TITLE: Fetalino v COMELEC Nature: Petition for Certiorari Certiorari Facts: On February 10, 1998, P resident Fidel V. Ramos extended an interim appointment to the petitioners as Comelec Commissioners, each for a term of seven (7) years, pursuant to Section 2, Article IX-D o f the 1987 Constitution.6 Eleven days later (or on February 21, 1998), Pres. Ramos renewed the p etitioners’ ad interim appointments appointments for the same position. Congress, however, ho wever, adjourned in May 1998 before the CA could act on their appointments. The constitutional ban on presidential appointments later took effect and the petitioners were no longer re -appointed as Comelec Commissioners.7 Commissioners.7 Thus, the petitioners merely served as Comelec Commissioners for more than four months, or from February 16, 1998 to June 30, 1998.8 Subsequently, on March 15, 2005, the petitioners applied for their retirement benefits and monthly pension with the Comelec, pursuant to R.A. No. 1568.9 The Comelec C omelec initially approved the petitioners’ claims pursuant to its Resolution No. 06 -136910 dated December 11, 2006 whose dispositive portion reads: The Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to approve the recommendation of Director Alioden D. Dalaig, Law Department, to grant the request of former Comelec Commissioners Evalyn Fetalino and Amado Calderon for the payment of their retirement benefits, subject to release of funds for the purpose by the Department of Budget and Management.11 On February 6, 2007, the Comelec issued Resolution No. 07-0202 granting the petitioners a pro-rated gratuity and pension. Subsequently, on October 5, 2007, the petitioners asked for a re-computation of their retirement pay on the principal ground that R.A. No. 1568, does not cover a pro-rated computation of retirement pay. In response, the Comelec issued a resolution referring the matter to its Finance Services Department for comment and recommendation. On July 14, 2009, the Comelec issued another resolution referring the same matter to its Law Department for study and recommendation. In the presently assailed Resolution No. 880816 dated March 30, 2010, the Comelec, Comelec, on the basis of the Law Department’s study, completely disapproved the petitioners’ claim for a lump sum benefit under R.A. No. 1568. The Comelec reasoned out that: Of these four (4) modes by which the Chairman or a Commissioner shall be entitled to lump sum benefit, only the first instance (completion of term) is pertinent to the issue we have formulated above. It is clear that the non-confirmation and non-renewal of appointment is not a case of resignation or incapacity or death. The question rather is: Can it be considered as retirement from service for having completed one’s term of office?
Application of statutory construction: Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568. T enure enure and term of office have well-defined meanings in law and jurisprudence. As early as 1946, the Court, in Topacio Nueno v. Angeles, provided Angeles, provided clear distinctions distinctions between these concepts in this wise: wise: The term means the time during which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another. The tenure represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds the office. Issue: Whether or not the petitioners be granted the retirement benefits.
Ruling: It should be stressed that the retirement benefits granted to COMELEC Chairpersons and Commissioners under R.A. No. 1568, as amended, are purely gratuitous in nature. The petitioners cannot claim any vested right over the same as these are not similar to a pension plan where employee contribution or participation is mandatory, thus vesting in the employee a right over said pension. The rule is that where the pension is part of the tenns of employment and employee participation is mandatory, employees have contractual or vested rights in the pension.
WHEREFORE, I vote that the petition filed by Evelyn I. Fetalino and Amado M. Calderon should be GRANTED while the petition tiled by Manuel A. Barcelona should be DENIED inasmuch as he admitted that he already received his pro-rated gratuity. =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
Title: Gachon v De vera Nature: Special civil civil action for certiorari certiorari and injunction injunction Facts: The factual antecedents of this case as found by the Regional Trial Court are undisputed and admitted as correct by the parties. A complaint for forcible entry 3 was filed by P rivate Respondent Susana Guevara against Patricio Guevara and Petitioners Victoria Gachon and Alex Guevara before the Municipal Trial Court for Cities (MTCC) of Iloilo City. Summons was served on and received by petitioners on August 25, 1993, directing them to file an answer within the reglementary period of ten (10) days. Patricio Guevara was abroad at that time; hence, the MTCC did not acquire jurisdiction over him. On September 4, 1993, petitioners filed with with the MTCC an urgent motion for extension extension of time to file file an answer. 4 On September September 7, 1993, the MTCC MTCC denied the motion on the ground that it was a prohibited pleading under the Rule on Summary Procedure. 5 On September 8, 1993, or more than ten days from their receipt of the summons, petitioner submitted an urgent motion praying for the admission of their answer, 6 which was attached thereto. Two days later, petitioners filed another motion pleading for the admission of an amended answer. On September 23, 1993, the MTCC denied the motions and considered the case submitted for resolution. 7 On October 27, 1993, the MTCC also denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration. 8 Thereafter, on November 26, 1 993, the MTCC 9 issued a decision 10 resolving the complaint for forcible entry in favor of herein private respondents. Instead of filing an appeal, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and injunction before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City, 11 Branch 24, praying mainly that the MTCC be ordered to admit the amended answer and to conduct further proceedings in the civil case for forcible entry. As prayed for, a temporary restraining order was issued by the RTC.
Issue: I. Are the provisions of the Rules on Summary Procedure on the p eriod of pleadings to be applied strictly or liberally. II. What is the legal effect of a belated answer under the Rules on Summary Procedure.
Application of statutory construction: The word "shall" ordinarily connotes an imperative and indicates the mandatory character of a statute. This, however, is not an absolute rule in statutory construction. The import of the word ultimately depends upon a consideration of the entire provision, its nature, object and the consequences that would follow from construing it one way or the other. As a general principle, rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done, or certain proceedings taken, are considered absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and to the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. By their very very nature, these rules are regarded as mandatory. mandatory.
Ruling: The pertinent provisions of the Rule on Summary Procedure are as follows: Sec. 5. Answer. — Answer. — Within Within ten (10) days from service of summons, the defendant shall file his answer to the complaint and serve a copy thereof on the p laintiff . . . Sec. 6. Effect of failure to answer. — Should Should the defendant fail to answer the complaint within the period above provided, the Court, motu proprio, or on motion of the plaintiff, shall render judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is prayed for therein: . . . Private respondent assails petitioners for engaging in forum-shopping by p ursuing the present ejectment suit, notwithstanding the pendency of an action for quieting quieting of title involving the same property and parties. We are are unable to find basis for this charge. charge. For forum-shopping to exist, both actions must involve the same transactions, essential facts and circumstances; and the actions must raise identical causes of action, subject matter, and issues. 35 Suffice it to say that an action for quie ting of title and partition has a different cause of action than that in an ejectment suit. As private respondent herself contended, ownership of a certain portion o f the property which is determined in a case of partition does not necessarily mean that the successful litigant has the right to possess the property adjudged in his favor. In ejectment cases, the only issue for resolution is physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership set forth by any of the party litigants. Anyone o f them who can prove prior possession de facto may recover such possession even from the owner himself. This rule holds true regardless of the character of a party's possession, provided that he has in his favor priority of time which entitles him to stay on
the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by either accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. 36 It has even been ruled that the institution of a separate action for quieting of title is not a valid reason for defeating the execution of the summary remedy of ejectment. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED in toto. Double costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED.
