Epictetus Xenakis

EPICTETUS Philosopher-Therapist by

JASON XENAKIS

MARTINUS NIJHOFF

/

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This book considers aIl known aspects of Epictetus' work (educational, cosmological, logical, epistemological, psychological, etc.), but ethics seems to have been his dominant interest. Yet, the therapeutic aspect of his work, such as his diagnoses of and techniques for coping with problems in living, has either been overlooked or else insufficiently appreciated. Epictetus was apt to Iocate the source of difficulties in the individual rather than outside: in impulses and conceptualizations. Hence his emphasis on training and thought-analysis, and on unfazedness as an ethical ideal. Hence, too, his apparent neglect of rebellion theory. Rightly or wrongly, the remains do not explicitly say, for example, that force, or the threat offorce, is justified when there is no other way of changing socio-political structures that invite or contribute to self-defeating aspirations or oppression. They do not even seem to condone punishment or at least retribution. Was it because Epictetus also believed that violence might in the process "corrupt" its user? But anyway his is not a pure ethics of adjustment, any more than it is a pure ethics of inwardness or withdrawal. Thus, he condemns slavery and tyranny, just as he recommends outgoingness ("for one can't be happy otherwise"). Stoicism, perhaps, need not imply conformism. (As a matter of fact, some Stoics and Cynics initiated uprisings.) Stoicism, or Epictetus' brand, is a complex - or an ambivalent - affair, and in more ways than one, at that.

About the author: Went to the Athens School ofEconomics, OberliD College (M.A.,), and Harvard (Ph.D.,), and has publishcd in European and American journals.

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EPICTETUS PHILOSOPHER-THERAPIST

EPICTETUS PHILOSOPHER-THERAPIST

by

JASON XENAKIS

•

MARTINUS NIJHOFF

I

THE HAGUE

I

I9 69

ISBN 978-94-on-8374-1 DOI 10.10071978-94-011-9060-2.

ISBN 978-94-011-9060-2. (eBook)

© I969 by Martinus Nijhotl, The Hague, Netherlands All rights reserved, including the right to translate or to reproduce this book or parts thereof in any form

ToZ.Z.

We neither know who we are nor have we studied what pertains to man as horsemen study what pertains to horses. What disturbs human beings is not the things themselves, but their conceptions 0/ things. What is terrible is not death, but the fear 01 death. Doing philosoPhy is preparing to face things. Before you say samething, find out what it means. Love someone but as though he were amigrant. Man can't live with man lorever. Nothing in life is dilficult, lor one can always quit. Life is a dance. EPICTETUS

PREFACE

Epictetus presents difficulties for the historiall of ideas. He published nothing, while his so-called writings are mostly notes of so me of his discussions taken down haphazardly by a friend. Moreover, about half of the notes are lost, and little is known of his life. All this may go toward explaining the paucity of Epictetus studies; for indeed this is the first book-length commentary published in English devoted only to hirn. All known aspects of his work are here considered and reconstructed and freshly approached. Eut the emphasis is on his remarks in ethics, for the simple reason that ethics was his dominant interest and that his diagnoses of problems in living and techniques for coping with those problems have been insufficiently appreciated. His ethics is primarily pain-oriented: it consists of existential reminders, such as that things are ephemer al and people vulnerable, plus ways of avoiding and easing distress, induding training and thought-analysis, because he believed that people's troubles stern largely from silly habits and preconceptions. Outside a biographical and a semi-introductory chapter, the sequel is roughly patterned after an Epictetian or ancient partition of Philosophy into Logic, Cosmology, and Ethics, even though the remains reflect no such structure. Rather, the structure is a convenience of exposition. Since Epictetus combines interest in such questions as "What is the world about?" with logico-linguistic concerns and procedures, he might serve to show that the rift in current philosophy between (say) the existentialists and the analysts is largely unwarranted. This is argued in the last chapter. Like everyone else he is indebted to others and whenever possible I indicate this, though to

x

PREFACE

avoid inflation, not in a special chapter but as I go along. For the Greek text of Epictetus I use Oldfather's edition which is arevision of Schenkl's (see Bibliography). What follows, though, presupposes no knowledge of any foreign language. When referring to Epictetus' Manual the letter M plus numerals are used, and only numerals for his Discourses. Thus, M53.3 means Manual 53, part 3, while III.4.10 means Discourses, book III, chapter 4, part (or line) 10. The second numeral for the Manual and the third for the Discourses may be disregarded by the Greekless or whoever does not use Oldfather's edition ortranslation (whichface each other). References to Roman and other Greek authors, as edited and translated in the Loeb Library series for example, follow a similar system, except that now no Roman or italicized numerals are used. Also, Cleanthes' Hymn to Zeus is referred in J. von Arnim's Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta (thestandard fourvolume collection of early Stoic fragments; volume IV is the Index to the other volumes and may be consulted when I refer to early Stoicism but give no reference). The letter f prefacing a numeral indicates fragment, and "s" at the end of a fragment signifies that the fragment is doubtful or spurious. I want to thank J. F. Anderson and in particular D. C. Dorrough and my "students" for extremely helpful advice, J. S. White for translating Cleanthes' poem specially for this volume, and Helen Drury for patient secretarial work.

CONTENTS

Preface I.

IX

BIOGRAPHY I.

Life and Stoicism

2. Teaching 3· Writings 4· Influence 11.

LIFE AGAME

5· 6. 7· 8. II I.

Living for Happiness Suicide, Euthanasia, Death Knowledge for Living Rational Self

LOGICAL TOPICS

9· Nature of Logical Studies 10. Irrefutability and Epistemological Issues II.

Logical Puzzles

12. Operators and Kin Matters IV.

NATURE AND GOD

13· 14·

15· 16. 17· 18. 19· v.

World Structure Providence Anthropocentrism Proofs of Design Cacodicy Hymns to God Zeus Inoperative?

VALUE THEORY

20. Theic Notions

I I

5 8 10 12 12 16 19 22 26 26 3° 33 35 4° 4° 41 43 45 46 5° 52 56 56

xii

VI.

CONTENTS

2I. Good a Protoconcept 22. Value Relativity 23· Value Criteria and Pleasure

59 64 66

PAIN AND TRAINING

7° 7° 72

24· 25· 26. 27· VII.

PREVENTIVE ETHICS

28. 29· 30. 3I. 32. VIII.

Examples "It's fate" and Other Tonics Loneliness Objections

SOCIAL REMARKS

37· 38. 39· 40 .

x.

Forestall, Resist, Ease Control Test Anxiety and Fear Other Safeguards Resistance Methods

REMEDIAL DEVICES

33· 34· 35· 36. IX.

Divisions of Ethics Learning Theory Rationalization and Erring Negative Ethics: A Look

Independence and Outgoingness Man as Social Troubleshooting and Cosmopolitanism Legal Questions

AFTERTHOUGHTS

77

80 85 85 86 9° 92 95 98 98 I02 I04 ro6 III III II5 II9 I23 I26

Bibliography

I3I

Index

I34

I

BIOGRAPHY

I.

Life and Stoicism

Not much is known of Epictetus' life. A contemporary of Plutarch and Tacitus, he was born a slave in a commercially important city in Phrygia called Hierapolis around A.D. 50, and probably died between 125 and 130, though scholars are not agreed on all the dates of events of his life. He was the son of a slave mother, and his emancipation may have occurred at the death of his master Epaphroditus, a freedman hirnself and Nero's secretary. "Epictetus" is the Latinization of the Greek Epiktetos which means "acquired." Whether this was a nickname, as some scholars tend to think, is a controversial issue. He was lame (LI6.20), feeble (IV.I.151f), apparently somewhat bashful (114), and, when he became a philosopher, wore a "beard and a rough cloak" (III.I.24). His lameness, according to Celsus, probably a younger contemporary, was caused by his owner. When Epaphroditus was once twisting his leg, Celsus says in Origen's Contra Celsum (7.53), Epictetus remarked smiling, you're going to break it. When the leg was finally broken, he calmly said, I told you so. Doubt about this account goes back to Suidas, who attributes the lameness to rheumatism. But Oldfather, for one, rejects Suidas' testimony and conjectures that the denial of the incident may have emanated from some over-zealous Christian, in aperiod of less scrupulous apologetics, who thought to take down the Pagans a notch or two (Epictetus, I, ixn).

Compare Celsus' next remark: "What comparable statement did your god [Christ] make while under punishment?" Oldfather does not seem to be biased, for perhaps he sees too many paralleIs between Epictetus and the Bible even though he agrees with Bonhöffer's conclusion that Epictetus was not influenced by, nor could he have read, the New Testament. Indeed, the Christians

2

BIOGRAPHY

Epictetus ignores, save for one passing reference to the "Gailleans" (IV.7.6). And twoofhisgreat admirers, Lucian (inPeregrinus I2f) and Marcus Aurelius (in Meditations II.3), regarded them as misguided and obstinate respectively. After all, Stoicism, not Christianity, was then the fashionable ideology. From Epictetus himself we have no clue to the cause of his disability, except possibly the following: He would say "This is man's lot" by way of countering the statement, "You'll suffer this or that in the hands of your master," made by his teacher to "test" presumably his moral progress (I.9.29f). The following too is worth mentioning even though it does not relate to his lameness but to his attitude in Celsus' story ("I told you so"): Come now, Epictetus, shave. If 1 am a philosopher, 1 say, 1 won't shave. Then I'll cut your throat. If that suits you, cut it (3.29).

But that Epictetus did not think much of Epaphroditus is certain. Thus, as he himself tells us, Epaphroditus owned a "shoemaker [named Felicio] whom he sold because he was useless." Then, when this "insolent and arrogant slave" became Caesar's cobbler, "you should have seen how Epaphroditus honored him. 'How is my good Felicio ... ?'" he would say. And if someone would inquire of Epictetus how Epaphroditus was, he would answer, "He is consulting Felicio about something." On another occasion Epictetus presents Epaphroditus as lacking in realism and sense of humor (I.I9.I9-23; IV.I.ISO; I.26.IIf). Yet it was while he was still a slave (9.29) and perhaps around the time when Nero made the Stoic Seneca kill himself (A.D. 65), that Epictetus began taking lessons from Musonius Rufus, themost prominent Stoic teacher of his day. It is believed that Epictetus witnessed the burning of the Capitol in 69 while a student of Rufus. Epictetus held Rufus (as he used to call him) in high esteem: Rufus used to say "If you have nothing better to do than to praise me, 1 am speaking in vain." Therefore he talked in such a way that each one of us as he sat there thought he was himself being criticized - such was his grasp of men's doings, so vividly did he put before ODe's eyes one's particular faults (111.33.29).

"Stoicism," as the movement to which Epictetus belonged was called, derives from poikile stoa, meaning dappled porch, a

BIOGRAPHY

3

structure in Athens where Zeno, the founder of the movement, started teaching toward the end of the fourth century B.C. However, it was not Zeno but Chrysippus (the third head of the school) who was the most influential early Stoic. In Diogenes Laertius' Lives there is the saying, "But for Chrysippus, there would be no Stoa" (7.I83). Laertius adds that Chrysippus was also considered by "most people" to be the greatest logician: the gods would choose no other logic than Chrysippus' (r80). Cleanthes, famed for his poem Hymn to Zeus (appended in section I8), was the second head of the school. One of his remarks, according to Epictetus, was: philosophers say what might be contrary to opinion, but not what is contrary to reason (IV.I.I73f).

With him, as with Zeno, Chrysippus "mostly disagreed," says Laertius (7.I79). Zeno was influenced by the Cynics and presocratics. Crates, a pupil of Diogenes, converted hirn to philosophy, though it appears that Stilpo the Megaric also had a hand in this conversion. Crates used to say [Laertius recounts] that we should do philosophy until we see generals as donkey drivers (6.92).

Stoicism abounds in admiring references to Diogenes and Antisthenes (both pupils of Socrates), as weil as to Socrates hirns elf and Hercules. N ext to (idealized ?) Socrates, Diogenes ma y wen have been the greatest single influence on Epictetus - though his taste for metaphysics must have been acquired from (say) Zeno or Cleanthes. Antisthenes, Epictetus says, "freed" Diogenes. He freed hirn, and here Epictetus looks as though he is quoting Diogenes, in the sense that he taught him what is truly "his," namely not property ... kinsmen, relatives, friends, reputation, familiar locations, socializing but [only the] use of perceptions (IV. I. 114; III. 24. 67-9; cp. 1.24.6-9; Socrates, PI. Meno 88).

This is characteristic Stoic doctrine and one Epictetus on a different occasion ascribes to Zeno, when he also uses Zeno's sentence,

4

BIOGRAPHY

Man's purpose is to follow the gods, while the essence of good is the co:rrect use of perceptions,

as a paradigm of philosophical brevity (1.20.16). Epictetus also praises Zeno's character (ILI3.14f; M33.1Z) and his, as well as Cleanthes' and Socrates', teaching (11I.23.3Z, quoted next seetion) . All this contrasts with the opinion of such men as Cicero and Zeno's contemporary and head of the Academy Polemo, who thought Zeno prolix, unimaginative, and even a plagiarist. Although classified as a Stoic, Epictetus was not servile toward Stoicism (partly an amalgam of heterogeneous elements anyway) and often refers mockingly to the movement and members of it. He speaks of "the trivial arguments of the Stoics" (II.I9.ZZ); says that "the books of the Stoics are full of quibbles" (1.29.56), that "we too say one thingand do another" (III.7.17f; cp. II.I2.1-4); and needles not only lesser Stoics, like Crinus whose fear of mice or learning he ridicules (111.2.15), but even the great Chrysippus (M49; 1.4.6ff). Moreon ancientfigures and views as portrayed, in terpreted, or criticized by Epictetus will be found throughout the remainder of this monograph. Epictetus was childless. Once, Lucian tells us, he reprimanded Demonax, a Cynic and former pupil of his, for not havingchildren. He told hirn to get married and procreate, so that philosophy won't deprive the world of a substitute when he is gone. To which Demonax replied: "Then give me one of your daughters, Epictetus." However, from Simplicius we learn that in old age Epictetus took a woman to help him raise a child whose destitute parents, friends of his, were about to abandon. His many references to children when making some philosophical point show great fondness for them, as well as insight into their psychology. "Who," he says, can resist thecallof attractive and wide-awake children toplaywith them and crawl with them and talk nonsense with them? (11. 24. 18; cp. I. IO.I 3).

Moreover it is from children and their games that he draws chiefly when he illustrates his metaphor that life is agame (with not enough winners). Epictetus lived very simply, with unlocked doors and no furniture, except for a straw mattress and a mat. Later, when he

BIOGRAPHY

5

left Rome for Nicopolis in Northem Greece, he was content with a lamp of coarse clay after the theft of his iron lamp possibly in order to disappoint the thief in case he retumed (I8.I5f; cp. 29.21). The cheap lamp was bought at his death for an exorbitant price by someone who hoped to become as "enlightened" by it as he thought Epictetus had been! Epictetus left Rome, already weH-known as a teacher, around 94 (according to Souilhe), when Domitian deported the philosophers. He settled in Nicopolis where he established a rather large and eventually famous school, in which he and his assistants directed classes in all the major fields of the day. He visited Athens and probably Olympia, but apparently no other place. Although Epictetus' cosmic laughter may not have been as pronounced as that of many of the Cynics, he was neither ponderous nor self-righteous and remained calm even after he became famous and friendly with emperors, such as Hadrian. He would often refer to hirnself as "a lame old man" (e.g. I.I6.20); or would joke about hirns elf and relate unflattering remarks of others about hirn (III.8.7, 9.14, 20.19), though once he brags a little (I.IO.2-6). But the last, like his self-disparagement, may weH contain a touch of irony, for he also had a sense of humor. He never set hirnself up as an example of the philosopher or of the Stoic, the really Free Man for hirn. This role was usually reserved for individuals like Diogenes and Socrates (IV.I.I5I-69).

2.

Teaching

Why did Epictetus choose Nicopolis instead of Athens as the new seat of his teaching? Colardeau explains (in Etude sur Epictete, p. 91) that he was thinking of his prospective pupils. Drab Nicopolis (I.26.IOf; II.2I.I4) would offer less distraction to leaming. Most of his pupils came from other places. To Epictetus this, like the apparent austerity of his school (ib.; III.5.I3), was likewise part of the educational enterprise, of what he wanted students to leam, namely to stand on their own feet. "My function [as your teacher, he would sayJ is to make you independent .... " (II.I9.29). To explain his work he used medical analogies:

6

BIOGRAPHY

Men, the philosopher's school is a clinic; you must not leave it in pleasure, but in pain. For you come unwell, one with a dislocated shoulder, another with an abscess, another with a small u1cer, another with a headache. And then am 1 to sit there and tell you little ideas and witty little remarks, that you may leave praising me, one carrying away his shoulder exactly as it was when he came, another his head in the same state, another his small ulcer, another his abscess? Is it for this then that young people are to leave home and their parents and friends and relatives and their bit of property, that they may exclaim "Great!" to you when you recite your witty little remarks? Was this what Socrates did, or Zeno, or Cleanthes? (111.23. 30-2; cp. aI.Bf).

Edueation for Epietetus is painful. Going to sehool means being siek. If one is not in pain while there, he is wasting his time. Learning philosophy at any rate is generally undergoing surgery, for the world one is brought up in is generally "upside-down" (ep. IV.6.8f). Epictetus' students were not ehildren: they didn't eome to him devoid of habits and attitudes. People, Epictetus goes on, lament that nobody benefits from attending school. Well, who goes to school expecting to be cured, expecting to have his beliefs fumigated, expecting to become aware of his needs? Why then are you surprised if you leave school with the very things you bring to it? For you didn't come ready to put them aside or correct them or replace them by others ... You want to speak expertlyon principles ... Did you ever light your lamp or stay up late for this? ... Far from it ... " ... but if my child or brother dies or 1 myself have to die or be tortured what good will such things do me?" But is this really what you come for? Is this why you sit by me? ... you say principles are useless. To whom? To those who use them improperly. For eyewash is not useless to those who use it when and as they should, piasters are not useless, jumping-weights are not useless, but only useless to some, and again useful to others. If you ask me now, AIe forms of inference (syllogismoi) useful? 1 shall say yes and if you wish 1'11 prove it. "But what good have they done me ?" Man, you didn't ask whether they are useful to you, but in general. Suppose someone suffering from dysentery asked me whether vinegar is useful; 1 would say it iso "But is it useful to me?" 1 would say - no: try first to stop your discharge, and heal your little ulcers. So you too, men, first take care of your ulcers, stop your discharges, calm your mind, bring it to school undistracted; then you'll see what power reason has (II.2I.I5-22).

Epictetus taught by the Soeratic method of elicitation; he did not leeture. He would shoek his students somewhat in order to motivate and instill interest in leaming new things. He would oppose one exaggeration by another (Colardeau, 187), thinking

BIOGRAPHY

7

perhaps üf Aristütle's püint made in reference tü ethical educatiün that the way tü straighten a crüüked stick is tü bend it in the üppüsite directiün (Nie. Eth. IIü9 b 5; cp. Diegenes, D.L. 6.35) ; für, as we shall see in seetion 25, Epictetus did recümmend such techniques für character training. The device üf meeting üne exaggeratiün with another may account for at least süme üf his extreme statements (see sectiün 36). Also., he wüuld assign a topic, perhaps ün süme technical Stoic subject. The pupil in turn wüuld write a paper ün it, which wüuld then be read and criticized in dass. "First," he says ün one üccasiün, "find üut wh at you're saying, then say it" (III.23.18). Logic and darification üf terms played an important role in the curriculum üf his schüül. In this of cüurse he füIlüwed a lüng tradition, as he himself was weIl aware (I.I7.6, II f): the early Stoics tended tü place lügic ahead üf every üther study; Prüdicus the Süphist and Antisthenes, with Epictetus füIlowing suit (II.I4.14), remarked that the beginning üf educatiün is the analysis üf terms. And Sücrates was famüus für his cüncern üver definitions; a concern which Epictetus cünstrued as an interest in "meanings" and the "articulation cüncepts" (I.I7.I2; II.I2.6, 9). In his üwn philüsophical practice Epictetus nüt uncharacteristicaUy speaks üf analyzing cüncepts and üf hüw this ür that "nütiün is used," as when he is discussing freedüm (e.g. IV.I.24f), lüneliness (III.I3.2), etc. This style üf düing philüsüphy gües at least as far back as Aristotle, whü, while criticizing üthers für example, wüuld sümetimes say üf this ür that expressiün that it is "used in many senses." A güod teacher in Epictetus' üpiniün dües nüt try tü impress his pupils with his knüwledge and jargün, but leads them by the hand and cünsequently dispenses with intimidatiün and, at first, with technicallanguage. He tries tü eliminate, not preserve, the difference üf knüwledge ür cümpetence between himself and pupil. His purpüse is nüt düminatiün but teaching. If he fails tü reach his pupil ür the layman, he fee1s that he is tü blame; he certainly dües nüt belittle his audience (cp. II.I2.1ff, 10.). Sücrates is used as a müdel, Socrates whü never lost his temper during an argument, never said anything abusive, or insolent, but stood the abuse of others and put an end to eonfliet (I4f;

ep.IV·5· 2 -4)·

8

BIOGRAPHY

Nevertheless a teacher cannot function weil without audience interest. The more eager his student is to learn, the better he hirnself performs. If the listener stands there like a stone or grass, how can he stimulate a man's desire ? (II.Z4· 16f).

There is an "art" about hearing and listening, just as there is one about teaching or talking (2, Sf). Skill in listening is a presupposition of both discussion and learning. So, When you want to hear a philosopher, don't tell him "Have you nothing to say to me?" but just show yourself capable of hearing and you'll see how you'll move the speaker (29).

3. Writings

Like Socrates and the virtuoso Skeptic Carneades, Epictetus published nothing. But he wrote some in preparation for his classes or in the way of exercise, as he believed Socrates also did. (When Socrates had no one to talk philosophy with, Epictetus says, he would examine and test his thoughts by writing them down, II.I.32.) Epictetus' so-called writings are stenographic notes recorded by his student and historian Flavius Arrian, plus several fragments, some suspect. In the Preface, which is addressed to Gellius, Arrian says that he "wrote down word for word" everything he heard Epictetus say in order to preserve the "manner of his thinking and the directness of his speech." However, only four of the original eight parts or "books" of the Discourses (Diatribai) survive, plus some bits in the form of fragments or contained in fragments, for not ail the fragments come from Arrian. Excerpts from the original set of notes (a little less than one-tenth of the extant set) compiled by Arrian hirnself and known as theMa11lJ.l.al (Encheiridion) , survive intact. Of the two publications, the latter has been by far bett er known. But the Manual is gloomy compared to (or is gloomier than) its archetype. It was in fact used by monks (see next section). It also tends to be oracular and aphoristic, while in the

BIOGRAPHY

9

Discourses, though sometimes apparently impatient (I.I6.8; 11.20.37; III.24.38), Epictetus is usually uncondescending and an arguer, going out of his way, as Colardeau points out, to find someone to discuss with and, when unsuccessful, taking up both sides of the imaginary dialogue himself. (Certainly Arrian does not usually indicate when Epictetus is talking to someone else which unfortunately means that often it is difficult or impossible to tell whether objections to views Epictetus is apparently anxious to defend are his own or someone else's.) The Discourses is closer than the Manual to the Socratic-dialectic tradition. Epictetus came to idolize Socrates not only for wha't the latter said, but also for how he said it (see e.g. II.I2.5-14; 1VS.I-4). Perhaps the lost' 'books" were devoted more extensively to nonethical questions, but ethics is the main topic in the remains. The notes, written in common Greek, thus contrasting with Arrian's own writings, which were not in the Koine but in Attic, are records of informal and frank talks between Epictetus and students or visitors, of private conferences, and of asides. This explains their somewhat repetitive and disjointed character. N evertheless, those interested in ancient Stoicism are lucky to have what is left of Arrian's efforts. For not much survives from that tradition even though Chrysippus, for one, who survives only in fragments, was the most prolific author of antiquity, having published, according to Laertius, "more than 705 writings" (mostly on logico-linguistic questions). The "Discussions," as the notes might more appropriately have been entitled, betray as well a strong personality, a quite informal teacher, an enthusiastic if sometimes delirious thinker (e.g. II.20.6-37; II1.22), a man skilled in repartee, and one not afraid of words, any more than of people, as Arrian was seen to intimate, and as does Gellius in the following fragment, which partly comes from one of the lost books of the Discourses. According to Favorinus, Gellius says, to Epictetus "most of those who gave the impression of doing philosophy were philosophers [in words, not deeds]." And, Gellius go es on, "there is an even stronger expression he was in the habit of using, which Arrian has recorded [in one of the lost books]." When Epictetus would see a shameless man" concerned with everything else but his soul" studying also philosophy

10

BIOGRAPHY

he would denounce the man in these words: "Man, where are you putting all this [i.e. philosophical studies] ? See whether the container is cleaned. For if you put them in the container of fancy, they are lost; if they spoH, they become urine or vinegar or perhaps something worse" (I1O.I-4).

Arrian's notes further show an unusual command of language, of turn of phrase, contrast, analogy, and imagery - extemporaneous though their contents were. That is why I let Epictetus tell his own story in his own words so frequently.

4. I nfluence When Epictetus died he was practically deified. An anonymous epigram describes hirn as "Epictetus a slave and maimed in body and as poor as Irus and friend of the immortals. " Lucian referred to hirn as that "marvellous old man." Gellius in Attic Nights calls hirn the "greatest of philosophers." Marcus Aurelius, his most famous disciple, admired hirn more than anyone else. Other ancient admirers, besides, of course, Celsus, Arrian, and Hadrian, were Galen and even Christians, such as Origen, Gregory of Nazianzus, Chrysostom, and Augustine. The Manual was adapted by Christian ascetics and, in I632, by Mathias Mittner for the Carthusians (Oldfather, I, xxviif). The adaptation, by some fifth-century ascetics, was a systematic replacement of the plural theoi (gods) with the singular theos, Socrates with St .Paul, and the suppression of certain details relating to sex (Colardeau, I24n4). In modern times Epictetus played a prominent role in the movement of Neo-Stoicism: Justus Lipsius had none but the highest regard for him. Descartes, Pascal, Spinoza, Kant, and other eminent modern figures were also inspired by him. Today, however, the picture is considerably different. To be sure, in a vague and general way Epictetus' ghost still wanders about. Thus "Be a stoic" is still with uso Its synonym, "Take it philosophically," may likewise be due in part to his influence. So may Kazantzakis' Zorba. The attitude of the protagonist in Camus' Stranger is also recognizably Epictetian, at any rate if it is taken to express not resignation but nonchalantness (tlIf I get what I want, fine; if not, who cares?"). Some contemporary

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psychiatrists, as is explained in the last chapter, use notions and techniques of his, though not always consciously. Oldfather's finding, that between I905 and I925 his remains or portions of them have seen more printings than in all the preceding years and centuries put together, mayaIso be mentioned. Nevertheless, especially compared with the elaborate interest still shown in such ancient names as Plato and Aristotle, Epictetus is hardly being noticed nowadays. The trouble is partly that the post-Aristotelian era, to which Epictetus belongs, is commonly regarded as one of intellectual or philosophical decline and unoriginality. But though this may be true of metaphysics, it is no more true of nonmetaphysical philosophy than it is of science. (Thus, in logic, sign-theory, and epistemology the Stoics, Megarics, and Skeptics developed new fields or distinctions. The ideas of humanism, individualism, nonnationalism, anarchism, and equality, including equality of the sexes, derive from the Cynics and Stoics (as weH as Sophists). The not ion that there are two sides to every question, and hence tolerance and antidogmatism, come from the Skeptics (and Sophists). The Cynics, Epicureans, Stoics, and some Cyrenaics emphasized coping with pain and distress rather than the pursuit of good or happiness, thus originating, or participating in the birth of, psychiatry. Cynics, Epicureans, and Skeptics, especially Euhemerus, Carneades, and Sextus Empiricus, as well as the Sophists Protagoras, Critias, and Prodicus, show initiative on theological topics, anticipating modern and recent views. For all this see Arnim, Laertius, Sextus, Cicero's philosophical works, and below. For post-Aristotelian science see, e.g. T.L. Heath and Greek Math., Loeb series.)

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5. Living tor Happiness What is life about? Is life agame or a burden ? Is suicide wrong? Are virtue and truth more valuable than happiness? How can distress be coped with? What, if any, is the use of reason? These are the kinds of questions Epictetus was really interested in. However, since this is somewhat less than an introductory chapter, not all of his answers to these and related questions will be considered thoroughly at this point, nor even all aspects of his answers to some of the questions. This means that the metaphysical ingredient of his thought and his remarks in logical, social, political, and value theory will be hardly discussed now. By contrast, his refrain that life is agame, and consequently his relatively optimistic mood, will here be treated exhaustively; so will, among other things, his positions on suicide and knowledge. The conception of life as a game runs through characteristic comments of Epictetus on life, knowledge, education, freedom, therapy, happiness, and death. His eudaimonism and his endorsement of suicide alike may weIl stern from a playful outlook on life. For, as I hope to show, when he compares life to agame he does so in the last analysis both to suggest that the point of living is fun and that nevertheless there is an escape if living is not fun. And by escape he means death, self-inflicted death. In other words, he exploits the double meaning of "game," namely (1) entertainment (eudaimonism) and (2) freedom even to quit agame (suicide). This is a consistent stand. That is, it would be inconsistent to compare life to agame and reject either eudaimonism or the right to suicide (unless of course "game" is used in some restricted sense, to suggest, for example, mIes only). To accept eudaimonism and condemn suicide, or vice versa, is likewise inconsistent. For to

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be a eudaimonist is to be committed to the idea that happiness (or the hope of happiness) is what makes life worth living; from which it follows that if there is no happiness (or hope of happiness), there is no point to living either; and vice versa. The game metaphor Epictetus often illustrates by using child behavior as a model for adults. The salient features of the model are: (I) the child plays constantly (treats life as agame), and (z) he stops playing (or switches to another game) the moment he gets bored. Human life in general, Epictetus suggests, should be like that. Adults should hold on to this attitude. Throughout, life should be childlike. (Not that Epictetus was naive or overromantic about children or childhood: see, e.g. II1.9.zz, I9-4-6, 24·53; IV·7· 22 -4, 3 Z .) Thus, on one occasion he suggests that the wise play and live like children: they play and live so long as the game and life and "banquet" are entertaining (II.I6.37). To live in anxiety, he says in another connection, is like playing a ball game in fear: "what fun is there left?" (5. 17). Again, ... just as [children] say "I won't play any more" when the thing doesn't please them, so you too, when things seem to you to have reached that point, say "I won't play any more," and leave, while if you stay don't moan (1.24.20).

If life is agame, it would be absurd to go on living if living turns

out to be intolerable; as absurd as going on playing aboring game or staying at a silly party or (one might add) finishing a dull novel. It would be absurd to do so even if life is not agame, Epictetus implies; for, as we shall see more fully in the next section, suicide to hirn is not necessarily a tragedy, or immoral, but may be rational. Being in a crowd, being bothered, being on trial, going to prison, risking death, and even predetermination, are all, at one time or another, said to be in the "game," or incidents in a "festival," "holiday," "fair," "pageant," "dance" (11.5.18-21, I4.23; IV.I. 104-9, 4.24-7, 7·1gf, 30f; 1.I2.21, 25.7f). To be sure, the "festival," etc. are frequently Zeus'. But this perhaps doesn't matter, since Zeus may weIl be inoperative in Epictetus' thought. Thus, Zeus does not punish the suicide. In fact, as we shall see, he does not punish, period. Life is the greatest game, Epictetus continues, greater even than

LIFE AGAME

the pancratium and wrestling and all other Olympic games; for its trophy (happiness) is the greatest (III.25.3). Though here as elsewhere he compares life to competitive games and speaks of trophies and victories, the competitive element is inoperative. By winning in life he means realizing noncompetitive goals and in the last analysis achieving happiness and unperturbedness. He does not mean defeating others. "Life is agame" may imply in his thought realism - "Take things as they come," the attitude of the professional dice player (II.5.2f) - but it does not me an "Compete." In fact, he would tend to prefer cooperation to competition. Though power is an ideal for hirn, it is power over one's fears rather than over one's fellow-man. The powerful individual is a brave individual, not the man who defeats or dominates others. To pursue power in the latter sense would signify to Epictetus lack of power in the former, and certainly lack of selfconfidence and self-reliance. On happiness and cognate subjects hespeaksfurtherasfollows: "For what is it that every man seeks? To be ... happy .... " (IV.I.46; cp. 4.22), while nobody wants to be "abject," "sad," "disenchanted," "afraid" (I.2-S). "We shouldn't however let any one make us unhappy, but let everybody make us happy .... " (III.24.63). "For God made all men to be happy, to be free from care" (2f; cp. 19, 63f). "The good" is "happiness, peace of mind, freedom from interference" (22.39). The "promise" and "function" of "virtue" are also utilitarian (1.4.3-6). So is the point of "learning" and "reading" (III.IO.10; IV.4-4-18). And the functionof"reason"isnot to make us unhappy (III.24.7f, I3.19). Reason or thinking can go by the board if safety or calm is thereby attained (cp. fraa; II.I6.41). As for truth, Epictetus remarks similarly that "deception" is all right if it brings freedom from care. He says that if to be free from care entails being deceived into accepting the Cynic-Stoic idea that things external and beyond our control are nothing to us, he for his part wouldn't mind "consenting" to being fooled (1.4.27). And he may be saying the same thing about the role of tragedyas a form of literature, for at the same time he characterizes tragedies as "the display in verse of the sufferings of men who have admired [or pursued] external things" (with Priam and Oedipus receiving passing mention). He may be saying, in other

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words, that it is all right for tragedies to deceive us (presumably without our knowledge) if in the process they teach us that to be attached to things external and beyond our control doesn't pay. Incantations too are in one place pragmatically conceived (111. 2 4.89) . No doubt, what is allowed to be illusory is not the Cynic-Stoic idea; rather, the way it is presented, in life or art. Still, the fact remains that as far as Epictetus is concerned, truth may be sacrificed to happiness. And, in view of the incantations passage, so may perhaps religion or ideology. (On tragedy see also 1.24.15-8, 28.32; II.I6.3I. On music, I4.6.) Epictetus' high praise of freedom - "freedom is the highest good" (IV.I.52; cp. 54, etc.) - is likewise the result of his generally conceiving of freedom as freedom from fear, hang-ups, disturbance. Freedom is typically compared with peace of mind and spontaneity, and typically contrasted with anguish and the feelings of stress and constraint. If a man is free, he does not feel hindered or driven, he is serene and happy. If a man is not free, he feels bothered, he is not serene or happy. Here are some excerpts: Am I not without pain, am I not without fear, am I not free? (III.22.48). Nobody then who is afraid or sad or distressed is free, but whoever is rid of sorrows and fears and turmoils is by the same path rid also of bondage (ILI.24f; cp. 21, 27f; IIL22.48, 26.39, I3.II; IV.I.I28f, 3.7f, 6.8f). For what is it that every man seeks? To be serene, to be happy, to do everything as he wants, not to be hindered, or compelled (IV.I.46). Hold, unhappy man; don't be carried away by your impressions. Great is the contest, divine the job, the stakes are a kingdom, freedom, peace, unfazedness (ILI8.27-9). Man, do something even foolhardy, as the saying goes, to get peace, freedom .... Straighten your neck as a man finally released from slavery ... (I6.4If). [My aim as your teacher is] to make you a finished product, safe from hindrance, pressure, constraint, free, serene, happy ... (I9.29; cp. I7.29ff and, generally, IV.I.IIO; 14).

In the last quotation "free" easily shades into unhindered, unconstrained, unfrustrated, unobsessed, unneurotic, spontaneous (which, by the way, makes freedom compatible with "causality"). The term freedom, Oldfather says, occurs some 130 times in Epictetus rand] with a relative frequency of about six times that of [its] occurrence in the New Testament and twice that of [its] occurrence in Marcus Aurelius .... (I, xvii).

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This fact is attributed by Oldfather and others to the aIleged gratitude of an ex-slave for his final emancipation. However, Epictetus seldom uses the word in the required, political sense; he seldom means emancipation from slavery; on the contrary (see, e.g. IV.I.8-60), while his usual meaning fits in very weIl with his eudaimonism and therapeutic ethics. So that to construe his typical use of freedom as an accident or obsession is to misconstrue his main concern in life, as weIl as his use of a term.

6. Suicide, Euthanasia, Death If life is agame, it is not sacred. Death may be welcomed and suicide permitted : This then is the harbor of all, death, this theirrefuge (IV.IO.27). Foritis better to die of hunger so as to be free from pain and fear, than to live in plenty but perturbed (MI2.I; ep. 132s; Nicias in PI. Lackes I9Sd).

Readiness to die is similarly construed as a sign of freedom: Henee we will eall free only those animals which don't submit to captivity, but eseape by dying as soon as they are eaught. So too Diogenes somewhere says that the one sure way to attain freedom is to die readily .... (IV.I.29f; ep. 24ff, 30ff).

And, "Diogenes was free" (152). For life, remarked Seneca, is slavery if courage to die is lacking (Epistles 77.15; cp. ours, "Whoever is afraid to die is too afraid to live"). In a context combining reflections on death and suicide Epictetus says: ... with tears and groans we stand what we suffer and eall it eircumstanees. What do you mean "eireumstanees," man? If you eall cireumstanees what surrounds you, everything is eireumstanee; but ü you use the word of harassments, how is harassment involved when what has come into being is destroyed? The ageney of destruetion is a sword or a wheel or the sea or a tile or a tyrant. What do you eare by what road you go down to Hades [the grave)? They are all alike [as Anaxagoras or Diogenes or Aristippus or someone else said). If you want to know the truth, though, the road the tyrant sends you on is the shorter. No tyrant ever took six months to slay someone, while a fever frequently takes over a year. All these things are mere noise and clamor of empty words. "My life is in danger in Caesar's presence." And I am not in danger,

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living in Nicopolis, where earthquakes are so many? And you too when you cross the Adriatic, what risk do you take? Don't you risk your li fe ? "But I am also in danger from thought." Y ours? How? For who can make you think what you don't want to? Or do you mean in someone else's thought? And what kind of danger to you is that others believe in falsehoods? "But I risk being exiled." What is being exiled? Being somewhere other than Rome? "Yes." vVhat then? "Suppose I am sent to [that island east of Attica for exiles] Gyara?" If it is for your good, you'll go; if not, you have a place [the grave] where you may go instead of Gyara, where he too, who's sending you to Gyara, will go, whether he likes it or not (II.6.16-23).

On suicide Epictetus says further the following: Since, we already saw hirn say, death is a "harbor" and "refuge," nothing in li fe is difficult. 'Whenever you wish you leave, and are no longer bothered by the smoke [pain]. Why then are you anxiety-ridden, why do you stay up late? (IV.ro.27f) . . .. do nothing as one burdened, or afflicted or who thinks himself in trouble; for nobody forces you to do this. Someone has made smoke in the place? If the smoke is moderate, I stay; if excessive, I leave. For one should remember and hold to this, that the door is open. But "Don't live in Nicopolis [Epictetus is supposedly ordered]." I don't. "Nor in Athens." I don't live in Athens either. "Nor in Rome." Rome too is out. "Live in Gyara." I do. But Gyara strikes me as too smoky a place to inhabit. I move to where nobody will prevent me from staying; for that place [the grave] is available to everybody. And beyond this last tunic, namely my poor body, no one has any authority whatever over me (1.25.17-22; cP.24.20; I1.r.20). "But is it not intolerable to hang oneself?" WeIl, anyway, when a man feels that it is reasonable, he goes and hangs himself (1.2.3f).

Further down in this last context (z5f) Epictetus praises an athlete for having chosen to die rat her than go on living mutilated. And he may be condoning euthanasia as wen; for he does not condemn anybody for not having interfered with the athlete's decision not to submit to a saving operation. Oi course he does not praise this noninterference either. In any case, elsewhere he comes out rather clearly in favor of mercy-killing. A friend of his, he says, decided to starve himself to death. I learnt of this when he was already in his third day of fasting and went and asked him what happened. "I have decided," he said. All right, but what made you decide? For if your decision was the right one, we are at your side and ready to help you make your exit from life (II.I5.4-7).

True, Epictetus berates his friend in the wider context, but not

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because he decided to kill hirnself, but because Epictetus thought that his friend stuck to a hasty decision. The issue in this chapter is whether one should hold fast to one's beliefs, or rather change them if they turn out to be unsound, with Epictetus siding with thelatter alternative (see esp. rf). "Whythen," he says onanother occasion to a man ridden with fears and inferiority complexes, . "do you go on living if this is the kind of person you are?" (IIL26.26). One can't tell, however, whether Epictetus approved of euthanasia which is not based on the subject's consent, as in merciful infanticide (condoned by Seneca), though he argued against simple infanticide (1.23). Epictetus endorsed the right to suicide because he was impressed by the phenomenon of suffering and wished to point out that life is not a prison, that there is a way out. This holds good even of those passages in which he looks as though he approves of suicide or death as a device for saving one's identity; for after all , the reason one would rather die than lose his integrity or self-image is that such loss strikes hirn as unbearable. To reject suicide is to turn life for the unfortunate into a trap. And this adds to the pain. Isn't a miserable life enough? Must one compound the misery? This, as Epictetus would say, is a good example of how a preconception ("Suicide is bad") can cause or increase suffering. As he actually puts it in connection with the fear of dying, death in itself is not dreadful; rather, the idea that it is dreadful is dreadful (M 5). Death is a "bogey": unmask it and you'll see "it doesn't bite" (ILI.13-7). Suicide (to playa while longer with Epictetus' position) is a safety-valve, a fire escape. It is not a duty but a permit, which may never be used but which it is good to have. Nor should it prey on one's mind. It should lie in the background. One does not live to think of death or suicide. Rather, one thinks of death and suicide when life is not worth living. For, as Epicurus, or rather Sophron, was thefirst to put it, "death is nothing to us" (Sextus Against Gram. 284). Death is not part of life, so it doesn't concern us; it doesn't concern the living (or the dead). If one is going to worry about death, one might as weIl worry about not being born sooner! Death is of no consequence. (That is, my death is of no

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consequence to me. It may be of consequence to others. But this is beside the point.) Just as death is irrelevant to life (and value, for living is a precondition of value), so suicide is a liberating rather than a depressing idea, anyway for those who, like Epictetus, don't believe in postmortem punishment. Occasionally, however, Epictetus appears to be qualifying the right to suicide by making it require Zeus' permission. We should not quit, he says, before God gives the "signal" (1.9.16f) and should wait until he has "no further need" of us (III.24.10Z). But Zeus' permission must be a mere formality here, for in the next breath it is abandoned, at least in the former passage, where one is also told that there is no reason to "whine" because we either get what we want out of life or else we can always "leave: the door is open" (1.9.zo). Similarly, elsewhere Zeus is said to let us go when he doesn't provide or indeed whenever we wish (II1.I3.14, 26.Z9, 8.6, 22.34). The right to suicide was a characteristic tenet of Stoicism and Cynicism (and of Hegesias the Cyrenaic, who, according to Cicero, was so successful in advocating suicide as a way out of misery that Ptolemy forbade hirn to teach). Moreover, Zeno, Cleanthes, Diogenes, and Demonax died by their own hand - as did Democritus and many other ancient philosophers, while Socrates deliberately, it seems, brought about his sentence and consequent death. (See Laertius and, for Socrates, below section 30.)

7. Knowledge tor Living If life is agame, value resides in what one does with life, rather than in life itself. "Life" is "indifferent": it is "the use made of of life," not life as such, that matters (I1.6.1f). Life per se is a "material," not an end in itself (cp. 5.1ff; I.I5.2f). Life is not the important thing: how one plays it is the important thing. Life should be treated the way a ball player treats the ball: "indifferently"; for his interest lies elsewhere, namely in how he handles the ball (II.s.20f). Here Epictetus follows Socrates' famous saying that the point is not to live but to live well (Pl. Crito 48b). He is closer, however, to Epicurus' meaning (Laertius 10.124-6).

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Man therefore (though this analogy is not Epictetus' but perhaps Socrates') is like a sculptor: he is to his life what the sculptor is to his material, except of course that while a sculptor is distinct from his material, a (living) man is not distinct from his life. But the point is that just as astatue is not a discovery but a creation, so man's life is not given to him; he must make it. (This may weIl conflict with fatalism.) Moreover, just as a sculptor cannot hope to succeed if he is ignorant of the properties of his material and of how to sculpt, so man cannot succeed in his primary concern (to be happy) if he is an ignoramus about the nature of life and especiaIly in how to live. To lack knowledge is to risk frustration and disappointment, as weIl as to be a "stranger in the world." Conversely, a knowledgeable man is a realist. He realizes that actuality is not necessarily ideal, that things are not always, if ever, as he wishes them to be, that they are transitory and strictly unreliable, that life is inseeure, that "everything is subject to death and to capture" (III.24·20f, 5; IVS·27)· But, it might be said, there are after all such things as promises, pledges, warranties. True enough but, Epictetus would go on, there are also many things which can interfere with these things being honored or fulfilled, from cheating to war to cosmic upheavals. And nobody can do anything about it. Not even Zeus, for he is not omnipotent. The price for ignoring facts, for ignoring "the will of nature," is disillusionment, bitterness, despair. In Epictetus, ethics is squarely based on ontology, how to live on how things work, especially if in his ontology is included his eudaimonism (that people pursue happiness). Thus, his ethical prescription that one should be prepared for misfortune results from his premises about precariousness and happiness, roughly as follows: Whatever makes for unhappiness is not wanted. Precariousness makes for unhappiness because it makes for insecurity. Precariousness can be mitigated by preparedness. Therefore to pursue (or want) happiness is to pursue preparedness. Epictetus' ethics is largely analysis and clarification, rather than "exhortation to virtue." He assumes that men wish to be happy,

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that they don't want to be in pain or fear, and devises methods for attaining or minimizing these. His methods may not always be palatable, but this is another matter. Ethics is needed because, though people want the things that make for happiness, they look for them in the wrong plaee (III.23.34f; ep. 22.26; II.I6.47).

Self-knowledge, however, is more important to Epictetus than knowledge of other things, "know yourself" than know science, especially speculation, which to hirn is a waste of time. What, he says in the first fragment, is the use in wondering' 'whether things consist of atoms or of indivisibles or of fire and earth?" Knowledge is for ethical use, or else it is pointless. (The Skeptics went further and regarded all pure theory, at least all philosophy, logic, and in particular metaphysics as maladies and even proposed treatmenttechniques. To the objection that Skepticism is another philosophy, Sextus replied, in Outlines 1.206, that Pyrrhonian Skepticism is like a "laxative ... which expels itself at the same time it cleanses the body" or, one might add, like a pencil eraser.) Yet, as we shall see toward the end of the next section, Epictetus complains that people are apt to neglect their speculative powers concerning the divine organization of the world. Either, then, he makes a distinction between scientific and theologicalmetaphysical speculation, or else the point of the latter is for hirn likewise ethical. The second alternative will be taken up again in more general terms in seetion I9. Now, by self-knowledge, in turn, Epictetus does not mean primarily indiscriminate consciousness of self so much as consciousness of one's capacities and limitations. \Visdom or The beginning of philosophy [he says] '" weakness and impotenee ... (II.II.I).

is a eonsciousness of one's

This of course is consistent with a pain-oriented ethics. Nor, presumably, is self-knowledge introspection for Epictetus. Self-examination is especially useful because our headaches derive from preconceptions or, in Epictetus' own words, What disturbs human beings is not the things themselves, but their opinions about things (M5).

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Even speech, as we shail see especiaily in chapter viü, may have such an adverse effect in his opinion. Examine your beliefs and talk, he advises, referring approvingly to Socrates' saying that "the unexamined life is not worth living for man" (PI. Apol. 38a). But again he may be giving a twist to famous words. The primary function of the inteilect is not to speculate, but to solve problems in living. He also praises "the philosophers who say that only the educated are free," where by free he means unfazed (ataraxia, etc., II.I.22ff). Knowledge, then, has a liberating, as weil as a healing force. But knowledge ("education") means here primarily knowhow, rather than knowledge of facts, knowledge of how to live, instead of knowledge about life or oneself. To be "educated" means to be a Stoic, and while the Stoic may be a polymath, he is first and foremost an individual who is not easily fazed. And this brings us to the most central kind of knowledge in Epictetus, namely skill in living: What then is that which makes someone unhindered and unfettered in writing? Knowledgeofhowtowrite. And whatinharpplaying? Knowledge of how to play the harp. So too in living, it is knowledge of how to live (IV.I.63 f).

8. Rational Sel!

It is primarily in this sense that reason is (or should be) "sovereign" in Epictetus. To be rational is to live rationaily; it is not primarily to know things or even ethical recipes. And to be rational, to have reason, is in this sense preeminently to be emotionaily strong. A weak man, Epictetus goes on, is not rational; or, has a fruitless reason (I.26.15). Small wonder that prohairesis figures so prominently in his ethics. For the word connotes will and choice, as weil as inteilect in the form of deliberation; which means that it implies also realism; for, to paraphrase Aristotle (N.E. 3.2f), it is logically impossible to choose or deliberate about the unattainable. And, by connoting will and realism, prohairesis underscores Epictetus' pain-orientation. For the point of being strong and

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realistic is to be prepared for trouble and to be capable of handling it when it strikes. Moreover, if there is room in Epictetus' thought for a self, prohairesis is it: Illness ehe says] is an obstacle to the body, but not to prohairesis, unless it consents. Lameness is an obstacle to the leg, but not to prohairesis. And say this to yourself whenever anything befalls you; for you will find that it is an obstacle to something else, but to yourself not (M 9). For you are not flesh, nor hair, but prohairesis (III.I.4o). Man, if you do nothing else, don't seIl [your prohairesis] cheap (1.Z.33).

Similarly, after being superlatively graded ("the essence of good"), prohairesis is elsewhere tacitly identified with "me," whose role or nature is in turn characterized as above, only perhaps in still more extreme terms. Thus, a tyrant can "threaten" my hands, feet, even neck, but not "me" (29.1-8; cp. I.23-5, I8.17, I9.8; IV·5· 1 2, 7.32). It follows that if prohairesis goes, you go. Or, identify mostly with what is least vulnerable, and this is prohairesis (whatever that may bel). The substance of all this Epictetus reads back into remarks of Socrates, such as, to quote Epictetus' own free rendering of a line from Plato's Apology (30c), Anytus and Meletus [Socrates' accusers] can kill me, but hurt me they can't (II1.z3.2I; cp. II.Z.I5; M53.4),

where "me" is evidently not intended to indicate the same thing both times. In its first occurrence presumably it denotes Socrates' body, while in the second his fearlessness; so that the quotation gives way to some such statement as, "Anytus and Meletus can kill me, but scare me they can't." And this suggests that perhaps prohairesis is not a mysterious entity which Epictetus somehow discovered in his psychological investigations, but an artifice of his remedial ethics, or maybe a nos trum (see also section 33). Certainly he was predominantly pain-oriented, a perspective which may weIl underlei his very game conception of life. For this conception can easily stern from the conviction, which Epictetus shared, that life contains some danger. The point of comparing life to agame may be to convey the idea that to make too much fuss about life is to invite disappointment. The reason for saying,

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LIFE AGAME

"Take life lightly, as agame" might be to suggest that life is a risky business. The unserious life knows no disaster, calamity, tragedy, despair. These concepts are foreign to it and empty. If you are not serious about anything, nothing fazes you (you enjoy ataraxia). The unserious attitude is Stoic as weH as Socratic, and is suggested by the expression "Be a stoic," since this implies "Don't take it too seriously." Perhaps the playful and unserious outlook need not be a function of the pain-orientation, but it is likely that it is so in Epictetus and taking it to be so certainly unifies hirn. His ethics is usuaHy described as one of "resignation." But how does this fit in with the carefree posture, even when this posture is an out co me of the pain-orientation? Surely, if people are brought up with the playful attitude they needn't experience resignation. Only adults who have been reared un-StoicaHy may come to feel resigned. For indeed resignation suggests disillusionment, but a Stoic by definition anticipates disillusionment, and consequently forestaHs the feeling of resignation. A Stoic system of child education would be based on the painorientation, but those brought up in it would not necessarily experience resignation or pessimism, though eventuaHy they might grasp intellectually what lies behind the way they were reared. The unserious outlook, then, need not involve resignation even when based on Stoic presuppositions. Zorba illustrates weH what I have in mind: he is not solemn, but neither is he "resigned." Of course aH these words ("serious," etc.) are vague. But that's life. Knowledge of fact, then, is instrumental to know-how. And to live adroitly, Epictetus go es on, training is required. Training involves acquiring new habits or exchanging old ones for new ones by doing something repeatedly. Nobody can hope to stay the same individual without doing the same things he used to do, Epictetus says (IV.2.2f). Some such technique of repetition he adapts to the solution of problems in living. If a man is weak or quarreisome, for example, he might be able to change if he practices doing brave and conciliatory things. For, "Every habit and power is supported and reinforced by corresponding works .... " (II.I8.r). One is, and becomes, what one does. This activist and prospectivist theory of learning and treatment

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does not conflict with but rather supplements his earlier method of thought-analysis. For when clarification of problems is not enough, one can always fall back on the technique of changing and learning by training and act-reiteration. It is true, however, that at times Epictetus talks as though thought-analysis was all that is necessary by way of doing away or minimizing difficulties in living (III.J.I8, 9.z, 26.34f; seetion 36). Rational conduct was the exception rather than the rule in his eyes. Ethical upbringing must be upgraded. Practicing withstanding adversity must especially be emphasized. Moreover, man tends to aggrandize rat her than belittle his predicaments. And so, because of insufficient training we constantly go out of our way to heap up terrors and to imagine things worse than they actually are.

"\Vhen I go out to sea" and notice the expanse of water all around me, I get scared and imagine that I will be swallowed by it, forgetting that "three quarts" of the liquid would suffice. Again, when there is an earthquake, I imagine that the city is going to collapse on me; yet isn't a little stone enough to knock my brains out? (II.I6.21-3)·

Some people, Epictetus says in the course of expounding his theory of cosmic design, let even their esthetic sensibility and powers of contemplation and speculation atrophy. They are blind to the beauty of the world. They are like those who go to a "fair" and instead of enjoying the spectacle and purpose and organization behind it, immerse themselves into buying and selling. In this fair of life too: some people, like cattle, trouble themselves about nothing but their hay - ... property and lands and [servants] and public offices ... (I4.23-5; for life-a-fair see Pythagoras, in Laertius 8.8).

Logical training is likewise neglected: Most of us [Epictetus says] fear the deadening of the body and would do everything to avoid falling into such a condition, but when it comes to the deadening of the mind we don't care at all (I.5.4f).

Yet, Epictetus goes on, the man who notices contradictions but is unmoved by them is deadened. Indeed, he is worse than a corpse (8f; cp. IV.5.ZI). Epictetus' discussion of logical topics is scant, but there is enough material for a short chapter.

III

LOGICAL TOPICS 9. Nature 01 Logical Studies Whatever in this chapter (or for that matter in the entire book) the reader finds unintelligible or uninteresting he can skip or reread. For Epictetus logical theory indudes a study of proof, implication, contradiction, forms of argument, conditionalreasoning, meanings, definition, truth, paradoxes, falsehood, fallacies, criteria, and "measurement andjudgment" (cp. I.I7.7-12, 7.12, I; III.2.2-7; M52; below passim). However, his characterization of logic as a study of criteria is not dear. To discover a criterion (descriptive criteriology) is one thing, to set one up (normative) is another; and he does not indicate which kind of criterion he has in mind when he says that logic deals with criteria - though he does speak in this connection of "grasping" criteria. But this does not seem to help (I.I7.7). The same kind of indeterminacy attaches all the more to his conception of philosophy itself as criteriology. For the crucial word he uses on this occasion is ambiguous more or less in the above twofold way: it means both discovery and invention. Notice the beginning of philosophy: ... the heuresis of a standard, as we heuromen the balance for weights, or the ruler for things straight and crooked (II.n.I3f).

It might be said that in view of his analogy between the philosopher's standards and technological standards, he probably means by the former a normative enterprise, seeing that the latter are obviously inventions, not discoveries. Yet he condudes by saying that "to do philosophy is this, to consider and determine the standards .... " (24). Similarly, Socrates' definitions and dialectic he construes as having to do with criteria and meanings (I2.5-g; I.I7.6-12); and this may weIl amount to his construing

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here inquiries into criteria or meaning-criteria descriptively, if, that is, it is assumed that he construes meanings as criteria (for using corresponding words) and meaning investigations as discoveries, rather than stipulations. (His views on definition and meaning will be completed presently.) Perhaps Epictetus did not distinguish between normative and descriptive criteriology. (Following hirn I use standard and criterion interchangeably.) Preoccupation with criteriological questions is a recurrent thing in hirn. See furt her below, seetions 10, 21-3, and meanwhile his tacit requirement that a criterion must be stable, which is why he rejects momentary senseimpression and fleeting pleasure as criteria of truth and value respectively (1.28.28-31; 11.II.15-25; II1.23.3f). By logical studies, then, Epictetus means some conceptual analysis as weIl as formallogic, though the extant writings contain no symbolism. N or do they contain any discussion of induction, but he does say in effect that man has the power to go from the observed to the unobserved ("from some things to others which are somehow related to them," 1.6.10). This is the basis for scientific generalization and prediction. Since in a broad sense logic for the Stoics included epistemology and since Epictetus' remarks in the latter field are few and rather offhand, they are discussed in this chapter (especially seetion 10), save for his practical conception of knowledge which has already been discussed (in seetion 7), as it forms an integral part of his philosophy of life. Logic or reason, Epictetus continues, is the only reflexive activity or discipline. While, for example, grammar, he says, is about language but not about itself, logic or reason or philosophy (logos) includes itself in its own subject (1.20.1-5; cp. I.rff). Similarly, When somebody present told hirn "Convince me that logical studies are useful," he said, Do you want me to prove this to you ? "Yes." Mustn't I in that case use proof? And when the man agreed, But how will you know that I am not playing tricks on you? As the man remained silent - Do you see, he said, how you yourself admit that these studies are necessary, if without them you can't even tell this much, whether or not they are necessary? (IL2S; cp. 23.13-5; LI7.1-3).

In other words, logic is so fundamental (or useful?) that even to

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discredit it, logical skill is required, in the form of adeptness at proof. "That is why I suppose," Epictetus adds, "they [the Stoics?] put logical studies first ... " (6). The substance of this corresponds to the so-called logocentric predicament, which says that to talk about logic requires logical principles (but why "predicament" ?). Yet equally one must use some gramm ar to talk about grammar (or for that matter about anything), just as one must use some grammar to talk about this or that grammar, though not necessarily the same grammar as the one talked about. Grammacentric fix. Epictetus also puts definition first, adding, though, that definition ("understanding the use" of expressions) is not required for employing language correct1y (II.I4.14-6; cp. III.23.18). And he may be subscribing to a circumstantial analysis of meaning, namely that words have their full import when used not apart from but in conjunction with relevant circumstances. For he denies that a man uses liturgicallanguage when the context is not liturgicalor typically so, just as, he adds by way of comparison, the same acts are not advantageous when performed at the wrong time and place. "Are words," he exclaims, "sacred themselves?" (2I.14-6). Logic is useful as weIl as basic according to hirn. The logical layrnan is like the man who wants to weigh something without a standard of weight, seeing that knowledge of standards logically precedes the particular acts of belief, assent, measuring. Nor, he goes on, is it enough to know that a statement is true: it is also necessary to know what follows from a statement or from a combination of statements. Awareness of implications is as useful as truth-awareness (cp. I.I7·6-8, 7.9f). However, as with reference to knowledge in general, logical knowledge to hirn suggests primarily know-how, the ability to use and apply logical ruIes, rather than the mere capacity to quote them. Knowing inference-permits and what this or that term means but thinking sloppiIy, is Iike knowing the difference between "genuine and counterfeit money" but failing to appIy it where it counts, namely in practice, with actual money, genuine or phony. Indeed, it might be doubted that in that case one could be said to know anything. Clarity about Iogical theory is not enough. It must be supplemented by competence in reasoning, by

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the skill to discriminate between valid and invalid thought in the concrete (S-8; cp. II.2.24; 9.13f). Logical skill (presumably acquirable by doing logic exercises) is a safeguard against spurious thinking, our own and that of others. It is useful consequently for discussion as weIl. Discussion, like inquiry, Epictetus continues, commits us to the acceptance of truth, the rejection of falsehood, and the suspension of judgment in cases of uncertainty; and without some logical training it might not be possible to tell the difference behveen what is worth believing and what not, and therefore to be good conversationalists and investigators. Logical training is a must for all intellectual work (I.27.6, 7f, 28.1-S). But though important, logic is not as important for Epictetus as ethics. \Vhen we have leisure, he says, doing logic and epistemology is all right, but ethical matters, like eliminating the conditions of worry and anxiety, are more urgent and pressing (III.9.19; I.27.21). A law governing hypothetical thinking, he says in another connection, is that what follows from the hypothesis must be conformed to. "But," he hastens to add, "much more important is the law of life, which is to act in conformity with nature" (realistic principles, 26.1 f). Similarcomments can be found elsewhere (III.2.2f, 6-16, 26.19f; MS2). Presumably he is deliberately exaggerating when on one occasion he says that logic j udges "everything" (I.I7. 8-II). He would not deny, I take it, that ethical principles must be consistent and as a result must rest on logic (or deontic logic). Otherwise they would be useless as guides for conduct or even harmful, since they would be proposing incompatible courses of action, and thus would make for indecision instead of decision, and for perplexity and anxiety rat her than peace of mind. (Inconsistency in precepts is not the same as inconsistency in (nonguiding) description; for though both may be forms of self-defeat, what they defeat or paralyze is different, namely action and stating, respectively, or, in the former case, talking as weIl.) In other words, Epictetus would not deny that ethical theory presupposes logical theory, and consequently that it is less basic than logical theory; rather, that it is more important than logical theory. This follows necessarily, if happiness (the distinctive concern of ethics) is more important than consistency (the distinctive C

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concern of logic). "More important" means here something like "more wanted." If happiness is more wanted than consistency, then necessarily it is more important than consistency. Happiness is more important than consistency even if consistency is indispensable to happiness, though I don't think that consistency is indispensable to happiness. I mean I don't think that happiness necessitates thought of any kind. Epictetus however might disagree. He says that animals cannot be happy on the ground that they lack understanding of things (though not perceptions, H.8.Sf). But is it nonsense tospeak of "happy animals?" Compare" contentedlike a cow." Perhaps Epictetus is here unduly influenced by AristoUe (who indeed denied, on similar grounds, the possibility of happiness to children and slaves, as weIl). Or Epictetus may be jesting. At any rate, we remember from section 5 that he says that the point of learning and reading is utilitarian; that the function of reason is not to make us unhappy; that reason or thinking may be jettisoned when safety or calm can be attained without it; and that truth (which presupposes consistency) may likewise be ignored when freedom from worry is at stake.

IO.

Irrelutability and Epistemological Issues

Some propositions, Epictetus remarks, are so basic ("sound and evident") that they "must be used even by those who deny them." And conversely, if a proposition must be used in order to be denied, this shows that it is basic or, as I would further put it, irrefutable and undeniable (H.2o.rf). He then proceeds to give examples of self-refuting expressions, directed mainly against the Skeptics. Here are sampIes : It is false that there is a true universal statement; I would have you know that nothing is knowable; Believe that nothing is worth believing; Learn that it is impossible to learn anything; and, Give your assent to the idea that no man assents to anything (2-5). All this is self-refuting because, to start with the second example, if nothing is knowable, this is unknowable too. Again, to say that nothing is worth believing implies that this is not worth believing either. To say that there is no true universal

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SI

statement is to make a universal statement. To say that nothing can be learned is to imply that this can't be learned either. And to assent to the idea that nobody assents to anything is likewise self-defeating. On the other hand, a statement like "Something is worth believing" Epictetus would presumably regard as logically unassailable ("sound and evident"), since it is presupposed by the self-refuting expression that nothing is worth believing. So far so good. But in the next breath Epictetus misses the target. He says that to teach that there is no such thing as concern for one's fellow-man is, by this very act of teaching and of writing "big books" (referring to Epicurus), to refute yourself; for if what you say is true, "Why do you care?" The fact that you bother to publicize your position militates against its truth. - But does it? Couldn't the speaker be motivated by self-satisfaction or even spite, rather than by fellow concern? Suppose, Epictetus considers on a different occasion, that "someone resists what is all too evident." His answer is that little can be done about such an individual. How, he exclaims, can a person reason with a man who is unimpressed by contradictions or who having been worsted in an argument "hardens to stone?" (I.5.If; cp. 8). In this context Epictetus is referring to Skeptic Academics. He goes on attacking them for maintaining that there is no difference between being awake and dreaming, saying that the Academics don't notice the "contradiction" in their position, or that if they do, this shows that they are "deadened" (6-8). But it is not clear that the Academic position is self-contradictory. EIsewhere Epictetus mentions the theory, vaguely attributed to "the philosophers," that "feeling" is at the root of all thought and impulse toward things, including assent, dissent, and uncertainty; that, in other words, one assents, dissents, stops deliberating, inquiring, etc., when one feels he has the right answer (I8.If; cp. 28.Sf). By being "deadened," then, Epictetus might me an here that the Academic lacks yes- and no-feelings, realityand unreality-feelings. But this may not apply to the Academic. The Academic's point is simply the point already made in Plato's TheaetetJus by Socrates (whom the Academic Skeptics regarded as their father and to whom they would point when

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criticized for transforming such a seat of Belief as Plato's Academy into a Skeptic stronghold). This point can roughly be reconstructed as follows: There is no infallible criterion for distinguishing waking from dreaming states. One can't go by the "I am awake" feeling because this feeling can go wrong, since one can have it while dreaming. Pinching oneself to make sure that one is awake won't do either, since again one can be doing this while dreaming. Epictetus seems to think that systematic skepticism of the senses (and here he has in mind especially the Pyrrhonian Skeptics) is likewise self-refuting or at least insincere. Although (he starts by saying on one occasion) he can't tell "how perception arises, whether from the entire body or from part of it" and that "both views puzzle" hirn, he is quite sure nevertheless that he and you are not the same person. And how does he know this? WeIl, because when he wants to eat, he doesn't take the food "there" (presumably where you are) but "here" (presumably where he is). And (somewhat irrelevantly) when he wants bread he doesn't reach for refuse but goes directly to the bread "as to a target." And you Skeptics, Epictetus exclaims, "do you do anything else?" Who among you, when he wants to take a bath "goes to a mill instead?" Or when you eat, where do you bring your hand, to your eye? Did you ever "call a pot a plate?" Can you blame your servant for pouring fish-sauce instead of oil into your bath? Suppose the servant says that fish-sauce "appeared" to hirn to be oil? "SmeIl it," you say; "taste it." "Yes but how do you know, if the senses deceive us?" (1.27.15-20; 11.20.28-31, 20). But perhaps Epictetus miss es the core of the Skeptic' sargument. In fact, a clear-headed Skeptic can concede the whole of Epictetus' partly ad haminem criticism. For the Skeptic need not hold that it is always profitable or psychalagically possible to deny the disclosures of the senses. Rather, that sense-experience (ar reason) is not an infallible guide to truth or knowledge. (Hence the Skeptic's sweeping rejection of "the criterion.") Skepticism as a movement originated, among other things, as areaction to extreme (infallibilistic) forms of empiricism, as weIl as to extreme forms of rationalism. And that includes respectively the Stoic idea of incontrovertible apprehension (phantasia kataliptike) and Plato's indubitable noetic intuition or intellectual beholding of essences.

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Epictetus uses but does not explain the Greek phrase (e.g. 111.8-4; M4S). He also says that sensation is the kriterion for "colors and smells, and ... flavors," and that whether things are black or white and alleged heavy things light are decidable by "perceptual darity" (1.II.9-II; IV.I.136). But how does this idea of perceptual incontrovertibility and darity fit in with his earlier point that momentary sense-impression is not a criterion of truth? Can't one have a momentary yet dear perception? Connected perhaps with the notion of incontrovertible apprehension is his distinction (likewise early Stoic or Cynic) between having and using phenomena or perceptions (phantasiai). Thunder, for example, somehow forces itself on our notice. Our freedom comes in only at the level of "using" experiences, whichmeansof "assenting" to them or not, of letting them bother us or being "indifferent" to thern (e.g. 19). But can't one train not to notice certain occurrences (not to ha ve certain types of experiences), as one can train not to be impressed by them? Epictetus hirns elf occasionally speaks of "training perceptions" (e.g. IV4.26). Of course, if by phantasiai he means data of consciousness, he is right but uninformative, for this reduces to the tautology that what we already notice we can't fail to notice. Similarly, one can, it seems, train to fore stall unpleasant "imaginings," though Epictetus' statement to the contrary is made in passing (III.24.108). But his rejection of systematic doubt about the senses is in itself well-taken. For how do I decide that my senses deceive me in a particular case if not by means of the sens es themselves? How do I come to realize that I am seeing amirage? By (say) touch. Perceptual illusion is a case of surprised or disappointed expectation. The denial of sense-experience as a whole is absurd.

11. Logical Puzzles Epictetus mentions several times but does not discuss the Liar (II.I7.34, I8.18, 2I.17; 111.2.7,9.21). "I am lying," one version of the Liar, is self-refuting presumably because if it is true, it is false. Also merely referred to are the Denier and the Silencer (ib.; II.I8.18). What the former was about is unknown, though we learn from Diogenes Laertius that Chrysippus wrote two "books"

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on the Denier (and eight on the Liar, 7.1g6f). The Silencer was Chrysippus' wayout of the Heap, authored, together with the Liar and a host of other logical antinomies and tricks, by the Megaric Eubulides (D.L. 2.108). The Heap was used by Skeptics to undermine the faith in the intellect by drawing attention to the vagueness inherent in certain concepts or distinctions, such as long-short, many-few, etc. A typical question a Carneades would put to the Rationalist or nonSkeptic would be : When do you stop having a heap - when one element ofthe heap is withdrawn, two, three, ... , when? Chrysippus wouldin theend turn mute (hence "Silencer"). This, however, was held against him on theground that in so behaving he, the nonSkeptic, was in effect "suspending judgment," thus giving in to Skepticism. According to Laertius and in particular Gellius, proposing and solving logico-linguistic puzzles was asport and an after-dinner pastime among Skeptics and Stoics. Also mentioned and briefly discussed is the Master, so called because thought to be insoluble. This conundrum survives only in Epictetus, who says the following about it: The master argument seems to have been propounded because of such considerations as these: since there is a mutual contradiction among these three [Le. any pair contradicts the third element, namely I] everything true in the past is necessary and [2] the impossible does not follow the possible [cp. I.7.2Sf] and [3] what neither is true nor will be is possible [cp. Sextus Outt. 2.230], noticing this contradiction Diodorus [the Megaric logician and apparently inventor of the Master] used the likelihood of the first two to prove that nothing is possible which neither is true nor will be. But somebody will maintain another two from these, [namely 3] that something is possible, which neither is true nor will be, and [2] the impossible does not follow the possible; but not [I] everything true in the past is necessary, apparently held by Cleanthes and his circle, largely supported by Antipater. Others however will maintain the other two, [3] something is possible, which neither is true nor will be, and [I] everything true in the past is necessary, while asserting [the denial of 2 that] the impossible follows the possible. But it is infeasible to [jointly] hold all three because of their mutual contradiction [or because any pair contradicts the third element] (II.I9.1-4; mentioned at: 8, 10, I8.17f).

But if all three translate into truths, the Master is soluble, since no set is self-contradictory which consists exclusively of truths. However, the following translations do not pretend to

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be faithful to what the ancients had in mind by such key-terms occurring in the Master as possibility, necessity, and truth, while going into this would be too much of a transgression. Proposition I ("Everything in the past is necessary") might mean: (I') "Once true always true," which is obviously sound. Thus, if it is true that yesterday it rained at a given place, it cannot be false that it did not rain then and there. Proposition z (' 'The impossible does not follow the possible") may give way to: (z') "If a sentence is meaningful, it cannot be meaningless (the meaningful does not imply the meaningless)," which is likewise obviously the case. Epictetus might accept the following equally valid principle as a possible interpretation of z, namely (z") "The false does not follow the true" (see next section on conditional). Both land Z, or their renderings, may well involve some formal principle, such as double negation, identity, or obversion. Proposition 3 ("What neither is true nor will be is possible") might mean: (3') "A never-occurring something is not ipso facto a contradiction." This allows for the possibility of F even though thereis no time at which F occurs; which Diodorus would reject. As he was seen to put it, "nothing is possible which neither is true nor will be [nor has been]." He restricts possibility to occurring at some time. But ifthis restrietion is arbitrary (not necessary), one need not accept it. Those who do so, may well be afraid that the notion of an unactualized possible involves reification. But the fear is unwarranted. For to accept F as a never-realized possibility is not to say that F exists. Quite the contrary. According to 3' it would be fallacious to deduce a contradiction (or meaninglessness) from "failure to occur at any time." The relation in any case is from contradiction (or meaninglessness) to failure to occur at any time, rather than the other way around.

I2.

Operators and Kin Matters

Epictetus speaks of "arguments involving equivocal premises" and of deriving "arguments by questioning," without however elaborating (1.7.1; I1.I3.ZI, 2I.17, 23-41; II1.2.6, 17, 2I.IO; IV.6.16, I2.IZf).

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He also mentions a eonditional method: For sometimes ehe says] it is necessary to assume a hypothesis as a kind of stepping-stone for the next argument (1.7.221).

This may be the geometrical-Soeratic method of hypothesis (see PI. Meno 86e, Phaedo ggeff) or its likely offshoot, the Megarie or Stoic principle known as modus tollens, which likewise functions as a device for testing statements and theories. (One version of thisprincipleis: "If p then q; but not-q; therefore not-p.") Yet in the same ehapter Epietetus says: Suppose I have granted a premise, whieh however, when worked on, develops a falsehood. Should I reject the premise? No. The inferenee? No. - He then seems to pass on to another, though related topie (1.7.13-5). Onee, interrupting someone who was eoneerned with hypothetical arguments, Epictetus said: This too is a law goveming hypothetical reasoning, that what follows from the hypothesis we must accept (26.1; cp. 25· II-3, 7.9).

It is a pity that we are not told what other "law" he thought hypothetical reasoning is governed by. But perhaps this may be added by way of a seholium to his extant remarks on hypothetieal reasoning, diseussion, and inquiry, namely that these remarks eommit him to the idea that there are not only assertions but also implieations, that statements don't form logical islands but eonneet with other statements (and therefore that to know the meaning of p is also to know q, r, etc.), that, for example, "I am breathing" is not an isolated linguistic or logical item, but collects perhaps, "I inhale," "I am alive," "I am not dead," and so on. This idea is essential to argument, conversation, cross-examination, science, logie, and the like. Epictetus uses the principle that if two statements eontradict eaeh other, one is false, the other true. If the Egyptians are right on dietary maUers, he says, then the Jews are wrong, and viee versa (presumably beeause their views dash, 1.II.12f). In the same eontext he uses the principle that if two statements are mutually ineompatible and one implies a third, then the other implies the negation of that third:

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when two things contradict each other and one of them conforms to nature the other must of necessity be contrary to nature (r8).

He also speaks of "complete" and "incomplete arguments" and of "types of arguments" and, interchangeably with the second, of "enthymemes" (e.g. 8.I-3). Though he uses the word syllogismos, he does not seem to mean the syllogism or only the syllogism. At any rate his example, if you have borrowed and haven't repaid, you owe me the money; but you haven't borrowed and haven't repaid; therefore you don't owe me the money,

belongs to propositional rat her than syllogistic logic. Besides, Aristotle hirns elf used syllogismos to mean also inference in general. It is not clear why this is an example of an enthymeme rather than of an invalid form of argument (which it is, by truthtable). It might be the former if some extra statement is added, but none is actually stated. The exclusive use of "or" (" p or q or ... , but not all") is mentioned (II.9.8) and incidentally characterized with the stock examples "It is day" and "It is night," as follows (M36): The "exclusive disjunction" of these two statements is all right, though their "conjunction" is worthless (presumably because, being contraries, they can't both be true of the same state of affairs). In other words, an exclusive disjunction is true when at least one disjunct is true and one false, while a conjunction is true when all conjuncts are true. That this is how Epictetus conceives of logical conjunction (" p and q and ... ") is evident from another passage where he says that a "conjunction" is true ("preserved") when it "fulfills its purport," that is, when it is "composed of parts which are [all] true" (II.9.8). Logical conjunction is referred to but not discussed in at least two other places (M42; I.26.I4). The conditional is also mentioned and illustrated with the same kind of example, "If it is day, there is light" (29.5I; II.6.I). And though the conditional is not explicitly defined, Epictetus alludes to the idea that "it is not possible" for the if-clause or "antecedent" to be false ("not good") and the then-clause or "consequent" to be true ("good"), and to the idea that for a conditional to be true, its consequent must be true if its antecedent

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is true. ("For for the consequent to be rational, the antecedent must be good," III.7.6-8; cp. I.7.2Sf.) The second idea, which goes back at least to the Megaric Philo (c. 300 B.C.), characterizes also implication and inference; for to say that pimplies q, or that the latter follows from the former, is to deny that p is true and q false. But the first idea does not square with the Philonian conditional, since for Philo a conditional is true ("possible," in Epictetus' words) in every case except when the antecedent is true and the consequent false, and this covers the case when the antecedent is false. Although the extant writings examine no concept from quantification theory, the following perhaps is worth noting. In the course of discussing some self-refuting expressions (above section IO), Epictetus renders the universal and categoricallooking sentence, "No universal statement is true" into the hypothetical sentence, "If a statement is universal, it is false." "For," he adds, "what else" does the former mean if not the latter (II.20.3f). This may not prove that he was fully conscious of the import of his translation for logical theory. Yet others of that era, such as Chrysippus and possibly Sextus, so construed universals, or some universals, in a rather deliberate fashion. (See Sextus Against Ethicists 8-II, where some categoricals are transformed into hypotheticals and moreover, into generalized conditionals. Even definitions are construed like that - and extensionally. ) Megaric-Stoic logic was typically a logic of compound statements, with truth-table definitions of some of the propositional operators, though modalities too were investigated, and not only extensionally either. Also, an apparently complete axiom system for the (propositional) tautologies was developed. Our main source is Sextus. For reconstructions of these and related maUers see B. Mates, Stoic Logic, and W. and M. Kneale, Development 01 Logic. Epictetus, we saw, regards logical inquiries and training indispensable for scientific work. But logic and cosmology were also connected in general antiquity through the word logos. Heraclitus used the word to express the belief in cosmic law and order, the belief that the world is intelligible. Logos came to mean

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as well language, argument, ratio, and ground. All this helped blur the distinction between the ideational and the real. This blurring is manifest in the Stoics' notion of reason-universal. And this brings us to Epictetus' cosmology.

IV

NATURE AND GOD I3. World Structure Epictetus sees the world as a unified totality. Each thing, he says, is part of a whole, "as the hour is part of the day" (11.5.13; IV.7.6). He quotes approvingly "the philosophers" who hold that this world is one city and the substance, out of which it has been made, is one .... (lI!. 24. 10),

and goes SO far as to endorse the pan-feeling doctrine, likewise early Stoic in character, though deriving from Pythagoras and Empedocles (Sext. Ag. Phys. 1.127). His version is that all things are united together . .. and earthly things feel the influence of heavenly ones (I.I4.If; cp. 5).

Society is conceived in the same terms. The individual, as we shall see in section 38, is compared to a foot, the organism being the community and in the end the whole world. One wonders whether this kind of cosmology does away with the void, seeing that it is a continuum as weIl as a dynamical conception of the universe. Like other Stoics, Epictetus subscribes also to the theory of "cyclical regeneration," on the ground that [the worldJ needs the things that actually exist and those that will do so and the things that have ceased to be (II.I.18f; cp. I!I.24·lOf, 94).

He also speaks of the "revolution" of the world (IV.I.100.) This cyclical process is universal. It encompasses man, the animals, and even "things divine and the four elements," that is, air, ether, water, and earth. Everything changes upwards and downwards. The heavier transffiutes itself into the lighter, and vice versa,

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4I

as earth turns into water, water into air, and air into ether; and the process in the downward direction takes place similarly (/8).

Perhaps this theory of cyclical regeneration rests on the twofold assumption that there are basic elements and that they are finite in number. But underlying all this flux there is a constant factor, namely "fire." Moreover, paralleling the above cycle there is a more radical type of circular metamarphasis: things are periodically consumed by fire (II1.I3.4). This too is early Stoic doctrine (cp. Aurel. IO.7), which, like fire and fate, derives from Heraclitus (Laertius9.7f). Same critics replied that fire demands something else, cannot exist by itself, and consequently dismissed the worldconflagratian theory as false or absurd. But what if fire is a precursar of energy? Perhaps the answer is the same. Only the "cosmos" is self-sufficient (lI3; cp. IV.7.6f). The warld also exhibits order, skill, beauty, and purpose. Epictetus' discussion of Providence divides into five aspects (not parts): a statement, a proof, and a praise of design, a justification of hardship, and the following prefa tory notice: One can' t realize tha t there is providence in the world unless one fulfills two conditions. One must have the power to understand clearly the nature of things and must have the sense of gratitude (1.6.I-3; cp. Sallustius). Yet, can't one understand the workings of nature with only sympathy? Why should admiration and gratitude be required? Besides, gratitude to whom and for what? To Zeus? For Providence? Evidently Epictetus begs the question.

I4. Providence Epictetus' statement of design is as follows: Purpose permeates nature. Thus, "heads of grain grow ... so that they may become dry" and ultimately "harvested" (II.6.n). Even such an apparently trivial detail as the "hair on men's faces" has a point: it serves ta distinguish the male from the female. (How about furry species?) Similarly, it is no accident that the voice of a woman has a "softness" in it, just as it is no accident that, in contrast with a man, she has no hair on her "chin." In this way both men and

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women can be identified from afar with respect to their sexes. Neither are misleading. Beards on the male and softness in the voice of the female are "signs" (I.I6.g-I4; cp. III.lr.27f). Zeus who manages "the world [and is] the lord ofthat mansion ... assigns each thing its place." The sun, a calf, a bull, Agamemnon, Achilles, all have their preordained roles. The sun, for example, has been given the power, as it makes the circuit of the heavens, to bring about the year and the seasons and to make fruits grow and to nourish them and to stir the winds and calm them and to warm men's bodies

and so forth (III.22.4-8). Everything obeys and serves the cosmos - earth and sea and sun and the other stars, and the terrestrial plants and animals, and our body too, in sickness and health alike ... U3).

This use of "cosmos," which recurs in fragments 4 and r3 and which was popular with Stoicism in general, is probably a pantheistic use, though, as we shall see, pantheism is tacitly rejected elsewhere. "The Divine Oversees Everything" is part of the title of a chapter (I.I4; cp. III.I.t.6). God conducts and supervises the workings of plant life, "the waxing and waning of the moon," the behavior of the sun, and human affairs. For men too have preassigned places. Each is "an actor in a play," which has been selected by "someone else." Accordingly, if "the Playwright" wants the play to be short, it is short, if long, it is long; if he wants you to play the part of a poor man you must do so as best you can; and likewise if your part is that of a cripple [self-reference ?], an official, or an ordinary person. For this is your business in life, to act, and act wen, the character given you; but the choice of the character is another's (MI7; cp. I.Iz. I5ff; IIl.z4.34-6; IV.3.Io-Z, I.IOO).

Children, Epictetus goes on (r07, ror), belong to God and "the giver takes away" (which makes him an Indian giver). Even dying involves returning something borrowed (cp. I:I.32). For this reason the wise man, remembering who he is and where he came from and who made him, directs his attention only to this, how he will fin his place in anorderlymannerandwithproperobedience toGod (III.Z4. 95).

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But how is one to tell whether one is playing the "right" role, or whether one is obeying God instead of the Devil? Not that Epictetus speaks of the Devil. Nothing is left to chance: "Providence" takes care of the "bad" as weIl, even when this is not apparent (f 13); or, even badness has a point (cp. 1.I2.I6). And, nothing could have happened otherwise than it actually does happen (f 8). Yet in the same fragment and elsewhere Epictetus admonishes not to tamper with the works of destiny (1.I6.I4, I2.I7; M7; 13; IV.I.IOI; cp. I1.Io.5). He even speaks on one occasion of missing one's preordained role (1.6.22), and talks at length on error, phoniness, self-deception, and rationalization (see esp. section 26).

I5. A nthropocentrism The whole creation is purposive, but Epictetus' general teleology is supplemented by a special type of design, roughly describable as anthropocentrism. The "irrational animals" are not "primary," but have been made to serve "the rational." Man is primary and not "destined for service." The reason is that, while man has "the capacity to understand the use of perceptions, " the animals lack this capacity even though they lack neither perceptions nor, unlike plant life, "the capacity to use perceptions" (II.8.3-rr, IO.3). Presumably therefore the plants too and the inorganic kingdom are equally "servants of man." Unlike the animals, man is capable of forming concepts as weIl, and can reason on these as on percepts (1.6.10-5). He is also able to "take cognizance of the divine governance of the world" (I1.Io.3 f). And since he is a rational animal, it is unnatural for hirn to live only for the satisfaction of his physiological needs (1.6.I4f, 20; cp. M4I; I1.20.IOf). Perhaps self-awareness is included in these extra capacities of man, in which case nature in man could be said for Epictetus to become self-conscious. At any rate, the world in his cosmology seems to form a pyramid with cognition as the principle of stratification and with Zeus as its apex: Zeus or God (these, as we shall see in section 20, Epictetus uses interchangeably) is charac-

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terized as "mind, knowledge, reason," possessor of "the most perfect judgment" (11.8.1-3; M3I.I). However, the picture is not clear. For example, it is not clear what the difference is between having perceptions and having the capacity to use them. One would think that the two are equivalento Again, while, on the one hand, the sun is not said to have intelligence, on the other, following Cleanthes and Chrysippus (Cic. Nat. D. 2.39f), Epictetus makes the sun "part" of God (1.I4.IO). Indeed, "everything," he says, "is filled with gods and divinities" (II1.I3.I5f). Yet, compounding the confusion, elsewhere (1I.8.IOf) divinity is withheld from the animals. (About the sun Epictetus says further that it draws "its sustenance to itself" (111.23.27). This as weIl is early Stoic doctrine, according to which "rays" of the sun are vapors attracted to it to sustain its fires, which is the summit of self-dependence. No wonder the sun was deified!) Each species, Epictetus continues, has its peculiar constitution and (a nonsequitur) "therefore purpose" (1.6.15-7). Thus, some animals are destined to produce cheese, others to be eaten, others to be used in agriculture, others, like the ass in particular, for transportation (18; 11.8.7). And happily we needn't worry about our natural servants. Nature provides for their needs, thereby increasing their value to uso Their relative self-sufficiency is part of the cosmic plan. They need no shoes, bedding, or clothing, while their food and drink are supplied by unvarnished nature. Imagine what a headache it would be if we had to worry about them; if we had to take care not only of ourselves but of our dogs and sheep and cows as weIl, to have to clothe them and perchance put them to bed too. As it is, animals have a built-in selfdependence (1.I6.I-5; cp. 9.9). Epictetus should have been reminded of cattle breeding and animal care in general, while to ascribe purposes to nonman-made things, like donkeys and beards, may weIl be an imputation, an objectification, rather than a genuine explanation. For there is no evidence that such purposes exist. N or does the fact that man is more intelligent than the animals necessitate anthropocentrism. One might as weIl argue that morons and children should be slaves. (Anthropocentrism therefore seems to clash with Epictetus' antislavery stand, to be examined in section 39.) The trouble is

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that here, as even in his critique of slavery, Epictetus misunderstands the concept of ownership: he mistakes it for a cosmological concept, while actually it is a legal concept, or one incorporating decision or will.

I6. Prools 01 Design Epictetus is not content to state or accept design. He also argues for it. He realizes that some people are willing to recognize human but not cosmic goals; that they are ready tu attribute purposes to some aspects of the universe, but (I) not to all , nor (z) to the universe as a whole. He argues for both types of design, particular and general, as they might be termed. (I) Everyone, he says, would infer the existence of a craftsman from noticing such facts as that a sword fits its sheath, and vice versa. Why then, he goes on, should one think that such things as vision and light, and milk coming out of grass, and cheese from milk, and wool growing from skin, and the phenomenon of lovemaking and all that it involves, are not likewise results of craftsmanship but have come intobeingfortuitously?We infer a plan from seeing manufactured objects. Why shouldn't we do the same when faced with much more complicated and marvelous items? Indeed, what about the human craftsman hirnself, whose reason is not inferior but equal to that of the gods? Doesn't he point to the existence of a cosmic maker? Must we not conclude that his powers of observation, abstraction, generalization, explanation, imagination, and inference cannot possibly be due to chance? (I.6.7-II, 15, I6.8, I2.z6f; cp. ZI). (z) Again, are we to say that "this great and beautiful structure," the universe , can manage in such "orderly" fashion by sheer accident while at the same time admitting that no household would endure for long without someone taking charge and managing it? (II.I4.z5-7). There are several replies to these kinds of arguments, many of which, we see from Cicero and Sextus, go at least as far back as Carneades who headed the Academy in the second century B.C. I shall confinemyselftoasmall number of criticalcomments.

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First, if man points to a maker because of his "admirable complexity," his alleged maker should do so all the more. So why stop at Zeus? (Indeed, why not go on forever ?) N ext, we infer the existence of a craftsman from seeing a sheath because we are accustomed to associating this kind of object with a craftsman. The inference, in other words, is based on experience; and this means that craftsmen, as well as sheaths, are in principle available to our inspection. On the other hand, Zeus is systematically elusive. (Epictetus does not seem to believe in 6th senses. ) The case against Epictetus is of course worse if he maintains not that the world probably but necessarily points to Zeus' existence; for the ordinary, sheath-like arguments are not necessary arguments but inductions. (No doubt, the concept "sheath" implies artificer. So in my reply to Epictetus read "sheath" as "objects having sheath physical properties.") Similar comments apply to Epictetus' argument from order which, we remember, infers (inductively or otherwise) the existence of an orderer from the fact of order. Indeed, why should it be assumed that things are always orderly, let alone that when they are, they should point (necessarily or otherwise) to an intelligence? For all we know, all science may be a kind of geography or history. This would go toward explaining why science is so often being modified: changes in scientific theory might be the result of changes in the things themselves, as well as of other factors. (It might be self-stultifying to deny the existence of order now, but there is no absurdity to denying the existence of order for a time which is not contemporaneous with the speaker.) I have been assuming that by order Epictetus means a scientific concept (regularity, synchronization, predictability). If he means (or sometimes means) an esthetic concept, the following discussion might be relevant.

I7. Cacodicy If providence is postulated because some aspects of nature are good (beautiful, etc.), there are other aspects which are "bad," and which therefore should prove the existence of malevolence.

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To this it might be replied that evilis (I) appearance, or (2) nonexistent, or (3) necessary for the existence of good. The first is not found in Epictetus, but the other two are; which is an inconsistency: to justify evil (position 3) is to admit that it exists (the denial of 2). However, the second reply is implicit rather than explicit in Epictetus. It is found in such remarks as that evil is absent from the "cosmos" (M27), that "whatever is done according to nature is right" (LII.5f), that "everything's evil is what goes against its nature" (IV.I.125) ; in his interchangeable use of nature with god and Zeus (since the last two imply good in his language), and in his refrain to follow nature or the will of nature (111.20.14, 24.IOOf, 7.28; 14-18, ISA, I7. 1 4, 18; M26; etc.). Not that he uses nature always to imply good. Thus he says that a bad father is still part of nature (M30), that it is natural for one's foot to be clean (11.5.24), that a man has a natural sense of affection, friendship, and the like (IO.23), that he tends by nature to avoid harm to himself (M3I.3) , that certain notions are innate (ILIIA, 6f). This double use of nature is not a case of accidental ambiguity. The Cynics, and before them the Sophists, sided with the instinctive, spontaneous, unconventional, natural- with the Stoics following suit. (See also eh. x.) If the no-evil view means that there is no pain, it can easily be refuted: one need only pinch the denier (assuming he has a nervous system). If it me ans that everything has a point, it is incomplete or misleading, since something may have a point for X but not for Y. If it means that there is no evil in the long run, the fact remains that there is evil (in the short ron). It seems, then, that the no-evil view (and its contrary is in the same boat) is not very plausible. Accordingly, those who see providence in the world should perhaps try to justify, rather than deny, evil and suffering. And in fact this is what we find Epictetus doing on the whole. Still, though a justification of evil (a cacodicy) or of suffering and pain (an algodicy) seems preferable to a no-evil (or no-pain) view, it must be more specific than it is in Epictetus (or elsewhere). For example, does Epictetus hold to a human or to a nonhuman cacodicy or algodicy? We are not told - unless his anthropomorphism serves as an ans wer. 1 coined the expressions cacodicy and algodicy because

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"theodicy," the usual word employed in connection with the Problem of Evil, is absurd if "god" is at the same time defined as perfect or even as good. For to justify is (among other things) to make good or excuse, and what sense is there to excusing good? Notice, on the other hand, that it is quite all right to speak of excusing evil and pain; which shows that neither is wanted if it can be helped, that evil as well as pain implies undesirable, which in turn coheres with the above rough analysis of evil and ills. Epictetus' cacodicy is as follows: Bandits and predatory and ferocious animals, he says, are not pointless, but make nobility and heroism possible. Neither Hercules nor Diogenes would have had the opportunity to exercise physical and emotional prowess had the world been cozy, but would have spent the time sleeping. This implies that danger is achallenge, and that to eliminate it altogether would be foolish (I.6.3Z-4; III. 22.57-60). But why should Zeus have so made people or the universe that in order to experience pleasure or good, pain or hardship must occur. Couldn't he have endowed man with another nature or made things differently? Why should suffering exist at all? Why couldn't only happiness exist? Epictetus might reply that Zeus is not omnipotent; for though he is our maker and father and guardian (I.9.7; cp. 3.1; II.B.1g, Z1), and we his sons (I.9.6, 14), and though he cares for us (III.24.16, 19) and made us to be happy and serene (zf, 19, 63) and supplied us with reason so we can protect ourselves against misfortune and unhappiness (7f) -still, he is not responsible for our body, which is what prevents us from being better]than we are (I.r.7---g). He can't even overcome our rational self (Z3f), and has failed to convince us of what is good or bad (IV.6.5). This means that Zeus is not an absolute creator who creates out of nothing, but more like a human craftsman; and further, that the material Zeus has to work with is recalcitrant. Otherwise Epictetus' idea that Zeus is our maker and yet not responsible for us, lands hirn into paradox. Still, if Zeus assigns miserable roles can he be consistently described as kind? Moreover, the arguments in which Epictetus' cacodicy is embedded are marred by irrelevancies. For example, when he considers the crucial questions, whether Hit is reasonable that

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there should be running noses in the world" and whether Hercules ought to have created an those obstacles for himself and perchance imported lions and boars and monsters of an kinds into his country only to exercise his strength and courage, Epictetus becomes irrelevant both times. "How much better it is to wipe your nose than complain," he says, and, "This would be madness," adding that since an these obstacles pre-existed, they served the purpose of inducing Hercules to reveal himself and exercise his prowess (I.6.3If, 36). Evidently he does not seem to realize that he makes these obstacles unnecessary and accidental; for to call their deliberate creation "madness" is to concede that there is something wrong with the way cosmic things are run. His reply to the question about running noses is obviously irrelevant. The issue is not whether one should complain about colds, but whether it is necessary that there should be colds. When the Roman Emperor Galba was slain (in A.D. 69), Rufus was told in effect: Wh at do you say now about Providence? To which, according to Epictetus (or Arrian), he answered: And when have I based my case for Providence on such an incident as Galba's death? (III.I5.14). Eut to say this is to say that only those facts which support design are relevant. A little before the discussion about colds Epictetus remarks that, by going an the way to Olympia to see the work of Pheidias (the famous ivory and gold statue of Zeus), instead of staying wherever one might happen to be, shows how stupid one can be. \Vhy? Eecause Zeus' artifact, the most sublime of artifacts, is everywhere - especially in oneself (1.6.23-5). "Yes but unpleasant and hard things happen in life," comes the reply (26). "And don't they happen in Olympia?" Epictetus counters. Of course they do (he says): you swelter, you're cramped for space, you bathe with difficulty, you get wet whenever it rains, and even shouted at; but I fancy you put up with all these nuisances because of the magnificence of the spectacle (26-8; cp. III.I7). Eut does this meet the objection? Not at all. On the contrary, the fact that Epictetus admits the existence of inconveniences - in Nicopolis or Olympia (cp. IO.5) - subverts the very thing he is anxious to prove, namely that everything is divine, all right (1.6.24). Epictetus goes on: You have received all the necessary capacities to bear hardship: you have received magnanimity; you

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have received courage; you have received endurance. Why then complain? (28f; cp. IV.I.I09f). But this too is strictly irrelevant. The question is not, "Do we have capacities to cope with hardship?" but, "Why should there be any opportunity for using these capacities?", "Why should there be hardship at all?" 0/ course the capacities are justified so long as there is hardship, but why should there be hardship to begin with? Epictetus should have stuck to the idea that Zeus is not omnipotent, or better still, to his earlier point, paraphrased eight paragraphs back, that without hardship life would be boring. For this implies that hardship is necessary for happiness, or perhaps that "pleasure" means "release from pain"; so that a life devoid of hardship (Paradise) is a meaningless expression or impossible. (Metaphysical Hell too is impossible if suffering presupposes its contrary.)

IB. Hymns to God

Epictetus' discourse on design may be concluded with the following "god" -intoxicated statement, plus its relative, Cleanthes' praise of Zeus, portions of which, especially one verse, Epictetus quotes admiringlyon several occasions. Not that this is the only passage evincing Epictetus' pro-feelings toward Providence (or the world), but it is certainly the lengthiest and perhaps the most moving one. Indeed what words are enough to praise [the works of Providence] or to bring them home to us? If we had any sense, should we be doing anything else in public or in private than praising and hymning the divine and paying him due thanks? Should we not as we dig and plough and eat sing the hymn to God? - "Great is God, that the has given us these tools with which we will till the earth; great is God, that he has given us hands, the ability to swaUow, a stomach, the capacity to grow unknowingly, to breathe while sleeping." This is what we should sing at every opportunity and especially the greatest and divinest hymn, that he has given us the power to understand these things and follow the way of reason. What then? Since most of you have become blind, shouldn't there be somebody to play this role and in behalf of all sing the hymn to God? Why, what eise can I a lame old man do but praise God in a hymn? Certainly if I were a nightingale, I would be singing as a nightingale, if a swan, as a swan. But as it is lama rational being; I must then be praising God in hymns. This is my job, I do it and

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won't abandon this station, so long as it is given me, and I invite you to join me in this same song (I.I6.15-ZI; cp. IV.I.g8-IOZ).

And now Cleanthes' turn: Most noble God of many names Eternal master King of all, Creating guide of nature, Zeus Who rules the world with law: Rejoice In me, for thus it is decreed That mortals speak your name. What lives and moves upon the earth Alone exists and takes its kind, An imitation, from your word, So I will praise and always tell Of you in song. This world above That spins entire about the earth Obeys whatever you direct, Concedes to you the ruler's strength, The thunderbolt's event. You hold Immortal darting fire within Unconquered hands, for nature's work Fulfills through Zeus' flaming touch. With this direct you reason's place Inflowing through the universe And mixed with lights both great and smalI, With this, great King, you are through all. No acts on earth without your will ensue N or in the sky nor in the sea Save what evil men unknowing do. But you know how to balance odds, Things confuse to organize and Love you show to hateful things. Thus good with evil you accord That endless reason stays for all, Which evil men, ill-fated, scorn Desiring always goods possessed, Knowing not God's universallaw Whereby convinced they would attain With thought a noble life, but runs Each witless to another wrong With quarrelsome thrust for fine repute, For wealth another works unchecked, Yet others for the play of flesh. Evil met, end ure they one and then Another kind, desiring change. Yet, Zeus, cloud shrouded, giving all, Bright fire, improve man's artless game Torn from his soul, and let him gain The thought wherein with justice Guide you all; that honored thus

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We honor you in turn, with praise Forever sing your works, we men. For gift no greater falls to gods Or men than fittingly to sing The endless universallaw. (Arnim 1537. Cp. 11.23.42; 111.22·95; IV.I.I3I , 4.34; M53· I )

I9. Zeus Inoperative? Though a metaphysical or mythological theologian of a sort, Epictetus can scarcely be said to compare with the usual run of mythological or metaphysical theologians. He allows for no such things as postmortem punishment, escape-proof prisons, reincarnation, or even survival, without which the preceding (or the point of the preceding) vanish. He has no eschatology (evensecular) - no stories of aboriginalguilt, Salvation, Last Judgment, or even Creation. (In this last connection presumably he departs somewhat from early Stoicism: see Laertius 7.13Sf.) There is no supernatural Hell or punishment, or even Beyond: When you die you go To nothing you need fear, but to that which you came from, to your friends and relatives, to the elements .... There is no Hades nor Acheron nor Cocytus nor PyripWegethon, but [as Thales said] everything is filled with gods and deities

or divine guardians; that is, with peace and security (III.I3.14-6; cp. IV.7.ISf). Death is a "harbor" and "refuge" (IO.27). When you obey Zeus you do it of your "own free will" (3.9f). When you disobey him, you do indeed suffer penalty and injury. "What kind of injury?" None other than not doing what you should; you will destroy the trustworthy, self-respecting, good man in you. Look for no greater injuries than these (111.7.36; cp. 24. 42f; I.I2.21-3)·

Nor for transcendental rewards (III.24.5If). And hatred is not part of Zeus even when he assigns bad callings (II3). Epictetus' ideology is not one of threats. Death is physical transformation and the obliteration of the individual (cp. also 93f). Antidualism of body and soul, as will

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be seen in seetion 25, underlies also his theories of edueation and eharaeter formation. Oeeasionally however he speaks of the "separation" of the "soul" or "spirit" from the "body" (IO.I4, 22.33f; II.I.I7; ep. III.I3.I5). But this perhaps should be taken with a pineh of salt as it is atypical. Similarly, his referenee to Zeus" 'solitariness" at the world-conflagration (4), should perhaps be eonstrued to mean that only fire exists for aspeIl; for we remember that aecording to his cosmology alt things are perishable and periodically eonsumed by fire. Boethus and Antipater, Laertius says (7.148), assimilated God to "the fixed stars" and made hirn "akin to air" respectively, v"hile aeeording to Sextus, "Stoics" identified hirn with "breath running through even foul things" (Outlines 3.218). Eeclesiasticism is likewise virtually absent: Burial (following Socrates and Diogenes) andineantations are not treated seriously (IV.7.3I; 111.24.89). The little divination allowed has to do with foreeasting the empiricalfuture (11. 7; M 32). Saerifices are indeed allowed but are not made fuss over: we should sacrifiee but not "beyond our means" (M3I.S). Noristhereanytalk of miracles, revelation, or religious sixth senses. Other definite immanent ist tendeneies may be found in the following passages: "you are a pareel of the gods" : in everything you do - eating, copulating, socializing, exercising, eonversing you are feeding God, fulfilling God. God is with you, .... within you .... (II.8.II-7; cp. I.I.I2, 9, I4·6). Outside the world [nobody] can be [ousted]. Eut wherever I go, there is the sun, there the moon, there the stars, dreams, tokens, discussion with gods (III.22.22).

The world "eontains its purpose within i tself" (IV. 7.6). Fragment 3 or 4 uses "god" and "eosmos" interchangeably, and fragment 13 so uses "providenee" and "eosmos." Stoics in general, aeeording to Laertius, identified the eosmos with God, and God with Zeus, fate, and reason (7.137, 135, 147). No doubt, "eosmos" derives from a value word, but it also grew a eosmologieal eonnotation. Epictetus' talk of divine guardians (daimonän) , above (1II.I3.I6) and elsewhere (I. I 4· I2-4), is perhaps a holdover from Soerates' "demon" (ep. 11l.2I.I9) or a metaphor for the idea that

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men participate in Zeus (the context is indeed the same concerning the second reference); which in turn may well be a metaphor for the intelligence each individual (hopefully) possesses. This point about the double metaphor occurs almost verbatim in Marcus Aurelius (5.27). The primary function of reason in Epictetus is to guard uso His talk of divine guardians (like of divination and sacrifices) may well be a concession to popular ways of thinking or else personification. Zeus hirnself, to generalize, is preeminentlyreason, andman's reason is not only his "regent part" but "equal to that of the gods" (I.I2.26f). ObeyingZeus boils down to obeying logos. Zeus is reason because reason is deified (cp. Aristotle). Reason is turned into a cosmic principle, ethics into metaphysics, with Zeus as the Sage, or Ideal, or personified Ideal. Stoicism in general is literally the deification of logos; so that had the Stoics been clearer on divinity (namely that it is not really a cosmological object but the result of deifying and idealizing), they may well have been clear naturalists. As it is they are confused naturalists, though something like this may well be true for all metaphysical cosmologies (for metaphysics is largely the result of value-theoretic confusion: cp. next section). Logos in Stoicism is also susceptible of a scientific interpretation or reduction. Logos and fire, reinterpreted, are metaphors for material principles or scientific presuppositions; for change, energy, lawfulness, predictiveness, intelligibility. Likewise fatalism may be regarded as an ancestor of determinism. I t can even be transplanted from cosmology to ethics, without its attendant pessimism either. Such sentences as "This was destined to happen," "It is fate," can (and often do) function as aids for cushioning blows. Indeed Epictetus, for one, was seriously concerned with remedial ethics. Of course this does not me an that fatalism functioned lenitively in his thought. At the same time it is interesting to notice that occasionally he does so use fatalistic-Iooking expressions (see, e.g. M26, 1.9.30, both discussed in section 34). To toy a moment longer with this proj ect of "demythologizing" Epictetus and still retain recognizably Epictetian tenets, the roleanalogy can similarly be redefined to refer to capacities rather than to metaphysical repertoires, and thus reduced to a plain ethics of realism, which says that goals should be proportioned to

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capacities instead of to wishes and fantasies (Cp. perhaps III.23.4-8). As a matter of fact, according to Laertius (7.160) and Dudley's History 01 Cynicism (66f, 100), Ariston, a Stoic turned independent, and the Cynic Bion apparently so construed the roleanalogy. Again, Epictetus' precept to live agreeably with nature is reducible to the advice to live realistically (cp. I.2I.Z; III.Io. II), or of course reasonably, insofar as the Stoic appeal to nature is regarded as a misguided appeal to human reason. But the text itself is often relatively clear that Zeus may be inoperative in Epictetus' thought. The passages on suicide and others already quoted or alluded to in the course of this book may be adduced as evidence. And there are many more passages where, for example, obeying Zeus amounts to being wise and realistic in the above senses - where, generally, though the ethics seems to be based on Zeus, the latter can be removed without affecting the former. (See I.I3.1f, I4.16f, 20.15ff, 25.3-7, 29.4-8, 30; II.I6.z8ff, I7.zzff; III.5.7ff, II, 22.zf, 24.100-18; IV.I.97ff, 3· IO - Z, 4·33 ff ; 14; MII.)

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20.

Theic Notions

Before considering in detail Epictetus' ethics (or straight ethics), it is convenient to examine first his value theory, which after all is intertwined with his ethics and to him value implies his ethics. And, for obvious reasons, it is fitting to start with (and simultaneously complete our review of) his remarks on god and kindred value concepts. Divinity Epictetus associates with value. On one occasion he slides to a discussion of the notion of sacredness while discussing good (1.22). On another he says that the "substance of god lies where that of good does" (H.8.lf). He also thinks of god and the holy in terms of advantage, as in the above contexts and the following ones: Men, he says, eoneeive of whatever has the power over the greatest advantage as divine (IV.I.6I). Forwhereverinterestliesthereis also religion [orpiety, M3I. 4]. That is why [when things go wrong] the farmer, and sailor and merehant, and those who lose their wives and ehildren, revile the gods (ib.; ep. H. 22.I7f). In sum we should remember this, that unless religion eoincides with interest, it eannot endure in a man (I.27.14).

The idea that god and sacredness go with good and greatest advantage and "highest object of preference" (22-4), coupled with the idea that good as well collects interest (see next section), suggest that divinity might be a value superlative or an ideal, rather than an actuality or a cosmological object. (Mutatis mutandisthesameapplies to "angel," "paradise," "hell," "satan," etc.) But Epictetus does not come up and say so. Another insight of his into the nature of theic concepts occurs in hisdiscussionof typical positions on divinity. The existence of "the divine," he says in a combination of places (11.20.22-4; 1.I2.l-7), is either denied altogether or, when affirmed, gods are

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made inactive and wholly indifferent to man; and "piety and holiness" are explained (by Epicurus or Epicureans) as a taU tale told by "double-talkers" and "by legislators to frighten and restrain wrongdoers." Others assert that the divine both exists and takes interest in human affairs but only in general, and is unconcerned about the individual as such. Still others say that the divine is also concerned about the individual. A wise man, Epictetus concludes, must weigh all these views before (and here comes a petitio) committing hirns elf to the existence of divinity, but will in the end rej ect all but the last view as "unsound." F or it doesn't make sense to lollow the dictates 01 a deity which cares nothing lor us personally. This is the insight to which I was referring. But Epictetus stops too soon. \Vhy not go on to raise the question about the very status of (metaphysical) gods? If these gods can be ignored when they ignore the individual, couldn't it be that they are not discoveries but ideals or projections, the outcome of reifying attributes or wishes, or magnified attributes? It is curious that Epictetus does not discuss the projectional and magnification views as they were not unknown in his time (Sext. Ag. Ph. 1.45) and as he does discuss, above, only to dismiss, the deception view (which go es back to Critias) that gods are lies, and also the view that, since men who control things which people "love and hate and fear" are "revered as gods," godscanbe men (IV:I.60f). This last argument, paraphrased, runs as follows: Whatever has the power to confer the greatest benefit is divine; X has such power; therefore X is divine. Insofar as X is a human being, Epictetus rejects the conclusion, though he tacitly admits that the argument is formally valid. He rejects the conclusion because, he says, no man, not even Caesar hirnself, has the power to confer the greatest benefit. Yet does this give hirn the right to go on affirming the existence of divinity so defined? If no known object has the required power, is it legitimate to go on maintaining its existence? Isn't this like saying that, though Z is nowhere to be found, nevertheless it must exist? (Augustine argues similarly that since happiness does not exist (adding: "in this life"), there must be another life in which it exists, City 01 God 19+)

VALUE THEORY

Notice that I have not been criticizing Epictetus' assumption that no man has the power to confer the greatest benefit. 1ndeed he may be right in this connection. Yet again does that prove that he has really refuted the above argument, that he has refuted it in its best (or in a weaker) form? Suppose its major premise were rewritten to read: "Whatever has the power to confer (not the greatest but) great benefit is divine." However, Epictetus might not accept this rephrased argument either, though on the different ground that it contains an inadequate conception of divinity, that though its major premise does define divinity in terms of a superlative ("great"), it does not use a highest superlative. For we rernernber hirn so characterizing god and sacredness. On the other hand, we also remember that he does not allow Zeus to be omnipotent and that he tends to avoid the supernatural. Yet to conceive of divinity in terms of highest superlatives is the road to the supernatural, as follows: experience is limited to the finite, while the superlative stretched to infinity yields the transcendent. (The supernatural of course tends to imply the not ion of value, as weIl as that of the nonempirical.) If all we experience is, for example, limited or comparative power ("X is more powerful than Y," in some respect of course), then almightiness cannot but be supernatural (or ideal?). This incidentally solves the riddle why gods tend to assurne metaphysical status, indicating at the same time how to stop short of a supernatural use of "god" and therefore of the supernatural simply, namely by refraining from overstretching god or god-ascriptions. Moreover, is Epictetus' "power to confer benetit" adequate as an analysis (not use) of divinity? How about malevolent gods? 1s a malevolent god a contradiction in terms? Or is "god" ambiguous? Neither. For god is intrinsically connected not with benevolence or malevolence, but with power, that is, just power. (Epictetus was only half blind.) A survey of the various religions tends, I think, to confirm this. Surely the Zeus of Greek "mythology" typifies power more than benevolence. So does the god of the New and especially of the Old Testament. Also, is it an accident that people speak of "God Almighty" as though they were one word? "Gods," we say, "are awe-inspiring beings." And, we worship God(s). Neither awe nor worship entails benevolence

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(or loved) but power (or being overpowered). "Worshipping power" sounds pleonastie. Cp. also "God-fearing." God may be benevolent but not neeessarily so, just as he may be intelligent but only perhaps beeause knowledge suggests power; and so on. If God is the value superlative (ep. "God is the supreme being"), then the drive for power must be a prime drive. It is worth mentioning that Epictetus makes no distinction among "Zeus," "god," "the divine," and "gods," exeept apparently in one plaee where he says that "god is the father of men and of gods" (1.3.1) and in another where he says the same thing with "Zeus" in the plaee of "god" (I9.12). But perhaps by "gods" in these deviant passages he means "the so-ealled gods." In the first passage "god" gives way in the next breath to "Zeus," which takes care of the apparent difference between it and the second passage. All the other relevant contexts make no distinction among the four terms. See, for example, the transition from" gods" to "Zeus" to "we" (i.e. "gods") to '''I' ("Zeus") and finally to "gods" again, at I.7-13; and from "gods" to "the divine" to "gods" and back aga in to "the divine" at I2.I-g. Compare II.I4.II-3 ("gods," "the divine," and, tacitly, "the gods"), and IV.4-47f ("gods," "the giver," "god"). Also, while at, e.g. 1.9.23 one reads "related to the gods," the heading of the chapter (supplied, no doubt, by Arrian) has "related to god." Again, in III.24 (esp. IIO to end of chapter) "god" gives way to "Zeus" and so on back and forth; likewise at II.IJ.22-9. See further 1.6, I4.

2I.

Good a Protoconcept

Sacredness Epictetus also characterizes as a prolepsis, which literally means "prior conception," and whieh translators tend to render as "basic concept" and "preconception." I chose "protoconcept" because it is shorter than the first two and less misleading than the third, since "prejudice" is not quite what Epictetus means in this connection. Other protoconcepts are: good, fairness, and their contraries, and ought, appropriate, and suitable (1.22.1-8; II.II·3-12, I7.6-14; III.22.39; IV.I.44). And so are: happiness (II.II.3f), health (I7.9), advantage (10), utility (II), rationality (1.2.6), and their antonyms. Protoconcepts

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are shared by everybody (VI.I.4Z; 1.22.1), mutually compatible (ib.; IV.I-4S), form a system (II.I7.ro, 13), are beyondreproach(rr, II.ro) , standards (1.28.28; cp. II.II.8-2S), and innate (3f, 6f; cp. I7.7). Early Stoics counted survival after death as a protoconcept (which contradicts their denial of such survival). And, following Epicurus, who started the whole thing, they also so counted the existence of the gods (cp. the ontological argument). When Epictetus says that the protoconcepts form a system, presumably he means that they are consistent with each other and also that they are interdefinable. For he construes good in terms of advantage, happiness, choiceworthiness; fairness in terms of good and fittingness; bad in terms of dis advantage and unhappiness; and so on (1.22.1-3; IV.I-44; III.22.39f; 11.8.1; and below). Strict1y, of course, consistency and interdefinability apply only to positive protoconcepts in relation to other positive, not negative, protoconcepts, and vice versa. Epictetus would not, I take it, want to say that, for example, good is consistent with (say) bad. So he needs the distinction between positive and negative protoconcepts. We all possess this consistent conceptual scheme, and from birth at that. By the latter maybe he means not that the protoconcepts are literally "innate ideas," ready-made notions, but conceptual predispositions. For he speaks more than once of working on and perfecting protoconcepts (IV4.z6; 1.2.6; II.I7.13; cp. IV.IO.IS). The protoconceptual scheme is internally consistent and universal, and we all agree on the meanings or definitions of the protoconcepts. Nevertheless, Epictetus adds, this does not prevent disputes involving the scheme from arising. They arise when the scheme is being applied to "particular cases," one man saying "He did weIl, he is brave," another disagreeing, even though both agree that if something is "good" it is "advantageous" and "worthy of pursuit" (1.22.3); or one man saying pork is sacred, another denying it, even though both agree that "the sacred should be preferred above all else and should be pursued in all cases" (4; cp. II.II.8). For who doesn't have a protoconcept of evil, that it is harmful, that it is to be avoided, that it is something to be got rid of by every means? No

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protoconcept contradicts another, but conflict arises when application comes in. What then is this ill which is harmful and to be avoided? Somebody says it is not being Caesar's friend: this man is way out, missed the application, is in bad shape, is looking for nothing to the point; for by getting to be Caesar's friend he has still failed to get what he was after [namely a life minus worry, trouble, anxiety, IV.I.44ff].

Strife among men, of the same or of different nationalities (1.22.4), and unhappiness and bad luck for the individual, are the price for misapplying protoconcepts. For this is the cause of men's ills, their inability to apply thcir common protoconcepts to particular cases (IV.I-42f).

At the pure protoconceptuallevel cverything is as it should be. Our fall is due to a misuse of language or concepts. Conversely, our salvation lies in learning how to use correctly the protoconcepts (1.22.9). This, I assurne, is what Epictetus means when he also sa ys tha t the protoconcepts are beyond reproach or perfect, namely that they involve no contradictions, that the trouble lies in our use of the protoconceptual scherne, rather than in the scheme itself. Of course if he means that the scheme is unimprovable (cp. the recent motto, "Ordinary language is correct language"), the question is, how can he, or for that matter anyone else, know this in advance? Surely scientific progress tends to be accompanied by conceptual (and linguistic) revisions. Surely, at least such a protoconcept as health can be, and in fact has already been, made more precise. Now a correct application of the protoconeeptual scheme is a Stoie application. This is obvious from the preeeding long quotation and especially from its wider context, and from elsewhere (e.g. III.22.3gf). In short, Epictetus derives his ethics from thc concept of value; for hirn the latter implies the former, and eonsequently eudaimonism and a pain-oriented ethics as weH. This means, more specifically, that value judgments apply primarily or essentially to things within, and only secondarily to other things. Epictetus' actual words, though, are that "external things and eircumstances" are "indifferent" and that the terms "good and bad, benefit and harm" should not be used at all of externals but only of rational will and choiee and the real me, and so forth (11.5; ep. I, r6.rf, 22.29; 1.22.gff; III.3.r-ro, Io.r8). But this amounts to the same thing. For he does not wish to

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recommend that we should stop saying things like "This is a good chair or horse," if only because, as we shall see in later sections, this would contradict other things he says. Indeed, to teach that value concepts should be used only of the internal region is selfdefeating, if "should" has a value use here and if teaching is getting involved with others, though one might, consistently with the philosophy of unseriousness, reject the latter. In any case, Epictetus' basic ethical point is that what ultimately counts is how one feels (whether depressed or happy, and so on), rather than how others and things are. And this can be taken care of by the distinction between primary and secondary use of value language. Thus, the terms "fine," "all right," and "good" itself can be used to express indifference as weH as interest. To say "That's fine (all right, good)" of incompatible events ("Sheloves you," "She doesn't") is to show preference forneither, or, at the very least, refusal to commit oneself. The trichotomy goodjbadjindifferent, a holdover (Epictetus traces it to Diogenes, Chrysippus, and others, II.I9.13f), has been used to parallel the states of desire, avoidance, and indifference. One may desire something (may find it good), or avoid it (bad), or be indifferent to it. Here "indifferent" may weIl reduce to the not ion of instrumental or indeed secondary good, which shows once again that Epictetus might not need the trichotomy goodjbadjindifferent. (He does not speak of truejfalsejneither.) In any case, though this neutral sense of "indifferent" does occur in the remains, it may not be the only sense he had in mind. Certainly the advice "Be indifferent to X" may function as a warning, meant to prepare someone for possible failure, signaling that he should not behave toward X as though its existence or status depended on him or was his to keep. "This is indifferent" may mean, "Don't get involved with it, watch out, avoid it," as weIl as "Take it orleave it." Compare: "Say 'This is nothing to you,'" an expression, incidentally, which occurs frequently in Epictetus (Mr.5; I.I8.12, 25.1, 29.25,3°.3). In this use, then, the indifferent is not strictly indifferent, but dangerous and bad. Moreover, it is a concept belonging to a pain-oriented ethics, and therefore as congruent with Epictetus' work as the other, neutral use of "indifferent." Now, the idea that the cause of strife among people is the result

VALUE THEORY

of misapplying the protoconcepts and in the end of an un-Stoic way of life or of ignorance of Stoic principles, implies that in every ethical value dispute between Epictetian and non-Epictetian the former always wins, and on logical grounds alone (the latter misuses concepts). Those who are not Stoics (or full-fledged Stoics) are so because of lack of appropriate conceptual upbringing. Accordingly a prime function of education is to insure that everybody reaches protoconceptual maturity. This will resuIt as weIl in uniform application of the protoconcepts. The contention that one's protoconcepts are not necessarily finished things but might require development, guards Epictetus against criticism. For he may give the impression that he tries to explain value disputes by saying that the disputants have, not different value concepts but different uses of the common concepts. And this can easily be upset by pointing out that if the disputants all possessed the same value scheme they would speak the same value language, rather than essentially disagreeing. Still, his diagnosis of value disputes can stand some complementation. For though it may be that in the last analysis such disputes are between Stoics and non-Stoics, one would like to know what happens in the penuItimate analysis; or indeed whether value disputes can be explained without, anyhow explicitly, appealing to Stoicism or eudaimonism. The endlessness of value disputes, I would briefly say, sterns from either or both of the following things: First, that the disputants neither share the same value standards (or immediate value standards) nor know this (which makes the disputes verbal); and second, that they don't fully realize that value concepts typically are standard-dependent, that "X is good" is logically incomplete unless some standard or purpose (what X is good tor) lies somewhere in the context. "This is good" is strictly unintelligible unless so specified. When value disputes are heated, the cause is roughly the same, plus the fact that value criteria, and consequently value words, reflect wants and aspirations, the region of the "passionate," to use not too irrelevantly an expression of Epictetus (III.2 .3). This analysis is not aItogether foreign to the remains. First, as we saw in section 2, Epictetus notices in effect that "This is useful" is incomplete. (Useful, we remember, is a protoconcept.)

VALUE THEORY

And, as we shall see in the next seetion, he ernploys the notion of value relativity, for the preceding analysis is based on sorne such notion. Finally, he construes protoconcepts as standards (see above). Not that he can rnean that value protoconcepts are standards, for value demands, rather than is, a standard. We speak of X being the standard 01 value, not the other way about. So, perhaps, only such protoconcepts as health and happiness Epictetus would want to describe as standards. And to say that these are standards is of course to say that they are standards of value. 22. Value Relativity Value to Epictetus is also related to praise. On one occasion he apparently agrees with "the philosophers" who put praise in "the category of good" (III.23.24). On another he says that to get rnan's good qualities, such as his beauty and fairness, notice "whorn you praise, when you praise people dispassionately" (I.8). Praising involves evaluating. In the second context he is lecturing an apparently too wellgroorned youth (thechapterheading is "On Adornrnent"). In the process he says in effect that value criteria, though he operates rnainly on beauty or excellence (kalon), are dass-dependent. This means that we don't pronounce sornething of dass C beautiful or good by criteria appropriate to sornething of dass D. Or, in his words, we don't judge a "dog" beautiful by standards appropriate to a "horse," or vice versa; and what makes a pancratiast [a judo-like fighter] beautiful [or excellent] does not make a wrestler good, while it makes the sprinter quite ridiculous (5).

It would be "absurd" to say that sornething of one kind is beautiful in the same way that sornething of another kind is (cp. 3). Dogs, horses, nightingales, pancratiasts, wrestlers, runners, pentathlon athletes, hurnans, wornen, rnen, all have their own special beauty, virtue, or excel1ence (passim). According to this, all inferences of the following sort are invalid: "Property P rnakes whatever belongs to category C beautiful (good, etc.). Therefore, since X, which belongs to category D, has P, X is beautiful." EIsewhere Epictetus argues for a kind of

VALUE THEORY

relativity of the useful as well, denying in effeet that "the same acts" are neeessarily useful if performed at different times and plaees (2I.I4; ep. II.2I.20-2, quoted seetion 2). Also perhaps intended is value realism: the idea that value eriteria must not ineorporate fantastie expectations or desiderata, that "X ought to be done" must presuppose that it can be done; so that to eondemn a dog for not outjumping a horse, or a wrestler for not outrunning a sprinter, would be unreasonable, for neither is equipped to do this (cp. also I8). But Epictetus may be thinking (or may also be thinking) of something else, especially in view of such remarks as: The exeellence of a species depends on its nature (III.I.3f); a "vine" and a "cock" fare "badly" \Vhen they act eontrary to their nature (IV.I.I2If); and "every anima I [man includedJ is better or worse because of its own special virtue or defect" (f I8; cp. III.I4.II-4). If this means that plants and animals make value judgments, Epietetus eannot aceept this, sinee presumably he allows only men to have sueh a capacity. If it implies that the plants themselves suffer ("fare badly"), this is objectionable because plants have no feelings (or if they do, they keep it a seeret). To speak of "plant disease" is not of course wrong, if it is like speaking of "punishing" a machine or of a dog "worrying" an old shoe. A plant is not i11 or well except in relation to some human use - or model. But models are not realities. They may even be misleading. How ean the protoeoneept of advantage be used of vines, not to mention mountains (Epictetus does not mention mountains). It can only be used figuratively or by transference, but not literally. And if one protoeoneept does not apply in a given case, the rest don't either, sinee presumably they all form a logical system. (This of course needs to be rephrased to take aeeount of the distinetion between positive and negative protoeoneepts.) Even with reference to animals (assuming they do have feelings) value language is not always used literally or non-anthropomorphieally, as when we say of an animal that he is "disfigured." Can he really be this as far as he is eoneerned? If "nature" means here a value coneept (see seebon I7), the thesis tha t the virtue and defeet of organisms are a function of their nature, is a misleading erypto-tautology and anyway has nothing

t

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to do with biological facts. This manner of speaking goes back to Aristotle and Plato's Dialogues. 23. Value Criteria and Pleasure

For Epictetus "the good" or ultimate criterion of value is of course "peace of mind, happiness, freedom from interference" (III.22.39). Yet, curiously enough, he does not regard pleasure as the, or a, good or (using another stock phrase) "the aim of life," or even as a protoconcept (II.II.19-22; /14). Indeed he places it alongside "indifferent" things like wealth, health, life, fame, and toil (ponos, II.I9.13; cp. III.24.71). (His classifying health both as an indifferent and, as we saw in section 21, as a protoconcept is likewise strange; so is his saying that toil is an indifferent, if this implies that it need not be, or isn't, avoided if one can help it.) I say "curiously" because one would think that happiness involves pleasure. Can one be happy without experiencing some pleasure? And, what does feeling good mean? Compare Epictetus himself: For it is impossible that good should be one thing, and that it is rational for,us to find pleasure in (epairometha) something else .... (III.7.7).

We remember too, from section 10, that he puts feeling at the basis of all thought and action, and what else can "feeling" mean here if not "absence of uneasiness," "feeling released, satis/ied?" The following is also worth quoting before proceeding to an examination of his reasons for rejecting value hedonism: For this is the nature of every living being to avoid and turn away from the things which seem harmful and whatever causes these, and to pursue and admire the things which are advantageous and whatever causes these. It is impossible then for someone who thinks he is harmed to enjoy [or take pleasure in, chairein] that which he thinks is harming him, just as it is impossible for him to enjoy the harm itself (M3I.3f; cp. IV.I.4, 46).

If this is value hedonism, then Epictetus contradicts here what he maintains elsewhere. If instead it is psychological hedonism (cp. /14 where pleasure is allowed to be underivative and "natural"), he may not be inconsistent but only if value and advantage are

VALUE THEORY

not in fact linked with pleasure. If they are, to reject value hedonism and accept psyehological hedonism as true (as Plato clearly did) is inconsistent. (The inconsistency is not removed if it turns out that psychologie al hedonism is a conceptual rather than an empirical thesis.) It is worth adding that to underwrite psychological hedonism as true is to go against early Stoies in their dispute with the Hedonists over the question whether thirst for pleasure (or pain-avoidance), rat her than self-preservation, is the primary impulse in the zoologieal world. In the above portion of fragment 14, Oldfather conjectures, "Stoies" are meant and criticized. Epictetus' actual referenee is to "the hard-to-please philosophers.' , Note as wen that to classify toil as an indifferent does not seem to square with the above exeerpt, or with saying that pleasure is "preferable" to toil (1.2.16). If pleasure lies outside the region of value, how can it be used to diseriminate and ehoose? Not that Epictetus' statement explieitly ascribes such a role to pleasure, but surely it implies such an ascription, if the reason forpreferring pleasure to toil is beeause we like the former but not the laUer, and if "like" is like "interest," a hedonic coneept (if to like something is to find it interesting and pleasant). In any case, the view that pleasure falls outside the domain of goods occurs in the only passage in which Epictetus discusses, rather than simply opposes, value hedonism, and whieh it is time to examine. Pleasure is rejected as a good on the twofold ground that it fails to meet the "standard" or "balance" of (I) "stability" and (2) "proper exaltation" (II.II.19-22). But the argument is fallacious. Concerning the laUer requirement, it is either circular (for "proper" is itself a value term) or, when the circularity is removed ("proper" deleted), it is incoherent, for to be exalted is to experience pleasure in a high degree. Nor need pleasure be fleeting, "unstable." "Prolonged pleasure" is not a contradiction in terms. Epictetus fails to see this because, inexplicably, he construes pleasure here as "momentary." This may not be immediately evident, for indeed he begins by speaking of pleasure simply. The notion of momentary pleasure is introduced suddenly and at the end of the argument. Then too, the requirement of stability may be unexceptionable (imagine your ruler shrinking or expanding during measurement).

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Still, it is not a special criterion of value, but a requirement of criterion in general (a sort of condition of criterion or higher order criterion). Indeed Epictetus hirnself, as was pointed out in section 9, uses, though again without discussing, stability as a criterion of truth as weIl. One would like to know also how (or whether) the stability requirement fits in with the view, also embraced by Epictetus, that things are unstable. If everything is unstable, then nothing can serve as a criterion of value or, for that matter, of anything (which means too that even if pleasure were fleeting, this would not be a special argument against its functioning as a value criterion). If everything is insecure and if a standard must be secure, then there is simply no standard. But the remains do not consider the problem. N evertheless, they might contain a solution: briefly, that (I) though everything is unstable, some things are more so than others and standards belong to the latter category; or that (2) though every particular thing is unstable, types are not quite in the same fix and standards are types, not particulars. Then, of course, the problem is how to construe types. (Plato metaphysicalized them, just as he metaphysicalized standards, for the immutable Forms are meant to solve both the problem of types and that of standards in a world of alleged flux. And so Plato blurred his insights; for let us face it, Formism is like meeting the objection that there is no eternal man by saying that there is, only he is invisible.) In his tendency to disparage pleasure Epictetus follows (and is perhaps unduly influenced by) early Stoics (II.I9.13f) and probably Antisthenes who, according to Laertius (6.3), said that he "would rather be mad than experience pleasure." He mayaiso have been misled by the puritan's use of "pleasure" (hedone) when it, like "desire," is a cacophemism or pejorative (a paradox, if this implies that pleasure is an unpleasant word). The puritanic use is probably the result of (I) arbitrarily confining "pleasure" to bodily functions, plus (2) a timid attitude toward the body (compare Epictetus' construal of pleasure as fleeting, since bodily pleasures are apt to be short-lived). The former is responsible for the confusion of hedonism with sensualism. A weaker form of puritanism is the disparagement of the pleasures of the body rather than of pleasure simply.

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Puritanism in some form or other is found in the extant writings. Thus somewhere the pleasures of "the soul" are praised, while those of "the flesh" are belittled (III.7.3-7). And in fragment 14 "pleasure" as "the good and aim of life" is rejected on the ground that nature has given me a sense of shame and I often blush, when I think I am saying something shameful (cp. III.7.27f).

But Epictetus was not a consistent puritan, for in the very same fragment he says not only (as we already noticed) that pleasure is something natural and primary, but that calm is derivable from physical rather than mental pleasures, agreeing in passing with Epicurus. Nor does he condemn sex (the prime target of puritanism), any more than the early Stoics or the Cynics or even Antisthenes did so. (For Antisthenes see Laertius 6.3, II; for the rest, below seetion 37.) The suspect fragments 33 and34, both attributed to Democritus, read: The rarest pleasures are the most enjoyable. If somebody goes beyond the mean, the most enjoyable things would become the least enjoyable.

The former fragment makes intensity of positive feeling a function of scarcity. But I would replace "pleasures" by the more accurate "conditions (or sourees) of pleasures." Examples of both fragments are: making love sporadically and overdoing it. Democritus was a hedonist (and a negative hedonist), though his remains do not present a very dear picture in this respect. But see C. Bailey, Creek Atomists.

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24. Divisions 01 Ethics Epictetus distinguishes three basic types of studies or training. One has to do with exercising in such things as desiring the attainable and avoiding the unattainable. Another pertains to social responsibility or responsiveness, for a man should try to establish amicable relations with others, should try to be a good "son, brother, father, citizen," and "religious." The third division concerns logical and intellectual training (111.2; cp. 7.2S-7; II.I7· 1Sf, 31ff, I4.7f; IV.IO.13; 1.4· lIf). The word rendered as social responsiveness and which translators tend to translate as duty (which however is misleading, since "duty" suggests alien will) is the Stoic technical term kathekon, first introduced into ethics by Zeno (Laertius 7.2S, 108). To Epictetus this term signifies further "orderly," "rational," and "careful" action (111.2.2; cp. I. 7 .3). And in a chapter entitled, "How can one discover his kathekonta [plural] from the words which apply to hirn?" he propounds the theory that to behave sociably, one should study the meanings of the words which are true of hirn. "For each of these designations ... suggests the acts which are appropriate to it" (II.IO.lIf). "Man," brother," "son," "councillor," etc., all imply certain kathekonta (cp. M30). The first term, Epictetus adds, entails being rational, so that by classifying oneself as a human being, one is committed to being a Stoic, that is, to regarding reason as sovereign (cp. also III.I.2S, 27). To this it might be replied, first, that neither "an irrational man" nor "an antisocial man" appear to be contradictions in terms. To say that Epictetus applies rationality and sociability tothehumanspecies, not to individuals,is tofail torealizethatheis speaking here of "man" as a designationreferringtoyou and me. Similarly, to say that "rational" and "sociable" are used here in

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their dispositional sense, is still to allow for a man to be both irrational and antisocial in the episodic sense. (Someone is something dispositionally when he can be, though actually he is not, that thing.) Also, can't a man be both rational and antisocial? Next, such terms as son, brother, and the like can be used in their thin or constant sense which implies no social responsiveness or commitment. Thus, "son" in this sense means simply "male offspring" (or "human male offspring"). And though such a term as councillor may be in a different category, still its meaning seems to be primarily legal, not Stoic. However, Epictetus does not appear to be taking this quasi-linguistic theory of morality very seriously, for he uses it sparingly and rather casually even in the chapter in question (II.Io). Of the three basic types of training Epictetus regards the first as "the most important and pressing." Indeed, the bulk of his writings is taken up with questions roughly falling under this division; which is further characterized as the sector of "strong emotions" and "passions," interfering with the voice of "reason" (III.2.3 f; cp. 16-8); so that ability to control one's impulses becomes the most important task in one's life. Accordingly, more space will be devoted to Epictetus' individual ethics than to his social and political tenets. The distinction between individual and soeio-political ethics may not be transparent, especially if man is regarded as a socio-political being, but it is convenient to follow Epictetus here. Another useful distinction is between a happiness-oriented ethics (howare happiness, fulfillment, etc., attainable) and a pain-oriented ethics (how can unhappiness, distress, etc., be coped with). Though perhaps a little misleading, it will be convenient to dub the former "positive" and the latter "negative" ethics. Negative ethics in turn divides into preventive (techniques for anticipating ills) and remedial (techniques for alleviating and rectifying ills). In a broad sense negative ethics comprises medieine and psychiatry (dis-ease). For Epictetus mental ethics appears to be more important than (physical) medicine (III.Io.g, 15). Preventive methods are more basic than remedial in that if effective they abolish suffering and hence the need for remedialism. 0l H '~N'BI!s~P U~A~ ~q lOU A'BlU n 'JHSH'B~J AIP'Bss~J~u S! llup~nns l{l!M A'BM'B AI~l~IdlUoJ op 0l lU'BJ~OJd ~l{l l'Bl{l lON

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eliminate suffering or hardship is at the same time to eliminate challenge and satisfaction (see also section I7). Less generic distinctions will be introduced as the discussion proceeds. Although some of those distinctions, like the divisions in the preceding two paragraphs, are not Epictetus' own, theyare useful for organizing his complex ethical discussions. His ethics will be reconsidered with a minimum of repetition. But first his general theory of training.

25. Learning Theory By way of introduction, for Epictetus, acts determine habits, and habits character; which means that acts determine character as weIl, which makes acts, rather than habits, character, or what not, the basic psychological reality. (This, as we shall see, is generalized.) Moreover, change of character is effected by changing corresponding acts (rather than by reminiscing), and determining wh ether the attempt at habit formation or transformation has been successful is by looking at relevant acts. (ep. Diogenes in Laertius 6.70; Aristotle in Nich. Eth. II03b, IIoSbS-IS.) Similarly, though this occurs rat her inexplicitly, discovering what kind of being one really is, is done by looking at relevant acts (rather than by introspecting). Epictetus also invented or taught programed learning, among several other connected devices and theories. Habit, he says in a chapter entitled "On Training," is a powerful force, adding, here and elsewhere, that to change, "oppose habit by contrary habit" (II1.I2.6; 1.27-4f; cp. 11.9.I4). Every habit and power ehe says in another connection] is supported and reinforced by corresponding acts, that of walking by walking, that of running by running. If you want to be able to read, read; if to be able to write, write. And when you haven't read for thirty days in a row, but have done something else, you'll know what happens. Likewise if you lie in bed for ten days and then get up and try to take a long walk you'll see how shaky your legs are. Generally then if you want to do something, make a habit of it; if you don't want to do it, don't do it, but get into the habit of doing som,ething else instead.

So too about things "mental," Epictetus adds:

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\Vhen you get angry realize not only that something bad has happened to you [for anger is a disturbance], but that you have reinforced the habit and as it were added fuel to the fire. \Vhen you have given in to someone sexually, don't count this as only one defeat, but realize also that you have fed your incontinence and increased it. For as a result of corresponding acts habits and powers are bound to be implanted if they wcre not there before, or intensified and strengthened if they were there already (lI.I8. 1-7)· Accordingly if you want to stop being hot-tempered, don't nourish the habit, don't let it grow. To start with keep quiet and count the days when you didn't get mad. "I used to be mad evcry day, then every other day, then every third, then every fourth." ~~nd if you miss as much as thirty days in a row sacrifice to God. For thc habit is first wcakened and then totally destroyed. "Today I was not distressed (and likewisc for the dav following and for two or thrce months after); but when occasion for distress arose I was on my guard." Know that you're doing fine (12-4).

If you wish to rid yourself of "arrogance," submit to insults and disparagements. Then you will make such progress that even if someone hits you, you'll say to yourself, "1magine you have thrown your arms around astatue" (lII. I2.IOf).

In other words, sometimes it is useful to use extreme methods: I inclinc toward pleasure [or sensuality? hedone]; I will go to the other extreme even beyond the mean so as to train myself (7).

And likewise about my inclination "to avoid hard work" (7f). Apply Apollonius' remark (Epietetus goes on), who used to say that if you wish to really train, rather than show off, "when thirsty in hot weather take a mouthful of cold water and spit it out and tell nobody" (17; cp. M47; III.I3.2I). Epietetus extends the idea about the inextricable connection between charaeter and skill, on the one hand, and aets and works, on the other, to such other traits as moelesty, loyalty, shamefulness, logicality, grammaticalness, and their opposites, and to abusiveness anel miserliness, and also to "arts," such as carpentry. In the process he conceives of things and organisms in the same manner, namely as sets of habits or dispositions which are a funetion of corresponding actions or actualities. How, he asks, "is a flute, a lyre, a horse, a dog preserved?" The answer, which he leaves somewhat unstated, is by the execution of corresponding deeds or actions. Thus, one preserves a flute or a

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lyre presumably by playing with it, rather than by using it as a weapon. A horse or a dog is preserved or is not "miserable" if he behaves like one of his species, if, for example, he goes on "running" or "smelling," not if he can "sing cuckoo" or "fly." So too, Epictetus analogizes, a skill and a character trait are preserved by corresponding performances, and "destroyed" by contrary ones. Carpentry is sustained by making tables and chairs ; grammaticalness by writing and talking grammaticaIly. A man's grammaticalness eventually dies out if he gets into the habit of uttering solecisms. By the same token modest acts preserve the modest man, while immodest ones destroy him (11.9.8-14; 1.7f; IV.5.13f).

Nor, in general, is it "possible to remain the same person ... without doing the same things." About "belief," Epictetus says similarly that it cannot easily be acquired unless a man constantly states and hears the same ideas and at the same time applies them to his life (z.2f; 116; cp. IV.6.ISf).

This notion of idea-repetition is of course essential not only to education but also to indoctrination, propaganda, and advertising. However, a complete cure of the "passions" must be effected. Once acquired, passions leave traces and marks behind them, and unless a man erases these entirely, when flogged again on the old scars the marks give way to sores (II.IB.nf).

Epictetus treats habits and dispositions of mind, body, and matter in the same way. He even refers to the passions and defects of character as "sicknesses" (8). In two passages (quoted in section 2) and in other contexts he describes the philosopher's school as a hospital, compares his students to patients with various indispositions, physicalinjuries, and diseases (IU.23.30-2; II.2I. 22; cp. I3.12f, I4.22), and refers to education in general with the word "therapy" (2I.IS). EIsewhere this same word is used with reference to ethical matters and the philosopher is compared to a doctor who treats (e.g. I.I7.4; III.23.27f). All this indicates that Epictetus does not make a radical distinction between the physical and mental (or between ethics and

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psychotherapy). Also worth noting are his tacit convinctions that amental infirmity is not something to feel helpless about and that such infirmities can usually be fixed without outside help - though, as we shall see in section 39, the mental physician, in theformof the Stoic troubleshooter, is not superfluous. Another feature of Epictetus' learning theory is realism. He notices, for example, that habits are ingrained and cannot be changed overnight. (He adds, though, that to have a given power is to be conscious of having it, which may be false.) He also sees that not everything is a suitable object of learning, but only those things which do not involve too great a danger and for which there is a reasonable chance of success. Things which are "unnatural or fantastic" are not wise objects of training (1.2.30-2, I5.7f; III.I2.1-4, I3.20). Learning should furt her form a progression from less difficult to more difficult phases (cp. also 1.26.3 f). A man should not try to surmount all obstacles at once for fe ar of surmounting none. He should analyze objectives into steps of increasing complexity, and take the steps one by one, starting with the relatively simplest. Thus, if he wants to stop drinking he should reduce little by little the intake of wine - though he shouldn't use programed learning to become an alcoholic! (II1.I2.n). Above all , a man should make sure that he is not in too great a disadvantage. For example, he should keep away from objectives which are too hard for hirn, and should avoid things which hinder his efforts in another direction. Thus, "a young beginner in philosophy" should avoid "pretty girls," for this is not "a fair match ... : pot and stone, as the saying goes, don't mix" (12). Eut nor should one easily despair of oneself and behave like spiritless people, who when they have given in once surrender themselves entirely and are swept off by the current ....

Coaches can serve here as a lesson, Epictetus goes on. A trainee is thrown: "get up [his coach] says, and wrestle again, until you become strong" (IV.9.14-6). I cannot be perfect but this does not mean that I should give up all training: Epictetus ehe says of hirnself] will not be better than Socrates; but if I am not worse, I am satisfied. For I won't be a Milo [a great athlete], and yet

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I don't neglect my body; nor a Croesus, and yet I don't neglect my property; nor, in short, is there any other area in which we give up training because we despair of attaining perfection (1.2.36f).

Now, you prove you have learned a principle when you exhibit it in corresponding acts and works, not when you know how to recite it. "If you didn't learn these things to display them in works, what did you learn them for?" (29.3Sf). Those who have leamed rules and nothing more are eager to give them out at once, just as men with weak stomachs throw up their food. First digest your rules and then you won't throw them up; otherwise they are really vomit, unclean stuff and inedible. If on the other hand you have digested them, show us some change in your rational self (hegemonikon), like the athletes show their shoulders, as a result of their training and eating, and like those who have mastered their arts can show the outcome of their leaming. The builder does not come and say "Hear me lecture on building," but takes a building contract and builds a house, proving in this way that he has the art. Do something like this yourself; eat like a human being, drink like a human being, be neat, marry, procreate, live a citizen's life; endure insults, be patient with an unreasonable brother, father, son, neighbor, travelling companion. Show us you can do these things, and then we'll know that you really have leamed something .... No; but "Come hear me make comments" you say. Get lost, go find people to vomit on (III.2I.1-7; cp. 1.4.6-27, 29.56f; I1.I.34-6, 19.5-28; M46).

We, Epictetus says on another occasion, "lie ... but are ready with proofs that one shouldn't lie" (Msz.z). Epictetus' usual conception of the phony philosopher is that he says one thing and does another (e.g. IV.I.I38-43). He professes to be master of circumstances but gets upset by the first trivial disturbance, like someone laughing while he is lecturing on How To Be AStoie (cp. 11.9.13ff). This is Epictetus' practical use of the term philosophy. By philosopher he means primarily one who "puts to use his valid opinions," who embodies a way of life, rather than who can theorize about life (cp. also III.2.IOff, 2I.2-6, IO.I6, 7.17f, I3.z3, I4.IO, I6.rrff, I5.4; II.I4·7f). For "what is philosophy? Isn't it preparing to face things?" (III.IO.6; cp. 11.8.Z9). A philosopher in this use is essentially a person, and, as Antisthenes put it, "virtue is a matter of deeds ... not ... of words ... " (Laertius 6.rr). Nor do appearances ("a rough c1oak, long hair, long beard") make you a philosopher,

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but how you think and live (IV.8-4ff). In fact, don't eall yourself a philosopher or say you're "doing philosophy - indeed an arrogant expression"; rather, show by your acts that you are the genuine article (17, I.II3; M46; II.I.36; III.24·II8). Imitate Socrates, who even professed to "know and teach nothing," and who when asked whether he knew of any philosopher would not point to himself but would take the inquirer to the Sophists "Protagoras or Hippias" (5.17; ep. 2J.22f; M46).

26. Rationalization and Erring Although it is not possible to be faultless, it is possible to strive to avoid making mistakes (IV.I2.1g). And there should be no procrastination where self-improvement is eoneerned. If "tomorrow" is a good time to start improving, to start extinguishing shamelessness, tactlessness, abjectness ... , how much better it is today. If it is in your interest tomorrow, it is much more so today, to be able to do the same tomorrow and not put it off again to the next day (20f; CP·4)·

Of course a man ean always postpone or even avoid changing himself by saying, for example, that he is stuck with his eharacter. But this to Epictetus would be rationalization of inertia. People, he remarks, look for alibis for their proerastination and laziness, and "like finding exeuses for their faults" (1.7.30; f 15; ep. 11.2I; IV.IO.l). But how are rationalization and self-deeeption possible? For aeeording to Epictetus it is impossible to assent knowingly to a falsehood, while this very thing seems to be demanded by selfdeeeption. Let someone feel, he says, that it is now night [being presumably day]. This isn't possible. Don't feel that it is day. This isn't possible. Feel or don't feel that the stars are even in number. This isn't possible [though not presumably because it is false but because it is undecidable]. Consequently when a person assents to a falsehood, you can be sure that he did not want to do so; for every soul is unwittingly deprived of truth, as Plato says; he only thought that the false was true (1.28.2-5; cp. II1.3.2, 7.15; PI. Sophist 228c).

(This idea is then extended to eonduct: a man eannot wittingly ehoose the unprofitable to himself either (ep. also II1.7.15). One

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would like to know whether these impossibilities, like the impossibility of rational creatures wittingly being irrational (II.26.3), are logical rather than empirical impossibilities. The same applies to some remarks of Epictetus on freedom, habit, disposition, and character, and also to Socrates' famous sayings that virtue is knowledge and that no one does evil voluntarily, which influenced Epictetus.) Perhaps another comment or two of Epictetus will help save the concept of self-deception, since, to repeat, the above does not seem to do so. Unless care is exercised in changing undesirable habits, he says, you will eventually fail to notice that you're doing wrong, but even give yourself alibis ... (lI.IB.3If; cp. IV.I2.If, 6; MSI).

Self-deception, perhaps, is a slow process. A man procrastinates and after a while forgets he wanted to change. He somehow talks himself little by little and with half-closed eyes into doing or accepting wrong. We may speak here of committal talk (typified as weIl by the lover's insistence that his or her partner say "I love you"). Committal talk, though this too is inexplicit in Epictetus, is not quite true-or-false talk but a form of influence (self-influence), which of course may contain some true-or-false talk. Nor is it tied to any particular form of words, though some form of words may be more suitable than others. Self-deception is possible, then, insofar as giving oneself alibis is possible, and the latter is possible insofar as it is a form of committal talk. Committal talk (or self-committal talk) is a bridge linking rationality (accepting only what one thinks is true or right) and rationalization or self-deception, and fits in with Epictetus' tenet that thought and talk can affect conduct. Needless to say, so to analyze self-deception is to make it a conscious (or semi-conscious) affair, rather than an unconscious one. Does Epictetus regard the erring man as wicked? Not typically; for wickedness implies motives, while Epictetus tends to speak of beliefs and actions apart from motives, and at any rate without ascribing maliciousness to them (cp. 1V4-44). He follows Socrates' thesis that nobody errs voluntarily (I.I7.14). Medea, Epictetus says, was ttdeceived": she didn't really choose to

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sacrifice her children. She was blinded by her pain and attendant passion; from which it follows that she should be pitied rather than hated (28.7-9). Similarly, neither the "bandit" nor the "adulterer" should be put to death, for again neither knows what he is doing. To punish them would aga in be like punishing a blind man for being blind - which, Epictetus adds, would be "inhuman" (I8·s-ro). Epictetus, then, would have dismissed the idea of original sin too, and on the additional ground that a person is responsible only for his own behavior, that you can't be in evil through someone else, any more than you can be in shame [or] misfortune (M24.I; 1.9.34; cp. IV.I3.8).

An un-Stoic, for Epictetus, makes mistakes; he does not sin. He may be foolish, but he is not wicked. (And he is "foolish" in the last analysis because he is subject to "pain, fear, envy, disturbance," 1I.22.6.) "A foul and unclean soul," Epictetus says, is the result of "mistaken decisions [andJ therefore ... of bad judgments," just as a "pure soul" is one with "correct judgments" (IV.II·7 f ; cp. 4-44). On occasion indeed Epictetus speaks of "mean people" (1I.9.6). But this is not typical; nor does it occur in a context in which error is specifically discussed (such as 1I.26, to be examined presently). For hirn, as for Socrates, the concept of wickedness tends to be empty. In a chapter devoted to error (hamartema), he says that every mistake involves self-defeat, failure. This implies that error is a purposive notion, that to say that an act is amistake is to say that it misses its objective, that it mis-takes something for something else. An erring man is mi staken about his interest. Therefore, Epictetus continues, all one has to do to set hirn straight, assuming he listens to reason, is simply to draw his attention to this fact, to point out clearly that he is not doing what he wants, that his conduct undermines his aims and real interest. Otherwise one should blame oneself, if he does not listen; for no man goes deliberately against his own interest, any more than he is irrational or errs voluntarily (cp. I1.26.rf, 7; I.I7.r4). But surely, as Aristotle said to Socrates, there is such a thing

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as a weak will. A man might concede that R is right, and yet because he is weak he ends up doing the opposite. The word Epictetus uses to characterize error in the special chapter on the subj ect meant also logical contradiction; so perhaps it would be natural to infer that he defined error as contradiction. But notice what he says: Every error involves a mache. For since he who errs does not want to err, but to succeed, it is obvious that he is not doing what he wants. For what does the thief want to accomplish? What is to his own interest. If then stealing goes against his interest, he fails to do what he wants (II.26. 1-3).

How can the contradiction interpretation apply here? (Or, for that matter, to e.g. II1.23.34 and II.I2.15, which also contain occurrences of mache.) \Vhen Epictetus says that the thief as an erring man fails to do what he wants (if stealing goes against his interest), obviously he does not mean that the thiefmakescontradictorystatements. Mache translates here into "discrepancy," which means that, according to Epictetus, error involves a discrepancy between purpose (or interest) and execution. And, no doubt, if logical contradiction is a form of self-defeat (as it is in science, not necessarily in debating or joking), then it too would count as an error for Epictetus, though again it would not be the same as error. This is obvious from another passage where he explicitly distinguishes logical from other kinds of mistakes. There are, he says, other "errors" besides "setting fire to the Capitol and murdering one's father," namely logical contradictions and fallacies in reasoning (1.7.31-5). To think that Epictetus identifies error with logical contradiction is as unsatisfactory as interpreting or translating his use of hamartema as "sin" (as some scholars also do).

27. Negative Ethics: A Look The erring and unhappy man Epictetus conceives as the man with the wrong kinds of habits. Hence his emphasis on training. Hence too his locating the source of unhappiness primarily within rather than outside the individual: in his impulses and conceptual make-up. Impulse must be "controlled" because it can be un-

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realistic, projectional, and as a result can lead to avoidable fear and misery. Suppose, to paraphrase fragment 9, that you hear a loud noise coming from the sky or from the collapse of a building, or that you hear bad news. If you are ethically untrained, you will probably panic. But if you are aStoie you will recover soon enough and take hold of yourself. The morallayman is overcome by his impressions and impulses (these two Epictetus does not clearly distinguish), while the Stoic is not, though he as well might be disturbed at first and perhaps "shrink and grow pale" because of certain rapid and unwitting movements in his brain which momentarily prevent the intervention of sense. The ethicallayman projects his fears into the phenomena or news, while the Stoic realizes that the fear is all on his side, that events are not in themselves terrible or peaceful, but neutral. The layman does not stop to think. While he is immersed in the phantasmagoria of his impressions and swayed by them, the Stoic eventually becomes detached from and master of impressions and impulses. It takes two to be bothered, and essentially only oneself. (On bad news see further III.24.2Sf, I8.If.) Ideal conduct to E pictetus means being master of circumstances (cp. IV.s.6f). It does not typically mean lack of feeling or interest. Ataraxia, a word he frequently uses in this connection, typically means in his language unfazedness, the capacity to withstand ills, not goods. It is typically used to mean being intrepid and dauntless, rather than apathetic (e.g. 1.4.27; II.I, 5.2, I8.29; IV.6.9; below). Apatheia itself, which he often uses interchangeably or jointly with ataraxia (3.7f, 4.36, IO.22; MI2; etc.), me ans in hirn typically this, rather than apathy: The oil will be spilt, my poor furniture will be lost, but I will be apathes (IV.Io.26).

Here obviously the word signifies unperturbed, not apathetic (see further 13; 1.4.3; III.I3.II).In fact, somewhere apatheia in the sense of unfeelingness is rejected, just as "inactivity" is said to be not a characteristic of man (2.4; LIO.7). Epictetus' typical use of the two Greek words compares with the famous classical statues and, in general, with the classical

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attitude, which obviously is one of unperturbedness rather than apathy (though, strangely enough, this attitude as weil has frequently been construed in the laUer manner). The Stoic to Epictetus is not overcome even by witnessed sorrow. As he does not think it rational to be overcome by thunder or bad news, so he does not see that it helps to be swayed by the pain of others. He will no doubt offer assistance and even "groan" with the sufferer, but hewiildesist doing so from "insidehimself," he will presumably refrain from empathizing (Mr6). It is not unusual to criticize Epictetus here. But perhaps one man in agony is enough (cp. III.24.rf). Perhaps the recipe is,"Do whatever has to be done with a minimum, not a maximum, of effort or pain." Perhaps it is a maUer of economy. Parsimony is an ideal in science, mathematics, logic, technology, business. Shouldn't it, perhaps, be a goal in life generally? Medicine I suppose tries to confine disease and suffering. Should ethics, perhaps, be predicated on the principle of spreading suffering? (This of course would be inconsistent, if medicine flows from ethics.) Maybe the only relevant question is whether it is feasible to help someone without sharing his pain. And the answer is yes. Doctors generaily do this; so do social workers and officers of charitable organizations and of foreign aid programs. To require that helping should entail making the helper share pain would lead to spreading rather than arresting suffering and might generate a kind of reverberation: to help X, Y would have to suffer, and to help Y, Z, and so on. That the helping habit to be discharged often requires a dose of sympathy need not go against Epictetus' thesis, which seems to be opposing rather empathy. (That even sympathy is not always necessaryis evident from the fact that ail that a surgeon, for example, needs by way ofmotivation is personal satisfaction for exercising his skill, or money, or farne, or a combination of these.) However, I do not wish to suggest that there is nothing wrong with Epictetus' ethics (or straight ethics). But one thing at a time. Many of his apparently objectionable statements, like his social organicism, which may weil conflict with his no-empathy point, will, for the sake of convenience, be considered in later sections (36 and 38). Man's true work, Epictetus says on one occasion, is

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to study how to rid his life of mournings and lamentations and of "Ah me" and "How miserable I am" and of misfortune and mishap and to figure out what death is, and exile and imprisonment, and [referring to SocratesJ hemlock, that he may say in jail ras Socrates didJ "My dear Crito, if it pleases the gods, so be it," instead of "Poor me, an old man, is it for this I kept my gray hairs" (1.4.23-5; cp. IV.4.21; M53.3f; PI. Crito 43d).

On his role as a teacher Epictetus says similarly that it is to make his pupils not only "free, serene, happy," but also "untouched by hindrance, pressure, constraint" (II.I9.29). Philosophy itself, as we saw in sections 8 and 25, he typically conceives in a negative as weIl as practical sense. His ataraxist or negative ethics includes, to begin with, the following items: Analysis, Dela y, Realism, Strength, Detachment, Separation, Mediation, and Suicide. Some of these may overlap. Their names are in part my own. Their textual support is not always given in this somewhat impressionistic section, but especially in the chapters to follow. The first item, Analysis, denotes the use of reason for the analysis of negative states (loneliness, anxiety, etc.) in order to determine causation and prevention or alleviation. Analysis further designates the study of impulse, desire, hope, and wish, so as not to be misled by them. It also denotes the analysis of habit and learning. The remaining items, save Suicide, signify the most basic and useful kinds of traits or insights one should strive to acquire. Thus Delay is the habit of counting to ten when misfortune strikes, to allow sense to come into play. A man could be so overcome by emotion when something untoward happens to hirn that he might succumb to his emotion or do something he will later regret. Delaying is also supposed to restore a damaged sense of confidence and safety. For as Socrates used to advise not to live an unexamined life, so we shouldn't accept an unexamined impression, but should say "Wait, let me see who you are and where you come from," just as the nightwatch say "Show me your identity" (II1.I2.15; cp. 3.17; II.I8.24; 1.20.7-12). Accordingly make it yourfirst task not to be carried away by your impressions ; for if you gain time and delay, you'll find it easier to control yourself (M20; cp. M34).

Realism designates the habit of not reaching for unattainable goals, of checking wishful thinking from issuing into pursuit.

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Strength (karteria) is the ability to withstand or cushion adversity, disappointment, calamity. Mental inoculation belongs here. Detachment is the ability to disengage oneself from a loved object when it is gone, in order to relieve pain or prevent collapse. Epictetus does not mean that one should not love, but that one should do so "in a free spirit," like "Socrates" (IIL24.6o). Also of great help is the capacity to distinguish attitudes from objects, affections from perceptions; not to read emotion into things, but to keep the two separate. The son is dead. What happened? The son is dead. Nothing else? Nothing. The ship is lost. What happened? The ship is lost. He was taken to jail. What happened? He was taken to jail. But "Something bad happened to him" is an addition .... (8.5; cp. I7·7; M45; M3). "But the time has come to die." Why say die? Don't dramatize the situation, but speak as it is "Now is the time for the material, you're made up of, to return to those things it came from." And what's so dreadful about that? (1V.7.15f; cp. Aurel. 8.49; 11.6.22). For what is terrible is not death or toil, but the fear of death or toil (II. I.I3; cp. II1.z6.38).

Connected (and sometimes conflated) with the principle of Separation is the principle of Mediation, which says that between events and affectivity there are beliefs, assumptions, etc. That is, while Separation says that perception doesn't entail affectivity. Mediation says that perception and affectivity are mediated by an intellectual component. Hence the importance of thoughtcontral. Man is an intellectual being. It is not what has happened that pains ... man ... but his belief about it

(MI6; cp. M5; 1.I7.25; 11.I6.22ff). Remember that it is not the man who calls you names or hits you that insults you, but your thought that they're insulting you. So when somebody angers you, know that it is your own belief which has angered you (M20; Lacydes the Academic recommended amnesia).

Suicide, finally, is the most drastic method of escaping pain and is used when all else has failed. Analysis, however, is the "ruling" factor, since without reason it wouldn't be possible to decide that the other items are useful (cp. LI.I-7; IL23.6ff, I2.20). "Useful" of course means here conducive to happiness and freedom from worry, as was established in chapter ii.

VII

PREVENTIVE ETHICS 28. Forestall, Resist, Ease This chapter and the next examine Epictetus' negative ethics in more detail and from a somewhat different angle, reverting to the scheme of classification outlined in the first section of the preceding chapter. The reason for two angles and schemes is, hopefully, variety of perspective and comprehensiveness. In any case, there won't be any tiresome repetition. Delay and Suicide, which belong to Epictetus' remedial devices, will not be taken up again; nor will Analysis (which, it may be noted, transcends his negative ethics, as it relates to his general theory of learning as well). Epictetus' preventive ethics includes two "tests," both of which, though not identical, he describes as primary (MI.5; 111.24.84). One of them, which will be termed the Control test, advises the pursuit only of things which are within one's power to control. The other says that when things go well, one should be prepared for the possibility that they might turn bad. There are, as we shall see, other preventive recipes in the remains. While the Control test is designed to forestall misfortune, the other test or rule is meant to prepare one for misfortune. The latter, being building-resistance methods, may be termed resistance methods. The forestalling devices indicate ways for avoiding misfortune, while the resistance ones indicate ways for withstanding misfortune in ca se it occurs. Resistance techniques differ from remedial in point of time or perspective: while the former relate to adversity before and in ca se it occurs, the latter come into play after, and are therefore cushioning devices. Remedialism consists of pain relievers, while resistance (or perhaps preventive) devices are pain anticipators. This scheme of classification (not Epictetus') is not meant to

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classify ideas so much as functions of ideas, or techniques. It is not meant to say that the same maxim cannot work both preventively and lenitively, for example. For it is obvious that it can. It is obvious that, just as aspirin, for instance, can be taken to forestail as weil as ease pain, so the same formula can be used both as a preventive and as an antidote. An example is the idea that things are ephemeral. Nor is there any incompatibility in devising techniques for both preventing and easing the same negative state. Epictetus' special treatment of fear and anxiety best belongs to this chapter, and his special treatment of loneliness to the next, but this does not mean that he was blind to the fact that the first two can be treated remediaily and the third preventively as weIl. To devise negative-ethics techniques, and in particular resistance and remediaiones, is to be committed to the notion that life is not (or is not necessarily) cozy. This in turn need not be pessimism; it could be realism - though (or because) the difference is hard to pin down.

29. Controt Test this is the source of sorrow to wish for something which does not come to pass" (1.27. ro f). And there is plenty of sorrow in life. The best "proof" is that when "I want something ... it does not happen," while when "I don't want something ... it happens" (II.I7.r7f). "People," Epictetus says, "are strange, wishing neither to live nor to die." For when they die young they feel an unfairness has been committed against them, and similarly if they don't die old - though again, when old and feel death approaching, they send "for the doctor," imploring hirn to waste no effort to save them! (124). To forestail disappointment, then, care must be taken not to wish for something "which does not come to pass." Accordingly, "the first test" of anything is, Is it concerned with what is in our control or with what is not in our control? (Mr.S). Hence, "know yourself," your "endowrnent and capacity" (Ir; III.I.r8; I.I8.r8; II.6.3, I4.20; III.22.I07-9, 23.If; IV.8.4rf).

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The possible should be the measure of both our stride and our hopes (f 3 I s). For once you exceed the measure there is no limit (M39).

When you undertake something, "first consider its nature; and then your own powers, to see if you can do it" (M 29.S; cp. M 4). Then train for it like an athlete and wrestler (III.IS.1ff). To "reach out for the impossible" is not merely "foolish" and being "a stranger in the world"; it is also "slavish" (24.21). To be free and invincible, "despise whatever is not under your control" and "never enter a contest in which you can't win" (M19; cp. I.I8.21-3; III.6.Sf). Envy and jealousy spring from desiring things beyond your control; so to forestall jealousy and envy (both perturbances), check your desires (M19). Being angry for having the parents one has is absurd, since offspring don't choose their parents (LI2 .27 f). Blame is pointless (MS; MII), partly becauseit relatesto thepast, which cannot be changed. Death being ','unavoidable," people should reconcile themselves to the idea instead of fighting it; similarly for some fatal disease or other and for a dose of hardship (L27.7ff; II.s.12f; HIS.Sf, IO.S; cp. M2). (Besides, the wish for deathlessness is selfish: it is wanting to "crowd the world"; or is a sign of immaturity: it is refusing to "grow ripe," to "be harvested," IV.I.106; IL6.13f.) In Manual 14 Epictetus says: If you wish your children and wife and your friends to live forever, you're silly; for you wish what is not in your control to be in your control .... (cp. IV.5.7). Likewise if you wish your [servant] to make no mistakes, you are a fool ... So exercise yourself in what lies in your power. Each man's master is whoever has authority over what he wants or does not want, to provide it or take it away (cp. II.2.26). Whoever then wants to be free let him neither want nor avoid anything which depends on others; otherwise he is bound to be a slave.

Compare, "Nobody is free who is not his own master" (/3Ss, ascribed in Stobaeus to Pythagoras). The Control test is designed to forestall disappointment and frustration by checking des ire and aspiration. Disappointment is a function of expectation; so that the less one expects from life the less disappointed one iso Another function of the Control test is to forestall fear and anxiety. This is clear from the above freedom passages. Why

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should a man not attach hirnself to things beyond his power to control? Because he thus becomes vulnerable, anxious, for fear that he might lose them. To be dependent is to pawn oneself, to be insecure. Conversely, to be independent is to be anxiety-free. Why should a man not place hirnself in the power of others? Because he thus puts himself at their mercy, which attracts insecurity. The power he thus invests in others over hirns elf is through himself, his desires. For what is a master? No man is a master of another ... (1.29.60; ep. II1. 2 4·7of).

Rather, someone is the psychological slave of someone else when he is afraid of hirn, and he is afraid of hirn because he desires something the other has. Have we then so many masters [as people and things we depend on]? Yes so many (IV.I.59). But onee I free myself from my masters, that is, from those things which make masters fearful, what further trouble do I have, what master any more? (1.29.63; ep. 9.20-6).

This (though the following analysis is not quite explicit in Epictetus) does not rnean that every time a person wants something he turns into a psychological slave. To want something could be only a necessary, not a sufficient, condition of psychological slavery. A man, for example, might want someone else's admiration, but this in itself is not enough to make hirn his slave. He must also seek his admiration. Note too that to want objects (animate or inanimate) which exist in abundance may involve becoming dependent on types, rather than on individuals : on food, sex, or companionship, instead of on this or that apple or person. And though type-dependence may itself be a form of dependence (Epictetus, we remember from section and fragment I3, tacitly rejects the idea of absolute human independence), it is much less slavery-conducive than dependence on individuals, whether a given person, pet, or house (cp. 130s). Unless a man is not afraid, he is not free to do what he pleases even when politically this is relatively feasible. This shows that negative or psychological freedom is more basic than positive or political. Hence it is that when political freedom exists, but small psychological freedom, it is dubbed "nominal." Hence too the

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reason Epictetus stresses psychological freedom (cp. esp. IV.I, passim), while, as we shall see, his concern with political freedom does not go beyond a very brief condemnation of slavery and some scattered remarks on the limits of state power. Marx, of course, emphasized financial independence, but at least in his early or "economic and philosophie manuscripts" he did so largely, it seems, because he thought that freedom from want conduces to psychologie al freedom, to exchanging the feeling of constraint for the feeling of spontaneity - a typically Epictetian idea. Indeed, a little before the middle of the third manuscript, for instance, such Epictetian-sounding passages as the following are found: A being does not regard himself as independent unless he is his own master ... A man who lives by the favor of another considers himself a dependent being (tr. T. B. Bottomore).

Nevertheless, the Control test might be criticized on the ground that it is impossible to determine what one can do without trying, and this involves risk of failure and therefore of disappointment, which is what the Control test is designed to obviate. But even according to this objection disappointment is not an inevitable concomitant of trying but merely a "risk," while if trying means among other things testing and if testing does not demand commitment to a specific outcome of the test but is comparable to investigating, then failure and disappointment are not even risks of trying and consequently of the use of the Control test. ("Y ou don't lose anything by trying," we say.) To which it might be replied that it is absurd to expect that the man who is trying to find things out about himselj does not in the process commit hirnself to one possible outcome of the test to the exclusion of the rest. But perhaps this confuses testing oneself with wishing to be something. If I want to discover, for example, whether I am good at singing, do I have to prove myself in the process? Indeed, if it turns out that I am not good at singing, I might even experience not disappointment but relief, for not trying to sing sooner. Still it is true that man is apt to get involved with what he tries to do. Yet again, this is not necessary, as Epictetus would say, and, he would go on, if one is careful not to commit hirns elf when testing hirnself and attempting to find things out

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about hirnself, he has a good chance of skirting both failure and disappointment. Similarly, to reject the Control test on the ground that what is impossible for one generation is possible for another, is to fail to realize that the test addresses itself primarily to individuals, not to mankind as a coIlection. The Control test underscores the idea that human nature has illusion-producing and self-defeating proclivities, that unguarded man tends, for example, to expect more from hirns elf than he is capable of. This, of course, is intensified in competitive contexts.

30. Anxiety and Fear The thesis that to reach for things beyond one's power to control is to risk anxiety and fear is amply illustrated in two chapters entitled "On Anxiety" and "On Unafraidness" (and elsewhere) . "When I see someone in astate of anxiety," Epictetus says, I wonder "what can it be that he wants?" Evidently he wants something "outside his control"; else why should he be afraid? When, for example, the citharoede (a singer harp player) is singing by himself, he feels no anguish. It is only when he sings before others that anxiety overtakes hirn even though "he has a good voice and plays weIl." What then is the difference between the two contexts? When he is alone the singer cares only about how he plays, but when he is in the theater he is worried about what others think of his performance, and this is the cause of his anxiety: " ... he does not want only to sing weIl, but also to win applause, and this is no longer in his control." Concerning skill, he shows confidence, for he does not panic when he does not perform before an audience. It is not skill that worries hirn, but pleasing others (II.I3.r-S). The orator, Epictetus says in another chapter, is in the same boat (I6.s-ro). The singer then, Epictetus goes on, is afraid because he wants something which someone else has. He knows how to sing but not what a "crowd or applause" iso He knows next to nothing about

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the "role of praise in life .... So he is bound to tremble and turn pale." He may know how to play his instrument and exercise his vocal cords, nevertheless "I call hirn astranger and say: This man doesn't know where in the world he is .... " He has been living so long, yet he is ignorant of the nature of life. Worse, he has not even consulted a lawyer (a philosopher) to inform hirn about the laws and customs of his hometown (life). While he does not draw up a will without legal study or advice, when it comes to ethical matters, and particularly to the kinds of things he should pursue and avoid, he is quite casual, ill-informed, and ill-prepared (II.IJ.S-8; cp. I2.17-2S). Zeno, by contrast, was not in agony when he was about to meet Antigonus [the King, because] Antigonus had no power over the things Zeno cared about, and what Antigonus did have power over, left Zeno cold.

On the other hand, Antigonus was anxious when he was about to meet Zeno, for he wanted to please hirn, and this was beyond his control (II.IJ.I4f). The same applies to fear. "What makes a tyrant an object of fear?" Epictetus asks. It cannot be his "chamberlain," "guards" or "their swords," for a "child is not afraid" when brought in the presence of the tyrant and his guards. Does the child fail to notice them? Not at all. If a man wishes to die and comes to the palace for that purpose, he as weIl would not be frightened by the guards. What makes the guards and the tyrant terrifying is neither their presence nor what they are, but oneself: If someone wants to live, the guards are a threatening sight. But if he doesn't care whether he lives or dies, they are neutral. And if he wants to die, they are a welcome sight (IV.7.1-S). Socrates at the trial (to interpolate) is worth remembering. Why was he not afraid? Because he wanted to die - and he succeeded in receiving the death penalty by deliberately irritating and provoking the judges (cp. II.2.18; Xenophon Apology). Socrates, says Epictetus, was not really in prison, because "he was there of his own free will," while a prison is a place in which "a man is against his will" (I.I2 .23 f). But the child analogy is infelicitous. A child might not be afraid of armed guards most likely because

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he does not grasp what they tend to signify (namely danger) , rather than because he is indifferent to his welfare. Doors are slammed in the faces only of those who wish to get in. So too, Epictetus continues, people are afraid of a tyrant, or rejected and hurt by hirn, only because they want something from hirn (IV.7.19-2I). See how large and sharp [the swords of the guards] are? Well, what do these large and sharp swords do? They kill. And what does fever do? The same. And what does a tile do? The same. Do you want me then to be in awe of all these things and cringe before them and act as their slave? (25). [No wonder] I wash, drink, sing, but do it all in fear and misery (I.29.62f). Put him in jail, the tyrant says about me. I follow, it's in the game. But your neck will be chopped off. And does the tyrant, and any of you who obeys him, keep his neck forever ? ["That is why, " Epictetus says elsewhere, when Demetrius was in a similar predicament he "said to Nero 'You threaten me with death, but nature threatens you'" (I.25.22f).] But you will be thrown out unburied. If land the corpse are one, I will be; but if I am not identical with the dead body, speak more subtly, as the fact is, and don't try to frighten me. These things are frightening to ... fools (IV. 7.3If; cp. LI9.1-8, 16f).

In the Demetrius context Epictetus advises not to betray weakness because to do so (for example, to "admire" your "body" or "property") is to invite being taken advantage of, "just as when the snake draws in his neck" he shows where he is vulnerable and "I say, strike that part of hirn he is protecting." Ifyou bear this in mind, Epictetus concludes, whom will you have to "flatter or be afraid of any more?" (25.24f). Defenses idea?

3I. Other Sateguards Sometimes to avoid making mistakes it helps to remember how you feIt in the past after you had given in to the same inclination, "as slaves remember their blows" (except that it is through physical pain that the slave is conditioned: "it is the pain which induces the memory" in hirn). We might term this a way of resisting temptation (III.25.9f, 6f; cp. M34). To avoid being "violent" and "regretful," remind yourself, when you're about to attack someone, that "you're a tarne animai" (125). The suspect fragment 30 advises "neither to fasten our ship to

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one small anchor nor our life to one hope." This is equivalent to our preventive maxim, "Don't put all your eggs in the same basket" (though there are over 60 such idioms in the English language, if lenitive ones are induded). But though the fragment is suspect, it is, as will be seen, in the spirit of Epictetus' uncontroverted sayings. The following analysis, however, at points leaves somewhat behind both the fragment and its spirit. The rather vague idea behind the fragment can be expressed equally vaguely as follows: No event or goal or aspiration should be regarded as crucial. \Ve should not build our lives around only one thing or hope. Why? Because the risk is great. Wh at kind of risk? Disappointment and frustration. \Vhy? Because "man cannot live with man forever" and "everything is perishable" (III.24· 20f) . Or did you neglect to study this matter too, but like female weaklings did you enjoy everything you took pleasure in as though you were to enjoy it forever, places, people, ways of life? And so now you sit and cry because you no longer see the same people and pass your time in the same places. Certainly you deserve this fate, to be more miserable than crows and ravens, who can fly where they please, and change their nests and cross the seas, without sighing or longing for their former situations. "Yes but they feel this way because they are not rational beings." And has our reason been given us by the gods for misfortune and unhappiness, that we may live in misery, in mourning? Or shall all men be deathless, and nobody leave horne, but shall we stay rooted in the soillike the plants; and if one of our acquaintances goes abroad, are we to sit and cry, and again, if he comes back, are we to dance and clap like children? Aren't we ever going to grow up rand realize that nothing stays put, etc.]? (5- 10 ; cp. 4).

Indeed, not only things and situations and other people are subject to change, but also ourselves (our likes, etc. )- though Epictetus does not pay much attention to this type of change, eventuality, risk. Yet "subject" instability is as noteworthy as "object" instability. Men are generally partial to novelty and variety, and though some of us may not growtiredintermittently or for good of the same thing, situation, or person, others do. Again, as soon as one level of needs, desires, or interests is taken care of another generally appears, and so on indefinitely. That is why "progress" is bound to be perpetual or the concept of necessities open. This, though, does not call for pessimism. For after all what matters is not whether we have many needs, but whether

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we can satisfy those we have. And if we can't, we can always practice self-control or suicide. There is always a way out. Or isn't there? Anyway, saying there is helps. To further clarify or toy with the many-hopes principle, suppose a man does center his life around one crucial goal. He will not only be miserable if his goal' 'does not come to pass"; but, unless he lies down and expires, he will sooner or later be miserable (or bored and restless) even if it does come to pass. For the glow accompanying achievement does not endure. Indeed, to go on following Epictetian leads, nothing stays the same (cp. 1.27.IOf; 1I1.24.4-ro, 20). No goal is sacrosanct: life as a whole is not, for Epictetus anyhow. Goals, like ideals and standards, are instruments. They are set up for our benefit, and of course by uso Consequently oppressive and misery-producing goals, ideals, standards should be discarded as pointless. We don't live in order to have or realize goals; rather, we realize goals in order to enjoy life. (We generally value the sense of achievement, which is a function of goalrealization.) Also, goals and even goal-realization are less important than the process of realizing goals; for the last keeps us busy and (hopefully) pleasantly so. At any rate, to focus on goals and goal-realization at the expense of the process of realizing goals is doing things only on account of their expected rewards, and this is impoverishing rather than enriching one's life. Activities, as well as their outcomes, should be enjoyed (cp. II.I6.rsf). The thing to do, then, is to set up attainable goals, enjoy the process of realizing them and, once realized, to start the same thing with other projects, like Epictetus' children who gather up broken pieces and dust and build something or other, then pull it down and build something else again; and so are never at a loss to pass the time pleasantly (IILI3.I8f).

Moreover, we should start playing again without regret or nostalgia for past success, but like those happy-go-Iucky crows and ravens, who can fly where they please, and change their nests and cross the seas, without sighing or longing for their former situations (24.6).

Unless a memory is pleasant there is no point to looking back

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anyway. The past is past and only a psychopath can change it (that is, his memory of it - which however is all that counts anyhow; ethically that is). But, it might be said, this would make for continual exertion, while, as Schopenhauer put it, the ideal is "rest." But, as Anacharsis-cum-Aristotle replied (N.E. II76b30),rest ismeaningful only as relaxation: we can't work continuously, so we have to take breaks. Indeed, life without exertion is boring (cp. I.Io.7). At least, life as we know it: perhaps medicine, with its euphoria drugs and electrodes, will change this. But equally, with exertion gone, procreation or family care and therefore life itself (as far as earth man is concerned) will follow suit (at any rate until "evolution" brings earth man back). Another likely result will be the vindication of hedonism, though no one (or no earth man) might be around to see this happen. (The prob ability that medicine will bring about the abolition of the race seems greater than that physics or engineering with its hydrogen bombs will do so.) 32. Resistance M ethods Readiness for disappointment and loss is the "highest and most important" habit. \Vhen you grow attached to something, act toward it not as an inalienable possession, but as though it was a jar or a cup made of glass, so that when it breaks, you'll remember its nature and not be perturbed (III.24.84f).

Extend this to people: " ... if you kiss your child, brother, friend," don't let your "imagination" or "enthusiasm" run away with you but check it, "as do those who stand behind generals riding in triumph reminding them that they are mortal" (85f). Epictetus, however, does not mean to equate lass of loved ones with loss of possessions. Losing some oil or wine, he says elsewhere (IV.I.I4I), is one thing, losing your child is quite another (presumably because one's emotional as well as financial investment in one's child is greater; and it is greater presumably because one's child belongs to the category of relatively irreplaceable entities, as explained in the ninth paragraph of seetion 29). Whatever a man has, Epictetus continues, is given hirn only for

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a time. Indeed, at any moment it might be taken from hirn, through loss or destruction (and to long for a loved one inopportunely is like "hankering for figs in winter"). Remind yourself that what you love is ephemeral, and that nothing you love is yours to keep (III.24.86f). The feeling of inalienable ownership is based on illusions (cp. also 20f, 4-10). Handle life "as travellers treat an inn" (Mn; cp. II.23.36-4S). Call things your own as you call "hotel beds" your own (1.24.14). Be "loose," not possessive (cp. IV.I.1S3). When you're taking delight in something recall the opposite image. What harm is there, if, when you're kissing your child, you whisper to yourself, "Tomorrow you'll die" ? Say likewise to your friend, "Tomorrow either of us will go away never to see the other again. " "But," comes the retort, "these are ominous words" (cp. Herodes Atticus, in Gellius 19.12). And so are "some incantations" (Epictetus replies), but "since they do us good," they have a point. Besides, he goes on, because a word is ominous does not mean that it shouldn't be spoken; for how else are we going to guard ourselves against the things themselves (adversity)? (III.24.88f). "When you are about to meet someone," especially a Very Important Person or a man of great power - Epictetus advises by way of further illustrating the precept to prepare for the worstsay to yourself that "you won't find hirn horne, that you'U be shut out, that the doors will be slammed in your face, that he'll ignore you." Wondering "what would Socrates or Zeno have done in these circumstances" will help (M33.12). "And when you call your servant remember that he might not pay attention to you and if he does pay attention to you that he might not do what you want hirn to do." Don't make your peace of mind dependent on hirn or on "any chance-corner" (MI2.2; M28). This then is what you should practice all day long. Start with the most trivial things and those most vulnerable - a pot, a cup, then go to a tunic, a mere dog, horse, parcel of land; from there to yourself, your body, members of your body, your children, your wife, your brothers ... Purify your judgments, in case something which isn't really yours c1ings to them, grows on them,

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and might cause pain when it is tom loose ... train yourself everyday, as you do in the gymnasium ... (IV.I.III-I3; cp. I.I8.18f).

Imitate Diogenes who "everything he had .... he was prepared to let go ... " not because he feIt nothing about anything, but because he had eliminated all conditions of affective enslavement. "Diogenes was free," free as a bird (IY.I.I5zf; cp. III.24.6). For Epictetus, then, taking precautions is essential for ethical success. Life is not necessarily ideal. To be unprepared is to be overoptimistic and to invite defeat and suffering. It is like eating whatever looks edible. To be sure, in attempting to prepare for adversity one might overdo it; one might become so inured to pain that one's capacity for enjoyment is impaired. But then anything can be overdone. If preventive medicine and insurance of all kinds are feasible and desirable, so is preventive ethics. After all , the first two are the logical offsprings of the third. (Historically as weIl, philosophy and medicine went hand in hand in antiquity, beginning at least with Democritus and running through especially the Pyrrhonian Skeptics, many of whom were practicing physicians. IncidentaIly, the Skeptics' ethical "end" was ataraxia.) This is not to deny that there are no asymmetries between medical and Epictetian vaccination. Thus, while complete absence of what the inoculation is intended to prevent is usually a reasonable expectation in the former case, this is not so in the latter, though wh ether Epictetus was aware of this, as of the above objection about overdoing mental vaccination, is an interesting question.

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RE MEDIAL DEVICES

33. Examples If you're prepared for adversity, Epictetus remarks, you won't

be painfully surprised when it hits: you won't say that the adversity was "unexpected." This, he adds, will be the first relief. For [after having lost an offspring] it is always very helpful to be able to say [cl la Solon or Anaxagoras or Xenophon] "I knew I gave birth to a mortal." For this is what you'll say, or again "I knew I was mortal," "I knew I might have to leave horne," "I knew I might be banished," "I knew I might be thrown in jail" (11I.Z4.104-6).

When you meet with difficulties, follow the example of the athlete and say, "It is for this that I was practicing, for this I was training" (IO.6-8). "Does anything take [the ideal Stoic] by surprise?" Indeed, doesn't he expect worse things to happen to hirn than actually do happen? Doesn't he count it as "gain" when things fall to go to their limit of badness? Doesn't he use the maxim that to every bad there is a worse? Doesn't he say to hirnself that things could be worse? So-and-so insulted you. I am [replies the Stoic] very thankful to him for not hitting me. But he did hit you. Many thanks to him for not wounding me. But he did wound you. Many thanks to him for not killing me (IV. 5.8-10; cp. II.I6.28; III.z6.37f).

In the above passages Epictetus combines preventive with remedial devices and slides naturally from the former to the latter. Remedialism may not require immunization in physiological cases, but in psychological cases it is certainly more effective if so preceded. Notice also how weIl intellectual antidotes fit in with Epictetus' general tenet that thought affects attitude and feeling. The "I knew" language is a case in point. By saying this to oneself when something bad happens, one might feel hetter;

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for it would be like winning a bet, like having a prediction come true. Some "gain" is squeezed out of amisfortune. But, it might be said, such comments as "I knew this would happen" are idle postmortems. Yet surely, sometimes it does help to say this, or again, "I am not sad, I am happy" (smiling perhaps: cp. I.I.22). Then too, if it is admitted that unfavorable self-talk, like "I am a coward, I am stupid," does make a difference to how one feels, it seems arbitrary not to ascribe the same power to lenitive talk. Anyway, how one reacts to happenings is largely a matter of attitude, even when the happenings occur on one's body. To paraphrase Epictetus (I8.19), when I have a "headache" or an "earache" I may of course "groan," but do I have to become depressed, anxious (or "say My my")? (This no doubt may not apply to sustained bodily pain or serious injury.) One's whole outlook on life, whether for example life is agame or a cross, is largely a matter of attitude (not true orfalse). Attitudes in turn are to an extent affected by what one says about things and oneself. Lenitive talk, especially when combined with preparedness, as it usually is in Epictetus, need not be useless. And when it is useless, it need not be harmful. If a man is going to drown anyway, what difference does it make that he has failed to save hirns elf from drowning? Lenitive "failure" need not collect disappointment, though when (or if) it does, the sum-total of pain is admittedly increased. N or is lenitive talk necessarily rationalization. This is not to say, however, that lenitive lorms 01 words may not be put to such use. We must distinguish between "lenitive talk," which refers to a function of expressions, and "lenitive forms of words," which does not. J ust as I can use "Eisenhower" to name a fictitious as weIl as a real person, so I can use "It's one of those things" to procrastinateorrationalize, as wellas a tranquilizer. Only the last (lenitive) use is relevant to an understanding of Epictetus' work in remedial ethics. The above distinctions may not be Epictetus' own, but he makes an analogous distinction in the course of discussing the nature of liturgy (see above section 9). When in a predicament, to go on with his lenitive devices, "say" to yourself: It doesn't concern me but

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either my poor body or my poor property or my poor belief or ... For me everything is a good sign, if I will; for whatever the outeome, I ean profit from it (MI8; ep. IV.4.28).

Look at the bright side of things. After all, the negative outlook is not necessary (cp. j28b). But what if [some things or people I lost] are indispensable to me? Don't set your heart on them and they are not. Don't tell yourself they are indispensable and they are not (IV.I.IIO,107).

Tell yourself you can do without them, and eventually perhaps you will detach yourself from them. "Don't ever say ab out anything I have lost it, only I have returned it," whether it is a "dead child," a "dead wife," or a "lost farm." (I have returned it to "the giver" (MII). This, by the way, is one obvious context in which Zeus is inoperative.) Say something good about your troubles: "How unlueky I am that this has happened to me." Don't talk like that, but rather "Lueky me, that though this has happened to me I go on living untroubled seeing that I am not erushed by the present, or seared of the future." ... [Or,] "This is not bad luek, but to stand it high-mindedly is good luek" (l28b).

Imitate Socrates who, insteadof "wailing" while in prison, wrote "hymns," or Agrippinus the Stoic, who when something would bother hirn would write a eulogy on it: if he had fever, on fever; if he suffered disgraee, on disgraee; if he was sent into exile, on exile. And onee ... when he was about to have breakfast someone brought him word that Nero ordered him into exile - "Then," he said, "we will breakfast in Aricia [a stop outside Rome]" (121; ep. I.I.28-3'1; on Soerates IV.4.22; II.6.26f; PI. Phaedo 60d).

Again, I must die; but must I die groaning too ? I must be ehained; whining too ? I must go into exile; and does anybody prevent me from going with a smlle and graeefully and without worry? (I.I.22).

Derive some benefit from illnesses, lameness, insults, even death (III.zo). Hence Epictetus' idea that things in themselves are neither good nor bad: one's attitude toward them makes the difference (cp. also M45).

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Or be nonchalant, indifferent: If an innkeeper dies and leaves his beds to you, fine. If he wills them to someone else, you can always look for another bed or even sleep on the ground "with courage andsnoring and remembering that tragedies occur among the rich and the kings and the tyrants" but not among the poor (except as members of "the chorus," 1.24.14-6). For everything befalling you remember to turn to yourself and inquire what power you possess for coping with it. If you see a beautiful male or female [you desire but can't have ?], you'll find continence the power to use here; if you meet with hardship, you'll find endurance; if offensiveness, you'll find restraint. And if you get used to behaving in this manner you won't be overwhelmed by your impressions PilO; cp. III.20.9-II).

Besides, it takes two to be insulted: you can't revile a "stone," can you? (1.25.29; cp. M20). Or make fun of your troubles (I presume this is in part the intent of these and other passages) : "I am about to die." And others will live forever? (II.6.27). And is the universe going to be shaken when you die? (III.IO.14f). "Should I then be the only one to be decapitated now?" Why, would you have all be decapitated, so you can be pacified? (I.I. 18). "If only there is no bad news." In this way for you every place can be a cause of bad luck. Isn't it enough you' re miserable where you are, but also overseas and by letter? (III.24. 2Sf). "My God, look at the kindoffatherandmotherI 'vegot!" What, was it given you to come forward and choose and say "Let this man have intercourse with this female at this hour, so I may be born?" (LI2.28-9; cp. 2.21, 29, I9.28f; II.I6.22f; III.5· If, 24.77, 26.37; IV·7·3 1).

The detachment passages are reminiscent of prohairesis, yet no reference to it is to be found in these or cognate passages (cp. also M44). Perhaps, then, Epictetus can get along without this concept or can subsume it under the principle of Detachment, which says that when you lose something, shrink, identify with less, and less still, and so on, though not to infinity, since suicide may be preferable and Epictetus allows for suicide. Prohairesis could be the vanishing point or ideal limit of this process of selfshrinking. "Prohairesis is your self" could mean no more than this. Similarly, "mind (or will) is your self" could mean that when you lose everything, as it were, you still have your mind (or will). (This of course is easier said than done.) After all , Epictetus was apparently more interested in remedialism than in Ego Theories (or metaphysics). Not that egos

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are substances. For "the self" collects "identifying with" and to identify with X is to value X highly. "Discovering my self" is at best like discovering good rather than (say) my heart, and at worst it is amisleading expression.

34. "It's tate" and Other Tonics Adopt the bystander's attitude toward your troubles: try to be as rational and matter-of-fact toward them as you are toward the troubles of others. When someone else's cup is broken, Epictetus remarks, we're ready with the statement, "Things like that happen." Similarly, when someone else's child or wife dies, we say "This is man's lot." On the other hand, when our own cup is broken or our loved on es perish we cry "My my, how wretched I am" ; but we should recall how we feel when we hear bad news that relates to others (M 26). And perhaps, though Epictetus would never say this, we should follow his example when his leg was broken ("I told you so") or when he would say "This is man's lot" in reply to Rufus who by way of testing him would say to him, "Y ou'll suffer this or that in the hands of your master" (1.9· 2 9 f ).

Supposing now that you do, by talking like that, experience some relief: Later on, when your imagination bites you, a thing you can't control, struggle against it with your intellect, fight it down, don't let it grow strong or take the next step which is the drawing up of the pictures it wants to draw. [Drive out the depressing thought. Think of something else. Practice thought-control.] If you are in [that exile island] Gyara, don't picture life in Rome with the fun you had living there and will have on your return ... And if you are in Rome, don't picture life in Athens .... (III.24.I08f).

Why torture yourself? But "Athens is beautiful." Y es "but happiness is much more beautiful, and peace of mind, unperturbedness, the feeling that your affairs depend on nobody" (IV-4·36f ; cp. 1.9.9). If something is bothering you, remind yourself that you can't get something for nothing. Say that everything has its price. If the wine or oil is spilt or stolen,

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r03

say to yourself, this is the price for peace of mind, this is the price for unruffled spirit; for nothing is got without a price (MIZ.Z; cp. IV.2.z).

When your servant doesn't do what you expect hirn to do, don't get all worked up; don't go around with a "long face, saying everybody hates me" (LI8.19). It's better that your employee be bad than that you should be disturbed. Don't let others upset you (cp. Mrz). If you haven't been invited to a party don't be depressed. Maybe you refused to pay the "price" for which the host "seHs" it: maybe you refused to flatter hirn. If you lament for not being invited, or for not being picked for some important function, you only show how "naive and greedy" you are. Y ou don't get a "head of lettuce" free, do you? So you didn't get invited to the party, but then neither did you have to praise a person you probably dislike or to put up with the insolence of his butler, and engage in gossip and smaH talk (cp. MzS; IV.3.zf; M33.Z). Indeed, consider yourself lucky that you didn't have to mix with the ethical layman, with his silly talk and concerns; for you are bound to get some "soot" on yourself if you brush u p against some bod y covered with it (IILI6.3f; cp. IV.2.rf. And, don't be divided, S-IO, IO.ZS). The price idea is evidently used above preventively as weIl. For Epictetus' advice, "Don't be greedy" has the force of, "Be prepared to pay something for what you want." The preventive use of the price idea is more obvious elsewhere, as when Epictetus wams someone ab out getting a "consulship" or "tribuneship." The position, he says, has its "price," namely servility. If you want position and all that goes with it, he continues, don't think that you'll get them gratis (zo-4). First weigh the likely consequences, the probable losses as weH as gains, making sure too that you don't sell yourself cheap (3.8; L2.S-II, 33). On one occasion Epictetus is particularly graphie about the trouble one lets hirns elf in for attaching hirnself to men in so-called high places and for social climbing (IV.I-4Sff). Speaking of the insatiate, elsewhere Epictetus compares hirn to "the thirst of a man in fever" (9.4), and to the behavior of children who put their hand in a narrow-necked jar trying to take out figs and nuts: if they fill their hand, they can't withdraw it, and then they cry. Let a few go [boy] and you'll gct it out (III.9.zz).

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So also the insatiate (Epictetus adds): if he drops some desires he'lI succeed. Imitate Socrates or Diogenes, Epictetus says in another connection, rather than the man who tries to seduce as many women as he can lay his hands on (IV.9.6f). And, the man who dies for admiration is blind enough not to realize that his professed admirers "secretly despise" hirn (III.23.14f). (The habitual confider (IV.I3) is not only insecure but a trap to others. "Unbosoming his troubles" somehow makes you feel neither "fair" nor "frank" if you don't reciprocate. But how do you know he won't gossip ? Y ou have no obligation to reciprocate. After alI, you didn't invite hirn to confide.) The following is yet another context combining preventiveness with lenitivism, with the emphasis perhaps on the latter: Don't be dissatisfied with or particular about things. "Vinegar is filthy, for it is acid; honey is filthy, for it upsets my digestion; I don't like vegetables." In the same way you say "I don't like having time on my hands, it is loneliness (eremia) , I don'tlike crowds, it is noise." Don't talk like that but if it turns out that you have to be by yourself or in small company, call the circumstance peace and make proper use of it - discuss with yourself, train your perceptions, polish your protoconcepts. And if you find yourself in a crowd, call it agame, a festival, a holiday, try to rejoice with people.

But, the reply comes, people in a crowd bother me with their shoutings: "H's only your hearing that is being bothered" (IV-4.2S-8; cp. 24; I.I2.20f). Don't be a cosmic grouch. 35. Loneliness On loneliness Epictetus speaks further as follows (in fact, a special chapter by that title is devoted to the subject). The "concept of loneliness," he says, does not imply being "alone" but being "helpless." Indeed, he adds, one can be lonely in a crowd or when surrounded by people, as in big cities, big apartment houses, large households (III.I3.If). To disentangle loneliness from aloneness is not only correct but useful (though Epictetus does not bring out the extra fact that loneliness is a matter of feeling, rather than of being, helpless). The disentanglement is useful because people tend to assumethat solitude means loneliness, with the result that when alone they come to experience insecurity and perhaps panic. "I am alone,

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therefore I must be lonely." A feeling is here the direct outcome of conceptual confusion; which once again shows the power that thought and language can have over conduct. (The English "lonely" is not very helpful, though why the word is verbally related to "alone" is perhaps obvious enough: perhaps because people tend to feel more helpless when alone than otherwise. Eut, as Epictetus would say, this is not "necessary." Yet to construe sodety as an organism, as he does, though on a different occasion, would seem to require that the connection should be necessary.) To be lonely, then, implies to feel insecure and exposed to dang er (zf). For this reason, Epictetus adds, we call ourselves lonely or forlom (eremia means both) most especially when we meet with bandits. For it is not the mere sight of a human being that relieves us from eremia, but the sight of a trusting and nonthreatening and useful human being (3f).

This point coheres with the initial one that being lonely does not entail being alone but being (or feeling) helpless, that in fact one can be lonely and helpless even in the company of others. For, in the words of the present quotation, it is not being with people that "relieves us from loneliness (or abandonment)" but being with "helpful" people. This of course is necessary, if "loneliness" entails "helplessness." That is, Epictetus' initial characterization of loneliness implies the present oue. So far, then, he is consistent in his analysis of "the concept of the lonely person." Eut though he starts by distinguishing loneliness from solitude, he ends up by conflating the two - possibly because eremia meant being deserted as weIl. In any case, he realizes that solitude itself might present problems; for in the same general context he endorses the view that people are sodal beings and enjoy each other's company and therefore don't like to be by themselves, adding that uevertheless it is good for a man to prepare hirnself for this also, to be able to be self-dependent, to be able to live with hirnself ... not to need others ....

And he praises the knack of finding ways of spending time profitably and confidently when alone, and makes some sug-

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gestions. Do some thinking, he says, meditate on Zeus' plans, eorrect what is still troubling you, ete. (S-8; ep. I4.2). Finally, he sets up ehildren as an example of what to do to forestall or alleviate loneliness or the feeling of malaise when alone. When ehildren are "left alone, what do they do?" he asks. They gather up broken pieces and dust and build something or other, then pull it down and build something else again; and so are never at a loss to pass the time pleasantly. Am I then, if you go to sea, to sit and cry because I am in this way left alone and deserted? Won't I have broken pieces, won't I have dust? "But they do this out of foolishness" - and we are miserable out of wisdom? ... Why do we make ourselves worse than little children? (I3.r8f).

In sum, when alone or lonely find something to do and don't eomplain about how deserted you are. Imitate ehildren - or (to interpolate) cats, if you ean fall asleep at will, as they can when bored. The above remedies apply also to boredom. (Cats are more representative than dogs of the Stoic or Cynic philosophy.) 36. Objections

Nevertheless, there may be serious flaws in Epictetus' ethics or psychology (even apart from its unverifiable or mythologieal ingredient, such as Zeus or predetermination). We remember hirn saying, for example, to practice "all day long" building resistance to possible misfortune (IV.I.II1-3; cp. LI.2S; IIL3.16). Taken literally, this would entail spending one's energy on practically nothing else. It would also make for self-absorption. But the formeris absurd, while in connection with the latter, what is the point of becoming a Stoic if this means becoming in the process neurotic or obsessive? Yet, as we shall see presently, Arrian's notes abound with statements of this kind. The problem is how to take them. The easy (and traditional) way is to take them at face value; another is to regard them as pedagogic devices of meeting one extreme with another. The latter alternative is not as farfetched as it may seem, granting the premise (advanced in section 2) that Epictetus did in fact use this device as a method of teaching and that his extant writings are snapshots of informal talks and not systematic treatises, publications, or even lectures. Perhaps obvi-

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ous examples of deliberate exaggerations besides the above one, are the first inscription to this book and the statement that "in our acts we are ... complete failures one and aH" (I1.6.14f, I6.18L In fact, unless such assertions are taken with a pinch of salt, Epictetus is not merely often implausible but a logical mess. For, as I shall also go on indicating in the sequel, practically every extremistsounding statement is matched by its opposite somewhere in the extant writings. Harm may be a function of preconception but that it is only this and, further, that nobody can harm anyone else sounds implausible (IV.5.28; cp. I2.7, I3.8; M48.1; LII.33-40). Besides, both are contradicted elsewhere in the remains, as when it is said that to injure others is self-injury (II.Io.26). To say that "nobody [canJ force you to accept what is false" ignores hypnotism and brainwashing (LI7.22; cp. 11.6.21; IIL22.{2f). And the ideas that there is something inalienable in us (that prohairesis is "by nature free," ILI5.1; cp. IV-S.23) and that fe ar cannot compel a man to do something against his will (I.69-71; cp. Aurelius 8.41) ignore, in addition, the fact that practically everybody has his breaking-point or, as Epictetus himself says, that there is a price for which everyone sells himself (1.2·5- II ,33)· To take literaHy the ancient (as well as modern) saying, "Touch what you will ... and it will turn to gold" is naive (III.20.12; cp. 15; IV.IO.9f). It is misleading to "promise" that if you pay attention to me ... wherever you may be, whatever you may be doing, you'n be in no sorrow, no anger, no oppression, no hindrance, but will live unperturbed and free from an care (IILI3.1I; cp. I2f).

No one can promise this; for, to paraphrase Timon and Sextus (Ag. Eth. 170-2), no one can be free from all care. Epictetus himself elsewhere denies by implication that any man has the power to confer this greatest of goods. For, as we remember from section 20, he denies that any man has "the power to bestow the greatest benefit" (IV.I.60f), adding on other occasions that it is "insane" to expect the best to happen to one (1.I2.IIf), that it is unrealistic not to expect untoward things to occur in a life time, for life is "a campaign" (III.24.28-37), and that the ideal Stoic simply does not exist (I1.I9.21-5).

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Equally magical are the notions that "if you will, you are free" (I.I7.28) and that changing oneself is the easiest thing in the world, you need only "will it" (IV.9.I6). We read further that to avoid "abject thoughts" and yearning for the unattainable, to think constantly of "exile and every terrible-seeming thing, and most of all death" (M2I). But this is morbid and not likely to lead to relaxing or to taking life in one's stride (cp. I.I.I7). In places one is advised not to lead things, but follow them (III.IO.I8f), [to] enjoywhat you have and be satisfied with what the moment brings (IV.4.45f; cp. 3.11; 12), [and to] want not that things happen as you wish. but wish that they should happen as they actually do happen and you'll be at peace (M8; cp. M33. 10; LIZ.I5; 1LI4.7f).

But again the result is very likely to be boredom or worse, rather than the anticipated contentment. Moreover, the apparent advice here is incompatible with reform and deliberate change of any kind. Yet Epictetus hirnself on another occasion fleetingly sees that actuality is not necessarily satisfactory (I.n.6f). Besides, to wish for what already exists or is known to exist is a contradiction in terms, since wishing implies the opposite, namely that the wished object or state of affairs does not exist or is not known to exist by the wishing subject. What may be meant, then, is wish elimination - which connects with Epictetus' saying that "you should totally eradicate desire" (IV4-33; cp. /27; MI5; M48.3; III.zz.I3, thoughherea would-beCynicis beingaddressed). But this too is absurd, and for the same reasons. ür, if life is such a desert that there is no use desiring anything, suicide is a better solution. Life minus desire is practically pointless, since desire tends to collect interest, and a life devoid of interest is not worth living. To be sure, if desire involves some pain, renunciation is in a way consistent with a pain-oriented ethics. But only "in a way." For to go against all desire (or wish) is to go against one's entire nature, and this is as painful as anything can be (if indeed it is at all possible, seeing that to deny desire is itself adesire, if one of a higher order). A strong desire may perhaps be oppressive. Hence Epictetus' remark that

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freedorn is not attained by [the satisfaction of] desire but by [itsJ annihihilation (IV.I.I75).

Eut first, if, as Epictetus himself elsewhere intimates (1.4.1), desire-satisfaction leads to happiness, what sense is there to speaking of desire as tyrannical? Surely happiness itself is not so? \Ve want and like happiness. Not that Epietetus eondemns happiness but, as we also saw, he does tend to dismiss pleasure. Yet pleasure too is something wanted and liked. (I t might be said that the desire tor pleasure is despotie. Eut "the desire for pleasure" may wen be a misleading expression for obsession, and obsession is eompulsive (undesirable!) preeisely beeause it is unpleasant. To eondemn obsessive desire is of course to condemn only one kind of desire, not desire per se. Those who eondemn desire simply, may mean to condemn only obsessive desire, or else construe an des ire as obsessive.) Next, "freedom" does not exclude des ire (or pleasure). Ta use Epictetus' own words, Free is he who lives as he wants ... [or pleases ? IV.I.!; cp. ILI.23].

Of course, as we saw above, des ire can be obsessive, and obsession is incompatible with freedom in the sense of spontaneity. Eut then that is why I did not say that freedom "means" desire ; rather, that it does not exclude it. Perhaps when Epictetus rejects desire he means to reject desire (or some particular desire) when it cannot be satisfied or for the time being (ep. M2.2; 1.4.1; II1.I3.21f; 1V.4.37). Or perhaps he means to reject bodily desire. We remember, for example, his disparagement of the pleasures of "the flesh" (III.7.3-5). Likewise, in fragment 23 bodily functions, like eating and drin king (and sex ?), are things to endure. EIsewhere someone is told to treat his body as an overloaded donkey (beeause his body is not his self, 1V.I.78-80). Fragment 26 reads: "You are a little soul carrying around a eorpse" (the body?). And so on (ep. M41; 1.3.5-9; II1.22·41). Yet, to compound the confusion, on other oeeasions Epictetus makes fun of the idea that one should neglect one's body and property (just beeause one doesn't happen to be a Milo or a Croesus, 1.2.37). He even construes care of body as a virtue

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(III.22.86-<); cp. I.44), speaks approvingly of bodily cleanliness as "innate" and as a "distinctive characteristic of man," and goes so far as to say that cleanliness "comes from the gods" (IV.II.I-3). In this whole last chapter, according to Oldfather (II,4I3n), he fights the tendency to uncleanliness of ascetics and others, "vigorously maintaining the validity of [paganJ feeling in this regard." To glorify bodily care is of course the antithesis of a disparagement of the body and a condemnation of the flesh. Often Epictetus appears to be restricting the scope of what is within one's control to subjective states alone - to choosing, assenting, and thinking in general (MI; 14; II.S·4f, I9.3z; III.24.S6, 68 ff; IV.6.9; and other comments on prohairesis and "mine"). Eut again this would lead to the atrophying of desire (if desire is typically outward-directed) or to pain or even to immediate death. Surely, to live only for the sake of assenting or choosing is silly. Eut perhaps this, like the statements apparently expressing the no-desire and zero-wish positions, is not quite what Epictetus has in mind, but some form of authentie realism. The surmise that many of the excerpts examined in this seetion are deliberate exaggerations or manners of speaking or quoted out of context is perhaps reinforced as one remembers Epictetus' refrain that life is agame, and in particular as one considers his remarks on matters of social and international policy. For these remarks are diametrically and often consciously opposed to the philosophy of withdrawal which was seen to permeate much of the material presented in this section. At any rate, whether these remarks substantiate this surmise or the suspicion that Epictetus was confused, the fact remains that, as we shall see next, they do not advocate either asceticism or monasticism.

IX

SOCIAL REl\IARKS

37. Independence and Outgoingness

Epictetus' individual ethics, at any rate onee the apparent excesses have been trimmed, is essentiaIly an ethies of freedom from psyehological slavery. And this need not be ineompatible with interest in people and things. N or is Epictetus unaware of this. Thus, as we already had oeeasion to notiee (in section 24), training for life embraees for hirn developing social tendencies. Or, as he puts it in a different eonneetion, the "ideal" for man (his arete) includes being "fair," as weIl as sueh self-regarding habits as "restraint" and "self-eontrol" (III.I.7-9; and below). Also, the individual ean enjoy the "sight" and "eompany" of others (IV4.26-8), and can be a family man (III.2I.S, 2-4, etc.) and clean; for cleanliness is both a private and a social desideratum, so that a dirty man might as weIl go live in the "wilderness" (IV.II.r3-8). The individual needn't be a recluse (ep./r), and ean even risk death for his family and eountry (M32.3). The free man will "labor to attain worrylessness, while yet have regard for [his] social ties" (IV.Io.r3). He will "rejoiee in those who stay with [hirn, though he] won't be sad at those who leave" (III.24.rrf). If anything goes wrong with his outward relations, he will be able to stand the exeision. He won't be swept by his impulses. He will have stamina (karteria), will "bear and forbear" (lw.Sf). For he won't develop symbiotie relationships; he won't be irrationally attached to "externals. "When your pot is damaged, Epictetus says, you don't starve to death, but go out and buy yourself another one (IV.IO.34). For 01 course it is aIl right, he says on another oceasion, to go out and buy things. There is nothing wrong with going to a shoe store to get shoes or to the market for vegetables. Only, don't "flatter" the merchant, or the rich, or the one you depend on for

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SOCIAL REMARKS

the fulfillment of your needs. Don't "kiss his hand" - unless you do it minus your heart. If the man is willing to sell or give what you want, fine. Otherwise go to someone else. Or forget about it. H's not worth the bother. The price is too high. H's like paying "a talent for a head of lettuce." Get what you want but don't cringe, don't be afraid (II1.24-44-9; cp. 71; II.6.6-8, I8.1g; 1.I9.4-6). Again, rational will may be what we should pay most attention to, but this does not me an that others and things and necessities, like shoes and clothes, and one's lesser faculties, like sight and hearing and speech, should be neglected. For this is neither "good" nor "natural." A man should strive to exercise his capacities and talents on some "outward material, though without incorporating it," or: he must be careful to preserve his balance. It is indeed difficult to mix and combine the two [but it is] impossible to be

happy otherwise.

What is the solution? Well, it is as though we were on a sea trip. What can I do? I can select the captain, the crew, the day, the hOJr. Then a storm breaks.

H is no longer my concern, but that of the captain. \Vorse, the ship goes down. So what? "I drown without fear ... realizing that what is born must also perish." I am a human being, not immortal. Why cry? I am like "the hour in the day." As it must pass, so must I at some time. What difference does it make howwhether it is by fever or by drowning? All roads to the grave are the same. Imitate the cool dice player, who takes it the way the dice falls (11.23.23-7,5.6-14,21, zf, 6.18). One needn't be "unfeeling like astatue" (III.2-4). Even "affection" is part of the game of life - provided again one doesn't sell his soul to his love-object, doesn't exchange independence for slavery, repose for anxiety; for there is no "advantage" in that. What, Epictetus asks, is there to prevent an individual from loving somebody as one subject to death, as amigrant? Didn't Socrates love his children? But as a free man .... [And] was there anybody Diogenes didn't love ... ? (z4.59"-64; cp. LII.I7).

Self-assurance is compatible with affection and should combine

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II3

with it. That is why Socrates, who was so stable that he "always wore the same facial expression" (25.31; cp. II1.5.17), lived such a full and happy life, because he was warm and self-confident. Contrariwise (to interpolate a little) , lack of self-confidence tends to make for aggression; fear is apt to generate hostility. Or, as Epicurus put it (in C. Bailey's fragment 84), "Whoever causes fe ar is not free from fear." Epictetus also tends to endorse sexual love, though he is not blind to the dang er and potential turbulence involved in eros (IV.I.1S-7, 20, 36; II1.I3.10). Thus, he exonerates Crates for marrying on the ground that he was in love (22.76); for, as we shall see in section 39, philosophers like Crates were not supposed to marry. (See Laertius 6.96f for the grande affaire between Crates and Hipparchia, the first, or one of the first, fern ale philosophers.) Again, Epictetus compares "being in love with a pretty girl" to being absorbed in a kind of Socratic dedication to an ideal, when one doesn't care whether one is ill, hungry, or nearing death (II1.5.18f). Accordingly, he adds on another occasion, when somebody out of love is forced to do something against his own judgment, all the while seeing the better path but laclcing the strength to follow, one might be more disposed to think that he deserves forgiveness, as being in the clutches of something violent, and in a way divine (IV. I. 147)·

At times Epictetus evinces a humorous attitude toward love, as when he was seen earlier to remark that young beginners in philosophy should avoid pretty girls because "pot and stone ... don't mix" (III.I2.12). Humor, sympathy, and reverence characterize also some of his comments on straight sex. Thus, referring to philosophers who easily lose their heads, he says he wouldn't mind standing over one [of them] while he was making love, to observe his eagerness and what words he utters, whether he remembers his own name, or the arguments he hears or makes or reads (IV.I.143).

In his cosmology he was seen to point to sex as evidence of design and to maintain that the godhead participates in the very act of intercourse (1.6.8; II.8.lZ). In one of his discussions of courage he implies that a life minus

SOCIAL REMARKS

one's private parts may not be worth living (1.2.25-9). Sometimes he speaks of sexual incontinence, but the context is usually one of training or committing adultery. Adultery, or adultery without the consent of both spouses (it is not clear which), is condemned because it is thought to be a form of betrayal, greed, or stealing, and therefore to gather loss of self-respect (II.I8.6, 15-8, 4.8-II). And though he is not altogether in favor of free love, unlike Rufus he does not condemn it either. N or does he recommend that it should be made illegal. His reasoning behind this is not apparent, but the tenets in his own words are as follows: Abstain as weil as you can before marriage from sex; and ü you have intercourse stay within the law [don't commit adultery ?]. But don't make yourself obnoxious to those who do make love or censorious; also don't keep bringing up your abstinence (M33.8).

Many Stoics and Cynics went further. Indeed, according to Sextus and Laertius, Diogenes, Zeno, and Chrysippus, for example, condoned or regarded as neutral practically every erotic activity, except of course rape. (Some Cynic ladies, like Nicion, were call girls.) The general, though not the only idea was that sexual desire is a pain, and sexual gratification arelief (a medicinal attitude toward love-play). So also Sextus. Diegenes' er Crates' reason for making love in the street was that if something can be done in private, there is no reason why it shouldn't be done in public. Perhaps he had in mind psychic wholeness. Aristippus the Hedonist was also a champion of eros. Consistently or not, then, Epictetus does allow for fellowship and outgoingness. It is not an accident that though he frequently speaks of freedom from pain or fear, he nowhere uses the expression "freedom from feeling." (Similarly, the idiom "Be a stoic" does not mean "Have no feelings (or affection)" but "Take it easy, don't panic.") Moreover, Epictetus attacks Epicurus on the whole pre.cisely because he took him to be advocating withdrawing from social affairs (1.23; II.2D; III.7). The remainder of this chapter can likewise function as evidence that he does not teach (or does not teach consistently) an ethics of unconcern. But first a note on his afiinity to Epicurus, for he is much closer to hirn than he realizes. Thus, Epicurus as well sanctions freedom from pain and fear, ethical realism, considers happiness more important than survival,

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II5

disparages death and burial, makes the ethieal use of intelligenee take preeedenee over all other uses, eompares philosophy to medieine, saying that unless philosophy "heals the sufferings of the mind [it isJ pointless, " adding that "pains of mind are worse ethan pains of bodyJ" (154; Laert. 10.137). No belief or ideology was justified for hirn if it inereased rather than deereased the sense of inseeurity. Even his disparagement of disinterested seienee and his utilitarian eoneeption of morality find echo es in Epietetus, the former in fragment land the latterin, e.g. the assertion that the function of virtue is to make for worrylessness and happiness (1.4.3-6). They also shared empirieism of a kind and to an extent the doetrine of protoeoneepts. And if Epietetus is ineonsistent in his soeial ethies, he at times agrees with mueh that he finds most objeetionable in Epieurus. lt is not an aeeident that Gellius, who had the highest regard for Epietetus, defends Epieurus against Plutareh (z.8f; 17.19-4).

38. Man as Social Before going on with Epictetus' polieies, let me finish his psyehology. He vaeillates between a relatively weak soeial psyehology (the individual is loosely tied to soeiety) and a relatively strong, whieh eulminates in the eoneeption of sodety as an organism. The weak psyehology has already been suffieiently eanvassed. Man was not meant to be a hermit : "Do you think that man is a being made to live by itself or soeially? Soeially" (f I). "Nobody is bad without loss and damage" (II.IO.Ig). "Man is naturally faithful" and "affeetionate" (4.1; IV.I.IZ6). A disloyal individual is not "a man but a wolf or an ape" (I1.4.II) or a "snake" or a "wasp" (IV.I.IZ7). Man is not a "wild beast" but a "tarne and sodal animal" (II.IO.I4; ep. IV.I.lzof, IZ7, 5.Io;lz5; PI. Soph.

2zzb).

He has a natural sense of trust, affeetion, benevolenee, toleranee (I1.Io.Z3). He doesn't have to lose money to suff er ; hurting others is enough (I4f). "Unfairness is a great injury to the unfair" (IV.5.IO) and "nobody ean do wrong with impunity" (I.IIgf). These may be lofty views, traceable to Antiphon's or Soerates'

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idea that to hann others is self-harm (cp. 11.IO.26). However, one must be careful not to misunderstand Epictetus in this connection. He is not intent on moralizing; rather, he is expressing what to him is a psychological theory. Sociability is not an obligation somehow imposed on the individual, but a need and an inclination. Epictetus adheres to psychological egoism: a man can be moved only by what he thinks is his own interest. Zeus hirnself and even the sun, Epictetus says, are so motivated because there is a cosmic principle of "self-conservation." Surely, he exclaims, "one cannot expect a man to hold aloof from hirnself." Nor, he adds, can self-interest, as such, be regarded as "unsocial." The individual and society are so constituted that their interests coincide. Sociability is a fact about human nature, not an obligation. To cut oneself off from society or to harm one's fellow-man is like starving oneself to death (1.I9.II-5, 22.13f; 11.22.1, 15-21). It might be said that the idea to injure others is self-injury, renders punishment superfluous. But what if self-injury is not always evident to the agent? A more serious objection is to say that the idea lacks in realism, if not in self-consistency. But this idea apart, how does Epictetus explain the fact that many men act unsocially and appear to enjoy being cruel and sadistic? Indeed, he hirnself says as much. Some of us, he remarks, are "Iarge beasts," others "mean little animals" (11.9.6). Does he contradict himself? Does he read an ideal (or wish) into his subject ? Does he so define the word "man" that it necessarily implies being gentle? In either case his analysis is deficient. This is obvious if he contradicts hirnself. But equally, if he unwittingly recommends a way of life (such as the life of co operation as against that of competition), or defines or redefines a word, he again falls to capture any organism. His talk belongs not to psychology or biology but to crypto-reform (moral or linguistic) or to lexicography. (This risk is characteristic of "theories of man," partly because of the emotiveness as well as vagueness attaching to the word "man." Maybe, then, a really scientific theory would dispense with this word, save perhaps as a shorthand, and would confine itself to formulating relatively precise correlations, such as that bipeds have kidneys.) In defense of Epictetus it might be said that recent investi-

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II7

gations (such as those of I. D. Suttie, Karen Horney, and of the World Health Organization about delinquents and orphans) show that hostility is indeed not a primary propensity but a function of insecurity, resulting from refused affection or approval. But what if the demand for affection or approval is "selfish"? Again, the idea that unless an individual "relates" hirns elf to others he eventually ceases to be "human," is inadequate to establish man's sociable nature, if an individual can "relate" to others aggressively. A similarly inconclusive argument for man's sociability is that the individual's very identity is a function of others (more precisely, of what he believes others think of hirn). Sociability Epictetus also characterizes as man's function, promise, calling. Hence his comparison of men to instruments and expressions, which obviously can literally be described as having functions. (Animals too are so described and compared.) As the function or promise of a flute is to play music, Epictetus says, so man's purport is, among other things, to be sociable. And, as something which does not play music is either not a musical instrument or it is a paar one, so if samething is not sociable, it is either not a human being or it is a deficient human being (cp. II.9f). This view is obviously part of Epictetus' cosmic teleology and therefore need detain us only long enough to give it a brief epitaph. Perhaps the nations of function, purpose, and destiny, in the biologie al field, give way to some such nation as tendency, which in turn can be explicated operationally and statistically. In arguing for the social nature of man, Epictetus even resorts to organismic analagies. The individual is compared to members of the human body, the total organism being the community and ultimately the universe at large. Just as a detached "foot will no langer be a foot, so you also if detached [from the community] will no longer be a man." The individual can no more live outside the social environment than a foot can survive dismembered from a body (unless it is put in a freezer?). Moreover, since the social whole is more "basic" than the social parts, it is "right" for the individual occasionally to be siek, to run risks, to be in want, and even to die before his time, for the sake of the group. What then is the role of a citizen ? To regard nothing as a matter of private interest, to consider nothing as though he were a detached unit, but to be like the foot or the hand, which if they possessed intellect and understood

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SOCIAL REMARKS

the nature of things, would never will or desire anything except in refer ence to the whole. For this reason the philosophers correct1y say that if the good man had foreknowledge of events, he would collaborate even with disease and death and maiming [cp. Marxism on justification of Communist Party even though Revolution and communist take-over inevitable], for he would realize that this role is assigned to him by the configuration of the whole, and the whole is more primary than the part, and the city than the citizen. Seeing however that we have no foreknowledge, it is fitting that we should ding to those things which are naturally choiceworthy, as we are born for this (11.5.24-6, IO.4-6; cp. 5.13f; 6.9f; Aurel. 6.54, 45, etc.).

The organic comparison perhaps is not meant to be taken too seriously; perhaps it is another deliberate exaggeration. In any case, it is obvious that while a person can commit suicide for example, a foot cannot. A person has a "will of his own," but in what sense can a foot or toe be said to have a will of its own? And, while the heart, for instance, is indispensable to a normal human organisrn, no particular individual seems indispensable to society. Likewise about government: While no foot can in any way perform the operations of the brain, practically any mature citizen can be "head of state" or fill some political office. At least, government in most cases is routine work, requiring no extraordinary abilities. This destroys as well the argument of political organicism against democracy as a form of government, though Epictetus is more anxious to defend social than political organicism. People form communities not because they are parts of wholes, but more likely because they are thrown together or (as the words "community" and koinönia suggest) because they share common interests. Epictetus speaks, though not perhaps in so many words, of individual sacrifice. (It is "right," he was seen to say, for the individual to run risks and even die before his time for the sake of the whole.) But the idea of individual sacrifice no more fits organicism as a description of man than the idea of individual' 'my" or self does. If the individual is part and parcel of society, he cannot be said to have interests which rnay conflict with those of society's, and therefore to be capable of "sacrificing" hirns elf for society, any more than this can be said of a foot in relation to its body. (A man can "sacrifice" his foot.) The idea of individual sacrifice may fit organicism as an ideal-

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II9

though Epictetus does not make the distinction between descriptive and normative organicism (though, as we saw, he does use value words, e.g. "right" and "fitting," in expounding his version of organicism). But in any case, he cannot accept unqualified normative organicism either. For, for one thing, he condemns slavery. He cannot, in view of this condemnation, require of the individual that he should sacrifice himself for just any society he may happen to belong to. Epictetus' cosmic pan-feeling doctrine, mentioned in section 13, may be briefly examined at this point. Now if this doctrine is taken literally and as meaning that individuals do, rather than should, share in each other's feelings, Epictetus is no more plausible here than he is in his description of society as an organism. On the other hand, if the doctrine is taken in the above second sense or as aprescription and again literally, it (like organicism) would dash with other parts of the extant writings. For it would require the sharing of pains as weIl as of pleasures, and this would make for the ethical waste and even perhaps for the reverberation discussed in section 27; and also for utopianism. For is it realistic to hope that a policy of universal friendship will work with thousands, millions, billions of people? (That is why Plato restricted the size of the population in his ideal societies to a very smaIl number of people, no more than 10,000 in the Republic and almost half as many in his later work, the Laws. But, short of force, how can this be attained, while if force is used, what will happen to friendship?) Perhaps all that can reasonably be expected of actual man is considerateness and limited affection. At any rate, nothing more can Epictetus' individual ethics absorb.

39. Troubleshooting and Cosmopolitanism Epictetus' description of man as naturally sociable blends with his doctrine of the philosopher Scout (or philanthropia) in that the Scout helps people because he is interested in them, not because he feels obliged or compelled to do so. Philanthropia was an inclination, not a duty. The Stoics and before them the Cynics, developed the idea and practice of philanthropia. Of course Socrates

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himself was a "gadfly." But with his admirers and followers, from Diogenes through Demonax notably, this "interest in mankind" took the form of concern for the unhappy, not primarily, as with Socrates (cp. III.I4.9). for the ignorant and conceited. Philanthropia meant neither charity nor philanthropy. It did not mean charity in the same sense in which emotional or psychiatrie help does not mean charity. (The story may be different with "charitable.") It did not mean philanthropy either because neither the Cynics nor the Stoics were typically concerned with financial problems, any more than (with the exception of Seneca) they were wealthy. Not perhaps that they were opposed to helping the needy with money: many Cynics practiced living off others and some gave or threw away their inheritance or wealth and lived in that manner. Ulysses did well, Epictetus says, to request food from the girls when he was shipwrecked (III.26.33), implying elsewhere that it is not always disgraceful for the poor to be supported by the rich (f I3); for poverty is not necessarily shameful, nor should one be upset if others "pity" hirn for being poor or a nobody. What others think of one is in any case beyond one's control and therefore of no consequence (IV.6.zIff). The distinctive job of the Scout was ethical rather than economic assistance. I t was to help people with their emotional troubles (free of charge or in return for room and board). The posthumously deified Demonax was so liked that people would beg hirn to spend the night with them. The Scout was not typically a political reformer either, though this did not prevent some Cynics from Alexandria and Megalopolis, and some Stoics, such as Sphairos of Borysthenes and Blossios of Cumae, to engage in social reform and even to initiate uprisings. The Scout, as Epictetus portrays hirn, was not an ordinary fellow. Though his appearance and wit are not neglected, his only possessions and armor are his "self-esteem." And, He must be beaten Iike a donkey and while he is being beaten he must love the very men who beat him as if he were the father and brother of them all (I1I.22.I3 ff, 52, 54f, 86ff).

Peregrinus, a second century A.D. Cynic, even burnt hirnself alive for the benefit of mankind, as he put it. Small wonder that the Cynic Scout is described by Epictetus as a "messenger" of and

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"friend and servant" of "the gods" (23,69f, 95; on Peregrinus see Lucian Per. 33, 23, though Lucian regarded Peregrinus as a fake; but the discussion in Dudley (171 ff) suggests bias on Lucian's part). The philosopher Scout is needed because the world is a "battlefield" (unhappiness-riddled); otherwise, Epictetus adds, he would be superfluous (III.22.67-9). To protect in effect the Scout against the accusation of being a "meddler" and allow hirn to off er uninvited assistance, Epictetus tacitly likens hirn to a "general" (97). But aseparate case should have been made for giving the Scout the right to offer unsolicited help. For this right is not self-evident, any more than it is democratic. Surely, only totalitarian societies are comparable to armies obeying generals. At any rate, unless being a physician implies the above right, Epictetus is once again caught in a contradiction; for, as we remember from section 25, he also compares the philosopher (and hirnself as weIl) to a physician. Or is a philosopher, even in Epictetus' practical use of the term, not to be identified with the philosopher Scout? Maybe. (But see also, on meddling, next chapter.) The ethical troubleshooter, Epictetus goes on, cannot marry. The reason is not that there is something wrong with marriage per se ("For people ... marry ... to be happy," I.II.3f) nor, as we saw in section 37, with love and sex, but because the Scout cannot be partial to any segment of mankind, but must regard all humans as his "children." "Yes; but Crates married." You're referring to a special case that arose out of love and you're assuming a wife herself another Crates [that is, Scout; III.22.67ff, Sr, 76J.

But then why reproach Demonax for not marrying and raising a family of his own? (See section 1). The Scout need not be a male. Nor does Epictetus hirnself seem to have been an antifeminist. On one occasion (M 40) he reproves the tendency of females to look upon themselves as playthings of males, and on another (III.24.37) he says that "a beautiful woman is something pleasant." (Occasionally he pokes fun at ejjeminacy, I.27ff.) The Scout does not discriminate racially or ethnically either. But both egalitarianism and cosmopolitanism are argued for separately by Epictetus.

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His egalitarianism is manifest especially in his brief comments on slavery, which can be paraphrased as follows: The principle of siblinghood encompasses the slave ("the slave" too is "our brother"). Next, slavery is not "natural" but conventional or arbitrary. "Naturally" the slave is just as "divine" as the freeman; the "seed" which brought hirn to life is of the same quality as that of the freeman (i.e. there is no blood difference between slave and free man). Next, the more fortunate is not entitled to despise or "tyrannize" the less fortunate. Finally, the legal system of slaveryis "base" (I.I3.2-5; cp. II.Z3.24f). Revolt? Epictetus defends a doctrine of equal rights and at the same time holds that people are unequal in ability. This is a consistent stand. Doctrines of equal rights do not typically mean equal ability, or for that matter, equal rewards, but equal opportunity and equal protection before the law (however "equal" occurs throughout the doctrines). Epictetus may not be a consistent pantheist, but it is worth noting in any case that pantheism (or literal pantheism) cannot condemn slavery, since its basic premise, "Everything is divine" implies that everything (and therefore actual slavery) is all right. (Pantheism of course is not only ethically impotent, since it cannot reject; it is also absurd, if divinity is a species of value and if it is impossible to value or worship just anything.) Epictetus' endorsement of cosmopolitanism is as follows: "you are a world citizen," he says (II.IO.3; cp. I5.IOf; III.z4.53). Why, he adds ironically, does one say, "I am an Athenian" rather than mentioning the bit of earth on which one was born? (I.9.2f). When Socrates was as~ed where he came from, he did not give any such answer but said instead, "I am a citizen of the world" (lf). And, Epictetus adds, so did Diogenes, who made the whole universe his "fatherland." (R. D. Hicks, in his edition of Laertius, conjectures that kosmopolites originated with Diogenes; II, 64 na.) When Diogenes was taken prisoner, Epictetus goes on, he did not hanker for Athens and his friends there, but got on very weIl with the pirates, and even tried to change them. "Later, when he was sold into slavery in Corinth he lived there just as he had lived in Athens." Had he gone even to the "Perrhaebians" (inhabitants of a remote place in Thessaly,

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123

Northern Greeee), he would not have ehanged his way of life (III.24.6S f).

40. Legal Questions Cosmopolitanism eoheres with the Cynie-Stoie emphasis on freeelom in that to belong to the whole world rather than to any part of it is the height of plaee-independence. (But what if this eoneluces to the feeling of homelessness anel nonbelongingness, and therefore to insecurity?) Internationalism also eoheres with pacifism and worlel government. \Var was generally eondemned by the Stoics, and Rufus almost lost his life on aecount of his antiwar attitude. Epictetus, however, says nothing in the extant writings on either paeifism or world government, though he does often speak of "the world city." But this may weIl belong to his organicism or eosmopolitanism, rather than to a theory of world government. In an)' ease, he was not against government per se. Like Diogenes (though unlike other Cynies), he does not seem either to repudiate the state as an institution or to maintain that laws are superfluous. To be sure, on one occasion he says that divine law, rather than "the laws of Masurius and Cassius," should be obeyed (IV.3.I2). But this need not be theoretieal anarehism. Perhaps Epietetus is thinking here of slavery law, and Roman law ("the laws of Masurius anel Cassius") was a slavery law. Or, judging by the wider eontext and other passages (e.g. I.1S9-61), including the ones on slavery discussed above, perhaps the meaning is that divine or ethieal preseriptions are more binding than legal; whieh probably means not that man shouldn't be governed by laws, but that legality should be based on morality (see eh. x). Then too, as already noted, Epictetus advises that sexual anel marital laws be obeyed (M33.8; 11.4.10). And he also speaks approvingly of "the citizen eomplying with the laws of the city" (1.I2.7f; ep. II1.24.107, IO.8; 1.29.9). On yet another occasion he discusses not the desirability of the state but its proper funetion, saying the following (II1.7.33-6): No state is rational if it is based only on threats or eoereion. Laws must be supported by reasons; they must be "advantageous,"

124

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presumably to the people. Otherwise they are arbitrary and despotie, and exact no respect but at most fear. Neither, Epictetus adds elsewhere, is servility "profitable" to the state or to the citizenry, but is its "destruction" (24.49). Revolution? If Epictetus accepted the state he must also have accepted legal punishment, whether in the form of retribution, deterrence, or reformation. The last, though, can be termed punishment only perhaps by extension. For it is not absurd to say that so-and-so should be reformed but not punished. Punishment, unlike reform, definitely implies pain-infliction and indines toward the past rather than the future; so that it is doser to retribution C'Y ou must pay for this") than to reformation C'You'll have to change") or deterrence C'You'll be made into an example"). It is true, however, that in legal contexts "reformation" too tends to imply inflicting some kind of pain on the offender , such as coercion and confinement. (No doubt, if the offender is willing to undergo change, there is no compulsion. But then perhaps there is strictly no "punishment" either.) Reform is not for the offender's own good only, but also, if not especially, for the good of others. All three "forms" of punishment have a common basis - the tendency to pain-infliction. And though they differ, they are compatible: vindictiveness, concern for the offender and society, and warning others, all three or four motives can coexist in the same act of punishment. Now, though Epictetus' acceptance of the state commits hirn to the acceptance of legal punishment, what he actually and explicitly says on the latter subject in the remains is not very dear and can only be surmised. As we saw in section 26, he certainly is against vengeance in interpersonal relations. He was also seen to be against sentencing the bandit and adulterer to death. Then there are two stories he mentions, one concerning the Stoic Agrippinus, the other Lycurgus. Agrippinus used to say, Epictetus relates, that he did not sentence the offender as his "enemy" but as his "guardian," and compared his role as judge or governor to a physician who "persuades" and "encourages" his patient to "submit to the operation" (122). But the context does not indicate whether Epictetus is merely describing Agrippinus here or siding with hirn. Of course the point of telling the story could be that he wanted to

SOCIAL REMARKS

I25

express his preference for reformation rather than retribution, and if he admired Agrippinus (as he did: see section 33), this is a definite possibility. The Lycurgus passage is more conclusive. Lycurgus literally refused to use the eye-for-an-eye doctrine or, in Epictetus' own words, instead of using the right given hirn by the people [to] punish in any way he pleased [the youth who] blinded hirn in one eye [he] educated him and turned him into a good man.

\Ve "all aclmire," Epictetus continues, Lycurgus' statement in the theatre to the effect that he received a rascal and is returning a pu blic-minded being (f 5). Ginn this 50mewhat slim evidence, then, it is perhaps reasonable to suppose that Epictetus favored reformation rather than retribution or even perhaps deterrence. And he presumably condemned retribution because of its underlying motive (revenge) anel, judging especially by the Lycurgus passage, because of its sterility as a method of improving the offender. Not that retribution (or deterrence) may not have a beneficial effect on the offender, but only by chance, not by design.

x

AFTERTHOUGHTS

The individual in Epictetus' thought is often the center of concentric circles, with country, race, and world as peripheries. One meaning of this is that, as the constitution of a typical federal union is more basic than the several constitutions of the constituent states, so "naturallaw" is more basic than national, the law of Zeus than the law of Caesar. Stripped of its mythological or metaphorical component, this reduces to the idea that Stoic law, or rather Stoic ethics is the most binding moral framework the individual need live by. If a norm, legal or other, contravenes Stoic ethics (or some version of Stoic ethics), it is invalid - for the Stoic. Whether or not the non-Stoic lives by the norm is his affair, not the Stoic's. For, ideally at any rate, the Stoic is not a proselytizer: he leaves it up to the individual how, or even whether, he is going to be "saved" (cp. IH. 23.Z7f). He may, however, offer assistance if asked. Stoic naturallaw doctrine, then, is not strictly a law doctrine: it involves neither laws 01 nature nor legal, enforceable laws. Stoic law is not discoverable by observation of phenomena or by experimental and laboratory research; nor is it necessarily passed by legally instituted authorities or backed by force. "Naturallaw" is law only by courtesy. Neither Epictetus, though, nor the rest of the Stoics were clear on this. And they were not clear on this because their interest in this connection was not in theory (the theory of law) but in practice, in telling the individual that he needn't follow the customs and laws of his society if they don't make sense. (This is literally a revolutionary idea.) Only, instead of always appealing to what makes ethical sense, the Stoics, and before them the Cynics and Sophists, frequently spoke, misleadingly, of what

AFTERTHOUGHTS

12 7

happens. There are many things that happen (that are part of "nature"), but unfortunately not all of them make ethical sense. (Hence, going backwards and self-refutingly, the need forsaying that "reason is ubiquitous," that "Pravidence exists." Which also tends to make negative ethics superfluous.) I have been speaking of making ethical sense, rather than of making sense simply, because otherwise my point about the Stoic appeal to nature as a misleading appeal to human interests would be blurred, since the second, unqualified expression has also a nonethical use, as when we say that science makes (or tries to makel sense of things. The two uses of "making sense" can be contrasted by saying that, while, for example, death and decay and senility may make sense scientifically (are understood, explained, can be predicted), they don't necessarily make sense ethically (in terms of what we wish). To go from what makes sense in one use of this phrase to what makes sense in the other, is evidently fallacious. Yet it wouldn't be surprising if much of the appeal of the doctrine of naturallaw or of universal reason rested on such an equivocation. Notice as weIl that some such ambiguity (whether a cause or an effect of the naturallaw doctrine) is widespread, permeating the whole range of logos- or reason-terms, and that includes also "explanation" and "understanding." Thus to say, "Explain yourself" is obviously not arequest for a descriptive or scientific account, but for an excuse. Wh at makes ethical sense? A short and vague answer, implicit in the above, is: happiness. Epictetus would add: unfazedness. Perhaps, then, the timeliest aspect of his work is his "demythologized" or "purified" ethics. Cosmopolitanism and siblinghood are contemporary trends, while some psychiatrists and psychotherapists use typically Stoic techniques and notions, whether they realize it or not. Thus the method of making fun of one's troubles forms part of Frankl's "existential therapy" or "logotherapy" under the name of "paradoxical intention" (Man' s Search tor Meaning, pp. 196f; Doctor and Soul, 2d ed., pp. 221ff). Compare also Frankl's statement that even when "conditions" are beyond our contral, we still have "freedom to take a stand toward the conditions" (Meaning, p. 205; cp. p. xiii; the latter, by theway, is the only connectionin which "the ancient

128

AFTERTHOUGHTS

Stoics" are mentioned, though again not by Frankl hirns elf but by Allport who wrote the Preface). Eut it must be emphasized that the theoretical underpinning of "logotherapy," consisting as it does of an objectification of meanings and values, is not traceable to Epictetus. Also worth mentioning is A. Ellis' "rational therapy" which is more akin to Epictetus' ethics and more consciously indebted to it. Thus in Reason and Emotion in Psychotherafry (p. 54) Ellis quotes approvingly the second inscription to this book, for one of his basic findings and theses is that Sustained negative emotions (other than those caused by continuing physical pain or discomfort) are invariably the result of stupidity, ignorance ... and intemalized sentences about outside things and events ... and for the most part they may be, and should be, eliminated by the application of knowledge and straight thinking (53f).

(Eut on page 361 Ellis misreads Epictetus' smoke-door metaphor, thinking it relates to life, rather than to freedom to depart from life, or suicide.) Admittedly Epictetus' nonchemico-physical therapeutic techniques will be outmoded when (or if) anxiety, dejection, and the rest will all be erasable by means of an operation or shock treatment or electricalconditioningor a pill, etc. (N arcotics andalcohol, of course, have been put to such use since time immemorial.) Eut meanwhile, at any rate, apparently his techniques have still some use, not to mention the fact that rational education, another characteristic feature of his thought, will stay with man as long as man is rational; for indeed the denial of this is self-contradictory. Admittedly too, his stress on mental upbringing and training, as against change in "externals," contrasts with present-day trends or realities. Eut what good would the affluent or classless (not necessarily Marx's) society or going to the mo on or getting ahead do if one is weak, greedy, afraid, neurosis-ridden? Also, of course, it is what one makes of things, not the things themselves, that counts. To be impressed, for example, by "gross national products" at the expense of mental health is to put the cart before the horse. Epictetus does not believe that solving external problems, as such, brings peace of mind. He does not believe that the way to contentment is inevitably attained by accumulating things or reorganizing society. The center of ethical

AFTERTHOUGHTS

12 9

gravity should be in the individual rather than outside, though, he would add, this does not mean that "externals should be neglected." Epictetus was impressed by the phenomenon of suffering and tried to do something ab out it. His emphasis on the individual, rather than the social and physical environment, is the result of his pinpointing the source of distress in man's innate or acquired impulses and ways of categorizing things. As he puts it in a slightly different connection, one must keep "watch over hirns elf as over an enemy lying in ambush" (M48.3). Take the widespread tendency to possessiveness. "If only I could own her (hirn), everything would be all right; I would be safe." Yet, as soon as one feels he has finally got hold of someone else's soul, it slips away. You may love, Epictetus says, but treat your love-object as something transient and fickle - though again not necessarily because he is "mean," for he may not be. Say anyway, "That's the way things are." Everyone is in the same boat (cp. M12.Z). And, if X does not satisfy you, turn to Y or Z. Don't put all your eggs in the same basket. To be dependent on this or that individual is (more) to be dependent on whims. (Fe ar of this prompts one also to favor "the rule of law" over that of man. Unreliability decreases as one goes from man to nonman.) Impulse, desire, hope, are apt to mislead. So is self-thought. We say, "I can't do this," when to a bystander it is obvious that we can. We think we have to live (or go on living) in a certain way, when nobody forces us to do so. We don't even have to live if we don't want to. The door is open. Even suicide in Epictetus is an expression of freedom. And what liberates is knowledge. The unaware is at the mercy of inherited or borrowed predilections. He misconstrues changeable courses of action as immutable. He feels he has no option, when he has. And so, in his nonfatalist moods, Epictetus allows for more freedom than even existentialism does. Absurdity, anguish, nausea, abandonment, despair, he would say, are not necessary. But the remains neglect revolt theory. Since interest in substantive questions is interlaced in Epictetus with interest in logic and analysis, this may wen prove that the split in current philosophy between analysts and nonanalysts is unnecessary. Certainly it is not clear why a concern with language and concepts cannot combine with a concern with problems of life and death. Vested interests apart, only a narrow definition of

13°

AFTERTHOUGHTS

philosophy or a superficial acquaintance with the powers of conceptual clarification prevents the analyst from appreciating what the existentialist or Marxist or anarchist is trying to do, or vice versa. Indeed, despite both camps, the results of concept analysis is not just description or information, but change in one's outlook on life and language. Surely no layman would recognize his conception of truth, meaning, happiness, value, right, wrong, duty, state, existence, reality, god, or sin in the logician's or analyst's results. He comes to conceptual philosophy with linguistic as weil as extralinguistic assumptions, and often feels depressed (or elated) after a dose of philosophical analysis. Philosophical analysis is not lexicography, while it can be debunking. Analytic and nonanalytic philosophy complement rather than compete with each other, the former by providing the latter with at least a tool, the latter by supplying the former with direction. Which shows too that they can coexist in the same thinker and moment of thought.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

For a bibliography of Epictetus in different languages, editions, translations, selections, and commentaries, through 1946 see VV. A. Oldfather, Contributions Toward a Bibliography 01 Epictetus (Urbana, 1927) and a Supplement, ed. M. Harman (Urbana, 1952). For short lists of translations in Dutch, English, French, and German, and of critical works on Epictetus in various languages, see J. Souilhe, ed., tr., Epict?;te, Entretiens (Paris, 1948), I, lxxxiiif, and Oldfather below. The following two lists include translations and commentaries in English only, and the third, writings mentioned or alluded to in this book. II. EDITIONS AND ENGLISH TRANSLATIONS

Matheson, P. E., Epictetus: The Discourses and 1Vlanual together with Fragments 01 his Writings, 2 vols. Oxford, 1916. Translation, introduction, notes, and index. Reprinted in W. J. Oates, ed., The Stoic and Epicurean Philosophers, New York, 1940. Oldfather, W. A., Epictetus: The Discourses as Reported by Arrian, the Manual, and Fragments, 2 vols. London and Cambridge, Mass., vol. I, 1925, vol. II, 1928; the Loeb Classical Library Series. Greek text, English translation, with abrief commentary, biography, bibliography, and a thorough but somewhat indiscriminate index. The translation is more literal and reliable than Matheson's, though it, like Matheson's (and G. Long's and T. W. Higginson's), is inaccurate on points of ethics and logic (though I am indebted to all four). The Greek text is based on H. Schenkl, Epicteti Dissertationes ab Arriano Digestae (Leipzig, 1894; editio minor 1898; 2d ed. 1916). Standard text edition. Oldfather's edition contains the extra fragment z8b.

IIr.

COMMENTARIES IN ENGLISH

Arnold, E. V., Roman Stoicism. London, 191I. de Lacy, P., "The Logical Structure of the Ethics of Epictetus," Classical Philology, 38 (Jan.-Oct., 1943), II2-25. Hicks, R. D., Stoic and Epicurean. New York, 1910.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

More, P. E., Hellenistic Philosophies. Princeton, 1923. Zeller, E., The Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics. Tr. from the revised German edition by O. J. Reiche!. London, 1880. IV. REFERENCES

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics. Loeb Library (see above II). Arnim, J. von, ed., Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, 4 vols. Stuttgart, 1964. Augustine, The City oj God. Loeb Library. Bailey, C., Epicurus. Remains, trans., and notes. Oxford, 1926. Bailey, C., The Greek Atomists. Oxford, 1928. Bowlby, J., Child Care and the Growth oj Love. Based by permission of the World Health Organization on the Report Maternal Care and Mental Health. Abridged and edited by M. Fry. Harmondsworth, 1953. Bonhöffer, A., Epiktet und das Neue Testament. Giessen, 1911. Camus, A., L'Etranger. Paris, 1942. Cicero, De Divinatione. De Finibus. De Natura Deorum. Etc. All in Loeb Library. Colardeau, Th., Etude Sur Epictete. Paris, 1903. Diogenes Laertius, Lives oj Eminent Philosophers. Loeb Library. Dudley, D. R., A History oj Cynicism jrom Diogenes to the 6th Century A.D. London, 1937. Eilis, A., Reason and Emotion in Psychotherapy. New York, 1962. Frankl, V. E., Man's Search jor Meaning: An Introduction to Logotherapy. Preface by G. W. Allport. Part One tr. by 1. Lasch. New York, 1963. Frankl, V. E., The Doctor and the Soul. 2d revised and expanded ed. Tr. in part by R. and C. Winston. New York, 1965. Geilius (Lucius), Attic Nights. Loeb Library. Hicks, R. D. Ed., tr. of Diogenes Laertius (see above). Horney, K., The Neurotic Personality oj Dur Time. New York, 1937. Kazantzakis, N., Zorba the Greek. Tr. C. Wildman. London, 1954. Original published in Athens, 1946. Kneal, W. and M., The Development oj Logic. Oxford, 1962. Lipsius, J., Manuductio ad Stoicam Philosophiam. Antwerp, 1604, Wesei, 1625. Lucian, Demonax. Peregrinus. Both in Loeb Library. Marcus Aurelius, Meditations. Loeb Library. Marx, K., Economic and Philosophie Manuscripts oj I844. Tr. T. B. Bottomore, in E. Fromm, Marx's Concept oj Man, New York, 1961. Mates, B., Stoic Logic. Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1953. Origen, Contra Celsum. Ed., tr. H. Chadwick. Cambridge, 1953. Pascal, B., Entretien avec de Saci sur Epictete et Montaigne. In M. Havet, Pensees de Pascal, Paris, 1852. Plato, Apology. Crito. Laches. Laws. Meno. Phaedo. Phaedms. Republic. Sophist. Theaetetus. All 10 in Loeb Library. Sallustius, Concerning the Gods and the Universe. Ed. with Prolegomena and trans. by A. D. Nock. Cambridge, 1926. Seneca, De Ira. Epistulae Morales. Loeb Library. Sextus Empiricus, Against Ethicists. Against Grammarians. Against Log. Ag. Physicists. DutUnes oj Pyrrhonism. All in Loeb Library.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

I33

Simplicius, Epicteti Enchiridion. Tr. from the Greek by G. Standhope, in Epictetus His Morals, with Simplicius His Comment, London, 174I. Stobaeus, Anthologium, 5 vols. Eds. C. Wachsmuth and O. Hense. Berlin, 1958. Suidas, Suidae Lexicon, Graece et Latine, 2 vols. Eds. T. Gaisford and G. Bernhardy. Halle, 1843, 1853. Suttie, 1. D., The Origins 01 Love and Hate. Harmondsworth, 1960. Xenophon, Apology. Loeb Library.

INDEX

Abandonment, 129. See Loneliness Abstraction, 45 Absurdity, 13, 129 Academy, 32, 45 Acheron,52 Achievement, sense of, 94 Achilles, 42 Act(uality), 71-3; act-reiteration, 25 Adriatic, 17 Adultery, 114 Adversity, 96ff. See Misfortune Advertising, 74 Affection, 112-4, 117, 119 Agamemnon, 42 Aggression, 92, 113, 117 Agony, 82. See Anxiety Agrippinus, 100, 124f Air,40f Alcohol(ism), 75, 128 Algodicy, 47 Alleviation, 83, 85f. See Remedial Allport, G. W., 128, 132 Amnesia,84 Anacharsis,95 Analysis: conceptual, 7, 27, 67, 129f ; philosophieal, ix, 129f; psychological, 83-5 Anarchism, 11, 123, 130 Anaxagoras, 16,98 Angel,56 Anger, 73, 107 Anguish, 15, 129. See Anxiety Animals, 30, 42-4, 65, 117 Antecedent, the, 37f Anthropocentrism, §15; -morphic, 47, 65 Antidogmatism, I I Antifeminism, 121 Antigonus, 91 Antipater, 34, 53 Antiphon, 115 Antisthenes, 3f, 7, 68f, 76; Ept. on, 3

Anxiety, 13, 17,29,61,83, 87f, gof, 99, 112, 128. See Fear Anytus,23 Apatheia, apathy, 8d Apollonius, 73 Apprehension: incontrovertible, clear, 32f Appropriateness, 59 A1'eti, 111 Argument, inference, 26, 36-8, 45f; complete, inc., 37; equivocal, questioning, 35; forms, pennits, types, 6, 26, 28; inductive, necessary, 27, 46 Aricia, 100 Aristippus, 16, 114 Ariston,55 Aristotle, 7, 11, 22, 30, 37, 54, 66, 72, 79f , 95, 132 ArniIn, J. von, x, 11,52,132 Arrian, F., 8-10, 49, 59, 106 Art(ifact), 8, 15, 45f, 73f, 117 Asceticism, 10, 108, 110 Aspiration, 63, 87, 93 Assent, 28, 30f, 33, 110 Ata1'axia, 22, 24, 81, 97; -ist, 83 Athens, 3, 5, 17, 102; -ian, 122 Attitude (outlook, posture, etc.), 2, 12ff, 24, 62, 82, 84, 99f, 128 Augustine, 10, 57, 132 Axiom system, 38 Bailey, C., 69, 113, 132 Beautiful, 64; male, woman etc., 101f, 121 Belief, 22, 28, 30, 74, 84. See Thought Beyond, the, 52 Biological, 43, 66, 116f Bion,55 Bird(s), 93f , 97 Bitterness: see Disappointment Blame,87 Blossios of Cumae, 120

INDEX Body, 42, 48 52f, 74,92,99, 109f, II5 Boethus,53 Bonhöffer, A., I, 132 Boredom, 13, 94, 106, 108 Bottomore, T. B., 89, 132 Brainwashing, 107 Brotherhood: see Siblinghood Burial, 53, II5 Cacodicy, 46ff Cacophemism, 68 Caesar, 2, 16, 57, 61, 126 Calamity, 84. See Tragedy Calm (etc.), 5f, 14, 30, 52, 69, 83 Camus, A., 10, 132 Capacity (disposition, skill, etc.), 8, 22, 24, 43f, 54,61,65, 7Iff, 86f, 110 Capitol, 2, 80 Carneades, 8, II, 34, 45 Carthusians, 10 Cassius, 123 Categoricals, 38 Cats, 106 Cause, 15, 83 Celsus, rf Challenge, 48 , 72 Chance,45f Change, 54, 68, 93 Character, §25 Charity, 120 Child: outlook, -ren, 4, 13, 30, 42, 91-5, 103, 106, 121 Choice, 22, 61, IIO Christ(ian(ity)), If, 10 Chrysippus, 3, 9, 33f , 38 , 44, 114; Ept. on, 4, 62 Chrysostom, 10 Cicero, 4, II, 19, 44f, 132 Classical: attitude, statues, 8d Cleanliness, 109-1 I Cleanthes, x, 3, 19, 34, 44, 50f; Ept. on, 4, 6, 50 Cocytus,5 2 Colardeau, Th., 5, 7, 9f, 13 2 Committal talk, 78 Communist: Party, revolution, takeover, II8. See Marx Competition, 14, 90, II6 Compound logic, 38 Conditional, the, 35, 37f; generalized, 38; reasoning, 26, 29, 36 Conduct, 77, 8r. See Thought Confider, 104 Conjunction, 37 Consequent, the, 37f Considerateness, 119 Constraint: see Spontaneity Contended cow, 30

135

Contradiction (consistency, etc.), 25f, 29-31, 34-7, 80; in description, precept, 29 Contro!, 110, 120, 127; of impulse, 71, 80; thought-c., 84, 102; self-, 83, 94, I II; c. test, 85ff Cooperation, 14, II6 Corinth, 122 Cosmic: grouch, 104; laughter, 5, 135; stratification, 43. Cosmology, ix, 3 8f, ch. iv. Cosmos, 4If, 47, 53 Cosmopolitanism, 121-3, 127 Country, III, 122, 126 Crates, 3, I13f; Ept. on, II3, 121 Creation, 20, 48, 52 Cringe: see Fcar Crinus, 4 Criteria, standards, 26-8, 32f, 60, 63f, 66-8, 94; descriptive, normative criteriology, 26f Critias, 11,57 Crito, 83 Croesus, 76, 109 Cross-examination, 36 Cyclical regeneration, 40f Cynicism, 3, 5, II, 14f, 19, 33, 69, 114, II9f, 123, 126 Cyrenaics, I I

Daimonän, 53 Danger, 23, 48 Death, vii, I2f, §6, 52, 83f, 86f, 108, IIof, II3, !I5, 1I7f, 127, 129; -lessness (survival, etc.), 19, 52, 60, 87, 93; deadened, 25, 3 1 Debating, 80 Decay, 127 Deception, 14f; self-d., 43, 77 f Defenses, 92 Definition, 7, 26f, 38 Deifying, 44, 54 Dejection: see Depression Delay, technique of, 83, 85 Deliberation, 22, 31 Demetrius, 92 Democracy, !I8; -tic, 121 Democritus, 19, 69, 97 Demonax, 4, 19, I20f Demythologizing Ept., 54, 127 Denier, 33f Deontic logic, 29 Dependence: on individuals, types, 88 Depression, 14, 62, 99, 103, 128 Descartes, R., 10 Desire, 62, 83, 87, 108-10, 129 Despair, 20, 24, 129 Detachment, technique of, 83f, Ioof Determinism, 54

INDEX Deterrenee (in law). 124f Devil. satan. 43. 56 Dialeetie. 9. 26

Diatf'ibai. 8 Dice player. 14. 112 Diodorus. 34f Diogenes. 3. 5. 7. 19.53. 72. 114. 120. 123. Ept. on D's: affeetion. 112; relation to Antisthenes. 3; cO!'mopolitanism. 122; independence. 5, 16, 97; freedom view, 16; "mine"view, 3; prowess, 48; sexual restraint, 104; slavery days. 122; value division, 62 Diogenes Laertius, 3. 9. 11. 19, 25. 33f, 41. 52f, 55, 60-70. 76, II3-5, 122, 132 Disappointment, (ete.) 14,20, 23f, 84, 87, 89!, 93, 95, 99 Discrimination: ethnie. racial, sexual, 121 Diseussion, 29, 36 Disease, 65. 71, 74. II8. See Medicine Disjunetion, exclusive. 37 Disposition: see Capacity, Habit Distress, ix, IIf, 129 Disturbance, vii, 21, 73 Divided, 103 Divination, 53f Divine: see God(s) Dogs, 106 Domination, 7, 14 Domitian,5 Double negation, 35 Drug!', pills, 95, 128 Dudley, D. R., 55, 121, 132 Duty, 16, 70, II6, II9, 130 Earth,40-2 Eecle!'iasticism, 53 Education, 5f, 12,22,25, 63, 74, 128; ebild, 24. See Learning Effeminaey, 121 Effort, exertion, 82, 95 Egalitarianism, equality, 11, 12d Eggs, 93, 129 Ego (-theories), Iod Egyptians, 36 Electrica1 eonditioning, 128 Electrodes, 95 Ellis, A., 128, 132 Emotion, 22, 83f, 128 Empathy,82 Empedocles, 40 Empiricism, 32, II5

Encheiridion, 8

Energy, 41, 54 Enthymeme, 37

Envy, 87 Epaphroditus, If Ephemeral, transitory, ix, 20, 86 Ept. studies, ix. Epiktetos, I Epieurus, Epieureans, II, 18f, 60, II35; Ept. on, 31, 57, 69, II4 Error, erring man, 43, 78-80 Eschatology,52 Ether,40f Ethics. ix, 20f, 29, 54-6, 62, 74, 91, 95, 106, 115, 122f, 126ff; divisions of, § 24; forestalling, 85f; happinessoriented. 71; individual, 71, III, II9; mental, 71; negative, 71, 83, 85f, 127; positive, 71; preventive, 71, 83, ch. vii, 104; remedial, 71, 85f, eh. viii; pain-oriented: see Pain; purified, demythologized, 127; resistance, 85f, § 32; social, II5; sociopolitieal, 71; straight, 56, 82; therapeutic, 16; & medicine, 71, 82; & value, 56, 61. Ethical: waste, II9; gravity (center of), 128f; layman, 81, 103; reverberation, 82, II9 Eubulides, 34 Euhemerus, I I Euthanasia, 17f Evil, 47; Problem of, no-e. view, 47f. See Good Exertion, 95 Exile, 17, 83 Existence, 130; -ial reminders, therapy, ix, 127; -ialism, ix, 129f Explanation, 44, 127 Extensionally, 38 Extemals, 14f. 6xf, 80, 128f Failure, 79, 89f, 99 Fair, 13, 25, 59f, 64, 111 False: see True Family, 70, 76, III; eare, 95 Fatalistie-looking expressions, 54 Fate (ete.), 20, 41, 54, 102, 106, II7f, 129. See Providence Favorinus, 9 Fear, vii, 13ff, 18, 21, 25, 88, 90-2, 100, II2f. See Anxiety, Freedom Feeling, 3d, 62, 65f, 81, 114; pan-f. doetrine, 40, 119 FeHcio,2 Fire, 41, 53f Flatter, 92, 103, 111 Formal: logie, 27; principle, 35 Formism,68 Frankl, V. E., 127f, 132 Freedom, 5, 7, IIf, 15f, 22, 33, 84, 87 f , 91,97,103,107,109, 122f, 127, 129; negative, nominal, political, po-

INDEX sitive, psyehological, 88f; the free man, 5, IIIf; earefree posture, 24 Friendship, 119. See Affeetion, Feeling Frustration, 15, 20, 87, 93 Fun, 121; make f. of troubles, 101, 127 Galba,49 Galen, 10 Galileans, 2 Game, 12ff. See Life Gellius, 8-10, 34, 96, 115, 132 Generalization, 27, 45 Generals, 3, 121 Girls: eall, II4; pretty, 75, II3 Goals, 83, 94 God(s), 10, 14, 19, eh. iv, § 20, II3, 122f, 130; "god"-intoxieated statement, 50. See Zeus Good, 11, 14, 23, 59ff, 112; & advantage, 60; & divinity, 56; a protoeoneept, 59. G./bad/indifferent trichotomy, 62. See Value Gossip, 103f Govemment, state, 89, 118, 123f, 130; world g., 123 Grammar, grammaeentric fix, 27f Grave, the, 16f, 112 Greed, 103, 128 Gregory of Nazianzus, 10 Gross national produets, 128 Gyara, 17, 102 Habit, § 25, 83; habitual eonfider, 104 Hades, 16, 52 Hadrian, 5, 10 Hamartema,79 f Hang-ups, 15 Happiness, I If, 14t, 20f, 29f, 59ff, 64, 66, 71, 102, 109, 115, 127, 130; -oriented ethics, 71. Happy-golueky, 94. Eudaimonism, 12, 16, 20, 61,63 Hardship, 48, 72 Harm, 107; self-, II6 Health, 59, 61, 64; mental, 128; World H. Organization, II7, 132 Heap, the, 34 Heath, T. L., II Heavens,42 Hedonism, 95; negative, 69; psyehologieal, 66; value h., 66f. Hedonists, 67, 114. Hedone, 68, 73 Hegemonikon, 76 Hegesias, 19 Hell, 50, 52, 56 Heraclitus, 38, 41 Hereules, 3, 48f Herodes Atticus, 96 Hicks, R. D., 122, 13rf

137

Hierapolis, I Hipparehia, 113 Hippias,77 Homelessness, feeling of, 123 Hope, 83, 87, 93, 129; many-hopes prineiple, 94 Horney, K., II7, 132 Hostility: see Aggression Humanism, I I Hydrogen bombs, 95 Hypnotism, 107 Idea-repetition, 74 Ideal, 54, 5~8, 94f, III, II3; eonduet, 8 I; -izing, 54 Idcntify with, 23, lOri Identity: in logie, 35; psyehol., 18, 11 7 Ideology, 2, 15, 52 Imagination, 33, 45 Immanenee, 53 Immunization,98 Implication, 26, 28, 38 Impulse, 31, 71, 80f, 83, 129 Inactivity, 81, 95 Ineantations, 15, 53, 96 Indian giver, 42 Indifferent, neutral, 33, 6If, 66, 81, 91f, 101, II4 Individualism, I I Indoetrination, 74 Induetion, 27, 46 Infallibilism, 32 Infanticide, 18 Inferenee: see Argument Inferiorityeomplexes, 18 Innate, 42, 60, 129 Inoeulation, 84, 97f Inorganic, the, 43 Inquiry, 31, 36, 89 Inseeurity: see Instability Instability (ete.), 20, 27, 67f, 88, 93, 123,129; objeet, subjeet i., 93 Instruments, 73f, 117 Insults, 84, 98, 101 Insuranee, 97 Intellect, 22, 29, 84, 98, 102, II7. See Thought Intelligible, 38, 54. See Sense-making Interest, 56, 62, 79-81, 108, 119; selfi., II6 Intemationalism, 123 Introspeetion, 21, 72 Irrefutable propositions, 30f ]ealousy, 87 lews, 36 ]okes,80 ]udgment: Last, 52; suspension, 29, 34. See Thought

INDEX Kant, 1., 10 Karteria, 84, 11 I Kathekon, 70 Kazantzakis, N., 10, 132 Kneale, W. & M., 38, 132 Knowledge, 12, 20, 22, 24, 28, 30, 32, 128; healing force of, know-how, 22, 28; "Know yourself," 21, 86; liberating force of, 22, 129; practical, 27; self-k., 21. Epistemology, 11,27, 29. See Thought Lacydes,84 Lameness, If, 5, 42, 50 Language, ix, 7, 9, 27f, 38, 129f; ordinary, 61 Law(ful). 29, 38, 45, 54, 114, 122-4, 126f; rule of, 129 Learning, 6, 14,24,30,83; programed, 72,75; theory, § 25, 85. See Teaching Legal: see Law Lenitive, 54, 93, 99; words, talk, 99· See Remedial Liar, the, 33f Life, ix, ch. ii, 82, 86,91, 94f, 97, 107f, 129: a burden, cro!'s, 12,99; agame (dance, etc.), vii, ch. ii, 92, 99, 110; law of, 29; philosophy of, 27 Lipsius, J., 10, 132 Logic(al). ix, 7, 12, ch. iii, 73, 129f Logocentric predicament, 28 Logos, 27, 38, 54, 127 Loneliness, 7, 83, 104-6 Love, vii, 69, 78, 84, 96, 120, 129. See Affection, Sex Lucian, 2, 4, 10, 121, 132 Lycurgus, 124f

Mache,80 Magnified attributes, 57 Malaise, 106 Man, vii, 42-5, 70f, § 38, 128f; an intellectual being, 84; "m.," 116 Marcus Aurelius, 2, 10, 15, 41, 54, 84, 107, 118, 132 Marriage, 76, 114, 121 Marx, K., 89, 128, 132; -ism, 118, 130 Masurius, 123 Master argument, 34f Mates, B., 38, 132 Matter, 74 Meaning, 7, 26-8, 35, 130 Measure(ment), 26, 28, 87 Meddler, 121. See Proselytizing Medea,78f Mediation, principle of, 83f Medicine, 6, 71, 74f, 82, 86,95,97, 121, 124, 128

Megarics, 11, 36 Meletus,23 Mental, 72; health, training, 128; inoculation, 84; physician, 75; vaccination, 97. Mind, 101 Mercy-killing, 17 Metaphysical, 3, IIf, 21, 52, 54, 57f, 68, 101 Milo, 75, 109 Miracles, 53 Misfortune, 20, 48, 83, 85, 99, 106 Mittner, M., 10 Modalities, 38 Models, 65 Modus tollens, 36 Monasticism, 1I0f, 115 Moon,42 Moral (ity), 115, 123; quasi-linguistic theory of, 71; layman, 81. Im-, 13. See Ethics Music, 15 Mythology(-ical) , 52, 58, 106, 126 Narcotics, 128 Nature (-al), ch. iv, 112, 122; confonnity with, 29, 55; natural law, 126f; naturalism, 54; will of, 20, 47; uses of "n.," 47, 65 Nausea, 129 Necessary, 34f, 89, 100, 105, 129 Needs,93 Negative: ethics, 71, 83, 85f; states, 83,86 Nero, If, 92, 100 Neurotic (un-), 15, 106, 128 New Testament, I, 15, 58 News, bad, 8If, lolf Nicias, 16 Nicion,II4 Nicopolis, 5, 17, 49 Nobody, a, 120 Nonbelongingness, feeling of, 123 Nonchalantness, 10, 101 Nonnationalism, 11 NoveltY,93 Obsession, 15f, 106, 109. See Freedom Obversion, 35 Oedipus, 14 Oldfather, W. A., x, I, IOf, 15f, 67, 110, 131 Old Testament, 58 Olympia, 5, 49 Olympic games, 14 Ontological argument, 60; -gy, 20 Operators (logical), 37f Optimism, 12 Order, 38, 45f

I39

INDEX Organicism: cosmic, 40, 123; descriptive, normative, II9; political, II8; social, 40, 82, II7-9 Origen, I, 10, 132 Ought, 59, 65 Outgoingness, 111, 114 Ownership, 45, 96 Pacifism, 123 Pagan(s), 1, 1 ro Pain, II, I5ff, 21, 82, 84-6,92,97,108, I14f, II9, 124, 128; bodily, 99, II5; no-po view, 47; -orient at ion, ix, 214, 6rf Panic, 81, 9°,1°4,114 Pantheism, 42, 122 Paradise, 50, 56 Paradoxical intention, 127 Party, 13, 103 Pascal, B., 10, 132 Passion, 63, 71, 74 Paul, St., 10 Peregrinus, 120f Perrhaebians, 122 Personification, 54 Pessimism, 24, 54, 86, 93 Phantasia, 33; kataliptike, 32 Pheidias, 49 Philanthropia, 119f Phi1o, -nian conditional, 38 Philosopher(s), -phy, vii, ix, 3, 6, 8, 1of, 2If, 26f, 31, 40, 64, 74, 76f, 83, 91, 97, 113-5, II8, 121; analytic, current, ix, 129f; phony, 76; Scout, II 9-2 I. "Take it philosophically, " 10 Phoniness, 43, 76 Phrygia, I Pity, 120 Plants, 42f, 65,93 Plato, 3, 11, 16, 19, 22f, 31f, 36, 66, roo, II5, 132; Ept. on, 71 Pleasure, 27, 50, § 23, 1°9, 119 Plutarch, I, 115 Polemo, 4 Political, 12, 16, 71, 88, 118, 120 Ponos, 66 Possessive, 96, 129 Possible, imp., 34f, 37f, 78 Poverty, 101, 120 Power, 14, 58f, 88. See Capacity, Strength Praise, 64, 91 Precariousness: see Instability Prediction, 27, 46 , 54, 99 Prepared(ness), 20, 99, 103. See Prevention Presocratics, 3 Pressure : see Spontaneity

Prevention, 83, ch. vii, 98, 103f Priam, 14 Price idea, 102f Prison, jail, 13, 18, 83, 91 Problems (difficulties) in living, ix, 22, 24f Procrastination, nf. 99 Prodicus, 7, I I Progress, 2,93. See Self-improvement. Prohairesis, 22f, 101, 1°7, 110 Projection (etc.), 35, 44, 54, 57, 81, 84, 128 Prolepsis, 59 Proof, 26f Propaganda, 74 Propositionallogic, 37 Proselytizing, 126 Protagoras, II, 71 Protoconcepts, § 21, 65f, 104, II5; positive, neg., 60, 65 Providence (etc.), ch. iv, 117, 127 Psychiatry, rof, 120, 127 Psychology, 4, 23, 106, IISf. See Analysis, Ethics Psychopath, 95 Psychotherapy, 75, 127f Ptolemy, 19 Punishment, 19, 52, 65, 79, II6, I24f Puritanism,68f Puzzles (fallacies, etc.), 26, § 11,68,80 Pyriphlegethon, 52 Pythagoras, 25, 40, 87 Quantification theory, 38 Rational, 22, 25, 43, 59, 7of, 79, 82, 123, 128. See Realism, Reason Rationalism, 32, 34 f , 99 Rationalization, 43, Realism (-tic), 14, 20, 22f, 29, 54f, 65, 75, 78, 81, 83, 86, 110, 119 Reason(ing), 6, 12, 14, 22, 27f, 30, 32, 50, 53-5, 7 1, 79, 83f, 93, 127f; reason-universal, 39, 127 Reform, 108, 120 Reformation (in law), 124f Regret, 83, 92 Religion (piety, etc.), 15, 56-60, 70; & advantage, 56. See God(s) Remedial, 23, 54, ch. viii Resignation, 10, 24 Responsibility, 70, 79 Responsiveness, 7of Rest, 95; -less, 94 Retribution, 124f Revelation, 53 Revolution (etc.), 40, 120, 122, 124, 126, 129

n

INDEX Right(s), 18f, 47, II7ff, 12If, 125, 13° Role-analogy, 54f Roman law, 123 Rome, 5, 17, 100, 102 Rufus, M., 2, 49, II4, 123; Ept. on, 2, 102 Saeredness: see Religion Saerifiee(s), 53f, II8f Sallustius, 41, 132 Salvation, 52, 61, 126 Satisfaetion, 72, I08f Schenk!, H., x, 131 Sehopenhauer, A., 95 Seienee (-tifie), 21, 36, 38, 46, 54, 61, 80, 82, II6, 126f Scout: see Troubleshooting Sea, 42 Self ("mine"), 3, 21, 23, 61, 92, IOd, Iogf, II8 Self-: absorption, 106; assuranee (eonfidenee, relianee), 14, 83, II2f; awareness, 43; eommittal talk, 78; eonservation, II6; eontrol, 83, 94, III; deeeption, 43, nf; defeat, 31, 79f, 90; dependenee, sufficieney, 41, 44, 105; esteem, 120; examination, 2If; image, 18; improvement, n; influenee, 78; injury, 107, II6; interest, II6; knowledge, 21; -ish, 87, II7; refutation (eontradietion), 303,38,127; respeet, 52, 114; shrinking, 10 I; talk, 99; thought, 129 Seneea, 2, 16, 18, 120, 132 Senility, 127 Sense, 83; -making, 126f Senses (-impression), 27, 32f, 81, 83; systematie doubt of, 32f Sensualism, 68; -ity, 73 Separation, prineiple of, 83f Sex, 10, 45, 53, 69, 73, 101, 109, 1I3f, 121 Sextus Empirieus, II, 18, 21, 34, 38, 40, 45, 53, 1°7, II4, 132 Siblinghood, 122, 127 Siek, ill, 6, 74f Sign-theory, II Silencer, 33f Simplieius, 4, 133 Sin, 79f, 130; aboriginal guilt, 52 Sixth sense, 46; religious, 53 Skeptics, II, 21, 30-2, 34, 97; Academie, 31; Pyrrhonian, 21, 32, 97 Skill: see Capacity Slave(ry), I5f, 30, Hf, 87ff, 92,97, IIIf, 119, 122-4 Small talk, 103 Smiling, I, 99

Smoke-door metaphor, 17, 19, I28f Snake,92 Sociability, 7of, II6f Social: climbing, getting ahead, 1°3, 128; theory, 12, eh. ix Socializing, 3, 53 Society, 40, 1°5, § 38; affluent, classless, 128 Soerates, 3, 7-9, 19f, 23f, 3 1, 36, 53, 78f, 83, 91, II5, II9f. Esteemed by Ept., 75. Ept. on S's: affeetion, 84, II2; eosmopolitanism, 122; definitions, dialeetie, 7, 26; deflationism, 120; erring view, 78; facial expression, II3; fearlesness, 5, 23; idealism, II 3; preparedness, 96; view of the self, 23; sexual restraint, 104; teaehing, 4, 6, 9; temper, 7f; trial & prison behavior, 91, !0O; "unexamined life," 22, 83; writing, 8. Ept. on hemloek, 83 Solon, 98 Sophists, II, 47, 126 Sophron, 18 Sorrow, 15, 86, 107 Souilhe, J., 5, 13 1 Soul, 52f, 109; foul, pure, 79; slippery, 129 Speeulation, 2If, 25 Sphairos of Borysthenes, 120 Spinoza, B., 10 Spirit, 53 Spontaneity, 15, 47, 89, log. See Freedom Standards: see Criteria Stars, 42 Stilpo, 3 Stobaeus, 87, 133 Stoicism, x, 2f, 7, 9, II, 14f, 19, 24, 27f, 32-4, 36, 39--42, H, 52f, 55, 60, 67-70, 114, II9f, 123, I 26ff. Ept. on, 4. Neo-Stoicism, 10. "Be astoie," 10, 24, 114. Stoa, 2f Strength, 22, 48f, 83f, III. See Power Suffering, 18, 48, 7d, 82, 129 Suieide(s), vii, I2f. § 6. 55. 83-5. 94, 101, 108, II8, 128f Suidas, 1, 133 Sun, 42, 44, II6 Supematural, 52, 58 Survival: see Death Suttie, I. D., II7, 133 Syllogism, syllogismos, 6, 37 Symbolism (Iogical), 27 Sympathy, 82 Tacitus, 1 Talk & conduct: see Thought

INDEX Tautologies, 38 Teaehing, 5-8, 83, 106. See Learning Testing,89 Thales, 52 Theodiey, 48 Theology, 11,21,52; theie eoneepts, 56 Therapy, 12, 74, 128; existential, logo-, rational, 127f. See Learning Thought, 30, 1°5, 110, 128; thought (eonception, judgment, opinion, talk, ete.) & eonduet, vii, 18, 78f, 84, 98f, 105, 128f; t.-analysis, ix, 25; t.-eontrol, 84, 102; wishful, 83 Threats,5 2 Timon, 107 Toil, 66f, 84 Tolerance, 11 Totalitarian, 121 Tragedy, 13, 24; literary, 14f Training, ix, 24, 29, 33, 70, 72, 97f, 128. See Learning Tranquilizer, 99 Treatment, 21, 24; shoek treatment, 128. See Learning Troubleshooting, 75, § 39 True, false, 12, 14f, 26-36, 62, 68, 77f, 99, 130; truth-table, 37f; t/f/ neither, 62; uneertain, 29, 3 I; undeeidable, 77 Trying,89 Types, 68, 88 Tyrant, 16, 23, 9If, 101 Ulysses, 120 Understanding, 30, 43, 12 7 Unfazed(ness), etc., 22, 24, 81, 103, 127 Universe: see World Universal sentences, 38 Unperturbedness, 14, 81f, 95, 102

Unreliability, 20, 129 Unserious: life, outlook, 24; philosophy of -ness, 62 Useful, 6, 59, 63, 65, 84 Using pereeptions, 3f, 33 Utilitarian, 14, 30, 115 Validity, inv., 29, 37 Value, 19, 27, eh. v, 122, 128, 130; eriteria, 64-8; disputes, 63; realism, 65; relativity, 64f; theory, 12, 56 Vindietiveness, 124f Virtue, 12, 14, 20, 64f, 115 Void, the, 40 Vulnerable, ix, 23, 88, 92 War, 20, 123 Water, 4of Whims, 129 Wieked (mean, ete.), 78f, II 6, 129 Will, 22, 45, 101, 107f, 118; alien, 70; free, 52, 91; of nature, 20, 47; rational, 61,112; weak, 80,128 Wise, sage, 13,21,42, 54f Wish, 83, 87, 89, 108, 110; -ful thinking, 83 World, universe, ix, 40, 45, 50, 53, 126; a battle-field, 121; city, 123; -conflagration, 41, 53; revolution of, 40; stranger, 20, 87, 91. See Nature Worry(lessness), 100, I II, 115 Worship, 58f, 122 Xenophon, 91, 98,133 Zeno (the Stoie), 3, 19, 70, 114. Ept. on, 4, 6, 91,96 Zeus, 13, 19f, eh. iv, 58f, 100, 106,116, 126 Zorba, 10, 24