Leg Writ Position Paper

I.

INTRODUCTION

Rarely has Martial Law been declared in a state after centuries of war and civil disorder taught the people, particularly their leaders, never to resort to force as means of resolving internal and external squabbles, may it be for political interests or for religious ideologies. Most states have long tried to abhor the option of armed intervention ever since the last World War ended with a humiliating (nuclear) jackboot to the face of enemies who dared to assert their own supremacy. But then there are times when some individuals, posing as political figures clothed with power, could not resist the temptation of inciting conflict for the sake of securing their hold in their community. What‘s worse, it‘s not jjust ust their rivals who are shouting foul; at the end of all this nonsense, the public will eventually suffer from the forcible autocracy resulting from the quarrels that they have no hand in. Philippine history tells us of the same story regarding the declaration of Martial Law, highlighted by one of the longest, wordiest, and most comprehensive Presidential Proclamations issued: the infamous ―1081‖ 1081‖ of September 21, 1972. Nearly two decades decades later, the t he drafters of the 1987 Constitution, notwithstanding the fact that they retained the long-frowned presidential power, strived to rectify the advantages available once it is imposed. Fast forward to the end of 2009 and some of the anti-Martial Law pundits resurfaced to question the actions taken by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to quell the state of unrest in Maguindanao, after authorities have reported on what is to be known as the worst electionrelated violence in the nation‘s history. And despite reducing the same to a state of emergency a

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few days after its implementation, the Chief Executive is continuously ridiculed for what her critics claim as an unnecessary declaration, for various reasons of legal or political nature. Which begs us to ask this question as basis of this position paper: was the declaration of Martial Law in Maguindanao worth it, considering both viewpoints?

II.

BRIEF BACKGROUND: THE EVENTS BEFORE PP 1959

A. Conflict Between Families

There‘s an old saying: he who does not look into his origins cannot move on to his destination. The same is true with analyzing the rationale behind statutes and legal orders, particularly Presidential Orders such as Proclamation 1959. For this position paper, it would mean going back to where the conflicts in Maguindanao have surfaced. The Ampatuans already have a chokehold on the said province, dating even before the rise of the late President Corazon Aquino into presidency in 1986; Andal Sr., its patriarch, was its provincial governor from 1988, despite being removed two years ago for maintaining loyalty to President Ferdinand Marcos. Since then, they remained the prime political force of the province unopposed for more than two decades, with most of its municipalities led by a clan member. Whilst Andal Sr. was grooming his son, Datu Unsay Mayor Andal, Jr. to be his successor in 2010, tension started to rise; their erstwhile political rivals from the Mangundadatu clan realized that they have had enough of the A mpatuans‘ regime in Maguindanao. As a sign of


contention, Buluan Vice-Mayor Esmael Mangundadatu declared that he will challenge Andal, Jr. in the gubernatorial race. In response to the brewing situation, the Lakas-Kampi-CMD decided to mediate on the matter, being the primary party of both political clans. After three meetings among both sides, including one hosted by the party chairman, Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro, Jr., it was initially agreed upon ―in principle‖ that no Mangundadatu shall contest the post of Andal, Sr. B. The Fateful Manslaughter

Then the inevitable happened: despite the warnings and death threats, Vice Mayor Mangudadatu proceeded with the filing of his Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) at the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Regional Office in Shariff Aguak, inviting journalists to the convoy to deter any attempt on his life; he also sent his wife Genalyn, and his sister, Mangundadatu Vice-Mayor Eden Mangundadatu, to do the filing so as to even discourage any violence. Unfortunately, the plan did not work at all; en route to the COMELEC office, about a hundred men halted the convoy, took them to a secluded part of the highway, and then killed off the passengers. Women who were with the convoy were even raped before getting shot; some were even mercilessly mutilated; others received gunshots from different parts of the body, particularly in the genital areas. Once the murderers have done their heinous acts, they hastily threw the bodies and a vehicle that was with the convoy, along with two other automobiles belonging to unsuspecting civilians (also executed on site), into a mass grave. Weeks after the first batch of corpses were unearthed from the site, the death toll topped at 57 casualties, 37 of whom were journalists – the deadliest election-related execution in the history of news media.


C. The Immediate Actions

On November 24, 2009, President Arroyo issued Proclamation 1946 in response, declaring a state of Emergency on the entire province of Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City. According to the proclamation, there was urgent need ―to prevent and suppress the occurrence of several other incidents of lawless violence. ‖ Autonomous Region of Muslin Mindanao (ARMM) Regional Governor Zaldy Ampatuan, in opposition to the order, asked the Supreme Court to have PP 1946 voided for violation of the following provisions: Article X, Sec. 16 of the Constitution - ―the President can only interfer e in the affairs and activities of a local government unit if she finds that the latter has acted contrary to law; ‖ and Art. V, Sec. 1, and Article XVI, Sec. 2 of Republic Act 9054 (Expanded Organic Act for ARMM), wherein stated that the regional government has the right ―to exercise disciplinary authority over officials and employees in the region. ‖

Whilst they were rambling on the legality of PP 1946, another bombshell dropped: the Philippine National Police (PNP), and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), by virtue of a search warrant issued by the local court, managed to unearth multitudes of weapons and armaments near the Ampatuan Compound at Shariff Aguak. According to military and police reports, the freshly-buried firearms (presumably the same ones used in the massacre), were composed of high-powered rifles, machine guns, and mortar tubes to name a few, ―enough to arm up an entire battalion. ‖ In response to the shocking discovery of weapons, along with reports of heavily-armed groups mobilizing ―to prevent the arrest of the Ampatuans, ‖ the President, after consulting high-


ranking officials from the AFP and PNP, finally issued Proclamation 1959 – declaring the entire province of Maguindanao, save for identified areas under the control of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), under Martial Law. Moments after the declaration, authorities raided a warehouse owned by Andal, Jr., arresting 20 militiamen, and confiscating hundreds of thousands of rifle ammunition, several more exclusive firearms, and even a couple of armored vehicles. D. Crying Praises and Fouls

Proclamation 1959 was approached with mixed views, just within days after it was enacted. Majority of the House of Representatives lauded the move made by the administration, considering the same as a well-thought-of decision; some even commented that it should have been issued earlier. In contrast, members of the Senate opposed the declaration, referring to it as a way of ―testing the waters‖ by the current administration. Other House members even contended that neither invasion nor rebellion – the things needed to exist for Martial Law to be declared – were present in Maguindanao, and that the same was just an overreaction on the part of the government. As for the Judiciary, the socio-political organizations, and even the Church Prelates, each of them also have mixed views on the matter at hand: necessity to quell imminent rebellion against excessive use of authority, covered by reasons of claims of impending revolt and nonfunctioning governmental and judicial systems (the latter contrary to the statement of the Supreme Court, saying that the said cases regarding the massacre were moving forward).


III.

THE CONCERNS AT HAND:

Main Issue: WAS THE DECLARATION OF MARTIAL LAW IN MAGUINDANAO

LEGAL? Subordinate Issues:

Did Invasion or Rebellion, as required under the 1987 Charter, exist in the area? Was the President at the proper position to impose Martial Law? Despite the lifting of Martial Law on December 13, 2009, were the actions taken by the PNP and AFP during the period justified?

IV.

ANALYSIS AND JUSTIFICATIONS

Before deciding on the matter, immediate factors are needed to be affirmed: the determination of invasion or rebellion, and the requisites for the declaration of martial law. Starting off, Sec. 18 Art. VII of the Constitution provides for the determination and procedure for issuing martial law: ―[I]n case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such


proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.

The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call.

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.

The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.

During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released. ‖

Finally, the term ‗rebellion‘, as one of the primary contentions for such implementation, was depicted under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 6968: ―Art. 134. Rebellion or insurrection; How committed . — The crime of rebellion or insurrection is committed by rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of the Philippine Islands or any part thereof, of

any body of land, naval or other armed forces, depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives.‖ ( Emphasis supplied)

In addition, records from the 1986 Constitutional Commission, particularly the discussions between Fr. Joaquin Bernas, Rep. Rustico de los Reyes, Jr. and Atty. Florenz


Regalado, indicate that the framers tried to distinguish between actual and imminent rebellion, which eventually led up to the interpretation that it is the President who ―determines, based on the circumstances, if there is presence of a rebellion. ‖ In answering the first two subordinate queries, a look into the Presidential Report to Congress regarding the proclamation is needed. Summarizing the said report, dated December 6, 2009, the following were indicated as signs of rebellion in Maguindanao, to wit: Sudden closure of the local government offices in the provincial capitol; Absence or non-appearance of the local judges, crippling the province ‘s local judiciary system; and The strategic deployment of more than 2000 rebel armed groups, reportedly preparing for armed conflict. With the Supreme Court debunking the issue of the non-appearance of judges, the focus now lies on the closure of government offices and the deployment of armed rebels. Despite the paralysis of government functions, the aforementioned events were only indicia of imminent rebellion. However, some political analysts, politicians, and members of the academe, argue that the same could be quelled through stricter enforcement of the laws instead of the option that the President used. Nevertheless, it still remains at the hands of the Commander-in-Chief, as stated earlier, to determine if rebellion exists in the area, and ―when the public safety requires it.‖ Now as to the actions of the AFP and PNP regarding the confiscations and warrantless raids and arrests, the case of Lacson, et al. vs. Perez, et al. (G.R. No. 147780) , provides for the answer, stating Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Hon. Zamora , (2000):


―. . . The factual necessity of calling out the armed forces is not easily quantifiable and cannot be objectively established since matters considered for satisfying the same is a combination of several factors which are not always accessible to the courts . Besides the absence of textual standards that the court may

use to judge necessity, information necessary to arrive at such judgment might also prove unmanageable for the courts. Certain pertinent information might be difficult to verify, or wholly unavailable to the courts. In many instances, the evidence upon which the President might decide that there is a need to call out the armed forces may be of a nature not constituting technical proof.

On the other hand, the President as Commander-in-Chief has a vast intelligence network to gather information, some of which may be classified as highly confidential or affecting the security of the state. In the exercise of the power to call, on-the-spot decisions may be imperatively necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss of human lives and mass destruction of property. . . ―(Emphasis Supplied)

In relation, SANLAKAS, et al. vs. Reyes, et al. (G.R. No. 159085) , was also decided on similar grounds, despite focusing on the validity of the declaration of a state of rebellion (Proclamation No. 427), which stemmed from the infamous 2003 Oakwood Mutiny. In dismissing the said petitions, the Court contended that the Constitution ―vests the President not only with Commander-in-Chief powers, but, first and foremost, with Executive powers. ‖


V.

CONCLUSION

There is no doubting of the power of the Chief Executive in relation to determining, declaring, and subduing any violent occurrences which can harm the welfare of the public, as the same is accounted for under the Constitution. As they would say in statutory construction: ―Salus populi est suprema lex. ”

However, it is still noted that it is not always through drastic measures that problems are solved. No amount of proclamations, executive orders, or dare I say ‗cheat codes‘, can cover up the fact that even the most efficient operations could end up not being as effective as expected and vice versa. The AFP and PNP may continue unearthing high-caliber firearms, confiscating exclusive ammunition, or even impounding all those armored and battle-ready vehicles, as a way of imposing authority among those presumably responsible for the carnage nearly two months ago. But unless justice is properly served to everyone involved, no strings attached, it is just another way of showing force to please the rabid public. In the (misattributed) words of Edmund Burke ,‖The only thing necessary for evil to succeed … is for good men to do nothing. ”


REFERENCES:

Article VII, Sec. 18, 1987 Constitution. Article 134, Revised Penal Code (As amended by Republic Act 6968, October 24, 1990.) Presidential Proclamation No. 1946 (November 24, 2009.) Presidential Proclamation No. 1959 (December 4, 2009.) Presidential Report to the Congress Re: Proclamation No. 1959 (December 6, 2009.) 1986 Constitutional Commission Record (Volume 2, RCC no. 2, July 29, 1986) Panfilo Lacson, et al. vs. Sec. Hernando Perez, et al. (G.R. Nos. 147780-81. May 10, 2001.) SANLAKAS, et al. vs. Sec. Angelo Reyes, et al. (G.R. No. 159085. February 3, 2004.) The Philippine Daily Inquirer (via http://www.inquirer.net ) The Manila Bulletin (via http://www.mb.com.ph )


Leg Writ Position Paper

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