1. MIRIAM DEFENSOR – SANTIAGO versus FIDEL RAMOS (253 SCRA 559)
Facts: The protestant, Miriam Defensor-Santiago ran for presidency and lost in the May 1992 election. In her Motion on the 16th day of August in the year 1995, reiterated in her comment of the 29th of August of the same year, protestant Defensor-Santiago prayed that the revision in the remaining precincts of the pilot areas be dispensed with and the revision process in the pilot areas be deemed computed. The Court deferred action on the motion and required, instead, the protestant and protestee to submit their respective memoranda. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not the election protest filed by Defensor-Santiago is moot and academic by her election as a Senator in the May 1995 election and her assumption of office as such o n the 30th of June in the year 1995. Held: YES. The Court held that t hat the election protest filed by Santiago has been abandoned or considered withdrawn as a consequence of her election and assumption of office as Senator and her discharge of the duties and functions thereof. The protestant abandoned her “determination to protest and pursue the public interest involved in the
matter of who is the real choice of the electorate. Moreover, the dismissal of this protest would serve public interest as it would dissipate the aura of uncertainty as to the results of the 1992 presidential elections, thereby enhancing the all too crucial political stability of the nation during this period of national recovery. Also, the PET issued a resolution ordering the protestant to inform the PET within 10 days if after the completion of the revision of the ballots from her pilot areas, ar eas, she still wishes to present evidence. Since DS has not informed the Tribunal of any such intention, such is a manifest indication that she no longer intends to do so. 2. BORJA versus COMELEC
Facts: Private respondent Jose T. Carpo, Jr. was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a term ending June 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, he became mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. For the next two succeeding elections in 1992 and 1995, he was again reelected as Mayor. On March 27, 1998, private respondent Carpo filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor of Pateros relative to the May 11, 1998 elections. Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was also a candidate candidate for
mayor, sought Carpo’s disqualification on the theory that the latte r would have already served as mayor
for three consecutive terms by June 30, 1998 and would therefore be ineligible to serve for another term after that. COMELEC ruled in favor of petitioner and declared private respondent Carpo saying that “In both the
Constitution and the Local Government Code, the three-term limitation refers to the term of office for which the local official was elected. It made no reference to succession to an office to which he was not elected.” Carpo won the election case c ase against Borja. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not a person who served in a position by operation of law could be considered as having served the term for the purpose of the three-term limit under the Constitution. Held: NO. The court held that when Carpo occupied o ccupied the post of the Mayor upon the incumbent’s death and
served for remainder of the term, he cannot be construed as having served a full term as co ntemplated under the three term limit. The term he served must be one for which he was elected. Furthermore, before assuming the position of Mayor, he served first as a Vice Mayor and the duties and responsibilities of the two positions are wholly different from each other. 3. ADORMEO versus COMELEC (G.R. No. 147927)
Facts: Respondent Talaga was elected Mayor of Lucena City in 1992, re-elected in 1995, but lost to Tagarao in 1998 elections. Tagarao was recalled and in the May 12, 2000 recall elections, Talaga won and served the unexpired term of Tagarao until June 30, 2001. Talaga was candidate for Mayor in the May 14, 2001 elections, and a petition for cancellation of his certificate of candidacy was filed on the ground that he has served as Mayor for three consecutive terms. Issue: Whether or not Talaga has served as Mayor of Lucena City for t hree consecutive terms. Held: NO. In the case at bar, Talaga did not serve for 3 consecutive terms. For nearly 2 years, he was a private citizen. The continuity of his mayorship was disrupted by his defeat in the 1998 elections.“ If one is elected representative to serve the unexpired term of another, that unexpired term, no matter how short, will be considered one term for the purpose of computing the number of successive terms allowed” this comment of Constitutional Commissioner Fr. Bernas applies only to members of the House of Representatives. Unlike government officials, there is no recall election for members of Congress.
mayor, sought Carpo’s disqualification on the theory that the latte r would have already served as mayor
for three consecutive terms by June 30, 1998 and would therefore be ineligible to serve for another term after that. COMELEC ruled in favor of petitioner and declared private respondent Carpo saying that “In both the
Constitution and the Local Government Code, the three-term limitation refers to the term of office for which the local official was elected. It made no reference to succession to an office to which he was not elected.” Carpo won the election case c ase against Borja. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not a person who served in a position by operation of law could be considered as having served the term for the purpose of the three-term limit under the Constitution. Held: NO. The court held that when Carpo occupied o ccupied the post of the Mayor upon the incumbent’s death and
served for remainder of the term, he cannot be construed as having served a full term as co ntemplated under the three term limit. The term he served must be one for which he was elected. Furthermore, before assuming the position of Mayor, he served first as a Vice Mayor and the duties and responsibilities of the two positions are wholly different from each other. 3. ADORMEO versus COMELEC (G.R. No. 147927)
Facts: Respondent Talaga was elected Mayor of Lucena City in 1992, re-elected in 1995, but lost to Tagarao in 1998 elections. Tagarao was recalled and in the May 12, 2000 recall elections, Talaga won and served the unexpired term of Tagarao until June 30, 2001. Talaga was candidate for Mayor in the May 14, 2001 elections, and a petition for cancellation of his certificate of candidacy was filed on the ground that he has served as Mayor for three consecutive terms. Issue: Whether or not Talaga has served as Mayor of Lucena City for t hree consecutive terms. Held: NO. In the case at bar, Talaga did not serve for 3 consecutive terms. For nearly 2 years, he was a private citizen. The continuity of his mayorship was disrupted by his defeat in the 1998 elections.“ If one is elected representative to serve the unexpired term of another, that unexpired term, no matter how short, will be considered one term for the purpose of computing the number of successive terms allowed” this comment of Constitutional Commissioner Fr. Bernas applies only to members of the House of Representatives. Unlike government officials, there is no recall election for members of Congress.
Neither can Talaga’s victory in the said recall election can be deemed as a “voluntary renunciation” under the Constitution. It was only by virtue of the recall that he served Tagarao’s unexpired term. This
did not amount to a third full term. 4. TEODULO M. COQUILLA, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND MR. NEIL ALVAREZ, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. 151914, JULY 31, 2002 FACTS: Petitioner Coquilla was born on February 17, 1938 of Filipino parents in Oras, Eastern Sam ar. In 1965, he joined the US Navy and was naturalized as a US Citizen. Citizen. On October 15, 1998, petitioner came back to the Philippines and took a residence certificate. Subsequently, petitioner applied for repatriation under R.A. No. 8171 to the special committee on naturalization. His application was approved on November 7, 2000, and on November 10, 2000, he took oath as citizen of the Philippines. On November 21, 2000, petitioner applied for registration as a voter of Oras, Eastern Samar, in addition, on February 27, 2001, he filed his certificate of candidacy stating therein that he had been a resident thereof for 2 years. On March 5, 2001, Mr. Alvarez filed for the cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy on the ground of material misrepresentation by stating thereat that the latter has been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for two years, when in truth and in fact he had resided therein for only about six months since November 10, 2000, when he took his oath as a citizen of the Philippines. The Comelec was unable to render judgment on the case before the election. Meanwhile, petitioner was voted for and proclaimed mayor of Oras, Eastern Samar. On July 19, 200 1, the Comelec (2nd Div) ordered the cancellation of the petitioner’s certificate of candidacy. Comelec en banc affirmed the order, thus this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar at least one (1) year before the elections held on May 14, 2001. RULING: The Supreme Court held that the term “residence” is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to “dwelling” or “habitation”, but rather to “Domicile” or legal residence, that is, the place
where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi). A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the place where the child’s parents reside and continues until the same is abandoned by acquisition of new domicile (domicile of choice). In the case at bar, petitioner lost his domicile of origin by becoming a US citizen after enlisting in the US Navy in 1965. From then on and until November 10, 2000, when he reacquired Philippine citizenship, petitioner was
an alien without any right to reside in the Philippines. Indeed, residence in the United States is a requirement for naturalization as a US citizen. Wherefore, the petition is without merit and DISMISSED. 5. Tolentino and Mojica vs Commission on Elections, Recto and Honasan
This is a petition for prohibition to set aside Resolution No. NBC 01- 005 dated 5 June 2001 (“Resolution No. 01-005”) and Resolution No. NBC 01 -006 dated 20 July 2001 (“Resolution No. 01 -006”) of respondent Commission o n Elections (“COMELEC”). Resolution No. 01 -005 proclaimed the 13 candidates elected as Senators in the 14 May 2001 elections while Resolution No. 01- 006 declared “official and final” the ranking of the 13 Senators Senator s proclaimed in Resolution No. 01-005. Facts: Following the appointment of Senator Teofisto Guingona as Vice-President of the Philippines, the Senate on February 8, 2001 passed Resolution No. 84, calling on COMELEC to fill the vacancy t hrough a special election to be held simultaneously with the regular elections on May 14, 2001. Twelve senators, with 6year term each, were due to be elected in that election. The resolution further provides that the “Senatorial candidate garnering the 13th highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr. which ends on June 30, 2004. On June 5, 2001, after canvassing c anvassing the election results, the COMELEC proclaimed 13 candidates as the elected Senators, with the first 12 Senators to serve the unexpired term of 6 years and the 13th Senator to serve the full term of 3 years of Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr. Gregorio Honasan ranked 13th. Petitioners Arturo Tolentino and Arturo Mojica, as voters and taxpayers, filed the instant petition for prohibition, praying for the nullification of Resolution No. 01-005. They contend that COMELEC issued Resolution 01-005 without jurisdiction because: (1) it failed to notify the electorate of the position to be filled in the special election as required under Section 2 of RA 6645; (2) it failed to require senatorial candidates to indicate in their certificates of candidacy whether they seek election under the special or regular elections as allegedly required under Section 73 of BP 881; and, consequently, (3) it failed to specify in the Voters Information Sheet the candidates seeking election under the special or regular senatorial elections as purportedly required under Section 4, paragraph 4 of RA 6646. Tolentino and Mojica add that because of these omissions, COMELEC canvassed all the votes cast for the senatorial candidates in the 14 May 2001 elections without distinction such that “there were no two separate Senate elections held simultaneously but just a single election for thirteen seats, irrespective of term.”
Tolentino and Mojica sought the issuance of a temporary restraining order during the pendency of their petition. Without issuing any restraining order, the Supreme Court required COMELEC to Comment o n the petition. Honasan questioned Tolentino’s and Mojica’s standing to bring t he instant petition as taxpayers and voters because they do not claim that COMELEC illegally disbursed public funds; nor claim that they sustained personal injury because of the issuance of Resolutions 01-005 and 01-006. Issue: WON the Special Election held on May 14, 2001 should be nullified:
(1) for failure to give notice by the body empowered to and (2) for not following the procedure of filling up the vacancy pursuant to R.A. 6645. HELD: (1) Where the law does not fix the time and place for holding a special election but empowers some authority to fix the time and place after the happening of a condition precedent, the statutory provision on the giving of notice is considered mandatory, and failure to do so will render the election a nullity. The test in determining the validity of a special election in relation to the failure to give notice of the special election is whether want of notice has resulted in misleading a sufficient number of voters as would change the result of special election. If the lack of official notice misled a substantial number of voters who wrongly believed that there was no special election to fill vacancy, a choice by small percentage of voters would be void. (2) There is no basis in the petitioners’ claim that the manner by which the COMELEC conducted the
special Senatorial election on May 14, 2001 is a nullity because the COMELEC failed to document separately the candidates and to canvass c anvass separately the votes cast for the t he special election. No such requirement exists in our election laws. What is mandatory under Section 2 of R.A. 6645 is that t he COMELEC “fix the date of election,” if ne cessary, and state among others, the office/s o ffice/s to be voted for. Significantly, the method adopted by the COMELEC in conducting the special election on May 14, 2001 merely implemented the procedure specified by the Senate in Resolution No. 84. Initially, the original draft of said resolution as introduced by Senator Francisco Tatad made no mention of the manner by which the seat vacated by former Senator Guingona would be filled. However, upon the suggestion of Senator Raul Roco, the Senate S enate agreed to amend the resolution by providing as it now appears, that “the senatorial cabdidate garnering the 13th highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto Giongona, Jr.” 6. Salcedo II vs Commission Commission on Elections
Aug. 16, 1999 This is a petition for certiorari seeking to reverse the earlier Resolution issued by its Second Division on August 12, 1998. Facts: Salcedo married Celiz, marriage contract issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Ajuy, Iloilo. Without his first marriage having been dissolved, Salcedo married private respondent Cacao in a civil ceremony. Two days later, Ermelita Cacao contracted another marriage with a c ertain Jesus Aguirre, marriage certificate filed with the Office of the Civil Registrar. Petitioner Victorino Salcedo II and private respondent Cacao Salcedo both ran for the position of mayor of the municipality of Sara, Iloilo in the May 11, 1998 1 998 elections, both of them having filed their
respective certificates of candidacy. However, petitioner filed with t he Comelec a petition seeking the cancellation of private respondent’s certificate of candidacy on the ground that she had made a false representation therein by stating that her surname was “Salcedo.” Petitioner contended that private respondent had no right to use said surname because she was not legally married to Neptali Salcedo. Private respondent was proclaimed as the duly elected mayor of Sara, Iloilo. In her answer, private respondent claimed that she had no information or knowledge at the time she married Neptali Salcedo that he was in fact already married; that, upon learning of his existing marriage, she encouraged her husband to take steps to annul his marriage with Agnes Celiz because the latter had abandoned their marital home. Neptali Salcedo filed a petition for declaration of presumptive death which was granted by the court that Neptali Salcedo and Jesus Aguirre are one and the same person; and that since 1986 up to the present she has been using the surname “Salcedo” in all her personal, commercial and public transactions. Comelec’s Second Division ruled that since there is an existing valid marriage between Neptali Salcedo
and Agnes Celiz, the subsequent marriage of the former with private respondent is null and void. Consequently, the use by private respondent of the surname “Salcedo” constitutes material misrepresentation and is a ground for the cancellation of her certificate of candidacy. However, the Comelec en banc resolution, overturned its previous resolution, ruling that private respondent’s certificate of candidacy did not contain any material misrepresentation. A Motion for Reconsideration filed by the petitioner was affirmed by the division which gives rise to the petition to review such promulgation. Issue: Whether or not the use by respondent of the surname “Salcedo” in her certificate of candidacy
constitutes material misrepresentation under Section 78 in relation to Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code. Held: Private respondent did not commit any material misrepresentation by the use of the surname “Salcedo”
in her certificate of candidacy. A false representation under section 78 must consist of a “deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible.” It must be made with an intention to deceive the electorate as to one’s qualifications for public office. The use of a surname, when not intended to mislead or deceive the public as to one’s identity, is not within the scope of the provision. There is absolutely no showing that the inhabitants of Sara, Iloilo were deceived by the use of such surname by private respondent. Petitioner does not allege t hat the electorate did not know who they were voting for when they cast their ballots in favor of “Ermelita Cacao Salcedo” or that they were fooled into voting for someone else by the use of such name.
The Court AFFIRMS the en banc Resolution of the Commission on Elections denying the petition to cancel private respondent’s certificate of candidacy. 7. Dumpit-Michelena vs Boado
Nov. 17, 2005 This is a petition assailing COMELEC resolution disqualifying Dumpit in the May 2004 election. Facts: Dumpit-Michelena was a candidate for the position of mayor in the municipality of Agoo, La Union during the May 10, 2004 Synchronized National and Local Elections. Boado sought Dumpit- Michelena’s disqualification and the denial or cancellation of her COC on the ground of material misrepresentation under Sections 74 and 78of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881. Boado, et al. alleged that Dumpit-Michelena, the daughter of Congressman Tomas Dumpit, Sr. of the Second District of La Union, is not a resident of Agoo, La Union. Boado, et al. claimed that DumpitMichelena is a resident and was a registered voter of Naguilian, La Union and that Dumpit-Michelena only transferred her registration as voter to San Julian West, Agoo, La Union on October 24 , 2003. Dumpit-Michelena countered that she already acquired a new domicile in San Julian West when she purchased from her father, Congressman Dumpit, a residential lot on April 19, 2003. She even designated a caretaker of her residential house. Dumpit-Michelena presented the affidavits and certifications of her neighbors in San Julian West to prove that she actually resides in the area. COMELEC rules in favor of Boado et al. The COMELEC En Banc denied in its ruling the motion for reconsideration filed by Dumpit-Michelena. Issues: WON Dumpit-Michelena satisfied the residency requirement under the Local Government Code of 1991. Held: Dumpit-Michelena failed to prove that she has complied with the residency requirement. The concept of residence in determining a candidate’s qualification is alrea dy a settled matter. For election purposes, residence is used synonymously with domicile. 8. AZNAR versus COMELEC (185 SCRA 703)
Facts: Emilio “Lito” Osmeña filed his certificate of candidacy with the C OMELEC for the position of Provincial
Governor of Cebu in the 18 January 1988 elections. Petitioner, Jose B. Aznar, filed with the COMELEC a petition for the disqualification of Osmeña on the ground that he is not a Filipino citizen since he is a citizen of the United States. COMELEC en banc decided to suspend the proclamation. Osmeña
maintained that he is a Filipino citizen, alleging that (1) he is the legitimate child of Dr. Emilio D. Osmeña, a Filipino and son of the late President Sergio Osmeña, Sr., (2) that he is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine Passport, (3) that he was continuously residing in the Philippines since birth and has not gone out of the country for more than six mo nths, and (4) that he has been a registered voter in the Philippines since 1965. Issue: Whether or not respondent is no longer a Filipino citizen by acquiring dual-citizenship. Held: YES. Osmena is still a Filipino. The court held that Aznar’s co ntention was not meritorious. Aznar’s
argument that Osmeña is not a Filipino citizen and therefore, disqualified from running for and being elected to the office of Governor of Cebu, is not supported by substantial and convincing evidence. Aznar failed to provide proof that Osmeña has lost the citizenship by any of the modes provided for under C.A. No. 63, these are: (1) by naturalization in a foreign country, (2) by express renunciation of citizenship, or (3) by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country. Osmeña did not lose his Philippine citizenship in any of the modes provided. By virtue of his being a son of a Filipino father, the presumption that Osmeña is a Filipino remains. In this case, Osmeña denies having taken the oath of allegiance of the United States. He is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine passport and has continuously participated in the electoral process in this country since 1963. The court held that the dissent of Mr. Justice Teodoro Padilla, that because Osmeña obtained certificates of Alien Registration as an American citizen, the first in 1958 when he was 24 years old and the second in 1979, he should be regarded as having expressly renounced Philippine citizenship, does not hold water. The court in this case held that Osmeña is still a Filipino citizen. It may also be noted he was not even declared a dual citizen. 9. RIVERA III versus COMELEC (G.R. No. 167591)
Facts: A petition for cancellation of the COC of Marino Morales as mayoralty candidate in Mabalacat, Pampanga for the May 2004 mayoralty was filed on the ground that he had already served three consecutive terms in the office that he seeks to run for.
However, Morales argues that this is not so because although he really served in 1995 – 1998 in his first term and 2004 – 2007 for his third term, he was merely a caretaker or de facto mayor in the year 1998 – 2001 for his said to be second term t hat is because his election was declared void by the RTC due to an election protest.
COMELEC ruled that Morales already served his third term and after an MR was filed, declared it final and executory on May 14, 2004. Issue: Whether or not Morales had already served his three consecutive terms and if so, who should take his position. Held: For the three term limit for elective government officials to apply, two conditions must concur to wit: 1.) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post and 2.) that he has fully served three consecutive terms. As the issue whether a “caretaker” or “de facto” officer, he exercises the powers and enjoys the
prerequisites of the office which enables him “to stay o n indefinitely”. With regard to the person who will replace Morales, it is a rule that t he ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office. Since his disqualification became final and executory after the elections, the candidate having the second highest number of votes cannot assume the position. Hence, it is the petitioner, the elected Vice Mayor Anthony Dee who should be declared as the mayor 10 MITRA versus COMELEC (G.R. No. 191938)
Facts: When his COC for the position of Governor of Palawan was declared cancelled, Mitra was t he incumbent Representative of the Second District of Palawan. This district then included, among other territories, the Municipality of Aborlan and Puerto Princesa City. He was elected Representative as a domiciliary of Puerto Princesa City, and represented the legislative district for three (3) terms immediately before the elections of 2010. On March 26, 2007 (or before the end of Mitra’s second term as Representative), Puerto Princesa City
was reclassified as a "highly urbanized city" and thus ceased to be a component city of the Province of Palawan. The direct legal consequence of this new status was the ineligibility of Puerto Princesa City residents from voting for candidates for elective provincial officials. On March 20, 2009, with the intention of running for the position of Governor, Mitra applied for the transfer of his Voter’s Registration Record from Precinct No. 03720 of Brgy. Sta. Monica, Puerto Princesa City, to Sitio Maligaya,Brgy. Isaub, Municipality of Aborlan, Province of Palawan. He subsequently filed his COC for the position of Governor of Palawan as a resident of Aborlan.
Soon thereafter, respondents Antonio V. Gonzales and Orlando R. Balbon, Jr. (the respondents) filed a petition to deny due course or to cancel Mitra’s COC.
Issue: Whether or not Mitra is qualified to run for Governor of Palawan. Held: YES. Mitra is qualified to rum for the position as Governor of Palawan. The Supreme Court ruled that Mitra did not misrepresent himself and t hat he met the residency requirement as mandated by the Constitution. The election of Abraham Kahlil Mitra as governor of Palawan in the May 10, 2010 elections was upheld in a vote of 11-3. The respondents were not able to present a convincing case sufficient to overcome Mitra’s evidence of effective transfer to and residence in Aborlan and the validity of his representation on this point in his COC. Likewise, the "COMELEC could not present any legally acceptable basis to conclude that Mitra’s statement in his COC regarding his residence was a misrepresentation." 11. SOCRATES versus COMELEC
Facts: Edward Hagedorn has already served for three consecutive terms as mayor from 1992 to 2001. He did not run in the immediately following regular elections. One July 2, 2002, the incumbent mayor, Socrates, faced a recall proceeding and was asked to step down from office. On August 23 of the same year, Hagedorn filed his COC for mayor in recall election. A petition for his disqualification was filed by Socrates on the ground that he cannot run for the said post for his 4th consecutive term. Issue: Whether or not Hagedorn was qualified to run for the 2003 recall election. Held: YES. The court ruled that the rationale behind the three term rule was to prevent consecutiveness in holding office. In the case of Edward Hagedorn, there was a break after the end of his third term and before the recall election. 12. FORNIER versus COMELEC
Facts: Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner initiated a petition before the COMELEC to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of respondent on two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of t he respondent. Issue: Whether or Not FPJ is a natural born Filipino citizen. Held: It is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of w hether such children are legitimate or illegitimate. But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a naturalborn citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code. 13. ADELINA TAMAYO-REYES, M.D. vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and FERNANDO R.
CABITAC. G.R. No. 175121. June 8, 2007 FACTS Private respondent Ceasar Vicencio was a candidate for the post of punong barangay in the July 2002 Synchronized Barangay Election. In his certificate o f candidacy, private respondent stated his profession as a certified public accountant. Private respondent won in the elections and was proclaimed. Petitioner
charged him before the Law Department of the COMELEC of misrepresenting himself as a CPA and evidences were attached to the complaint.
ISSUE Whether or not the respondent misrepresentation of profession or occupation in the Certificate o f Candidacy a valid ground for disqualification RULING Profession or occupation is not a qualification for elective office, and therefore not a material fact in the certificate of candidacy. A misrepresentation of a non-material fact is not a ground to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED. 14. NELSON CUNDANGAN, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CELESTINO V. CHUA. G.R.
No. 174392. August 28, 2007 ELECTION LAWS Jurisdiction over an offense punishable under the Omnibus Election Code by imprisonment of not less than 1 year but not more than 6 years FACTS That on or about July 15, 2002 Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) Elections, in the City of Caloocan, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did, then and there, willfully and unlawfully, c ast her vote in substitution of another person by misrepresenting herself to be Emely Genovia and voted in substitution of said Emely Genovia, a registered voter in Precinct No. 779-A, Barangay 60, Caloocan City. Under Section 264 of the Omnibus Election Code, violation of any election offense: b SECTION 264.
Penalties. — Any person found guilty of any election offense under this Code shall be
punished with imprisonment of not less than one year but not more than six years and shall not be subject to probation.
By Order of September 21, 2005, Caloocan RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, it citing Section 32 (2) of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 198 0) reading:
Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal C ircuit Trial Courts in Criminal Cases. — Except in cases falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise: (2)
Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six
(6) years irrespective of the amount of fine regardless of other imposable accessory penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated ther eon, irrespective of kind, nature, or value amount thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof. The COMELEC moved to reconsider the trial court's dismissal order, inviting attention to Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code which reads: SECTION 268. Jurisdiction of courts. — The regional trial court shall have the exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or proceedings for violation of this Code, except those relating to the offense of failure to register or failure to vote which shall be under the jurisdiction of the metropolitan or municipal trial courts. From the decision of the courts, appeal will lie as in other criminal cases. November 15, 2005, the trial court denied the COMELEC's motion for "lack of merit." Hence, the present petition for certiorari. ISSUE Whether or not the RTC have jurisdiction to try and decide criminal action or proceeding for violation of the Omnibus Election Code. RULING The petition is meritorious. The Court said, as correctly argued by the COMELEC, Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code specifically provides, regional trial courts have exclusive jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or proceedings for violation of the Code "except those relating to the offense of failure to register or failure to vote." It bears emphasis that Congress has the plenary power to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdictions of various courts. Hence, it may, by law, provide that a certain class of cases should be exclusively heard and determined by a specific court. Section 268 of Omnibus Election Code is one such and must thus be construed as an exception to BP Blg. 129 , the general law on jurisdiction of courts. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Respondent judge is DIRECTED to reinstate the case to the court docket and to conduct appropriate proceedings thereon with reasonable dispatch. SO ORDERED.
15. DOMICIANO R. LAURENA, JR., vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and NESTOR L.
ALVAREZ G. R. No. 174499 FACTS Cundangan and Chua were candidates for Punong Barangay for Barangay Sumilang, Pasig City in the July 15, 2002 Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections. After the canvass of votes, Cundangan was proclaimed as the duly elected Punong Barangay. On July 23, 2002, Chua filed an election protest which impugned the results of the canvass in all the 19 precincts of said barangay. After the revision proceedings were concluded, the trial court rendered a Decision dated September 26, 2003, affirming the proclamation of Cundangan. Unsatisfied with the decision of the trial court, Chua filed on October 14, 2003, an appeal with the COMELEC First Division. In its Resolution dated October 25, 2005, the COMELEC First Division reversed the trial court's Decision dated September 26, 2003, and accordingly declared Chua as the duly elected Punong Barangay of Barangay Sumilang, Pasig City. On November 2, 2005, Cundangan moved for a reconsideration of the said Resolution. However, the COMELEC En Banc, in its Resolution dated August 18, 2006, denied Cundangan's Motion for Reconsideration and affirmed the challenged Resolution of the COMELEC First Division. ISSUE Whether or not the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack and excess of jurisdiction in promulgating its assailed resolution when the COMELEC invalidated valid ballots of Cundangan as follows: a. Groups or sets of ballots totaling eighty seven (87) ballots of Cundangan allegedly as written as one person b. Single ballots totaling nineteen (19) valid ballots of Cundangan allegedly written by two persons c. Three (3) valid ballots of Cundangan allegedly as marked ballots RULING The Court holds that the COMELEC En Banc did not abuse its discretion in invalidating all of the aforesaid contested ballots. In the present petition, the court has more reason to respect the findings of the COMELEC En Banc with regard to the questioned ballots, considering that the same is consistent not only with the findings of the COMELEC First Division, but also those of the trial court. It must be stressed that the appreciation of contested ballots and election documents involves a question of fact best left to the determination of the COMELEC, a specialized agency tasked with the supervision of elections all over the country.
It is the constitutional commission vested with the exclusive original jurisdiction over election contests involving regional, provincial and city officials, as well as appellate jurisdiction over election protests involving elective municipal and barangay officials. Consequently, in the absence of grave abuse of discretion or any jurisdictional infirmity or error of law, the factual findings, conclusions, rulings and decisions rendered by the said Commission on matters falling within its competence shall not be interfered with by this Court. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Resolutions of the COMELEC are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner. SO ORDERED.
16. CIRILO R. VALLES vs COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ROSALIND YBASCO LOPEZ
Facts: Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace, Broome, WesternAustralia, to the spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a F ilipino citizen and native of Daet, CamarinesNorte, and Theresa Marquez, an Australian. In 1949, at the age of fifteen, she left Australia andcame to settle in the Philippines.On June 27, 1952, she was married to Leopoldo Lopez, a Filipino citizen, at the Malate Catholic Church in Manila. Since then, she has continuously participated in the electoral process not only as a voter but as a candidate, as well. She served as Provincial Board Member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao Oriental. In 1992, she ran for and was elected governor of Davao Oriental. Petitioner maintained that private respondent is an Australian citizen, not qualified to run for elective office, because: she is a holder of an Australian passport; and she expressly renounced her Filipino citizenship when she declared under oath in her application for alien certificate of registration and immigrant certificate of residence that she was a citizen or subject of Australia. Issue: Whether or not private respondent is disqualified from running for elective office because of her dual citizenship. Held: In dismissing the petition, the Supreme Court held that the mere fact that privaterespondent was a holder of an Australian passport and had an alien certificate of registrationare not acts constituting an effective renunciation of Filipino citizenship. Renunciation must beexpress, to effectively result in the loss of Filipino citizenship. At most, private respondent had dual citizenship she was an Australian and a Filipino, as well. Dual citizenship as adisqualification refers to citizens w ith dual allegiance. Her filing of a certificate of candidacy,where she declared that she is a Filipino citizen and that she will support and defend thePhilippine Constitution and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto, sufficed to renounceher foreign citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification as a dual citizen.
17. melanio d. sampayan et.al vs raul daza et.al
Facts: Petitioners, residents of the second Congressional District o f Northern Samar filed theinstant petition for prohibition seeking to disqualify respondent Raul Daza, then incumbentcongressman of the same congressional district, from continuing to exercise the functions of hisoffice, on the ground that the latter is a greencard holder and a lawful permanent resident of the United States since October 16, 1974. Petitioners allege that Mr. Daza has not, by any act or declaration, renounced his statusas permanent resident, thereby violating Section 68 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 881 (OmnibusElection Code) and Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution.Respondent Congressman Daza filed his comment denying the fact that he is apermanent resident of the United States; that although he was accorded a permanentresidency status on October 8, 1980 as evidenced by a letter order of the District Director, USImmigration and Naturalization Service, Los Angeles, U.S.A., he had long waived his status whenhe returned to the Philippines on August 12, 1985. Issue:Whether or not respondent Daza should be disqualified as a member of the House of Representatives for violation of Section 68 o f the Omnibus Election Code. Held: The Supreme Court dismiss the instant prohibition case. First, the case is already moot and academic for it is evident from the manifestation filed by petitioners dated April 6,1992 that they seek to unseat respondent from his position as Congressman for the duration of his term of office commencing June 30, 1987 and ending June 30, 1992. Secondly, jurisdiction of this case rightfully pertains to the House Electoral Tribunal. Under Section 17 of Article VI of the1987 Constitution, it is the House Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualification of its members. Since petitioners challenge the qualifications of Congressman Daza, t he appropriate remedy should have been to file a petition to cancel respondent Daza’s certificate of candidacy before t he election or a quo warranto case with the House Electoral Tribunal within ten (10) days after Daza’s proclamation. Third, a writ o f prohibition can no longer be
issued against respondent since his term has already expired. A writ of prohibition is not intended to provide for acts already consummated. Fourth, as a de facto public officer, 1 respondent cannot be made to reimburse funds disbursed during his term of office because his acts are as valid as those of a de jure officer. Moreover, as a de facto officer, he is entitled to emoluments for actual services rendered. The Court Resolved to DISMISS the instant petition for being MOOT and ACADEMIC. 18. BENJAMIN T. LOONG vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTION
FACTS: This case stemmed from elections held in Sulu where LOONG and private respondentTan ran for the position of Governor while petitioner Tulawie and private respondent Estino ranfor Vice-Governor. The Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBC) recommended to the COMELEC arecanvass of the election returns
of Parang and Talipao. COMELEC, accordingly, relieved all theregular members of the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) and ordered such recanvass bysenior lawyers from the COMELEC office in Manila. During the re-canvass, private respondentsobjected to the inclusion in the canvass of the election returns of Parang. The reconstitutedMBC, however, merely noted said objections and forwarded the same to respondent ProvincialBoard of Canvassers for resolution. Provincial Board of Canvassers denied the objections of private respondents and still included the electionreturns of Parang municipality. The canvass of respondent Provincial Board of Canvassersshowed petitioners to have overwhelmingly won in the municipality of Parang. The privaterespondents filed petitions with the COMELEC regarding the inclusion of the questionedcertificates of canvass and that there was failure of election in said municipality due to massivefraud Petitioners, likewise filed for failure of elections in 5 other municipalities.COMELEC ruled annulling the results of the elections in Parang as well as holding in abeyancethe proclamation of the winning candidates for Governor and Vice-Governor until furtherorders from the Commission but dismissed other petitions for other municipalities where it wasalleged that there were also badges of fraud. Issue: Whether or not SPA No. 90-006 (a petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of petitioner Loong) was filed within the period prescribed by law. Ruling: COMELEC was incorrect in annulling elections of Parang, Sulu but not ordering forspecial elections in the same municipality. It was also incorrect in dismissing other petitions forfailure of elections in other municipalities where there were also badges of fraud. The SupremeCourt held that, before the COMELEC can act on a verified petition seeking to declare a failureof election, two (2) conditions must concur: first, no voting has taken place in the precinctsconcerned on the date fixed by law or, even if there were voting, the election neverthelessresulted in a failure to elect; and, second, the votes not cast would affect the result of theelection. We must add, however, that thecause of such failure of election should have been any of the following: force majeure, violence,terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes. This is an important consideration for, where thepropriety of a pre-proclamation controversy ends, there may begin the realm of a special actionfor declaration of failure of elections. While the COMELEC is restricted, in pre-proclamationcases, to an examination of the election returns on their face and is without jurisdiction to gobeyond or behind them and investigate election irregularities, the COMELEC is duty bound toinvestigate allegations of fraud, t errorism, violence and other analogous causes in actions forannulment of election results or for declaration of failure of elections, as the Omnibus ElectionCode denominates the same. Thus, the COMELEC, in the c ase of actions for annulment of election results or declaration of failure of elections, may conduct technical examination of election documents and compare and analyze voters' signatures and fingerprints in order to determine whether or not the elections had indeed been free, honest and clean. Needless tosay, a pre-proclamation controversy is not the same as an action for annulment of electionresults or declaration of failure of elections. The COMELEC was orderd to conduct special elections in the municipality of Parang, Sulu andwas directed to supervise the counting of the votes and the canvassing of the results to the endthat the
winning candidates for Governor and Vice-Governor for the Province of Sulu beproclaimed as soon as possible.
19. MONTEJO v. COMELEC
Facts: The province of Leyte is composed of 5 legislativedistricts. Biliran, located in the third district of Leyte,was made its sub-province by virtue of RA 2141.When Biliran was converted into a regular province,8 municipalities of the third district c omposed thenew province. As a consequence, the composition of the third district was reduced to 5 municipalities. Toremedy the resulting inequality in the distribution of inhabitants, voters and municipalities in Leyte, t heCOMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2736 where ittransferred the municipality of Capoocan of thesecond district and the municipality of Palompon of the fourth district to the third district of Leyte. Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC has the power totransfer municipalities from one legislative district toanother legislative district Held: The COMELEC relies on the Ordinance appended tothe 1987 Constitution as the source of its power of redistricting which is traditionally regarded as part of the power to make laws. But based on thedeliberations of the Constitutional Commission, itdenied to the COMELEC the major power of legislative apportionment as it itself exercised thepower. Section 2 of the Ordinance only empoweredthe COMELEC to make minor adjustments of thereapportionment made. Consistent with the limit of its power to make minor adjustments, Sec. 3 of theOrdinance did not also give the COMELEC anyauthority to transfer municipalities from onelegislative district to another district.It may well be that the conversion of Biliran from asub-province to a regular province brought about animbalance in the distribution of voters andinhabitants in the 5 legislative districts of Leyte. Butthe issue involves a problem of reapportionment of legislative districts and petitioner’s remedy lies with
Congress. Section 5(4), Art. VI of the Constitutioncategorically gives Congress the power toreapportion. The Court held that COMELECcommitted grave abuse of discretion amounting tolack of jurisdiction when it promulgated a resolutiontransferring the municipality of Capoocan of thesecond district and t he municipality of Palompon of the fourth district to the third district of Leyte. 20. AKBAYAN-YOUTH v. COMELEC
Facts: Petitioners in this case represent the youth sectorand they seek to seek to direct COMELEC to conducta special registration before the May 14, 2001General Elections, of new voters ages 18 to 21.According to
them, around four million youth failedto register on or before the December 27, 2000deadline set by the respondent COMELEC. However,the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 3584disapproving the request for additional registrationof voters on the groundthat Section 8 of R.A. 8189 explicitly provides that noregistration shall be conducted during the periodstarting one hundred twenty (120) days before aregular election and that the Commission has nomore time left to accomplish all preelectionactivities.Aggrieved by the denial, petitioners filed before theSC the instant which seeks to set aside and nullifyrespondent COMELECs Resolution and/or to declareSection 8 of R. A. 8189 unconstitutional insofar assaid provision effectivelycauses the disenfranchisement of petitioners andothers similarly situated. Likewise, petitioners prayfor the issuance of a writ of mandamus directingrespondent COMELEC to conduct a specialregistration of new voters and to admit forregistration petitioners and other similarly situatedyoung Filipinos to qualify them to vote in the May14, 2001 General Elections. Issues: 1. Whether or not respondent COMELEC committedgrave abuse of discretion in issuing COMELECResolution2. Whether or not the SC can compel respondentCOMELEC to conduct a special registration of newvoters duringthe period between the COMELECs imposedDecember 27, 2000 deadline and the May 14, 2001general elections. Held: 1. No The right of suffrage invoked by petitioners is not atall absolute. The exercise of the right of suffrage, asin the enjoyment of all other rights is subject to existing substantive and procedural requirementsembodied in our Constitution, statute books andother repositories of law. As to the procedurallimitation, the right of a citizen to vote is necessarilyconditioned upon certain procedural requirementshe must undergo: among others, the process of registration. Specifically, a citizen in order to bequalified to exercise his right to vote, in addition tothe minimum requirements set by the fundamentalcharter, is obliged by law to register, at present,under the provisions of Republic Act No. 8189,otherwise known as the VotersRegistration Act of 1996. Section 8, of the R.A. 8189, explicitly providesthat No registration shall, however, be conductedduring the period starting one hundred twenty (120)days before a regular election and ninety (90) daysbefore a special election. The 100 -day prohibitiveperiod serves a vital role in protecting the integrityof the registration process. Without the prohibitiveperiods, the COMELEC would be deprived of anytime to evaluate t he evidence on the application. If we compromise on these safety nets, we may verywell end up with a voters list full of flying voters,overflowing with unqualified registrants,populated with shadows and ghosts .Likewise, petitioners invoke the so called³standby´ powers or³ resi dual ´ powers of theCOMELEC, as provided under the relevant provisionsof Sec. 28 of RA 8436 ³Designation of Other Dates forCertain Pre- election Acts´. The act of registration isconcededly, by its very nature, a pre-election act.Under Section 3(a) of R.A. 8189, ³(a) Registration refers to the act of accomplishing and filing of a sworn application forregistration by a qualified voter before the electionofficer of the city or municipality wherein he
residesand including thesame in the book of registered voters upon approvalby the Election Registration Board. It bears emphasisthat the provisions of Section 29 of R.A. 8436invoked by herein petitioners and Section 8 of R.A.8189 volunteered by respondent COMELEC, far fromcontradicting each other. SC hold that Section 8 of R.A. 8189 applies in the present case, for thepurpose of upholding the assailed COMELECResolution and denying the instant petitions,considering that the aforesaid law explicitly providesthat no registration shall be conducted during t heperiod starting one hundred twenty (120) daysbefore a regular election. The provisions of Section28, R.A. 8436 would come into play in cases wherethe pre-election acts are susceptible of performancewithin the available period prior to election day.The³stand-by power´ of the respondent COMELEC underSection 28 of R.A. 8436, presupposes the possibilityof its being exercised or availed of, and nototherwise.Moreover, the petitioners in the instant case are notwithout fault or blame. They admit in their petitionthat they failed to register, for whatever reason,within the period of registration and came to thisCourt and invoked its protective mantle notrealizing, so to speak, the speck in their eyes. Impurisminibus nemo accedat curiam. Let no one come tocourt with unclean hands. Well-entrenched is therule in our jurisdiction that the law aids the vigilantand not those who slumber on their rights.Vigilantissed non dormientibus jura in re subveniunt. 2.NO SC believes that petitioners failed to establish, to thesatisfaction of this Court, that they are entitled tothe issuance of this extraordinary writ so as toeffectively compel respondent COMELEC to conducta special registration of voters
21. Kabataan Party-List vs. Comelec
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8585 on February12, 2009 adjusting the deadline of voter registrationfor the May 10, 2010 national and local elections toOctober 31, 2009, instead of December 15, 2009 aspreviously fixed by Resolution No. 8514. The intensepublic clamor for an extension of the October 31,2009 deadline notwithstanding, the COMELEC stoodfirm in its decision not to extend it, arguing mainlythat it needs ample time to prepare for theautomated elections. Via the present Petition forCertiorari and Mandamus filed on October 30, 2009,petitioners challenge the validity of COMELECResolution No. 8585 and seek a declaration of itsnullity. Issue: Does the Comelec have discretion to fix otherdates for continuing registration? Held: The clear text of the law thus decrees thatvoters be allowed to register daily during regularoffices hours, except during the period starting 120days before a regular election and 90 days before aspecial election. Both R.A. No. 6646, Section 29 andR.A. No. 8436, Section 28 grant the COMELEC thepower to fix other
periods and dates for pre-electionactivities only if the same cannot be reasonably heldwithin the period provided by law. This grant of power, however, is for the purpose of enabling thepeople to exercise the right of suffrage –
thecommon underlying policy of RA 8189, RA 6646 andRA 843 6.In the present case, the Court finds no ground tohold that the mandate of continuing voterregistration cannot be reasonably held within theperiod provided by RA 8189, Sec. 8 –
daily duringoffice hours, except during the period starting 120days before the May 10, 2010 regular elections.There is thus no occasion for the COMELEC toexercise its power to fix other dates or deadlinestherefor. 22. ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY V. COMELEC , GRNo. 190582, April 8, 2010
This is a Petition forCertiorari under Rule 65 of theRules of Court, with an application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, filed by AngLadlad LGBT Par ty (Ang Ladlad) against theResolutions of the Commission on Elections(COMELEC) dated November 11, 2009 (the FirstAssailed Resolution) and December 16, 2009 (theSecond Assailed Resolution) in SPP No. 09-228 (PL)(collectively, the Assailed Resolutions). The case hasits roots in the COMELEC¶s refusal to accredit AngLadlad as a party-list organization under Republic Act(RA) No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-ListSystem Act. FACTS: Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued that theLGBT (lesbians, gays, bisexuals and transgender)community is a marginalized and under-representedsector that is particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation and gender identity; thatLGBTs ar e victims of exclusion, discrimination, andviolence; that because of negative societal attitudes,LGBTs are constrained to hide their sexualorientation; and that Ang Ladlad complied with the8-point guidelines enunciated by this Court inAngBagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission onElections. Ang Ladlad laid out its nationalmembership base consisting of individual membersand organizational supporters, and outlined itsplatform of governance. On August 17, 2009, AngLadlad filed a Petition for registration with theCOMELEC.On November 11, 2009, after admitting thepetitioner¶s evidence, the COMELEC (SecondDivision) dismissed the Petition on moral groundsthat petitioner tolerates immorality which offendsreligious beliefs, and advocates sexual immorality.Petitioner should likewise be denied accreditationnot only for advocating immoral doctrines butlikewise for not being truthful when it said that it ³orany of its nominees/party-list representatives havenot violated or failed to comply w ith laws, rules, orregulations relating to the elections.´ Furthermore,states COMELEC, Ang Ladlad will be exposing our youthto an environment that does not conform to theteachings of our faith. When Ang Ladlad soughtreconsideration, COMELEC still, on December 16,2010, upheld the First Assailed Resolution
On January 4, 2010, Ang Ladlad a Petition, prayingthat the Supreme Court annul the AssailedResolutions and direct the COMELEC to grant AngLadlad¶s application for accreditation.Ang Ladladalso sought the issuance ex parte of a preliminarymandatory injunction against the COMELEC, whichhad previously announced that it would beginprinting the final ballots for the May 2010 electionsby January 25, 2010. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the denial of accreditation byCOMELEC, violated the constitutional guaranteesagainst the establishment of religion. insofar as it justified the exclusion by using religious dogma. 2. Whether or not the Assailed Resolutionscontravened the constitutional rights to privacy,freedomof speech and assembly, and equal protection of laws, of Ang Ladlad, as well as constituted violationsof the Philippines¶ international obligations againstdiscrimination based on sexual or ientation. HELD: 1. Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5that ³No law shall be made respecting anestablishment of religion, or prohibiting the freeexercise thereof.´ At bottom, what our nonestablishment clause calls for is ³governmentneutrality in religious matters.´ Clearly,³governmental reliance on religious justification isinconsistent with this policy of neutrality.´ TheSupreme Court ruled that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC toutilize the Bible and the Koran to justify theexclusion of Ang Ladlad. Rather than relying onreligious belief, the legitimacy of the AssailedResolutions should depend, instead, on whether theCOMELEC is able to advance some justification for itsrulings beyond mere conformity to religiousdoctrine. The government must act for secularpurposes and in ways that have primarily seculareffects.2. The Assailed Resolutions have not identified anyspecific overt immoral act performed by Ang Ladlad.Even the Office of the Solicitor General agrees that³there should have been a finding by the COMELECthat the group¶s members have committed or arecommitting immoral acts.´ Respondent have failed toexplain what societal ills are sought to be prevented,or why special protection is required for the youth.Under our system of laws, every group has the rightto promote its agenda and attempt to persuadesociety of the validity of its position through normaldemocratic means. Fr eedom of expressionconstitutes one of the essential foundations of ademocratic society, and this freedom applies notonly to those that are favorably received but also tothose that offend, shock, or disturb. Absent of anycompelling state interest, it is not for the COMELECor the Supreme Court, to impose its views on thepopulace. Otherwise stated, the COMELEC iscertainly not free to interfere with speech for nobetter reason than promoting an approved messageor discouraging a disfavored one. Laws of generalapplication should apply with equal force to LGBTs,and they deserve to participate in the party-listsystem on the same basis as other marginalized andunder-represented sectors. This is in accord with thecountry¶s international obligations to protect andpromote human rights. The principle of non-discrimination as it relates to the right to electoralparticipation, enunciated in the UDHR and the ICCPRshould be recognized. The Constitution and lawsshould be applied uninfluenced by public opinion.True democracy should be resilient enough towithstand vigorous
debate due to conflictingopinions.The Petition was GRANTED. The Resolutions of theCommission on Elections dated November 11, 2009and December 16, 2009 in SPP No. 09228 (PL) wasSET ASIDE and the COMELEC was directed to GRA NTpetitioner¶s application for party-list accreditation 23. DANIEL GARCIA and TEODORO O'HARA vs. ERNESTO DE JESUS and CECILIA DAVID, and
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Facts: Petitioners GARCIA and O'HARA in G.R. No. 88158, and Petitioner TOBON UY in G.R. Nos. 97108-09, question the arrogation unto itself by the COMEL EC of the power to issue Writs of Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus. They invoke the previous ruling of this C ourt in Pimentel v. COMELEC (G.R. Nos. 53581-83, 19 December 1980, 101 SCRA 769), which maintained that no such jurisdiction was ever conferred on respondent Commission by the 1973 Constitution or by law. On the other hand, all Respondents in the Antipolo Case (G.R. No. 88158) and in the Isabela Case (G.R. Nos. 97108-09) contend that since the 1987 Constitution now expressly empowers the COMELEC to exercise "appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction" (Section 2[2], Article IX-C), and to "promulgate its own rules concerning pleadings and practice before it" provided they do "not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights" (Section 6, Article IX-A and Section 3, Article IXC), the COMELEC validly promulgated the rule which empowers it to issue the special Writs. Issue: Whether or not COMELEC have jurisdiction over Petitions for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus.
Ruling: In the absence of any specific conferment upon the COMELEC, either by the Constitution or by legislative fiat, the COMELEC is bereft of jurisdiction to issue said Writs. It is the COMELEC alone, invoking its Constitutionally invested appellate jurisdiction and rule-making power, that arr ogated unto itself the authority to issue Writs of Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus in Rule 28, Section 1, of its Rules of Procedure. However, neither the appellate jurisdiction of the COMELEC nor its rule-making power justifies such self-conferment of authority.Apparently, the COMELEC Rule on its Certiorari jurisdiction is patterned after the previous authorization to the Court of Appeals to issue Writs of Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. That authority, however, was not inherent in the Court of Appeals but was specifically conferred by Section 30 of the Judiciary Act (Rep. Act No. 296) and Section 9(1) of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1 980 (B.P. Blg. 129). It does not follow that just because the 1987 Constitution vests the COMELEC with appellate jurisdiction, without more, it can issue such Writs in aid of that appellate jurisdiction.The grant of appellate jurisdiction to the COMELEC does not necessarily make it a "superior Court" vis-a-vis Regional Trial Courts.
To recapitulate, in the absence of an express Constitutional or legislative authorization, the COMELEC is devoid of competence to issue special Writs simply on the basis of its appellate jurisdiction and its rulemaking power. Neither is the COMELEC empowered, through its procedural rules alone, to deprive Regional Trial Courts of authority, in the exercise of their discretion, to order execution pending appeal upon good reasons stated in a special order. The Supreme Court granted these consolidated Petitions for Certiorari and prohibition. 24. PETRONILA S. RULLODA vs. COMELEC
Facts: In the barangay elections of July, 2002, Romeo Rulloda and RemegioPlacido were the contending candidates for Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas, San Jacinto, Pangasinan. Before elections were held, however, Romeo died and petitioner PetronilaRulloda sought to run as candidate in lieu of her late husband. Petronila won the election, but t he Board of Canvassers proclaimed Placido as the winner. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not substitution of candidate in Barangay Election is allowed. Ruling: Private respondent contended that under Sec. 77 of the Omnibus Elections Code, substitution of candidates is not allowed; that inasmuch as the barangay election is non-partisan, there can be no substitution because there is no political party from which to designate the substitute. The Court ruled that such interpretation, aside from being non sequitur, ignored the purpose of election laws which is to give effect to the will of the voters. The absence of a specific provision governing substitution of candidates in barangay elections cannot be inferred as a prohibition against said substitution. Further, technicalities and procedural niceties in election cases should not be made to stand in the way of the true will of the electorate. Petitioner should be proclaimed as the duly elected Barangay Chairman.
24. JOEL G. MIRANDA vs. ANTONIO M. ABAYA and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Facts: This is a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction questioning the resolution of the ComelecEn Banc dated December 8, 1998 in SPA Case No. 98-288. The aforementioned resolution of the Comelec reversed and set aside the earlier resolution of the First Division of Comelec dated May 16, 1998 dismissing private respondent's petition
to declare the substitution of Jose `Pempe' Miranda by petitioner as candidate for the City of Santiago's mayoralty post void. Issues: 1.) Whether the annulment of petitioner's substitution and proclamation was issued without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction; 2.) Whether the order of the Comelec directing the proclamation of the private respondent was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Ruling: The Court found neither lack of jurisdiction nor grave abuse of discretion attended the annulment of the substitution and proclamation of petitioner. In particular, the Court ruled that the Comelec's action nullifying the substitution by and proclamation of petitioner for the mayoralty post of Santiago City, Isabela is proper and legally sound because herein petitioner cannot substitute a candidate whose certificate of candidacy has been canceled and denied due course. Moreover, Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion in resolving SPA No. 98-288 in favor of private respondent. The result in the dispositive portion of the December 8, 1998 resolution pertaining to the issues involved in SPA No. 98288 is correct insofar as it annulled the election and proclamation of Joel G. Miranda. But even assuming for the sake of argument that it is not, still, this supposed error did not constitute grave abuse of discretion which may be annulled and reversed in the present petition for certiorari. However, the Court ruled that the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion when it ordered the city board of Canvassers of Santiago to reconvene, prepare a new certificate of canvass and proclamation and proclaim the winning candidate among those voted upon because this was inconsistent with the ruling applied in the case of Labo vs. Comelec, Aquino vs. Comelec, Reyes vs. Comelec and Nolasco vs. Comelec. Accordingly, the petition is partly denied, insofar as the Comelec ruling to annul the election and proclamation of petitioner is affirmed. The petition is, however, granted so as to modify the resolution of the Comelec in SPA No. 98-288 by deleting the portion directing the city board of canvassers to reconvene and proclaim the winning candidate from among those voted upon during the May 11, 1998 elections. 26. Trinidad vs Commission on Elections and Sunga G.R. No. 135716
This is a petition for certiorari questioning the Resolution of the Commission on Elections disqualifying petitioner as a mayoralty candidate in the May 1995 elections. Likewise, it seeks the review of a subsequent resolution annulling petitioner’s proclamation as elected mayor in the May 1998 elections.
Facts:
Petitioner Trinidad won the May 1995 elections. Private respondent Sunga filed a disqualification case against petitioner and asking the COMELEC to proclaim him as the duly elected mayor. COMELEC promulgated it decision on June 22, 1998, disqualifying Trinidad. Petitioner filed a Motion For Reconsideration claiming that he was deprived of due process. Petitioner was again proclaimed winner in the May 1998 elections. On October 13, 1998 COMELEC denied petitioner’s MR as well as annulling his proclamation as elected mayor. Thus this petition for certiorari. Issues: 1. WON petitioner was deprived of due process in the proceedings before the COMELEC insofar as his disqualification under the May 8, 1995 and May 8, 1998 elections were concerned. 2. WON petitioner’s proclamation as Mayor under the May 11, 1998 elections may be cancelled on
account of the disqualification case filed against him during the May 8, 1995 elections. 3. WON private respondent, as the candidate receiving the second highest number of votes, m ay be proclaimed as Mayor in the event of petitioner’s disqualification. HELD 1. NO. Petitioner was able to file an Answer with Counter Petition and Motion to Dismiss. He was also able to submit his counter-affidavit and sworn statements of forty-eight witnesses. He was also given a chance to explain in his Motion for Reconsideration. He was afforded an opportunity to be heard, through his pleadings, therefore, there is no denial of procedural due process. 2. NO. Petitioner cannot be disqualified from his reelection term of office. Removal cannot extend beyond the term during which the alleged misconduct was committed. If a public official is not removed before his term of office expires, he can no longer be removed if he is thereafter reelected for another term. 3. NO. As earlier decided by the Supreme Court, the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be proclaimed winner in case the winning c andidate is disqualified. That would be disenfranchising the electorate without any fault on their part and to undermine the importance and meaning of democracy and the people’s rig ht to elect officials of their choice. 27. Sinica vs Mula and Commission on Elections
In this case, assailed was the COMELEC Resolution on Oct. 6, 1998 in SPA No. 98-292, declaring the substitution of mayoralty candidate Teodoro Sinaca, Jr. by petitioner Emmanuel D. Sinaca as invalid. Facts:
In the May 1998 elections, petitioner Emmanuel Sinica was a substitute candidate for the mayoral post of the Matugas Wing after their original candidate, Teodoro Sinica, Jr., was disqualified for being convicted of bigamy. He was proclaimed winner after the canvassing. (Matugas Wing was a faction in the LAKAS-NUCD-UMPD party, as well as t he Barbers Wing. Each faction has separate candidates for the mayoral post in the Municipality of Malimono, Surigao del Norte.) Respondent Mula (who got Sinica, Jr. disqualified) filed a disqualification case against Emmanuel Sinica before the COMELEC. He alleged that said substitution was invalid because: a) Sinica was not member of the LAKAS party when he was nominated as a substitute; and b) it lacks approval of Sen. Barbers as a joint signatory of the substitution. The COMELEC Second Division dismissed the disqualification case. However, when respondent Mula filed a Motion for Reconsideration, COMELEC en banc set aside the r esolution of the Second Division and disqualified EMMANUEL asserting that the substitution violated the provisions of Sec. 77 of the Omnibus Election Code that the substitute m ust belong to the same political party as the substituted candidate. Emmanuel D. Sinaca was not valid because he was an independent candidate for councilor prior to his nomination as substitute candidate in place of the withdrawing candidate who was a Lakas party member. Therefore, this case before the Supreme Court. Issue: WON the substitution of Emmanuel Sinica was against the provisions of Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code. Held: NO. Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code only mandates that a substitute candidate should be a person belonging to and certified by the same political party as the candidate to be replaced. Petitioner Emmanuel Sinaca, an independent candidate, had first withdrawn his certificate of candidacy for Sangguniang Bayan Member before he joined the LAKAS party and nominated by the LAKAS MATUGAS Wing as the substitute candidate. He had filed his certificate of candidacy and his certificate of nomination as LAKAS mayoralty candidate signed by Gov. Matugas with his written acceptance of the party’s nomination. Therefore, he is a bona fide LAKAS member. There is nothing in the Constitution or the statute which requires as a condition precedent that a substitute candidate must have been a member of the party concerned for a certain period of time before he can be nominated as such. 28. Gador vs Commission on Elections
G.R. No. L-52365
January 22, 1980 This petition for mandamus with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction was filed on January 21, 1980 at 4:47pm asking the Supreme Court to immediately order the respondent COMELEC to include the name his name in the list of candidates for Mayor of the City of Ozamiz. Facts: The petition alleges that the petitioner is a candidate for the Office of Mayor of the City of Ozamiz as Independent this coming January 30, 1980 local election. He filed his certificate of candidacy with the Election Registrar of Ozamis City on January 7, 1980 because of the news in the Bulletin Today. The said news stated that the respondent COMELEC issued a resolution for the extension of time for filing COC. However, the President denied said resolution. Therefore, respondent COMELEC informed the petitioner that his name might not be included in the list of candidates for mayor because of the said incident. Thus, this petition. ISSUE: WON the certificate of candidacy of the petitioner which was filed on January 7, 1980 is v alid. Held: NO. A certificate of candidacy filed beyond reglementary period is void. Section 7, Batasang Pambansa Bilang 52, provides that “The sworn certificate of candidacy shall be filed
in triplicate not later than January 4, 1980.” It is a fact admitted by the petitioner that the President had not extended the period within which to file the certificate of candidacy. This Court is powerless to grant the remedy prayed for in the petition. Having been filed beyond January 4, 1980, the certificate of candidacy of the petitioner is void. 29. RONALD ALLAN POE a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR. VS. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO P.E.T. CASE No. 002. March 29, 2005
Facts: In the 2004 election, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (GMA) was proclaimed the duly elected President of the Philippines. The second-placer in the elections, Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ), filed an election protest before the Electoral Tribunal. When the Protestant died in the course of his medical treatment, his widow, Mrs. Jesusa Sonora Poe a.k.a. Susan Roces filed a motion to intervene as a substitute for deceased protestant FPJ. She claims that there is an urgent need for her to continue and substitute for her late husband to ascertain the true and genuine will of the electorate in the interest of the Filipino people. The Protestee, GMA asserts that the widow of a deceased candidate is not the proper party to replace the deceased protestant since a public office is personal and not a property that passes on to the heirs. Protestee also
contends that under the Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, only the registered candidates who obtained the 2nd and 3rd highest votes for the presidency may contest the election of the president.
Issue: May the widow substitute/intervene for the protestant who died during the pendency of the latter’s
protest case?
Held: Only the registered candidate for President or for Vice-President of the Philippines who received the second or third highest number of votes may contest the election of the President or the Vice-President, as the case may be, by filing a verified petition with the Clerk of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30) days after the proclamation of the winner. An election protest is not purely personal and exclusive to the protestant or to the protestee, hence, substitution and intervention is allowed but only by a real party in interest. Note that Mrs. FPJ herself denies any claim to the office of P resident but rather stresses that it is with the “paramount public interest” in mind that she desires “to pursue the process” commenced by her late husband. However,
nobility of intention is not the point of reference in determining whether a person may intervene in an election protest. In such intervention, the interest which allows a person to intervene in a suit must be in the matter of litigation and of such direct and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the effect of the judgment. In t his protest, Mrs. FPJ will not immediately and directly benefit from the outcome should it be determined that the declared president did not truly get the highest number of votes. 30. Salva v. Makalintal GR No. 132603 sept 18, 2000
FACTS: Salva, et al, officials and residents of Barangay San Rafael, Calaca, Batangas filed a c lass suit against the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Batangas, Sangguniang Pambayan of Calaca, and the COMELEC for annulment of OrdinanceNo. 5 anlo[pd Resolution No. 345, enacted by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Batangas, and COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 Ordinance No. 5 declared the abolition of Barangay San Rafael and its merger with Barangay Dacanlao, and accordingly instructed the COMELEC to conduct the required plebiscite. Resolution No. 345 affirmed the effectivity of Ordinance No. 5, overriding the veto exercised by the Governor of Batangas. COMELEC Resolution No. 2987, on the other hand, provided for the rules and regulations governing the conduct of the required plebiscite scheduled on 28 February 1998, to decide the issue of the abolition of Barangay San Rafael and its merger with Barangay Dacanlao. The trial court denied the motion for the issuance of a TRO and/or preliminary injunction for lack of
jurisdiction. According to it, any petition or action questioning an act, resolution, or decision of the COMELEC must be brought before the SC. ISSUES: W/N the trial court had jurisdiction to enjoin the COMELEC from I mplementing Resolution No. 2987. HELD: YES. Resolution No. 2987 which provides for the rules and regulations governing the conduct of the required plebiscite, was not issued pursuant to the COMELEC’s quasi-judicial functions but merely as an incident of its inherent administrative functions over the conduct of plebiscites, thus, the said resolution may not be deemed as a final order reviewable by certiorari by this Court. Any question pertaining to the validity of said resolution may well be taken in an ordinary civil action before the trial courts The powers vested by the Constitution and the law on the COMELEC may either be classified as those pertaining to its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial functions, or those which are inherently administrative and sometimes ministerial in character 31. FRIVALDO vs. COMELEC
Facts: Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect and assume office in due time. The League of Municipalities filed with the COMELEC a petition for annulment of F rivaldo’s election and proclamation on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States. Frivaldo admitted the allegation but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that his naturalization was merely forced upon himself as a means of survival against the unrelenting prosecution by the Martial Law Dictator’s agent abroad.
Issue: Whether or not Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election.
Held: No. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution.
Even if he did lose his naturalized American citizenship, such forfeiture did not and co uld not have the effect of automatically restoring his citizenship in the Philippines that he had earlier renounced.
Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer’s entire tenure.
Frivaldo declared not a citizen of the Philippines and therefore disqualified from serving as a Governor of the Province of Sorsogon. 32. LEGASCA vs. DE VERA
Facts: Legasca, herein petitioner, signed himself as President of Goodwill Party, asking that the latter be recognized as a duly organized political party. COMELEC denied petitioner’s prayers upon conclusion that it is not a political party contemplated in the Election Code. Respondents answered alleging that petitioner did not have a permanent address whatsoever; that socalled Goodwill Party is neither organized nor is composed of a group of persons pursuing the same political ideals in the government, it having no members than petitioner himself; that petitioner has not presented any other proof of membership or organizations aside from his gratuitous and unsubstantial claim. Issue: Whether or not Goodwill Party is a political party under the purview of the Election Code. Held: There cannot be any quarrel that the platform of the Goodwill Party embodies many ideals of a political character. But nowhere appears the existence of “an organized group of persons” pursuing said ideals. Petitioner’s claim of 453,989 individuals is not enough. It is nece ssary that there should be “an organized group.” There is no evidence on record as to the existence of an organized group, it is
necessary that all of them be joined in a corporate body, articulate, with the attributes of a social personality. A constitution, by-laws, rules, or some kind of character is needed so as to give existence to the organization. The so-called Goodwill Party is not a political party. 33. Paras v. COMELEC
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G.R. No. 123169 (November 4, 1996)
FACTS: A petition for recall was filed against Paras, who is the incumbent Punong Barangay. The recall election was deferred due to Petitioner’s opposition that under Sec. 74 of RA No. 7160, no recall shall take place within one year from the date of the official’s assumption to office or one year immediately preceding a regular local election. Since the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set on the first Monday of May 2006, no recall may be instituted.
ISSUE: W/N the SK election is a local election.
HELD: No. Every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to its context, and it must be considered together and kept subservient to its general intent. The evident intent of Sec. 74 is to subject an elective local official to recall once during his term, as provided in par. (a) and par. (b). The spirit, rather than the letter of a law, determines its construction. Thus, interpreting the phrase “regular local election” to include SK election will unduly circumscribe the Code for there will never be a recall election rendering inutile the provision. In interpreting a statute, the Court assumed that the legislature intended to enact an effective law. An interpretation should be avoided under which a statute or provision being construed is defeated, meaningless, inoperative or nugatory.
34. UTUTALUM vs. COMELEC 181 SCRA 335
Facts: Petitioner Untalum obtained 482 vot es while respondent Anni received 35,581 votes out of the 39,801 voters. If the returns of Siasi were excluded, petitioner would have lead of 5,301 votes. Petitioner filed written objections to the returns from Siasi on the ground that they “appear to be tampered with or falsified” owing to the “great excess of votes” appearing in the said returns.
COMELEC issued annullin g the Siasi List of Voters “on the ground of massive irregularities committed in the preparation and being statistically improbable”, and ordering a new reg istration of voters for the local elections. Petitioner contends that the issue he raised referred to “obvious manufactured returns,” a proper subject matter for a pre-proclamation controversy and therefore cognizable by the COMELEC; that election returns from Siasi should be excluded from the canvass of the results since its original List of Voters had already been finally annulled. Issue: Whether or not the election returns from Siasi should be excluded from the canvass of the results since the original List of Voters had been finally annulled. Held: The Siasi returns, however, do not show prima facie that on the basis of the old List of Voters, there is actually a great excess of votes over what could have been legally cast considering that only 36,000 persons actually voted out of the 39,801 voters. Petitioner’s cause of action is not a listed ground for a pre-proclamation controversy. To allow the
COMELEC to do so retroactively would be to empower it to annul a previous election because of the subsequent annulment of a questioned registry. The list must then be considered conclusive evidence of persons who could exercise the right of suffrage in a particular election. The preparation of a voter ’s list is not a proceeding before the Board of Canvassers. A pre-proclamation controversy is limited to
challenges directed against the Board of Canvassers, not the Board of Election Inspectors and such challenge should relate to specified election returns against which the petitioner should have made verbal elections 35. MASTURA vs. COMELEC
Facts: Petitioner Michael O. Mastura and private respondent Didagen P. Dilangalen were congressional candidates for the first district of Maguindanao during the 8 May 1995 elections. In the canvassing of votes, Dilangalen objected to the inclusion of the Certificate of Canvass of the Municipality of Matanog on the ground that the same was allegedly tampered. Acting on the objection, the COMELEC Second Division ordered the production and examination of the election returns of the Municipality of Matanog. In the course of the examination four (4) ballot boxes were produced and opened. Upon examination and comparison of the copies of the election returns of the MTC Judge and the COMELEC, the COMELEC Second Division found that, indeed, the C ertificate of Canvass of the Municipality of Matanog had been tampered with. Consequently, the COMELEC Second Division issued the herein assailed Order o f 29 February 1996 annulling the Certificate of Canvass of Matanog. Issue: Whether or not COMELEC can suspend the canvass of votes pending its inquiry whether there exists a discrepancy between the various co pies of election returns from the disputed voting centers. Held: We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent COMELEC. It is settled jurisprudence that COMELEC can suspend the canvass of votes pending its inquiry whether there exists a discrepancy between the various copies of election returns from the disputed voting centers. Corollarily, once the election returns were found to be falsified or tampered with, the COMELEC can annul the illegal canvass and order the Board of Canvassers to reconvene and proclaim the winners on the basis of the genuine returns or, if it should refuse, replace the members of the board or proclaim the winners itself. That the Certificate of Canvass of the Municipality of Matanog was tampered with is a factual finding of the COMELEC. 36. TAULE vs. SANTOS
Facts: On June 18, 1989, the Federation of Associations of Barangay Councils (FABC) of Catanduanes, composed of eleven (11) members convened in Virac, Catanduanes with six members, including Taule, in attendance for the purpose of holding the election of its officers. The group decided to hold the election despite the absence of five (5) of its members. The Governor of Catanduanes sent a letter to respondent the Secretary of Local Government, protesting the election of the officers of the FABC and seeking its nullification due to flagrant irregularities in the manner it was conducted. The Secretary nullifed the election of the officers of the FABC and ordered a new one to be conducted to be presided by the Regional Director of Region V of the Department of Local Government. Taule, contested the decision contending that neither the constitution nor the law grants jurisdiction upon the respondent Secretary over election contests involving the election of officers of the FABC and that the Constitution provides that it is the COMELEC which has jurisdiction over all contests involving elective barangay officials.
Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC has jurisdiction to entertain an election protest involving the election of the officers of the Federation of Association of Barangay Councils; Held: The jurisdiction of the COMELEC over contests involving elective barangay officials is limited to appellate jurisdiction from decisions of the trial courts. Under the law, the sworn petition contesting the election of a barangay officer shall be filed with the proper Municipal or Metropolitan Trial Court by any candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted for the same office within 10 days after the proclamation of the results. The jurisdiction of the COMELEC does not cover protests over the organizational set-up of the katipunan ng mga barangay composed of popularly elected punong barangays as prescribed by law whose officers are voted upon by their respective members. The authority of the COMELEC over the katipunan ng mga barangay is limited by law to supervision of the election of the representative of the katipunan concerned to the sanggunian in a particular level conducted by their own respective organization. 37. NACIONALISTA PARTY vs. BAUTISTA
Facts: Petitioner Nacionalista Party alleges that it is organized and registered under the laws of the Philippines, brought this action praying that a writ of prohibition issue commanding the respondent Solicitor General to desist forever from acting as acting member of the Commission on Elections under the designation rendered to him by President Quirino, unless he is legally appointed as regular member of the said Commission on Elections. Issue: Whether or not petitioner, a political party is entitled to bring an action in the courts of justice. Held: It may be organized and registered as a political party in or with the Commission on Elections for the purposes of the Revised Election Code (Republic Act No. 180), but for the purpose of bringing an action in the courts of justice such organization and registration are not sufficient. It has to be incorporated under Act 1459 for only natural or juridical persons may be parties in a civil action, but this technical defect may be cured by allowing the substitution of the real parties in interest for the petitioner. The petitioner is granted five days within which to amend its petition so as to substitute the real parties in interest for it (the petitioner) or to show that it is a juridical person entitled to institute these proceedings. Otherwise, or if the petitioner does not amend its petition or does not show that it is a juridical entity, the petition will be dismissed. After the amendment or showing referred to shall have been made, the writ prayed for will issue. 38. BAYTAN ET AL. VS. COMELEC GR No. 153945. February 4, 2003
Facts: Reynato Baytan registered as a voter in two precincts and the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the recommendation of its Law Department to file information of double registration in violation of the Election Code. Baytan filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari on the grounds, among others, that there was no probable cause and that election cases must first be heard and decided by a Division before the COMELEC En Banc can assume jurisdiction.
Held: 1. It is well- settled that the finding of probable cause in the prosecution of election offenses rests in the sound discretion of the COMELEC. Generally, the Court will not interfere with such finding of the COMELEC, absent a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion. This principle emanates from the exclusive power of the COMELEC to conduct preliminary investigation of all election investigation of all election offenses and to prosecute the same. 2. Under Sec. 2, Art. IX-C of the Constitution, the COMELEC exercises both administrative and quasi judicial powers. The administrative powers are found in Sec 2. (1), (3) to (9) of Art IX-C. The Constitution does not provide on whether these administrative powers shall be exercised by the COMELEC en banc or in division. The COMELEC en banc therefore can act on administrative matters, and this had been the practice under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. The prosecution by the COMELEC of violations of election laws is an administrative power. 3. The exercise by the COMELEC of its quasi-judicial powers is subject to Sec.3, Art.IX-C which expressly requires that all election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies, shall be decided by the COMELEC in division, and the motion for reconsideration shall be decided by the COMELEC en banc. 39. BAROT VS. COMELEC ET AL. GR No. 149147. June 18, 2003
Facts: In the May 14, 2001 elections Barot was proclaimed the 10th winning candidate for councilor of Tanjay City, Negros Oriental. On May 29, 2001 the Chairman of the Board of Canvassers sent a Memorandum to the COMELEC requesting for authority to correct the Certificate of Canvass and to proclaim Tabaloc, instead of Barot, as the 10th winning candidate for Councilor, by errors committed by the Board of Canvassers. The COMELEC considered the Memorandum as a petition, and after notice and hearing, granted the request. Tabaloc was proclaimed the 10th winning Councilor. Barot filed with the Supreme Court a petition for and prohibition.
Held: 1. Rule 27, Sec.5, par (b) of the COMELEC Rules provides that a petition for correction must be filed not later than five (5) days following the date of proclamation, impleading the candidates who may be adversely affected thereby. Rule 1, Sec.4 of the COMELEC Rules also provides that “ in the interest of justice and in the order to obtain speedy disposition of all matters pending before the Commission,
these rules or any option thereof may be suspe nded by the Commission.” The filing of the petition beyond the 5- day period was upheld in the interest of justice, it having been clearly shown that it was Tabaloc and not Barot who was the 10th winning candidate for councilor. 2. The COMELEC had the authority to consider the Memorandum of the Chairman of the Board of Canvassers, after notice and hearing, may even motu propio correct errors committed by in the tabulation of the votes. 40. NAVARRO VS. COMELEC
Facts: Petitioner was a candidate for Mayor in the May 14, 2001 elections and during the canvassing, he petitioned the Board of Canvassers (BOC) to exclude the election returns contained in nine (9) ballot boxes on the ground that said boxes were not secured by the required “3 padlocks.” The BOC denied the petition and petitioner appealed to the COMELEC. The COMELEC en banc denied the appeal and ordered the BOC to proceed with the canvassing and proclaim the winning local candidates. Petitioner lost in the election.
Held: 1. Lack of the required number of padlocks on the ballot boxes is not a proper issue in a preproclamation controversy. The issues that may be raised in a pre-proclamation controversy are enumerated in Sec 243 of the Omnibus Election Code, to wit: a. Illegal composition or proceeding of the board of canvassers; b. The canvassed election returns are incomplete, contain material defects, and appear to be tampered with or falsified, or contain discrepancies in the same returns or in other authentic copies thereof as mentioned in Sections 233, 234, 235, and 236 of this Code; c. The election returns were prepared under duress, threats, coercion, or intimidation, or they are obviously manufactured or not authentic; and d. When substitute or fraudulent returns in controverted polling places were canvassed, the results o f which materially affected the standing of t he aggrieved candidate or candidates. This enumeration is exclusive. 2. A pre-proclamation controversy is limited to an examination of the election returns on their face and the COMELEC as a general rule need not go beyond the face of the returns and investigate the alleged election irregularities. In the case of Baterina, et al. v. COMELEC, 205 SCRA 1, the following facts were shown: (a) failure to close the entries with the signatures of the election inspectors; (b) lack of inner and outer seals; (c) canvassing by the Board of copies not intended for it; (d) lack of time and date receipt by the Board of the election returns; (e) lack of signatures of petitioners’ watchers; and (f) lack of authority of the person receiving the election returns. It was held that while said facts may, indeed, involve violation of the rules governing the preparation and delivery of election returns for canvassing, they do
not necessarily affect the authenticity and genuineness of the subject election returns as to warrant their exclusion from the canvassing. Above facts are clearly defects in form insufficient to support a conclusion that the election returns were tampered with or spurious. 3. The COMELEC en banc validly ordered the proclamation of the winning candidate even during the pendency of the appeal to the COMELEC from the BOC’s denial of the petition for exclusion of the questioned election returns. RA 7166, Sec 20 (I) provides as follows: (i) The BOC shall not proclaim any candidate as winner unless authorized by the Commission after the latter has ruled on the objection brought to it on appeal by the losing party. Any proclamation in violation hereof shall be void ab initio, unless the contested returns will not adversely affect the results of the election. Above-quoted provision applies only where the objection deals with a pre-proclamation controversy 41. COMELEC VS. TAGLE, ET AL.
Facts: In connection with the May 11, 1998 elections, candidate for Mayor Florentino A. Bautista filed a complaint against Mayor Federico Poblete et al. for vote –buying in violation of Sec 261 (a) and (b) of the Omnibus Election Code. The Information was docketed as Criminal Case No. 7034-99 of the RTC of Imus, Cavite. Subsequently, a complaint for vote-selling in violation of Sec 261 (a) of the Omnibus Election Code was filed with the Prosecutor’s Office as witnesses in Criminal Case No. 7034-99 and the Provincial Prosecutor in Imus, Cavite filed separate Informations for vote-selling against said w itnesses. On appeal, the COMELEC en banc declared that the witnesses in Criminal Case No. 7034-99 were exempt from criminal prosecution pursuant to 4th paragraph of Sec 28, RA No. 6646, otherwise known as “The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987” which grants immunity from criminal prosecution to persons who voluntarily give information and willingly testify against those liable for vote-buying or vote-selling. The Law Department of the COMELEC moved to dismiss the Informations against the said witnesses but the RTC in Imus, Cavite denied the motion to dismiss.
Held: 1. One of the effective ways of preventing the commission of vote-buying and of prosecuting those committing it is the grant of immunity from criminal liability in favor of the party whose vote was bought. Sec 28 of RA No. 6646 concludes with the following paragraph: The giver, offeror, the promissory as well as the solicitor, acceptor, recipient and conspirator referred to in paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 261 of Bat as Pambansa Blg. 881 shall be liable as principals: Provided, that any person, otherwise guilty under said paragraphs who voluntarily gives information and willingly testifies on any violation thereof in any official investigation or proceeding shall be exempt from prosecution and punishment for the offenses with reference to which his information and testimony were given: Provided, further, that nothing herein shall exempt such person from criminal prosecution for perjury or false testimony.
2. To avoid possible fabrication of evidence against the vote- buyers, especially by the latter’s opponents, Congress saw it fit to warn “vote-sellers” who denounce the vote-buying that they could be liable for perjury or false testimony should they not tell the truth. 3. The prosecution witnesses in Criminal Case No. 7034-99 are exempt from criminal prosecution for vote-selling by virtue of the proviso in the last paragraph of Section 28, RA 6646. At the time when the complaint for vote-selling was filed with t he office of the Provincial Prosecutor, the respondents had already executed sworn statements attesting to the corrupt practice of vote-buying. It cannot then be denied that they had already voluntarily given information in the vote-buying case. In fact, they willingly testified in Crim. Case No. 7034-99. 4. The COMELEC has the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under the election laws and to prosecute the same. The Chief State Prosecutor, all Provincial and City Prosecutors, or their respective assistants are, however, given continuing authority, as deputies of the COMELEC to conduct preliminary investigation of complaints involving election offenses and to prosecute the same. This authority may be revoked or withdrawn by the COMELEC anytime whenever, in its judgment, such revocation or withdrawal is necessary to protect the integrity of the COMELEC and to promote the common good, or when it believes that the successful prosecution of the case can be done by the COMELEC. When the COMELEC nullified the resolution of the Provincial Prosecutor, it in effect withdrew the deputation granted by the COMELEC. 42. PANGKAT LAGUNA VS. COMELEC ET AL.
G.R. No. 148075. February 4, 2002
Facts: On January 30, 2001 then Vice Governor Teresita Lazaro succeeded to the office of the Governor of Laguna when then Gov. Jose Lina was appointed Secretary of the DILG. Upon assumption of office as Governor, Lazaro publicly declared her “intention to run for Governor” in the coming May 2001 elections. Subsequently, she ordered the purchase of trophies, basketballs, volleyballs, chessboard sets, t-shirts, medals and pins, and other sports materials worth P4.5 millions. Gov. Lazaro bidded 79 public works projects on March 28, 2001. Pangkat Laguna, a registered political party, filed a petition for disqualification of Gov. Lazaro for premature campaigning.
Held: 1. The act of Gov. Lazaro in “ordering the purchase of various items and the c onsequent
distribution thereof of Laguna, in line with the lo cal government unit’s sports and education program” is not election campaigning or partisan political activity contemplated and explicitly prescribed under the pertinent provisions of Sec 80 of the Omnibus Election Code. 2. Evidence is wanting to sufficiently establish the allegation that public funds were released, disbursed, or expended during the 45-day prohibitive period provided under the law and implementing rules. Absent such clear and convincing proof, t he factual findings of the
COMELEC cannot be disturbed considering that the COMELEC is the constitutional body tasked to decide, except those involving the r ight to vote, all questions affecting elections. 43. CAASI vs. COMELEC
Facts: Private respondent Merito Miguel was elected as municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan during the local elections of January 18, 1988. His disqualification, however, was sought by herein petitioner, Mateo Caasi, on the ground that under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code private respondent was not qualified because he is a green card holder, hence, a permanent resident of the United States of America, not of Bolinao.
Issues: 1. Whether or not a green card is proof that the holder is a permanent resident of the United States. 2. Whether respondent Miguel had waived his status as a permanent resident of or immigrant to the U.S.A. prior to the local elections on January 18, 1988.
Held: The Supreme Court held that Miguel’s application for immigrant status and permanent residence
in the U.S. and his possession of a green card attesting to such status ar e conclusive proof that he is a permanent resident of the U.S. despite his o ccasional visits to the Philippines. The waiver of such immigrant status should be as indubitable as his application for it. Absent c lear evidence that he made an irrevocable waiver of that status or that he surrendered his green card to t he appropriate U.S. authorities before he ran for mayor of Bolinao in the local election on January 18, 1 988, the Court’s conclusion is that he was disqualified to run for said public office, hence, his election thereto was null and void. 44. PERALTA vs. COMELEC
Facts: Section 4 of the 1978 Election Code provides that the election period shall be fixed by the Commission on Elections in accordance with Section 6, Article XII[C] of the Constitution. The period of campaign shall not be more than forty-five days immediately preceding the election, excluding the day before and the day of the election. Petitioners questioned the constitutionality of the 45-day campaign period because: (a) it was decreed by the President and not by the Commission on Elections as provided by Section 6 of Article XII-C and (b) the period should cover at least ninety days (90). They argue that Section 6 of Article XII-C of the Constitution provides that the election period shall commence ninety days before the day of election and shall end thirty days thereafter.” Issue: Whether or not the 45-day period is unconstitutional Held: The 45-day campaign period is constitutional. Although the campaign period prescribed in the 1978 Election Code for the election of the representatives to the interim Batasang Pambansa is less than
90 days and was decreed by the President and not by the Commission on Elections as provided by Section 6 of Article XII-C of the Constitution, the same does not violate the Constitution, because under Amendment 1, the manner of election of members of the interim Batasang Pambansa shall be prescribed and regulated by law, and the incumbent President under Amendment No. 5, shall continue to exercise legislative power until martial law shall have been lifted. Moreover, the election for members in the interim Batasang Pambansa is an election in a state of emergency requiring special rules, and only the incumbent President has the authority and means of obtaining information on the peace and order condition of the country within which an electoral campaign may be adequately conducted in all regions of the nation. But even assuming that it should be the Commission on Elections that should fix the period of campaign, the constitutional mandate is complied with by the fact that the Commission has adopted and is enforcing the period fixed in Section 4, Article 1, of th e 1978 Election Code. 45. JURILLA vs. COMELEC
Facts: On March 23, 1992, respondent Antonio V. Hernandez filed with the Commission on Elections his certificate of candidacy for one of the contested seats for councilors in the Second District of Quezon City. In Item No. 6 of his certificate he gave as his address “B 26 L 1 New Capitol Estates, Quezon City.” However, he did not indicate in the space provided in Item No. 12 therein his Precinct Number and the particular Barangay where he was a registered voter. His biodata submitted together with his certificate of candidacy gave his address as “Acacia St reet, Mariana, Quezon City,” which is a part of the Fourth District of Quezon City. In other words, his certificate of candidacy and his biodata filed with the COMELEC did not expressly state that he was a registered voter of Quezon City or that he was a resident of the Second District thereof within the purview of Sec. 39, par. (a), of the Local Government Code of 1991.
Issue: Whether or not the failure of a candidate to indicate his Precinct Number and the particular Barangay where he was a registered voter invalidates his certificate of candidacy.
Held: No. It may be gleaned from the provisions of Sec. 39, par. (a), of the Local Government Code of 1991, earlier quoted, that the law does not specifically require that a candidate must state in his certificate of candidacy his Precinct Number and the Barangay where he is registered. Apparently, it is enough that he is actually registered as a voter in the precinct where he intends to vote, which should be within the district where he is running for office. In the case at bar, his failure to state in his certificate of candidacy his Precinct Number is satisfactorily explained by him in that at the time he filed his certificate he was not yet assigned a particular Precinct Number in the Second District of Quezon City. He was formerly a registered voter of Manila, although for the past two (2) years prior to the elections he was already a resident of “B 26, L 1 New Capitol Estates,” admittedly within the Second District of Quezon City
46. Afiado vs COMELEC (G.R. No. 141787 Sep 1, 2000)
When an elective public official was installed in a higher office through succession, a recall against him during his previous elective post is already rendered moot and academic. During the May 11,1998 elections in Santiago City, Joel Miranda won as Mayor while Amelita Navarro won as vicemayor. Miranda was removed from office after it was held that the certificate of candidacy of his father Antonio Abaya (whom Joel substituted) was not valid thus Joel Miranda could not be validly proclaimed as the winner in the mayoralty elections. By virtue of the law on succession, Navarro became the new mayor. On the other hand when she was still a vice-mayor, Navarro was sought to be recalled through a preparatory recall assembly (PRA) Issue: WoN an elective official who became City Mayor by legal succession can be the subject of a recall election by virtue of a Preparatory Recall Assembly Resolution which was passed or adopted when the said elective official was still the Vice-Mayor Held: No, such action is already moot and academic. The assumption by legal succession of the petitioner as the new Mayor of Santiago City is a supervening event which rendered the recall proceeding against her moot and academic. A perusal of the said Resolution reveals that the person subject of the recall process is a specific elective official in relation to her specific office. The said resolution is replete with statements, which leave no doubt that the purpose of the assembly was to recall petitioner as Vice Mayor for her official acts as Vice Mayor. The title itself suggests that the recall is intended for the incumbent Vice Mayor of Santiago City. The third paragraph of the resolution recounted "the official acts of City Vice Mayor Navarro that brought forth the loss of confidence in her capacity and fitness to discharge the duties and to perform the functions of her public office." And because of such acts, the assembly "RESOLVED to invoke the rescission of the electoral mandate of the incumbent City Vice Mayor." Clearly, the intent of the PRA as expressed in the said Resolution is to remove the petitioner as Vice Mayor for they already lost their confidence in her by reason of her official acts as such. To recall, then, the petitioner when she is already the incumbent City Mayor is to deviate from the expressed will of the PRA. Having, thus, succeeded to the position of City Mayor, the petitioner was placed beyond the reach of the effects of the PRA Resolution. Even if the Preparatory Recall Assembly were to reconvene to adopt another resolution for the recall of Amelita Navarro, this time as Mayor of Santiago City, the same would still not prosper in view of Section 74 (b) of the Local Government Code of 1991 which provides that "No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's assumption of office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular election." There is no more allowable time in the light of that law within which to hold recall elections for that purpose. The then Vice-Mayor Amelita S. Navarro assumed office as Mayor of Santiago City on October 11, 1999. One year after her assumption of office as Mayor will be October 11, 2000 which is already within the one (1) year prohibited period immediately preceding the next regular election in May 2001. 47. Latasa vs COMELEC (G.R. No. 154829 Dec 10, 2003)
A mayor for 3 consecutive term of a municipality which became a city in the said mayor’s last term is barred from running in the next preceding election if the said new city has the same territorial jurisdiction when it was still a municipality. Arsenio A. Latasa, was elected mayor of the Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur in the elections of 1992, 1995, and 1998. During petitioner’s third term, the Municipality of Digos was became a component city. On February 28, 2001, petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for city mayor for the May 14, 2001 elections. He stated therein that he is eligible therefor, and likewise disclosed that he had already served for three consecutive terms as mayor of the Municipality of Digos and is now running for the first time for the position of city mayor. On March 1, 2001, private respondent Romeo M. Sunga, also a candidate for city mayor in the said elections, filed before the COMELEC a Petition to Deny Due Course, Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and/ or For Disqualification against petitioner Latasa. Respondent Sunga alleged therein that petitioner falsely represented in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to run as mayor of Digos City since petitioner had already been elected and served for three consecutive terms as mayor from 1992 to 2001. On March 5, 2001, petitioner Latasa filed his Answer, arguing that he did not make any false representation in his certificate of candidacy since he fully disclosed therein that he had served as mayor of the Municipality of Digos for three consecutive terms. Moreover, he argued that this fact does not bar him from filing a certificate of candidacy for the May 14, 2001 elections since this will be the first time that he will be running for the post of city mayor. Issue: WON Latasa is barred from running as mayor of the newly created city of Digos being the mayor of Digos for 3 consecutive term when it was still a municipality. Held: Yes, Latasa is barred from running. An elective local official, therefore, is not barred from running again in for same local government post, unless two conditions concur: 1.) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms to the same local government post, and 2.) that he has fully served three consecutive terms. In the present case, petitioner argued that a city and a municipality have separate and distinct personalities. Thus they cannot be treated as a single entity and must be accorded different treatment consistent with specific provisions of the Local Government Code. He does not deny the fact that he has already served for three consecutive terms as municipal mayor. However, he asserts that when Digos was converted from a municipality to a city, it attained a different juridical personality. Therefore, when he filed his certificate of candidacy for city mayor, he cannot be construed as vying for the same local government post. True, the new city acquired a new corporate existence separate and distinct from that of the municipality. This does not mean, however, that for the purpose of applying the subject Constitutional provision, the office of the municipal mayor would now be construed as a different local government post as that of the office of the city mayor. As stated earlier, the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Digos is the same as that of the municipality. Consequently, the inhabitants of the municipality are the same as those in the city. These inhabitants are the same group of voters who elected petitioner Latasa to be their municipal mayor for three consecutive terms. These are also the same inhabitants over whom he held power and authority
as their chief executive for nine years. The delineation of the metes and bounds of the City of Digos did not change even by an inch the land area previously covered by the Municipality of Digos. The framers of the Constitution specifically included an exception to the people’s freedom to choose those who will govern them in order to avoid the evil of a single person accumulating excessive power over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the same office. To allow petitioner Latasa to vie for the position of city mayor after having served for three consecutive terms as a municipal mayor would obviously defeat the very intent of the framers when they wrote this exception. Should he be allowed another three consecutive terms as mayor of the City of Digos, petitioner would then be possibly holding office as chief executive over the same territorial jurisdiction and inhabitants for a total of eighteen consecutive years. This is the very scenario sought to be avoided by the Constitution, if not abhorred by it. 48. Pena vs HRET (G.R. No. 123037 Mar 21, 1997)
While it is conceded that statutes providing for election contests are to be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public officers may not be defeated by mere technical questions, the rule likewise stands, that in an election protest, the protestant must stand or fall upon the issues he had raised in his original or amended pleading filed prior to the lapse of the statutory period for filing of the protest. Petitioner Pena and the private respondent Abueg were contenders for the said Congressional Office in the May 8, 1995 elections. On May 12, 1995, upon canvassing the votes cast, the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Palawan proclaimed the private respondent as the winner. On May 22, 1995, the instant petition was filed with the HRET. The petition was dismissed by the HRET for the failure of the petition to state a cause of action because it is fatally insufficient in form and substance (for failing to identify specific precincts where alleged widespread election, fraud and irregularities occurred). In its Petition for Certiorari, petitioner argues that the petition was initially defective for failure to specify the contested precincts, said defect was cured when petitioner submitted summary of the contested precincts. Issue: WON the HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to having acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the election protest of petitioner.
Held: No. substantial amendments to the protest may be allowed only within the same period for filing the election protest, which, under Rule 16 of the HRET Rules of Procedure is ten (10) days after the proclamation of the winner. While it is conceded that statutes providing for election contests are to be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public officers may not be defeated by mere technical questions, the rule likewise stands, that in an election protest, the protestant must stand or fall upon the issues he had raised in his original or amended pleading filed prior to the lapse of the statutory period for filing of the protest. Admittedly, the rule is well-established that the power to annul an election should be exercised with the greatest care as it involves the free and fair expression of the popular will. It is only in extreme cases of fraud and under circumstances which
demonstrate to the fullest degree a fundamental and wanton disregard of the law that elections are annulled, and then only when it becomes impossible to take any other step. This is as it should be, for the democratic system is good for the many although abhorred by a few. 49. Mutuc vs COMELEC
FACTS:
The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) prohibited petitioner Amelito Mutuc, a candidate for the position of a delegate to the Constitutional Convention, from using “jingles in his mobile units equipped with sound systems and loud speakers” on 22 October 197 0. Petitioner impugned the act of respondent
as violative of his right to free speech. Respondent however contended that the prohibition was premised on a provision of the Constitutional Convention Act, which made it unlawful for candidates “to purchase, produce, request or distribute sample ballots, or electoral propaganda gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature), flashlights, athletic go ods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, cigarettes, and the like, whether of domestic or foreign origin.” It was its contention that the jingle proposed to be used by petitioner is the recorded or taped voice of a singer and therefore a tangible propaganda material, under the phrase “and the like.”
ISSUE: Whether “jingles” falls down on the prohibited electoral pr opaganda gadgets of R.A. No. 6132.
RULING:
For respondent Commission, the last three words sufficed to justify such an order. We view the matter differently. What was done cannot merit our approval under the well-known principle of ejusdem generis, the general words following any enumeration being applicable only to things of the same kind or class as those specifically referred to. It is quite apparent that what was contemplated in the Act was the distribution of gadgets of the kind referred to as means of inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate responsible for distribution. 50. ARTURO TOLENTINO AND ARTURO MOJICA VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, SENATOR RALPH RECTO AND SENATOR GREGORIO HONASAN G.R. No. 148334. January 21, 2004
Facts: Following the appointment of Senator Teofisto Guingona as Vice-President of the Philippines, the Senate on February 8, 2001 passed Resolution No. 84, calling on COMELEC to fill the vacancy through a
special election to be held simultaneously with the regular elections on May 14, 2001. Twelve senators, with 6-year term each, were due to be elected in that election. The resolution further provides that the “Senatorial candidate garnering the 13th highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr. which ends on June 30, 2004. On June 5, 2001, after canvassing the election results, the COMELEC proclaimed 13 candidates as the elected Senators, with the first 12 Senators to serve the unexpired term of 6 years and the 13th Senator to serve the full term of 3 years of Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr. Gregorio Honasan ranked 13th. Petitioners Arturo Tolentino and Arturo Mojica, as voters and taxpayers, filed the instant petition for prohibition, praying for the nullification of Resolution No. 01-005.
Issue: Whether or not the Special Election held on May 14, 2001 should be nullified: (1) for failure to give notice by the body empowered to and (2) for not following the procedure of filling up the vacancy pursuant to R.A. 6645.
Held: (1) Where the law does not fix the time and place for holding a special election but empowers some authority to fix the time and place after the happening of a condition precedent, the statutory provision on the giving of notice is considered mandatory, and failure to do so will render the election a nullity. The test in determining the validity of a special election in relation to the failure to give notice of the special election is whether want of notice has resulted in misleading a sufficient number of voters as would change the result of special election. If the lack of official notice misled a substantial number of voters who wrongly believed that there was no special election to fill vacancy, a choice by small percentage of voters would be void. (2) There is no basis in the petitioners’ claim that the manner by which the COMELEC conducted the
special Senatorial election on May 14, 2001 is a nullity because the COMELEC failed to document separately the candidates and to canvass separately the votes cast for the special election. No such requirement exists in our election laws. What is mandatory under Section 2 of R.A. 6645 is that t he COMELEC “fix the date of election,” if ne cessary, and state among others, the office/s to be voted for.
Significantly, the method adopted by the COMELEC in conducting the special election on May 14, 2001 merely implemented the procedure specified by the Senate in Resolution No. 84. Initially, the original draft of said resolution as introduced by Senator Francisco Tatad made no mention of the manner by which the seat vacated by former Senator Guingona would be filled. However, upon the suggestion of Senator Raul Roco, the Senate agreed to amend the resolution by providing as it now appears, that “the senatorial cabdidate garnering the 13th highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto Giongona, Jr.”
Extra: NAVARRO VS. COMELEC
GR No. 150799. February 3, 2003 Facts: Petitioner was a candidate for Mayor in the May 14, 2001 elections and during the canvassing, he petitioned the Board of Canvassers (BOC) to exclude the election returns contained in nine (9) ballot boxes on the ground that said boxes were not secured by the required “3 padlocks.” The BOC denied the petition and petitioner appealed to the COMELEC. The COMELEC en ba nc denied the appeal and ordered the BOC to proceed with the canvassing and proclaim the winning local candidates. Petitioner lost in the election. Held: 1. Lack of the required number of padlocks on the ballot boxes is not a proper issue in a preproclamation controversy. The issues that may be raised in a pre-proclamation controversy are enumerated in Sec 243 of the Omnibus Election Code, to wit: a. Illegal composition or proceeding of the board of canvassers; b. The canvassed election returns are incomplete, contain material defects, and appear to be tampered with or falsified, or contain discrepancies in the same returns or in other authentic copies thereof as mentioned in Sections 233, 234, 235, and 236 of this Code; c. The election returns were prepared under duress, threats, coercion, or intimidation, or they are obviously manufactured or not authentic; and d. When substitute or fraudulent returns in controverted polling places were canvassed, the results of which materially affected the standing of the aggrieved candidate or candidates. This enumeration is exclusive. 2. A pre-proclamation controversy is limited to an examination of the election returns on their face and the COMELEC as a general rule need not go beyond the face of the returns and investigate the alleged election irregularities. In the case of Baterina, et al. v. C OMELEC, 205 SCRA 1, the following facts were shown: (a) failure to close the entries with the signatures of the el ection inspectors; (b) lack of inner and outer seals; (c) canvassing by the Board of copies not intended for it; (d) lack of time and date receipt by the Board of the election returns; (e) lack of signatures of petitioners’ watchers; and (f) lack of authority of the person receiving the election returns. It was held that while said facts may, indeed, involve violation of the rules governing the preparation and delivery of election returns for canvassing, they do not necessarily affect the authenticity and genuineness of the subject election returns as to warrant their exclusion from the canvassing. Above facts are clearly defects in form insufficient to support a conclusion that the election returns were tampered with or spurious. 3. The COMELEC en banc validly ordered the proclamation of the winning candidate even during the pendency of the appeal to the COMELEC from the BOC’s denial of the petition for exclusion of the questioned election returns. RA 7166, Sec 20 (I) provides as follows: (i) The BOC shall not proclaim any candidate as winner unless authorized by the Commission after the latter has ruled on the objection brought to it on a ppeal by the losing party. Any proclamation in violation hereof shall be void ab initio, unless the contested returns will not adversely affect the results of the election. Above-quoted provision applies only where the objection deals with a pre-proclamation controversy. IMMUNITY FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY
PREMATURE CAMPAIGNING
Quinto vs Comelec G. R. No. 189698
FACTS: Petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition against the COMELEC for issuing a resolution declaring appointive officials who filed their certificate of candidacy as ipso facto resigned from their positions. In this defense, the COMELEC avers that it only copied the provision from Sec. 13 of R.A. 9369.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said COMELEC resolution was valid.
HELD: NO. In the Fariñas case, the petitioners challenged Sec. 14 of RA. 9006 repealing Sec. 66 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) for giving undue benefit to elective officials in comparison with appointive officials. Incidentally, the Court upheld the substantial distinctions between the two and pronounced that there was no violation of the equal protection clause. However in the present case, the Court held that the discussion on the equal protection clause was an obiter dictum since the issue raised therein was against the repealing clause. It didn’t squarely challenge Sec. 66.
Sec. 13 of RA. 9369 unduly discriminated appointive and elective officials. Applying the 4 requisites of a valid classification, the proviso does not comply with the second requirement – that it must be germane to the purpose of the law. The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a governmental position to promote one’s candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous or coercive influence of the electorate. The measure is further aimed at promoting the efficiency, integrity, and discipline of the public service by eliminating the danger that the discharge of official duty would be motivated by political considerations rather than the welfare of the public. The restriction is also justified by the proposition that the entry of civil servants to the electorate arena, while still in office, could result in neglect or inefficiency in the performance of duty because they would be attending to their campaign rather than to their office work.
Sec. 13 of RA. 9369 pertains to all civil servants holding appointive posts without distinction as to whether they occupy high positions in government or not. Certainly, a utility worker in the government will also be considered as ipso facto resigned once he files his certificate of candidacy for the election.
This scenario is absurd for, indeed, it is unimaginable how he can use his position in the government to wield influence in the political world.
The provision s directed to the activity any and all public offices, whether they be partisan or non partisan in character, whether they be in the national, municipal or barangay level. Congress has not shown a compelling state interest to restrict the fundamental right involved on such a sweeping scale.
Carlos vs Angeles (G.R. No. 142907 Nov 29, 2000)
Even if the candidate receiving the majority votes is ineligible or disqualified, the candidate receiving the next highest number of votes or the second placer, can not be declared elected. Municipal Board of Canvassers, Valenzuela, Metro Manila proclaimed petitioner as the duly elected mayor of Valenzuela having obtained 102,688 votes, the highest number of votes in the election returns. Respondent Antonio M. Serapio who obtained 77,270 votes, the second highest number of votes, filed with the Regional Trial Court, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, an election protest challenging the results. The tr ial court rendered a judgment ruling that the perpetuation of fraud had undoubtedly suppressed the true will of the electorate of Valenzuela and substituted it with the will of the protestee. Notwithstanding the plurality of valid votes in favor of the protestee, the trial court set aside the proclamation of protestee Jose Emmanuel Carlos by the Municipal Board of Canvassers and declared protestant Antonio M. Serapio as the duly elected mayor of Valenzuela City. Issue: WoN the trial court acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion when the court set aside the proclamation of petitioner and declared respondent Serapio as the duly elected mayor of Valenzuela City despite its finding that petitioner garnered 83 ,609 valid votes while respondent obtained 66,602 valid votes, or a winning margin of 17,007 votes. Held: Yes, an election means "the choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote" through the use of the ballot, and the elected officials of which are determined through the will of the electorate. "An election is the embodiment of the popular will, the expression of the sovereign power of the people." Specifically, the term 'election', in the context of the Constitution, may refer to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters, the holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of votes." The winner is the candidate who has obtained a majority or plurality of valid votes cast in the election. "Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who receive the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office. For, in all r epublican forms of government the basic idea is that no one can be declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election." In case of protest, a revision or recount of the ballots cast for the candidates decides the election protest case. The candidate receiving the highest number or plurality of votes shall be proclaimed the winner.
Even if the candidate receiving the majority votes is ineligible or disqualified, the candidate receiving the next highest number of votes or the second placer, cannot be declared elected. "The wreath of victory cannot be transferred from the disqualified winner to the repudiated loser because the law then as now only authorizes a declaration of election in favor of the person who has obtained a plurality of votes and does not entitle a candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected." In other words, "a defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office." Rulloda vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 154198 Jan 20, 2003)
The purpose of election laws which is to give effect to rather than frustrate t he will of the voters. It is a solemn duty to uphold the clear and unmistakable mandate of the people. It is well-settled that in case of doubt, political laws must be so construed as to give life and spirit to the popular mandate freely expressed through the ballot. Romeo N. Rulloda and Remegio L. Placido were the contending candidates for Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas, San Jac into, Pangasinan. On June 22, 2002, Romeo suffered a heart attack and passed away. His widow, petitioner Petronila "Betty" Rulloda, wrote a letter to the Commission on Elections seeking permission to run as candidate for Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas in lieu of her late husband. BoC proclaimed Placido winner despite garnering only 290 votes which is lesser than Rulloda’s 516. Petitioner later found out that COMELEC denied her application to be substitute candidate of her late husband. COMELEC based its decision on its Resolution No. 480 1 declaring there shall be no substitution for barangay and SK elections. Petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari, seeking to annul Section 9 of Resolution No. 4801 and Resolution No. 5217, both of the COMELEC, insofar as they prohibited petitioner from running as substitute candidate in lieu of her deceased husband; to nullify the proclamation of respondent; and to proclaim her as the duly elected Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas, San Jacinto, Pangasinan. Issue: WON Rulloda should be declared the winner and proclaimed as the Barangay Chairman Held: Yes, election means the choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote through the use of the ballot, and the elected officials which are determined through the will of the electorate. An election is the embodiment of the popular will, the expression of the sovereign power of the people. The winner is the candidate who has obtained a majority or plurality of valid votes cast in the election. Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who receive the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office. For, in all republican forms of government the basic idea is that no one can be declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in t he election. Private respondent argues that inasmuch as the barangay election is non-partisan, there can be no substitution because there is no political party from which to designate the substitute. Such an interpretation, aside from being non sequitur, ignores the purpose of election laws which is to give effect to, rather than frustrate, the will of the voters. It is a solemn duty to uphold the clear and unmistakable mandate of the people. It is well-settled that in case of doubt, political laws must be so construed as to give life and spirit to the popular mandate freely expressed through the ballot. Contrary to respondent’s claim, the absence of a specific provision governing substitution of candidates in barangay elections cannot be inferred as a prohibition against said substitution. Such a restrictive construction cannot be read into the law where the same is not
written. Indeed, there is more reason to allow the substitution of candidates where no political parties are involved than when political considerations or party affiliations reign, a fact that must have been subsumed by law. Marquez v. COMELEC
Facts: Marquez, a candidate for an elective position in Quezon Province during t he 1998 elections, filed a petition praying for the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of Rodriguez on the ground of disqualification under section 40 of the Local Government Code (Section 40. Disqualification. The following persons are disqualified from running for any local elective position… (e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad.) Rodriguez is allegedly criminally charged with insurance fraud in the United States and that his arrest is yet to be served because of his flight from the country. The COMELEC dismissed Marquez’s Petition. Rodriguez was proclaimed the Governor -elect of Quezon.
Issues: WON Rodriguez, at the time of filing his certificate of candidacy, is said to be a fugitive from justice as provided for in section 40 of the Local Government Code.
Held: a Fugitive from justice• does not mean a person convicted by final judgment. It includes those who after being charged flee to avoid prosecution. The COMELEC is directed to proceed and settle the case in conformity of the given clarification with the term fugitive from justice•. Soller v. COMELEC
G.R. NO. 139853
FACTS Petitioner and private respondent (Saulong) were both candidates for m ayor of the municipality of Bansud, Oriental Mindoro in the May 11, 1998 elections. The petitioner was proclaimed as mayor by the municipal board of canvassers. Private respondent filed a petition with the COMELEC to annul the proclamation. Later, private respondent filed an election protest against petitioner with the RTC. The COMELEC dismissed the pre-proclamation case filed by private respondent, while the RTC denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but said motion was denied. Petitioner then filed with the COMELEC a petition for certiorari contending that respondent RTC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in not dismissing private respondent’s election protest. The COMELEC en banc dismissed petitioner’s suit. Petitioner now questions this decision of the COMELEC en banc. ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC has the authority to decide on the case.
HELD The SC has ruled in previous cases that the COMELEC, sitting en banc, does not have the requisite authority to hear and decide election cases including pre-proclamation controversies in the first instance. This power pertains to the divisions of the Commission. Any decision by the Commission en banc as regards election cases decided by it in the first instance is null and void. In the SC’s view, the authority to resolve petition for certiorari involving incidental issues of election protest, like the questioned order of the trial court, falls within the division of the COMELEC and not on the COMELEC en banc. AQUINO vs. COMELEC
(248 SCRA 400)
FACTS
On 20 March 1995, Agapito A. Aquino filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative for the new Second Legislative District of Makati City. In his certificate of candidacy, Aquino stated that he was a resident of the aforementioned district for 10 months. Faced with a petition for disqualification, he amended the entry on his residency in his certificate of candidacy to 1 year and 13 days. The Commission on Elections dismissed the petition on 6 May and allowed Aquino to run in the election of 8 May. Aquino won. Acting on a motion for reconsideration of the above dismissal, the Commission on Election later issued an or der suspending the proclamation of Aquino until the Commission resolved the issue. On 2 June, the Commission on Elections found Aquino ineligible and disqualified for the elective office for lack of constitutional qualification of residence.
ISSUE
Whether “residency” in the certificate of candidacy actually connotes “domicile” to warrant the
disqualification of Aquino from the position in the electoral district.
HELD
The place “where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home,” where he, no matter
where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election law. The purpose is to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and needs of the community from taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that community for electoral gain. Aquino’s certificate of candidacy in a previous (1992) elect ion indicates that he was a resident and a registered voter of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac for more than 52 years prior to that election. Aquino’s
connection to the Second District of Makati City is an alleged lease agreement of a condominium unit in the area. The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one. The short length of time he claims to be a resident of Makati (and the fact of his stated domicile in Tarlac and his claims of other residences in Metro Manila) indicate that his sole purpose in transferring his physical residence is not to acquire a new, residence or domicile but only to qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City. Aquino was thus rightfully disqualified by the Commission on Elections. TONY L. BENWAREN vs COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EDWIN CRISOLOGO
G.R. No. 169393
Facts Petitioner Tony L. Benwaren and private respondent Edwin Crisologo were candidates for the position of Municipal Mayor of the Municipality of Tineg, Abra in the May 2004 elections. During the canvass of the election return of Precinct No. 16A, counsel for petitioner objected to the inclusion of the election return on the ground that the same was allegedly prepared under duress, force or intimidation, or was prepared by persons other than the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) concerned. The MBC deferred the proclamation of the winning candidate for the position of Municipal Mayor because it contended that the contested election return from Precinct No. 16A would affect the result of the election for the position. To speedily settle and put an end to the controversy reconstitution of the MBC with new members, to, among others, determine if the identity and integrity of the said ballot box and the ballots contained therein were not violated; and, proceed to recount the votes of the candidates affected and prepare a new election return for the said precinct; and then canvass the said return and proclaim the winning candidate/s; or During the examination of the election return, the MBC found that the integrity of the ballot box was violated as it was left unattended and was never delivered to its proper custodian. The ballots were not also placed in properly sealed or placed in enveloped prepared by Comelec.
The New MBC proclaimed private respondent Crisologo as the duly elected mayor of Tineg, Abra based on the results of the remaining uncontested election returns. Due to the unfavorable result, Benwaren filed a Petition to Annul Proclamation or to Suspend the Effects Thereof and Petition to Declare Illegal [the] Proceedings of the New Board of Canvassers of Tineg, Abra. In a Resolution dated February 18, 2005, t he COMELEC First Division dismissed the petition for lack of merit, declaring the New MBC was specifically mandated by it to determine whether the identity and integrity of the ballot box for Precinct No. 16A and its ballots were violated. Thus, it held that the matter was left to the sound discretion of the members of the New MBC, which complied with its order. It added that the New MBC is presumed to have regularly performed its official duty absent a strong proof to the contrary by petitioner. Petitioner filed a a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court.
Issues: 1. Whether or not COMELEC gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it affirmed the ruling of the New MBC that the integrity of the ballot box for Precinct No. 16A, Barangay Lanec, Tineg, Abra, and its contents had been violated. 2. Whether or not COMELEC gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it illegally proclaimed private respondent Crisologo based on incomplete canvass of votes. 3. Whether or not COMELEC en banc Resolution dated August 31, 2005 was illegally promulgated since former Commissioners Virgilio O. Garcillano and Manuel A. Barcelona, Jr. were no longer members of the COMELEC at the time of promulgation. Ruling: 1. No, there was no abuse of discretion on the part of Comelec. The COMELEC First Division specifically mandated the New MBC to determine whether the identity and integrity of the ballot box of Precinct No. 16A and its ballots were violated. After convening for that purpose, the New MBC found that the integrity of the ballot box of Precinct No. 16A and its contents was violated and it issued a Ruling accordingly. The COMELEC upheld the factual finding of the New MBC and declared that the New MBC is presumed to have regularly performed its official duty absent any proof to the contrary by petitioner. The factual findings of administrative agencies which have acquired expertise in their field are generally binding and conclusive on the courts in the absence of grave abuse and none has been shown in this case.
2.
No, there was no abuse of discretion on the part of Comelec. The COMELEC ruled that based on
Section 20 (i) of Republic Act No. 7166, earlier cited, the proclamation of private respondent Crisologo was proper because the contested returns would not adversely affect the results of the election. If the votes in Precinct No. 8A as reflected on the contested return are added to their votes in the uncontested precincts, the result would be 918 as against 924, in favor of private respondent Crisologo who still emerges the winner by a margin of six (6) votes.
3.
No, there was no abuse of discretion on the part of Comelec. A decision becomes binding only
after it is validly promulgated. Consequently, if at the time of the promulgation of a decision or resolution, a member of the collegiate court who had earlier signed or registered his vote has vacated his office, his vote is automatically withdrawn or cancelled. However, the Resolution, in this case, remains valid because it is still supported by a majority of the COMELEC en banc. Mercado vs Manzano
Facts: Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Private respondent Eduardo Manzano are candidates for the position of Vice-Mayor of Makati City in the May, 1998 elections. Private respondent was the winner of the said election but the proclamation was suspended due to the petition of Ernesto Mamaril regarding t he citizenship of private respondent. Mamaril alleged that the private respondent is not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States. COMELEC granted the petition and disqualified the private respondent for being a dual citizen, pursuant to the Local Government code that provides that persons who possess dual citizenship are disqualified from running any public position. Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration which remained pending until after election. Petitioner sought to intervene in the case for disqualification. COMELEC reversed the decision and declared private respondent qualified to run for the position. Pursuant to the ruling of the COMELEC, the board of canvassers proclaimed private respondent as vice mayor. This petition sought the reversal of the resolution of the COMELEC and to declare the private respondent disqualified to hold the office of the vice mayor of Makati.
Issue: Whether or Not private respondent is qualified to hold office as Vice-Mayor.
