 0;'.1.1c...,;):')1<.).}, r':;;i1d.tc'} in the cV"'\'cuation of" ?163 X;1 0'.' 1 ,'~';'!:IJnl'ne ~)..i.v.Luion, '160 01' .I. ulish l-'C)_r::\chute Bri·;fl.de D.nU 75 of 1;. .u-,~I~.b't.', H~() L·._~: 0' tlh; L tter 'OllJr·,;; ltJl't on the mRT' lJank of th.; ~i)~n~.: .I.'I,IrT f.,t'· 11 f'2..~ntin}~ tfJ c.·ver tho '"j tldrfl.',ial. .l~}.'ran3('J,: nto '..Ie' I''.. 1,. ,'0_' tol J l"lJ';~ .to'. lJ.,' ~.3 DivLJL,n ::tt !~i1ort notice, thtJ Gurvi,\P L .:,.; .. It'· ;.. )11,\\.,.1 il ";i1.t.; ho.rr:).ck~ at Nr,Ti::':~GEN. ')') , 1'}'j i~'l'1 rot: D:ivi,3ion cuntinued. 1'he .LJ.l,.riC;..Jl UL, th~ir res t,>'JC t i vc to.~:;l~., cJf _·..L.ll.nl: )J 'otC>C+iOlL, :l.tld a:.::\1'iistine to clcal' t~le L of C. • •• / .~l thou:..,ll
"
- 71 .':"lthough ,'lctivity ',;!.p,im,t t:1e 82 US Division \'/0-6 not very ncticeoble, there ','/ore eigns th:\t they W8rc preparing to counter [ltt~ck on this Divi21on' t;: RIGI-E fl')nk in th!1t '1rea.
64-. The l.Iriori ty \'IfJ,S still em the ::.RNHF.il sector. .. very larGe number of t£\:c~;ctD 'cou?lcl tho ilcrimotcr of the ..·:..irborne Division V/ore eng9.ge<'l in spi t<:; of cloud, sleet and rllin. GUIl and mertar posi tions" including Nebel...:cri'crs, W0l:'C C\ttnckcd. SOl':1e r?ther de ~ er t~rgets '/lcre ~lso t.3.ken on. i.Iovemcnt !'rcm REl%lJ1'.i ,:n the ';,"33'£ \·/(!.s given a goed stro2\l'c [IIld armed rec("',nnaissnnc;::s ';;ent to .:-:J.iEi"::'POORT where camoufh-ged ;'.!T \"1::'-S rept'rtec1. No lesults are 2.vnilablc. int()
J,RNH:El';~
,.... ~ctic('l.l Reoonnaiss,'u1CC \',1qS hindered by b2.d Boine on the recormaiss:.mce :::drfield early on .')nd by oloud bnnks later. By 1700 hours, the sortios hnd ~ll proved abortive.
65. ~·.t '1bout 0<330 hours, 1''Pproximc.tely 4-0 ::!.ircrlll't TIlClde an unsuccesaful ~tteJnpt to destroy both the NIJj\jJ;GEN bridges. Throughcu+' the c1::.y fi[hter patrol~; :c:nda contact ·....i th encn\y fiGhters, on tw.) ccc{~sions \/hile covering the .'...liI',!JjEt. n."'ld f.I.P..iliGEN nrc:\s. Ii; ·."~:s ::t:rq::.\rexlt th~t the enemy "\Ins m1.king ') IIIJjcr effort to cut the :'!I:.J.,;EC~: bridges Yd. th the object of disruptinr; our L of C for OUT troops o~J£'rr,ting be tween the l'~"""S :md the l'·iEDE...1i. ~IJN.
., .
66. On the lUC~~ r:~~)k of the Corps: SOU'rH of the H .:iJ,....,s, the encr:vr ''':::',5 [,T£l.Ju,.l'ly l)ein5 !?ushe~l E·'st'.'l,?Xds. ;.t 1700,hcurs, 30 ~~nd '3 Corps joined up ·.t 3T ;j:TH<).::!S 7138. Further 3OU'l'H, ~·.iERT 5730, EEL,lo'm 5522 :'.nc1 .TJl:,t':iJ-JE 6520 ..-lere. nOVI firnly held by 8 Corps. Thus this 'K3sh'nrr3::; ~dV{lnCe by 8 Corps mcnnt thc.t there was little hO!.Je cf t111;) rernn:;mtH esc~:,!'ine: EUS'G\IClrtls D.cr05~ 30 Corps L ef C. On the Gcrri>o V":1'"'l fl~~nkJ 12 Ccrps h'1d reported that tho (\Xis of :1d~'mec i'lQi.rm of S']' O;~D:~'1RI)DE VIas still Nor clear Md the rr-)m,-:i~2er of' l;h~ (~I\Y ...·!<'l,S e~()nt in trying to c1eer up this crcu•
mu~n
•
- 72 SEC'IrOi'/ 9
f
'HE EXECUT ION OF THE .t-.LAY
In gencr31 tho ~ L:n 'iOr)~e-.:d very well, and provec itself' flexible to meet .-~ll t:lctic8.l si tuetions. During the course of the QJ:.:e:cG.tioi.1 the ~L:<.is of advance 'oetv:een S'.P OEllEHllOIlE ':'.)1:] VEGHF,L ';/')s cut. b,V enel,,y notion on ty'/o occasions:
67. (e)
J'TI ',,- _', '?:' 25 hours
No 1:10vefi10nt of sof(j"'GKi .., . , vellicl':s took
:110.00
during
ti.leS(; iJCi:iods. ~\'rcc€~'·.'3 l f I free:dIl~~', to pnss for:"':rd tr:?,ff'ic of v:i_ to.l :00C ~;s~i t-y, ':la.S successfully::"ccom!:lished.
(b) l'l1e ,Jif1'icu1
J
ETI-.jJHOVK:: '::::~::. hC'~vil:: ";)on1bec1 f'..n c1 J.;h.U3 blC'cked on lIi tnt 19/20 Septeuber: srI' OED""" nODE .,,~ s shelled interrni ttently wi th r;~.1.' bursts tl'li'()UD1011-t the oper·::ti0l1. o:c.·~'.:rli .:.;c- tiOl" (-:Ii th one e.:-ccepticlIl), 11;, of'fioE;l'S':l1C1 ·:fireless o:'ll.Jr::.tC':i.~s. 'rhis t , ~n ,'1SSClltJL -" r,-:i ..... :::n H.: .30 Corys the d::18" prior to the st ~t of iiI'L,) 1,i:':~''-' '"ion f:"OT briofinr; "md ':"ireless l1vttins.
(c) '-,-'he ',L'1.',lf'-{,ic ccnsi:...te
(a)
CO::l{,1.'ol
~ of
'.hrclcss co:,lillmie:y~~on l)ci.;·:,'e"o'1j U.. [p.l'ltillL~ IiQs '.1n(~ TC1.Js v/ol'keel s::__n sl.: t!i.e~·ll:/ fro!". th,~ outset of the o.,,--,r .tion und coul(~ not b\: =0:'.icclll),]i. '.i.his '.. ';S ']ue to the lir!Jitcd r:mge of th set"" K8cour:.;c ':1':',5 l:!-; lie to Dl.-?s. 'j/iro1':':33 tOUC 1l ';:;J.;-'-', ho·.. e:;vc:c, SlJ.CC0ssfully l:nint:::incd on lIP S('; t s (,'). ':IGcn the Do:;' " .t chi n ~,' -~n cl , (30 Corps TrG1'fi c Of:Lice) , an':: th·.) RCGZ,;ivini,~ :i:;nd, (G(;,m) A'1in H~ 30 Corps), throu~hout i;i1U (' ;)e_'~:,i.m.
(e) '.(he orgeniseCl
of'
i;;OVt;[:10nt
l'.lrgt.:
nW~lnr>rs ot' vehicles is
cntircJ.s" '],..;pcl)(lent em ;~
fC.-" S '~CLi
CGccl c
Cf
CO!l t:cc 1
Jl::)i1Ullic'
tio:l1s
... '" 1.'13 -:1' '·he l·.ttLr, it J..;, su,';: ,··"tee tll-;t line COl;Dunic;:-tio;:; is C~j_"C;l1 \;i;"l. 'rh,,~ control c1.'i'.'llis:"tion ",houle: not lYJ ,)vc:::- c1- bor'~ t8, ·'.ne} shaull be sufficiently flexi ble to d'J" 1 .:~, ;;:' 1.J:~jforujccn cOlltixH',mci ''15. ;.-:t11ch ',;/ill ( ,~.!)':nc1 0" J ,ct:i.VIJ I r) l;rolli'H,', of' the route b'J cluthusi :1stic: officCTr: ':,"eLI ·/t:·:"·;~\.;' ill 'vlie J.j_ cticol ~Jl m. {~Ilick thinldn{,: rmd. fin) 'Icbm] QY; ~'r '(~l... Ljtl:r j.·IJ,!IlLrcd. BUORITIES
G8. Cht111r~e~:1 of .\r.\. r~~ t:V" .:Cl' G (SD) loc;',ted yJi th ... iII ~.~'''l:.: i:"
l;1\i;i.i'icd teJ 'l'r:'\fl'ic Oi'':''icc t:irCJIIUl ::mch c: "u,Ts in 'l.'iori ty ·.'te:r.....~
'-->'1,:::
ordered ;
(i)
" o'.'h1gy c,l!:i!), -'.50 voiliclcs, tc .' (. }'~.
'I',:3C'JJ'l' G'''l1~\l
73
(li) 69 l1rigFlr'c, )+50 vehicles,
Esc;~ur.i.' C"n~l to
3'..' OEDEl\llWDE.
(iii) 50 Divisiol1, lcn;~ 69 Brig3<1e, 3,000 vI·;l'ticles, ES(1~U'l.' C':ma1. to s'r OEI:!El.mODE.
(iv) 7 .,:.nneu.rec1 Divisio11. reo,uircd the :)xis fror:l
'l'ms fOl'1:l::::.tion
Em-maVEN to
\iEGl-JEL.
The ').cccler·~Jdon of ti1ese colutl.ns involved the I free~ing' of all other colw:ms Oll the :COile to :l110'.! for t.l1cir fruo; ~)'"l..ss::;,,[';c. In f..ll1 four C:.\SUS these C01U:l1rlS had unhi.nJereJ runs to thGil' c.isperse,l -:re(.\s, the; Y3:ci"1~tj,nG 8, lumn covering th" (1ist::ncc of 47 1::i1es in 3'~ hours, ;.md 50 Division hD..vinC their best run 8inc0 I' ndiri[5 on D DO-Y'
li'REEZING
69.
Ch:mees in }ziori ty 'md order ui' ,,:.rch y/o]rc ., 1e for reasons O£"Jc:c·:~.tiorJ'll nCC8s~;ity.
of urgent
It ;;.us t be bCL11C in min i, 11;:; ':!(;vcr, tj;,~ t t f'rce zini: t docs ili.poSe'l dcl:ty in l,i;I)1.: ~ 1 8:','-::C(; n:rl ':ovin!:; columns v/hich. h"vc to be frozen. The ~ I'OCC;';S ch, ,u1,:1 no'~, J~1~0rcfo:L'e, be (::~ ttcl':1l'to l 1 except c,ftcr c:..;r",f'u1 c nsi' ,.n·~'f;ion.
'l'R;un:'IC DISCI1?LD·::E
70.
Ill·;Jih;J:.... l
r]isci!,linc
\J'":.E
..~
~li01 f.: JG·,ll':t~.l·;
of imhvidu·.:l
(tri vin;:; ~::n,J convoy
: .~\int'.\i118d.
Double b~ml:in', ';:,~:E l\(Jf )8r:~d. ttcc (:xcr:lt l)y ~)I" icr of' the _r:':ffic COll'(;rc1 or.:.;"niz:\tion '.-:i th tlLC obj'Jct 'Ji' :):t.::>r-d.n[ throueh yriority column~. '
PHOVCST
71. Cl,P
fi,)intslllen, m\.~st
l<,;r:('yin~~
be incl'.1.rkd in
lnobilt~ p';' '~rols
':rcr,- Dot
(;~,ch
WM
','11.:.; llu.,'-bcr ai'
:::,11;1 1:1o'oilt: d0't'\cru'1011tS of .i.:;oini;suon -:....; re cxcclltmt, but
~ufi':i.ci'_;lltly
72. .Doth ",': ,rl; ~lcceSS'\l"J Irops cxc suit:"blc luc,·ti,TIs.
73.
.·--:rtics,
'j'C,.
"1ld
in evidence.
shoull be srncvc1 ',1m)
'vohicl f ) C'\8U"lti':G
l11W
the
::XJ.S.
1.0 ·IHI.c}t"tlic"'l h:x\.~knO\l!Js
m:r.:l:i.f1.b11,;.
f r . 'we lo::t ,\';;inl~ t,,> <..n 'I y ·,ctir)ll it -tv ' C.Ne 'bj' Jli;'ht. In fillitc ;.j,,' 1"Jc) Ll'on l the Gt".ih:"..r~1 cf cTivil",;:; ',ii tIt n,} li,':hL[' ',:::~'. vcr,Y hie)l inilced. 71+.
l)(.;C",lilC
In 1):1.',1,):1::,,) '1'\.1.:<.; III
l)~ccn~-:::',t:l
~tho
L.I J"i tirjl) of'
:Li..~'
ttiil':
J.· ... strictir.m:::.
"I\.lot be c:'J.",.J.ull,j ':r"i:',hcr"t,rith 1.11...: ula·.. lll
1)11
!Uc to t"ctic"l llt'lC"~Hd.t:'i
.lc.'iv'.l:':;. -, • •• / u..
fliT .... JJ'~(,)' .
- 74
75.
Scme
v~hicl~~ ~nd cQ~ipm8nt
enGmy uomLinc.
SPEED
Oj~
of TCPs verc destroyed by :, .c cscrvc I"lU:: t be hela irmcJi~.tcly ,~v,,\il'~ble.
i,;OV tj :::ENT
76. . The speed of cmy convey Clc;Jer.os on the sp<'lcd of the slowest vehicle. It y/[.$ lloticeo'blc th:\t ;"J:K:riC:::m convoys tr3.vel :.:tt a. higher SpGed tha!1 J;;l1ci'r Ilri t,ish countcrp.'1rts. 200 USi. 2-6- ton vchiclt~s ','lere f'requcnt1Jr obscrvec1 to pass n point in 16 - 18 ~inutes. l.:ISCELL.JmoUS TlLJ,l}-i'IC
77. (a)
~'ihiJst cpntrol ':lrIS riGid, it ',"I[:.S inevi table tho.t in an or:.'::r".Iti~-,n r)f' this sC:)l)o ,:} l·r,reo amount of misccl1i'neous
trof:Cio '~'l:::S on the mc,d. It is csti:n'3te<1 th'.1 J .; not less th~n 25 per cent of the tr'ffic usinC the ~is comprised incident':.l vchicles ':r1.ich mrv]e their WD;f inde~)elJ(k;nt1y to their destim\ tion. III 2..11 pl~nninG' .:1110"/8once i'lUst Lo T>lo..c1c for thi.~ tro.ffic. (b)
7B. from
:, coruni t)!)i~nt not cOTl:.;idere'1 in the lllnnnin['; sta,r;:;o Y{(\5 R'.p tr':l.f'fic. During the j:criod um1er rovieu, :).t least 1,OC)(; WJ.!' vchiclcG USCr' the Axis to ElliDHOVEH nnd l~ter to GRtWE. This priorit:>, :nust be fl-cce;,Jted if we :JrE: to h'lve ,-,dequnte nir cQver for ::m op8r~tiu{l of this n.'"\turc. lUi}' ir.ust mDke their (lel~nl1ds in time for thelll to be incorpor'ltecl in the controllinG ;,rJ'lY j;\orrnQtion Pb..n.
;.. tct-;l of 25,280 vchic18s h-;c1 l)ccn 1l.:.l,s30Cl up the axis
1900 he llrs '19
Sept8ijl1H)r
194-1+ to 2359 hours 26 SCl-'t ember ,
This Tn0Ve,,)0Tlt tllck :,l,')c0 ::'.n :~vcro.De of 3,610 vehicles :. (by.
79.
(."')
r]urini~
'i 941+. 3m/en (Jays runninr;, 1. e.
!,1ecent '''.!':,,_;rdi-:,ns ()f' .30 Corps hl1vc ~.:roved the neccssi 'bJ
for ~ hi~h1y efficicrJt 'L'r~l'.Cic Control or;::>..nisation to de:':.l ',:i th l!,~r ::0 sc::.lo T:1C.vr:;.)cn ts on ro[\.(ls. (b)
ProvQst rcsuurCGS in the Corps 1U'e not co,p~~I)lc of proviilinc the personnel ':'.nCl cotrrnunic~,tions requircc.1. It hl'l5 :'.l\'lttys bccm foun:1 nccess:'..r.f to fona an "3.<1 hoc" trn.ffic org~1nisation '.':i thin the Corps trJ (\(;',1 '.'ri th this problen~.
I
- 75 S.20TWN 10
------
30 CUR?.:; AND 1 BRI'I'ISH Alflli01{l'fE CORPa p,:;, .~:rr:: L.:5'l'iLT!VE .t'JUuiJ\;GE./LENTS
..,
80.
The admini.st!'ativc ar:can(;;l;;ments that were .nade fOr this
opLration ;i.ave o.ln::':;,.d.'l been outlined in Part I, Section 6,
It is noV{ i)r\)jJo~3eri .~" (;,xro. inv t"e. nlll..:.n a~pect'J of these arrangements
vii th a vitr;/ to :3cciJl,9; h0~1 1;n<,' -,'(;l"~ executed: d.uring the operation.
1'Il'J lIi;·J..:l':";'l;~'o tivo ,:,~":'l:hin~ry and the ei'f,)ct op0rations had dLtc~n£ trio.; 9<.:l.:.io'1 17/?..) .'0t~/"I..:r:\Lcr, [~rc
110\'/ considored. For GaBO of 1'C:fcr.:mce in ' G ill',ti:",l ".iOS tJ d?.y accounts the maintenance a.spect of' Ground :,~nd Air1r,riL ",<'oops is considded separately during poriod 17/1(3 S(;ptCI[lbcr.
Formati C'~lS 'J.'..Ljj(;!' c;c-;' t, thO~t scales of' C olllrnodi ti es a.f; She\ffi in Part I, Jl:cttOrJ 6, cxc':..;pt t.et~t 'I)Gill the Gun,rds Armoured Divi~ion and f3 ArmDured B:cigade ',{UTe cloficiunt of r.,any s8cond 1,ine naturus of ammuni tion \/h :ch 0vGon'1 __r-my (~("..l.ld not lUeet from ~rmy Roadh'.;ad. This ~lUS GVvrcomc o~r duc0nd. ~_r,ty n.gl',~;~ing th~t thv"u deficient na.tures 3hould bt: I pi,J.lrl.ged t frol, 1"1 .~nl,our~d :0ivit,ion .ind 4 J~rr~"ourod Brigade. j
(a)
Suc.-,nd ':~rJ!\y were short ai' tran.:;rjort fDr tht; il:ul!ediate t'0quir;,;;r.l.C:;nt::; of: 3') Oorp8, ,'ti1Q ,'Lore not in· f.'. position to ))'.'ovide 'i;!"lln;.:;port lift I'm:' thu two US ~.... irborne j)i\li;~ionJ~ ',iJ10[~(; or~! n i.r;{tt:!.on~: !·~i..d(;; no j)l'ovision for trc.n,;por\' lj ft '-'cftur L~n,'i 'ng. T,"', n,cet th:i.::i tre.nsport dd'ic i vney, i'Ollr' US 'l'ruck Ci)hpc:.nic:j ,lure tuld to :c,,~; ,)ort £'):'011.
(b) 'l'ho v(Jr'.king
DB ,,__ ',3 tv
by 'EJ JaptGmb;:-.
the () Jrp~j l'L'f,~n:";port by:
01'
sU~)J.)10mantcd
:5:~ 8Grp~
X'(;3)UrCuS ',l::"::, '
,'::Jrmal,
(i) 90 J~rmour'..;d •.',),':!. "'tdL: :ELSC COI,I9f.1ny-, prillaril:f [,Hatted. l'<'J: t:coop li:Cting; . 'This OJmpany lJ[J.~;i:>ud, hO'':lUVU:C, to S Cc,r{?s ",lith 50 (N) Division, :',na ,/01'\. fully cuplo,Vvd in the lifting of j.J (,') Divbion. '
(iii) (c)
:':;ix ~"\] U'~oonB 52 D:i.vi;;ioil,
wd f'rGJ,l the: 3caoorno elcm(;nt of 11.1::; four Ud Truck CGJ.lpanieG.
f(JJ'
T'iIO pl:Y~~ion:;;, ',l0ru ,CuI J .,JJ.,i1l1.ittud in lifting COSs until 26 ;5 opt (;!l10Gr. 'l'hd,l' rd,tlrn to Corp;; l.:Dntrol would h~tvc; been Inr,i'd :c:"c'Jicl It;,),-': j'~ n:;\, 'l,)L;i.;r, £,,)!' thv " eu t" in 'tho a,"d.s.
J.lrorn 17 :Jl;ptC'iJll)(;C -,~1..Jl,rd:;, j') Curps WetS bn.:,~od on 161 PUG at BuURG LEui-{)LD \!hich .in t!tr"J .. ;~:'; :.;tOL;}:Ud. by C'jrps tr:ln,,":,,po:ct dr~',dng frOl\l . : .. l'l,y ii..:. dh Go,d 0. t Bj:I.t1S;:i ili;~.
(<1)
17 ::.)c;ptc, lUUs.'.
'PIlC' \ltr)!.J~tic: ::h~' '~) for rdl f'"rlllati.CJns
1 B.ci tish '. iri)Jl"n u C,;,r" p:; ',:c..s c-9:r:ri ad out ~ uccc;ssfully Dn 17 soptu.,o\Jr.
;)1"
' •• j(b)
- 7j (b)
18 30ptrsr..bGr. v... lng tv inaccurate dr"pping, due to tho iLten.3C cnClJ,:.i flc.k, 1;;-.0 r(;su. ~ly of 1 i3ritish ..~irborne Corps 'tiM nl)t su::ces.;ful :.1 tl the l:lajuri ty of containors ','/ur ... drf; J:'J.;;d cO the <,;nCi;~r. 82 Ui:) .. ~.:rbrJl·ne Division "/ere, hO'.Juvur, :3UGc''':.:>3i·ully .!'.;:::;uppliod, ,'/hilst 101 US ~"i;:b::Jrno ])~,dsir)n h:.d tr-kon ',fith tho!', sur':.iciont supplios and {~~';'LU.'l_:. ·l;:t·...... i';/r 4e j1:.J~rs.
35. Ground and .'.ij:..J(.rnu (u)
'b' :'l'CCS
Dur':"ng this day Corps troops transport en,::Jl::,yod in LJui].ding up 161 .l!LO. ..J..1thuugh 50 Division 'l,/crc )Ul; '",'?erat, ,;nally unUl;r co ~uld uf 8 Corps, thoy reI:lilinud ~Cu.LL·l.istratively It.ldor .30 Cr;rps. Liaison officers .,er e scn'~ t.j 101 '1.nd :::;2 US ....ir '001'n "" Di visions ,/hose adr;'lin~st 'utive si tuati'Jn ·,m.• satid'uctory. Th0 four US Truc C! .;.:pcll1ics tha.t Secor.:l .'.:rr:.y \/cr(~ :)roviding for the ma.intenan~ r,t these t','/:') divisi'.,ns failc:d. to arrive. 19 Septa !o<;r.
'1~o.s
(b)
20 Sopt01:lber. .~l·i;hr'llr:;h the US True!~ Companies arrived, they, iro}:',.; inc jJ: pl.:t.::>, c..n:l they v/ere alsr- loaded up ·;d th the wrong typ~ r.J.l." 105 t"::' a....:r..unitir,ni in o.ddition,vital trans :Jort lift hl~c1 n::·t b(.;en :.::.1:U use oi', 2'oS :301Ilt~ trucks cone up eillpty. Truck C~.'~:lpMies ':er-;.; sorted und.:..r 30 Corps direction, and aa.ch ;.::rbr)rnc Division 'iJn:~ :,.11ocatod 20 trucks for ground distri'Out':'-.:-! ·,T.i.thin iivisi :.i1e.l ar~F.l.s. During the night, heavy enl!,~'! b,:,::uing im:~JJllW~~ de5trnycd a,9pruxi!na.tely 27 seconl line vohi~lE)s of Guards ••rLlGurod Division. Un this i~1 4111 thr';;;; divisi "nfl w'Jr ... j,~<:,.intD.in(:)d. by !ur, but nut acloqut,toly, 3,::: J1")1 ling ir,to DZs '.,;a~.; inaccurate :,,·./'ing t:·, hoavy f'l:;.k, inoxJ ~rioncv If the ~)ilots a!ld r:J.sty ',leather.
rJf
(c)
(~l)
21 ScptlLber. ..dvonco eL::!ont,s :1f 162 b"'l'.iC ',,'orc' despatched tr, j,iaj~1 Cc,rJ:ls \!i't:l the; f'.:;ject r.I: est:',blish'ing 162 i'il,:C in the nre!l. t,r _..ro~}lEi:.;. ,0. vrati r.,:~ny, t:,i,3. pro',od i...~ossible and a situ Y/C,,,, c!',0son L ,3te~d i:1 tht: (.LL..VE /.lrea. uS 3. st::.rt, f',ur pb,tC'Jons fjf }'VL 'y/C"!:Cj sont IIp 0 GfL.iE i"rora 161 .FlliC at BuUHG LEUfuLD, l.>ut these d.i.d. ~ruT .'lrrive until 23 September o'iling tn th,; II cut ll inth0 L ',".1' C. . 4~ ,?la.t ',on of .'jJiur.L C~ ~lwli, ti ',Ii ","l.S sent up to 16~ ]liC for a spuciD.l :lr'~illlJry pr :.gr:.l ~ lU by 64 l,1(,'<1iur.. R0giment, in support (~f 1 13ritiuh i .. il:'borne DivisiGn; this arrived just prLNious ,!;,) th.~ cnc :1 (lutting tho Crjrl)S L of 0. 50 (N) .Ji"isi;:ln, "r:.: such Ur.'l''p!.i trc·ops 0.::: ,;,oro in th", vicinity, cr.'lltinuuu t~J ou I "':J..nt:..:.inw l.'r(" _ 161 L'l,iC .:'.I.t ':'UUnG LEUroLD. ~ l:,rge G ",l";.~" sup 'l~" dl.l..,:! 'dtl:.; C;lt'>turOO .:d 058 Md this subsequently provul': ,.If gr0~t v,~lue, ;,'.s :")';,ing tv the /I cut"-_ in tho:: L I-,i' C; J . t.h·; I..j,~.n t.m·~1C G of c vrt ai n C0r ps t ronps becar."'e thu rt;", ..J onsihility r.:'" Divisi;"',ns in illhose aroas they wora. loc 6.t cu. Cor;?s then 'lirf)cted tha.t Divisi:/nc.l trnnsport should drn.;, Gr. ti1i~ d\J1i\fJ or. ~\ d:\Y-to-doy insis \.U1til thu L of' Chad i)"cn r,,:-;tc.r(;d~ h['.Vin~\ i.n~.;tall(;d D. Cr,II;YH>itc pl~t:-,on t~ uillunc(; r.:lti :,n~ ,-~r:d : '.,nt;ct',l 'is'.uos. CCJl.!~)osito ::1,;\;ntcnanco :"\t.cl~n lJi' ~~)L ·.~rl'. sat?Vliv~:.\..;~~t,; also dusp,!\.tchcd to 82 MU 101 US ,'..Lrbm:r.v ;)i.vi;';.;"'l:i J.u,J:'.lng ttl.,; lo.y. . 22 :3(;~tUl.~b;:;r.
lin thi J'y th C'Jr):3 L of C ',.e.s cut in the to C '!)!!.'';:Jti'Jl1 -,1') tho !',lX\.};J 'Ii.~ ch:'tlJges (:: priori ty, ~h~ f .m," Jlr t, ·;:,n8 'J£' roL .l<,,;sp~,tcht.lJ on 21 Supto'.lber ,;\,lr:; hvl: u. ~jVUT:-t Jl' t c " eu t ll , rl.~; :::.1>5'.' '.!ns thl.; iJuinton!:\IlCO lift f(.!, ..12 113 .. i~·br....:n~ iV·LS.1.c.n, bat that tu 101 US ..~irbornc Divi,!;';'un ,J" ti~r:)uBh.
: ft .... ·~·noi)n.
\..1>1'.11'(
• ••/( c)
23 Scptel.lbcr
- 77
(e)
23 So}.:tellib8';:~ ~):Iing to the L of C beinG cle':lred, translJort tlB,t hnd be@ GeJlt ,)n the 21 S0~:;tumber tc the 82 US •.: ,ir borne Divisicn dclivcrcG its lc~d. The four platoons carrying J:'JL continuwc1 their journey nnd delivered their load to 162 J.'~C. j!'urther composi to II u.interJ;"\l1ce pnclm were also dCspctci:lec1 tc.. 'ooth tiS Divisions. During tr~e night, S0ven pldoonn of' I.{nin Amrrn.mi tion Ne.tures were despatched by Oorps 'Ql from BOUllG· LEOi-DLD to stock
162
m~c
at 'GRAV3.
3 ond "10 QOS vrerc eutnbli:.;llcd 3t l'lI,1i~l.I~GEH 'lnd 163 Field Ambulonce moved forli,~:!'u t" DJ.~L 6875 to uoal with Airborne c8.Bual tics' cvccud '0 ov·.r ;~ l\f::1;DER RUN in DUi~rIS.
(r) 24 Se'otomber. On tho L of' C beine rustored, Hear Headquart ers .30 Corpo moved, but the L of C '::o.s 2..gcli:'.l cut nt 1200 hours on 211- i3cpt·)mber, rmd Re·'),r Ccrps were mr\rocne,l SOUTH of the I cut' in the VI~('J.IEL area, t0gether wi th three of the onmu:oi tion pl.':J.tOOl1S deSllotched the previous night; in addi tion, NOH'nl: of the t cut', the four platoons which had delivered 8J:mlUl1i ticn ',:ere ,1150 prev(,mtcd from returning, together wi til 30m·; cf t.h(; four !'ll~toons nhich had deli vercd POL. 82 US ,\irbornE' Division' G i.::revious dGYs maintenance requirements ---,ere '"\leo held up JOlf.PH of the I cut. ' The Ge:crnan OUPl11.y dunp r.t eGS continued to be me-de consider c.ble usc of tr:;. I:luct C::)rpn troo~G' requiroments nnd to supple ment Divisions' dl'limlling rC30urees. Vlhilst dr:~\:inG from this dump, i,:hc S.)COllt~ lirlU ~i.:.s0 Oompcmy of the 8 ;l.I:mourcd Brigo'rlc rou ~ea GllClTlY olemcnts \100 ':lere also trying to use the dump, ~lnc1, m'tel· killine several of the enemy took 75 prisoners 01: 'fIe'x. The supply s1 tUi..:.tion :.~t All:W RC''ldhe~d Wr.\S not [pea C\.t this time but thG Corps '.'/0rc ..,1110 to maintcin themselves to the extent of 4GO,OOO r~'l;iolls even though the mC\1n bi\l4U1cing items, i, e. tutl, sug"r, 11i lk ond eigare tt(J~ were unprocU1'able Jill D..vailnble OorD:) tr'mcr>ort :..'esources ";terc ooncentrated on the tnak of building up stocks iTI 161 FHC to the mo.x1mum, as forward rnn.intenancc ',I:~S impossible.
(g)
25 September.
86.
The total number of prisonurs of \lar that were captured by the foxmntions \',Ii thin 30 Oorp:..; during the period 17 to 26 September, was as follows:Ufficcrs
CRs
Guards .i.rrnou.red Vivision
10
140
43 Divi Gian
11
500
50 Division
5
400
26
1,040
'rot·'\l
- 78 ;.PPENDIX I G' to p;u~ II.
30 CORIS l:LOVEJ,iEUr llTGrr:':'UC'..l'ION I-'OR OPER;1T ION I GARDEN I 1.
General,
'rhi:" instruction is to bu rood, in conjunct~on with 30 Corps 0peration Instructicm-i';o. 24, cxtra.cts of' .:hich 3X'e included under Section 4- of' this report. 2.
;.xes of
;.dV[~ll££
30 Corps is ,:dv~mciI:8 on one j':i-::in Axis as loiii iloYllJ in 30 Corps l"'Peration Instruction Le. 24. (Sec :.ppcndix IB' 10 P'U't r). The subsic1i8.ry :'lxis \lill '"l.ssint the ['. dvancc t:'ctically and may provide a most ir.J:Jortant ;Jlt,,;rrJ 'tive route should the f.l:lln axis or any pv.rt of it prove unq.st-.blc. It \',ill NOf hov,,-~ vcr Tn:ltcrially increase thc oVvr~ll speed of I:lOVCment.
3.
Qrdcr 01:
.l,1~'trch ~nd 'l.'imil~
J'" t ':.nne:h."Ure 1 is und units fer mOYCffi£nt.
~rhe
be appreciated
s;
tuble showinr, grou)ine ef forntr;-. tions
tc.blc is arra.rti~eu 111 the urller of march, but it r;mst t11;~'t this >,,riLI. "l')ry in aecordnnee ':Ii th the tactical
situation. Gur..rc1z Arl,lOUred Divisicm ':!ill
h0WeVGr ~\llvancc
o.t
I
L"
hour.
Sl' fer 011 zeri.::lls, (1<:::83 those nlrendy HORTH of' it), is the SOlJrH on<1 cf the bridge 3596. Dispersal point is the Northern cut::;k.irts of :.Ri!1lEE.
5-
Rate of ]vlovU'lent
(3.) The r:1tc of movcJ:!cnt situatior.. It is, 35 vtm cn2 1) mih.
(b)
<1en,;n(~3 hc',;ev~;r,
clc"Jrly on the t'lctic'11 hopcr] to i:10V·J ·~,t ~}'Proy.imately
It is csti:',::tucl tlVlt 1'Ot' tacticnl rCD.nOU3 1:he 'le"..: p"l.st SP on 'D' J'o,y is unlikely to exceed 3 hours.
Ther<)a..ftcr it is hOYJe:] th:~t a. 1.3 hour flo':1 (bily, (vi~; from C6()();. hours to 19()()j'~ hours), '.vill p:-l.s::: SP.
(c) 'i'hcre ','/il1 be 1'W movemoJlt on Lhf: un,in ~.v.::i f, durinB the hours of
( i) (ii) ',/han
~ c.:rcuJ,:' COI'711n.ndcr i:..; s/;~tir;H(.;(l the.t his group c:\n C01,1. let(J i +'1'; tn,WI,.;, ':li thout .-lisrupting tr':1.ffic Clrr'll'll:l;l.lCl)1;3, y:ithin bto hOllrn of I',st li fl-t.
(d)
G,roups lC:',.I!.Ucrillf fer the l1ii'ht',~Jill !ll'oo::'hly h:wc to do GC on the rn::.:in l'''-'',l1 e:ri.nr t th,: fl' tur,~ ('f the l~rtJund) though it l")~i;\; !H::5.;ibln for ..;1(;:"'. to _,ull off' into f'i;'l.d::; <1d.j:~ccnt in sorn" ,1..\e·"s. II" UNrf3 jJ~£•• ~ rl'll}~ ~{Q;.D :b'Ol{ LE .Glr·~lUNG 'l'HEY ".VILlJ 1·~ .. J"t ~·:i.l&~~)j~l·J~eoL··6r.rI J 01; '11' O~'Jlj) to i1 .1ic:ltC the point "t ';..hieh tho t· 11 01' the colUJ:U1 ":l~8 Wh.:)D it Gt:1rte·] to lc"ve '1
J
:'.
••• /th\~ roed.
·.. 79 therond. Follo~ing scriul~ vall NOT oass this point excc}?t under provi:Jions of' (c) (i) and (ii.) above.
In any case, it i~ essential that all serials start to move again punctunlly at o6qO hourn. If this is NOT done the order of m:_reh wi.ll be disarrarlged ~Ind ch:ws is likely to ensue.
N.o li';,hts '0"1111 be ''lllowed on the mnin ;)xi5 by niE"pt. No
Ol~Gtl
!'ire Hill be lit by night on the main Qxis oX' in
its imnediate vicinity.
7.
Rear,vOId 1'raff'i c
Re~.rw
8.
Provost
AR{ "30 Corps ·,rill co-orc1inntc 'policing of thl] I}li'"in n::ds. One section 43 DividOTl01 Frovoct and tvto sect_~Ol1S 50 Di vision·'ll Provos t ::Lr'l. l'l:,;cod lUllL:::- COl Jli8nd HH.:: 30 Coq's.
In princiTllc, crlch formation ':Iill police Divisional Civil' Yforkinr; under the [':cnc:cal. direction the sector cf the rO;1d concerned. ('I'hL:; docs NC'J.J ~~rn1011rc:l Division v/he· ··.:i11 '0,:; E:Tltirdy responsible O'im movement). .
i, ts o..,.,,(} move., of 'l'CP contrr-lling ::l.})""\ly to C,unrds for t:;olicine their
(D..) 1. t. ,llmexur::- 2 is :; ucscription of 30 C<..1rl)S 'err-.ffic nne1 MO"/cment Control or~
(b)' .i.ll Groups will forw;:.rd to this HQ by not b·ter then 2000
hours 16 ~)cptcd.J(·;r, ~: et[\il::: of sub-allotH~l.'nt of sarL."'.l numbur:; and, if r05~iblo, ·:;n D.nti.cip~ted order of m:\l'ch.
('rhil':i oos lwr a.pply ~o Gu:.l.rds ;'rmoureJ Division, exc,-,pt for' ;,(]l':1i Ili~ tro ti v.~ Grult[J, Gw.\rc)::; .i\rmourud lJi viden wi 11 however !WE;lJ Tr·':\ft'ic Office 30 00I1)S fully ill:i.'ormccl 01' the pre'L:I'css ni't.heir ~l\ove. This ill ,'}sscllti'11 Bochnt subs"equ ent. }5t"'nUlJS em) U.:.; .'wt on to the CO·~,15. (e) E3Ch group \,'in r,j,"\irlt'\in':m La ,'l,t Tl',':Ii'fic (~'1'1'icc 30 Corljs. LO will report :'-4 ho.urs befor'::, the c1."\y on '.'/hieh the gruup is c.x.pt~cte
(d) 't'ep ~ t [.)1'" has authuri ty to pas~ throu[',h onto the .cc·ute groups c1' NC/.t' more th'Ul 10 vehicles L\S:lJl<1 when 0P:P0l'tUlli toy of'f'cr~.
lJri ::'.':ldicr, C-cn~ ,:'11
..
:3 t',ff •
- 80 .. 1.i\lNEXURE 1 to' ;",?PENDIX IGI to
PfffiT II
F0!'O",ti,'D or Unit resI:('ns1 ble for Group
·A dan. tional 'l'roo~3
unJ.or Cor..l::and or
Serial N Ul':-lber [i
Destination
lJ..'1.:lcr Ccm::'.anl1. f 1r I::ovroent
( a)
.'
5 Guards
Apr..rox- Remarks
U:&. t8
~
r.umber
tice
ot
hast
vehicles l oint ( c)
(0)
Ar~ox
.:.l
1
( d) ARNI-IE1(
.•rmourcd
and
Brigade
HOPJ.'H
( e)
(f)
888
180
(r)
~--
One Squadron 2 HeR
2
do
40
8
Ii. 3"
do
40
8
I.
1~
do
158
30
j\.
5
do
20
h
6
do
11-0
8
i .. 7
do
G
,1n
40
" ()
0
'.Ie
,:76
180
<10
170
~~)
81
15
50
'1 ()
113
20
b
Under command ·5 Brigade for, move
2 BOH less LI Squ!:l.drons
Guards Division:il.
{) Oi,
vchicl'3s
He<:l.d(ltw.~t0rs
il.P
94 L:.;~ Regii lent less c1ct·3.chments Re cormc.i SS(')J1ce
Party 100 h.!, Brica.de
Ono Squn.
,~
I\.
Brig".h.le
,
84
Medium
Rl~ £?ml;rJt 1':55
" "10
2 Scct::.onr;
100 ;.;, Brif:;'''.]c clements 148 Field l:"\rk Squ·:tdro:r. 11 Pic J.d COtl]Lny
nnd
i~
11
NI~ll i1~GEN
;"
".') I£.
.:_, I
...
1.3
ell')
!r'.:a.•~
Bridginr~
••• /.:~ 14.
- 81 J'~dc1i tioIlr~' . Sorial Des ti- Approx- ~ppro:lGir.~ate Troops l.J1l(ler Nunbers nation iuate nUl:lber tiJ.l6 COIT
Forr.1ation or Unit responsible fnr Group
( a)
(b)
(~)
(c)
.b.ir OP 2HCR (Squadron) and A Echelons Squodron 2 HCR c.nd
~,15
do
J~
do
16
16
(f) 4
282
55
(e)
( g)
90
R.t~SC
Headquarters
30 Corps'TOTh 15/19 H
Battery 56
J 200
VDI' ious
Go
12
C 220
EL~DHuVEN
300
60
Field Regi I.ten t, Squadron RlJYi~S
44 RTR
s.t: Bn.ttery. Squadron
D 230 V£.GUEL
350
70
E 240
375
75
,d.lJ~J.,S
Detach non t 27 L..·u'..
SRY
Ba.ttery Hf-7 Field Regi l.lcnt- Squad ron RlJY.. J..S
G&4VE
Dctaciu:1.ent
27
123
L.'J~
20
Lh.A
rtogiuGnt ( le35 ba.ttery) Y GOR
G 261:
do
9
2
HcD.C'lquart ers 100 1l./1. Driendo
G 262
do
14-
4
165 H.,·..ll. Rogi !.lont loss one troop
G 263
10
124
25
Seabor]1<;3 Tail tAt
II 270
J lNI-IEr>'~
517
100
J
---------,._----_._---_. -- 43 Itoconn
Squadron
K 301
J:RNHElo1 .
aissancc
J~rJ.llJured
nnd
Rcgt. 12 IrnRC
Rceir.lcnt
NUlnU
-
350
70
Rcconnai SSD...'1CC find Harbour 1 ax·ti(;ls
K 302
do
15
3
1'30 Bric;ude Group
K 303'
do
719
140
Incl 100 DUK'WS o.nd
4-6
rt.-t"-SC
- 02 h.dd.i tional . .. s~ciar· Dcsti- .....pprox- l'..pprox iunte Troops \.K'l&r, Nur.tcrS nation inate ntUJber tine CQi.li u.:.nd or
Forl.lation
or Unit responsible for Group
of veh- pas t
under
iclea
oor.r.lD.nd for l:1ovcr,en t
(b)
( a)
I,
•
.
post .'
(01. __ :< '(d)
Troop' 236 .I>n·n.: K 304 :~"J~N1IE:\r Tank Battery' and . NORTH
10
dn
·.351,
70
do
110
K .307
do
18
2
K 308
do
'675
13~
K309
do
339
65
Divisional Troop 236 i..nti- K 31.0 Headquortcrs Tnnk D.;:~ttcry 15 and HeadFDS quar-tcrs 8
do
238
50
do
442
90
43
..
_.~
'
.~
...
Survey Troop
a. 1....
K306
43 Divisional RE Group
-.
ReconnaissMoe
( g)
(f)
49
Tao
Division Tae 8 f.rnoured Driga..c1e - 64 Hed.iUD Rogir.len t 112 Field Regil:1ent
. ~Rema.rks
Incl 70 RlL$o
and tprbour Parties 214 Bri3adc
l~I'!";ICoUred
Group
Regiuent
8
Inol100 DUKW~ and 22 IU.SO
z'~rnourod
Jrieado RN vriCado
~rr-uOured
Brigado 179 Field
RN l.rtillory
Re~ir.lent
48 Survey
94 Field
!3attery
ReeiTDnt 419 Heavy Bo.ttery
K 311
Incl 100 Rh.SC
, .' .\
129 Drieo.dc i>.rr:Dured Group.. Rcgif.len t lcos Squadron
.-Md 25-RASe
K.313
Bridging
Incl 100 I>tJXWS .. _~_
129
.. K 312
do ..
16
3
177
35 .
273
55 Bridgehead
Platoon 207 Field Park
Cor.lpan~
61 l1cconn ai.ssanco
Detaohuent 508 OOllpany
RCLri .lent
rt.~C
5 E Y0J.1KS
L 500
L 'SOO
.ARNHEM
do
Detacnuent
Group
113 ~iiL RCe:L1 \cnt less ~JD.ttery
do
1'14
25
U 502 M .503
do
11
2
do
20
.. '2
J300
.illmIDII
70
15
,
un e Troo:) 557 , $ Dn.tte2'
3
CCB
and NvilTH
'.
-,'
Fonnation or Unit responsible £o~ Group
Additional Troops 'Jllc1er. Command "or under cOnr.'&8Jld for movement (b)
(a) 10 CCS
.,
- S3
Seriel Destination Num bers
- ,
.
Approx- .ripprox irnato ' imate nwnber time of.. past ve1"licles po t ..... . ' in .
(0)
( d)
. (e)
N ;10
ARNHEM
70
15
195
4-0 ,
754
150
27.5
55
882
180
ROOlaX'ks
(g)
( f)
and -'
Seaborne Tail IBt 69 Brigade
Gr.oup
C
Rear Hoad quarters 50 Division Group
do
to
P544 7 .Mediun less one battery
P 560
to
P 565·
do
7 t:cdi.um Regi [lent Artillery Platoon
P 570
to
P 579.
do
2,31 Brigade
Se~borne
~I
P54.0
/319
165
incl 1 liiU..iFS
. ..
P580
G~oup
Rear Head quarters 30 Corps
5~1,
86 Field Regi:", p 530 ..i.RNHE'J r.'len t less 3 to
and batteries P 537 NORTH Battery 7 hfediwn Regjment;
M~n
Head quarters 50 Division Group 151 Brigade Group
NORTH
'#
J,.ir Troops Headquarters Reconnaissance 1~2 RiC i
,
to
p 583.
do
630
125
Q 700
do
3.50
70
~fIE}.t
202
45
i.
..
"
Tail tc I
s
800·
. '.,' .'.......
"
. ! "
US Airborne Tail
' It
162 }liC
U100o-'
?
1OCO
200
T 830
?
300
Go
IC900
?
850
170
Guards l~rmoured
. Division iLdI:li.ni stJ;~" tive Grp~p
43 Division ~~dninistra-
tive Group
50 Division
. Ji.c1r.iinistra. tive Group
',.
"
~.
B oohelqn .. 110
Li~~ Re gin6n t
to ;.'
.,
K 949
!3attery 75 anti- P 950· to . Tank Hcgiuent P 9~5 . 165 lWt.. Regi- 12,} I.dh. Hegioert V 1100 uent 113 k~ Regir.1~ to , 324 Coupany RASO V 1'1103
'1
1,71
.55
?
200
40
~ll
D
echelon
- 84 The followinG serials will be phased in as required according to progress .of opcratiJnal und tactic~l situation. Serial· Nuubers
Formation or Unit responsible for Groul?
(a)
(b)
Hain Headquarter~l F 250 30 Corps
.:"pproxina.te ~pproxima.t e nUl,lber .. of .tir;t~ _past vehieloJs post ( c)
( d)
370
75
Remarks
.-
( e)
RE Group
-
HiiRRY
it 733-7l~1
878
180
JTI\i
R 742-746
483
95
MICF...li.EL
H 747-754
.380
75
l::JETE.R .
a 755-760
536
105
RICF",illD
R 761-760
766
150
.':iL:"URICE;
R 769-775
1110
220
GEORGE
n 776-778
566
115
SPIKE
R 779-784
1486
300
JOHN
R
785-790
1146
230
TO.i
~t
7 2f)- 722
300
60
FlUID
R
72.0-722 '
300
60
BILL
R 723-726
419
85·'
DEHTRlJ:i
R 723-726
419
85
i.-n~GIE
R
727-728
109
25
B~.sIL
H 729-732 .:
.316
65
r
..
- 85 i~.NNEXURE
iLUP.ENDIX
.2. to I Gt
TRilFFIC Xtm n:>VE,'ENT OONl'HOL ORG~:Jrrs.ATION FOR
OPER.-£ION t G..UIDEH. t
ORGANISATION OF I,DVEirlENT 1. Contro!. of movement ""ill bc exercised through 30 corps Trilffio Offioe.. . This Offioe ·,.-rill co established initially o.t Main HQ 30 corps, passing to Rear 30 Corps ·,,,hen i\'ln.in 30 Corps moves forward.
When Rear 30 corps Doves foX".-ro.rcl, Trttffic Office will r.enw.in at 30 Corps Adn post until ordered forward. 2. The organisa.tion within HQ ,30 corps for ca.llitlg for-mlrd of movement groups is as 1'o11o\"[s : (a) G (SD) Ere-uch tl111 control priori tics for movcncnt on the Ma.in Axis nnd Hill gj.vo necessary instructions to the Traffic Office.
(b) TrD.i'fic Office '\"lill iSbUC ncccssury, Llovcmcn"t orders and Dulce [.11 nrrc.ULCGCnt~~ 1':;1" tllC implcl':'lento.tion of tho, movc. ORGiJT~s..·j,TION
3.
OF TR..."]'FIC CONTROL
Tra.ffic Control ",{ill pc Qxercised through regulating HQ's
and TOP's.
4.
Rcgulatin[:; HQs' ·.-lillcn.ch be i:.. charge of a certain aaotol" of the Main Axis and . .-ri11 control certain TCPs. The location of these is as 1'0110".'5 : (a)' ROGUlating HQ No. 1 -. Briclge over MEUSE - ESC.I'1tJT Canal. TCPs
-:~
B
o
1';EUSJ<~
-
ESc.:~Uf.r
Cnnal Bridce
V~Ul(E,'NSW:uJID
EINDHOVEN
(b) Rcgula";ing HQ No. 2 - VEGHEL
&".r .OEDE.!IJRODE E VEGHEL
Teps - D F
rd june ESCI-L'Jilll~ E G251
(c) Rogula.ting HQ No.
~iRNHEH
3 -
TCPs - G NIJNEGEN
R ~U\NI!E}.I
TOP
OOi~,rU:NlCi~TIONS
5. 6. No. 2 R(;gulatin(~ J-IQ at VEGIillL ,/il1 a.ct as control station for 0.11 Rceula.tine Hqs anu. will bv in COT.1lflunic.:l.tion '.rith l.iain nnd Rear oorps.
7.
Line cor.u:1Unicatiol1 vill be 1::'dJ. to Tl"nffic Orfice Renr 30 Corps fran No. 1 ncguln.-tir~ IlQ r,t ESC/..UT :sriclG(: thruugh HEOnrEL cross roads K 3483.
..•/c. ._~
-
~---=---
Code
- 86 code signs~ ,f~~quencies, etc, will be issued by esa 30 corps,
8.
COt.iPOSITlON OF REGU"'J..A1':lliG tiQ c-.nd ~CPs
9.
Regula.tin,~ HQ - ~sonnel
(a)
Equipment
(b)
One senior oi'ficer One Noo l l hree wireless operators One ~iruless vehicle Jeep or Car. ~
-
- Pcr3'or\.llct
TOPs
! :.
.....
One nffiocr One senior 1'-00 Three .:ireless operators 'rwo regimental DRs Half Section Provost Cook
Recovery ?crsorrncl Equi~1mcnt
roSITIONING AND
:i.{OVE~.E'i·:r
OF TePs J\ED
One \"iirclcss vehicle, yli th t~vo bal~ of batteries and chargine set. Four gallons clear petrol One 15 CYit domestic vehicle One Hocovery vehicle Provost motor cycles Cooki~ facilitieo ~DGUiNr1lJG
n:qn
10. TOPs and Regulating HQs will move into positiun as ordered by HQ 30 corps. Those for;fard of Corl's SP ",Jill move behind Guards Arnoured Division and \fill drop off on arrival at their respective destinations. OJDE NAI,fES 11. Each TOP will be knO\Jl1 by the code name I T.l\IQ:;J follo-ilCU by ,a pln.oe code name of the to","!h in "i:hich it is lOf1llted.
-
...
..
SKmOH tAt TO ANNEXURE 2
10
APHNDIX tGt TO B\RT I
TRAFFIC CUlTROL NET
MAll{
.-
TCP
" -",
TARE MALVOLIO
"
TOP
"'
.'
NL'J}{ID]N
/
TARE BELCH
\
--"
30
No.3 RID HQ ...6.EASY
CORm 6 BAKER
( "
, I
AIM
6 FOX
TCP ESCHAREN ~
TYDALT
TOP VEHEL TARE \f'ULSEY
/T.
1.'~~·
Gp II 6187
\ ........ J
2.
TOP
t"
S'l' OEDENRODE
TARE CODWED
\
..-
...........
,
. 3.
'.
.. .,
TOPs R/T it oonditions
t'a.vourable. Control may order Cftl. Reg HQs and 30
:r
TCP VALIaNSWllARD TARE GLPNOOWER
Rear 30 Corps will HQ until No. 2 Reg HQ opens.
\ ;
(
Controi Sta.tion
oontrol one to one link to No.1 Reg
... / :
..,-.
TC? EINIHOvm TiaRE BRUTUS
/
Corps will be OW.
/
Gp I
5603 TCP ESCAUT nUIroE TARE BRIDGE
REAR 30 OORl?S
(~';-.-/
- - -
TP
HmHTEL CROSS ROO
-
.60HARLIE
- 88 .--=--.-
JSPalIDIX I H I to PJ~T II
- ....
GSO I (L)
.. .
GSO II (Ops)
GSO TIl
" .(Cam) .
1.
'~
Responsibiliti~5 ;
GSO I (L) -, (a) Co-ord'inatir;n' of movernc;;nt and traffic control. .-,. ."0
(b)
i ...
f
•••
vailahili ty of route,:;.
( c) Liai30n wi th ·Ops~·
Gsa rr(ops)
.. ) O;;:-ero.ticmal situation. ,'"
(
(b) Inf'o:"'l1w i;i.:-.Jll· en
~Lntj.:d:~atej
opero.ti(inal moves.
( c-) ( a) Datai1s ,f DAQMG
r.)I:.t-0S U~ lL'~
Ccrps c0ntroL
(a) Co-ord:iz:.:>.ti.:in
:_f m:Jv€ll\en:; ;mt'l.. i3 sue ci: f.I,)V
uni ts.
(b) PU'J)nin;.;
'\1,';
exc:nutLn .:f TC organisation.
( c) Liabon v:i ttl provo::; t
. SORE
(a) ,~~dvice f.mi. n t
;)11
(;1) an
0:
~ta to
(b) Ini'on.,at:i.(",n ,.in
l' )\Jtc
l.lriLl::O::l,
clos;,ific(\tL:m;;
GpU III (Cam)
rr.·ui. ~s nnJ.
co. tc:,'
(a) Iasue all tlxecutivu )~lo"elJlent 0rders for opcra.titinul units~
(b) statc roo-a av,dl.'1bili ty• .A.fH·
(1.» Co-oru:i.nuti:m Q.f Cor~!::; .l'rovost rclsources. (c) j"Jrovi:.;ilm Te
1)1'
.Fr. ,vast
l'eSOUl'~es i'or'
or;.~~ni:~atior'l.
(<1) Zst.~lJli:~lu:lent 01' noc~s:~o.r.y :liv~rsions in C onj unction
~/i th
1m.
2. G-SO I (L), DiLQI':tG, anti GSO ,III' (Cam) will bv l:::.Jtnblishcd at Traffic Office }.-Io.in 30 C01'pS.
- 89
APPENDIX 'J 't~ PART II
TOPOGRl\PHlGAL AFPRECIATION OF THE AXE OF ADV.\NCE AND OF RIVERS \VAAL AND NEDER itIJN WESTERN 1.
(a)
~\XIS
ESCAUT Canal - EINDHOVEN
First class road 25 - 30 ft wide with a tarrnacadam surfaco and ample grass verges in most places. Parts of the road, however, are embanked and flanked by ditches. Deployment is difficult except in sandy woodland areas . immediately on either side ~f the road between Vl~NSWAJ~J and EINDHOVEN. This stretch is also sui. table for the dispersal of vehicles, a5 there are manY wooded stretches which also are most suitable for the defence.
(b)
EINDHOVEN Exoept for the main NORTH - SOUTH road, the streets are tort uous and narrrm.
( 0)
EINDHOVEN - GRAVE
Shewn as first class rand, ~idth 20 - 30 rt, but in places the road surface is very bad. Deployment pnssihle along most of 'ita length except between ZON 4426 and ST OEDENRODE 42.32 where the surrounding country is peaty., and in the neighbourhood (If GRAVE where the road is embanked with ditches ~n either sida. The bridge over the WILHEUSINA Canal is a claSS 40, but oan only take single line traffio. That over the ZUID VIILLEM; VAARl' Canal at 4736 is shewn on a German map, corrected to March 1943, nS h.wing ~ ,1laximuill lond capaci ty of 16
tons.
The loop at ST C!b"'DENRODE can be by-pllssed by :1 new rna-d, (not shewn on the 1: 100,000 mapa), from 424317 to the cross rOads at 427322.
(d)
GRAVE t~ NIJr,lEGEN
First class road with concrete surf'nce, 20 - 30 ft wide, and two cycle tracks, 5 ft wide ~ flanked by broad grass verges. From GRAVE to 6459 the road crosses the MEUSE volley which (Ire intersected by hedgl;ls, trees Jnd (Ii tches, except for a. stretch on an embankment h,'\lf-:l-milc ench side from the t:~USE bridges. F'.t'l"m 6459 the rood followe' the rnilw~ through country dotted with clmnps of tree~ ('r bushes, :md vHl:1S. Alml)s t the whnle of thf: rond i8 dr:min..'\ted by tho high ground SOUTH nnd EAST of NIJ1"~GEN. Between GRAVE ;md NI.JMEGEN there nrc film dry 80ils except for two belts of wet clay, one i'or two miles NORTH of GRAVE and the othor a m~ile long at 652600. p()ld.~;r6
( e)
NIJ1'-ffiGEN to ARNHEl-i. The old road via ELST 7070 vari~8 from 20 ft tn 40 ft in width. The SUrf':\CIJ is conCl'ete for me-st of the way, th~ugl. parts nre of rolled clinker. • •• /The road
- 9c by 11 nevI bridge. 716631, to LENT 7164, and t r:::verses the CiTJcn cul tivn.ted plai,il to the lO\"ler RHINE through fL1J~ "pen fields lined wi th deep ditches, ana 610n11 scattered. orchD.:':'ds nonr the villages. The road is raisod abou.t h to' 6"·i'c,; t a hove tho surrow1ding country. Finn dry, Sa"'1dy ~oiL 'fr13CS alo~lg tho.:! roadside and the orcharCls n·ffnrd ':;he oniy cover ~:s far ds WT. whilst deploynont is lj mi tud to E'13Ve).·~11 sE;condary roads. The road crosses thc';{"iwLT.J river
At 715737, a ne'.~' r0ad 1 uads to ~"Rl\!Hm:: via a ·now bridge over the Im1cr RHINE .at 740707, Th. ronU is believed to be still under com;truotio;l. 17. ~hould 1'>e capnble of taking tracked vehicles, b\lt tlws8 v/ould hG,ve to by-pass two inc~plete "flj- ove:C11 ' tri<.1ges. v
E;'STERN AXES 2.
(0) First class road" b'.lt n.ep-LoYIli0nt vcr~' c1i'£'l'ici.llt. except for n short stre tel ~'jot\m~'~.l m~NilE Dnd lili."?7.,j,": 4911, owing to peaty naturo of the 31'( lll:d. Lir.:ited Gc',)l'Jjlllcnt just ':JEST of. road ilEEZE to Gt;LDRCP. ( b)
GELDROP to iIEL.';OND ,).S'2~
:
".' ;
, Fir~t cluss roed ,;}i '.;h' (;.lJ'.i'o3 l ..{l hr'idg.:i ovor the EINDHOVF...N Canal. D.yploymmt po.\ C ;j,~ f '''1' '! s j,TERI-O 5216.. but fair from there to EEIllJYD,
(c) HEIi.;OND -' B;"KEL 6122:... c::r.,L"J-SnT, 5780 '_: ,VOT1G;L 5640 - IviILL 6445 - ESOlIERElf ~!.sJ;----_··-----····:wSe~ondar:'
ro'~d, in ,,()'lu;?:'uJ p11cee fH Dn1y for single line tro.ffic. Sllrfncer:ul!.€Y.'L'l} l~r !:(ODC., ~::')Il suitable for heavy lands, except for a 2tr0t~h ]ciil:':1i1Y ~')·,;t'<1ce:l VOIKEL.. /llXl MILL 'uhere the B:.lbs Jil :~sl>t)C',·i;r,.
One ClnSs 40 and hie G.i.~8s24- !->:oi0r.ee. ovux' '~hc ZUIn \lILLEMS V.l\"U:"T at HEDJOlf..). Deployment possj.blc along uost of' the r()<".d. though there nrc bad str'3tches ~i}~S'l' r the roa,1. at 6026';.'01:£. ei thor side of the ro,,,d b0 i;w~Gn VOI2<:';L ,~nd ~.lILL, ond for' l\ couple of fal1us ~rJ of ;::ILI",
RIVERS ,
3.
'
Do. tn on the Hi vcrs.. ;,:.::..:'l C;, J::..-\1, ;A~1q. J'WDER RIJN :,'}ht~ro the mnin :'lxia bridges cross theJ!! is as sht:\'/ll :101'Oll"'1do:,:,:··
IUVleRS i,rAAS! ~1iJj\J.; L..-:~~]m HIJN
( [;,)
RIVER J-,Ju'J3 DilJle~lSions
GRAVE
[)(Yf,th
6,1, feet
Ilidth : 800 feet
Current The '
- 91 Banks
, The banks are flat over a
con~iderable
stretch; they
are covered,with gravel nnd peat; the fields and heaths
which back the banks offer little cover; woods seldom approaoh wi thin 550 ,verda of the bank; on the left bank there ,are concrete casemates at every 220 yards. ( b)
RIVER \VAAL
General The River I{AIJ., is the most important shipping channel of the RHINE by VJhich ships can reach the RUlffi area from tho estuery ports of the NETHERLANDS. 1'hu river flows
through polderland, whioh gives place to river terraces in t~c upper reach near NI~~IDGEN. The river has a oonstant seasonal variation which is felt along the whole stretch, as there are no locks. Low water is in September October. ' Dimensions Width (at nonaal low water):
normally 850 feet.
Depth varies according to the seasonal levels of the
RHINE.
Banks
Normally dyked along each bank, exoept at points where there ,is a quay, loadil~ ~tage, or port. (0)'
RIVER NEDER RIJN
Dimensions Width at .illNHEM: tlpproximately 300 [("et. of the river may incre3so to 1640 fect.
In winter the width
Depth 3 - 11;. feet.
Current
The tide is notiocable as for as
~.mORG
(E 27).
Banks 'rho river is fairly constricted between dyk~6 along tho river b[,I,nkc. ThGSO dykes fire n01'r.;elly of earthen construction, reinfor~cd n~ intervals by atone setts.
There is noruully a towpath along one bank, though the path frequently chllnge~; from one bank to the other. 'fhere io littlu cOv~r on uither bank of tho Rivor EAST and \IE3T of .J.UlHEM.
- 93 .... ....
...
~-
-;- ." -: ~ i-
--
l'iJ\IN
EX'IT~\.CTS
.:.P.l?EHDIX P;J1T II
GDS .'JtbJ) DIV 00 NO 12
15 Sep 44
.~
' ..... _-
LIt 0
~l
INFORl'.IATION ,
I
'i~xxxxxi;q.:ro;Xxxxxxxxxxx
INTENrrI~
5. Gas . Ari1'Xl. Di v ,./ill adv at' HI hr' it max'irnum S -PEl ed t 0 fire a ~1iElVI and, by-passing IJ:."ELDOORN, will dOl'llinqtu the Cirea from incl NUt~SPEE'l' to excl .:\PELDOORN. 1~T-HOD
6. GroUping. ahd 'Ordex:-Sf ·:.::i.r("\h· " ~
. l '
,Groupibg and Order of :lhrch c.re shown f;lt Annexure 1. ','
7.
.Air Sp
(8) Allotment of Tentacles ( i) .. One conta0t oar under Li.ireet ·div' control for P~~se I then pa~~ing to 2 HCR (ii) One tent~nle to 32 Gds Rde
One tentacle to Div IlQ
Fw~ Control Post in order to
moni tOl~al1 calls for :;ir sp so th'lt should npPo/lls
frail: ourselves or 'the .Airbo:::-nc C0ry.s conflict or
endanger the l:;thc.r~ :.\ v8tiJ ')nn il~lr.. edi~tely be it1pOsed.
(b) .30 Corps will r.lointni n a
(0) Ground to Air
Reco~nition
Hill 'b;~ nccess',ry ']Ul:i~ this OPt During' the rupid Ddv, , cerise rlllorr:3'~<";lt piJnGln '.'Jill bL: displayed vlhEii-ever nvaililble. Tll..:i!.- tViC 1:""""} lc Fiuspendod Itt the discretion of CClmds as ''1."(: ihc: .n , -I;l:.c c,(;~~i('al si tun.tion dmllonds it. . (i)TJCtWElt'':D H' i:d.nu~ '1)' ninf: !wid Ii: hr yellow SHIL ke wi.ll be r..urnc(l y,ht'r., f:·'i~ ~'.dJy :1il:'craft e.r.~ seen. Nm~ r..lore th:m 5CY;b of st()ck~ hdd '"Jill be hurned. The other recogni tilm ,tid:..; ·,.ill be used in nr:corc1nnoo with prCyiOUB ~,nst;:.~s~
(ii) The vel"Y lini h')d
.-:i1' cfi'Drt '.Jhich the: enemy tnny ir.i1ke is likely te· he direr-ted ,:\f.:,.inst the airborne force and
it is most D!lproh"blo tilat our ·tps ...f ill be attacked by Griemy E1ir~l.\ft d urinr: the pc riod 'of the drop. Thercfo:""c, for t.~\.} pud.ull H winuc 1 hr to H plus 2 hrs, Sj" fire will Nor rr::]?oo.t NOT be oI,cned on any ·ai:tc.raft Ylh~t50e'TOr~ ,
:
,
(iii) Retali::tN:;y fhe ac;nirlst frInnoly' nircraf t who are a ttacking 01l;~ ):'!l' tp~ -.nIl IV.Lve. only one, ofi'o<.:t.nonfirL'1-thc pilot's bIllie£' that he is attflcking -Germnns c B.
to
M SepF,lrete orders wiD. be' ilJL".WU by CRA incl instrs for 100
...
/.~\
- 94 AA Bde fer their anti-river craft role at NIJMEX;.EN. :FWd tps will give every assistance to enable this det to get into ection at the· e,arliest possible moment., beginning on D Day, and continuing Wltil further orders. "
9. Airfds The airfda nt EINDHOVEN 4-210 and VOrKEL 5640 are urgeny1y required by RAF. Tps from whichever Me reach these airfde f1_t, will paSs a report on their condition wi th the highest prio'~•. Arrnngements for taking over will then be nade with'al! speed.
10. B§ CE 30 Corps will control all bridging ops, sufficient eqpt being carried initially to provide crossing over the oarials, ,up to and incl R MAriS, end ferries for t~e rivers WAAJ., and NEDER ~JN.
It is possible that DUID1s and DDs will also be employed on these crossings should bra not be available. 11. Div Tasks Gds ArInd Divwill corry out its task in two phases: ...
PHASE I ( a) On the at'ternoon of D Day, Gds :~T:lc1 Div wi th 5 Gds Arrr.d Bde leading will capture ViI,LKENSWAAJID 4-108. (b) The adv will be preceded by full arty sp as coord
by ORA
(c) As the ad\" outstops the ranee of arty sp this will be taken up by TYPliOONS on u pro-nrra~ed plan.
(d)
Two
bns 50 (N) Div will move forward behind leading tps, the main nxis, to proteot the flanks and
~Btride
subsequ~ntly
take over VAI1
(e) Leading tps will pause on the boum 'JUDAS' Wltil ordered fwd by GOO to mo.ke contact with 101 US Airborne Div in area EINDHOVEN.
(f)
The Div ~ay cone SOUTH of EINDHOVEN in areaS of the CL preparatory to further adv.
PHASE II
(a) 'ftle Div will continue the adv two up, as ordered by GOC J at first ltD + 1 al1ll will eo through to the final objective. (b) At GRAVE 6253, where the 0TJ8 converI~e, the bele whioh reaches this pt first will continue .the t.d\", while the other bdc will wait for t~e tail to clear•. (c) If 32 Gds Me shOuld lead, it is probnblethat Div HQ will pass through 5 Gds Arr.~d Bc1e und t!lke eta between the; two bdes. ,••.• !ADM.
- 95 12.
}~~~~~~~y:.adr:J
,
.,
instrs will bEl issued separately.
INTERCOMN 13. Location of HQs .-..-..
Div HQ will be locnted in the area of the Fnctory 3695 before the COJranencemcnt of Phose I) thereafter will move by lEFT CL.
14. LOs (a) 2 HeR will provide 10 '1Ii th WT set to report to HQ 101 US ;~r~orne Divas soon as contact is made. ,·He will remain until such time as relioved by LO from HQ 30 Corps. (b) 2 HOB. will also provide LOs with 82 US Airborne .Div and 1 Brit Airborne Di.v from the time contact is firat BJ;\incd until such time as the tail of the main body of Gds Art1d Div MS passed through their area.
15. ACK .~
:Orders were alao written· on Recognitio~ and Passwords between .\irborne· Forces Ground Troops.
and
j,!.ethod of desp::i tch
SDR '"
",
,
,
- 96 ~lliNEXURE
1 to
itpPENDIX PART II
ILl
to
CROUPING- AND ORDER OF J.lARCH 1.
(8)
SP - JOES Br 3596
(b) Speed - Best possible ( c) Densi ty - 60 vtm
(d) Halts - jllien ~onsidered essential by Bdc Comd, whD
will infonn this HQ
-
(e) Lts - Full. at discretion of oomds. '
(a) Div will move on one CL as fat' as VALKENSW)..ARD 4108, subsequuntly on two 'CL~ 'until GRAVE 6213, woon Div will again move on one CL. .
.
(b) Ord... l.~ of March and Grouping for RIGHT and LEFT eLs and Ordor of lfuarch on one OL are att at Annexures lA and IB respectlveJy. Order o£ March on one OL is liuble to alterntion by GOO ohould tho op situa~ion demand.
3.
As the preliminary adv is depondent on ops to be carried out
by S:Gds l~d Bde, it is impossible to give timings acrose SP. As n, resUlt of' this, and with the exception of 5 Gds .iirmd Bde~" no' 'unit will
leave its present h~rbour area until ordered through this HQ. Eao~ unit will B end an offr t 0 the unit pre ced.ing it on the ord er of march in order to (a) Give warning of move of preceding serial (shoUld this HQ
order several units to follow each other), and
(b) Ensure that there is no blocking of ra to SF
This offr will have "liT sat.
4.
Afl~ will arrange TOPe at X rds 3493, X rds 3595 and when the op situation warrantn, at X rde 415083.
5.
. 190/73 A tk bty will be under cornel 2 HeR and will be allotted to the two sqna of 2 HOn re8por~ible for the protection of A Echs 5 Gda iU'lnd Bde and 32 Gde Bela, and Rl.sC vehs.
\
)
)
dNNEmRE JA 'ID ~ENDIX
ORDER OF MABCH »ID -GROUPING LEFT CL No
Flllry'Unit
.One sqn 2 F.GR 5 Gds h.lUd Bde Gp, (less 1 ..J.r_ul QOIDM. GDS) .Ii ~h,:!1}~cr c~::.d_
~
_RIGHT CL
of Vchs
lE!i~ One sqn 2 HeR Gds B1.c Gp
40
32.
461.
-153 Fd ~c:gt, 'Plu~. one sec 84 M0:: Regt :mo btys ?..l ,,~-t~: '?::3t (O~lC SP,
1 An:lt:. OOIDl.i GOO 2 1&.rnc1 ~!~ cce ':!(;. l"d I:.cgt, r}JI,>. one ~cc 8)~~ I:~cd Rcgt 21 Ii tk Regt, I).ess t ':,.) -Dt;i So r 0::-,0 S!?
and one to','rod) 128 Fd ~b
125
130
,0~lO tr:l.cJ.;or cl;.;'c'wn)
'55
6J
19 Lt Fd ..:.00
40
with in sp
14 Fd Sqn, incl br lorries 2 HCR, (less four sqns)- : Div HQ, (~Bch, to incl 8 Civil ~ff~irs vehs) liP
-84
I.ted Regt, (less t\'iO aecs) 94 ~ Rezt, (loss dcts) Recce P;l.rty 100 A.'I. Bdc
RbSC vohs
No of Vchs ----
40
344
~'£.th_ ,,!~.~c~-::~
3 IG •
Elci:J.ents 100 ~ .Boo 1.48 Fd Pk Sqn II Fd Coy~ (incl 72 AOP (Portee) pOne sqn 2. HeR .with, .4 Echs 5 G<:.s 1~ pOne sqn 2 HCI. with,
It'
PART II
15B 20 170
40
2.C 113 16
Wldar co::.» for nov and protection, Bde, 32 Gds Bde, 2 HCR and iU~ under corJd tor oov and protection,
60
38
64
40
81
_ br lorrias)
127 127 116
282
440
pOne Bty 73 i .. tk Regt Vlil1 be sub:-allottoG. to these
sqns by CM and will CQiJe under cOC'.d.
-,
T-dtb-_}~~
-
015 Fd Sqn, ,(incl 14- bI' lorries)
\D
(,I-j-
-..J
- 9B -
. iiNNEXURE 1B to .."U'PENDIX. t L' to PART II
ORDER OF
~.iiillCH
ON ONE eL
Fr.m/Unit
SOl'
No
No of Vehs
Tim0
REl/L1RKS
Past Point (inol 5OJ~
lbrgin) j
1
5 Gds M.I'ud
2.
One sqn 2
~<1o
cOI:rp1eto
888
120
HeR
4D
6
3
2 HeR, (10 S5 four sqns)
40
6
4
Div HQ
158
20
5
;iP
20
4
6
84 1.i:0d Rcet, (10Ss two SQcs)
170
22
7
94 L..·..il Regt, (l a s3 dots)
40
7
8
Recoo Pn.rty 100 i ...'l Bda
9
Ono S'ln 2 lIOR
4J)
7
876
125
81
10
50
7
113
14
16
3
10
.32 Gds Bde G-p cor.'l.p1e-tc
11
Elononts; 100 ..·•.i.. ndo
12
148.Fd
13
11 Fd COy
14
Air OP (Portoo)
15
One sqn 2 Hea with, undor COl.1d for r.lOV0 ::.rid proteotion A Echs 5 Gds ;~.'l.d l>l1o, 32 . C~· Bda, 2 UGH. :.lnd Rll
282
36
Ono sqn 2 HeR \/i th, under cuud for 1:\oVC a.nd prutcction Rj~ vehs
440
55
16
Pk
Sqn
Unde I' cor.'ld 5 Bda for }:lOV
Incl 8 niL vehs
Incl 73 bridg ing vcha
- 99 SEJRET
APPENDIX 1M' to PART II
16 September 1944 t,iAIlq EXTRACTS
52 "(NORTHUMBERLAl'ID)
DIVISION OPERATION INSTRUCTION NO )6 OPERATION IIGARDEN"
INFORMATION
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 9.
50
(N) Division will :
(a) Send detacronent to secure a crossing over R IJSSEL at DOESBURG E 9081.
(b) Advance and secure high ground to the NORTH of ARNHEM keeping cont~ct vnth the Northerr. troops of 1 British Airborne Division. (c) Be aVuilable as Corps reserve. 'METHOD 10. Grouping
(a) 50 (N) Division ~il1 bo tiroupod for the advance in aocordD.nce vn. th Appondix ID' (Not included). (b) GroUping will commence as soon as possiblo and will be completed by 1800 hr~ 18 September as far as the tactical situation permits. 11. Order of Mllrch
The anticipated order of rnarch ,nthin the Division and the probable date of"movoment is as folloTIs:
61
Raoee Roginlent
Detachmont 69 Brigndc Group Main Divisional Group 151 Brigade Group " Rear Divisional Group 231 Brigadc Group 50 (N) Divisional Administrativ<.: Group Br~dgchuad
D + 2
D + "2
3
3
3
D + 3
D + 3
D + D+ D+
D + 4
12. Movement
(a) The Di vi~ion \":i.ll move on tho Oorps M:o.in Axis by groups. Details vill be issuod later. (b) Serial Nwnbers ~rc allotted as shevm in Appendix 'D I • (Not included). They ho.vc been allotted to all groups, a.nd to units, the mov.:;mcnt priority of \Jhich i t is con sidered it l!\.~y b0 noccss.:lr~ to cha.nge from one group to another. Group Serial NUi:lbcrs ';fill be ...-hitovlD.shcd on the '\Jindscrecn antl tailboo.rd of as many vehicles .:l.S •••/possible.
- 100 p.os~;'iblc.
L.ca.ding .:lnd r"n.r vehicles ront be ma.rked with Group Scr:i..::.l NUL1bcrs. Scrin.l NUI:lbers n.llotted to units 'iiithin eroups viill NOT be lll£.l.rkf:;d on vehicles unless tho unit i~ OrdGi.'0U to nove se:Xl.r:ltclyfi-or;i its group• . . .r
(c) R~:-tc ~ ~f inOVCT:lcnt -dcpcni~ hoped to be at
-60 -tactlc:ll
a.pproxir~~a.1(el:l
si tun tion
.35 'Ttm and 10 mih.
-",
.
bU~ i:t- "is
(d) Nip,ht ItlOvu;.icnt.
1'h(;rc ',',ill be NO r.lovcraent on the r.l3.in axis during tho hours of d.:l.rkneDs, c.:xcopt: (i) Wh.:::rc i t is ['~ t3.ct ic~tl noccss i ty.
(ii) Whon a Group Cor.lr.landcr is satisfied th.:l.t his group can .._. co.plote its movo, ·\iithcut.disrupting trof'fic arrange Ll.cnts, ..:ithin h/o hours of lc..::;t light. .
(c) Lc.1.guoring.
Groups le.1.Guering for th.c night viill probn.bly hllvo to do so on tho ):~ir. ron.d o"../ inG to the nature of the ground, though it. :.lD:'J be poss ible for thou to pull off into :ldjaccnt fields. '_ If units luo.ve the road to lca.guer thoy \nll leave a representative on the rond to indi~te the point ~h~rc the tail of the colw.m ~~s vhcn it started to leave the road. Follo~ing seria.ls ~ill NOT pass this point except under provision of (d) above. In ::iny C:J.:;C it is essenticd th.'1t all serials sta.rt to Illove-· ago-in punctu"lly at 0600 hours. If thin is NOT done the ordor of i.mrch -.lill bo disarrc..nged nnd chaos is li!>:ely to" . annual
( f)
Li.o:h t s. NO light:.; \'1111 bo pu rr;ll t tG d o.n~\ no open firos vlill be 1i t "by night.
No rel.l.r;m.~d traffio other than tho rorc3t i.liniJ"::ur.l for COl:li.land and loca.l Il£l.intcn~;.nc(J will be "plJr, d. t ted on the Lain cueis.
(8) RiJa.r,/ard trn.ffic.
(h) ~nh Diucipline. Th8 3uccess of the op,-,ration ",/ill depend upon the :3pued ()f' tho· n;dv<:\.llcc, striL;t r,l..'1rch disciplino '::\.lld adhorunctJ to I.lO-"cr.t<.mt ordurs. The contonts of 50 (N') Division 3t~nding Opo~\tion In3truction No. ~ will aGain be ~:~ros30d on all r.~nks.
1.3. Task of 13ri%<.lhcad Dctachuent. Tel{; i3riUeu!l<:oad Dct:~chJ,1Cnt, a:; const i tu ted in ;~ppcndix 'D' (not 0. tt..'\cho
14. RE !ill 50 (N) Division l.lAY bo rolled upon to C<.'\rr.:l out to.sks under Q,ircction of CE .30 Corps. .' 1"icld Goupa-nics arc therefore grouped undur brig2.dos for 1.10VcI.Kmt only Golla. r8l.i..,\in under the cOJ.a.lnnd of the
ORE• ..illi-JINIS TR,,~T ION
15.
i~intcnance
On arrivll in the ~'Lffi\Jl-illl.~ ~l'cn.J 50 (N) Division anel troops undol' cOl"Jrmnd will b<.: 'Qt}.$ed on 162 Pi,r:, . ,hich is opening D plus .3. Loon. tion and. ti'.lus for d.r..\\linf~ nill be notif.icd to L.l.ll concerned lc..tor. Supplies and POL • ••/16.
- 1Q1
i6.
Supplies and POL 11.11 uni ts will carry four dAys rD, tions, and full tanks plus
200 miles reservo POL in unit transport.
17. ilJi1I.llmi tion ~\11 first line of all natures ,n11 be curried less those natures dotailed by fon-.l-3.tion CO!.1f.undcrs.
18. Roplcnisru.wnt (a) As there ,rill be; no baclC'.-..].rd j,\oveJ:l
(c) Units '.lill l.dcc their first
re~lcni3hr.lcnt frol.1 the vchicllols a.tto.chod ,~s in po.ro.grc.ph 18 (b) o.bovo, so that the tr:\nsport uil1 be ir:ll:iodio.1:ely c.v::\ilab1c to ruturn, \/hcn ordurcd, on rco.ching the d05tination.
-
19. TOVs TOVs ..till report to briEP..d0s undor o.rrangcJ.lUnts CR.:.sO by 1200
hours 18
Septc~bor, 0.3
undcr:
One pl;).too~ 20 Coupany R.1SC to 69 Brigado Ono p1tltoon 90 Co:-:rpn.ny Ril.SC to 69 Brigado Two lllatoons 90 OO':l'p.'l.ny R.i..sc to 151 Brigado 1'.. .1 0 platoons 20 Ooupe.ny Ria.SC to 231 Brigade.
20. Medical (a)
Fiold ~~:lbu1:~ncl.s \lill .:l~WI,,; under cOLl..lund brig:tdos
tlS
undor:
186 Field JLJ.lbula.ncc under coLt.klnd 69 13ri"go.do. 14-9 Fiela. .:....lbu1·1.ncc under cOr.ll.nnd 151 Bri~.:tdc. 200 Fiolcl •.J.lbulo.nc0 under cor.lr.l:lnd 2}1 BrigCl.<1o.
(b)
I B I P1atoon 111 l·,Ul.C, vil1 uove under eOJ:lr:nncl 4B FDS roo.r of tho Divisi·mrtl £~&:Iinistr~tive Group.
( 0)
All eusuc.l tics ;lil1 be c:\rr-lcd 1'or..-m.rd by :b'iold J·u.ibulances and 48 FDS ::mu OVo...J\lJ\t..::U to th~ COS on arrivnl. Fiold i~1buln.nccs ~ill bo prvl~rcd t~ cvncuo.tc ~Lsuo.ltios fr~~ airborne units on routo.
0. t
tho
':.nd 40 :E"DS 'trill eaoh dctrd1 ,~ section COP for att6..chl.icnt, undor arro.n~jc ..:Jnts ~·.m·.jS, 01\0 ",t, co.ch of tho follorJing TO?::> :
(d) Field ,Li.lbul.:\nccs
Crossin0 ESC~"'UT cann.l
3695
VEGJ lEL GR.....VE
4B37
ErnDaOVEJ.~
4-218
6253 ••• /Thcsc sections
- 1.02 -
Theso sections \',ill be proparod' to hold Co:\sual tios and siok for a perioel of up to 3 d..'1.ys.
(0) 3 CCS will be es~bli5hed ~lRlllHEr:i 7577. 10 CCS "~ll be ustablishod NI~t~GEN
7162. .,~
(f) Ono section of'163 Field ~~,bulnnco is establishinn ~ stagine . post at ST OEDENRODE 4332.
(g) A CCS \"lill bo cs~blishod at BOURG LEOPOLD
c\.s a
stc.ging post.
-
21. ORD ~~ dotachl,lont of 50 (N) Division Orti Fd Pk \/ill tr.:l.vel "with Roar HQ 50 (N) Division and ,./i11 btJ locntcd in th.:: ~rea. of Rco.r Division. All indents on the Ord :F'd Pk will bo put through this de tachr.~ont.
22.
'~
(0.) Rooovery sections froi.' 1Jrieo.o.c YlOrkshops vlill ror:uin undor co~~~nd,rospoctivo bri~Qdes.
(b) Vehicles \-Ihioh bren.k dovm ,'lill, if possible, bo towed for;"ard to final destination. Should this not be possible, tho vohiclcs '.'iill be I.:ullcd off tho ro.::.d and tho 10c1.tion rc~ortcd to C~iE at Rcar 50 (N) Divi~ion.
(c) 69 Brigade '~;Iorkshops only v!ill ..love for\'la.rd vii th tho
division. ~·.11 uni to l/ill be notifiod of its loc:::\tion
'ilhun est:,.blishocl 0. t tho final dostin..' l.tion.
23. Civil ~~:n'.\ourl:d
~~ffairs
Tho threo CorPs Det<:l.ch.;,e;nts
222
213 214
.24.
Ci~
Dota.chncnt
CJ~ Det~ch'.\(::mt C_~ Detc.chuon t
z 70
iiPELDOORN
E 77
IJ{NHEM NIJjjEGEN
E 76
-PH (a) PW tc.kon ·,;.,hiI3t on tho '· ......rch .Jill be nco.rost
h:'J1~(;J over to the
TCP.
(b) Tho divisiona.l Pil et'.~o .. till bo cst['.blishcd ~\t the Supply
Poiot on ~rriv~l fin~l dustinntion.
25. Place Code
Ncr.10S
(a) ~tt~chcd at ~PP0nuix 'e' (not included) is u list uf pl.:l.cO ooda nlli.1CS for use in ep..::r~tion ·G~'.RDENI. These place codo n(IJ"Jcs 00:.10 into force 1200"~ hours j) Do.y .:\.t 'which t:i.uo 0.11 previous pl."loO coda n'j)",lC3 c.rc onnc.;;llcd•
•• •/(b)
...
.-. supplol".1cntary
- to}
(b) J'~ suppl.:.r.icntc.ry list of ph.co code nw"']os ';till be issuod for distribution NOT bolow Brigade HQ, to bo t~kon into use if the list r.:.t ~'lpp(mclix Ie I Decm.los CO\:lprar.iiscd. This sUJ..)'plc~.l(;nt!lry lid 'iiill bo hkt::n into usc o.ncl the present list c~ncQllod on rec~ipt of code word ID~~SPE;illE •••••••• n hours. I ~lOKNOWLEDCE
(Sgd) X X X X X X X X
Lieut-Colonel, of signature 2305 hrs Mothod of issuo - Narr.nl. TiL~
Gencr3.1 Stll.ff J
50 (Nol'thumbrin.n) Division
, I
-101:...
.A.PP.ENDU I NI to PART II Appendix 'E I to 30 Corps Operation Instruction No. 24 of 15 Sep 44.
...1-_llRB=· O:;;,;:~;.;;;.~_~::::.;;...I' ..;.C..;.0.;:.;R~fS:_(_)~_i _L".'_i.'I_~~
O~7,R
FOR OPERATION 'MARKET I
1. British i~~.rb:>r.1e CC'l"l'S ~.s under cor;unand Seoond British ArlIW. It is ccmroanued. '0J ~ ~.el'.-I;-(;·e'.:e::a1 l!\ A..M. BRO'iMING. It consists of 1 British Airborne Dl'.'Lion and· 82 U8 Airborne Division. : 2.., .101 US .A.:i.l:b0rn 0 )) :.',.~;::::ion ::.s being dropped under a.rrange ments British Ai~bor!le Corp.'O.~ but em landing comes under cO.llllland 30 Bri tish Corps~·
3.
Missions o.s3ig.Ded "tv the Airborne Divisions are' in genera.l terms a.s follows:
to lane. and captu:t'e th~ bridge.,:; over NEDER RIJN at ABNHHd with .:m·,:·~icil.ent br:"dgeheac1s to fo.oilitatethe passage of 30 CorL~~
(b) 82 US Airoolne Division ._-- To seize and h')lil. th.e ,'!':;'ri.ges over R l1iul.S at GRlLVE and over R WA..·,L at NIJlYLn:EN so feS to facilitate the passage of 30 Corps. The capturo and retention of the high ground between NmImnJ and 'GROESBEEK 7554- is considered imperative for the accomplishment 01' this task~
(0) 101 US Airborne Division to seize canal and 5 tream' cross ings in area EINDHOVEN) ZGl, and VEGHEL in order to facilitate the advance of 30 Corps, to R :M,lu4S.
4.
A heavy air support effort is being carried out by 8 United States h~ hir Force in support o~ this oporation directed chiefly against FLJ.K in DZ fl.r.en,q.
5. Details oi' pla~1 c.r.::' cr:."t?)0sition of 1 B...· itish Airborne Division are ~s fnUi)WS':':---- --- -".. (a)
(0) Ordor of
(c)
xxx
Commandor
res,
B~ttlc
1 Paraohute Brigade ~araohute Brigade 1 ,Air Landing Brigade 1 F.~lish Paraohute Brigade
4
LZs anc:. O');\I_'ctivcs n~ Brigades are as shovm at Appendix
IB I to Part
I~
6. Details of plan and L:o:n~~ )::d'~io:1 of 82 US l.J.:cborne Division are a:::i :"'OL'.OVlS: ( a)
Commander
Y.. ."': X
••• j(b)
Order of Battle
- 105
I
Order· of Battle
504 Parachute Infan try Regt
505 Parachute Infantry Regt 508 Parachute Infantry Rogt
352 Glider Infantry Rogt (c)
DZs,' LZ3 and objectives of Regimcntai Combat Teams are a.s shO\"ffi at .Appendix 'B I to Part I ..
7.
De tN-In of :)18.0 and are as follows:
COl. P03 it ion 0 f
101 US
.I. irborne
Division
( a) Oorrunand.er
xxx
'(b)
HQ 101 US ~irborne Division 501 Parachute Ini'ontry Regt 502 Parachute Infantry Regt 506 Paraohute Infantry Regt
Urdor of BD:ttle
.(0) .res, LZs, and objectives of Regimenta.l Oorobat Teams are as shown at AppendiX IBI to Part I. :£Q B:citish i ... irborne Oo:r.·PS lands 'wi th first Glider\ lift· in US ":'irborne Div-ision and \-,ill be estL~blished initially :in area 7454. It will ~ovc later to aroL'. EJl.ST of llit~-.s/wi~·J., bridgen on main axis GRiNE - Nm~EN.
8.
n.rea.
l.~2
9.
Recogni tion o.ncl
Pa.sS\·IO~S.
XXXXXXXXX'xxxxxx'xxxxxx 10. Timingn •. (~)
H hour is the time at which the first paraohutists (less Pathfinders) are dropped. This' vr.ill proba"bly be 171300iL hours.
(b) This t:UJling is subjeot to conf'irriiUtion. rlOulc1
·l"~!.Lch
bL; for :,
r}crioL~"
of
<.;x~ct
24
Postponements or multiple th.creof.
hOUl~r;
( c) i .. ppro:ri:mate timinGS for dropping in 0D..ch Diyisional Clrca. will be as follo'i/s II minus .30 minutes
Pathfinders
H to H plus 1{- h.our3 -
Fir~t lif't (para.chutbts)
Later D Day
First Glider lift
Thcrt'} ".rill bo no drop during till; night DID plus 1.
•
The next lif1; \ull bi; c:,.rly on D plus 1 and will include both glidurs o.nd paro.chutists and ttiso possibly supply dropping.
- 106 -
APpendix: 'u' to Part II
30 CUR:fS
U}-~TluN
INSTRUC:rION :1'10. 25
(To'be read ih conjunction 'with '30 Corps Operati~n . 'I'nstro.oti~iO No. 24.)
Own Troops
8 and 12 Corps
1. 2.
~re
c,',ntinuine; vii th pres en t tasks.
Dritish 4drborne Cor j?B
British ~~irbornc Cori1S ..-lith under e,rLld R. Netherlands 3de, SRY Gp less one sqn, 52 l1eccc Gp, (wef 0900 hrs 24 S()p) , is :
(a) Continuine to h:)ld prescnt posns with 1 Dr Airborne. Div, 82 Md 101 US J..irborne Diva nnd R Notheriands :3de. (b) Relieving 69 Ldc G~ by 1400 hrs 24 Sep 0f rosponsibility for close 1>r.:Jtcction'i'iI.J1.IEL.EN bra and also, taking over 'responsibility fClr 'Orheo:l, fr'.Jr.1 l'\.iRT '7264 - GltuvT litEr.
696;. (c) hssw:1ing rasponsil>i1ity f,)r pr,jtoctL)n le.nJihE gr,~A.mcl·" sites in area li]ST of G-,d,.~VE.' ,
(d) Assur.1ing resptimdhili ty fGr the follo'W'inc roceo to.ales :
( i)
\lEST flank frou exel n, ;;~~J.. as. fer SOUTH;, A.S Canal. VIDUEL - iii t HERTOGENBOSCIi. (HOR r.~ay 0.180
1e op in this a.roa while 32 Cds Dde is SuUTH of GRi.VE).
( ii)
.
Et'.ST flenk frlX, :H. \i..·... .L ::)0UTH tc 40 Nr'rthinc . Grid.
INTENTlvN
3.
30 Corps, in conjuncti~n with British 'Will c:'"Jnt fu~e wi t'h op "li;iliDEN."
4.
~irbornc
Corps,
43 Div 43 Div will: (a) Socure tho RIGHT flank of 30 Corps frou incl
T~sks
ELST, (after co.pturo), to incl 30UTH bunk
NEDEH RIJN at the pt whero brhead is beine est.
(b) Ensure thD.:t: ~")lish' tps n' '~i in a.rea. SvUT~f of
NEDER LiIJN PL\::lL; :wer to join 1 .Jr Airborne
Div dunnt, n ir;h t 23/24 Sop.
( 0) Pa.ss two cays over NEDl:t{ iUJN night 23/24 Sep
to link up with itmJ'l' flnnk :'";f 1 ~r 4~irborne Div•
••••• (d) 'Iihan
- 107
(d) \"lhen . ,~.. .' te,sk :.. .::..5.{a) over
129 Bda is relea.sed frGl:1 present
l)y a.ction of GdG j~rn'.d. Di v, (s ee para
below), be prepa.reJ. to pass this Bda NEDm RLJN with the -)bject of ~~~inB brhead. .
( e) Carry out reconnais3ance iiK3'l' between iviJ.J., and NEDER RLJN as far as 50 Basting Grid•.
5.
Tasks Gds 4~rr.d
Div'
69 Inf i3de Gp c~r;l~:} under .COl.ld. Gds ..n.rmd Div at 1400. hrs 24 Sep, (after rcli0f frcrJ present tasks by 82 us Div). Gds AnJd Div will :
(a)
Protect the RIGHT flank of 30 Corps fraii incl ilE·.:i',EL 7367, (\:,thiy:h will be oaptured), to e.."'Col ELST.
(b)
Clear and keep clear the main rd NLn.1IDEN
_.:":'':''':''_-: ..
- ELST. (c) RetD.in om: aniil rel3t Sp in res NIJHTH of R \V'A.::.L.
(<1) Continue to op
\'Ii th present force in n.roa. exel T"&HEL to excl GR.NE ·to secure ;0 Corps il of' C.
6.
Tasks 69 Inr Duo Gp .
69 Bde- Gp will. :
( a) Continue ...lith prese.'l'it rccco task. I_'EST . between 1l..'..n.S 3.n(l W....·LL un til 24 Sep.
~ 200
h:t"s
Continue -"lith r<...naininJ present tasks until rcliev~d by 82 US Div 1400 hrn 24 Sap.
( c) C;:,ne undor
Cf"K:ld
G
(Signed)
i.iETIiOD uF IS·mE
TIl,ill LJF SIGN;.;rURE
.;fy .LO @,nu. Si)It
2015 A
X X X X X X,'X X X X X X ,d rif,aJ.ier, Gener.'.ll staff•
- 1,08
~ppendix
..
I
:
.,
,0
I?'
to Pa.rt II
"J ~
239/G ~5
Sep 41~
---
30 cvH.rs OfEl~ ..TlvN IN:-iTRUCTluN No. 26
( a.)
1 i..irborne Div brhc:l.d ovor NlillEll HIJN is nc,
long~r
tenable owing 'to cas\.ial'ties' awl ti'hc,rtage
sups.
(If
Necessary rfts ancl supc can :/nly b8 provided on a lirJited sc~le by nj" lit wi'th asuault boats, etc, each effort ./ill ar.i(llInt to .~ u''I.jor 0Ij sin~c the encny clGi.linatc thu narl"OW' cr:,sGinc i,lace- freu the hie}1 g1' ',una N.:E "Ulel Nil•
.
(b) The area. in '."Ihich 1 ... i1'10r00,Div have thc;ir pr.:sent brhead'is NUT 3uit:.:.blu r::·r develQP,0nt as Cl Corps brhcad .:owinC t;) dif'ficultics Df -o.:qJ&'1Si0n anJ. the il!lpossibility of buildinE ::ull r.cintuininG a Lr in thi3 area..
,,-...:;;
(c) It has th'urofor(~ 1I:.;.on 1.oGiulKl to eVD.Cuatc 1 J'.irborne Div frol.'! the; brhGad n.i.~ht 25/26 ::;cp. 2. :British .iarlJol"nc Corps·'fl.ro at I.Jrescnt responsible for the close def of NLJl\iIDEN brhcl:l.d, f',:,r op:~ betwcen I\:i....il:. and'1U'..AS and for close "protectir)O :Jf' Gi't'~VE -brh.o~d.
3.
8 Corps n.ro 'lireetod directed on SCHIJNDEL 4138.
,In
CUY'!' 711..9)
12
Corps
INT»TTlvN
4. 30 Cot'ps yri.ll ~rranc:c evacuatiDn. ot' 1 i .. irborne Div night 25/26 Sep and will cr)nt'inuc p:r;-cnent cps.
METHOD
.
~.
I
:C~VL\cuo.tion
MJ, roo cpt i.on of 1
~.irhorno
Div •
T eraporo.ry rC-o'l.djustl.lent. ~.
Freparn.t~on
..
fJr future ops •
..... • •••••• /~Vncuat~on
•
- 109 EVACUATIW AND RECEPrION OF 1 AIR;3URNE DIV
6.
(a) .4,) Div will carry out the evacuati')n of 1 hirborne .Div incl deception plan and backward lift of personnel to the SOUTH bank of NLThI:EG:EN rd br.
( b) Ali elsuents 43 Div on NORTH bonk of NEDER RIJN will
also be withdrawn end rejoul. tho f,lain body of the dive
( c)
CCRA will co-ord fire plan to cover 'ilithdrawal;
for this purpose all 25 pr aIJI1 less 50 rpg nay be
used.
( d) All· dets of Poles N0RTH of NIJMEGEN will be withdrawn
under orders 43 Di v. 43 Di v will arrange with 1
Corps direct into what area Poles should be
concentrated.
~irborne
Df,.. & ~iG 30 corps, in conjunctirm \/ith Br .ri.irborne .. Corps, will arrange reception 1 J..irborne D:i,.v in NIJ1.iliGEN area.
7.
TEMFORAR,Y RE -/illJUS/l'}:[EN'l.'
8.
Tasks Gds ~:"mrl Div
( a) Proceecl with capture vi' :3E\ii":EL. (b) Continue to hold SOO).lrc EAST flank of 30 Corps fran H WA,J. to excl EL8T.
-
(c) Continue to operate ·,dth 32 Gds Bde SOUTH of
Grt.:NE to keep the Corps axis clear. This will
inc 1 positionin[; one ref~t 6P in area 5851.
(d) Continue with present rucce taskS SE, SOUTH and
friv of GRiNE, SUUTH 01' R 1.LAAS.
NorE : -
This tb.sk is bcini~ tuken over by British Corps at a time to be notified later.
~~irborne
9.
•
Tasks 43 Div
( a) Proccod '.vi th Cll pturc 0 i' ELST. (b) Hold securo·the ~'iST flunk of the Corps fron
incl ELST to inc 1 3JUTH bank NEDER RLJN •
(c) Protect the \lEST flank of 30 Corps between
Ii ilJ·tJ'.L and NEDER RIJN reconnoitering as tar
w.EST as 50 Easting Grid.
(d) Hold one Dele Gp, (incl one an:l.d. reet ) ,
centrlllly place1 in res.
• •••••• /lREBUU~ION
,
- 110 PREPI®\.TION FOR FUTURE OPERATION.3
10. Gels ~\.rmcl Div ,"r.l.ll continuc to op in NE dir
1'). 43 Division will proce:ed \1.1. th rccce nnd plnnning for t\ possible river crossing op be~,een RENKUM 6276 and ITAG~f.[NGEN 5776. 12.
Bdy between Gels ;'erma. Div H.r,d 11-3 Div.
Incl Gds [.rlnd Div Lr:NT 7164 - REEK 6968 excl Gds Annd Div ELST 7071 - ELDEN 7375. 1 .3.
ACKNOViLEDG.E
(r,i~ncd)
}.lETHOD OF ISSUE BY 1,0
XXXX XX X
Brig,.
TIME OF SIGNATURE 1545.
--
-------------------------------------------
---"~
APPENDIX I QI to Pr\RT II
EXECUTION .30 CORPS SIGNAL PLAN i
!
BEFORE DROPPING OF AIRBOIDJE CORPS The two links to Airborno Corps in UK, (!9 ~nd A11), wore established satisfactorily by afternoon September 14 and worked throughout 24 hours •
1.
.AFTER DROPPING AIRBORNE TROOPS -AND BEFORE THE
MOVE OF MAIN HQ 30 CORPS
-
2. No contact wn.s m:i.de \\i"2 th 101 US Airborne Division until 0830 hours 18 Scptcmb.or. Conb.ct for;). short time was Iw.I.de with Airborne Corps evening 17 Septomber, but this WI"..S not satisf::l.ctory until ::l.bout 0830 hours 18 September. One HP set \'las tE,kcn off' 1\11 to work on C8. ?alse contact was made with the Phantom aeb.chrnent with 101 US Airborne Division ,'\t 1800 hours 17 Septembor. Three cipher messn.ges were received in the Corps Sign~l Office frOTIi th~t link. They looked like book cipher but did not work out and were initially assumed to be corrupt. It was then di~covcrcd th~t they were Phantom messages and the true idontity of the outsti'l.tion was confirmed. The Phantom deta.chment 'with101 US Airborne Division had been a.llotted the smne link sign as 101 US Airborne Division orl C5 and Corps Ciphers held no details of Phantom ciphers. On 18 September, f!:.:\in Second Army could not work at any time to Airborne Corps on c8. 30 C01~8 was given priority on that net as it w~s not possiblo to t~ke over control because of the confusion of code signs that would htwe boen caused at Airborne Corps. Conversely, there were periods by day when 30 Corpc could not work Airborne Corps on C5 and Main Second AJ:.·my could. Pn.rticulur attention was necessary to ensure the roost expodi tious routine of traffic which could always be clenrccl if nccess'U"y through Rear Airborne Corps in
UK. The US detachment sent to work on C14 h.'l.d no contact. was put on to this link with no results.
A lIP set
30 CORPS ON THE MOVE
3.
The link to Airborne Corps in UK W:'l.S ffi1.int:'..ined throughout the rrDve. As fn.r ~s EINDfIOVEN, the move was by night and rod aerials only could be used. Conb.ct wns lost with 101 US Airborne Division and 1 Airborne Division by midnight ,IDd trd'fic W,JS routed vi.~ Renr Airborno Corps in UK or Mnin l\.rITty. Until MD.in HQ Corps was NORTH of EINDHOVEN there "\'I::\.S no cont:1.ct on 014. E:lrly on 19 September perfect contn.et wus made with 82 US Airborne Division. On tho rrove, cipher tr~ffic reached 10,000 groups over a period of 24. hours. That was made possible by the addition of the; oxtr:L 3-ton cipher office o.t Corps HQ. As soon as ~~in HQ 30 Corps w~s cst~blishcd in 1~\IDEN, lino was laid to Airborne Corps and 82 US Airborne Division.
ARTILLERY 4. With 101 :Lnd 82 us .idrborne Divisions 2'..rtillory communicL\.tioos wero gener::J.11y satisf3.ctpry. No contl\ct Vias rrndc \','i th HA represent,'\tive 1 Airborne Division undor the n.rrnngemants m:\de. On 21 September, a set from 1 Airborne Division carno up on 64 },{edium Regiment Cornrr/ll1d net. This was :1uthentico.tod :md n set put on the snmc not at. Muin HQ 30 Corps. 64 l1edium RCljirll0nt "las at tho ,time firin IT in support of 1 Airborne Division ... /and it
- 112 a.nd it Wa,3 not t~dvisable to <:.ttcr:;>t to chl\nbc frequency to produce a ono-to-one link CCRA 30 Corps - eRA 1 l,irborne Div:ision. Cormnunications wi th :It. 1 Airborne Division r,rcrc through 64 1.1editun Regiment Co~nnd net until the relief of 1 .i.irborno Division on night 25/26 September. CONTACT DETAClllliENT S
5. The SCR.300 netn rlerc the most s~ltisf',,-c~9~Y"_'~ben·1 DORSETS were given the t~ak of crosa~ng the NEDER RIJN .~d p~trolling for some dista.nce to the l·rORTH, there was no British i rmy pack set avrdl;).blc which would gU:'U':mtco cornmunicc tions through thick country to n distaJ).ce of ttl Ge or four miles for p:i. trcls which had to cross Do river ;.. .nd tr:lvel t'..~ light ·:1..8 possiblo. Five SCl,.300 were loa.ned fran) 82 us Airborno Division Qnd produced perfect communic~tions for thQ to.sk.
, \
- "\13
P J-.. R T SE~"T ION IMl?ORTAl~1'
III 11
LESSONS
GENERAL
h In itt tl;lnpting t·o StLrrtrn,rizG tho ttdn'l()ssons of this operation, it is :\ppropri:'..te to r~illise that ~\. .J.eep thrust of some 60 miles was l1'.;-~dc into country occupiE;cl ,~nd hold by a stubbcrn encI!\Y, the.t five n.." ..jor " " tc;l'" cro,,::.lings '.Vcra 3ucccssfully negotiated in the faco of stro~,,! opposition, ~:.nJ. th.'1t the' pltn :',S origin~lly conceived wc.s 90/~ succ~ssf'ul.
1
f
WEi.THER 2. The weather will ~lw3.Y3 be ~n ~ver-ridin~ factor both in plfll'U'l.ing :mel in executing an opera Hon of' this w:lturc. During this po.rticul'U· opcr:'..tion, the we::.thcr h . . tl f". Llcf-i nitc effect on the course of opcrn.'tions, f;nd. there is o.,rory rO'"1.son to 3UppOGEi thCl.t the.: oper,tion would h:lve been 1007~ succos:Jful, E:.S diotinct from only 90-10, if the f ollovd.n~'. eomli Hons had b\::Jen f·ulf ill cd : If the wC'1ther h'ld permittoG. the 1 'Polish P'}r:~chute Bri ado to be .~lccur. . t.ely clroppcq.. on D + 2, ~\nd 352 Glider Regiment on D + 2, il.S f.b.mlOd, .'lnd thereby en'lbled the 1 li..irborne D~vision to obtn.in it~1 quick ar.cl vi b.l build-up.
(:).)
(b) If .the weD.thor h:'td permitted the nOrT:\l'\l sc:T..le of r,dr support ~vE\.ilf\.blc.
( c)
•
If the won.the!' haa pcrmi tted the 'rdr ::.'upply
8.S
pl::mncd•
3.
Reference to the ·:::.tt:"'..ched Appendix 'R t, which ahows the forecast IU1.d ~cctu:"'..l '.'Iv chi;.r conditions, indiccttos thB uffect the Y:G"-lthor h'ld on this opern.tion. 1. ~UJ:lS·'.ry, the weathor did not permit th:.)f:OC essential rcquirumunts Dhown above, :mel thorefore the 1 .flirborne Division portion of the oper~tion did not ~chiuvc fJll success ~8 origil"'.D.11y pir:..nncd. This 3t.'~ tcmcnt in no w().y cletracts from 1 ll.irbornc Division' 3 m:\::,;nificcnt fi[';ht in tho iJti\Uillr.; .~~}:'.., fl~ without this ·u:tion, tho fcllov:inr; r!unifiC:l tions would hf'..vO beon fol t by the rem~ind.or af the US forces ,m(lertil.kin[~ the opcr'ytion. H'ld 1 ldrbornu Division not cl~ elm to its bric"lrehc'\d in. the M'JlliE},! C'..ro:l. the onony night woll h3.vO cone()ntrrltG~l ::mpcrior forces ~p::1.inst u.s in the NIJ1~C£N bridgohead, .~d L~cdcd Olrr rcor?'1niz~tion ~~thin thnt brid['ch()~"..d (lurin£ the period. 'when :.dr m.lPport ':"lnd '.Lir st..'Pply were rr~").c1c i.rnpoBsible by the we3.ther. !i'rom tho t.bovc i t follo~,:.J thO. t uncllSr Northern European clirr,,'ltic conclitiuns ~t this tirl.c of thu' YfYlI',"n ;~irbornc pl,an 1rhich relic;:; upon linking up . ) ,irborno forces Ul"oppcd on D D':I.Y and (!ropping additiOn~l forces [~ D +1 is risky, since the w0"t.ther ~lY frustrate the plan.
PLANNING
4.
The :pl'lnnh~g of :the opor"ltion W~l.::;
('l)
.'
chicvr;J. by the visits of
The c'ornr:lfmdors of tho -'i.irbornc Forl:~'ltions
(b) ;.. . nurr:bcr of' ~t"lff officors f::on 'cirbol'ne Corp [.1 <'mel Div HQ (c)
,
RuprGsontntivoo of' Troop Co.rrying Cor.T:'-'l.nL1. a ••
/In
!l.ddition
a_
- 11l..-
In
ddition, an LO from ,~irborne Corps
HQ Second Army.
HfJ
was attached to
It is considerod that it would ha.ve been a gr~at advnntage to have had a :>lnnnin. and advisory staff from Alliod Airborne Army at' Army HQ. The .:'unctions of this s tn:f'f \\roulf1 be to become fully acquainted with :
5.
( a) The gra'ind Army 1J:ul for the ground fo ces (b) The grotl.'"ld Army ?J.an for thG Airborne Forces nftcr. lnnding ( c)
The Airbcrnc Army Pbn for tho initial droppinr l:'.nd
subsequcr:ol; build-til of the Airbo ne ·Forces.
(d), Tho "T'rn.ns)ort CO!m:'lDJ1d's Plan for tho initi ro-supply and
fly-in and
•
(e) To advise ~he ground force conrnandcr on all aspects of sub-par graph~ (c) and (c:.) o.bovo. To do this. it is cszenti: 1 for thL at ff to ru.'l.VC excellent 30 ~rborr.e Arny and tho rear echelon of the senior formation carryinc Ol.t the opcrutio:1. This stnff should be l~ge enough to provido rep~esent~tives on the Continent and in the UNITED KINGDO..1 ooth during t,le planning an-after the operatiqn has t'l.kon plnce, until the build-up by ~..ir htil.5 finished. communic~tions \vith
Provided suffieiQnt vtaff ~s nvnil;,ble, it i considered that tho ntt...chmont of ocriain officers of Airborne Formati.Ql13 to Army and other hendquurters prior to the opor£,tion would 'be of value, . so that stnfi"s cnn get to knO\~ each othe:: pr:'or to :md not
6.
At
7, . n 0pvrnt?-on of' thi.s n:J.turc mn.y forel.:: us to make deep ~ro\V, penetrations, 'which d.ClnU.'1U the climin·~tion of oJ.l vehicles which :'U'o NOT eSGontiul. 1. point to be.r:.r in mind when plannine, thorefore, is to inv0atig::i.to the l>o3"ibility of ·.lsing spacial l:u.l.."l.pt', tiona of t1 assa ul til or "light sc,uos ll of tr:U1sport, wh:'ch may' 03.... 0 the trn.ft'ic problem. In considering the p~til1cry plan) long range artillery ~nd Hfu1 artillery mU3t bu h'\OV0\J. woll·for\'~~.rd in th~l ground f.. rmy columns to be in position to provide ult~~~tc s~port for the irborne Forces .~d ~heir landing stri.ps t the first pos.,iolc opportunity.
8.
USE OF AIRBORNE TROOP.:> 9~
There is one outstnndin str~te?icol lesoon, Airborne troops must be \X)ed in m SSt and th(1 r tei:\t \.,.hich they are bui!t up must De . extre ,ely r"\pid. From the IrDment tt,"I.t rdrborne troops l
( 3.) The
.
•
- 115
(b) The continual protection of the lxndi ~ zones, v~thout which oper tional md a.drninistrfltivo build-up collapse. The simultaneous execution of theso ~vo tasks demands dispersion, whicp·can only be compensated for by concentratin the full effort of Inrge airborne foroes upon a small nuIDber of tasks. Disp rsion of airborne troops is jUGt 03. unsound as is the dispersion of effort of normal ground forces. 10. . The propping ZOne of the 1 Airborne Division W~ s too far fron their objective, i.o. oi3ht milo... from ARNHEM ; this \Va 'because thc torr in and fl~ ronde it iffip~ssible to lund the Division close to I~ .Inform~tion before tho opor~tion ,vas also to the effect that 1 ding3 SO'l!l'H of the .. iver NEDER RIJN wore also impossible owing to tho torr in. In view of this, it was decided to drop . m d land the Division on the NORTH bank of tho River NEDER RUN. The nct result of these factors was that the Ie d,in troops of 1 ; irbor:1e Division diU. not <.~rive in ARNHEM for four hours, b;yt which timo tl'.e enemy d~f.once schome had been put into effoot.
11. The polioy of'l ding airhorne troops to secure vit 1 points
along tne axis of advaneo of the ground troops ~~s groat success.
The trongthening of these garrisons vlith ADmy Troops w~ soun4.
Thoir tq.sks should include wide patrollin :mel the maintenance pf' a hard.
hit-;in reserve to deal with y enemy threa.t before it roaches the
L 0;" C .~is.
1::::. Irnmcdio.toly the main forcus of the lending corps hr~ve pessed through tho corridor, consistent with circumat nccs existing ~t t~e time, it is desirable thQt the re3ponsibility for tho protection of _he L of C should pns~ to ~ ~eparatc comnmnuer and none' of the loading ~roops should bo required to turn- bout. In the particular oirc~~ances under rqviow1 tho course diverting ground troops back -;0 deal \yith enomy o.ctivity aga~st the Co:rys L of C was inevitable. :n 'lddition, the existing route", wore fully eon n~tted with the follow '.Ip fightin"" troops nnd supportine ; thus it would not have boen ?oss:~le '~o p~~ additi~n~ troops u! th axis for the prot~ction of the
of
L of' C. C
ruNICATIONS
13. (a)
T~o operation proved ~rovided between the
th t exeellont communic tiona must be v rious headquarters a considerabl~ -;ime before the operation is planned to take place, ~o -;hat postponcrr.cnts or 1 st- inuto changes of ple..n cen bo quickly corrummien.tcd, nd information ~J(7'b,:Cl.;;n . th(] '.' tl..\ff mrkin~ ,vithin the theatre d ~irborne Base quickly Passod.
(b) :t was difficult to find out wh:1.t units h~d 1 ndcd und what -;hc build-up and rL:-supply inte:nti ns were from day to day. The plunning of this was done at 1.irbornc Base Md the scale oi' conununie::.tions providod aid not ponni t of tho inforIfi tion oeing passed in time to 3econd Il:r y. This fn"-de it inpossible ~o r,
• •• (c)/On the
- 116
!t the plnnni ~ stage, the gre test e was t:lken to orronge (l sound systet1 of cOmr:1unico.tions between eloments of 30 Corps nnd ·\irborn.0 Corps, but it is clear fron reQults t~~t forther trainin and improved \vireless sets :ere essential in order that comnunicat1ons between airborno troops and ground. troops followi r them up becoMe more efficient. C0J!'07.UJ1ic0tions. with 1 ~',.irborne Division were alr..ost non- . existent, 1 3 were cornmunic:l.tions between 1 Airborne Division and 1 P rachutc Bri .n.do.
(0) On the Corps level duri C
(d) Air support communic. tions must b0 provided by expert air support tentacles mld parties, ~U British tent~cles must be suitable for currying by glider. In this casc, US ir support p~ties \'/ere formed t the last moment, but the ir corps oper!ltors hetd not renched 0. rCf1sonl"ble st lchrd of wireless operdinrr. A modif'ied Forward Control Post (FOP). should Iso be provided at ~irborne Force HQ in the field in oreer to provide VHF Communic~tion tv reconnaissance and support airoraft as well as cor:mmnication on the norrnnl. j SSU network.
(e) Fool-pro 01 communications
st be arrang d bc~~een tho Airborne Porpes and the m..'\in body of the l\rmy. ~rithout . these cOT;1iimnic"ti('ns ado u.~to artillery support cannot be provided. Liaison Officers \vith \~ruloss sats, preferably cryatnl controlled, should be utt ched from thc Airborne Forces to the artillery scheduled to support thorn. Liaison Officers mu t be sufficiently senior to ct ~s representative of the CRA Airborne Division i f nocessary.
EFFECTING THE BREi'J<:-OUT
in
1~.
~~en grotmd troops ~e co-operating ~uch an operation as "MtillKET GARDEN", the first essential is to make sure of th "break-out. N In this opcr?tion, r.'\oticulou.u care wns taken to produc really powerful support pIon including artillery nnd air forces •. In the circumstances, the ene "; s in considerably grc:ltcr strength than ho.d been anticipated; but for the wei ht of this support rold for the mo.gnificent fi hting qualities of the breo.king-out troops, th junction wi th tho J irborna troops might well rove been delayed for a number of days.
ORGANISATION i.II BORNE CORPS 15. The orgmi I1.ti·;n of Airborne Corps HQ i s, tisfn.ctory. Tho proble is now undor study.
NOT entirely
AIR SUPPORT
16.
The close nir support '. iven to the Airborne Forma.tiona by WIZ\3 soriously curtailed by the fact th<:l.t 83 Group wa.s not L\llo\Ved to operate durint. the various flying-in opcrationc. Owine to the fact th.".t these took place, for obvious reasons, during tho periods of good wee.thor onel such periods as hn.vo already been noted were' very limited, this meant tha.t on certain days j~irborne Formations, and in partioular 1 Airborne Division, rocuived -practicnlly no close support at all.
83 Group RAF
. It is considered thn.t some whereby ground forces should not bo periods.
ltorn-'\tive system should be 4cvi~d of air support at vit~l
d~prived
• •• /CONFLICT
- 117
CONFLICT BETYJEEN
IR SUPPORT AND
IR SUPPLY rlIRFIELDS
17.
1 conflict of interest w~s eA~erienced be~vecn tho provision of forward irfields for air supply and the requirements for. fighter ~d fighter bomber fOIT."tltiollS of the R:.p Group supportin the y. As (lwClYS, in this type of operation, there ':ill be a number of ruling factors i the m"l.in ones are :
( ) Pvaib.bility of airfields rtnc1 suitability of country f'or quick can truction. (b) Amount of supp rt thr.. t fighter or .fighter bombers cnn give from op0ration~1 airfields lroady in use•
•
(0) Prioritie a ~s be~iocn Fight r Bonbcr Support
"l.n
emergoncy
~intonance requirements.
There J"Y be rct-lS where fi 0 hter and .,upply strips con be T:ladc in sufficient numbers to i..Cco "Od..:.te both fi hter and transport aircraf't. Nevertheles-, regnrdlesn of how far the above factors will be relevant, noI'r.lU1ly th.) conflict of interosts referred to above will usually require th'lt priority be ...>ivcn to "the RAP Group supporti :.> the Ar.y. "!here it is eo:> 0nti 1 to fly-in vital rnaintcnllnce requirements, it is considerod th:lt the l:m ing of supplies by vulnertlble ircruft in forward" CD,S should not bo forbidden sololy b€ : causc cam.lalties "tre expected j in fact, the scnle of plnne cas lties should be baltlnced agaill5 t the 'value of ~hc suppliLJS i.'7lported. AmITNISTRi.TIVE US ONS
GENERAL Before ~tte..:ptil\lJ to draw tlny concl sions from the Oodministrativo acpects of the oper~tion, it io n~cesG~ry to ex.~ine the administrative situ~tion 1vhich W~C cxistir.. in Second :\rmy ~t thet time. ,econd ArmY had just eoncluded nIl ndvanee of' s me 400 iles. The "rmy wa still being mnintained from the ID...t\ ~t BAYEUX, supplemented from DIEPPE; nnd the avnil~ble road tr~port was m~ch over-str~ined. The French and BolCian railways \' ere: in cours~ of oing put into 0 orOot ion , Mct their captlcity wns li.it0L by tho existence of rQil bre ks which h~d to be covered by ro~d tr~sport, ~d the difficulties inherent in operntinG u liberated rei! vo.y.
18.
Having reGard to the ~dministrative b ckground outlined above, the achievoment o"f 30 Co in "int, inin their fonn:\tions in the face of extreme difficulty is worthy of noto, "l.lld points to the f ct th'lt with an 0Jq orienced '(}' staff :It Form:,tion He.'"l.dqunrters· concerned, it is po iblc to accept ~dministr tive risks whieh othe~~ise might be disastroun. 4
PLIl.NNING ASPECTS
19.
Vfuen nn oper. tion involvin[ the mointcnanco of nirborno formntions, to~ethcr with those o"f ',rount.. forJTl.ntions, is being plrom6d, the fol1oYling f~ctors shonl receivo considcr·\tion :
( a)
Firstly, ~hen ~irborne for~~tions ~e to b~ dropped, nnd subsequ ntly r.tployed in' rotmd role in conj unction with the le~din ground forco~, the lending r,round Co s must bo a iniotratively reponsiblo for those .,irborne formations •.• /o.s soon a3
I
- 118 - .
as soon as the ground troops join up. This will be necessary because, the airborne Oorps Headquarters does not,. at present, in the early phnscs of this. type of operation, possess tho facilities or knowledge of local conditions to exercise executive administrative control and provision4 (b) Secondly, i f there is ~ny uncertain~y us to tho length o~ time which may elupse before the ground and airborno forces unite, IT'D.intenance of the l ... irborno force by air will be inevit!:'.ble. This ydlJ. be {\ vor.v; important f!\ctor when ffi'lking the operational plan ~or the Airborne force. For, if . maintenance by nir is to succeed the Airborne Forces dropped must be large enough to hold .:1. perimeter of such size that supplies can be dropped accurately within it without undue loss from enemy fire. (c) Thirdly, thd ~nintcnance requirements of airborne formations for the time \ hils t they CU'e operating' with ground forces should 1)8 ~::;so6sed on the basis of requiring u minimum of one month's muintonnrice. This is npcessury to .ensure thut udminist~ative prOVision will r.ot be lacking ohould the airlJornc forcos have to be employee1 in a ground role longer thl.n oriGinn.lly anticipated. This applies . pnrticulnrly when US Airborne Forces ~c operating in front oi' 1:\ British L of C and vice versa. RESERVES
20. The value oi' ordering fO!'lTh."..tions to car~y the 1TIc-'\Ximurn possible :reserves was amply demonstra"tcd when the I, of 0 was cut,' the first timo from D of> 5 to D +6 nnd. the second. time from D + 7 to D -n 9. Dm to operational priorities, it had been ~)ossible to get more than tho minimum cssQntial ammunition, petrol, oil nne. lubricants forwax-d.
Forl'M.tions were' thus foroed to make tho fullest use of their reserves and the lnr~er reserves of divisions were used to help the more needy Oorps and llimy troops. USE OF AIR TRANSPORT
Once ground contact hr-s been established wtth airborne troops, their maintenance should be e~rriod out in the n0rmn.l m~nner as for ground trobps, ~d air transport should be relied on only to bring to the theatre such itcrr~'of special ~~turos ~s arc unobtainable in the thcatre, because air dr0pping or air laneling of supplies depends on the 'No:lther plus air superiority, plus av.lilability of transport o.ircrn.ft. 21.
l!'inally, when plonning oper&tions of this nature, it is imporative to apprvciClte tho.t tho employment of a.n alli(..':' Airborne FO!m..Ltion ha 0 administrative objections, b,.. t by doir..g so the administration overho~d3 arc greatly increased. 22.
The essential foature will be the ~nrly ostablishment of a complete chain of Liaison Officors nne Administrative Signals of the same ne.tionality a::; the 1.irborne force. nt succ0ss;ive HQs along the L of C.
•
)
)
OEERhTION "Mi.RIOO.' G.£JIDE'If"
Serial Day and No Da.te ( i) (1i) 1
2
D - 1 16 Sep
D
17 Sep
3
D + 1
18 Sep
SUI!:lIl)8.ry of' Final Weather Forecast (i.ii) Period 17-20 Sep suitable for airborne ops ~dth rair weather c.part from tlvrning fog. Light winds.
Fog over bases clearing by 1000 hrs wi~h l~dcrate aDounts CUl::ulus 3000 ft thereafter and good Visibility. Light win~.
Time of Issue and Period. ( iv)
- - - - - Repercussions
-.Lv.!}
1630 hrs.
0708 hrs. 0800-1800 hrs
0800 hrs. after 1000 hrs, visibility 1000-1900 hrs becoming good. 'f;ell broken cloud 3000 ft over buses bee'Jring 8 10/10 sea and target arc[\. b~~se 15/2000 ft but sr,r.lC pc.tches 7 800 ft in uccasir...nal rain. Rain dying out, cloud li ft ing during afternoon. Wind light variable.
Fog at b<".scs clearing shortly
Summary of .l"'~ctual Weather ( v)_ ._
Appendix 'HI to Part III
Notes
____ (vi_i) Lt~en
BRERE'.IU'f decided to proceed with op MftRKEr
SirJilar to forec.:tSt
Op proceeded according to
plan
Bases as f·orccust but Ops procoedcd cloud ';7ell brl:,ken base according to 2500-4000 ft "'jvor sea plon, but and tcrgGt. ~cather NORTHERN r:mt over the airfields and only used. Take &1d battle area was off around 1030 hrs. Ground bad.
On advice given to Lt-Gen BREREIDN at 1800 hrs of' fog on r.'l:.rning 18 Sep, it VlaS decided tc. postpone take-:>ff' till 1030 hrs. Thick cloud., base 600 ft or less, had been m:JVing slo";lly NORTH from ~J'J"CE
to\lards tt\rget area all night 17-18 Sep. .i..dvice :: given by Met that NORTlfEIC"IJ" '-D route via DUTCH islands I should definitely be troops did ;'lot aJvpted. This was d::.ne get suCh ess anu c;:,ndi tiGns were even . ential close bet t er than fOl:ecast. Had SOUTHERN r0ute be0n support f'rora the air (1.8 th<.:Y :ld::>pted ~:.any gliderS" v.:JUld have been lost in did on th previous day. cloud.
Appendix
{f
(ii)
J,..
D + 2 19 Sep
Lv}
(iv)
(iii '.
Extensive area of low cloud 0900 lu's. As forecast except for 1000 ba:;e 500-1 000 ft MIDLAlIDS, two pts 2000 hrs 1. Low cloud remail1ed lifting and dispersing 1100· 1 200 Ors. El sewhere well in GRANT}~ area, per ~roken cloud. base 2000-.3000 si stea all day. Base ft. Huzy, visibility 2-5 GOO-10oo ft. 2. patches of 10\ miles. Light EAS~' - SE moos. f10ud 500-1000 ft were encountered alone; p.ttachu
--
::'{OJ.'ES:
-
"
'R'
to Par~ III (Sheet 2)
(vi)
(~J.)
}lost planes in GRAl"lW.A1I area ere unable to take off despite pootponcment 1130 1400 (i.e. gliders of U~. troops D:lla. 'j poli3b para. Bde) • 38 a..\'ld 4b GP. and G-REEI·fr1JJ-,f oo1:.:.oN took off on· time - 11 30 hrs. 1 ~~ of gliuers lost mainly it is believed becaus<3 of !:J8.tchos of 10\1 stratus !1ev.r HZLGIAN coast. Over 2/3 mooe the DZ •. Rest larded in friendly
Lt-Gen BRERETON was advised at 0900 hrs that NORTHERN route better than SOUTHERi''l" ",ith practically cloudless conditions. He ~r:.9tcd. SOU:l'RERN route for tac reaSOnB. It ~ppears from scanty observations there was little a!' no 10\!1 cloud on the NORrHERN route.
BELGIhN
..
territol~.
. I
D
+
3
20 Sep
0900 11.1.':;;. Si.milnr to f'orecE\st.
Fog und 10\1 ~trt..tus, base 500-1.000 ft lifting nnd dlspersinc by midda.y o.t SOU ~:jof busos and. by 1 500 - 1600 hrs .::tt gOR11ID!:::m bases becoming bruken cumulus base 2000-3000 ft afternoon. str&tus eyer
1000 2000
SOU".!HEl=>J.r NOld'R SEA ,:md.·
C9ntincpt liftDlg a.bove 1000 f(:; co;.rly af'tornoon and breaking arou.nd 1600 hrs. ;.rinds ligh~ vuric.ble.
,.
[lrS
In vi'';·;1 of the 3101'7 clenrunce of 10\1 cloud at NORTHERN bases, decided to put on paro:i.:p (1 Poli$h .Para Bde) and ~C-5UP missions only. These oarried out. ::rac/R could produce lit tIe infor mation, and this enabled the enemy to concentra.te EJ.ST and TIEST of 30 Corps axis of advance Viith a vi to disru{iting traffic on it.
•
urea take-off post poned from 1030 - 1400 hrs a\Jaiting lifting of low c10lrl. GIUU~TBAM
38, 46
Gpz 3.nd GREENlilJJ COMMON"
a~ea
- take-off as planned 1130 hrs.
J
....
~
\
,
.
)
)
A,ppendix 'R I to Part III (Sheet 3)
.(.i.} 6
(.;i.i)
Lij.JJ
.u
(J.y)
._ •
'D + 4 Extensive mist and low 2') Sep cloud below 8(X) ft clear ing by 1100 hrs in SOUTH. 1200 hrs in NORTH. Then vi sibili ty 2-8 miles and overland, there~ter 4 8/10. cumulus base generally, 2-3000 :rt but belo,"' 1000 1 500 ft at times in sP.owers. Small amounts cloud at 2000 3000 ft over sea~ Winds light variable.
.
6'1
0900 hrs. Stratus uersisted base 600- - 1000 ft 1000 2000 hrs tops aroW1d 2000 ft over EASTERN ENGLJl.ND, rev patches eyer aea. No showers erlcountered. Other-lise as forecast.
-------- '--'- -----'
0900 hI'S. 7 D + 5 Wicespreao mist or fog 1000 toge ther with loVi cloud 22 Se belcw 1000' f't over ENGLflJll1) 20c0 hrs ·..Ii th cloud base improving to over 1CXX) ft during ear]y ef·ternoon. Visibi1i~ im proving 1500 yds or more by noon except in NORTHEP~1 bases where 1000-2000 yds to 1500 hI'S. Over sea and target area well broken cloud 2000': 3000 ft but loce.l rain like ly, cloud 1 owerin g to around 1500 ft.
-------- ---- -
---...
--
._~____
_.-- -- -----------------
(vii)
_
_ __
In view of low cloud conditions
GRANTHAM areas take c.f'f post and moderate visibility decided poned until 1400 hrs. 38 ana to send re-sup p 18..'1e s only. 46 Gps and GREENIWvi COMMON areas took off as planned at Tac/R limited and prevented 11CX) ht"S i'lyi!lg over low addi tional informutiOl; t'rom being obtained abcut the ene1I\,v's stratus in EASTERN ENGLPlID. operations against the L of" C axis. 30 Corps agreed unusual procedure of strd.'.e on recog nition.
-----_._----
Ops cancelled at 1300 hrs. Reason a.ppeared to be glider work not possibl~ in vieu of lo\'! cloud, and nc re-sup or paratps required although this cculd have been done.
--_. ---_._---- 1.'~et
briefing of' Gen STEARLY FAJ...J.. at 1715 hrs: Explained that clearing cold front would pass area on 23rd giving geod conditions for glider ·;Iork behind it provided it did not become s~ationary over target area, as seemed possible at the time.
---.. - --------..0:------
I
.....
N
.
·'
.;"
Appendix 'R' to part III (Sheet '4)
( i)
( ii )
(iii)
Forecast
8
( i v)
__ {Y.tit
(vi)
(v)
~em.oo
out intermittent from i.T.iWT to by evening. B.~in out
.
o.t 1200 hrs.
but .3or.1e oth<::r rain
Similar to
forec~st.
Condi tiollS
<:'5
spreading
nffect ;:..11 bnses
OlcOO 1OCX) it or
better.
9
D ....
6
23 Sop
cold front cle~ring t~rEet uren by 14iXJ hrs givinG ver" good conditions bcl1ind. Visibility 8 + mile~. Cloud. 5-8/10 2C'OJ 3000 ft. ,~7ind '.:csterly 10-15 mph increasing 15-20 r.l::?h OVGr la.nd.
08qo
lu.'~.
1COO 2000 hi·s
c~se
o.part
fore
fr~n.0ne
slight sholler in
tcrgat cloUG
urc~
ons~
with
bll gliders sent over from GP"",NTHAl.L t.hat had been \'Jui ting te, go &ince 19th.. 09 IJP.Ri)ET concluded.
Time over DZ fixed at 1600 hrs to give front good chance to move by.
1500
.,
2000 ft.
,u
~
(.