INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEO RY TODAY TODA Y FLA FLA CSC) SC) - BibJ BibJiiotec ot ecaa
E dited di ted by
Ken Booth and Steve Smith
T h e P e n n s y l v a n i a S t at at e U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s U n i v e r s it i t y P a r k , P e n n s y l v a n ia ia
T h i s c o l l ec e c t i on o n c o p y r i g h t © T h e P e n n s y l v a n i a S ta t a t e U n i v e r s i t y P r es e s s 1 995 Each chapter © the author F i r s t p u b l i s h e d i n 1 99 99 5 i n t h e U n i t e d S t at a t es e s a n d C a n a d a b y T h e P e n n s y l v a n i a S t at at e U n i v e r s i t y P re r e ss s s , 8 20 2 0 N o r t h U n i v e r s i t y D r i v e, e , U n i v e r s i t y P a r k , P A 1 68 02 . All rights reserved. I S B N 0 - 2 7 1 - 0 1 4 6 1 - X ( ccll o th th ) ISBN 0-271-01462-8 (paper) A C I P c a t a l o g u e r e c o r d f o r t hi h i s b o o k i s a v ai a i l a bl bl e f r o m t h e L i b r a r y ol ol C o n g r e s s . T y p e s e t i n 1 1 o n 12 12 p t G a r a m o n d S t e mp mp e l b y C e n t r a C e t L t d , C a m b r i d g e P r i n t e d i n G r e a t B r i t ai ai n b y I l a r t n o l l s L t d , B o d m i n , C o r n w a l l I t is is t h e p o l i c y o f T h e P e n n s y l v a n i a S t a t e U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s t o u s e a c i d - f re re e p a p e r l o r t h e f ir i r st st p r i n t i n g o f al al l c l o t h b o u n d b o o k s . P u b l i c a t i o n s o n u n c o a t e d s t o c k s at a t i sf sf y m i n i m u m r e q u i r e m e n t s o f A m e r i c a n N a t i o n a l S t a n d a r d f o r i n f o r m a t i o n S c ie i e n ce c e s — P e r m a n e n c e o f P a p e r f o r P r i n t e d L i b r a r y M a t e r ia ia l s , A N S I 239.48-1984.
T h i s c o l l ec e c t i on o n c o p y r i g h t © T h e P e n n s y l v a n i a S ta t a t e U n i v e r s i t y P r es e s s 1 995 Each chapter © the author F i r s t p u b l i s h e d i n 1 99 99 5 i n t h e U n i t e d S t at a t es e s a n d C a n a d a b y T h e P e n n s y l v a n i a S t at at e U n i v e r s i t y P re r e ss s s , 8 20 2 0 N o r t h U n i v e r s i t y D r i v e, e , U n i v e r s i t y P a r k , P A 1 68 02 . All rights reserved. I S B N 0 - 2 7 1 - 0 1 4 6 1 - X ( ccll o th th ) ISBN 0-271-01462-8 (paper) A C I P c a t a l o g u e r e c o r d f o r t hi h i s b o o k i s a v ai a i l a bl bl e f r o m t h e L i b r a r y ol ol C o n g r e s s . T y p e s e t i n 1 1 o n 12 12 p t G a r a m o n d S t e mp mp e l b y C e n t r a C e t L t d , C a m b r i d g e P r i n t e d i n G r e a t B r i t ai ai n b y I l a r t n o l l s L t d , B o d m i n , C o r n w a l l I t is is t h e p o l i c y o f T h e P e n n s y l v a n i a S t a t e U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s t o u s e a c i d - f re re e p a p e r l o r t h e f ir i r st st p r i n t i n g o f al al l c l o t h b o u n d b o o k s . P u b l i c a t i o n s o n u n c o a t e d s t o c k s at a t i sf sf y m i n i m u m r e q u i r e m e n t s o f A m e r i c a n N a t i o n a l S t a n d a r d f o r i n f o r m a t i o n S c ie i e n ce c e s — P e r m a n e n c e o f P a p e r f o r P r i n t e d L i b r a r y M a t e r ia ia l s , A N S I 239.48-1984.
Contents
The Contributors Preface
1
T he Self-Images of a Discip line: A Ge nea logy of International Relations Theory Steve Smith
2
T h e E n d o f t h e C o l d W a r a n d I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t io io n s : Some Analytic and Theoretical Conclusions Fred Halliday
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I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a ti ti o n s a n d t h e T r i u m p h o f C a p i t a l i s m Richard Little
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I n t e r n a t i o n a l P ol o l it it ic i c al a l T h e o r y a n d t h e I d ea ea o f W o r l d Community Chris Brown
5
Th e Political Politi cal Th eory of Intern ation al Society Socie ty Robert H. Jackson
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Intern atio nal Politic Political al T he or y and the Glob al Environment A n d r e w H u r r e l l
7
Political Politi cal Ec on om y and Intern ation al Relations Susan Strange
Contents
VI
8
Re-vision ing Secur ity
175
Contents
VI
8
Re-vision ing Secur ity J. J . A n n T i c k n e r
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The Leve Le vell of Analysis Prob lem in Intern ationa l Relations Reconsidered Barry Buzan
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Th e Po st-Positivist Deb ate: Re con struc ting Scient Scientif ific ic Enquiry and International Relations Theory After Enlightenment’s Fall Jo J o h n A . V a s q u e z
175
198 19 8
217
11
Neo -realism in T h eo ry and Practice Practi ce A n d r e w L in k l a te r
241
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International Politics and Politic Poli tical al T he o ry Je J e a n Be thke th ke El sh t ai n
26 3
13
Q u e s t i o n s a b o u t I d e n t i t y i n I n t e r n a t i o n a ] R e l at a t i o ns ns Marysia Zalewski and Cynthia Enloe
279
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International Relation s and the C o nc ep t of the Political R. B. J. Walker
30 6
D a r e n o t t o K n o w : I n t e rn rn a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s T h e o r y versus the Future Ken Booth
32 8
15
Index
351 35 1
The Contributors
Ken Booth is Professor of International Politics at the University o f W a l e s , A b e r y s t w y t h . H e h a s b e en a S c h o l a r - i n - R e s i d e n c e at th e US Naval War College, Senior Research Fellow at the Center for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University (Canada) and Visit i n g M a c A r t h u r P r o f e s s o r i n t h e F a c u l t y o f S oc ia l a n d P o l it ic a l S c i e n c e s , C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r s i t y . A m o n g h i s b o o k s a r e Strategy a n d E t h n o c e n t n s m (1979), L a w , Force a n d D ip lo m a c y a t Sea (1985) and, as editor, N e w T h in k in g a b o u t S tr a te g y a n d I n te r n a t i o n a l S e c u r i ty (1991). C h r i s B r o w n is Professor of Politics at the University of South a m p t o n . H i s r e c e n t p u b l i c a t i o n s i n c l u d e I n te r n a tio n a l R e la tio n s T h e o ry : N e w N o r m a t iv e A p pr oa ch es (1992) and, as editor, P olit ic al R e s tr u c tu r in g in E uro pe: E th ic a l P erspectiv es (1994). He has written numerous articles on international relations theory. B a r r y B u z a n is Professor of International Studies at the Univer sity of Warwick, and a Project Director at the Center for Peace and Conflict Research in the University of Copenhagen. His b o o k s in clu d e People , S ta te s a n d Fea r: T h e N a tio n a l S ecu rity P ro b le m in I n te r n a tio n a l R e la tio n s (1983, revised 1991) and A n In tr o d u c tio n to S tra teg ic S tu d ie s: M il it a ry T e c h n o lo g y a n d I n te r n a t io n a l R e l a ti o n s (1987). Jointly written works include T h e L o g i c o f A n a r c h y : N e o r e a l is m t o S t r u c t u r a l R ea li sm (1993) and I d e n tity , M ig ra tio n , a n d th e N e w S e c u rity A g e n d a in E u ro p e (1993). Jean Bethke El shtai n is Laura Spelman Rockefeller Professor of Social and Political Ethics at the University of Chicago. Among h e r m a n y b o o k s a r e P u b lic M a n , P riva te W o m a n (1981), W o m e n
Xll
Pre face
national should have primacy, since the good life at home cannot be achieved u ntil th e w o r l d has freed itself fro m in te rn a tio n a l conflict. Although academic traditions and momentum generally continue to maintain the boundaries between the three traditions of speculation, it is our contention that it is increasingly untenable to consider the three sites as spatially separate; instead, we should understand theorizing about politics as analogous to a palimpsest. O n a particular issue on e o r other of the th ree sites will be the main focus of interest but the other narratives will nearly always intrude with more or less clarity. The different texts of political theory exist on the same page, not in different books. Ea ch narrative - ‘do m estic ’, ‘internation al’ and ‘w o rld ’ - develops within a context in part shaped by the others. Domestic political theory cannot proceed far without reference to the context of inter-state relations and trends in world politics. The study of po litics at the sit e o f in ter-state relations - tra d itio n a l ‘in te rn a tio n a l p o litic s’ - m u s t in creasin g ly (even at sig n ifican t cost to its d isc i p lin a ry focus) r e c o g n iz e th a t it to o c a n n o t be a discipline u n to itself. The more it recognizes this, and takes advantage of its global perspective, the m o r e it has the o p p o r t u n i t y , as is sa id later, to b e c o m e the su b ject o f all subjects in th e social sciences. The book is aimed at all levels of students of international relations, from undergraduates to professors; we believe that the quality of essays is such that everybody will be able to get something out of them, but that senior undergraduates and p o stg rad u ates in p a rt ic u la r wi ll gai n a g o o d deal. T h e in d iv id u al authors were asked to write in an accessible but advanced way about the condition of theoretical speculation on their particular topic. We hope that after finishing the book the reader will have learned something about the empirical state of the world, but even more importantly will be more aware of the problems involved in theorizing about international relations in world politics. We have incurred a number of debts in preparing this book. The most important is to Anthony Giddens, for suggesting to us a work on international relations theory today in the first place. To Donna Griffin and Elaine Lowe thanks are due for efficient and cheerful typing; and to our contributors, whose enthusiasm and responsiveness have made editing this book an easy and rewarding task. Ken Booth and Steve Smith
1
The Self-Images of a Discipline: A Genealogy of International Relations Theory Steve Smith
1
The purpose of this introductory chapter is to provide a context w i t h i n w hi c h t h e i n d i v i d u a l c ha pt e rs m a y b e re a d. My p r i n c i p a l c o n c e r n i s t o o f f e r an a c c o u n t o f t h e m a m d i v is i on s m i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s t h e o r y , a n d t o i l l u m i n a t e t he i n t e r e s t i n g, a n d o f t e n contradictory, categorizations of international theory that have b e co m e c o m m o n p l a c e . In this sense, this c h a p te r aim s to p r o v id e a n o v e r v i e w o f h o w i n t e r n a t i o n a l t h e o r y i s d e s c r i b ed a n d c a t e g o r i z e d . B u t i t a l s o a i m s t o d o s o m e t h i n g r a t h e r m o re u n s e t t l i n g , namely to show how the history of international theory, and s p e c i f i c a l l y t h e w a y s i n w h i c h i n t e r n a t i o n a l t h o u g ht h a s b e e n categorized, has created privileged, that is to say primary and d o m i n a n t , u n d e r s t a n d i n g s a n d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . M y f oc u s , t h e n , i s o n h o w t h e d i s c i p l i n e o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s h as p o r t r a y e d i t s t h e o r i e s a n d t h e d i s t i nc t i o n s b e t w e e n t h e m : w h a t a re t h e s e l f images of the discipline, and what do these self-images tell us?
T H E O R I E S A N D P R A C T IC E S
I want to provide a context for reading the essays that follow in t h e l i g h t o f t h e w o r k o f t w o w r i t e r s . T h e f i r s t i n fl u e n c e o n t h i s c h a p te r is Z y g m u n t B a u m a n ’s b o o k M o d e r n ity a n d th e H o lo c a u st ( 1 9 8 9 ) . I n t h i s i m p or t a nt w o r k B a u m a n a r g u e s t h a t so c i o l o g y h a s
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S t e v e S m i th
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S t e v e S m i th
b e e n strang ely silent a b o u t the H o l o c a u s t , seeing it as an e x c e p ti o n that cannot be explained or as the last outpost of pre-modern b a r b a r is m . In c o n t r a s t , B a u m a n argues t h a t th e H o l o c a u s t w a s o n e m a n i f e s t a t i o n o f m o d e r n p o l i t i c a l l i f e a n d o f t h e do m i n a nc e o f ‘re as on ’ and ‘ra tio na lity ’. As he pu ts it, the H olo ca us t ‘was a legitimate resident in the house of modernity; indeed, one who w ou ld n ot be at ho m e in any oth er ho us e’ (p. 17). Its stress on rational solutions, its use of technology and its reliance on advanced bureaucratic machinery made the Holocaust very much a product of Western ‘reason’. In this sense Bauman echoes the a r g u m e n t s o f M a x H o r k h e i m e r a n d T h e o d o r A d o r n o i n t h e ir 1944 b o o k D ia lecti c o f E n lig h te n m e n t ( 1 9 7 9 ) , w h e r e t h e y a r g u e t h a t i t is mistaken to see the Enlightenment as necessarily progressive; rather, there is a negative side to the Enlightenment, as clearly i n d i c a t e d b y t h e N a z i p e r i o d i n G e r m a n h i s t o ry . T h es e v i e w s a r e controversial. Many claim that an explanation of the Holocaust n e e d s t o be c o u c h e d m o r e i n t e rm s o f G e r m a n h i s t o r y a n d c u l t u r e r a t h e r t h a n t h e E n l i g h t e n m e n t p e r se, w h i l s t o t h e r s s e e t h e E n l i g h t enment providing the means for essentially pre-Enlightenment thinking. I do not want to discuss the specific claims of Bauman’s v i e w o f t h e H o l o c a u s t s i n c e I do n o t w a n t a n y s u c h di s c u s s i o n t o d e t r a c t f r o m t h e g e n e r a l i s s u e h e r a i s e s a b o ut t h e n a t u r e o f t h e p o w e r / k n o w l e d g e r e la tio n sh ip ; specificially, th e p o in t I w a n t to stress is that a discipline’s silences are often its most significant feature. Silences are the loudest voices. The significance of Bauman’s comments on sociology’s silence about the Holocaust for a discussion of international theory may a t f i r s t s i g h t s e e m u n c l e a r ; b u t I w a n t t o a r g u e t ha t w h a t B a u m a n , Adorno and Horkheimer have to say about the Enlightenment a n d a b o u t r e a s o n r e s o n a t e s w i t h t h e o r i z i n g w i t h i n th e d i s c i p l i n e o f i n t e r n a ti o n a l r e l a t i o n s . T h e c o n n e c t i o n is t h a t t h e w a ys i n w h i c h international theory has been categorized, and the debates within it presented, fail to acknowledge the link between social practice a n d t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n o f s o c i a l k n o w l e d g e . I n t e r n a t ion a l t h e o ry ten ds to speak of in ternatio nal practic e as if the ‘re as on ’ of t h e o r e t i c a l u nd e r s t a n d i n g c a n b e o p p o s e d t o , o r s e pa r a t e d f r o m , the ‘un rea so n’ or ‘irra tion ality ’ of the an arch y of inter natio nal s o c i e t y : t h e d i s c i p l i n e c o m m e n t s o n , o r o b s e r v e s , or e v a l u a t e s , o r explains an empirical domain; it does not constitute it. Yet, just as s o c i o l o g y r e m a i n s s i l e n t a b o u t t h e H o l o c a u s t , s o i nt e r n a t i o n a l theory remains silent about massive areas of the social reality of t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l , t r e a t i n g i t a s a r e a l m o f p r e - m od e r n b a r b a r i s m
The S elfIma ges o f a D iscipline
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The S elfIma ges o f a D iscipline
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o r a s a t e m p o r a l a n d s pa ti al d o m a i n i so l at e d f r o m c u l t u r a l i d e n t it y and interpretation. It is a d o m a i n , d e f i n e d b y i t s o w n p r a c t i c e s and, in an important sense, trans-historical, totalizing and given. It is a distinct and separate realm of enquiry in which regularities in behaviour are seen as proof of the very separateness that needs to be questioned. What, in short, are the silences of international theory, and what is the relationship between the study of inter n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s a n d a p a r t ic u l a r v i e w o f w h a t c o n s t i t u t e s i n t e r national practice? What international theory rarely accepts, although there have b e e n i m p o r t a n t , and alw ays m a rg in a liz e d , e x c e p tio n s th r o u g h o u t it s h i s t o r y ( f o r e xa m p le , t h e w o r k w i t h i n p e a ce s t u d i e s o r m u c h o f the inter-war work on improving inter-state relations), is that our rationalization of the international is itself constitutive of that p ra ctice . T h e selfsame ‘r e a s o n ’ w h ic h rules o u r th in k in g also helps constitute international practice. In short, international theory is i m p l i c a t e d in i n t e r n a t i o n a l p r a c t ic e b e c a u se o f th e w a y t h a t t h e o r y , in the main, divorces ethics from politics, and instead promotes u n d e r s t a n d i n g v i a a ‘r e a s o n ’ s e p a r a te d f r o m e t h ic a l o r m o r a l concerns. There are exceptions to this general trend, most notably t h e w o r k o f m a n y w r i t i n g b e f o r e t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of a s e p a r a t e discipline of international relations, and many traditional realists such as Niebuhr, Wolfers and Carr. But in the received wisdom of the discipline, these normative and ethical elements tend to be p la y e d d o w n o r seen as im p ly i n g a specif ic realist in te rp re ta tio n . My claim is that the dominant strain in international theory has b e e n o n e w h ic h sees ethics as applicable to th e k i n d o f c o m munity that international society cannot be. Thus, m the name of e n l i g h t e n m e n t a n d k n o w l e d g e , i n t e r n a t i o n a l t h e o r y ha s t e n d e d t o b e a d is c o u rs e accep ting of, a n d c o m p lie d in , th e c re a tio n and re-creation of international practices that threaten, discipline and do violence to others. Nuclear strategy, and especially its treatment of arms races as natural phenomena, is merely the most explicit example of this tendency; the other areas of international thought co nfi rm it. It is ‘rea son ’ w hi ch is implicated in the r e-c rea tion and reaffirmation of international practices of domination and subor d i n a t i o n , a n d t h r o u g h w h i c h t h e i d e n t i ty o f o t h e r s is l e g it im i z ed . The second, and more fundamental, influence on the aims of this chapter is Michel Foucault. I will use his writings on the a r c h a e o l o g y a n d t h e g e n e a l o g y o f k n o w l e d g e t o i l l u mi n a t e w h a t stories international theory has told about itself. I am m ore intereste d in F ou cau lt’s later writings on genealogy than his earlier
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work on the archaeology of knowledge, and the differ ence b e tw e e n the tw o is a g o o d w a y of illu stra tin g w h a t I w a n t to d o in this chapter. This difference represents the main distinction between the e a r li e r a n d th e l a te r w o r k s o f F o u c a u l t . I n w o r k s s u c h as M a d n e s s a n d C i v i l i z a t i o n (1967, first published in 1961), T h e B i r th o f t h e C l i n i c (1975, first published in 1963), T h e O r d e r o f T hin gs (1970, first published in 1966), and T h e A r ch a e o lo g y o f K n o w le d g e (1972, first published in 1971), Foucault undertakes an archaeological examination of the rules that regulate discourses. His method is one of scholarly detachment from the subject matter, with the aim of showing how discursive practices operated in history. This is not merely a version of the history of ideas, since Foucault does n o t s e e a n y s m o o t h e v o l u t i o n o f i d e a s , b u t r a t h e r ga p s , d i s c o n t i n uities and violent changes. As Smart (1985, p. 54) has put it: ‘Through such an analysis the meanings, beliefs, and truths of a p a s t are revealed to b e m e re ly so m a n y in te r p r e ta tio n s r a th e r th a n p ro g ressiv e a p p ro x i m a tio n s to th e re ality o f th in g s in th e m se lv e s .’ In contrast, the later works of Foucault, especially his work on p u n i s h m e n t ( D is c ip lin e a n d P un is h 1977, first published in 1975) and on sexuality — T h e H i sto r y o f S e x u a l i ty , Volumes 1, 2 and 3 (1979, 1987 (first published 1984) and 1988 (first published 1984)) —reveal m o re o f a c o n c e rn w ith g e n e a lo g y , t h a t is to say w i th th e linkage between social practice and discourses. In these later w or k s Foucault looks at discourses as embodying social power, and specifically seeks to critique what the human sciences take as g iv e n. O f c o u rs e , t h e r e a re v e ry c l ea r c o n t i n u i t i e s b e t w e e n t h e t w o approaches (thus I reject any notion of a break between .the earlier and later Foucault), but there is a clear shift of emphasis, and it is genealogy that seems to offer most for the study of international theory. Fo uca ult outlines his genealogical m et h od m os t clearly in a 1971 p a p e r (1 98 6, first p u b l is h e d in E n g lish in 1977). T h e ti tle o f th is p a p e r, ‘N ie tz sc h e , G e n e a lo g y , H i s t o r y ’, m a k e s very clear th e intellectual debt that Foucault owes to Nietzsche’s work on genealogy. Genealogy is to be distinguished from tracing the o r i g i n s o f t h e i d e n t i t y o f t h e e s s e n c e o f h u m a n b e ha v i o u r . R a t h e r , a genealogist ‘finds that there is “something altogether different” b e h in d thin gs: n o t a timeless and essential secret, b u t th e se c re t that they have no essence or that their essence was fabricated in a piecem eal fash io n f ro m alien fo rm s. E x a m in in g the h i s to r y o f reason, he learns that it was born in an altogether “reasonable”
The S elfIm ag es o f a Discipline
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fashion —fro m cha nc e’ (1986, p. 78). T he k ey pr oc ess at w o rk is that of domination. In this sense history is a series of dominations, and discourses a central mechanism of these dominations. There be in g n o un iv e rsa l tru th s o r essences, the clash b e tw e e n disc o u rse s is a place of c on fronta tion, a ‘non-place’, a pure distance, which indicates that the adversaries do no t belong to a co mm on space . . . In a sense, on ly a single drama is ever staged in this ‘non-place’, the endlessly repeated play of dom ination s . . . H um an ity does not gradually progress from combat to combat until it arrives at universal reciprocity, where the rule of law finally replaces warfare; humanity installs each of its violences in a system of rules and thus proceeds from domination to domination . . . The successes of history belong to those who are capable o f seizing these rules. (1986, pp. 85 -6)
James Der Derian’s excellent study of diplomacy shows very clearly what a genealogical account looks like. As he comments it means to act on a suspicion, supported by historical research, that the given origins of diplomacy have been defined more by diplomacy’s present status and needs than by its past principles and practices . . . It m o st assuredly will n o t rep ro d u c e the c ertitud e of traditional diplomatic historians wh o study diplom acy as an unfold ing story of the past neatly creating the present . . .; but to project the present on to the past, discover laws of development, or assert some continuous movement towards a single telos is to abuse history. (1987, p. 3)
Centrally, his account shows how diplomatic practice was sus tained and constituted by the discursive practice of diplomacy, a fact reflected in much of the writing about international relations u n d e r t a k e n b e f o r e th e f o r m a t i o n o f a s e p a ra t e d is c ip l in e . What does adopting a genealogical approach to international theory involve? Richard Ashley has noted five overlapping aspects of a genealogical attitude. First, it involves a shift away from uncovering structures of history and towards a focus on ‘the m o v e m e n t a n d c l ash es o f h is t o ri c a l p r a ct ic e s t h a t w o u l d i m p o s e o r resist structure . . . With this shift . . . social inquiry is increasingly disposed to find its focus in t h e p o s i n g o f “ h o w ” q u e s t i o n s , n o t “w h a t” qu es tio ns ’ (1987, p. 409). Second, all hi sto ry is seen as the clash of multiple wills, even history which produces order. In this light, discursive practices ‘are to be understood as containing their
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own exemplary and replicable strategies and technologies for the disciplining of plural historical practices in the production of historical m od es of do m ina tio n’ (p. 409). Th ird, a genealogical attitude is particularly concerned with how discursive practices emerge and are disciplined. Boundaries are seen as especially p r o b le m a tic , as are cla ims o f u n i t y , id e n tity and a u t o n o m y w ith in a field of practice. In short, academic disciplines are to be seen as the results of multiple practices and as historically constituted, and not at all as autonomous and natural or given. They are fields of battle b e t w e e n ri val in te rp re ta ti o n s: ‘th e “a u t o n o m y ” a n d “id e n tity” of a field [are] a consequence of the play of power among p lu ra l e le m e n ts. O n e is d is p o se d to lo o k fo r the stra teg ies . . . by w hic h m ult ipl e them es . . . are exc lud ed , silenced, disp ers ed . . . thereby to privilege some elements over others, impose bound aries, and discipline practice in a manner producing just this no rm aliz ed division o f practical sp ac e’ (p. 410). F o u rth , there are no transcendental subjects with existences formed prior to prac tice. Instead, subjects ‘emerge in consequence of the powe r po litical stru g g le a m o n g c o n c e p ts , th e m e s, an d m o d e s o f practice. As suc h, the subje ct is itself a site o f po w er political co n te st’ (p. 410). Finally , academic ap pro ach es w hich claim to prov ide access to the universal truths, hidden essences, underlying struc tures or moral imperatives are seen as ‘political practice intimately engaged in the interpretation, production, and normalization of modes of imposed order, modes of domination. They are seen as means by which practice is disciplined and domination advances in hi sto ry ’ (pp. 41 0-11). A genealogical approach is, therefore, one which analyses both d e s c e n t a n d e m e r g e n c e . A s S m a r t ( 1 9 8 5 , p p . 5 6 - 6 0 ) po i n t s o u t , the analysis of descent questions notions of unity and identity, and attacks the assumption of an unbroken continuity of history. The study of emergence looks at how historical forms are merely transitory manifestations of subjugation and domination. What it means for intern ation al th eo ry is that it calls into que stion the selfim a ge s o f t h e d i sc i pl in e , w h e r e b y i n t e r n a t i o n a l t h e o r y is p o r t r a y e d as a de ve lopin g discursive field with c lear boun daries a nd tran sc en d e n t a l c o n c e r n s . R a t h e r t h a n b e i n g a ‘n a t u r a l ’ a n d ‘a u t o n o m o u s ’ discipline with a series of unfolding debates which get ever closer to explaining reality, from a genealogical perspective international theory appears as a historical manifestation of a series of conflict ing interpretations, whose unity and identity are the product of a victory in this conflict. Crucially, a genealogical analysis focuses
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our attention on to the picture of the discipline that the discipline tells itself. What is the self-image of international theory that dominates debates, and whi ch graduate students are given as th e history of international thought? What assumptions are hidden in the w ay that the history of the discipline is presen ted? W ha t voices are silenced and which marginal ized in the canon of international theory? Above all, what power-political practices infuse the selfimages of international theory?
T E N S EL F -I M A G ES O F I N T E R N A T I O N A L T H E O R Y
I will no w turn to loo k at the ways in w hich international theorists have tended to talk about the field. I am concerned to look at how international theorists have described the debates within the field, and particularly to focus on the depiction of the key di sputes and p o s iti o n s w ith in it. O f th e ten that fo llo w s o m e ar e cle arly m o r e widely accepted categor izations of the discipline than others, but each has been used as a typology of the discipline, or as a way of p r o n o u n c i n g o n w h a t are th e ‘k e y ’ deb ates a n d p o sitio n s w i th i n the discipline. In each case I am mo re interes ted in wh at is silenced or pronounced inappropriate than with reiterating the claims of the specific categorization.
I n te r n a tio n a l T h e o ry versus P oli ti cal T heo ry
This way of thinking about international theory has been particu larly important among those who fit within what is usually, if inaccurately, ter m ed the ‘En glish ’ school (for a definitive stat em en t of this see Bull, 1977). The argument was best expressed in an influential 1966 paper by Martin Wight, in which he defined international theory as being ‘a tradition of speculation about the society of states, or the family of nations, or the international c o m m u n ity ’ (1966, p. 18), in con trast to political theo ry, w hic h was con cerned w ith ‘specu lation abo ut the state’ (p. 18). H is argument was not that there could be no international theory; rather, that there was no body of international theory to rival the achievements of political theory. Not only was there no body of international theory before the twentieth century to match the work of the great political theorists but also what international theory had existed had been marked by ‘i ntellectual and moral
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p o v e r t y ’ (p. 20). H e p u t th is d o w n to th e d o m in a n c e o f th e state as the focal point for political theory, which made it difficult to think beyond the state to notions of a world community or of individuals having rights outside the framework of the state. M o r e o v e r , i n t e r n a t i o n a l t h e o r y d i d n o t f it w el l in an e ra d o m i n a t e d b y a belief in p ro g res s . A b o v e all, W i g h t arg ued th a t to talk o f international theory required using the language of domestic p o litical th e o r y , a n d t h a t th is w as in a p p r o p r ia te to a realm w h e r e survival was the main concer n. Instead, Wight argued, there is no international theory apart from the philosophy of history; it is historians wh o cou ld best explain ‘the nat ure of foreign policy and the w ork ing of the states-sys tem’ (p. 32). The problem with this view is that it sets up a f alse dichotomy b et w e en po litical a n d in tern atio n al t h e o r y , o n e w h ic h can o n l y load the dice against international the ory . As R oy Jone s has p o in t e d o u t, W i g h t ’s v iew that there can be n o in te rn atio n al t h e o r y should really be rephrased to read: ‘in the English school there can be no theory of international relations because the English school has cut itself off from the classical theme of political tho u gh t’ (1981, p. 2). For Chris B ro w n the problem lies in the definition of political theory that Wight uses. It is a nar row definition, focusing on the state; such a definition axiomatically limits internation al th eo ry to a m ino r role since it cann ot deal with the kinds of questions raised by pol itical theory. Yet, there are other definitions of political theory which do not focus on the state, and which indicate that there are significant overlaps between political an d in ter n a tio n a l th eo ry , so th a t each is in vo lved in v er y much the same type of enterprise. As Brown puts it: ‘the theory of international relations is not a long-lost, new ly invigo rated tw in of political theory but an integral part of the later discourse. Wight’s mistake was not to misunderstand international theory b u t to m is ch aracte rise p o li ti ca l theory . . . Wight’s definition of political th e o r y is h i g h ly c o n te n tio u s ’ ( 1992, pp. 6 -7 ) . B r o w n th e n p o in ts o u t th a t a d efin itio n of po litical t h e o r y fo r P la to w o u l d have involved notions of justice, and such a definition would be one that united political and international theory; each deals with differing aspects of questions of justice. Wight’s starting point, which results in his verdict on why there can be no international theo ry, is ther efor e no thi ng like as ‘n atu ra l’ or ‘ne utr al’ as W ig ht suggested. This view depends on a highly specific reading of p olitical th e o r y , a n d can th erefo re n o t s im p l y be taken f o r g ra n te d . Rather, it is his definition, rooted in a historically specific view of
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what politics was about, that leads to his conclusion. Contrary to h is v ie w , p o l it ic a l an d i n t e r n a t i o n a l t h e o r y s h a r e t h e s a m e c o n c e r n s and imperatives and are part of the same theoretical enterprise, albeit dealing with different constructions of the political world. I n d e e d , o n e m i g h t m a k e t h e m o r e r a d i c a l p o i n t , r a d ic a l a t l e a s t f o r the self-image of international politics, that international theory is b u t o n e asp ect o f a m u c h w i d e r ra n g e o f social, p o litical, ethical a n d e c o n o m i c t h e o r y a n d t h a t t h e y a r e a s p e c t s o f i nt e r n a t i o n a l t h e o r y . T h e c o n v e n t i o n a l l y a c c e p t e d d i v i s i o n s b e t w ee n , s a y , s o c i ology and politics, must, in this light, be seen as social construc tions, and no t as natural. As R. B. J. Walk er (1993) has persuasively s h o w n , t h e d i s co u r s es o f p o l i t ic a l t h e o r y a n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l t h e o r y have been presented as distinct, yet presume each other.
Communitarian versus Cosmopolitan Thought
This categorization refers to a debate which has been particularly i n fl u e nt ia l in t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f w h a t i s t e r m e d n o r m a t i v e t h e o r y . This is rather a misleading term since it implies that there is any s u c h t h i n g a s n o n - n o r m a t i v e t h e o r y . T h e b a s i c d i s t in c t i o n i s simple: communitarian theories argue that political communities are the bearers of rights and duties in international soci ety; c o s m o p o l i t a n t he o ri es a r g u e t h a t m o r a l a r g u m e n t s s h o u l d b e b a s ed not on communities but on either humanity as a whole or on individuals (see the debate between Brown and Hoffman in B r o w n , 1 9 8 7 , 1 9 8 8 ; H o f f m a n , 1 9 8 8 a ) . T h e d e b a t e b e t we e n t h e s e p o s iti o n s has o p e n e d u p c o n s id e ra b le space b o t h fo r d e v e lo p in g n o r m a t i v e i n te r n a ti o n a l t h e o r y a n d f o r li n k in g i n t e r n a t io n a l t h e o r y with similar debates in other disciplines, particularly moral phil o s o p h y , a n d s oc ia l a n d p o l i t ic a l t h e o r y . T h i s h a s b e e n m o s t e v i d e n t in the works of Brown (1992), Beitz (1979), Nardin (1983) and Frost (1986), which explicitly use the cosmopolitan/communitar ian d e b a t e t o l in k i n t e r n a t io n a l t h e o r y w i t h t h e w i d e r p h i l o s o p h i c a l and social science literatures, notably the works of Walzer (1980), Barry (1989), and Rawls (1971). The main problem with this categorization is that the vast m a j o r i t y o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l t h e o r y h a s p r o c e e d e d a s if i t d i d n o t exist. The central thrust of the discipline since its emergence as a separate subject in the aftermath of the First World War has been to create an a u t o n o m o u s t h e o r y o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s . T h i s requires treating the international as distinct from the other
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r e f e r e n c e p o i n t s o f s oc ia l a n d p o li t ic a l t h e o r y , l et a l o n e t h e o b t u s e debates within contemporary moral philosophy. The dominance of realism furthered this tendency with its stress on practical and scientific knowledge and the consequent belittling of normative theory. For realists, the international political sphere is one of necessity, regularity and danger, wholly unsuitable for the moral p h i l o s o p h e r . M o r a liz in g b e lo n g s in th e p u lp it, n o t in th e c la s sr o o m o r i n th e c o r r i d o r s o f p o w e r . T a k i n g n o r m a t i v e c o n c e r n s s e r io u s l y w o u l d a t b e s t m is l ea d s t u d e n t s as t o t h e real n a t u r e o f i n t e r n a ti o n a l r e l a ti o n s a n d , a t w o r s t , c o u r t n a t io n a l di s as te r . T h e p r o b l e m s w i t h this viewpoint are threefold: first, it is based on an imp licit assumption that non-normative theory is possible; second, it assum es th at the ‘politica l’ and the ‘inte rna tion al’ are in som e w ay n a t u r a l c a t e g o r i e s , n o t a t a l l t h e p r o d u c t o f t h e wa y s i n w h i c h w e think about the social world; finally, it assumes that realism does not already adopt, albeit implicitly, moral principles. On this last p o i n t it is fair to p o i n t o u t th a t som e classical realists, such as Kennan, Morgenthau and Niebuhr, did sometimes speak of the international sphere as one suitable for moral reasoning, but they a ls o s p o k e o f th e p r e p o n d e r a n c e o f p o w e r - p o l i t i c a l c o n s i d e r a ti o n s a n d w a r n e d a g a in st t h e d a n g e r s o f a m o r a l f o r e i g n p o l i c y . M o r e over, although this strain of practical realism has been influential it has been dominated by a more technical realism in which there i s a b s o l u t e l y n o r o o m f o r n o r m a t i v e r e a s o n i n g . W r i te r s l i k e Morgenthau adopt each position in different places in their writ ings, but in my view it is technical realism that lies at the centre of t h e i r a n al y si s. I t is o n l y r e c e n t l y t h a t th is d o m i n a n t v i e w h a s c o m e u n d e r s u s ta i ne d a tt ac k , m o s t p o w e r f u l l y f r o m C h r i s B r o w n ( 1 99 2) . N o n e t h e l e s s , th e c o s m o p o l i t a n / c o m m u n i t a r i a n d e b a te do es hav e the difficulty that it places at the centre of our analysis moral and ethical concerns. This is problematic because of the discipline’s focus on scientific approaches, which eschew concern with oughttype questions. It is also problematic because of the focus on p o li c y relevance. H o w can in te rn atio n al t h e o r y fare w h e n th e p o li c y analysts w a n t a n s w e r s to t o d a y ’s p r o b l e m s , an sw e rs t h a t are costed and evaluated for political risk? The worry is that the cosmopolitan/communitarian debate results in a marginalization of international theory. More important still is the worry that the debate is really rather too narrow, because it is based on debates w i t h i n p h i l o s o p h y a n d p o l i t i c a l t h e o r y t h a t a r e t h em s e l v e s c o m i n g u n d e r a t t a c k f o r w h a t t h e y l e a v e o u t o f t h e e q u a t i on . I n t h i s s e n s e the cosmopolitan/communitarian debate merely defers to work in
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other disciplines regardless of the constructed nature of the categories and concepts within these privileged narratives; that is to say that international questions are defined and answered in terms derived from political theory. Thus, although not predeter mined, the debates within normative international theory all too o f t e n s o u n d l i k e t h e c o n c e r n s o f w h i t e , W e s t e r n , w e a l t h y m a l e s. Once other definitions of rights or of referent points enter the frame, the categories can no longer carry the analytical weight assigned to them. It is for this reason that agreement between communitarians and cosmopolitans is very difficult, maybe i m p o s s i b l e , s i n c e t h e r e e x i s t s n o i n d e p e n d e n t g r o u nd f o r r e s o l v i n g differences. Finally, it is obvious that within each of the broad camps there are enormous differences of emphasis, and a corre sponding set of very serious weaknesses. But centrally, the debate is one framed within terms that are themselves socially con structed, and therefore open to question. Yet it is this very fact w h i c h p o i n t s t o o n e s i g n i f i c a n t s t r e n g t h o f t h e w o rk i n t h i s a r e a : in my judgement anything which links international theory to d e v e l o p m e n t s i n p h i l o s o p h y a n d t h e o t h e r s o c i a l s c ie n c e s i s t o b e welcomed. The problem is that this categorization of international theory refers to a very small part of what passes for international theory and therefore runs the risk of further marginalizing nor m a t iv e t h e o r y .
The Three Rs
Martin Wight’s threefold categorization has been particularly influential in th e d eve lop m ent of the ‘En glish ’ school of int er national theory. Originally given as a series of lectures at the L o n d o n S c h o o l o f E c o n o m i c s i n t h e 1 9 5 0 s , a n d p u b l i sh e d o n l y long after his de ath (Wigh t, 1991), W ig h t’s division of intern ation al theory into three traditions has been the dominant categorization o f t ra d i ti o n s a m o n g t h o s e w h o w o r k a t t h e i n te r se c ti o n b e t w e e n i n t e r n a t i o n a l a n d p o l i t i c a l t h e o r y , a n d , l i k e W i g h t, a t t e m p t t o create the kind of international theory that, as noted earlier, was hitherto abs ent. W ig h t’s legacy is aston ishing for one w h o , as Hedley Bull (1976, p. 101) notes, published so little in his lifetime, though he wrote prodigiously (one 68-page pamphlet and half a dozen chapters and articles). Yet his legacy has clearly been p a rticularly p r o f o u n d fo r th o se w h o a tt e n d e d his lectures a n d later
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worked with him in the British Committee on the Theory of International Politics. For Wight, international theorists can be divided into three traditions, known either as realists, rationalists and revolutionists or as Machiavellians, Grotians and Kantians. In each case, the first group saw international politics as anarchical, a potential war of all against all; the second saw it as a mixed domain of conflict and co-operation, in which a society of states existed, in which rules o f b e h a v i o u r a l s o e x i s t e d a n d w e r e o b s e r v e d ; t h e t hi r d g r o u p s a w i n t e r n a ti o n a l p o li t ic s a s r e al ly a b o u t h u m a n i t y , t h e c iv ita s m a x i m a , o n a c c o u n t o f w h o m t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l s o c i e t y o f s t at e s h a d t o b e transcended. There are three main problems with this categorization. The first is that there are other ways of dividing international political theory; Michael Donelan (1990) lists five traditions (natural law, realism, fideism, rationalism, historicism), whilst Nardin and M a p e l ( 1 9 9 2 ) o f f e r t w e l v e w a y s o f t h i n k i n g a b o u t i nt e r n a t i o n a l ethics. This is not simply a matter of semantics but, rather, a q u e s t i o n o f w h a t d i s t in c t p o s i t i o n s e xi st . T h e s e c o n d p r o b l e m i s t h a t m a n y s c h o l a r s , a n d c e r t ai n l y m o s t major political thinkers , do no t fit at all easily within one trad ition . Thus, a false sense of unity is created, and nuances and subtleties lost. O f cou rse, this is a pro ble m w ith any ca tegoriza tion, bu t it is pa rtic ularly m a rk e d in W i g h t ’s case, a p r o b l e m m a d e m o r e p r e s s ing by the extensive re-evaluation of political thinkers that has occurred since Wight gave his lectures. For Hedley Bull (1976, p. I l l ) , W i g h t ’s categ ories d o n o t b e a r th e w e ig h t he a ssig n e d to them. In his defence, Tim o th y D u n n e (1993, pp. 3 12—13) has noted that Wight was well aware of the difficulty in putting thinkers into categories; for Wight, ‘the greatest political writers in international theory almost all straddle the frontiers dividing tw o of the tr ad iti o ns ’ (1991, p. 259). Yet, for Bull it is d o ub tf u l w h e t h e r m u c h o f t h e t h i n k i n g a b o u t i n t e r n a t i o n a l p ol i t i c s r e l a t e s to the debate within and between the three traditions: ‘There is a p o in t at w h ic h th e d e b a te W i g h t is d e s c rib in g cease s to be o n e th a t has actually taken place, and becomes one that he has invented; at this point his work is not an exercise in the history of ideas, so m u c h a s t h e e x p o s i t i o n o f a n i m a g i n a r y p h i l o s o p h i c al c o n v e r sa tio n’ (1976, p. 1 1 1 ) . T h e p r o b l e m i s n o t t h a t i m a g i n a r y p h i l o s ophical conversations are unhelpful, indeed Michael Donelan has used these to very good effect in his recent study (1990); rather, t h e p r o b l e m i s t h a t W i g h t n e e d s t o i m p u t e t o t h i n k er s v i e w s t h e y
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did not express in order to deal with many of the central issues in international theory. T h e f in a l p r o b l e m is w h e t h e r d e b a t e b e t w e e n t h e t h r e e t r a d i t i o n s can be resolved or whether such a categorization is, in the final analysis, relativistic. Dunne argues that the three traditions are meant to be seen as historically rather than ethically relativistic, in the sense that each tend ed to d om inate at var ious tim es in historical p r a c tic e ; b u t the p r o b le m r e m a in s th at, as w i t h c o m m u n ita r ia n is m and cosmopolitanism, there is no basis for deciding between the traditions that is external to each but not external to all. By this I mean that each tradition had its own, and distinct, evaluative criteria, with no criteria being agreed on by the three traditions; there was no foundation for evaluating truth claims outside each tradition. Wight himself was firmly in the Grotian or rationalist tradition, although Alan James (1982, p. 118) has placed him u n a m b i g u o u s l y i n t h e M a c h i a v e l l i a n o r r e a l i s t t r a d it i o n . H o w e v e r , W i g h t w a s a l s o c l e a r t h a t u n d e r s t a n d i n g i n t e r n a t i o na l r e l a t i o n s r e q u i r e d d e a l i n g w i t h a l l t h r e e t r a d i t i o n s , w i t h t he m a i n c o n c e r n being n o t to p ro v e o n e r ig h t b u t, rath er, to see th e d e b a te b e tw e e n the three as of central i m p o r t a n c e . T r u t h w a s n o t a n a t t r i b u t e o f any one tradition but of the dialogue between them. This raises the obv iou s qu estions of ‘W h ich dialog ue?’ and ‘Is any dialogue as go od as any ocher dia log ue ?’ Th e prob lem w ith this, of course, is that the grounds for making choices between the arguments of each tradition on any given issue must, in the absence of an e x t e rn a l f o u n d a t i o n , d e p e n d o n t h e va lu es a n d b el ie f s o f t h e p e r s o n involved. In Wight’s case, for example, this has led to a debate over whether or not his Christian beliefs led to a bias against the Kantian or revolutionary tradition. What the three traditions leave us with, then, is a set of theories from which the analyst can ‘pick a n d m i x ’ . T h i s p r o b l e m is c o m p o u n d e d i f t h e t r a d i t i o n s a r e n o t a c c u r a t e r e f l e c t i o n s o f w h a t c i t e d t h i n k e r s t h o u g h t ; t he d a n g e r i s t h e n o n e o f t a u t o l o g y . T h e m a i n i s s u e , h o w e v e r , i s n o t re a l l y w h e t h e r thinker X fits accurately into tradition Y, but how do we choose b e tw e e n th e various tr a d itio n s th a t are used in in te r n a ti o n a l th e o ry .
T h e T h r e e W a v e s o r T h e ‘G r e a t D e b a t e s ’ A m u c h w i d e r c h a r a c t e r iz a t i o n o f t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l
t h e o r y t h a n t h e p r e v i o u s o n e s h a s b e e n t h a t b a s e d on a c h r o n o l o g ical v ie w o f d e v e l o p m e n t ( u s u a ll y t ie d t o s o m e n o t i o n o f p ro g r e ss ) .
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Steve Smith
S u c h a p e r s p e c t i v e h a s t e n d e d t o d i v i d e u p t h e h i s to r y o f t h e discipline into phases when a specific theoretical position domi n a t e d o v e r r i v a l v i e w s , w i t h t h e p e r i o d s o f t r a n s i ti o n b e t w e e n hegemonic voices being marked by ‘great debates’. S t a r t i n g f r o m t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e la t i o n s a s a s e p a ra t e di s ci p li n e b e g a n w i t h t h e f o u n d a t i o n b y D a v i d D a v i e s o f t h e Woodrow Wilson Chair at Aberystwyth in 1919, such accounts usually speak of three main phases in the development of inter national theory. As John Vasquez puts it: ‘The twentieth-century history of international relations inquiry can be roughly divided into three stages: the idealist phase; the realist tradition; and the “b eh av ior al” re vo lt’ (1983, p. 13). H ed le y Bull, in a w idely cited overview of the growth of international theory, adopts the same characterization, with rough dates to delineate the periods of dominance: ‘it is helpful to recognise three successive waves of theoretical activity: the “idealist” or progressive doctrines that p r e d o m i n a t e d in th e 1920 s and e a r ly 1930s, th e “ r e a lis t” o r c o n s e r v a t iv e t h e o r i e s t h a t d e v e l o p e d i n r e a c t i o n t o t h e m i n t h e l at e 1930s and 1940s, and the “social scientific” theories of the late 1950s and 1960s, whose origin lay in dissatisfaction with the m e t h o d o l o g i e s o n w h i c h b o t h t h e ea r li er k in d s o f t h e o r y w e r e b a s e d ’ ( 1972, p. 33). I f id e al is m , r e a li s m a n d b e h a v i o u r a l i s m d o m i n a t e d t h e d i s c i p l in e s uc c es si ve ly , t h e n m u c h a t t e n ti o n b e c o m e s f o c u s e d o n t h e p e r i o d s o f t r a n s i t i o n ; a c c o r d i n g l y t h e l i t e r a t u r e i s f u l l of r e f e r e n c e s t o t w o ‘great debates’. The first of these was between idealism and realism in the late 1930s and early 1940s; the second was between realism and behaviouralism in the late 1950s and 1960s. More recently, s o m e s c h o l a r s h a v e s p o k e n o f a t h i r d ‘ g r e a t d e b a t e ’; h o w e v e r , there are differences over who are the protagonists of this third debate. Maghroori and Ramberg (1982) accept the chronological interpretation of the development of the subject just summarized, b u t see a th ir d d e b a te d e v e lo p in g b e t w e e n s tate-c en tric realists a n d transnationalists, whereby the latter (usually including idealists a n d b e h a v i o u r a l i s t s ) s e e o t h e r a c t o r s c e n t r a l l y i n vo l v e d i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l it ic s . Y o s e f L a p i d (1 98 9) , o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , c h a r a c t e r i z e s t h e t h i r d d e b a t e a s o n e b e t w e e n p o s i t i v i s m ( w hi c h characterized all previously dominant theories) and post-positivi sm , a c o ll e c t io n o f v i e w s t h a t c h al le n g e t h e c e n t r a l a s s u m p t i o n s o f p o sitiv ism . F o r A r e n d L i j p h a r t ( 1 9 7 4 a a n d 1 9 7 4 b ) , t h e f i r s t t h re e w a v e s o f t h e o r y a n d t h e t w o ‘g r e a t d e b a t e s ’ b e t w e e n t h e n c a n b e s t be
The SelfIm ag es o f a Discipline
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u n d e r s t o o d as so ci al sc ie n ce e xa m p l e s o f T h o m a s K u h n ’s c o n c e p t of a para digm . L ijphart argues th at the second ‘great de b ate ’ was much more important than the first debate, because it involved a more fundamental dispute than that between realism and idealism. A s h e n o t e s , b o t h r e al is m a n d i d e al i sm w e r e p a r t o f t h e t r a d i t i o n a l p a rad ig m o p p o s e d in th e s e c o n d d e b a te b y the scien tific p a r a d i g m (1974a, p. 20). Accordingly, the chronological periods when first i d e a l i s m , t h e n r e a l i s m , a n d t h e n b e h a v i o u r a l i s m d o mi n a t e d w e r e p e rio d s o f K u h n ia n n o r m a l science, w ith th e ‘gr e a t d e b a te s ’ representing times of paradigm crisis (1974b, pp. 54-9). There are a number of problems with this characterization of t he d e v e l o p m e n t o f in t e r n a t io n a l t h e o r y . T h e f i r st d i f f ic u l ty c o m prises a n u m b e r o f p o in ts a n d relates to the use o f K u h n ’s w o r k on para digm s, wh ich, as we will see in the next section, has beco m e a common way of talking about international theory. My com ments here about the problems of using the concept of paradigm i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l t h e o r y w i l l , o b v i o u s l y , a p p l y t o th e o t h e r u s a g e s as well. But the Lijphart view is a particularly appropriate place to s t a r t b e c a u s e i t i n v o l v e s e x p l i c i t l y b o t h K u h n ’ s c om m e n t s o n ‘norm al science’ and his w o rk on pa radigm crisis and cha nge (Kuh n, 1970a). Th e central difficulty is that K u h n ’s version of scientific progress is itself hotly contested within the philosophy of science, yet its usage in international theory tends to deal with i t a s i f i t w a s u n p r o b l e m a t i c . T o c i t e j u s t o n e o b vi o u s p r o b l e m : K u h n i s v e r y i m p r e c i s e o v e r w h a t h e m e a n s b y a p a r ad i g m . A s M a r g a r e t M a s t e r m a n ( 1 9 7 0 , p p . 6 1 - 5 ) n o t e s , K u h n u s es t h e t e r m i n t w e n t y - o n e d i f f e r e n t w a y s . B u t t o t h i s m u s t b e ad d e d t h e m a j o r debates over the picture Kuhn paints of scientific activity (for a good sta rting po int see the essays in Lakatos and M usg rav e, 1970). T h e s e c o n d p r o b l e m w i t h u s i n g K u h n ’ s w o r k i s t h a t he w a s c l e a r that his arg um en t applied on ly to the ‘m atu re’ sciences, and no t to either the ‘pr oto -sc ien ces ’ or to the arts and social sciences. Th ird , there is an absolutely key prob lem with K uh n’s arg um en t that has far more bearing on any social science application than it does for any science application. This is the que stion of w he the r K u h n is a relati v i s t ; i n t u r n t h i s b o i l s d o w n t o w h a t K u h n m e a n s w he n h e t a l k s o f ‘reality’. This is not the place to discuss this in any depth, except to note that Kuhn walks a very fine line between implying that he is a relativist (1970b, pp . 259 —66), and argu ing th at he is n o t since there is a reality against wh ich para digm s can be tested (1970a, pp. 20 5-7). Consider these two statements as an example of the deep waters involved: ‘Most of the puzzles of normal science are directly
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p r e s e n te d b y n a tu r e . . . F o r m e, scienti fic d e v e lo p m e n t is, like biolog ical e v o lu tio n , u n id ir e c tio n a l and irre v ersib le ’ ( K u h n , 1970b, p p . 2 6 3 —4); ‘T h e r e is, I th in k , n o t h e o r y - i n d e p e n d e n t w a y to reconstruct phrases like “really there”, the notion of a match b e t w e e n th e o n t o lo g y o f a t h e o r y and it s “ r e a l” c o u n t e r p a r t in na tu re n o w seems to me illusive in principle . . . I can see in [the] s u c c e s s i o n [ o f t h e o r i e s ] n o c o h e r e n t d i r e c t i o n o f on t o l o g i c a l d e v e l o p m e n t ’ ( K u h n , 1 97 0a , p . 20 6) . W h a t e v e r th e p r o b l e m s o f dealing with this issue m the natural sciences, it will clearly cause more fundamental problems in international theory, where the no tio n of ‘reality’ can be seen in qualitatively distin ct terms. If reality is a problem for scientists consider what introducing the n o t i o n o f a s o c i a l l y c o n s t r u c t e d r e a l i t y d o e s t o t he d i s c u s s i o n . Think, for example, of the meaning of terms such as society, or the family, or masculinity. In short, if Kuhn sees relativism avoided by recourse to a notion of a reality, even if our theories of it see it in different ways, then dealing with a reality in which our theories are themselves constitutive of that reality is much more p r o b le m a ti c ; hence K u h n ’s v ie w th a t his a r g u m e n ts a pp lied o n ly to the natural, or, as he termed them, mature sciences. I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e p r o b l e m s i n v o l v e d i n u s i n g K u h n ’s w o r k , there are other difficulties in presenting the discipline in the Bull/ Vasquez/Lijphart way. The first is that it makes the process far more clinically exact than it actually was. The chronology is a p p e a l i n g b u t is a ls o m i sl e a d i n g . I n t e r n a t io n a l t h e o r y d i d n o t m o v e so effortlessly through the three phases, much like a car accelerat ing through the gears. Such a version of events silences all the debates and conflict between rival interpretations and in effect a w a r d s a w i n n e r ’s m e d a l t o t h e d o m i n a n t v oi ce . T h e c h r o n o l o g i c a l version of events is therefore too simplistic and offers far too neat and tidy a version of theoretical development; it is as if all realists s u d d e n l y r e al iz e d t h e f o ll y o f t h e i r w a ys , r e n o u n c e d t h e i r sin s a n d converted to the new theory immediately. A second problem is that the paradigms were nothing like as united as this version of events implies. The idealist or realist c a m p s c o n t a i n e d a w i d e v a r i e t y o f t h e o r e t i c a l p o s i ti o n s a n d c e r t a i n l y c a n n o t b e f o r c e d i n t o a b o x o f s h a r e d v i ew s a n d a s s u m p t i o n s . I n s tr e ss in g c o m m o n t h em e s, d iv e r s i ty a n d c o m p l e x ity are downplayed. What results is a simplified, even simplistic, v e r s i o n o f t h e o r e t i c a l d e v e l o p m e n t w i t h n e a t c h a n g eo v e r p o i n t s a n d c o m m o n m a n i fe s t o s. T h i s d o e s c o n s i d er a b le v i o l e n c e t o a c tu a l theoretical development, and imposes on events a logic that is that
Th e S elfIm ages o f a Discipline
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of the observer, not of the participants. A related difficulty is that t h e c h r o n o l o g y i m p l ie s t h e o re t ic a l p r o g r e s s , w i t h d e p o s e d t h e o r i e s fading away in much the same way as Einstein succeeds Newton. This is simply wrong as a statement about international theory. What is termed idealist thinking is still powerful in contemporary t h e o r e t i c a l d e b a t e s , a n d r e a l i s m s t i l l p r o b a b l y d o mi n a t e s t h e teaching of the discipline. The strands of thought outlined in this version of events should instead be seen as rival conceptions of i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e a l i t y , w i t h n o o n e v e r s i o n s u p e r s e di n g t h e o t h e r s for all time. Moreover, there is the question of what this characterization of international theory omits. The idealist/realist/behaviouralist pro gression is in fact a narrow, and particularly political, reading of international theory. Where, for example, is class, or ethnicity, or g e n d e r i n t h i s s e l f - i m a g e ? W h e r e a r e t h e c o n c e r n s of d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s t o be f o u n d i n t h i s c a n o n ? I t i s, in f a c t, a W e s t e r n / w h i t e / male/conservative view of international theory. Finally, the ‘great de ba tes ’ are m uc h o ve rsta ted in this ve rsio n of events. Ne ithe r ‘de b ate ’ was really a de ba te; rather, each was really only a series of statements of faith, with political or s o c i o l o g i c a l f a c t o r s d e t e r m i n i n g w h i c h v o i c e w a s h ea r d . I d o n o t read the ‘tri u m p h’ of realism o ver idealism as a deb ate; n o r d o I think much light was shed by the traditionalist/behaviouralist debate. Indeed, the latter ‘deb ate’ sho w s jus t ho w limited is this c o n c e p ti o n o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l t h e o r y . A s J o h n V a s q u e z ( 19 83 ) h a s s h o w n , t h e d e b a t e b e t w e e n t r a d i t i o n a l i s t s a n d b e h a vi o u r a l i s t s w a s not a debate about theory but one limited to methodological q u e s t i o n s . T h e m a i n p r o t a g o n i s t s , B u l l a n d K a p l a n fo r e x a m p l e , saw much the same world and explained it in similar ways, albeit using different methods. They shared a view of what the world of international relations was like (its ontology), and saw similar processes at w o r k in m te r -s ta te re la tio n s. B u ll, h o w e v e r, c h o s e to s t u d y t h is via w h a t w e r e t e r m e d t r a d i ti o n a l m e t h o d s w h i ls t K a p l a n came to very m uc h the same con clus ion s b y using ‘scien tific’ l a n g u a g e . O n t o l o g i c a l l y , t h o u g h , t h e i r u n d e r l y i n g th e o r i e s o f international relations were essentially identical. In this sense L i j p h a r t wa s q u i t e w r o n g t o c la im t h a t t h e s e c o n d ‘g r e at d e b a t e ’ w a s m o r e f u n d a m e n t a l t h a n t h e f i r s t ; I w o u l d s a y t he o p p o s i t e , because the first w a s a b o u t far m o r e basic q u e s tio n s d ea lin g w i t h the nature of social reality.
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The InterParadigm Debate
T h i s c a t e g o r i z a t i o n o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l t h e o r y h a s b e en i n f l u e n t i a l s i n c e t h e m i d - 1 9 8 0 s , b e i n g t h e o r g a n i z i n g s c h e m a f or m a j o r t e x t s a n d r e a d e r s ( L i t t l e a n d S m i t h , 1 9 9 1 ; O l s o n a n d G r o om , 1 9 9 1 ; M c G r e w a n d L e w i s , 1 9 9 2 ; V i o t t i a n d K a u p p i , 1 9 9 3 ) a nd t h e starting point for many studies of contemporary international theory (see, for example, Holsti, 1985; Hoffman, 1987; Whi tworth, 1989). It was first adopted by Michael Banks (see 1984, 1985) in 1984 and refers to the situation in international theory in the aftermath of the behavioural ‘revolution’. In this sense it d e s c r i b e s t h e s t a t e o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l t h e o r y f r o m t he e a r l y 1 9 8 0 s onwards, and has become the accepted wisdom of most inter n a t i o n a l t h e o r i s t s . T h e c e n t r a l a r g u m e n t i s s t r a i g ht f o r w a r d . Whereas international theory had traditionally been marked by s uc c e ss i ve d o m i n a n t p a r a d i g m s ( i d e a li s m / r e a l is m / b e h a v i o u r a l i s m ) , the situation by the start of the 1980s was that no one approach dominated the literature. Instead there were three alternative a c c o u n t s , e a c h o f w h i c h o f f e r e d a r e l a t i v e l y c o h e r en t a n d l o g i c a l a c c o u n t o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s ( a l b e i t n o t t h e sa m e i n t e r n a t i o n a l po litics). T h e th re e m a in p a r a d ig m s w e re re a lis m /n e o - re a lis m , liberalism/globalism/pluralism and neo-Marxism/structuralism. The labels are clearly problematic, since neo-realism is often also called structural realism, and both the world society (Burton, 1972) and the globalization (Scholte, 1993) approaches sit uneasily b e t w e e n p lu r a lis m an d n e o - M a r x is m ; in d e e d , H o ls t i (1985, p p . 11—12) sees the tw o a lte rn ativ es to realism as b e in g w o rld s o c i e ty a n d n e o - M a r x i s t a c c o u n t s. N o n e t h e l e s s , th e view o f in te r n a tio n a l t h e o r y as c o m p r is i n g t h r e e m a i n c o m p e t i n g p a r a d i g m s i s a t e n a b le o n e , a n d o n e e x c el le n t for introducing students to the variety of theories available in the d i s c i p l i n e . A c c o r d i n g l y , e a c h p a r a d i g m c a n b e s u m m ar i z e d i n terms of its answers to questions such as: ‘Who are the main actors?’, ‘What are the main issues in international politics?’, ‘W h a t a r e t h e m a i n p r o c e s s e s a t w o r k in i n t e r n a t i o n a l s o c i e t y ? ’ a n d ‘W h a t a r e t h e m a in o u t c o m e s ? ’ C l e a r l y , e a ch p a r a d i g m gi ve s different answers to these questions, so that the student gets three d i f f e r e n t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s. A t t h i s p o i n t , tw o crucial questio ns arise: first, ‘Are the parad igm s co m pa tibl e? ’ a n d , s e c o n d , ‘W h i c h o n e is c o r r e c t ? ’ T h e t e m p t a t i o n is t o s ay t h a t each offers a view of a different aspect of international politics,
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with realism dealing with war and peace, liberalism with the management of international regimes in which states and non states are active, and neo-Marxism dealing with global poverty and d e v e l o p m e n t i s s u e s . T h e q u e s t i o n o f w h i c h o n e i s c or r e c t i s there fore avoided, since each is ‘corr ect’ w ith rega rd to the asp ect o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s t h a t i t d e a l s w i t h . F o r Mi c h a e l B a n k s a n d o t h e r s w h o u s e t h e c o n c e p t o f a n i n t e r - p a r a d i g m d e ba t e , i t s m a i n advantage is that it offers three interpretations of international relations and invites debate between them. There are a number of points to make about this, the dominant s e l f - i m a g e o f c o n t e m p o r a r y i n t e r n a t i o n a l t h e o r y . T he f i r s t , a n d r a t h e r p r e d i c t a b l e , p o i n t i s t h a t t h e d i v i s i o n s b e tw e e n t h e t h r e e p a ra d ig m s are q u e s tio n a b le . T h e th ree view s are n o th in g li ke as distinct as the categorization implies. Similarly, within the div isions there is much more diversity than is implied by the labelling o f e a c h p a r a d i g m . B u t t h i s w i l l b e t h e c a s e w i t h a ny s u c h a t t e m p t t o d i s t i l t h e l o g i c a l k e r n e l s o f o v e r l a p p i n g a r g u m en t s , a n d m u s t t h e r e f o r e b e s e e n a s m a i n l y a m a t t e r o f a c c u r a t e r ep r e s e n t a t i o n o f the main claims of the various positions. A s e c o n d p r o b l e m i s t h a t t h e d i v i s i o n o f i n t e r n a t i on a l t h e o r y into these three paradigms reflects a specific view of what inter n a t i o n al t h e o r y . c o n si s ts o f. I n s h o r t , a l a rg e p r o p o r t i o n o f international political and eco no mic activity is left o u t of the in ter p a ra d ig m deb ate. F o r H o l s t i , a p a ra d ig m o f in te r n a tio n a l t h e o r y must deal with three issues: the causes of war (‘the raison d’etre of the field’); the essential actors; and images of the world system/ society o f states (1985, pp . 7—8). To p u t it simp ly , this leaves m u c h out of international theory, and puts any inter-paradigm debate o n t o a d v a n t a g e o u s t e r r a i n f o r r e a l i s m , s i n c e t h a t is t h e t h e o r y t h a t has traditionally focused on war. Thus, dividing the discipline into t h e s e t h r e e p a r a d i g m s r e a l l y d o e s r e s t r i c t w h a t c o un t s a s i n t e r n a ti o na l th e o r y , a n d s il en c es m a n y o t h e r i n t e r p re t a t io n s . C r u cially, it makes it difficult for any paradigm that challenges the three criteria that Holsti outlines, most importantly that concern ing war as the raison d'etre o f the discipline. A t h i r d p r o b l e m i s t h a t t h e n o t i o n o f a n i n t e r - p a r ad i g m d e b a t e is really misleading, since it implies that the three paradigms can c o n f r o n t o n e a n o t h e r o v e r h o w t o e x p l a i n i n t e r n a t i on a l r e l a t i o n s . The problem is that there has been very little at all in the way of a debate between the rival positions. Rather, each has had i t s s u p p o r t e r s , a n d t h e s e h a v e r e f e r e n c e d o n e a n o t he r , b e e n o n o n e a n o t h e r ’ s c o n f e r e n c e p a n e l s , a n d b u i l t i n c r e m e nt a l l y o n o n e
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another’s work. Very rare is any attempt to debate between the p a ra d ig m s ( fo r o n e v e r y clear a tt e m p t to d o so see T o o z e , 1992). Paradigms are more akin to research frameworks within which identifiable groups work. This leads to a fourth problem, which is that if there is little in t h e w a y o f d e b a t e t h e n t h e c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f t h is ‘d e b a t e ’ as t h e d e f i n i n g f e a t u r e o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l t h e o r y i s v e r y l im i t e d a n d c o n servative. In effect each paradigm deals with its own research agenda and leaves the others alone. This is an effective way of marginalizing dissident voices. Even pluralist and structuralist c h a l l e n g e s t o r e a l i s m c a n b e g h e t t o e d a n d t h e r e b y ig n o r e d b y r e al is t s c h o la r s , a l t h o u g h t h e n e o - r e a l i s t / n e o - l i b e r a l i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s t d e b a t e i s a n e x a m p l e o f a g e n u i n e d e b a t e b e t w e e n r iv a l a c c o u n t s . Yet, there, as we will see below, the debate is on very precise and n a r r o w t e r m s , a n d s e e s n e o - r e a l i s m d e f i n i n g t h e t e rm s o f d e b a t e . T h e o v e r a l l p i c t u r e , t h e n , i s o n e w h e r e l i t t l e i n th e w a y o f alternative versions of reality are allowed space to debate. This is p a rtic u la rly so if th e dice are lo aded b y s ta tin g t h a t a n y p a r a d i g m m u s t d e a l w i t h a n a g e n d a l a i d d o w n b y t h e r e a l i s t pa r a d i g m . A f i f t h p r o b l e m i s t h a t t h e i d e a o f a n i n t e r - p a r a d ig m d e b a t e hides the extent to which most international theory is realist. The w o rry is that in the n am e of theo retical p lurality, all tha t is h a p p e n i n g i s a f o r m o f M a r c u s i a n r e p r e s s i v e t o l e r a nc e ; b y t h i s I mean that the discipline appears liberal, tolerant and open, but all t h a t h a p p e n s i s t h a t r a d i c a l v o i c e s a r e m e r e l y c o - op t e d o n t o t h e realist agenda, and are thereby effectively marginalized since they c a n n o t e x pl ai n t h a t a g e n d a ( n o r w o u l d t h e y w i s h t o) a s w e l l as c a n r e a l i s m . C e r t a i n l y , t h e 1 9 8 4 p a p e r b y A l k e r a n d B i er s t e k e r i n d i cated that the vast bulk of international politics writing fell within t h e r e a l i s t p a r a d i g m , w h a t e v e r t h e m e t h o d o l o g i c a l sl a n t o f t h e work involved; nearly 70 per cent of work cited in their survey of r e a d i n g l i s t s i n t h e m a m U S d e p a r t m e n t s o f i n t e r n a ti o n a l r e l a t i o n s w e r e r e al is t o r n e o - r e a l i s t , w i t h o n l y s o m e 6 p e r c e n t fi t t in g w i t h i n the ne o- m arx ist tr ad itio n (1984, pp. 129—30). F i n a l l y , n o t e t h a t t h e i d e a o f a n i n t e r - p a r a d i g m d eb a t e i n v o l v e s hidden complications over the question of whether the paradigms a r e t h r e e d i f f e r e n t a s p e c t s o f t h e s a m e w o r l d o r w he t h e r t h e y a r e t h r e e v i e w s o f d i f f e r e n t w o r l d s . T h e n o t i o n o f a n in t e r - p a r a d i g m debate implies that these are three accounts of the same world, w h i c h t h e s t u d e n t c a n t h e n c o m p a r e t o s ee w h i c h o f f e rs t h e ‘b e s t ’ account. Yet if these are the terms of the debate this is a debate t h a t r e a l i s m s e e m s c e r t a i n t o w i n . T h e w o r r y i n g t h ou g h t i s t h a t
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the three paradigms each see a different world, and that they are therefore in an important sense incommensurable. If so, the alternatives to realism can be seen as dealing with peripheral issues. The tem pta tio n fo r students is to a do pt a ‘pick and m ix ’ attitud e, using each paradigm to explain the areas in which it is strongest, without realizing that the three cannot simply be added together to form an overall account of international politics since they are based o n in c o m p a tib le a ss u m p tio n s . In s h o rt, v ery c o m p le x issues are i n v o lv e d h e r e , d e s p i t e t h e b e g u i l i n g a t t r a c t i o n o f t h i s p r e s e n t a ti on o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l t h e o r y .
StateCentrism versus Transnationalism
W e h a v e a l r e a d y m e n t i o n e d t h i s c a t e g o r i z a t i o n i n c on n e c t i o n w i t h the chronological account offered by Bull, Vasquez, Maghroori and Ramberg, and Lijphart. According to Maghroori and Ram berg, th e d e b a te b e tw e e n sta te -c e n tric a n d tra n s n a tio n a lis t a c c o u n ts comprised the th ird ‘great de b ate ’ in the histo ry of inter na tion al theory. At its simplest, the dispute is between state-centrists (who also happened in the main to be realists in the first debate, and traditionalists in the second), and globalists, or transnationalists (who tended to be idealists and behaviouralists in the previous two debates), over the role of the state in international politics. The resulting pictures of the world offered by the rival approaches are thereby very different. The point for Maghroori and Ramberg is that neither of the earlier ‘great de ba tes ’ involved an y discus sion of wh o a cted in international politics; it was always as sum ed to be the state (1982), as Vasquez shows very clearly in his study of be h aviou ralism (1 983). In this ligh t th e th ird d e b a te is th e m o s t fundamental debate in the history of international theory. This is a view of international theory that is rooted in a specific time period and geographical and political location. It is a child of the 1970s, and an approach reflecting the policy concerns of the US in the era of detente. It is important to note that it was in many ways the forerunner of the pluralist paradigm of the 1980s and of the neo-liberal institutionalist paradigm of the 1990s, but it w a s n o n e t h e l e s s a n a r r o w d e b a t e i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l t he o r y . T h i s i s indicated by the way in which the debate developed in the 1980s and 1990s, with attention turning to look more at the regimes and institutional settings of actors, rather than dealing solely with the question of whether or not they were states.
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The central weakness of this categorization is that it led to a f o c u s o n q u a n t i t a t i v e m e a s u r e s o f a c t o r a c t i v i t y . It t h e r e b y t e n d e d to downplay the role of the state, seeing it as one actor among many. At its best (see Mansbach and Vasquez, 1981) it provided a sophisticated framework for moving beyond power politics to a f o c u s o n i s s u e p o l i t i c s . B u t i n t h e m a i n t h e w o r k un d e r t a k e n co nfu sed activity with imp act, analysing the activities of each actor q u a n t i t a t i v e l y , f o r e x a m p l e s o a s t o s h o w t h a t s t a te s w e r e n o t a s d o m i n a n t i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n t e r a c t i o n s a s p r e v i o u s ly t h o u g h t , regardless of what each action consisted of (see Mansbach, Fergu s o n a n d L a m p e r t , 1 9 7 6 , f o r o n e s u c h s t u d y ) . W h e n t he i n t e r national climate shifted back to a form of cold war in the early 1980s, transnationalism seemed to have little to say about the main issues confronting international theorists. Similarly, the 1980s witnessed a major increase in the role of the state in international economic activity, which obviously undermined the transnation alist account. A related problem is that the transnationalist literature adopted a s p e c i f i c p e r s p e c t i v e o n p o l i t i c a l e c o n o m y . A s R o be r t G i l p i n (1987, pp. 25—64) has s h o w n there are at least three main w ay s o f a c c o u n t i n g f o r i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l e c o n o m i c b e ha v i o u r . O f t h e s e t h e t r a n s n a t io n a l i s t s w o r k e d w i t h i n a li b e ra l p er s p ec t iv e . T h e p r o b l e m , o f c o u rs e , is th a t the o t h e r t w o a c c o u n ts (n ation a list, w h i c h e q u a t e s t o p o l i t i c a l r e a l i s m , a n d M a r x i s t , w hi c h , u n s u r p r i s ingly, links to structuralism) offer powerful critiques of the liberal view of political economy. In this sense, it is caught between two p o w e r f u l f r a m e w o r k s , each o f w h ic h stresses th e im p o rta n c e o f a structure (of national power in the case of nationalism, and of class p o w e r in the M a rx is t case); yet, tra n s n a tio n a lis ts ten d e d to hav e no clear idea of the role of international structures, a position only fully resolved with the development of neo-liberalism in the 1990s.
N e o re a lis m a n d N e o lib e r a lis m
As has been noted above, this characterization of international theory is the latest round of an ongoing debate. It had its origins i n t h e d e b a t e b e t w e e n s t a t e - c e n t r i s m a n d t r a n s n a t i on a l i s m , b u t h a s m u c h m o r e t o d o w i t h t h e d e b a t e s b e t w e e n p l u r a li s t a n d neo-realist paradigms of the 1980s (for the classic statements of neo-realism, see Waltz, 1979; Gilpin, 1981; Keohane, 1986; and f o r i t s m o s t s o p h i s t i c a t e d t r e a t m e n t s e e B u z a n , J o ne s a n d L i t t l e ,
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1 9 9 3 . F o r p l u r a l i s m s e e K e o h a n e a n d N y e , 1 9 7 7 ; K r a sn e r , 1 9 8 3 ; K e o h a n e , 1 9 8 4 ) . I n m a n y w a y s t h i s d e b a t e i s c u r r e n tl y t h e m o s t s i g n i f i c a n t w i t h i n t h e m a i n s t r e a m o f U S i n t e r n a t i o na l t h e o r y , a n d is c e rt a in l y t h e d o m i n a n t d e b a te i n o n e o f t h e l e a d in g U S j o u r n a l s , International Organization. A c c o r d i n g t o D a v i d B a l d w i n ( 1 9 9 3 ) in his introduction to a collection of the main articles dealing with th e d e b a te , t h e r e a re s ix p o i n t s o f d i s p u t e b e t w e e n t h e t w o s c h o o l s o f t h o u g h t ( p p. 4 - 8 ) . T h e f ir st c o n c e r n s t h e n a t u r e a n d c o n s e q u e n c e s o f a n a r c h y , w i t h neo-realists seeing concerns over physical security as producing far more of the motivations of state action than do neo-liberals. S e c o n d , n e o - r e a l i s t s t h i n k t h a t i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o - o pe r a t i o n i s m u c h harder to achieve than do neo-liberals. Third, neo-realists stress the centrality of relative gains for decision-makers in dealing with i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o - o p e r a t i o n , w h e r e a s n e o - l i b e r a l s s tr e s s t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f a b s o l u t e g a i n s . F o u r t h , n e o - r e a l i s t s t e n d to d e a l w i t h national security issues, whilst neo-liberals tend to look at political e c o n o m y , w i t h t h e r e s u l t t h a t e a c h s e e s r a t h e r d i f fe r e n t p r o s p e c t s f o r c o - o p e r a t i o n . F i f t h , n e o - r e a l i s t s c o n c e n t r a t e on c a p a b i l i t i e s r a t h e r t h a n i n t e n t i o n s , w h i l s t n e o - l i b e r a l s l o o k m or e a t i n t e n t i o n s and perceptions. Finally, whereas neo-liberals see institutions as a bl e t o m i t i g a te i n t e r n a t i o n a l a n a r c h y , n e o - r e a l i s ts d o u b t t h is . There is no doubt that this is an important debate, one made even more relevant by the end of the Cold War and a subsequent c o n ce r n w i t h t h e a b i l it y o f i n s t i t u t i o n s t o m i t ig a t e a n a r c h y . I n d e e d , f or m a n y t h e f u t u r e o f E u r o p e a n c o - o p e r a t i o n is a t es t o f th e t w o a p p r o a c h e s ( s e e B a l d w i n , 1 9 9 3 , p . 5 ; K e o h a n e , N y e an d H o f f m a n n , 1 9 9 3 ) . H o w e v e r , t h e r e a r e s o m e s e r i o u s l i m i t at i o n s o f t h i s c u r r en t v i e w o f t h e s t a t e o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l t h e o r y . The main limitation is that this is an extraordinarily narrow view of what are the topics to debate in international theory. If it i s t r u e t h a t t h i s d e b a t e i s a t t h e f o r e f r o n t o f c o nt e m p o r a r y international theory, that is a stunning indictment of the myopic and ethnocentric nature of international theory. Of course it matters whether states pursue relative or absolute gains, and the r o l e o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s i s v i t a l l y i m p o rt a n t b o t h p r a c t i cally and theoretically; but to claim that in a world of extreme danger and violence these are the c r u c i a l q u e s t i o n s f o r i n t e r n at io n al t h e o r y s e e m s p e r ve r se . O f c o u r s e , i t is im p o r t a n t t o enquire whether or not states can develop policies of common security in a world full of dangerous weapons, but this is both a limited definition of types of violence in t h e w o r l d , a n d , m o r e
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i m p o r t a n t l y , is a n a r r o w d e f i n i t i o n o f t h e c e n t r a l i s s ue s a nd c o n c e r n s o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l t h e o r y . T h e d e b a t e i s a We s t e r n , e v e n north Atlantic, one. It hardly begins to deal with the concerns of the vast majority of humanity, and very effectively silences those w h o d o n o t f i t i n t o t h i s U S v i e w o f w h a t i n t e r n a t i on a l p o l i t i c s i s all about. Linked to this is the thought that the two accounts are very s i m il a r; t h i n k o f h o w c lo se t h e y a r e in t h e ir p o s i t i o n s o n B a l d w i n ’s six points noted above. In an important sense they are part of a specific view of international politics rather than two alternatives that together define the space within which debate about inter national theory can take place. If this is where the action is, it t a ke s p l a ce w i t h i n a v e ry n a r r o w s pa ce .
The PostPositivist Debate
In the last few years a number of powerful attacks on realism h a v e b e e n m o u n t e d b y s c h o l a r s f r o m a d i f f u s e g r o u p in g o f p o sitio n s. F o r Yo sef L a p id (1989), these to g e t h e r c o n s tit u te th e p o s t- p o s itiv is t challenge to th e realist d o m in a n c e o f in te rn a tio n a l theory. There are four main groupings involved in this challenge. T h e f i r s t c o m e s f r o m c r i t i c a l t h e o r y , a n d i s f o c u s ed o n t h e w o r k of Robert Cox (1981, 1987), Mark Hoffman (1987) and Andrew Linklater (1982, 1990, 1992). For critical theorists, knowledge of t h e w o r l d is a lw a y s t o b e u n d e r s t o o d w i t h i n a c o n t e x t o f i n te r e st s, following on from the pioneering work of the Frankfurt School, m o s t n o t a b l y J u rg e n H a b e r m a s . K n o w l e d g e is n o t n e u t r a l, as p o sitivists suggest. F o r critical th e o ris ts, p r o b le m - s o l v i n g p o s itiv ism needs to be replaced by a critical theory, awa re o f the political interests it represents, and with an overt commitment to emancipation. A s e c o n d s t r a n d o f t h o u g h t h a s d e v e l o p e d f r o m a c o nc e r n w i t h t h e o v e r la p b e t w e e n s o c i o l o g y a n d i n t e r n a ti o n a l r e l a ti o n s , u n d e r t h e general heading of historical sociology. This is a broad grouping, ranging from the meticulous historical research of Michael Mann (1986, 1993) and Charles Tilly (1975, 1990) to the very specific studies of social revolutions by Theda Skocpol (1979). The point here is that historical sociologists show that the state, made by war in many cases, is the product of the interaction between internal forces and an external setting. This undermines realist, and especially neo-realist, claims of the power of the external setting
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i n d e t e r m i n i n g s t a t e b e h a v i o u r , a n d o f t h e f u n c t i o na l e q u i v a l e n c e o f s t a t e s , w h a t e v e r t h e i r i n t e r n a l m a k e - u p a n d r e g ar d l e s s o f t h e i r location in time and space. Having said which, this grouping is the least post-positivist of the four, since it uses very much the same m e t h o d s a n d r e l i e s o n s i m i l a r a s s u m p t i o n s a s a r e f ou n d , f o r e x a m p l e , i n t h e i n t e r - p a r a d i g m d e b a t e . I t s f i n d i n g s, h o w e v e r , r e p r e s e n t a si g n if ic a n t u n d e r m i n i n g o f n e o - r e a li s m . The third grouping comprises feminist writers. This is such a wide category that it is difficult to pin down many common themes and assumptions; but one main concern for feminist s c h o l a r s i s t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f g e n d e r . W o r k d o n e by f e m i n i s t i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s w r i t e r s r a n g e s f r o m t h o s e co n c e r n e d t o l o o k a t i s s u e s c o n c e r n i n g w o m e n , t h r o u g h t h o s e i n t e r e s t ed i n s t r u c t u r e s of male dominance, to w riters examining the natu re o f identity and g e n d e r . C y n t h i a E n l o e ( 1 9 8 9 , 1 9 9 3 ) , f o r e x a m p l e , l oo k s a t w h e r e w o m e n a c t u a l l y are in international relations, as well as exploring h o w so cia lly c o n s t r u c t e d n o t i o n s o f m a s c u l i n i t y a n d f e m i n i n i t y help to oil and turn the wheels of international politics. Jean Elshtain (1987) discusses the assumptions about females and males i n t h i n k i n g a n d w r i t i n g a b o u t w a r , w h i l s t S p i k e P e te r s o n a n d A n n e S i s s o n R u n y a n ( 1 9 9 3 ) l o o k a t t h e m a n i f e s t a t i o ns o f g l o b a l g e n d e r i n e q u a l i t y . A r g u a b l y m o r e r a d i c a l l y s t i l l , Ch r i s t i n e S y l v e s t er (1 99 4) o f fe rs a p o s t m o d e r n f e m i ni s t r e p a i n t i n g o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l politics in a p o s t m o d e r n era. C e n tra lly , e ach o f these w r ite rs c h a l l e n g e s t h e a s s u m e d g e n d e r l e s s n a t u r e o f i n t e r n at i o n a l t h e o r y , and shows how assumptions about gendered roles, and even gendered knowledge, run through international theory. Inter n a t i o n a l t h e o r y i s n o t s o m u c h g e n d e r n e u t r a l a s g en d e r b l i n d . F i n a l l y , t h e r e a r e t h o s e w r i t e r s c o n c e r n e d t o d e v e lo p p o s t m o d e r n r e a d i n g s o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s . T a k i n g t h ei r c u e s f r o m writers such as Foucault, Derrida, Nietzsche, Heidegger and Virilio, postmodern international theorists attack the very notions of reality, or truth, or structure or identity that are central to international theory as well as all other human sciences. Whilst I am well aware that all literatures are full of nuances and sophistic ations, and am convinced, for example, that realism has been subject to gross oversimplification (stressing the technical rather than the practical aspects of realist writings), the problem is far more acute in the case of postmodernism. This is an impossible literature to summarize without crass oversimplification, but rep resentative examples of the work in this area would be R.B.J. Walker’s re-reading of political and international theory (1993),
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J a m e s D e r D e r i a n ’s s t u d y o f ‘a n t i - d i p l o m a c y ’ (199 C a m p b e l l ’s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f U S f o r e i g n p o l i c y (1992 W h a t t h e s e f o u r s ets o f w r i t in g s h a v e in c o m m o n m e n t to a n in t e r n a t i o n a l t h e o r y f a r r e m o v e d f ro m th of positivism and realism. They are in that sense p although they are massively different in terms of w] to put in its place. The most helpful distinctioi foundationalist and anti-foundationalist approaches, shall see later, is becoming a crucial division in international theory. Put simply, critical theory, his ogy and much feminist work are firmly located \ ationalism, and are explicitly part of what can Enlightenment tradition. Some feminist work and al writings would not see themselves as anti-foundatior as unsure of the security of a claim of foundationalis There are problems with this categorization, as suggests. The main worry is that these are so diffe that they cannot be grouped together. In this sense united by what they agree on but by what they approach has its own problems, and there is not s into the massive literatures involved (a fact that ha: many in the discipline from commenting on the in these new voices in international theory). These literatures, especially in the cases of feminist theory e r n i sm , a n d a n y c r i t i q u e o f t h e m h a s t o b e fa r m o r e claims and nuances than is usually the case. The one s t r e s s i s t h a t t h e y d o n o t a d d u p t o a post-positivist theory; they are often mutually incompatible, and c as easily combinable. What they have in common is the simplistic philosophy of science that underlines istic scholarship in international theory. Thus, to as! approaches to comment on a realist agenda is mas: the dice against the post-positivist argument. Askin ernist to list his or her policies for the Bosnian crisis disciplinary power in a most effective way.
Constitutive versus Explanatory Theory
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accounts of international relations, and those that see theory as constitutive of that reality. At base this boils down to a difference over what the social world is like; is it to be seen as scientists think of the ‘na tu ra l’ world , that is to say as someth ing ou tside of ou r theories, or is the social w or ld w ha t we make it? Radically different types of theory are needed to deal with each of these cases, and these theories are not combinable so as to form one overarching theory of the social world. There have been many attempts to overcome the tension between the two types of account, most notably the scientific realism of Bhaskar and the structuration theory of Giddens, but in my view these attempts cannot succeed. I should be clear that my reading of this division in social theory is one hotly contested by those who hope to make either consti tutive theory yield ultimately to explanatory theory (Bhaskar) or vice versa (Giddens); that is to say that Giddens sees constitutive theory as in the end able to encompass the structural and external factors dealt with by explanatory theory, whilst Bhaskar sees explanatory theory as able to deal with meanings and understand ings. My view would also be rejected by those who do not accept the division in the first place, arguing, for example, that it sets up a false dichotomy, one which reflects a specific view of epistemology and ultimately of the ontology of the social world. In this latter group would be most postmodernist writers who are wary of the utility of claims of foundationalism. Nonetheless, in my jud g e m e n t this really is a f u n d a m e n ta l divide w i th in social th e ory, one which gives space to attempts to ground theory via hermeneu tics as well as by appeal to functional or structural notions. (For my developing position on this see Hollis and Smith, 1986, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1994; and Smith, 1994.) But in international theory the dispute between explanatory and constitutive theory seems to be central, even if, as we wdl see below, th e constitutive th e o r is ts su b se q u e ntly fall o u t over w h a t kind of constitutive theory is appropriate. Most of the work of po s tm o d e rn is ts and critical th e or is ts, and th a t o f so m e feminists, fits into this broad category of constitutive theory, with the work of A lexa nde r W en dt (1987, 1991, 1992a, 1992b; W en dt and Duvall, 1989), Jo h n Ruggie (1983, 1993), N icholas O n u f (1989) and Walter Carlsnaes (1992, 1994) being the clearest examples of attempts to create this kind of international theory. Opposed to this stands virtually all the work contained in the three dominant paradigms of the 1980s, realism, plura lism and neo -M arxism . In dee d, Ro ber t Keohane made the point in his 1988 presidential address to the
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International Studies Association that the task of international institutional theorists was to examine the merits of explanatory and constitutive theories, or, as he named them, rationalistic and reflective accounts (Keohane, 1988; see also Goldstein and Keohane, 1993). T he con trast is very clear in Jim G eo rg e’s (1993) review of W a ltz ’s neo-realism, in wh ich he argues that W a ltz ’s positivism results in an ac co unt w h ic h is ‘ba na l’, ‘ah isto ric al’ and ‘dep oli ti cise d’ (p. 210). As Ge or ge p uts it: ‘M y o w n p os itio n on [W altz ’s] T h e o r y o f I n t e r n a t io n a l P o litic s and (to a lesser degree) M a n , th e S t a t e a n d W a r is that they stand as major indictments of an IR community which, closed to critical reflective capacity for so long, has ac cor ded such hig h sta tus to w ork s of so little substa nce ’ (p. 207). However, one effect of thinking about international theory in terms of a divide between constitutive and explanatory theory is that it makes it possible to be more sophisticated in thinking about realism. This is because there are very significant overlaps between c o n t e m p o r a r y c o n s t it u t iv e t h e o r y a n d th e w o r k o f t h e ‘E n g l i s h ’ school of international theory (especially the work of Bull) and of some realist (but not neo-realist) thinkers (especially Niebuhr and Carr). The central debate within each of these categories is basically the same. F o r th e ‘En g lish ’ school th a t issue is w h e th e r the meanings and interpretations of international society are constitutive of that society or are mere ciphers for structural forces. Within realism, the central division is between practical and technical realism, with the dispute turning on precisely this same question. In each case these are versions of the exact issue that lies at the heart of the dispute between explanatory and constitutive theory.
F o u n d a tio n a lis t a n d A n tiF o u n d a tio n a h s t I n te r n a tio n a l T h eo ry
If the previous division is the mo st im po rtan t categ orization at the grand theoretical level of international theory, then in my view the most exciting debate within constitutive theory is between two very different epistemologies. Mark Hoffman and Nick Rengger have proposed that there are really two distinct types of post po sitivist in ternational th e o r y . T his view e m e rg e d o u t of an initial disagreement between them (Rengger, 1988; Hoffman, 1988b) over the nature of critical international theory, but led to a joint
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a p e r w h i c h m a k e s a u s e f u l d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e tw o t y p e s o f t h e o r y ( R e n g g e r a n d H o f f m a n , 1 9 9 2 , p p . 1 3 2 - 4 ) . T h e re t h e y distinguish between critical interpretative theory and radical intern r e t a t i v i s m . T h e f o r m e r i s t h e w o r k o n c r i t i c a l t h eo r y d i s c u s s e d above, which Rengger and Hoffman see as implying a ‘minimal f o u n d a t i o n a l i s m ’ . B y t h i s t h e y m e a n t h a t t h e r e a re g r o u n d s f o r ju dg ing b e tw e en ri val t r u t h claims. T h e s e g r o u n d s are d e r iv e d from Habermas’s concept of communicative competence and, crucially, his notion of an ideal speech situation. These provide a basis by w h ich it is p o s s ib le to evaluate th e ‘k n o w l e d g e - c o n s t i t u tive interests’ involve d in differing theo ries. Critical inte rpr etativ e theorists argue that the main criterion for assessing truth claims is whether or not these theories are emancipatory, as distinct from mere problem-solving theories. The former attempt to better the h u m a n c o n d i t i o n , w h e r e a s t h e l a t t e r a r e s e e n a s t a ki n g t h e w o r l d a s i t i s a n d c o n c e n t r a t i n g o n w o r k i n g w i t h i n t h a t se t t i n g , n o t changing it. Problem-solving theories are seen as positivist, whereas critical interpretative theory is seen as emancipatory. Radical interpretativism, on the other hand, shares with critical interpretative theory this rejection of positivism, but does not share its minimal foundationalism. Instead, it posits a p o w e r - k n o w le d g e r e la tio n s h ip th a t calls in to q u e s tio n even th e emancipatory claims of critical interpretative theory. In Lyotard’s famous phrase, radical interpretative theory involves ‘incredulity toward m etan arra tive s’ (1986, p. xxiv). By this he means th at th ere a r e n o f o u n d a t i o n s o u t s i d e a n y i n d i v i d u a l t h e o r y w hi c h c a n s e r v e a s a n e u t r a l a r b i t e r b e t w e e n c o m p e t i n g a c c o u n t s . F or r a d i c a l interpretative th eo ris ts, critical in ter pr eta tiv e the o ry is ‘ju st ’ a n o t h e r a t t e m p t t o p r o v i d e s u c h a m e t a n a r r a t i v e . A ft e r a l l , t h e y point o u t, w h o s e e m a n c ip a tio n is in v o lv e d here? F o r critical t h e o r i s t s , e m a n c i p a t i o n m e a n s s o m e t h i n g v e r y d i f f e re n t f r o m w h a t many radical feminists mean by it. In short, whereas critical theorists want to establish a minimal foundationalism, radical interpretativists argue that this is just as illusory as are positivist claims about truth as correspondence (i.e. that theories can be assessed by whether they fit ‘reality’). This is not the place to judge these two approaches, since there exist no common standards by which such a judgement might be made. My point is not to offer my view about which of these positions is b e tte r , let alo ne ‘r i g h t ’; r a th e r , to in d ic ate t h a t th is categorization seems to me to be exactly where the frontiers of constitutive international theory are today. As such this is a far
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deeper debate than that offered by the inter-paradigm debate or b y th e d i s p u te b e tw e e n n e o -re a lis ts and n e o -lib e ra l in s titu tio n a l ists. Is is a particularly interesting and important debate because it p r o p e ls in te r n a ti o n a l t h e o r y t o w a r d s th e cen tra l d e b a te s w ith in the other social sciences. In this sense, it undermines the very mislead ing characterization of international theory as autonomous and d i s t i n c t w h i c h h a s d o m i n a t e d v i r t u a l l y all th e s e l f- i m a g e s d i s c u s se d above. By so doing, it requires international theory to be less p a r o c h ia l a n d exclusiv e. I ha v e p u t this de ba te at th e e n d o f m y list b e c a u s e I feel it to b e th e m o s t im p o r t a n t o n e f o r th e fu tu re of international theory. For too long, under the shadow of p o s itiv ism , in te rn a tio n a l re la tio n s has been d o m i n a t e d b y e x p la n atory theory which rested on an outdated and fundamentally c o n t e s t e d v i ew o f b o t h t h e c o n t e n t o f i n te r n a ti o n a l t h e o r y a n d th e n a t u r e o f s o c i a l s c i e n t i f i c e n q u i r y . F o c u s i n g o n f ou n d a t i o n a l i s m / anti-foundationalism returns international theory to a more h u m b l e , a n d m o r e c e n t r a l , p l a c e w i t h i n t h e h u m a n s ci e n c e s .
CONCLUSION
These categorizations represent ten self-images of international relations theory. My introductory comments about Bauman and Foucault will make it clear where my sympathies lie, although I s h o u l d p o m t o u t t h a t I h a v e t r a v e l l e d a l o n g , a n d po s i t i v i s t , r o a d to get here. What interests me about international relations theory t o d a y i s t h a t t h e s e t e n r e a d i n g s o f t h a t t h e o r y o f fe r d i f f e r e n t accounts of what international theory is about, and what should r i g h t l y b e i t s c o n c e r n . A s m y c o m m e n t s a b o v e i n d i c at e , I a m m o s t interested with the final two self-images, since they seem to me to f o c u s o n t h e c o n c e r n s r a i s e d b y m y d i s c u s s i o n o f B au m a n a n d F o u c a u l t a t t h e s t a r t o f t h i s c h a p t e r . B u t , o f c o u rs e , t h e s e c a t e g o r izations are themselves partial and obviously reflect a political and theo retical agenda. The c entral claim of this cha pte r, tho ug h, is t h a t a ll s e l f - i m a g e s r e f l e c t n o r m a t i v e c o n c e r n s . T h e r e i s no m o r e normative theorist than one who proudly boasts that he or she will simply deal with ‘the facts’. The problem with this is which ‘facts’. Crucially, focusing on questions about the contr ast b e t w e e n e x p la n a to r y and c o n s titu tiv e th eories a n d th e c o m p e tin g claims of foundationalist and anti-foundationalist accounts makes u s t h i n k a b o u t i n t e r n a t i o n a l t h e o r y a s i n t i m a t e l y co n n e c t e d w i t h t h e o t h e r h u m a n s c i e n c e s . I t i s v i t a l l y i m p o r t a n t th a t i n t e r n a t i o n a l
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t h e o r i s t s q u e s t i o n t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t i n t e r n a t i o n al t h e o r y i s a rate field of enquiry. Instead it should be seen as one arena in which both the clash between explanatory and constitutive the ories and that between foundationalism and anti-foundationalism take place. H a v i n g s a i d w h i c h , I m u s t s t r e s s t h a t t h e c o n t r i b u to r s t o t h i s b o o k o c c u p y a v a rie ty o f p o s itio n s in th e se self-im ag es, an d th e re is no orthodoxy shared by them all. What, however, is shared is n o t o n l y a n e n g a g e m e n t w i t h t h e s e l f - i m a g e s a n d c a te g o r i z a t i o n s w i t h i n w h i c h t h e y w o r k , b u t a l s o a c o n c e r n w i t h i n te r n a t i o n a l relations theory as more than a free-standing discipline. Each c o n t r i b u t o r d e a l s w i t h i s s u e s t h a t a r e o n t h e f r o n ti e r o f t h e d i s c i p l i n e , a n d w h i c h t h e r e a d e r n e e d s t o c o n t e x t u al i z e w i t h i n t h e self-images noted above. My aim has been to give the reader a set of lenses through which to think about the contributions that follow, and thereby to read into the contributions to see not only what voices are present, and which are privileged, but also which v o i c e s a r e a b s e n t . I l e a v e o p e n t o t h e r e a d e r w h e t he r o r n o t h e o r she sees one lens are providing th e a n s w e r, w h e t h e r m o r e th a n o n e l e n s i s n e e d e d t o c o m p r e h e n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o ns , o r w h e t h e r the problem is that the different lenses are incompatible. The u n d e r l y i n g q u e s t i o n f o r t h e r e a d e r i s w h e t h e r t h e se l f - i m a g e s a n d debates dealt with above are different accounts of the same world, or whether they are accounts of different worlds. That question a g a i n r e t u r n s i n t e r n a t i o n a l t h e o r y t o t h e m o s t f u n da m e n t a l d e b a t e s within the social sciences. Finally, if the central messag e of Fo uc au lt’s genealogical m et ho d is to enquire into the way in which certain categorizations of thought dominate over others, then the reader needs to think a b o u t w h a t t h e s e l f - i m a g e s o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l t h e o r i st s t e l l u s a b o u t t he d i sc o ur se o f in t e r n a t i o n a l t h e o r y . W h i c h a c c o u n t s h a ve d o m i nated and w h y } W h ich voices are do m ina nt? W hic h ‘reality’ is dominant? If Bauman makes us think about that over which we remain silent, perhaps it is appropriate to end by asking the reader t o r e f l e c t o n h o w B a u m a n ’ s c e n t r a l c l a i m a b o u t s o c io l o g y a n d t h e Holocaust translates into the relationship between international t h e o r y a n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l p r a c t i c e : ‘ t h e H o l o c a u s t ha s m o r e t o s a y about the state of sociology than sociology in its present shape is a bl e to a d d t o o u r k n o w l e d g e o f t h e H o l o c a u s t ’ ( 19 8 9, p . 3). W h a t do the self-images of international theory tell us? What are the s il en ce s, id e n ti ti e s a n d d i s c o n t i n u i ti e s s u b m e r g e d w i t h i n t h e d o m inant discourses of international theory? Does the practice of
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international politics tell us more about international theory than the dominant debates within international theory can tell us about i n te r n a ti o n a l p o l it ic s ? T o g e t h e r t he w o r k o f B a u m a n a n d F o u c a u l t should alert us to the link between theory and practice. What do the self-images tell us about the social practice of international theory? Whose interests get represented in international theory? Whose interests and identities are ignored and silenced and seen as irrelevant? Ab ov e all, w h y is international theory?
Note I wou ld like to thank Ken Booth, Tim Du nne , Rich ard Wy n Jones, Nic k Wheeler and Marysia Zalewski for their particularly helpful and incisive comments on an earlier draft of this chapter.
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