Modern Defense Force Philippines

Security Sector Reform

MODERN DEFENSE FORCE p h i l i p p i n e s

Security Sector Reform: Modern Defense Force philippineS Published by: Ateneo de Manila University (ADMU) Department of Political Science

Working Group on Security Sector Reform (WGSSR) 3/F Leong Hall, Katipunan Avenue, Loyola Heights, Quezon City 1108 Ph Tel No: +632 426.6001 Email: [email protected] in partnership with Armed Forces of the Philippines

Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City 11 1110 10 Ph Tel. No.: +632 913.0952 Military Tel. Tel. No.: +632 911.6001 Military Line: +632 774.5625 Website: www.afp.mil.ph with funding support from: Australian Aid

Level 23-Tower 2 RCBC Plaza 6819 Ayala Avenue, Makati City, 1200 Tel. No.: +632 757.8100 Fax: +632 757.8268 Philippine Copyright ISBN

©2014

978-971-550-691-5

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any means, except brief quotations for review, without permission in writing from the Authors. Editor

Jennifer Santiago Oreta, Ph.D. Copy Editors

Kathline Anne S. Tolosa Mereniza C. Gomez Reyna Mae L. Tabbada Tabbada Maribel Daño-Luna Alexis Jerome M. Tolibas Tolibas Disclaimer Admin Support

Ramona Liza M. Paulino Layout & Design

Tyrone John A. Reyes Email: [email protected] Bernadette N. Patañag Email: [email protected]

This publication is produced by (or is a product of) Working Group on Security Sector Reform, Department of Political Science, Ateneo de Manila University with support from the Australian Aid. The ndings, interpretations, and c onclusions expressed in this volume do not necessarily reect the views

of the Australian Government.

ABOUT THE BOOK T

The authors have attempted to break apart the ten-point agenda towards a Modern Defense Force to problematize and translate the big words into smaller, bite-sized, chewable pieces. The essays attempt to elaborate on the intricacies of the concept ‘modern defense force,’ and engage the reader to think through the issues. The authors have extensive knowledge as regards the issues they have dealt with in their essays – some of them are military ofcers in active duty, others are researchers

who were involved in actual policy research while in the Department of National Defense (DND) and/or Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), while others are academics involved in security research. The writers are part of the technical working group (TWG) created for this research publication while some were invited contributors. The papers, prior to publication, were all subjected to thorough discussion by the TWG. While the essay-writer has full responsibility to his/her work, each paper was vetted, challenged, and debated debated upon by the entire TWG. The series of TWG discussions happened during the period January to December 2012. No condential information is revealed in any of the papers.

ABOUT THE BOOK

iii ii i

TABLE OF CONTENTS about the book

iii ii i

foreword

vii vi i

chapters: 1 Dreaming of a Modern Defense Force

1

2 Policy Environment for a Modern Defense Force

11

3 Mapping Out the Legal Terrain of the Philippine Security Sector

25

4 AFP Modernizatio Modernizationn

39

5 AFP Force Structure

49

6 AFP Doctrine and Training

57

7 AFP Clear Operational Plans

65

8 Philippine Intelligence Community: A Case for Transparency

75

9 Civilian Engagement of the Militar Militaryy

87

10 Gender Inclusiveness in the Milita Military ry

99

11 Ethnic Representa Representation tion in the Armed Forces of the Philippines

109

12 Self-Reliant Defense and People-Centered Security

115

13 AFP Regional Security and Defense Cooperation

131

14 The Evolving Role of the AFP: Skewing Towards Non-Traditional Roles

141

15 Regional Cooperat Cooperation ion on Civil-Milit Civil-Military ary Coordinatio Coordinationn in Disaster Response

155

– Crisis or Opportunity? JOINT TECHNICAL WORKING GROUP

175

about the authors

177

TABLE OF CONTENTS

v

FOREWORD T

This publication comes at an auspicious time in the history of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). In 2011, the AFP formally began its institutional reform with the adoption of the Internal Peace and Security Plan (IPSP) “Bayanihan”. The IPSP puts on paper the positive strides that AFP units operating on the ground have accomplished. For many years, our soldiers and ofcers have carefully

and painstakingly tried to rebuild their relations with communities and stakeholders, with lessons the IPSP Bayanihan has harvested and put into a formal document that now guides the doctrines and rules of engagements in the military. Alongside such efforts, the Major Services of the AFP embarked on crafting their respective transformation roadmaps, which allowed the units to collectively realize the future of the armed forces that they wish to become. True to the spirit of multi-sectoral engagement, engagement, civilian-led advisory boards were created to help guide the transformation roadmaps in achieving their agenda, with distinguished members of the business, academe, and public service as members. Likewise, the AFP has also formalized its commitment to the Bantay Bayanihan, a network of civil society organizations (running now to almost 180 CSO-members nationwide), to allow the group group to be the oversight in the implementation implementation of the IPSP Bayanihan. Since November 2011, the AFP and Bantay Bayanihan network has institutionalized the quarterly dialogue with AFP Unied Commands, Divisions, Divisions, and Brigades that allowed for candid and serious discussions between AFP ofcers and civilian groups regarding combat and non-combat operations of the AFP.

The IPSP Bayanihan and the Transformation Roadmaps, together, serve as the platform of the AFP reform agenda. Most signicant in these undertakings is the fact that the drive to transform is coming from

within the organization. The AFP is is transforming to be a better armed forces that is more responsive in the fulllment of its constitutional mandate as protector of the people and the State. It is recognizing the

changing landscape of the Philippines as a democratic country, country, and the need for the military institution to adapt to this changing environment. It recognizes the increasing demand to address and manage territorial concerns due to competing claims to t o resources. I am happy that military ofcers and civilian researchers have worked very closely in the true spirit of

Bayanihan to put together the essays in this publication. publication. Indeed, the discussion in this publication publication will greatly help the AFP in further realizing the needed transformation that the military requires to become a credible and modern defense force, worthy of Filipino pride. Maraming Salamat at Mabuhay ang Sandatahang Lakas ng Pilipinas!

GENERAL EMMANUEL T BAUTISTA AFP

Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines

FOREWORD

vii vi i

Security Sector Reform: Modern Defense Force

1 Dreaming of a Modern Defense Force by Jennifer

Santiago Oreta, Ph.D.

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T

The paradox of transitional societies is that while it attempts to strengthen and deepen the institutionalization of basic governance infrastructures, it also requires a signicant

democratic space for people to engage in democratic governance. It is a paradox since institutionalization requires regularity, standardization, and routinization of practices, which are easily disrupted, sometimes even compromised if people’s engagement is not managed well. well. During transition transition period, different

eye of security groups, while groups supportive of the state enjoy its friendship. During periods of democratization, security forces naturally experience, too, a transition – from “waltzing with a dictator” 1 and exclusive power circles, to periods where inclusivity and people engagement become the new normal. In the Philippine context, the military and the police forces were heavily utilized by the Marcos’ government during the infamous martial law era

groups may push for specic policies and

(1972-1983), and even way after the ofcial lifting

measures on how to address issues confronting society. If avenues for people’s participation are unclear, this can have detrimental effects on the standardization-routinization demand of institution building. Policies that are within the ambit of “good governance,” if unpopular, can even succumb to public pressure. Yet, people’s engagement in governance is also the fundamental fundament al essence of democracy. A healthy level of people participation ensures that the political system is relevant and responsive to people’s needs, and transparent and accountable to merit the trust of the voting public.

of martial law law until its fall in 1986. 1986. In more than a decade of the cozy relationship between the dictator and the security forces, hundreds have reported to have been victimized by the state’s strong hand, while others remained disappeared, mostly those who belong to the opposition and/or militant groups.

Security governance is among the most controversial and contested terrain in transitional societies. Society always has ambivalent feelings towards security forces, depending on which side of the fence they are in. This is precisely due to the fact that it is the security forces – in this essay, the military and the police – that are usually utilized by the state to protect its survival. Oppressive leaders use the military and police to suit their agenda – to quell dissent and remove possible roadblocks to their rule. Expectedly, groups critical of the state receive the watchful

Naturally, when the failed coup d’etat of then Defense Minister Enrile produced the severing of ties between the defense department and Malacanang (with then AFP Chief of Staff Fidel V. Ramos joining the beleaguered Enrile), the attitude of the people was expectedly ambivalent – largely due to the perception that it was simply a staged play of the dictator, which had one-too-many. It was the intercession of the late (Catholic church’s) Jaime Cardinal Sin that swayed the favor of the people and eventually produced the now famously regarded “people power”. In this historical juncture, it was the military’s swinging of loyalty, from Marcos to Corazon Aquino 2 that catalyzed the political change. This greatly changed the perception of people – especially the fence sitters – favorably towards the military.

1 aymond Bonner, Walzing Walzing wih a Dicaor: Te Marcoses and he Making o American Policy. Vinage, 1987. 2 Hisori Hisorical cal accouns o he even, however, claim ha Enrile was no oo eager o suppor Presiden Corazon Aquino’s Aquino’s ascension o Presidency.

1 DREAMING OF A MODERN DEFENSE FORCE

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The succeeding years of democratic transition under President Corazon Aquino (1986-1992), however, were peppered with several attempts at power grab by the military, the same group that won the favor of the people due to their participation in the 1986 “people power.”

(Weber, 1919).4 After all it is the military that is the primary instrument of the state to protect its survival. This is the fundamental argument on why the institution should be out of politics. Finer (1975) argues that the military has the ability to usurp power anytime it wants to, and the fact that it does not is a clear testament to its professionalism.

The second wave of “people power” in 2001 again placed the military in the center of controversy. The withdrawal of support of the military from the presidency of Joseph Estrada was, in military parlance, a mutiny, but it produced the desired result – the stepping down of the President from the seat of power. 3 This showed again the capacity of the military institution as a decisive force during historical crossroads. As shown, in both 1986 and 2001, it was the military that served as the ‘swing vote’ that changed the direction of events. The key role that the military played in crucial historical junctures is also the source of the mixed feelings of the people toward it.

The Crucible: Internal Security Operations (ISO) In a democratic and fully functioning state, the monopoly of use of legitimate force is lodged only with the state, through its military and police

During the administration of President Marcos, the Philippine Constabulary (PC) 5 was the primary unit that managed and handled internal security, with the rest of the military acting as support units. Dealing with internal armed threat groups, therefore, falls in the lap of the PC. PC. The PC was, to a large extent, similar to the gendarmerie of Western countries where it functions as a ‘hybrid’ police and military, and handles internal threats. The administration of President Corazon Aquino (1986-1992) adopted peace negotiation with armed threat groups as a major pillar of its security policy. There was an attitude of reconciliation,, viewing the armed threat groups no reconciliation longer as adversaries but as possible partners in development. With the internal threat threat seemingly seemingly lessened due to the progress of the peace talks, 6 the need for internal security operations was also lessened. This somehow justies the move

to collapse the PC with the Integrated National Police (INP), hence the new entity PC-INP was

3 Tis ac was regarded by he Supreme Cour as anamoun o resignaion, hence, he swearing in o he Presidency o hen Vice Presiden Gloria

Arroyo. 4 Max Weber Weber,, “Poliics as a Vocaion,” Vocaion,” (speech, (speech, Munich Universiy, Universiy, 1919). 5 Pobre, Hisory o he Armed Forces o he Filipino People (Manila: New Day Publishers, 2000), 207. Te Philippine Consabulary was he

nucleus o he Philippine Army during he Marial law regime. 6 Te peace alks wih he Communis Pary o he Philippines-New People’s Army-Naional Democraic Fron, however, evenually collapsed under he wach o Presiden Corazon Aquino. I was only he peace negoiaions wih he Cordillera People’s Liberaion Army (CPLA) ha was signed under her leadership leadership..

4



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born. This later on was further transformed to the now Philippine National Police (PNP). 7 The major change was the removal of the semi-military or constabulary character of the unit, fully clothing it with civilian identity and function, and placing it under the Department of the Interior and Local Government. In short, the police was fully integrated in the government bureaucracy. With the PC out of commission, dealing with armed threat groups was left with the civilian police as it was regarded more as a law enforcement concern rather than an an ISO (see RA 6975). Note however, that while the police was civilianized, the armed threat groups (e.g. the Moro National

Continuous involvement of the military in internal security affairs would have great repercussion on the force structure of the AFP service units, the military code of conduct; the rewards, sanctions, and promotion mechanism, and the capacity of the institution for external defense.

Liberation Front, New People’s Army, private armed groups) continued to function as guerilla

units, with military-like chain of command and were still equipped with high-powered weapons. Unfortunately, when the function of going after them was transferred to the t he police, the capability upgrade of the police force, both in materiel and training, remained wanting. A civilian-trained and bureaucratized police dealing with armed guerilla fronts is an obvious mismatch that would have great repercussions in effectively quelling armed dissidence. The institutional limitation of the police prompted President Ramos (1992-1998) to shift again the security policy, policy, calling on the military to again take the lead in internal security concerns (see RA 8551 [Sec. 3], 1998). The difference this time was that there was no longer a hybrid or semi-military Constabulary to take on the internal security operations (ISO). Hence, it was the entire military institution, instead of just a unit, that was drawn into the ISO arrangement.

Given the renewed thrust of the Aquino administration (2010-2016) to peace talks and political negotiations with armed groups, there again is renewed discussion as regards the role of the AFP in internal security operations, especially since the peace settlements are steadily moving forward. The basic contention is, if armed groups will forge political settlements with the government, they will no longer be considered ‘threats’, and hence, any infraction will be a lawenforcement concern, an issue well within the ambit of police function. With less of its force committed to ISO, more attention and resources of the AFP can now be devoted to improving its basic and fundamental function in a democratic state that is, protecting the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the country. The crucible, however, is the lesson learned in transferring ISO to the police in 1992, and back again to the military in 1998. As shown, the sudden shift in transferring ISO from AFP to PNP was not a good move. A clear plan and transition strategy is key to generate a win-win solution to peace and security concerns. This is the context by which the concept of a modern defense force is framed.

7 see epublic Ac 6975, as amended by R 8551 and R 9708.


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Modern Defense Forces Despite the positive developments in the peace tables and the impending gradual disengagement disengagement of the AFP in select areas, the reality remains that the military shall continue to engage in ISO whenever it is necessary, until such time that the police develops the necessary capability and institutional grounding in taking on the lead role in ISO. The concept of defensive forces relative to internal security, therefore, requires the broadening of the imagination to include both the military and the police. It is a concept put forward as the long-term agenda of security reform initiatives.

of the entire process process to professionalize professionalize is coming from within the ranks of the institution rather than externally driven. This is what makes it interesting. The ten-point agenda below attempts to capture this momentum momentum for reform. reform. A large part of the ideas presented are actually culled from formal and informal conversations with military ofcials. The humble humble contribution contribution of this essay essay

is the attempt to put the ideas in a cohesive and organized fashion. The 10-point agenda towards a Modern Defense Force: In order to provide for effective and efcient

For this publication, however, however, the theme revolves around the security reform agenda necessary for the Armed Forces of the Philippines to move closer to becoming a modern defense force. In simple terms, a modern defense force is one that

provision of security (state security and people

has the capacity and capability for effective and efcient provision of security that satises the demands of a democratic state, contributes to regional stability, stabil ity, and operates within a framework framewor k of democratic governance, rule of law law,, respect for human rights and international humanitarian law.

•

are trained and equipped to suit the t he strategic domestic and regional environment;

•

maintain an appropriately-sized force structure for its army, navy, marines, and air force, whose size is consistent with the internal-externall security demands; internal-externa

•

has sound organizational set-up that maximizes the strengths of the institution and ably complements its weaknesses;

•

has sufcient budget to support its operations;

•

can contribute to national and international goals of peace and security.

The relevant question, hence, is how to create this professional and modern defense force? This

security) that satises the demands of a

democratic state, it is necessary that the armed forces:

concern, to a large extent, reects the dilemma of

security governance in transitional societies. The push and pull of the need for order and control on the one hand, and the t he need for inclusivity and accountability on the other permeate the whole discussion on security. What makes the entire process noticeable is the fact that we have an armed force that has been used to perpetuate power and privilege during the dictatorship period, but is now struggling to make itself professional and democratically accountable – and the driver

6

The armed forces is expected to operate within a framework of democratic governance, rule of law, respect for human rights and international



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humanitarian law. A clear showing that these values are respected are the following:

to ensure that the training and education of the military personnel are consistent with the demands of the strategic environment

• •

The Armed Forces is under civilian authority; There is clear mechanism for feedback between the Armed Forces and civilians;

2. The Armed Forces maintain an appropriatelysized force: •

Clearly delineate the roles and responsibilities of the military and the police in so far as internal security is concerned.

•

The armed forces abide by the principles of accountability and good governance;

•

The armed forces abide by the principles of human rights and international humanitarian law;

•

The force structure of the armed forces must be consistent with its internal-external security tasks.

•

The armed forces have representative composition in terms of gender gender,, and ethnicity;

•

There has to be a clear policy that

Obviously, pursuing the ten-point agenda would have operational and policy implications. Listed below are the key action points for each of the agenda: 1. The Armed Forces are trained and equipped to suit their strategic domestic and regional environment. To do this, the following are the necessary interventions: •

•

•

•

denes situations needing military action,

and situations needing law-enforcement/ police action. 3. The Armed Forces has sound organizational set-up that maximizes the strengths of the institution, and ably complements its weaknesses. •

The military institution must introduce integrated approaches to policy development, military expenditure, human resource planning, and management of military assets.

•

It should improve the career development of military personnel.

•

The institution must promote a transition and resettlement plan for those leaving the armed forces.

•

It must establish clear feedback channels between force employers (users) and providers (deployment unit).

There is a need to strengthen the process for reviewing security threats and developing the capacity of the state to respond to them; It is important to capacitate the armed forces with modern equipment necessary to support its mission; It is necessary for the country to develop a self-reliant defense program; The training and education of military personnel must be improved; there is a need


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4. The Armed Forces have sufcient budget to support its operations.

7. The Armed Forces have clear mechanism for feedback from civilians:

•

The state must have clarity in national policy regarding the share of “security mission areas”8 in the national budget.

•

• •

•

The expectation between the demand of transparency in government procurement process should be balanced with the need to satisfy the military specs in equipment and materiel purchase. There has to be a clear state policy regarding budget-sharing budget-sharin g of local government units and AFP in disaster response and humanitarian mission.

8. The Armed Forces abide abide by by the principles of accountability and good governance: •

It complies with the requirements imposed by the Central government as regards transparency and accountability.

•

Metrics on grievance, reward, and punishment regarding AFP personnel are clearly stipulated.

5. The Armed Forces can contribute to national national and international goals of peace and security. •

Strengthening regional arrangements for military cooperation, condence building,

Encourage civil society debate, improve citizens’ awareness and engagement with defense reform issues. There must be clear mechanism for civilian oversight on security forces.

9. The Armed Forces abide abide by by the principles of human rights and international humanitarian law.

arms control and disarmament. •

Establish clear Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) regarding complaints on HR/ IHL violations.

There must be clear constitutional and legal framework regarding the role of the military in state building and national security.

•

Communicate to public the HR-IHL SOPs of the AFP A FP..

Clarify and strengthen the accountability lines in the chain of command.

10. The Armed Forces have representative composition in terms of gender and ethnicity;

6. The Armed Forces is under civilian authority: •

•

8 ‘se ‘securiy curiy mission areas’ are he assigned asks given o he miliary. Inernal securiy operaions operaions (ISO) is one mission area, while humaniarian humaniarian

assisance and disaser response response is oher mission area. egional peacekeeping work is anoher anoher mission area, as well as he erriorial deense uncion. Oher mission areas areas include ‘suppor ‘suppor o naional naional developmen.

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•

There must be a clear policy that promotes equal opportunity in the t he defense sector.

•

There must be a clear program to improve the gender sensitivity of the institution.

•

An afrmative action to increase the number

of ethnic representation in the AFP must be initiated. As a nal note – defense reform is not just

about changes in management or organizational structure. Its main agenda is changing mindsets, perspectives, and most importantly, security policies. Pursuing the ten-point agenda of a modern defense force, this publication believes, would allow the AFP to move closer to its dream of becoming a world class military worthy of the pride and condence of the Filipino people.


SOURCE: PAO AFP

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2 Policy Environment for a Modern Defense Force by Kathline

Anne Sigua Tolosa


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POLICY ENVIRONMENT FOR A MODERN DEFENSE FORCE Anchored on the basic tenet “the “the military military is is an instrument of policy policy,” ,” this this article article pieces together a picture of a “modern defense force” based on existing national policies on defense and security. A look at existing policies from the National Defense Act of 1935 during the Commonwealth era to the most recent National Security Policy 2011-2016 shows an ever-expanding role for the Philippine military. Over time, the military has been increasingly called upon to perform tasks beyond the core specialization of soldiery. True to its nature, the military does as the policies say. say. However, However, the military cannot perform its varied varied missions through sheer talent and ghting spirit alone. In this light, the article traces laws and policies that sought to develop the capabilities of the military for it to reach fully mission-capable readiness levels. Juxtaposing the two sets of policies, the article discovers that modernization policies are playing catch up to the expanding roles of the military military.. Nonetheless, the article nds that one can form a coherent picture of a modern defense force: one that is fully mission capable. The article asserts in the end, however, that this picture is but a portion of the bigger puzzle of security sector reform. It asserts that modernizing the country’s defense force must extend beyond reforms and capability development in the military. Equally, if not more important, is the modernization of existing policies and other institutions in the security sector. The article ends by calling for these efforts to be framed within a coherent national security sector reform agenda.

SOURCE: PAO AFP

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2 POLICY ENVIRONMENT FOR A MODERN DEFENSE FORCE


Locating the military in national security planning and policy making

T

The military is an instrument of policy. This is especially true in a society such as the Philippines where the military is assumed to be under t he rm

democratic control of civilian authorities. In the words of Huntington (1957), “the superior political wisdom of the statesman (over the military) must be accepted as a fact.” In a democratic state, the military receives its marching orders from the civilian government as the representatives of the Filipino people. The supremacy of civilian authority over the military is enshrined as early as the 1935 Philippine constitution, which states, “The President shall be commander-in-chief of all armed forces of the Philippines.” 1 The Commonwealth Commonweal th Act No. 1 reiterated this principle in Article 1, Section 2 (d), to wit: “The civil authority will always be supreme. The President as the Commander-in-Chief of military forces, shall be responsible that mobilization measures are prepared at all times.”

This principle was further upheld in the 1987 Constitution and subsequent laws and policies thereafter. In other words, the military implements national security and defense policies crafted by civilian

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government agencies. This is embodied in the national security planning process. Simply illustrated, the process ows as such. All policies

and programs of the state are anchored on the Constitution. From the Constitution, relevant laws are passed by Congress. Based on the Constitution and other other pertinent pertinent laws laws and and issuances, the National Security Council then crafts the National Security Policy and the National Security Strategy. From these, the Department of National Defense draws its National Defense Strategyy. Based on the National Defense Strategy, Strateg Stra tegy, the Armed Forces of the Philippines then crafts its own policies on how it will perform its role in the attainment of national security goals and the safeguarding of national interests. Currently, these plans are the National Military Strategy, the Unilateral Defense Plan, and the Internal Peace and Security Plan Bayanihan. 2 Moreover, the military’s performance of its role is subject to the oversight and control of civilian government institutions. The Department of National Defense is the lead line agency in formulating national defense and security policies, plans and programs. 3 The Defense Department likewise exercises supervision and control over the Armed Forces of the Philippines. 4 In addition, performing oversight roles on the military are the National Security Council, the House of Representatives and the Senate, the Sandiganbayan Sandiganbaya n and the Ombudsman,

1 1935 Philippine Consiuion, Secion 11. (2) 2 Te Naional Securiy Planning Process is urher discussed in Kahline S. olosa and Jennier Saniago Orea, evisiing he Policy Environmen

on Peace and Securiy (Quezon Ciy: ADMU, 2013). 3 Execuive Order Order No. 112 o July July 9, 1999, e-Direcing he Funcions Funcions and Operaions Operaions o he Deparmen Deparmen o Naional Naional Deense, Secion 2. 4 Execuive Order No. 292 o July 25, 1987, Adminisra Adminisraive ive Code o he Philippines, Book IV, ile VIII, Subile II, I I, Chaper 1 – General

Provisions, Secion Secion 18. Organizaional Organizaional Srucure.


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and

constitutional

commissions,

the military is expected to perform. Consequently Consequently,, a modern defense force’s form (structure, capability, technology, etc.) must be dictated by its function. Based on key defense and security policies, this section traces the evolution of the roles and functions given to the Armed Forces of the Philippines from 1935 to present.

specically

the Commission on Human Rights and the Commission on Audit. It follows, therefore, that when one draws a denition of a Modern Defense Force, it cannot

simply be from the point of view of the military. It has to be rmly grounded on national laws

and policies on defense and security. It is in this light that this paper engages in a conversation with relevant policies in an attempt to surface a

During the Commonwealth period, the prime duty of the Government was the protection of the state and all citizens may be required to render military or civil service. 5 The armed forces may be called upon by the President, as Commander-inChief, “to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof.”6 Under Commonwealth Act No. 1 or “The National Defense Act” of 1935, the military is the Army composed of the Regular Force7 and the Reserve. The Philippine Constabulary was likewise transferred under the control of the Chief of Staff. It is given the primary task of ensuring internal security (lawless violence, insurrection, or rebellion) and the performance of police duties in peacetime and wartime but may also be called upon in case of invasion or national defense. Ergo, the military in 1935 was organized as a ground force, a territorial organization, adapted as closely as possible to the territorial and administrative organization of the Philippines Philippines..

denition of a Modern Defense Force. This paper

treats the picture of a Modern Defense Force as a puzzle, with its pieces drawn from existing policies on security and defense. It hopes to surface these pieces, the specic aspects and angles

of a Modern Defense Force; how it is imagined, what roles the force is expected to play, play, and how this modernization is to be achieved. Lastly, this paper then attempts to piece them t hem together into a more coherent picture.

The Roles of the Philippine Military: Protector of the People, Plus, Plus The standard architectural maxim “form follows function” is often applied in military decision making for identifying the force structure and military technology that must be evolved to meet military needs. In layman’s terms, this means the military’s force structure, capability and technology must be based on the functions that

As a side note, back then, there was no Navy or Air Force yet.8 In fact, in the 1935 Constitution, Filipinos still owed allegiance to the United

5 1935 Philippine Consiuion. Aricle II – Declaraion o Principles, Sec 2. 6 1935 Philippine Consiuion. Aricle VII – Execuive Deparmen, Sec. 11 (2). 7 Te egular Force is composed o he Inanry, he Cavalry, Cavalry, he Field Arillery, he Coas Arillery Corps, he Air Corps, he Corps o engineers,

he Signal Corps, and he acive elemens o he Offshore Parol; Parol; he General Saff Corps; he Services S ervices consising o he Adjuan General’s General’s Service, he Judge Advocae Service, he Quarermaser Service, he Medical Service, he Ordnance Service, and he Chaplain Service, he proessors and officers and enlised men as may be provided or, and o he Consabulary. 8 Te U.S. Navy parolled he Philippine’s waers unil July 4, 1946.

14


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States.9 This is because the Commonwealth administration was a transitional arrangement with the end view of preparing the country for independence. It is assumed therefore that the territorial nature of the military and the dependence on the United States for external defense were intended as transitional arrangements as well, with the country eventually developing its own capabilities for external defense. By 1987, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) was anointed the “protector of the people and the State.”10 It was given the goals of securing the sovereignty of the State and the integrity of the national territory. 11 All members of the Armed Forces are bound by an oath to uphold and defend the Constitution. 12 Moreover, with the country emerging from the shadows of the martial law era, the 1987 Constitution sought to clearly dene the role of the military as an instrument

of policy and thus, decreeing that no member should be involved in partisan politics, except in the exercise of their right to suffrage.13 While the 1987 Constitution clipped the political wings of the military, Executive Order No. 292 or the Administrative Code of the Philippines provided for an expanded role of the AFP, under the auspices of the Department of National Defense (DND). Its roles are spelled out, to wit: 1.

Uphold

the

sovereignty,

support

the

Constitution, and defend the territory of the

Republic of the Philippines against enemies, foreign and domestic; 2.

Promote and advance advance the national aims, goals, interests and policies;

3.

Plan, organize, maintain, develop and deploy its regular and citizen reserve forces for national security; and,

4.

Perform such such other functions as may may be provided by law or assigned by higher authorities.14

Clearly, from the twin roles of ensuring internal security and territorial defense under the Commonwealth-era laws, additional functions have been given to the military. This expansion of roles is a natural consequence of the broadened role of its “mother unit”, the DND, which is to guard the State against external and internal threats while providing support for social and economic development. The military likewise moved away from its transitional force structure under the Commonwealth regime to an Armed Forces of the Philippines comprised of the following major services: Philippine Army, Philippine Air Force, Philippine Navy, Philippine Coast Guard, and the Philippine Constabulary. Evidently, this signals an attempt to develop its own capabilities for external defense while performing police and coast guard functions as well.

9 1935 Philippine Consiuion. Ordinance Appended o o Te Consiuio Consiuion. n. Secion 1 (1). 10 1987 Philippine Consiuion. Aricle II – Declaraion o Principles and Sae Policies, Secion 3. 11 Ibid. 12 1987 Philippine Consiuion. Aricle XVI – General Provisions, Secion 5 (1). 13 1987 Philippine Consiuion. Aricle XVI – General Provisions, Secion 5 (3). 14 Execuive Order 292, “Adminisra “Adminisraive ive Code o 1987”, ile VIII. Naion Naional al Deense, Subile II. Deparmen o Naion Naional al Deense, Chaper 6.

Armed Forces o he he Philippines, Secion 33. Funcions. Funcions.


15

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Three years later, the military’s police functions and internal security role were removed 15 by virtue of Republic Act 6975 or the “Department of the Interior and Local Government Act of 1990” with the creation of the Philippine National Police and the transfer of the primary role of preserving internal security, security, with some considerations, to the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG), to wit: “Section 11. Relationship of the Department with the Department of National Defense. – During a period of twenty-four (24) months from the effectivity of this Act, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) shall continue its present role of preserving the internal and external security of the State: Provided, That said period may be extended by the President, if he nds justiable, for another period not

exceeding twenty-four (24) months, after which, the Department shall automatically take over from the AFP the primary role of preserving internal security, leaving the AFP to its primary role of preserving external security. However, even after the Department has assumed primary responsibility on matters affecting internal security, including the suppression of insurgency, and there are serious threats to national security and public order, such as where insurgents have gained considerable foothold in the community thereby necessitating the employment of bigger tactical forces and the utilization of higher calibre armaments and better armored vehicles, the President, may, upon recommendation of the peace and order council, call upon the Armed Forces of the

Philippines to assume the primary role and the Philippine National Police (PNP) to play the supportive role in the area concerned.” 16

With the AFP relieved of its internal security function, it is assumed that it can now re-allocate its resources to the other functions given to it. Thus, in a bid to modernize the armed forces of the Philippines, the Congress sought to develop the AFP’s capability to (a) uphold sovereignty and territorial integrity; (b) assist civilian agencies in the preservation of the national patrimony; (c) protect the Filipino people from armed threats and natural and man-made disasters; (d) assist in the enforcement of domestic and foreign policies as well as international covenants; (e) support the PNP in law enforcement and ISO; (f) fulll

the country’s international commitments; and, (g) support national development. 17 Plainly, the transfer of internal security operations to the PNP was not simply to allow the AFP to focus on its primary role for external security. In fact, there is an expansion of its roles which, by 1995, include responding to natural and man-made disasters, support to law enforcement and ISO, and support to national development. There is also a reiteration of its role as an instrument of foreign policy. policy. It must likewise be emphasized that considerations for the eventual (i.e. after a minimum of 2 years or a maximum of 4 years from the passage of the law) and full transfer of the primary role in internal security to the Philippine National Police (PNP) stems from a recognition that the PNP, as a new organization is not yet fully mission capable to address insurgency. Therefore, said transfer of function was not absolute. The law provided that

15 Laer on, he Philippine Coas Guard was also esablished as a separa separaee armed and uniormed service atached o he Deparmen o

ransporaion r ansporaion and Communicaions Communicaions by virue o epublic Ac 9993 o 2009. 16 epublic Ac 6975 oherwise known as he “Deparmen o he Inerior and Local Governmen Ac o 1990”, Secion 11, December 13, 1990. 17 epublic Ac 7898 oherwise known as he “AFP Modernizaion Ac”, Sec. 3 – Objecives. February 23, 1995.

16



military can be called upon, at any time, should circumstances require, to take on the cudgels of internal security. As history would tell us, this is exactly what happened. In 1998, by virtue of Republic Act 8551, the primary responsibility of suppressing insurgency was given back to the AFP,, to wit: AFP Section 3. Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6975 is hereby amended to read as follows:

“SEC. 12. Relationship of the Department with the Department of National Defense. – The Department of the Interior and Local Government shall be relieved of the primary responsibility on matters involving the suppression of insurgency and other serious threats to national security. The Philippine National Police shall, through information gathering and performance of its ordinary police functions, support the Armed Forces of the Philippines on matters involving suppression of insurgency, except in cases where the President shall call on the PNP to support the AFP in combat operations.” 18

In 2004, within the ambit of the overall Philippine Defense Reform Program of the DND, the Secretary of National Defense (SND) issued the rst ever Defense Planning Guidance (DPG).

The DPG intended to institutionalize a defense planning system that is based on strategy and is responsive to capability needs. The DPG followed the “tradition” of calling upon the military to perform such peacetime tasks beyond the functional specialization of soldiery. It identied seven mission areas that the Defense

Department, including the AFP should strategize, plan, implement, and develop capabilities for.

philippines

These are: 1. internal security; 2. territorial defense; 3. disaster response; 4. support to national development; 5. international defense and security engagements; 6. international humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping peacekeepin g operations; and, 7. force-level central command and control, support and training. In 2011, the National Security Plan (NSP) was issued, prescribing a comprehensive denition

of national security. Accordingly, national security has seven (7) elements: socio-political stability, ecological balance, territorial integrity, external peace and harmony, cultural cohesiveness, economic solidarity, and moral-spiritual consensus. Under the NSP, it is the policy of the state to “undertake the necessary steps to ensure that the Filipino national community’s welfare, well being, way of life, institutions and territory and sovereignty are enhanced and protected.” This is divided into a two-fold goal: promote internal socio-political stability and capacitate the Philippines to exercise full sovereignty over its territory and to provide protection to its maritime and other strategic maritime interests. Following the national security policy planning process, the military has to anchor its plans on the NSP. To guide the performance of its internal security role, the AFP came up with the Internal Peace and Security Plan (IPSP) Bayanihan in December 2010. Under the Plan, the ISO function is divided into four (4) strategic tasks: contribute to the permanent and peaceful closure of all armed conict; conduct of focused military operations

18 epublic Ac 8551 oherwise known as he “Philippine Naional Naional Police eorm and eorganizaion Ac o 1998,” ile II. Te  ole o he PNP

in Couner-Insurgency Couner-Insurgency Funcions, Secion 3, Februa February ry 25, 1998.


17


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against armed threat groups; support communitybased peace and development efforts; and, carry out security sector reform initiatives in the AFP. These tasks are consistent with the thrusts and objectives of the Philippine Development Plan 2011-2016 and the National Security Policy 2011-106.

3. International Engagements, Humanitarian Assistance and Peace Support Operations; and, 4. Force-level C2 (command and control), support and training.

What is remarkable in IPSP Bayanihan is the paradigm shift that the entire military institution takes in the conduct of its decades-long task of suppressing insurgency. Rather than the traditional goal of defeating the enemy, the military instead should focus on “winning the peace” through a “whole of nation approach.” In doing so, it seeks to conduct military operations and support operations with the security and wellbeing of the people as the t he foremost consideration and in concert with different stakeholders. This is termed as “people-centered security” within the ambit of human security. Flowing from this, IPSP Bayanihan emphasizes multi-stakeholder engagement and respect for human rights, international humanitarian law and rule of law as imperatives in the dispensation of its duties. In addition to spelling out the principles that must underlie AFP internal security operations, IPSP Bayanihan articulates a clear intention to move away from internal security operations to give priority to territorial defense.

Starting with roles distinctly assigned to the coercive organs of the state (internal security and territorial defense), the mandate of the Philippine military has been gradually redened

and expanded. Based on existing policies, the Philippine vision of a Modern Defense Force is one that can address the armed component of insurgency, defend the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, respond in times of natural or man-made disasters, support in the delivery of the State’s international commitments, and perform a broad array of tasks in support to national development. The title “protector of the people and the State” has been liberally interpreted to include protection from non-military/non-armed threats to the well-being of the people and the State. As an instrument of policy policy,, the military does as the policies say. Whether it has the necessary capabilities to do so or not is another question. Military training, logically, remains to be focused on honing the soldier’s professional specialization of warghting. It goes without saying, however, that

a Modern Defense Force should be appropriately This intention was somewhat echoed in the 2013 Implementing Guidelines, Rules and Regulations (IGRR) of the Revised AFP Modernization Program. The seven (7) mission areas were streamlined to four (4) mission areas: 1. Territoria erritoriall Defense, Security and Stabilit Stability; y; 2. Disaster Risk Reduction and Response;

organized, fully trained, sufciently equipped,

adequately supported, and able to maximize its effectiveness for all of its functions, 19 not just for internal security and territorial defense. To look at whether capabilities being developed are aligned with the vision for a Modern Defense Force, modernization and capability build up programs within and for the Armed Forces of the Philippines

19 Execuive Order No. 112 o June 18, 1999, e-Direcing he Funcio Funcions ns and Operaions o he Deparmen o Naion Naional al Deense, direcs he

enire Deense Deparmen o maximize is effeciveness, i.e. mainain a mission capable saus, or he perormance o is uncions.

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are discussed in the succeeding chapter.

the Philippines.” 21 The modernization process was to take place for a period of 15 years requiring a total budget of PhP 332 billion with

Toward a Fully Mission Capable Defense Force

PhP 50 billion intended for the rst ve (5) years of implementation. It was divided into ve (5)

components: The Commonwealth-era reliance on the United States for external defense, which was supposedly a transitional arrangement, remained even as the country gained its full independence. While the Armed Forces Forces of the the Philippines Philippines was reorganized into three Major Services (Army, Navy, Air Force), the capability of the Navy and the Air Force were maintained at a dismal level and largely dened

within the ambit of internal security. In fact, up until 1991 when the Philippine Senate rejected the renewal of the bases agreement, the Philippines availed of a de facto security umbrella from US military presence in the country. The primary responsibility for the defense of the country’s airspace was given to the 3 rd Tactical Fighter Wing of the United States. 20 The early 1990s sought to ll the gaps in the

country’s territorial defense capability. With the transfer of the internal int ernal security function fu nction to the PNP, PNP, the AFP was geared towards external defense. The Philippine Congress thought likewise. On February 23, 1995, the AFP Modernization Act was passed into law. It sought to “modernize the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to a level where it can effectively and fully f ully perform its constitutional mandate to uphold the sovereignty and preserve the patrimony of the Republic of

1. force restructuring and organizational development; 2. capability, material and technology development; 3. bases/ support system development; 4. human resource development; and, 5. doctrines and development. Attention is drawn to the fact that while the projection primarily was a credible defense capability, the Modernization Act actually intended to develop a multi-mission capable armed forces able to “engage in conventional and/or unconventional warfare, disaster relief and rescue operations, and contribute to economic development and other non-traditional 22 military roles.”23 The goal, therefore, was not merely to focus the military to territorial defense (though this is the primary intention of the law) but also to ensure that it can continue performing nonwarghting tasks.

The implementation of the Modernization Program would tell an altogether different story.24 The dreams for a “modern” armed forces were quickly dashed when an assessment of defense capabilities in 2005 revealed that there

20 Kahline Anne S. olosa, olosa, “Owning “Owning Sovereigny,” Sovereigny,” OSS Diges, 4h Quarer (2008): 6. 21 epublic Ac 7898, “AFP Modernizaion Ac,” Sec. 2 – Declaraion o Policy, 25 February 1995. 22 I can be argued ha wha is “non-radiional” “non-radiional” o Wesern Wesern counries are acually he “radiional” “radiional” roles ha have been given o he Philippine

miliary. 23 epublic Ac 7898, “AFP Modernizaion Ac,” Sec. 2 – Componens o he AFP A FP Modernizaion Program, para (a), (a), 25 February 1995. 24 Te ae o he 1995 AFP A FP Modernizaion Ac is urher discussed in olosa, “Owning “Owning Sovereigny.”


19


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was virtually very little to modernize. What capabilities the AFP had have been worn down by time and regular operations. There was a dire need to bring back the basic capabilities of the AFP to acceptable levels of readiness. Thus, instead of the Modernization Program, what were implemented instead were the Capability Upgrade and Philippine Defense Reform Programs. In addition, while while the intention was for the development of multi-mission capabilities, capabilities, the

The Philippine Defense Transformation (PDT) Program intends to ensure that the Department of National Defense is able to meet the strategic objectives laid down in the National Security Policy of 2011-2016. These objectives are to promote internal socio-political stability and to enable the Philippines to exercise full sovereignty over its territory and provide protection to its maritime interests.27 Thus, capability had to be developed to carry out ve (5) strategic options:

upgrade was focused on beeng up capabilities

for internal security. The implementation was likewise distinctly skewed towards materiel and equipment upgrades, with very little attention given to ensuring that necessary skills and know how are transferred to the soldiers, especially for the performance of non-warghting

tasks. Moreover, the release of funds for the Modernization Program is dismal to say the least, with only PhP 33.9 billion released by the end of the implementation period. Nonetheless, gains have still been achieved under the AFP Modernization Plan though it was not implemented according to plan. The Philippine Defense Reform likewise resulted in positive reforms inside the defense and military institutions.25 The White Paper on Philippine Defense Transformation of 2012 takes stock of these advancements and seeks to “sustain and institutionalize the reform measures initiated under the PDR Program” and to synchronize the improvements in materiel and technology capabilities under the AFP Modernization Program.26

1. securing the national territory and protecting strategic maritime interest; 2. securing communities and supporting supporting local authorities; 3. reducing the risks of natural natural and humaninduced disasters; 4. strengthening and and expanding expanding international international defense alliances and partnerships; and, 5. strengthening the integrity integrity of the defense establishment by subscribing to generally accepted principles of security sector reform. The PDT attempts to balance modernization of materiel and equipment on the one hand with the modernization of knowledge and skills and transformation of mindsets on the other. This includes education and training so that the military can work within the framework of the primacy of the peace process. Appropriate skills for engaging other stakeholders in internal security are also sought to be developed, such as the capacity for inter-agency and multi-sector security cooperation and engagement activities, enhanced knowledge of ethnic communities’

25 Tese are discussed in deail in Melanie odulo-Veril, “AFP Modernizaion” in his book. 26 Deparmen o Naional Naional Deense, “ransormi “ransorming ng he Deparmen o Naional Naional Deense Deense o Effecively Mee Mee he Deense and Securiy Challenges Challenges

o he 21s Cenury: A Whie Paper on Philippine Deense ransorma ransormaion,” ion,” July 2012. 27 Naion Naional al Securiy Policy 2011-1016.

20


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culture, customs, and traditions, key capabilities for strategic communications, and humane civil disturbance control capabilities, among others. The bid to rejuvenate modernization efforts of the AFP under the PDT was given a fresh breath of hope with the passage of Republic Act 10349 also in December 2012, which established the Revised AFP Modernization Program. This was supported with DND Department Circular No. 3, series of 2013 or the Implementing Guidelines, Rules and Regulations (IGRR) of the Revised AFP Modernization Act. This effectively extends the Legislative’s commitment to see through the AFP’s modernization for another 15-year period from 2013 with a promise of PhP 75 billion for the rst ve (5) years. While the Revised

Modernization Program carries over the intention of its precedent plan to beef up military capability for external defense and other mission areas, the old and the new modernization plans differ into two points. First, instead of playing a support role to the PNP in internal security, the military’s new modernization program sought to “enhance its capability in the conduct of Internal Security Operations (ISO), particularly in the suppression of insurgency and other serious threats to national security.” 28 Second, from the intention of developing and transforming the AFP into a primarily external security-oriented force, the revised modernization program seeks to develop and transform the AFP into a multi-mission oriented force capable of effectively addressing internal and external security threats.

The

AFP would be the rst to say that

modernization and true reform does not happen simply through the acquisition of new equipment. Particular attention has to be ensured to improve the entire military institution in terms of good governance and internal processes and systems. In addition to anchoring their plans and programs on national policies on security, these should likewise be moored to the institution’s shared mission, vision and core values. The Philippine Navy took the initiative in 2006 and came up with the Philippine Navy Sail Plan 2020. The Philippine Army followed suit and released the Army Transformation Roadmap 2028. The General Headquarters, AFP is currently in the process of coming up with an AFP-wide transformation and governance strategy. Looking at these transformation plans, the military institution is telling us some things. First, the very nature of the institution requires that it is able to act as one. This can be done by clearly linking each individual’s tasks to the overall mission, vision and goals. This is done through the respective Governance Roadmaps. Second, equal attention must be paid to the non-tangible aspects of modernization – internal controls and systems, training and education, morale and welfare, ethics and values. Third, developing capabilities for a modern defense force takes time. Note that the Sail Plan charts the course for 16 years while the Army’s Roadmap spans 18 years. This means that efforts must be sustained, holistic, consistent, and coherent.

28 Deparmen o Naional Naional Deense, Deense, Deparmen Circular Circular No. No. 3 o April 11, 2013, “Issuing “Issuing he Implemening Implemening Guidelines, Guidelines, ules and egulaions egulaions

o he evised Armed Forces o he Philippines Modernizaion Ac.” Aricle 1.1.2.


21

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Completing the puzzle: coherent patches, missing pieces, sketchy framework As we piece the different parts of the puzzle, we can coherently form a picture of a modern defense force. In a nutshell, this is an Armed Forces of the Philippines that is fully multi-mission capable. A look at the foregoing tells a story of a military with continually expanding roles with capability development and modernization policies playing catch up. Efforts under the current Aquino administration are laudable. Finally, it appears that the Philippines is committed to addressing the yawning gaps in our military’s capability to protect the people and the State. As of January 2014, Secretary of National Defense Voltaire Gazmin said that a total of 36 modernization projects worth PhP 41.2 billion have been completed and awarded under the current administration. 29 In March 2014, the Philippines inked a contract for the procurement of 12 Korea Aerospace Industries FA-50 ghter aircraft. 30 Indeed, things are looking up as we see the beginnings of a modern defense force. But a modern defense force is not reached through transformation, reforms and capability development in the military alone. We realize that the puzzle we are trying to piece together must not just show the necessary capabilities of the military to be mission-capable. This is but a patch in the bigger picture of national security planning. First we look at the border pieces of the puzzle; those pieces that frame the entire picture,

that denes the parameters and limits of modern

defense force. When we look at the policies, we see consistency in the assignment of multiple roles to the military military.. But this does not mean that the multiple roles assigned to the military cannot be looked at and evaluated anew. At the very least, clear parameters have to be set to dene the roles

of the military. The limits, so to speak, to the military’s involvement in internal security and stability,, support to law enforcement, and support stability to national development has to be clearly demarcated. Therein lies the paradox of the military’s noninvolvement in partisanship politics. While the military is required to separate itself from politics, national policies make this quite difcult

to do so as the military is also required, in the same breath, to perform tasks that necessitate its involvement in the broader service delivery and governance tasks. The military has to liaise with national government agencies and local politicians; at times it takes the role of “catalyst” for governance and service delivery in provinces and municipalitiess that are strongly affected by violent municipalitie conict. When the military prods underperformin underperforming g local government ofcials, or even links local

communities with their local government unit and other relevant government institutions, it is inevitably exposed to politics. Ironically, it is the military that calls for its weaning out from internal security operations to a focus on territorial defense. No national-level policy calls for this

29 Fran Frances ces Mangosing, “36 AFP Modernizaion projecs projecs compleed under Aquino, says Gazmin,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, Inquirer, January 14, 2013,

Accessed htp://newsino.inquirer htp://newsino.inquirer.ne/563845/36-ap-modern .ne/563845/36-ap-modernizaion-proj izaion-projecs-compleed-under-aqui ecs-compleed-under-aquino-says-gazmin. no-says-gazmin. 30 Greg Waldron, Waldron, “FA-50 buy pus Manila back in he je business,” Flighglobal, March 28, 2014, Accessed htp://www htp://www.flighgloba .flighglobal.com/news/ l.com/news/

aricles/a-50-buy-pus-manila-back-i aricles/a-50-buy-pus -manila-back-in-he-je-business-397548/. n-he-je-business-397548/.

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transition. Perhaps another look at the strategic assumptions made when policies were crafted can ascertain if these could have changed with the positive developments in the peace process with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the Cordillera Bodong Administration - Cordillera People’s Liberation Army (CBA-CPLA), and the Rebolusyonaryong Partido ng Manggagawa – Pilipinas/ Revolutionary Proletarian Army/ Alex Boncayao Brigade Tabara Paduano Group (RPM-P/RPA/ABB TPG). The revised AFP Modernization Program, which ends in 2028, includes the development of ISO capabilities. Do we still see a role for the AFP in ISO post-2028?

Clear national interests, dened through broad

At the most ideal, the roles assigned to the military must be anchored on a clearly articulated national security frame based on national security interests. While the National Security

consultations with a well-informed public, also cultivate a strong national will to modernize the military – a rm resolve to beef up the

military’s capabilities that is sustained even after incursions in the country’s territory by other countries is highlighted highlight ed in the news andsocial media. The initial AFP Modernization Program faded into the background as the Chinese incursions in Mischief Reef also faded from the front pages of national dailies. The administration of President Benigno S. Aquino has consistently sought to safeguard the national territory from day one. This is reected in a sustained

commitment to the revised AFP Modernization Program. This national will must carry beyond the current administration and nally be seen to its

completion.

objectives,

If policies commit men and women in uniform

it is silent on prioritization. It fails to identify which interest the Philippines, as a country, is willing to die for. 31 This clear articulation of

to a certain task, then there must be rm

Policy

identies

broad

national

national priorities could then provide a rm

anchor and rationale for the painful decision to involve the military in functions beyond its institutional specialization of warghting. This

safeguards that the deployment of the military for “civilian tasks” is borne out of national interests rather than simply calling the military to ll in

gaps in service delivery that, for all intents and purposes, should be done by the civilian government. This also provides a clear basis for the development of the military’s capabilities beyond its core tasks.

national resolve to commit full support to reach the objective. There must be a strong national resolve to organize, train, and equip them to ensure that they are fully mission capable to do so. For national commitment to happen, there must be a clear understanding of why such roles are given to the military. Moreover, commitment does not only mean the passage of laws and allocation of resources. This involves the commitment to journey with the armed forces in its modernization by seeing to it that the other parts of the puzzle are completed as well. Now we look at the missing pieces of the bigger picture.

31 Te case or he need or a sronger and more coheren naional securiy aming which will define core naional securiy ineress and prioriies

and om which will be drawn a Naional Naional Securiy Policy and a Naional Securiy Sraegy is discussed in more deail in Kahline S. olosa and Jennier Jenni er Saniago Orea, evisiing evisiing he Policy Environmen Environmen on Peace and and Securiy (Quezon Ciy: ADMU, 2013).


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The hierarchical responsibility of the military, or its chain of command, directly places it under civilian control. A big part of modernizing the

general direction and milestones so that these are done in harmony and synergy.

armed forces is ensuring that it is under rm

Civil society likewise plays an important role. A strong constituency for peace and security issues, with a clear understanding of democratic institutions and values, the roles and functions of the military, can help frame a coherent strategy for reforms in the security sector. sector. Civil society can also further strengthen the modernization process by performing oversight and monitoring roles. 32

democratic control under the supervision, control and oversight of civilian government institutions. These institutions must be “fully mission capable” as well. The legislative plays a signicant role in the formulation of

national laws on security, in bringing the voice of their constituents to national policymaking, in approving the budget for the military and ensuring transparency and accountability in spending. The Department of Defense is tasked with the direction and supervision of the military. It is now undertaking its own transformation plan to ensure that it is fully capable of dispensing its tasks. Other institutions in the security sector involved in preserving peace and security in the land should likewise be equally modernized. The Philippine National Police is undertaking its own transformation roadmap. As the two institutions (the military and the police) pursue their own tracks, national level policies must lay down the

Developing a modern defense force entails more than just modernizing the armed forces. It calls for the modernization of policies and the entire security sector as well. All of these efforts must be done in unison, under a coherent framework of a clear national security sector reform agenda. The absence of one would mean that while reforms may move forward, these would be done in patches, silos even. This poses the danger that, at the end of the day, we would be holding parts of different puzzles rather than coming together to form a coherent whole.

32 One such effor is Banay Bayanihan, a nework o civil sociey organizai organizaions ons ha perorms an oversigh role in he AFP’ AFP ’s implemenaion o

IPSP Bayanihan. Banay Bayanihan likewise endeavors o creae dialogue spaces o discuss deense and securiy issues as well as build a srong consiuency or peace and securiy.

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3 Mapping Out the Legal Terrain of the Philippine Security Sector by Atty.

Noel del Prado


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MAPPING OUT THE LEGAL TERRAIN OF THE PHILIPPINE SECURITY SECTOR Upon the country’s reversion to democracy, the 1987 Philippine Constitution has mandated and established several oversight mechanisms to ensure that the Philippine security sector will never again return into a Martial law force characterized as highly-politicized, deeply partisan and lacking in accountability accountability.. The article examines the country’s legal foundations and the resultant institutional design and mechanisms which have the authority to control con trol and the power of oversight over security forces such as the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP). It provides an in-depth discussion of how the three (3) branches of government (i.e. executive, legislative, and judicial branches), autonomous constitutional bodies (i.e. CSC, COA, Ofce of the Ombudsman, and NAPOLCOM), and their agents carry-out their respective mandates and powers, and subsequently affect the administration and operations of the security forces. The article asserts that the security forces were never insulated from the highly politicized culture and partisan environment despite the beauty and intent of the constitutional provisions and other legal instrumentalities instrumentalities to eradicate these socio-political illnesses. illnesses. Instead of becoming more more mature, these government entities relegated the security forces into becoming “gatekeepers of power” and “courts of last resort”. The article also characterizes the multi-layered security sector and oversight mechanisms as lled with the same institutional aws attributed to the Marcosian regime: political misuse of security units, unaccountable bureaucracies, arbitrary policy-making, lack of transparency transparency,, risk- avoiding, amateurism, amateurism, corruption, and nepotism. In view of the institutional and legal gaps and shortfalls, the article offers several recommendations aimed at rationalizing, optimizing, and integrating the legal frameworks and policies which govern the security sector. It advocates for the reformation of institutions and the prevailing political culture that will veer the security forces and the rest of the government from the entrenched partisan politics. Furthermore, a comprehensive Security Plan and related policies should be enacted that will foster an integrated, whole-of-nation approach to national security.

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3 MAPPING OUT THE LEGAL TERRAIN OF THE PHILIPPINE SECURITY SECTOR

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Introduction

I

In June 2010, President Benigno Simeon Aquino assumed ofce and declared that he is anchoring

his administration on a 16-point Agenda that is built on a strong foundation of respect for human rights, which he appropriately denominated as his Social Contract with the Filipino People. Thus, the President has embarked on a journey to attain a just, comprehensive, and lasting peace within the perspective of the rule of law, by eradicating the root causes of unrest, through poverty reduction and empowerment of the poor and vulnerable and transparent, accountable, and participatory governance. Likewise, the President has vowed to translate the gains from good governance into direct, immediate and substantial benets for the poor, by building the

capacities of, and the t he creation of opportunities for, for, the poor and marginalized; and increasing social protection and engaging the local government units in their own developmenta developmentall processes. 1 The Philippines is a democratic and republican state.2 While government authority emanates from the people, the people do not directly exercise that authority. authority. The Philippine Constitution shuns a direct and unbridled rule by the people, and abhors the concentration of power on one or a few. Thus, the Constitution has created a government that is a “republican” state which is

run and governed by representatives. representatives. The term “democratic” refers to the manner manner,, by which such representatives are chosen, and the mode and extent that such powers may be exercised by the people’s people’s agents. The people’s people’s sovereignty is expressed, and its authority is exercised, through representatives. The Filipino people, coming from two (2) decades of martial rule that was characterized by monopolies of power, wealth and inuence,

and the inevitable abuses that are spawned by a unitary system, have decided to delegate the state authority to three (3) co-equal branches of government: the Executive, Executive, the Legislative, and the Judiciary. Each branch is supreme within its own sphere, but their respective powers and authorities have inherent constitutional limits and may only operate within a well-dened system of

checks and balances. 3 This research aims to map out the legal terrain of the Philippine Security Sector. Sector. By demonstrating how the legal frameworks and policy instruments have served to isolate and dis-integrate the principles of good security sector governance 4, we hope to build the philosophical, legal and policy “bridges” to rationalize, optimize and integrate the discordant and separate “islands” of the Philippine security sector “archipelago”.

1 Execuive Order No. No. 43 o May 13, 2010, Pursuing Our Social Conrac Conrac wih he Filipino Filipino People Trough Trough he eOrganizaion o he Cabine

Clusers. 2 1987 Philippine Consiuion, Consiuion, Secion 1, Aricle II: Declaraion o Principles and Sae Policies. 3 Fra Francisco, ncisco, Jr. Jr. vs. House o epresenaives, G.. No. 160261, 10 November 2003, he main decision and he separa separaee opinion o Jusice Viug;

Ople vs. orres, orres, G.. G. . No. 127685, 23 July 1998. 4 Carolina G. Hernandez, SECUIY SECO EFOM AND GOVENANCE IN HE PHILIPPINES: “… looked a wheher he

principles o good securiy secor governance governance (ransparency (ransparency,, responsibiliy, responsibiliy, accounabiliy, accounabiliy, paricipaion, paricipaion, responsiveness) responsiveness) were presen presen or absen in he securiy secor secor…,” …,” Insiue or Sraegic and Developmen Sudies, www.isdsphilippines.org www.isdsphilippines.org


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Scoping the Legal Terrain: An “Archipelago “Archipelago” ” The policies relating to the Philippine Security Sector may be likened to a landscape of monolithic, self-contained and separate islands of legal frameworks, policies and rules. Their scope and application are dened within the connes of their specialized mandates and

jurisdictions, but they are separated by “deep waters” of discontinuity, limited cooperation and non-integration. Ironically, the Philippine Development Plan 2011-2016 recognizes that peace and security are indivisible, and adopts a “whole-of-nation approach” that seeks to bring about a concerted effort towards national peace and security. 5

of good security sector governance, which are responsiveness, transparency, responsibility, accountability and wider participation, not just among the formal security forces, but also among the general citizenry. A study undertaken by the Institute for Strategic and Development Studies found that martial law and authoritarianism has not only destroyed the democratic processes and political institutions, but also hindered the progress of the security sector in several ways: (1) limitation of elite recruitment and elite circulation; (2) underdevelopment or reversal of democratic institutions of governance; (3) the decline of the ethos of public service; (4) politicization of appointments to the executive departments including the foreign service, the courts, the constitutional bodies, the military and police ofcer corps, etc.; and, (5) failure to

Even between and among the core security forces, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP), they are separated by the following lines:

develop a responsible citizenry in a functioning democracy, among other democratic political development decits. 6 These decits in public order and security are

1. national government agency; 2. geographica geographicall and political subdivisions; and

not products of conscious decision-making, but surfaced only through the natural accretion of historical events, social movements, and political upheavals. After the rst EDSA Revolution, the

3. mechanisms for accountab accountability. ility. While

these

lines

promote

administrative

efciency,, they do not promote the efciency t he basic principles

Filipino people sought to eradicate the evils of the unchecked abuses of the concentration of power, and sought to disperse it by ushering in a regime of “oversight” and an era of checks-and-balances.

5 Philippine Developmen Developmen Plan 2011-2016, Chaper Chaper 9: Peace and Securiy. Securiy. 6 Carolina G. Hernandez, Hernandez, “Securiy Secor eorm and Governance in he Philippines,” Insiue Insiue or Sraegic and Developmen Sudies, htp://

www.isdsphilippines.org.

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Over-seeing the Security Sector: A Case of Over-Oversight?

on the Armed Forces, when the President deems it as necessary, his judgment cannot be reviewed by the Court or the Legislature.9

The 1987 Philippine Constitution has decreed several oversight mechanisms to ensure that the security sector will never again regress into the Marcosian armed force that is highly-politicized, deeply-partisan and lacking in accountability.

Executive Oversight

The new Constitution declares that: “civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military”. 7 This principle nds practical expression in the constitutional designation of the t he President,

As head of the Executive Department, the President is the Chief Executive. He represents the government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the ofcials and employees

of his department. 10 The President is likewise vested with the broad authority to appoint

the highest civilian ofcial of the country, as the

all executive ofcials, except for some high-

“Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces of the Philippines”. 8 The Constitution is quick to qualify and limit this supreme authority over the military, and provides for a graduated manner of exercising this executive power power..

level appointments that are subject only to the

In the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Convention, it was clear from the clarications of

Delegate Bernas that the President is authorized to exercise “graduated power” from being able to call out the Armed Forces as may be necessary to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion; to the power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus; until the exercise of the power to declare martial law. law. The power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and the power to declare martial law is subject to judicial review and conditioned upon the concurrence of the National Assembly. However,, in exercising the lesser power of calling However

conrmation of the Commission on Appointments Appointments

(CA), who are composed of representatives from both Houses of Congress. Aside from the power of appointment, the President has the authority to directly assume and exercise the functions of the executive department, bureau and ofce or interfere with the discretion of its ofcials. 11 He has control over the executive department, bureaus and ofces,

including all the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police (PNP). The President exercises the power of control and supervision over the AFP and the PNP, either directly or through the Secretaries of the Department of National Defense (DND) and the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG), respectively.

7 1987 Philippine Consiuion, Consiuion, Secion 3, Aricle II: Declaraion o Principles and Sae Policies. 8 1987 Philippine Consiuion, Consiuion, Secion 18, Aricle VII: Execuive Deparmen. 9 Joaqu Joaquin in G Bernas, S.J., Te Inen Inen o he 1986 Consiuion Consiuion Wriers. Wriers. ex Booksore, 1995. 10 Sec. 17, Aricle Ar icle VII: Execuive Deparmen, 1987 Consiuion provides:

Sec. 17. Te Presiden shall have conrol o all he execuive deparmens, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure ha he laws be aihully execued. [Emphasis supplied] 11 Pelaez vs. Audior Audior General, 15 SCR 569, 583 [1965].


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In recent years, the Ofce of the Presidential

Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs. 17 It

Adviser on the Peace Process (OP (OPAPP) APP) has likewise been constituted, through the broad administrative powers of the President under the t he Revised Administrative Code, as an additional executive oversight of the security sector, with the end in view of pursuing peace negotiations, while complementarily addressing the root

enables the President to x a uniform standard of administrative efciency and check the ofcial

conduct of his agents. 18 To this end, he can issue administrative orders, rules and regulations.19

causes of conict, through the effective and

Thus, any and all signicant reforms in the

sustained delivery of basic services, institution of good governance, people empowerment, policy reforms, and local economic development.

security sector will necessarily entail an overhaul of the manner by which the President exercises his role as both the Commander-i Commander-in-Chief n-Chief and the Chief Executive of the institutions, organizations, and operations of the core security forces.

Executive power generally refers to the power of the President of the Republic to execute and to implement the laws of the land. 12 Executive power is vested in the President,13 and the cabinet secretaries who act as the President’s alteregos, and whose actions and decisions, unless recalled or countermanded by the President, are for all legal intents and purposes, the acts and decisions of the President. It is generally dened

as the power to enforce and administer the laws. 14 It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due observance. 15 In the context of the t he security sector, sector, the President is obliged to supervise the enforcement of the laws for the maintenance of general peace and public order. Thus, he is granted administrative power over bureaus and ofces under his control

to enable him to discharge his duties effectively effectively.. 16

Legislative Oversight Congressional oversight is the broad power of the Congressional Legislature to inquire into the implementation of any and all ofcial activities undertaken pursuant

to the laws that it has enacted. Both Houses of Congress likewise posses the inherent power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution provides that: “ the the Senate or the House of Representatives, or any of its respective committees, may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published published rules of procedure.” procedure.” This power is founded upon the basic principle of necessity of information in the crafting of legislative measures.

12 Governmen o he Philippine Islands vs. Springer, 50 Phil. 259, 305 [1927]. 13 Sec. 1, Aricle Ar icle VII: Execuive Deparmen, 1987 Consiuion. 14 Cruz, PHILIPPINE POLIICAL LAW (1996): 173. 15 anada and Carreon, POLIICAL LAW L AW OF HE PHILIPPINES 1 (1961): 275. 16 Sinco, PHILIPPINE POLIICAL LAW LAW,, (1962): 234-235. 17 Sinco, PHILIPPINE POLIICAL LAW LAW,, 234. 18 Sinco, PHILIPPINE POLIICAL LAW L AW 235. 19 Blas F. F. Ople vs. uben D. orres, orres, e al., G.. No. 127685 July July 23, 1998.

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The enactment of laws should be informed by the wealth of information and experience, culled from

may exercise the power of judicial review, in

the operation of their ofces; thus, the two Houses

authority, by any branch or instrumentality of the government, to determine whether there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or not in accordance with, or beyond, the limits imposed by the Constitution. 21

of Congress have the inherent power to access that information and to compel the disclosure thereof. This power of inquiry is exercised through established congressional committees such as, the Blue Ribbon Committee, National Defense Committee, Committee on Public Order and Safety, and such other ad hoc committees, that the Congress in the exercise of their broad legislative power, power, may create and constitute. The power of legislative oversight covers all postenactment measures undertaken by Congress: • • • • •

to monitor bureaucratic compliance with program objectives; to determine whether agencies are properly administered; to eliminate executive waste and dishonesty; to prevent executive usurpation of legislative authority; and, to assess executive conformity with the congressional perception of public interest. 20

cases where the exercise of any ofcial power or

Constitutional Constitutio nal Oversight The 1987 Constitution created several oversight bodies that are intended to exercise specialized powers of review, inquiry and enforcement in the eld of security and public order.

Constitutional Oversight: Constitutional Civil Service Commission (CSC) As the central personnel agency and human resource organization of the national government bureaucracy, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) exercises concurrent jurisdiction over all personnel matters, 22 including the disciplinary and administrative jurisdiction for violations of civil service rules and regulations.

Judicial Oversight The Supreme Court of the Philippines, as well as all lower courts of competent jurisdiction,

While the core security institutions have their own specialized human resources development programs for all levels and ranks, and their own

20 Primer on Separai Separaion on o Powers, Inquiry in Aid o Legislaion.”, htp://jlp-law htp://jlp-law.com/blog/primer-s .com/blog/primer-separaio eparaion-o-powers-inq n-o-powers-inquiry-in-aiduiry-in-aid-

legislaion/. 21 Secion 1. Te judicial power shall be vesed in one Supreme Cour and in such lower cours as may be esablished by law. Judicial power includes includes he duy o he he cours o jusice jusice o setle acual conroversies conroversies involving involving righs which are legally demandable demandable and enorceable, enorceable, and o deermine wheher or no here has been a grave abuse o discreion amouning o lack or excess o jurisdicion on he par o any branch or insrumenaliy o he Governmen. [Emphasis supplied] 22 Secion 3, Aricle IX. B.: “Te Civil Service Commission, as he cenral cenral personnel agency o he Governmen, shall shall esablish a career service and adop measures o promoe morale, efficiency, inegriy, responsiveness, progressiveness, and couresy in he civil service. I shall srenghen he meri and rewards sysem, inegrae all human resources developmen programs or all levels and ranks, and insiuionalize a managemen climae conducive o public accounabiliy. I shall submi o he Presiden and he Congress an annual repor on is personnel programs.” [Emphasis supplied]


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mechanisms to promote accountability, the CSC

accounts pertaining to the expenditure and use of public funds and property. 23 All the core security forces are subject to the broad audit powers of the COA. In fact, it is constitutionally prohibited for Congress to pass laws that will have the effect of exempting any government entity from the jurisdiction of the COA. COA.24

sets the minimum standards for qualications,

advancement based on merit, accountability and due process requirements for administrative investigations. While the military and police have their own Judge Advocate General Ofce

(JAGO) and Internal Affairs Service (IAS), respectively,, the Philippine Constitution provides respectively for concurrent jurisdiction over all public ofcers

and employees.

Constitutional Oversight: Constitutional Ofce of the Ombudsman (OMB)

Republic Act No. 3019 tasks the CSC as the central repository of the records for all Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN) of all

The 1987 Philippine Constitution devoted a

public employees and ofcials. In coordination coordination with the Ofce of the Ombudsman, the CSC

And true to its general distrust of the military establishment, the constitutional provision

is authorized to conduct lifestyle checks on

providing for the Ofce of the Ombudsman,

all ofcials and employees of the security

mandated that a separate Deputy for the military establishment may be appointed. The other deputies of the Ombudsman correspond to the major island clusters of Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao. Subsequent legislation implemented

sector based on their baseline information and subsequent submissions of the SALN.

whole article to “Accountability of Public Ofcers.”

Constitutional Oversight: Constitutional Commission on Audit (COA)

this constitutional prescription, and the Ofce of

The Commission on Audit (COA) is the supreme audit institution of the Philippine bureaucracy. It is empowered under the 1987 Constitution to conduct examination, audit and settlement of all

the Ofce of the Ombudsman has denominated this Ofce as the Deputy Ombudsman for “Military and Other Law Enforcement Ofcers” or

the Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs was created under Section 3 of R.A. 6770. 25 Currently,

“MOLEO.”

23 Secion 2. Aricle IX. D.: “(1) Te Commission on Audi shall have have he power, auhoriy, auhoriy, and duy o examine, audi, and setle all accouns accouns

peraining o he revenue and receips receips o, o, and expendiures or uses o unds unds and propery, owned or or held in rus by, or peraining peraining o, he he Governmen Governmen xxx (2) Te Commission shall have exclusive auhoriy, subjec o he limiaions in his Aricle, o define he scope o is audi and examinaion, esablish he echniques and mehods required hereor, and promulgae accouning and audiing rules and regulaions, including hose or he prevenion and disallowance o irregular, unnecessary, excessive, exravagan, or unconscionable expendiures, or uses o governmen unds and properies. [Emphasis [Emphasis supplied] 24 Secion 3, Aricle IX : Commission on Audi, 1987 Consiuion. 25 epublic Ac No. 6770, An Ac Providing or he Funcional and Srucural Organizaion o he Office o he Ombudsman, and or Oher

Purposes, “Te Ombudsman Ac o 1989,” November November 17, 1989.

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The Deputy Ombudsman for MOLEO exercises

of the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM). Thus, the authority over the police force would be shared between the NAPOLCOM and the local chief executives. executives. The daily daily responsibilities responsibilities and functions of the police, including but not limited to: criminal investigation, crime prevention

jurisdiction on all graft cases led against the

following: 1. Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and and its service units; 2. Philippine National Police (PNP); 3. Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP); 4. Bureau of Jail Management & Penology Penology (BJMP); 5. Bureau of Corrections; 6. Philippine Coast Guard; and, 7. All civilian employees of the the above agencies. When these constitutional provisions were being debated upon during the 1986 Constitutional Convention, there were extended debates on the need to insulate the security forces from politics. The solutions explored were often based on clear delineation of roles and responsibilities, as well as the institutionalization of a system of intergovernmental checks and balances, that are secured by a general constitutional prescription, and the use of the phrase “as may be provided for by law” to identify specic areas for further

legislative determination. These constitutional and statutory focus on the security sector reveals a deliberate effort to subject the core security forces to closer scrutiny in terms of anti-graft monitoring and integrity promotion.

Constitutional Oversight: National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) The focus on the core security forces nds

another constitutional foundation in the creation

and control, trafc control, peace and order

initiatives, are under the operational control of the provincial governors, city and municipal mayors. The national police may, in certain exceptional cases where the local police cannot cope with or handle the situation, come in and take control. The NAPOLCOM has been tasked with the larger administrative matters, among others, the standardization of pay, professional training, organization and operation of crime laboratories, and investigation of administrative and disciplinary cases. The PNP is now governed by Republic Act No. 6975. Under this law, the NAPOLCOM has been re-organized as an instrumentality or agency of the executive department, and thus, it is under the power of control of the President, and this “control” is exercised through the line agency department head head or the cabinet secretaries. secretaries. The governors and mayors were given the power to appoint, but this function has been declared by the Supreme Court as being exercised by the local chief executives as deputies of the NAPOLCOM, and as such, the decisions of the former, may be countermanded by the latter. 26 RA 6975 likewise granted disciplinary powers to the People’s Law Enforcement Boards (PLEB), and made the decisions of the PLEBs appealable to the NAPOLCOM. The President exercises control and supervision over the national police force, not pursuant to his power as commanderin-chief, but his powers as chief executive.

26 Carpio vs. Execuive Secreary, G.. No. 96409, 14 Februa February ry 1992.


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While the objective of the constitutional provision providing for a multi-level executive oversight of the PNP, and the legislative enactment that was

oversight mechanisms, the Philippine security

meant to enesh this constitutional purpose,

the same evils that has plagued the pre-1987 Constitution security sector still hound our core security forces to this day. During the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Convention, Commissioner Natividad, speaking about the dangers of giving full control over the police to the governors and mayors: “[b]y our experience, this has spawned warlordism, bossism and sanctuaries for vices and abuses.” Despite several layers, and in some cases, overlapping jurisdictions over the discipline of the core security forces, we nd the same

structures, bumps and barriers in the security sector landscape: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

Political misuse of security units Unaccountable Unaccountabl e bureaucracies Arbitrary policy-making Lack of transparency Risk- avoiding Amateurism Corruption Nepotism

sector continues to reect the highly-politicized

environment that has developed into its natural habitat. The inter-governmental oversight structures have not only ironically institutionalized political intervention into the security sector, but have also informally installed the security sector as the “gatekeeper “gatekeeper of of power” and and the “court of last resort.” In its most palpable demonstration, the transition to power and installation of a replacement administration was made possible through the pivotal withdrawal of support of the Defense Secretaries, Chiefs-of-Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and the Chiefs of the Philippine National National Police. This is the discernible discernible and indubitable formula for the two (2) EDSA Revolutions. Even in the recently concluded impeachment proceedings, no less than the Presiding Judge, the Senate President of the Philippines, who himself served as the long-time Defense Secretary of then President Marcos, when asked about the acceptability of the manner and outcome of the highly political exercise, conceded that: “[t] he only one that can stop us is the might of the military.”27

All of these elements are present in the core institutions of the security sector in the Philippines today.. They do not only prevent today prevent modernization, modernization, but they point to a fundamental irony, that despite the institutionalization of multi-layered

The underlying principle of insulating the security sector from partisan political activities and political opportunism in the 1987 Constitution, has effectively become a self-fullling prophecy.

27 Chrisine Avendaño, Avendaño, “ENILE: ONLY MILIAY MILIAY CAN CA N SOP COONA IMPEACHMEN IM PEACHMEN IAL,” IA L,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, Inquirer, January

02, 2012, Accessed htp://newsino htp://newsino.inquir .inquirer. er.ne/121009/enrile-only-mil ne/121009/enrile-only-miliary-can-sop-corona-i iary-can-sop-corona-impeachmen-ria mpeachmen-rial.l.

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Gaps in the Big Picture: Plain Oversight

coherent standards where appropriate security sector policy reforms can be drawn.

Section 21 of Article X of the Constitution provides for a clear delineation of the responsibilities. On the one hand, the local police agencies are tasked with the preservation and maintenance of peace and order. order. On the other hand, the defense and security of the regions is clearly placed in the hands of the national government.28

Each major security establishment is governed by a law or a charter that embodies its general

The problem of ordinary criminal activities is the responsibility of of the local police authorities. In the age of international terrorism and transnational organized crime, the local peace and order concerns have been elevated to a level that is beyond the capabilities of the local governments. The responsibility for the defense and security of the regions belongs to the national government. Through the years, however, this unambiguous delineation of roles has been blurred into several gray areas of joint responsibility. responsibilit y. In Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 7898, otherwise known as the “AFP Modernization Act,” provides that one of the objectives of modernizing the armed forces is “to enhance its capability to assist the Philippine National Police in law enforcement and internal security operations.” On its face, this provision appears to unduly stretch the boundaries of the constitutional assignment of duties for external defense and internal peacekeeping, and may be corrected by either legislative amendments, judicial relief, or by executive issuances. However, upon further review of other similar symptomatic indicators, we nd that there are no

mandates

and

specic

responsibilities

and

objectives. However, these laws and charters have institutionalized a fragmented approach to security policy. policy. What was being practiced practiced on the ground has been captured in legislation, and thus cementing an inert and solitary existence, which ultimately slows down any progress of thought, practice and vision. A quick review of the existing structures and legal instruments reveal a terrain of unrelated, dis-integrated and self-contained “islands” of security policies and stakeholders. These “islands” must, therefore, be re-connected by philosophical, structural and policy “bridges,” if we are to successfully adopt a “whole-of-nation approach.”29 1. There is a need to integrate integrate the local Peace and Order Councils into formal security sector structure and processes. •

•

•

The PNP should be given the authority to prescribe the structures, procedures and training of barangay peace and order. Barangay neighborhood watch systems are not integrated into the peace and order initiatives of the police and military establishments Provincial, City and Municipal peace and order councils should have a minimum set

28 Secion 21 o Aricle X o he 1987 Consiui Consiuion: on: “Te preservaion o peace and order wihin he regions shall shall be he responsibiliy o he local

police agencies which shall shall be organized, mainained, mainained, supervised and uilized uilized in accordance wih applicable applicable laws. Te deense and securiy o he regions shall be he responsibiliy responsibiliy o he naional governmen. [Emphasis supplied] supplied] 29 Philippine Developmen Developmen Plan 2011-2016, Chaper Chaper 9: Peace and Securiy. Securiy.


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of objectives that are prescribed by the PNP and the DILG

school system, except in formal security sector recruitment and formation There is a need to articulate the role of an “Informed Public” There is a need to identify the “pillars of the

•

2. There is a need need to correct the mis-integration of cross-over institutions.

•

security sector” and to identify their specic • • •

Role of the Local Chief Executives over police and military units must be further de-limited Philippine Coast Guard as an adjunct of DOTC 30 The administration of the Philippine National Police Academy (PNPA) must be returned the Philippine National Police (PNP)

roles and responsibiliti responsibilities es 5. There is a need to dene the role of an “informed Media establishment,” where their “watchdog” (outsider) function must be clearly delineated from their stakeholder (insider) function.

3. The development of Military Bases must be based on a Comprehensive Security Plan.

•

It should NOT be Secondary to social and economic development of communities. It should NOT be based on their historical, but on their strategic value. Procurement and acquisition of materiel should be based on established mechanisms of identifying and prioritizing security needs, as opposed to stockpiling and upgrading of existing facilities, equipment and supplies.

•

• • •

4. There is a need to foster a culture culture of of “Security “Security Consciousness.” •

Security education is not integrated into the

“Distrust” for public institutions is exacerbated in the negative portrayal of state security agents in the media Reports of abuses, unresolved cases, and involvement of police and military ofcials and ex-police and ex-military ofcials in graft

•

cases or organized crime The Freedom of Information Act (FOI) and/ or the Public Ownership of Government Information

(POGI)

must

clearly

dene

matters of “national security,” “national defense,” and “national interest” 6. There is an an urgent need need to insulate insulate the security sector from politics, without removing the built-in checks-and-balance functions of oversight agencies.

30 epublic Ac No. 9993, oherwise known as he “Philippine Coas Guard Law,” Law,” and is Implemening ules and egulaions (I).

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Conclusion While most of the above proposals will only require executive action through administrative issuances to be undertaken by the President and his cabinet secretaries, there are a few areas that will require legislative action. The President, as the Commander-in-Chief and as the Chief Executive of the State, is strategically installed at the helm of the formal security sector organizations, with all the legal mandates and capabilities to rationalize, re-organize and steer the security sector in the direction of integration, rationalization and encourage a wider ownership and internalization of the “whole-of-nation” approach. One may argue that the resulting “isolation” of security sector stakeholders is a product of historical and cultural cultural accidents. accidents. The Philippine Philippine Constitution envisions an integrated national and local government; security consciousness must pervade all levels of Philippine society, down

to the barangay, and even welcomed into each family unit. unit. It would seem that the concepts concepts of health and safety are generally accepted as being included in the concept of general welfare, but security remains to be perceived to be restricted to the national government, the core security forces and the intelligence agencies. While health and safety consciousness has been seamlessly integrated into the collective consciousness of the Filipino family, a shared responsibility for national security has yet to be internalized and institutionalized. Unless we initiate and usher in an era of integration, not just of functions and processes, but also of vision and perspective, the stakeholders will remain standing on “separate islands,” unable to communicate, incapable of drawing support from other stakeholders, and cut-off from what would otherwise be a synergistic environment.

SOURCE: 4TH SPECIAL S PECIAL FORCES BATTALION, BATTALION, AFP


37


4 AFP ModernIZATION by Melanie

Rodulfo-Veril

philippines


philippines

AFP MODERNIZATION Confronted by a number of challenges and threats to national security, there is an exigent need for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to develop and modernize its capabilities to fully support the effective implementation of national security and defense plans and programs. The article provides a quick historical review on the evolution of the AFP from being one of the superior militaries in the Asia-Pacic region after the Second World War into a one that lags behind its neighbors in terms of modern assets, materiel and equipment. It establishes the relationship between the capability and readiness of the AFP to the level of support and augmentation provided by the US, which peaked during the heydays of the US bases in the country. The article characterizes the present state of the AFP as plagued with strategic, institutional, and operational deciencies making the military only partially capable of performing all its critical mission areas. It offers several several factors which which have been crucial in the current weakened state of the Philippine military, including 1) end of Cold War and the subsequent expulsion of US bases in the Philippines; 2) reprioritization of AFP operations from traditional defense to internal security operations; 3) 3 ) intricacies of the Republic Act (RA) 7898, otherwise known as the AFP Modernization Act of 1995, and the resulting complications and shortfalls in the implementation of the law; and, 4) lacking and delayed release of funds to support the implementation of the law and related modernization programs. Consistent with the new administration’s policies and strategic intent, the article deems it imperative to fast track AFP modernization to effectively address prevalent national and regional security issues and concerns. It further recommends the continuous streamlining of defense planning and procurement processes, and allocation of signicant budget to support the modernization programs and projects under the new ne w AFP Modernization Modernization Law.

SOURCE: PAO AFP

40

4 AFP MODERNIZAT MODERNIZATION ION


S

philippines

Security Sector Reform (SSR) is linked with security and development since ineffective and

1970s. At the height of its laurels, the AFP had a range of aircraft in its inventory to include

inefcient governance becomes a challenge in the development, democratization, conict

jet-ghter interceptors – the F-5A/B and F-8

prevention, and peacebuilding of a state. 1 The development of the AFP’s capabilities is included in the SSR component of the Internal Peace and Security Plan (IPSP) Bayanihan. Furthermore, it is deemed important to have a credible deterrent posture in attaining peace and security in the country.

The Hope of an Independent Defense Force By the end of the World War II, and upon declaration of Independence from the US, the Armed Forces of Philippines (AFP) was established with the three service units (Army, Navy, and Air Force) in 1947. Both states recognized the other’s strategic value to their respective national interests and thus entered into several bilateral arrangements. These are the Military Bases Agreement (MBA) of 1947, the Military Assistance Program (MAP) of 1947 and the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) of 1951. The Clark Air Base located in the Philippines was then the biggest airbase outside US territory. 2 It was the golden era of the AFP when it enjoyed military superiority from the 1950s until the early

Crusaders. It also had 140 “Huey” helicopters, 35 attack helicopters, 30 trainer jets, and 12 C-130 “Hercules” planes. It also boasted of warships and gunboats for the Philippine Navy (PN). 3 The AFP was equipped, although apart from minimal counter-dissident counter-disside nt campaigns, campaigns, its major major role then was the occasional participation in the military exercises conducted by South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO).4 The support from US was rm but like all military

organizations, the AFP sought to professionalize its soldiers and develop its own capabilities. In the 1970s, during the outbreak of Muslim separatism in Mindanao, the government made an effort to upgrade the capability of the AFP. Then President Ferdinand Marcos particularly aimed for an independent armed forces that will be capable for an autonomous defense posture. This attempt was further encouraged following the reluctance of the US to provide the AFP with counter-insurgency materiel. Considered as the rst major step in the AFP capability upgrade,

the government allocated USD 25M to support research and development of the Philippine Army (PA) capabilities. 5 The government’s vision of having an autonomous defense capability was furthered in the 1980s.

1 IncieGov & Sifung, “A “A Primer on Securiy Secor eorm (SS) ocused on Democraic Democraic Conrol Conrol o Armed Forces (DCAF),” Manila, 2010. 2 enao De Casro, “Philippine Deense Policy in he 21s Cenury: Auonomous Deense or Back o he Alliance?,” Pacific Affairs 78 No. 3

(2005): 403-422. 3 Ben Cal, “SPECIAL EPO: AFP modernizaion sill an elusive dream”. July 11, 2011. erieved om htp://www htp://www.inera .ineraksyon.com/ ksyon.com/

aricle/8682/special-repor-ap-modernizai aricle/8682/specia l-repor-ap-modernizaion-sill-an-elusive-d on-sill-an-elusive-dream. ream. 4 De Casro, “Philippine “Philippine Deense Policy, Policy, “ 404. 5 De Casro, “Philippine “Philippine Deense Policy, Policy, “ 405.


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In 1989, with the brewing tensions in the West Philippine Sea, the Department of National Defense (DND) aimed to strengthen the maritime security of the country and this time proposed the modernization of the PN. The acquisition of six fast attack crafts (FAC) was projected to better control the maritime borders. The PN, lacking any missile or blue water capabilities, requested the funds.6 This was encouraged by the Senate and the Congress and directed the AFP to formulate a 15-year plan for arms acquisition and ultimately, a plan to lessen dependence on the US. The conclusion of the Cold War welcomed the plan in view of the possible withdrawal of US bases in the country.7

Forces became apparent. This prompted the AFP to create an initial 10-year plan for modernization. It initially focused on the acquisition of weapons system, and was billed for a total of PhP 140 billion or USD 560 million for the 10-year program. This, however, was way below the USD 200 million provided by the US for military support annually before the withdrawal of the bases. 9 The 10-year plan also experienced criticisms from various sectors in the Philippine society, and was therefore hampered. It took the Congress three (3) years to approve the AFP Modernization Program (AFPMP).

The road to a modernized AFP Post Cold War, the general view is that Manila and Washington no longer shared similar security interests. By then, the Philippines requested payments from the US for hosting the latter’s military facilities. A new basement treaty was proposed but was not ratied in the Senate in

1991, which led to the withdrawal of US forces in the Philippines. 8 The turn of events created strife in the RP-US relationship, and there was an obvious impasse on the alliance. This was reected in the reduced

US military and economic aid to the Philippines. The need for the modernization of the Armed

The AFPMP was nally approved on February

23, 1995 as a legal and policy framework. This program aims to “modernize the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to a level where it can fully and effectively perform its constitutional mandate of upholding the sovereignty and preserving the patrimony of the Republic”. 10 This 15-year Program is mandated by Republic Act (RA) 7898, otherwise known as the AFP Modernization Act and is implemented through Department of National Defense Circular (DC) No. 1 dated 06 March 2000 (replacing DC 29 dated 19 May 1996). 11

6 De Casro, “Philippine “Philippine Deense Policy, Policy, “ 410. 7 _________”Te 20-Year 20-Year Sraegic Plan: Sel-elian Sel-elian Deense Posure”. Posure”. Quezon Ciy: Armed Forces Forces o he Philippines. 2002. 8 Bayoneo M Vicoria, Vicoria, “Te Former Former U.S. U.S. Bases in he Philippines: An Argumen or he Applicaion o U.S. U.S. Environmenal Environmenal Sandards o Overseas Overseas

Miliary Bases.” Fordham Fordham Environmenal Environmenal Law eview 6 Issue Issue 1 (2011). 9 De Casro, “Philippine “Philippine Deense Policy, Policy, “ 411. 10 Armed Forces O he Philippines Modernizaion Program Program Managemen Office. AFP Modernizaion Program Primer. Quezon Ciy: Armed

Forces o he Philippines, 1996. 11 Jaime Frumencio Monañez, “Te Need For Qualified Conracing Officers In Te Armed Forces O Te Philppines (AFP) Modernizaion

Programme,” (Tesis, Naval Naval Pos Pos Graduae School, School, 2008).

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The modernization program focused on ve

The proposed acquisition was deemed timely following the incidents in the West Philippine Sea over the territorial disputes in the area. The Philippines has been ill-equipped in confronting China upon the discovery of Chinese military structures in Mischief Reef in 1996.

components namely: 1. Capability, Materiel and Technology Development; 2. Bases and Support System Developmen Development; t; 3. Human Resource Development; 4. Doctrines Development, and; 5. Force Restructuring & Organizational Development.12

The incident veried how the AFP scantily

operated in view of potential and sensitive ash points.

RA 7898 stipulated parameters to limit the effect The program was given a PhP 331.62 billion budget broken down into two sub-programs: Sub-program 1 has a budget of PhP 164.55 billion while Sub-program 2 has a budget of PhP 167 billion. This was also distributed down tranches, PhP 50 billion to implement the rst ve years of

the AFPMP, PhP 74.2 billion for the second year, and PhP 37.6 billion on the third year, while the remaining ve years is PhP 2.8 billion. 13

Under the Program, the Air Force hoped to acquire two squadrons of multi-role ghter aircraft

and surface-to-air missile and gun systems. The PN projected the procurement of three frigates, six corvettes, 12 offshore patrol vessels and 12 missile boats along with nine helicopters and six xed-wing aircraft to develop its naval aviation

capability.14

of hefty military spending in the country. The rst

set of parameters is that AFPMP allocation will not hamper the basic economic and social services provided by the government. As such, the DND was required to make the t he program sustainable by creating its own trust fund. 15 The AFP Modernization Act Trust Trust Fund was to be sourced out from: 1. Appropriations Appropriations for the AFPMP; 2. Proceeds from the sale, lease, or joint joint development of military reservation, as may be authorized by Congress, include such immovable and other facilities as may be found therein, not covered by the Bases Conversion Development Authority, as provided for in Republic Act (RA) No. 7227 16 ;

12 Armed Forces o he Philippines Modernizaion Program Managemen Office. AFP A FP Modernizaion Program Primer. Quezon Ciy:Armed

Forces For ces o he Philippines. 1996. 13 Monañez, “Te Need.” 14 Armed Forces O he Philippines Modernizaion Modernizaion Program Managemen Office. AFP Modernizaion Program Program Annual epor 2008. Quezon

Ciy: Armed Forces o he Philippines. 15 Monañez, “Te Need.” 16 R 7227 or he Bases Conversion and Developmen Ac o 1992 declared he policy o he Governmen o accelerae he sound and balanced

conversion ino alernaive producive uses o he Clark and Subic miliary reservaions and heir exensions (John Hay Saion, Wallace Air Saion, O’Donnell ransmiter Saion, San Miguel Naval Communicaions Saion and Capas elay Saion), o raise unds by he sale o porions o Mero Manila miliary camps, and o apply said unds or he developmen and conversion o produciv producivee civilian use o he lands covered under he 1947 Miliary Bases Agreemen beween he Philippines and he US.


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3. Share of the AFP from the proceeds proceeds of the sale of military camps provided for under RA No. 7227; 4. Proceeds from the the sale sale of the products products of the Government Arsenal; 5. Proceeds from the the disposal disposal of excess excess and/ and/ or uneconomically repairable equipment and other movable assets of the AFP and the Government Arsenal; 6. Funds from budgetary surplus, if any, any, as may be authorized by Congress subject to the provisions of Section 8 of RA 7227; and, 7. All interest income of the trust fund Congressional funding however will only be made available if there is a surplus in the appropriations.17

AFP of principal technology involved for the operation and maintenance of the equipment. Unfortunately,

the

Asian

nancial

crisis

caught up with the program in 1997. When the modernization plan was crafted, the exchange rate was only PhP 20 to 1 USD. The peso depreciated by almost 40 percent and

nancial

investments

in

the

country

economic and technological benets of the

were greatly reduced. Funding for modernization was austerely challenged. In 1998, with the advent of increased Muslim separatist activity in Mindanao, the AFP shifted priorities from external defense to internal security, which also shifted the priorities of the modernization program to enhance Internal Security Operations (ISO) capabilities. 19 The Revised Reprioritized Project List (RRPL) was approved in 2004 based on the project lists

country from AFP acquisitions. The program

identied in the years 2001 and 2002.

The second set of parameters guarantee the

must be able to reduce foreign exchange outow, outow,

contribute to local employment, and enhance technology transfer to the Philippines. With this, the DND must ensure the following: 18 •

•

•

Give preference to Filipino contractors and suppliers or foreign contractors and suppliers willing and able to locate a substantial portion of production in the Philippines; Incorporate as far as possible, in each contract/ agreement provisions for countertrade, in-country manufacture, co-production schemes or other innovative arrangements; and, Include in the contract the transfer to the

On the side, for its contribution to the US-led global war on terrorism as an offshoot of the 9/11 incident, the Philippines and the US prompted the Joint Defense Assessment which led to the Philippine Defense Reform (PDR), and the AFP Capability Upgrade Program (CUP). In the assessment as early as 1999, the ndings were

able to identify 65 key and 207 ancillary areas of concern. The key areas have been distilled into ten (10) key recommendations, which the PDR implements throughout a multi-year time frame: 20 1.

Implement a strategy-driven defense planning system;

multi-year

17 AFPMPMO, 2008. 18 Monañez, “Te Need.” 19 AFPMPMO, 2008. 20 Deparmen o Naiona Naionall Deense. “Te Philippine Deense eorm Program (PD)” erieved om:htp://www om:htp://www.dnd.gov .dnd.gov.ph/ .ph/

DNDWEBPAGE_files/hml/pdrpage.hm. DNDWEBPAGE_files/h ml/pdrpage.hm.

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2. Improve AFP operational and training capacity; 3. Improve operational readiness rates of key key AFP systems; 4. Improve operational level expertise by addressing organizational, management and

The development of military capabilities for 2012-2018 is anchored on seven mission areas namely: ISO, Territorial Defense, Disaster Risk Reduction Management and Response, Support to National Development, International Defense and Security Engagements (IDSE), Peace Support Operations (PSO), and Force-Level Command and Control, Support and Training (FLC2ST).22

operational systemic deciencies;

5. Develop an effective AFP personnel management system; 6. Plan, program and execute a Multi-Year Capability Upgrade Plan for the AFP; 7. Optimize the the defense defense budget budget and improve management controls; 8. Create a professional acquisition workforce and establish a centrally- managed defense acquisition system; 9. Increase capability capability of the AFP to conduct civil-military operations; and 10. Develop accurate baseline data on critical AFP functional areas. areas. Program 6 of the PDR, the Multi-Year Capability Upgrade Plan (CUP) was aligned in the AFP Modernization Plan. The program is an 18-year defense acquisition period that is divided into three phases:

AFP Modernization 15 Years After The implementation period of the RA 7898 expired on December 2011 without any signicant progress in terms of modernizing

AFP capabilities. What was pursued instead was the upgrading of basic capabilities to bring these back to acceptable levels of readiness. 23 However, of the total amount of PhP 331 billion approved for the total fund requirements of the Program, only PhP 35 billion was used for the capability upgrade program of the AFP for internal operations. On the July 2011 report released by the Ofce of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans,

J5, only three hundred seventeen (317) projects (59.36 percent) were completed from the ve

Phase 1: (2006–2011)—acquisition and upgrade of equipment for enhancing the ISO; Phase 2: (2012–2018)—the transition phase from ISO to territorial defense; and, Phase 3: (2019–2024)—acquisition geared for territorial defense and peacekeepin peacekeeping g operations. 21

hundred thirty four (534) planned projects. There are still two hundred nine (209) ongoing projects and eight (8) projects suspended for review. review. The Commission on Audit (COA) found that the AFP itself was slowed down by its complex acquisition structure, which would commence from the Circular Requirements (COR) formulation to

21 Office o he Depuy Chie o Saff or Plans, J5. AFP Capabiliy Upgrade Plan. Quezon Ciy: Armed Forces o he Philippines. 2007. 22 Office o he Depuy Chie o Saff or Plans, J5. AFP Medium erm Developmen Plan (2012- 2018). Quezon Ciy:Armed Forces o he

Philippines. 2010. 23 Vincen Cabreza, “Gazmin admis AFP upgrade a dud,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, February 19, 2012. Accessed May 8, 2012, htp:// newsino.inquirer newsino .inquirer.ne/148403/gazm .ne/148403/gazmin-admis-ap-upgra in-admis-ap-upgrade-plan-a-dud. de-plan-a-dud.


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contracting phases. Certain RA 7898 stipulations would also make complications inevitable to wit:

This section made it difcult for Filipino contractors

raised by Secretary of National Defense (SND) Voltaire Gazmin for the poor implementation of the program. The Commission on Audit agreed and added that the lack of funding was a major reason for the program’s poor implementation since only Php 35 billion or 10.02 percent of the total projected amount of Php 331 billion was appropriated.

who were willing to invest on defense industry, as they were required to sell to other countries before selling in the Philippines.

Interventions Intervention s to address the concern

“That no major equipment and weapons system shall be purchased if the same are not being used by the armed forces in the country of origin or used by the armed forces of at least two countries”.

In this pretext, RA 7898 contradicts itself as the Section 10 of the law explicates, “The SRDP intends to induce the AFP to give preference to Filipino contractors contractors and suppliers or or to foreign contractors or suppliers willing and able to locate a substantial portion of, if not the entire, production process of the terms involved, within the Philippines.”

President Benigno Aquino intends to fast track the delayed modernization plan under his term. In 2010, with the commitment from the SND, the AFP Long Term Capability Development Program was crafted. It pushes for an immediate development of a modest deterrent capability to protect the country’s vast maritime borders and to protect its territorial claims in the Spratlys. 24 This transition from internal security to territorial defense is timely and well reected in the IPSP

The modernization plan also shouldered changing priorities from the government. The Reprioritized Capability Upgrade Program (RCUP) was primarily designed to speed up the procurement of equipment for ISO and realign modernization with AFP missions. A 2010 AFP

Bayanihan.

Ofce of the Special and Strategic Studies report

planning, resource and nancial management

however noted that RCUP directs the AFP to consider foreign military sales or governmentto-government transaction in the procurement of equipment, which contributed yet again to the complex procurement process.

and decision-making responsibilities of the SND, the Chief of Staff, AFP and other senior leaders of the AFP and DND in determining the needs and priorities of the defense system.

The DND also released Department Circular No. 11 to effectively implement the Defense System of Management (DSOM) in the entire defense establishment. DSOM was created to support the

The DND has lined up one hundred thirty eight The lack of and the delay in the release of funds for the program were the main reasons

(138) projects spread over a period of ve (5) years.

The bulk of the budget has been earmarked for

24 Office o he Depuy-Chie-o-Saff or Plans (J-5). DND-AFP Trus or Capabiliy Upgrade: Te AFP Long-erm Long-erm Capabiliy. Quezon Ciy:

Armed Forces o he Philippines. Philippines. 2010.

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4 AFP MODERNIZATIO MODERNIZATIONN


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the Philippine Air Force (PAF) and PN. 25 Planned acquisitions for the PAF include eight brand-new combat utility helicopters along with multi-role

procurement process will be introduced and will be cut down from 29 stages to two assessment levels in addition to the actual procurement and contracting stages. There are also amendments on the AFP Modernization Trust Fund. It is proposed that funds should be used to “cover all necessary expenses to implement the procurement of equipment such as expenses for

and lead-in ghter planes, surface-attack aircraft,

and long-range reconnaissance planes. The PN on the other hand has projected the acquisition of multi-role attack vessels, off-shore patrol craft, and even surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles. Materiel for “joint maritime surveillance, defense, and interdiction operations in the South China Sea” were also included in the plan. 26 Among the notable acquisitions under the Aquino administration administration is the Hamilton Hamilton Class BRP Gregorio del Pilar. The DND has approved 10 percent of the 138 modernization projects meant to modernize the military in securing our borders and protecting our territory. 27 The Php 70 billion initial budget has already been approved.

the pre-selection and post-qualication stages”.

In addition, the “approval of congress will no longer be required in the lease or joint development of military reservations”.29 Additional funds will also be sourced from the earnings of the Malampaya gas wells from the new oil exploration service contracts in the Sulu Sea.

Way Forward for the AFP Modernization

The ofce of the expired AFP Modernization

Program on the other hand was deactivated and has transitioned into a Defense Acquisition Ofce, under the direction of the Department of

National Defense. Sec. Gazmin stressed that the modernization of the AFP is nally moving and the

program will support not only internal security but also external security, disaster risk management and support to national development. 28 The bill for the amendment of the AFPMP was passed by Congress in 2012. In a statement by Senator Panlo Lacson, a new system for the

While recent acquisitions of defense materiel and equipment, and continuing efforts toward defense reform and transformation are recognized and lauded, it is still apparent that there is a need for the the continued allocation of funds for bigger acquisitions of defense materiel and equipment, and the continuing defense reform efforts of the government. There is also a need for more focused efforts, programs and policies within the defense establishment to facilitate more effective and

25 “AFP modernizaion awais unding,” Manila imes, January 30, 2012. erieved om: htp://www.manilaimes.ne/index.php/news/

naion/16081-ap-modernizaion-aw naion/16081-ap-m odernizaion-awais-unding ais-unding.. 26 OJ5, 2010. p. 3. 27 Fra Frances nces Mangosing & Kaherine Evangelisa, “DND approves 10% o miliary modernizaion projecs,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, Inquirer, February

18, 2012, accessed May 8, 2012, htp://newsino htp://newsino.inquirer .inquirer.ne/148187/dnd-ap .ne/148187/dnd-approves-10-o-mi proves-10-o-miliary-modernizaion-pr liary-modernizaion-projecs. ojecs. 28 Elena Aben, “AFP Modernizaion Projecs Parially Parially OK’d,” Te Manila Bullein, February 18, 2012, accessed May 29, 2012, htp://www.

mb.com.ph/node/351788/ap-mo mb.co m.ph/node/351788/ap-modernizaion-proj dernizaion-projec. ec. 29 Iner Ineraksyon, aksyon, “Senae Passes Bill Bill Amending AFP Modernizaion Program,” Ineraksyon, Ineraksyon, June June 5, 2012, rerieved om om htp://www.inera htp://www.ineraksyon. ksyon.

com/aricle/33822/senae-passes-bill-amendin com/aricle/33822/sena e-passes-bill-amending-ap-modernizaion-pr g-ap-modernizaion-program. ogram.


47


fast implementation of modernization projects. At the same time, such policies promote a more responsive defense institution in a changing security environment. At present, the modernization of the AFP is moving and looks positive. Budget allocations for the procurement of materiel and equipment to modernize the AFP have already been approved and released. According to Sec. Gazmin, before the term of the President Aquino Aquino III ends in 2016,

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the 138 modernization projects will be achieved. The AFP faces different security challenges in light of the changing security environment. This highlights the need to sustain capability development efforts. Otherwise, the AFP might be left behind once again, and might not be able to address these challenges. The AFP must at all times be able to perform its mandate of upholding the sovereignty and preserving the patrimony of the Republic.

Other references: Cal, Ben. “SPECIAL REPORT: AFP modernization still an elusive dream”. July 11, 2011. Retrieved from: http:// www.interaksyon.com/art www.int eraksyon.com/article/8682/special icle/8682/special-report-afp-report-afpmodernization-still-an-elusive-dream

Interaksyon. “Senate Passes Bill Amending AFP Modernization Program” June 5, 2012. Retrieved from: http:// www.interaksyon.com/article/33822/senate-passes-billamending-afp-modernization-program

Cabreza, Vincent. “Gazmin admits AFP upgrade a dud” 19 February 2012. Inquirer News Retrieved from http://newsinfo. inquirer.net/148403/gazmin-admits-afp-upgrade-plan-a-dud 8 May 2012

InciteGov&Stiftung. “A Primer on Security Sector Reform (SSR) focused on Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)” January 2010. Manila, Philippines

Department of Budget and Management. http://www.mb.com. ph/node/351788/afp-modernization-project nt. Retrieved from http://budgetngbayan.com/mybudget-2012/the-2012-budgeta-summary/ Elena L. Aben. “AFP Modernization Projects Partially OK’d”. The Manila Bulletin Newspaper Online. 18 February 2012. Retrieved from http://www.mb.com.ph/node/351788/afpmodernization-project 29 May 2012

48

Manila Times.net. “AFP modernization awaits funding” January 30, 2012. Retrieved from: http://www.manilatimes. net/index.php/news/nation/16081-afp-modernization awaits-funding Mangosing, Frances & Evangelista, Katherine. “DND approves 10% of military modernization projects”. 18 Februar y 2012 Inquirer News. Retrieved from http://newsinfo.inquirer. net/148187/dnd-approves-10-of-military-modernizationprojects 8 May 2012

4 AFP MODERNIZATIO MODERNIZATIONN


5 AFP FORCE STRUCTURE by Capt

Roy Vincent T Trinidad (GSC) PN

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AFP FORCE STRUCTURE The Armed Forces is classied as one of the core state security actors. It is utilized by the government to implement its policies. Currently, it is a primary tool of the government to suppress insurgency. Additionally Additionally,, the AFP is heavily land-based, even though the Philippines is archipelagic in nature, thus requiring an armed force with strong air and naval capabilities. capab ilities. The paper examines the different events and factors that led to the current AFP Structural Organization. These events include the post martial law culture, counter-insurgency operations, organizational expansion and modication, utilization of reservist, and strategic direction. The author argues that a national policy framework is an imperative in coming up with the AFP’s strategic direction, which is the hinge in devising the organization’s force. Additionally Additionally,, policies should be cleared on the handover of areas to civil authorities and declaration of insurgent-free areas. A Transition Plan that would govern the shift from ISO to Territorial Defense should also be formulated.

SOURCE: PAO AFP

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5 AFP FORCE STRUCTURE

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Introduction

T

stresses the need to review the organizational structure of the AFP to bet the Philippine setting.

The Armed Forces is classied as a core security

actor and a state actor. It is one of the political tools of the government to implement policies. The AFP is a security sector institution whose

Source of Problems in AFP Structural Organization

core competency is war ghting, may it be real

or for intimidation. It is the government actor tasked to protect the territory of the state and its sovereignty sovereignty.. In the current Philippine setting, the AFP is used by the government as a primary tool to suppress insurgency. Yet the government should be circumspect in the utilization of the armed forces in resolving conicts whether local or

international. The use of military strategy to settle conicts should be the last option of the

government since it is violent and expensive. The resultant damage to people and properties and the nancial equivalent of such damage is widely

greater than when other options are used. During the rise of disputes and even response to crisis situations, other approaches should be employed

The Post Martial Law Culture

The effects of Martial Law are still apparent in the security sector even decades after its fall. With the overthrow of dictatorship after the massive display of people power in 1986, the reins of power were handed to civilian revolutionary leadership which paved the way for the gradual strengthening of democratic institutions. The end of Martial Law symbolized the triumph of military force over dictatorship. This made an impression of a strong military force and even emphasized its vital role in society society.. Martial Law created a culture of the use of inherent force since it is how the AFP was trained to perform its task. The military became the immediate option in every emergency situation and conict.

rst since the use of military forces beget greater

collateral damage and leaves no viable option once committed initially. In the aim of transforming the AFP, one of the things to be looked into is the suitability of its organizational structure to the dynamism of the current societal setting. It is devised to be land based, army-based per se, though the Philippines is archipelagic in nature. Instead of being heavy with land forces, the organization should be equipped with air force and naval personnel which the geographical and strategic setting demands. The assumption of a more active role in territorial defense and other non-traditional tasks such as disaster relief and response operations also


Even during the Marcos administration, the military was given non-traditional duties in economic development and infrastructures under the banner of ‘civic action’ to bridge gaps on resources, manpower and logistical requirements. Moreover, military members/ofcials were given

posts in the government which were traditionally appointed to civilians. This practice of utilizing the military in activities other than war continued even after the fall of the Martial Law. Indeed, the end of martial law and the utilization of the military during the Marcos regime led to the emergence of a more participatory role of the AFP in the civilian government, which in turn led to the modication

for the structure of the military to address this

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role. The employment of the military in various government endeavors also led to the change of focus of the AFP from its true mandate of territorial defense to the performance of tasks beyond the jurisdiction of the Armed Forces.

Since the transfer of the ISO lead role from PNP to AFP in 1998, the AFP performs activities such as nation building efforts, community organizing, medical services and other engineering projects. The military personnel who were once trained to engage in combat became teachers, engineers, medical practitioners, law enforcers etc. This elicited mixed responses from LGUs. Some grew complacent and dependent on the military for the performance of their tasks while others felt disrespected or encroached upon by the AFP. On the other hand, there are others that failed to fully grasp their roles and functions in internal security as the AFP has been performing these tasks since previous administrations.

Counter Insurgency Operations

Through Republic Act 8551, which holds that the DILG (PNP) be relieved from the primary responsibility on matters involving the suppression of insurgency and other serious threats to national security, the AFP is tasked to lead on matters involving internal security operations. Yet there had been difculties in dening the scope of efforts where the AFP should lead, even in dening suppression per se. There are also no denite set of parameters

which will accurately measure the success of suppression of insurgency.

Hence, the capability build-up for territorial

Since there is no denitive boundary on where

AFP which should be its core competency

the task of the AFP in the suppression of insurgency starts and ends, there is also a confusion in the internal security functions that should be assumed by government agencies, especially the local government units (LGUs). In

had been neglected likewise and modied to

its ght against insurgency, the AFP was able to

determine the factors and roots of insurgency. It further asserted that these cannot be solved solely through a militaristic approach but through a holistic national effort. However, local government units do not take an active role on matters concerning insurgency in spite of the problem being rooted in concerns that necessitate the LGU’s participation and efforts. The AFP is forced to perform various tasks even those which are beyond its mandate and competency since those are held to be part of its broad mission of suppressing insurgency.

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defense has been sacriced to support ISO efforts. The war ghting capability of the

suit its ISO mission. The roles played by the AFP in ISO led to the structuring of the military organization as land-based with a heavy army force. The structure is expected to remain as such while the lead role in ISO remains on the shoulders of the military. Additionally, improvements on the AFP’s capabilities for its other mission areas will continue to be compromised. Organizational Expansion/ Modication The demands of fullling the ISO mission

forced the AFP to train and build up capabilities to satisfy needs which should have been catered by civilian sectors such as engineers, health workers, educators,


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community organizers and others. This resulted to the activation/ establishment establishment of AFP branches,

Strategic Direction

units and ofces that will provide said services.

The absence of a comprehensive policy framework such as the National Security Strategy (NSS), National Defense Strategy (NDS) and National Military Strategy (NMS) for the defense and military establishments

The lack of an efcient human resource

system led to the abuse in the creation of positions even exceeding in number to that authorized by the law. As to recent cases, Grade 07/BGen positions are lled up with Grade 06 Ofcers/Colonels since piled up promotions

cannot be accommodated anymore Congress.

in

the

Utilization of Reservist

made it more difcult to have a strategic

direction for the AFP. Policy baselines and national frameworks are very important in setting military objectives and coming up with the appropriate framework to support said plans. The absence of a forward looking plan will make it hard for the organization to set its own specic and measurable objectives

There are currently two (2) types of reservists in the component of the AFP Reserve Force; the Ready Reserve and the Standby Reserve. Ready Reservists are personnel that are always on constant alert and on call whenever the mobilization order has been given, while Standby Reservists are the personnel that support and augment the Ready Reserve Force only when needed. At present, the AFP organization lacks proper accounting of the reservists as well as a clear concept or strategy on how to integrate reservist into the regular force. The organization is devised from a ‘peace time perspective’ thus the reservists are not seen as integrated in the force. There is no clear strategy for integration; whether reservists would be tucked into the regular force or there will be a separate regular organization with regular soldiers as cadre. Moreover, the capabilities that reservists

and provide a suitable structure to accomplish them. The strategic direction of the AFP is hinged only on available references such as the National Security Policy, the Defense System of Management, the National Military Intent, the Internal Peace and Security Plan and the Unilateral Defense Plan.

may contribute to the force are unspecied.

There should also be clear policies on the transition of the law enforcement concept which covers the handover of areas to civil authorities and declaration of insurgent free areas. A government policy should also be crafted rendering the military as the last option in addressing

Thus it would be hard to mobilize them when the need for integration arises. The reservists are also not considered in most contingency plans and are likewise not included in the array of forces of the Unied Commands.


Interventions Needed to Improve AFP Force Structure The publication of a national policy framework is very vital in coming up with the AFP’s strategic direction which is the hinge in devising the organization’s force structure. There is a need to expedite the formulation of the NSS to consequently publish NDS and NMS.

53

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emergency

or

conict

and

even

in

the

enforcement of government policies. Upon

fulllment

of

above

mentioned

interventions, a Transition Plan for the shift of military operations focus from ISO to Territorial Defense should be formulated. This should includes the exit plan of AFP from internal security operation and dened roles of AFP

units in territorial defense. This transition plan should also provide a clear concept and strategy on the utilization/ employment of reservists. Contingency plans and Rules of Engagements should also be consistent with this transition plan. There should also be a review of the Unilateral Defense Plan and its implementation plans. Mobilization plans should also be revisited to ensure its relevance and consistency with the transition plan.

The concept of having a sole headquarters for all the Major Services of the AFP should also be considered. This will aid in better coordination, supervision supervision as well as command and control among the services. It will also avoid the advent of creating a separate domain per Major Service. This may also provide a united atmosphere among the highest leaders of the AFP and translate to a strengthened armed forces. Should the AFP be structured to address maritime security and other non-traditiona non-traditionall tasks, there is the need to reprioritize programs to the support the modernization of the AFP, particularly the PN and PAF, and upgrading its capabilities build-up. This will also entail the procurement of equipment, material and assets.

Consequences

There should also be an in-depth review of the force structure of the AFP organization organization based on the strategy laid down by the agency agency.. Reservists’ organization should be rationalized and be incorporated in the structure of the AFP. There should also be strict observance of the force employer/ provider concept. The AFP organizational structure should also follow a simpler command and control mechanism to avoid confusion in assuming responsibilities and chain of authority. The structure should also address different war time scenarios may

There is a growing recognition of the need for defense and security sector transformation in our society. The reform in the Armed Forces is just a miniscule element that may contribute to the reformation of the security sector yet the AFP gives great value in every minimal step that the institution may do to effect change.These may only be viewed as baby steps toward a reformed security sector but these small steps when done in a consistent and determined pace will eventually lead to the bigger goal.

it be internal or international conicts and can

Should there be no revision in the AFP structure, deterioration of the AFP capability may follow. The core competency of the AFP in war

easily adapt to different situations. The AFP also needs a force structure that complies with national policies, can easily be adapted and is centered in the core competency of the organization.

54

ghting may be compromised. The country might gradually lose the AFP afxed to its ‘real’

mandate and mission.



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Addressing the concerns and issues on force structure of the AFP entails a deep political will among the leaders and members of the organization. This will also call for a wide advocacy of this endeavor to policy makers and other stakeholders. The rationalization of the AFP

had been doing a big role not just in the provision of security but also in the internal dynamics of the state. In this light, the support of various government sectors to the gradual changes in the uniformed service in terms of strategy and roles in society is one key factor toward developing a reformed AFP AFP..

structure into a more tting organization will affect

other government instrumentalities as the AFP



55


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6 AFP Doctrine and Training by Col

Amador T Tabuga Jr (GSC) PA

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AFP DOCTRINE AND TRAINING In 1998, RA 8551 assigned the task of handling insurgency from the PNP to the AFP. AFP. However, a document crafted in 2010 redened military operations, with the end goal of the military focusing on territorial defense and only as a support to the country’s coun try’s domestic threats. The paper examines the possible gaps in the AFP’s AFP’s doctrines and training that may have been crucial in the battle against insurgency. It discusses how the absence of an ISO doctrine has greatly hampered the fulllment of the AFP’s assigned task of suppressing insurgency. The absence of an ISO doctrine would also impact on the quality of military training, rendering military training weak and inadequate. The author argues that there is a need for a National Security Strategy that will provide the basis in the formulation of the AFP’s AFP’s ISO doctrine and an d other related military doctrines. Furthermore, there is a need to transform the US-patterned doctrines to suit domestic requirements and incorporate regional, cultural, and territorial differences.

SOURCE: PAO AFP

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6 AFP DOCTRINE AND TRAINING

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Background

T

The Philippines has been ghting insurgency

insurgency or it is beyond their capacity, looking traditionally at the Armed Forces who were basically trained to defend territorial boundaries

throughout history, from the Huk rebellion, to the communist and Muslim insurgencies. Insurgency

and not internal conicts.

is dened as an organized movement aimed to

overthrow a constituted government through

Several researches, studies, dialogues and fora were conducted to look closely on this particular

the use of subversion and armed conict. The

issue and one common nding stood out, that

communist insurgency is considered as the longest running insurgency in the country that lasted for more than 40 years and affected and killed thousands of combatants and innocent civilians.

Philippine insurgency is multi-dimensional, covering the political, cultural, sociological and economic dimensions, and requires a multidimensional approach, approach, a new frame in addressing insurgency.

The passage of Republic Act No. 8551 in February of 1998, entitled: ‘An Act Providing for the Reform and Reorganization of the Philippine National Police’, formally transferred the task of handling insurgency from the Philippine National Police to the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Section 3 clearly provides:

However, a document was crafted in 2010 that

“The Department of the Interior and Local

would redene the whole military operation,

with the end goal of leaving its primary role on domestic threats, assuming functions therein and refocusing on territorial defense. Internal Peace and Security Plan (IPSP) Bayanihan, as a military document, provides the strategic guidance in the AFP performance of its mandated functions of protecting the state and the people.

Government shall be relieved of the primary responsibility on matters involving the suppression of insurgency and other serious threats to national

Issues

security. The Philippine National Police shall, through information gathering and performance of its ordinary police functions, support the Armed Forces of the Philippines on matters involving suppression of insurgency, insurgency, except in cases where the President shall call on the PNP to support the AFP in combat operations.” operations.”

Since then, the AFP has been in-charge and in the forefront of every operation against insurgency. But despite numerous attempts, the AFP continuously failed in putting an end to insurgency. This resulted in a growing debate on whether the Armed Forces is capable of handling


While the AFP considers a new direction come 2016, it is still fundamental to re-examine past performances versus counter-insurgency operations. Experience is the best teacher after all. It is agreed that the military invested their lives, their knowledge and learnings, and to an extent, their own families, in their attempts to suppress insurgency. These investments are worth highlighting and should not be overshadowed by failures. The military’s learning talks about training, education, experience and doctrine; logically

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perceived to be present in every man-in-uniform in actual operations. All military at the forefront of insurgency operation are assumed to be fully equipped and ready. Room for mistakes is hardly considered.

on best practices and lessons learned rather than ISO doctrine.

The government on the other hand is in full support and poured a substantial amount of resources and services, year by year and administration by administration to really put closure on the insurgency problem. The only issue here perhaps is political.

5. Is it be be doctrinal development? This pertains to technical capacity, the available documents, the systematic approach and motivational attributes towards doctrine development.

Sources of the Problem On Doctrine

However, success is usually short-lived and pocket-based, because in the long run the problem on insurgency resurfaces. So, what could be or where could it be wrong?

The absence of an ISO doctrine has been largely considered as one of the major setbacks why the military was unable to suppress insurgency despite substantial investment and resources provided in every operation. The AFP Manual

1. Is it the doctrine doctrine or the lack of it? The Internal Internal Security Operation (ISO) doctrine is supposed to serve as the guiding principle in all AFP’s operations against all forms of insurgency. This way, heavy reliance on best practices and lessons will be minimized. Rather, these will be utilized only as models or modes of reference in an operation.

“Doctrine Development” (AFPM 8-03) denes

2. Is it the existing AFP doctrines doctrines that were were patterned from foreign principles, from the United States? The kind of doctrine that does not address regional differences nor

Without doctrine or the so called “guiding principles,” all operations conducted against insurgency will rely on past operations, as the next most logical approach to do so. Interpretation will not be cohesive and likely be based on individual belief and interpretations vis-à-vis best practices and lessoned learned. Point of consensus will only be achieved should exchange of opinion be given enough space; however we also have to observe the concept of individuality.

contextualize regional conict-based groups.

3. Is it the absence of national security strategy on insurgency? The strategy would clearly dene strategic approaches among

stakeholders or courses of action towards insurgency. 4. Is itit systematic? systematic? The way the military training was developed and conducted rely heavily

60

doctrine as a body of principles in any branch of knowledge that is set forth as a speculative and or self-evident truth, or as speculative working principles as taught or recommended for acceptance by others. It is based on the accumulation of knowledge gained through experience, study, study, analysis, test and validation.”

Other existing military doctrines on the other hand were patterned from the United States, the remnants of American occupation that shaped the



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Philippine Armed Forces from structure, system and academic institutions. The overarching principles were foreign in nature. The doctrine does not constitute Filipino discipline nor put into context territorial, regional and cultural differences in this archipelago.

eventually become the AFPDDC today. Aside from developing doctrines, its primary roles include managing GHQ and AFPWSSUs’ doctrine research and development activities, and to reinforce doctrine proponents in support to the AFP mission. Since 1977, AFPDDC has published 80 doctrine manuals, 23 are current while 57 are for review and revision.

In addition, the doctrine centers or ofces

observed that little attention has been given to doctrine development in the Armed Forces notwithstanding that it is one of priority areas in Philippine Defense Reform (PDR) Program and also one one of the major major pillars pillars of the earlier earlier AFP Modernization Program. Instead, priority is given to pressing operational requirements for ISO. Consequently, emphasis was given to units that were created for ISO and not units dedicated for doctrine development. Less or inadequate doctrinal emphasis when correlated to degree of importance would eventually affect personnel assigned or being assigned to doctrine development in terms of attitudes, technical capacity and motivational attributes (facilities, promotion and monetary support to programs). Doctrine Development at GHQ and Major Services AFP

Doctrine

Development

Center. The

AFPDDC was established on February 10, 2007 as an AFP-Wide Support and Separate Unit (AFPWSSU). Historically, it is the Doctrine Development Ofce (DDO), a Special Staff

of the Chief of Staff, AFP (1977). In 1984, its functions and personnel were transferred to the AFP Command and General Staff College (AFPCGSC) and became the Research and Doctrines Development Group of the college. The center underwent several renaming and


Philippine Army. Doctrine development for

the Philippine Army (PA) is undertaken by the Doctrine Center established in 1995 under the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) of the PA. The primary mission of DC, TRADOC is to develop, test, evaluate and validate doctrines; publish manuals and pamphlets for doctrinal/ historical information and instructional purposes. To date, TRADOC has developed 34 doctrine manuals and 145 reference materials. Philippine Air Force. Doctrine development for

the Philippine Air Force (PAF) is handled by the Air Power Institute (API) which was organized on January 16, 2002. API is mandated “to develop doctrines and advance airpower for the Philippine Air Force”. Force”. As of the end end of 2012, API has has already already developed 39 manuals (34 organizational, 4 functional and 1 operational manual). Philippine Navy. The task of developing naval doctrine has been given to Naval Doctrine Ofce (NDO) of the Philippine Navy (PN). The ofce

was established on December 2, 2009 and was later organized as a separate ofce from the Ofce of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Education

and Training, N8, PN on July 26, 2010. The PN Basic Doctrine is still on test and evaluation at its Headquarters and would soon set for promulgation by the Chief of Staff, AFP.

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On Military Training

During the AFP Education and Training Summit 2012 at GHQ, participants observed and identied

Fundamental to military training is the presence of doctrine that would provide guiding principles for courses of action in the conduct of operations. In the absence of doctrine, military training t raining would be weak or inadequate to some extent. Assumptions are: (1) context and direction setting if not difcult

will be mostly trial-based, (2) discourse might be all over the place and interpretation is widely open, (3) cohesiveness or consensus building will be quite hard to achieve; and lastly, (4) targets or mission might suffer.

the following major gaps and challenges on training and education, among others: 1. Apprehension of some unied commanders to conduct joint training due to the absence of clear policy. ISO remains to have utmost priority compared to training. 2. Some participants including ground ofcers agree that the present AFP peace education for soldiers is insufcient. Its creation should

be designed to encompass building trust, communications, human relations, social marketing and stakeholders’ management.

The AFP denes training as the development of a

particular skill or group of skills through a regimen of teaching, drills, exercises, practices, and systems primarily designed to enhance precision and discipline response (AFP ETS, 1997). Syjuco (1977) on the other hand denes military training

as the instruction of personnel to enhance their capacity to perform specic military functions and

3. There has has been no local local doctrinal doctrinal basis for training. Training is usually anchored on US and allied doctrines. Akin to operations, training relies heavily on domestic best practices and lessons learned.

tasks. 4.

Lastly, the participants observed that there is no institutionalized and functional development program in training institutions or units primarily due to the following circumstances:

• • •

funding challenges; lack of permanent faculty; absence of standards

If doctrinal development in the AFP has issues on emphasis, absence or inadequacy, and contextualization or localization, then the kind of training given to the military would likely reect

the same. And while both training and doctrine are still far from enjoying priority and support, the nature of insurgency in the country continuously evolves, becoming more and more complex or multi-dimensional. Quite a mismatch. Then comes the military’s transition to external defense in 2016. Imagine adding this to the equation. As a paradigm shift, will it create opportunity for doctrinal support or would it merit support

for

instructor’s

qualication; • •

lack of training facilities and amenities; and, ambivalent attitude of ofcers and personnel

towards training and assignment to training units.

insufciency?

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Recommendations/Interventions

“Armed Forces Joint Doctrine Development Strategy” (2006) into policy, to wit:

On Doctrine “The rank or grade that will head this AFPWSSU

1. To hasten the process of formulating a National Security Strategy (NSS), thru the national leadership, to provide basis in the formulation of AFP’s ISO doctrine and related military doctrines that would in turn provide overarching principles and guidance in training and actual operations. Subjective interpretations in the conduct of operations will be avoided, if not minimized.

will be O-7. This new AFPWSSU requires a matured, seasoned, and experienced ag ofcer to steer and lead it. Having a ag ofcer rank means that he has already gained much knowledge and experience in the military service and this could be utilized to motivate and inspire the personnel to attain the goal of producing joint doctrines. His rank and authority could be used to leverage needed resources for the center. Relatedly,, having a star-rank as the head of this Relatedly

2. To transform the current US patterned doctrines to suit domestic requirements and incorporate regional, cultural and territorial differences. 3. To highlight the importance of doctrine development and encourage DND/AFP to consider the following: • •

include doctrine development in all AFP training courses; come up with policy that would encourage ofcers, enlisted personnel and civilian

employees assignment in doctrine centers and ofces; •

•

•

allocate additional resources on doctrine facility improvements and other logistical needs/amenities like transports and billeting areas; consider interface with learning institutions, civilian agencies and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), local and foreign, in support to doctrine formulation; and, transform the proposal of the then Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Alexande r V. Ambal, PA on AFPDDC leadership described in his paper entitled


AFPWSSU will show that that the AFP is now serious in pursuing the development of doctrines.”

On Training

1. To formulate policies that would amplify emphasis and support on training in order to further enhance AFP capacity and to generate more quality and skilled personnel. 2. To create a more comprehensive AFP education and training system. The design of which will include policies and procedures in conducting individual, unit, joint and combined training exercises with emphasis on pre-entry training, professional military education program, and instructor development program. It should also include the interface interface between between the AFP and and civilian learning institutions, both local and foreign, within the objective of enhancing the capacity of AFP training institutions. In addition, it should also include modules on peace building,

conict

transformation,

human

relations, communications, social marketing and stakeholder’s management.

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3. To create a policy on the motivational attributes of training. Examples are:

also include modules on peace building,

• • •

credit on promotion among instructors both for local and foreign f oreign trainings; improvement on training facilities and amenities; and, allocation of additional fund support and resources to training institutions.

conict

transformation,

human

relations,

communications, social marketing stakeholder’s management.

and

“Article 18 which provides for the following; (1) establishment of National Defense University (NDU)

(Sec. 66), 66), (b) DND shall maintain a

defense and security education system (Sec. 62), (2) DND shall enter with learning institutions,

4. To support the proposed Senate Bill No. 675, the ”National Defense and Security Act” that would strengthen military training and education. In addition, it should

local or foreign, for the conduct of education, training and research programs designed to keep the defense establishment abreast with current trends and developments (Sec. 64).”

SOURCE: PAO AFP

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7 AFP Clear Operational Plans by Col.

Isidro L. Purisima (GSC) PA andd Iren C. Gumpal an

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AFP CLEAR OPERATIONAL PLANS The AFP has employed various operational concepts and approaches in addressing add ressing insurgency and its root causes. The AFP implemented the Bantay Laya series from the early to the latter part of the 2000s that brought together tested operational concepts such as Win-Hold-Win, Sustained Operations, and the strategic precepts of Lambat Bitag (Rapid Conclusion, Gradual Constriction, One-on-One, and Keyhole Approach). With the termination of Bantay Laya 2 in 2010, AFP crafted the Internal Peace and Security Plan (IPSP) – Bayanihan, a seemingly fresh approach addressing insurgency and translating the government’s peace and security agenda at the local level. The paper discusses the specic operational concepts employed in the various Operational Plans implemented by the AFP. It also talks about the innovations introduced by the IPSP Bayanihan, such as the People-Centered Approach, Human Security, and the Whole-ofNation Approach. The authors argue that there are interventions needed to be conducted to address the current gaps in the plan. There should be a national policy that will compel other line agencies to take part in internal security operations. Furthermore, the AFP’s campaign plan should be clearly understood by its personnel and staff.

SOURCE: PAO AFP

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7 AFP CLEAR OPERATIONAL PLANS


Overview of the operational approaches/concepts approaches/co ncepts employed by the AFP over the years

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priority group develops into a more dangerous threat, the AFP will shift its priority focus and WIN against the emergent threat while containing the other threat groups.

Lambat Bitag/ Bantay Laya

identied principal threat group while employing

In the strategy of Sustained Operations, the strategic precepts of Lambat Bitag were employed. The AFP used the Rapid Conclusion, which aimed at dismantling, in the shortest possible time, the major guerrilla fronts and decisively defeats the main enemy forces through simultaneous and sustained campaign. This likewise is aimed at drawing out the armed threat groups to do battle in a situation determined by the military. The Gradual Constriction, on the other hand, slowly constricts the targeted guerrilla fronts by progressively organizing the enemy affected barangays “in reverse” starting from the outskirts of the guerrilla front and moving slowly towards the central district of the given front. This is coupled with seeking decisive engagements. Further, the One-on-One concept prescribes the deployment of forces to be on a one-onone basis: one task unit under one commander against one of the guerrilla fronts. It is about focusing or concentrating forces and resources of one unit to an enemy target. The guiding principle is “focus rather than spread.” This This enhances unity of command in launching “gradual constriction” against each of the enemy guerrilla front. Furthermore, the Key Hole Approach applies to units with enough forces to form a mobile battalion that sit right in the central district of the armed threat to serve as the unit strike force and disrupt threat group activities in the central districts and threaten his rear.

economy of force to HOLD and contain lesser priority threats. Upon defeat of the targeted priority threat, forces will be shifted on the next priority threat. Should the threat posed by the less

By and large, the AFP employed the operational principle of Clear-Hold-Consolidate-Develop (Support) to carry out the coordinated and

O

Over the years, the AFP has employed various operational concepts and approaches in addressing insurgency and the root causes that propelled insurgency. While some of these approaches were unique in concept and implementation, most were a metamorphosis of one or two operational concepts. Since the AFP’s assumption of the lead role in internal security operations through RA 8551, its main thrusts mostly orbited on the suppression from insurgency and other threats to peace and security. RA 8551 prescribed the relief of the PNP of its primary responsibility on matters involving the suppression of insurgency and other serious internal threats to national security. security. The AFP implemented the Bantay Laya series in early up to the later part of 2000’s bringing bringing together combinations of time tested operational concepts such Win-Hold-Win, Sustained Operations and the strategic precepts of the Lambat Bitag (Rapid Conclusion, Gradual Constriction, Oneon-One, and Keyhole Approach). Preceding the original Bantay Laya was the AFP Lambat Bitag campaign plan. On the tactical level, the Win-Hold-Win approach approach focused on combat power to WIN against the


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integrated efforts of the entire government machinery, with the support and participation of civil society. In the operational plan, it is accomplished within a frame of four overlapping, supporting and interrelated stages that may be conducted sequentially or simultaneously

Apart from these operational approaches, concepts such as the Red Area/ White Area Operations demand for two distinct operations conducted simultaneously to break the red area-white area symbiosis. Red Area Operations focus on the armed threat groups in the countryside while the White Area Operations focus on guerrilla front committees piloting general uprising in the urban areas.

depending on the specic situation in the area. The

CLEAR stage ensures decisive defeat of armed groups and neutralization of its politico-military structure. The HOLD stage preserves the initial gains by strengthening the local defense system to secure the cleared areas. The CONSOLIDA CONSOLIDATE TE stage involves the collaborative participation of the military, the PNP and the civilian government agencies and instrumentalities in the delivery of basic services. The DEVELOP stage is the implementation of government’ government’ss socio-economi socio-economic, c, psychosocial and political reforms. The deployment of Special Operations Team (SOT) operations integrate combat, intelligence and civil-military operations. SOT activities are components of the CLEAR phase which frees the barangays from insurgent inuence. It dismantles

the mass base political structure developed by insurgent groups at the barangay level. This doctrine, having been proven to be effective, has undergone several renements leading to

the development of COPD, PDOP, Peace and Development Team/ BayanihanTeam which the AFP has been using using until today. today. In its basic sense, the CLEAR stage is also referred to as the Area Clearing wherein it aims for the decisive defeat of the insurgent armed groups and the neutralization of the insurgent’s politico-military infrastructures in target priority fronts.The aforementioned tactical approaches were variedly used in this stage.

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To reinforce the HOLD stage, the AFP utilized/ developed the Community Security Mechanism/ Integrated Territorial Defense System (ITDS)/ Integrated Area Community Public Safety (IACPS) Plan by integrating the efforts of territorial forces (AFP, CAA and PNP), local defense organization, local government, local sectoral organization, and local populace into an effective defense and security system that will secure and insulate the locality from threat group inuence, incursion or re-entry.

ITDS starts as soon as all affected barangays are cleared of armed groups and mass-based organization. Furthermore, under the Bantay Laya, the AFP also employed the TRIAD Concept, a synergistic employment of combat operations, intelligence, and civil-military operations. As supplementary measure, the AFP, in close coordination with the PNP and other law enforcement agencies exercised legal offensive operations against armed threat groups to ensure the successful prosecution of those responsible for

committing

atrocities

by

ling

cases

against leaders and members of the different threat groups. The establishment of Inter-Agency Legal Assistance Group (IALAG) has strengthened the effort on legal cooperation.



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While the AFP employed various approaches to address the armed threat groups, it has not ceased in providing opportunities to those who are sincere to return to the folds of law. The DND AFP Balik-Baril Program in coordination with LGUs, LGAs and NGOs continued to encourage armed insurgents to lay down their arms and be productive members of the society. Rebel

insurgency efforts of the government, combines the energies and capabilities of LGUs, the AFP the PNP, concerned CGAs and some committed citizenry at the national, regional, provincial and city/municipal levels. This can be viewed that the AFP has always been clear on the role of the POCs and the importance of the support of other line agencies in the campaign against insurgency. However,, the AFP is just part of the whole gamut However of the counterinsurg counterinsurgency ency efforts.

returnees who availed of the program benetted from rearms payment, emergency cash loan,

livelihood assistance and amnesty amnesty.. The Amnesty Program of the government thru the Proclamation No. 405, s. 2000 grants amnesty to all rebels who have committed crimes in pursuit of their political beliefs. Rebels who applied in this program beneted from integration into a peaceful,

pluralistic and democratic society. Furthermore, the AFP has also supported the rehabilitation of conict-affected areas through peacebuilding

initiatives by constructing barangay roads and school buildings, and other community-based infrastructure projects. Civil Government Agencies Involvement

While

the Lambat Bitag series prescribed

intensied military operations against threat

groups, it has likewise called for the active support of civil government agencies (CGAs) such as Peace and Order Council (POC), National Reconciliation and Development Program (DSWD, DND, DILG, DTI, DPWH), Joint Legal Action Committee (DOJ, DILG, DND) and other related bodies of instrumentalities of the government to the overall counterinsurgency campaign. In the document, the POC was described as a coordinative body designed to orchestrate a unied and strongly coordinated

mechanism in the conduct of overall counter-


IPSP Bayanihan

With the termination of Bantay Laya 2 in 2010, the AFP saw the crafting of the Internal Peace and Security Plan (IPSP) – Bayanihan, a seemingly fresh approach to address insurgency and translate the government’s peace and security agenda at the local level. In this plan, the AFP is the catalyst. The crafting of the IPSP Bayanihan has introduced several concepts unfamiliar to the exclusive military organization. It has put emphasis to People-Centered Approach which seeks to enhance human rights and promote human development efforts, the necessary conditions to create a peaceful and secure environment under the broader frame of Human Security. Human Security centers on the protection and respect for human rights, good governance, access to economic opportunities, education and health care. It addresses the seven components which are economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security, and political security requiring the entire government bureaucracy, the private sector, and the civil society to collectively implement. This, however, does not eliminate the

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role of the ordinary citizen and the entire Filipino nation as active contributors to internal peace and security. In the Whole-of-Nation Approach, security is shared not just among security forces and government institutions but also with civil society and the communities.

development teams that shall use the combination of military and non-military activities to counter

Moreover, it introduced the concept of “Winning the Peace” wherein it shifts from a predominantly militaristic solution to a peoplecentered security strategy that is founded on broad-based consultations and engagements with key stakeholders. It strives to pursue collaborative efforts with other internal peace and security actors and participants in sharing the responsibility of the peace and security agenda. It also strengthens interagency coordination which effectively and efciently synchronizes

and integrates efforts and responses of the entire government machinery and non-governmental entities to overcome insurgency and to identify areas of exclusivity exclusivity,, coordination, and integration to ensure unity of efforts.

coercive activities and diminish the inuence

wielded by armed threat groups in barangays. With the IPSP, the AFP has embraced a new approach to check and balance by integrating interagency assessment and stakeholder’s analysis as part of its approach to enhance its operational cohesiveness in the implementation of IPSP. In the essence of the whole-of-nation approach, the AFP in return, employed support operations to establish and maintain a just and lasting thorough support to civil law enforcement, civil-military

cooperation

such

as

conict

resolution, peace advocacy, peace constituency and human security. Moreover, under this new campaign plan, it introduced the concept of Security Sector Reform which is operationalized by adhering to the principle of Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) with emphasis on democratic principles, such as transparency, and accountability. It identies three main thrusts, to develop AFP

While it pursues collaborative efforts, the AFP under the IPSP, conducts Focused Military Operations against all internal armed threat groups threatening the safety and well-being of the people. Under the IPSP, adherence to the principles, concepts, provisions and spirit of Human Rights, International Humanitarian Law or Law on Armed Conicts and Rule of

Law became a must in all its operations. It has not ceased to support Community Based Peace and Development through the deployment of specically organized community peace and

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capabilities; to enhance professionalism in the armed forces; and, to institutionalize stakeholders’ involvement. As new operational approaches were introduced in the plan, several gaps were identied that need clarication. There is a need to review the old

operational concepts and approaches whether they are still applicable or needs revisions. There are concepts in the IPSP that need further elucidations because they are not purely military in nature.



Interventions needed for improvement of the plan and operational environment The need for a national policy that shall necessitate other line agencies to take part in the internal security operations.

The publication of the National Internal Security Plan (NISP) in 2001 embodied the “Strategy of Holistic Approach” Approach” involving the t he entire instrument of power of the government. Past experience indicated that these were not achieved on the ground. In a review of the implementation of Bantay Laya, it was identied the lack of

awareness and dissemination of the NISP to other government agencies and their lower units/ ofces resulted to the limited participation, if not

the non-participation of line agencies in the peace and security agenda of the national government. At the local level, level, subsequent subsequent to the area clearing operation of the AFP, the development phase of cleared barangays was either delayed or lacking at all. As a result, the psychological impact of the government’s development projects and the delivery of basic services remained marginalized. The NISP has provided a mechanism to address insurgency however; this plan is more viewed as a military defense/security plan rather than a plan that requires the essential participatory and holistic approach to address insurgency. Thus, efforts of all involved were not coordinated and focused. Even with the PNP, its support role to ISO was taken nonchalantly that pre-emptive measures against insurgent offensives were overlooked. As a result, local PNP stations and detachments have become lucrative sources of

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The publication of the IPSP Bayanihan has relatively dened what it hopes to achieve under

the peace and security agenda of the government. Compared with the all-military plan Bantay Laya, the IPSP necessitates sincere commitment from other relevant actors and stakeholders for it to achieve its maximum potential. The plan gives equal emphasis on the combat and noncombat dimensions of military operations and the increasing involvement of national and Local Government Agencies, NGOs, Civil Society and the entire citizenry. While the government has published the National Security Policy 2011-2016 which lays down the fundamental and comprehensive framework on inter-related issues and concerns that may impact on national security, it lacks the National Security Strategy (NSS) which embodies the method by which the instruments of national power are developed, applied and coordinated to attain the national security objectives. In the absence of an updated NISP, the IPSP is in need of a comprehensive national plan that shall necessitate the commitment and involvement of all government line agencies and other relevant stakeholders in addressing internal security concerns. This national policy shall also be expected to clarify the roles of government units, especially the PNP, and the AFP. Empowering of the POCs and LCEs/LGUs

rearms for the insurgents.

The Peace and Order Council with the LGU are the focal point and central authority responsible to deal with human security issues at their level. This is clearly stipulated in the Local Government Code of the Philippines wherein the local government units are empowered by law to


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exercise efcient and effective governance. They

internal threats to national security. The RA 8551 provides that the AFP is the lead agency involving in the suppression of insurgency. The urgency of this concern is relevant because the Defense Planning Guidance 2013-2018 projected the AFP to focus its main efforts on its highest core security concern which is the challenges on the country’s territorial integrity. It shall however, render support to other actors and government agencies on matters pertaining to internal security. security.

shall have the lead role in creating a structure that shall address human security issues at the local level. Moreover, they are the lead actors in promoting the general welfare of the people within their respective territorial jurisdiction such as maintaining peace and order. Furthermore, under Section 4 of the E.O. 546 signed on 14 July 2006, the local chief executives (LCEs), in coordination with the POCs are tasked to include their priority program of action/thrust in their respective Integrated Area/Community Public Safety Plan on resolving insurgency and serious threats to national security. As such, the POCs and LCEs should be strengthened and empowered to pursue the peace initiatives in their area of jurisdiction. In totality, the DND/AFP is just a part of the whole-of-nation approach toward the attainment of the national goal. Imperative to this is the mutual support of all government agencies and stakeholders working toward good governance, delivery of basic and services; economic reconstruction and sustainable development; and security sector reform. While the AFP on the ground is yet to polish its grasp of the approaches embodied in the plan, it lacks the t he central authority to compel key players and line agencies in the local arena to commit and get involved. The need to repeal Section 3 of RA 8551

One of the main issues in the defense reform is delineating clear roles and responsibilities with the PNP for internal security operations. This is apparent in the need to repeal Section 3 of the RA 8551 which prescribed the relief of the Philippine National Police/DILG of its primary responsibility on matters involving the suppression of insurgency and other serious

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Continuity of the Modernization Program in preparation of its transition to territorial defense (RA 7898)

The issuance of RA 8551 in 1998 prompted the AFP to shift its priority from the then called External Defense to Internal Security Operations. This event led to the refocusing of the modernization program from building AFP’s future territorial defense capability to addressing shortages in the ISO. The RA 7898 known as the AFP Modernization Act which was signed by the President in February 1995 purposely declares, as a policy of the state, to modernize the AFP to a level where it can effectively and fully perform its constitutional mandate to defend the sovereignty and protect and preserve the patrimony of the republic. This was extended in 2012 for another period of 15 years under RA 10349. The need for parallel understanding of the AFP and stakeholders of the plan.

As the AFP has entirely shifted from purely military plan to co-authoring the internal security plan with stakeholders and civilian counterpart, it caused diverse appreciation on how this will be operationalized on the ground. The need for comprehensive advocacy and education of all actors involved in the implementation of IPSP is



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essential. This lack of parallel grasp of the plan is evident in the study conducted by the Working Group on Security Sector Reform of Ateneo de Manila University, University, Political Science Department to

its core mission of upholding the sovereignty and defend the territory of the country as long as it performs primary role in ISO.

various AFP units and ofces across the country.

Yet, the PNP must be prepared and equipped to take the lead role so as not to compromise the gains the country has achieved so far against armed threats. The Joint Peace and Security Coordinating Center (JPSCC), an AFP and PNP partnership, must be enhanced as one of the mechanisms in the gradual transition t ransition of the AFP’s ISO to law enforcement functions of the PNP.

Intervention on this is crucial.

Implications If No Interventions Are Done In the absence of interventions on the gaps in the plan, the potential of the AFP’s current operational plan will not be fully realized. With the lack of a national policy that will compel other line agencies to take part in the internal security operations, the plan shall remain an entirely AFP plan – no different to previous plans crafted by the AFP. Non-functioning POCs/LCEs shall again put greater weight on the AFP to pursue the peace and security agenda of the government in the local level. Furthermore, with RA 8551 still in force, the AFP shall not be able to focus its energy and resources to territorial defense. It cannot be fully effective in

In addition, without the support of the government’s modernization program, the AFP cannot be fully mission-capable mission-capabl e in territorial defense. It is primary that this be emphasized as the AFP is working towards its shift to territorial defense. Lastly, that the personnel and staff of the AFP have no clear and unied understanding of its

own plan is a serious concern that should not be neglected. Disjointed appreciation of the plan breeds indifference to commanders and eld

operators.

References: Armed Forces of the Philippines, Primer on AFP Campaign Plan (LOI 23/88) Lambat Bitag Bitag of December 16, 1988. Armed Forces of the Philippines, Campaign Plan (“Lambat Bitag II”) of November 18, 1991. Armed Forces of the Philippines, AFP ISO Plan 02-01 (“Bantay-Laya”) of February 24, 2002. Armed Forces of the Philippines, AFP ISO PLAN s-2007 (“Bantay Laya”) II of December 01, 2006. Armed Forces of the Philippines, AFP ISO Plan 02-01 (“Bantay Laya”) Review Report and Brieng Brieng of January 06, 2007.

Armed Forces of the Philippines, IPSP Handbook of December 2010. Armed Forces of the Philippines, Rules of Engagement for AFP IPSP “Bayanihan” of March 31, 2011. Department of Interior and Local Government, Executive Order No. 546 of July 14, 2006. National Internal Security Plan (NISP) Version 3.0 National Security Council, N ational Security Policy 2011-2016 of April 2011. Armed Forces of the Philippines, GHQ and AFPWSSUs CY 2011 2011 Yearend Yearend Accomplishment Report of December 2011. 2011.


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8 Philippine Intelligence Community: A Case for Transparency by Francis

Domingo

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PHILIPPINE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY: COMMUNITY:

A CASE FOR TRANSPARENCY The continuously evolving global security landscape has prompted states across the world to establish intelligence agencies to effectively protect national sovereignty and security from prevailing and emerging emerging security challenges and threats. threats. Anchored on Western ideas, ideas, a general notion of intelligence is that it is “stolen information” acquired through espionage or clandestine activities. This information normally pertains to matters critical to aspects of national security and threats from actual or potential adversaries. Thus, secrecy of intelligence information, processes, and organization is absolutely necessary to prevent any damage to the prestige and national security of a state. Despite the need to ensure secrecy across all aspects of intelligence, the article argues that the prevailing tradition or practice of security restrictions should not impede impede public understanding or awareness of basic intelligence information in the Philippines. The article provides an in-depth examination of the Philippine Intelligence Community (IC) by focusing on the following critical junctures of analysis: analysis: 1) identication of the notions notions of the intelligence; 2) implications of secrecy of intelligence activities; 3) structure and organization of the Philippine IC; and, 4) mechanisms for intelligence oversight. Furthermore, the article offers some recommendations in developing and ensuring intelligence transparency in the Philippines. These include 1) maintaining public transparency through the dissemination of basic information on intelligence agencies (i.e. use of media platforms and linkages with academic and civilian civilian research entities), entities), and 2) developing intelligence oversight mechanisms, either through executive or congressional oversight mechanisms, which will ensure that intelligence agencies operate ope rate in accordance with democratic principles and controls.

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8 PHILIPPINE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY: A CASE FOR TRANSPARENCY

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D

Democratic states, both new and established, are confronted with fundamental and inevitable dilemma in combining intelligence agencies that are effective and under democratic civilian control. This is due to the tension between the necessity of intelligence agencies to work in secret and the requirement of democratic government for accountability, accountabi lity, obliging intelligence transparency. transparen cy. 1 The ultimate challenge for policymakers and scholars is to understand this dilemma and to manage it in a consistent and productive manner. 2 In the case of the Philippines, basic information regarding the mandate, functions, and objectives of intelligence agencies are not available to the public due to the ‘culture of secrecy’ embedded in members of the intelligence community. And without the benet of a freedom of information

in democratic states, 4 the general mindset towards intelligence and intelligence agencies in the Philippine is still dominated by secrecy and resistance to transparency. This is manifested by the fact that government agencies that engage in intelligence work do not have ofcial

communication mediums like websites and do not consistently publish information briefs and annual reports where basic details can be imparted to the public. It is also signicant that scholars, local

and foreign, have not produced any research that focuses primarily on the intelligence community. While some commentators and journalists have written about issues that challenge intelligence agencies, their works did not consider the emerging academic literature on intelligence studies and the substantial information available from other states.5

law which provides access to ‘all information decisions, as well as government research data used as basis for policy development…’3, it would be impossible for ordinary Filipinos who help fund intelligence agencies to develop awareness and gain basic knowledge about the activities of the Philippine Intelligence Community.

With this background, this article argues that while numerous aspects of intelligence should remain secret, security restrictions should not impede the public from understanding the purpose, objectives and basic functions of intelligence agencies. The article examines the Philippine Intelligence Community (IC) in the context of the following questions: What are the notions of intelligence

Considering that transparency and openness are instituted norms in intelligence communities

in the Philippines? Why is secrecy necessary in intelligence activities? What is the structure and

pertaining

to

ofcial

acts,

transactions

or

1 eers o he oversigh uncion or differen secors including legislaive and judicial branches o governmen, media, academia and non-

governmen organizaions organizaions o ensure ensure he Philippine Inelligence Inelligence Communiy Communiy is underaking is mission legally, legally, effecively, effecively, and efficienly. efficienly. 2 Tomas Bruneau, “Inroducion: Challenges o Effeciveness in Inelligence due o he Need or ransparency ransparency and Accounabiliy in Democracy,”

Sraegic Insighs Volume Volume VI, Issue 3 (2007). 3 Freedo Freedom m o Inormaion Ac o 2009, S.B. No. 3308, 14h Congress, Second Session (2009). 4 Adam N. Shulsky and Gary J. Schmit, Silen War Undersanding Undersanding he World o Inelligence 3rd Ediion (Washingon D.C.: C.: Brassey’s, Brassey’s, 2002),

102-103. 5 Kimberly an, an, “Drilon wans inelligence coordinaing coordinaing agency reorganiz reorganized” ed” GMA GM A News Online, Ocober 10, 2010, accessed, May 13, 2012, htp://www.gmanework.com/new htp://www .gmanework.com/news/sory/203297/news/na s/sory/203297/news/naion/drilon-wa ion/drilon-wans-inelligence-coor ns-inelligence-coordinaing-agen dinaing-agency-reorganized; cy-reorganized; Cahy Yamusan, “Open records records o Marcos’ spy agency, Enrile urges,” Inquirer News Online, December 12, 2011, accessed, May 13, 2012, htp://newsino.inquirer htp://newsino.inquirer.. ne/109377/open-records-o-marcos%E2%80%99-spy-agency-enrile-urges; Maila Ager, “Drilon, Enrile quesion inelligence agency’s 811 ‘unjusified’ ‘unjus ified’ posiions,” Inquirer News Online, November 13, 2010, acce ssed, May 13, 2012, htp://globalnaion.


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organization of the IC? What are the different mechanisms for intelligence oversight? The last

relevant to a government’s formulation and implementation of policy to further its national security interests and to deal with threats from actual or potentials adversaries.” 9 In most cases, this “relevant information” is collected from different sources (secret and open) and pertains to matters regarding an adversary’s military capabilities and intentions, diplomatic affairs, and intelligence activities. 10 The information is then processed and analyzed to generate what is referred to as an “intelligence product.”

section presents recommendations for developing intelligence transparency in the Philippines.

Understanding Understandin g intelligence The concept of “intelligence” in the Philippines is predominantly inuenced by Western notions

of intelligence. In fact, the whole concept of “coordinating intelligence” and establishing a government agency that would coordinate national intelligence efforts and provide assessments can be attributed to American inuence.6 Therefore, currently Philippine civilian and military intelligence strategies and policies are mostly based on the practices of the United States Intelligence Community. 7 There are three dominant notions of intelligence which are generally accepted by intelligence scholars and practitioners. These notions classify intelligence into focus on three general categories: information, process, and organization. 8

Another notion is that intelligence is also considered a systematic process. Mark Lowenthal, a former American intelligence ofcial offers another perspective on intelligence.

He asserts that intelligence is a “process by which specic types of information important to national

security are requested, collected, analyzed, and provided to policy makers.” 11 This notion of intelligence is broader and considers the entire intelligence cycle, from planning and direction to dissemination,, as “intelligence.” dissemination Lastly, intelligence is dened as an organization.

One notion is that intelligence is information. In their seminal work Silent Warfare, intelligence scholars Abram Shulsky and Gary Schmitt

dene

intelligence

as

“information

Prominent intelligence scholar and former British

intelligence

ofcer

Michael

Herman

asserts that while there are several perspectives on intelligence, the key element in these

6 Execuive Order No. No. 235 o 1949, “Creaion “Creaion o he Naional Naional Inelligence and Securiy Securiy Auhoriy.” 7 See or example: Execuive Order No. 246 (1987). “Providing or he Creaion o he Naional Inelligence Coordinaing Agency, and or

oher Purposes.”Malacanang, Manila, med Forces o he Philippines, AFPM 2-2 acical Inelligence (Quezon Ciy, General Headquarers, Camp Aguinaldo, 1978), Armed For Forces ces o he Philippines, AFPM 2-5 Te Armed Forces Ataché (Quezon Ciy, General Headquarers, Headquarers, Camp Aguinaldo, 1981), and Armed Forces Forces o he Philippines, Philippines, AFPM 2-02 Join Join Inelligence Inelligence Collecion Manual Manual (Quezon (Quezon Ciy, General General Headquarers, Headquarers, Camp Aguinaldo, 2008) 8 Shulsky and Schmit, Silen War. 9 Ibid. 10 Ibid. 11 Mark Lowenhal, Lowenhal, Inelligence om om Secres o Policy 4h Ediion Ediion (Washingon (Washingon D.C.: C.: CQ Press, 2009).

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perspectives is the organizational aspect. He explains that “intelligence in government is based on the particular set of organizations with that ‘intelligence e services’ or name: the ‘intelligenc or (sometimes) the ‘intelligence communities.’ 12 Consequently, aside from information or a systematic process, intelligence also refers to government organizations. These organizations or intelligence

Therefore, information from open sources newspapers, television broadcast, or academic publications may be valuable, but it is not necessarily intelligence.

services have been a twenty-rst century growth

industry and are now permanent institutional structures in governments around the world. 13

In terms of methodology methodology,, there are different ways of stealing information. Information can be stolen through technical means such as enciphered cables from foreign embassies can be intercepted and decoded or satellites can surreptitiously photograph a terrorist training camp hidden in a desert. Information can also be the work of a

The denitions presented above are certainly

human agent, perhaps by slipping classied

useful in increasing our understanding of intelligence but they are not considered as “ofcial” or “accepted” denitions. In fact, for the past years, a number of practitioners, academics, and specialists (intelligence scholars) have attempted to develop viable denitions of intelligence. 14 While these studies have contributed to the emerging academic

documents into a briefcase when leaving work at the end of the day, the classic secret agent of the spy movies. However the information is stolen, its theft involves two extremely sensitive components that intelligence agencies have to protect at all cost: the source of information and the method used to steal the information. 15

literature of intelligence, a viable denition of

The maintenance of secrecy has proven essential to the successful development, implementation, and completion of plans and missions of the government. 16 Secrecy is

intelligence is still lacking until this time.

Secrecy and intelligence Since a general notion of intelligence is that it is stolen information that pertains to critical aspects of state’s national security and threats from actual or potentials adversary, secrecy is absolutely necessary to prevent any damage to the prestige and national security of a state.

implemented through levels of classication, reecting the sensitivity of the intelligence or intelligence means. More specically, the condential classication level prevents the

disclosure of information that is expected to cause ‘damage’ to a state’s national security, the secret classication level prevents the disclosure of

information that is expected to cause ’serious

12 Michael Herman, Herman, Inelligence Power Power in Peace and War War (Cambridge: (Cambridge: Universiy Press, 1996) 13 Ibid. 14 Michael Warner, Warner, “Waned: “Waned: A Definiion or or Inelligence,” Sudies in Inelligence Inelligence Vol. Vol. 46 Issue 2 (2002). 15 Tomas Parick Carroll, “Te Case Agains Inelligence Openness,” Inernaional Journal Journal o Inelligence and Couner Inelligence 14 (2001):

559-574. 16 Commission on Proecing and educing Governmen Secrecy, epor o he Commission on Proecing and educing Governmen Secrecy

(Washingon (W ashingon D.C.: Governmen Prining Office, 1997): 6.


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damage’ to a state’s national security, while

national security and foreign policy matters with his senior national security advisors and cabinet ofcials.18 The President chairs the NSC, which is composed of members of key government departments including foreign affairs, national defense, military, interior and local government, justice, labor and employment, science and technology.19

the top secret classication level prevents the

disclosure of information that is expected to cause exceptionally grave damage’ to a state’s national

security.

These

classications

are

driven by concerns that disclosure of sources and methods will allow other actors to implement measures to prevent collection, effectively negating the collection system. 17 Therefore, intelligence and secrecy are directly correlated. Since intelligence is information acquired through espionage or clandestine activities, secrecy is required to protect the sources of information and the methods utilized to steal the information. Having established the connection between intelligence and secrecy, the next section examines the structure and organization of the Philippine Intelligence Community.

The Intelligence Community The structure of the IC is generally patterned after the US Intelligence Community prior to 2004. Much like the United States, the President of the Philippines is the highest authority on matters involving national security. The National Security Advisor Advisor (NSA) is the chief advisor of the President on national security matters and belongs to the ofcial cabinet of the President.

The National Security Council (NSC) is the President’s principal forum for deliberating on

To translate policy into action, the NSC relies on the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency (NICA) which is the main intelligence agency of the Philippine government. The agency which was originally established as the National Intelligence and Security Authority (NISA) by President Elpidio Quirino in 1949 was tasked to “organize and coordinate the intelligence collection activities of various government instrumentalities concerned.” However since 1987, NICA’s mandate has shifted to a broader scope of “directing, coordinating, and integrating all government activities involving national intelligence.” 20 In addition, the agency plays a central role in preparing intelligence assessments for consideration of key decision-makers decision-make rs in the Philippine government. Under NICA, there are two functional bodies, the National Intelligence Committee (NIC) and the Regional Intelligence Committee (RIC). The NIC is the principal arm of the National Intelligence Board for providing direction and control of intelligence operations and activities of the intelligence community. The NIC is also a

17 Lowenhal, Inelligence Inelligence From From Secres o Policy Policy 18 Te Whie House, Naional Securiy Council, las modified 2010, htp://www htp://www.whieho .whiehouse.gov/admini use.gov/adminisraion/ sraion/eop/nsc. eop/nsc. 19 Shiela Coronel and Yvonne . Chua (eds.), Te PCIJ Guide o Governmen (Quezon Ciy: Philippine Cener or Invesigaive Journalism,

2003). 20 Deparmen o Budge and Managemen, Naiona Naionall Expendiures Expendiures Program 2009 Execuive Execuive Offices, Naional Naional Inelligence Inelligence Coordina Coordinaing ing Agency.

Quezon Ciy: Deparmen o Budge and Managemen, 2009.

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high-level forum where the IC can conduct intelligence exchanges to generate inputs for NICA’s national intelligence estimate (NIE). 21

the SMC, SMC-Alpha and SMC-Bravo. Alpha

RICs have the same mandate and structure as the NIC, however the scope of these units is narrower or more “localized”. RICs have direct operational function thus permitting them to act on intelligence reports requiring immediate action.22

tasked to undertake threat assessment work”

The National Intelligence Board (NIB) is the highest forum for intelligence exchange among senior

ofcials

from

selected

government

departments and units.23 The NIB provides the NICA Director-General with an independent source of advice on the effectiveness of the IC in meeting the country’s intelligence requirements and the coordination and integration of local and global intelligence operations. Due to the nature of its mandate the NIB has access to all information needed to perform its functions and includes senior ofcials of all government

department and units of the Philippines government.24 The Special Monitoring Committee (SMC) was established in 2002 for counterintelligence operations, particularly to monitor domestic threats such as destabilization plots against the administration, and terrorism against the general public. Two groups were created within

closely monitors domestic threats specically

destabilization plots against the administration while Bravo serves as “the body principally including intelligence monitoring of terrorist plans and activities.” 25

Recommendations for intelligence Recommendations transparency The emergence of transnational security threats originating from state and non-state actors has proven that intelligence is an essential tool for states in the twenty rst century century..

While developing an internal security service is a standard procedure for states to secure their citizens, few states still take the view that they can dispense with a foreign intelligence service. Two basic patterns exist for organizing security and intelligence. The rst

involves the establishment of a single agency integrating domestic and foreign intelligence (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Netherlands, Spain and Turkey). The second necessitates the creation of separate agencies for domestic security and external intelligence, with either distinct or coinciding territorial capabilities (France, Germany, Hungary, Poland, the UK and the USA). Even with the variations in the organizational structure or

21 Naion Naional al Inelligence Board Direcive No. 1 Series 2003 cied in Ariel Perlado, “Assessing “Assessing he Effeciveness o he Inelligence Coordinaion Coordinaion

Sysem o he Naion Naional al Inelligence Coordinaing Coordinaing Agency (unpub (unpublished lished maser’s maser’s hesis, Naional Deense College o he Philippines, 2011). 22 Ibid. 23 AFP-J2, AFP-ISAFP, PNP-IG, PNP-IG, NBI, Presidenial Securiy Group, Jusice, For Foreign eign Affairs, Local Governmen, Budge and

Managemen, Finance, Energy, ranspora ransporaion ion and Communica Communicaion, ion, Labour and Employmen, ranspora ransporaion, ion, Environmen Environmen and Naur Naural al esources, Social Welare, Public Works, rade and Indusry, Heah, Agriculure. 24 Execuive Order No. No. 158 ______ (1968). 25 Naiona Naionall Inelligence Board Board No. 2 Series 2002 cied in Perlado, Perlado, Assessing he Effeciveness. Effeciveness.


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governmental set up, security and intelligence pose a common set of challenges for accountability across different states. 26

various threats to national security. 27 On the other

The central issue in advocating for intelligence transparency through oversight is the challenge of how to provide democratic control of intelligence and intelligence agencies which are essential to the survival and prosperity of the state, but which must operate secretly. Consequently, this study submits the following recommendations which are based on the practices of democratic governments.

hand, setting up ofcial websites that feature

basic information about intelligence agencies indicates a high level of transparency and respect for democratic processes. Indonesia’s Badan Intelijen Negara (State Intelligence Agency), Mexico’s El Centro de Investigación y Seguridad Nacional (Center for Research and National Security) and India’s Central Intelligence Bureau are examples of developing countries that have been successful in disseminating information to the public through the Internet. 28

There are two basic strategies that intelligence agencies employ to maintain public transparency. One strategy is for intelligence

Collaborating with academics and researchers is another basic strategy which intelligence agencies implement to maintain transparency. Since intelligence is a process, intelligence agencies work with academics and researchers to ensure that their administrators, analysts, and

agencies through their public affairs ofce,

ofcers

publish basic information, whether printed or online, about their their work. A second second strategy is for the intelligence agencies to collaborate with academics and researchers to allow them to understand and assess different aspects of intelligence agencies.

perspectives regarding the different aspects of intelligence, particularly clandestine collection, counter intelligence, analysis and covert action or in Philippine parlance ‘special operations’. While the literature on intelligence is well developed, it is strictly dominated by Western academics and practioners. Important examples of scholarly works on intelligence include: Michael Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War and Allen Dulles, The Craft of Intelligence which discusses clandestine collection from an historical perspective; Jennifer Sims, Buton Gerber, Vaults and Mirrors and Masks Rediscovering

Maintain public transparency

Publishing basic information about intelligence agencies such as US National Intelligence: A Consumer’s Guide to Intelligence released in 2009 and the UK National Intelligence Machinery published in 2010 provides American and British citizens with a general understanding of how the intelligence agencies will protect them against

develop

new

and

progressive

26 Hans Born and Ian Leigh, “Democraic Accounabiliy o Inelligence Services” Geneva Cenre or he Democraic conrol o Armed orces

Policy Paper Paper 19 (2007), 6-7. 27 Office o he Direcor or Naional Inelligence, Naional Inelligence: A Consumer’s Guide (Washingon D.C.: U.S. Direcor or Naional

Inelligence, 2009) and UK Cabine Cabine Office, Naional Naional Inelligence Machinery Machinery (London: Te Saionary Saionary Office, 2010) 28 Cener or esearch and Naional Naional Securiy, Wha is he CISEN?, las modified 2010, htp://www.cisen.gob htp://www.cisen.gob.mx/ .mx/ cisen.hm; BadanInelijen BadanInelijen

Negara, Profile,las Profile,las modified 2012, htp://www. htp://www.bin.go.i bin.go.id/#; d/#; Minisry o Home Affairs, Affairs, Organisaional Organisaional Seup, las modified modified May 16, 2011.

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US Counterintelligence and William Johnson, Thwarting Enemies at Home and Aboard discusses prospective reforms in US counterintelligence; Stephen Marrin, Improving Intelligence Analysis: Bridging the Gap Between Scholarship and Practice and Thomas Fingar, Reducing Uncertainly, Intelligence Analysis and National Security provide key ideas on how to improve

powers, functions, duties, decision making processes and other information that does not damage the the national national security of the State, it is still uncertain whether this bill will be approved by both legislative and executive branches of the government.30

intelligence

The central issue in ensuring intelligence transparency is the challenge of how to provide democratic control or oversight on intelligence functions and institutions which are essential to the survival and development of a state, but

analysis;

and,

nally

Gregory

Treverton, Covert Treverton, Action The Limits of Intervention in the Postwar World and William Daugherty, Exec tive Secrets: Covert Action and the Presidency Presidency offer recommendation recommendation to address controversial issues regarding covert actions actions in the United States. States.

Develop intelligence oversight mechanisms

which must operate in justiable secrecy.

In contrast to other areas of governmental Aside from the two basic strategies, it is necessary for the Philippine Congress to pass legislation requiring intelligence agencies to disclose basic information which should at the least, include “descriptions of its central

activity,

and eld organization” and “statements of the

need to be modied to match the requirements

general course and method by which its functions are channeled and determined.” 29 As mentioned previously, the Filipino people have yet to

of intelligence agencies. Therefore, the need for rigorous oversight is much greater than in the case of activities such as education or welfare. 31

benet from a law that mandates easy and efcient access to public information. While

the latest version (2012) of the freedom of information bill, An Act to Strengthen the Right of Citizens to Information held by the Government requires all government agencies to “regularly publish, print and disseminate” updated key information regarding mandate, structure,

it

is

accepted

that

ofcial

communications and operations of intelligence agencies can only be transparent to a limited extent. Prevailing mechanisms for oversight applied by a majority of governmental activities

Intelligence oversight is still an emerging concept in the Philippines .32 The mission of investigating “illegal, unjust, improper or inefcient” actions by public ofcials resides with the Ofce of the Ombudsman, the Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Ofcers

and Investigations (Blue Ribbon) and the House

29 Te Freedom o Inormaion Inormaion Ac, 5 U.S.C. C. § 552 as amended by Public Law No. 110-175, 121 Sa. 2524. 30 Proposed Freedom Freedom o Inormaion Inormaion Ac o 2012, accessed on 16 July July 2012, htp://www.gov.p htp://www.gov.ph/oi/. h/oi/. 31 Born and Leigh, Democraic Democraic Accounabiliy o Inelligence Inelligence Services. 32 Senae Bill 765, Te Inelligence Oversigh Ac o 2010, accessed on 17 July 2012,

htp://www.senae.gov htp://www .senae.gov.ph/lis/bill_res. .ph/lis/bill_res.aspx?congress=15&q=SBN-765 aspx?congress=15&q=SBN-765


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Committee on Good Government and Public Accountability..33 While these may be considered Accountability successful in uncovering vital information regarding national security matters, these investigative institutions are not necessarily suitable to implement effective intelligence oversight because they lack the focus and security protocols present in specialized department or committees of more advance democratic states like Argentina, the United Kingdom and the United States. 34 The succeeding section discusses the two dominant types of intelligence oversight mechanisms which could be appropriate for the Philippine government. government.

they authorized. In states where this system is absent, the only democratic alternative is for a congress to take over. However, this alternative is questionable because, while legislative bodies can effectively investigate the use of powers and expenditure after the fact, they are not capable of directing and managing real time intelligence activities unlike the executive branch of government.36

Executive oversight

Without a specialized committee, it is difcult if not

The

denitive

authority

and

legitimacy

of

intelligence agencies rest on legislative approval of their powers, activities and budget. However,, for practical reasons and because of the However sensitive nature and urgency of the tasks of involving intelligence, effective external control of these agencies must rest with the executive branch of government. 35 There is no inherent conict between executive

control and congressional oversight. In fact, the congress depends on the executive for effective oversight because congress can only reliably call members of the executive branch to account for the actions of intelligence agencies only if these ofcials have actual powers of control and have sufcient information about the operations

Congressionall Oversight Congressiona

The international norm is for Congress to create a specialized body which is mandated to provide oversight of the intelligence services. impossible for the Congress to exercise systematic and focused oversight of the intelligence services. The extent of the mandate of the Congressional intelligence oversight committee is critical for its success. One option is for the mandate to be comprehensive, reviewing both policy and operations (Germany and United States). A Congressional oversight body that focuses on operations may have greater credibility and may be given greater powers, such as powers of subpoena. However, it will encounter unavoidable restrictions on how it undertakes investigations and on what can be reported to the Congressional Committee or the public. It will operate in effect within a ‘ring of secrecy’ and that will create a barrier between the specialized body and the remainder of the

33 34 Hans Born, Loch K. Johnson, and Ian Leigh (eds.), Who’s Waching he Spies? Esablishing Inelligence Service Accounabiliy (Dulles,

Virginia: Poomac Publishers, 2005). 35 Born and Leigh, Democraic Democraic Accounabiliy o Inelligence Inelligence Services. 36 Ibid, pp. pp. 10-11.

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Congressional Committee. As long as the committee establishes a reputation for independence and thoroughness, this barrier should not affect its legitimacy. With this arrangement, the Congressional Committee and the public will have to trust that there exists proper oversight of operational matters even without readily available supporting evidence. 37

security of a state. More specically, secrecy

is absolutely vital in protecting the sources of intelligence and the methods utilized to obtain intelligence.

The alternative approach is to limit the mandate of the Congressional oversight committee to certain

In terms of structure, the Philippine Intelligence Community is generally patterned after the US Intelligence Community Community prior to 2004. Much like the United States, the President of the Philippines is the highest authority on matters involving national security while the National

aspects particularly policy and nance (United

Security Adviser is the most inuential senior

Kingdom) or human rights and the rule of law (Norway). These aspects are generally examined in the public arena with fewer restrictions on disclosure, although the publication of exact budgetary details may be damaging to national

staff member when national security matters are involved. The NSC which is also patterned after the American National Security Council, is the President’s principal forum for deliberating on national security and foreign policy matters with his senior national security advisors and cabinet

security. The difculty of this approach, however,

is that it undermines one of the key tasks of Congressional scrutiny: ensuring that government policy is carried out effectively and within the boundaries of the law. Without access to operational details, an oversight body can have

ofcials. To implement policies developed within

or give no assurance about the efciency or the

the NSC, the President relies on the NICA, which is the main intelligence agency of the Philippine government. Under the NSC, there is also the National Intelligence Board where the highest forum for intelligence exchange among senior

legality of the intelligence agencies. 38

ofcials from selected government departments

and units take place.

Conclusion The concept of “intelligence” in the Philippines is dominated by Western ideas which dene

intelligence as not only information but also a process and an organization. Since a dominant notion of intelligence is that it is stolen information, secrecy is absolutely necessary to prevent damage to the prestige and national

With the emergence of transnational security threats originating from state and non-state actors, there is no question that intelligence agencies are necessary for states to survive in the twenty rst century. While there are different

patterns and procedures for organizing intelligence agencies, achieving intelligence transparency will always remain a main challenge for democratic states.

37 Ibid. 38 Ibid.


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Increasing public transparency and developing intelligence oversight mechanisms are recommendations to develop intelligence transparency in the Philippines. As discussed previously, intelligence agencies can increase

practical oversight mechanism because with the sensitive nature and urgency of the tasks of involving intelligence, effective external control of these agencies must rest with the executive branch of government.

public transparency by developing an ofcial

website, publishing documents regarding the Philippine Intelligence Community and collaborating with academics and researchers. Intelligence oversight is still an emerging concept in the Philippines. Executive oversight and congressional oversight are two dominant mechanisms to ensuring that intelligence agencies are a countable for their actions.

Although

denitive

authority

and

legitimacy of intelligence agencies rest on legislative approval, executive oversight is a

On the other hand, Congressional oversight is the dominant mechanism adopted by different democratic states because these committees are generally effective in investigating the use of powers and expenditures of intelligence agencies. However However,, the problem with these committees is that they are not capable of directing and managing real time intelligence activities that the executive branch of government can implement.


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9 Civil-Military Operation: Models of Institutional Engagement in the Philippines by Maribel

Daño-Luna


philippines

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATION: MODELS OF INSTITUTIONAL ENGAGEMENT IN THE PHILIPPINES It is recognized that a transparent, effective, and institutionalized civil-military engagement is one of the characteristics of a modern defense force. Additionally, civil-military relations is a necessity for reforms in the defense force to be sustained. In the case of the Philippines, this is enshrined in the Philippine Constitution, which recognizes a ‘civilian authority (that is) supreme over the military”, and characterized by the robust involvement of various civil society organizations in the country country.. The paper foregrounds the evolution of the Armed Forces of the Philippines Civil-Military Operations in support of Security Sector Reform amidst different contexts and realities regarding implementations on the ground. Emphasis is also placed on how the shortcomings in the Armed Forces of the Philippines’ Civil-Military Operations implementations can be addressed. The author reiterates the importance of Civil-Military Operations to enacting Security Sector Reform. However, However, there is a need to clearly dene the focus of Civil-Military Operations, aligned with the apparent paradigm shift brought forth by a post-agreement security arrangement.

SOURCE: PAO AFP

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9CIVIL MILITARY OPERATION: OPERATION: MODELS OF INSTITUTIONAL ENGAGEMENT IN THE PHILIPPINES

philippines


Introduction

I

In the broader frame of security sector reform (SSR), there is recognition that a modern defense force is not only a function of upgraded capability but also a result of transparent, effective and institutionalized civil-military engagement. 1 In order for the reforms to take root, a healthy civilmilitary relation relat ion is a necessity. 2 This relationship is anchored on unique Philippine democratic context

– rst, the Philippine Constitution’ Constitution’s s principle that

the “civilian authority, is at all times, supreme over the military;” 3 and second, the vibrant civil society organization (CSO) involvement in the Philippines. The manner in which the military cultivates relationship with stakeholders on the ground is concretized through civil-military operations (CMO). The Philippines’ rich history as a democratic nation tells us that strengthening of civil-military relations over the years paved the way for gains in SSR in the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to be instituted. After the EDSA Revolution in 1986, there had been sustained efforts for CMO to veer away from treating civilians as “subjects-to-be-won-over” 4 to treating

stakeholders as “partners-to-be-engaged” .5 The importance of this paradigm shift is emphasized in the AFP’s Internal Peace and Security Plan (IPSP) Bayanihan indicating the “involvement of all stakeholders in the pursuit of internal peace and security” 6 as a strategic imperative

in pursuing military mission. However, there are realities surrounding CMO implementation that has to be taken into mind. On the part of the AFP, they operate under conditions of “limited funding, weak combat capabilities, poor

human

rights

records,

corruption…” 7

among others, which affect how they perform their mandate and consequently, how they professionalize their ranks. On the part of the civilians, history of antagonism brought about by military human rights abuse stays in the discussion table and affects the quality and to a certain extent, transparency of the engagement. Moreover, implications of CMO activities on communities remain points of debate as to how it addresses insurgency while raising community dependence on the military and militarization in the area. 8

1 OECD DAC Handbook Handbook on Securiy Secor eorm (2007) menions a similar argumen “ A recogniion ha SS is no only abou increasing

operaional operaio nal capaciy bu also abou enhanced service delivery, governance and accounabiliy highlighs ha oher skills are required…” 2 C. Pangaungan, Pangaungan, “Implemening Securiy Secor eorm in he Armed Forces o he Philippines: Issues and Prospecs,” AFP Office o Sraegic

and Special Sudies (AFP-OSS) Diges 18 Number 2 (2013): 8. 3 Te 1987 Consiuion o he epublic o he Philippines. Secion 3 o Ar icle II o Declaraion o Principles and Sae Policies, page 1. 4 . Alcudia, “Civil Miliary Operaions or Civil-Miliary Operaions? Wha’s in a Hyphen?,“ Philippine Army Journal (2007): 4, accessed a

htp://www.army.mil.ph/e_publicaions/pa_journal/pa_journal_2nd.pd. 5 Ibid. 6 AFP Inernal Peace Peace and Securiy Plan (IPSP) Bayanihan (2010), page page 27. Ava. 7 D. ussel, “Examining he Armed For Forces ces o he Philippines’ Civil Miliary Operaion Operaions.s. A Small Power Securing Miliary elevancy in

Nonradiional Miliary Nonradiional Miliary oles,” Small Wars Wars Journal Journal Vol. Vol. 6 Issue 1 (2010): 15. 8 Orea, J. and olosa, olosa, K. (2012). IPSP Assessmen: Assessing A ssessing he readiness o he miliary insiuion and he commimen o securiy sakeholders’ o he AFP’s Inernal Peace and Securiy Plan (IPSP). Working Group on Securiy Secor eorm, Aeneo de Manila Universiy.

9 CIVIL MILITARY OPERATION: MODELS OF INSTITUTIONAL ENGAGEMENT IN THE PHILIPPINES

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Against this background, the following questions are raised – since its inception, how did the AFP’s

On the other hand, the UN humanitarian context calls for “coordination between the military

CMO evolve in support of security sector reform? What are the means in confronting dilemmas in CMO implementation? How do we imagine civilmilitary operation in support of a modern defense force?

component and the civilian components of the same integrated mission…” 11 Responsive to

With reference to the context discussed, this paper presents practices in civil-military operations of the AFP and how it contributed to gains in security sector reform. Equal emphasis is put in the discussion on how predicaments in AFP CMO implementatio implementation n can be addressed. Corollary to this, the paper presents models of institutionalized clear feedback mechanism between the Philippine military and the civilians – both civilian government and civil society.

Fundamental Concepts of Civil-Military Operation There are two concepts recognized by the United Nations system in the performance of civil military coordination (CIMIC), that is, humanitarian and military.9 These two concepts differentiate how the NATO and the UN conduct CMO. The NATO is “generally deployed as a military force” 10 hence the need for them to establish their separate mandate from UN and other groups performing peace building activities in the same country.

the context and security environment, CMO implementation varies in different countries. In the Philippines, the concept of AFP-CMO is regarded as “sui generis” (Russel, 2010) where concepts have been developed from unique military culture and rich military history of the AFP.. As early as 1950’s under the administration AFP of President Ramon Magsaysay, the elements of CMO are seen in efforts towards counter-insurgency and nation building. 12 This continued until democratization efforts post-EDSA 1986. However, it was only until 2006 when the AFP CMO Doctrine was crafted – regarded as a broad doctrine providing the scope and necessity for CMO while leaving room for subjective interpretation. 13 Also, this doctrine has not yet updated upon arrival of IPSP Bayanihan. In 2013, the CMO Handbook was developed to provide clear guidelines in the conduct of CMO activities.

AFP-CMO Pillars and Components The AFP denes civil-military operations as “planned activities undertaken independently or in coordination with civilian entities in support

9 Coning and Holshek, “Unied Naions Civil-Miliary Coordinaion (UN-CIMIC) Course Manual,” Peace Operaions raining Insiue

(2012): 16, accessed a htp://cdn.peaceopsraining.org/course_promos/civil_miliary_coordinaion/civil_miliary_coordinaion_english. pd. 10 Ibid., page 26. 11 Ibid., page 27. 12 Office o he Depuy Chie o Saff or Operaions, “AFP “AFP CMO Docrine,” AFP CMO Handboo Handbook: k: CMO Assessmen A ssessmen ools. ools. 2013. 13 AFP CMO Handbook: CMO Assessmen ools. ools. (2013). Published Published by he Office o he Depuy Chie o Saff or Operaions, Operaions, page 31.

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to the accomplishmen accomplishmentt of the AFP mission to gain popular support and weaken the will of the enemy to ght.” 14 AFP-CMO activities

can take many forms from model behaviors of soldiers on the ground to big-ticket projects for the community facilitated and or participated by the AFP. Put simply, CMO takes a counterinsurgency stance while dictated largely by developmental orientation. 15 CMO doctrine is founded on winning the hearts and minds of the people while facilitating the cooperation of stakeholders to support operational objectives. As will be discussed in more details later, this poses challenges both for the military and the civilians. All in all, CMO efforts “complement Intelligence and Operations as an integral part of the AFP Triad” 16

where commanders on the ground ensure that these three components (intelligence, operations, CMO) work in support of each other towards accomplishmentt of AFP mission. Balancing these accomplishmen three is important, as efforts given to one must augment the other two. Primarily, the objective of CMO activities is to reduce the will of the armed threat groups to ght and to gain popular support for

the AFP. The secondary objective is to support the government’s development activities, protect the environment, and help the people prepare for and cope with the hard realities of disasters/calamities.17 CMO activities are

categorized into three pillars targeting a specic audience: Public Affairs, Civil Affairs,

and Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) or Information Support Affairs (ISA).18 While each pillar addresses specic concerns of CMO, “one pillar must always be supported” by

the other two to ensure maximum effectiveness. Programs under each pillar are in coordination with the civilian government and civil society organizations (CSO) while being implemented in three levels: strategic, operational and tactical. Below is the summary discussion of AFP-CMO pillars and its respective components. 19 The Public Affairs (PA) pillar is concerned with gathering support from the public in order to accomplish military missions. Its activities are geared towards acquiring support from the people through Public Information (PI) and Community Relations (COMREL) activities. The second pillar, Civil Affairs (CA), “encompasses socioeconomic development activities undertaken by the AFP in coordination with or independent of civilian government and non-government entities in support of national development.” 20 Among

the three pillars, the CA is where the military can directly affect the people by facilitating the delivery of basic services through strengthened linkages in civil relations (CIVREL) and mobilization of resources in coordination with stakeholders during civic action (CIVAC) activities.

14 Office o he Depuy Chie o Saff or Operaion Operaions,s, “AFP CMO.” 15 ussel, D. (2010)., page 15. 16 Office o he Depuy Chie o Saff or Operaion Operaions,s, “AFP CMO.” 17 AFP CMO Docrine Powerpoin Presenaion Presenaion by AESCOM, shared in 2011. 18 AFP CMO Docrine (2006) as cied by ussel (2010)., page 16. 19 Discussion o his secion is majorly majorly sourced om om he AFP CMO Handbook. (2013). 20 AFP CMO Handbook, 2013, page 6.


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Formerly known as Psychological Operations (PSYOPS), the third pillar is Information Support Affairs (ISA). It includes activities that “are geared

Evolution of AFP-CMO Practices in the Philippines

to redirect or inuence the beliefs, emotions, attitudes, opinions and behavior of a given target audience.” 21 This pillar is also responsible in

Albeit absence of clear CMO doctrines in the past, the AFP has adapted CMO strategies responsive to the prevailing context and pressing

processing former rebels and in helping their reintegration into the communities. 22

needs of the country at specic periods in time.

Similar to the AFP triad, care and balance is required in the conduct of activities under the three pillars and its components. The strength of intended impact of AFP-CMO activities is dependent on its interconnectedness as exemplied in the history of AFP-CMO practices

in the Philippines.

Figure 1. AFP CMO Pillars and components, Adapted from the AFP CMO Handbook (2013)

Primarily as an instrument of national policy, the AFP inched its way towards achieving a more comprehensive CMO approach by initially varying the application of the present AFP-CMO pillars. Especially during the critical transition years of 1986-1998, 23 the CMO has played an important role in national reconciliation and has inuenced

the onset of peace negotiations with the different armed groups. Critical to understanding the present AFP-CMO is tracing the history of how civil-military engagement shaped AFP-CMO practices through the years. As far back as 1950’s, CMO has always been a vital part of the Philippine military’s history. CMO elements were employed together with armed combat right from the start when the rise of communist insurgency began with threats from the Hukbalahap (Huks) 25 to topple down the government and cause chaos in the countryside. Dubbed as one of the best counterinsurgency practices, the method of President Ramon Magsaysay, which attempted to address the socio-economic-political roots of Huk rebellion, failed to fully eradicate insurgency as a small

21 Ibid., page 7. 22 Inerview o ussel, D. (2010) o LC Fero Ferozaldo zaldo Paul . egencia in AFP NADESCOM, Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon Ciy Philippines,

Ocober 8, 2007. 23 Hernandez, C. (1999). 24 ussel, D. (2010)., page 16. 25 “an agrarian-based and Sovie-influenced insurgency”, (Hernandez, 1999), page 2.

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faction of the Huks – committed to the political goals of the movement – still remained in the society.

with OPLAN Mamamayan, with focus on the protection of the people rather than the state. This was coupled with the 1987 counterinsurgency strategy seeking to encourage insurgents to turn in their arms and return to the fold of law in exchange of loans so they can start their new life.29 Replaced by OPLAN Lambat Bitag,

In 1965, President Ferdinand Marcos began his ofce touting economic development as the

permanent solution to internal security threats. He then deployed the AFP to the countryside to embark on a “socioeconomic program of unprecedented scale under the banner of ‘civic action’.” 26 Meanwhile, the late 1960s saw the

recovery of insurgency which gave birth to two groups: the Communist Party of the Philippines/ New People’s Army (CPP/NPA) and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). 27 With these developments, President Ferdinand Marcos placed the country under Martial Law in 1972. This gave rise to military corruption and human rights violations “negating any impact civic action had on the community.” 28

After the Marcos dictatorship was toppled in 1986, the government underwent Democratization under President Corazon Aquino. Because the security forces were used as abusive instruments during Martial Law, the Cory administration placed emphasis in restoring civilian authority over the military. The AFP replaced OPLAN Katatagan

CMO was rst introduced in Special Operations

Teams (SOTs),30 which is a composite of combat, intelligence gathering and CMO that gave birth to AFP Triad.31 This involved holding dialogues in the communities to undo insurgency in the area. In 1994, when the AFP engaged in CMO activities under OPLAN Unlad Bayan, modest gains were seen as evident in the turnover of 236 rearms

from the Moros.32 The administration of President Fidel V. Ramos and President Joseph Estrada, more AFP and PNP 33 coordination was seen under OPLAN Pagkalinga, Kaisaganaan, and Balanga from 1996-2000. Cleared areas were turned over to DILG-PNP while establishing development programs. 34 However, AFP turned its attention to modernization brought about by the closure of US Bases. At this point, CMO was not a top priority in the AFP. 35 When President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo took ofce, OPLAN Bantay

Laya was launched, implementing a new security

26 Hernandez, C. (1999)., page 2. 27 Ibid., page 2-3. 28 . Kessler, ebellion and epression in he Philippines (New haven and London: Yale Yale Universiy Press, 1989), 144. 29 Pobre, A Hisory o he Armed Forces, p. 596. Cied by Hernandez (2005), Insiuional Insiuional esponses o Armed Conflic: Te Armed Forces o

he Philippines. A Background paper submited o he Human Developmen Nework Foundaion, Foundaion, Inc. or he Philippine Human Developmen Developmen epor 2005., page 11-12. 30 AFP CMO Docrine (2006) as cied by ussel (2010)., page 16. 31 Discussion o his secion is majorly majorly sourced om om he AFP CMO Handbook. (2013). 32 AFP CMO Handbook, 2013, page 6. 33 Philippine Naional Naional Police. Police. 34 L. Pena, “Finding “Finding he Missing Link o o a Successul Philippine Counerinsurgency Counerinsurgency Sraegy” Sraegy” (Tesis, Naval Posgraduae Posgraduae School, School, 2007). 35 ussel, D. (2010), page 17.


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operations where instead of the traditional methodology of ‘clear, hold, consolidate and develop’, the new methodology is ‘clear, hold and support’. This is in admission of the fact that the military is not equipped in handling development and the last phase should be done by the civilian government. However, territorial defense forces were still used in the hold phase. 36 Up until this time, even though elements of CMO are seen in the implementation of AFP campaign plans, there was no clear doctrine outlining its conduct.

of internal peace and security” as a strategic imperative. This is an “admission and recognition by the military” that purely militaristic solution alone cannot solve the pressing problems in peace and security. 38 Under the IPSP, “CMO emerges as the best tool available to manifest the paradigm shift from a predominantly militaristic solution to a people-centered security strategy that is founded on broad-based consultations and engagements with key stakeholders.” 39 It is therefore critical for the AFP-CMO to be clearly translated on the ground through guidance and protocols. After all, the abolishment of the National Development Support Command (NADESCOM) and some engineering brigades was done under the expectation that all units must be able to conduct CMO embedded in their respective operations. Thus far, the AFP has published the CMO Handbook: CMO Assessment Tools in 2013, which outlines detailed steps in the conduct of comprehensive CMO in an area. For the institutionalized engagement with the civilian government and civil society, the following models are presented.

Nonetheless, CMO was renewed in 2006 with the publication of the rst CMO doctrine, the AFP

Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations. 37 Under the 2011 IPSP Bayanihan, SOTs are replaced by Peace and Development Teams (PDTs) or Bayanihan Teams giving equal importance to combat and non-combat operations on the ground. It is under this plan that the role of civilmilitary operations in the achievement of military goal is most pronounced.

Paradigm Shift: Models of Institutionalized Institutional ized Engagement “The IPSP acknowledges that the contribution of each and every government agency, civil society organization, and even local community, is vital in ensuring peace and security.”

- President Benigno S. Aquino III Clearly spelled out in the IPSP Bayanihan is the “involvement of all stakeholders in the pursuit

Signing Memorandum of Agreement with National Government Agencies Enshrined in the constitution is the supremacy of the civilian authority over the military at all times. The President, who is also the Commander-inChief of the military, exercises this. Likewise, the civilian government agencies and local chief executives are also inherently involved in the conduct of CMO. Without encroaching on

36 Hernandez, C. (2005). Insiuional esponses o Armed Conflic, page 16-17. 37 Ibid. 38 2011 Inernal Peace and Securiy Plan (IPSP) Bayanihan. 39 AFP CMO Handbook, 2013, page 2.

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the responsibilities of concerned agencies, the AFP must also learn to project a cooperative

Bantay Bayanihan as Civil Society Oversight

stance. The Ofce of the Chief of Staff for

Civil Military Operations (OJ7) created lines of convergence with the civilian government by entering into Memoranda of Agreement (MOA) with national government agencies. Indicated in a broader CMO Plan, the MOA indicates areas for joint cooperation where tasks of both parties are indicated. 40 This partnership addresses two concerns in the conduct of CMO. One, it breaks the notion of military as the only face of government in far-ung areas. Two, it claries

the tasks of government agencies in peace and security. When people in the communities see different government ofces working together with

the military, military, this raises the bar for the involvement of all stakeholders in the pursuit for peace. With clear objectives, expectations are managed within the bounds of the agreement in terms of how the projects can support peace and security.Although not perfect and in need of a more policy-aligned approach, the MOA partnership facilitates a clear feedback mechanism on the functions of the AFP and government agencies on the ground.

The Philippines enjoys the vibrant presence of civil society organizations (CSOs) from non-government organizations (NGOs) catering to the needs of marginalized sectors to progressive think tanks pushing for policy reform in the country. CSOs acts as enablers, making them an important partner in pushing for peace and security. The crafting of the IPSP Bayanihan opened doors to this partnership when they were invited by the military to provide inputs to the Bayanihan plan. With reference to the strategic imperative in the IPSP Bayanihan, the institutionalized engagement of the AFP and CSOs was born. Formally launched in 2011, the Bantay Bayanihan (BB) carries out its mandate41 as the network of CSOs performing an oversight role on the implementation of IPSP Bayanihan. The tangible expression of the network’s monitoring role is the Bantay Bayanihan Assessment Matrix,42 a tool that guides the dialogue between local CSO members and local AFP commanders. Deviating from the numbers game, the assessment is focused on how the AFP performs their mandate mandate in light of adherence to Human Rights, International Humanitarian Law and Rule of Law while being transparent and accountable. The nature of engagement is both critical and constructive where monitoring results are discussed with the AFP with shared recommendations on how they can address negative ndings. Although noticeable positive

40 Inerview wih BGen. Lysander Suere a he Office o he Chie o Saff Saff or Civil-Miliary Civil-Miliary Operaions (OJ7), (OJ7), Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon Quezon Ciy,

February Februa ry 21, 2014. 41 Indicaed in Banay Bayanihan Manieso Manieso,, a documen signed by he ormer AFP A FP Chie o Saff Gen. Eduardo Oban, Banay Bayanihan

ounding convenor convenor Dr. Dr. Jennier Orea, Orea, OPAPP Sec. eresia eresia Deles and oher sakeholders. sakeholders. 42 Te assessmen marix was joinly developed and localized by he AFP and CSOs in 2012.


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improvements are seen on the ground, the challenge is in the policy gaps to ensure that reforms take root and continue even under a

part of the civil society, this feeds the historical antagonism between the military and the CSOs, which affects the transparency and effectiveness of civilian-military relationship towards security sector reform.

different leadership. This engagement, the rst

of its kind in the Philippines and conceivably in Southeast Asia, is a relevant institutional mechanism for civil society to engage defense reform issues.

Civilians and military vary on how they think and how they operate, a nuancing that has to be considered in an environment where CMO is implemented.

Confronting Dilemmas of AFP-CMO As AFP-CMO does not exist in a vacuum, its implementation in support of and complementing other military functions creates issues that need to be confronted. The deployment of Peace and Development Teams (PDTs) in far-ung

Conclusion Strong, transparent and institutionalized civilian engagement is an imperative towards security sector reform.

communities makes them wear the developmen developmentt hat in a conict-affected area where there is

practically absence of the face of government. The prolonged stay of the military in communities, although for facilitating the delivery of basic services, poses challenges as to shaping the mindset and attitudes, both of the military and the communities. One of them is the perspective of some soldiers that CMO breeds soft soldiers. Another concern is the dependency of the communities, even civilian government, on the military in ensuring peace and security in their area.43 Looking from within the AFP, the function of CMO in a triad, which is in support of counterinsurgency strategies, becomes problematic when this puts the military in a position where simple proling

of progressive CSOs leads to harassment and consequently human rights accusations. For the

Balancing CMO in AFP Triad Similar to how UN recognizes two (2) concepts of CIMIC, counterinsurgency strategies have utilized the right hand and left hand approach. In the conduct of such, clarity should be shed on the main purpose of CMO. Is it to t o support the internal security operation, which is militaristic in nature? In the evolution of AFP CMO, are we on the right track towards a modern defense force? With developments in the peace process, CMO must be recalibrated to balance the AFP triad. An epitome of an armed forces focused on territorial defense does not conduct heavy CMO activities.44 In a post-agreement security arrangement, CMO in support of counterinsurgency may not be the best utility for civil-military civil-military engagement. engagement. Instead, activities related to humanitarian and nation

43 Orea, J. and olosa, olosa, K. (2012). IPSP Assessmen. A ssessmen. 44 . Hall, “Modern soldiery inerrogaed: caaloguing he local miliary’s ask and heir percepion o l ocal civilian acors,” Philippine Poliical

Science Journal 33 (2012): 18.

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building is seen as the likely focus in support of the envisioned modern defense force.

to outline clear sharing of efforts towards peace and security. Transparency in the performance of mandates ensures that both parties, civilian and military, perform their tasks while combining and complementing their efforts.

The AFP’s mandate to perform ISO functions does not only prevent them from improving on other mission areas but causes serious implications in the community. community. It is thus crucial for f or the civilian units (LGU and PNP) to take the lead role in ISO.45 Institutionalized engagement The AFP provides security of the state and its people while bearing capacity to inuence the

democratic processes and still contribute in the pursuit of just and lasting peace.46 In a democratic country such as the Philippines, where the military plays a vital role in peace and security, it is only

Balance implementation of activities As a major contributor to internal security operations, the deployment and employment of CMO must be reviewed. Perhaps capitalizing from the gains of the PNoy administration, CMO can be widened in such a way that shared responsibility in peace and security can now be sustained. This also goes without saying that the developments in the security environment and peace process have to be taken into consideration in the review of CMO.

tting to create a safety net on how best to be in

a critical and constructive stance when it comes to the performance of their mandate. Stakeholder engagement must not only be aligned with the national security policy, but institutionalized as well. In terms of how civilians can contribute in engaging defense reform issues, there is a need to clearly understand the roles and functions of different stakeholders. Blurred lines must be claried.

Previously in the National Internal Security Plan, the tasking of different government agencies in terms of peace and security was underscored. However, the tasking was not known to the government agencies because the NISP was a secret document. Current efforts of the AFPCMO to ink memoranda of agreement with government agencies is just a stopgap measure. There is a need for a national security strategy

Some CMO activities are mere dole-outs which perpetuate the culture of dependency on the military of local communities and local security providers (e.g. tanod, barangay captain, police).47 Reviewing CMO’s shift towards the other AFP mission areas (e.g. disaster risk management and regional security etc.) and how it can contribute to a modern defense force should be examined. The existing AFP-CMO Handbook 2013 has to be implemented with strong monitoring to ensure balance in the implementation of CMO pillars and components. Taking into consideration the historical context of AFP-CMO evolution, the dilemmas that emanated from it and the developments in the security environment and peace process, a review of the conduct of AFP civil-military operation is

45 Orea, J. and olosa, olosa, K. (2012). IPSP Assessmen. A ssessmen. 46 Arugay, A. (2007). 47 Alcudia (2010).


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strongly recommended. In imagining a modern defense force, there must be clear protocols and guidelines in moving away from simple support to internal security operations but towards complementing territorial defense. Aligned with national policies in peace and security, the

civilians must be continuously engaged with clear taskings to allow the stakeholders to do their part. After all, a modern defense force is not only a function of upgraded capability, but also a result of transparent, effective and institutionalized civil-military engagement.

SOURCE:: BANTA SOURCE B ANTAY Y BAYANIHAN BAYANIHAN

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10 Gender Inclusiveness in the the Milit Military ary by Carla

Isabel M Ravanes

philippines

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GENDER INCLUSIVENESS IN THE MILIT MILITARY ARY The Women’s Movement in the 50’s and 60’s increased the participation of women in various working sectors. Since 1980’s, there is a considerable rise in the percentage of women in armed forces. However, this increase in proportion does not even exceed the 15 percent threshold, which would elevate it to more than just being token membership. Aside from the low percentage of women in the military, military, there is a lower number of women who perform direct combat roles. The author discusses how physically suited women are for direct combat and consequently the effect of the presence of women in combat units on its effectiveness.Additionally, effectiveness.Additionally, she also examined how women are integrated into the Philippine forces. The author argues that increased female participation in the defense forces is practical, necessary and benecial in operations. However, more interventions should be conducted in order to realize this potential.

SOURCE: PAO AFP

10 0

10 GENDER INCLUSIVENESS IN THE MILITARY

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T

The integration of women in various working sectors has increased since the Women’s Movement of the ‘50s and ‘60s (Harries-Jenkins, 2002). This can be observed in virtually all aspects of the workforce, such as in law law,, politics, business, and of course, the security sector. Since the late ‘80s, there has been a considerable rise in the percentage of women in armed forces (Segal, 1988). However, comparing this increase in involvement to that of the civilian sector, most Western (or Western-style) military forces seem to have a low degree of integration of women. Despite the increase in recruitment of women over the past decades, one would still be hard-pressed to nd

a military force with a proportion of women that would approximate 15 percent. Fifteen percent, as such, is an important number in organizations since leading analysts have pointed out that women must number 15 percent of an organization to be considered more than a token (Kanter, 1977). Being extremely underrepresented in the contemporary military, women are not only a minority population; they actually form an even smaller classication – the token population.

To address this, positive recruiting policies and strategies that are reective of the best practice

in major organizations must be adopted. Said policies must be effective in military systems, as well (Harries-Jenkins, 2004).

issue may lead one to ask how physically suited women are for direct combat, consequently, would the presence of women in combat units negatively impact effectiveness. Several studies have demonstrated that with the proper physical training methods and given an appropriate amount of time, women volunteers could effectively execute duties traditionally carried out by men in the military (Wilson, n.d.; Casey, n.d.). Furthermore, it has been shown that in mixed-gender groups, members have identied leadership and teamwork as more

important factors than gender in determining variations in morale, lack of cohesion, and military performance (Harrell & Miller, 1997; London Ministry of Defence, 2002). It is important in this subject matter to consider women’s views on being assigned to combat units. A survey survey of female cadets on West Point in the ‘90s showed that only 30 percent would join a combat arms branch if these were opened up to women. From those who did not have a desire to enter combat units, only 12 percent expressed a lack of faith in their physical capabilities as motivating their decision. Majority of those who said no were just not interested in combat arms (Field &Nagl, 2001). From this, it can be deduced that a possible key reason as to why women do not have the same population in combat units as men is because they are, rst and foremost, not

Aside from the aforementioned population issue, a widespread military concern, in terms of gender inclusiveness, is the small number of women who perform direct combat roles. Although personnel policy in various countries do not discourage women in lling combat roles, majority still serve in

non-combat roles (e.g., military nurse) or combat service/support roles (e.g., clerk, radar operator) (Harries-Jenkins, (Harries-Jenkin s, 2002). The commonness of this


drawn to it. In connection to this, it has been proposed that the main hurdle for women integration into numerous military roles is the “warrior framework” that is present in the military culture (Davis & McKee, 2004). The warrior framework reinforces the traditionally ideal military image of a physically strong, emotionally tough, masculine

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war-ghter. The emphasis on masculinity, with its

2.64 percent of the total population of enlisted personnel (“Percentage Fill-up of Enlisted

associated attributes such as courage, tolerance of pain, sense of sacrice, etc.; are in contrast to

those qualities socially ascribed to women. It is propositioned that military women are stigmatized, “simply because they [are not viewed as having]

Woman in the AFP”, 2012). An equally signicant statistic shows that female ofcers, as of March

2012, are at a relatively high proportion of 9.22 percent (“Percentage Fill-up of Female Ofcers

those socially legitimate qualities that dene

in the AFP,” 2012). Even with the comparatively

soldiers,” (Sorin, 2004). Woman as a Soldier is not easily deemed as a natural social concept. It is up to each military force, then, to determine if there should be any changes in its structural relationships so that it would be able to combat

large percentage of women ofcers in the country,

this inherent conict. Specically, this would

target the issue of the retention of the masculine culture, as opposed to gender-neutra gender-neutrall norms, and its supposed importance to the effectiveness of military forces (Pinch, 2004). It is recognized that women often possess a variety of skills which make them better at defusing and de-escalating potentialy violent confrontations, and are less likely to be involved in problems with use of excessive force. In addition, women not only have a useful skill set, but in certain contexts, their inclusion may become an operational imperative since they can carry out tasks that men can have a difculty

taking on, if at all. These include: screening of female ex-combatants, assisting in the aftermath of sexual violence, performing the cordon and search of women. Anecdotal Anecdotal evidence also points to women as more able to gain the trust of the community, ensure the full involvement of local women, and exercise communication and crowd control skills (Valasek, 2008).

Gender Integration in the Philippine Forces As of March, 2012 there are 2,905 enlisted women serving in the AFP. The 2,905 constitute

10 2

the presence of women in the higher positions paints a different picture. Most outstandingly, Brig. Gen. Ramona Go, the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, is the rst female line ofcer to become a general. She is currently the

only female general in the active service (“More women joining in AFP,” 2012). This circumstance mirrors the state in other countries wherein women are almost inexistent in the more senior ranks (Sorin, 2004). The Women’s Auxiliary Corps (WAC), an allwoman division in the AFP which was based on the now defunct Women’s Army Corps of the US Army,, has been deactivated. This progression Army is parallel to the fate of the US Army WAC, as well as to the closure of Écoleinterarmées du personnel militairefémini (EIPMF) – the joint service women’s school of the French Army. Similar to the closing of the US Army WAC WAC and the EIPMF, the deactivation of WAC aims to improve the circumstances of the women in the force by discontinuing the gender-based segregation and by giving women greater chances to get to the service of their choice. And while the intent may have been great, the AFP failed to couple the deactivation with the necessary adjustments and preparation in terms of addressing the impact of the dissolution of the Ofce of the Chief WAC, AFP to its members. For

instance, WAC has no representatives in various functional areas of personnel and logistics management. And though the integration of the



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WAC members to the Major Services is possible, there is still a need for a clear-cut policy and uniform procedure for the implementation of the integration process (Gat-Eb, 2008).

While examining the gender-inclusiveness of the Philippines’ defense forces, it is also important to look at the gender-mainstre gender-mainstreaming aming condition of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA).

Through the implementation of RA 7192 (Women in Nation Building Law), the AFP recruited female line soldiers. This action enabled the Filipino women to now have a chance to study military science in the Philippine Military Academy, participate in combat operations and mobilize military assets. But the AFP overlooked the crafting of implementing rules and regulations that will address the proper utilization of this new set of females f emales in the AFP (Gat-eb, 2008).

The PMA rst opened its gates to female cadets

Similar to the need for clear-cut policies in dealing with the deactivation of WAC, there is also a lack of clear-cut policies in handling “Gender and Development (GAD)” as mandated by RA 9710 (Magna Carta for Women). GAD policies and programs are vital instruments for any organization if it wants to promote and/or further develop gender-inclu gender-inclusiveness. siveness. On the national policy level, gender and development concerns are not integrated into the plans and programs of the government on defense or armed forces, which is basically what the essence of gender mainstreaming is all about. On the ground level, many ofces of

the armed forces are conducting efforts related to GAD simply to follow the word of the law and for substantial compliance. In effect, these GAD efforts are short term and nominal. Without an implementation strategy, GAD is not utilized as a strategic tool to boost the morale of the armed forces or to enhance the capability of the military organization. This is further aggravated by the misleading perception of the military leadership on “gender” and “gender and development” (Caluag, 2010).


in 1993 (Romero, 2012). Since then the AFP has seen an increase in the number of women in the military. While this may be the case, the genderinclusiveness of the academy is still found to be wanting. In 2010, Rivera subjected the The Cadet Core AFP Regulations (CCAFPR) 2008, also known as the gray book, to a limited textual analysis to determine its gender-sensitivity, particularly, if it is free of any sexist word. Unsurprisingly, the research showed that only 2/27 of the document’s sections are completely free from any sexist term. Since language used articulates consciousness, reects culture, and affects socialization (Gender-

Fair Language, 2008), it would be safe to say that the gender-insensitive terms in the current CCAFPR are highly reective of the academy’s framing of the cadets and ofcers.

Also, by comparing the surveys on the perceived capacities and capabilities (physical, intellectual, and emotional) of male and female cadets answered by the PMA classes 2000, 2001, and 2002 with those from the classes 2010, 2011, and 2012; the study (Rivera, 2010) showed that there has been an increased favouring of the male cadets over the female cadets.

Institutionall Interventions Institutiona The Department of National Defense (DND), since 2009, has been conducting Gender Sensitivity Training Trainin g (GST) with military ofcers. The program

aims to: identify, assess, and analyze the gender issues and gaps that is present in the society, society, and in the participants’ personal and work situation;

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recognize the signicance of attaining gender

More than the recruitment and education of female cadets, substantial retention of the female military personnel will give the necessary weight to the gender-inclusive efforts of the AFP. This will be achieved by strengthening gender-mainstreaming gender-mainstreaming in the AFP, AFP, through the development deve lopment of substantial subst antial and long-term GAD programs.

equality, and develop in the participants the condence to do their work as gender advocates.

(“Gender Sensitivity Training Module”, n.d.) There are at least three GSTs held every year, with 30 participants for each training session. Initially, majority of the participants of the GSTs were women, but for 2012, the male participants constituted 55.56 percent of the total participant population for all GSTs held that year. It could be said that over the years, the th e GSTs GSTs conducted have encouraged male ofcers to be more participative

It has been suggested that a three-pronged, integrated institutional strategy of changing the thinking, attitude and practices in the military institution should be pushed forth (OximosoIgnacio, 2004, as cited in Caluag, 2010). The

in the said program.

three strategies identied were: 1) A Championing

Apart from the GST GSTs, s, there is also the Trainer’s Trainee Program designed to create a larger and better skilled pool of trainers among the military ofcers for the Gender Sensitivity Trainings. This

is held once a year (Quinzon, 2012). The efforts undertaken by the DND, although commendable, are far from sufcient. For the

gender issues present in the PMA, it has been suggested (Rivera, 2010) that the next revisionists of the CCAFPR, should consider language reform as an approach to gender-sensitize it. The

strategy aimed to obtain support from the highest ranks of the military; 2) A Social Marketing/ Information Campaign Strategy aimed to change the way military personnel of the AFP think and behave regarding gender and development; and 3) An Organizational Development Strategy aimed to make the GAD initiative relatively easier by eliminating organizational barriers such as gender-bias regulations, policies and facilities and establishing mechanism that would complement the change process (Oximoso-Ignacio, 2004, as cited in Caluag, 2010).

change in identication will be a step towards

the needed change in framing and thinking with regards to gender-sensitization. This effort should extend to the reviewing, revising, and removal of any form of gender bias in all military documents/ references. The PMA should also conduct its own regular Gender Sensitivity Seminar among the cadets, ofcers, and civilian employees to further

raise gender awareness. Moreover, a GAD Focal Person or committee in PMA should be institutionalized and strengthened.

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A strategy to make GAD program more responsive and effective should include a strategy to enhance the capability of the primary unit/ofce

that would see the fruition of the GAD program. This strategy should cover the need for mandate, the operational need of the organization and the mechanism for control, management and oversight (Caluag, 2010). This way, the overall GAD strategy will ensure that the organization that will handle the GAD-related concerns would be able to address the GAD issues of the armed forces with maximum effect.



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Further, the success of any GAD initiative greatly depends on the support of the higher leaders or commanders. To increase the leaders’ commitment, they must be made accountable to the actual achievement of gender mainstreaming. Making them realize that gender is actually a force multiplier for its mission’s success

with concrete output and/or recommendations. In Fiji, this strategy has brought forth signicant

recommendations which include: Inclusion of the Minister of Women as a member of the National Security Council, women should be effectively and equitably represented on Provincial and District Security Committes, etc. (Valasek, 2008).

and acknowledgement of such benet would

require acceptance, support, actual involvement and accountability in its implementation and achievement of its goals. Similarly, to effectively persuade the other commanders, a “gender champion” must rise from the ranks that can positively inuence the commanders.

Apart from the effective integration of women into a crucial mission structure and functions, it is also a component of the efforts on gender-inclusiveness gender-inclusiveness to recognize the need and importance of improving the health and living condition of both male and female personnel. To achieve this, other oth er GAD-related training programs and seminars, especially those focused on health and education, such as breast cancer examination and education campaign should be conducted. Improvement of physical infrastructure, like living quarters, should also be constructed for the benet of the women

On the part of the military as regards engagement with stakeholders, they need to take steps to ensure that, not only the concerns of the primary stakeholders are addressed, but also that these primary stakeholders are encouraged to participate in the creation, implementation and assessment of GAD programs. It is mandated by law that 5 percent of the t he budget allocation of a government organization must be for GAD program, with an option to increase allocation by 10-20 percent after ve (5) years.

However, most are not able to meet the 5 percent However, budget appropriations. Since 1995, only an average of 0.33 percent of the expected 5 percent is actually allotted for GAD programs (Caluag, 2010). Nonetheless, the defense force should still aim to appropriate the supposed 5 percent for their GAD programs.

members of the various military units. The constructive but critical engagement of CSOs with the AFP should not only be on internal security operations (ISO), territorial defense (TD), but should also include gender-main gender-mainstreaming streaming in the Armed Forces. Women’s groups should push for greater engagement of women in civil society (Valasek, 2008). A strong and inuential inu ential CSO that tha t

can effectively represent the women’s needs in gender-inclusiveness gender-inclus iveness should hold a dialogue with the military wherein both parties can come up


Forecasting for the worst case scenario in budgeting for the implementation of GAD programs, only 0.33 percent of the 5 percent would be allocated. allocated. On the other hand, with the implementation of GAD program in best-case scenario, there could be at least 10 percent budget allocation for GAD. But given the present restriction on military funds, it is likely that strict implementation of 5 percent GAD appropriation program would be maintained.

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Conclusion There is growing recognition that increased female participation in the defense forces is practical,

GAD policies/programs still need to be established to enable more women to actively participate and contribute in addressing security (“Initiatives for Women in the Military”, 2011).

necessary and benecial in operations. A more

gender-inclusive defense force will ultimately lead to an increased access to additional human resources and will create a more diverse pool to select better qualied staff (Valasek, 2008).

While the AFP has formulated and issued several gender supportive policies such as the increased quota allocation for female cadets and ofcer candidates from its previous quota of 5

percent to the present quota of 20 percent, and the authorization for female military members to marry upon completion of only 1 year active service instead of the previous waiting time of three (3) years, more substantial and long-term

If there are no interventions done, the movement towards forming a modern defense force would be incomplete. The advantages of a genderinclusive defense force would not be experienced by the AFP. AFP. The Philippines’ Philippines ’ defense forces would not be able to maximize the utilization of citizens to directly be involved in the military. Moreover, the females of the armed forces may continue to be perceived as a marginalized population. As such, such, in in order order to fully realize a modern modern defense force, it is essential to factor in the effective promotion of a gender-inclusive defense force.

References: “Annual Review of Women in NATO’s Armed Forces.” (2000-

“Gender Sensitivity Training Module.”(n.d.)Department of

2001).

Defense, Republic of the Philippines.

Caluag, Z.M. (2010). A Strategy for gender mainstreaming

Harries-Jenkins, G. (2002). The Extended Role Of Women

in the Philippine Army.Unpublished dissertation. Master in

In Armed Forces: CRMI Report. Hull: University of Hull

Development Management, Asian Institute of Management. Harries-Jenkins, G (2004).Institution to occupation to Davis, K. D. & McKee, B. (2004). Women in the Military:

diversity. . In Pinch, F.C., MacIntyre, A.T., Browne, P.,

Facing the Warrior FrameworkIn Pinch, F.C., MacIntyre, A.T., A.T.,

&Okros, A.C., (Eds.). Challenge and Change in the Military:

Browne, P., &Okros, A.C., (Eds.). Challenge and Change in

Gender and Diversity Issue (pp.26-53). Canadian Defence

the Military: Gender and Diversity Issue (pp.52-75). Canadian

Academy Press: Canada

Defence Academy Press: Canada “Initiatives for Women in the Military.” (2011). [PowerPoint Gat-eb.N.E. (2008).Assessing the utilization of the Women’s

Slides]. Presented to US Embassy Mindanao Working Group

Auxiliary Corps in the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Unpublished dissertation.AFP Command and General Staff

“More women joining in AFP.”(2012). In Edge Davao.

College, Armed Forces of the Philippines.

Retrieved

10 6

from

http://www.edgedavao.net/index.


philippines


php?option=com_content&view=article&id=6400:more-

Quinzon, T. (2012, April).Gender-Sensitivity Training. (C.M.

women-joining-afp&catid=68:the-big-news&Itemid=94.

Ravanes, Interviewer).

“Organizational Survey and Annual Reports from Committee

Rivera F.J. (2010). Towards Towards a gender-mainstreamed Philippine

of Women in the NATO Forces.” (2002).

Military Academy.Unpublished dissertation.AFP Command and General Staff College, Armed Forces of the Philippines.

Oximoso-Ignacio, M. L. (2004). Gender mainstreaming in the Armed Forces of the Philippines in parallel with its

Romero, A. AFP cites increasing role of women in military. In

Modernization Program: an Institutional Strategy. Unpublished

Philippine Star.Retrieved from http://www.philstar http://www.philstar.com/Article. .com/Article.

dissertation. Master in Development Management : Asian

aspx?articleId=786369&publicationSubCategoryId=63

Institute of Management. Segal, S. (1988) Organizational Survey: Annual Reports of the “Percentage Fill-up of Enlisted Woman in the AFP.” (2012).

Committee of Women in the NA NATO TO Forces.

Armed Forces of the Philippines, Republic of the Philippines. Sorin, K. (2004). Women in the French forces: Integration vs “Percentage Fill-up of Female Ofcers in the AFP.” (2012).

conict In Pinch, F.C., MacIntyre, A.T., Browne, P., &Okros,

Armed Forces of the Philippines, Republic of the Philippines.

A.C., (Eds.). Challenge and Change in the Military: Gender and Diversity Issue (pp.76-96). Canadian Defence Academy

Pinch, F.C. (2004). Diversity: Conditions for an Adaptive,

Press: Canada

Inclusive MilitaryIn Pinch, F.C., MacIntyre, A.T., Browne, P., &Okros, A.C., (Eds.). Challenge and Change in the Military:

Valasek, K. (2008). Security Sector Reform and Gender.

Gender and Diversity Issue (pp.171-194). Canadian Defence

In Bastick, M. & Valasek, K., DCAF, OSCE/ODIHR, UN-

Academy Press: Canada

INSTRAW (Eds.). Gender and Security Sector Reform Toolkit. Toolkit. SRO-Kundig :Geneva

“Primer on Gender-Fair Language,” (1998).

SOURCE: PAO AFP


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11 Ethnic Representation in the Armed Forces of the Philippines by Carla

Isabel M Ravanes

philippines

philippines


ETHNIC REPRESENTATION IN THE

ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES The 140 indigenous groups of the Philippines collectively represent nearly 20 percent of the country’s population. They are mostly concentrated in the Northern Luzon and Mindanao regions. In 2003, the Department of National Defense (DND) committed to giving ve percent of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) recruitment quote to indigenous peoples (IPs). Accordingly,, the AFP lowered its height and education requirements to accommodate IPs. Accordingly It was also in this year that the AFP was geared to draft “lumads” (indigenous or native) as regular soldiers and members of the Citizen Armed Force Geographical Unit (CAFGU). The paper discusses how the efforts to make the AFP more inclusive of IPs have polarized sides. There have been claims that the IPs are placed at the frontline in the ght against the Communist threat group New People’s Army (NPA), thus making their communities permanent battlegrounds. battlegrounds. On the other hand, the recruitment and reintegration reintegration processes can be perceived as efforts in creating a more diversied army. The author argues that the initiation of afrmative action for greater ethnic diversity in the AFP must be jointly conducted by the National Commission on Indigenous People (NCIP), given that it is the primary government agency responsible for the formulation and implementation of policies for Indigenous Cultural Communities (ICCs) / IPs, and the General Headquarters (GHQ), being the policymaking arm of the AFP. Furthermore, in order to bring in more IPs to the AFP, AFP, a unique and culturally-sensitive employment strategy must be crafted.

SOURCE: BADZ PATAÑAG, WGSSR

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11 ETHNIC REPRESENTATION REPRESENTATION IN THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES

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M

Majority of the Philippine population are descendants of the Austronesian peoples, who hails from Southeast Asia and Oceania. But because of the long history of Western colonial rule, combined with visits from merchants and traders, it is often difcult to t o accurately distinguish

the lines between the numerous ethnicities present in the country. In addition, the National Statistics Ofce (NSO) does not account for the

racial background or ancestry of each Filipino, thus rendering it almost impossible to produce an ofcial population count of mixed-race Filipinos.

ofcial in Republic Act 6734 during the Cory

Aquino administration, to differentiate these ethnic communities from the Bangsamoro (Ulindang, n.d.). To safeguard the rights of the indigenous cultural communities (ICCs)/(IPs), RA 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act (IPRA) of 1997 was enacted. The IPRA states that: The State recognizes the inherent dignity and equal and inalienable rights of all members of Philippine society as the foundation of freedom,

In this regard, the initiation of afrmative action

justice and peace. The rights of indigenous

for ethnic representation in this paper will mainly refer to the ethnic representation of the Indigenous Peoples (IPs) in the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).

cultural

communities/

indigenous

peoples

are universal, indivisible, interdependent and interrelated. It is, therefore, the policy of the state to recognize and promote all individual and collective rights of ICCs/IPs within the framework of national unity and development in accordance

Indigenous Peoples of the Philippines The 140 indigenous groups of the Philippines collectively represent nearly 20 percent of the country’s population. The estimated 14-17 million IPs are mostly concentrated in the Northern Luzon and Mindanao regions, with a few groups situated in the Visayas. The IPs of the Northern Luzon are found in the Cordillera Mountain Range. The peoples of the Cordillera could be grouped according to the following major ethnolinguistic groups: Kankaney, Ibaloy, Bontok, Kalinga, Isneg, Itneg, Ifugao, Iwak, and Gadang (Florendo, n.d.). In Mindanao, the IPs are referred to as “lumads,” a Visayan term meaning “native” or “indigenous.” The name was adopted by a group of 15 Mindanao Min danao ethnic groups to distinguish themselves from other main groups of Mindanaoans, namely the Moros and the Christians. Its usage was made

with the Constitution and applicable norms and principles.

AFP Recruitment and Integration of IPs During the time of former Secretary of National Defense Angelo T. T. Reyes in 2003, the t he Department of National Defense (DND) committed to giving ve percent of the AFP’s recruitment quota

to indigenous peoples. Accordingly, the AFP lowered its height and education requirements to accommodate high school graduates standing below ve feet and four inches.

It was also in the same year that the AFP was geared to draft lumads as regular soldiers and members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU). In Region 11, the recruited lumads became a part of the Philippine Army’s 4th Infantry Division. Division.


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Then Defense Secretary Reyes proclaimed that the commitment of drafting lumads (and other IPs) into military service “comes with appropriate and adequate education, training package and assurance that the AFP will guard against discrimination of IPs not only in recruitment but also in the duration of their service in the military (“AFP open recruitment,” 2003).

of the Cordillera People’s Liberation Army (CPLA), an armed group of indigenous people in the Cordillera Region, into the AFP. Through

This effort of the DND to make the Armed Forces more inclusive to IPs has been met with numerous criticisms from various organizations such as the human rights group Karapatan, the Catholic Bishop Conference of the Philippines-Episcopal Commission on Indigenous Peoples, as well as from an alliance of lumad organizations called the Pasaka Regional Lumad Confederation Confederation..

AO 18, fteen (15) members of the CPLA were integrated as ofcers while 249 were integrated

as enlisted personnel. Other CPLA members who were not accommodated in the 264 quota for integration were given an option to join the CAFGU Active Auxiliary Companies that were organized and deployed in each of the provinces in the Cordillera Administrative Administrative Region (CAR).

Afrmative Action By providing quota allocation in its recruitment and integration processes, the AFP is actually implementing some form of afrmative action for

Groups opposing the AFP’s recruitment of lumads claim that the motive of the military is to put them at the frontline in its ght against the New People’s

Army (NPA), and in the process, this transforms their communities into permanent battlegrounds (Ribaya, 2007). It has also been purported that the civilian recruitment of IPs is contradictory to the provisions stated in the IPRA, one of which is under Chapter 5, Section 22, prohibiting the recruitment of indigenous peoples “… for use against other ICCs/IPs.” The AFP, has negated these claims, stating that the recruitment of IPs, through self-volunteering, is part of the regular civilian recruitment for the CAFGU. This does not violate any laws and as a matter of fact, the recruitment constitutes the IPs’ constitutional right to self-protection, as provided in the IPRA. In 2001, then President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo enacted Administrative Order (AO) No. 18 (2001) which integrated qualied members

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the indigenous groups of the Philippines. This promotes diversity in the Armed Forces, albeit it is still not completely representative of the IPs in the country. However, majority of the criticisms on the steps taken by the government to bring in IPs into the AFP revolves around the central idea that the critics do not percieve the recruitment and integration processes as efforts to diversify the armed forces. Instead, these are seen as direct tactical approaches to augment the AFP’s counterinsurgency counterinsurge ncy operations. On the AFP’s part, it is yet to proclaim any intention to increase the ethnic diversity among its military personnel, or to aid in promoting equal opportunities among IPs and non-IPs. Based on the AFP’s latest operational plan, the IPSP “Bayanihan”, it will impose “training programs which give importance to indoctrination on... ethnic sensitivity, sensitivity, and indigenous peoples,” as part of its thrust to carry out Security Sector Reform



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(SSR) initiatives in its institution (AFP, 2010). It

that is culture-sensitive to IPs. Cultural awareness training for military personnel involved with recuited and integrated IPs and their corresponding ICCS could be conducted.

does not mention conducting further afrmative

action programs for IPs.

Due to the differences in cultures and traditions

Necessary Interventions

of the various ICCs/IPs, a “one-size-ts-all” IPs

The National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) is mandated to protect and promote the rights of the t he ICCs/IPs. Additionally, Additionally, the NCIP has the power to formulate policies and regulations for the proper implementation of IPRA. The commission was designed to function as an independent agency with its members being representative of IPs themselves (Muhi&Pasimio, 2009). As such, any actions to be taken concerning IPs will require the involvement of the NCIP.

employment strategy may not be feasible. Instead, there should be an overall general framework that will ensure a consistent approach for recruitment and retention, though the actual implementation

Therefore,

action

It is important to note, however, that afrmative

for greater ethnic diversity in the AFP must be jointly conducted by the NCIP, and theGeneral Headquarters (GHQ) since it is the policy-making arm of the AFP. However, both the NCIP and the AFP must have the desire and follow-through to create a military force whose cultural diversity will enrich the activities and operations of the Armed Forces.

action programs for IPs, the Armed Forces may take several years or decades to produce an increase in the representation of minorities among

initiation

of

afrmative

In order to effectively bring in IPs into the AFP,, an IPs employment strategy must be AFP crafted. The employment strategy must focus on the recruitment and retention (including integrated IPs) in the forces, including the creation of an inclusive environment and meaningful communication lines for IPs. To avoid violations of Rule V, Section 2 of IPRA which states that, “The state shall not require indigenous individuals to work for military purposes under discriminatory conditions,” the AFP must foster an environment, especially on the ground,

plans will utilize a more specic and nuanced

approached to account for the differences among the indigenous groups.

Implications in the Absence of Interventions

senior military ofcials. Without implementing meaningful afrmative

action programs for IPs, the armed forces will fail to benet from the unique inputs that could be

contributed by a culturally diverse AFP. Further, the armed forces will miss out on the opportunity to bridge its security operations and the indigenous communities. Further, initiating half-hearted or misguided afrmative action programs that will not effectively

improve the opportunities and progress of minority groups will only fuel the speculations of of groups accusing the AFP of using IPs for token roles.


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References: Administrative Order No. 18 of 2001, PROVIDING FOR THE INTEGRATION INTEGRATION OF QUALIFIED MEMBERS MEMBERS OF THE CORDILLERA PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY INTO THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, (2001): http://www.gov.ph/2001/08/31/administrative-order-no-18-s-2001/. Armed Forces of the Philippines-Civil Military Operations. “AFP to open recruitment for lumads.” Retrieved on October 30, 2012. http://afp-cmo.tripod.com/articles-2003/04-27-afp-to-open-reruitment-to-lumads.html. Armed Forces of the Philippines. “Internal peace and security plan ‘Bayanihan.’” Retrieved April 30, 2012. http://www.afp.mil.ph/ http://www.afp.mil.ph/ pdf/IPSP%20Bayanihan.pdf. National Commission for Culture and the Arts and Florendo (n.d.). “Ethnic History (Cordillera).” Retriev ed on November 14, 2012. http://www.ncca.gov.ph/about-culture-and-arts/articles-on-c-n-a/article.php?igm=2&i=192. Muhi, A.R. and Pasimio, J.P. “Legal overview of Philippine Indigenous Rights. Customary Land Rights in Southeast Asia Conference.” Retrieved on November 14, 2012. https://customarylandrightssea.wordpress.com/2009/10/22/going-beyond-theindigenous-peoples-rights-act-ipra-in-the-philippines-ana-rhia-muhi-legal-rights-and-natural-resources-center-friends-of-the-earth-philippines/. Republic of the Philippines, “Indigenou s Peoples’ Rights Act (IPRA).” Ofcial Gazette 94 (1997).

Ribaya, R.R. “Armed forces seek budget to hire 8.400 CAFGUs.” The Manila Bulletin. Retrieved October 31, 2012 from http:// www.mb.com.ph/node/36630#.UKWgYuQvXz4 National Commission for Culture and the Arts and Ulindang, F. (n.d.). “Lumad in Mindanao.” Retrieved November 14, 2012 from http://www.ncca.gov.ph/about-culture-and-arts/articles-on-c-n-a/article.php?igm=2&i=189. Montañez, Jaime Frumencio J. “The Need For Qualied Contracting Ofcers In The Armed Forces Of The Philppines (AFP)

Modernization Programme.” Thesis, Naval Post Graduate School, 2001.

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12 Self-Reliant Defense and People-Centered Security by Joseph

Raymond Franco


philippines

SELF-RELIANT DEFENSE AND PEOPLE-CENTERED SECURITY Sharing the vision and core principles of the Filipino First Policy, the Self-Reliant Defense Program (SRDP) was enacted through the late Ferdinand Marcos’ Presidential Decree (PD) 415 issued in 1974. The program was envisioned to enable the Philippine Government with a “self-reliant defense posture” through the promotion and/or establishment of strategic industries essential to national defense and security. The article provides a historical examination of SRDP’s development from its inception to its present state under the current administration. Citing various cases of local industries which once thrive under the auspices of SRDP, the article sheds light on the multiple factors that hindered its successful implementation. It asserts that that a combination of different factors – political, economic, and technical – continue to pose signicant challenges in pursuit of the country’s self-reliance objectives. Fund support from the government remains the primary obstacle to its effective implementation, further aggravated by policy arbitrariness, limited market base, and intermittent institutional and bureaucratic discontinuities. However, the article expresses optimism on the the country’s future self-reliance initiatives, taking into consideration the renewed interest of the new administration for indigenous defense materiel production. The recent success stories of ARMSCOR’ ARMSCOR’s s small arms industry and the joint Propmech Corp. – Philippine Iron Construction and Marine Works Inc.’s shipbuilding capability prove the viability of small arms and watercraft manufacturing in the country. In order to fully realize SRDP capability capability,, the article recommends greater policy interventions from the government through organizational/bureaucratic reforms and adequate funding allocation.

SOURCE: PAO AFP

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12 SELF-RELIANT DEFENSE AND PEOPLE-CENTERED SECURITY

philippines


Introduction

D

Developing self-sustaining capabilities is one of the hallmarks of a modern defense force. From an operational standpoint, a self-reliant Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) is better poised to contribute in fullling the goals, aspirations

and well-being of the Filipino people as a tool of national policy. Under the overarching theme of security sector reform (SSR) and “people-centered “people-center ed security,” a self-reliant defense posture has two strategic benets. First, it is

consistent with initiatives for enhanced civilian oversight over the military: with more independent means, the AFP could readily transition into a more depoliticized institution. Related to this is the issue of making the Philippine security sector more resilient in pursuing modernization effort, which unfortunately has become a ‘buyer’s market’. Second, self-reliant defense accrues benets for the whole nation by opening up

opportunities for synergy among industries/ commercial enterprises and the nascent defense industry. But except for a few success stories, the Self-Reliant Defense Program (SRDP) has largely failed to live up to expectations since it

began in March 19, 1974. 1 Nonetheless, optimism remains as recent initiatives in small-arms 2 and watercraft3 manufacturing show the potential rebirth of a defense industry in the Philippines. Thus, appropriate government intervention is necessary to encourage the growth and sustainment of these enterprises. Along with proper policy policy,, stakeholders must demonstrate commitment to the long-term gestation associated with building a viable defense industry. The passage of the 2011-2016 Philippine Development Plan (PDP) and the National Security Policy (NSP) marks an opportunity for policymakers and all stakeholders to bring SRDP into fruition. Amongst other specic

security

sector

reform

initiatives,

SRDP is fully aligned with the three broad strategies of the PDP, namely: for high and sustained economic growth; opportunities across geographic areas and across different income and social spectrum; and the implementation of effective and responsive social safety nets. SRDP can also be aligned with the earlier thrust of the P-Noy Aquino Aquino administration to pursue and encourage “public-private partnerships” (PPP) in various areas of the economy.

1 Presidenial Decree (PD) No. 415 o March 19, 1974, “Auhorizing he Secreary o Naiona Naionall Deense o ener ino deense conracs o

implemen projecs under he sel-relian deense programs and or oher purposes,”. 2 Te Governmen Arsenal has jus embarked on a projec o resar he in-counry producion o A-15 ype carbines and assaul rifles o mee

he domesic requiremens o he securiy secor, which includes he AFP and he Philippine Naional Police Police (PNP). 3 Propmech Corpora Corporaion ion (based in Subic Bay, Zambales) was awar awarded ded a conrac o build “he larges locally-buil naval vessel”, he BP

agbanua(A-296) in 2010. Te ship was subsequenly commissioned ino service by he Philippine Navy in November 2011. Propmech was also responsible or he consrucion o hree (3) Muli-Purpose Atack Craf (MPAC), “an all-Filipino designed and buil waercraf”�an improved and indigenized version o a aiwanese Coas Guard waercraf. Tese MPACs joined he Philippine Navy on 22 May 2012.


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A Review of the Self-Reliance Defense Program

AFP was entirely dependent on the American security umbrella with almost all ordnance and ammunition coming from US stockpile. In short, the SRDP was a response for the need to provide the AFP “necessary materiel to accomplish its mandate of upholding the sovereignty of the state and protecting the national territory.” 6

SRDP, the “Filipino First” policy, and the 1987 Constitution On March 19, 1974, Presidential Decree (PD) No. 4154 has initiated the Self-Reliant Defense Program, premised on the objective to attain a “self-reliant defense posture.” It was intended to establish strategic industries deemed necessary for national defense and security. Reecting

the zeitgeist at the time (i.e. the ascendance of import-substitution industrial policies) 5, PD 415 envisioned SRDP implementation to “generate

At the policy level, SRDP is a tacit continuation of the prevailing “Filipino First” policy that started with Republic Act (RA) 5183. 7 RA 5183, Section 1 states that: “No contract either through a public bidding or negotiated contract for the supply to, or

labor, spur industrial and commercial activities, and conserve foreign currency.” Funding

procurement by by,,

any

government-owned or

appropriated for SRDP was pegged at PhP 100 million annually under the purview of the Secretary of National Defense.

municipal corporation of materials, equipment,

controlled corporation, company, agency or goods and commodities shall be awarded to any contractor or bidder who is not a citizen of the Philippines or which is not a corporation or

Sans the ascendance of import-substitution policies in the Philippines’ external environment, the stronger imperative for SRDP was the prevailing internal security situation at the time. In the early seventies, the escalation of Muslim secessionism, specically the campaign waged

by Nur Misuari’s Moro National Liberation Front, shook up the government and brought to fore a strategic vulnerability. At that time, the

association at least sixty percent of the capital of which is owned by Filipino citizens…”

Decades on, the 1987 Constitution would reiterate this stance with Article II, Section 19 stating that “The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy.” It would be further stated in Article XIV, Section 10 that the State “shall support indigenous, appropriate,

4 Te ull ile o PD 415 is “Auhorizing he Secreary o Naional Deense o ener ino deense conracs o implemen projecs under he sel-

relian deense programs and or oher purposes”. 5 Impor-subs Impor-subsiuion iuion indusrial policies were firs adoped in Lain America in he 1970s as a resul o global oil shock. Te concep gained

currency amongs developing counries such as he Philippines as a proacive response response o offse he dominan posiion o oreign governmens and/ or mulinaional corporaions corporaions in local economies. 6 AFP Modernizaion Program Program Managemen Managemen Office, “Te Sel-elian Deense Deense Posure Posure Program winessing winessing a rebirh,” rebirh,” erieved a htp://www. htp://www.

ap.mil.ph/apmpmo/SDP/srdp.hml. 7 epublic Ac No. 5183 is known as “An ac regulaing he award o conracs or he supply o, or procuremen by, any governmen-owned or

conrolled corporaion, company, agency or municipal corporaion o maerials, equipmen, goods and commodiies, and providing penaly or he violaion hereo”.

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and

self-reliant

scientic

and

technological

capabilities, and their application to the t he country’s productive systems and national life.” SRDP’s mixed record

Other land warfare systems were also developed, but most only got as far as the t he concept development development phase; even fewer were built as actual prototypes such as the Santa Barbara11 multiple rocket launcher. Prototy Prototypes pes of more complex projects such as aircraft were seen with the Deant 12

The explicit support of the Philippine government government to SRDP has resultedin varying levels of success, mostly during the 1970s. But by 2002, the estimated PhP 4 billion spent on SRDP failed to achieve its main objective since the small number of industries established were most often not sustained.8 The various SRDP-related projects came in various forms, which included combat clothing and individual equipment for soldiers such as the AFP Bolo-Bayonet 9 and combat boots by the now-defunct, Marikina-based Ang Tibay brand. Vetronix Corporation, on the other hand, was able to manufacture locally in 1974, the URC-187 and URC-601 radios for frontline infantry units. The SRDP was able to produce relatively more complex items. To help satisfy the mobility requirements of the AFP’s ground (Army) and Constabulary units, Delta Motors started to manufacture the ¼ - ton “Mini-cruiser” in 1974, a jeep which became the most proliferated land mobility asset of the AFP.10

and Hummingbird 13 projects spearheaded by the state-run Philippine Aerospace Development Corporation (PADC), which, though not formally under the SRDP, followed the “spirit” of this initiative. Most of these projects, however, were terminated after funding and support dried up. While the PADC was never formally within the ambit of the SRDP14, it cannot be argued that its initiatives were fully aligned and advanced the objectives of PD 415. These examples demonstrate the inherent difculty

of

starting

projects

under

SRDP.

Research and development (R&D) requires substantive start-up costs and, more importantly, time for institutional knowledge to be accumulated and utilized. The success stories associated with SRDP did not come from in-house R&D by the Department of National Defense (DND) / AFP. One success story was achieved by a private corporation in the production of small arms with support from the Philippine government. As part

8 AFP Modernizaion Program Program Managemen Office, “Te Sel-elian Sel-elian Deense Posure Posure Program”. Program”. 9 Te Bolo-Bayone was an indigenously designed bayone incorporaing incorporaing eaures o he ubiquious jungle bolo. I was issued in limied numbers

o deployed inanry unis. 10 Carolina Hernandez, “Arms Procuremen and Producion Policies in he Philippines” in Chandran Jeshurun, ed. Arms and Deence in Souheas Asia (Singapore: Insiue Insiue o Souheas Asian Sudies, 1989). 11 Te Sana Barbara was a ruck-mouned muliple rocke launcher sysem, designed o complemen he howizers (large cannons), he later

solely comprised he invenory o AFP arillery unis. 12 Te Defian was an aircraf designed or pilo raining. raining. 13 Te Hummingbird Hummingbird wasdesigned and buil as a ligh helicoper. helicoper. 14 Currenly, he PADC is under he supervision o he Deparmen o ranspor and Communicaion (DOC).


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of the SRDP, Arms Corporation of the Philippines (ARMSCOR) developed in-house production capability for 5.56 mm ammunition used in the

Elisco Tool Manufacturing Company. 19 It is a little known fact that for nearly four years, from 1983 to 1987, the Philippines was able to be self-reliant

AFP’s standard-issue weapon, the M-16 rie.

in the production of standard-issue rearms used by the security forces. Facing nancial difculties

ARMSCOR credits itself as “one of the very few surviving SRDP participants, if not the only one” as a result of its business model which pursued the “commercial market and not relying solely on government contracts” (emphasis added). 15 Other positive examples of relatively successful SRDP is through license-based production of defense materiel. Still in service with the Philippine Navy are the 44-meter Aguinaldoclass patrol gunboats, which were built in the Philippines based on a West German design. 16 Decades later, the Philippine Army would lead the initiative for the in-country assembly of the Simba Fighting Vehicle 17 in Clark Field, Pampanga under license from GKN Simba by the Philippines’ Asian Armored Vehicle Technologies Corporation.18 While it was a licensed design, the domestic assembly of the Simba proved the viability of taking the initial steps for in-country armoured vehicle production. However, due to the limited production runs of the Simba, the start-up local corporation which undertook them either closed shop after the fulllment of their

contracts or reverted to their non-defense related core businesses. Elisco Tool: Tool: a missed opportunity opportunit y for self-reliance? self-relian ce? The most compelling case that illustrates the challenges faced by SRDP is the short-lived

in the United States, Armalite Inc. sold the rights for the production of the M-16 to the Elisco Tool Manufacturing in 1983. Inventory, tooling, and machinery were subsequently shipped from Armalite’s Sterling plant to the Philippines. Within a few months, fullscale production of the M-16 commenced and met the domestic requirements of the AFP. What terminated the operation of Elisco was the shift in government priorities in 1987, which emphasized other productive sectors of the economy. Elisco ceased production of the M-16, with its production assets falling into a decrepit state. Consequently Consequently,, Elisco ceded rights to the M-16 license, with most of its machinery sold as scrap by the mid-nineties. The Challenges to Self-Reliance

Hurdles faced by Philippine self-reliance initiatives are an amalgamation of different factors reecting the overall state of the economy and

society. An examination of the various SRDP projects discussed above reveal the multiple factors that hinder SRDP to take ight. Discussed

below are the political, economic, and technical factors that pose a challenge to self-reliance. Focus will be on the SRDP’s small arms and watercraft manufacturing experiences, together with analogous initiatives overseas.

production of the M-16 rie in the Philippines by

15 Quoes om AMSCO 70h Anniversary publicaion daed17 November 2011. 16 Tere are wo acive Aguinaldo-class ship bearing he pennan numbers PG-140 and PG-141. 17 Te Simba is he workhorse o he Philippine Army’s Army’s ligh armor and mechanized inanry unis. I replaced he Vienam-era Vienam-era M113 and V150

armored personnel carriers. 18 GKN is a Briish corporaion specializing in land warare sysems. 19 Te accoun o Elisco ool ool Manuacuring is culled om “A “A Hisorical eview o Armalie” daed 04 January 2010 by Armalie Inc.

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Political As the Elisco Tool case illustrates, SRDP initiatives suffer from changes in the priority of the national leadership. At the time of the acquisition of Armalite Inc. assets (1983), the in-country manufacturing of the AFP’s standard-issue M-16 rie not only marked a logistical/technical

milestone. It was also viewed as a political statement, an embodiment of national pride of being able to produce assault ries with little

dependence on foreign actors. Notwithstanding the positive nature of the Elisco acquisition, the production lines at Bataan were allowed to atrophy. Even earlier, another missed opportunity showed the impact of political expediency in hampering SRDP, this time in the more complex aircraft manufacturing sector. In 1968, the Philippines embarked on a project to convert the US Navy’s T-610 Pinto trainer aircraft into the Super Pinto. This variant was marketed by its proponent, American Jet Industries, as a low-cost light attack aircraft for counterinsurgency missions. By 1974, the Philippine Air Force’s Self-Reliant Development Wing bought the schematics, patents, and ight test data for the T-610, which led to the manufacture of the rst Super Pinto prototype, christened as the Cali Pinto. The rst

example, while built in the United States, was subsequently followed followed by a second unit; that was manufactured in the Philippines. Both prototypes were ight-tested over Manila. Unfortunately, Unfortunately, the

then Ministry of Defense pulled the plug off the project due to serious doubts over the commercial viability and marketability of the aircraft.

A decade later later,, a similar story would emerge, this time on the area of aircraft production. In the mid-nineties, a single-engine trainer plane called the Deant was designed and envisioned to fulll a counter-insurgency role. At the same

time, a prototype of a Philippine-made light utility helicopter named the Hummingbird was also completed. By July 1997, the Ramos administration authorized spending for the projects with the PADC spearheading the effort. Unfortunately, just a year after, the succeeding Estrada Presidency terminated both projects. 20 While both are non-military, non-SRDP projects, they would have nonetheless formed the core of a budding Philippine aerospace industry, which would have synergized well and strategically align itself with a prospective military aviation sector. sector. In general, the high degree of political patronage and support required for a defense contractor to ourish bodes ill for the SRDP. Political backing

for any project is co-terminus and co-dependent on the incumbent. As such, the time horizon for project gestation — from inception to fullscale manufacturing — becomes severely limited and short. This bodes ill for research and development, which is intrinsically timeconsuming and resource-intensive. Even simpler projects that do not require research and development incubation, the actual construction and manufacturing would take a substantive amount of time. The construction of the Tagbanua (to be described below) was an illustration of the challenges facing SRDP as a whole, “noteworthy for the numerous twists and turns in its three year run” which included the deferment of bid opening in eleven occassions. 21

20 htp://www htp://www.globalsecuriy .globalsecuriy.org/mili .org/miliary/world/philippi ary/world/philippines/indusry nes/indusry.hml. .hml. 21 htp://adroh.ph/apmodern/?p=845>.


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To further illustrate the long time horizons required by R&D, Singapore Technologies Kinetics (ST Kinetics) took nearly two decades before establishing the knowledge base,

In 1999, the AFP ofce primarily tasked to manage and implement the program, the Ofce of the

industrial capability, and nancial sustainability

main function to a division of the Ofce of Deputy

to produce the SAR-21, the Singaporean Armed Forces’ standard issue rie. 22 The AFP BoloBayonet case illustrates a type of “quick-win” project, reminiscent of backyard industries and the resulting low production outputs. Simply put, the temporality of political favors and the arbitrariness of political backing preclude the accumulation of long-term sustainable support needed for R&D.

Chief of Staff for Logistics (OJ4). 24 A succeeding reorganization did not fail to arrest the dilution of the SRDP, wherein 25 its functions were subsumed under the AFP Modernization Program Management Ofce (AFPMPMO) in 2004 26 . This implicitly sidelined SRDP projects as the AFPMPMO was more focused in administering

Organizational/Bureaucratic Arbitrariness in SRDP also manifests not only with the national leadership but within the defense and military establishment itself. The build-up institutional knowledge has been hampered by the cyclical activation-reactivation of units/entities which are indispensable to SRDP. Following PD 415, General Order (GO) No. 187 was issued which activated the Material Development Planning and Programming Ofce (OJ8) as a

Special Staff at the General Headquarters (GHQ), AFP..23 The OJ8 subsequently went several AFP restructurings and deactivation.

Deputy Chief of Staff for Materiel Development (OJ9) was deactivated in 1999, relegating its

and fullling secretariat functions in support of the

various AFP project management teams (PMTs) assigned to acquire defense materiel from foreign sources.27 This trend of institutional discontinuity was further illustrated by the reversion of OJ9/ AFPMPMO/SRDP functions functions back to the OJ4. The lack of attention to SRDP in recent years also seemed to manifest with the omission of provision of R&D funding. As late as the 2011 General Appropriations Act (GAA), an explanatory note for the DND under the sub-heading “Research, Feasibility Studies, Development Projects, and Test and Evaluations” stated that: “The Secretary of National Defense, upon direction of the President of the Philippines, and

22 S Kineics was incorporaed in 1967 as he Charer Indusries o Singapore wih he primary mission o making ordnance (i.e. ammuniion) ammuniion)

or he Singapor Singaporean ean Armed Forces Forces.. While here had been several small arms projecs made by he S Kineics, K ineics, only he SA-21 had a very exensive producion run. Use o S Kineics as an example is due o is analogous naure o he effor o Elisco o produce he M16 in-counry. 23 Hernandez, Arms Procuremen, 135. 24 AFP Modernizaion Program Program Managemen Office, “Te Sel-elian Sel-elian Deense Posure Posure Program” Program” 25 While he SDP is ormally under he Secreary o Naional Deense, he implemenaion implemenaion o projecs are under he effecive conrol o he Chie

o Saff, AFP. 26 “Big srucural reorms se a AFP; 3 offices o be abolished” Manila Bullein daed 27 December 2012. 27 Culled om “Issues and Concerns” secion o he 2007 AFP Modernizaion Program Annual epor.

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Reliant Defense Posture (SRDP) Program,

SRDP. While the intent of the law is laudable, in trying to stem corruption, it did not discriminate over the the distinct nature defense acquisitions. As stated in successive AFPMPMO reports, RA 9184 can hamper the purchase of either time-

including materiel requirements of the AFP

sensitive or classied military materiel. Further

on weapons and armaments, air and naval

compounding the problem is inherent tendency of start-up defense projects to lack institutional robustness. Simply put, there is a lack of nuance for the uniqueness of defense acquisition.

upon favorable recommendation of the Chief of Staff, AFP, is authorized to conduct research, feasibility studies, and development studies for projects planned and approved under the Self-

armaments, air and naval materiel requirements, ammunition, communication - electronics and quartermaster items, the cost of which shall be chargeable to the appropriations provided for the SRDP Program, Research and Development (R &

Economic/Commercial

D) Program and other special funds as provided by law. The Secretary of National Defense, upon

While government-provided nancial support is

favorable recommendation of the Chief of Staff, projects to private entrepreneurs or government

essential, public funding cannot and should not be expected to fully support manufacturers of defense materiel. After domestic security sector

scientic agencies when these are not within the

contracts are fullled, the local defense industry

capability of the AFP to undertake: PROVIDED,

should endeavor to tap outside markets, whether civilian or military. Without an expanded market base, it is just a matter of time before sunk and operating costs would diminish industry revenues and lead to bankruptcy.

AFP,, is likewise authorized to farm out R & D AFP

That the amount to be spent for such research, feasibility and development studies shall not exceed four percent (4%) of the contract price of the direct cost of each project.” (emphasis added)

Omission of this provision in the subsequent 2011 and 2012 GAA illustrates the lack of commitment in supporting SRDP. It neglects the fact that amount of PhP 100 million for SRDP. Without the provision on R&D, SRDP projects are deprived

Aside from possible public equity issues (i.e. the oft-quoted guns-and-butter dichotomy), heavy public subsidies are inimical to the market-oriented nature of the Philippine economy. Government should instead focus on creating a policy and political environment that would be conducive to

of specic legislative clause that would empower

defense industries. Specically, Specically, the “Filipino First”

stakeholders in the defense industry to obtain and leverage government support. It is a belated

Act (RA 5183), while laudable, limits the sources of capitalization for potential and existing defense manufacturers. As discussed earlier, R&D is inherently capital-intensive, with the necessary

PD 415, which is still in force, allocates a xed

reection of the declining support for SRDP, a

trend which started in the mid-nineties. 28

nancial resources not easily accessible from

Another complicating factor is the Government

domestic sources.

Procurement Act or RA 9184 which stied nascent

28 AFP Modernizaion Program Program Managemen Office, “Te Sel-elian Sel-elian Deense Posure Posure Program” Program”


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To illustrate, the sole commercially-viable SRDP company in the Philippines, ARMSCOR, thrived because it capitalized on economies of scale. Aside from the manufacture of ammunition required by the Philippine government, it also embarked on commercial products such as

economies of scale — as per-unit cost would be driven down by foreign sales. 32

hunting and sporting rearms. Anticipating the

nancial capital, another factor which prevents

relatively smaller non-government market in the Philippine domestic sector, ARMSCOR made exports to the United States a core business imperative.29 The ability to tap foreign markets is therefore a critical part of any defense-related corporation currently or potentially based in the Philippines. The key challenge here is to maintain the potential of private defense industries to support national policy objectives while not

the emergence of a self-reliant defense industry is the diminished state of industries in the Philippines. As early as 1998, it has been recognized that SRDP can only meet its full potential with deliberate and protracted “foreign procurement coupled with technology transfer”.33 The same Defense Policy Paper pointed out that it takes a long process to develop infant industries before it can be “initially capable of at least providing repair and maintenance support” and evolve into mature

prejudicing their protability—an protability—and d ultimately ultimately,, their

sustainability.

Technical Even with extensive government support or

industries with sufcient investment in research

Compounding this problem is the lack of an explicit and specied SRDP policy document. 30 Although PD 415 contained the underlying objectives and basic principles of the SRDP program and DND Circular 24 prescribed policies, organization and procedures in the management of SRDP projects, there is a perceived lack of an explicit program that denes priority areas for development. 31

Thus a gap between the development and the independence stages emerge. With the process of weaning away industries from government support still unclear, SRDP failed to benet from

and development. Ultimately, it will be capable of “providing upgrades and even move into the [commercial-scale] manufacture of defense products.” The most critical technical hurdle is the lack of a manufacturing base for defense industries. The substantive public public debt of PhP 1.46 trillion means there is no room for establishing an entirely new state-run weapons manufacturing complex. 35 But even with unlimited funding, efforts to jumpstart SRDP will be hampered by the lack

29 AMSCO secured an ISO 9001 cer ificaion in 1997 and claims o be he larges privaely-owned arms and ammuniion manuacurer manuacurer in

Souheas Asia. 30 AFP Modernizaion Program Managemen Office, “Te Sel-elian Deense Posure Program” Program” 31 Ibid. 32 Ibid. 33 From “Chaper 6-Policy Areas” 1998 Deense Policy Paper. 34 Ibid. 35 Philippine Deense oday, oday, “Susainab “Susainable le weapons manuacure manuacure in he Philippines.” Philippines.” erieved a htp://adroh.ph/?p=608. htp://adroh.ph/?p=608.

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of upstream industries. 36 Theoretically, although manufacturing may grow at an enormous rate, the technology of upstream industries may not be able to cope with the demands for specialized materials such as high-quality metals and alloys.

be self-sufcient in meeting its small arms needs.

Realizing Self-Reliance

years one to ve. An annual production rate of

Notwithstanding the challenging circumstances, self-reliant initiatives persisted, with recent initiatives demonstrating the viability of small arms and watercraft manufacturing in the Philippines. These two industries warrant special attention as they represent areas that exhibit a more established knowledge base and, at the same time, greater salience for the AFP. Small arms are the foundation of the inventory of any defense force, while watercraft is a necessary enabler for the AFP’s maritime strategy to secure the archipelago. Recent Developments In 2010, the Government Arsenal Arsenal (GA) embarked on a program to undertake in-house production of a line of ries based on M-16. 37 The project is intended to meet the requirement of the AFP for standard-issue and special purpose ries.

It includes the Recon/ Special Operations, Service Rie and Special Purpose Variants. 38

The end-state is for the Philippine Government to

Upon acquisition of manufacturing equipment at no cost to GA, the project will operate as part of a joint venture or similar agreement with another entity, most likely of foreign origin. Costs are estimated at PhP 1.4 billion for the joint venture with no cost to the government from 20,000 units is envisioned to meet AFP and PNP requirements. The following year, in November 2011, the Philippine Navy (PN) commissioned with the Fleet its rst 51.43-meter landing craft utility (LCU), the

Tagbanua (AT-296). 39 The Tagbanuas are jointly constructed by Propmech Corporation (engine and propulsion system) and the Philippine Iron Construction and Marine Works Inc. of Misamis Oriental (hull). The project is intended to provide the PN an additional “inter-island and coastal operations watercraft capable of logistics transport and amphibious operations.” Manned

by a crew of 15 members, the Tagbanua has a freight capacity of transporting 200 soldiers with a cargo space area of about 250 square meters, or a maximum of 110 tons. Specically, the ship

is optimized: “to transport combat personnel, vehicles, artillery equipment, and cargoes in support of military amphibious operations and secondarily, to perform noncombatant

36 AFP Modernizaion Program Program Managemen Office, “Te Sel-elian Sel-elian Deense Posure Posure Program” Program” 37 Jona Jonahan han C Marir, “Te Governmen Governmen Arsenal (GA) M-16 Manuacuring Manuacuring Projec,” GA Bulle-In Vol. Vol. 1 No. 2 (2011). 38 Te econ model adheres o he M-4A1 sysem as used by mos Wesern Wesern and allied Special Operaions Forces (SOF). Te Service rifle model

will replace he sandard service rifle or he AFP, A FP, he M16A1. Te Special purpose model is aa coninuing developmen om he 5.56mm Marine Scou Sniper ifle (MSS). 39 Business Mirror, Mirror, “Navy prepares or firs PHL-made landing craf.” erieved a htp://businessmirror.com.ph/home/na htp://businessmirror.com.ph/home/naion/19621-navyion/19621-navy-

prepares-or-firs-phl-made-lan prepares- or-firs-phl-made-landing-craf-. ding-craf-.


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evacuation, medical mission, disaster, rescue-and-relief operations and transportlogistic mission, in support to national socioeconomic projects of the government.” (Emphasis added)

The Tagbanua is the largest locally-manufactured Philippine Navy ship to date. 40 The previous record holder was the Marcos-era 44-meter Aguinaldo class class patrol gunboat. gunboat. The Tagbanua Tagbanua in comparison, is 51 meters, making it 15 meters longer than existing LCUs. Costing the DND PhP 189.934 million, it was intended to initiate a viable production line that would replace the exUS Navy LCU Mk.6s which were remnants of the Second World War. 41 The 2011 commissioning was the culmination of a protracted project management process, which started with the LCU being conceptualized as part of the 2002 Revised Reprioritized Project List of the AFP Capability Upgrade Program. Propmech would be involved in another project, this time for the construction of three (3) MultiPurpose Attack Craft (MPAC) via a joint venture with Safehull Marine Technologies echnologies,, costing PhP 268.9 million. 42 The high-speed MPACs can accommodate 16 soldiers each and is optimized for the insertion and extraction of special operations forces in hostile operational areas. Its ability to operate in harsh environments also makes it an appropriate asset for search and rescue mission in areas which could not be accessed by ordinary watercraft. 43

Policy Interventions These recent developments illustrate the nascent viability of defense contractors in the Philippines, notwithstanding the multi-faceted challenges. Hence, the response of all stakeholders through policy interventions should also be comprehensiv comprehensive e as well. This paper argues for broad strokes to reinvigorate the edgling defense corporations in

the Philippines. At the level of national policy policy,, the symbiotic relationship between SRDP and the wider national development agenda should be fully emphasized. A new SRDP plan should both complement and support the proposed 2011-2016 National Development Development Plan. It would not sufce to have vague references to SRDP. Specic, time-

bound project goals should be conceptualized with consultation of the widest stakeholder base. To initiate an industry-wide knowledge base, sustained research and monitoring process should be considered to periodically determine policy gaps. For instance, the PADC’s organizational and institutional relationship with the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) needs to be reconsidered. One option is to enhance its interactions with entities such as the PAF, which would in effect bring the producers of materiel to their most important stakeholder: the prospective end-users. At the same time, legislation pertaining to acquisitions (RA 9184) must be reviewed periodically reviewed to ensure that it does not stie innovation.

40 Philippine Deense oday, oday, “Landing “Landing Craf Uiliy Uiliy acquisiion projec.” projec.” erieved a htp://adroh.ph/apmodern/?p=845. htp://adroh.ph/apmodern/?p=845. 41 Ibid. 42 Philippine

Sar, “Only one firm bids or P 276-M Navy craf.” erieved a htp://www htp://www.philsar .philsar.com/Aricle. .com/Aricle.

aspx?aricleId=635716&publicaionSubCaegory aspx?aricleId=635716&publicaio nSubCaegoryId=63. Id=63. 43 Ibid.

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Next, it must be stressed that policy intervention by the government should ensure that local industries are weaned off direct support (i.e. government funding) or indirect assistance (i.e. tariffs and non-tariff barriers to competing products) once local defense corporations achieve a viable level of sustainability. Admittedly, the threshold for industry independence would have to be made on a case-to-case basis, albeit with

Memoranda of Understanding or processes for liaising between government / defense entities and corporate stakeholders.

well-dened general criteria. Sans these criteria, it would sufce in the interim to explicitly inform

local defense manufacturers that government assistance (nancial/non-nancial) would not be provided indenitely. inde nitely. To To reiterate the th e points raised

earlier, it is imperative that local defense materiel earlier, be marketed not only domestically. Fixation over cornering the relatively small Philippine market would only lead to a repeat of the short-lived life cycles of local corporations in the defense industry. Finally, it must be recognized that government and government-led institutions do not have a monopoly over good management practices— especially in the realm of R&D and constructing viable business models. Corporate or private stakeholders must be brought on board. A critical requirement is for a publicly-known, transparent SRDP Roadmap that would highlight which

Funding Requirements (Long-term) Aside from a responsive policy policy,, a critical requirement for SRDP is adequate funding. The following prescriptions require a longer time horizon due to the need for legislative action. As discussed above, funding from the government should be focused on jumpstarting entities that can demonstrate viability. First, the synergy between the SRDP and the AFP Modernization Program (formally known as Republic Act 7898) must be enhanced and fully institutionalized. The lapse of the AFPMP and the current initiative to legislate an extension (Senate Bill 3164) is an opportunity to highlight its dynamics. Supplemental funding set aside for the AFPMP has been proven effective in stimulating the acquisition process (i.e. the AFP Capability Upgrade Program or CUP). A similar, separate funding stream for SRDP should be considered as well. 44 To emphasize the nuanced appreciation required by SRDP within the context of the AFPMP, the government should consider legislating a specic SRDP Law along the lines of the lapsed

pitch in, in support of the overarching national goal of attaining a self-reliant defense force. The thrust of the government should be on providing the institutional framework to operationalize the PPPs being promoted by the government. Operationalizing PPP would require going beyond speaking engagements with the plethora of chambers of commerce and business (i.e the Makati Business Club). This should include basic steps such as the creation of templates for

RA 7898 or SB 3164 that is currently being deliberated on. While there is nothing nothing intrinsically undesirable about the subsuming of the SRDP to the broader AFPMP, it would insulate the former from the sudden shifts in modernization-related acquisitions. For example, a deterioration of the internal security environment in 2003 (due to the 2003 Buliok Campaign) led to the Capability Upgrade Program, which relegated acquisitions of external defense-related materiel as a secondary priority.


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Funding Requirements (Short-term) In the interim, there are funding policies that can be pursued which could lead to quick wins and serve to initiate the protracted process of building a knowledge base for SRDP. For starters, the SRDP would benet from the reinstatement of

the four-percent clause found in the pre-2011 GAAs. To further the funding of SRDP projects, appropriations should be allocated to specic line items, not simply as discretionary nancing by the Ofce of the Secretary of National Defense

(OSND). This proposal is not in any way an attempt to circumvent civilian oversight for SRDP but to make sure that even with operational imperatives, SRDP funding is not sidelined inadvertent as it may be. To maximize this prospective funding, limited as it may be, a specic SRDP fund can be handled as

a venture capital fund. The DND, with its military and government stakeholders, can disseminate or publicize defense-related requirements, accept unsolicited project proposals, or consider potential dual-use projects for integration with security sector procurement plans. Companies with potential potenti al would then be provided seed money. If needed, the government can act as guarantors for such corporation to apply for nancing

from government or government operated and controlled corporations (GOCCs) such as the Development Bank of the Philippines.

The selection criteria could follow on the tack proposed in a 2002 policy paper that would see SRDP: “SRDP programs should give emphasis on projects for which the country has comparative advantages and should avoid one-shot projects or projects whose economic viability is doubtful. Beyond achieving defense self-reliance, a local defense industry, arising from today’s self-reliant defense posture programs, will provide employment opportunities, enhance the depth and diversity of the Filipino’s technological expertise and help build an industrial base for economic growth.”45

Conclusion The preceding discussion presents the challenges and opportunities in attaining a selfreliant defense posture. While there have been signicant setbacks and substantive hurdles,

small successes have shown the potential for indigenous defense corporations to thrive and prosper. The multi-faceted nature of problems requires a comprehensive approach by all stakeholders both public and private. The thrust of the Aquino administration to engage the entire nation — the Filipino people as a collective force — bodes well for a self-reliant defense posture. In the short-term, feasible policy and nancial

interventions must be made available to jumpstart SRDP. Ultimately, these small successes will

44 For several years, he AFP Capabiliy Upgrade Program (an inernal-securiy ocused sub-program o he AFPMP) was provided PhP 5

billion annually. I allowed he AFP o expedie he acquisiion o mission-criical equipmen or orward-deployed unis. Te specific capabiliies acquired were ocused on move-shoo-communicae abiliy or inanry unis. Te CUP also had a specific ocus on improving he individual survivabiliy o soldiers in he field hrough he procuremen procuremen o Comba Lie Saver kis.

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accrue towards a deliberate and sustainable SRDP initiative. What is needed now is for the political will and commitment to see through the

vision of having a modern, professional security sector which is in step with the well-being and prosperity of the Filipino nation.

SOURCE: 4TH SPECIAL FORCES BA BATT TTALION, ALION, AFP


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13 AFP Regional Security and Defense Cooperation by Melanie

Rodulfo-Veril


philippines

AFP REGIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENSE COOPERATION The Philippines, despite the country’s strategic advantages from its geographic positioning, has perennially been challenged by a multitude of security issues emanating from a volatile regional environment. Having a military force force that has relatively outmoded materiel and equipment, the country remains vulnerable to traditional and non-traditional regional security concerns capped by rival claims over the South China Sea, instability in the Korean peninsula, environmental hazards due to climate change, and political and economic impacts of oil dependency and rapid expansion of emerging industrialized states. The article provides a substantial overview of the AFP’s International Defense and Security Engagement (IDSE) framework. It highlights relevant defense cooperation arrangements entered by the Philippine Government, through the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), with allied countries and strategic partners such as the United States, Australia, South Korea, and the ASEAN. The implementation of AFP’s AFP’s IDSE serves as an essential component of the government’s national policies and strategies aimed at establishing a credible AFP which is capable of addressing the myriad of threats and challenges to national security. Moreover, leveraging on its cooperative cooperative framework, the Philippines can gain a stronger stance for the promotion of its interests interests over key geopolitical and strategic security security issues (e.g. (e.g. expedition of a binding Code of Conduct or establishment of a Joint Authority over the South China Sea). In conclusion, the article calls for the enhancement of the country’s bilateral and multilateral security-defense cooperative engagements toward maximizing derived benets in pursuit of national interests. Comprehensive review and/or reassessment of various policies and IDSE programs are strongly recommended to enhance relations with emerging powers (i.e. China) and to support prevailing defense programs programs (i.e. prioritization of defense materiel materiel and equipment transfer or acquisition to support shift to territorial defense operations).

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13 AFP REGIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENSE COOPERATION

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T

The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) is striving to promote defense and security cooperation based on the principles of equality,

national interest. 2

mutual benet and full respect of sovereignty

Sea dispute has remained a potential ash point as

with the desire of strengthening mutual cooperation at the operational level. The AFP remains committed to the promotion of regional and international peace and stability through its continued presence and involvement in various international engagements. 1

concerned countries have different perspectives

The Philippine Security Landscape As a country located in a politically strategic, but environmentally environmental ly cataclysmic area, the Philippines is inundated with several security challenges topped by a number of potential ash points in

the region. With the politics of oil, geopolitics of navigation and politics of marine resources, there is no doubt that the West Philippine Sea will remain a primary security challenge in the Philippines’ relations with claimant nations, most recently with that

Nevertheless, over the years, the West Philippine

in resolving their conicting positions. China

favors bilateral negotiations, and subsequently opposes internationalization of the issue and the involvement of the US. On the other hand, multilateral negotiation is favored by ASEAN member-claimants, including the Philippines, which strongly pushes elevating the issue to the International Tribunal on the Laws of the Sea. 3 However, the multilateralism was constantly repudiated by China, which maintains its claim to undisputed sovereignty over the West Philippine Sea. In response, President Aquino in his 2011 State of the Nation Address Address (SONA) said that the Philippines is prepared to use military force to protect its territory in the t he West Philippine Sea and subsequently ordered the fast tracking of the new programs for AFP modernization to support this objective.4 The security in the Korean peninsula also remains

of China. The potential economic benets from

a potential ash point with the North and South

the resources in the contested islands and the political leverage derived from effective control of the area is urging countries in the region to an arms race thereby increasing tensions and rigidities among claimant states’ militaries and affecting the regional security. Despite not siding with any of the claimant states, The US declares and upholds the freedom of navigation in the West Philippine Sea an integral component of its

Korea, in principle, still at war. Recent North Korean missile tests and continued proliferation of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons development program have not discounted the possibility of military conict in the peninsula.

Filipinos living in South Korea will be the main concern of the Philippines with a number of its citizens estimated at 70,000 permanently residing in said countries based on ofcial records

1 Office o he Depuy Chie o Saff or Plans, “Te ole  ole o he Armed Forces o he Philippines in egional Securiy.” 2008. 2 Zha, Daoijing, “Securiy in he Souh China Sea,” Alernaives: Global, Local, Poliical 26 (2001) 3-51. 3 Carolina Hernandez, “Changing Discourse on Securiy: 1946 o he Presen,” in Enhancing Philippine Naional Securiy Agains Exernal

Trea epor and Seleced Paper Discussion, ed. owena Pangilinan (Quezon Ciy: Asian Cener, Universiy o he Philippines, Diliman, 2008). 4 Baviera ,Aileen San Pablo Pablo.. Te Souh China Sea Dispues: Is he Aquino Way he ‘ASEAN Way’?. Singapor Singapore: e: ajaranam School o

Inernaional Inernai onal Sudies Singapore. Singapore. 2012.


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with another estimated 14,000 - 15,000 Filipinos undocumented.5 With North Korea embarrassed by the failed missile launch in April 2012, tensions between the two Koreas and instability in the entire East Asian region are not completely tempered and may even be exacerbated by the strong possibility of future missile launches by North Korea.

and environmental degradation, this current phenomena creates greater unprecedented risks to the country. The most prominent of these

A full full blown China-T China-Taiwan aiwan armed conict will also

have serious repercussions on the Philippines. Although “unlikely “unlikely,, but not impossible”, crossstrait conict has a spill-over impact to Philippine

interests wherein the eventual war between the mainland China and Taiwan will jeopardize the safety of its citizens in the said territories.6 Most Philippine security policies are still anchored on the realist perspective which centers on the protection of the country’s territorial integrity and sovereignty from possible aggression and threat intentions of other states. The theory downplays the effects of non-traditional security issues which, in recent years, have emerged as more urgent concerns among states.7 Most critical of which are climate change and disaster management. Climate change is apparent, and with increasing populations

environmental risks is evident in the signicant

increase in the number and intensity of storms and weather disturbances which have occurred in the Philippines in recent years. 8 In 2010 alone, the country was severely affected by at least 22 typhoons, to include super typhoons Ondoy and Pepeng which left nearly 1,000 people dead and resulted in about USD 700 million damages in infrastructures particularly those around Manila. 9 In 2013, super typhoon Yolanda caused catastrophic damages to affected provinces. The Philippines is still on its way to recovery from the destruction the typhoon left on its wake. In the last decade, on average, more than 200 million people were affected and about 10,000 people were killed by disaster and calamities in the country which accounts to 25 percent of the world total. The extent of these damages to life and property caused by these disasters is comparable to that caused by war.10 Given the impact of environmental hazards brought about by natural disasters to national security, the AFP has been deputized and delegated with an expanded role and involvement in disaster management.11

5 Esplanada, Jerry. Jerry. “Philippines readies readies evacuaion evacuaion o Filipinos Filipinos in Souh Korea”. Korea”. March 27, 2012. Inquirer Inquirer.. Ne.

erieved om: htp://globalna htp://globalnaion.inqui ion.inquirer rer.ne/30565/philip .ne/30565/philippines-readies-evacu pines-readies-evacuaion-o-filipino aion-o-filipinos-in-souh-korea. s-in-souh-korea. 6 Hernandez, Carolina. “Changing Discourse on Securiy: 1946 o he Presen” in Pangilinan, owena (ed).”Enhancing Philippine Naional

Securiy Agains Exernal Trea” epor and Seleced Paper Discussion Quezon Ciy: Asian Cener, Universiy o he Philippines, Diliman. 2008. 7 Ibid. 8 Habio, Cielio F. Climae Change and Naional Developmen. A presenaion made a he Meeing on Climae Change and Naional

Developmen in he Philippines, held on November 8, 2002 a he Jusii Jusiiaa oom,  oom, Aeneo Proessional Schools, ockwell Cener Cener,, Makai Ciy, Philippines. 9 H.Y H.Y.. Kim, “Disaser Managemen In Asia: Where Are We Now?,” Asian Journal o Public Affairs 3 (2010). 10 USAID, 2008. erieved om: www.a www.ausaid.gov usaid.gov.au/hotopi .au/hotopics/pd/AIDF_Feasi cs/pd/AIDF_Feasibiliy_Sudy_epor_annex6-10.pd biliy_Sudy_epor_annex6-10.pd.. 11 Dencio Acop, “Assessing he Expanded ole o he Armed For Forces ces o he Philippines in NaionNaion-Building.” Building.” Asia-Pacific Social Science eview.

erieved om htp://www htp://www.dlsu.edu.ph/r .dlsu.edu.ph/research/jou esearch/journals/apssr/p rnals/apssr/pd/200612/science_5.pd d/200612/science_5.pd..

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Moreover, though the Philippines is classied as

of the various international engagements of the AFP is facilitated through the interaction of three (3) key different systems: the J5-network [i.e. overseeing of the overall IDSE implementation in accordance with the country’s security-defense security-defense agreements); the J2-network (i.e. utilization of the intelligence network through the various Defense Armed Forces Attaché (DAFA)]; and, J4-network (logistics network).

an oil-importing country, energy security remains underappreciated in the country. The country’s dependence on oil and coal as energy sources accounts for 50 percent of its electricity, with the remainder sourced from renewable energy sources. A recent recent study suggests that the country may suffer from potentially dangerous energy shortage in the future. 12 China, with its expanding economy realized this early on and has been hoarding oil for its reserves since 2008 which add to the build up in global oil demand. This can also explain their increased movements in the Spratlys for the search of oil elds, and

construction of dams in the Mekong region for hydroelectric power. 13

Call a Friend: AFP’s Strategic Networking and Defense Cooperation In the previous article, it was explained that the country has limited defense capability to address these challenges. Amidst gaps and shortfalls in the modernization of AFP, the defense department relies on cooperation and relationship with its friends and allies to uphold its mission and objectives. Consistent with national policies and strategies, the AFP continues to leverage its alliances and engagements with foreign militaries to augment and/or enhance its sorry-state capability to effectively address and respond to security threats. 14 The implementatio implementation n

For the Philippines, its alliance with the US continues to be its single, most important bilateral relationship. 15 Albeit the withdrawal of US military bases in the Philippines in 1992, the treaty allies have maintained their cooperative ties through the regular conduct of joint military activities on counterterrorism and maritime security. The relationship was further strengthened through the recent signing in 2011 of the “Manila Declaration” by US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and DFA Secretary Albert F. del Rosario. The joint declaration “reafrmed

the bilateral security relationship and called for multilateral talks to resolve maritime disputes in the region” in the American’s “return to Southeast Asia.”16 In June 2011, the Philippines submitted to Pentagon a “wish list” of military equipment for securing the country’s maritime territory. The US has likewise provided an initial fund for the Coast Watch System. 17 PH-US cooperation also extends to humanitarian assistance and disaster response, civil-military operations, and peacekeeping operations among

12 Kevin Punzalan, “Aquino’ “Aquino’s Challenge: Energy Securiy,” SIS Commenaries (2010). 13 Carolyn Cui, “Chi “China na Seen Bolsering Oil eserves.” Te Wall Sree Journal. erieved om htp://online.wsj.com/aricle/SB10001424052 htp://online.wsj.com/aricle/SB10001424052

702304587704577335722040019632.hml. 14 Office o he Depuy Chie o Saff or Plans, “Te Sraegic Direcion o AFP Inernai Inernaional onal Miliary Affairs,” 2010. 15 Ibid. 16 Tomas Lum, ”Te epublic o he Philippines and U.S. Ineress,” (Washingon: (Washingon: Congressional esearch Services, 2012). 17 Pia Lee-Brago, “US willing o help Phl ge F-16 jes,” Te Philippine Sar Sar,, erieved December 25, 2011 om htp://www htp://www.philsar .philsar.com/ .com/

Aricle.aspx?aricleId=761971. Aricle.aspx?aricleI d=761971.


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others. Despite the entrenched relationship of the two countries, the strength of this relationship will be tested on whether the US will support the Philippines in case tensions in the West Philippine

capability enhancement.” This is manifested by the USD 90 million worth of military assistance from South Korea. The AFP continues to support the Honor Guard Company which provides ceremonial security and support to the United Nations Command (Korea) in the 38 h Parallel pursuant to the Treaty of Armistice between the Two Koreas. The Philippines, Philippines, being one of the original parties who partook in the Korean War was given honorary slots to this “Company” which is part of functions of the current DAFA in South Korea.21

Sea escalate into an armed conict.

The Philippines also sees Australia and South Korea as potential allies. Next to the US, Australia is the largest provider of training to AFP personnel under the Defense Cooperation Programme (DCP). The Australian government has provided assistance to the Philippines on counter-terrorism (CT) in the wake of the US-led global war on terrorism in 2002 18 and have likewise assisted the maritime needs analysis (MANA) to determine specic requirements for the Coast Watch South

(CWS)19 project initiatives. Most importantly, with the recent concurrence of the Philippine Senate

Other agreements on Defense and Logistics Cooperation were also forged with countries such as Spain, Japan, India, and United Kingdom. These countries have uttered their willingness to assist in the AFP modernization.

with the ratication of the Status of Visiting

Forces Agreement (SOVFA) between the two, military cooperation between the Philippine and Australia are expected to become more robust in the coming years through the conduct of more military-to-military trainings and engagements. 20

Power of 10: The Role of ASEAN As a member of the ASEAN, the Philippines is committed to the establishment of a peaceful region which is free of conict and anchored

Common security concerns also strengthens Philippines-South Philippines-So uth Korea defense relations which was formalized under an MOU on Logistics and Defense Industry Cooperation. Under this agreement, the two countries “assist each other through defense logistics and defense industry agencies and manufacturers and the development of a workable framework for

on a friendly and cooperative relationship. The armed forces of ASEAN nations recognizes the need for a strong ASEAN Security Community (ASC), which acknowledges the principle of comprehensive security, security, and commits to address the broad political, economic, social and cultural aspects of building an ASEAN Community. It also acknowledges that political and social stability,

18 ______. Living Living in he Shadow o he Hegemon: Philippine-Ausr Philippine-Ausralian alian elaions elaions and and he Global Global War War agains agains errorism errorism Ausralasia Ausralasiann Poliical Poliical

Sudies Associaion Conerence. Universiy Universiy o New Casle 25-27 Sepember 2006. 19 Te Coas Wach Wach Souh (CWS) is a naional mechanism or securing he borders and addressing mariime securiy o he Souhern Philippines.

I is envisioned o sage a surveillance, conrol and response response capabiliy covering he criical mariime domain o he Sulu and Celebes Seas. I is a coordinaing body or join civil, miliary and law enorcemen surveillance and response operaions. Tis has been urher expanded o he Coas coordinaing Wach Sysem which covers a bigger sraegic mariime area. 20 IMA , 2010. 21 Dr Dr.. Azmi Ma Akhir, “ASEAN “ASEAN egional Securiy: Te Treas Facing i and he Way Way Forward,” Forward,” erieved April 10 2006 om htp://www.

aseansec.org/18394.hm.

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economic prosperity, narrowed development gap, poverty alleviation and reduction of social disparity would constitute a strong foundation for a sustained ASC given the ASEAN’s subscription to the principle of comprehensive security. 22 To complement this goal of attaining an ASC, ASEAN strongly encourages military-to-milita military-to-military ry engagements among ASEAN member-states to further facilitate community cooperation and shared identity in the region. It recognizes defense cooperation and synergy among ASEAN militaries as important elements in preserving the peace and security of the region. This is because Defense Security Cooperation involves the provision of nancial and technical support,

transfer of defense materiel, provision of training and services to allies, and promotion of military-tomilitary contacts. It fosters and oversees securitycooperation arrangements and promotes security relationships among allies or partner countries. The goal is to lead, resource, and educate the Defense Security Cooperation community in order to shape, rene and execute innovative security

solutions for partners in support of their respective national interest, and regional or global security. In realizing the Blueprint for establishing ASEAN Political-Security Community, the Association has increased cooperation activities, establishing the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting (ADMM) which is the highest ministerial defense and security consultative and cooperative mechanism for regional security issues among the ASEAN Member States.23

philippines

Within the framework of ADMM, besides preparatory meetings such as ASEAN Defense Senior Ofcials’ Meeting (ADSOM) and ADSOM

Working Group (WG), it is worth to mention the Track II Network of ASEAN Defense Institutions (NADI) as a supporting tool for the ADMM. Founded in 2007, NADI is a forum where scholars and researchers in ASEAN meet and exchange insights and perspectives on defense and security matters that are relevant to ADMM, with a view of seeking innovative recommendations to ADMM. ASEAN military-to-militar military-to-militaryy cooperative activities have been conducted at various levels through the conduct of annual or regular top-level military meetings such as ASEAN Chiefs of Defense Forces Informal Meeting - ACDFIM (since 2001), ASEAN Chiefs of Army Multilateral Meeting ACAMM (since 2000), ASEAN Navy Interaction – ANI (since 2001) ASEAN Air Force Chiefs Conference - AACC (since 2004) and ASEAN Military Intelligent Informal Meeting (AMIIM). All in all, the growth and expansion of military-to-military interaction and cooperation have contributed to building mutual condence and understanding,

thus, deepening and strengthening solidarity among ASEAN defense forces. 24 With regard to external cooperative relations, ASEAN has been increasing the defense cooperation with its partners outside the region under the framework of the ASEAN Regional

22 VieNew VieNews,s, “Briefing on developmens o ASE AN deence and miliary coopera cooperaion ion by ADMM+ ADM M+ Chairman,” erieved Ocober 12, 2010 om

htp://www.dzimes.n htp://www .dzimes.ne/pos/pol e/pos/poliics/briefing-on-developmen iics/briefing-on-developmens-o-asean-deence-and-mili s-o-asean-deence-and-miliary-cooperaionary-cooperaion-by-admm-chairman.as by-admm-chairman.aspx. px. 23 “Briefing on developmens o ASEAN deence and miliary cooperaion by ADMM+ Chairman” VieNews, 12 Ocober 2010, htp://www.

dzimes.ne/pos/poliics/briefing-on-developmens-o-ase dzimes.ne/pos/polii cs/briefing-on-developmens-o-asean-deence-and-milia an-deence-and-miliary-cooperaion-by-admm-c ry-cooperaion-by-admm-chairman.asp hairman.aspx. x. 24 al Emmers, “Te De-Escalaion o he Spraly Dispue in Sino-Souheas Asian elaions,” SIS Working Paper Paper Series (2007).


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Forum (ARF), specically the ARF Security Policy Conference (ASPC), ARF Defense Ofcials’

recognized principles of international law and the UNCLOS”.26 However, the DOC implementing guideline was just adopted in 2011. This however is non-binding, and a policy with more teeth and hold is needed to manage tensions between ASEAN claimant states and China. 27

Dialogue (DOD) and ARF Heads of Defense Universities/ Colleges/ Institutions Meeting (HDUCIM). At these meetings, participants engage in extensive discussions on regional security issues, taking stock of the role of defense establishments in the evolving regional security architecture, and mapping out future plans for ARF defense cooperation aimed at boosting the experience exchange in maritime security, HADR, natural disaster and climate change. ASEAN political instruments also continue to inuence condence building measures, preventive diplomacy, and conict resolution

among members. These instruments include the Declaration on Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN 1971), the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TACSEA (TACSEA 1976), and the Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone (SEANWFZ (SEANWF Z 1995). To address the issue on West Philippine Sea, claimant countries signed the ASEAN Declaration on the Conduct (DOC) of Parties in the West Philippine Sea in 2002. 25 Aside from the Philippines, other ASEAN member claimants are Malaysia, Vietnam, and Brunei. However, competing claims on the ownership of the islands continue to be a source of security anxieties in the area. The DOC elucidates that “parties reafrmed their respect to the freedom of navigation in and over ight

above the SCS, as provided for by universally

The ASEAN must strengthen its security cooperation mechanisms and guideline, institutionalize the peaceful resolution of conict and make these binding on member-

states. Because of the securitization of many non-traditional threats, 28 ASEAN militaries must synergize their roles thru the framework of the ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint. This Blueprint Blueprint aims to intensify intensify shared responsibility on regional security by ASEAN member states.29 To do this, ASEAN militaries must lay the groundwork for information sharing, mutual support and assistance, especially on common security concerns. Second, a common understanding on the promotion and protection of human rights as an essential element of human security is also recommended. Realistic assessment of the defense capabilities of ASEAN militaries is necessary in order to outline cohesive responsibilities or roles and to ensure transparency of military actions among members. Finally, continuous dialogue and exchange on best practices in defense security and peace operations that are applicable at the regional level must be promoted.

25 Emmers, al, “Te De-Escalaion De-Escalaion o he Spraly Dispue Dispue in Sino-Souheas Sino-Souheas Asian elaions”, SIS Working Working Paper Paper Series(6 June 2007). 26 ommel Banloi, Philippines-China Securiy elaions:  elaions: Curren Issues and Emerging Concerns, (Quezon Ciy: Philippine Insiue or Peace,

Violence and errorism esearch, 2012). 27 Office o Sraegic and Special Sudies, Briefing or he New Commander in Chie (Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon Ciy: Office o Sraegic and

Special Sudies, July 2010). 28 Office o Sraegic and Special Sudies, Briefing or he New Commander in Chie (Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon Ciy: Office o Sraegic and

Special Sudies, July 2010). 29 “Chinese Drilling Ship Leaves Dispued Waers,” Japan Economic Newswire, November 4, 1992.

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To address the tensions in the West Philippine Sea, a legally-binding regional Code of Conduct in the West Philippine Sea that is aimed to establish an open and co-operative engagement framework in the area should be pursued. A creation of a joint authority dedicated to common development of resources within the Spratlys area may also be adopted as a logical solution for a territorial disputes as convoluted as this one the West Philippine Sea case. Establishing a “Spratly Resource Development Authority” Authority” would be consistent with statements by the Chinese government which aver that while sovereignty over the Spratly Islands is non-negotiable, joint ventures to exploit the natural resources of the West Philippine Sea may be discussed. 30 Thus, a kind of multilateral “Authority” analogous to that for mining the deep seabed in the 1982 LOS Convention may be established, which would be responsible for managing resource exploitation, including sheries, the environment, and safety

of navigation.31 Measures of engaging all the parties for a discussion must be explored to resolve the issue; otherwise a status quo will likely prevail and will be most favorable to the country with the most dominating military force China. 32

The Prospects for AFP Advantage Despite all challenges, the AFP is committed to have a professional and capable armed force responsive to various challenges confronting the Philippines and the region where it is situated. While the AFP is on the process of modernizing

its capabilities, the Philippines aims to bolster and leverage its alliances. 33 In reality, however proactive the Philippines is, it lacks the power to fully leverage. In addition, despite the willingness of allies and partners for mutual defense agreements, defense materiel transfer is often not utilized or maximized since the Philippines does not have excess or even advanced materiel worthy of being exchanged. For this reason, the Philippines can use its reliable human resources activities such as peacekeeping missions, training and education exchange, where the AFP has vast experience, as the bargaining piece. The exchange of military exercises has been consistent in the Philippines particularly with the United States. To enhance its military operations other than war (MOOTW) capabilities, the AFP conducts bilateral and multilateral exercises with the US such as the Balikatan Exercises. The AFP also regularly participates in the Southeast Asia Cooperation Against Terrorism (SEACAT) which is a regional cooperation mechanism in support of cooperative response to terrorism and transnational crimes at sea. Since the Mutual Defense Treaty with the US is the only defense treaty of the Philippines, it must therefore be maximized. A review to reprioritize U.S. security assistance programs to make them responsive to the AFP’s shift from internal security to territorial defense is essential.34 The Pentagon and AFP can also explore acquisition of defense equipment (newer and not just Excess Defense

30 Mark J. Valencia, Valencia, “A “A Spraly Soluion,” Soluion,” Far Easern Easern Economic eview (1994). 31 Valencia, Mark J. “A Spraly Soluion,” Far Easern Economic eview (31 March 1994): 1. 32 Dagdag, 2011. 33 enao Cruz De Casro, ”Balancing Gambis in weny-Firs Cenury Philippine Foreign Policy Gains and Possible Demise?,” Souheas

Asian Affairs (2011). 34 De Casro, “Balancing “Balancing Gambis”.


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Articles) through Foreign Military Sales (FMS) since government-to-government transactions are faster than the bidding process of the AFP.

engage with China, and curb the view that China is an imminent threat. The AFP must play the “China Card” to gain diplomatic leverage. 35 The AFP must be clever in the international playing

In the midst of issues and tensions in West Philippine Sea, the Philippines must learn to

eld, as they say; countries have no hearts but

only national interest to protect.

35 De Casro, enao Cruz. “Balancing Gambis in w weny-Firs eny-Firs Cenury Philippine Foreign Policy Gains and Possible Demise?” Souheas

Asian Affairs, 2011. Kim, H.Y.. “Disaster Management in Asia: Where Are We

References:

Now?.” Asian Journal of Public Affairs 3 (2010). Banlaoi, Rommel C. “Broadening Philippine-Australia Defence Relations in the Post 9/11 Era: Issues and Prospects.” Contemporary Southeast Asia, 2003.

______. “Living in the Shadow of the Hegemon: Philippine Australian Relations and the Global War against Terrorism”, Australasian Political Studies Association Conference.

Baviera, Aileen San Pablo. The South China Sea Disputes: Is the Aquino Way the ‘ASEAN Way’?. Singapore: Rajaratnam School of International Studies Singapore. 2012.

University of New Castle: 2006. Long, Bernard Fook Wen. “Transforming the Strategic Landscape of Southeast Asia.” Contemporary Southeast Asia

Baviera, Aileen San Pedro. “China-Philippines Relations:

27 (2005): 388-405.

Cautious Cooperation.” Hawaii: Asia-Pacic Center for

Lum, Thomas. The Republic of the Philippines and U.S.

Security Studies, 2004.

Interests. Washington: Congressional Research Services,

Chau, Andrew. “Security Community and Southeast Asia: Australia, the U.S., and ASEAN’s Counter-T Counter-Terror.” error.” Asian Survey 48 (2008): 626-649.

2012. Ofce of Strategic and Special Studies. Brieng for the New Commander in Chief. Quezon City: Ofce of Strategic and

De Castro, Renato Cruz. “Balancing Gambits in TwentyFirst Century Philippine Foreign Policy Gains and Possible Demise?” Southeast Asian Affairs (2011).

Special Studies, 2010. Ofce of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans. “The Role of the

Armed Forces of the Philippines in Regional Security.” Security.” 2008.

Emmers, Ralf, “The De-Escalation of the Spratly Dispute in Sino-Southeast Asian Relations”, RSIS Working Paper Series

Ofce of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans. “The Strategic

Direction of AFP International Military Affairs.” 2010.

(2007). Habito,

Cielito

F.

“Climate

Change

and

National

Development.” Paper presented at the Meeting on Climate Change and National Development in the Justitia Room, Ateneo professional Schools, Rockwell Center, Makati City, Philippines Philippines, November 8, 2002. Hernandez, Carolina. “Changing Discourse on Security:

Pangilinan, Rowena. “Enhancing Philippine National Decurity Against External Threat.” Report and Selected Paper Discussion Quezon City: Asian Center, University of the Philippines, Diliman. 2008. Punzalan, Kevin. “Aquino’s Challenge: Energy Security.” RSIS Commentaries. 2010.

1946 to the Present.” In Enhancing Philippine National

Valencia, Mark. “A Spratly Solution.” Far Eastern Economic

Security Against External Threat Report and Selected Paper

Review, 1994.

Discussion, edited by Rowena Pangilinan. Quezon City: Asian Center, University of the Philippines, Diliman, Diliman, 2008).

Zha, Daoijing. “Security in the South China Sea.” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 26 (2001): 3-51.

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14 The Evolving Evolving Role of the AFP:

Skewing Tow Towards ards Non-Traditional Roles by MERENIZA

C GOMEZ

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THE EVOLVING ROLE OF THE AFP: SKEWING TOWA TOWARDS RDS NONNON-TRADITIONAL TRADITIONAL ROLES In international relations, security is associated with sovereignty while focusing on deterrence, power balancing, and military military strategy strategy.. Traditionally raditionally,, security is equated with the non-existence of military threat and protecting the state from subversion and attacks posed by external forces. In the post-cold war era, security has broadened to include unprecedented and emerging sources of insecurity such as terrorism, transnational crimes, health crises, environmental degradation, hunger, unemployment, social conicts, and political repression. This changing concept of security consequently reshapes a military’ military’s s mission, which was evident in the case of the Philippines and its armed forces. The author discusses the changing roles of the AFP and how these affect not just the military but also civilian actors. The author also examines the various factors that redene the capacities of the members of the armed forces. After examining the evolving role of the AFP AFP,, the author concludes that the changing concept of security continues to dictate how militaries of the modern world behave. Thus, refocusing military operations to non-traditional security concerns is not a zero-sum scenario, ‘where the performance of one is detrimental detrimental to the other.’ other.’

SOURCE: PAO AFP

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14 THE EVOLVING ROLE OF THE AFP: SKEWING TOWARDS NON-TRADITIONAL ROLES


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“The AFP of the 21st century shall be a highly effective, technologically driven, efcient combatant but socially oriented institution; it shall possess the versatility to undertake non-military roles in aid of development and governance and its members shall remain role models for the Philippine citizenry.”

include terrorism, transnational crimes, health crises, environmental degradation, hunger,

- The AFP 2020 Vision

Introduction

I

In international relations, security has been conventionally associated with the concepts of sovereignty, often with focus on the dimensions of deterrence, power balancing, and military strategy.1 In its traditional sense, security is equated with the non-existence of military threat, or is identied with safeguarding a state from

subversion and attack posed by the external forces.2 Since the decline of the Cold War Era, security has evolved from being a single function of geo-politics and power-balancing of major powers into a nexus of economic, political, and societal forces.3 Thus, security has broadened broadened its scope scope to include prevalent, often unprecedented and emerging, non-traditional sources of insecurity. These alternative sources of security challenges

unemployment, social conicts, and political

repression, among others. 4 This changing concept of security continues to reshape a military’s mission, and this has been evident in the case of the t he Philippines and its armed forces. Since its formation more than a century ago, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) has played an important, if not a central role, in the process of nation-building and state formation over the past decades. The primary mission of the AFP is “to protect the people and secure the sovereignty of the state and the integrity of the national territory.” 5 However, as the concept of national security becomes conventionally more comprehensive, the basic role of the AFP broadens from a traditional defense and military force into an agent of political, social, and economic development in the country. 6 This backdrop frames the discussion on the changing roles of the AFP and how these emerging new roles affect not just the military but also the civilian sectors. It will identify various factors that redene the capacities of the military

over time and present some possible scenarios for the AFP as it is continuously inuenced inuenced by the

changing concept of security.

1 Bouin and an, an, Non- Non-radiion radiional al Securiy Issues in Souheas Asia (Singapore: (Singapore: Insiue Insiue o Deense and and Sraegic Sudies, 2001). 2 Ibid., p. p. 6. 3 E. ohschild, “Wha is Securiy?,” Daedalus 124 (1995): 53-98. 4 Bouin and an, an, Non- Non-radiion radiional al Securiy Issues. 5 1987 Philippine Consiuion. Consiuion. Secion 2 o Aricle II Declarai Declaraion on o Principles and Sae Policies, p. 2. 6 C. Hernandez, “Conrolling Asia’s Armed Forces.” (Inernaional Forum or Democraic Sudies, 1996).


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The Traditional Roles of the AFP The evolving concept of security has been inuential in shaping and dening the AFP’s

mission. The 2002 National Military Strategy (NMS), which sets the strategic direction of the military leadership, identies ve mission

objectives on how the AFP shall address the various threats to national security. security. Among these mission objectives, only two can be construed as traditional roles: 1. 2.

to maintain territorial integrity and defend the national territory; and, protect the exclusive economic zone (EEZ).

Maintain territorial integrity and defend the national territory. As provided in the Philippine Constitution, the AFP shall be the protector of the people and the state. 7 In line with this mandate, territorial defense remains the top priority mission of the AFP AFP.. This means that it is the core responsibility of the AFP to ensure that the country’s vital interests are protected and that all intrusion into the national territory by external aggressors are detected, identied, identied, documented,

intercepted, and if necessary, neutralized. Territorial defense ensures the dominance of the state powers over all Philippine-claimed territories and features, including airspace and territorial seas, and the prevention of any dismemberment, encroachment, or foreign occupation over these areas.8 Protect the EEZ. Protection of the EEZ is paramount to defending and upholding sovereignty over national territory and territorial

claims and likewise, is of utmost importance in the pursuit of the Philippine’s economic and strategic interests. The overlapping EEZ in the West Philippine Sea (WPS) shared by at least six Asian countries and territories has adversely affected the relations of claimant countries and has since been regarded as a potential ashpoint for military conict in the region. The continued military

developments and the increasing aggressive stance and show of force in the contested WPS area pose serious threats to national security. security.

The Non-Traditional Roles of the AFP The remainder of the mission objectives identied in the NMS can be classied as non-traditional.

These include: 1. 2. 3.

decisively defeat all armed armed internal security threats; contribute to regional peace peace and stability; and, support national development.

Decisively defeat all armed internal security threats. As a result of the country’s persistent insurgency problem, the AFP has assumed responsibility over the government’s internal security operations (ISO) by virtue of Republic Act (RA) 8551.9 Although internal security presupposes comprehensive solutions and approaches, AFP’s focused military operations remain at the center of the government’s efforts to suppress insurgency, reduce internal armed threats, and subsequently establish peace and order in conict areas.

7 1987 Philippine Consiui Consiuion. on. 8 AFP Naional Naional Miliary Sraegy (2002). 9 Hermogenes C. Esperon, “Progress in Couner-errorism: Te Philippine Experience” (paper presened a he 6h Shangri-La Dialogue,

Inernaional Inernaio nal Insiue Insiue or Sraegic Sudies, Singapore, Singapore, June June 2-4, 2007).

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Contribute to regional peace and stability. The AFP supports the government’s diplomatic initiatives through continuous participation

occupation of the Philippines that the concept

in

condence-building

measures,

security

dialogues, and other defense cooperation activities with with allies and friends. friends. In consonance consonance with national policies, the AFP shall implement and participate in various bilateral and multilateral engagements with foreign partners to further national security and interests. Support national development. National development is of paramount importance to national security. security. It is for this reason that the AFP has always been tapped to perform peacetime roles in support of infrastructure, disaster relief and rehabilitation, search and rescue, protection of national resources, preservation of the environment, and civic action, among others.

Looking into the Factors: Catalysts for Change Various factors can be accounted as major catalysts for the changing roles of the military. Issues regarding professionalism and politicization of the AFP remain the greatest challenges the Philippine military as an institution must face. Lack of professionalism emanates from within the armed forces while politicization comes from the outside of the AFP.

of a “professional armed forces” was rst

introduce d. A professi introduced. professional onal military would mean an rmed force that possesses expertise in managing violence, has an unwavering responsibility to the state, and a corporate interest of protecting its traditions and organizations.10 The signing of various bilateral defense agreements, such as the Military Bases and Military Assistance Agreements in 1947 and the Mutual Defense Treaty Treaty in 1951, paved the t he way for the institutionalization of an independen independentt Philippine military.. The nascent AFP’s culture, military culture, equipage, equipage, organization, training, education, doctrines, operations, logistics, and personnel management were all patterned after the US military systems. The professionalization of military personnel was further facilitated through the creation of the Joint US Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG), which was instituted to give advice to the AFP and supervise the implementation of various military agreements between the US and the Philippines.11 The professionalism of the military, however, deteriorated in the post-World War era. With some elements of the military joining the insurgencies against the newly-formed government, the Defense Department, under then Secretary Ramon Magsaysay, introduced reforms in the training and equipage of the armed forces in order to boost their morale and ghting

Historically, the native Filipino ghters who

mounted the resistance against Spanish and American colonizers colonizers were driven by deep martial martial traditions of bravery, sacrice, resourcefulness,

and ingenuity. ingenuity. It was only during the American

performance.12 The role of the AFP further expanded with the creation of the Economic Development Corps (EDCOR), which took charge of giving resettlement areas to rebel returnees in the process of reintegration.

10 S.E. Finer, Te Man on Horseback (Colorado, (Colorado, USA: Wesview Press, 1988), 20-21. 11 Cesar P. Pobre, Hisory o he Armed Forces o he Filipino People (Quezon Ciy: New Day Publishers, 2000) ,76.


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Under the Marcos administration, the AFP became a “close partner” of the government for national development under the “New Society” movement. movement. In addition addition to suppressing violence and lawlessness, the military performed substantial socio-economic roles. Former President Marcos, although for a different reason,

The role of the RAM in the restoration of democracy enabled the AFP to regain the trust

“deployed the AFP in development projects, particularly in areas where civilian agencies lacked the resources to undertake the project themselves.” 13 But beyond being a partner in

As such, it is the AFP’s core responsibili responsibility ty to be the guardian of democracy, the Constitution, and people’s freedom and liberties.

nation-building, the AFP became the regime’s self-preservation apparatus, used to suppress the opposition, control media, and curtail the people’s freedom of expression.

However, the same provisions of the Constitution However, which legitimize the role of the military are being used by some sectors to justify its involvement in the political affairs, claiming that as the protector of public interest, the AFP must support calls to unseat an incumbent president. Even with a regime change, there remain clear indications that the military are not entirely free from political partisanship. This phenomenon of military interference has been evident through various coups d’état that have challenged postMarcos presidencies. Notable among these were the series of coup attempts against President Corazon Aquino between 1987 and 1989, the military’s withdrawal of support from President Joseph Estrada in 2001, the failed Oakwood Mutiny in 2003, and the unsuccessful withdrawal of support by two Brigade Commanders in 2006 during the term of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo.

The imposition of martial law exposed the military’s vulnerability to patronage politics and corruption as it was made to t o perpetuate politicians in power, thereby effectively alienating it from public interest. This resulted in public distrust against the regime and the military, with many people joining the communist movement and the t he middle class demanding drastic political reforms. The politicization of the military however took its toll on the dictatorship and the AFP as calls for reforms brew within the uniformed services. The assassination of then Senator Benigno Aquino Jr. in 1983 became an impetus for the creation of the REFORM the Armed Forces Movement (RAM) by young military ofcers in 1985. 14 Calling for reforms in the military, military, RAM became instrumental in the ouster of the dictatorship as its failed coup d’état spurred the rst People Power Revolution

in February 1986.

and condence of the Filipino people as the

military was perceived to be a powerful balancing force in the nation’s political life. Meanwhile, the role of the AFP as the “protector of the people and the State” was codied in the 1987 Constitution.15

The political interferences of military elements in recent years are manifestations of continued, if not renewed, calls for reforms within the t he organization.

12 Paricio N. N. Abinales and Donna J.J. Amoroso, Sae Sae and Sociey in he Philippines, (USA: owman and Litlefield Publisher, Publisher, 2005), 196. 13 Paricio N. Abinales, “American Miliary Presence in he Souhern Philippines: A Compar Comparaive aive Hisori Hisorical cal Overview.” (Eas Wes Cener

Working Papers, 2004), 196. 14 Te acronym .E.F.  .E.F.O..M. O..M. mean esore Ehics Fair-mindedness Order igheousness and Morale. 15 1987 Philippine Consiuion, Aricle II, Secion 3.

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The thwarted Oakwood mutiny resulted in the creation of the Feliciano Fact-Finding Commission by former President Arroyo to investigate the incident. incident. The report acknowledged acknowledged the “reality and legitimacy” of the grievances of

Philippines was able to save more than USD 7 Billion for a ten-year period of US bases presence in the country.19

the disgruntled junior military ofcers involved

as compelling factors to execute such mutiny. 16 The report concluded that the issues of graft and corruption and the poor conditions of soldiers in combat operations create a “powerful emotive force” for soldiers to be easily recruited to stage coup attempts. 17 These grievances of the mutineers have underscored the need for corruption control mechanisms and modernization of the AFP.

The US Connection The enactment of the Military Bases Agreement between the US and the Philippine governments in 1947 ensured a large American military presence in its former colony. With American bases operating in the country, the AFP was able

The greatest challenge to the Philippine security framework came upon the non-renewal and the eventual closure of American military bases in 1992. The eviction eviction of of the military forces severely reduced the strong deterrence of the country against external aggression and the signicant

amount of military assistance needed to develop AFP’s capabilities. capabilities. Albeit presenting presenting opportunities opportunities for the Philippine government to assert full sovereignty and independence, the capability of the AFP to defend the state and national territory has since deteriora deteriorated. ted. Similarly, even the AFP’s capability to address internal security concerns has weakened in order to sustain both combat and non-combat operations. To date, the current armed forces lacks a credible defense capability due to the government’s inability to acquire new equipment for the AFP or, at the very least, even maintain the military’s ageing equipment.

to benet from US military assistance through

military capability upgrade and training, while extending a security umbrella for the Philippines. Territorial defense of the country was guaranteed through the air and naval support of the US forces.18 Moreover, the Philippine Government logically gained savings in defense expenditures, which were further complemented by additional compensation and grants in return for allowing American bases to operate in the country country.. Between 1980-1989 alone, it is estimated that the

From Modernization to Back-to-Basics Losing the security benets from the US military

bases in the country, it became imperative for the Philippines to modernize the capabilities of the military to effectively perform its constitutional mandate. In 1995, the Philippine Congress enacted Republic Act (RA) 7898, otherwise known as the AFP Modernization Act in order to t o develop a self-reliant and a credible strategic armed

16 Florenino P. Feliciano, “epor on he Fac-Finding Commission.” (Pasay Ciy: 2003), 36. 17 Ibid. 18 aymund Jose G. Quilop, Bilaeralism, egional Securiy and he Philippine-US Alliance (OSS Working Paper) (Quezon Ciy: Office o

Sraegic and Special Sudies, AFP, 1999), 8. 19 Eribero C. Varona, Varona, “An “An Economic Analysis o he US Miliary Miliary Bases in he Philippines” (Tesis). (Tesis).


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force which is capable of defending sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Philippines and preserve national patrimony. Under the law, the AFP’s Modernization Program was intended to be implemented over a period of 15 years with

all funds for the Trust Fund were sourced out from the AFP’s share from proceeds of subsequent bases conversion, from the Government Arsenal, Arsenal, sale of excess AFP assets, and the Malampaya Gas Project, from which the AFP received PhP 1 billion. Despite the law authorizing the Congress to appropriate annual funds for AFP modernization modernization,, it was only in 2007 that appropriations was made by the Congress amounting to PhP 5 billion. Almost twelve (12) years into the program, the Trust fund only holds roughly 36 percent of the PhP 50 billion intended

a PhP 50 billion budget ceiling for the rst ve

years. The program’s program’s implementation implementation was to be funded through the AFP Modernization Act Trust Fund (the breakdown shown in Figure 1) which was to be sourced out mainly through the annual appropriations by Congress and other prescribed complementary sources. 20

for the rst ve years of the modernization

However, no funds were allocated by Congress for the modernization program in its nascent years. It is only through the AFP’s initiative that the Modernization Trust Fund was initially

program. Notwithstanding the fact that while the PhP 50 billion should have been appropriated by the National Government, only PhP 10 billion has been disbursed to date.

nanced using the AFP’s share from the proceeds

of the sale of Fort Bonifacio in 2002, amounting to PhP 5.4 billion. For more more than half of the intended duration of the modernization program,

Aside from the expected appropriations from Congress, the sale and lease of military lands through the BCDA has been a primary source of GA REMITTANCES

Figure 1: AFP Modernization Trust Fund

51,257,165 FY 2007 GAA

0%

5,000,000,000

BCDA Shares

27%

6,943,770,376 39%

MNGP Proceeds 1,000,000,000 5% FY 2002 GAA Source: AFP MPMO

5,000,000,000 28%

BCDA Shares 271,144,000 1%

20 In addiion addiion o he he annual appropria appropriaions ions made by he Congress, Congress, R 7898 provides ha ha he AFP Modernizaion Ac rus rus shall also be sourced sourced

ou hrough he proceeds o he sale, lease, or join developmen o miliary reservaions no covered under he Bases Conversion Developmen Auhoriy (BCDA); shares o he AFP om he proceeds o he sale o miliary camps; proceeds om om he sale o he producs o he Governmen Arsenal; proceeds om he disposal o excess and/or uneconomically repair repairable able equipmen and oher movable asses o he AFP and he Governmen Arsenal; unds om budgeary surplus, i any, as may be auhorized by Congress; and, all ineres income o he rus und.

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the Modernization Fund. RA 7227, as amended by RA 7917, stipulates that the AFP shall receive a 35 percent share from the proceeds of sale or transfers of military camps while the rest of the proceeds are then to be divided up to at least fteen (15) other government agencies. 21 The logic of these government agencies receiving shares from the proceeds of military camps is being questioned by the Feliciano Commission, especially since the functions of these said agencies are deemed “non-military-related” . Moreover, the Commission recommended that the shares allocated to the AFP Modernization Program should be increased substantially. The Commission held that it appears only reasonable that all the “proceeds from the sales of military land should be shared only by the AFP (for its modernization program) and the BCDA.” 22 Indeed, if the 37.5 percent of the proceeds being shared by said government agencies were to be shared solely by the Modernization Program and the BCDA, there would be a considerable increase of much needed resources for the Modernization Program.

of the Trust Fund. As of the end of 2006, the Trust Fund has already generated PhP 256.77 million in interest income. Given that this interest income is earned by the Trust Fund, it is but logical that the said amount be transferred from the Bureau of Treasury to the Trust Fund. It would also be worthy to look at the possibility of exempting the said interest income from tax deductions to maximize the various of resources for the Trust Fund. This would remain true to the spirit behind the creation of the Trust Fund, which is ensuring peak and sustained availability of funds for projects under the program.

Another issue that demands attention is that while the Trust Fund generates its own interest income, these earnings are deposited with the Bureau of Treasury and therefore do not form part

The insufciency of the Trust Fund is further

aggravated by the continuous tapering of the AFP annual budget, which is distinct and separate from the modernization appropriation. Not only is the AFP now faced with the responsibility of stepping up and lling in the air and naval support

lost from the US bases pullout, it was also forced into a dwindling budget. As shown shown in Figure 2 , the budget appropriated to the AFP vis-à-vis the country’s real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has been on a continuous decline in the most recent years: from 1.42 percent percent in 2002, to 1.29 1.29 percent in 2003, 1.14 percent in 2004, 1.00 percent in 2005, and 0.90 percent in 2006. Notably, the country’s budget for defense in 2006 is even

21 Secion 1 (d) o R 7917 daed February 24, 1995, names he ollowing governmen agencies: BCDA (27.5%), Naional Housing Housing Auhoriy;

Naional Naion al Home Morgage Finance Corpora Corporaion ion and Home Insura Insurance nce and Guarany Corporai Corporaion on (12%); Philippine Healh Insura Insurance nce Corpora Corporaion ion (3%); Deparmen o Public Works and Highways and Deparmen o ransporaion and Communicaions (5%); Philippine Veerans Affairs Office (2%); Commission on Higher Educaion (1%); Deparmen o Science and echnology (2%); Office o he Secreary, Deparmen o Jusice and he Ombudsman (1%); Naional Bureau o Invesigaion, Invesigaion, Bureau o Correcions, Philippine Naional Police Police and he Bureau o Jail Managemen and Penology Penology (2% bu no o exceed P2 Billion); Supreme Cour Cour o he Philippines and he Lower Cours, Sandiganbayan, Sandiganbayan, Cour o Appeals and Cour o ax Appeals (1% bu no o exceed P1 Billion); Deparmen o Educaion, Culure Culure and Spors and Deparmen o Social Welare and Developmen (2%); Deparmen o Labor and Employmen (½% bu no o exceed P5 Million); Deparmen o Social Welare and Developmen (1%); Moun Pinaubo Assisance, ehabiliaio ehabiliaionn and Developmen Fund (3%); and he Philippine Economic Zone Auhoriy (2%). 22 Te epor o he Fac Finding Commission Pursuan Pursuan o Adminisraive Order No. 78 o he Presiden o he epublic o he Philippines Daed

July 30, 2003, Par Par Tree, Ocober 17, 2003, p. 142. 142.


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smaller compared to the budget in 1991 when the US military bases were still in the country.

air and naval support from US bases, and the absence of bases compensation. It thus comes as no surprise that from one of the nest armed

Equally important to delve into is how the annual appropriations of the AFP are being spent. On average, average, 70 percent of the total AFP appropriations are used to compensate personnel services, while the remainder is primarily used to sustain its operations. On the other hand, capital outlay receives very minimal funding, which could have been used to complement the Modernization Trust Fund for capability upgrade and acquisition. The decline in AFP appropriations and the virtually non-existent allocation for capital outlay have been detrimental to the AFP modernization, which was further worsened by the reduction in military assistance from the US, the loss of

forces in Asia, Philippine defense capability is now considered as “a perennial joke within ASEAN” and “the weakest military force among ASEAN states”.23 This sentiment is shared by Zachary Abuza of the U.S. Institute of Peace, who discredited the role of AFP in the regional security arena since it has “almost no navy” and and its “ability to protect its exclusive economic zones and maritime resources is nil.” 24

Unfortunately, the Philippine Government could not easily brush off these criticisms as the AFP itself concedes to the fact that the military has long been burdened with capability challenges. A capability assessment of the AFP in 2007 reported various inadequacies and gaps in the military’s

Figure 2: Real AFP Appropriations (% of Real GDP) 2.50 %

2.00 %

1.50 %

1.00 %

0.50 %

0.00 % 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06

Source: AFP RMO

TOTAL AFP APPROPRIATIONS

CAPITAL OUTLAY

23 Sheldon W. Simon, “Asian Armed Forces: Inernal and Exernal asks and Capabiliies,” NB Analysis, Accessed May 2000, htp://www.

aiwandocumens.org/nbr01.pd. 24 Carlos H. Conde, “Corrupion roubles Philippine Miliary,” Inernaional Herald ribune, Accessed htp://www.ih.com/

aricles/2005/05/25/news/ phils.php phils.php..

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adeptness to support both traditional and nontraditional operations. 25 The apparent incapability of the AFP for territorial defense, or for some, the “lack of it”26 , can be summarized as follows:

aircraft, and mine sweeping capabilities for modern naval warfare. Serviceability of air air assets, with ages averaging almost 30 years, is likewise low due to insufcient funds for

maintenance, communication support, and •

•

The Philippine Air Force does not have a credible air defense capability to perform its mission of territorial defense. 27 It does not have any modern air-defense, surveillance, airlift, and ground attack capabilities. 28 Its air assets cannot fully conduct and sustain operations,29 particularly with its ghter

night-ying capabilities. 30 •

Army has no modern re The Philippine Army control systems. It has no air defense system and anti-aircraft weapons except for small arms and machine guns. Similarly, the Army has no capability for inshore defense

eet being severely depleted with the

except for the re support assets of the

decommissioning of the F-5s. Its surveillance decommissioning surveillance equipment are either obsolete or nonfunctional and its radars are unable to provide nationwide coverage. Meanwhile, most air bases do not even meet the requirements of a standard air force base.

infantry divisions. Communication equipment

The Philippine Navy is greatly challenged in the conduct of maritime defense over the country’s territorial waters and and EEZ. Out of the Philippine Navy’s more than 50 patrol ships, ten are almost almost 50 years old. A limited limited number of naval assets are also worsened by the non-existence of anti-submarine, anti-

The modernization of AFP’s capability for territorial defense was further encumbered by the shifted focus towards internal security operations.

are likewise insufcient while intelligence

highly relies on human assets and lacks technological capability. Mobility assets, logistics support, and bases maintenance are also hampered by lack of funds. 31

In 2005, the AFP leadership implemented the rst

block of the military’s Capability Capability Upgrade Program (CUP), which was dubbed as “back to basics”. The upgrade of AFP capabilities was focused

25Office o he Depuy Chie o Saff or Plans, J5, AFP, A FP, AFP Capabiliy Capabiliy Assessmen epor, Sepember 2007. 26 Kahleen C. Villamin, as quoed in enao Cruz De Casro and Waler Lohman, “U.S.–Philippines “U.S.–Philippines Parnership in he Cause o Mariime

Deense,” Te Heriage Foundaion, Augus 8, 2011, Asia-Pacific Secion, Accessed htp://www htp://www.heriage.o .heriage.org/research/r rg/research/repors/2011/08/usepors/2011/08/us philippines-parnership-in-he-cause-o-m philippines-p arnership-in-he-cause-o-mariime-deense#_fnre ariime-deense#_fnre19. 19. 27 Office o he Depuy Chie o Saff or Plans, AFP Capabiliy Assessmen epor. 28 De Casro and Lohhan, Lohhan, “US-Philippines Parnership Parnership in he Cause o Mariime Mariime Deense.” 29Te AFP Capabiliy Assessmen epor saes ha he F-5s o he Air Force, is las flee o figher jes,have reached peak perormance and

were evenually decommissioned afer more han hree decades in operaion. Is curren air asses mainly composed o he S-211s, which are primarily rainer rainer aircrafs, aircrafs, and and OV-10As, OV-10As, which are are primarily primarily as observaion observaion aircrafs aircrafs bu bu are convered ino ino de aco aco bombers or inernal inernal securiy operaions, are old and lack he necessary capabiliies. Te MG-520s are he only ligh atack helicoper o he PAF. operaions, PAF. Is flyable aircrafs are are decreasing in number. number. Lack o armamens has also become one o is main problems aside om is lack o insrumenaion or nigh flying missions. 30 AFP Capabiliy Assessmen epor. 31 Ibid.


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on providing the basic and critical capabilities to support internal security operations, such as

of a security paradigm shift is the utilization of the military in operations other than war, wherein

mobility, repower, communications, command

armed forces will no longer be employed just to ght

and control, force protection, and combat life support for individuals individuals and units. An examination of the procurement program would reveal that

wars but also to support peacetime government activities to achieve national objectives.

one of the rst items procured are for force

In the absence of any clear external threats to the national territory or indications of external aggression against the state, the future mission and activities of the AFP are likely to be driven by non-traditional security challenges. This shifting role of the military is not completely remote to AFP as the military military has been utilized utilized not to solely solely confront threats to national security that emanates externally, but also those that exist within its territorial boundaries. That is, the AFP has since been at the forefront of the government’s counter-insurgency efforts, despite such operations being constabulary and not traditionally military in nature.

protection such as helmets, body armor, and combat life-saver kits, which are generally considered and should have been basic and regular provisions to soldiers on the ground. In addition to its internal security functions, the AFP also takes an active role in support of the government’s national development initiatives. Notable among these is the use of the military’s engineering brigades to support infrastructure projects such as roads, bridges, school building, core shelters, and water systems. Taking into consideration all of these expanded roles of the military, substantial increase in the AFP’s budget is an apparent imperative. imperativ e. On the contrary, contrary, the AFP remains hard-pressed to spread its meager resources to cover both its core and expanded missions.

What Lies Ahead? Possible Scenarios for the AFP The traditional professional specialization of soldiery is ghting wars. That is, the military’s

traditional role is to ensure the continued existence of the state amidst external threats of aggression. However, the conclusion of the Cold War era has signicantly changed the

international security landscape wherein threats no longer come primarily from outside the state’s territorial boundaries as given the emergence of non-traditional security threats such as terrorism and climate change. Corollary

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Given the geographic exposure of the country to natural hazards such as typhoons and earthquakes, the military will remain a critical force of the government for humanitarian assistance and disaster response (HADR). Despite being theoretically “non-military” in nature, it has been increasingly evident that armed forces around the world play a crucial part in responding to natural calamities in support to civilian authorities. Particular to the case of the AFP, the geographic deployment of military personnel and equipment across the archipelago allows the military to be rst-responders in times of calamity calamity.. Albeit being

considered as below par to international standards, the AFP has capabilities and equipment that may not be readily available to civilian government agencies. Moreover, the military’s organizational structure, discipline, and operational conduct are added advantage for the conduct of HADR operations.



philippines

In terms of internal security operations, the AFP is still at a much superior stance over the national police to quell insurgency and acts of terrorism in the country. However, looking at the live case of Afghanistan, combating terrorism and insurgencies should not be construed as pure and traditional military military operations. operations. Rather Rather,, such operations necessitate a comprehensive civil-military approach for humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation, and reconstruction.

promote and direct interagency efforts and further civil-military interactions.

Conclusion The changing concept of security continues to dictate how militaries of the modern world behave and operate. Historically, the evolving security landscape, both at the international and domestic levels, has been redening the role

The increased involvement of the military in operations other than war directs the AFP towards a future centered on maintaining domestic order and fostering the nation’s social and economic development.. However, a caveat should be development considered since veering away from traditional operations may compromise the military’s combat readiness and deviate from its core mission. While the end of international ideological conict

has led to widespread acceptance of democracy and capitalism, the need for combat-ready armed forces has not disappeared. The central task of the armed forces should remain the defense of the nation’s territory against external attack and the preservation of Constitutional order. Even when such traditional security threats do not manifest, the AFP must remain vigilant against their resurgence. To ensure its potency in territorial defense, the AFP should continue pursuing internal reforms designed to improve the military’s technological sophistication and quick-response capabilities. It is within the legal prerogative of the central government to exercise oversight and effective control of the armed forces to achieve national objectives. However, utilizing the military for non-traditional security purposes presupposes a clear legal construct that will not only identify AFP’s responsibilitie responsibilities, s, but more importantly importantly,, will

of the country’s armed forces, or at the least, a determinant for the military’s internal or external security missions. It could be argued that refocusing military operations for non-traditional security concerns is not a zero-sum scenario that is completely detrimental against traditional security missions. However, long-drawn prioritization in favor of non-traditional military missions could produce adverse effects on the armed forces’ traditional security missions, particularly in the modernization of its territorial defense capabilities, wherein the latter are tempered, if not superseded, by more pressing requirements of internal and non-traditional non-traditional security operations. operations. Needless to say, modernization efforts are further hampered by budgetary constraints. It is indeed the sovereign right of a state to determine how it intends to utilize and employ its military. However, the perception of other states as regards the capability of a certain country to defend itself from external aggression is a matter of great consequence to its sovereign standing in the international community. The current international system continues to exist as a function of power – political, economic, or otherwise – that is solidied by considerable

military might.


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A state without a credible external defense is a very vulnerable vulnerable state. It is therefore prudent for any state to balance its priorities by employing a right mix of traditional and non-traditional military capabilities. capabilities. A state must continuously look at the evolving security landscape wherein

non-traditional military missions may be undertaken without compromise to the military’s core traditional missions. The military should always ensure that the sovereignty of the state is never threatened and its people protected from any danger.

References: Hernandez, C. Controlling Asia’s Armed Forces. International

Center Working Papers: 2004.

Forum for Democratic Studies. 1996. Feliciano, Florentino. Report on the Fact-Finding Commission. Rothschild, E. “What is Security?.” Daedalus (1995).

Pasay City: 2003.

Boutin, K., and Tan. Non-Traditional Security Issues in

Quilop, Raymund. Bilateralism, Regional Security and the

Southeast Asia. Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic

Philippine-US Alliance (OSS Working Paper). Quezon City:

Studies, 2001.

Ofce of Strategic and Special Studies, APF, APF, 1999.

Esperon, Hermogenes. “Progress in Counter-Terrorism: The

Varona, Eriberto C. “An Economic Analysis of the US Military

Philippine Experience.” Paper presented at the 6th Shangri-

Bases in the Philippines.”, Thesis

la Dialogue, International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Report of the Fact Finding Commission Pursuant to

Singapore, June 2-4, 2007.

Administrative Order No. 78 of the President Preside nt of the Republic Lucero, Daniel. “Development and Security: The Role of the

of the Philippines Dated July 30, 2003, Part Three, October

AFP.” AFP .” Digest (1997).

17, 2003

Finer, S.E. The Man on Horseback. Colorado: Westview

Simon, Sheldon. “Asian Armed Forces: Internal and External

Press, 1988.

Tasks and Capabilities.” Accessed May 2000. http://www. taiwandocuments.org/nbr01.pdf.

Pobre, Cesar. History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People. Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 2000.

Carlos H. Conde. “Corruption Troubles Philippine Military.” International Herald Tribune, Asia-Pacic Section. Accessed

Abinales, Patricio, and Amoroso, Donna. State and Society in

http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/05/25/news/ http://www.iht. com/articles/2005/05/25/news/ phils.php.

the Philippines. USA: Rowman and Littleeld Publisher, 2005. Ofce of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, J5, AFP, AFP

Abinales, Patricio. American Military Presence in the Southern

Capability Assessment Report, September 2007

Philippines: A Comparative Historical Overview. East West

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15 Regional Cooperation on Civil-Military Coordination in Disaster Response – Crisis or Opportunity? by Saya

Kiba, ph.d. a nd Rosalie Arcala Hall, Ph.D.

Invited contributors


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REGIONAL COOPERATION ON CIVIL-MILITARY COORDINATION COORDINATION IN DISASTER RESPONSE

– CRISIS OR OPPORTUNITY? The military’s engagement in humanitarian assistance/ disaster response is seen as a doubleedged sword. On the one hand, it opens up an avenue for dialogue between the military and civilian actors such as NGAs, LGUs, NGOs, and international humanitarian organizations, which in turn leads to enhanced military accountability and encourages oversight on the military’s performance. On the other hand, it can undermine local civilian authorities who are perceived as “weaker” or “less” effective than the military military.. The paper examines how the globalization of disaster response norms and emerging international cooperation have affected civil-military relations in the Philippines and Thailand. In the case of the Philippines, the authors conclude that there is little danger of undermining civilian control tasks since soldiers generally accept local government leadership in disaster response. However, there is much room for improvement in the Philippine military’s military’s asset-poor condition (air and land vehicles) for disaster response, thus making coordination and linkages with international humanitarian agencies and foreign militaries crucial and imperative.

SOURCE: PAO AFP

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15 REGIONAL COOPERATION ON CIVIL-MILITARY CIVIL-MILITARY COORDINATION IN DISASTER RESPONSE – CRISIS OR OPPORTUNITY?


Introduction

W

While frequently-occurring natural disasters have threatened Southeast Asian countries, civilmilitary cooperation has been a crucial issue on disaster relief operation. Some scholars and practitioners expect that the military’s involvement in humanitarian assistance/ disaster response (HA/DR) opens up opportunities for mutual communication between military and civilian actors, such as central government agencies, local government units, non-governme non-government nt organizations (NGOs) and international humanitarian organizations. Experiences of civil-military engagements are argued to eventually create more military accountability or better public relation policies, which in turn can change the military’s professionalism or the behavior of high-ranking soldiers. It might also encourage parliament, media, and civil society organizations to exercise more oversight on the military’s performance and defense budget. On the other hand, it is also true that the military takes advantage of its HA/DR activities as a tool to achieve its own objectives – for instance, to integrate themselves to local communities through psychological operation, to publicize its civilian-friendly image to enjoy future public support. However, an unintended effect could be a feeling of inadequacy of other civilian government agencies which have less assets and human resources. In societies where the military traditionally played an important domestic political role (e.g. Thailand and Philippines) , the institution’s involvement in HA/DR can be parlayed to somehow demoralize local civilian authorities, which are seen as “weaker” and “less effective” than the military.

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Disaster response by the military gives soldiers a chance to encounter civilians and offers great possibility to stimulate professionalism and improve the capabilities of the state security forces. But it can also undermine civilian control and initiatives in this functional area, where the military is presumed to have no core capability (assuming that the military is, primarily, a war instrument). Under what condition can

civil-military engagement in disaster response be a good trigger point? And in what condition does it turn to an unfavorable opportunity? opportunity?

Humanitarian Assistance Assistance and Disaster Response: Setting Parameters on Military Involvement Civil-military cooperation in disaster management is not only a trend among Asian countries, but also a new model of international cooperation. It is inevitable that multi-sector and multinational actors such as military, international humanitarian organizations, NGO, and private sectors “encounter” each other on the ground in disaster relief operations. All countries now take it for granted that disaster management is a matter of governing global and diverse actors and stakeholders. The United Nations Ofce for

Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) and other international humanitarian agencies have tried to institutionalize coordination coordination in HA/DR among these multiple and diverse stakeholders, including the military, military, by the crafting of guidelines. The Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defense Assets in Disaster Response (Oslo Guidelines) and 2003 Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defense Assets (MCDA) to support UN Humanitarian Activities in Complex


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Emergencies (MCDA Guidelines) govern the use of foreign military assets and their interface with UN humanitarian organizations. The Oslo guideline addresses natural disasters in peace time while the MCDA guideline assumes the

areas in foreign countries to provide assistance; enabling the armed forces to diversify its role, which the US armed forces doctrine categorizes as “military operations other than war.” The US Department of Defense Joint Publication

presence of armed conict. Both instruments

3-07.6 denes foreign humanitarian assistance

see the use of military assets, especially in logistics and planning as “last resort” and clearly articulate that the primary responsibility for response lies with the affected country’s civilian agencies. Although these guidelines are nonbinding to states, UN agencies and international humanitarian organizations try to “nationalize” its principles by negotiating with individual governments to come up with country level guidelines. The norm of “last resort” however, is far from normative; many national governments rely habitually on their armed forces as primary responders to large scale natural disasters

as “operations intended to relieve or reduce the results of natural or man-made disasters of other endemic conditions...” (Thompson 2012, 3). Unlike combat operations, humanitarian assistance exercises are limited in scope and duration, while also assumed as add-ons to efforts by host nation’s civilian authorities or agencies which have the primary responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance. Natural

(Madiwale and Virk 2011, 1089).

disasters and conicts create different operational

environments for humanitarian assistance. As such, the US military further distinguishes between humanitarian assistance as disaster response (HA/DR) from humanitarian assistance during complex emergencies dened as “internally,

The military has traditionally played a crucial role in disaster response and reconstruction in many Southeast Asian countries. Role-sharing and command and control between civilian government agencies and military have been widely discussed in each country as a matter of democratic control over the military. While multi-sectorial and multi-national stakeholders, such as national/local governments, military, international organizations, private business sectors, religious groups, and local and international NGOs, are engaged in disaster relief, civil-military relation is not yet fully institutionalized based on consensus of the military’s role and division of work in order to secure democratic governance over disaster management. HA/DR has also attained international import as many militaries have been deployed to affected

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socially derived disasters that may be incited by some kind of violent political event.” (Thompson 2012, 3). In the latter, the latent or overt security concerns underpin relief distribution. The notion of HA/DR as a military mission area has since found great conceptual resonance among other military institutions. The years following the outpouring of international assistance to large scale disasters like the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami saw the mainstreaming of HA/DR as a key mission area for many overseas military deployments. From the Pakistani oods

in 2010, Haiti earthquake in 2012, and the recent Typhoon Haiyan destruction in the Philippines, more and more foreign militaries are being deployed as part of their government’s assistance package. In the Southeast Asian region, the erstwhile “traditional” military focused on internal security/ defense has responded with relatively



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exible attitude towards the recently-emerging

4. engagements with civilian actors also involved in disaster response – elected authorities, UN agencies and NGOs – on the ground and how these are informed by the presence and functionality of the Oslo Guidelines and

regional activities on HA/ DR. The ASEAN Defense Minister’s Meeting (ADMM) and ADMM Plus are the arenas to discuss international cooperation on massive or large-scale disasters for which international assistance will be needed. In June 2013, the ADMM countries conducted joint HA/DR exercises in Brunei. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) also started practical cooperation among 26 member courtiers and the European Union. It organized disaster relief exercises in Indonesia in 2011 and in Thailand in 2013. Pacic Partnership, which has been led

by the U.S. since 2007, is another framework for conducting multi-nation medical exercise and cultural exchange aimed at smoothening coordination among governments, military, international organizations and NGOs. Although multinational security cooperation is still a new concept in Asia Pacic, the East Asian countries

are now trying to strengthen regional cooperation through HA/DR. Notwithstanding, there remains outstanding debates surrounding these deployments: 1. legitimacy of HA/DR role for the military given lingering concerns that shift in resources towards this task compromises the military’s combat readiness (Farrell 2005, 6; Thomas 2012, 3); 2. greater military (foreign)-to-military (host) interface that provides both broader operational experience but also sharpened duality (separation from civilian stream) in disaster response (Hall 2009, 29) ; 3. the foreign military’s military’s integration integration into the affected country’s civilian mechanisms for disaster response with due considerations for respect of sovereignty and cultural sensitivity to foreign presence (Hall 2008); and,

country-level iterations that conne these

engagements to the emergency phase with a limited timetable. Belo (2006) and Sheller (2012) issue a reminder that while foreign militaries bring much needed mobility assets and logistics expertise crucial to relief operations, their presence could not be readily separated from the geopolitical strategic considerations at play. In the Haiti earthquake, Sheller (2012, 187) argues that the militarization of the relief operations logistics was connected to efforts at controlling migration and the border, ultimately conferring differential mobilities between victims who can go out versus the internallydisplaced population who cannot. The tsunami operations was dovetailed with US interests in opening Indonesia for the war-on-terror efforts in Asia and was regarded as a preview to later amendments of Indonesian law resuming normal military exchanges with the US (Belo 2006, 282) . Concerned over how foreign military presence may affect the internal conict (i.e. insurgents may take advantage of foreigners to advance political and military objectives), the Sri Lankan

government asked the US military to scale down its deployment in the island (Samaratunge et al. 2008, 694). Madiwale and Virk (2011) point out the gray area between “natural disasters” and “complex emergencies” set out in the Oslo and MCDA guidelines, such as in the case of the international response to the Pakistani 2010 oods that also affected conict areas. In

their analysis, civil-military engagements were nuanced and context specic; that there remains

differential understanding whether the crisis was


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seen as a disaster or complex emergency and that local and international NGOs diverge on the use of military assets as “last resort.”

and military streams of coordination, owing partly to the division of tasks (search and rescue, relief) and areas of operations (ground zero, town proper). The military units provided logistical help

For many militaries, HA/DR deployments ushered new structures and demands for greater integration modalities. Civil-military operations center (CMOC) and joint command and control centers (CCC) are now standard features

in relief operations but were largely conned in

in this type of short-term and area-conned

mission. CMOCs serve as liaison nodes with civilian actors while CCCs are used to plug into the host nation’s military. Thompson (2012, 11) argues that the deployment of Task Force Grifn for response to the Kashmir region ood

in 2005 portrayed the effectiveness of the unit’s vertical nesting strategy which allowed the US troops to operate seamlessly under the mission directives from Pakistani authorities and with a conscious effort to take the back seat even with their logistics expertise (they offered the army aviation tasking chain to the Pakistani leaders without taking credit). In his assessment, the US troops formed good relationship with the Pakistani authorities by accepting any tasks given to them and earned good points with some civilian actors for the transparency in the way they ran their airlift operations. Hall and Cular’s (2010) study on the patterns and dynamics of civil-military engagement in the St. Bernard, Southern Leyte, Philippine mudslide response in 2006 reveal nuances of how the legal framework and military mechanisms intersect on the ground. Among their ndings, there is dense interface

between civilian and military actors with the local Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) personnel acting as lynchpin. The Philippine military dealt almost exclusively with the foreign troops, while the only civilian link for the foreign military was the Red Cross. There were separate and largely independent civilian

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search and rescue as well as in providing physical security (with the police) for relief goods and personnel/equipment personnel/equ ipment at ground zero. The ofcers

took policy direction from civilian authorities (the provincial governor) on deployment, activities, tasking, reporting procedure, and timetables. However, it is noted that the governor appointed all military ofcers to lead the various operations.

As one of the early examples of US forces participating in HA/DR mission in the Philippines, the case illustrates remaining gaps in the t he disaster response: 1. How foreign foreign troops troops are to be plugged into given the specic security ecologies of the

disaster area are not fully articulated; 2. There is no standard rule on on how how local local civilian civilian agents may access military assets, especially communications. This paper is based on a research project which analyzed how the globalization of disaster response norms, and the emerging international cooperation on disaster relief, has affected civilmilitary relations in the Philippines and Thailand along three dimensions. First is legal framework to support democratic governance of disaster response including: • •

•

military’s role on disaster relief as a mandate; policies and practices that dene the role

sharing between the military and government; and, guidelines, either developed by civilian



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authorities or by the military institution, that

Globalizing Disaster Management and Royal Thai Armed Forces

dene military’s involvement and NGO-

military cooperation in HA/DR Second is peacetime communication mechanism among government, military, and civil society organizations, including: •

•

•

opportunity of joint evacuation drill, shared emergency plan or emergency contact network; opportunity for soldiers to participate in forums/ conferences organized by civilians such as business or international NGOs; and, opportunity for civilians to participate in military’s training or joint exercises.

Third is the awareness of civilian Defense Ministries and military ofcers including: • • •

self-evaluation on the military’s role in disaster relief; ideal/actual role-sharing between military and civilian; and, perspective towards NGOs.

The research was done both in the Philippines and Thailand from June 2013 to December 2013. 1 The authors examined the relevant laws and policies of the two countries and interviewed military ofcers and NGO representatives.

Legal framework to support democratic governance

As the 2007 Constitution of The Kingdom of Thailand tasks the military to protect independence, sovereignty, national security, the institution of monarchy, and “national interests and the democratic regime of government with the King as Head of the State and for the development of the country,” count ry,” there is a widespread consensus that national development and disaster management are military principal roles. 2 In terms of mechanism, the prime minister’s order is necessary to mobilize the military in largescale disasters. However, city mayors who are appointed by the Ministry of Interior can request commanders of each Region’s Army to deploy the troop for relief operation in case of disaster in a small area. Disaster Management Act 2007 denes that the

Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation (DDPM) of the Ministry of Interior plays prior role in disaster management. However, both Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense admit that disaster relief has actually been led by military. Policy on disaster management is decided at the Disaster Relief Division, Ofce of Civil Affairs of

Ministry of Defense, while actual relief operation is

1 Tis research was suppored by Te Nippon Foundaion’s Asian Public Inellecuals (API) Collaboraive Gran “Comparaive Analysis on

Miliary-NGO Coopera Cooperaion ion Policies Policies in Asia.” Te views o he auhor do no reflec hose o he API Fellow Fellowships ships Program, Te Nippon Nippon Foundaion, Foundaion, he API Inernai Inernaional onal Selecion Commitee, he API A PI egional Coordinaing Insiuion, Insiuion, and/or he Parner Insiuions. Insiuions. 2 CONSIUION OF HE KINGDOM OF HAIL AND, B.E. 2550 (2007), Secion 77. “Te Sae shall proec and uphold uphold he insiuion

o monarchy, independence, sovereigny and inegriy o he erriorial jurisdicion o he Sae and shall provide such armed orces, miliary weapons and echnology as are modern, necessary and sufficien or proecin proecingg and upholding he independence, sovereigny, naional securiy, he insiuion o monarchy, monarchy, naional naional ineress and he democraic regime o governmen wih he King as Head o he Sae and or he developmen o he counry.” c ounry.”


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led by Disaster Relief Center of Thai Royal Army. Exercises and training are managed by Joint and

adopted the ASEAN Defense Establishments and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) Cooperation on Non-traditional Security Concept Paper 4 he says. He also stresses the hope that the guidelines, as a Thailand model, will contribute to future disaster cooperation within the ADMM and ADMM Plus framework. framework.5 One of the facilitators of the said workshop, Group Captain “W” of Air Force

Combined Exercise Planning Ofce, Royal Thai

Armed Forces Headquarters. Disaster Relief Center has regional ofces which correspond to four (4) Army Region command ofces, which coordinate with DPMM regional ofces in each

province.

Civil Affairs Affairs Ofce, also states that the momentum

In 2013, the Ministry of Defense drafted “Guidelines of Civil-Military Coordination in Disaster Response,” which is expected to be nalized by 2015. In November 2013, it organized

a 3-day international workshop on the guidelines in Pattaya, inviting DDPM, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Public Health, Diplomatic Corps, Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance of U.S. Pacic Command, and NGOs such as the

Thai Red Cross. Colonel “B,” who is in charge of drafting says that the Ministry expects the guideline to “clarify organizational structure of government agency, military, and NGOs so that everyone can easily nd its counterpart to smoothen interagency

coordination,” and “make rules and regulations on how military provides its assets upon NGOs’ requests.” He says that those are high priority during 2011 ood in Thailand. 3 On the other hand, drafting the guidelines has been one of the important agenda of the Ministry even before the 2001 ood . This has been a priority since February

2009, when Thailand hosted ADMM Plus, which

of civil-military dialogue has emerged in the Thai military after ASEAN agreed on the Asia-Pacic

Regional Guidelines Guidelines for the Use of Foreign Military Assets in Natural Disaster Response Operations in 2009 and started drafting Standard Operating Procedure for Regional Standby Arrangements and Coordination of Joint Disaster Relief and Emergency Response Operations (SASOP). He admits that the experience of the 2011 ood was

also an opportunity to strengthen civil-military cooperation.6 Peacetime communication mechanism

In the closing ceremony of the workshop, Colonel “B” said to participants, “it is important that military and civilian talk to each other in the same language. We need to minimize the gap among us.” 7 In the provinces, the Thai Army’s Disaster Relief Center held joint exercise coordinating with DDPM regional ofces. Local evacuation drills

are done separately and independently by each village chief. However, the military has tried to organize the sharing of emergency contacts and evacuation plans.

3 Inerview conduced on November November 5, 2013 a Minisry Minisry o Deense. 4 htp://www htp://www.adpc.ne/cso/Dow .adpc.ne/cso/Downloads/CD/Documens nloads/CD/Documens/2ADOPED%20Concep_Pa /2ADOPED%20Concep_Paper_ASEAN_Deence_Esablishmens_ per_ASEAN_Deence_Esablishmens_and_CSO. and_CSO.

pd. 5 Inerview conduced on November November 5, 2013 a Minisry Minisry o Deense. 6 Inerview conduced on November 13, 2013, during Inernaio Inernaional nal Workshop on he Guideline or Civil-milia Civil-miliary ry Coordin Coordinaion aion in Disaser

esponse, in Pataya. 7 November 13-15 2013, 2013, Pataya. Pataya. Te auhor atended i as an Adviser o Embassy Embassy o Japan Japan in Tailand.

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The Thai military has been positively encouraging NGOs to participate in these joint exercises. Cobra

unit, not a main service provider. However, it

Gold, the largest Asia-Pacic Military exercise

responder on the disaster scene. Therefore it

held in Thailand every year, includes medical exercises or non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO) which involves local villagers and civilians. In May 2013, the 3 rd ASEAN Regional Forum Disaster Relief Exercise (ARF-DiREx) hosted by Thailand and South Korea invited international organizations. The Thai military is now planning to host the ASEAN Disaster Exercise (AHEx) with Malaysia in April and May 2014, inviting local governments, volunteer organizations and local and international NGOs.

is necessary that guidelines dening roles and

is usual practice for the military to be the rst

norms are crafted, recognizing and accepting actual practice and action. “Civilian organizations are not at all competitors to the military,” 8 he says. Group Captain “W” “W” of the Air Forces insists insists that the purpose of making the guidelines is to share the military’s tools for needs-assessment with civilians so that DDPM and NGOs can also follow the military’s good practice. 9 All military informants were quite condent in the military’s

comparative advantage over NGOs. Colonel “J” recalls his relief operation for 2011 ood victims in

Meanwhile, the military’s approach to the NGOs is not a new trend. Colonel “J,” who served in the Army’s Disaster Relief Center in the 2001 ood,

points out that the Thai military has been always “ready” to closely work with ordinary citizens and NGOs because the Army’s Staff College provides special education on civil affairs. He says that staff ofcers over lieutenant

colonel have the opportunity to learn communication skills with civilian classmates who have different ideas and mindsets. Other soldiers also mentioned that civil-military cooperation is already embedded in Thai military’s training program as civil assistance, including rural development which is one of the principal mandates of military.

the Army’s Disaster Relief Center. “As water came little by little, politicians in the affected area used to ask military to save his/her own constituents. I received phone calls from them every day and commanders always must consider such ethical problems. NGOs are even worse in coordination. The military always try to eliminate political bias and cooperate with local government.” 10 Colonel “A” of the same Center also criticized NGOs, saying “NGOs never approach the military, they are overcondent in their ability

and assets although Thai NGOs are small-scale and less effective. Civilian organizations cannot start action immediately because it takes too much time for administrative arrangements. For ordinary people, military is the one who comes

Awareness of of Defense Ministries and and military

rst and serves rst.”11

No informant said that military’s role in HA/DR must be scaled down. Colonel “B” of Ministry of Defense said, ideally, military should be a support

On the other hand, it is remarkable that some soldiers nd the “new identity” of the military in

disaster relief. Scholars also point out that the

8 Inerview conduced on on November 5, 2013 a Minisry Minisry o Deense. 9 November 13-15 13-15 2013, Pataya. Pataya. Te auhor atended i as an an Adviser o Embassy o Japan Japan in Tailand. 10 Inerview conduced on November November 4, 2013 a Channel Channel 5 (miliary’ (miliary’ss channel). 11 Inerview conduced on November November 5, 2013 a Army Headquarers. Headquarers.


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military recovered its public support by helping

assumed since the 1970s (Hall 2004). Under Presidential Order 1566 (1978), the military is one of the many agencies tasked for disaster response, which in turn is coordinated by a civilian National Disaster Coordinating Council (NDCC)

ood victims, perhaps changing the bad image

of 2006 Coup and 2010 Red-shirts crackdown. Colonel “S” of Civil Affairs Ofce of the 3 rd Region Army said military’s involvement in disaster relief is not a psychological operation, unlike development aid or defense medicine. For him, “It is the soldiers’ duty to help people. However, it is true that disaster relief benets us if the image

of ‘military for people’ is rooted in people’s mind and it helps our other operations.” 12

The Philippine Military: Disaster Response Veteran Legal Mandates and the t he Philippine Military’s HA/DR Role

Following the democratic transition in 1986, the Constitution has been amended to conne the

military to non-political roles. Prohibition against the government appointment of active duty personnel and political partisanship were provided in the Constitution. In turn, the Philippine military was reorganized, removing the constabulary under its control, placing the entire administration under the supervision of the civilian Ministry of Defense and instituting greater administrative oversight (by the Congress and Commission on Audit) over its budget and procurements. Further inroads on human rights accountability were made by placing the jurisdiction for cases involving human rights violations by soldiers to civilian courts and by putting restrictions on the hiring of paramilitary personnel. Disaster response was formalized as one of the Philippine military’s seven mission areas, thus institutionalizing a role which it has historically

with the Ofce of Civil Defense as administrative

hub. The Philippine’s tiered disaster response system (there are disaster coordinating councils at the regional, provincial, municipal, and barangay or village level) locates the primary responsibility to local government units and the civilian local government executive (governor, mayor, barangay captain) to spearhead coordination, allowing further for a “scaling up” where the affected areas extend beyond administrative boundaries. A later shift to a cluster-based system placed the military under the tasks of search and rescue, transportation and communication. In line with the Calamities and Disaster Preparedness Plan (1988), the military formed reaction teams for natural disasters in each military unit (Quilop 2009, 119). Disaster response task groups in military installations (both regular and reservists) and disaster response coordinating centers are collocated with the civilian-led DCCs. Each disaster response task group is required to provide communication linkages, assist the local police; assist in reconstruction, and provide transportation of relief goods and personnel. The military is also tasked to ensure peace and order in support of the police and provide force protection where disaster happens in a conict zone (Quilop

2009, 127). The Philippine military also has a standing HA/DR mechanism for integration of deployed US forces in a disaster area, there is a provision for a Combined Coordination Center (brigade level and up) for both forces. In such a case, the military serves as a focal point for coordination between the US forces and civilian agencies.

12 Inerview conduced on Ocober Ocober 17, 2013 a he 3rd Army egion Headquarers, Headquarers, Pisanulok. Pisanulok.

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In 2010, a new legal framework for disaster (Republic Act 10121) came into force, which shifts the focus from disaster response to risk reduction and management. The new framework locates responsibility for these tasks to local government units, with help from other agencies including the

the military has been assigned to the logistics and telecommunications clusters. This assignment considerably narrows down what the military may be deployed for and limits its coordinative relationships to organizations that deal with food and health.

military. More emphasis and scal investments

are given to community-based early warning system, geo-hazard geo-hazard and vulnerability mapping, risk assessment & contingency planning, maintaining a database of disaster volunteers and education and awareness-raising. Unlike the previous framework which was governmentcentric, the new law recognizes the participation of civil society, private sector, and volunteers in these tasks. It also follows f ollows international international norms and standards for humanitarian assistance/disaster response including cluster-based coordination among actors (e.g. logistics, telecom, evacuation center management, relief distribution). The law authorizes the President to declare need for international assistance and provides explicit mechanisms for international humanitarian assistance. This law has important implications to the military responding to disaster. According to Colonel “P”, a multi-year military liaison ofcer at the

OCD, the new framework entails that the military must invest in capital outlay for risk reduction. 13 To nance this, a Quick Response Fund under

the Department of National Defense (DND) or pooled funds under the line-item budget of each

The new Philippine disaster law rmly assigns the

task of coordinating government agency efforts to civilian authorities at applicable tiers: local chief executives for municipalities and provinces while the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council is chaired by the Ofce of Civil Defense Chief (a Presidential

appointee). The law requires for an Incident Command Post within the affected area to be established for information sharing and coordination to transpire. The military is a member of local and national DRRM councils, as are the local police. While the law does not explicitly mention the military as rst responder,

it is the standard practice of many local chief executives to call on the military for assistance. This linkage is not unusual, as there are other existing institutional mechanisms (e.g. Peace and Order Councils) where the local civilian authorities and the armed forces work together. Moreover, given the advance alert and early warning systems for typhoons especially, much can be done as “preparation” including evacuation and forward deployment bases for relief stockpiles and personnel, for which military logistics could be utilized.

military unit are set aside specically for these

tasks. It also means more robust organization of reserves and engineering units (for rehabilitation/ reconstruction) as opposed to reliance on regular forces, which in the past have been tapped more for this mission area. In terms of coordination,

This new mandate for disaster response also transpired within the military’s new Internal Peace and Security Plan (IPSP) dubbed “ Bayanihan. ” Bayanihan anchors the armed forces’ activities in support of the government’s peace efforts. With

13 Inerview conduced on Sepember Sepember 21, 2013 a Iloilo Ciy. Ciy.


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more emphasis on non-kinetic means, Bayanihan makes it imperative for the military to engage civilians (local authorities, agencies, NGOs and peoples organizations) in all its mission areas. Premised upon “whole-of-government” effort, the military is seen as not taking the lead, but rather providing support to civilian efforts. The premise behind this “support role” is because the military

locations makes for an interesting study on how military-civil society engagements transpired during the emergency phase.

can’t solve conict or bring about peace on its

own. NGOs specially are engaged as partners, since they have the resources and capabilities that can benet communities. In disaster response,

this translates to deference to local government executives (Mayor and Governor) and DSWD personnel for operations falling within the military unit’s area. Meaning versus Doing: Civilian-Mil Civilian-Military itary Engagements during Disaster Response Operations to Typhoon Pablo

The following section describes how the Philippine military’s new HA/DR role and the Bayanihan framework intersect and mapped out on the ground using Typhoon Pablo relief operations as template. Typhoon Pablo (international name Bhopa), which struck the provinces of Davao Oriental and Compostela Valley (Mindanao) in December 2012, was the rst large scale disaster to which these new

frameworks were applied. The response featured a strong international element with contributions from UN agencies and ASEAN countries. The typhoon’s ground zero (the municipalitie municipalitiess of New Bataan, Cateel and Baginga) also happened to

A national alert was issued for Typ Typhoon hoon Pablo three (3) days before its landfall, thus not requiring individual declarations declarations of state of calamity by local councils in affected areas. Mindanao, already has a standing framework for international humanitarian assistance (Humanitarian Action Plan in Mindanao) in place since 2008. This means that international humanitarian actors already have prior structures with which to coordinate their actions on the ground. For Typhoon Bhopa, a UN Humanitarian Action Team (formerly interagency standing committee) was created involving 15 major UN and international agencies (e.g. Christian Aid, Oxfam). A direct link was made between this team and the NDRRMC in Manila, allowing for a quick processing of paperwork needed for foreign goods and personnel to come in. 14 A one-stop shop center was created at the Davao International Airport for customs, immigration, and quarantine matters to be settled. Assistance from ASEAN also came quickly with several C130 load of stockpiles from the ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance Center stockpile in Jakarta, a bilateral assistance from Malaysia. That said, the international actors all understood and respected the norms surrounding relief assistance, which puts the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) as lead. The DSWD template for family access card as basis for distribution and documentation was followed.

be an active communist conict zone, with two

army battalions from the 4 h Infantry Division (4ID) in place for internal security operations. The conuence of disaster and armed conict in these

On the ground, there were two parallel mobilizations following the landfall in Davao Oriental and Compostela Valley. On the military

14 Tese insighs were shared by Colonel “P”, who was direcly involved in he operaions. Inerview conduced on Sepember 21, 2013 a Iloilo

Ciy.

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side, a unied command (army, navy, air force)

interesting dynamics. On the whole, the military

level. 15

was created at the 4ID A Joint Peace and Security Coordinative Center was also set up with the Philippine National Police. Having not received communication from the 66t h and 67h Infantry Battalions (on ground zero), a decision was made to send one company each from the unaffected 84IB and 39IB to Davao Oriental and Compostela Valley, respectively, as advance party on Day 1 following the landfall. Said troops were only able to reach ground zero on Day 2 by foot and immediately went on search, rescue and retrieval operations. On Day 3 additional troops were sent out to clear the roads from Davao City and also from Caraga, Agusan del Sur. Only on Day 3 has communication been rmly established with DSWD for relief delivery

by land to Compostela Valley. In Davao Oriental, relief operations was easier as Philippine Navy and other ships could make deliveries by sea. Within Davao City, two hubs came into being: Hub 1 at Panacan near the 4ID Headquarters organized by the military’s Civil Relation Service (CRS, brigade level) unit using the neighboring DPWH warehouses for relief stockpiling, sorting and deployment, and Hub 2 at the DSWD Regional Ofce. Hub 1 only operated for a limited period;

from December 16, 2013 onwards, management was turned over to DSWD and to other military ofcers at the Division level. The hubs were

centers for relief drop-offs and for volunteers. All NGOs interviewed who participated in the relief efforts were cognizant of the two hubs and their

ofcers interviewed were aware of the principle

of civilian supremacy in emergency situations and deferred to DSWD personnel on relief matters.

Colonel “G” was was the the ofcer-in-charge ofcer-in-charge

behind Hub 1; when queried why a different hub from that of DSWD was created, his response was that DSWD region has limited space and could not accommodate voluminous third party assistance.16 The DSWD personnel were also deployed in the Panacan Hub (1) but they were generally seen by the NGO representatives interviewed as less reliable and efcient than

their military counterpart in organizing the relief operations.17 More third party assistance and volunteers were recorded going to Hub 1 than Hub 2 prior to December 16. To analyze civilian-military engagements, this paper offers viewpoints derived from interviews of 66IB (whose area of operations included Campostela Valley) and 67IB (headquartered at Baganga, Davao Oriental) commanders at the ground level. Because the affected areas are also communist conict areas, very few NGOs had

presence in the communities prior to Typhoon Pablo. Given the known security concerns, many NGOs also feared going there directly. The local governments of New Bataan, Campostela Valley and Baginga, Davao Oriental, which had been designated as Incident Command Posts also had differential capacities in handling the response operations. In New Bataan, 66IB commander Colonel “F” initially acted as Incident Commander

15 Te succeeding discussions came om he inerview o General “B” conduced on Ocober 7, 2013 a Camp Panacan, Davao Davao Ciy. 16 elephone inerview conduced on Ocober 3, 2013. 17 Tis view came om Ms. “F”, Dr. “Y” and Ms. “A” who represened local NGOs. Inerviews conduced on Ocober 5, 2013 and Ocober 7,

2013, respecively, in Davao Ciy.


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because the mayor was himself a survivor and couldn’t immediately attend to his duties. 18 The post was quickly turned over to the mayor after a few days. Unlike in New Bataan where the mayor was on top of the situation, the local government leaders of Baginga disagreed with each other, leading 67IB commander Colonel “M” to be appointed by the Governor as Incident Commander until May 2013. In his capacity as Incident Commander, Colonel “M” had numerous engagements with NGOs who came through

In relief deliveries, this means the NGOs come to the local army unit to report where they are going (often); ask for transportation assistance (few); or request for security escort (rare). The NGOs in most cases already had parish and civil society contacts they want to deliver the goods to. The local military unit did little to persuade them to change the destination of relief operations. In fact, all local commanders strongly suggested for NGOs to coordinate with the LGU to avoid duplication of efforts. Given Colonel “M’s” unique position as Incident Commander, he was able to

his ofce for coordination of relief deliveries.

He also directed civilians (teachers and health personnel).19 At New Bataan, the 66IB spearheaded the search and retrieval operations which lasted for almost a month and involved a large number of personnel (apart from military augmentation from the 10h Infantry Division, they also had numerous volunteers from Davao, MMDA and foreigners). Colonel “F” was able to focus his unit’s work on search and retrieval as the task of taking care of VIP visitors was carried out by the Brigade Commander. For deliveries (mostly directed to the LGU), the 66IB partnered with parishes by using military vehicles for relief transport. There were two types of NGO-military engagements that transpired. Coordination or informing the military about NGO activities in the area comprise the bulk of the engagements. The standard practice was for the NGOs with projects at hand to report to the military about it, as these have security implications in the area.

direct NGOs coming for the rst time to deliver

relief goods in the upland areas with the military. If NGOs returned for more deliveries, they usually go on their own sans the military. For rehabilitation activities, NGO-military engagements differed depending on activities initiated solely by the NGO or by the battalion. For the 66IB, the NGOs typically coordinate to ensure that no pending military operations are happening in or around the area where they wish to go (something which the military is reluctant to disclose for concerns of leakage to the insurgents). 20 The ICRC which provided cash-for-work in the affected barangays of Padsabanga, Manurigao, and Cagan is an example of such coordination linkage. Colonel “F” observed that while relief operations were carried out in an ad hoc fashion, more careful planning and deliberation were made with rehabilitation activities by the municipal government. The Kiwanis, by contrast, which had a school-based feeding and water supply project, asked and

18 Inerview conduced on Ocober Ocober 10, 2013 a Davao Ciy. Ciy. 19 Inerview conduced on Ocober Ocober 7, 2013 a Davao Ciy. Ciy. 20 Inerview conduced on Ocober Ocober 7, 2013 a Camp Panacan, Panacan, Davao Davao Ciy.

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were provided with manpower, security and transportation assistance by the military. Other projects with this type of engagement include those funded by TV5, a retired military personnel group and an OFW family circle. For the 67IB, local commander Colonel “M” opined that NGOs that came to their area typically:

person and lynchpin for engagements with other government agencies. For all commanders interviewed, they emphasize that the LGU is

1. have narrow, conned goals that do not correspond to actual needs on the ground; 2. have no prior on-the-ground needs assessment and have limited timelines for engagement; 3. come in in with their pre-selected pre-selected target sites sites and project templates. 21 In his experience, the NGOs initially relied on military assessment data but later came up with their own. He lists the International Labor Organization (ILO), World Health Organization (WHO), Merlin, UNICEF, and UNDP as having undertaken rehabilitation projects in their area covering health, shelter construction, agriculture, and livelihood and rehabilitation of public infrastructure. Battalion-initiated engagements with NGOs are understood as part and parcel of the unit’s overall Bayanihan mandate. The requirement for “multi stakeholder engagement” under Bayanihan encompasses all mission areas, including disaster response and puts premium on the ofcers’ negotiating and social skills. Structurally,

every military unit has a designated civil-military operations (CMO) ofcer who serves as point

their rst priority for civilian engagement; engagement; second,

other government agencies and NGOs last. The ofcers likewise distinguish between NGOs which

are “outside of the community” organizations and people’s organizations that are communitybased, says 66IB commander Colonel “L” whose AOR also includes Lumad (indigenous) areas, and have a distinct mandate of engaging Lumad communities.22 But for Colonel “M” no distinction exists between the types as both bring in resources on the ground. While the commanders expressed openness (to accept any NGO help), it was nevertheless the practice to be selective when it comes to NGOs they wish to partner with for military-conceptualized undertaking. Residual concerns about the “leftist” connections of some NGOs require vetting or screening of groups who want to come into their area. However, However, they were also careful not to be accused of “red baiting.” Colonel “L” says that his unit’s strategy when an NGO of suspicious credentials indicate that they want to do a medical mission, they usually put together a counterpart mission themselves and schedule it ahead ( “inuunahan” ) of the NGO.23 Yet even in military-initiated medical missions, for instance, the commanders are careful not to mix such with armed operations. Colonel “L” related that in one instance, their intel revealed that communist rebels were initially in the vicinity where the unit was holding a medical mission; he opted not to pursue said rebels because that was NOT the unit’s mission for that day. 24

21 Ibid. 22 Ibid. 23 Ibid. 24 Ibid.


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Two cases of post-Pablo responses illustrate how the military puts Bayanihan to practice for self-initiated projects. Colonel “G”, then key

the civilian authorities; authorities; nor were there local DRRC assets or manpower to tap given the widespread destruction. What is notable is that the military self-organized the search-and-re search-and-rescue scue operations themselves; and even took the initiative to create a relief operations operat ions hub in Davao City. Only by Day 3, after the military has established communication and mobility, have the civilian agencies made it to ground zero. The time frame points to the civilians actors relatively conceding to the military’s lead (where to go; how to get there) in

Civil Relations Service ofcer for the Brigade,

organized a fund-raising concert featuring local and national musicians. The concert was his rst engagement with NGOs, although he had

considerable experience putting together youth camps and had been previously posted in Aceh where he had a chance to observe NGO work close at hand. In the interviews, he lamented about how NGOs have serious time commitments; are personnel decient (relies only on volunteers,

no permanent staff) so that many were unable to deliver on the tasks consistently until the completion of the project. 25 While the project ended up earning little money, he considers it a relative success for its advocacy component. Second, the military mil itary carried carri ed out its own Task Task Force Tambayayaw in which 40-50 teams tea ms of engineering units were deployed for shelter construction/ repair from a one million peso donation by NGOs matched by the Department of National Defense (DND). The limited proceeds from the concert also went to Task Force Tambayayaw. HA/DR Convergences and Divergences

The nature of civil-military engagements in the context of Typhoon Pablo disaster response did not vary much from the observations made by Hall and Cular (2010) that the military are the t he de facto primary responders, and that civilian agents and communities are accepting of the military’s key role in the crucial emergency phase. There was no test for “last resort” (were there other civilian alternatives to military assets and personnel?) by

the rst few days following the disaster. However,

in succeeding days, when more information is available and prior relief delivery run has been made, NGOs gain condence and become more

independent. To many local NGOs, working with the military appeared to be a non-issue. The military also displayed little concern for physical/ kinetic security of relief distribution; they offered to escort or provide transportation assistance to NGOs delivering relief goods but did not insist on it nor did they make strong efforts to channel relief distribution in certain villages. NGO-military coordination where they transpired was limited to reporting; NGO requests for military logistics and security assistance were few or rare. Even in rehabilitation, the military has taken a back seat; NGOs with projects only coordinate with the local unit for information purposes (making sure the project staff will not be adversely affected by planned military kinetic operations). Similar to relief operations, NGOs come to the area prepared with their own templates for project goals, planning, planning, and implementation. implementation. The local local military unit suggests that it would be better for NGOs to coordinate with the local government than with them. Even with limited resources, the

25 elephone inerview conduced on Ocober 3, 2013.

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military also tries to conduct its own rehabilitation initiatives by actively seeking partnership with NGOs, although they tend to be selective and

countries and also facilitated the entry of foreign medical personnel and other foreign emergency responders. This set up is a marked improvement from the CCC that limits engagements between military-to-military. However, as the research did not cover interviews of international humanitarian agencies, no arguments can be made regarding issues that have arisen from relief distribution involving these actors.

more inclined towards charitable outts with

whom the commander has personal connections. The fund-raising concert to support Task Force Tambayayaw was one such initiative, although the military ofcer in-charge of the event admitted

that it made more inroads in improving the military’s prole among Davao-based NGOs.

Synthesis The engagements between local military units and local elected authorities are fundamentally different. It was clear that military ofcers ofcers and

local civilian authorities alike have a shared understanding of civilian supremacy in keeping with the country’s disaster response guidelines-the local chief executive is in charge and the military takes direct order from him/her. him/her. The three battalion commanders interviewed conceded control immediately to the mayors/governors of the affected towns (mindful that in the rst

The prevailing norms and practices in HA/DR operations in regional and international settings do not necessarily inuence the Thai military,

which has a long experience of undertaking civil assistance as a physiological operation and intelligence, and also mobilized for disaster relief operations if necessary. Perhaps on account of just experiencing more large scale disasters than any other country in the region (and with the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Mindanao due

few days, the mayor/s also being a survivor may be initially psychologically immobilized). Colonel “M’s” position as Incident Commander was an exception, but it was an appointment made by the governor on account of the political squabbles between the local elected authorities. It was also interesting that the commanders are generally differential to mayors and the local government when it comes to relief distribution and rehabilitation plans.

to the Moro conict) the Philippine military, by

On the whole, the military exhibits openness to working with international humanitarian agencies as was evident in its involvement in the crafting of guidelines for humanitarian action in Mindanao. The establishment of a one-stop shop at the staging area (Davao City airport) made for the easy entry of relief deliveries from ASEAN

the likely conuence between disasters and conict, the Philippine military surprisingly is not

contrast, has far more experience under its belt working with international humanitarian actors. These encounters have made the Philippine military more attuned to international norms (e.g. protocols for receiving international aid; use of military assets for relief operations), yet when it comes to local civilian actors, its engagements are more nuanced. The Philippine military historically performed disaster response role, separate and distinct from internal security operations. Given

all too kinetic security conscious when it comes to relief operations, nor are NGOs necessarily reliant on military assets or assessments for relief deliveries.


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The globalization of disaster management cooperation framework has helped Thai civilmilitary relations to be more democratic. The drafting of guidelines or the inclusion of NGOs to military joint and combined exercise are relatively new activities. As Colonel “B” of Ministry of Defense says, the ASEAN’s momentum encouraged the Thai military to lead, making such a good example in institutionalizing civilmilitary cooperation mechanism. A Thai political scientist also remarked that Thailand could start thinking “civil defense” from a different angle of “civil-military cooperation” thanks to multinational dialogue among ASEAN countries.

consideration of gaining public support. There remains a serious gap between the Thai military rhetoric of respecting civilian control and onthe-ground reality. More inquiry is needed as to whether recent “encounters” of military and multi-spectral civilian actors in table top exercises about disaster relief has really changed the military or civil-military relations. Still, peacetime communication and joint activities among civilian and military, particularly in transnational setting, can provide good opportunities for both military and NGOs to know different cultures and organizational restrictions. One example is the Japanese Ministry of Defense-organized Tokyo Defense Forum. In 2013, the forum focused on HA/ DR coordination. Japan’s Ground Self Defense Forces have likewise been inviting counterparts from the region since 2006 to the Multinational

In the Philippines, a civil defense framework is already in place since the 1970s, clearly putting civilians on the driver seat when it comes to decisions on disaster response. The military’s role is conned to search and rescue and relief

operations, mainly as support or assistance to local civilian efforts tasked under the framework. There is a convergence between what the framework stipulates and actual practice: as indicated in Hall (2009) and in this research project’s examination of the Typhoon Pablo response, the military defers to and takes directions from local civilian authorities, even to the DSWD when it comes to relief operations (for which the military offers indirect assistance). For the Thai military, civil-military cooperation in HA/DR remains conceptual or at the dialogue level; and is a conversation initiated by the military.. As revealed in the interviews, the military military has incentive to work with civilian organizations not because of pure sincerity but for pragmatic

Cooperation Program in the Asia Pacic (MCAP). A SDF ofcer who was sent to Leyte in response

to Typhoon Hayan recalls that he could achieve good coordination with AFP and foreign military in Camp Aguinaldo as he was trained to do so in table top exercise in MCAP. Moreover, he met several MCAP participants in the Philippines. 26 The Philippine military, being a veteran in HA/ DR role, is continuously learning and developing denser networks with civil society groups, including NGOs. Under Bayanihan, the imperative for multi-sector engagement in disaster response, whilst limited to its cluster-based assigned role of food and health, nevertheless is enabling soldiers and civilians to get to know each other more from across the ideological (communist insurgency) divide. The ASEAN framework and various opportunities for joint exercises with

26 Newspa Newspaper per ASAGUMO, January January 2, 2014.

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other militaries in the region are also providing fertile grounds for military-to-military interface, from which it is hoped more global norms on

is the Philippine military’s asset-poor condition (air and landing vehicles) for disaster response, which makes the country ever more dependent on external logistics assistance for large-scale disasters. For this reason, coordination and linkages with international humanitarian agencies and foreign militaries are crucial.

conducting humanitarian activities will lter.

There is little danger of undermining Philippine civilian control in this task, as Philippine soldiers generally accept local government leadership in this disaster response. What is more critical

SOURCE: 4TH SPECIAL FORCES BA BATTALION, TTALION, AFP


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Samaratunge, ramanie, Ken Coghill and HMA Herath. “Tsunami engulfs Sri Lankan governance.” International

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JOINT TECHNICAL WORKING GROUP Security Sector Reform: Modern Defense Force philippineS

Jennifer Santiago Oreta, Ph.D. Kathline Anne S Tolosa Atty Noel del Prado Melanie Rodulfo-Veril Francis Domingo Carla Isabel M Ravanes Joseph Raymond Franco Iren C Gumpal COL ISIDRO L PURISIMA (GSC) PA CAPT ROY VINCENT T TRINIDAD (GSC) PN COL AMADOR T TABUGA JR (GSC) PA LTC ISMAEL P MANDANAS JR PA LTC CHARLEMAGNE CHAR LEMAGNE F BATA BATAYOLA JR INF PA MAJ JO-AR HERRERA PA

All rights reserved. Copyright © 2014 ISBN

978-971-550-691-5

JOINT TECHNICAL WORKING GROUP

17 5

ABOUT THE AUTHORS J

Jennifer Santiago Oreta, Ph.D. JENNIFER SANTIAGO ORETA holds a PhD in Political Science. Her research interests include security sector reform and development, peace and security, arms and gun-violence, gender and social movements. Dr. Oreta is Asst. Professor on Political Science at the Ateneo de Manila University. She has been appointed as Assistant Secretary to the Ofce of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace

Process (OPAPP) last February 2013. She is in-charge of the DDR (disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration) program, as well as the Knowledge Management and Resource Center of the institution. She is also the focal person in mainstreaming the cross-cutting issues of gender, children, indigenous communities, human rights, and security sector reform, and e nsuring there is consistency in policy as regards these issues.

K

Kathline Anne Sigua Tolosa KATHLINE ANNE S TOLOSA is Co-Convenor of the Working Group on Security Sector Reform. As the head of the National Secretariat, she convenes the Bantay Bayanihan, a network of civil society organizations performing oversight on the Philippine military, creating dialogue spaces, and building a constituency for peace and security issues. She has co-authored Pagpati’ut: Mediating Violence in Sulu, published by the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, and Revisiting the Policy Environment on Peace and Security, published by the Australian Aid-The Asia Foundation partnership in the Philippines. She has served in various capacities at the Department of National Defense, Armed Forces of the Philippines, Department of Transportation Transportation and Communications, and the Ofce Ofce for

Transportation Security.

N

Atty. Noel del Prado NOEL ROMERO DEL PRADO graduated from the Ateneo de Manila University with a degree in AB Philosophy in 1992, and the Ateneo de Manila Univers ity College of Law in 1997. He teaches Filipino Literature at the Ateneo de Manila University. He is a Board Member of the Inter-Country Adoption Board (ICAB) and the Movie and Television Review and Classication Board (MTRCB). He worked as

the Legal Service Director of the Philippine Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), and as a Legal Consultant in the Senate, the House of Representatives, the Department of Education (DepEd), UNICEF and USAID. He served as the Chief of Staff in the Senatorial Campaign of Hon. Grace Poe. He is also a volunteer lawyer for Bantay Bata 163, the Counc il for the Welfare of Children (CWC), and the National Council on Disability Affairs.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

17 7

M

Melanie Rodulfo-V Rodulfo-Veril eril

MELANIE ROSE RODULFO-VERIL is a graduate student from the University of the Philippines majoring in Asian Studies. Her area of research is in comparative Southeast Asian politics and is particularly interested on issues on Philippine security relations, disaster management, and disaster diplomacy. As a professional, she has been involved in several foreign-funded peac e and development programs, including those implemented in conict and post conict affected areas in the Philippines.

She currently works for the Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program of the Department of Social Welfare and Development as a Planning Ofcer.

R

Captain Roy Vincent T. Trinidad (GSC) PN CAPT ROY VINCENT TRINIDAD PN (GSC) is currently the Chief of the Territorial Defense Division of the Ofce of the Deputy Chief of Staff Staff for Operations, J3. Prior to his serving as the Chief TDD, he

is the Assistant Division Chief of the Manpower and Organization Division, and at the same time the Chief of the Administrative Division of OJ3. He has been working with OJ3 for three (3) years.

A

Colonel Amador T. Tabuga Jr. (GSC) PA COL AMADOR T TABUGA, JR. graduated from the Philippine Military Academy in 1986. He is the Chief of Unied Command Staff of Western Western Mindanao Command, Armed Forces of the Philippines Philippines

which covers the whole of ARMM region, Zamboanga Peninsula and the two Lanao provinces. Prior to this, he was the Assistant Chief of the AFP Doctrine Development Center and was the Team Leader of the Poject Management Team Team (PMT) in the revision of the AFP Basic Doctrine and Joint Doctrine manuals which were approved for publication public ation by the CSAFP.

17 8

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

I

Colonel Isidro L. Purisima (GSC) PA PA COLONEL ISIDRO LA MADRID PURISIMA is currently the Chief C hief of Staff of 3 rd Infantry (Spearhead) Division, Philippine Army based in Panay Island, Western Visayas. His recent assignments include Chief, Research and Doctrine Division and Executive Ofcer of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, J3, AFP AFP.. He is a member of PMA ‘Sandiwa” ‘Sandiwa” Class of 1985. He nished his Diploma in

Strategic and Defence Studies in University of Malaya in Malaysia and is a graduate of Master of Arts in Strategic Security Studies at the National Defense University, USA.

I

Iren C. Gumpal IREN CACHOPERO GUMPAL is a Research Analyst of the Ofce of the Deputy Chief of Staff for

Operations, J3, GHQ, Armed Forces of the Philippines. She took her Master of Professional Studies in Development Communication at the University of the Philippines Open University, and her BS in Development Communication at the University of the Philippines Los Baños. She is currently under the Research and Doctrine Division of OJ3.

F

Francis Domingo

FRANCIS DOMINGO is an Assistant Professor at the International Studies Department of De La Salle University and concurrently a postgraduate research student at the Department of Politics and International Relations of University of Reading. Before joining academia, he was a military analyst with the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Associate Managing Director of RVD Business Intelligence Consultancy, a pioneering competitive/business intelligence consultancy rm based in

Makati City for several years. He completed a BA in Political Science from De La Salle University in 2004 and an MA in Intelligence and Security Studies from Brunel University in 2009.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

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M

Maribel Daño-Luna MARIBEL DAÑO-LUNA is a researcher for peace and security from the Working Group on Security Sector Reform. She serves as the coordinator of Bantay Bayanihan, a nationwide network of CSOs that acts as oversight for the implementation of the AFP’s IPSP Bayanihan on the operational and policy level. Her rst-hand experience in promoting civilian and democratic control of the armed

forces stems from her background both from the civil society and the military. She began her career as a researcher for Task Force Mapalad, an NGO helping farmers in Mindanao and Negros. After her transitory residence in Mindanao, she proceeded to work as a researcher/analyst for the Armed Forces of the Philippines where she took on research positions in the Philippine Navy and the Ofce

of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (OJ3). She studied BA Communication Research in the University of the Philippines Diliman.

C

Carla Isabel M. Ravanes

CARLA ISABEL M. RAVA RAVANES NES is a graduate of Bachelor of Science in Psychology from the University of the Philippines Diliman. She has previously worked for the Ofce of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, OJ3 of the Armed Forces of the Philippines under the said ofce’s Research and Doctrine Division. Currently, she is a part of the Policy Unit of the Ofce of the Presidential Adviser on the

Peace Process (OPAPP) which aims to mainstream the different cross-cutting concerns on gender, children, human rights and international humanitarian law, indigenous peoples, and security sector reform in the various Philippine peace tables.

J

Joseph Raymond Franco JOSEPH FRANCO is an Associate Research Fellow at the Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS), S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. He holds a BA in Political Science from the University of the Philippines-Diliman and an MSc in International Relations from RSIS (ASEAN Graduate Scholarship). Joseph is currently working on issues surrounding radicalization in the Southern Philippines. His other research interests include internal conict, counter-insurgency, special operations forces and peacekeeping.

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ABOUT THE AUTHORS

M

Mereniza C. Gomez MERENIZA DELA CRUZ GOMEZ is a member of the Ateneo de Manila University Working Group of Security Sector Reform (WGSSR). She was a faculty of the Makati Medical Center College of Nursing teaching Philippine History, Government and Constitution. She is also a part-time faculty of De La Salle University Department of International Studies. She worked for the Armed Forces of the Philippines as a Defense Analyst for International Affairs from 2008-2011 under the Ofce of the

Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, J5. She is a graduate of BA Organizational Communication from UP Manila and earned her graduate degree, Master in International Studies, at UP Diliman.

S

Saya Kiba, Ph.D. Saya Kiba is a political scientist. She studied at the Graduate School of International Cooperation Studies, Kobe University (Ph.D. in Political Science 2010) and the Third World Studies Center, University of the Philippines (2003-2004, 2010). Her major elds of interest are civil-military relations,

international cooperation studies, and social movements especially in urban poor communities. She has worked in the Embassy of Japan in the Philippines and the House of Representatives of Japan. She is currently an adv iser in the Embassy of Japan in Thailand. In 2 013, she is awarded The Nippon Foundation’s Asian Public Intellectuals (API) Collaborative Grant for her joint research project, “Comparative Analysis on Military-NGO Cooperation Policies in Asia.”

R

Rosalie Arcala Hall, Ph.D. ROSALIE ARCALA HALL is a Professor of Political Science and University Scientist I at University of the Philippines Visayas Miagao, Iloilo. She earned her graduate degrees (Ph.D. in Public and International Affairs; MA Political Science) from Northeastern University, Boston, Massachusetts under a Fulbright Fellowship. She published articles on civil-military relations in the Philippine Political Science Journal, Asian Security, Korean Journal of Defense Analysis and Scientia Militaria. She has completed various research projects on civil-military engagements during counterinsurgency, humanitarian, disaster response and anti-terror operations; gender issues inside the armed forces and police; and rebel integration into the armed forces with grants from The Nippon Foundation, Toyota Foundation, East Asian Dev elopment Network, Fulbright Advanced Research, and the Austrian government North-South Exchange Program.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

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Modern Defense Force Philippines

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